

NOTA
Van: KA-R.A.
Aan: Hoofd C
No. E. 892.

*Cm of of Bork en co heeft
in PD 1593*

ONDERWERP: Communistische activiteit in andere delen
der wereld.

U gelieve hierbij aan te treffen een aantal rapporten
betreffend bovengenoemd onderwerp, die SARDINE ons
deed toekomen.

U kunt ze behouden.

29-11-50, H

BIJLAGE: 9 rapporten. (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, L)

~~HA~~
~~BE~~
~~B~~
~~B~~ 17/11/51

~~HC~~
~~C~~
~~C~~
~~C~~
~~CVVI~~

th
47-11-50
Gesamen KARRA
account. *14/6*
KARRA
Het zal bij B een op prijs gesteld
worden wanneer dergelijke rapporten
i.s.m. de actualiteit en de mogelijkheden
van verlichting met de C.M. voortaan met
welken aan B ter kennisgeving konden
worden worden.
19.5.51

B t. k m. ~~19/11/51~~

C

YUGOSLAVIA

POLITICAL

Agreement between the State and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The following report comes from a new and untried source, from informants in the Serbian Orthodox Church.

1. It is reported that an Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Serbian Orthodox Church will shortly be announced.
2. Under this agreement, the recently elected Patriarch Vikentije Prodanev will guarantee that all bishops who have been absent from their dioceses for six months or more will be relieved of their offices.
3. In return, the State will agree to permit religious instruction to be given again in the schools. It will also make itself responsible for the salaries of priests, and for the pensions payable to priests' widows.

The attached report comes from a regular source who has contacts in the Croatian Communist Party.

D

Expulsions from the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In September 1950 three members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, - Rade Zigic, Dusan Brkic, Stanko Canica-Opacic, and a certain Bogoljub Repajic, editor of "Srpska Rijec", - were arrested by the police, charged with pro-Cominform activities and economic sabotage and expelled from the C.P. of Croatia.
2. Rade Zigic was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P.J. and of Croatia. Born in Lika, he joined the Communist Party at an early age before the war. Until he joined the Partisans in 1941, he earned his living as a commercial traveller. During the war he filled various political appointments, ending up as Political Commissar of the II Yugoslav Army. After the war, he was appointed Minister of Heavy Industries in the Republic of Croatia. During the reorganisation of Industry and Administration which was initiated in Croatia in 1950, he was appointed President of the Council of Industry.
3. Dusan Brkic, born in Dalmatia, was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P.J. and of the C.P. of Croatia. A lawyer by profession, he filled during the war various politico-military appointments in Slavonia. After the war, he became Minister of Justice of the Republic of Croatia, and later Vice President of Croatia and President of the Legislative Council. Prior to the reorganisation of Croatian Industry in 1950 and the creation of a Croatian Council of Industry, Brkic, in his capacity as Vice President of Croatia, was responsible for industrial policy in Croatia.
4. Stanko Canica-Opacic was a member of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia. Born in Kordun of peasant stock, he is alleged to have been a member of the S.D.S. and J.R.S. (Serb democratic parties) before the war. He joined the Partisans in 1941 and after the war became Minister of Building and later Minister of Forests and the Timber Industry in Croatia. A man of little culture and education.
5. Bogoljub Repajic held no Communist Party appointments. Born in Lika, he worked as a journalist in Zagreb before the war. After the war, he became Secretary of the Serb Club in Zagreb and editor of "Srpska Rijec" ("The Serb Word") published in Zagreb. A great lover of wine and Women.
6. Although, through the agency of the cell committees, the members of the C.P. of Croatia had been warned beforehand to prepare the public for the impending expulsion from the Party of the above named, the warning came too late, and the public was taken completely by surprise.

B. THE CASE AGAINST ZIGIC AND HIS ASSOCIATES.

7. The case of the C.P. of Croatia against Zigic, Brkic and Canica-Opacic may be considered under the following headings:-
 - (a) That they were Cominformists in that they praised Stalin and the U.S.S.R. after the Cominform resolution against the C.P.J.
 - (b) That, as Cominformists, they had attempted to sabotage Croatia's economy.
 - (c) That, as Cominformists, they had attempted to destroy the unity of the C.P. of Croatia and C.P.J. by pursuing a policy of Serb Chauvinism.
8. (a) In a speech to the Croatian parliament on 11th September 1950, Bokaric (Prime Minister of Croatia) claimed that Zigic and his associates had supported the Cominform resolution against the C.P.J. ever

since it had been passed in 1948, and that proof of this lay in a speech Zigic made in November 1949 at the Zagreb Theatre before a gathering of the Party hierarchy, in honour of the October Revolution. In this speech, made at a time when the Tito-Cominform quarrel was at its height, he went out of his way to praise the U.S.S.R. and hail Stalin as an "infallible genius".

(b) According to well informed sources in the C.P. of Croatia, Bakaric suspected Zigic and his associates of pro-Cominform leanings long before Zigic's panegyric of Stalin in November 1949. As a matter of fact, Zigic was chosen to speak in honour of the October Revolution with the express object of finding out exactly what he thought of Stalin and Stalinism.

(c) Another fact which finally persuaded Bakaric that Zigic and his associates were in sympathy with the U.S.S.R. and Stalin was their attitude to the Korean war. According to well informed sources in the C.P. of Croatia, Bakaric had found out that Zigic and his associates had confided to their most intimate friends that they were opposed to Yugoslavia's policy on the Korean problem, that they approved Gromyko's declaration of policy and Russia's obstructionist tactics in the U.N.O., that they considered North Korea's attack on South Korea as one of the main moves to drive capitalist-imperialism out of Asia, that they were convinced that Russia would liberate Europe after she had dealt with Asia, and that they regarded the Red Army as the most powerful army in the world, -an army which could beat the Yugoslav Armh and conquer Yugoslavia in a few days.

9. (a) In his speech at an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia, held on 10th September 1950, Bakaric described how Zigic and Brkic had attempted to sabotage Croatia's economy. He gave details of how Zigic had defied the orders of the Federal Planning Commission to concentrate the resources of the Republic in building up the heavy industries and had, instead, permitted the Republic's raw materials and resources to be squandered not only on building up local industries of secondary importance, particularly in the Serb districts of Croatia, but also on manufacturing quality goods in small quantities instead of cheap goods in big quantities. As a result of this policy, progress on the heavy industries in Croatia had been very seriously hampered and in Croatia there was a greater shortage of consumer goods than in any other Republic of the F.N.R.J. Thus, for example, work on the Vinodol power station and the Sisak steel plant was very much behind schedule, and great difficulty had been found in redeeming the "robni bonovi" (coupons given to peasants in exchange for food which permit them to buy manufactured goods at greatly reduced prices).

(b) In addition, Zigic had deceived Boris Kidric and the Federal Planning Commission. In April/May 1950, Belgrade issued orders to all Republics to suspend work on all industrial projects except major one of Federal importance. At the same time, Boris Kidric invited Zigic to Belgrade and asked him to explain why the general level of industrial production in Croatia was so low, and why progress in the heavy industries was so slow. Instead of telling the truth, and admitting that he had distributed Croatia's raw materials so badly, Zigic placed the whole blame for the serious state of Croatia's economy on an overall shortage of raw materials and skilled labour, and hinted that if Kidric and Tito gave up some of their "grandiose" ideas about building new heavy industries, Yugoslavia's economy, and Croatia's in particular, would soon improve.

(c) Zigic had moreover consistently opposed Yugoslavia's export policy which provided for the export of goods, particularly timber, at a price well below production cost. Quite obviously, Zigic did not realise - or did not want to realise - that Yugoslavia had to export at competitive prices if she was to import the capital

equipment she needed for the 5-Year Plan. Zigic's attitude was merely another sign of his opposition to the 5-Year Plan and to the building up of heavy industries in Yugoslavia.

10. (a) For economic, political and national reasons, the C.P.J. has always sought to preserve friendly relations between the various national groups in Yugoslavia. It was this policy which very largely contributed to the success of the Partisan movement during the war and which brought the C.P.J. to power.

(b) The Central Committee of the C.P.J. is very conscious of the fact that any attempt to revive the latent hatred that exists between the Serbs and Croats may well have a disastrous effect on the relations between the C.P. of Croatia and that of Serbia, may lead to the disintegration of the C.P.J. and, worst of all, may tempt many members of the C.P. of Serbia to seek support from Serbia's traditional ally, Russia, or - in other words - to turn towards the U.S.S.R. and the Cominform. For these reasons Tito has consistently emphasised that any attempt to stir up hatred between one national group and another will be ruthlessly suppressed.

(c) The history of Tito's fight against Zigic's Serb chauvinist tendencies goes back to 1941, if not earlier. In 1941, Rade Koncar, the Political Secretary of the C.P. of Croatia was shot by the Italians at Sibenik and succeeded by the Organisation Secretary of the Party, Hebrang. Later, in the same year, Hebrang called a meeting of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia at Lika which Zigic attended. The meeting was marked by a very violent quarrel between Hebrang and Zigic which clearly revealed that they represented respectively the Croat and Serb chauvinist wings of the C.P. of Croatia. Hebrang accused the Serbs in Croatia of collaborating with the Cetniks and letting down the Partisan movement, and Zigic accused Hebrang of throwing the Serbs into the arms of the Cetniks by pursuing a policy of outrageous Croat chauvinism. The result of this quarrel was that the Partisan Movement stagnated, so much so that Tito published an open letter in which he condemned the chauvinist tendencies in the C.P. of Croatia as being responsible for the poor progress of the Partisan Movement in Croatia. The situation changed but little until Hebrang was arrested by the Ustashe in Zagreb in the first half of 1942, and Bakaric succeeded him as Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia. Bakaric admonished Zigic, abandoned the chauvinist policy pursued by Hebrang and, by working for friendly relations between the Croats and Serbs, succeeded in developing the Partisan Movement into a very powerful political and military force.

(d) Because Bakaric was well aware of the dangers of Serb chauvinism in the C.P. of Croatia, he went out of his way after the war to please the Serb wing in the Croatian Party. In relation to the size of their respective populations, he appointed a far greater proportion of Serbs than Croats in the highest positions of the Croatian administration and the Communist Party.

(e) Nevertheless, Zigic and his associates remained unsatisfied, and deliberately pursued a policy calculated to stir up hatred between the Croats and Serb minority in Croatia. They claimed that the C.P. of Croatia did not respect the rights of the Serb minority in Croatia and discriminated economically and politically against them. Because Zigic and his associates obtained little support for their policy from the Serb members of the Croatian C.P. and the Croatian mass organisations, and still less from the strongly pro-Tito Serb-Orthodox church led by the patriarch Vikentije Brodanov, they turned to the Serb peasant minority in Croatia.

(f) From time to time they visited the districts which they represented in Parliament - Serb districts which included Titovo Korenica, Udbina, Podravska Slatina, Sl. Pozega, etc., - and openly

sympathised with the peasants' complaints against the forced sale of crops to the Government. In public speeches which they made in these districts, they condemned the forced sale of crops in the Serb districts of Croatia on the grounds that during the war these districts had been devastated by the Ustashe and had not been rehabilitated since the war in the same measure as the purely Croat areas of Croatia. They claimed that the inhabitants of the Serb districts of Croatia should be exempt from "voluntary labour" and from the operation of the laws affecting mobilisation and direction of labour because these districts had suffered so much during the war both in the way of property and manpower. So far as the "kolhos" or state cooperative farms were concerned, they pressed for better terms for the peasants; instead of the peasant being allowed to retain his house, half a hectare of land and livestock sufficient to meet the immediate needs of his family and not exceeding 1 cow, 5 sheep, 2 pigs, etc., they demanded that the peasant be allowed to retain, as his own inalienable property, 1 house, 5 hectares of land, 5 cows, 30 sheep, and as many pigs as he wanted.

(g) The extent of Brkic's pro-Serb chauvinistic feelings may be judged by the following incident which took place in June 1950. Brkic, in his capacity as Director and Supervisor of the construction of Armament Factories in Croatia, visited the new Armament Factory under construction at Samobor/Bregana, and among other things asked the colonel in charge of construction why he was building so many wooden huts for "these Croat swine", as he described the Croat workers, and suggested that they should sleep in the woods. This remark made by a prominent member of the Central Committee of the Croatian C.P. made a deep impression.

C. CONCLUSION.

11. Once Zigic and his associates had been expelled from the Party, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia did not find it very difficult to take advantage of the widespread anti-Cominform feeling in the country in order to interpret their actions as part of a widespread Russian/Cominform plot to destroy Yugoslavia's economic, political and national unity. Zigic and Brkic were blamed for the slow development and poor results of Croatia's economy and taking advantage of the deep hatred that exists between the independent peasants and the urban and industrial proletariat, Zigic's defence of the Serb peasant was interpreted not only as a defence of a greedy capitalist class that exploited the proletariat by selling agricultural produce at exorbitant prices, but also as an attempt to foster Serb chauvinism and destroy national unity. In short, Zigic and his associates were branded as Cominformists, and because the C.P. of Croatia published ample details of the affair and satisfied popular curiosity, the public - which is overwhelmingly anti-Cominform - soon lost interest in them.

12. Though the general public may have lost interest in Zigic and his accomplices, it does not necessarily follow that the Party has done so. Two questions inevitably arise:-

(a) Why did the C.P. of Croatia permit Zigic and Brkic to retain their key positions in the Party and in the Republic's economy, if it knew all along that they were Cominformists.

(b) If the C.P. of Croatia really believes that Zigic and Brkic were Cominform agents, is it seriously worried about the possibility of there being other Cominform agents in key positions, and what steps does it propose to take to liquidate them.

13. The answer to the first question is that there is absolutely no documentary or concrete evidence that Zigic and his associates were ever Cominform agents. Bakeric, who knows Zigic well, is convinced that, although Zigic was definitely pursuing a policy calculated to favour the Cominform, he did so out of motives of Serb nationalism, a

nationalism which blinded him to the Party line and which inevitably led him to regard the U.S.S.R. as Serbia's traditional ally, regardless of the fact that she was also the Head of the Cominform. The reasons therefore why Bakoric allowed Zigic, Brkic and Conica-Opacic to retain their key positions in the Party are because he considered them "deviationists", not Cominformists, who had "misunderstood" the Party line, but who would sooner or later see reason and return to it; because he wished to avoid giving the impression that the C.P. of Croatia was discriminating against the Serb elements in the Party, and because he desired, if possible, to avoid a public scandal which would reveal internal disunity in the Party and would only provide the Cominform with additional propaganda ammunition. Bakoric decided to expel them when he realised that they were not prepared to modify their chauvinist views, and that, in pursuance of these views, they had reached a point when they might risk seeking contact with the U.S.S.R. and the Cominform.

14. The answer to the second question is that the Central Committee of the C.P. of Croatia does not believe Zigic and his associates were Cominformist agents in touch with the Cominform, nor is it particularly worried about the possibility of there being other Cominform agents in key positions. The Central Committee had in fact been aware of Zigic's views since its celebrated meeting in 1941 under Hebrang's presidency.