

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

Dutch Intelligence -
Towards a Qualitative Framework for Analysis

*With Case Studies on The Shipping Research Bureau
and the National Security Service (BVD)*

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de
Rechtsgeleerdheid
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
op gezag van de
Rector Magnificus, dr. F. Zwarts,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag 27 oktober 2005
om 16.15 uur

door

Guillaume Gustav de Valk
geboren op 4 maart 1961
te Rotterdam

Promotores: Prof. dr. M. Herweijer

Prof. dr. A.B. Hoogenboom

Beoordelingscommissie: Prof. mr. L.J.A. Damen

Prof. dr. A.B. Ringeling

Prof. dr. M.S. de Vries

Dr. H.B. Winter

ISBN: 90-5454-625-5



Acknowledgments

While conducting research in the various archives and libraries, I benefited from the helpful advice and assistance of many librarians, curators, and archivists. I want to thank the staffs of the archives and libraries at the University of Groningen, the University of Amsterdam, the VU Amsterdam, Harvard University (USA), the National Archives (USA), the National Security Archives (USA), the Archive at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the Archive at the Dutch Embassy in Pretoria (South Africa), the Archive at the Shipping Research Bureau, the Freedom of Information Act Department at the BVD/AIVD, and at a series of private archives of which material was sometimes handed over on the basis of anonymity.

During my US-travel to visit archives and libraries I was glad to be able to stay with Ruud Janssens. Ruud Janssens and Andries Hoogerwerf were also helpful to stimulate my research when things were not going that straight-forward.

I especially want to thank those who read and commented on my writing. Richard Hengeveld read and criticized in detail all the chapters on the Shipping Research Bureau. Ad de Jonge, Dick Engelen, and Peter Keller read the chapters on the BVD and made valuable suggestions. Penny Lancaster corrected my English (the author is still responsible for the translation) and Ping Cleton translated Appendix 2. Henne Korff de Gidts offered additional comments.

I want to thank Michiel Herweijer and Bob Hoogenboom, my academic advisors, who read and commented on the manuscript during its various stages. I would also like to thank Michiel Herweijer for his guidance throughout this project and the faith he expressed in it.

I want to thank Jaap Hoogendam who was my employer for many years and who organized the work scheme in a way I could optimally carry out my research and travels. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my wife Anke de Jong and my parents Guill de Valk and Ricki de Valk-Pillhofer who supported me financially and morally.

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1 Introduction

What is the quality of intelligence and security agency reports that politicians, corporate business and NGO's (Non Governmental Organizations) have to work with? This question is largely unanswered. The reason being, for a large part, is that intelligence is a recently developing discipline. This does not mean that nothing is written about it. Especially during the past decades, there has been almost an incredible growth of publications.¹ Both scientists and practitioners have published intelligence articles, or raised sites on the internet. Also within the wider public context, intelligence has been renewed and has received increased attention, because of the events of 9/11 and the current conflict in Iraq. A key development, within the Dutch context, is that intelligence is becoming more integrated into the European intelligence network. This is largely because of the issues at hand and because of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993).² Intelligence is likely to have a more central place in the discussion on security issues. This calls for a further professionalization of intelligence. In this need for professionalization, it is important to consider the quality of intelligence and security agency reports, because of their central place in and influence on the (political) decision making process.

There is a great need of quality assessment in the intelligence branch. We have to look to methodology to inform such an examination. This examination needs to be constructed in such a way that quality can be assessed without waiting to see if reports are accurate. In other words, what is needed is an ex ante instrument to assess the quality of intelligence and security agency reports.

An ex ante instrument differs from the daily practice that usually takes place in the intelligence community. Until now, the issue of the accuracy of reports has been mainly limited to incidents, such as disasters like Pearl Harbor and 9/11. If you look at evaluations of such disasters, the focus of attention is on post mortem analyses. The disadvantage of this approach is that such improvements are more based on learning processes of incidents and the dubious perceptions by post mortem analyses, than on criteria that are more objective.³ In post mortem

¹ From 1975 onwards, there is also more attention for issues as intelligence analysis (Lowenthal, "The Intelligence Library," *Intelligence and National Security*, April 1987, 371)

² The third pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) encompasses issues such as the maintenance of the public order (Pouw, *Naar een 'Europees binnenlands veiligheidsbeleid'* 1995, 145-155).

³ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 13, page 4 of 7. See also: Blight & Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and Intelligence Performance," *Intelligence and National Security*, Autumn 1998, 189-191.

In Dutch publications on intelligence generally two approaches are dominant – the descriptive approach (insiders such as Engelen, Jensen & Platje, and Hengeveld & Rodenburg; and outsiders such as De Graaff, Kluiters, and Wiebes) and the critical approach (Van Meurs and Vleugels – and watchdog comities like the Utrecht-based Amok, the Amsterdam-based Buro Jansen & Janssen, and the Nijmegen-based Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten OBIV/SIP). Some studies are known to beyond describing and try to develop the discipline of intelligence studies, such as the publication on *Peacekeeping Intelligence* (De Jong, Platje & Steele). Yet, none is on ex ante assessment of quality.

analyses, you look back, knowing the outcome of the danger evaluated. The question, *what is good intelligence* is scarcely answered. Unfortunately, good intelligence is merely understood by a feeling that a warning should have been given in a certain instance, rather than underlying objective criteria that measures the quality of the report. In short, what are lacking are norms that reports have to meet. Such a gap may affect the effectiveness to cope with dangers, threats, and risks.

However, before we can apply an ex ante instrument of intelligence assessment we have to make sure that the evaluations based on this ex ante assessment make sense. To develop such a relevant quality assessment, two fields of literature are of interest. First, it is necessary to pay attention to what is written on this issue by intelligence practitioners – what does the intelligence community discuss concerning the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. Second, attention needs to be paid to the literature on methodology. Together, these two fields can provide norms – or criteria – that intelligence and security agency reports have to meet.

Insights concerning which factors contribute to a high or a low quality of a report. To trace such factors, case studies can serve as a source of information. To contribute to the thinking on producing high quality intelligence and security agency reports, the following research question has been developed.

Central research question

The purpose of this study is to support the process of professionalization of intelligence. It is aimed at contributing to the process of moving towards a qualitative framework for analysis. Concerning the quality of intelligence and security agency reports, this need – as indicated – concerns two issues. First, there is a need to develop an instrument for an ex ante quality assessment of intelligence and security agency reports. Second, there is a need to identify factors of influence on the quality of reports. These aims lead then to the following central research question of this study:

How can the quality of intelligence and security agency reports be measured, what factors influence the quality of a report, and how can high quality reports be achieved?

The initial impetus of this research began as early as 1993 as a result of studying a BVD-report.⁴ The initial aim was to learn how to produce intelligence and security agency reports. During this process, a fundamental nature was shown to be lacking. There was no analytical framework to assess or to evaluate intelligence and security agency reports. Furthermore, there arose also a need to identify factors that

⁴ This resulted in the publication of a pilot study: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996. In this pilot, some insights were given on the quality of a BVD-report. Yet, the lack of a framework meant that it was not possible to test to quality against criteria.

influence the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. During the research process, these two issues gradually became the prime focus of the study.

How to investigate the research question?

The first issue of the central research question is to develop an *ex ante* instrument that can assess the quality of an intelligence and security agency report. To develop such an instrument, first notice has to be taken of what is specific about intelligence and security agency reports. Analysis of the main types of intelligence and security agency reports needs to be undertaken to understand what they are, to identify their characteristics, and to conceptualize what demands are expected in each type of intelligence research. This arrangement of types of intelligence and security agency reports is informed by a literature search into the fields of methodology, the practice of research by professionals, and intelligence. Literature on methodology informs the general insights for each type of intelligence research. The literature on the practice of professionals makes clear what specific demands are met by professionals in research and what is specific compared with science. The literature on intelligence will supply insight in the types of intelligence and security agency reports, and the specific problems and demands of intelligence research.

Criteria will be developed concerning the main characteristics and demands of each type of intelligence research. This implies that an *ex ante* instrument is construed in such a way that the quality of reports can be evaluated, even when crucial intelligence is absent, or if the outcome of a danger is not known. In short, a literature search into the mentioned fields is carried out to develop an *ex ante* instrument fit for an assessment of the quality of intelligence and security agency reports.

Later in the research – in case studies – the quality of certain reports is assessed by using this *ex ante* instrument. As the selected reports are mostly from the 1980's, the quality assessment may be open to criticism that some *ex post* elements will also be included.⁵

The second issue of the central research question is to identify factors that contribute to a high or a low quality report. Although an implicit assumption of this study is that the quality of reports will be higher when established methods are used better – this assumption is necessary in formulating criteria for an *ex ante* instrument – this does not exclude that other factors may play a role. To analyze factors that may contribute to a high or a low quality of a report, case studies will be carried out. As this study is written for the Dutch context, Dutch agencies have been chosen for this investigation. To cover a broad scope of reports, two Dutch organizations, that differ as much as possible, have been selected. This may lead to extra insights than if more of the same are investigated. Therefore, the large and

⁵ To check the accuracy of data presented, sometimes information is included that was only made open as late as the 1990's. This happens, for example, in the SRB-case, when information from South African sources is discussed. Yet, as in this case, it also concerns documents that as such preceded the intelligence and security agency report in question. Concerning interviews, some *ex post* elements may be included.

public BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst) and the small, private, and non-profit Shipping Research Bureau (SRB) have been selected for investigation.

This study attempts to identify factors that may lead to a high or a low quality report. To trace such factors, this part of the study will be of an exploratory nature. As there will be many variables present, with only a limited number of cases, the factors cannot be identified through statistical manipulation. Instead, analytical generalizations will be used. Therefore not only causal explanations based on the findings of the cases will be used – including within-case and cross case analysis – but also of hypothetical expectations from the literature on methodology and intelligence.

To identify more precisely factors that are of influence on the quality of reports, hypotheses are developed throughout the first four chapters of this study. These hypotheses are focused issues on which there is insufficient information in the literature, or on which there are ambivalent opinions. The hypotheses are on the relationship between quality and political and diplomatic feedback, quality and the release of reports, and quality and deception by an opponent.

Sources

For the case studies – to serve their different functions – a wide variety of sources are consulted. Interviews are held with (former) staff members and employees of the BVD and the SRB, in addition to people connected to related groups and organizations or those named in reports. Use is made of different types of archives, literature from different fields, and open sources, such as the internet, publications and media broadcasts. For the literature on intelligence, both scientific publications as well as literature from within the agencies themselves are used. The sources consulted are in English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, and Afrikaans. Sources in Russian or Chinese (of relevance for some BVD-reports) are not consulted, by a lack of knowledge of these languages.

There are several limitations in analyzing intelligence and security agency reports. All the selected reports are pre 1990. To avoid juridical complications and to avoid endangering security, reports from before 1990 are a better option than those of a later date. Furthermore, requests under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act are time-consuming. Many BVD-documents quoted in this study took at least a year – and some more than five years – to be released. Concerning the BVD case, thousands of pages can be consulted, but only a very limited number of *complete* reports are available.

This study will not give an overall picture of the state of affairs of Dutch intelligence and security agency reports. This is not the purpose of this study. The aim is not a descriptive generalization of the quality of SRB- or BVD-reports. As noted before, the aim is to identify, through analysis, which factors influence the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. Knowledge of these factors will be very useful, if we want to improve our intelligence performance in the near future.

The success of this study depends on the findings in three fields. First, the criteria must have a discriminating capacity concerning the quality of reports. Second, if a causal argument is made on factors of influence on the quality of a report, it must also indicate the degree of probability this causal connection is. Third, this study has to lead to recommendations (the third part of the central research question).

Composition of the study

To answer the central research question, this study is composed of three parts. In the first part, the concepts of intelligence and analysis are discussed and an ex ante instrument is developed to assess the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. In the second part, two cases are presented – one on the SRB and one on the BVD. In the third part, factors of influence on the quality of reports are discussed and recommendations are presented.

The first part of the study is composed of chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5. In chapter 2, an introduction to intelligence is presented. It outlines what the main characteristics of intelligence are, and provides an overview of the field – in particular on aspects that are relevant to producing reports.

In chapter 3, three main types of intelligence and security agency reports are discussed – descriptive, explanatory, and prognostic intelligence research. For each type, its characteristics are presented, the particular demands each has for research are explored and the main methods and techniques that each makes use of in research. Chapter 3 mainly focuses on literature, methodology and research practice by professionals.

Chapter 4 focuses on insights on what the intelligence community sees as main pitfalls and biases in producing intelligence and security agency reports.

Finally, in chapter 5, criteria are identified for developing an instrument that is capable of making an ex ante assessment on the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. In 5.3, the criteria and their specific indicators are presented (table 5.1).

In the second part, two case studies are presented – the first one focuses on the SRB and the second one on the BVD. The first case – chapters 6, 7, and 8 – focuses on the SRB, a private non-profit organization that monitored oil shipments to the apartheid regime of South Africa. The SRB, which had a powerful lobby in Dutch parliament, reported directly to the United Nations.

In chapter 6, background information is presented on the SRB and the selected SRB-reports. In chapter 7, the quality of the selected reports is assessed with the help of the criteria from chapter 5 – the ex ante instrument. In chapter 8, an investigation on complementary elements that can be identified as influencing the quality of a SRB-report is undertaken.

The second case – chapters 9, 10, and 11 – focuses on the BVD, the Dutch public agency on domestic security. This agency had the most media coverage in

the Netherlands, making it more easy to investigate than the other main public agency – the military agency.⁶

In chapter 9, background information is presented on the BVD and the selected reports. In chapter 10, the quality of the selected reports is assessed with the help of the criteria from chapter 5. In chapter 11, complementary elements that can be identified as influencing the quality of a BVD-report are investigated.

The third part deals with factors that influence on the quality of intelligence and security agency reports, conclusions, and recommendations. In chapters 12 and 13, the factors that influence the quality reports are discussed. Use is made of both within case and cross case outcomes. Attention is paid to hypotheses that are developed to assess more precisely the influence of a factor.

In chapter 14, the intelligence processes of the two case studies are compared. In what respect does the quality of the intelligence and security agency reports investigated differ? Did the *ex ante* test lead to plausible assessments? Following this different explanations of quality are compared – also with a reference to the presented literature. Finally, recommendations bring this study to conclusion.

As intelligence studies is a relatively new – and partly still developing – scientific discipline, a caution has to be made. This caution concerns that in such a relatively new discipline normative elements (*ex ante* instrument) and causal connections (factors that influence the quality of a report) may be partly intertwined. Therefore, these two issues are separated as much as possible in the composition of this study. In the case studies, the normative issue of the quality of a given report is dealt with in chapters 7, 8, 10, and 11. The analytical issue of factors of influence on the quality is dealt with in chapters 12 and 13.

⁶ During the 1980's, there was a large reorganization in which the three separate military agencies were merged into one organization. This complicates research, because four organizations will have to be object of investigation – the military agency and its three predecessors. This reorganization was preceded by the so-called Fatima-affair. This was an infiltration – not authorized by the responsible ministers – into the unions of the army. This infiltration became public after the anti-militarist activist group Onkruid unveiled documents that it had obtained after a theft at the 450 Counter Intelligence Detachment in November 1984.

2 Intelligence: concept, process, institution, and political context

What is intelligence, and what is its concept? What models are used to process intelligence? Moreover, what is its relation with its (political) context? This chapter explores insights into these aspects of intelligence.

To begin with, the concept of intelligence is presented (2.1). An explanation is given concerning the extent the field of intelligence has been developed as a discipline. This sets limits to the way issues as methods can be dealt with (chapter 3).

After this first positioning of intelligence, some basic insights in the intelligence process are given (2.2), starting with different models of the intelligence process. This gives a context to the analysis (which is object of study of chapter 3). In these models, the input and output of information play an important role. Therefore, separate attention is paid to the different types of intelligence collection, and the different types of intelligence products. Concerning the intelligence products, more in-depth discussion explains the issue of warning.

After this introduction of concepts and processes, attention is paid to the more general context of intelligence analysis. First, the organizational aspects are dealt with (2.3). Insights are explored on the relationship between organization and quality. The concept of a Review Section is discussed. In addition, there is a discussion about training and education.

This introductory chapter is concluded by setting intelligence in its political context (2.4). Because intelligence functions as part of a political (or a corporate) system, attention is paid to the relation between intelligence and politics. In this way, a division is made between chapter 2 and 3. Where as chapter 2 emphasizes the relation between analysts and politics (relevance, acceptance), the emphasis in chapter 3 is on the relation between analysts and the investigation (validity, reliability, robustness). Part of the discussion on analysis and politics, concerns also the relation between openness and quality. As there is more to openness and quality than just a political aspect, this issue is dealt with as a separate – and final – issue of this chapter.

2.1 CONCEPT

What is the concept of intelligence? To what extent has intelligence studies been developed as a discipline? Together with some very basic features, these questions are discussed in this section.

The concept of intelligence

What is intelligence? There are many definitions of intelligence. Sometimes it is used to describe a product, sometimes to describe a process, or both. In this study, the concept of intelligence is used for the analysis of information processes within public and private organizations, which play a role in the prevention and repression of (organized) crime, fraud, and infringement of a democratic legal order.¹ Intelligence is information that is gathered, processed, and/or analyzed for actors or decision makers. If these actors are national decision makers, it is often called national intelligence – intelligence on international security issues. Yet, intelligence may also be used by companies or for domestic security.²

As noted, there are many definitions of intelligence. Sometimes, in contrast with the actual reality of agencies the definition of intelligence is restricted to secret information (yet, open sources form the majority of information); information that is designed for action (but, not always the case); information, which is meant for national public policymakers (but intelligence can also be meant for sister agencies or even companies); or to information about countries or national intelligence (excluding intelligence on persons or domestic intelligence).³ The chosen definition does not have these drawbacks mentioned.

Intelligence has the power to multiply the value and effectiveness of the forces used by policymakers and other actors to combat a danger. Yet, intelligence is a fallible asset. It is likely that you can find for every successful application of intelligence, as a force enhancer, a counter example where intelligence failed to live up to its potential.⁴ Furthermore, intelligence is generally not the only information on a certain issue that reaches an actor or a decision maker.

Intelligence is often referred to as the division between domestic and international security. Domestic security refers to security within the national boundaries. Its aim is to counter threats manifesting itself within the country. Foreign intelligence relates to actors or matters beyond the national boundaries. It is aimed at operating abroad and getting information on anything that an agency wants to know about foreign actors.⁵ Of course, there are overlaps. Foreign intelligence is about issues such as verification of arms treaties, warning for war and international terrorism, strategic planning, or the nature, capabilities,

¹ Van der Aart/editorial, "Erasmus Centre for Police Studies," *NISA Newsletter*, Spring 1997, No. 1, Year 6, 19.

² Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" *Verspieters voor het vaderland*, 1996, 13-14.

³ *Ibid.*, 13-14. In *Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië*, it is explained that many definitions have some serious limitations (Wiebes, *Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995*, 2002, 14-16). The definition used in this study does not have the limitations that are evaluated here. Still, it is oriented towards democratic legal orders, in regards to its phrase on 'infringement of a democratic legal order.'

⁴ Probst, "Intelligence as a Force Enhancer," *CIA's Studies in Intelligence (CIA/SII)*, Winter 1987, 61, 67.

⁵ Notes by W.P.J. Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

and intentions of foreign opponents.⁶ Domestic security relates to issues such as counterespionage, terrorism, or political violent activism.

Intelligence and security agency reports and intelligence studies: a characterization

Following this first definition of the field, we will now provide an overview of how this field has been developed.

Within intelligence, several activities take prominence. First, there is the collection of information and the production of intelligence and security agency reports. Second, there are activities as operations, security and counter intelligence measures, and covert diplomacy.⁷ As this study is on the quality of intelligence and security agency reports, the focus is on the first activity – to collect information and to produce reports. This first activity is characterized by some general features. Although these features do not apply to all individual cases of producing reports, they do help us to gain an overview of what takes place. These features also show that the practice of producing a report is a difficult one. The features that will be described here will be return to in chapter 3 to discuss the characteristics of different types of intelligence research, and to help develop the criteria of the ex ante instrument. In general, the production of intelligence and security agency reports is characterized by the following features:

1. *Interdisciplinary.* In many cases, analysts combine methods, data, and findings from completely different professional fields into one analysis. What methods and concepts are adequate, given a certain question? Moreover, how should data from different perspectives be integrated?
2. *Future oriented.* To serve politics, intelligence is future oriented. As the future is unknown, it is by definition a hard field to explore. An element of speculation is often included in intelligence and security agency reports. This element of speculation is more prominently present than in science. The risks that analysts take into account when speculating, make their job a vulnerable one.
3. *Inaccessible data.* Agencies often deal with opponents and hidden factors. The resulting inaccessibility of data can be described in two ways. First, there is a greater chance than in most disciplines that information is safeguarded or manipulated – especially by opponents. Second, a feature of intelligence is that key information is often absent – for example, concerning the intentions of an opponent.
4. *Small chance - high impact.* To assess risks, analysts often deal with events that are hard to predict, because they are characterized by a small chance the event will actually take place, but if it takes place the impact is high. This

⁶ Probst, "Intelligence as a Force Enhancer," Winter 1987, CIA/SII, 64-65.

⁷ This is often referred to as an (intelligence) mission – in which one person, or a group of people, carry out an intelligence assignment.

also highlights the costs of failure. To predict – or to predict in a precise way – is complicated as such events often depend on a chain of conditions.

5. *Specific and applied nature.* Intelligence deals with expectations that are often more concrete and specific than in science. The expectations are about issues of a particular period and area. It is very much an applied discipline. The combination of being applied and interdisciplinary sets a difficult task to combine several concepts and findings in an overreaching model.
6. *The position as supplier.* Agencies are in most cases suppliers of intelligence products – an exception being when reports are directly used in operations. In general, the intelligence community does not make the decision on the policy to be carried out. Intelligence subsequently can only serve as a force enhancer. This is a sub-ordinate, dependent, position.
7. *Control is complicated.* Public agencies take a special position within the governmental bureaucracy. Secrecy of an agency and the fear of politicians being compromised with the knowledge of ‘political touchy’ information can hamper control. Lack of adequate control has the risk that problems will pile up eventually.

The first five features, described above, are directly related to knowledge itself. The sixth and seventh features are institutional. The methods used in producing a report must fit the first six features. This is not an easy task. A further complication is the nature of the literature on intelligence. Much attention is paid to practice and aberrations. Yet, relatively little is published on how to do the research, especially in relation to theory and methodology. This study has to cope with this state of affairs. Therefore it has set limits to the questions researched and to the solutions presented.

Although intelligence is a relatively new discipline, it can be positioned between other disciplines. In order to provide an overview, the locus and focus of intelligence studies are presented in comparison with political science, law, and economy.

Table 2.1 Locus and focus of intelligence studies: a comparison

	intelligence studies	political science	law	economy
locus	security, threats & risks	public policy	conflict	distribution of productive income and capacity
focus	anticipation	power	what ought to be	scarcity

For a discipline, more is needed than just the locus and focus. A discipline also rests on definitions, concepts, methods and the continuous development of a body of theories. The following table illustrates elements that are present or absent in intelligence studies.

Table 2.2 Intelligence studies as a discipline

Elements discipline	Already known/developed?
locus	yes: security, threats & risks
focus	yes: anticipation
definitions/concepts	yes: many definitions of key concepts are formulated; ⁸ some general agreement on concepts
methods	hardly any arrangement in the choice and use of methods; white spots/methods need to be developed
development of theory	no explicit theory; body of knowledge: based on intuition and experience, not formulated explicitly

Following this introduction to intelligence, now attention is paid to an issue that is more closely related to the issue of intelligence and security agency reports themselves – the research process that leads to the production of intelligence and security agency reports.

2.2 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

What do intelligence processes look like? What are their in- and output? The central research question of this study focuses on the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. Such reports are the output of an intelligence process. For a detailed understanding of the issue of the quality of reports, it is helpful to obtain some insights into this process. In this section, the production of intelligence is explored. There are several models that describe this process – including the often quoted ‘intelligence cycle’. These models and their different phases are presented and explained. Each of these models (2.2.1) – used within the intelligence community – is thought to give a specific yet different perspective. Models are by definition a simplification of essential features of an external phenomenon.

In all models, analysis plays a crucial role. As the analysis is so crucial – especially for the quality of a report – it is the object of study in chapter 3. A discussion of the models is presented here to provide understanding for chapter 3, and to set it in context.

In addition, extra attention is given to the input and output of information that these models produce – collection and report. In 2.2.2, information is given on the different types of intelligence collection. In 2.2.3, information is given about the different types of intelligence products. Warning is a special and

⁸ The issue of definitions is widely known and an old one within the literature. It is even practice in related fields, such as studies on the police (for example: Frost & Morris, *Police Intelligence Reports*, 1983, III-VII). In Dutch publications for example, terms are also well defined, as in De Graaf & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 493-497.

characteristic type of such an intelligence product – and therefore is also given attention.

2.2.1 Three models

Intelligence and security agency reports are the result of collecting, processing, and analyzing information. To describe the intelligence process, different models are used – the intelligence cycle, the intelligence matrix, and the warning cycle. Each model provides a specific perspective of the research process. We start with the model that is most referred to in the literature on intelligence – the intelligence cycle.

The intelligence cycle

The intelligence cycle is described in many ways. However, in all descriptions, the following phases can be distinguished – to design, to collect, to process, to analyze, to report, and to disseminate. The intelligence cycle is a phase-model of the research process.

*Design*⁹

Almost every research process starts with a design. This means an inventory of the needs and consumers within the whole intelligence issue. The central research questions are formulated. In such a phase, literature is explored and key intelligence requirements are arranged. In such requirements, special issues or areas are identified that are thought to be of special interest for policymakers.¹⁰

This phase influences decisions to be made later on in the process. By having defined the consumers and their needs, the goal of the intelligence issue at hand is formulated. This leads to the definition of the problem. In turn, it also indicates the methods that could be used to carry out the investigation.

Collection

The second phase of the research process is the collection of information. Collection involves the gathering of raw data. Collection is the acquisition of

⁹ In one presentation of the intelligence cycle, the design is split into two steps. In this approach, the first step is the identification of the need for intelligence and the translation of this need into requirements. The second step is the tasking (Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 75-76). In the literature on intelligence, the design is sometimes referred to as planning and direction. Yet, the problem with this characterization is that for some authors this implies the first phase only, while others stress that with planning and control actually means the management of the entire intelligence effort – from the identification of the need for data to the final delivery of a report to a consumer. Compare, for example Johnson, *America's Secret Power*, 1989, 76-77 with: Milberg, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 1980, Appendix I-3. For an alternative presentation of the intelligence cycle as a figure, see: Gordon, "Winners and Losers," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Fall 1986, 5.

¹⁰ See for example: Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" 1996, 16.

specified information, from denied and open sources and regions, using both human and technological means, and that is relevant to a security policy.¹¹

Processing

The third phase is about processing. This concerns the conversion of the vast amount of information that comes into the system to a form more suitable for the production of intelligence and security agency reports. Processing involves activities such as language translations, decryption, and sorting information by subject matter. Processing also includes data reduction and interpretation of information stored on film and tape.¹² Processing serves as the most dominant filter.

Analysis

The fourth phase of the research process is the analysis. This is the conversion of basic information into an intelligence analysis. It includes the integration, evaluation, and analysis of the data available.¹³ In this phase, analysts integrate and evaluate the often fragmentary and contradictory raw material.¹⁴ They draw the conclusions concerning the central questions.

Report

To report is the fifth phase of the research process. This is different from the preceding phase, as it does not concern the analytical aspect of the research process. It deals with items such as presentation techniques, writing strategies, the information presented, and the structure of a report.

Dissemination

This is the sixth and the last phase of the intelligence cycle. This is the distribution and the handling of the finished intelligence product to the consumers. Consumers can be people within the intelligence community, or, for example, domestic and foreign policymakers. This phase also concerns the reception and eventual feedback of the policymakers.

Limitations of the model of the intelligence cycle

The intelligence cycle is a model that distinguishes different phases within the research process. This model, however, does not serve to interpret all aspects of

¹¹ This definition deviates from the one by deGraffenreid. He argues, for example, that collection is made by *special* means, while ordinary means are increasingly important for the research process (de Graffenreid, "Intelligence and the Oval Office," *Intelligence requirements for the 1980's*, 1986, 11).

¹² Milberg, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 1980, Appendix I-3.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

the research process. While the research process does not often end with finished intelligence, the semi-finished product is still intelligence.

Furthermore, there are standing requirements for intelligence that do not need to be defined repeatedly every time, such as design.

Above all, the research process is often deviated from when passing through all the phases of the intelligence cycle. This happens, for example, in times of crises when policymakers are especially interested in raw intelligence (collection).

Finally, not all the information enters the intelligence cycle. This happens as an effect of the compartmentalization and the need-to-know principle within agencies. This effect may also be enhanced by competition between agencies or units.¹⁵

In practice, the research process is not as straightforward as the model indicates. Sometimes, steps are passed over. On even more occasions, there are loops and feedback moments to earlier phases of the intelligence cycle during the research process. To cope with such aspects and to obtain a different type of insight, another model has been developed – the intelligence matrix.

The intelligence matrix

The intelligence matrix – a newer model than the intelligence cycle – differs from the intelligence cycle in terms of the type of understanding that is obtained. Where the intelligence cycle is oriented on the phases of the research process, the intelligence matrix is product-oriented. It is based on the idea that the research process is organized – that there is a division of labor. Within the CIA, some prefer the intelligence matrix as it makes the various aspects of the intelligence-policy relationship more clear.

The traditional intelligence cycle describes accurately the phases of the research process, whether or not the steps of the model have a sequential nature. Nevertheless, within the intelligence community there was a need for a newer model, as the process is more complex than indicated by the intelligence cycle. First, there is a large difference between the requirements for the collection and the requirements for the analysis. While collection requirements are usually a result of finding gaps in existing data, the analytical requirements are focused in another direction – the need for a policy response on an issue. Second, during the collection, energy is also put into analysis – to evaluate raw data, to put data in a usable format, to put data in their perspective, or to remind users about other reports on the same issue. Third, some parts of the research process work sequentially, but other parts are carried out almost autonomously.

To meet these demands, a model was developed in which the process is understood as a matrix of interconnected parts rather than a sequence of activities – the intelligence matrix. In the intelligence matrix, it is assumed that the steps may take place synchronously. There is feedback as the steps are

¹⁵ Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" 1996, 19-20. See also: Johnson, "Analysis for a New Age," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1996, 657-671.

passed through and the streams of activities deviate from a chronological sequence. In the intelligence matrix, the process is seen as three parallel streams of activities:

1. collection;
2. production;
3. support and services.¹⁶

Collection and production – the first two pillars – have many parallel features. The most important ones are:

- *Requirements*. To fill in gaps in collection capabilities (collection) or to formulate requirements for analysis, research and evaluation (production).
- *Management and planning*. To assign collection requirements to appropriate collection resources (collection), or to translate political issues into a question for analysts (production). In both cases, monitoring is needed.
- *Collection*. In most large organizations, this is unique for the collection pillar.
- *Analysis*. Collectors also analyze to evaluate raw data. They analyze to see if information is significant, reliable, accurate, or unambiguous. Collectors may add analytical commentary.
- *Production*. This often takes the shape of constructing a standardized format. It also permits the protection of the sensitivity of material.
- *Dissemination*. The consumers receive the information they need. This applies to raw reporting from the collection pillar, as well as reports from the production pillar.
- *Evaluation*. There are different views on this step. Some see it as a function of management, while others argue it is an independent or autonomous process carried out by professionals.¹⁷

From the perspective of the relation between producer and consumer, most of the elements of both the collection and production pillars have a link with the consumer. In this model, it can be defined more clearly how important these links are, and what priorities should be assigned to such links. The importance and priorities will vary with the type of intelligence products, as each product has a particular impact on the policy process.¹⁸

Support and services is the third pillar. It deals with items as physical and personnel security, counter-intelligence, psychological warfare/propaganda operations, library services, or translations.

¹⁶ Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 76-79.

¹⁷ Ibid.. See also: Hulnick, "Managing Analysis Strategies for Playing the end Game," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Fall 1988, 323-326.

¹⁸ For more, see Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 79-85.

If applied to the production of intelligence and security agency reports, the intelligence matrix can be presented as follows.¹⁹

Table 2.3 The intelligence matrix

	Collection of data	Production of report	Support & Services
project ——— report 1	management requirements	management requirements	administration
project ——— report 2	tasking	tasking	security
project ——— report 3	collection	analysis	counter-intelligence
project ——— report 3	collation & analysis	production	covert action
project ——— report n	dissemination	dissemination	inspection & audit
	evaluation	evaluation	liaison

As noted, this model leaves more room for feedback procedures, and is in this respect closer to the actual proceedings than the intelligence cycle, in which feedback procedures are less well represented. It also focuses more directly on the parallels between collection and production – it makes the various links between the pillars and the consumers more clear (the intelligence-policy relationship). Moreover, the advantage of the intelligence cycle is that it describes the phases of the research process more clearly.

There is also a third model. However, this model does not stem from the intelligence community, but from a completely different discipline – psychology.

The warning cycle

The warning cycle is developed from another perspective. The steps of the warning cycle – also characterized as the cognitive warning cycle – were compiled by psychologists in the natural disaster branch of warning.

The type of understanding obtained from the warning cycle, differs from that of the intelligence cycle (phases of the research process) and the intelligence matrix (streams of activities). The warning cycle is action-oriented. In the warning cycle essential questions are ‘is the recognized danger genuine,’ ‘when do you warn’ and ‘how do you reach and stimulate the decision maker to act?’

In the warning cycle, the following six steps are distinguished. The first four concern intelligence, the last two relate to decision making. These final two steps mean a different approach compared with the intelligence cycle and the intelligence matrix, because decision-making is explicitly included.

¹⁹ This is a reworked version of: Hulnick, “Controlling Intelligence Estimates,” *Controlling Intelligence*, 1991, 84. Hulnick’s version was actually a representation in three columns – it was not represented as a matrix.

Intelligence

1. *Recognition*. Early recognition is often the weakest link because the information available is limited and ambiguous.²⁰
2. *Validation*. The danger is genuine, and not a product of imagination. Validation usually involves some additional collection and analyzing. Prior hypotheses are tested and new ones are formulated to accommodate new information on the danger.
3. *Definition*. The agency fills in the blanks about the danger in terms of: nature, gravity, probability of occurrence, timing, and duration.
4. *Communication*. In this model, the producer of intelligence does not only warn a consumer, but also stimulates them to take action.

Decision-making

5. *Evaluation*. The decision maker evaluates independently the threat.
6. *Action*. The decision maker acts.

Though presented sequentially, the six steps are best understood as nearly simultaneous, continuous, interactive, and iterative. In the literature, it is argued that one of the conditions for success is that the participants in the warning cycle understand each other (2.4.1).²¹

In presenting the warning cycle as six successive phases, the model illustrates similarities with the intelligence cycle. By understanding this model as nearly simultaneous and interactive, it also illustrates its similarity with the intelligence matrix. Despite this, the warning cycle differs from both models. It focuses on decision-making and on when and how to act. In this section, only the warning cycle itself is discussed. Warning as a *product* is part of the section on intelligence products – 2.2.3.

All three models – the intelligence cycle, the intelligence matrix, and the warning cycle – are useful to formulate activities and products. All three provide a partial insight – from different perspectives – to set priorities and to steer a course. To obtain insights from different perspectives supports the planning and coordination of intelligence, especially if problems occur or large tasking is at hand. Concerning the field of application, each model appears to be useful in a particular way:

- The intelligence cycle is most suited to explain the *research process* of intelligence.
- The intelligence matrix is most suited to provide insight into the *links* of *different intelligence products* – especially in relation to the importance and priorities of links, from the collection and production pillars with the *consumers*. It also provides insight in the parallels between collection and production.

²⁰ It may be that the conceptual framework to recognize indications are also underdeveloped.

²¹ McCreary, "Warning Cycles," CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 72-74.

- The warning cycle is most suited to obtain insights of the interaction between producers and decision makers from the perspective of *when and how to act* by a decision maker, in order to deal with the danger.

Now that these three models on the intelligence process are discussed, it is time to explore the types of input and output products – respectively types of collection, and types of intelligence products.

2.2.2 The input – types of collection

In the following two sections, the input and output of the intelligence process are presented. On the input side, there is a wide variety of sources that agencies use. Within this wide variety, three main types of collection can be distinguished – collection from open sources, human intelligence, and technical intelligence. Each type is composed of different sub-types. The main characteristics of each type of collection are described.

Open sources

Open sources include a variety of sources. These can be sources such as papers, periodicals, books, governmental and scientific publications, radio and TV broadcastings, internet, commercial on-line services, and limited access electronic data basis – as maintained, for example, by universities and businesses. They are anything that is published in print, broadcasted, or electronically accessible – also when it has to be paid for.

In terms of quantity, open sources are the main sources of information. It is estimated that most agencies currently receive approximately 80-85% of their information from open sources. However, the contribution from the different fields varies. Open sources rarely contribute to target assistance, for example, in the case of denied area coverage by classified sources. For strategic economic intelligence, however, almost all information will come from open sources.²²

Although the majority of incoming information is from open sources they have received relatively little attention in intelligence studies. This has changed somewhat over the last years. This change in attention has also led to a new arrangement of open sources. In this new division, two types of open sources are distinguished. First, the open source information that is legally available, and is obtainable at a relatively low cost. This does not mean, it does not have to be paid for, as for example in the case of databases (e.g. from Lloyd's). The second open source is open proprietary information, relating to products. Such products are legally obtained, but some costs are required in order to commission reverse engineering studies to extract information from the product. For example, a missile is bought in order to study the missile guidance software and hardware.²³

²² Robert D. Steele, Information peacekeeping, e-print of upcoming publication in Dearth and Campen, 11 March 1998. Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" 1996, 16.

²³ Steele, *Open Source Intelligence*, 1996, chapter 2, section 2004.

Human intelligence (HUMINT)

There are two main types of covert data collection – human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT). Of these two, human intelligence is sometimes characterized as the classical form of espionage. HUMINT is information that stems from a human source. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the interviewing of informants and spies.²⁴

Not all of these activities need to be covert. Under such circumstances, open human sources are a possibility, as for example contacts with academics, journalists, or leaders and operators of organizations.²⁵ Nevertheless, overt HUMINT does not necessarily mean sources are open to anyone. Such examples of HUMINT refer to collection through reports by diplomats and attachés, or official contacts and correspondence with foreign intelligence and security agencies. It also includes systematic debriefing of refugees, immigrants, defectors, or released hostages. All these types are considered overt or non-secretive, contrary to the covert or clandestine HUMINT. Clandestine HUMINT is normally obtained by the use of a case-officer and his stable of agents. It often provides information that is obtainable in no other way.²⁶

In the literature, several divisions of types of HUMINT are made, for example:

- strategic HUMINT (long term, more high level sources) and tactical HUMINT (collected in the field – field HUMINT – and time-sensitive);
- HUMINT by interrogation of unwilling sources (e.g. prisoners of war), and HUMINT by debriefing (e.g. refugees, defectors, deserters).²⁷

Technical intelligence (TECHINT)

The second type of the covert collection is technical intelligence (TECHINT). TECHINT is about the technical collection of information, the covert collection through technical means such as photography, film, or electronic interception. TECHINT is – compared to HUMINT – the modern form of covert intelligence, and has become increasingly more important.²⁸ The methods of TECHINT involve normally scientists and technical operators with their equipment.²⁹ There are three main groups of TECHINT – signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

²⁴ www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/part16.htm.

²⁵ Steele, *Open Source Intelligence*, 1996, chapter 2, section 2013.

²⁶ Johnson, *America's Secret Power*, 1989, 83-86. Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" 1996, 17. Snyder, "With a little bit of heart and soul analyzing the role of HUMINT in the post cold war area," *Woodrow Wilson School Policy Conference 401a*, 6 January 1997 (www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/humint.htm). Macartney, "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Winter 1988, 464.

²⁷ AFMC/ASD -Global Hawk Integrated Dictionary, Attachment AV, page 3 of 43 (<http://web1.deskbook.osd.mil/valhtml/2/24/241/241T01.htm>).

²⁸ Milberg, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 1980, Appendix I-3.

²⁹ Johnson, *America's Secret Power*, 1989, 83-86.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT)

Within TECHINT, an important place is reserved for signals intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is a source which includes a wide variety of types of electronic interceptions. Yet, there is more to SIGINT than just a source – it is a more generic term for describing both the interception, processing, and analysis of electronic interceptions. This applies to all the different forms of TECHINT's.³⁰ The INT's that are presented here are types of sources that focus on how (or where) they generate their data from – rather than their product. SIGINT comprises activities such as COMINT (communications intelligence),³¹ ELINT (electronic intelligence),³² or TELINT (telemetry intelligence).³³

Imagery intelligence

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) deals with the exploitation, development, and dissemination of multi-sensor imagery products in support of war-fighting operations and other activities. Likewise, this form of TECHINT is not only limited to collection. What is collected, interpreted, analyzed, collated and evaluated is imagery to determine the number, type, dimensions, location, and the significance of subjects such as industrial installations, transportation, networks, military offensive and defensive systems, installations, and activities. Data can be obtained by, for example, airborne reconnaissance, border photography, satellite imagery, or even open sources. IMINT is par excellence the activity that allows the commander to see the battlefield in real time as the operation progresses.³⁴

Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)

Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) refers already to a product, rather than a source. Nevertheless, it also refers to special sensor disciplines that are a clue for the sources. MASINT as a product is obtained by data analysis

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

³¹ COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the interception of (foreign) communications by individuals or groups who are not the intended recipients (Richelson & Ball, *The ties that bind*, 1985, 101, 175). Some main activities are cipher/code breaking and traffic analysis.

³² ELINT is information derived from (foreign) non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources (Richelson & Ball, *The ties that bind*, 1985, 101, 176). Some common ELINT targets are transmissions by radar stations and navigation systems.

³³ TELINT is aimed at the telemetry of missiles. Telemetry is the set of signals by which a missile, or stage of a missile, or a missile warhead sends back to earth data about its performance during a test flight. It is a source, for example, to monitor compliance with SALT agreements. To make it more complicated, TELINT is also a subcategory of FISINT – foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. Foreign instrumentation signals are electromagnetic emissions associated with aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. FISINT includes, among others, telemetry, beaconing, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/command systems and video data links. Sources: Richelson & Ball, *The ties that bind*, 1985, 102, 177; www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam/14-210/part16.htm.

³⁴ www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/sentinel/senti005.htm; www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/tacimlp.htm.

derived from sensing instruments, other than those generally used for communications, electronics, or imagery collection. The quantitative and qualitative analysis concerns types of data such as metric, angle, spatial, wave length, time dependent, modulation, plasma, and hydro-magnetic data. MASINT collection and processing is shifting with the fielding of modern weapons systems. The last five years there have been significant developments for the relatively new field of MASINT.³⁵

Confusion

TECHINT varieties are a source of confusion, not only because there are so many types. First, it is a field of almost endless abbreviations. Even in a relatively early publication of 1985 on this field – *The Ties That Bind* by Richelson and Ball – it opened with nine pages of acronyms and abbreviations.

A second source for confusion lies in the prospect that an abbreviation is not a direct clue for its meaning, especially if there are so many. Moreover, there is a probability it will lead to explicit or implicit doubles. This actually does occur with, for example, the abbreviation EW. In the same publication, in one instance EW stands for early warning. A few pages later, however, in the abbreviation REWSON,³⁶ EW stands for electronic warfare.³⁷

A third source for confusion is caused by different classifications of types of TECHINT's. In one publication, it is possible RADINT is characterized as a type of SIGINT, while in another publication it is seen as a type of MASINT.³⁸

As noted, the TECHINT's do not refer to only collection. Yet, by naming the TECHINT's, especially from the perspective 'from which' or 'on what' data is gathered, insights can be gained from the input of an intelligence community. In the following section, the focus shifts to the output.

2.2.3 The output – intelligence products

In this section, the output of the intelligence process is presented. This provides a closer idea of the intelligence process concerning the different types of products that reaches a consumer. The types presented do not refer so much to a classification by area or subject, but to the nature of the product itself. As we

³⁵ MASINT includes, among others, the following special sensor disciplines: radar intelligence (RADINT), acoustical intelligence (ACINT/ACOUSTINT), nuclear intelligence – including sampling radio-active materials and seismology records (NUCINT), unintended radiation intelligence (RINT), electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-OPINT), event-related dynamic measurement photography (DMPINT), laser intelligence (LASINT), radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse intelligence (RF/EMPINT), chemical and biological intelligence (CBINT), directed energy weapons intelligence (DEWINT), infrared intelligence (IRINT), spectroscopic intelligence, materials intelligence, or effluent/debris collection. Source: www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam/14-210/part16.htm; www.fas.org/irp/program/masint.htm.

³⁶ Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations and Naval Intelligence.

³⁷ Richelson & Ball, *The ties that bind*, 1985, XI and XV.

³⁸ Wiebes, "Hookers and sportscars?" 1996, 16; www.fas.org/irp/program/masint.htm.

will see, such output products do not necessarily have to pass through all the stages of processing.

After the presentation of the output products, special attention is given to the issue of warning. The warning as an output will illustrate more closely the relation between product and implementation of intelligence.

Types of intelligence products

Each type of intelligence product has a particular impact on the policy process. Therefore, each product has a different level of importance for the relationship between producer and consumer.

- The first type of product warns – warning intelligence. Policymakers want an agency to discover crisis events, and want to rely on its vigilance to alert them. For this, an agency may develop a list of indicators. With the help of this list, an agency monitors targets on a regular basis. It analyzes whether deviations from a steady state suggest the possibility of change. Depending on the priority and importance, some targets are monitored constantly, but others only periodically.
- A second type of product is the information on a daily basis – current intelligence. An agency has to ascertain what policymakers would ask, if they could. Current intelligence is often used to alert policymakers to problems at the pre-crisis or sub-crisis level. It has more a journalistic than an estimative content.
- The third type of product is the compilation of encyclopedic data – basic intelligence. It is often used in research on policy matters. It often includes a feedback aspect. It is then used to decide what gaps in basic knowledge ought to be filled, what questions ought to be addressed, and what issues will probably need attention.
- The fourth type of product is estimative intelligence. Its function is as an input to the policy process and it has the greatest potential impact. In reports, analysts make both an analysis and an assessment. Based upon these elements, analysts provide estimative judgments of future developments and recommendations.
- The last type of product is raw intelligence. Although it is sometimes referred to as unevaluated reporting, it is often evaluated by collectors, but it is not compared with reports from other sources. Raw reports have become a more regular intelligence product. It has the danger of bias if policymakers do not review all relevant material.³⁹

³⁹ Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 79-85. Raw intelligence is usually from a single source (Britt Snider, "Congress as a User of Intelligence," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/98unclas/congres.html>, under heading 'How Intelligence-sharing Works').

Different classifications of types of output are possible, see for example: Herman, *Intelligence*, 1996, 105-108; or, Wiebes, *Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995*, 2002, 19. The one presented in this study is of a general nature and oriented towards the actual product.

As with the input, the demarcation between output and other – and preceding – phases of the processing is not always that sharp. An output product as raw intelligence bears all the features of the collection phase.

The receptivity by policymakers of different types of intelligence products may differ. The receptivity of basic intelligence is uniformly high. Current intelligence – with its journalistic content – is often criticized as being superficial. The greatest criticism concerns estimates, especially when policymakers do not like the conclusions. Subsequently, these policymakers view them as undermining the policy process.⁴⁰

Other classifications are possible.⁴¹ In the literature on intelligence, it is claimed that policymakers value the product based on brevity, being on time, and relevance, and they value it in that order. Intelligence producers tend to reverse those priorities.⁴² In the following section, a further example is given of the relation ‘output – consumers’, with particular emphasis on product warning.

On warning

This section serves two functions. First, it explores the important issue of warning. Furthermore – as this also is an aim of chapter 2 – some elementary insights are explored concerning the relation between producer and consumer (2.4). In 2.2.1, the warning cycle as an action-oriented model was presented. In this section of 2.2.3, the relation between the producer of warning and its consumer is illustrated from this action-oriented perspective.

There are three primary warning outcomes: success, failure, and false alarm. Success often takes the nature of a self-denying prediction. If there is a danger⁴³ and adequate measures are taken, the harm it predicts will be deterred, avoided, contained, or cushioned. Therefore, a warning is considered a success when it leads to a process that develops deliberate, well-reasoned measures, which avoid surprise and harm. Early action generally leads to the lowest costs. ‘Consequently, the best chance for avoiding harm is when evidence provides a reasonable basis for action, not when the likelihood of harm occurring is beyond

⁴⁰ Boatner, “The Evaluation of Intelligence,” CIA/SII, Summer 1984, 69.

⁴¹ For example, more in line with the INT’s presented in 2.2.2. There is also another classification concerning types of intelligence. This classification is based upon the spectrum of policy fields: biographic, political, sociological, geographic, military, economic, and scientific intelligence (Thomas, “Geographic Intelligence,” CIA/SII, A2. Compare: Wiebes, “Hookers and sports cars?” 1996, 14). The reports by the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB) – the first case study – are an example of economic intelligence. The SRB-reports resemble encyclopedic intelligence most. The quarterly survey by the BVD is a mixture of sociologic-political (the Movement Against Nuclear Energy) and biographic intelligence (Joost van Steenis). In terms of intelligence products, the BVD-report is somewhere between current intelligence and an estimate. It is best described as just background information.

⁴² Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage,” CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 82.

⁴³ ‘For a threat perception, there are three necessary conditions: an assumption of the rival’s hostility, the vital nature of the issue or area under observation, and a subjective sense of vulnerability’ (Cohen, “Early Warning Systems,” CIA/SII, Fall 1989, 45). Compare to J.D. Singer’s formula: deterrence = estimated capabilities x estimated intentions.

a reasonable doubt.’⁴⁴ For the intelligence community, the ultimate failure is the lack of warning in the face of immense danger, such as war. Nevertheless, there are false alarms and misses. A false alarm is a danger that has been identified, but that later turns out not to exist. Yet, warning of a danger that proves to be a near miss is a warning success.⁴⁵

Agencies have a tendency to embed in reports a bias towards worst-case scenarios. This is understandable in a setting where analysts receive most criticism when their estimates are too optimistic.⁴⁶ In a worst-case scenario, each piece of evidence that points to a calamity is presented, while little evidence that indicates a different conclusion is presented.⁴⁷ In such a scenario, analysts describe all evil an opponent is capable of, and then estimates how the opponent may undertake them all, irrespective of the consequences to the opponent’s larger objectives. This approach has two disadvantages. First, the consumers will in the course of time tire and pay no attention to a report that contains bad news and subsequently takes no accurate measures. Second, the consumers may pay attention to it, but they may be frightened into immobility or may take a drastically wrong policy decision. In short, an overproduction of worst-case scenarios may lead to permanent hysteria or hopeless apathy. Therefore, it is argued that it is crucial that analysts warn selectively. Selectivity involves rejecting small risks, and potential danger. Within the literature from the intelligence community, the opinion is that an occasional miss is preferable to continuous over-prudent warnings of the worst-case scenario type.⁴⁸

In the literature, it is explained that it is difficult for analysts to provide an unambiguous warning. In case of a warning, they are advised to illuminate and to evaluate the critical or decisive aspects of the threat.⁴⁹ Analysts then give their best estimate of how a particular situation will evolve. Furthermore, they also examine less likely outcomes if they have significant implications.⁵⁰ For a warning of an actual threat, analysts are advised to pay attention to:

1. *Necessity*. Is the threat unavoidable or optional?
2. *Unambiguousness*. Are the opponent’s moves preparations for hostilities or may these serve other purposes as well?
3. *Monitoring*. What indicators are at our disposal to observe the threat?

In the literature, it is advocated that the answers to these questions provide analysts with an idea as to whether, and to what extent, an opponent is prepared or is preparing to act. Nevertheless, it does not provide a complete picture. An estimate of the opponent’s intentions will remain the biggest problem. Does the

⁴⁴ McCreary, “Warning Cycles,” Fall 1983, CIA/SII, 74-75.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 75-76.

⁴⁶ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 67.

⁴⁷ Britt Snider, “Congress as a User of Intelligence. Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers,” <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/98unclas/congres.html>, under heading ‘Challenges and Pitfalls.’

⁴⁸ Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” CIA/SII, Spring 1964, 10-11. Clark, “On Warning,” CIA/SII, Winter 1965, 18.

⁴⁹ Howells, “Intelligence in Crisis,” CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 8.

⁵⁰ Boatner, “The Evaluation of Intelligence,” CIA/SII, Summer 1984, 73.

opponent intend to attack, does the opponent fear we may attack, or does the opponent bluff in tacit negotiation?⁵¹ For these more elaborate questions, systematic analysis is needed (chapter 3).

A difficult warning process is the repeated warning about a gradually developing danger. Repeated warnings to the consumer give rise to the conditioning phenomenon that they can handle the danger. Analysts, however, can do more in subsequent alerts than only repeat the original alarm. They can make explicit that the danger has become more severe. If analysts label the danger unjustly – or exaggerate it – in an earlier phase, they will have difficulties to explain the evolutionary and growing gravity of the threat. It may postpone necessary action, and consequently the warning process can be transformed into a warning disaster.⁵²

Finally, the most difficult intelligence exercise is the negative warning. A negative warning means that analysts conclude there is *no* danger. This requires a thorough and detailed investigation before it can be confidently claimed that an opponent cannot attempt something that may cause a threat. A successful example of a negative warning by the allies was the analysis of the atomic bomb project by the Nazi's in the Second World War. A negative warning could be given after the Norwegian heavy water production operation was knocked out since this prevented the Nazi's from completing their vital experiments.⁵³

This discussion has illustrated the issue of warning concerning the relation between producer and consumer. We will return to this relationship in more detail in 2.4. Before this, a closer look is given to the relation between quality of reports and the intelligence organization.

2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS

What is the relation between the quality of an analysis and the organization in which the analysis is produced? In this section, some insights are presented about the secondary processes of making analyses. This section focuses on aspects that help the organization to produce reports of high quality. Furthermore, training and education are discussed.

⁵¹ Howells, "Intelligence in Crisis," CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 9-10.

⁵² McCreary, "Warning Cycles," CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 76-77. Compare also: Jones, "Some Lessons in Intelligence," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95unclas/jon.html>, under heading 'Compromise and Balance.'

⁵³ Jones, "Scientific Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1962, 76. In respect to such intelligence achievements, Jones argues that it is likely that the most successful intelligence organizations are those that employ the smallest number of individual minds with the greatest possible ability (ibid, 59-60). Concerning the aspect of size, this may, to some extent, correlate with the notion as put forward by Wilensky. He argues that the further we go from data collection to policy decision, the less knowledge and the more error may creep in (Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 81).

2.3.1 Organization and quality

In the relation between organization and quality, three issues are addressed. First, general aspects to optimize an organization are presented. Second, the limitations of such improvements are given. Third, an Israeli experience is presented. This experience is of special interest for countries with small agencies, such as the Netherlands.

To optimize the organization

Good employees are a core requirement of an agency. This implies the importance of the recruitment process. Optimizing the relationship with the academic world can potentially contribute to the secondary process to optimize quality, since it may lead to better options for recruiting employees.

Moreover, there is the issue of professionalization. In the intelligence community, it is advocated that professionalization is seen as a continuing process, not a static end. Professionalization then reflects a state of mind. The intelligence professionals accept responsibility for their own professional development. Professionalism means expertise, to master skills, to broaden your own perspective, to serve the bureaucratic clients, and to expand your awareness of how you contribute to the intelligence process.⁵⁴

In terms of the attitude of employees, the intelligence community distinguishes a link between the issue of balanced information and high quality analysis on one hand, and the issue of integrity on the other hand. Integrity refers to commitment without coercion, to deeply held priorities and values. This implies that this commitment to these values is maintained even when they go against one's self-interest to do so. In practice, this means analysts need to always speak the truth, to power bases, both within the agency and the policymakers that they serve. The issue of integrity is not restricted to the role of analysts. Organizational integrity plays a central role. This implies an organization wants to deal with problems effectively. Within the intelligence community, it is advocated that problems are brought into the open before they become too serious to manage. Subsequently managers encourage dissent and accept bad news, instead of 'shooting the messenger'. This requires constant organizational effort.⁵⁵ Organizational integrity will have a positive influence on reporting integrity, and thus on the quality of producing balanced information.

Another issue is coordination. An accurately coordinated intelligence community embodies cooperation. Important reports are the product of the contribution of all departments involved. It can be of great importance when all the resources have been brought to bear on the problem. Different points of view are evaluated. As a result, true analytical differences of opinions may occur.

⁵⁴ Allen, "The Professionalization of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1982, 29-30.

⁵⁵ Kent Pekel, "Integrity, Ethics, and the CIA," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/98unclas/integrity.html>, under headings 'Origins and Overview,' 'The Elements of Integrity,' and 'Encouraging Dissent and Accepting Bad News.'

Within the intelligence community, it is advocated that analysts should never water down their assessments to the lowest common denominator just to obtain consensus with their colleagues. If possible, a dissenter is forced to dissent within the context of a generally agreed discussion and not in a separate paper.⁵⁶ If everyone agrees on an issue, something may be wrong. Self-reflecting practitioners argue that the analytical process has potentially fallen into a 'group-think'⁵⁷ mentality. 'Differences of opinion are healthy because they force both sides to make their case on the field of intellectual battle.'⁵⁸

Another possibility to improve the quality is to commission an investigation twice for topics of a central interest. Subsequently, policymakers evaluate both reports. Thus, the possibility of overlooking or misinterpreting crucial clues of threatening developments is reduced. The different perspectives of different approaches may also lead to a better understanding of the problem in question. This would encourage competition, which is thought to have a positive effect on the quality of reports.⁵⁹ In the 1980's, both public (like the BVD) and private (like Control Risks) organizations investigated arson attacks by the Dutch anti apartheid group called RARA (9.4, footnote).

Quality of research, whether produced by a public or a private organization, is crucial for intelligence. It is possible that a small think tank working solely on the basis of open material provides more valuable information than a large and non-well functioning agency which is using classified information.⁶⁰

Sometimes, the working pressure shows a peak. Especially in times of crisis, this should not result in a decreased quality of the analyses. To cope with this

⁵⁶ Montague, "The Origins of National Intelligence Estimating," CIA/SII, page 7 of article. Watanabe, "Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/axioms.html>.

⁵⁷ Groupthink can be defined as 'a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action' (Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*, 1972, 9).

⁵⁸ Watanabe, "Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/axioms.html>.

In the USA, the intelligence community has had a positive experience with dissents. A dissent directly points the policy maker to the core of the discussion or to possible bottlenecks. Examples with a Dutch connection are "Dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence" of ORE 40-49 and "Dissent of the Intelligence Organization Department of State" of CIA/RR 6-50. These reports were respectively on the consequences of the Dutch police actions in Indonesia and the repercussions on the Netherlands of Indonesian independence (Consequences of Dutch 'Police Action' in Indonesia; ORE 40-49, 27 January 1949, CIA, 5. Repercussions on the Netherlands of Indonesian Independence; CIA/RR 6-50, 19 December 1950, CIA, 11. Not all reports necessarily have a dissent. An example of a document without a dissent is Basic Dutch-Indonesian Issues and the Linggadjati Agreement; ORE 20, 9 June 1947, Central Intelligence Group).

In the dissent of ORE 40-49, the Office of Naval Intelligence was of the opinion that the Dutch police actions strengthened the position of Indonesian extremists and communists. The position of more moderate local leaders – who were seen as more capable and more American oriented – was weakened by continuous economic and social destabilization. The Office of Naval Intelligence set its dissent in the context of the communist threat in South-East Asia (ORE 40-49, 5). Thus, the dissent focuses immediately the attention of the consumer to a crucial issue.

⁵⁹ Probst, "Triage in Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1990, 3.

⁶⁰ Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 61.

working pressure, an option is to create an intelligence reserve. Such a reserve would most likely come from annuitants and former intelligence employees.⁶¹

Finally, in the intelligence community it is claimed that unless the intelligence community tries constantly to improve its performance, it is bound to deteriorate,⁶² because the outside world is competitive, especially its opponents. The initiative for improving the impact of analysis is seen as to lie within the intelligence community itself.⁶³

Limitations of measures to improve the organization

Insights and causes, such as scandals, can lead to reorganizations. From experiences, self-reflecting practitioners claim that organizational solutions are hampered by three factors:

- Most procedural reforms tend to introduce or accent other problems.
- Changes in the analytical process will never fully transcend the ambiguity and ambivalence of information.
- More rationalized information systems cannot fully compensate for personal factors as character traits and lack of time.⁶⁴

These limitations mean that intelligence failures always will occur. If reforms are marginal, the following measures tend to be preferred:

- *On the side of the producer*: reforms that facilitate dissent and access to the consumer.
- *On the side of the consumer*: measures that facilitate skepticism and scrutiny.

Hard to realize are measures that increase the time available for reading and reflection.⁶⁵ Are there promising experiences with such organizational measures?

Review Section

In Israel, an interesting experience is made with a specific organizational measure – the installation of a so-called Review Section within the Israeli Military Intelligence Research Unit. It is presented as a relatively inexpensive way to improve the quality of reports. This Review Section – whether asked or not – comments and writes reports. The Review Section has direct access to the Director of Military Intelligence. It deals with military and non-military intelli-

⁶¹ Probst, "Triage in Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1990, 5.

⁶² Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 60.

⁶³ Donovan, "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 74.

⁶⁴ Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," CIA/SII, Fall 1979, 52, 54. A complicating factor of intelligence research is the need to make judgments before all the evidence is in (Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981,31).

⁶⁵ Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," CIA/SII, Fall 1979, 52, 54.

gence and evaluates completely independently. The Review Section does not test whether an analysis is right or wrong, but whether it is self-consistent:

1. Does the conclusion of the assessment arise from the available data?
2. Is another legitimate conclusion possible?
3. Has all relevant data been taken into account, and are the facts not taken into consideration capable of altering the product's basic premises?
4. Do the conclusions exaggerate or underrate the description of the situation?
4. Are there incongruities between two reports that deal with the same issue?⁶⁶

It is only a small step from testing the self-consistency of techniques to testing or confirming findings. Techniques can be used as: checking for representativeness; checking for researcher effects; triangulation; weighting the evidence; making contrasts/comparisons; checking the influence of outliers; using extreme cases; ruling out spurious relations; replicating a finding; checking out rival explanations; looking for negative evidence; or getting feedback from informants.⁶⁷

The Review Section also examines problems of the intelligence gathering process. It scrutinizes unpublished analyses. The Review Section investigates the accuracy of an analysis concerning the intentions and preparedness to act by an opponent. Often, the Review Section examines the issue from a different angle. In addition, it may play the role of the devil's advocate to comment on an assessment. Despite this, it rarely makes use of this role and instead tends to produce vigorous responses while ignoring the Review Section's elements that cast real doubt on the original assessment. The role of the devil's advocacy may erode the value and credibility of the Review Section.

Furthermore, the Review Section has become an instrument for the expression of minority and dissent opinions by other analysts who do not want to present a written dissent themselves. The Review Section may include these viewpoints in its reports. Intelligence officers who have such a dissent or minority opinion are thus less vulnerable, but their viewpoints are still transmitted to higher echelons. The important point is that the adverse view be heard.⁶⁸ It prevents the 'group think' scenario.⁶⁹ The creation of a Review Section is more explicitly focused on the quality of reports than the role of a quality manager or a Staff Department Quality Control.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Shmuel, "The Imperative of Criticism," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 65-69.

⁶⁷ Miles & Huberman, *Quality Data Analysis*, 1984, 230-243.

⁶⁸ Shmuel, "The Imperative of Criticism," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 65-69. Compare: Cohen, "Early Warning Systems," CIA/SII, Fall 1989, 30.

⁶⁹ Compare: Russ Travers, "The Coming Intelligence Failure," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/failure.html>, under heading 'Essential Overlap.' For more on the limitations of a devil's advocate, see also: Brady, "Intelligence Failures," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1993, 92-93.

⁷⁰ After the reorganization in 1990, the BVD appointed a quality manager. A Staff Directorate Quality Control is advocated in: Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 31. Until 1998, the quality manager was part of D6 (Directorate 6) of the BVD. In 1999, this directorate was renamed as the Management Directorate (Directie Bedrijfsvoering). The main difference is that in this new directorate a new division is added: the Division Registration, Documentation, and Archive (Besluit

However, the creation of a Review Section has some disadvantages. Its criticism may lead to outbursts. This effect is tempered by the Review Section addressing the top in addition to criticizing papers, rather than people. Sometimes, officers who reacted against criticism by the Review Section on their report congratulate it for expressing their own criticism of a colleague's product. The overall experience with the Review Section is said to be a positive one.⁷¹

In addition to improving the organization or introducing a Review Section, there is another type of measure that can have positive effects on the quality of reports – training and education. The following section focuses on this.

2.3.2 Training and education

The preparation of employees through education is crucial. It affects directly their capabilities needed for the primary processes of analysis. In addition, training (on the job) is a vehicle for improvement.⁷²

The possibility for training and education should not be limited to analysts only. A broader accessibility – such as research and university level studies – will lead to a general improvement of the quality of the political and societal debate on this issue.

Training and education – its availability, and how it can be organized – belong to the secondary processes of the intelligence analysis. It is assumed, these secondary processes can have a positive effect on the quality of intelligence.

Education

In the Netherlands, possibilities for education in the field of intelligence are limited. Contrary to the USA, it is not possible to obtain an academic degree in this field. A first step – to develop a bibliography – is slowly developing. While there are a few academic subjects available there are no faculty based academic programs offered. In the absence of such an academic program, there is no place where the teaching of intelligence is consigned as part of a broader framework within a discipline, or as an interdisciplinary subject matter on its own. The Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA), founded in 1991, recognizes the need for academic research and education in the field of intelligence.⁷³

organisatorische inrichting BVD 1996, *Staatscourant*, 1996, no. 124, 8; Besluit organisatorische inrichting BVD 1998, *Staatscourant*, 1998, no. 87, 9. Besluit organisatorische inrichting BVD 1999, *Staatscourant*, 1999, no. 17, 52).

⁷¹ Shmuel, "The Imperative of Criticism," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 69-70.

⁷² Cremeans, "The Agency and the Future," CIA/SII, Spring 1970, 87. Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 59.

⁷³ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Hun crisis was de onze niet*, 1994, 7 and 135.

Course material

In the literature – including those outside the Dutch context – there are many gaps, preventing intelligence studies from becoming a fully developed discipline. This especially is the case with conceptual and analytical publications. Almost absent in the Netherlands are materials such as case studies, simulations, or adjunct expertise. Nor are there readers that combine essays and case studies. Intelligence war games are absent, at least publicly. Also lacking are grants and fellowships for graduated students interested in intelligence.⁷⁴

Despite this, promising initiatives and developments – focused on organizing professional and/or academic conferences. In particular, NISA was successful, for example, in organizing, November 1999, an international SIGINT-conference, an international conference on peacekeeping and intelligence in November 2002, and on German-Dutch intelligence relations in 2005.⁷⁵ These initiatives led also to the first (informal) network of experts – working or retired – of intelligence and academic professionals. In related fields, more mature networks do already exist, as SISWO – the Dutch institute for social sciences that hosts platforms where experts and academics exchange experiences and insights. Former head of the BVD, Doctors van Leeuwen, for example, participated in SISWO's public administration network.

In the Netherlands, the state of affairs in relation to academic development and support is poor. Recommendations relating to this will be made in chapter 14. In this section, the discussion focuses on the relationship between organizational aspects and quality of reports. In the following section, another context of intelligence is presented – the politics in which intelligence functions.

2.4 POLITICAL CONTEXT

What is the political (or corporate) context of intelligence? Intelligence is not an entity on its own. Intelligence functions as part of a political or corporate system. For a good understanding of intelligence and security agency reports, some attention is paid to the relation between intelligence and politics.⁷⁶

One issue is the reception of a report. As such, the reception of a report is not a main clue of the quality of such a report. Yet, when this is presented in combination with the expectations producers and consumers have of each other, a better understanding is obtained of the context in which reports are dissemi-

⁷⁴ - , "Teaching Intelligence," CIA/SII, Winter 1982, 49-50.

⁷⁵ SIGINT-conference 'The Importance of SIGINT in Western Europe in the Cold War' 27 November 1999, hosted by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association. The conference on 'Peacekeeping and Intelligence. Lessons for the future?' of 15/16 November 2002, was organized by both NISA and the Netherlands Defense College.

⁷⁶ Comparable Dutch information on this issue is absent. To discuss this issue, sources from within the (American) intelligence community were chosen, in order to also include the insights and demands of this community.

nated. High quality analysis is one issue, but a good understanding and communication is also needed for a more likely chance that this high quality analysis functions as a support for decision-making. In 2.4.1, attention is paid to aspects that are mainly related to understanding and communication.

However, there is a need to highlight another issue – political control and its relationship with legislative power (2.4.2). The way control is carried out will not only have its effect on the quality of the intelligence community, it may also have consequences for the budget.

A final issue is the relation between openness and quality (2.4.3). This relationship goes further than just a constitutional (or political) debate. There is also a technical aspect to this debate. The relation between openness and quality will be dealt with in a separate – the final – section.

These issues relate, albeit in a remote way, to the quality of reports. The context, in which intelligence functions, influences the quality of the analysis.

2.4.1 Relation producer and consumer

As noted, the relationship between intelligence and politics is an important one. Politics are a main consumer of reports. Insight and understanding into each other's world are needed for an optimal interaction between producers and consumers of intelligence and security agency reports.⁷⁷

Starting points in the relation intelligence-politics

High quality information may lead to high quality intelligence. High quality intelligence may help to produce good policy. Nevertheless, the connections are highly mediated.⁷⁸ In the literature on intelligence, it is argued that the increased importance of intelligence is not matched by an increased understanding of what it is or how it may and should be used to improve decision-making.⁷⁹ High quality analyses to some extent can only compensate for weaknesses of policy-making. Self-reflecting practitioners expect that intelligence is likely to feature many of the characteristics of the society or environment in which it is embedded. Likewise, poor intelligence can sometimes ruin a policy that would otherwise succeed.⁸⁰

Intelligence is a dependent phenomenon. In practice, intelligence is a junior partner of policy.⁸¹ Intelligence is a prerequisite for an effective policy or strategy, but it never is a substitute. In the absence of an effective policy, even

⁷⁷ It is about the distinction between the mode of calculation and the locus of decision. The locus of decision is on exchange and bargaining – aimed at correcting error and securing agreement, and administered by reacting to other actors rather than sending orders and expecting obedience (Wildavsky, *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*, 1987, 123).

⁷⁸ Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 18.

⁷⁹ -, "Intelligence and Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1980, 9.

⁸⁰ Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 19.

⁸¹ Donovan, "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 64.

the best intelligence will be of no avail.⁸² High quality intelligence will at most contribute to a higher quality of the political analysis or of the political debate. It can however, prevent the use of unsound arguments, and help to indicate where positions are internally contradictory or where they rest on biased or mistaken readings of the evidence.⁸³ Within the intelligence community, it is accepted that a decision maker has the right to disregard the advice of intelligence, because of additional considerations. It is the responsibility of decision makers to evaluate them all and to introduce their personal priorities.⁸⁴ This shows the limited latitude of intelligence. In this context, the relation between the BVD and policymakers has been described as follows.

‘It is the task of the Agency to warn, to inform, and to advise; after that, it is up to the responsible authorities – primary administration, legislator, Public Prosecutor, and investigative bodies – to take steps they consider to be necessary on the basis of the advices presented by the BVD.’⁸⁵

A self-image of intelligence is that of a body presenting information as objectively as possible to policymakers. Referring to this image, an agency would be able to supply policymakers with less biased information than, for example, pressure groups.⁸⁶ Yet, in politics and in intelligence similar processes can occur. For example, the pressure for corporate intelligence consensus is not likely to differ from the pressure for corporate policy consensus.⁸⁷ Also like politics, the intelligence community is not monolithic. There are a wide range of views on virtually every issue. Internal debates may be fierce and brutal.⁸⁸ This makes the type of conspiracy theories as advanced by the Dutch journalist Rudie van Meurs unlikely.⁸⁹ Within the intelligence community, it is also felt that other similarities with politics include the sharing of risks and incremental steps and that intelligence is marked by delay.⁹⁰ A problem occurs when intelligence becomes politicized. It has been warned that politicization has a profound impact on the morale of analysts and managers alike. It may foster distortions in analyses.⁹¹ The (self) image of providers of objective information does not mean agencies and their analyses are free of bias (see 4.1.1).

⁸² Laquer “The Future of Intelligence,” CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 57.

⁸³ Jervis, “Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy,” CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 27.

⁸⁴ Gazit, “Intelligence Estimates and the Decisionmaker,” CIA/SII, Fall 1988, 32.

⁸⁵ *Lower House*, session 1991-1992, 22463, no. 3, 7.

⁸⁶ Compare: Whitman, “On Estimating Reactions,” CIA/SII, Summer 1965, 2, 4.

⁸⁷ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 63.

⁸⁸ Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” CIA/SII, Fall 1987, 30.

⁸⁹ Van Meurs, *De BVD*, 1978. The position of Van Meurs not being valid seems to be supported by, for example, the discussion raised by former head of the intelligence unit of the police forces at Zaanstad Sjoerd Bos. Bos criticized the methods used (10.2.2 footnote; also 13.1.1). Furthermore, according to unconfirmed reports, the internal course of the BVD was the object of fierce internal discussions (*de Volkskrant*, 11 March 1992).

⁹⁰ Gries, “New Links Between Intelligence and Policy,” CIA/SII, Summer 1990, 4.

⁹¹ Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” CIA/SII, Spring 1992, 2. For more: Handel, “The Politics of Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1987, 6 ff. Politicization of intelligence: ‘the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgment in order to please political authorities’ (Greenberg & Haas, “Making Intelligence Smarter,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Summer 1996, 139).

Different worlds of expectations

Politicians and members of the intelligence community often suppose they speak the same language. Some reflective intelligence practitioners think this is a misconception. They think more attention on different positions, interests, and ways of working will lead to a better understanding of each other's world. First, the most common mutual reproaches are evaluated. Second, issues are discussed that give a better understanding of each other's world.

The producer

The producer is normally someone from the intelligence community. The consumer may be a policy maker. Colleagues of the producer may also be the consumers of intelligence and security agency reports. The larger the intelligence community is, the more often consumers are from within the intelligence community. Producers know their own way of working. Sometimes, consumers criticize this way of working. Without being exhaustive, some of the main points are discussed.

One reproach is that intelligence fails to reduce uncertainty concerning future developments. This reproach is seen as not correct when the reports contain an accurate analysis of possible future developments. A high quality report is not an oracular prophecy, but an estimate – an analytical judgment resting carefully on defined and clarified assumptions.

Another reproach is that intelligence restricts the options of policymakers. This is seen as not true when an accurate analysis shows that the policymakers indeed have no elbow room to maneuver. The reproach is given when analysts are unaware of the real objectives of a policy. For example, a certain regime will not be forced to bring about changes through oil sanctions. An agency draws these as correct conclusions. Still, government decides to impose these sanctions. The sanctions, though unsatisfactory in terms of direct effects, are a strong signal, without endangering worrisome consequences. They are imposed to satisfy the popular need to express the nation's sense of outrage. In this case, domestic considerations are the dominant objective, not the overthrow of a foreign regime. If analysts are focused on analyzing the foreign aspect, they cannot be expected to consider these domestic considerations.

Furthermore, government and an agency may differ in opinion. Policymakers may sense that their policy is undermined.

Another problem occurs if a report containing ambiguous intelligence evidence reaches the public. It may provoke a public controversy. In general, policymakers are not happy with this kind of situation. They fear that the public debate will lead – concerning the threats – to selecting a worst-case scenario. In addition, intelligence and security agency reports often contain vague concepts and descriptions. This may be caused by a weak analysis, but it may also be

caused by uncertainty concerning future developments. Controversies and vagueness make life for policymakers more difficult.⁹²

Finally, some reports are windy. It does happen that producers want to demonstrate their knowledge while policymakers with their overburdened agenda want a terse report. Sometimes, it is best that producers write that no new developments worth mentioning took place.⁹³

*The consumer*⁹⁴

Reproaches by producers against consumers – especially policymakers – partly overlap the issues already mentioned. Yet, the approach differs. Intelligence practitioners mention the following reproaches.

A first reproach is that consumers fear the unknown and uncertain.⁹⁵ It is argued that decision makers also do not want to be reminded of their limited capacity to influence events.⁹⁶

Another reproach is that consumers use intelligence as an instrument of public persuasion. Producers fear such action may lead to security breaches. This reproach was heard, for example, after president John F. Kennedy unveiled to the UN photographic intelligence on the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.⁹⁷

According to Robert Gates (USA Director of Central Intelligence, 1991-1993) the usual response of policymakers to intelligence when there are disagreements or when they find situations unpalatable, is

‘to ignore it; sometimes he will characterize it as incomplete, too narrowly focused, or incompetent (and sometimes rightly so); and occasionally he will charge that it is “cooked” – that it reflects a CIA bias.

[...]

Policymakers have always liked intelligence that supported what they want to do, and they often try to influence the analysis to buttress the conclusions they want to reach. They ask carefully phrased questions, they sometimes withhold information; they broaden or narrow the issue; on rare occasions, they even try to intimidate.’⁹⁸

⁹² Heymann, “The Intelligence – Policy Relationship,” CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 61-65. See also: Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage,” *Intelligence and National Security*, May 1986, 215-216.

⁹³ Such reports do exist. In 1985, for example, the ministry of Defense informed the ministry of Foreign Affairs and several intelligence authorities. The text on new developments was ‘concerning the Middle East in general and the Lebanon in particular, no new relevant developments took place the last weeks’ (Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1975-1984, 902, File 3757. Official secret coded message from ministry of Defense to Foreign Affairs, 10 April 1985). It is a perfect example of a succinct report.

⁹⁴ The BVD makes a distinction between consumers and a target group. The BVD provides this last group uninvited with information (*Lower House*, session 1990-1991, 21819, no. 5, 2).

⁹⁵ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 65.

⁹⁶ Heymann, “The Intelligence – Policy Relationship,” CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 62.

⁹⁷ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 66. For more, see also Heymann, “The Intelligence – Policy Relationship,” CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 64-66.

⁹⁸ Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” CIA/SII, Fall 1987, 33-35. For more, see 2.4 ‘Reaction by policymakers.’

Another complaint of producers is that policymakers see intelligence as a tool to make policy look good, instead as a tool for making good policy. If this is the case, it is difficult for an agency to correct the misuse of intelligence, because it is then vulnerable to being criticized as disclosing classified information.⁹⁹ This issue is of interest for the case study on the BVD. On the one hand, former minister of Home Affairs Ed. van Thijn denied that the Dutch peace organization Stop the Neutron Bomb was the object of investigation by the BVD. On the other hand, the BVD called Stop the Neutron Bomb a communist front organization. Van Thijn said to have read the BVD-report in which Stop the Neutron Bomb actually was the object of investigation.¹⁰⁰

Another reproach concerns the unwillingness or inability of policymakers to spend enough time on longer-range issues, or in helping to guide or direct an agency's long-term efforts. As policymakers run the country for a shorter period than analysts work at an agency, the intelligence community thinks these policymakers are more biased towards solutions of acute crises.¹⁰¹

A last reproach is implicitly mentioned in the one above: most policymakers fail to give the intelligence community the guidance and the feedback it needs.¹⁰² This issue is repeatedly claimed in articles by intelligence employees. They argue that decision makers are responsible for guiding the activities of the intelligence system subordinate to them. Yet, these employees feel that decision makers often fail to inform their subordinate networks.¹⁰³

Insight in and understanding for each other's world

Reproaches from both parties stem from differences in the role they play and the unfamiliarity – sometimes even incomprehension – with the role, the other party plays. The intelligence community is part of the permanent administration. Politicians play a transient role. Agencies are not so willing to advocate a certain policy.¹⁰⁴

According to some authors, the distinctions stem not only from the difference in position, but also from differences in personality. To explore this more deeply some characteristics of both groups are discussed to draw attention to the features of an ideal type. Although generalizations are hazardous, an insight in some common differences may further a better understanding.¹⁰⁵

The view of policymakers is perceived like the view from a bridge. Their approach is decision oriented, decisive, and confident, rather than avoiding making a decision, contemplative, and reflective. In this ideal type characteriza-

⁹⁹ Hamilton, "View from the Hill," CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 68.

¹⁰⁰ For an evaluation, see: 11.3.2.

¹⁰¹ Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," Fall 1987, CIA/SII, 33.

¹⁰² Gries, "New Links Between Intelligence and Policy," Summer 1990, CIA/SII, 5.

¹⁰³ Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decisionmaker," Fall 1988, CIA/SII, 36.

¹⁰⁴ Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues," CIA/SII, Summer 1992, 13.

¹⁰⁵ Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 23. Gardiner, "Dealing with Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1989, 1. Heymann, "The Intelligence – Policy Relationship," CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 60.

tion, policymakers have a strong interest in the success of their policies. Policymakers find themselves perpetually embattled with criticism. This attitude does not contribute to an enthusiastic breeding ground for reflection or for ambiguous intelligence and security agency reports. Apart from this, policymakers are – because of their position – more vulnerable to mistakes than intelligence employees are. Policymakers are in the center of the political game, an agency is more on the side. They use intelligence for bureaucratic power games. They pay a lot of attention to negotiations, making concessions, and maneuvering. Policymakers judge intelligence for its value to describe developments, to comment alternatives, to estimate obstacles, and to enhance their influence.

In contrast, the ideal characteristics of analysts are generally contemplative, who examine an issue extensively, and avoid making decisions that call for action. They avoid oversimplification, and believe the real world is ambiguous and uncertain. Only rarely, a judgment indicates a course of action. By effect, if not intent, they will often convey caution, if not indecision. Intelligence and security agency reports often warn in a way that impedes making a decision. In their reports, analysts do not tell so much, what will happen, but they represent what policymakers should worry about most of all. Yet, policymakers want confidence. This way of reporting is a cause for tension for policymakers who want to act quickly. Policymakers want to influence a situation. Only on rare occasions, the position of policymakers towards decisiveness is parallel to intelligence impulses. For policymakers, politics is highly personalized. Analysts, on the contrary, tend to identify themselves with the problems.¹⁰⁶ An understanding of such differences will improve linking expectations.

In an American study on the thinking of policymakers, some trends were found. There are, generally spoken, differences in the approaches of issues policymakers and analysts have to deal with. Policymakers think in the here-and-now and are thinking about or taking action. Their period is almost open ended and they will seldom completely give up a goal. They keep open as many options as they can. Policymakers are more likely to aim at incremental changes than at sweeping ones.

Analysts, on the contrary, are much less comfortable with incompatible objectives. Analysts break apart the goals of policymakers into achievable sub-goals and sets priorities. This way of setting goals is complicated when many goals and linkages are involved. In such cases, they want to identify possible incompatibilities and sacrifice some goals for others. At the same time, they prefer to focus on the big picture, the future possibilities, and the abstract patterns and principles that underlie and explain facts.

¹⁰⁶ Gardiner, "Dealing with Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1989, 6. Heymann, "The Intelligence – Policy Relationship," CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 60. Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 23. Whitman, "On Estimating Reactions," CIA/SII, Summer 1965, 5-6. Gardiner, "Squaring the Circle," *Intelligence and National Security*, January 1991, 141-143. For more: Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," *Intelligence and National Security*, July 1988, 263 ff.

Both groups tend to attract and reward contrasting clusters of personality and cognitive traits. The strength of policymakers is they understand how to use bureaucratic procedures to accomplish their plans. Analysts tend to be critics who often disclose flaws in current policy solutions of the policymakers they are serving.¹⁰⁷

For analysts it is important to know when policymakers are receptive for information and analysis. Issues often evolve through four stages. In the first stage, the issue exists as part of the portfolio of analysts, but it does not affect policymakers. In the second stage, the issue has become relevant to policymakers, but they do not yet make a decision. Policymakers are most open to factual intelligence and to analysis that stimulates ideas about how to respond. In the third stage, policymakers have made up their position and viewpoint. Their interest in information and analysis is now narrowed to only that which immediately informs them on the implications and prospects of their decision. The fourth stage concerns the implementation of the policy. Analysts whose reports cast doubt on the success of the implemented policy become part of the enemy camp. The most suitable stage for analysts to promote ideas is at the second stage.¹⁰⁸

Analysts are likely to be effective if they present information in such a way that it meets the need of policymakers. To do so, analysts need to be oriented toward policy and action. Above all, their intelligence is just one input of information policymakers receive.¹⁰⁹ The above insights – sometimes presented as generalizations – may promote a better understanding. They do not say anything on the *quality* of a report, but rather focus on communication and understanding. High quality is the central issue of this study, but good communication and understanding is needed to ensure that the interaction between producers and consumers is of the highest quality.

Traditionalist and activist approach

In the above, the relation between the producer and consumer was described from the perspective of understanding. A last aspect of this issue concerns the discussion between traditionalists and activists.

There are two views concerning the relationship between intelligence consumers and producers. These two views are presented here as ideal types. The first group – the traditionalists – advocates responding to specific requests for data and analysis rather than initiating direct interaction with consumers. This means the consumer identifies the desire or need for intelligence. Traditionalists tend to present descriptive factual background information from which policymakers have to draw implications. They want to protect their objectivity.

¹⁰⁷ Gardiner, "Dealing with Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1989, 3-5.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹⁰⁹ Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 73-74.

The second group – the activists – advocate a closer working relationship between producers and consumers through the development of a two-way flow of information and feedback. Activists are of this opinion because they think this is needed to provide consumers with relevant reports and analyses. Activists routinely want to appraise the consumer's reaction to reports and constantly be aware of new consumer problems. They also want to monitor reactions after a policy decision has been reached. Generally, activists pay more attention to the presentation.¹¹⁰

Activists reproach traditionalists as they – because of their strict independence – provide intelligence irrelevant to policymakers' actual problems. In addition, activists think intelligence failures are more easily corrected.¹¹¹ In turn, traditionalists argue that activists may put too much effort in serving policy well. By striving too hard in this direction, intelligence may become another policy, and an unwanted one at that.¹¹² Too much identification with policy may lead to a situation where analysts ignore facts and dangers that stand in contradiction to that policy.¹¹³ Activists say this danger can be coped with by giving policymakers inconvenient information and if responsible intelligence officers do not act in this way, they lack sufficient backbone and are not worthy of their position.¹¹⁴

Whatever the view is, one opinion seems undisputed. Intelligence analysts inexperienced in political and bureaucratic processes are likely to be at a disadvantage.¹¹⁵ The discussion between traditionalist and activist is useful in thinking about how intelligence can be served best. In the following section, the relation between producer and consumer is shifted towards another relation between intelligence and politics – that of the legislative power on the side of politics.

2.4.2 Intelligence and the legislative power

In the relationship between producer and consumer – as a part of the political system – the consumer is largely representative of the executive power. In this section, attention is paid to another relationship – the relationship between the intelligence community and the legislative power.

In nearly all countries, the intelligence community has the closest links with the executive power – the government. Governments are not only the main consumers of intelligence; they also monitor and determine the policy of the agencies. The situation in the Netherlands is likewise.

In some countries – such as Australia, Canada, and the United States – the legislative power holds a stronger position concerning the intelligence commu-

¹¹⁰ - , "Intelligence and Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1980, 11-13. Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, 73, 75, 85.

¹¹¹ - , "Intelligence and Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1980, 14-15.

¹¹² Heymann, "The Intelligence – Policy Relationship," CIA/SII, Winter 1984, 66.

¹¹³ Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decisionmaker," CIA/SII, Fall 1988, 38-39.

¹¹⁴ Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 61.

¹¹⁵ Gries, "Intelligence in the 1990s," CIA/SII, Spring 1991, 10-11.

nity. In the mid-seventies, these changes took place in the United States because of a series of affairs. These changes did not only concern control, but also budgeting and reports. The reforms carried out led to satisfaction both at the CIA and with the politicians. The outcomes may be of interest for the Dutch situation. It may be a source of information to reconsider the limited role of Dutch parliament in intelligence matters.

Need of oversight

There is a need to control agencies. First, agencies that are not controlled by legislative bodies or the public may pose a threat to peace and civil freedoms.¹¹⁶ Second – and this argument fits with the American political tradition – agencies need public support, participation and cooperation of the legislative to carry out their assignment.¹¹⁷ Third, a vigorous oversight prevents problems accumulating.¹¹⁸ William H. Webster, director of the CIA from 1987 until 1991, placed emphasis on the need for control by the legislative power.¹¹⁹ A continuing process defines and redefines the value our society expects to be applied by its institutions.¹²⁰

What is supervised?

Supervision covers both the quality of intelligence and possible abuses.¹²¹ Abuse refers to issues such as the use of illegal means, to achieve illegitimate goals, and fraud. Quality is related to the effectiveness and efficiency of an administration. It refers to issues as the effectiveness of spending the budget and the quality of the activities of agencies.¹²²

In the American experience, the active role of the legislative led to the establishment of a detailed and, to a large degree, public legal code for the conduct of intelligence activities.¹²³ The oversight included the covert action program and hearings on the budget.¹²⁴ Notwithstanding, a member of the legislative may not want to know too many details of a particular intelligence operation, in order to avoid moral ambiguities and deeply troubling decisions.¹²⁵

Results of the intensified oversight and cooperation

In the American experience, the intensified oversight by the legislative power resulted in some benefits for the intelligence community. Because of the interest

¹¹⁶ Kalugin, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 39.

¹¹⁷ -, "Congress, Oversight and the U.S. Intelligence Community," CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 49.

¹¹⁸ Nedzi, "Oversight or Overlook," CIA/SII, Summer 1974, 17. Compare: 13.1.1.

¹¹⁹ Webster, "With Fidelity to the Constitution," CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 85.

¹²⁰ Knott, "Secrecy and Intelligence in a Free Society," CIA/SII, Summer 1975, 1.

¹²¹ Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 54.

¹²² -, "Congress, Oversight and the U.S. Intelligence Community," CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 41-42.

¹²³ Silver, "The CIA and the Law," CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 52.

¹²⁴ Hamilton, "View from the Hill," CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 67.

¹²⁵ Nedzi, "Oversight or Overlook," CIA/SII, Summer 1974, 18.

in the agencies, their annual budgets grew faster for a number of years than, for example, the budget of the Department of Defense. Moreover, there was a growth in requests for analytical briefings and publications. The need for high quality intelligence was accepted. Furthermore, the agencies are now firmly planted in American society.¹²⁶

Another effect is a shift in the balance of power on international security issues between the executive and legislative, in favor of the legislative. The growing role of the legislator adds stress to the relationship between the agencies and the government. The legislator is better informed on international security issues because of information and assessments by the intelligence community. Now both parties – the executive and legislative – obtain intelligence and security agency reports, which may enhance the quality of the political debate.¹²⁷ Furthermore, ‘because Congress has access to intelligence, it has sometimes managed to avoid irrational legislative responses to world events, responses that would have created serious diplomatic problems for the incumbent administration.’¹²⁸ Agencies gained independence from the executive. They are poised nearly equidistant between the executive and legislative.¹²⁹

To guard against side effects

Some problems may occur because of the intensified role of the legislative. Already mentioned is the extra stress on the relationship between the intelligence community and the administration. Another issue is secrecy. In the new situation, more people have access to classified documents. There is a need for a proper discretion in the handling of classified information.¹³⁰ It appears that the executive has leaks more often than the legislative. A third issue to avoid is the micro management of intelligence programs. ‘Because oversight committee members rarely have the time to address a full range of intelligence issues, the tendency to concentrate on single issues is strong, and in some cases the temptation to become involved in day-to-day management of these issues is irresistible.’ The system seems to work best when these two functions – control and management – are kept separate.¹³¹

Improved supervision does not necessarily lead in all cases to more clarity. Criticism for example may be, dictated by party political considerations.¹³² Criticism may also be only lip service, but such problems already occur in situations where there is only a limited control.¹³³

¹²⁶ Gries, “The CIA and Congress,” CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 78-79.

¹²⁷ Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” CIA/SII, Fall 1987, 31-32.

¹²⁸ Britt Snider, “Congress as a User of Intelligence,”
<http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/98unclas/congres.html>, heading ‘The Impact of Intelligence Sharing.’

¹²⁹ Gates, “The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” CIA/SII, Fall 1987, 31-32.

¹³⁰ Maury, “CIA and the Congress,” CIA/SII, Summer 1974, 1.

¹³¹ Gries, “The CIA and Congress,” CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 81.

¹³² Laqueur, “The Future of Intelligence,” CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 55.

¹³³ An example preceding the improved oversight concerns the role of the CIA in Laos during the Vietnam War. Some members of the legislative publicly criticized that the CIA should had put a stop

The positive experience of the intensified oversight does not mean affairs will belong to the past. To work on the quality of the intelligence community and its products is a continuous process, and not a static goal.

In this section, the need for adequate control by the legislative and the fear of leaks was addressed. This implies a certain relation between quality (by adequate control) and openness (by leaks). This goes beyond the direct relationship between intelligence community and politics and is therefore discussed separately in section 2.4.

2.4.3 Openness, secrecy, and quality

There is a continuous debate about the dichotomy openness/secrecy. This discussion is not only of importance for the acceptance of intelligence, for the possibility of third parties to use it, or to control the quality of the intelligence products, but also for the relation between quality and openness.

The dichotomy quality - openness goes beyond the context of the relationship intelligence - to politics. Actually, there are two discussions on the issue of openness and quality - a technical one, and a constitutional one. Before these two discussions are dealt with, a discussion about what has to be kept secret and what can be public is presented.

In the 'Studies in Intelligence', it is argued that the matters that need to be kept secret must be reduced to a minimum. The underlying idea is that when everything is classified, then nothing is classified. When material not worthy of being withheld for the public is classified, it devalues the case for secrecy about truly sensitive data. The fewer the secrets are, the more serious the real secrets will be protected.

A complicating factor is that a government may keep documents secret for its own interest. A government may stifle debate, protect itself from embarrassment, or carry out a policy or program that will not win parliamentary or public support.¹³⁴

The use of the term 'security' is alone an inadequate base for a secrecy classification system.¹³⁵ Superfluous secrecy can be seen as a habit, not as culture.¹³⁶ The call for more openness is not only limited to society, but also advocated within agencies. It meets the demand of society for more freedom of

to it long ago. Privately, some of these members congratulated this agency for having done an effective job (Maury, "CIA and the Congress," CIA/SII, Summer 1974, 6).

¹³⁴ Knott, "Secrecy and Intelligence in a Free Society," CIA/SII, Summer 1975, 5. Hamilton, "View from the Hill," CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 72. Graham, "Secrecy and the Press," CIA/SII, Winter 1988, 17. Kalugin, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 38-39.

¹³⁵ Knott, "Secrecy and Intelligence in a Free Society," CIA/SII, Summer 1975, 2.

¹³⁶ 'The "culture" of secrecy, so often given as an explanation for the continued classification of information, is less a culture than a habit. It could be quickly changed by strong, emphatic leadership.' Quote in foreword written by Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers Univ.), Chair, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the U.S. Department of State in: "The Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the U.S. Department of State," *Perspectives, American Historical Association Newsletter*, Vol. 36 No. 1 January 1998, 41.

information.¹³⁷ Intelligence spreads more into the political, the economic, and the societal arenas. If intelligence analyses on such problems are communicated, the public can understand and support necessary programs in order to manage and solve them. Therefore, more information will be shared with more people.¹³⁸

A more normative argument is that openness is the main advantage that democracy has over totalitarianism.¹³⁹ Katharine Graham – who was the publisher (1969-1979) of *The Washington Post* – said: ‘The record of history shows that a government that operates in secrecy, hidden from scrutiny, shielded from examination, is neither accountable nor ultimately faithful to the people it exists to serve.’¹⁴⁰ This does not mean you have to inform the public about everything, but rather which matters have to be, or not, kept secret.

Secrecy

In our society, relationships of secrecy and confidentiality are accepted, as in lawyer-client or doctor-patient relations.¹⁴¹ While agencies also know relationships of secrecy, the position of these relationships is different. The ultimate goal is more abstract.

To understand the need for secrecy, a difference is made between the information itself and the way this information was obtained. Source protection is crucial, and it is a recurring issue in pleas for secrecy. Sometimes, information stems only from a single source. In that case, the release of information may endanger the source. Often, the authentication of this source gives authority and credibility to the intelligence and security agency report. This is important in case of public controversy. However, it is exactly in these kinds of cases that it is more likely a report is leaked. If an error has been made in the judgment of protecting a source, it may become harder to attract additional sources. Sources do not want to run any risk. Furthermore, an agency should take into consideration that – if the channel through which the information is obtained is disclosed – an opponent may manipulate the information. Source protection and protection of method generally are legitimate and reasonable, but they may also be pushed too far.¹⁴² While it is advocated that operations should be kept secret, it is the principles and the way an agency is directed and controlled that should be discussed.¹⁴³

Opinions differ concerning what has to be kept secret. The opinions presented are from ‘Studies in Intelligence.’ The American tradition is generally

¹³⁷ Donnalley, “Declassification in an Open Society,” CIA/SII, Fall 1974, 18.

¹³⁸ Colby, “Intelligence in the 1980s,” CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 36.

¹³⁹ For this, Kalugin quotes Turner in: Kalugin, “Intelligence and Foreign Policy,” CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 39.

¹⁴⁰ Graham, “Secrecy and the Press,” CIA/SII, Winter 1988, 21.

¹⁴¹ Warner, “Where Secrecy is Essential,” CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 45.

¹⁴² - , “The Reports Officer,” CIA/SII, Spring 1983, 15-16. Donnalley, “Declassification in an Open Society,” CIA/SII, Fall 1974, 12.

¹⁴³ Compare with remarks made by Knott in: “Secrecy and Intelligence in a Free Society,” CIA/SII, Summer 1975, 3.

more aimed at openness than the Dutch – but the Dutch are not the most closed European country on this issue. In the mid-1970's, the CIA protected employees working abroad (and those in line for such assignments in the future), agents, current methods to obtain information, information dealing with cryptography and crypto-analysis, details of the processing and analysis of information, and finished intelligence publications. The security adviser under president Kennedy – McGeorge Bundy – identified six classes of secrets: defense information, current diplomatic negotiations, covert activity abroad, covert collection of information, material whose capacity for international embarrassment outweighs its value for informing the public, and legitimate secrets relating to the process by which the cabinet makes a decision.¹⁴⁴ The issues and aspects to be kept secret are subject of a continuing discussion, also within the Dutch intelligence community.

Openness

In the discussion on secrecy and openness, different views were advocated based upon different assumptions. In the 1970's there was a trend towards almost complete openness. This trend was based on the following assumptions:

- An agency can function – and even better – in a democratic society under the supervision of outside officials.
- The disclosure of secrets by leaking is part of an unofficial system of checks and balances.
- There is no fundamental clash between secrecy and the right to know.
- It is usually more important to protect the citizen against intelligence abuses than to shield agencies against its opponents.

These assumptions put emphasis on the value of freedom. It is also assumed that there is no immediate danger.¹⁴⁵

There are other reasons to advocate openness. Former director of the CIA – William E. Colby – wanted, as a starting point, reports to be made public and then determined the best way to do this. He argued that the advantage of releasing reports is the additional expertise that is gained from independent and external criticism. Academic experts, political advocates, media, and even foreigners will point out aspects of the assessment that appears faulty from their point of view. It will raise the standard of intelligence products, and make them more reliable and useful.¹⁴⁶ From a slightly different angle, Ben-Israel argues that the intelligence community as a closed society is potentially a major obstacle to the development of intelligence

¹⁴⁴ Donnalley, "Declassification in an Open Society," CIA/SII, Fall 1974, 13-14. Concerning this last point, Donnalley referred to the president of the USA. However, the Netherlands has a parliamentary democracy, instead of a presidential one.

¹⁴⁵ Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," Spring 1986, CIA/SII, 50.

¹⁴⁶ Colby, "Intelligence in the 1980s," CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 38.

theory.¹⁴⁷ These theories are helpful in producing accurate estimates, and improving forecasts (3.1 and 3.2.3).

In some cases, secrecy may be superfluous, because the information needed is openly available. In most cases, this applies to economic information needed for policy formulation.¹⁴⁸ Even if detailed economic information is needed, this is often available. In the case study on the Shipping Research Bureau – the first case study (chapters 6, 7 and 8) – the South African government took a series of measures to try to keep data on oil supplies secret. While oil-traders manipulated the data, the Shipping Research Bureau managed to trace a growing number of shipments.

Two debates

In the preceding section, two parallel discussions are addressed. The first debate is more a technical one, about the relationship between openness and quality. It is argued that a policy of openness is needed to obtain additional expertise. This opinion is opposed by those who fear the loss of sources, the disclosure of methods, and the manipulation or shielding of information by third parties. In essence, this discussion concerns the best optimum possible for the relation between openness and quality. The second debate is a constitutional one; the extent a government should be public and the extent secrecy is allowed in a democratic legal order. This puts the emphasis on aspects such as legitimacy and acceptance. The technical and constitutional debates are complementary. If put in a table from the perspective of the effects of the disclosure of reports, the elements of both debates can be composed as follows.

Table 2.4 The effects of the disclosure of reports

positive effect on the quality of a report	positive effect on the agency	negative effect on the quality of a report	negative effect on the agency
additional expertise on data and methods by outside criticism	legitimacy; an agency is the backbone of the democratic legal order instead of a necessary evil	possible cut off from sources, by lack of source protection	opponents have insight in data and methods used
critics can help to improve assumptions underlying the conclusions	acceptance; the agency is part of <i>public</i> government	third parties manipulate and shield off information	
theory building is stimulated by outside criticism and openness	recruitment: to show what you are capable of		
	political commitment: enlarged budget		

¹⁴⁷ Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. IV, October 1989, 695.

¹⁴⁸ Casey, "Economic Intelligence for the Future," CIA/SII, summer 1982.

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The debates do not stimulate a conclusion. If source protection had been the only disadvantage, measures to protect the sources in case of disclosure can be established quite easily. This means that for reports composed of past methods on past issues, there is no reason to keep these sub rosa. On the contrary, such reports will yield the benefits of a disclosure.

For other reports, not only the pro's and con's have to be weighed, but also the conditions of disclosure in relation to these pro's and cons. This will lead to a more balanced picture in this debate, which has to be considered also from a political perspective. Regrettably, both debates are completely absent in the Dutch political arena. This is also an indication of lack of commitment at the level of politics. The absence of debate may not only affect the quality of reports, but also the legitimacy of agencies.

To further this debate, and to, in particular, gain more insight in relationships concerning the quality of intelligence, three hypotheses are developed. They address issues on which the literature is ambivalent or implicit.

HYPOTHESIS 1: If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.

A returning issue in the CIA-literature is the politicization of intelligence.¹⁴⁹ This coincides with the CIA-literature that focused on biases caused by the psychology of analysts and by the organization (4.1.1 'Findings'). It may be, therefore, that a plea for openness is also inspired by the implicit assumption that if – as a result of secrecy and limited distribution – the dominant forum function is performed by political and diplomatic feedback, there is a risk of extra bias and self serving analyses. To make this possible relationship explicit, it is presented as a hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 2: If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, this will lead to a worsening of the information position caused by a decrease and manipulation of sources – especially of secret sources.

What is the actual effect of intelligence and security agency reports, on your information position, when they are made public? There is speculation on this issue. The extent of effects remains unknown. The reports in the first case study were publicly available which provides the opportunity to investigate these effects.

¹⁴⁹ See for example: 2.4.1 'Starting points in the relationship intelligence - politics:' Gates, "Guarding Against Politicization" CIA/SII, Spring 1992.

HYPOTHESIS 3: If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, their quality will increase because the positive effect caused by the feedback from different forums will dominate.

Colby's starting point is that reports must be made public. An implicit assumption is apparently that feedback from different forums will result in a better quality, than feedback from a limited forum. Nevertheless, other effects will also occur because of the disclosure. If all the effects are put together, what is the overall effect? Are there conditions to be set, resulting from, for example, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2?

With this discussion on openness and quality – and the hypotheses to be tested in the case studies – this introductory part concludes. Besides an introduction, some links were also made to – especially the secondary processes of – the quality of reports. The following and last section provides an overview.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS AND INFLUENCE ON THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This chapter focused on providing an introduction to intelligence. By providing an overview of the field of intelligence, direct links have been made to the research questions.

First, insight on the development of intelligence as a discipline was explored. There is a limited development of theory on intelligence. It is a body of knowledge mainly based on intuition and experience. Moreover, a methodology of intelligence is not as developed as in more established disciplines. Methods are available from other disciplines (and widely used), but there is still a need of more arrangement and some methods need to be developed. This sets limits to the possibilities to test theory. It also means that there are limitations in carrying out this study compared to research in a more established field. This becomes clear in chapter 3 and 4.

There is information available to write on the pragmatics of intelligence analysis and its aberrations. There are some well developed techniques. This applies to intelligence as a *trade*, especially for the field of TECHINT. TECHINT is also the field in which there is an intense cooperation with scientists, often because of its breaking new grounds technology.

Second, issues were presented that related to the quality of intelligence. These were mostly related to secondary processes of the analysis. In this chapter, the primary processes of the analysis were not addressed – this is part of chapter 3.

Important as secondary processes, for the quality of intelligence products, are coordination, management, and organization of an agency. To explore insights on the relation between these and intelligence products, three 'intelligence producing' models were presented. In combination with the case studies, the

causes of poor or high quality reports will be traced, such as setting appropriate priorities during the design, and the way filters are built for processing data.

The literature addresses how an organization can influence positively the quality of reports in an indirect way. For example by promoting dissent in reports, commissioning a crucial research twice, or establishing a Review Section.

Part of the secondary process is also the way training and education can be carried out. In the Netherlands, there is no academic degree in intelligence studies. There is hardly anything available that specializes on intelligence studies within the academic community. This is not an optimal situation for the recruitment of highly qualified personnel. Subsequently the focus is on 'on the job' training.

On a different note, there is a plea for accurate external control. This plea is strongly promoted from within agencies to prevent problems building up over the long term. Different aspects of the ongoing technical and constitutional debates on the relation openness and quality were identified.

Attention was paid to the need of mutual understanding between producers and consumers. While this is not so much related to the quality of reports themselves, it directly affects the receptivity of (high quality) intelligence by consumers. This is important for high quality intelligence to play a role as a force enhancer of a security policy. Furthermore, the increased understanding can lead to a better feedback by consumers (4.2.2). This feedback is related to the issue of high quality reports. It may point, for example, gaps in the design phase, in the collection of data, or policy issues that need to be addressed.

The insights on quality presented in this chapter are mainly of an indirect nature, and belong mainly to the secondary processes. As such, these insights will – combined with the findings of the two case studies – be used to determine what factors contribute to a high or low quality of a report.

Finally, the main elements, from which criteria can be derived, will be presented in chapters 3 and 4 where issues of the primary process, such as methods and techniques are discussed. Chapter 2 also identified some of these. The elements mainly concerned warning. A few were on information and presentation.

Chapter 2 was primarily an introduction. The following chapters focus on issues as validity, robustness and on how to be resistant against misleading factors. These belong to core issues of producing high quality analysis.

3 Intelligence research

How is intelligence research carried out? As noted, not that much has been developed on the issue of methodology for intelligence studies. Subsequently the literature chosen to review in this chapter has focused on general methodology.

To gain more insights in the issue of analysis, this chapter is composed of the following sections. In 3.1, some general characteristics of intelligence research are presented. In dealing with intelligence research, some concepts are used somewhat differently compared to science. For a good understanding of intelligence research and its specific characteristics, attention is paid to these differences.

In 3.2, three main types of intelligence research are explored – descriptive, explanatory, and prognostic research. For each of these three types of intelligence research, attention is paid to their specific characteristics, the demands placed on that type of analysis, and their methods and techniques.

The intelligence community has also developed characteristics of intelligence research. One characteristic for instance is developed from the perception of intelligence and counter-intelligence – the policy of deception. In 3.3, a model on deception is presented. This model will be further used in the case studies to trace factors that lead to high or low quality reports, and their influence on the analytical process.

3.1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CONCEPTS OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

What is high quality intelligence? What are the general specifics of intelligence research? Until now, high quality reports have not been defined. This section explores this definition.

General specifics of intelligence research are also presented to explain the differences between science and intelligence research. These differences are of importance to understand the rest of this chapter.

In this section, some concepts, which are used somewhat differently, compared to science, are explained. In order to obtain a good understanding of intelligence research these differences are described in terms of theory, hypothesis, and uniqueness. Section 3.1, is limited to aspects of intelligence research in general whereas section 3.2, deals with three main types of intelligence research and their specifics.

High quality intelligence

The core of this study focuses on high quality intelligence and security agency reports. In this study, high quality intelligence is understood as described by Wilensky:

‘High quality intelligence designates information that is *clear* because it is understandable to those who must use it; *timely* because it gets to them when they need it; *reliable* because diverse observers using the same procedures see it in the same way; *valid* because it is cast in the form of concepts and measures that capture reality (the tests include logical consistency, successful prediction, congruence with established knowledge or independent sources); *adequate* because the account is full (the context of the act, event, or life of the person or group is described); and *wide-ranging* because the major policy alternatives promising a high probability of attaining organizational goals are posed or new goals are suggested.’¹

A high quality report is the written product presenting high quality intelligence in a way that it addresses the issues of interest for the consumer, and likewise is easily accessible.

As we can see, this definition of high quality intelligence is in several ways linked to the consumer. The consumer is not only provided with possible dangers, threats, and risks, but is also fundamental to objectify such reports.

To ensure high quality intelligence – or even a stable and satisfactory quality – the application of methods and techniques is vital. Analysts who work without such a concept easily are bogged down in inessentials. By using a method, analysts can draw valid conclusions from the assembled data. While method enhances the ability of analysts to appraise the reliability and validity of statements, the research question and the design of the research largely determine the methods and techniques used. This central issue is explored in 3.2.

General characteristics

In 2.1, general characteristics of intelligence research were presented. These general characteristics are: 1) interdisciplinary research, 2) future oriented research, 3) inaccessible data, 4) research on small chance - high impact events, 5) specific and applied nature of the research, 6) intelligence in the position as a supplier, and 7) control of intelligence is complicated.

In short, intelligence research is about chance, risk, and threat. All these three issues are subject to subjective interpretations and assessments. What is needed in such a subjective sensitive context is a more objective, less personal, reliable measurement and assessment. The way such a reliable measurement is made has to be understood as a professional activity. This implies intelligence is applied research (fifth characteristic).

¹ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, VIII-IX.

Concepts in intelligence research

Intelligence research is not oriented at general statements about possible events, irrelevant of the actual context. Intelligence research is not focused on theory building. It is concerned about specific, concrete cases that pose chance, risk, and threat. The aim of intelligence is to give insight into a specific, concrete event – a real life context. Methods and methodology are therefore presented in the context of applied research.

As a result, there are differences between science and scientific research on the one hand, and intelligence and security agency reports and intelligence professionals on the other hand. To explain these differences is not the aim of this study. Yet, some differences may cause confusion. Consequently, to obtain a better understanding of intelligence research, attention is paid to the differences concerning the use of theory, hypothesis, and uniqueness.

Theory

Some differences are explained about the concept of theory in intelligence research and in science. First, different levels of theory are explored. Second, how theory is used in professional research is examined. Finally, intelligence research is discussed in the context of the regulative cycle.

In science, academics usually understand theory as a general or nomothetic theory. Subsequently a phenomenon is explained in a very general sense. This type of theory is also referred to as a level-A theory.²

In applied research, professionals may also develop a theory, but usually in the form of a so-called level-B and level-C theory. Level-B theory is a practice oriented theory – or an ‘isonom’ theory. It is a problem oriented special theory and its explanation of a phenomenon is limited to a certain category of cases.

Level-C theory is developed for an individual case. This is therefore also referred to as an N=1 theory – or an ‘idionom’ theory. This theory of an individual case is a disposable theory that has shown its use as soon as the problem has been solved. Level-C theory explains phenomena for a concrete person or a concrete societal situation. Such research can be carried out through methodological disciplined and standardized induction.³ The level-C theory is

² Theory in this sense is seen as a system of logic coherent – especially non-conflicting – statements, opinions, and concepts concerning a field, formulated such that it is possible to derive verifiable hypotheses from it (De Groot, *Methodologie*, 1981, 42, 99).

³ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 56-58. In scientific research, often a limited number of data is gathered on a large amount of cases. In the applied N=1 research, a large number of data is collected for just one case (Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 53). For these N=1 one type of research, principles, techniques, and applications are developed. For some more information, see: Davidson & Costello (eds.), *N=1*, 1969. Cattell's R-technique: Cattell, *Personality, a systematic theoretical and factual study*, 1950. Stephenson's Q-technique: Stephenson, *The Study of behavior*, 1953. Semantic differential method: Osgood & Luria, A blind analysis of a case of multiple personality using the Semantic Differential, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, January 1954,

likely to be used by field officers and analysts analyzing a concrete case. In particular, the level-C theory is likely to be endemic in professional intelligence research.

As noted, professional intelligence research is not aimed at generalizations, but on a unique case. It is more about the use of theoretical notions, than on theoretical laws. Intelligence research does not aim at scientific laws or theory, but at actions concerning future situations. This kind of professional research is aimed at the realization of a situation that is believed to be the desired one, instead of a hypothetical anticipating approach. It focuses on factors that can be manipulated. The object of research is more *mutandum* than *explanandum*.⁴

When professional research is referred to at level-A theory, the reference does not generally take into account the nature of the system of theoretical laws, but rather the background nature in order to make things clear, or to develop hypotheses.⁵ In professional intelligence research – especially to explain or to formulate a prognosis – the level-A theory is applied to produce an ‘if ..., then ...’-statement. A professional may apply the same A-theory that a scientist would test. However, the purpose of the professional is to solve the problem at hand, and not to explore general theory any further, or to test it.

What is typical for professionals is the way emphasis is placed on knowledge, skills, and choices. Their knowledge is biased towards level-B and level-C theory. Their skills are empathy, recognizing a problem fast, and social-professional skills. Choices made are influenced by norms, values, and power.⁶

Professional research can be placed in a regulative cycle framework. This regulative cycle is composed of the following steps: definition of the problem - diagnosis - plan - intervention - evaluation.⁷ In the intelligence setting, not all the steps are necessarily passed through by an agency. Some steps can be executed by others, such as policymakers or armed forces.

Above, it was noted that the choice of the professional is influenced by norms. Through norms, the object of research is transformed into a *mutandum* – into something to be changed. The normative element penetrates the regulative cycle in all its phases.⁸ As in the case of all professional research, intelligence is aimed at intervention.

The insights above lead to a paradigm of professional research that differs in type and nature from a scientific one. The paradigm of a professional can be

Vol. 49, 579-591. For more on the relation between the level-A, -B, and -C theory, and the relation between hermeneutic and nomology, see Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 62, 96-105.

⁴ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 18/19.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-12. Professionals often apply very general principles, standardized knowledge, to concrete problems (Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, 1983, 24).

⁶ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 136, 141.

⁷ The regulative cycle is often presented as an opposite of the empiric cycle. Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 3, 7, and 19.

⁸ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 20.

defined as an approach that passes successfully through the regulative cycle in relation to a certain type of problem.⁹

Hypothesis

Because science and applied research use the concept of theory differently, differences relating to the concept of hypotheses will also occur. To prevent confusion, these differences need attention and explanation.

A hypothesis has to do with the relation between two phenomena. In the literature on methodology, a hypothesis is connected with a level-A theory. In this literature, a hypothesis is a presumed law – in the sense of coherence – defined in a certain field. New observations are possible. The hypothesis can be tested for such new observations.¹⁰ Hypotheses are formulated in a general way, disconnected from setting and time. This type of definition of hypothesis refers to theory building.¹¹

In intelligence research, hypotheses are used differently. It is applied research. In intelligence research, hypotheses do *not* play a role in the development of theory or science. Yet, level-A theory hypotheses may be used to solve an intelligence problem at hand.

Professionals place more emphasis on hypothetical deductive thinking, with theoretical notions as an important source to generate knowledge.¹² Such professional hypotheses are then formulated as a product derived from phenomena based on other situations. In such an approach, they are still calibrated, contrary to those hypotheses being self-invented by the analysts.

In intelligence literature, the term hypothesis is also used in an even more loosely context. Hypothesis is then described in the sense of formulating plausible expectations, possible explanations, potential answers, or alternative estimates.¹³ This may take the form of self-invented expectations that are not connected to theoretical notions or phenomena based on other situations. The use of the word hypothesis in the intelligence literature also includes cases in which there is no relationship between phenomena. In such instances, one would expect the use of the terms expectation and hunch. In the intelligence literature the term hypothesis is sometimes used as a catch-all concept, including hunches. This may cause confusion to the unprepared readership. It is an *ex ante* prediction of what the research or the future events may bring.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁰ De Groot, *Methodologie*, 1981, 45-46.

¹¹ Hypotheses in the scientific methodological sense have a main function in preventing the invention of conceptual frameworks and theories for every new situation. Use is made of the thinking of others, also in other fields. This approach prevents constructions being made for special opportunity.

¹² Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 55. This type of hypothesis is closer to, in methodological terms, the *ad hoc* hypothesis – a hypothesis that is formulated as *ad hoc* is used for interpretation purposes (De Groot, *Methodologie*, 1981, 45).

¹³ Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," CIA/SII, Summer 1980, 66.

Uniqueness

As noted, intelligence research is of a specific and applied nature. Confusion can be caused by misinterpreting the context in which the word unique is used. Unique can be used in two different contexts. Both uses of the term unique may occur in intelligence research:

- referring to an explanation of intentions from within;
- referring to dealing with a single case.

When unique is used in the context to explain intentions, this refers to the approach of ‘Verstehen.’ It means the analysis is actor oriented. The approach of ‘Verstehen’ assumes that any actor is unique. Unique in the context of ‘Verstehen’ means the uniqueness of the human being, in the sense that any human being has its own meaning – and therefore it is not possible to predict someone’s behavior from the knowledge of human beings in general.¹⁴

In intelligence research, unique may be used in this context of ‘Verstehen.’ If so, the norms and values are explained from within – as if the actor’s behavior is unique.

In intelligence research, however, an opposite approach can also be used.¹⁵ In these cases, the focus is on external explanations – to trace patterns of action and reaction, regularities, and inter-anticipation, and their consequences. In this so-called quantitative approach, it assumes that you can exceed the uniqueness of a case as a starting point and that under specified conditions most rational actors will behave in the same manner. The analysis is now act-oriented – and *not* actor-oriented. It explains and forecasts in a general sense. Act-oriented analysis often happens in explanatory and prognostic intelligence research. Actually, in intelligence analysis both opposite approaches will occur – to explain from within (actor-oriented) and to explain from the outside (act-oriented).¹⁶

Unique can also refer to the context of a single case – it means that only one case is explained. In the context of intelligence analysis, unique then means the analysis of *one* case. Such a unique analysis can be both actor- and act-oriented.¹⁷

¹⁴ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 41.

¹⁵ For an overview of the main differences between quantitative and interpretative (‘Verstehen’) research, see: Swanborn, *Methoden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, 1987, 352-354.

¹⁶ Both occur – and differences in such emphasis are reflected – in the intelligence community. Compare the speeches of Theunens (he states that – in the behavior of groups and organizations – intentions and motives are more important than capabilities) with the one by Välimäki (he stresses the difference between understanding action from the inside – aimed at intentions and motives – and explaining behavior – aimed at capabilities, external opportunities, and positive reactions on actual actions). Speech on 16 November 2002 by Renaud Theunens – and speech on 15 November 2002 by Pasi Välimäki – at the Conference on ‘Peacekeeping and Intelligence. Lessons for the Future.’ Conference of 15-16 November 2002, organized by the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA) and Netherlands Defense College (IDL).

¹⁷ For information on case study research, see: Yin, *Case Study Research*, 1994.

An explanation of one case is the opposite of an explanation for many cases. In relation to theory: when you make general statements that apply for many different cases, your theory needs to focus on the real essentials. Whereas when you make statements about future developments in one single case, your theory does not need to focus on the essentials as much. It is more important to weigh the different details – by having many variables and few instances.

As we saw, in intelligence research some concepts are used somewhat differently than in science. These concepts were discussed. This provides us the opportunity to focus now more on the intelligence research itself, especially to discuss different types of intelligence research.

3.2 THREE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

What types of intelligence research can be distinguished? What are the methodological characteristics of each of these types of intelligence research?

Every professional discipline knows its own methodological characteristics and problems.¹⁸ The aim of this section is to present some insights into these methodological aspects. It is not meant to present a complete toolkit of methods, techniques, or requirements, but to present the main features in order to develop criteria. These criteria will be explored further in chapter 4.

To present the methodological characteristics and problems in more detail, it is necessary to make a division between different types of intelligence research. Three kinds of research are typical for this field. When presented for both their research type and their intelligence objective, they can be presented as follows (table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Types of intelligence research

Research type	Intelligence objective ¹⁹
descriptive research	to describe the essential characteristics of a situation
explanatory research (post hoc)	to explain causes and conditions of a current development
prognostic research (ante hoc)	to forecast future developments

For each of these three types of intelligence research the characteristics, demands, and methods and techniques are described. Finally, some solutions are presented for problems that are typical for intelligence research.

¹⁸ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 2.

¹⁹ Compare: Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," Summer 1980, 66.

As noted, attention is paid to methods and techniques. A central assumption of this study is that the use of established methods and techniques will help analysts avoid misinterpretations. Producing a report is in essence, the same as applying a method or technique to answer a question. Moreover, the research question at hand largely dictates the appropriate methods and techniques.

All three types of intelligence research refer to a different type of question and information need. There are three research purposes, and thus three types of research questions that dictate methods and techniques. The first type of intelligence research that is dealt with is descriptive intelligence research.

3.2.1 Descriptive research – to describe the essential characteristics of a situation

In applied intelligence research, the object of descriptive research is to describe the essential characteristics of a situation. In this section, special attention is paid to the characteristics of the sources.

The characteristics of the sources, also apply to the other two types of intelligence research – explanatory and prognostic intelligence research. In a sense, explanatory and prognostic intelligence research is a continuation of descriptive research. An accurate descriptive research is easily 80% of the work to be done for an explanatory or a prognostic research. However, the importance of the descriptive research cannot be overestimated.

Characteristics

Before going into more detail, it is important to underscore that in any multidisciplinary research, there may occur some problems in descriptive intelligence research to define terms and concepts. Words, terms and concepts are not always defined the same in different disciplines. The concepts are the lenses through which the research is focused and directed. This can sometimes set limits to having an unambiguous approach to measuring or explaining; to having a range of different theories and demands.

Interdisciplinary research is characterized by multiple variables, different conditions of influence, and different levels of causes. It also creates multiple expectations. The multidisciplinary intelligence research tends to be of an eclectic nature. It requires modeling before carrying out the research. This modeling provides a picture of the factors to be analyzed. It can help the investigation by segment the issues.

Finally, the research is often carried out at different levels – the individual (micro-), the group or organization (meso-), and the society (macro-level). This makes research a complex activity.

Sources and information

The typical characteristics of descriptive intelligence concern the sources of data and information. Three aspects of this relationship between researcher and object of investigation are of special interest – observation, cooperation, and documents.

Concerning observation, the nature of the relationship between researcher and object of research is often of a hidden nature. If both the researcher and the object of investigation operate in secret, it leads to undercover observations. Such undercover observations are common, but it is not the only possible relationship.

It is possible one of the actors – researcher or object of the investigation – acts in the open. First, the object of investigation may be an open group, but of interest for an agency to infiltrate – for example, to observe extremist elements within this open group. In that case, observation may take the form of a non-reported observer. Second, the aim of an agency is to interfere in a secret organization, for example, to prevent an assassination from taking place, rather than report. In that case, the agency may act openly in a hidden group – an obtrusive approach.

If both act openly – this is not common, but does happen – the nature of the observation is that of the participant observer. In intelligence research, however, more often both parties act covertly. It means that the most difficult type of observation is the most common one. This makes descriptive intelligence research a more complicated profession compared to, for example, most descriptive academic research. When represented in a table, the issue of observation may take the following forms.

Table 3.2 Observation

OBJECT OF RESEARCH	action in the open	action covertly
RESEARCHER		
known in target group	participant observer	obtrusive
unknown in target group	non-reported observer	undercover

In terms of cooperation, the relationship between researcher and object of research has often a non-cooperative nature. In its most complicated form, the object of investigation does not want to cooperate, and the researcher uses pressure to obtain cooperation.

Mixed forms are possible. In these mixed forms, it is still possible that the object of investigation pretends to cooperate but actually hides or manipulates information. Full cooperation and absence of pressure are also known. This is

the case in, for example, debriefings and expert consultations (2.2.2 'HUMINT').

Although some types of HUMINT are based on unconstrained cooperation, quite often an unwilling object of investigation is put under duress. In such interrogation types of settings, data may still be hidden or manipulated by the object of investigation. Hiding or manipulating information may be common in most types of (non)cooperation. The issue of cooperation can be illustrated in the following forms.

Table 3.3 Cooperation

OBJECT OF RESEARCH RESEARCHER	Willing to cooperate	unwilling to cooperate
no pressure	open conversation (as debriefing)	object of research hides and manipulates data
yielding pressure	miscommunication, to train/test an agent	interrogation setting (data may still be hidden or manipulated)

In terms of documents, the nature of the relationship between researcher and object of investigation is often a secret and a manipulated one. The object of investigation may shield or forge documents. In turn, researchers may shield where they get their information from, or try to obtain documents secretly. Sometimes, this will lead to a selective perception of researchers (4.1.1).

Many documents are openly available. While much of the data is not manipulated – at least not in the sense to manipulate researchers intentionally, data that ends up in open documents may still be manipulated or shielded by the object of investigation (Lloyd's databases in the SRB-case). What makes intelligence research a difficult profession is that you do not know beforehand which documents are manipulated and which are not. This problem is likely to be more pervaded and more often present in intelligence research than in, for example, most academic research. When put in a table, the issue of documents may take the following forms.

Table 3.4 Document

OBJECT OF RESEARCH RESEARCHER	authentic	not authentic
open access	reliable data	data manipulated, data shielded off (risk of deception)
covert access	reliable data, but risk of selective perception	data manipulated and shielded off (risk of deception) + risk of selective perception

Compared to many other research types, intelligence research is often at a disadvantage. This disadvantage concerns a more complicated observation process, less cooperation, more manipulated data, and more data absent compared to most other research types. For the most part, intelligence research has to deal with sources that belong to the most difficult categories.

In other words, descriptive intelligence research is pervaded with problems such as dark numbers, pressures being placed on non-cooperative objects, manipulation, and forgery. It is characterized by hidden and strategic behavior of the objects of investigation – or even by a policy of deception (3.3). This makes intelligence research more complicated, because it also has to deal with problems known in most other disciplines – such as differences between what people say, how people act, answer and behave in the presence of others according to social desired patterns. What demands are placed on the difficult activity of descriptive intelligence research?

Demands

Research has to meet certain demands. Each type of research has its own particular emphasis on a set of demands. What demands are typical for descriptive intelligence research?

A first demand concerns the reliability of the research. Reliability refers to a measurement being verifiable. The reliability of a measurement or measure instrument refers to the degree that it is clear of errors caused by chance factors.²⁰ The measurement has to be independent from the observer – the researcher. Demands of reliability are aimed at the quality of the observation, the inter-subjectivity, and the verifiability. The quality of the observation is related to the research process being underpinned with protocols, to have other observers (for example, a Review Section), to quantify, to use standard instruments (for example, in the case of HUMINT to make use of psychologists), and to objectify. The inter-subjectivity and the verifiability are improved by being familiar with the terminology used, being familiar with the peculiarities of the object of investigation, and by training.

A second demand concerns the validity of the research. Validity refers to an accurate observation of the phenomenon that is described – to measure the concept you intend to measure. Validity is about the soundness of concepts. Validity is the degree to which a measurement or a measurement instrument to measure something is clear of errors caused by chance factors or by factors caused by a systematic variable.²¹

A third demand is of a more pragmatic nature and less methodologically oriented. This demand stems from the intelligence literature itself. In this literature, it is argued that consumers value an intelligence product because of its brevity, being in time, and its relevance (2.2.3). Being brief and in time speak for themselves. To be policy relevant means to direct the research to danger,

²⁰ Swanborn, *Methoden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, 1987, 175.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 27, 173-175. Webb a/o, *Unobtrusive measures*, 1971, 10-12.

threats and, risks – which is the locus of intelligence as a discipline – and ways to react.

If combined with the characteristics of the sources and information, some intrinsic problems seem to occur for the issue of reliability and validity. The quality and the accuracy of the observation is influenced in a negative way, because sources and information belong to a category that is difficult to access and are the most manipulated. These characteristics may affect already, by their inherent nature, the reliability and validity in a negative way. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of the intelligence research may cause additional difficulties for being familiar with different terminologies and concepts used. What methods and techniques can be used to obtain a reliable and valid result?

Methods and techniques

Descriptive intelligence research can be focused on achieving very different ends, thus leading to different types of descriptive intelligence research. Descriptive research, for example, may be carried out to obtain a better understanding of the environment of a target group (qualitative research), or to reach a more complete picture of an economic situation in a country (through a quantitative research). It may be aimed at describing the extent to which terrorist acts are prepared, or politically motivated crimes are committed. It may even describe trends that have been developed through time, or it may just be meant to keep a finger on the pulse. Descriptive intelligence research can take many different forms.

These many different types of design within descriptive intelligence research lead to different methods and techniques being used. As noted, this discussion is not meant as a handbook of the toolkit of methods and techniques available in intelligence research. Nevertheless, some general comments can still be made.

To carry out descriptive research, there are three main primary techniques. These are observation, interview (e.g. casual interview, agent), and content analysis. Their intelligence characteristics were presented above, when observation, cooperation (interview), and document (content analysis) were dealt with respectively. For all three techniques, it was shown that the sources and information used often belong to the most difficult category, data can be shielded or manipulated by opponents and key data may be absent.

How do you deal with such sources and information from such difficult categories? In the intelligence community, emphasis is put on the need to check and double-check sources.²² In general, to obtain a research result that has an acceptable degree of reliability and validity, triangulation of sources will play an

²² Interview with W.P.J. Keller by the author of 27 November 1999.

important role. Triangulation of sources is also referred to explicitly in the intelligence literature.²³

Triangulation of sources of information

Triangulation refers to an exploration from different perspectives. This multiple exploration is a way to objectify – to prevent mistakes caused by focusing on a single source. Through the triangulation of sources, an assessment is made of data, and how to interpret them. Also through triangulation, an assessment can be made to identify absent data. Essentially, a key characteristic of any field research is the use of different sources of information.²⁴

Within the literature on intelligence, it is argued that most reports are based on fallible sources and therefore limited to present facts. What is presented as a fact actually may be an interpretation or an estimate.²⁵ In the intelligence literature, it is suggested that every source has its own biases and limitations. For HUMINT, for example, to determine the reliability of a source and to verify information is often very difficult. Dissemination and fusion of information is often difficult to accomplish, or there is a time lag between collection and reporting. For SIGINT, for example, data may be denied because of secure communications, false information is passed by an opponent for deception purposes, or a collection is subject to atmospheric conditions.²⁶

In short, any source has its limitations and biases. In intelligence research, however, the accessibility of sources is more limited and the reliability of sources is more difficult to assess compared to most scientific disciplines. To cope with such fallibilities and incompleteness of data and information – typical for intelligence research – extra attention needs to be paid to the triangulation of sources.

As noted, descriptive analysis is the bulk of work to be done for explanatory and prognostic intelligence research as well. The following section begins with a discussion on explanatory intelligence research.

3.2.2 Explanatory research – to explain causes and conditions of a current development

In applied intelligence research, the objective of explanatory research is to explain causes and conditions of a current development. The interest of such research is to explain to intelligence consumers why things happen. If policy-

²³ Heuer, for example, recommends the integration of both the perspectives of case-specific data and more general background information (Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 39-40).

²⁴ Swanborn, *Methoden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, 1987, 332.

²⁵ Compare: Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1989, 672.

²⁶ USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE, Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 Intelligence, 1 February 1998, 142-143 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/part16.htm>).

makers can assess the course, they can counteract unwelcome developments and they can stimulate positive trends.

Characteristics

Explanatory intelligence research possesses two characteristics that are the same as in descriptive intelligence research. First, it is an interdisciplinary activity. Second, it shares the characteristics of descriptive research concerning sources and information – and with it, its difficulties.

A third characteristic is that the intelligence professionals for the most part explain a unique situation. They aim to explain causal determinants of dangers, risks, and threats.

Demands

Explanatory research is about explanation – cause and effect. The cause precedes the effect. If the cause is present, the effect will follow. If the cause is not present, the effect may be absent (statistical connection). There is no third factor, which explains the co-occurrence of both cause and effect. In fact, you need beforehand a general statement about the covariance between cause and effect.²⁷ Essentially, the researcher must explain what causes the development, to show which factors contribute to a development, or what stimulates it.

What demands does explanatory research have to meet? Analysts aim to present evidence that make their conjecture as plausible as possible. To do so, explanatory research has to be convincing. Analysts demonstrate the strength of the causal relationship they have uncovered. A convincing research result is characterized by eliminating alternative explanations, and by the plausibility of the findings. It refers to the validity of the research – the correctness of the argument, or whether the research is constructed well.²⁸

Furthermore, explanatory research gains quality when it is more profound. Essentially, it aims to uncover in-depth and relevant cause-and-effect relationships.

Finally, explanatory research has to be robust. Robustness refers to cross check mechanisms. Multiple measures of dependent variables are an approach to get an indication of the robustness of a relationship. A robust research is independent from changing conditions. The relation holds under different conditions. If all tests lead to a certain result or a certain direction, this will enhance the plausibility of the conclusions. In short, analysts strive to produce an analysis that is as robust as possible by using different techniques and methods to show the plausibility of the presented cause-and-effect relationships.

²⁷ Swanborn, *Methoden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, 1987, 90, 95.

²⁸ Especially for experiments, all types of sub-divisions of validity are made: Swanborn, *Methoden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, 1987, 189-192; Van der Vall, *Sociaal beleidsonderzoek*, 1980, 48, 70-72.

In explanatory research, analysts show relationships that may be related to dangers, threats, and risks. To do so, they cannot put scientifically high demands of significance on a possible cause-and-effect relationship, because that may cause a security problem. Analysts also aim at identifying effects that may lead to a security problem. This has consequences for the so-called alpha- and beta-chances (see below).

Methods and techniques

The central issue in explanatory research is to demonstrate that a certain presupposed causal relationship actually exists. Proof of this relationship can be demonstrated in the form of a successful experiment or a statistical measure of covariance between the variables assigned as cause and effect. In case studies, interpretations, attributions, and chronology may indicate that, certain causal relations are highly plausible. Finally, you can indicate a causal relationship by reaching consensus over its plausibility (3.2.3, Delphi).

Although in explanatory research the central element is causal reasoning, this does not mean there are always causal relationships between elements discussed. To be too focused on causal relationships that actually do not exist, may lead to biases (4.2).

Explanatory intelligence research very often takes the shape of case study research. In terms of case study research, methodological literature is available, for example by Yin.²⁹ The least common technique for explanatory intelligence research is the experiment. The use of experiments often has ethical consequences or leads to political risks.

In explanatory intelligence research, expert hunches, intuition, induction, analogies, and theory are often used. In this, it does not differ so significantly, from what happens in ordinary scientific explanation.

To reach an optimal result, explanatory intelligence research pays special attention to three issues. All three issues will be discussed separately in the following:

- competing hypotheses – to approach a phenomenon from different angles to prevent missing a plausible explanation;
- alpha and beta chance – to obtain relevant significant findings, not overlooking weak but existing causal relationships, and;
- robustness – to make sure conclusions do not depend on ad hoc circumstances.

²⁹ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 1994.

Hypothesis

In the literature on intelligence, the idea of competing hypotheses is well worked out. These ideas are based on methodological literature. First, some general thoughts from within the intelligence community are presented. This is followed by discussing the idea of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.

In an article by Heuer,³⁰ three strategies, about how to generate and to evaluate hypotheses – through theories, situation logic, and by comparison, are presented. These three strategies are discussed for their weaknesses and strengths.³¹

To generate all relevant competing hypotheses, Heuer suggests that analysts employ all three options – theories, situation logic, and comparison – at an early phase. This often appears actually not to happen because of a lack of time. Heuer says that, especially concerning political analysis, analysts are generally stronger in situation logic (inductive) than in theory (deductive). Yet, higher-level officials and policymakers tend to use theory and comparison more. This difference is seen of importance as it is judged as an indication for the way policymakers will receive a report.³²

In his article, Heuer argues that most data supports different hypotheses, hence his plea to focus on data that has the best diagnostic value. Heuer recommends that '[w]hile we often cannot apply the statistical procedures of scientific methodology to test out hypothesis, we can and should adopt the conceptual strategy of seeking to disconfirm rather than confirm hypotheses.'³³

However, Heuer does not argue explicitly that you still need methods or techniques to evaluate data. Here, there seems to be some sort of methodological gap in his approach, between data on one hand and to confirm or to falsify a hypothesis on the other hand. There is a test, an argumentation to present the evidence supporting the statement, and a criterion to evaluate whether data confirms or refutes the hypothesis. In Heuer's article, it is just referred to as the 'strategies' of theory, situation logic, and comparison. Only in his later work, does he present a possible test – Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.

By falsifying hypotheses, Heuer makes a parallel with the ideas of Popper.³⁴ In the actual practice of testing a hypothesis, there often seems to be a problem in the attitude of analysts. Heuer suggests that analysts tend to discount data that

³⁰ Richards (Dick) J. Heuer, Jr., served in the Directorate of Operations until 1975. Then, he moved to the Directorate of Intelligence. He headed the methodology unit in the DI's political analysis office. Although he retired in 1979, he remained active and wrote many articles on method and analysis (<http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/19104/art3.html>).

³¹ In addition, data immersion is mentioned, but this is characterized as a non-strategy. Heuer argues that there are also numerous other strategies. Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," CIA/SII, Summer 1980, 67-76. See also: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 50-51.

³² Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," CIA/SII, Summer 1980, 73-74, 76.

³³ Ibid., 76.

³⁴ To falsify hypotheses is shared by others who published on intelligence, for example: Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1989, 669.

will lead to a denial of their hypothesis, by judging data as questionable in terms of reliability or as an unimportant anomaly.

Heuer argues that it is seldom possible to eliminate a hypothesis. Therefore, analysts also need to evaluate its probability. He notes that the few detailed descriptions of intelligence successes were all based on testing evidence against competing hypotheses.³⁵

Some additional remarks are made in relation to the ideas of Heuer. First, his ideas generally do fit well with studies on professional research (Swanborn). Besides, professionals often, in practice, model unfamiliar problems on familiar ones. With the help of hypotheses, they build new theory by reflecting on perceived but yet inarticulate similarities.³⁶

Second, a complicating factor to work with hypotheses is that the subjects of investigation – human beings – may change patterns of action, strategies of reaction, and thoughts. Therefore, an earlier proof or denial may not be accurate years later.

Third, and this concerns the issue to deny a hypothesis, it is sometimes possible to verify a hypothesis, or to prove it. In these cases, this kind of evidence should be included in the analysis.³⁷ Yet, a characteristic of intelligence analysis is that key information is often lacking. This means the more promising strategy is generally to deny a hypothesis. Generally, the best diagnostic value is generated by data that falsifies a hypothesis.³⁸

A last issue discussed here is the so-called Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). It is grounded in basic insights from cognitive psychology and decision analysis.

In the intelligence literature, ACH is promoted for two reasons. First, it is seen as a tool to aid a judgment on important issues requiring careful weighing of alternative explanations or conclusions. It helps against selective perception, biased perception, or one-sided analysis – ACH forces an account of all the alternatives. Second, it is a way to indicate quite precisely on which point there might be an intelligence dissent. If a second analyst disagrees with the other's judgment, the matrix of step 3 of ACH (see table 3.5) can be used to highlight the precise area of disagreement. Subsequent discussion can then focus on the ultimate source of the differences.³⁹ In the following table 3.5, the subsequent steps of ACH are presented.⁴⁰

³⁵ Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," CIA/SII, Summer 1980, 75-78.

³⁶ Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, 1983, 203.

³⁷ Compare: letter by Henk bij de Weg to the author, 26 January 1997.

³⁸ In an intelligence and security agency report, there is an emphasis on estimating its value. Therefore, hypotheses often are of an estimative nature. For the underlying theoretical limitations of the possibilities to estimate, see: Bij de Weg, *De betekenis van zin voor het begrijpen van handelingen*, 1996, IX.6.3, especially page 307.

³⁹ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 8, page 1 of 9, 6 of 9, and 9 of 9.

⁴⁰ This table is an abstract of Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 8.

Table 3.5 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)

Step 1	Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.
Step 2	Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.
Step 3	Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side. Analyze the diagnostic value of the evidence and of the arguments – that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.
Step 4	Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.
Step 5	Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis. Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.
Step 6	Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence. Consider the consequences of your analysis if evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.
Step 7	Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, rather than just the most likely one.
Step 8	Identify milestones for future observations that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected

ACH is aimed at working with multiple causes – it is a multiple variable model. Risks, threats, and dangers happen to be multi-causal events. Mono-causal explanations are usually too simple. Furthermore, ACH is a qualitative way to tabulate the evidence – it is not a quantitative approach. As noted, ACH is likely to be helpful to indicate intelligence dissents (the matrix of step 3). In the second case study on the BVD, an illustration is presented of such a matrix (10.2.2).

Alpha- and beta-chance

There is a difference between the ultimate aims of scientific analysis and intelligence analysis. Scientific analysis is ultimately aimed at truth finding; intelligence analysis is ultimately aimed at interventions – to give warnings in cases of assessed risks, identified dangers, and uncovered threats. This has consequences for how it is dealt with, so-called alpha- and beta chances. First, these two chances are explained. Second, the consequences are discussed.

The alpha-chance is the chance that you *incorrectly* conclude that there is a significant relationship between phenomena. The beta-chance is the chance that you *do not discover* a weak, but actual existing, relationship between phenomena.⁴¹ In science, the alpha-chance is placed very low (often 0.05), but

⁴¹ This leads to two occasions in which a right decisions is taken: 1-alpha, or 1-beta (also called *power*). For more, see: Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 223.

the beta-chance is positioned higher (for example, 0.20).⁴² If there are only small effects, the power⁴³ of a research will be low. This means that only in a minority of the cases, you would discover a significant relationship, but in the majority of the cases, you would miss weak relationships that actually do exist.⁴⁴

Applying the mentioned approach of a low alpha and high beta to intelligence has serious consequences for security. In intelligence analysis, small effects are notorious – not in the least caused by the nature of the research, the absent data, and the case study approach. This means analysts would miss the majority of actual existing relationships because of the low alpha and the high beta. In the case of the low alpha, analysts do not accept an actual existing relationship as significant enough. In the case of the high beta, they simply miss identifying an existing relationship. In other words, analysts may miss so many relationships, that they also miss those of interest from the perspective of security – and do not warn when necessary.⁴⁵ The costs of such errors are extremely high.⁴⁶ In intelligence research, therefore, it is recommended to put the alpha higher – which makes a relationship significant sooner – and the beta lower⁴⁷ – in order not to miss an actual existing relationship. In reality, the beta-chance is often a somewhat neglected element in scientific research – scientists often overlook a weak, but existing, relationship.⁴⁸ Intelligence research needs to place a larger emphasis on the beta-chance than usually happens in science.

Robustness

Robustness refers to applying several techniques and methods in an analysis. The more such independent tests are survived, the more plausible the conclusion will be. Consequently, the finding does not depend on the analytical method used. A robust relationship may also be detected by simple correlative techniques. The esteem in the validity of the conclusion will increase. Of course, this is only reached if the different tests show the same findings.

The robustness of a causal relation can be proved by several methods and techniques. As noted earlier, this can be achieved by, for example, a case study, a correlation of quantitative data, attribution by experts, or by an experiment.

A problem in intelligence research is the absence of data and imperfect data. Yet, if in such an instance a presupposed causal relation can survive a series of test, some confidence can be placed in it. At least more confidence, than when

⁴² Between the alpha and beta, there is a negative relation – in which the actual relation depends on the size of the n. In a research, the beta will increase in case of a weak relationship and a small n.

⁴³ Power = 1-beta. See earlier footnote.

⁴⁴ Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 222-228.

⁴⁵ Compare: 2.2.3, 'On Warning:' (...) the best chance for avoiding harm is when evidence provides a reasonable basis for action, not when the likelihood of harm occurring is beyond a reasonable doubt.

⁴⁶ Compare: Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1989, 661.

⁴⁷ You may opt to put the beta low – say 0.05 – in case of serious consequences, but higher – say 0.20 – in case of a threat of a less harming order.

⁴⁸ Compare: Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 226-228.

only one method or measure instrument is used. Of course, this confidence is increased by minimizing error in each instrument and method and by a reasonable belief in the different and divergent effects of the sources of error.⁴⁹

Again, the conclusions in such an intelligence research have to all go in the same direction. This may not always be the case. In science, examples are known in which the application of both quantitative and a qualitative techniques raised more questions in the first instance than they solved – because of the different perspectives that the qualitative and quantitative data produced. In the second instance, however, this often leads to a far better understanding of the exact causal process.⁵⁰ To apply more methods and techniques is likely to refine the model of the exact causal process – also in cases where different techniques provide seemingly opposite outcomes.

Although the idea of robustness is not as explicitly put forward as the issue of competing hypothesis, the concept is not completely absent in the intelligence community. In the intelligence literature, it is argued that particularly during times of crises, you may consider looking into a matter from different angles.⁵¹

A final remark on robustness is related to findings in social policy research. Here, there seems to be a higher degree of exploitation of research – a policy success rate – when a researcher is familiar with applying a multi-method strategy, than using a single method.⁵² From the perspective of protecting the market share by the consumer of intelligence and security agency reports, aiming at robust research may be an effective strategy.

In the above, attention was paid to competing hypotheses, alpha- and beta-chance, and robustness. All three elements play a role in increasing the quality of an explanatory intelligence research. Explanatory research is aimed at causal relationships. Some intelligence authors suggest focusing on studying, analyzing and recognizing *patterns*, in order not to be confused by detail.⁵³ Such patterns can also be used in prognostic intelligence research. The prognostic research is the last type of intelligence research discussed in this section.

3.2.3 Prognostic research – to forecast future developments

In applied intelligence research, the objective of prognostic research is to forecast future developments. The interest of such research is in the possibility to anticipate threats, events, and risks, and to formulate a sound strategy of response.

⁴⁹ Webb a/o, *Unobtrusive measures*, 1971, 3.

⁵⁰ For an example, see: Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 303-304.

⁵¹ Mitelman, "Preface to a Theory of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Fall 1974, 22.

⁵² Van der Vall, *Sociaal beleidsonderzoek*, 1980, 181.

⁵³ Wheaton, "Modeling and Simulation Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," *Peacekeeping Intelligence*, 2003, 175-176.

Characteristics

Prognostic intelligence research contains three characteristics that are the same as in explanatory intelligence research. It is an interdisciplinary applied activity, it shares the characteristics concerning sources and information, and it is mostly aimed at a unique case – in order to forecast.

As any research based on forecasting, prognostic intelligence research is characterized by an area of speculation – defined by what is likely and unlikely to happen.

Typical for prognostic intelligence research is the distribution of the chance that an event will take place – this chance is often low.⁵⁴ This low chance is called a Poisson-distribution. Positioned on a scale, this distribution is not a linear one, but curve-linear.

In intelligence research, events often take the nature of a Poisson-distribution. In intelligence research, risky events are often hard to predict, because of the small chance that the event will actually take place. If something happens, however, the impact is often high and may have considerable consequences.

Demands

What are typical demands for prognostic research? It must depart from a sound, actual description of the existing reality – a principle of continuity. Prognostic research has to be plausible. To be plausible, the research is supported by a defense to support its line of reasoning. The case is made explicit, and patterns are drawn. To be plausible, general insights – such as theory or theoretical frameworks – can be used in the research process.

Second, the research has to be relevant. To be of relevance not only refers to focusing on risks or threats of interest for the consumer, but also on anticipation, which is a main feature of intelligence as a discipline. To be of relevance the producer indicates in the reports factors that can be manipulated concerning possible future developments. The analysis is about an activity of how to affect the future.⁵⁵

Third, within the intelligence literature, it is argued that the test of intelligence analysis does not lie in whether the possibilities actually occur, 'but in whether forces of whose existence intelligence was unaware come into play, or if their speed of intervention exceeds the intelligence forecast.'⁵⁶

In the presented tripartite division of intelligence analysis, the warning and risks analysis may take a somewhat difficult position. They may be completely

⁵⁴ A risk is composed of chance and consequences (risk = chance x consequences). Events are risky:

- if they occur sometimes and bring danger, or;
- if they occur seldom, but bring great damage in those positive instances.

⁵⁵ Compare: Wildavsky, *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*, 1987, 208-209 (397).

⁵⁶ Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decisionmaker," CIA/SII, Fall 1988, 31 (38 and 39).

prognostic research, but they may also be situated halfway between the explanatory and prognostic research types.

Methods and techniques

There are many methods and techniques to forecast. In this choice of techniques and methods, four main techniques and methods for prognostic research can be distinguished.⁵⁷ First, there is modeling based on accepted theories and exploration of the relevant institutions in which assumptions are made in order to simulate future developments. Second, there are expert judgments, based on judgments by panels, such as Delphi. Experts speculate, judge, and write scenarios. Third, there is the scenario building – including opposite or competing scenarios. Fourth, there is the trend extrapolation, which is not based on theory.⁵⁸

As presented here, forecasting is achieved based on modeling. Modeling by level-A theories may not be well-established in intelligence research – as intelligence studies is a relatively new discipline. Subsequently theories used may not be validated, yet may well be plausible. As a result, you may expect, in prognostic intelligence research some preference for expert judgments, scenarios, and trend extrapolation.

In the methodological literature, questions are presented to be asked in the modeling. Such questions often can be easily adopted in the prognostic intelligence research.⁵⁹

In a forecast, different possible futures tend to be presented. These different possible futures can be based on different assumptions. Seldom will there be only one scenario. In most cases, several scenarios and their preconditions will be presented. A forecast has to consider all relevant conditions and their likelihood – and thus, all relevant outcomes. It must take into account all possible developments of the conditions without bias. The probability and the relevant conditions have both a certain width. It means analysts present options with a certain openness of the outcomes. They point out what contributed to these options and openness – and their strengths and weaknesses.⁶⁰ They assess

⁵⁷ Different arrangements can be made. In interactive policy preparation techniques, for example, methods mentioned include: focus groups; concept mapping; Delphi-method; workshop-method; scenario-method; and gaming (Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 152-173). However, these are limited to what is described as group interview techniques. The four techniques presented in the main text are wider in their scope of types.

⁵⁸ There are more methods and techniques of forecasting (see, for example: Van Doorn & Van Vught, *Forecasting*, 1978, 31-32). Some of the techniques mentioned here are rarely used in practice.

⁵⁹ For example, SWOT – strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The strengths and weaknesses refer to aspects of continuity.

⁶⁰ Compare: Pröpper, *Argumentatie en machtsuitoefening in onderzoek en beleid*, 1989, 216-217. For more see Cronbach a/o., *Toward Reform of Program Evaluation*, 1980, 77, 84. Compare also: Van Doorn & Van Vught, *Forecasting*, 1978, 22-23.

both the (subjective) maximum and minimum of the appearance of a certain phenomenon.⁶¹

When more methods of forecasting are used bias caused by a particular method will be reduced and the usability of the forecast will be enhanced. In literature on methodology, it is advised to use different types of forecasting techniques.⁶² This could also be reached through the Delphi-technique, in which various predictions are conducted independent of each other.

Generally, the longer the time-span of the period to be forecasted, the more the calculus of probability will play a role. In addition, the longer the time-span of the period to be forecasted, the more the qualitative aspects need to be included.⁶³

Intelligence literature

In the literature on intelligence, forecasting methods and techniques are known and used. This is the case for Delphi, for example, that has been used since the beginning of the 1950's – although its military application remained secret for years. Delphi is an expert judgment – a so-called Subjective Iterative Group (SIG) process. It is characterized by anonymous responses, iteration and feedback, and statistical group answers.⁶⁴ Over many years, it has been referred to or applied in intelligence literature by, for example, Wilensky and Wheaton.⁶⁵ The long-term validity of this technique is questioned, so this may limit its application. It is popular, because it is a relatively cheap technique and it is adaptable at many different levels.⁶⁶

In the literature on intelligence, other techniques are mentioned. Some of them are attractive because of their simplicity, as for example the Decision Tree. With a minimum of costs, the Decision Tree is helpful to make motivated judgments for future developments – also for non-repetitive situations.⁶⁷

Elements of the methodological literature on forecasting and CIA-publications largely address the same issues. To mention in an analysis the alternative options and their range of similarity are also expressed in CIA-articles.⁶⁸

⁶¹ Van Doorn & Van Vught, *Forecasting*, 1978, 102.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 63-64. For suggestions of possible combinations of methods and techniques, see *Ibid.*, 63-64, 179-189.

⁶³ This is regrettable often contrary to the actual praxis, in which it mainly relies on quantitative models. *Ibid.*, 149-150.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁶⁵ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 65. Wheaton, "Modeling and Simulation Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," *Peacekeeping Intelligence*, 2003, 194- 196.

⁶⁶ Van Doorn & Van Vught, *Forecasting*, 115.

⁶⁷ For an illustration: Greenlaw Sapp, "Decision Trees," CIA/SII, Winter 1974, 64-7.

⁶⁸ For example, in the CIA's *Analytic Toolkit*, the formulation of plausible alternative outcomes are promoted. In relation with these alternatives, an analyst identifies: 1) the factors at play that could lead to unexpected developments; 2) sign-posts or indicators of change; and 3) events that could trigger a major shift in direction (Directorate of Intelligence {CIA}, *Analytic Toolkit*, chapter 'Outlook,' section 'General rules,' <http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/toolkit/trade4.html>).

In modeling research, it is advised in intelligence literature to focus research on issues that estimate strengths and purposes, and the forces and factors working to influence the opponent's decision making. It is also advised to estimate what these will lead the opponents to and to identify their own room to act.⁶⁹ It is also advised to focus research on factors that could lead to unexpected developments, signposts or indications of change, and events that could trigger a major shift in direction.⁷⁰

For prognostic intelligence research, an interesting approach is proposed by Ben-Israel. Ben-Israel proposes a kind of meta-analysis of assessments and forecasts produced by an agency – in order to obtain a more accurate prognosis. He proposes that the intelligence community not only creates reports, but also criticizes these in order to falsify them. This should especially be carried out when opposite or competing views are presented in different reports. When opposite reports survive such refutation, he proposes that decision-making should be handed over to policymakers.⁷¹ In an illustration on the Yom-Kippur war, he argues how such an approach of refutation would have led to better results than the actual practice by Israeli analysts.

In his article, Ben-Israel refers to the use of conceptual frameworks. These frameworks show parallels to what was explained in 3.1 as level-B and level-C theory. He defines a conceptual framework as 'a system of basic assumptions, theories and beliefs.' This is used to arrange and interpret data and facts.⁷²

Ben-Israel's idea is to replace the traditional inductive approach to produce intelligence estimates, by a model that is loosely analogous to Popperian ideas on falsification, called an amended analogy. This approach focuses on logic between science and intelligence.⁷³ In an overall figure, he presents his kind of meta analysis of intelligence (figure 3.1).

The value of Ben-Israel's ideas is not only to obtain a more accurate prognosis, but also to supply an intelligence community with a reflective break. In applied professional research, reflective breaks can be built in as a branch of the normal regulative learning and trying by experience. These branches can be scientifically supported by problem analysis and diagnosis, or the knowledge and expertise of changes.⁷⁴ Now that all three intelligence types have been discussed, a conclusion will be drawn.

⁶⁹ Samford, "The Intelligence Necessary to the Formulation of a Sound Strategy," CIA/SII, Fall 1955, 2. Colby, "Intelligence in the 1980s," CIA/SII, Summer 1981, 33. Cremeans, "The Agency and the Future," CIA/SII, Spring 1970, 82.

⁷⁰ <http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/toolkit/trade4.html>, Directorate of Intelligence Home Page, *Analytic Toolkit*, Outlook, page 2 of 3 (as being published on internet early 2000).


⁷¹ Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1989, 672, 708.

⁷² Yet, a conceptual framework should never be treated as something final. *Ibid.*, 711.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 668 (see also 662).

⁷⁴ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 26.

Figure 3.1 An amended analogy, as put forward by Ben-Israel



3.2.4 Conclusion

In this section, an overview of the three types of intelligence research and their characteristics, demands, methods, and techniques were discussed. The three types are descriptive, explanatory, and prognostic intelligence research.

When we look at three characteristics of the relation between researcher and object of investigation – observation, cooperation, and document – all three belong in most cases to a complicated category to investigate. As a result, intelligence research is a difficult and precarious activity. While these characteristics are typical for descriptive intelligence research, they are also reflected in explanatory and prognostic intelligence research, because the descriptive research is often 80% of the work of these two latter intelligence research types.

The demands placed on all three types of intelligence research still needs to be high, because of the societal and political consequences that a low quality report can produce. In general, the demands concern the reliability, the validity, and the robustness of the research, with a different emphasis on these demands for each type of intelligence research. In the intelligence literature, some extra general demands are expressed. It is argued that consumers value an intelligence product because of brevity, relevance and being in time (for more, 4.1).

In practice, there will be limitations to solve all the typical difficulties of intelligence research. For example, the time pressures that analysts have to work under will result in limited triangulation of sources and robustness.

The methods and techniques that can be used encompass a large range of possibilities. This is due to the multidisciplinary and wide-ranging nature of the field itself. The author is very aware that on the issue of the arrangement of methods and techniques a lot of work still has to be done. What mainly is

lacking is an arrangement of methods and techniques that provides more insight. This is something, in the first instance, that has to be worked out. In the intelligence literature, material is available on how to direct such research, and on how to use methods and techniques. As such, this is not the aim of this study and is therefore dealt with in general terms only.


Of a different and more difficult order, are the characteristics of intelligence research that seem to cause some intrinsic problems in affecting the reliability and validity of research. In the intelligence literature, these characteristics are reflected upon from a different point of view. In the following section, attention is paid to this different perspective – and the possible consequences this has on the quality of intelligence analysis.

3.3 INTELLIGENCE CHARACTERISTICS – THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Is there another perspective on the main characteristics of intelligence research to be acknowledged? In the preceding sections (3.2), the characteristics of intelligence analysis were discussed from the perspective of the type of report presented. It was methodologically oriented. In the intelligence literature, however, a different perspective is known also – the characteristics seen from the perspective of intelligence and counter-intelligence. This perspective can be useful in tracing factors that influence the quality of a report – besides the mentioned factors in 3.2 on demands and techniques.

An often-quoted model concerning the perspective of intelligence and counter-intelligence is Angleton's Model of Soviet Strategic Deception (figure 3.2).⁷⁵

Figure 3.2 Angleton's Model of Soviet Strategic Deception



⁷⁵ Angleton founded the counter-intelligence department of the CIA. Model as presented by Robarge, "Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions," *The Journal of Intelligence History*, Winter 2003, 31.

Angleton's model illustrates an opponent's possibility of deception, on the one hand by feeding an agency with disinformation through double agents and false defectors, and, on the other hand, by getting feedback from an organization through moles. It gives an opponent the opportunity to manipulate.

When an opponent acts this way, you may expect that this will cause problems for making an analysis. In 3.2.1, the problematic characteristics were described concerning observation, cooperation, and document. Double agents and false defectors may contribute to these problems by manipulating information. An extra element here – not shown in 3.2 – is feedback (moles). This is supplementary to the previous mentioned element of the difficult position analysts are in to make an analysis. This completes the circle of deception.⁷⁶

When we look for factors to explain causes of high and low quality reports, the element of a policy of deception by an opponent may play a role. Two opposite hypotheses can be developed.

HYPOTHESIS 4: If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact whether this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.

This first hypothesis makes a direct connection – excluding third factors of influence – between the opponent that tries to blur your vision and the quality of your analysis. Even if the deception is discovered, the analysis will not obtain a higher quality than in the case of a policy of deception being absent. This includes also the idea that if, in turn, opponents are approached in a non-direct, non-open, covert way, the researchers do not entertain friendly relations with this opponent. The researchers run the risk of being preoccupied, and as a result making it hard to correct their preconceptions. The pursuit for falsification (to get rid of personal, subjective preconceptions) is hindered by the covert approach.

HYPOTHESIS 5: If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy⁷⁷ of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.

⁷⁶ Deception 'is the transformation of a target's perceptions by a planner channeling one or more ruses, composed of simulative (showing) and dissimulative (hiding) constructs, that once accepted as an illusion changes objective reality and the target who accepts the false as real, and responds' (Bowyer Bell, "Toward a Theory of Deception," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Summer 2003, 246).

Strategic deception 'the effort by a nation to achieve its objectives in the world by deliberately distorting the perceived reality of the governing elites of other nations' (Epstein, "Analysis of Foreign Governments' Deception," *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's*, 1980, 123).

⁷⁷ This does not mean that those double agents, false defectors or moles are actually discovered. It only means your agency is – by one or another reason – aware of such a policy.

At first sight, this second hypothesis seems contradictory – more manipulation means better quality. However, it may be that to discover a policy of deception results in organizational activity – such as mobilizing new resources and an improved information flow – that subsequently gives rise to an analysis of a higher quality.

To explain this further, some short comments concerning a publication on organizational intelligence by Wilensky are discussed. Wilensky suggests that ‘only the big (costly, risky, innovative) policy decisions that are also very urgent are likely to activate high-quality intelligence, because deliberation then moves out of channels towards men of generalized wisdom, executives and experts alike, communicating informally and effectively at the top.’⁷⁸ The organization then functions less institutionalized – less bureaucratic. In situations of urgency, according to Wilensky, information pathologies are minimized, because ‘urgency will shape many decisions, freeing the flow of information, secret or not.’⁷⁹

To discover a deception is not the same as making a significant policy decision or urgency. It is therefore assumed that while deception potentially leads to high quality analysis it does not trigger all the elements relating to urgency. Yet, to discover that a policy of deception may trigger at least some of the elements, as Wilensky revealed, means that this will eventually lead to a higher quality of analysis than when no policy of deception is found. In the case that deception is discovered, elements must be found such as the growth of informal consultation, the mobilization of new or other resources, or a more free flow of information. When such factors are found, they can explain why an analysis of a higher quality is produced than when a policy of deception is not present.

To summarize, to discuss deception has more importance than to obtain insights into intelligence characteristics as described from the perception of intelligence and counter-intelligence. The main interest is that a policy of deception may be a factor to explain the quality of an analysis. In terms of its relation with quality, two opposite hypothesis – each based on identifiable factors – can be formulated. The case studies will explore those identifiable factors – besides those factors concerning demands and methods, as discussed in 3.2.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the focus has been on analysis. In the first section, some terms were clarified for their use in applied intelligence research.

To identify factors of influence on the quality of intelligence, three types of research were distinguished – descriptive, explanatory, and prognostic research. Factors of direct influence on quality were discussed. The more the demands of

⁷⁸ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 81.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

each research type are met, the better methods and techniques are applied – the higher the quality of the intelligence research will be.

The characteristics of an intelligence research resulted in a less straightforward relationship. At first sight, you would expect that the more complex, and the more dubious the reliability and validity of such characteristics are, the lesser the quality of the final intelligence and security agency report will be. Yet, an opposite argument can be constructed. In this case, a new concept has to be introduced – the policy of deception. The idea that a policy of deception produces all kinds of different processes to take place in the intelligence organization – such as a more free flow of information – that will enhance the analytical capabilities and will result in a higher quality. To trace the actual effects, two competing hypotheses were formulated to trace its effect on the quality.

Although analysis was the central issue of this chapter, the issue of collection was re-examined on several occasions. To collect data is also the core business for intelligence research. Intelligence failures will occur if an agency neglects two basics – the collection and the unbiased analysis of data.⁸⁰ The phase of collection is so crucial that it is not limited to a discussion in chapter 2 (2.2). Issues related to collection were explored again in this chapter, when discussing the characteristics of descriptive research – observation, cooperation, and document (3.2.1).

Characteristics of descriptive research showed how difficult the discipline of intelligence is. Already in chapter 2, a picture emerged of compartmentalization and filters – such as translating a document from one language to another, the selection of data, paraphrasing and condensing long documents, or integrating sub-reports into one. At each step of the research process errors may creep in and distort the original meaning. Such problems and difficulties seem to be intrinsic to the discipline of intelligence. For the time being, these problems are enhanced by intelligence studies being a discipline that has only just begun to develop. Most conceptual thinking is barely arranged as an overall view, and in many fields, elements are missing.

Still, some solutions are already present to cope with a range of problems and difficulties. In 3.2, attention was paid to the triangulation of sources of information, to formulate competing hypotheses, to the robustness of a research, and to the width of the outcomes of different options.

The different elements mentioned in this chapter will be returned to in two ways following this research. First, some are used to formulate norms that intelligence research has to meet. This concerns, for example, the demands placed on the three different types of intelligence research.

Second, factors that were identified as having an influence on the quality of research will be paid attention to in the case studies. For example, an attempt to

⁸⁰ Russ Travers, “The Coming Intelligence Failure,”
<http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/failure.html>, under heading ‘The Path to Failure.’

identify the influence of a policy of deception on and its relationship with quality will be made.

In chapter 5, attention is paid to the criteria that high quality intelligence and security agency reports have to meet. However, before this can be discussed attention needs to be given to what the intelligence field itself sees as the pitfalls and biases that it has to deal with (chapter 4).

4 Practitioner's insights

What are the insights that intelligence practitioners have concerning quality? In the previous chapter, an overview was given of the methodology of intelligence analysis. Elements of this more deductive oriented overview will serve to formulate the criteria that intelligence and security agency reports have to meet (chapter 5). Nevertheless, one element is missing. These are insights by reflective practitioners. This more inductive oriented overview is the object of this chapter.

In 4.1, attention is paid to what can go wrong in research and during an analysis – biases and inadequate analyzing techniques. This is an issue on which many strong views are presented in the literature on intelligence. When necessary, this material is also contextualized within the literature on methodology.

In the intelligence literature, a lot of emphasis is placed also on another issue that can affect the quality of intelligence and security agency reports – the presentation. In 4.2, attention is paid to this. It is assumed that when it comes to quality, the analysis is a far more dominant factor than the presentation. Yet, an analysis has to be transformed into a report. To be of high quality, a report has also to be accessible and readable.

4.1 PITFALLS AND BIASES

What can go wrong in the process of producing an intelligence analysis?¹ A lot. This can range from biases to non-optimal analyzing techniques. In this section, attention is paid to these issues. Use is made of literature on intelligence. Professional experience informs the main pitfalls and problems that may occur in this field. Attending to these issues may be useful in recognizing and avoiding errors common in intelligence analysis. Furthermore, it may point to issues from which criteria could be developed.

4.1.1 On bias

Intelligence research knows – as does all research – its biases. A bias may be a twist, an incomplete representation, or fantasy. In this section, different causes of bias are discussed. While an agency cannot always be blamed for bias, it can be in most cases. The causes are varied. Insight into the type of bias – and the cause – contributes to the writing of reports of a higher quality. There will always remain some bias. If analysts properly recognize a bias, they can use it as

¹ For an overview of pathogens that are not limited to the phase of the analysis, see: Bar-Joseph & Sheaffer, "Surprise and its Causes in Business Administration and Strategic Studies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Fall 1998, 335-342.

an assumption of the research.² The advantage of this approach is that analysts make the bias explicit – and as a result, consumers can calculate the effects.

First, some general information is presented on causes of biases. This general information is derived from literature on methodology. Second, the discussion focuses on biases as described in the literature on intelligence. It is indicated if such a bias is – from a methodological point of view – characteristic for intelligence research, or if it is of a more general nature. Finally, the measures that can be taken to cope with biases are discussed.

In the literature on methodology, different arrangements are made to prevent the causes of bias. When grouped into four main categories, the following can be distinguished – sources of invalidity of measures triggered by the object of research, sources of invalidity of measures triggered by errors of the researcher, problems concerning access on content by the class of the research method, and factors related to the operating ease and validity checks.

First, there are sources of invalidity triggered by the object of research. This can be caused because the object is aware of being investigated, the role defining decision of being investigated by this object of investigation, the investigation working as a change agent, or the response sets. In general, such reactive errors can be reduced by measures that do not require the cooperation of the object of investigation.³ Yet, one problem of intelligence research is the often-hostile environment in which the research is carried out, and in which information is purposely withheld or manipulated.

Second, there are invalidity sources of measures, which can also be triggered by errors from the investigator. The characteristics of the investigator, for example, will contribute to a bias in the set of findings – eventually through the interaction with the object of investigation. Another factor is a change in the research instrument – for example, if a new SIGINT technology is implemented – or varieties of a sampling error. Furthermore, there may be population restrictions, in the sense of the group that is investigated. Prognostic trend research, for example, can be affected by problems concerning population stability over time or over areas investigated.⁴

Third, there are problems concerning the access to content. Each class of research method, whether it is an interview or an observation, has rigidities on the content it can cover. ‘These rigidities can be divided, as were population restrictions, into those linked to an interaction between method and materials, those associated with time, and those with physical area.’⁵ Such restrictions can lead to biases.

Fourth, factors related to the operating ease and validity checks can lead to biases. If an investigator can choose between different methods and techniques and can select options that are likely to promise valid data, the researcher is

² Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 66.

³ Webb a/o, *Unobtrusive measures*, 1971, 12-21.

⁴ Compare: Webb a/o, *Unobtrusive measures*, 1971, 21-27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 27-32. Quote: pp 29-30

likely to choose the less time-consuming and cheaper ones. There is also a tendency to choose the method or technique that is more flexible, that allow repetition if something unforeseen happens, and which has the potential to produce internal checks on validity or errors.⁶

CIA-literature

The causes of biases presented in the above were formulated in general methodological terms. What types of bias are mentioned in the literature on intelligence, and what is characteristic for intelligence research? To discuss this issue, CIA-articles as 'Studies in Intelligence' are taken as the reference.⁷ Since this may result in a bias the outcomes will therefore be evaluated in the subsection after this – 'Findings.' In the articles consulted, no indication was given as to how often a certain bias occurs. Therefore, no statement can be made on the actual presence of a certain bias in reports, only on how much attention was paid to discuss a bias.

The first group of biases looked for were those related to the invalidity of measures triggered by the object of investigation. This can be a powerful potential cause for bias and in most cases; the objects of investigation suspect or know that they are being investigated. As a result, they may shield or manipulate information purposely – and often do so.

This type of bias is known in the intelligence community, for example, as deception (3.3). More strikingly, it is rarely discussed or dealt with in combination with biases in the mentioned literature. For example, when the issue of absent data and key information is discussed, it is not, or rarely, referred to deception by an opponent as a cause.⁸

A second group of biases is related to the invalidity of measures triggered by errors of the researcher. One variant is the bias caused by the characteristics of the investigator. A lot of attention is paid to this type in the literature on intelligence. It was even subject to a special separate CIA-publication.⁹ Biases mentioned in CIA-articles include the following.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 32-34.

⁷ Dutch literature on bias is too fragmented to be a relevant source for the framework needed. As comparable Dutch literature was absent, American literature was selected. Within American literature, sources from within the intelligence community were chosen. 'Studies in Intelligence' of the CIA is such a source. Compared with other literature, it gives a relatively compact and complete insight in the issues that need to be addressed within the frame of this chapter. Furthermore, within the 'Studies in Intelligence,' it is argued that the intelligence professional, by its position, should be best able to express the essence of intelligence (Bowen, "The Quality of Intelligence Literature," CIA/SII, Winter 1990, 33-35). Some of its articles have been published in scientific magazines. A more extended description of the biases is presented in De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1986, 32-42.

⁸ For example: Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 40-41. For more on data absent, see third group of causes of biases, heading: 'Absence and redundancy of data.'

⁹ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999.

- *Overconfident analysts.* They write their report rapidly, glibly and persuasively and then the report progresses along the chain. The next reviewer or consumer has the task to discover whether it has a substantial research base.¹⁰ This kind of bias, however, is not specific to intelligence research.
- *Shared assumptions and causal connections (attributions).* Assumptions may be so fundamental and widely shared within society that they will permeate the intelligence as well as the decision-making community. That does not mean these assumptions are accurate. General beliefs are not easily altered – not even by a significant amount of discrepant information.¹¹

A second factor of influence on the persistence of impressions based on discredited evidence is the causal connection. This process is as follows: if you receive evidence, you postulate a set of causal connections that explains this evidence. The stronger you perceive the relation between facts leading to that causal connection; the stronger you perceive that causal connection. This attribution tends to persist even after the evidence that created those connections has been fully discredited. Even if you learn that the information – on which you had developed your causal connection – comes from an uncontrolled source who may be trying to manipulate you, this does not necessarily reduce the impact of this causal connection.¹² In general, the ‘early but incorrect impression tends to persist because the amount of information necessary to invalidate a hypothesis is considerably greater than the amount of information required to make an initial interpretation [...] People form impressions on the basis of very little information, but once formed, they do not reject or change them unless they obtain rather solid evidence.’¹³

As such, this is an overall type of bias that is not specific for intelligence research.

- *Impact of different types of information.* The impact of vivid, concrete, or personal information is disproportionately great. This applies to case histories and anecdotes. Analysts tend to disregard abstract and statistical information that may have greater evidential value. Such information is commonly ignored unless it illuminates causal relationships. If background information is non-causal, the tendency to ignore it is so strong that it is still not used even when case-specific evidence is worthless.¹⁴ ‘Background information that tells what the probabilities are prior to receiving specific evidence on the case at hand may be highly informative and should be used even if it does not illuminate cause and effect relationships.’¹⁵ To ignore or to discount such information is often due to analysts’ perception that a problem is unique.¹⁶

¹⁰ Alexander, “An Intelligence Role for the Footnote,” CIA/SII, Summer 1964, 6.

¹¹ Jervis, “Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy,” CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 20 and 22.

¹² Heuer, “Biases in Evaluation of Evidence,” CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 44-46.

¹³ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 4, page 4 of 6.

¹⁴ Heuer, “Biases in Evaluation of Evidence,” CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 31, 32-35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 32, 34, 37, 39.

Concerning people as objects of observation, analysts tend to overestimate the role of internal factors and to underestimate the role of external factors. External factors are role requirements, social pressures, or other societal forces as cultural or economic aspects that individuals have little control over.¹⁷ A bias may result if analysts tend to focus on words and individuals, instead of the institutions and the political systems that have usually created them and in which they function. An extra weakness of this approach is that the speaker is not necessarily competent or did not address the analysts, or that their speech served another goal or hidden agenda. Analysis of an institution and a political system gives a better insight. From this, analysts can derive the priorities of the players in question, their strengths and weaknesses, whether they have the right priorities, and whether they are playing the game right.¹⁸

A last bias is caused by security paranoia. Security paranoia often excludes non-intelligence data and eliminates competing evidence. This happens, for example, when an agency prohibits analysts from bringing unclassified periodicals to their offices. Furthermore, it may lead to the erroneous belief that classified material is inherently more credible than unclassified information.¹⁹ For example, analysts may ignore public speeches.²⁰

This type of bias is quite general, except for the last example, which is typical for an organization working in secret.

Related to the issue of errors because of the characteristics of the researcher, are errors because of the characteristics of the organization the researcher works in. Although this is not mentioned in the consulted literature on methodology, the literature on intelligence refers to it as a potentially influential source of biases for a closed society such as the intelligence community.

- *Structure of the organization and company culture.* The way the organization of an agency is structured – the degree of hierarchy, centralization, compartmentalization, and specialization – influences bias. It is even argued that these structural characteristics hinder the intelligence function most.²¹

Whenever analysts move into a new area, or new analysts are appointed, they have to update the judgments and estimates of their predecessor. These previous judgments and estimates serve as a starting point. These starting

¹⁷ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 11, page 5 of 13.

¹⁸ Howells, "Intelligence in Crisis," CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 6. A Dutch analyst, who worked in such a preferred way, Ad de Jonge of the BVD (11.3.3). He combined this way of analyzing with the use of empathy.

¹⁹ Donovan, "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 66-67.

²⁰ An example is given a public speech by Saddam Hussein in relation to the Gulf War of the early 1990's. Davis, "Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/davis.html>, under heading 'Gulf Crisis.'

²¹ Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," CIA/SII, Fall 1979, 39-40. See also: Donovan, "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 66 (and also; Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 75-87).

points are an anchor that reduces the amount of adjustment. The outcome stays closer to the starting point than it should.²²

Analysts work for a specified group of decision makers. A trade-off may develop between objectivity and influence. At least, analysts are under pressure to bend the estimate towards the policy maker's conclusion.²³ This effect is enhanced in a heated political atmosphere.²⁴

During a crisis, there is a special type of bias. A reliance on objective indices, like capability and facts, tends to be replaced by subjective appraisal of intentions. In short, threat perception tends to overshadow threat assessment.²⁵

This type of bias is to some extent characteristic for a closed society such as an intelligence community.

- *Other aims of the intelligence organization.* Intelligence analysis and operations, like covert action, may take place within one department of an agency. If a group evaluates an operation itself, it tends to issue optimistic assessments. Such reports will then be self-serving, justifying its performance.²⁶ This type of bias is characteristic for a closed society such as an intelligence community.
- *Impact of different types of information.* To put more emphasis on certain types of information is not only related to the analysts, but may have organizational causes. Collectors or their managers, for example, may focus on signal intelligence and denigrate the importance of human assets. This way of collection is excellent in ferreting out data, but it is less useful in estimating a coherent picture or in assessing intentions. While this means a focus on quantifying accurately and rapidly, it is limited in terms of qualifying or in retaining context. This has an effect on the findings of an analysis.²⁷ This type of bias is of a general nature.

²² Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 12, page 3 of 9.

²³ Whitman, "On Estimating Reactions," CIA/SII, Summer 1965, 3. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," CIA/SII, Fall 1979, 39-40. (More in general, solutions to policy problems reflect and are limited by the moral consistency of historical social relationships: Wildavsky, *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*, 1987, 396. Compare also Välimäki, "Bridging the Gap," *Peacekeeping Intelligence*, 2003, 58, and Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 69).

²⁴ Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 20-21. The clash of rival agencies and secrecy add also to the pressures of screening out unpleasant information (Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 69).

²⁵ Cohen, "Early Warning Systems," CIA/SII, Fall 1989, 36.

²⁶ Hamilton, "View from the Hill," CIA/SII, Summer 1987, 69; Allen, "Intelligence in Small Wars," CIA/SII, Winter 1991, 22; Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," CIA/SII, Fall 1979, 37; Montague, "The Origins of National Intelligence Estimating," CIA/SII, Spring 1972, page 6 of article.

Accurate control limits the margins for this kind of bias (Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," CIA/SII, Fall 1987, 31). In the USA, both liberal and conservative members in Congress have reserves to combine operations, like covert actions, and intelligence. Conservative members often feel that the additional burdens of covert action divert an agency from intelligence, and may erode and corrupt the discipline and commitment of the intelligence mission (Maury, "CIA and the Congress," CIA/SII, Summer 1974, 7).

²⁷ Laqueur, "The Future of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Spring 1986, 57-58. Donovan, "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 66-67. Cohen, "Early Warning Systems," Fall 1989, CIA/SII, 43. For more see 3.2.2, 'Robustness.'

A third group of biases is related to the access of content caused by the class of research method. It is on the restriction of what is available – content over time and over area.

- *Absence and redundancy of data.* A characteristic of intelligence analysis is that key information is often lacking. Ideally, analysts identify data that is absent, and is able to factor these into their calculations. They estimate the potential impact of the missing data and evaluate alternative hypotheses. Analysts consider whether the lack of information is normal or whether the absence is itself an indicator of unusual activity or inactivity. Analysts rarely pay attention to information that is lacking.²⁸ For an analysis, however, knowing what you do not know is as important as knowing what you do know.²⁹ Rarely will analysts point out when their evidence is thin.³⁰ In contrast, the sheer volume of data that can be accessed may overwhelm analysts. This may cause bias, especially if analysts ignore data that is difficult to process. This encourages analysts to choose only the evidence that supports their arguments. Analysts tend to quantify a few formulae with a few criteria.³¹

In particular, the absence of key information is characteristic of intelligence research.

In 3.2.1 ‘Triangulation of sources of information,’ the *collection* technique (HUMINT/SIGINT) that may lead to biases in the data gathered has already been discussed.

A fourth group of biases is related to the operating ease and validity checks. If an investigator can choose between different methods and techniques, which both are likely to promise valid data, the researcher is likely to choose the less time-consuming and cheaper one. There is also a tendency to choose the method or technique that is more flexible, allows repetition if something unforeseen happens, and which has the potential for producing internal checks on validity or errors. In ‘Studies in Intelligence’, no such examples were found. The biases presented here primarily refer to a problem of a more fundamental nature – methodical errors.

- *Analytical inertia* refers to the passivity of patterns that analysts use to investigate a changing world. Analytical inertia tends to favor oversimplification.³² This is a bias of a general nature.
- *Oversensitivity to consistency.* Internal consistency in a pattern of evidence is a major determinant of someone’s confidence in judgments based on that evidence. In these circumstances, however, consistency may be deceptive.

²⁸ Heuer, “Biases in Evaluation of Evidence,” Winter 1981, 40-41.

²⁹ Howells, “Intelligence in Crisis,” CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 1.

³⁰ Britt Snider, “Congress as a User of Intelligence. Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers,” <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/98unclas/congres.html>, under heading ‘Challenges and Pitfalls.’

³¹ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 67.

³² *Ibid.*, 67.

For example, data may be consistent only because they are highly correlated. Redundancy of the same information also may lead to the erroneous perception of consistency. In that case, many related reports are no more informative than a single one. Another option is that the available evidence is consistent, because it represents a small and hence unreliable sample taken from a large and heterogeneous group. It may create the illusion of validity caused by the consistency of the – small and biased sample of – information. Analysts are overly confident of conclusions drawn from little data if that data seems to be consistent. The tendency to place too much reliance on small samples has been shown true to even those scientists trained extensively in statistics.³³

Oversensitivity to consistency may be combined with being insufficiently sensitive to the reliability of the evidence. Unreliable information is then used to meet the felt need of consistency. Conflicting information of uncertain reliability is endemic to intelligence analysis, as is the need to make rapid judgment on current events even before all the evidence is collected.³⁴

On a more fundamental level, the oversensitivity to consistency is caused by the tendency to favor causal explanations in the search for coherence. If no pattern is apparent, the first thought analysts have is often that they lack understanding. Yet, it is possible that analysts deal with random phenomena that have no purpose or reason. Outcomes may be determined by forces that interact in random, unpredictable ways.³⁵

Spurious correlations may occur if analysts see a relationship that actually does not exist. In a series of cases, analysts often focus on elements that support the existence of a relationship, but ignore those elements that fail to support it. Furthermore, when two events co-occur – and event A is followed by event B – event A does not necessarily cause event B.³⁶

Another variant is called the fallacy of identity – that a cause must resemble its effect. Analysts tend to assume that, for example, economic events have economic causes, large events have large consequences, and that little events do not affect history. Yet, there is little basis to expect such inferences.³⁷

This bias is of a general nature.

- *Analytical errors concerning the opponent.* In relation to an opponent, there are three types of intelligence errors resulting in bias. The first error is related to the observation of the opponent, through mirror imaging and lack of empathy. Mirror imaging means that analysts expect the opponent to share their characteristics and behave like them; analysts are projecting their thought process or value system onto someone else.³⁸ In practice, analysts for example, may not pay adequate attention to the full range of plausible

³³ Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 41-42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

³⁵ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 11, page 2 of 13.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, chapter 11, page 8 of 13. This is also known as 'post hoc, non ergo propter hoc.'

³⁷ *Ibid.*, chapter 11, page 5 of 13.

³⁸ Watanabe, "Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts. How To Succeed in the DI," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/axioms.html>.

interpretations of the opponent's goals and tactics.³⁹ A lack of empathy means analysts are unable to place themselves in the opponent's position. For example, you assume that the opponent's behavior is driven by unusual or malign internal characteristics. Yet, the behavior may largely be a product of the situation or culture in which the opponents find themselves. A special type of lack of empathy is the tendency to overestimate your own importance. This applies to your own perception of how you are able to successfully influence your opponent's behavior, or whether you are the target of the opponent's action. This last aspect is caused by the sensitivity to the impact the opponent's action has on you. Analysts 'are much less aware of, and consequently tend to downgrade the importance of, other causes or results of the action.'⁴⁰ A complicating factor is that their own policy is interactive with the opponents. To exclude your own policy and behavior may happen subconsciously, but it reduces the ability to produce accurate analyses.⁴¹ Analysts have to place themselves in a meta-position to take stock of the situation. Moreover, analysts do not always have a good insight into the hidden or personal agenda of their own policy maker.⁴² A part of the analysis is also to present how an opponent views the conduct and capabilities of your own party. Analysts demonstrate where there is support or criticism.⁴³

A second error is related with irrationality. Agencies tend to underestimate their judgment of the role of irrationality. This can be questioned if analysts have another option.⁴⁴ Nobody should expect analysts to estimate exactly when an enemy is about to make a dramatically wrong decision. Analysts are not encouraged to underestimate their opponents.⁴⁵ That an opponent does not always behave rationally – may conflict with what was written initially. It has been argued that strange action does not necessarily need to be strange, since it may fit with the values and norms of an opponent. When action is perceived as strange, analysts need to find out whether they are lacking of empathy, or whether the opponent is action irrationally.⁴⁶

A third error is to underestimate factors typical of the *weaker* opponent. Unpredictable and surprise actions are more attractive to the weaker opponent when it faces a stronger antagonist. The weaker opponent perceives it as one of the few possibilities to balance its inferior position. It uses such action as a force multiplier. While surprise has its drawbacks for the weaker opponent – it often blocks the possibility of the opponent

³⁹ Davis, "Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/davis.html>, under heading 'Focusing on Uncertainty.'

⁴⁰ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 11, page 7 and 8 of 13 (the need of empathy is also described in the regular intelligence literature: White, "Empathy as an Intelligence Tool," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Spring 1986).

⁴¹ Jervis, "Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy," CIA/SII, Winter 1989, 24-26.

⁴² Compare heading 'Impact of different types of information.'

⁴³ Ford, "The Primary Purpose of National Estimating," CIA/SII, Fall 1991, 76-78.

⁴⁴ Boatner, "The Evaluation of Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1984, 68.

⁴⁵ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived," CIA/SII, Spring 1964, 15.

⁴⁶ Irrational action can be a product of, for example, stress.

attaining its final political objectives. Analysts need to anticipate a weak party taking resources to surprise actions.⁴⁷

This type of bias is characteristic for intelligence research.

- *Ambiguous and non-perfect data.* Analysts have to judge the reliability of material. If analysts reject evidence as unreliable, they tend to reject it fully. If they accept it, they tend to accept it as wholly reliable. However, the probabilistic nature of the reliability judgment is then ignored.⁴⁸ This can result in a base-rate fallacy. The reliability of what is perceived as the best data ranges from 90 percent to 'who knows.'⁴⁹ Analysts have to consider this in making their analysis. If you combine data, the joint probability is equal to the product of its individual probabilities. For example, analysts' judge two facts each as probably true for, say, 75%. When they combine these facts, the joint result presents only for 56% (75% x 75%) reliability.⁵⁰ This is a general type of bias, but ambiguous and non-perfect data is especially endemic in intelligence research.

Findings

The methodological arrangement of biases was explored with the descriptions as presented in CIA-articles. In these articles, no indication was given of how often a certain bias occurs. Therefore, a few comments should be made on how much attention was paid to discuss a bias. For the four main categories, the following observations can be made.

The first group concerned sources of invalidity of measures triggered by the object of research. As such, this type has features characteristic of intelligence research. The researcher often investigates in – or on – a hostile environment. Objects of investigation are more likely than in other research to manipulate or to shield information. In the intelligence literature, attention is paid to such issues in the context of *deception* (3.3). Yet, it is almost absent when perceived from the context of *bias in an analysis*. As the issue of deception is widely known and discussed, it can be translated relatively easily to the consequences in the specific context of bias. For example, by analyzing the best and worst case analyses on how this type of bias is dealt with.

The second group concerned sources of invalidity of measures triggered by errors of researchers themselves. Two points are striking. First, the enormous amount of attention paid to biases related to psychological aspects of the mind-

⁴⁷ Wirtz, "Miscalculation, Surprise and US Intelligence," CIA/SII, Summer 1991, 6-7. Lowenthal put on this issue: 'Analysts are prisoners not only of their information, but also of their own mindsets. Events they have never seen before are too often held to be, at best, highly unlikely if not downright impossible. Most events rejected as "unbelievable" begin in the "impossible" category. In reality, very few events or behaviors actually belong in that category. The ability to keep a relatively open mind, even in subjects that analysts have an expertise and are familiar with, is a necessity. Surprise – in the neutral sense of the unexpected – is not only an existing but also a recurrent phenomenon' (Lowenthal, "Intelligence epistemology," *Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Fall 1993, 324-325).

⁴⁸ Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 43.

⁴⁹ Howells, "Intelligence in Crisis," CIA/SII, Fall 1983, 13.

⁵⁰ Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," CIA/SII, Winter 1981, 43.

set of the analysts. In most cases, these biases are of a general nature and not characteristic of intelligence research. Second, the reflective CIA-practitioners showed a special sense for biases caused by their own organization. This well developed self-reflecting capacity in the CIA-literature is absent as a special category in the methodological literature consulted.

The third group is on problems concerning access to content. This type of bias is characteristic of intelligence research and attention is paid to this – although elementary – in a range of articles.

The fourth group concerned factors relating to the operating ease and validity checks. In 'Studies in Intelligence,' it was primarily referred to as a problem of a more fundamental nature – methodical errors. To meet possible biases in this field, a second step therefore still needs to be taken concerning the issue itself – biases caused by operating ease and validity checks. What has to be done in the first place is to obtain a better arrangement of methods and techniques that can be applied (3.2).

To summarize, the biases discussed in the consulted CIA-articles are primarily focused on those caused by the psychology of the analysts and by their own organization. It is for the most part aimed at being self-critical. Strikingly, it is not primarily focused on discussing those biases that are characteristic for intelligence analyses from a methodological point of view.

This emphasis of attention in the CIA-articles may point to two different possible explanations. First, it might be that the reflective CIA-practitioners are oversensitive for their own psychological mindset, thereby neglecting some biases that are – from a methodological point of view – typical of intelligence research. Second, it might be that such psychological and organizational factors indeed play a more dominant role than one would expect from a purely methodological point of view. In that case, an explanation is not grounded in methodological aspects, but in other ones, as for example the absence of a well-developed forum (4.2.2). If so, the absence of a forum would then create a situation in which such psychological and organizational factors could play a more dominant role – and, eventually, give rise to more related biases. The case studies on the Shipping Research Bureau and the BVD may produce some further indications on this issue.

What can be done to cope with the biases identified? Some remarks of a general nature are already made in 3.2 – on the triangulation of sources of information, on competing hypotheses, on robustness, and on presenting the width of the possible outcomes. In addition, best and worst case analyses can be made to illustrate how certain types of biases were reduced.

Furthermore, in literature on methodology, ideas are presented on this issue. There are several, interrelated subjective factors that can cause bias. In literature on methodology, remedies are suggested to reduce these factors.⁵¹ First, there is the remedy to work with judgments of others who are independent or have no

⁵¹ The remedies mentioned here stem from: De Groot, *Methodologie*, 1981, 244-253.

interest in the research – a forum. In intelligence research, this remedy is often limited for reasons of secrecy. Even peer review or review by supervisors may therefore be more complicated than in other fields. A second remedy is the coding and composing of instructions – developed in a pilot. This may be a solution for laboratory-like settings, but this is often not possible in the applied intelligence research – for example, for reasons of time. A third remedy is to let the researcher only know that aspect or facet that is needed to objectify his judgment. Again, this is a laboratory-like approach not fit for the interdisciplinary approach of intelligence research – and can be further complicated by the existing compartmentalization of an agency. A fourth remedy is to vary the arrangement of data for repetitive situations. Again, this is not a likely solution for intelligence research since it is oriented to unique cases.

To summarize, intelligence research is in a disadvantageous position when it comes to the possibility of executing standardized remedies against biases. To cope with biases, therefore, use has to be made of solutions that are more general in nature, such as the triangulation of sources of information, to develop competing hypotheses, and robustness (3.2). In one respect, an additional measure can be taken relatively easily. This concerns the forum function as proposed by De Groot. It could be augmented by the installation of a Review Section (2.3.1).

In the next section another issue of the intelligence literature is discussed that may lead to problems – non-optimal and manipulative techniques.

4.1.2 Non-optimal and manipulative techniques

This section on techniques is composed of two elements. First, some non-optimal analyzing techniques are presented. Second, some remarks are made on techniques to manipulate a research. By discussing inadequate techniques, insight is given as to what may go wrong in the field of intelligence analysis.

Non-optimal techniques

The analytical process requires selecting main conclusions among competing hypotheses. It calls for a full set of competing hypotheses and a systematic evaluation of them. In practice, often non-optimal techniques are employed for making decisions in the face of incomplete information, and multiple and competing interpretations, hypotheses, and assumptions. These techniques are presented here as discussed in the intelligence literature. This will make it easier to identify them – and, hopefully, to also avoid them.

Before discussing these non-optimal techniques, two reservations have to be made. First, there is no indication of how often a certain non-optimal technique occurs. Second, the next list seems to be largely inspired by insights of decision-making processes – such as selecting sound policy and intervention – and less by selecting an accurate explanation.

In the intelligence literature, the most common non-optimal techniques are mentioned:

1. Satisficing.⁵² Analysts select the first identified alternative explanation that appears to be good enough as an explanation or prognosis. This is opposite to examining all alternatives to determine which the best one is. If satisficing is applied, analysts tend to accept a hypothesis if the data fits in a reasonable way. Yet, to reach a high quality analysis analysts aim, in the first place, to deny a favorite hypothesis (3.2.2).
2. Incrementalism. Analysts focus on a narrow range of alternative hypothesis representing marginal change. They do not examine hypotheses on a possible dramatic change.
3. Seeking consensus. Analysts opt for the alternative that will elicit the greatest agreement and support. The dominant factor is the group process, not logic.
4. Reasoning by analogy. Analysts choose the alternative that appears most likely to avoid previous errors or to duplicate previous successes.
5. Analysts rely on a number of principles or maxims (rules of thumb) that distinguish a good alternative from a bad one.
2. Analysts play it safe. They simply describe the situation and identify the alternatives, but they let consumers make the decision as to which judgment is most likely.⁵³

The first four techniques are better known in the decision-making process, rather than for selecting an accurate explanation. In the context of the decision-making process, however, satisficing⁵⁴ and incrementalism⁵⁵ are presented as possibly useful and acceptable strategies. Regarding the fifth technique, it can be said that this may work as long as the rules of thumb are correct.

Heuer appears to have transplanted techniques that stem from a different discipline. This may cause confusion – especially concerning their usefulness. What Heuer attempts to make clear is that – concerning the first five techniques – analysts fail to investigate in a complete way by excluding beforehand a number of alternatives. Pre-selection is arbitrary. Seen this way, Heuer's contribution can be judged positively.

Concerning the sixth technique, analysts back out of their responsibility to give an independent judgment. The techniques mentioned are non-optimal ones for, in particular, explanatory and prognostic intelligence research. If the aim is

⁵² Satisficing is also used differently in scientific research on professional analysis. In a publication by Van der Vall, satisficing is used as the opposite of maximizing. Satisficing is then aimed at an optimal satisfaction of a range of needs, opposite to the aim to maximize the satisfaction of one single need (maximizing). Used this way, satisficing is not only used in a different context (to satisfy needs, instead of to test hypotheses), but also has a different connotation – a positive one, instead of a negative (Compare: Van der Vall, *Sociaal beleidsonderzoek*, 1980, 103-104).

⁵³ Heuer, "Strategies for Analytical Judgment," Summer 1980, CIA/SII, 74-75.

⁵⁴ Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 1976, XXVIII and 272 (38-41, 80-81, 240-244, 272).

⁵⁵ Braybrooke & Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision*, 1970, 31, 64-71, 166 (62-63., 72-110, 188, 234ff.).

to produce a descriptive intelligence analysis, the sixth technique for example, does not apply, because a judgment is not necessarily expected.

Besides non-optimal techniques, there are techniques to manipulate a research. This is the issue of the following section.

On manipulation

Besides non-optimal techniques, there are techniques that are intended to manipulate a research. It is not proposed here to present a toolkit of manipulative techniques. On the contrary, this study is on high quality analysis. The discussion about manipulation is to help analyst and consumer to recognize, avoid, and uncover manipulation more easily.

What may cause the use of tricks? What happens for instance when analysts want to steer the readership of their report. This may occur because they disfavor, for example, the budget claims of their department because of the original outcome. Alternatively, their original findings may support a policy that they oppose, or that policymakers do not support with sufficient vigor a policy that they favor.

In such instances, analysts have several means to steer their findings in a way that cannot easily be accused of manipulation. For example, they may not complete their report. Analysts also may resume their research with a slightly different scope, some different analogies, or by using some data that was dismissed originally as irrelevant. The basis of this report may be largely the same, but the findings and conclusions lie in a zone less dangerous in terms of job security or are more appropriate to the requirements of their policy preconceptions.⁵⁶

Now analysts have entered the twilight zone of serving their own interest and group thinking through manipulation. This is a dangerous approach. The worst accusation is that a report is misleading. If analysts are correctly accused of this, they need to take this criticism very serious. At least the credibility of reports are called into questioned when analysts are caught operating so unwisely:

'If the same group of estimators are caught out a second or third time, their credibility will probably be dead for good. Thereafter almost any intelligence pronouncement they or their associates make will be slightly referred to as propaganda, and perhaps not even read. They have not only lost all hope of directly influencing policy, they have lost what is even more important because more attainable than direct influence. This is the indirect influence which they might have exercised through an honest contribution to the debate which ought to precede every substantial policy decision.'⁵⁷

4.1.3 Conclusion

In the intelligence literature, attention is paid to the issue of biases. Some of these biases are characteristic for intelligence research from a methodological point of view. Not all these typical biases are dealt with thoroughly in the

⁵⁶ Kent, "Estimates and Influence," CIA/SII, Summer 1968, 17.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 19-20.

intelligence literature. Nevertheless, the intelligence literature is very keen on biases caused by the own organization and by the psychological mindset of analysts. Concerning these two fields, self-reflecting intelligence professionals have shown that they contemplate well on their own analysis.

In the intelligence literature, there is also an awareness of non-optimal research techniques. The frame, in which this issue is placed however, needs sometimes extra clarification. It was indicated how a producer may manipulate the research purposely. There is an awareness of both issues. As such, this awareness makes it easier to cope with both groups of inadequate techniques.

After dealing with biases and inadequate techniques, one last issue will be addressed that is often mentioned in the intelligence literature – the presentation and feedback.

4.2 PRESENTATION AND FEEDBACK

Are there other factors that influence the quality of intelligence and security agency reports? The focus of this study is on the analysis. In this frame, presentation and feedback are secondary issues. Still, some discussion is necessary, as a good presentation and feedback are also factors that influence the quality of a report.

In the intelligence literature, an underlying assumption is that intelligence is a force enhancer for a security policy, and that this function is served best by a good presentation and communication of intelligence and security agency reports.⁵⁸ Also in the scientific literature, it is understood that the workability of a research is enhanced by a good presentation and communication.⁵⁹

If we look at the steps of the research process (2.2.1) – design, collection, processing, analysis, report, and dissemination – the issue presented in 4.2 (steps: report, dissemination) follows that of the analysis (3.2).

This section is composed of two parts. First, comments are made on presentation. Second, attention is paid to different types of feedback mechanisms between the consumer and producer.

4.2.1 Presentation

In this section, the presentation of a report is dealt with. A good presentation serves the accessibility of a report – and thus its quality. This section deals with aspects such as, the words used, balanced information, quoting sources, and the structure of a report.

⁵⁸ See also 2.1. Intelligence is seen as an integral part of planning and policy making. Intelligence has the function as a force enhancer. For this, decisions are based on information that is correct, precise, timely, and properly interpreted. (Probst, "Intelligence as a Force Enhancer," CIA/SII, Winter 1987, 67). Intelligence is seen as essential for making sound policy decisions and to judge the performance of a policy (Murphy & Smith, "Making Intelligence Analysis Responsive to Policy Concerns," CIA/SII, Summer 1973, 1).

⁵⁹ Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 310, 323-325.

In 3.2, it was noticed that an analysis has to be policy relevant and future oriented. To be future oriented is not necessarily limited to prognostic research, although this is the most outspoken manifestation. In addition, other types of intelligence products are meant to be more than just an historically interesting product. They are designed to serve a policy and to be oriented to interventions.⁶⁰

There is abundant useful information present within intelligence literature. This abundant attention may fit with the American tradition of selling the message, and subsequently may explain the comparatively large attention in intelligence articles paid to the issue of presentation.

Use of words

In the intelligence literature, it is argued that analysts define terms the first time they are used.⁶¹ An accurate description is seen as crucial. Incorrect definitions can lead to false understanding, and frequently to flawed analysis.⁶² Clarity, accuracy, brevity, and directness are mentioned as core qualities of a report.⁶³ When a report is written in ambiguous terms, the consumer's interpretation is likely to be biased in favor of consistency with what the consumer already believes in.⁶⁴

It is understood that analysts should present findings clearly to the reader as to what certain knowledge is and what reasoned judgment is. Concerning judgments, analysts provide the degree of certitude behind each key statement. Analysts should avoid vague terms. Instead, they choose words or phrases that accurately describe the degree of certainty. To illustrate this:

'There are ten horses in the starting gate. It is *possible* that any one of them will win – even the one with three legs.

However, the *odds* (or chances) *against* the "three-legger" are overwhelming.'⁶⁵

In the intelligence literature, a plea is made for analysts to express differences of reliability by key evaluative words – 'suspect' information; something is 'possible,' something is 'probable.' Every term then refers to a different degree of reliability of the information. A more fixed use to express a degree of certainty will lead to an improved insight for consumers.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ In the intelligence literature, the implicit assumption is that the consumer is not interested in the complete analysis. Analyst derive only those elements of interest for the consumer. To reach this, analysts rewrite their analysis into a report.

⁶¹ Drell, "Intelligence Research," CIA/SII, Fall 1957, 93.

⁶² -, "Hu's a Reformist, Hu's a Conservative," CIA/SII, Winter 1987, 49.

⁶³ Knapp, "Style and Stereotypes in Intelligence Studies," CIA/SII, Spring 1964, A4.

⁶⁴ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 12, page 4 of 9.

⁶⁵ Kent, "Words of Estimative Probability," CIA/SII, Fall 1964, 50, 51, and 53. Ben-Israel illustrates this issue by the term truism (Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, October 1989, 671).

⁶⁶ Ibid., 61. For the difference between producers and consumers in the interpretation of such terms, see: Wark, "The Definition of Some Estimative Expressions," CIA/SII, 67-80. For an example of a mathematical approach, see: Anderson, "Probability Analysis for the Case of Yellow Rain," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Spring 1989, 77-82.

Besides written communication, there is the oral briefing. Some authors argue that for a good reception of intelligence by a policy maker, effective communication is needed – and a briefing is seen as potentially the most effective form of communication.⁶⁷ However, this study is not focused on the more fleeting impressions such as oral briefings.

Balanced information

In the intelligence literature, it is argued that the question of objectivity is all pervasive.⁶⁸ Yet, objectivity is a tricky concept. Everyone belongs to a particular culture and has particular values and assumptions from which no one can dissociate themselves. Therefore, is the concept of objective observation a possible one? Any observation is to a certain degree subjective and any interpretation of it may be steered by a certain interest. Popper argues that data – on which a theory is formed – is in fact an adaptive reaction. He maintains that data is, like theory, impregnated with conjectural expectations, and ‘that there can be no pure perception, no pure datum.’⁶⁹ Perhaps the concept of balanced information may avoid some of these pitfalls. Balanced information is opposed to biases, as described in 4.1.1. While it will never be possible to avoid biases completely, analysts can include explicitly, for example the assumptions that they are making. Subsequently this obtains a more balanced report.

For a balanced report, analysts are advised to set their data in context. This will enhance the relevance of the product.⁷⁰ Analysts can pay attention to weaknesses and contradictory information. In this respect, it is argued that quality is more important than quantity. Most policymakers have overburdened agendas. Brevity means the policymakers will be more likely to be receptive.⁷¹ A complicating factor is that policymakers want the highest possible quality of intelligence in the shortest possible time.⁷²

Although it is stressed again and again that reports need to be concise, some limitations are placed on this brevity. Reports have to be underpinned as best as possible. Consumers of intelligence and security agency reports focus on what they see as useful. First, they want clarity of what is known by laying out the evidence and by giving attention to cause-and-effect patterns. Second, they want assumptions and argumentation to be carefully structured in terms about what is unknown and unknowable. Third, they need expertise to bear for planning and action on important long-term threats and opportunities. According to this view, policymakers are not served by intelligence and security agency reports that emphasize prediction over explanation and opinion over evidence. It is argued

⁶⁷ Donovan, “Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions,” CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 70, 72.

⁶⁸ - , “The Reports Officer,” CIA/SII, Spring 1983, 12.

⁶⁹ Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, 1979, 145.

⁷⁰ For this last remark, see Russ Travers, “The Coming Intelligence Failure,” <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/failure.html>, under heading ‘Adding It All Up.’

⁷¹ - , “The Reports Officer: Issues of Quality,” CIA/SII, 14. Clark, “On Warning,” CIA/SII, 20. Hanrahan, “Intelligence for the Policy Chiefs,” CIA/SII, Winter 1967, 4, 5.

⁷² Darling, “Central Intelligence under Souers,” CIA/SII, Winter 1968, 63.

that in a report the facts, evidence, and analysis should be laid out, instead of just stating conclusions or analytical judgments. The judgment then flows from the evidence.⁷³ Even if attention is paid to the elements mentioned this would not make intelligence and security agency report an elaborate scientific study.

On quoting sources

The need to quote sources is a concept from the academic world that has led to debates within the intelligence community. Within the CIA, it is argued that open and obvious sources may be cited without danger. It is not necessary to identify sensitive sources. Nevertheless, a neutral documentary reference should make it possible for a properly cleared user to run it down.⁷⁴ BVD-reports with a wider distribution that were classified as confidential, were mainly composed of open sources.⁷⁵ Such information may be cited without danger.

Quoting sources will enhance the substantive quality of the final report. The marginal extra time that documentary referencing takes is likely to be compensated by the time saved searching for unquoted sources of questionable statements. In the literature on intelligence, a simple system of documentary referencing – somewhat similar to those used in scientific journals – seems to be preferred. A non-documentation system is seen as job protection for the mediocre analysts, because it makes it difficult and time-consuming to expose their work to careful examination.⁷⁶

W.P.J. Keller – head of the Training Section EO at the BVD 1980-1986 – put forward the issue of data in confidential reports that was not from open sources, but which was processed in such a way that it looked like it was from open sources. If such data was used in a report, a problem would rise concerning quoting sources. Still, Keller supports the opinion that a standardized system of quoting sources enhances the verification of information and that in the end will enhance the quality of reports.⁷⁷

Structure

In the American intelligence community, there is a long tradition of prescriptions of how to present intelligence and security agency reports in a clear and uniform structure. An early example of the 1940's is a document by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. In this document of a couple of dozens of pages, it is explained in detail how producers have to compose their report.

⁷³ Davis, "Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations," under headings intro., 'What Adds Value and What Does Not,' and "'Bad News' and Warning'
(<http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/davis.html>)

⁷⁴ -, "Managing/Teaching New Analysts," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 7.

⁷⁵ Interview with W.P.J. Keller by the author, 27 November 1999.

⁷⁶ -, "Managing/Teaching New Analysts," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 7-8. The author has experienced this for his research on the case on the BVD, the 1981-survey.

⁷⁷ Letter by W.P.J. Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

Besides structure, attention is paid to layout and the level of secrecy.⁷⁸ According to this document, a report has to be composed of the following elements: 1) the problem; 2) facts bearing on the problem; 3) conclusions; and 4) recommendations.⁷⁹

Also in practice, these reports have a fixed structure. In the American tradition, a report is supplemented with follow-ups, dissent opinions, conclusions that are commented upon, and measures to be taken.⁸⁰

Although a uniform structure definitely will enhance the accessibility of a report – especially for successive reports, or for a compilation of reports in one cover – there is no need to follow this too strictly. Furthermore, different types of intelligence and security agency reports will have different formats. In the American literature, for example, it is recommended to begin an estimate with the conclusions and then to explore what this means for future developments.⁸¹ This is likely to differ from the format of encyclopedic intelligence. Moreover, it is likely that the particular company culture will lead to presumptions on how to compose a report. The point made is that every type of report has its own preferable structures that will enhance the receptivity for the consumer.⁸²

Besides the structure of a report, there is the structure of argumentation. This links up with how to present balanced information. Although some attention is paid to it, the structure of the argumentation is less worked out in the intelligence literature. To make a report accessible, it is helpful if analysts pay attention to the structure of the argumentation. The argumentation of intelligence and security agency reports is mostly a pragmatic form of arguing. In it, motivations and reservations of an argument will have their place. For such a pragmatic form of arguing, a model has been developed – the Toulmin-model. The accessibility of a report is likely to be enhanced if an argumentation is structured this way –

⁷⁸ War Department Office, Chief of Staff, "War Department General Staff Circular No. 35-16," Washington, 15 June 1945, 3 and 8. See also: SWNCC-SANACC 1944-1947, Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977 (Microform), Paper and Correspondence Manual, 6 January 1948, SANACC 555/2, 6 (enclosure 1).

⁷⁹ Ibid.


⁸⁰ See for example: NSC 17 (on communism in the USA), NSC 17/1, NSC 17/2, and NSC 17/3 (supplements, remarks and measures taken). NSC 17: A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the Internal Security of the United States, 28 June 1948, Washington. Microform, Documents of NSC 1947-1977, Washington DC: University Publications of America, 1980 (microform), reel 1, 388 ff.

⁸¹ -, "Managing/Teaching New Analysts," CIA/SII, Fall 1986, 2-4. Some adaptations are made because of recommendations in: letter by Henk bij de Weg to the author, 26 January 1997.

⁸² To develop a format for intelligence estimates for Dutch government, elements of the format of the presentation form for governmental documents may be taken into account (Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, 1975-1984, 921.30, File 641, aanbiedingsformulier voor (rijks)ministerraadsstukken 307364LC). Consumers – both politicians and officials – generally want a longer document to begin with a summary. This is requested to further its receptivity, and for a quicker understanding, evaluation, and judgment of its importance (Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1975-1984, 901, File 2, Letter Foreign Affairs to all diplomatic posts, 12 May 1978, DGPZ/XX-129239, 3; memo from Assistant to the Director-General Political Affairs to Director-General Political Affairs, 20 September 1978, No. 56/78, 2-3; and, letter Foreign Affairs to all diplomatic posts, 9 January 1979, DGPZ/6048, 2).

at least, analysts are aware that an argumentation structure exists. In short, the Toulmin-model can be presented as follows (figure 4.1).⁸³

Figure 4.1 The Toulmin-model



The aspects mentioned up to now have concerned the presentation of a report. In this process, there are different feedback processes possible. This is discussed in the following section.

4.2.2 Feedback/forum

Feedback can be an input to improve the quality of a report. It can function as a forum. There are different types of feedback. There is, for example, the feedback from the consumer of a report to the producer. Feedback from within the organization is a second possibility. A third type involves feedback from a producer to consumer. This last type of feedback is to a large part related to communication and presentation.

As noted, the first type of feedback is that from the consumer to the producer. Although this is not part of an analysis itself, such feedback is important for the research process.

This feedback will include the needs of a consumer. The consumer makes a decision or asks for new requirements.⁸⁴ If so, this is related to its design. The needs expressed by a consumer set in motion the goals to be formulated, the definition of the problem, and the methods and techniques needed to carry out the research (2.2.1).

Feedback can also deal with other steps of the intelligence cycle. It can lead, for example, to measures to improve aspects of the collection (if certain data is absent), or to use other methods and techniques (phase of analysis).

In the end, all such feedback will improve the quality of the intelligence and the reports.

⁸³ Van den Bersselaar & Hoeksema, *Discursieve vaardigheden*, 1998, 113, 127.

⁸⁴ Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," CIA/SII, Winter 1985, 75-76.

Feedback is also possible amongst the producers. In this case, the forum is composed by supervisors, peer readers, or a review section (2.3.1). The quality of the feedback will be furthered when documentary reference is included in the report (4.2.1). The use of documentary reference will be easier in this internal forum – because the clearance of this internal forum is in general of a higher level than in the case of external consumers.

It may be possible that two versions are open for feedback – the extended original analysis and the reworked smaller report composed for the consumer. The extended original analysis – with sources and full argumentation – will then be a helpful source to scrutinize the quality of the final report.

For the third type of feedback, the starting point is feedback from producer to consumer. This may be somewhat confusing in that it concerns feedback from *producer* to consumer. However, this is an approach used in social policy studies. Because of the similarities with intelligence and security agency reports, these insights can be helpful for intelligence and security agency reports as well.

This third type of feedback strategy may have a positive effect on the intensity in which the findings of a report will be utilized in policy decisions. Six such feedback strategies include:

1. the design of the research that is not aimed at the verification of theoretical hypotheses, but on the production of policy relevant recommendations;
2. the timing of the research, in which the output precedes the decision making;
3. the use of different communication channels – horizontal and vertical, written and oral, formal and informal, mass media and interpersonal communication;
4. the manipulation of the volume of information – for example, a large volume may lead to a low utilization;
5. extra attention for communication with target groups, and;
1. the most used feedback strategy in practice, the convenient *presentation*.⁸⁵

Some of the mentioned feedback strategies are actually already discussed in 4.2.1 and in other previous sections. Although the first feedback strategy is often not recognized as such, it cannot easily be overestimated. The more that the research question of an investigation links up with the incremental⁸⁶ structure of the organizational policy, the more intensive the research findings will be utilized in the policy decision-making process.⁸⁷ All six feedback strategies are aimed at enhancing the reception and use by the consumer.

⁸⁵ Van der Vall, *Sociaal beleidsonderzoek*, 1980, 174-175.

⁸⁶ See comment on Heuer's use of incrementalism in 4.1.2.

⁸⁷ Van der Vall, *Sociaal beleidsonderzoek*, 1980, 193.

4.2.3 Conclusion

As noted in the beginning of this section (4.2), the issues dealt with are secondary in nature. Still, in the intelligence literature a lot of attention is paid to the issues of presentation and communication. Although they have a secondary nature, they have an influence on the quality of an intelligence and security agency report.

In the intelligence literature, many ideas are expressed about the presentation of a report. These focused on the use of words, balanced information, quoting sources, and the structure of a report. Most of them concerned obvious or self-evident advice.

Two of these items deserve some extra attention. In regards to quoting sources, there is an ongoing debate. Although there seems to be widespread consensus that documentary reference is possible and needed, it seems that this practice is not yet widely established.

The structure of an argumentation is less explored in the intelligence literature. However, relevant literature from other fields is available to fill some of the gaps and may be helpful in establishing a more structured practice in this field.

In principle, feedback mechanisms are widely available. There are some limitations to implement them wholly for reasons of secrecy. If secrecy prevails, an external forum is likely to be almost absent.

4.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a discussion on the issues of what may go wrong in intelligence analysis. It focused on biases, non-optimal research techniques, and the abuse of research methods.

By discussing biases, an issue of chapter 3 was revisited – for example, the collection phase of research, by the way information is collected, and the focus of data collectors (4.1.1).

Furthermore, the idea of chapter 3 – of intelligence being a difficult discipline – was reinforced when it was concluded that intelligence is in a disadvantageous position when thinking about possibilities to execute standardized remedies against biases. Some general methodological cures to install a forum – such as a Review Section – may be of some help.

A common feature of non-optimal techniques (4.2) is that research is not designed carefully and no checks are built in. In such an inaccurate approach, there is a failure to engage in comprehensive investigations since a number of alternatives are excluded beforehand. Subsequently pre-selection is arbitrary.

To discuss these issues, articles by reflective practitioners were taken as the starting point. To mention what may go wrong is not only of interest because you are then warned of pitfalls and mistakes. These issues also point to aspects from which relevant criteria can be developed.

In 4.2, the issues focused on presentation and feedback. Presentation and feedback get a lot of attention in the literature on intelligence. Although they will not be the core issues in terms of quality, they are of interest for the reception by the consumer.

Following the discussion on methodology (chapter 3) and issues that are specific for intelligence literature (chapter 4), it is now important to formulate criteria that high quality intelligence and security agency reports should meet.

5 Criteria to assess quality

What criteria can be formulated for an intelligence and security agency report? The issue of methodology (chapter 3), but also the do's and don'ts mentioned in the intelligence literature (chapter 4), stress the need to formulate criteria which high quality intelligence and security agency reports have to attain. The idea to develop criteria and standards for intelligence activities is not just an academic one. It is also propagated by practitioners from within and around the intelligence community.¹

In this chapter, criteria – together with their specific indicators – will be formulated for high quality intelligence and security agency reports. Together, these criteria will compose a standard for intelligence and security agency reports to achieve.

In the two case studies – the Shipping Research Bureau and the BVD – these criteria are used to measure the extent to which the investigated reports meet this standard. In this way, not only is the quality of a report judged, but also a first insight is gained in aspects that need improvement.

The more deductive elements of chapter 3 and the more inductive elements of chapter 4 will serve as a source to formulate criteria that intelligence and security agency reports have to achieve.² To develop an instrument to assess the quality of intelligence and security agency reports, a decision has to be made concerning argumentation. To measure the quality of a report, a choice between a more formal argumentation and reasoning in context can be selected. In this study, the choice has been made to combine both.

To develop the more formal argumentation, criteria are derived from methodology in general. In addition, some relevant laws (5.1) are explored. The disadvantage of this formal approach is that a lot of data will remain unused because of the distance between the concept of the instrument (general methodology and law) and the context (the intelligence and security agency reports tested).

Consequently, reasoning in context is also used. For this, criteria are derived from literature within the agencies themselves. In this approach, a translation has to be made of the norms of that particular culture – from that particular expert group of intelligence practitioners – to the instrument to be developed (criteria to measure the quality of intelligence and security agency report). While this translation is not a strictly logical process, it prevents ending up with an instrument that is too blunt to investigate the quality of intelligence and security agency reports in-depth.

For criteria to be developed, those related to logic and to legitimacy have been chosen. Underpinning this choice is the idea that criteria derived from these will yield a correlation. In other words, the notions of logic and legitimacy support a

¹ For example: Steele, "Information Peacekeeping & the Future of Intelligence," *Peacekeeping Intelligence*, 2003, 201, 219.

² On a few instances, this also includes material from chapter 2.

report that is judged as one of high quality. The implicit assumption is that a mix of criteria of such notions – and the combination of a formal argumentation, and of reasoning in context – will lead to the most optimal balanced set of criteria to assess the quality of intelligence and security agency reports.

5.1 CRITERIA – DEMANDS AND SPECIFIC INDICATORS

As noted in the beginning of 3.1, high quality intelligence designates information that is clear, timely, reliable, valid, adequate, and wide-ranging (Wilensky). A high quality intelligence and security agency report is then the written product presenting high quality intelligence in such a way that it addresses the issues of interest for the consumer, and is easily accessible.

Yet, how do you translate such general – and other – insights to high quality intelligence criteria? For this, a criterion has to be appropriate – and therefore some demands are placed on them. First, attention is paid to demands criteria have to meet. Second, criteria are formulated – together with their specific indicators.

Demands to select criteria

The idea is to develop a set of relevant criteria. Such criteria will result in variables, in which indicators that are more specific are built in to make a more precise assessment possible.

The criteria that will be formulated will have to meet certain demands. The aim is to develop a set of criteria that is as relevant and discriminating as possible. First, the demands are presented. Second, these demands are explained. Criteria to be formulated have to meet the following three demands:

- the criteria have to be characteristic for the field of intelligence;
- the criteria have to fit in and meet compelling societal demands, and;
- the criteria have to have a discriminating value concerning quality.

Characteristic

The first demand is that criteria have to be characteristic for intelligence research. The criteria to be selected are less relevant, if they are too general nature, and not specific for the discipline of intelligence studies. The characteristics of intelligence research have already been put forward – interdisciplinary research, future oriented research, inaccessible data, research on small chance - high impact events, specific and applied nature of the research, intelligence in the position as a supplier, and the complicated control of intelligence. Yet, to be of more relevance to formulate criteria, there has to be an orientation on actual and expected (as from methodological insights) problems.

In order to begin with actual problems – so as to reason in context – it is necessary to identify characteristic issues that give rise to biases, within

intelligence research. Causes of biases that were described in intelligence literature, as characteristic for intelligence research, include (4.1.1):

- key information that is often absent;
- data that is often ambiguous or non-perfect;
- a policy of deception by an opponent;
- security paranoia and the agency's company culture;
- a lack of empathy and mirror-imaging.

Often, the triangulation of sources and producing a robust analysis will contribute to combating such biases. Subsequently, it is necessary to pay attention to these two elements.

Problems to be expected generally concern methodological aspects that give rise to a more formal argumentation. To make formal argumentation specific for the field of intelligence, problems based on methodological aspects can be best presented for the specifics of each of the three types of intelligence research – descriptive, explanatory, and prognostic research.

In descriptive research, the main problematic characteristics concerning the three primary sources of information – observation, interview, and document – are to gain access to these sources and a policy of deception by an opponent. These characteristics call for extra attention concerning the issue of reliability and validity. Often, the checking and double-checking of sources and the triangulation of sources are employed to combat such difficulties.

In explanatory research, non-optimal techniques may be used that exclude research options beforehand (4.1.2). A third factor that explains the co-occurrence of both cause and effect may be overlooked easily. To cope with such methodological difficulties, you may formulate competing hypotheses, choose a higher alpha- and a lower beta-chance, and make the conjectures robust.

In prognostic research, it is characteristic that risky events are often hard to predict, because of the small chance, the event will actually take place. Yet, if something happens, the impact is high. To cope with this, you can model the research, present unprejudiced possible futures and their width, and use different types of forecasting techniques.

Societal demands

The second demand is that the criteria have to fit in with and meet compelling societal demands. An intelligence and security agency report is not a product on its own. It fits in a wider societal context, in which also demands are placed on the product. The most compelling of these demands are found in laws. For a (public) agency, the most relevant Dutch laws include the Law regarding the Intelligence and Security Agencies (LISA)³ and the General Administrative Law

³ In Dutch: Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (of 2002).

Act (GALA).⁴ In these laws, we searched for the most relevant norms. Norms derived from law serve a more formal argumentation.

To begin with there are two issues, in relation to LISA, that are of prime interest concerning the quality of intelligence:

- an agency has to take care of facilities that promote the accuracy and completeness of data that is processed,⁵ and;
- the processing of data has to take place in a proper and meticulous manner. This implies – among others – that processed data needs a reference to the reliability or to the document or source.⁶

In addition, there is administrative law – GALA. This is a relevant law, as agencies produce regularly reports for policymakers. Although you may not be able to predict which individual report will influence policy makers further on in the intelligence cycle, each has the potential to do so. Such action could explicitly imply the preparation of an order. Therefore, a report can be submitted to the general principles of proper administration.⁷

To explain this in more detail: the general principles of proper administration apply to the action of an administration, especially concerning its orders. The administration has to take these orders in accordance with the general principles of proper administration. If preparatory procedures lead to an order, they are directly connected with the action itself. It is therefore justified to submit preparatory procedures to the same principles as the final order.⁸ These principles are set down in GALA. In general, this law applies to all kinds of action of an administration, including the preparatory phase. Intelligence and security agency reports may belong to this phase.⁹ Central to GALA (section 3:1 paragraph 2), is a connecting rule that links most principles to other action of the

⁴ In Dutch: Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, Awb.

⁵ LISA, section 16 paragraph a.

⁶ LISA, section 12, paragraph 3 and 4.

⁷ An order (in Dutch: 'besluit') includes also a decision (in Dutch: 'beschikking'). Nicolai a/o, *Bestuursrecht*, 1997, 278-279. Compare: Van Buuren, a/o, *Kroonberoep en Arob-beroep*, 1981, 50-51. De Moor-Van Vugt, *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur en buitenlandse equivalenten*, 1987, 20. Sometimes, a judge can opt for the view that the advice is not only a preparatory act, but also a material juridical act. In such cases, the judge looks at the content of the advice (Addink, *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur*, 1999, 214) A special kind of research concerns positive vetting in order to give clearance for a job. In such cases, it seems to be logical to give the interested party a hearing opportunity, based upon 4:8 GALA (:General Administrative Law Act) (Compare: Addink, *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur*, 1999, 239). In that case, 4:8 GALA prevails 4:11, paragraph c GALA.

⁸ Nicolai a/o, *Bestuursrecht*, 1997, 144.

⁹ The law deals with all kind of action of the administration, being action under both public and private law, or a conduct not aimed at a legal act (3:1 - 3:7 GALA). The only exception is the investigation and the prosecution of criminal acts, and the execution of criminal decisions (1:6 GALA). The existing laws in this field are meant to be exhaustive. Other action of the Public Prosecutor is also submitted to the General Administrative Law Act. As a result, the activities of agencies are submitted to this law (Addink, *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur*, 1999, 8, 17; Nicolai a/o, *Bestuursrecht*, 1997, 245-247, 252, 259, 261).

administration. Because of this connecting rule, most principles apply to the preparatory phase in GALA.¹⁰

The preparatory stage is crucial in arriving at an order. Elements of the preparatory stage will be evident in the order itself. These will underpin not only the order itself, but also the consequences, that the order produces. Therefore, the preparatory research has to be carried out in a meticulous, accurate, and attentive manner.¹¹ For intelligence and security agency reports, the most important principles of proper administration are:

- *Freedom from prejudice.* Analysts are not permitted to be prejudiced or to have a personal interest in a case.¹²
- *Collecting intelligence:* a) necessary knowledge has to be amassed of the relevant facts. This implies relevant facts have to be taken into account, and facts have to be investigated sufficiently for the case in question; b) necessary knowledge has to be amassed and the interests have to be weighed.
- *Representation:* a) facts and interests are represented correctly; b) the evaluation of (complex) facts or interests must be correct. If facts are given a certain qualification, the acceptability of this qualification must be shown.¹³
- *Method:* the method used must lead to an as objective as possible assessment. This condition is of extra relevance in the case of classified intelligence and security agency reports. These reports are generally not open to independent examination.¹⁴

The mentioned principles and demands in both the Law on Intelligence and Security Agencies and General Administrative Law Act give a compelling argument for the Dutch legal context.

¹⁰ Van Buuren a/o, *Algemene wet bestuursrecht*, 1997, 38.

¹¹ De Moor-Van Vugt. *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur en buitenlandse equivalenten*, 1987, 17, 19-20.

¹² Section 2:4 paragraph 1 and 2 GALA. Van Buuren a/o, *Algemene wet bestuursrecht*, 1997, 26.

¹³ The main frame of these two bullet-points is given in 3:2 (careful preparation) and 3:46 GALA (sound motivation). The refinement stems from jurisprudence and literature: Addink, *Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur*, 1999, 202-204, 213, 217; Van Buuren a/o, *Algemene wet bestuursrecht*, 1997, 40-41, 78; Greenwood, *General Administrative Law Act of the Netherlands*, 1994. Hartmann, "Het bewijs in het bestuursrecht en het strafrecht," *Ars Aequi*, Aprile 1999, 222-223; Heldeweg, *Normstelling en expertise*, 1993, 86, 101, 376; Nicolai a/o, *Bestuursrecht*, 1997, 282, 446-447. See also: Van Buuren a/o, *Kroonberoep en Arob-beroep*, 1981, 64.

¹⁴ In the General Administrative Law Act, there is no explicit reference to the method (Nicolai, *Beginselen van Behoorlijk Bestuur*, 1990, 536). Yet, if the method of analysis was not accurate, it could result in a violation of the proper grounds, 3:46 GALA (other indirect links are found in 3:2 GALA – careful preparation – and section 3:4 paragraph 1 GALA – to weigh the interests. See also: President Court Assen, 25 January 1996: *JB* 1996, no. 95/1302).

An adequate method is needed to comply with the duty of carefulness principle. This method must lead to an objective as possible assessment (Nicolai a/o, *Bestuursrecht*, 1997, 408; Nicolai, *Beginselen van Behoorlijk Bestuur*, 1990, 336).

In the case of an intelligence and security agency report, the requirement of a sound method is even more relevant as such reports are often classified, and an opportunity is lacking to present counter-expertise as in administrative procedures.

Discriminating value

The third demand is that criteria have to have a discriminating value concerning the quality of the intelligence product. If they do not have such a discriminating value, they are too blunt to be used as a means of measurement.

With these three demands in mind – to be characteristic, to meet compelling societal demands, and to have a discriminating value – criteria are formulated to test whether intelligence analysis and reports are of high quality.

5.2 CRITERIA AND SPECIFIC INDICATORS

In the previous section, the focus of attention, concerning the methodological aspect of an intelligence analysis, was on reliability, validity, and robustness of research and that the content of a report needs to be plausible and convincing.

This is very general and not specific for intelligence research. However, when we translate this to specific criteria for intelligence research – and when we meet the three demands of the previous section – the next six criteria can be formulated. Each of these criteria is completed with specific indicators to make a more precise assessment possible when a criterion is met. Often a specific indicator is developed for a characteristic of a certain research type, such as explanatory or prognostic research. The criteria are presented in such a way that they follow, to a certain extent, the sequence in a research process – except for the sixth criterion.

Criterion 1. New intelligence research has to be subject to careful preliminary designing, a standard research is designed according to an established protocol.

Concerning characteristic methodological demands, the following can be said. Intelligence is a difficult discipline, and can take many different turns; therefore extra attention needs to be paid to its design. Preliminary designing, needs to meet the demands set by reliability, validity, and when applicable also robustness. Preliminary designing will also enhance the research process in terms of being plausible and convincing.

Concerning compelling societal demands the following can be said. Careful modeling ensures that data is processed in a proper and meticulous manner (LISA). It is also during the initial stage that methods and techniques are chosen. Careful designing ensures that the circumstances in which methods and techniques are chosen will lead to an objective as possible assessment (GALA).

Concerning specific indicators to assess whether this criterion is met, the following comments can be made. Attention is paid to the design of the investigation. Preliminary designing is used to gain a picture of the factors to be analyzed. It focuses on the research question and on the methods and techniques to be used. It pays attention to the terminology to be used and defines terms and

concepts. Relevant literature is explored to identify the design. This extra attention is needed, because of the interdisciplinary nature of intelligence research.

This modeling is aimed at specific types of research. In explanatory research, for example, it takes a higher alpha- and a lower beta-chance than in scientific research. In prognostic research, for example, the research is aimed at issues such as estimating strengths and purposes, and the forces and factors working to influence the opponent's decision-making. It shows what these will lead the opponent to do and focuses on the extent to which one can act. It is also aimed at identifying the factors at play that could lead to unexpected developments, signposts or indications of change, and events that could trigger a major shift in direction.

Criterion 2. Research is carried out by researching through relevant different angles of investigation, oriented at relevant options to be formulated.

To research from different angles is a necessary criterion because of the disadvantageous position of intelligence research, compared to most other disciplines. Focusing on different angles will support the research outcomes to be convincing and plausible. Triangulation of sources is more likely to increase validity and reliability than if one source was consulted. To apply different techniques enhances the robustness.

The different angles of the research will promote the completeness of data and accuracy of information presented (LISA). The different angles will serve the demand that necessary knowledge of relevant facts is amassed and interests are weighed (GALA).

Although the common issue is to carry out the research from different angles, the implementation will differ for each type of research. This leads to the development of a specific arrangement – specific indicators – for each research type.

In descriptive intelligence research, this means the triangulation of sources of information. Triangulation takes into account the possible biases of sources by identifying their problematic accessibility or by their specific characteristics.

In explanatory intelligence research, the different angles concern three issues:

1. Competing hypotheses – to approach a phenomenon from different angles in order to prevent missing a plausible explanation, and to work with multiple causes in a multiple variable model.
2. A higher alpha and a lower beta chance – to obtain relevant significant results and not to overlook weak but existing causal relationships.
3. Robustness – to make sure conclusions are not dependent on ad hoc circumstances multiple measures of dependent variables are taken to gain an indication of the robustness of a relationship.

Furthermore, attention is paid to the profoundness of the research – to uncover in-depth and relevant cause-and-effect relationships.

In prognostic research, the focus is robustness – in this case to use different types of forecasting techniques. This research has a certain width. All relevant conditions and their likelihood are considered – and thus, all relevant outcomes. It takes into account all possible developments of the conditions. The probability and the relevant conditions have both a certain width. This means analysts present options with a certain openness of the outcomes. They point out what contributed to these options and openness – and their strengths and weaknesses. They assess both the (subjective) maximum and minimum of the appearance of a certain phenomenon, and potentially give room to dissenting opinions.

Criterion 3. Data and information presented need to be correct, complete, and accurate.

In intelligence, data is often lacking or manipulated. At the same time, large interests are at stake. This makes this criterion even more relevant. This criterion is very much focused on the validity and reliability of the research.

It links up with the demand for accuracy and completeness of data, as stated in LISA, as well as with the GALA-demand that facts and interests are represented correctly. A special place is given to the issue of using a reference system. According to LISA, the processing of data has to be undertaken in a proper and meticulous manner. This implies – among others – processed data needs to be referenced to the reliability or to the document or source.

This criterion implies some implicit assumptions – and with it, some specific indicators. It assumes a sound processing of data and information presented. It implies that you take notice of the reliability of your material. By describing the likelihood, the producer does not use ambiguous words concerning the certainty. This also implies a critical approach towards the consistency of the material – for instance, is the consistency caused because the data or the information stems from a single source? Awareness of these issues secures correctness, completeness, and accuracy.

Especially concerning the issue of completeness, this criterion implies that you are not permitted to ignore data that is not in line with your own argument. On the contrary, if you evaluate hypotheses, it should focus on data that denies your hypotheses. Furthermore, it should identify data that is missing.

There are three more comments to make concerning this criterion. First, this criterion can be met when collectors also analyze new information to see if it is significant, reliable, accurate, or unambiguous. Second, acknowledging sources, through a reference number, enhances the possibility of meeting this criterion. Third, the producer does not ascribe viewpoints to people who are not represented.

Criterion 4. The analyses and presentation of data, arguments, and conclusions need to be plausible and convincing – replicable and verifiable.

Secrecy in intelligence research – and the impossibility to check information – demands that the aspects of this criterion receive extra attention, especially in terms of the aim of the report. This criterion is primarily aimed at ensuring that the research outcomes and conjectures are as plausible as possible. To be convincing refers to validity of the research – the correctness of the argumentation, but also that the research is constructed well and uses the correct (data) analysis techniques (both are already dealt with in criterion 1).

This criterion links up with the demands of the GALA that the evaluation of facts or interests is correct; and that if facts are given a certain qualification, the acceptability of this qualification is shown. The issue of using a reference system is already mentioned in the previous criterion.

To be plausible and convincing is enhanced by several factors that function as specific indicators to assess if this criterion is met. First, the information is the best and most balanced at that moment. If a bias is unavoidable, this bias – if possible – is made explicit. Second, the content of the report is consistent, and elements in it do not contradict each other. Third, the consumers understand what the producers mean, and the producers write what they mean. Fourth, the producer shows established knowledge and the underpinning judgment – including its degree of certainty. Fifth, arguments and accompanying information are of relevance for the conclusion. If not, the producer explains why that information is presented. Sixth, in the report there is a clear use concerning reliability and probability. Seventh, the report has a clear structure, as does the argumentation of the report.

In explanatory research, the strength of a causal relationship is demonstrated – as is the plausibility of the findings. Alternative explanations are eliminated. An additional element for both explanatory and prognostic research is that an analytical judgment rests on carefully defined and clarified assumptions. Implicit in being plausible in prognostic research is the idea that you need to depart from sound, actual descriptions of the existing reality (principle of continuity) in order to support the argumentation. The argumentation is made explicit, and patterns are drawn. To be more plausible, general insights – based on theory or theoretical frameworks – can be used in the research process.

Criterion 5. The information, conclusions, and options presented needs to be of relevance for the consumer it is written for.

Intelligence and security agency reports are usually written for a specific group of consumers. This group place specific demands on these reports concerning its relevance. This criterion is very much connected to the intelligence literature. Contrary to the first four criteria, this criterion is not oriented at methodological

needs. Concerning the LISA, this implies that the research must fall within the legal competence of the agency.¹⁵

This criterion can be supplemented with some specific indicators. First, consumers place general demands on reports in terms of brevity, clarity, direct and in time. To be policy relevant, research focuses on danger, threats and, risks – which is the locus of intelligence as a discipline.

There are limitations to brief reporting. What is unknown and unknowable is explained. Statements are supported by arguments – unless the producer has a sound rationale this support can remain absent.

In explanatory research, cause-and-effect patterns are presented. In prognostic research, the producer indicates in the reports factors that can be manipulated concerning possible future developments, as the analysis is about an activity about how to affect the future. Yet, the test of prognostic research does not lie in whether the possibilities actually occur, but in whether forces of whose existence intelligence are unaware come into play, or if their speed of intervention exceeds the intelligence forecast.

Criterion 6. The timely and well-urged warning makes clear the nature, gravity, duration, and timing of the threat, as well as the likelihood the threat will become reality.

This criterion is designed for one specific, but very characteristic, intelligence product – the warning. It is an extra criterion, on top of the previous five criteria made for intelligence analysis in general. This criterion is very much connected to the intelligence literature.¹⁶ It is not oriented at the methodological needs. It follows from the legal task of logically functioning within an agency.

More specifically, the timely and well urged warning focuses on two issues. First, the timing of a warning is important. The best moment to avoid harm is when evidence provides a reasonable basis for action, not when the likelihood of harm occurring is beyond a reasonable doubt – and damage will occur. Second, the advice refers to when an agency not only warns, but also urges for measures to be taken.

The other specific indicators refer primarily to the content. Of course, the danger is not the product of someone's imagination. A warning is about a danger that concerns nature, gravity, and probability of occurrence, timing, and duration. The producers are aware of the overproduction of warnings with a bias towards worst-case scenarios. Therefore, they deliberate whether a threat is mandatory or optional; whether the threat is unambiguous, or whether the actions of the opponent serves other purposes; what indicators are available which observe the threat, and what are the intentions of the opponent. A warning is *not* a summing up of all the dangers possible.

¹⁵ LISA, section 6, 7, and 13.

¹⁶ Most components of this criterion stem from chapter 2 – the section on warning in 2.2.3.

Criteria and cases

In the case studies, the criteria are used to test the quality of the intelligence and security agency reports investigated. Some of the specific indicators of the criteria seem to be obvious. Nevertheless, they are mentioned for they may not be met in the case studies. In the case studies, earlier sections are referred to in order to recall the proper context and conditions of a criterion – or of a specific indicator.

In the above, no attention was paid to the discriminating value of a criterion – the third demand. The problem of explaining or defending means that only in the actual following case studies can a criterion show whether it has enough discriminating value – or not.

Through the criteria, the quality of a report is judged and insight is given in aspects that need improvement. The criteria may also be helpful to trace factors that cause differences between a low and a high quality intelligence and security agency report. The criteria may be of limited use for this last issue, however, because not all the relevant factors that will lead to a low or a high quality report can be set down as criteria. For example, the absence of a fully developed forum, such as in science may have a negative influence of the quality of secret reports produced within a closed and compartmentalized organization. In the case studies, attention is also paid to such factors. They may lead to recommendations (Chapter 14.4).

5.3 CRITERIA – CONCLUSION

In this chapter, criteria were developed to test the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. These criteria are a mix of formal argumentation and of reasoning in context.

Each criterion had to meet three demands. First, it had to be characteristic for the field of intelligence. Second, it had to meet compelling societal demands, the demands of relevant laws. Third, a criterion had to have a discriminating potential. A criterion incorporated specific indicators to make a more precise assessment possible.

By reflecting on the material of chapters 2, 3, and 4, six criteria have been developed. In the next table 5.1, these criteria are presented.

The first five criteria are aimed at the research and presentation. The sixth criterion is exclusively reserved for a special and typical type of intelligence product – the warning.

The six criteria will be discussed in the following two case studies, the Shipping Research Bureau and the BVD. Reports from these organizations will be investigated. An assessment is made of the extent to which these reports meet the criteria – and thus their quality is indicated. This standard is not meant as an

absolute norm in which all factors must always be met completely. The quality of a report is defined by the extent criteria are met. If several criteria are not met on different instances in a report, and if this applies to different specific indicators of those criteria, a report is judged as one of poor quality. If the criteria are generally met, and if nearly all the applicable specific indicators are met, a report is judged as one of high quality. If all aspects are met, a report is judged as one of very high quality.

Table 5.1 The six criteria and their specific indicators

1	<p>New intelligence research has to be subject to careful <i>preliminary designing</i>, a standard research is designed according to an established protocol.</p> <p>a) <i>preliminary designing</i>: research question, methods & techniques, initial literature exploration, to define terms and concepts;</p> <p>b) <i>explanatory research</i>: high alpha- & low beta-chance;</p> <p>c) <i>prognostic research</i>: to estimate strengths & purposes, forces & factors to influence opponent, room to act, factors leading to unexpected developments, indicators of change, events to trigger major shifts</p>
2	<p>Research is carried out by researching through relevant <i>different angles of investigation</i>, oriented at relevant options to be formulated.</p> <p>a) <i>descriptive research</i>: triangulation of sources, biases by problematic accessibility;</p> <p>b) <i>explanatory research</i>: competing hypotheses, high alpha & low beta chance, robustness, profoundness;</p> <p>c) <i>prognostic research</i>: robustness, width, options & openness (& their strengths and weaknesses), dissenting opinions</p>
3	<p>Data and information presented need to be <i>correct, complete, and accurate</i>.</p> <p>a) <i>sound processing</i> (collectors also); take notice of reliability; be unambiguous on certainty; be critical on consistency;</p> <p>b) <i>pay attention to missing data</i>; do not ignore deviant data; aim at denying a hypothesis;</p> <p>c) <i>acknowledgment of sources</i>; correct representation of viewpoints</p>
4	<p>The analysis and presentation of data, arguments, and conclusions need to be <i>plausible and convincing</i> – replicable and verifiable.</p> <p>a) <i>information is best and most balanced of that moment</i>;</p> <p>b) <i>make unavoidable bias explicit</i>; content of report is consistent; consumer understands what producer means; producers write what they mean; show what is established knowledge, and what is an underpinned judgment; arguments and information are relevant for conclusion; clear use of reliability and probability; clear structure of argument and report;</p> <p>c) <i>explanatory research</i>: show strength of causal relationships, and plausibility of findings; eliminate alternative explanations;</p> <p>d) <i>explanatory & prognostic research</i>: a judgment rests on defined and clarified assumptions;</p> <p>e) <i>prognostic research</i>: principle of continuity; argument is made explicit, patterns are drawn; if possible make use of theory</p>
5	<p>The information, conclusions, and options presented need to be <i>of relevance for the consumer it is written for</i>.</p> <p>a) <i>policy relevant</i>: directed towards danger, threats, and risks;</p> <p>b) <i>report</i>: being in time, brief, clear & direct;</p> <p>c) <i>explain what is unknown</i>; support statements by arguments;</p> <p>d) <i>explanatory research</i>: present cause-and-effect patterns;</p> <p>e) <i>prognostic research</i>: sketch possibilities of (width of) future developments, indicate factors that can be manipulated; be aware of relevant forces & speed of intervention</p>
6	<p>The timely and well-<i>advised warning</i> makes clear the nature, gravity, duration, and timing of the threat, as well as the likelihood the threat will become reality.</p> <p>a) <i>warn when evidence is a reasonable basis for action, not when harm will occur</i>; do not only warn, but also urge that measures are taken;</p> <p>b) <i>danger is not a product of the imagination</i>; avoid bias of worst-case scenarios; a warning is not a summing up of all the dangers possible;</p> <p>c) <i>indicate nature, gravity, probability of occurrence, timing, and duration</i>; what indicators are available to observe a threat; what are the intentions of the opponent; is the threat unambiguous, or does an opponent's actions serve other purposes; is a threat mandatory or optional</p> <p>d) <i>make recommendations</i></p>

5.4 HYPOTHESES – SUMMARY

Besides criteria, chapters 2, 3, and 4 also contributed to the formulation of hypotheses. Hypotheses were formulated for those issues in which the literature is ambiguous – because of ambivalence, or implicit assumptions may be present. The next hypotheses may lead to additional insights on relationships concerning quality of intelligence.

Ambiguousness is especially present in two issues. The first one concerns several factors in the relationship between openness and secrecy, as discussed in 2.4.3. This issue was discussed again to some extent in discussing bias and forum function (4.1.1 ‘Results’), and in discussing quality and feedback/forum (4.2.2). To assess the effects of some factors on the quality of reports, three hypotheses were developed.

***HYPOTHESIS 1:** If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.*

***HYPOTHESIS 2:** If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, this will lead to a worsening of the information position caused by a decrease of and manipulation of sources – especially of secret sources.*

***HYPOTHESIS 3:** If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, their quality will increase because the positive effect caused by the feedback from different forums will dominate.*

The second issue is the relationship between deception and organizational aspects, as described in 3.3. The effects of the ideas Angleton and Wilensky are unknown if they are combined and transformed for the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. To assess these effects, two competing hypotheses were formulated.

***HYPOTHESIS 4:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.*

***HYPOTHESIS 5:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.*

While the criteria focus on the normative issue, the hypotheses deal with the analytical aspect. For the composition of this study, the criteria set the structure. The elements to evaluate the hypotheses are woven in between, and will be returned to in chapters 12 and 13.

6 The case of the Shipping Research Bureau

What is the quality of intelligence reports that monitored the physical oil flow to apartheid South Africa in the 1980's? This question will be answered in this case study based on reports by the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB, the Bureau). It is the first of two case studies. The case description is composed of three chapters.

Chapter 6 has an introductory nature. In chapter 7, reports by the SRB are tested against the criteria of chapter 5 – to discover the extent that the investigated reports meet the demands set. In chapter 8, complementary aspects concerning their quality are investigated.

As noted, chapter 6 has an introductory nature. In 6.1, information about the reports is presented and in chapters 7 and 8 they will be evaluated.

In 6.2, the introduction focuses on the Bureau that produced these reports, and in particular on the way it is organized. Information is given on its history, aims, parent organizations, and the division of tasks.

In 6.3, the societal and political context, in which the SRB operated, is explained.

Finally, in 6.4, an explanation is given as to why the SRB was selected as one of the two cases to be investigated. Insight is also given regarding the sources consulted.

6.1 REPORTS INVESTIGATED

Which reports are investigated? The Shipping Research Bureau (for more about the organization itself, see 6.2) produced a series of written products. Within these written products, a selection of reports has been chosen for investigation. This selection is explained. Furthermore, the positioning of the SRB-report is described. Finally, some general working conditions are presented.

Products and selection of reports

The Bureau was familiar with five types of written products: main reports, surveys, conference papers, newsletters, and annual reports. All these products were published or externally disseminated.¹

In the main reports, the Bureau attempted to provide a complete as possible overview of oil shipments during a particular period. The SRB issued a main report every two years. The production of these reports influenced the working schedule of the organization. Moreover, the Bureau saw these reports as show-

¹ On occasions, the SRB produced a confidential report for a specific consumer.

pieces on which its reputation was built: of delivering thorough and reliable information. The main reports were published with the cooperation of various pressure groups. A lot of lobbying accompanied the publications. Companies, governments, and media received the reports. These publications led to media coverage, and, in turn, to many questions from journalists.

Surveys generally presented research results on a single aspect of oil deliveries, such as on one specific country. The SRB published surveys to provoke or take advantage of a political debate and publicity. Surveys served a direct political or publicity goal. Publication often took place in cooperation with other organizations.² The publication of the *main* reports took place at a low pace. In contrast, the problem of a swift produced survey was sometimes that results on a very recent period did not allow the SRB to make concrete allegations. Subsequently, allegations were left to journalists or pressure groups.³

Conference papers gave information of a more general character. The Bureau presented such papers to parliamentarians, trade unions, churches, and others active in the field of anti-apartheid. Depending on the audience the SRB had in mind, the content would change. The general aim was to promote or reinforce the politics of implementing oil embargoes.

Newsletters incorporated different aspects. Newsletters could take advantage of actual developments, as in the case of the Shell-campaign (6.2). It informed lobby groups, journalists, and governments. The SRB published the first *Newsletter* in February 1985 and the last (33rd) in the beginning of 1994.

Finally, the SRB made annual reports. The Bureau wrote reports for organizations that subsidized the Bureau, and for briefing the press.⁴

The main reports are focused on to study the quality of SRB-publications. This choice was made for several reasons. The method that the SRB used for main publications was the most elaborate and systematic one. Subsequently a lot of data can be investigated. A comparison can also be made between the quality of successive reports since the Bureau published these reports every two years. Furthermore, the production of the main reports took place in such a way that concrete conclusions could be drawn. The scope of the findings presented in surveys was more limited. Moreover, the SRB saw the main reports as its showpieces and they influenced, more than any other publication, its working schedule. Newsletters had more the format of a specialist journal, than that of a report. Conference papers were different from the main reports; the contents was often more descriptive than analytical. The annual reports served a totally different goal than making an analysis. Thus, in the next chapters, the focus is the main reports.

Concerning surveys, two exceptions are made. Of the many issues the SRB published surveys on, two had a direct link with Dutch interests. The first survey focused on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, the second one on

² SRB staff, "Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB," 14 October 1986, 2-3.

³ Minutes meeting SRB, Kairos & HCSA, "Verslag discussie 17 November 1986 over SRB," 1 December 1986, 4.

⁴ SRB staff, "Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB," 14 October 1986, 2-3.

Rotterdam. These surveys are included in this research, not only because of their special interest to the Dutch situation, but also for their relevance to publicity and political discussions in this country. All other publications will only be referred to incidentally. The frame of this study is limited to the Dutch context.

Reports: positioning and working conditions

The SRB worked on a tight budget, under great political pressure. The Bureau also had to develop an elaborate method to analyze data that opponents had deliberately manipulated or kept secret. The SRB published its findings in reports. The role of these SRB-reports differed from governmental security agency reports. The Bureau was part of a political lobby that was a mainstream policy within the UN. The goal of the SRB-reports was not so much to inform policy makers as accurately as possible, but to apply political pressure on them. To try to classify the SRB in the dichotomy of the traditionalist or the activist approach is not expedient (2.4.1). The Bureau went beyond this dichotomy. Its intelligence work was political activism.

The main reports of the SRB come closest to encyclopedic data or basic intelligence (2.2.3), with additional descriptive overall analyses. The reports were not oriented towards future developments such as estimates. Nevertheless this did not prevent the Bureau from making recommendations, as for example in the Rotterdam survey. These recommendations must be seen in the context of the SRB being part of a political lobby. At the same time, the reliability of its reports was – as for all public agencies – paramount to gain influence. A single erroneous case could destroy the reputation of the Bureau as a reliable source of information.⁵

All staff members of the Bureau had an academic background, for example in political science or economics.⁶ This was useful in making a descriptive overall analyses. It also contributed to the structure of the two yearly main reports. To monitor oil transports was new to everyone. The academic background helped to develop the SRB-method. Being almost pioneers in monitoring oil-shipments, the staff members had to identify and overcome all the problems and pitfalls specific to this type of research. The researchers solved most problems themselves, but also sometimes with the help of their own network (12.1.1).

The costs and means needed to produce a report were minimal since the SRB had only one to four staff members. Until 1988, the most important sources were extracts from databases bought from Lloyd's in London.⁷ In the 1980's, the SRB did not reveal how many people were on the payroll or its budget, and did not provide information about its financial backers. In the two yearly reports,

⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 123.

⁶ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995. The most important criterion for selection were research skills.

⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 117. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995. For more on Lloyd's, see 7.2.2, 'Lloyd's.'

information was only given on the two parent organizations: Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA) and Kairos (6.2).

Although the SRB did not reveal detailed data on its organization, accurate information on these issues was passed among third parties. When the Japanese Permanent Representative to the UN asked its Dutch counterpart for information on the SRB, Dutch Foreign Affairs informed them that the SRB reserved fl. 80,000 (Euro 36,364) for salaries. This information was obtained from an 'application for a subsidy' document that the Bureau completed at the UN Council for Namibia.⁸

6.2 ORGANIZATION

To understand the mission of the SRB, insight is needed in the history of the Bureau, and the reasons why it was founded. Aims, tasks, and the structure of the organization will be discussed. Also attention is paid to the parent organizations of the SRB since they influenced it throughout its existence.

Developments preceding the foundation of the SRB

The earliest seeds that later led to the foundation of the SRB in 1980 were sown in 1973.⁹ In that year, the Working Group Kairos (Kairos) – one of the two organizations that founded the Bureau in 1980 – responded to the idea of an oil embargo against South Africa, by establishing a Dutch campaign to put pressure on Shell. The campaign did not result in the anticipated outcomes. In 1976, Kairos published a report on Shell in South Africa. It asked the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA)¹⁰ to join its initiative. This led to a nation wide campaign, which started on 21 March 1979. In this campaign, the organizations had three demands. First, they asked the Dutch government to initiate, at an international level an oil embargo against South Africa. Second, they asked the Dutch government to ban the export of oil products to South Africa. Third, they asked Shell to withdraw from South Africa.

In this campaign, composed of three demands, three phases can be distinguished. In the first phase, the anti-apartheid organizations aimed at public awareness and support. The second phase was aimed at the Dutch parliament, especially at the Christian-democratic (CDA) members of parliament, for example Scholten. The CDA played a key role in the center of Dutch politics,

⁸ From such data, a calculation can be made about how many people were working for the Bureau at the time. Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1994, 553.12, File 466, letter Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1987. Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1985-1994, File 846, letter no. 1218/370, 17 March 1987.

⁹ At an international level, 1960 and 1963 were turning points. In 1960 at the Second Conference of Independent African States, Arab states were invited to thwart processes that brought about oil from being sold to South Africa. In November 1963, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, calling for an oil embargo for the first time.

¹⁰ In Dutch: Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika; KZA.

since this party was the deciding factor to obtain a parliamentary majority for a center-right or center-left coalition.¹¹ The first success of this campaign was the passing of the Scholten-resolution in November 1979. Scholten asked the government to prepare measures that could lead to the implementation of an oil embargo, to consult formally with the partners of the European Economic Community (EEC) of this intention, and to report to parliament regarding the outcome of these consultations before 1 June 1980.¹² In the third phase, the campaign gained a more international dimension. In March 1980, anti-apartheid organizations organized, in cooperation with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, an international seminar on the oil embargo against South Africa.¹³ In July 1980, the HCSA and Kairos founded a new organization to monitor the transports of oil to South Africa: the Shipping Research Bureau.¹⁴ Thus, the SRB was a result of a Dutch campaign, which had begun one year earlier.

The SRB and its parent organizations Kairos and the HCSA

The SRB had two parent organizations: Kairos and the HCSA. Kairos – which means ‘high time’ – was founded in 1970, and was rooted within the Dutch Protestant-Christian community. It was oriented towards the Christian Institute for Southern Africa, which C. Beyers Naudé led.¹⁵ Kairos had an informal structure, and many volunteers supported its activities. In the 1980’s, it had between one and four paid staff members. In those days, 40% of the financial support came from government funding, and 40% from the churches. The rest came from donations and selling publications.

The other parent organization was the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA). In 1962, it started as the Angola Committee. Towards the end of 1976, it transformed itself into the Holland Committee on Southern Africa to raise public awareness and to lobby in parliament. It also gave material support to SWAPO and ANC. During these years, the HCSA had about ten full time employees, 40% was paid through government funding while the rest was

¹¹ Van Haalen, *De kwestie van een olie-embargo tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1984, 34-37. Also often quoted is a publication in English: Everts (ed.), *Controversies at Home*, 1985, 215-229. For the following reasons, the Dutch publication by Wico van Haalen was selected rather than the English publication edited by Everts. First, the publication of Van Haalen is the original on which Everts based the chapter in his book (Everts, 215, footnote 1). Second, Van Haalen’s publication has notes, contrary to Everts. Third, the publication by Van Haalen is longer (58 pages), than the according chapter by Everts (15 pages). Consequently, the publication by Van Haalen provides more information. During the research for his publication, Van Haalen was a temporary research assistant at the institute Everts worked, the Institute for International Studies, University of Leiden (Everts, 363) See also: De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 1999, 272.

¹² *Lower House*, session 1979-1980, 15800, V, no 43, 13 November 1979.

¹³ Araim, “The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa,” *Embargo*, 1995, 236. The idea to establish an organization like the SRB did already exist. The seminar was used to legitimize establishing the Bureau (interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000). Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5928, correspondence February and March 1980.

¹⁴ Van Haalen, *De kwestie van een olie-embargo tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1984, 37-38. See also, Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 22-24, and 56.

¹⁵ In 1977, South Africa banned this institute, which proclaimed the abandonment of apartheid.

financed by donations. The HCSA worked within a structure of local autonomous groups in Southern Africa. Like Kairos, it had an informal structure.¹⁶ The HCSA had no ties to any party or political ideology. The majority of the employees had their political preference left of the political center, but were not communists.

Both the HCSA and Kairos nominated half of the members for the SRB Board. The SRB itself was officially founded on 11 July 1980 – and the ‘oil and shipping research desk’ was given its official name: Shipping Research Bureau.¹⁷ The activities of the Bureau came to a natural end, after the UN General Assembly lifted its – voluntary – oil embargo, at the end of 1993. The last activity of the SRB was to publish a book on its work, in 1995.¹⁸ On 1 January 2000, the Bureau was formally dissolved.¹⁹ The Bureau was based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

The SRB served the international demand for accurate information on oil shipments to South Africa. In the beginning, it paid a lot of attention to shipments that had a Dutch connection. In those early days, the SRB worked for both parent organizations. During its existence, this changed drastically. The Bureau became an independent phenomenon on the international agenda. While the HCSA and Kairos were users of the Bureau’s research results, other organizations, to a far larger extent, made use of the results.²⁰ However, its Dutch origins remained and had a role to play in later years. This especially concerned the expectations of the parent organizations in discussing the future of, and methods used by, the SRB (12.1.1).

The international political influence of the Bureau was strong. This influence would have been absent – and the SRB probably would have never been founded – if Dutch politics had have taken a different course in 1977. In 1977, a concept coalition agreement was reached with a center-left oriented government comprising the PvdA, the CDA, and D66.²¹ According to this concept agreement, the new policy towards South Africa was for its economic isolation. Nevertheless, the formation of this cabinet failed.²² If this coalition had been formed, the introduction of an oil embargo would have been more likely. In that case, the parent organizations of the SRB would probably not have felt the need to found the Bureau in 1980, in order to put more pressure on the public debate.

Aims

The overall goal of the SRB was to contribute to a wider implementation of oil embargoes (6.3.1) against the apartheid regime of South Africa. According to the SRB, this could be reached through a basic triplet of embargo politics: legislation,

¹⁶ Van Haalen, *De kwestie van een olie-embargo tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1984, 23-26.

¹⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 24.

¹⁸ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 1.

¹⁹ Interview with Ruud Bosgraaf (HCSA & board SRB) by the author, 29 January 2000.

²⁰ Minutes of the meeting of 14 January 1987 by SRB, the HCSA and Kairos, 16 January 1987, 4.

²¹ For more on Dutch parties and politics, see 6.3.3 ‘Dutch parliament.’

²² Scholten & Diggelen, *Vrijheid*, 1993, 146.

monitoring and enforcement.²³ The Bureau wrote ‘Publicity and Action are Effective.’²⁴ Monitoring and publicity were seen as essential elements to lobby for an embargo.

The aims of the SRB ‘were to do research and related activities on oil transports and supplies, and to furnish the HCSA, Kairos, and others with its research findings.’²⁵ Its principal aim was to promote an oil embargo against South Africa using research findings on – in the words of the SRB – ‘sanctions busting.’²⁶ The Bureau did the research. It published – often in cooperation with other organizations – data related to oil deliveries to South Africa. The Bureau formulated its objectives as follows:

‘The principal purpose of the Shipping Research Bureau is to conduct in-depth research, and to publish reports, on the means whereby the oil embargo against South Africa is circumvented. Other objectives are to conduct research on legislative and other means whereby countries could more effectively enforce the embargo, and to develop relationships with those countries, and with inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies which would be able and willing to make effective use of the research results.’²⁷

In practice the Bureau described its political goals; to deter companies and countries that delivered oil to South Africa, to keep wavering companies and countries on the ‘right’ track, and to compliment ‘well behaving’ companies and countries. In addition, the SRB tried to influence the UN and the legislation of different states. To reach these goals, the Bureau not only informed the media, but also the countries in which organizations – like oil companies, shipping companies, and insurance companies within the shipping industry – were actively evading voluntary and legal embargoes. Thus, the SRB hoped to enhance the pressure on those, who supplied South Africa with oil.²⁸

The research goal – the data on shipments – was of central importance. If this was neglected, the Bureau would ‘kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.’ At the SRB, this research approach was defended strongly in internal discussions.²⁹

On the issue of cutting off the oil flow to South Africa, SRB-research director Jaap Woldendorp wrote in an internal evaluation:

‘I have never been surprised or disappointed that the Bureau has not been able to cut or reduce the flow of oil to South Africa. To put it simply, that was not our job as I saw it. Our job was to make accurate information on oil deliveries to South Africa available to the media, governments, intergovernmental and international organizations, churches, unions, anti-apartheid movements and coalitions etcetera. Those institutions and organizations would have to make the oil embargo effective.’³⁰

²³ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 175.

²⁴ SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 43.

²⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 374.

²⁶ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 2.

²⁷ SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 104.

²⁸ Rouweler, “Voorstellen voor de toekomst van het Shipping Research Bureau,” 3 October 1984, 2. Also: interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000.

²⁹ De Jong “Toekomst Shipping Research Bureau (2),” 2 October 1984.

³⁰ Woldendorp, “The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991,” 24 January 1991, 8.

In this, the Bureau functioned as any agency that wanted to produce the best intelligence it could, and then leave it to others to decide whether or not to act upon these reports.

Division of tasks and organization

Within the Netherlands, the actual campaigning was carried out by Kairos and the HCSA whereas elsewhere the campaigning was undertaken by organizations such as the ANC, SWAPO,³¹ and foreign sister organizations, such as the British Anti Apartheid Movement.³² There is a parallel between statements within the CIA's 'Studies in Intelligence' and internal notes of the Bureau. The CIA literature, advised that analyses and operations should be kept separate.³³ While the SRB wanted to keep the research and campaigning separate, it was for different reasons. The CIA wanted to avoid making self-serving analyses. The Bureau wanted in particular a quiet place to work. Moreover, the SRB was of the opinion that research and campaigning could not, because of the difference in daily attitude, be undertaken by the same person.³⁴ In 1983, the SRB became more active in the field of the media, and the first staff member for public affairs was appointed.³⁵ A division was maintained between research and campaigning.

The SRB was a small foundation with only one to four staff members. Various groups financed the Bureau. In the beginning, financing from the Swedish government was substantial. It later obtained financing from Norway and the UN. Trade-unions and churches were also among its financial backers. An evaluation of the activities of the SRB was reported in the book *Embargo; Apartheid's Oil Secrets Revealed* (1995), edited by its former director Richard Hengeveld and co-edited by the late Jaap Rodenburg.³⁶ In fourteen years, the total budget of the Bureau was less than \$ 2 million. As a comparison, the additional costs for South Africa – as a result of a wide variety of sanctions, measures, and pressures – to obtain oil in the 1980's were estimated to be more than \$ 2 billion *a year* (8.2 'Effects of SRB-publications').

³¹ - , "Future of Shipping Research Bureau," 7 July 1984, 1-2; and Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB: discussiestuk," 23 July 1984, 1-2. Within the ANC, Frene Ginwala was the principal contact.

³² For example: NiZA-archive, telex HCSA to Ginwala (ANC) and Terry (AAM), 7 January 1981.

³³ 4.1.1. 'CIA-literature': Other aims of the intelligence organization.

³⁴ Rouweler, "Voorstellen voor de toekomst van het Shipping Research Bureau: achtergronden," 3 October 1984, 5 summary point 3.

³⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 375. During its existence, the SRB made increasingly more contacts. In the very beginning of the existence of the SRB, on at least one occasion the parent organizations, not the Bureau, asked a government for information. This happened just before the publication of the report on the involvement of the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, which preceded the first main report. In a telex, the HCSA and Kairos asked the prime minister of the Netherlands Antilles, Don Martina, for additional information concerning his denial that some tankers that had called at the Antilles were involved in oil deliveries to South Africa (Telex HCSA and Kairos to Don Martina, prime minister Netherlands Antilles, 9 January 1981).

³⁶ Rodenburg died in 1998. Richard Hengeveld wrote Part A of *Embargo* (Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 1, 68, 374-375; interview by the author with Hengeveld, 4 July 2000).

6.3 SOCIETAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE REPORTS

What was the societal and political setting in which the Bureau operated? Because this research concerns Dutch intelligence, the focus is on the Dutch setting.³⁷ First, insight is given to what is meant by ‘the’ oil embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. Second, attention is paid to the three Dutch networks that composed the setting in which the SRB operated. Third, the focus is on the SRB-lobby, paying attention to the UN and the Netherlands. Finally, a discussion on (changes in) the oil market is presented.

Describing the societal and political setting is important to gain an understanding of the interaction between the political goals of the SRB and its environment. The political and societal setting may have had an effect on the Bureau and the reports it produced. An analysis of the possible actual effects is part of chapter 12, in which attention is paid to factors that influence the quality of reports.

6.3.1 What was meant by ‘the’ oil embargo?

‘The’ oil embargo did not exist. Individual countries and international organizations – like OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and the UN – made statements and took measures. Consequently there was a wide variety of measures taken and resolutions made. One of the better known measures was the decision that was taken at the Algiers Arab Summit of 26-28 November 1973.³⁸ This decision implied a total oil embargo against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. In 1977, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a committee. The aim of this committee was to gather cooperation from all OPEC-countries. Subsequently, OPEC-members – with a few exceptions like Iran, which joined the embargo after the revolution in 1979 – officially banned supplies to South Africa. OAPEC also adopted a detailed resolution ostensibly aimed at preventing Arab oil from reaching South Africa. These countries banned open supplies of crude oil to South Africa. At the end of the 1970’s, these countries focused the embargo only towards South Africa. Hardly any statutory regulations were taken.³⁹ The countries generally implemented the embargo through contracts with oil companies, by preventing them from selling this oil to South Africa.

³⁷ A major focus of attention of the Bureau was also on the United Nations, on the ANC, and on other countries, like Denmark and Norway.

³⁸ In political analyses, this decision is linked with the war between some Arab countries and Israel in October 1973, and the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, at Addis Ababa on 19-22 November 1973. During this meeting, Arab countries sought African support against Israel. In turn, African countries asked for support against Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portugal. The decision at Algiers is seen as a trade-off, linking African support for the Arab cause against Israel with the struggle against minority rule in southern Africa. De Quaasteniet & Aarts, “Money over Mouth,” *Embargo*, 1995, 270.

For more on the oil embargo against, among others, the Netherlands (1973-1974), see: Hellema, Wiebes & Witte, *Doelwit Rotterdam*, 1998.

³⁹ One of the exceptions was Kuwait.

Nigeria even forced this implementation through the nationalization of British Petroleum Nigeria. No mandatory international oil embargo by the UN Security Council was ever effectuated. On 13 December 1977, the UN General Assembly recommended to the Security Council a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa. The UN General Assembly passed a separate non-binding oil embargo resolution almost every year from 1977 onwards.⁴⁰ At the end of 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to lift its – voluntary – oil embargo.⁴¹

6.3.2 The Dutch context: three networks

There were three important networks, within the Dutch context, for the SRB to take into account concerning lobbying and for the discussion on the quality of its reports:

- the anti-apartheid movement (pressure groups and individual politicians);
- the government (ministries and diplomats);
- Dutch business (business and consultants).

The SRB was located in the first network. This network used the SRB-reports to promote oil sanctions. More information on these activities is presented in 6.3.3. The other two networks were central in both criticizing SRB-reports and being the target of the anti-apartheid lobby. All three networks used their contacts to be informed and, if possible, to be pre-informed.

The Dutch government had a strong network with many contacts through its ministries and embassies. Normally, it gathered information through these contacts. On some occasions a ministry obtained or protected information in a more covert way. Foreign Affairs, for example, ‘found’ in a ‘garbage can’ questions that Member of Parliament Brinkhorst (D66) wanted to ask in parliament.⁴² Foreign Affairs also tried to cover up information regarding annual reports that had been written by embassies. A complete reform of annual reports was instigated after Kairos inquired whether it could obtain a copy of one section of a report. Dutch parliamentarians were among the target group of outsiders, to be shielded from this

⁴⁰ In 1978, 1984, and 1985, there were no separate resolutions. In those years, the issue of a non-binding oil embargo was part of more general resolutions by the UN General Assembly. This also was the case in 1975 and 1976.

⁴¹ The UN Security Council is the only institution to pass mandatory resolutions (see also quote on this issue in 6.3.3 ‘Through the United Nations’). Lifting the voluntary embargo began in several steps, starting in October and ending in December 1993. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 29, fourth quarter 1992, 3; no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 1-2. Araim, “The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa,” *Embargo*, 1995, 241. The last sanctions, among them the weapons embargo, were lifted in 1994. See also : UN General Assembly: *a/res/48/258*; 48th session; 6 July 1994; Ag. item 38. Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, 1975-1984, 921.30, File 639, note on memo International Organizations Department, 27 January 1982, no. 6/82. Pagan International, “Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy,” Summary Assessment, 5. Hufbauer a/o, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Supplemental Case Histories*, 1990 (second edition), 228.

⁴² Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 64, memo directed at ‘Xxxxxxx,’ 8 August 1978. First name of the official is deleted for reasons of privacy.

information.⁴³ Within this network, conflicting activities can be traced, illustrating that some activities were even close to being a rogue operation against their own government.⁴⁴

Within the network of Dutch business, a wide range of means was used. Pagan International⁴⁵ worked out an elaborate plan for Shell – that Pagan advised to keep secret from most of Shell’s own personnel⁴⁶ – on how to influence the public debate. This strategy was leaked and subsequently the ensuing exposure limited Shell’s possibilities to influence the public. Dutch churches interpreted further actions and public approaches from Shell in the light of this strategy.⁴⁷ Another organization, Algemene Beveiligings Consultancy (ABC), made use of infiltration-techniques. ABC made use of a man who worked as a volunteer, as a collector of wastepaper, at organizations such as the SRB (12.1.2).

Unorthodox methods were used, in particular within the network of business. A possible explanation may be that business was not used to being confronted with its societal responsibilities. An additional factor might be that this network was – as far as it can be traced from public sources – the weakest of the three.

Dutch policy on South Africa

Within the Dutch context, the aim of the lobby by the HCSA and Kairos was to use the SRB-reports to influence Dutch politics implement an effective oil embargo. During the 1980’s, the Dutch government evolved a three track policy for South Africa.

The first track concerned sanctions against South Africa. These measures were not aimed at disrupting the South African economy, or at the total isolation of South Africa. Generally, the Dutch followed decisions taken by the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the European Community.⁴⁸

⁴³ Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1985-1994, 901, File 2943, memo Asia and Oceania Department, 6 December 1984, no. 86/84.

⁴⁴ The former Dutch foreign intelligence agency IDB (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland), for example, had handed over to their South African counterparts reports of meetings between successive Dutch prime ministers (Den Uyl and Van Agt) and employees of the ANC and resistance groups from southern Africa. The IDB was very critical about the then minister for Development Cooperation, Pronk. There is no doubt the policy of the IDB was not in line with the politics of the Dutch government (De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 305, 313, 320, 340, 341, 344).

⁴⁵ Pagan International was seated in Washington DC, and internationally known for its role in breaking the consumer boycott against Nestlé in the affair of the instant formula for milk powder (sometimes referred to as the baby killer-affair). The organization also advised Union Carbide after the 1986 Bophal-disaster (NRC, 17 December 1986; SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 7, April 1987, 9-10).

⁴⁶ ‘Articles in employee and management newsletters used internally should not discuss the strategy [...]’ Pagan International, “Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy,” 1986, Grassroots Strategy, 1.

⁴⁷ Letter of the Generale Diakonale Raad van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk to Dutch participants of the meeting between Shell and the World Council of Churches, 15 November 1990.

⁴⁸ Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, 1983-1986 (extended after 1986), 912.1, File 550, English translation at the embassy of evaluative note on South Africa, presented to the Lower House in 21 December 1990, DAM/XX-257/90. Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1985-1989, 912.1, File 4964, memo for the parliamentary debate on South Africa, 7 June 1988. *Lower House*, session 1990-1991, 17895, no. 73, 21 December 1990, 14-15. The Lower House was informed on intentions and measures by the EPC through, for example, a letter with appendix of 17 September 1985 (Lower House, session 1984-1985, 17895, no. 34, 17 September 1985, 1-5).

One of the sanctions could have been an effective oil embargo. In the Netherlands, such an oil embargo was never implemented. Nevertheless, the issue of an oil embargo was one of the touchiest political issues of this period. From 1981 to 1983, the Dutch position was akin to a voluntary, but effective, oil embargo. However, a comprehensive embargo never became an official political stance. Generally, the Netherlands only wanted to support a mandatory oil embargo by the UN Security Council.⁴⁹

The second track was to provide support for social development and forces working to bring about equality and genuine reform by peaceful means.⁵⁰ The third track was aimed at promoting dialogue regarding the constitutional order in post-apartheid, and at a solution to the conflict in South Africa.⁵¹

6.3.3 The Shipping Research Bureau and its lobby

The Bureau put pressure, through various channels, but especially through the UN. In the Netherlands, the parent organizations HCSA and Kairos played an important role in lobbying for oil sanctions. They used the SRB-reports for this lobby. Also the Bureau had its contacts in parliament and with Foreign Affairs. Though the SRB also influenced many other countries, the focus of this section is on the Dutch context.

Through the United Nations

The Bureau tried to put pressure on governments through the UN, including the Netherlands. The UN played a crucial role in the existence of the SRB. From beginning to end, the SRB and the UN were in touch which each other, especially through the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. In the SRB-publication *Embargo*, Amer Salih Araim, the former secretary of the UN Intergovernmental Group to monitor the supply and shipping of oil and petroleum products to South Africa (UN IGG), wrote:

'In 1980 the Committee convened the International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa in Amsterdam in the Netherlands, in cooperation with the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos, two non-governmental organisations active in the struggle against apartheid. As a result of the work achieved during the Seminar, the Shipping Research Bureau was established with the active support of the Special Committee. Besides actively encouraging activities by non-governmental organizations, the Special Committee established contacts with oil-exporting and oil-shipping states. The Special Committee transmitted the results of the research done by non-governmental organisations concerning violations [GdV: there was no mandatory resolution by the UN Security Council, but only non-mandatory resolutions by the General Assembly] of the oil embargo against South Africa to those states.'⁵²

⁴⁹ For more on the oil issue and the impact of the SRB, see § 8.2 'Diplomatic activities.'

⁵⁰ Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, 1983-1986 (extended after 1986), 912.1, File 550, English translation at the embassy of evaluative note on South Africa, presented to the Lower House in 21 December 1990, DAM/XX-257/90.

⁵¹ Ibid. (17895, no. 73).

⁵² Araim, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 236.

The HCSA and Kairos had invited the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to this oil embargo seminar. A representative attended.⁵³ Being an oil-shipping state and because of Shell, the Netherlands was one of the countries contacted by the Special Committee. Especially regarding the first main SRB-report, Foreign Affairs had to do some diplomatic overtime. In the first year of the SRB's existence, it was the UN Special Committee that sent confidential advance copies of the SRB-report to the Dutch government. The Special Committee asked the Dutch government to 'study and investigate the information in the attached report,' and to advise the Committee 'urgently of the results of the investigation.'⁵⁴ For a detailed insight of the reaction at Foreign Affairs, see 8.2 'Diplomatic activities.'

Dutch parliament

The issue of the oil embargo was an extremely touchy subject, especially in the beginning of the 1980's. From 1980 to 1983, the pressure from parliament on the government was enormous. Van der Klaauw – minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977-1981 – wrote that the pressure was so enormous that the issue of an oil embargo sometimes seemed to be the central point of Dutch foreign policy.⁵⁵ In July 1980, the Dutch parliament almost accepted a vote of no-confidence when the government did not want to carry out a resolution to install a unilateral oil embargo against South Africa. Six members of the christen-democratic CDA, one of the parties in government, had voted in favor of the resolution. Nevertheless, no oil embargo was established as hoped for by anti-apartheid groups.

HCSA and Kairos mobilized parliamentarians to promote one of the first SRB-reports, which concerned data on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. The members of parliament represented parties that were crucial in enhancing pressure to obtain a majority in parliament for an oil embargo – the social democrat Ter Beek (PvdA), the liberal Brinkhorst (D66), and the Christian democrat Scholten (CDA).⁵⁶

The anti apartheid organizations had a strong foothold in Dutch parliament. Anti apartheid organizations were not only helpful in giving information, but they also

⁵³ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5928, correspondence February and March 1980. The Minister felt the need to be present by representation because of the issue in question and the place (Amsterdam). A year later, at the London weapons embargo seminar of 1981, Foreign Affairs did not send a delegation (Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 852, memo ('urgent') International Organizations Department, no. 67/81, 23 March 1981).

⁵⁴ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, letter B. Akporode Clark, Chairman Special Committee against Apartheid, to Dutch Permanent Representative UN, Reference PO 230-SOAF (2-2-1), 15 December 1980.

⁵⁵ Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 1995, 302.

⁵⁶ Telex HCSA and Kairos, announcing a press conference at Nieuwspoord (The Hague) on 13 January 1981, of the survey *Oil Supplies to South Africa: the Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles*, 9 January 1981. At that time, the Bureau called this survey a 'report.' It was a kind of prepublication to the first main report. See also reminder telex HCSA and Kairos, announcing the press conference at Nieuwspoord on 13 January 1981, of 12 January 1981.

assisted in asking parliamentary questions and political debates. On several occasions, the HCSA and Kairos provided spokespersons on South Africa with suggested questions. In the beginning of the eighties, Scholten (CDA), Ter Beek (PvdA), Brinkhorst (D66), Waltmans (PPR), Van der Spek (PSP), and Bakker (CPN) were provided with such information.⁵⁷ These parliamentarians were well organized. Already in 1973, Ter Beek founded, together with some other members of parliament and anti-apartheid committees, a parliamentary information group on Southern Africa. Its aim was to consult each other on how the Lower House could contribute to the abolition of apartheid.⁵⁸ Sometimes, Kairos and the HCSA first informed a member of parliament of the questions to be asked. After a minister had answered such questions, they would then respond publicly. When necessary these organizations responded in between and on the 'inside line' to members of parliament.⁵⁹ Erik van den Bergh of Kairos prepared every year ten to twenty questions for the parliamentary sessions on the Foreign Affairs Budget. Van den Bergh spread those questions among members of parliament of different parties. One time, he was too late. As a result, fewer questions were asked during the sessions on the Foreign Affairs Budget. When Van den Bergh later met a civil servant of Foreign Affairs, this official said to him that the interest in South Africa was declining. To compose these questions, Van den Bergh always asked the Bureau if it had specific questions.⁶⁰

The information position of organizations such as the HCSA was strong. As noted, they prepared parliamentary questions for members of parliament to ask. On some occasions – especially when they dealt with more specialist issues – it even happened that the responsible official at Foreign Affairs asked the HCSA how he could possibly best answer the parliamentary question. On such occasions, the HCSA played not only a major role in having a question asked, but also in answering it.⁶¹

Rotterdam survey

There was a special relationship between the municipality of Rotterdam and the SRB. First, the harbor of Rotterdam was by far the biggest in the Netherlands, and therefore of central importance of possible oil deliveries to South Africa. Second,

⁵⁷ For example, telex by HCSA and Kairos to spokespersons on the debate on Southern Africa – Scholten, Ter Beek, Brinkhorst, Waltmans, Van der Spek, and Bakker – 6 April 1981. CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labor Party; D66: Democrats 1966; PPR: Radical Political Party (composed of former left wing catholics at the CDA); PSP: Pacifist Socialist Party (left and radical third way party, being anti Moscow and anti Washington); CPN: Netherlands Communist Party (Soviet oriented communists) (for names in English: Everts {ed.}, *Controversies at Home*, 1985, 353).

⁵⁸ De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 1999, 296.

⁵⁹ This happened, for example, in the case of Ter Beek: telex by HCSA (also on behalf of Kairos) to Ter Beek, 9 February 1982.

⁶⁰ Interview with Erik van den Bergh by the author, 1 October 1998. Also: interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000.

⁶¹ Interview with Ruud Bosgraaf by the author, 29 January 2000.

Foreign Affairs saw Rotterdam as an important spot market for oil.⁶² Third, the municipality of Rotterdam asked the SRB – simultaneously with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam – to investigate trade links between Rotterdam and South Africa.⁶³ The SRB focused on oil deliveries. The municipality asked the Department of International Economic Relations of the Erasmus University to investigate the effects on Dutch employment if it stopped oil shipments to South Africa.⁶⁴ Both documents were presented to the municipality during the summer of 1985. In October 1985, these documents were made public. A public discussion of both documents followed. A central finding of the SRB was the sharp decline of oil shipments to South Africa. In 1979-1980, Rotterdam harbor covered 9-10% of all oil imports to South Africa. During the following years this import declined sharply: 4 shipments in 1982 (3, 6% of the total import); 1 in 1983 (0, 5%); and none in 1984.⁶⁵

Foreign Affairs took notice of SRB's-activities for the municipality of Rotterdam. On 14 October 1985, the conservative liberal Weisglas (VVD) asked parliamentary questions concerning these.⁶⁶ A couple of days earlier, the social democratic mayor of Rotterdam, Bram Peper, and the Christian democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs Van den Broek, were in touch with each other. The mayor wanted to consult the minister.⁶⁷ Foreign Affairs knew Peper was not a supporter of unilateral sanctions and quoted him: 'later, nobody will remember why, but *that* Rotterdam has taken measures based on political reasons.' Foreign Affairs only wanted measures if they were supported with sufficient international backing. The ministry also wondered whether the decline in oil shipments was a result of the monitoring activities of the SRB. In an internal memo, Foreign Affairs suggested Rotterdam could express its solidarity with the black population by, for example, giving 'black artists the opportunity to demonstrate in Rotterdam their abilities of expression.'⁶⁸ Foreign Affairs did not feel at ease with the activities of Rotterdam. As *de Volkskrant* published an article titled 'Rotterdam wants to slow down trans shipments of oil to South Africa,' an official reacted in a handwritten memo:

'I am wondering how the municipality of Rotterdam conceives all this. In the reply to the letter of the minister, it has to be made clear there is no role at all for the municipality of Rotterdam in

⁶² Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5927, telex Foreign Affairs/Press Service, no. 372687/662626, 1 November 1979. 'Many observers associate the spot market with the large Rotterdam entrepôt, but the market is not physically located in any one place' (*Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, 7 March 1983, supplement page 2).

⁶³ Rotterdam commissioned this research after a successful lobby of local and national anti-apartheid groups.

⁶⁴ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 9.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 32, 33.

⁶⁶ Parliamentary questions by Weisglas, Lower House, 14 October 1985.

⁶⁷ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1550, letter Municipality of Rotterdam to Minister Van den Broek, no. H.B. 82/686d, 8 October 1985, 2.

⁶⁸ Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1990, 553.12, File 467, confidential memo of official of Transport Adviser, no. 240/85, 9 October 1985. See also: Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1550, memo official of Transport Adviser, no. 251/85, 17 October 1985.

this, and where the Netherlands has concluded a unilateral oil-boycott is legally not possible, all the more so Rotterdam can only make a fool of itself.⁶⁹

Mayor Peper informed the minister regarding the contacts Rotterdam had with Hamburg and Bremen, and also about how impossible it was to organize a conference with Antwerp, Le Havre, and Dunkirk. Peper acted this way to be ahead of upcoming publicity, and he promised the minister to act in the same way if there were any new developments. Meanwhile, Peper's salutation of the minister changed from 'Dear Mr. Van den Broek' into 'Dear Hans.'⁷⁰

There was international attention for the Rotterdam initiative, in particular from Norway, Algeria, and Nigeria. In Norway, the attention was caused by the legal measures that could be taken in this country.⁷¹ In Algeria, the daily *El Moudjahid* took up the news. The line 'La municipalité a réservé 50.000 florins (135.000 FF) pour cette enquête qui risque d'établir la complicité néerlandaise aux infractions au boycott du pétrole pour l'Afrique du Sud fixé dans une résolution de l'ONU que les Pays-Bas ont signée il y a quelques années,' raised doubt at the Dutch embassy in Algeria. The ambassador wondered if he should respond to the supposed 'complicity' of Rotterdam. Foreign Affairs advised the ambassador to consider raising the Dutch position to the authorities, and that he should not make a public statement via, for example, a letter to a newspaper.⁷² In Nigeria, the Nigerian authorities sent – through their embassy in The Hague – a telex to the Rotterdam municipality in November 1985. In turn, the Rotterdam Head External Affairs got in touch with Foreign Affairs. He sent his draft answer to Foreign Affairs for approval, which he obtained.⁷³ Finally, Foreign Affairs gained control over the activities of Rotterdam.

The SRB-survey of 1985 was not the first publication that focused on Rotterdam. In November 1982, the SRB presented the survey *Het olie-embargo tegen Zuid-Afrika en de rol van Rotterdam*⁷⁴ as a syllabus for a lecture at the Erasmus University. In this survey, the Bureau unveiled detailed information on oil deliveries from Rotterdam to South Africa during 1980 and 1981.⁷⁵ Afterwards, a series of talks took place between the SRB and the City Council of Rotterdam.⁷⁶ In September 1983, after a meeting with representatives of the

⁶⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 849, undated memo attached to article of *de Volkskrant* 9 October 1985 by 'Xxxxxx' to 'Xxx' (first names deleted for reasons of privacy).

⁷⁰ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1994, 613.211.45, File 1562, letter mayor Peper of Rotterdam to minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 November 1986.

⁷¹ Interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000.

⁷² *El Moudjahid*, 19 November 1984. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5933, open message embassy Algeria to Foreign Affairs, and Economic Affairs, 19 November 1984; and letter Foreign Affairs/African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department to embassy Algeria, no. DAM/XX-325951/394, 20 December 1984.

⁷³ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1560, open message Rotterdam External Affairs to Foreign Affairs, 6 November 1985.

⁷⁴ In English: The Oil Embargo Against South Africa and the Role of Rotterdam.

⁷⁵ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 9.

⁷⁶ -, "Brief Overview of Activities Shipping Research Bureau," 27 August 1984, 1.

Port Authority, the SRB prepared a paper for the Rotterdam City Council. This paper was on end-user certificates and discussed the possibility of how to investigate the role of Rotterdam. The Bureau expected, after a first selection, that fewer than 100 ships had to be investigated. The SRB even presented a quick method to identify tankers that might have transported oil from Rotterdam to South Africa.⁷⁷ In April 1984, the Bureau produced a brief paper on the role of Rotterdam, 'Politiek Café Rotterdam.' One month later, the town council of Rotterdam invited the SRB to investigate the role of Rotterdam concerning oil deliveries to South Africa.⁷⁸ On 13 December 1984, the City of Rotterdam and the SRB signed an agreement for this research.⁷⁹

6.3.4 Oil market

The oil market changed throughout the years. Such changes can be attributed to the number of oil supplies that the Bureau uncovered (7.2.3).

On 11 January 1979, Iran stopped selling oil to South Africa. This development could have given the embargoes more effect.⁸⁰ In those years, the oil trade also changed from a sellers to a buyers' market. Still the Bureau held the opinion that South Africa remained vulnerable for oil sanctions.⁸¹ The South African government was well aware of the threat of an international oil embargo. Nevertheless, in a buyers' market, it is easier to obtain oil.⁸²

The patterns of oil supplies to South Africa changed during the 1980's. In an internal evaluation, the SRB identified four major changes. The first change concerned the increase in secrecy. In 1979, about one third of the tankers kept their calls at South African ports secret. In 1982, when the Bureau had existed for two years, this percentage was more than 90%. A similar development took place in regard to the owners of oil cargoes. In 1979, in three quarters of the cases, the identity of the owner of the cargo could be established. From 1982, in more than 90% of the cases the charterers demanded confidentiality.

A second change concerned the countries from which South Africa obtained its oil. Until 1979, about half of the identified shipments were from Iran. Before 1979, Iran occasionally supplied even up to 95% of the oil. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles played for a short period – until

⁷⁷ SRB, *Eindbestemmings-certificaat*, 14 September 1983. - , "Brief Overview of Activities Shipping Research Bureau," 27 August 1984, 3.

⁷⁸ - , "Brief Overview of Activities Shipping Research Bureau," 27 August 1984, 1 and 4.

⁷⁹ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, index.

⁸⁰ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 21.

⁸¹ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 34. Throughout the first half of the 1980's, Dutch officials saw oil as the most vulnerable spot of South Africa (Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, Secret Archive, 1977-1983, 613.211.451, confidential message embassy Cape Town to Foreign Affairs, 20 April 1983, 2). South Africa tried to reduce its dependency on oil imports. It started the Mossel Bay project, explored the Kudu gas field, and set up a strategic stockpile of oil (for more, see: Davie, "Apartheid and the Cost of Energy Self-Sufficiency," *Embargo*, 1985, 242-253).

⁸² Secret letter the minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs to Mostert, SFF, 21 May 1981. Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB," 10 August 1984, 3.

early 1981 – an important role, with an estimated involvement of 20-30% of the assessed import volume. From 1982 - 1987 between 80% and 90% of the oil originated from the Gulf area. From 1987 onwards, this percentage rose to more than 90%. The two main suppliers were the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, followed by Oman, Qatar, Iran, and, since 1988, Egypt.

A third change concerned the oil companies that delivered oil. In 1979, Shell, BP, Exxon, and Mobil owned more than 40% of the oil cargo delivered. Since 1981, major oil companies withdrew, or made use of smaller middlemen who were harder to trace. Among these oil traders were Marc Rich (owner of a network of companies), Transworld Oil (owned by the Dutchman John Deuss), and Marimpex (a German company).

The fourth change was the decrease of the number of shipping companies involved. In the beginning of the eighties, Scandinavian companies played an important role. In 1987, this changed after the introduction of a Norwegian law, banning crude oil shipments to South Africa. From now on only a very limited group of shipping companies were involved. Among these companies were World Wide Shipping (Hong Kong), G.P. Livanos/Carras (Greece/UK), Seaarland (Austrian), C.M. Lemos, Hadjipateras, Kulukundis, and Embiricos.⁸³

6.4 CASE-SELECTION AND SOURCES

What are the reasons for selecting the SRB-publications on the oil flow as a case study? It is one of two cases – the second one focuses on the BVD. One case focuses on a private Dutch agency while the other on a public Dutch agency. Both focus on the 1980's.

It is desirable to include a private agency, because private organizations play an increasing dominant role in producing intelligence and security agency reports.⁸⁴ As a private organization, the Bureau is an example of a non-profit organization. The SRB can be best located as part of civil society. It is therefore an example of a specific niche of private agencies.

The SRB was chosen for several reasons. First, it received a lot of attention from the media.

Second, it has a special position in the political lobby context. The Bureau is likely to have been the only private agency in Dutch history that had a powerful lobby in parliament to promote its reports and its political aims. It also was a major player in this field at an international level, among others, by its role with the United Nations (UN). At the international level, the SRB was seen as the 'most active non-governmental organization' to impose an effective oil embargo against South Africa.⁸⁵ As the Bureau had to work with manipulated data and

⁸³ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 2-3, 6.

⁸⁴ Hoogenboom, "Inlichtingenwerk en ethiek," *Justitiële verkenningen*, 2004, 134.

⁸⁵ Speech of Anthony Nyakyi, chairman of the UN Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa (UN IGG). In: SRB, *Newsletter on the Oil*

within a highly politicized environment, this agency is of interest to study whether it is possible to produce high quality reports, and to identify difficulties to be avoided. Such a study on a private agency could lead to additional factors that may contribute to understanding what makes a high or low quality than when more of the same (another public agency) is investigated.

Third, sources were comparatively easily accessible – all its reports were published, a former staff member wrote a book on the organization, and for this study a full and unconditional access was granted to its archives.

Sources

To carry out this case study, information was – among others – retrieved from the SRB itself, its parent organizations Kairos and the HCSA, the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shell, employers' organizations, South Africa, and the UN. From all of these sources, internal and confidential information was obtained. Sometimes this included leaked material and material that was acquired through an intermediary. However, in most cases access was granted by the organizations. Furthermore, a diversity of other sources was used that provided a clue in identifying the quality of the data presented in the SRB-reports. This ranged from, for example, comments by the local authorities such as the municipality of Rotterdam, to letters by foreign ship owners. Use was also made of a range of media and (academic) publications on this issue.

A lot of effort was made in obtaining documents of a diverse nature. It would have been easy to limit critical voices to the information of several easily accessible Dutch ministries. However, the choice to obtain a triangulation of sources of information, as Shell, the UN, or secret sources from within South Africa was explicitly taken.

Although this was difficult – for example, apartheid is still a sensitive issue for Shell, and it has no procedures such as a Freedom of Information Act – nevertheless some crucial documents could be obtained (for example on Pagan, on Shell Nigeria, and on documents related to exports from the Netherlands Antilles).

Another crucial type of source in checking the accuracy of SRB-reports were South African sources. When the author planned a trip to South Africa, it turned out that South African material needed to check the SRB-data had just been sent to the Bureau in the Netherlands. This material arrived in the Netherlands after the final publication of the SRB and was never used in any previous publication. Use could be made of this material with the support of the SRB. In South Africa, additional data was obtained at the archives of the Dutch embassy at Pretoria. Also, inside information was obtained through a SRB-intermediary concerning the digital archive of a former UN-employee. Finally, two informers in the oil and shipping industry were consulted.

There was also an advantage in studying the quality of SRB-reports. Two former staff members of the SRB edited the book *Embargo*, evaluating their activities. A series of interviews was held with the principal author, Richard Hengeveld. He also assisted in consulting the SRB-archives. As a result, all inside SRB-data – necessary in gaining insights into issues such as analytical difficulties, mistakes, biases, political pressures, and solutions to process a report – could be obtained.

Besides this, the Bureau published reports. These provoked a public reaction by the parties involved and by opponents of the SRB. These reactions were included in checking the quality of the reports.

Furthermore, Dutch ministries are accessible under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act. The main source was the archive of Dutch Foreign Affairs. This ministry played a crucial role for two reasons. First, it was eager to check – for political reasons – the accuracy of the data presented by the SRB. This especially applied to data with a Dutch connection – Dutch harbors (Rotterdam), the Netherlands Antilles, and Shell (60% Dutch). Second, it was a crucial source to describe the setting of the SRB-reports, their impact, diffusion, and knowledge use in 8.2. For the Dutch context, the SRB-reports were meant to put pressure on Dutch politics. Foreign Affairs played a central role, as this ministry is responsible for the policy on South Africa.

For the case study on the SRB, there were no language barriers, because all the material obtained was in Dutch, English, Afrikaans, and French.

In chapter 6, background information was presented, not only to give the SRB-reports a context, but also to obtain a better understanding of the conditions under which the Bureau produced its reports. These conditions were influenced by factors such as the societal and political context of the three networks (anti-apartheid, government, and business), and changes on the oil market. In short, chapter 6 also served to gain understanding of the peculiarities of research in monitoring oil deliveries.

Finally, it may be helpful to have an overview of the main events of importance for the SRB and its environment. Such a chronological overview is presented in the next table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Facts and dates in relation to SRB and its reports

SRB	the Netherlands	South Africa	World (incl. UN)
	<p>'79: several local authorities ask for oil embargo by Dutch government</p> <p>5/3/'79: parliamentary questions on Namibian uranium; problems with resolution 283 UNSC* 22/7/'70</p> <p>18/10/'79: Dutch parliament bans South Africa at Paralympics</p> <p>1/11/'79: Foreign Affairs sends oil analysis of Bailey to diplomats</p> <p>13/11/'79: parliament asks government to investigate EEC oil embargo</p>	<p>11/1/'79: Iran stops selling oil to South Africa</p> <p>'79: start Salem-affair</p>	<p>'79: BP subsidiary nationalized by Nigeria after oil supplies to South Africa</p> <p>24/1/'79: UNGA* resolution oil embargo</p> <p>12/12/'79: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>
<p>11/7/'80: SRB is officially founded after the Amsterdam Seminar 14-16/3/'80</p>	<p>30/6/'80: parliament almost passes vote of no-confidence; government promises consultation of Scandinavian countries on oil embargo</p> <p>19/11/'80: weighty Shell delegation visits Foreign Affairs</p> <p>12/'80: advance copy first SRB report sent to Foreign Affairs through UN: activity at Foreign Affairs</p>	<p>'80: SFF/Sasol overpays \$ 200 million for two oil contracts; minister misinformed</p>	<p>14-16/3/'80: UN co-sponsors International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa in Amsterdam (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</p> <p>16/12/'80: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>
<p>13/1/81: release sub-report on Netherlands Antilles</p> <p>11/3/'81: first main report SRB</p>	<p>'81: Cultural Treaty with South Africa revoked (formal revocation: 5/2/'82)</p> <p>1/'81: (advanced) publicity on sub-report Netherlands Antilles; consultations Foreign Affairs-Netherlands Antilles</p> <p>2/'81: check of Foreign Affairs at Shell of denial involvement by Netherlands Antilles; denial incorrect according to Shell. Shell informs Foreign Affairs OPEC supplies South Africa with oil</p> <p>2/'81: Scandinavian countries do not want to support oil embargo</p> <p>4/'81: parliamentary debate on oil embargo</p> <p>8/9/'81: Foreign Affairs internally labels data SRB as accurate</p> <p>11/'81: installation of committee to investigate oil embargo</p>	<p>'81: South Africa stops to cooperate with Dutch authorities on Salem-affair. Reason: it wants to avoid publicity</p>	<p>'81: London weapons embargo seminar (not attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</p> <p>30-31/1/'81: parliamentarians Brussels conference (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</p> <p>20-27/5/'81: UN/OAU conference on sanctions at Paris (attended by Dutch Foreign Affairs)</p> <p>17/12/'81: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>

SRB	the Netherlands	South Africa	World (incl. UN)
<p>28/1/'82: HCSA, Kairos (SRB) visit Foreign Affairs</p> <p>25/5/'82: HCSA, Kairos (SRB) visit Foreign Affairs</p> <p>6/'82: second main report SRB</p> <p>7&8/'82 British based ANC-, PAC-, and SWAPO-offices burgled. SRB also on list of caught suspects</p>	<p>1-2/'82: Foreign Affairs contacts Netherlands Antilles because of preliminary findings second SRB-report; coordination of public action</p> <p>2/'82: Pik Botha does not want to put more pressure on Dutch - South African relations</p> <p>29/7/'82: government to parliament: data SRB generally reliable</p>		<p>(3-8)'82: London ANC office bombed</p> <p>26-27/11/'82: conference by West European Parliamentarians on Sanctions against South Africa</p> <p>9/12/'82: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>
<p>'83: tension inside SRB because of perceived declining of the publicity, but no brain drain</p>	<p>'83: Dutch embassy appoints social attaché in South Africa (Code of Conduct)</p> <p>21-22/6/'83: parliamentary debate on unilateral sanctions</p>		<p>5/12/'83: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>
<p>6/'84: third main report SRB</p> <p>8/'84: SRB presents survey to the municipality of Rotterdam. 10/85 publication of this survey by the municipality</p> <p>19/11/'84: Algerian daily writes about Rotterdam investigation by SRB</p>	<p>'84: South Africa puts pressure on Dutch - South African relations</p> <p>25/6/'84: memo second track policy</p>	<p>'84: ANC put on the defense by South Africa</p> <p>27/6/'84: report by Advocate-General reveals long term contract with Saudi's (in 1985 in Dutch media)</p>	<p>13/12/'84: UNSC* all states are asked for arms boycott; Dutch initiative is supplement of UNSC arms embargo of 1977</p>
<p>2/'85: first <i>Newsletter</i> SRB</p>	<p>'85: Code of Conduct revised</p> <p>'85: continuation of South African pressure on Dutch politics</p> <p>8/'85: Nedlloyd contacts Foreign Affairs, fears sanctions shipping trade</p> <p>9/'85: inaccurate '81 list of Dutch embassy at South Africa criticized by unjust listed company</p> <p>9-10/'85: Dutch diplomatic efforts to stop import Namibian uranium fails because of German and UK resistance</p>	<p>20/7/'85: state of emergency in 35 areas</p>	<p>31/7/'85: Chase Manhattan Bank does not renew short-term loans. Start South African debt crisis</p>

SRB	the Netherlands	South Africa	World (incl. UN)
9/'86: fourth main report SRB	<p>2/7/'86: spokesman Shell admits oil shipments to South African police and army on Dutch radio, he later denies in written statement</p> <p>end '86: much activity by local authorities against apartheid (LOTA), protest by Dutch entrepreneurs</p>	'86: according to Dutch diplomat, South African measures are obtuse bureaucratic, and so are answers on press briefings. Central policy absent?	<p>6/'86: secret Neptune strategy for Shell by Pagan Int.</p> <p>6/'86: UN co-organizes oil embargo conference in Oslo</p> <p>16-20/6/'86: UN conference on sanctions and South Africa at Paris</p> <p>10/11/'86: UNGA resolution oil embargo; UN Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa founded</p>
	<p>'87: Dutch ban on equipment for personal data and nuclear products, according EPS decision 10/9/'85; Dutch embargo on steel, iron, golden coins according EPS decision 16/9/'86; ban on limited <i>export</i> (not transport) EC-oil</p> <p>14/7/'87: UN Council for Namibia starts legal proceedings against the Netherlands on uranium</p>		<p>'87: secret Shell strategy unveiled on Dutch national TV</p> <p>27/2/'87: Khalifa-list criticized by Dutch company for outdated listing, fear terror attack</p> <p>20/11/'87: UNGA resolution oil embargo</p>
<p>26/8/'88: SRB visits Foreign Affairs</p> <p>9/'88: fifth main report SRB</p>	<p>12/3/'88: Economic Affairs informs business on Mossel Bay project. No more information given afterwards</p> <p>11/'88: Soviet Academy to Dutch diplomat: no role USSR in Southern Africa</p>	12/'88: peace pact signed for independence of Namibia	5/12/'88: UNGA resolution oil embargo
'89: abortive bombing against Kairos, parent organization of SRB			22/11/'89: UNGA resolution oil embargo
<p>9/'90: sixth main report SRB</p> <p>1990/2: SRB gets direct access in South Africa to data on oil shipments; coverage raises from 50-60% to 85%</p>		2/2/'90: Speech of F.W. de Klerk	19/12/'90: UNGA resolution oil embargo (Angola does not attend voting session)

SRB	the Netherlands	South Africa	World (incl. UN)
			13/12/'91: UNGA resolution oil embargo
1-3/'92: seventh (last) main report SRB			18/12/'92: UNGA resolution oil embargo
fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994: last (33rd) <i>Newsletter</i> SRB		7/12/'93: first meeting of the TEC, the government in transition	10-12/'93: UNGA resolution to lift the voluntary oil embargo

*UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

*UNSC: United Nations Security Council

7 SRB-reports and criteria

What is the quality of the SRB-reports? First, an explanation of the SRB-reports that were investigated is given. Then, the quality of the SRB-reports is evaluated against the criteria formulated in chapter 5.

This case study differs slightly from the BVD, because the material to be investigated is different. First, contrary to the investigated BVD-report, the SRB focused mainly on encyclopedic data. Attention is paid to the reliability of the encyclopedic data, including the issue of bias. Second, a series of reports are investigated in the SRB-case. Conclusions are drawn regarding the increase or decrease of the quality of the reports over time. In the BVD-case, only one report is analyzed in-depth. Third, SRB reports were criticized externally and consequently are open to research, unlike the BVD-case.

As this research is on Dutch intelligence, the focus is on Netherlands-related criticism. The two rival networks of the SRB, the Dutch government and Dutch business, expressed criticism. Criticism by Norwegian ship owners, for instance, is only included when it provides new information. When similar Dutch observations are available, only these are evaluated. The investigation concerning quality issues is not only focused on outside criticism, but also for example, on new inside information from South Africa, of oil shipments that have never been made public before, not even in the final SRB-publication *Embargo* (6.3).

7.1 HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE QUALITY OF WHICH REPORTS

How is the quality of the SRB-reports tested with the help of the criteria, as presented in chapter 5? This is carried out per criterion. In 5.2, specific indicators were developed for each criterion. These indicators are also included in the investigation.

In this case, seven main reports of the SRB are investigated. Furthermore, two surveys especially written for the Dutch situation – a survey on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, and a survey on Rotterdam – are also included.

These documents were chosen to be investigated for the following reasons. The main reports are the most important and the most elaborate documents of the Bureau. Subsequently they are likely to produce the most thorough research results. Also, a comparison between these successive main reports can be made (see 6.1). Two surveys are included because of their link to Dutch interests and to Dutch politics. The following nine documents are investigated (table 7.1).

Table 7.1 SRB-reports and -surveys investigated

<i>Main report no.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Pages</i>
1	<i>Oil Tankers to South Africa</i>	1981	90
2	<i>Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981</i>	1982	99
3	<i>Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982</i>	1984	104
4	<i>South Africa's Lifeline: Violations of the Oil Embargo</i>	1986	106
5	<i>Oil to South Africa: Apartheid's Friends and Partners</i>	1988	77
6	<i>Fuel for Apartheid: Oil Supplies to South Africa</i>	1990	100
7	<i>The Oil Embargo 1989-1991: Secrecy Still Rules</i>	1992	16
<i>Surveys</i>			
Survey on Neth. & Neth. Antilles	<i>Oil Supplies to South Africa: The Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles</i>	1981	18
Survey on Rotterdam	<i>Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika. De Betrokkenheid van Rotterdam</i>	1985	75

For an accurate insight into the sequence of the first publications, an additional comment is made. Two surveys preceded the first main report. The very first publication was a survey on Norway. This report was released at a press conference in Oslo on 3 December 1980. It led to a debate in the Norwegian parliament in the weeks afterwards.¹ It was followed by a second survey on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, titled *Oil Supplies to South Africa: the Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles*. On 13 January 1981, the HCSA and Kairos, the parent organizations of the SRB, made it public through a press conference at the press center Nieuwspoord, The Hague.² On 11 March 1981, the SRB published its first *main* report, titled *Oil Tankers to South Africa*. This was done as SRB board chairman Cor Groenendijk handed over a copy to the chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, at the UN in New York.³

The first two surveys and the first main report appeared within a short period of four months – December 1980 - March 1981. There were many reactions to these three publications. The Bureau published its next main report in June 1982. In the meantime, the SRB made some changes in relation to its investigative methods, verification, and data presentation. These changes were mainly provoked by outside criticism and political pressures.

7.2 CRITERIA AND SRB-PUBLICATIONS

As noted earlier, use will be made of the main criteria, and also their related specific indicators to evaluate the SRB-publications. These specific indicators, can show more precisely, the extent to which a criterion is or is not met. As the

¹ Telex for press conference Nieuwspoord at 13 January 1981, 9 January 1981. Telex press statement HCSA and Kairos, 13 January 1981.

² Telex board member SRB to British AAM, 7 January 1981. Telex HCSA and Kairos for press conference Nieuwspoord at 13 January 1981, 9 January 1981. Telex reminder for press conference, 12 January 1981. Press statement HCSA and Kairos.

³ Telex by HCSA, press communiqué, 11 March 1981. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 July 1999.

SRB-publications contained mainly encyclopedic data, the specific indicators on explanatory and prognostic research will not be applicable. Only the specific indicators for descriptive intelligence – or those indicators of a general nature – can be tested.

The quality of the SRB-publications is investigated per criterion. While SRB-reports had almost all the same design and used the same sources, eventual differences over time appeared. These are discussed per criterion. This approach is taken to avoid repeating the same aspects for each report over and over again. There are six sub-sections of 7.2. Each sub-section is headed by the criterion in question and all the specific indicators – including those not tested as noted above.

7.2.1 Criterion 1 – design

Criterion 1	New intelligence research has to be subject to careful <i>preliminary designing</i>, a standard research is designed according to an established protocol
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<p>a) <i>preliminary designing: research question, methods & techniques, initial literature exploration, to define terms and concepts;</i></p> <p>b) <i>explanatory research: high alpha- & low beta-chance;</i></p> <p>c) <i>prognostic research: to estimate strengths & purposes, forces & factors to influence opponent, room to act, factors leading to unexpected developments, indicators of change, events to trigger major shifts</i></p>

Main research design

Right from the beginning the Bureau, considered how to design an investigation that monitored oil supplies to South Africa. For this preliminary designing process, the British economist Bernard J. Rivers and the British journalist Martin Bailey were consulted extensively. Rivers helped the SRB in the capacity of a consultant, whereas Bailey, from a distance, acted as an adviser and a source for information. They played a key role concerning the methods the SRB developed, because of their earlier experience of investigating the oil trade. From the early seventies on, Rivers had investigated the failure of the Rhodesian oil sanctions. Bailey was also engaged in researching the Rhodesian embargo. In 1979, both Rivers and Bailey were also involved in the ad hoc Sanctions Working Group, aimed at monitoring oil supplies to South Africa.⁴

During the preparation of the second survey⁵ – the survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, which preceded the first main report – Rivers was also actively involved in the research itself, contacting the authorities and Shell in Curaçao.⁶ Although Bailey assisted from a distance, he was actively involved in the Bureau until the end of the 1990's, and assisted in, for example, evaluating the research of the SRB.⁷

⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 2, 11, 17, 56, 57.

⁵ This was a sub- or mini report of the first main report.

⁶ Telex Rivers to board of SRB, 29 December 1980.

⁷ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 2.

The following section focuses on explaining how a main report was produced. Special attention is given to two complex investigations – the so-called gap tankers and incorrect calls.

General overview of the design

Generally, it took the SRB one and a half to two years to produce a main report. This is relatively long, but the information produced was still the latest available. The report was composed of two parts. The most important part was focused on encyclopedic data of oil shipments to South Africa. The other part had a more general nature. It included among other issues, an explanation of the need and the effect of an embargo. For this study, the part on encyclopedic data is the most interesting one as it provides information on how the Bureau dealt with biased and manipulated data.

The SRB explained the general features of its methodology in its main reports attention except for the 7th main report.⁸ Its methodology was also explained in the Rotterdam survey, and marginally in the survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles.

From the third to the sixth main report, this explanation followed a fixed pattern and appeared as Appendix II. The general features of the methodology were open to the public, but details remained de facto secret. In its main reports, the Bureau presented the four – public – stages of preparing a report as an intelligence cycle (2.2.1):

1. *The initial gathering of data.* As a starting point of research, the SRB focused on tankers which were capable of carrying a crude oil load of 50,000 tons or more.
2. *Findings submitted to companies for corrections.* After preliminary selection of the cases, registered letters were sent to companies that were identified as the owner of a ship, the manager of the tanker, and the last known owner of the oil cargo. The Bureau provided each company with its preliminary findings, and asked to correct or to amplify the data. The SRB explicitly asked a company to confirm or to deny that the vessel in question had delivered oil to South Africa during her calls there. The Bureau sent a reminder by telex or fax to companies that had not responded. The SRB took replies into consideration.⁹

In its letters, the SRB also informed these companies about the Bureau itself, and its relation with the UN. Enclosed in these letters were also a questionnaire and summary data sheets, which included information on the name of the tanker, its flag, the managing company, the registered owner, the beneficial owner, the charterer, and its voyage history. Because the information in the summary data sheets needed to be checked at various

⁸ The seventh main report was a reprint from a survey in a *Newsletter*.

⁹ SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, Appendix II, 95. The same type of explanation is found in Appendix II of the third, fourth and fifth two yearly report.

sources the SRB wanted to keep them confidential so asked the companies involved not to quote them or to disseminate them publicly.¹⁰

3. *Findings submitted to governments for investigation.* The SRB sent letters, telexes, or faxes to governments of countries in which the above mentioned oil and shipping companies were based, where the vessels were registered or from where the vessels had sailed from to South Africa. These governments received detailed data about the vessels suspected of delivering oil, including those that companies had given the SRB at best an inconclusive reply. 'The governments were requested to investigate the cases and – if possible – to inform the Shipping Research Bureau of any inaccuracies in the data. Again, the replies received were all taken into consideration.'¹¹

For the first and second main report, there was a different situation. The UN itself handed over the initial findings to those countries that were involved. Most countries responded.¹² Some countries criticized the UN for this way of acting. In subsequent investigations, the Bureau handed the data over itself.¹³

The SRB took responses and corrections into account in the final report.¹⁴

4. *The final analysis and decisions about the findings.* The SRB conducted further analyses until the completion of the report.

For the first step of the investigation, the initial gathering of data, the SRB used as its main source data bases bought from Lloyd's. When an oil tanker sailed from an oil-exporting country to South Africa – for example to Durban or to Cape Town – calling there for three days, and then immediately returning to an oil-exporting area, the SRB saw this as a key reason to conclude that an oil delivery had been made. The Bureau held this opinion because you only need one day for bunkering, and there was no other reason to sail this route other than to deliver oil.¹⁵

The approach of the SRB was to reduce the number of ships that could have delivered oil to South Africa. The most effective way of working was by excluding the possibility that a ship had delivered oil (7.2.3 'To deny hypotheses'). In the case of, for example, the fourth main report, the SRB reduced the number of ships over and over again. First, it formed a mass of more than 1000 cases that had to be investigated for the biannual report. During the

¹⁰ In a typical case, the SRB sent such sheets with accompanying letters to Transworld Oil (TWO) – the Dutchman John Deuss. TWO got a letter from the SRB on 22 January 1982 and it answered the Bureau on 24 February 1982. As some of the information was, in the eyes of the Bureau, ambiguous, it sent a second letter on 9 March 1982. In 1983, TWO chose not to react to the SRB. As a result, TWO got a reminder by fax (Letter SRB to TWO, 22 January 1982; letter SRB to TWO 9 March 1982; letter SRB to TWO 20 June 1983; fax SRB to TWO 2 August 1983).

¹¹ SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, Appendix II, 95. The same explanation can be found in Appendix II of the third, fourth and fifth two yearly report.

¹² Telex HCSA, press communiqué, 11 March 1981.

¹³ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 60, 71. For the second report, 130 companies were sent letters. The Bureau received replies from, or on behalf of, more than three quarters of the companies written to (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 6).

¹⁵ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 13. See also for example: SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 57-67.

second selection, the SRB decided that about 500 cases needed to be investigated. After this investigation, a third selection took place resulting in around 150 remaining. The Bureau presented this information to the companies involved. After obtaining answers and additional research, a fourth selection took place. As a result of this, about 90 cases were presented to governments. After receiving responses and further investigation, the fifth selection took place. Finally the SRB published 83 cases. Already at the fourth step, the Bureau began to write the draft of the final report. It finally corrected the draft with the results of the fifth and last selection. The time between the second selection and publication took at least eight months.¹⁶

In addition to this approach of regularly reducing the number of ships, individual ships were checked. These were initiated most of the time from a tip or a print-out. The SRB always investigated serious tips – received from a telephone call or a letter – concerning a ship or a company.¹⁷

Gap tankers and incorrect calls

In the beginning, tankers could still be directly traced in data bases provided by Lloyd's. However, the data base from Lloyd's became increasingly incomplete and unreliable during the years because ships delivering oil to South Africa made secret calls or reported fake calls at other ports. The only type of ship that still reported calls at South Africa and could transport oil were the so called OBO's – multi functional bulk carriers.¹⁸ Oil tankers did not report calls any more to South Africa. As a result the Bureau refined and supplemented its initial design by developing two new types of investigation – the gap-tanker investigation and the incorrect call investigation.

Gap-tankers

The SRB traced gap-tankers by checking all the movements of a certain ship. The Bureau made a sheet of such a ship and analyzed its movements for a whole year, using Lloyd's voyage histories. If there was a gap in combination with passing the Cape, the ship received special attention.¹⁹ Every gap was analyzed. The SRB checked the date and place of the last call before the gap, and the date and place of the first call after the gap. If this gap perfectly coincided with the time needed to sail to and from South Africa, this was a strong lead. If the time was too short, the case could be dropped. The SRB easily traced gap tankers,

¹⁶ SRB staff, "Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB," (internal paper) 14 October 1986, 1. In the beginning of the 1980's, the selection until the final analysis took about nine months. Three months were for obtaining tips and collecting data. This was followed by six months of investigation and research of the data (-, Possible Activities of the Shipping Research Bureau in the Future, September 2 1982, annex 1, 1).

¹⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 117. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹⁸ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹⁹ Ibid.

because it simply analyzed tankers that had a gap in their calling. Nevertheless, some companies developed a more sophisticated cover up, the incorrect call.

Incorrect call

Incorrect calls were more sophisticated. They left no trace of an inexplicable gap in their movements. However, ship owners could make mistakes. The SRB began to investigate incorrect calls when it found irregularities after cross-checking the data bases from Lloyd's such as when a ship supposedly called at a port that was simply too far away to sail to within a given time. Still, a ship could call at a port that was at the same distance from, for example, the Persian Gulf as was South Africa. Singapore was one such harbor, but also so was Ain Sukhna in the Red Sea. Singapore was the kind of harbor which could be checked, by checking the call with information from harbor and custom officials. Ain Sukhna was an almost perfect incorrect calling because Lloyd's did not have a representative there to check information. Once the Bureau discovered the popularity of such fake destinations, these ports became a standard indication that an incorrect calling had been given.²⁰

Cycles

The research could take various turns as a result of gap tankers and incorrect calls. These turns resulted in different research cycles. Although the SRB did not formulate explicitly on paper such cycles, in practice the researcher followed a set of steps to analyze the data. An attempt is made of how these cycles could have looked like. When the main data was already at the SRB, it took regularly the shape of a cycle. The researchers did not work always according to an intelligence cycle. In particular when halfway the processing new data came in, their approach was similar to a matrix way of working.²¹ This especially concerned data originated from tips that had been judged by an analyst as valuable.²²

Gap tanker cycle

The first cycle focuses on the gap tanker investigation. Regarding a gap tanker, the cycle was more or less as follows:²³

²⁰ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 34-36. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 6. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 41, 43, 50, 51, 71, 72. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 3, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61-63, 83, 85, 87. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 118-120, 135-137.

²¹ An intelligence cycle offers the clearest insight of steps to be taken. For a further explanation of the intelligence cycle and matrix, see 2.2.1.

²² Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

²³ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 31. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 28, 73-78. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 8, 25, 32, 34-36. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 6. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 3. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 60, 61, 117-121, 144, 145, 356 note 21. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996. See also the notes of the four stages of preparation in 11.2.1.

Gap tanker cycle

- Is there a gap?
- If yes, is the gap long enough to sail to and back from South Africa, given the last call before and the first call after the gap? To answer this question, the Bureau used the data from Lloyd's voyage histories and technical information derived from various tanker registers (sailing speed). A researcher made a sheet of the voyage history of an individual tanker on which it named all gaps.
- If yes, can this information be checked with other information that hints at a call at South Africa ('passed Cape')? If yes, the SRB paid extra attention.
- Is there information that shows the ship did not supply South Africa with oil? For this, the SRB used the information on charterers. If the charter information led to another destination, the Bureau saw this as not delivering oil in South Africa. The Bureau checked at ports (Lloyd's agents, harbor officials) to be sure the ship had called there. If this charter information said 'chartered unknown,' the SRB investigated the case further.
- The Bureau combined other information from which it could become clear that it was unlikely that oil had been delivered to South Africa. The SRB paid extra attention to shipments connected to people, organizations, and countries known to deliver oil to South Africa (for example: the country where the oil originated from; a shipping company or an oil broker; or someone who issued misleading data on the destination or actual routes, or who shunned publicity regarding a voyage).
- If there was no information available that suggested it was unlikely that the ship delivered oil to South Africa, the SRB investigated whether there was a combination of a gap with supplementary information that made a delivery of oil almost certain. For this, the Bureau checked tips, and, even more important, its staff members held sessions to evaluate a tanker. These sessions took the shape of brainstorming in which they formulated and falsified hypotheses. For example, staff members checked distances and data in Lloyd's shipping index that could be an indication that a tanker had for instance called at Ain Sukhna. A staff member could play the devil's advocate to develop all kinds of hypotheses of what could have happened. The goal was to analyze what was most likely, concerning the route and deliveries of the ship.
- The SRB decided which ships were entered into the computer. After this, it selected ship sheets to be sent to shipping companies. The Bureau did not transfer all the information it had to a ship owner, in order to leave open the possibility of false statements being made by a ship owner. This could lead to new hypotheses or leads. After a (refusal to) answer, the SRB sent the sheets to governments. The Bureau did not send the weakest cases to governments.
- After the SRB analyzed responses, it finally evaluated whether or not to draw a conclusion that oil had been delivered. If not, the SRB staff members discussed whether: a) there was a strong link or a remote one; b) the evidence for this link was from a reliable source. When there was a strong link combined with a reliable source, the SRB named the shipment in its report.
- Some difficult cases were put aside. One difficult case, for example, was a combined carrier which was purported to have loaded iron ore, but could have also loaded bulk products such as oil and coal.

The SRB directly *started* investigating ship owners, who were known to deliver oil to South Africa, when there were gap tankers among their ships.

Incorrect call cycles

The incorrect call cycles did not begin by tracing an incorrect call but, for example, by asking Lloyd's for all Ain Sukhna calls. During the first steps of analyzing data bases, it became clear that possibly incorrect calls were being made. The SRB traced abnormal patterns – for example suspect destinations such as sailing from Rotterdam to the Persian Gulf and back in thirty days. When a shipping company was known to deliver oil to South Africa, this was

sufficient an indication to check for incorrect calls. Because incorrect calls were more complex, two different lines of investigation could be followed.²⁴

Incorrect call cycle.

The first line: checking the sequence of calls

- The SRB investigated a connected sequence of calls, for example the calls 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of a certain ship. The researcher would check whether these were a logical sequence. For example, whether the ship could have made all the voyages listed or whether the ship called at a harbor that it simply could not reach because of the speed it could sail (if this resulted in a gap, see: gap tanker cycle).
- If the calls as such were possible, any combination of three callings in a row were investigated to check whether it was possible for one of the calls to have actually been in South Africa, for example calling 1, 2, and 3; calling 2, 3, and 4; calling 3, 4, and 5; and so on. The Bureau checked the time needed to sail to and from South Africa between other callings.
- If it was *not possible* to sail to South Africa and back, what could be the reason for the improbable sequence of callings? For example, could other callings in this sequence be incorrect; is there a traceable mistake made by Lloyd's? If it was *possible* that the ship actually sailed to South Africa, was the supposed incorrect call at a harbor known for its incorrect calls? This could be, for example, a harbor or oil facility that did not have a Lloyd's' official to check calls, such as Ain Sukhna.
- If the harbor was *not known* for its incorrect calls, this still could be a new harbor used for incorrect callings. When a harbor was *known* for its incorrect calls, and the shipment was suspected of supplying South Africa with oil – because of the country where the oil originated from, the shipping company or oil broker, or someone who issued misleading data on destination or actual routes, or who shunned publicity regarding the voyage – this was a strong indication of an incorrect call.
- The Bureau used the ship sheets it sent to ship owners to evaluate leads and to check whether evidence was from a reliable.
- After sending the ship sheets and waiting for a response that hopefully gave additional information, a strong link combined with a reliable source was sufficient reason to name the shipment in the report.
- A decision was made on the remaining cases.

Incorrect call cycle.

The second line: checking places known for incorrect calls

- Some harbors were known for their incorrect calls, for example Ain Sukhna, Singapore, and Port de Bouc. The Bureau tried to check calls at those harbors, because of the possibility that a call could have been made in order to cover up a shipment to South Africa.
- Is it possible to sail to South Africa and back between other calls? If this was possible – these calling points were chosen for that reason – did the shipment have a connection to someone known to have delivered oil to South Africa (such as the country where the oil was originated from, the shipping company or oil broker, or someone who issued misleading data, or shunned publicity regarding the voyage)?
- If there was not a connection to someone who was known to supply South Africa with oil, was this an indication of an unknown person? In such cases, the SRB made an in-depth investigation of a ship and the company in question. For example, by tracing whether a ship of that size could call at the harbor mentioned; the type of oil transported; whether the ship was chartered openly or not. If analysts found such clues, they checked whether there was a strong link, and whether the evidence stemmed from a reliable source. After sending the ship sheets and waiting for a response that hopefully gave additional information, a strong link combined with a reliable source was a reason to name the shipment in the report.

SRB research design from 1990/1992 onwards

Especially after 1992, the research design changed. First in 1990 and later in 1992, the SRB gained direct access to new sources within South Africa. This

²⁴ Ibid.

made the whole investigation much easier since it provided the Bureau with a much larger number of accurate data on the actual delivery of oil. Especially after 1992 (the second new source), the original time-spending method of investigation belonged to the past. Now that it was known which ships had delivered oil, the Bureau had only to discover the voyage history before and afterwards, and additional facts on shipping companies, the land of origin of the oil, and oil brokers. Having access to all the sources this tracing was easy and straightforward. The new sources meant that the Bureau could trace 85% of the estimated shipments, compared with the usual 50-60%.²⁵

Alternative designs

The SRB discussed also discussed, internally, completely different research approaches. For more on this – such as investigating oil brokers and oil companies, or the journalist approach – see 12.1.1 ‘Internal forums.’ Different types of investigations were, at most, seen as additional approaches. However, they were never seen as promising as the tanker analysis which used data from Lloyd’s as its main initial source. Tanker analysis was the goose that laid the golden eggs (6.2, ‘Aims’). Therefore, the Bureau gave this type of analysis the highest priority throughout its existence. It guaranteed a cost-efficient report every two years.

To define terms

In the successive main SRB-reports, there was a special section in Appendix I in which the Bureau explained and defined the technical terms it used. Again, an exception was the 7th main report. The SRB also explained the terms in the survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, but only marginally in the Rotterdam survey.

Conclusion

The SRB worked with a research design that was developed with the help of two external advisors. In this research approach, the main initial source was data bases from Lloyd’s. The aim was to reduce the number of files on tankers that could have potentially delivered oil to South Africa. When the information obtained from Lloyd’s became increasingly incomplete and incorrect the main research design was refined and supplemented by new types of investigations on gap tankers and incorrect calls.

The Bureau discussed other research designs, but the tanker analysis turned out to be the most reliable and the most efficient. After 1990, the SRB gained access to reliable sources within South Africa. In its reports, the SRB defined terms and explained some main features of the research design.

To conclude, the Bureau met criterion 1 and its applicable specific indicators.

²⁵ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996; Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 121-122, 356 (note 21). For more, see 7.2.2, ‘South Africa and sources after 1990.’

7.2.2 Criterion 2 – different angles of investigation

Criterion 2	Research is carried out by researching through relevant <i>different angles of investigation</i> , oriented at relevant options to be formulated
Specific indicators	<p>a) <i>descriptive research: triangulation of sources, biases by problematic accessibility;</i></p> <p>b) <i>explanatory research: competing hypotheses, high alpha & low beta chance, robustness, profoundness;</i></p> <p>c) <i>prognostic research: robustness, width, options & openness (& their strengths and weaknesses), dissenting opinions</i></p>

First, attention is paid to the main source of the SRB – the data bases bought from Lloyd's. Other sources were also used as a source on their own and to cross reference data obtained by Lloyd's. Attention is also paid to sources that were problematic for the SRB to access. Finally, two special cases are discussed – the information position after 1990 as a result of reliable sources from within South Africa, and the sources for the Rotterdam report.

Lloyd's²⁶

Data bases from Lloyd's were the main initial source for the SRB although this was not made public in its reports. Publicly, the Bureau just stated:

'The Bureau's main sources of data regarding these ships have been specialized shipping industry publications and computerized data bases. These sources record the identities of the companies that own, operate and charter individual ships, including the movements of these ships in and out most of the world's ports as reported by agents in those ports and by the companies operating these ships. [...] The Bureau has extensively checked and supplemented this information by a variety of means.'²⁷

An extra clue was the comment:

'Shipping industry sources regularly produce publications listing all movements by merchant shipping. These publications are based on reports received from agents in virtually every port of the world. The publications show, for each ship, the dates upon which it called at and left each port. The publications do *not* indicate, however, whether the ship actually made a delivery at any particular port.'²⁸

Insiders in the world of shipping companies will directly conclude from this quote the importance of Lloyd's' databases for the SRB.²⁹ However, the Bureau

²⁶ The SRB worked with Lloyd's Maritime Information Services.

²⁷ SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, Appendix II, 95 (sixth main report). The same lines are found in Appendix II of the third, fourth and fifth two yearly report. In the second report Appendix II, there is an explanation of the Bureau how it assessed whether a ship had transported oil to South Africa (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 73-78). In the first report, the SRB explained its research method briefly in chapter four (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 12-17).

²⁸ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 12.

²⁹ Interview with Guill de Valk by the author, 21 February 1996. Guill de Valk was director of the International Association 'The Rhineshipsregister' from 1969 - 1976. In internal UN documents, the awareness of its dependency for its research on Lloyd's is also present (UN IGG, "Information note on the work of the Secretariat regarding monitoring the supply and shipping of oil and petroleum products to South Africa," page 2 and 3 of 8).

did not mention Lloyd's when it explained its methodology,³⁰ at the request of Lloyd's itself.³¹

The SRB used different types of print outs from Lloyd's. This was needed, for example, to trace the gap tankers and incorrect calls. The SRB found clues for such irregularities by cross-checking different data bases of Lloyd's.

The Bureau studied the voyage histories of ships in order to investigate whether a ship could have visited South Africa. As noted, data on ship histories was sometimes manipulated. Besides the annual voyage histories of Lloyd's, the Bureau also bought special print outs. For example, the SRB always requested a print out from calls to South Africa, and later on from, for example, Aïn Sukhna ('Incorrect call'). In addition – to trace the special gaps – the Bureau asked for a print out of all ships that called into the Persian Gulf twice on a row. This movement could be an indication that a ship sailed to South Africa and back. Furthermore, the SRB traced unusual patterns of reporting by cross-checking the above data with information such as the weekly Lloyd's voyage records and Lloyd's shipping index. Lloyd's print outs were not cheap. The SRB had to pay several thousands of pounds for a set of prints. You could request any combination of data, if you paid Lloyd's for it.³²

Other sources

In the main reports, the Bureau did not explain how it checked or supplemented information. From the beginning, the SRB had access to other sources.

Concerning the initial sources, the Bureau was not restricted to the data bases of Lloyd's. Bailey and Rivers – who had laid down the basis of the research method for the SRB – were helpful in supplying the Bureau with information throughout the years. Sometimes, journalists gave them a lead which initiated an investigation. The documentation from UNCTAD, concerning its campaign against the flag of convenience (Foc) registries, was also helpful.³³

Trade Unions were another source. An exchange of tips and requests for information took place between the Bureau and Maritime Unions Against Apartheid (MUAA) and, on a smaller scale, the British Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association (MNAOA) and the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF).³⁴

³⁰ The SRB made an exception to this policy for the municipality of Rotterdam. It revealed the importance of databases of Lloyd's to Rotterdam, hoping the city would carry out its own research. The SRB explicitly mentioned the prints of Lloyd's and Lloyd's Voyage Records in: SRB, *Eindbestemmings-certificaat*, 1983, 6.

³¹ Interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000. The importance of Lloyd's as a source was later revealed in *Embargo* (Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 117).

³² Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

³³ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 116, 117.

³⁴ Afraid of being accused to break an embargo, ships were very careful about what items they bunkered at South African ports. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 113-115.

The Bureau obtained information from informers inside the shipping industry and other confidential sources. Information from informers had to be always checked for various reasons. For instance, an informer could make a mistake by changing names and data. Some data was simply not relevant. The SRB was also confronted with storytellers or people who purposely fed the Bureau with disinformation, to distract the researchers from their work.³⁵

The Bureau obtained information from harbor and custom officials. Not every official knew exactly the kind of work the SRB did. However when questioned, the Bureau explained its remit. The information obtained could be used to check whether a ship had indeed called at a particular harbor as was listed in the data bases from Lloyd's, or whether it was a probable incorrect call. The problem with this kind of data was that the information, while it was not classified, was not necessarily in the public domain. Sometimes authorities took measures to silence a source for example in the Netherlands Antilles, authorities declared this type of information as confidential.³⁶

In addition, there was incidental information which was provided by a wide variety of sources, ranging from a doctor in Singapore treating seamen for venereal diseases, to the Norwegian missionary Per Anders Nordengen living in South Africa.³⁷

Being a low budget organization, the SRB was often dependent on material passed to them by others. This sometimes led to hilarious situations. For example, when the Bureau hired a car to collect a large number of copies of the trade journal *Oil World*, to find out it focused only on soybean and palm oil.³⁸ Among the information the Bureau used up until the final days of its existence was the South African press clipping service *Stockpress*.³⁹

The Bureau sent its preliminary findings to companies for corrections, and it submitted findings to governments for investigation. This information was a source on its own. In the case of the second main report, for example, some companies denied transport or made corrections. The SRB took these replies into consideration for the report. Often this led to extra information, which, in turn, the Bureau could check.

Some replies led to actual changes in the text. In the preliminary findings, for example, the SRB wrote that Norwegian oil was transported to South Africa. Norway denied this. The Bureau changed the text accordingly.⁴⁰ In the final text of the second report, the SRB wrote 'Norway has no legal oil embargo either, but it has officially requested oil companies not to sell Norwegian crude oil to South

³⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 115, 116 126, 128, 149.

³⁶ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 24. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 64, 65, 125.

³⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 115, 121.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 61, 117, 173.

³⁹ Staff SRB, "Over het huidige en toekomstige werk van het SRB," 30 October 1992, 5.

⁴⁰ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5931, confidential message embassy Norway, reference 14325, 29 June 1982.

Africa.⁴¹ This still left the possibility open that non-Norwegian oil was being transported to South Africa by Norwegian companies. Norway was an important oil transporting country.

A special case was the very first publication of the SRB – the survey on Norway. Norwegian ship owners produced a counter-report and argued that not all the ships listed had delivered oil.⁴² The ship owners reaction was welcomed by the Bureau as a confirmation that some of the ships *had* delivered oil and as a source to check the original information.⁴³

The information position of the parent organizations of the Bureau was also sometimes helpful. HCSA and Kairos focused mainly on lobbying, rather than intelligence, which is why they founded the SRB. Nevertheless, both Kairos and the HCSA were active in gathering information on the other two networks, government and business.

In the archives of Kairos and the HCSA, for example, there is a memo on Dutch business ('VNO/NCW Contactgroep Zuidelijk Afrika') meant 'for internal use.' In this document, among others, the position of the government on oil sanctions is evaluated.⁴⁴ There is also an internal letter, from the management of Shell Nederland B.V. to its employees, concerning actions taken against it as a company and the struggle it was having with its image. This letter was probably obtained via the SRB.⁴⁵ In addition, there were confidential memos of meetings between Shell and the Dutch Council of Churches, and Shell and the World Council of Churches.⁴⁶

Government documents were obtained from public sources, except for one incidental draft of a report that later became official. The parent organizations also had good contact with the UN. Sometimes this caused uneasiness with other countries. Norway, for example, felt uncomfortable about a letter that Kairos sent to Reddy of the UN Center against Apartheid. Its uneasiness was caused by the 'very accurate information that Kairos had regarding the Norwegian position vis-à-vis the disputed reports of the UN expert group [...] it looks as if Kairos took notice of the so-called "Norwegian comments" and also the report "The

⁴¹ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 2.

⁴² The Bureau had laid down the explicit qualification that its survey did not contain proof that all tankers listed as having called at South Africa had actually delivered oil.

⁴³ Press communiqué by HCSA, 11 March 1981. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 62, 63.

⁴⁴ Memo VNO/NCW Contactgroep Zuidelijk Afrika to the executive committee of VNO (for its meeting on 10 May 1983), 'Zuid-Afrika,' Dn/vS/1591, 5 May 1983. VNO: Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen; in English: Federation of Netherlands Industry. NCW: Nederlands Christelijke Werkgeversverbond; in English: Netherlands Christian Employers Federation.

⁴⁵ Interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000. Letter: letter Shell Nederland B.V. (H. Hooykaas) to the employees of Shell companies in the Netherlands, 11 April 1989. Obtaining such documents seems to have a long history. See for example a confidential report of the NCW: NCW, "Rapport studiereis naar Zuid-Afrika, 14 maart - 3 april 1974," 33 pages. The visit as such was not confidential and NCW made a press release afterwards.

⁴⁶ Confidential report of the meeting between Shell and the Dutch Council of Churches on 31 March 1989, 7 April 1989, 9 pages. World Council of Churches, confidential memo, 10 May 1990, 3 pages. This Dutch business had met the Dutch Council of Churches on earlier occasions. See: confidential report of a meeting between VNO/NCW and Dutch Council of Churches on 11 November 1975, 4 pages.

Norwegian Supply of Oil to South Africa.”⁴⁷ The Dutch ambassador in Oslo had the impression, a Norwegian authority had informed him about Kairos’ information position during a ‘chance opportunity,’ because this confidential information might have been leaked by a Dutch source.⁴⁸ Foreign Affairs replied to the Dutch embassy in Norway, to tell the Norwegian authority – also in a ‘chance opportunity’ – that this leak was not caused by a Dutch official. Kairos ‘took at least the same critical attitude towards the Dutch government as, for example, towards the Norwegians. According to Foreign Affairs, the UN Center against Apartheid should be a more legitimate object of Norwegian suspicion.’⁴⁹

Throughout the years, the SRB gained access to an increasing number of diverse sources. As a result, incorrect denials by companies could no longer avoid rigorous scrutiny as in the beginning.

In table 7.2, an overview is presented of the sources of the Bureau, and the way these sources were employed and adjusted.

Table 7.2 Sources: overview of the SRB intelligence method 1980-1988

	Initial source	Supplemental source	Source to check initial sources	Counter-measures against SRB	Adjustment by the SRB
databases Lloyd's: voyage histories, voyage records, shipping index	yes, major source until 1988	no	no	secrecy and cover up: - hiding calls - reporting incorrect calling - confidential charters	- tracing gap tankers - tracing calling points with no Lloyd's official, and harbors with same distance to South Africa - direct checks by SRB on location (port authorities/Lloyd's agent)
lists from harbors, data on charterers	yes, major source	no	sometimes, to check other data of Lloyd's	no	no
technical data on tankers & harbors	no	no	yes	rare (flag of convenience/ hiding ownership of tankers)	not applicable
Foc-files of UNCTAD	no	yes	no	no	not applicable
other databases and periodicals of the shipping industry	yes	yes	no	inside South Africa: yes, secrecy outside South Africa: yes, being more careful with contents of publications, or to stop	no

⁴⁷ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, Oslo, confidential, 23/30 (by courier) December 1983. This UN-expert group was the predecessor of the UN IGG, see 8.3.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, minister of Foreign Affairs confidential, 2 January 1984.

				publication (Norway)	
	Initial source	Supplemental source	Source to check initial sources	Counter-measures against SRB	Adjustment by the SRB
oil trade statistics	no	rare, (Brunei, Rotterdam)	yes (Rotterdam)	yes, secret in South Africa	yes, using sources external to South Africa
other media outside South Africa	no	sometimes	no	no	not applicable
other media inside South Africa	no	rare	no	yes, Petroleum Products Act and National Key Points Act, in combination with the Internal Security Act, Customs and Excise Act, and Publications Act	no, but more liberal approach of South Africa in the beginning of the nineties
South African parliament	no	once	no	yes, this report of the Advocate-General was confidential and censored	yes, the report was leaked, and the censorship was not accurate.
tips from inside the world of shipping (South Africa):	yes, after 1992 major source*	yes	no	no	not applicable
corporate intelligence	no	no	yes	no	not applicable
replies to SRB from companies and governments	no	no	yes	yes, by not giving answers, denying or lying	yes, any information is information, especially a detected lie
informers/deep throats (seamen, clergymen, etc.)	no	yes	no	No	not applicable
sailors' unions (MUA, MNAOA, ITF, etc.)	no	sometimes	sometimes	yes, being careful with bunkering items	no
port and custom authorities	no	no	yes	occasionally (Netherlands Antilles)	no
monitoring ships, in South Africa or surveillance of radio contact	yes, after 1990	hardly	no	ship spotting: yes, covering names of ships radio contact: yes, contact under coded names and radio silence	ship spotting: no regular access spotting of ships before 1990 radio contact: no, only years after radio contact was introduced, the SRB had access to it

*) These sources were a help to publish the updated lists in the final publication *Embargo*

Biases and accessibility

The research goal of the SRB was to monitor the physical oil flow to South Africa. In its reports, the Bureau commented:

‘There are no publicly available statistical sources on the supply of crude oil to South Africa. The principal research method used by the Shipping Research Bureau has been an extensive analysis of the movements of the world’s tanker fleet.’⁵⁰

In the ideal situation the Bureau gained access to sources with information on the countries of origin of the oil, the companies selling the oil, the names of the ships and its shipping companies, and the role ports played in trans-shipments.⁵¹ However, access to these sources differed. This resulted in biases. Biases related to sources were the following (biases unrelated to sources are presented in 7.2.4).

The first bias was caused by differences in access – ‘[t]he success rate in linking shipments to specific *oil companies* was always lower than that in identifying the shipping companies involved and the countries of origin of the oil.’⁵² The main reasons for difficulties to obtain information were secrecy and the lack of access to oil exporting countries from the Middle East. The greatest difficulties were in gaining access to the following information:⁵³

- oil producing countries: cooperation with oil traders, (governmental) contracts with South Africa, laws and regulations;
- oil companies and oil traders: contracts that were made with oil exporting countries; contracts that were made with shipping companies; and contracts that were made with South Africa; traders who were used as intermediaries;
- oil in South Africa: consumption, import, stockpile, Sasol, Soekor.⁵⁴

A second and related bias was that the research was more tanker-oriented, rather than focused on the oil-trade.⁵⁵ This is related to the first bias because oil traders

⁵⁰ SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, Appendix II, 95 (sixth main report). The same lines are found in Appendix II of the third, fourth and fifth two yearly report. In the second report Appendix II, there is an explanation of the Bureau how it tested alternative hypotheses to answer the question of whether a ship had transported oil to South Africa (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 73-78). In the first report, the SRB explained its research method briefly in chapter four (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 12-17).

⁵¹ Rouweler, “Voorstellen voor de toekomst van het Shipping Research Bureau,” 3 October 1984, 1.

⁵² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 194.

⁵³ SRB staff, “Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB,” (internal paper) 14 October 1986, 1 and 3.

⁵⁴ SFF/Sasol: Strategic Fuel Fund Association/South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation. Soekor: Southern Oil Exploration Corporation.

⁵⁵ The problem of bias, caused by the method used, is a phenomena well known in criminology. For example, if you concentrate on intensive patrolling in the street instead of electronic data surveillance in the field of banking, it is highly likely gang crimes will be covered much more than white collar crime.

were the most difficult aspect of the investigation to follow. To illustrate this two examples are given on John C. Deuss and on Marc Rich.

In its first main report, the Bureau reported on movements of some ships chartered by Transworld Oil. In this report, the SRB wrote that this oil trading company was based in the USA. This was according to the data then available to the Bureau.⁵⁶ It did not give any further information. In the second report, the SRB discovered that its owner was the Dutchman John Deuss. This led to a special item in this second report.⁵⁷ The SRB described Transworld Oil as ‘amongst the most important suppliers of crude oil to South Africa.’⁵⁸

The Bureau discovered only in later years the importance of other oil traders. For example, the SRB mentioned Marc Rich name in its first report, but nothing else.⁵⁹ In later years, the Bureau found out more on Rich, and it even included special section in its third main report on him as one of the main companies involved since 1979. The Bureau only discovered the full extent of Rich’s involvement in long term contracts after it received a confidential report on 27 June 1984, written by the South African Advocate-General (heading ‘South Africa and sources after 1990’).⁶⁰

In the book *Embargo*, Rich was typed as one of the highest ranking persons who was responsible for oil being delivered to South Africa during 1979-1993.⁶¹ Because oil traders maintained complex structures and networks, it was more difficult to trace their involvement than tankers. Compared to other traders, Rich’s involvement was more difficult to trace than Deuss’. One explanation is ‘that the secretive Rich was more skillful in covering his tracks than John Deuss.’⁶² To frustrate investigations – not only from the SRB – oil traders such as Marc Rich made use of an empire of often short lived companies based in different countries.⁶³ He used a range of puzzling ways to charter ships.

The Bureau tried to balance this second bias by focusing special investigations on oil traders and brokers, instead of primarily focusing on oil tankers. When these were successful they were presented in the main reports. By focusing on ships rather than oil brokers, an important oil trader like Rich came only at a relatively late stage into the spotlight of attention. This may have been different if another approach had been chosen.⁶⁴

A third bias concerned countries who were relatively under- or overexposed. When the SRB mentioned one country from which oil originated more often

⁵⁶ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 76.

⁵⁷ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 23-24 (§ 3.2 of this report).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵⁹ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 50 and 78.

⁶⁰ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 18-19 (§ 3.4). See also: Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 87-88, 138-140. Scholtz, “Drive Now and Pay Forever,” *Embargo*, 1995, 266. Contrary to Transworld Oil, Rich was not mentioned in Table B (on oil companies), 58-59, of the second report.

⁶¹ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 145.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 146.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 138, 139.

than another, this did not mean it was reporting that this country actually delivered more oil. Sometimes there were differences in the accuracy of the data from Lloyd's, which was the basic source of the SRB. In the book *Embargo* (page 90), the United Arab Emirates are ranked as number one and Iran is ranked third. Further in this book, the Bureau wrote that this does not preclude that Iran's share was greater. On page 117-118, Hengeveld explains:

The structural problem relating to the fact that not all terminals were covered [by Lloyd's] does affect the scope of the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. In the table on page 90 the United Arab Emirates heads the list, whereas Iran is ranked third. To a certain extent this tells us more about the quality of the information passed on to Lloyd's from the two countries than about the actual share of each country in South Africa's oil supply. (...) in the case of Iran, the SRB is thoroughly convinced that its findings considerably underestimate the role Iran played as a country of origin for oil to South Africa since 1979.

Because some countries kept a relatively low profile during this period their role, which might have been more important, was concealed, for example, Gabon.⁶⁵ The Bureau was aware of this factor, but it was unable to completely correct this bias. The SRB barely developed techniques for unveiling the dark number of 40-50% of shipments.⁶⁶

A fourth bias was a result of source protection. This occurred when the Bureau developed a qualification system to label the certainty of an oil shipment. In some cases the SRB was very sure a ship delivered oil, whereas in other cases it was almost sure. The Bureau sometimes twisted words in its reports to express this certainty ('suggesting' or 'strongly suggesting') to prevent people involved in oil deliveries gaining an insight as to the exact information that informed the research results.⁶⁷ For another example – regarding Soviet oil – see the heading 'Rotterdam survey' further down in this section.

There were also some other aspects concerning accessibility. Some sources were either cut off over time or the SRB simply never gained access. The UN, for example, was an important source of information. In 1986, however, activities of the UN led to sources being cut off. When the UN established the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa (the UN IGG), Saudi Arabia for example

⁶⁵ In its listing in *Embargo*, the SRB only mentioned two shipments for the period 1979-1981 (Mobil Petroleum in June 1979, and Wangli in October 1981). This is less than one percent of the total of 210 identified shipments (Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 91, 206-209). According to South African documents, Gabon was at that time responsible for 3,7% of the import (Letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 2 October 1981, 2). Gabon was even the only country South Africa could obtain its oil from without an intermediary (Confidential and personal letter general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 29 April 1981, 2. See also Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 325).

⁶⁶ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 118.

⁶⁷ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

used this as an excuse to not send any more copies of discharge documents to the SRB.⁶⁸

The SRB did not gain access to sources in oil exporting countries from the Middle East. This was a problem for the SRB, as most of the oil originated from these countries.⁶⁹ The absence of this source can be explained by the non-existence of anti-apartheid pressure groups in these countries. The SRB labeled, in internally, Arab governments as 'generally [...] notoriously difficult to communicate with, for any purpose except oil procurement and/or arms' sales.'⁷⁰

Although the Bureau made use of informers, most of the information was publicly available. This not only concerned the information bought from Lloyd's, but also from all kind of specialized or general newspaper and periodicals. All these sources were the so-called basic material, which the Bureau cross-referenced with other sources. The former research director of the SRB, Jaap Woldendorp, estimated that at least 95% of this basic material was publicly available. Woldendorp estimated that at most 5% of the cases would not have been published, if these non-public sources had not been available.⁷¹ Woldendorp's colleague, Hengeveld, estimated that the amount of cases that the SRB revealed through non-public sources was higher than 5%. He saw, in particular, tips by the journalist Martin Bailey as being very helpful.⁷² Sources not available to the public were especially helpful in identifying oil traders. These sources could make a case more solid and subsequently could lead to an earlier publication than would have been the case through regular research.⁷³

South Africa and sources after 1990

While this last period is less interesting from the aspect of how to investigate manipulated data, it is interesting in terms of gaining access to sources. For a long period, obtaining information directly from South Africa was extremely difficult. South Africa silenced sources by censorship and new laws (12.1.2, 'Deception'). Nevertheless, incidental information sometimes reached the Bureau, passed on

⁶⁸ See: 8.3 'UN IGG.' Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 130. Araim, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 237.

⁶⁹ SRB staff, "Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB," 14 October 1986, 3.

⁷⁰ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 7. In all the internal documents, the SRB only referred to 'Our Man in the Gulf' once even though he was responsible for a growing number of identifications in 1989 (Hengeveld, "Een paar opmerkingen n.a.v. JJW's Personal Note over Zes Jaar SRB," 29 January 1991, 4) Nevertheless, this was not an Arab source, but was a ploy obviously meant to protect a South African source (Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 July 1999).

⁷¹ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 11-12. The figure of a public availability of 95% is in line with a comment by former CIA-director James Woolsey who said that 95% of all economic information is from public sources (Woolsey in the *Christian Science Monitor*, quoted in *NRC Handelsblad*, 22 March 2001)

⁷² Hengeveld, "Een paar opmerkingen n.a.v. JJW's Personal Note over Zes Jaar SRB," 29 January 1991, 4.

⁷³ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 11-12.

for instance by a Norwegian priest and the ANC.⁷⁴ A further example was the leaked confidential and censored report, from the South African Advocate-General of 27 June 1984. Because the South African censor failed to do its work well, the Bureau could trace a long term contract between South Africa and Saudi Arabia in this report.⁷⁵

Only after 1990, the Bureau could buy documents and obtain information from two South African sources. The 'long source' (from 1990) was data concerning ships, but rarely on related aspects. The 'short source' was an incidental source from which information was obtained around 1992. The contents of this information covered almost every aspect of the oil shipments, including the owners of the oil cargo. As a result, the Bureau could unveil a high percentage of oil traders.⁷⁶

The South African sources were not limited to these two only. The SRB was able to gain access to radio messages between ships and South African shore stations. However, the South African authorities had already anticipated this and made use of coded and veiled radio contact. It was only in mid-1994 – after the end of apartheid – that the Bureau met Dutch ship spotters who could report on everything regarding the appearance of ships.⁷⁷ Direct spotting of ships was a source of information also, but even now the Bureau is still very reserved about it in order to protect the people involved.⁷⁸

The SRB had to pay several thousands of dollars to obtain the South African information. In the final years, the SRB spent its money for acquiring data for a large part on these sources from South Africa, rather than on a wide range of data bases from Lloyd's.⁷⁹

Rotterdam survey

In 1985, the SRB published its Rotterdam survey that had been commissioned by the municipality of Rotterdam; the only oil report formally commissioned by a Dutch authority.⁸⁰ The case of the Rotterdam survey differs from the main reports of that period, because of the advantageous information position in Rotterdam. In Rotterdam, the quality of some information was higher than elsewhere, such as on calls. When the SRB obtained information from, for example, an Asian port regarding a ship that did not make a call, this could mean three things. First, there was no call. Second, a tanker had called but it was not in the

⁷⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 121.

⁷⁵ Advocate-General, "Report in Terms of Section 5 (1) of the Advocate-General Act, 1979 (Act 118 of 1979)" (As amended by Select Committee), No. 7, 27 June 1984, confidential, 20.

⁷⁶ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998. See also the fifth column on owners of oil cargo on pages 207-221 of Hengeveld, *Embargo*.

⁷⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 87, 88, 115, 116, 121, 122.

⁷⁸ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁷⁹ Hengeveld, "Iets over de 'toekomstdiscussie' van het SRB," 13 April 1992, 2. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁸⁰ Of course, others could ask for a report, like Dutch labor unions. See: - (internal anonymous SRB paper), Possible Activities of the Shipping Research Bureau in the Future, 2/9/82, 2.

books of the officials. Third, a ship was near an Asian port, but it had transferred the oil outside the harbor. In Rotterdam a no call, actually meant a *no call*.⁸¹

Not only was the quality higher, but the SRB also had access to more sources than usual. The Bureau had a greater access to Rotterdam authorities because the municipality had commissioned the report. The SRB obtained, through the port authorities, detailed information for the years 1982-1984.⁸² The Rotterdam port officials also had data on oil stock alteration in entrepôt. The Bureau compared this data with data on the tonnage of ships that left the harbor, and checked whether oil was delivered at the ports named. A relatively small amount of oil left Rotterdam for another continent. Therefore, checking shipments was not a large task. Not only could the Bureau obtain weekly statistics, but it was also sometimes possible to connect directly an alteration in the entrepôt with a ship. Sometimes informers supplied information that concerned an individual shipment.⁸³

The quality of the informers was so high that the accuracy of the information potentially could reveal their identity. The SRB, through this informer received information on the transshipment in Rotterdam by order of the company Marimpex. These sources told that, out of the ten Marimpex shipments during 1979-1983, six cases involved Soviet oil. When the SRB submitted this information to the Soviet consulate in Amsterdam, a twelve person strong delegation asked the representatives of the Bureau for additional proof. The Soviets were not at all pleased to be confronted with this information. They afterwards warned Marimpex, who denied the allegations, that no violations of the contract clauses would be tolerated. Because further verification from public sources was not possible, and in order to protect sources, the SRB decided not to include the Soviet link in its public reports. Besides, it was clear that the Soviets did not participate themselves in the transshipment of their oil in Rotterdam. When the media in 1988 exposed the first direct delivery of Soviet oil to South Africa, the Bureau did not hesitate to give as much publicity to it as possible.⁸⁴ Before 1988, in its contacts with journalists who asked whether Soviet oil went to South Africa, the Bureau always stimulated them to delve into the Marimpex-Rotterdam link telling them that Marimpex 'was known to trade in Soviet oil.'⁸⁵

⁸¹ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁸² SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 17. Though there were in the beginning some delays and problems to obtain data from the port authorities, this situation changed later on (SRB internal note "Lijdensweg kontakt met Havenbedrijf," middle of May 1985 (undated) meant as a preparation for a meeting with the port authorities of 20 May 1985. Letter SRB to councilor Van den Dunnen, 5 July 1985) Letter Hengeveld to the author, 15 July 1999.

⁸³ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁸⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 102-103, 354 note 16. SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 21-22, 28-30. In the BVD-files, it is noted that in October 1987 the SRB was in touch with the Soviet embassy 'concerning the problem of the delivery of oil to South Africa' (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, on South-African Communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998. File 3 of 6 (Shipping Research Bureau), page 1 of 4). A SRB-delegation also visited Rotterdam authorities to inform them about the Soviet oil (Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998).

⁸⁵ The Dutch newspaper *Reformatorisch Dagblad* wrote an article on the possibility of transports of Soviet oil to South Africa. The original source of *Reformatorisch Dagblad* was Jaap Woldendorp of the SRB. The Bureau could face an image problem, as being soft on communism – as was suggested

Dissent

This specific indicator does not apply to the SRB, as the whole analysis unit – the Bureau itself – was so small. In cases of doubt, all staff members were involved in solving the problem.

Conclusion

The main initial source was different types of print outs from Lloyd's. The Bureau also used a wide variety of sources to check and double check information. No information from any source was taken for granted. Both the SRB and its parent organizations had a good information position concerning the other two networks – business and government. The main exception of access to sources was an entree in oil exporting countries from the Middle East.

After 1990, the Bureau gained access to accurate sources from within South Africa. This simplified the research process – and the research outcomes were improved significantly. In the case of the Rotterdam survey of 1985, the SRB also had an excellent information position. Some informers were even so detailed and accurate that the SRB could not reveal this information without endangering them.

Criterion 2 was met by the Bureau through constant effort and awareness of triangulating sources of information, and by constantly improving its information position.

7.2.3 Criterion 3 – to be correct, complete, and accurate

Criterion 3	Data and information presented need to be <i>correct, complete, and accurate</i>
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<i>a) sound processing (collectors also); take notice of reliability; be unambiguous on certainty; be critical on consistency;</i> <i>b) pay attention to data lacking; do not ignore deviant data; aim at denying a hypothesis;</i> <i>c) acknowledgment of sources; correct representation of viewpoints</i>

Since the SRB published its reports, there was a lot of information available to check this criterion. Internally or publicly, organizations reacted. This information is included in assessing the extent to which this criterion was met. It begins with the correctness and accuracy of the information in the SRB-reports, followed by an evaluation of its completeness. Finally, attention is paid to the applicable specific indicators.

in *Reformatorisch Dagblad* – by not making these transports public. In the book *Embargo*, Hengeveld reminds the reader that the Bureau was neither overtly nor covertly afflicted to be a communist front organization (Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 102, 103, 354 note 13. For more, see: *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 11 October 1986; or: Vermaat, *De Informatievervuilers*, 1987, 54). In an oral briefing, the SRB informed representatives of the municipality of Rotterdam about the transports of Soviet oil (interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998).

Correct and accurate

In the winter of 1980-1981, the Bureau prepared its survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles. In the beginning of January 1981, the Netherlands Antilles denied its involvement as described by the SRB in its confidential *advance* papers. The Netherlands Antilles told the Dutch press agency ANP, that only *two* ships transported oil to South Africa.⁸⁶ After this press statement, the Acting Governor of the Netherlands Antilles declared, in a confidential message to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, that only *one* ship delivered oil to South Africa. The Acting Governor wrote that he based his findings on data from the Statistical Office, port offices, and oil companies. The other ships that were said to have bunkered did not call at the Netherlands Antilles or left to go to another destination.⁸⁷

Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs wanted to double check the data because of an expected parliamentary debate, and invited Shell to a meeting on 27 January 1981. The Shell representatives reported that Shell South Africa provided 19% of the oil that the country needed. This was realized through the British based Shell International Trading Company Limited. Shell also said that the six tanker movements of three Shell-tankers mentioned by the SRB were correct. This concerned the tankers Laconica, Latirus, and Mytilus.⁸⁸ The SRB mentioned these shipments both in its survey and in its first main report of March 1981.⁸⁹ According to a concept press release by Shell – which it never made public – the Dutch Shell company Shell Tankers B.V. owned these three ships.⁹⁰ To the ministry, Shell explicitly stated, that it did *not* endorse the position of the Netherlands Antilles that the majority of the facts in the SRB report were not correct. As a result of this, Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that ‘it seems therefore wise, for the time being, to leave the denials of the Antilles of involvement the view of Willemstad.’⁹¹

Dutch Shell decided not to make its press release public. Despite this the Nigerian branch of Shell released a press release public on 20 January 1981. In this press release, Shell Nigeria wrote the SRB was established ‘two years ago’ – whereas the Bureau was actually established six months earlier on 11 July 1980. Shell Nigeria also reported that the SRB admitted that its ‘information is second-hand and they draw conclusions from this second-hand information which are

⁸⁶ ANP-message quoted in Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, telex Foreign Affairs to governor and prime minister of the Netherlands Antilles at Willemstad, no. 480013, 14 January 1981. Telex HCSA and Kairos to Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles Don Martina, 9 January 1981.

⁸⁷ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Acting Governor at Willemstad to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 January 1981.

⁸⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 3 February 1981.

⁸⁹ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 46-51, 64-65, 82.

⁹⁰ Unpublished concept press release of Shell, 30 January 1981. See also: Table A, of SRB survey *Oil Supplies to South Africa* of January 1981. There is no information on tankers chartered by British Shell companies.

⁹¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 3 February 1981.

not sustained by facts,' and '[t]he Government of the Netherlands Antilles has issued a press release which points out the inconsistencies and half-truths of the Shipping Research Bureau's allegations as far as the Netherlands Antilles is concerned in it.'⁹² The statement that data from Lloyd's is 'second-hand' is questionable. Moreover, the Shell Company in the Netherlands explicitly did not share the opinion of the Netherlands Antilles.⁹³

Generally, the SRB did not publish data if it was not completely convinced of its accuracy. An exception occurred in regard to shipping or trading companies, already well-known for delivering oil to South Africa. In these cases the transports by particular companies could be cited by SRB as 'almost sure'. Also in these cases, the Bureau sent preliminary findings to the companies in question for corrections.⁹⁴

There was also a clear preference for SRB-researchers to provide perfectionist details. For example in the Rotterdam survey – in a special item on the Mobil Weser on page 24 – the Bureau included the weather conditions at the moment the ship called at Rotterdam. This made the story accessible in a journalistic way. The data on the weather was – in the pursuit of perfectionism – accurate. The Bureau obtained this data from the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute.⁹⁵

A large involvement?

In the *press statement* for the *survey*, the HCSA and Kairos wrote that the Netherlands Antilles and Shell were heavily involved in oil deliveries to South Africa.⁹⁶ In the survey itself, the SRB wrote '[t]he principal finding of this report is that tankers owned or chartered by Shell [...], plus tankers sailing from the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles have played a larger role in delivering crude oil to South Africa than have tankers connected with any other country.'⁹⁷ According to the conclusion, Shell 'appears to be particularly deeply involved in supplies to South Africa.'⁹⁸ This was not denied by any of the parties. The Bureau

⁹² Press Release by Shell Nigeria, P.F. Holmes Managing Director, 20 January, 1981.

⁹³ The nationalization of BP Nigeria in 1979 may have triggered off this type of reaction by Shell Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria said that any ship entering its waters was liable to prosecution, if it had visited South Africa for any reasons in recent months (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 18). For that reason Shell forbade its ships to call within a year at a Nigerian port, even when this ship only picked up post by helicopter at Cape Town (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5929, embassy Lagos, no. 686/116, 4 February 1981).

⁹⁴ A denial from a shipping company could be a lead on its own, especially if later on this turned out to be untrue. The SRB from then on treated every other case of the same company with extra suspicion. The Bureau – not completely sure whether such a ship actually delivered oil at South Africa – could list a shipment in a report, and later this shipment turned out to be untrue. Nevertheless, the shipping company in question did not protest, because otherwise it had to unveil a number of other shipments (Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 119-123).

⁹⁵ Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute, in Dutch: Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut (KNMI). Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁹⁶ Press statement HCSA and Kairos for SRB-survey *Oil Supplies to South Africa*, 13 January 1981.

⁹⁷ SRB, *Oil Supplies to South Africa*, 1981, 2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

wrote, in regard to the Netherlands Antilles, '[n]or have we as yet identified in which oil-exporting countries the oil originates which appears to be going to South Africa via the Netherlands Antilles.'⁹⁹ Being involved could, to a large extent, be concluded from Table 5 in the report. In that table, the Netherlands Antilles were ranked as having the highest number of tankers that sailed to South Africa.¹⁰⁰

Generally, Foreign Affairs, for political reasons, tried to downplay the large Dutch involvement.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, they kept on checking and double checking the data during 1981:

'In the same period, [January 1979 - March 1980; GdV] the number of departures from the Netherlands Antilles would have been nineteen, of which eight through Shell, of which we know of these eight, five were sailing under the authority of a Dutch corporate body (Shell Tankers B.V.).'¹⁰²

In retrospect, the involvement of the Netherlands was larger than assumed at that time by both the SRB and the Dutch government. South African documents show the extent of the Dutch involvement. In particular, this concerned the role of the Dutchman John Deuss. In 1985, the SRB was the impression that Deuss played a substantial role, when it had obtained a report from the South African Advocate-General. In this report, the advocate-general wrote SFF (Strategic Fuel Fund Association) had 'purchased a total of 69 cargoes of crude oil between January 1981 and March 1983.' Also an implied warning was given that some contracts could result in having 'too many eggs in one basket.'¹⁰³

Despite this the real extent of the involvement of Deuss has not yet been published. In other South African documents it shows that in 1981 and 1982, Deuss supplied South Africa with more than half the total South African imports. In May 1981, Sasol calculated that this was 67% of the total.¹⁰⁴ In October 1981, SFF wrote that this percentage was 57%: 'Mr. Deuss now supplies 8, 0 million tonnage crude oil a year, or 57% of all import.'¹⁰⁵ In 1982, the position of Deuss was still strong. In 1982 in a secret letter, SFF estimated this percentage to be 53%.¹⁰⁶ The

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6. Shell controlled the Curaçao Oil Terminal (COT). Nevertheless, non-Shell companies owned most of the oil. The SRB had difficulties to investigate this trade in detail. See: Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 65.

¹⁰⁰ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 23.

¹⁰¹ On 28 January 1982, for example, a meeting took place between officials and representatives of the parent committees of the SRB (HCSA and Kairos). During this meeting, the minister of Foreign Affairs promised to investigate the extent of The Netherlands' involvement. The minister said this was denied for the time being (Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, 1975-1984, 921.30, File 639, memo Van der Stoel, 4 February 1982, no. 6/82).

¹⁰² Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 8 September 1981.

¹⁰³ Advocate-General, "Report in Terms of Section 5 (1) of the Advocate-General Act, 1979," 16, 20, and 23. In this report, the part on 'the John Deuss contract' is on page 16-32.

¹⁰⁴ Sasol wrote that Deuss delivered 8.5 million tons a year, from a total of 12.67 million tons a year. Confidential and personal letter of general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to the director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981, 7. This estimate is also given in a secret undated (probably end of 1982) document: "kontraktprys vergelijking:" 2.

¹⁰⁵ Letter Director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 2 October 1981, 1; Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 147.

¹⁰⁶ Then, South Africa had contracts for import of a total of 260.000 barrels a day. Of this total, Deuss had contracts to import 160,000 a day (53 %), and Shell 46,000 barrels (18 %). Shell supplied South Africa in the beginning of 1982 with oil from Brunei, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (Secret letter director SFF,

contribution of Deuss slowly declined over time. Because his position was so dominant, SFF/Sasol strongly stressed the need for more diversification, not only because of their dependency on him, but also because of the publicity he attracted:

‘When the Deuss-contract was made, it was de facto impossible to get more diversification in practice.

The large extent of publicity that Deuss enjoys in the past period, see for example appendix 5, makes him the more vulnerable. We cannot leave such a large volume in the hands of somebody who has become so visible. Because of the high profile he maintains, he may become for us also a political embarrassment; therefore, I am of the opinion that he has to break up his assets in the RSA and that we have to negotiate with him preferably abroad.’¹⁰⁷

Sasol wrote that the publicity – and the minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs also was worried about this¹⁰⁸ – was caused by ‘publicity and continuous investigations, especially in the Netherlands,’ by the SRB.¹⁰⁹

When you only look retrospectively at the role the Dutchman Deuss played, the conclusion is that there was a *very* large Dutch involvement. This is even when the roles that Shell and Vitol¹¹⁰ – which are partly Dutch – played are not taken into account.¹¹¹

In terms of correctness of data, the Bureau had to take some risks of making mistakes in order to publish ‘a reasonable accurate *overall* view of the oil trade with South Africa.’¹¹² The SRB saw an occasional mistake concerning a transport by Deuss as less harmful than a mistake regarding a transport by an unknown company.¹¹³

Shell

D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 13 April 1982, 5-6) The peak of deliveries by Deuss was in 1981. In another document, this impression is supported by the listing of the contracts. In the period of November 1978 - September 1982, 140 ships transported for Deuss 136,900,000 barrels of oil to South Africa. This was based upon three contracts: 1) Lucina Saudi Arabia, period December 1980 - September 1982, 64 shipments with 78,180,000 barrels; 2) Lucina Oman, period April 1980 - August 1982, 42 shipments with 32,770,000 barrels; and, 3) TWO Lucina Spot, period November 1978 - August 1980, 34 shipments with 25,950,000 barrels (Undated {probably end of 1982} confidential document: “Crude oil purchases,” 2; see also annex A, B, C, D, and H of this document).

¹⁰⁷ Secret letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 13 April 1982, 11. Already at the end of 1980, Sasol stressed the need of diversification (Telex H.R. Wiggett, Sasolkor Johannesburg, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 21 October 1980, ref. 2127). Mostert repeated the need for diversification over and over again (Confidential and personal letter general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981, 5. Secret telex director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 6 August 1981. Secret letter general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 7 October 1982, point 11 on page 3). In his reply, the South African minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs shared the concern of Mostert. The minister asked for immediate steps to diversify sources (Secret letter South African minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs to Mostert, SFF, 21 May 1981, 1-2).

¹⁰⁸ Secret letter South African minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs to Mostert, SFF, 21 May 1981, 1.

¹⁰⁹ Confidential and personal letter general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 29 April 1981, 2.

¹¹⁰ Vitol was a Dutch-Swiss oil company. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 30, first quarter 1993, 8. For shipments by Vitol, see Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 206-208.

¹¹¹ For a discussion on the responsibility in terms of the line of the management, see heading next ‘Shell.’

¹¹² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 123.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 123.

As Shell is partly Dutch and oil was delivered to South Africa, the Bureau wanted to make a link to the Dutch being involved. In the second main SRB report, it is written:

‘In an attempt to belittle the role of the Netherlands in the supply of crude oil to South Africa, a Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that, because Shell is a multinational company, not every delivery of crude oil to South Africa by a Shell tanker should be accounted to the Netherlands. However, the whole conglomerate of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies is owned by two parent companies: a) the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, registered in The Hague, Netherlands, with a 60% interest in the Group; and b) the “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, registered in London, U.K., with a 40% interest. Both parent companies, though maintaining their separate identities, are responsible for all actions of the Group as a whole.’¹¹⁴

What the Bureau missed in its second main report was the extra level in the line of responsibility. The line of responsibility is less direct than the Bureau suggested. The Royal/Shell Group has two mother companies: the Netherlands based N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Petroleum Maatschappij (Koninklijke), and the UK based Shell Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. (Shell Transport). This is a Dutch/UK association with a 60:40 share. The mother companies limit themselves to shareholder affairs and the appointment of members of the Board of Directors. Below this are holding companies.

Shell South Africa (Proprietary) Limited, was a 100% subsidiary company of the British *holding* company. The only way for the Dutch *mother* organization Koninklijke to influence Shell South Africa, was by exercising its position as a shareholder in the British *holding* Shell Petroleum Company Limited (SPCO) Ltd., because the managerial organization starts at the level of the holdings. The Bureau did not make this restriction.¹¹⁵

South African harbors

Another point of third party criticism concerned the harbors that the SRB took into account. According to Foreign Affairs, the draft of the second main report differed from the first in regard to the harbors that were identified. In the first report the Bureau took only the harbors of Durban and Cape Town into account whereas in the second report the SRB also included Saldanha Bay and Richards Bay. Within Foreign Affairs they wondered whether this was correct, for there were no

¹¹⁴ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 26.

¹¹⁵ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 841, Letter Shell top official to Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1 November 1984. Shell executive, Van Wachem – the same Dutchman who explained that there was no direct link between Shell in the Netherlands and South Africa – was present at the Nobel peace prize in 1993, ‘apparently invited on the instigation of the South African embassy.’ According to a Norwegian newspaper, this invitation somewhat undermined the position that Shell subsidiaries operated independently from their parents (SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 4). It is only in the 1990’s that a documented example is known that Shell-directors of different national Shell companies met to make a decision about a political issue. After actions by Greenpeace, these directors met in June 1995 in The Hague and decided not to sink the Brent Spar (VPRO-documentary *Een geschenk uit de hemel*, 1999. Broadcasted second half of documentary: Nederland 3, 24 January 2000, 20.54-22.00 hours).

refineries or pipelines in these harbors. According to the ministry, the SRB suggested that there was nothing to stop crude oil from being delivered to any of the other ports in South Africa and then delivering it to a refinery by overland transport or by using smaller tankers whose movements were not necessarily known. Foreign Affairs did not accept this as a line of reasoning, and not at all as a reasonable indication of probability.¹¹⁶

Some comments can be made. First, in the final version of the second main report, the SRB did not make a reference to Saldanha Bay or Richards Bay.¹¹⁷ Second, Saldanha Bay was – contrary to the opinion of Foreign Affairs – a harbor with oil facilities. In a contract of August 1980 between Deuss and South Africa, Saldanha Bay is – together with Cape Town and Durban – the port of delivery.¹¹⁸ In the early 1980's, Deuss delivered the majority of his oil to Saldanha Bay.¹¹⁹ Third, in the first report, Richards Bay is already mentioned, for example in Table A, page 40-55. In that table, the Bureau referred to this harbor (together with Saldanha Bay) in combination with Cape Town and Durban. This combination is perhaps an indication as to why there was a disagreement. The SRB also investigated combined carriers. These vessels could transport ore, bulk, or oil. The Bureau referred to these vessels as OBO's (ore-bulk-oil). Richards Bay was a coal harbor, which OBO's could transport coal from. When the Bureau traced a call in Richards Bay, this could be an indication that this vessel could have transported oil first to Cape Town or Durban. In that case, naming Richards Bay did not so much refer to an oil delivery there, but rather a previous oil delivery to Cape Town and Durban.¹²⁰

Costs

¹¹⁶ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 11/82, 5 February 1982.

¹¹⁷ The only reference in the second report to those harbors, without any further leads, is a map on page 98.

¹¹⁸ Agreement for purchase of crude oil in bulk, 18 August 1980, 2, point E2. This is a contract between Deuss (Lucina Limited) and SFF.

¹¹⁹ Personal and confidential letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to Director General of the Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981, 6 (The Bureau mentioned the oil storage units at Saldanha Bay in: SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 29).

¹²⁰ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 July 1999. For an example of such a call, used by the SRB as a lead for tracing a concealed oil delivery, see: SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 35-36. This concerned an ore transport from Saldanha Bay. In UN-documents, the possibility of combined carriers (to import oil and to export coal) at Richards Bay is explained (UN IGG, electronically stored wp-document, hearings.igg, 29 March 1989, c.1. harbors), or put that '[s]ince 1979 South Africa is increasingly forced to obtain oil in smaller lots and some of these are brought into Richards Bay on combi-carriers which are taking coal out (this defrays the cost of freight by utilising the same ship to transport oil on the empty run). This is assumed to be particularly important for maritime links with the Far East, but it could possibly also be important for maritime links with Europe because South African coal is delivered to Rotterdam, which is also a major spot market for oil. As far as the use of Richards Bay and the combi-carriers is concerned, the otherwise profitable coal trade is being used to subsidize, or at least defray the costs of, clandestine oil procurement arrangements.' (UN IGG, South African Coal Report, draft, March 1988, C2)

In the beginning, the SRB only paid attention to the need for an oil embargo. In the third report, the Bureau gave attention to another aspect – the extra costs for South Africa to obtain oil.¹²¹ The SRB-estimate was roughly the same as a later statement made in 1986 by South Africa's President P.W. Botha. The Bureau quoted this statement in the fourth and fifth report.¹²²

Complete

Generally, the SRB published, as complete as possible, data that it had concerning oil supplies to South Africa. Nevertheless, there were two exceptions worth mentioning. The first one is regarding source protection, for example in the case of Marimpex (7.2.2 'Rotterdam survey').

The second concerns the omission of oil exporting countries from the Middle East in its second and third main report. The Bureau named some countries in these two reports, but not others. In the first main report, Table A, column 10, the SRB provided data on ports and countries from which a tanker departed before calling at South Africa. It mentioned the names of all countries involved, for example Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia and Khor al Amaya in Iraq.¹²³ In the second and third report, the way of listing Table A changed. The Bureau still mentioned the names of Western countries, such as the Netherlands and France and countries that did not join the OPEC embargo, for example Brunei. However, it referred to oil exporting countries from the Middle East as the Arabian Gulf.¹²⁴ In the third report, of the fifty seven harbors at which tankers left for South Africa, forty (more than 70%) were from this unspecified 'Arabian Gulf.' Of the seventeen remaining, three departures were unknown. Of the other fourteen, the Bureau named in twelve cases the countries explicitly, not one being an 'Arabian Gulf' country.¹²⁵

¹²¹ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 2, 28-29. For example, in the 'Summary of findings and the Conclusions,' point 10.

¹²² SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 38 (37-40). SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 2 (25). For the sixth report, see: SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, VI, 32, 33.

Different estimates showed roughly the same outcome. The Dutch embassy in Pretoria wrote, based upon a British estimate, South Africa needed in 1978 between 12 and 15 million tons (Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, Secret Archive, 1977-1983, 613.211.451, confidential message embassy Pretoria to Foreign Affairs, 23/31 January 1979, 2) The SRB estimated South Africa imported 14-15 millions tons of crude oil (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 1. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 2. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 3. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 37. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 4. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 1). From confidential South African papers, you can learn the actual figure for the beginning of the 1980's was a bit lower than the SRB-estimate: 1981: 13.2 million tons; 1982: 12.3 million tons; and 1983: 11.7 million tons (Confidential and personal letter of general manager of Sasol, D.F. Mostert, to the director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981, 7). See also: Hufbauer a/o, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy*, 1990, 120-122; Hufbauer a/o, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Supplemental Case Histories*, 1990, 233; Van Bergeijk, "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," *Kyklos*, 1989, 390-392, 398-399.

¹²³ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 40-55.

¹²⁴ The Gulf area was later referred to as the Persian Gulf.

¹²⁵ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 42-55. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 52-67.

This veiled way of reporting was a result of international diplomatic lobbying and pressures. From 1985 onwards, however, the SRB moved away from this kind of reporting. In the fourth main report of September 1986, 'Arabian Gulf' changed to the Persian Gulf, and in most cases the Bureau put the name of the country in brackets underneath. From the sixty three cases of ships sailing from the Persian Gulf to South Africa, twenty four (38%) cases remained unspecified, whereas thirty nine (62%) were identified by country. In the fifth main report of September 1988, the figure of specified cases increased; from a total of forty six Persian Gulf cases, seven (15%) remained unspecified, while thirty nine (85%) were identified. The Bureau named countries like Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.¹²⁶ Especially in its *Newsletters*, the Bureau paid attention to violations of OAPEC countries of their own embargo resolution. The SRB mentioned the secret long term contracts of the Saudi's in its *Newsletter* of June 1985. In the fourth main report (1986) the Bureau wrote:

'There are strong indications that since 1981, almost all crude oil which has been imported by South Africa was purchased on the basis of long term contracts. (...) The crude oil, shipped to South Africa during 1983 and 1984, appears to originate in a limited number of oil-exporting countries, mainly in the Middle East and the Far East.'¹²⁷

The SRB explicitly named Saudi Arabia as the long term contract partner in its June 1985 *Newsletter*. In the notes for the press statements of the main report of 1986, the SRB paid explicit attention to the involvement of Saudi Arabia.¹²⁸ In its *Newsletters*, the SRB reported on oil deliveries in which Saudi Arabia was involved.¹²⁹ For more on the causes of this bias by incomplete reporting, see 7.2.4, 'Bias.'

Rotterdam survey

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the Rotterdam survey of 1985 was complete, but in the ten years following, the Bureau was only able to publish one other case of an oil delivery (the Marakanda) from the Netherlands to South Africa during the period of 1979-1984 (8.1). When you take into account that in later

¹²⁶ In the sixth (1990) report, the figures of specified cases from the Gulf area raised to 89% (49 out of 55 cases). SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 56-71. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 34-51. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 48-63.

¹²⁷ SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 49.

¹²⁸ Statements SRB, Oslo, Brussels, London, For internal use only, end of August 1986, 1, 4. In retrospect, Hengeveld does not have a specific reason for this, especially since naming Saudi Arabia was not a problem anymore (Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 July 1999).

¹²⁹ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 2, June 1985, 1; no. 8, July 1987, 2; no. 15/16, July 1989, 2. no. 18, first quarter 1990, 7. The Bureau published a forged Saudi Arabian certificate in SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 14, January 1989, 3; and SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 11. See also: SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, Appendix I, Table G, 68-69; and SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, Appendix I, Table F, 78. In 1987, for example, the SRB presented in its *Newsletter* data of shipments in which Saudi Arabia was involved during January 1979 - March 1985: 'at least **112 crude oil deliveries to South Africa** were made from oil terminals in Saudi Arabia, a volume equal to about 22 million tons. About 80 of those shipments, mainly in the period 1979-1983, were made by tankers chartered by the Dutch oil trader, Mr. **John Deuss of Transworld Oil**.' (Bold is presented as in the original text. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 8, July 1987, 2).

years the Bureau gained access to sources, such as informers within South Africa, the number of shipments mentioned in the Rotterdam survey was not a poor result.

An aspect that does not concern shipments is the role that oil brokers and other organizations played. The SRB always had more difficulty in exposing their role than shipments. This was also the case with Marimpex. It was only after the SRB stopped publishing its reports, that the role of Marimpex could be fully established. South African documents showed that Marimpex – with its Soviet oil – was responsible for almost 10% of the total imports during those years.¹³⁰

One aspect of completeness is the percentages of oil deliveries that were uncovered in *successive* reports and surveys. This will be dealt with in section 8.1.

Sound processing

SRB tried to process the data properly and meticulously, for a single mistake could ruin the Bureau's image. One aspect of sound processing is the general design of the research – including presenting the preliminary findings to parties and countries involved. This was discussed in 7.2.1.

Another aspect is the filing system. Around 1981, the SRB set up a detailed filing system that kept track of all the various hints and leads, as well as possible connections. In the beginning, the Bureau put information regarding oil deliveries in one file. Later, it stored data in all files that could potentially be relevant. The detailed filing system was not so much the result of an effective use of entries, but of letting the photocopier run and store them. There were main filing systems on countries, ships, shipping companies, voyage histories, and information on charterers (oil companies and oil traders). When in one document two countries, five ships, and three shipping companies were named, the Bureau photocopied this document ten times (2 + 5 + 3) and stored it away in the respective files of these systems. This time consuming filing was useful for the actual research.¹³¹

Attention paid to data lacking

See 7.2.2.

To deny hypotheses

¹³⁰ SFF wrote 'Marimpex 25,000 barrels Russian oil a day.' On a total of 260,000 barrels a day, this is almost 10%. Secret letter D.F. Mostert, Director SFF, to Director General of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 13 April 1982, 5-6. See also undated (probably 1982) secret document: "Omstandigheden tijdens aangaan van termynkontrakte:." 3. In another document, the share of Marimpex is estimated to be 9% of the total being 1.25 million ton a year (Letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 2 October 1981, 2). A few month earlier, the share of the Soviet oil – Romaschkinskaya oil (32.4° API) – is calculated to be a bit higher: 1.5 million tons a year (Personal and confidential letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to Director General of the Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981, 2).

¹³¹ SRB staff, "Belangrijkste activiteiten en werkwijze van het SRB," 14 October 1986, 2. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 140. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

In different ways, the Bureau worked with hypotheses and tried to deny them. A first point was the number of shipments under investigation. To reduce the number of suspect tankers as quick as possible, the Bureau tried to falsify the hypothesis a ship could have delivered oil.¹³² In the latest phase of the investigation – after all the previous steps had failed to make it very reasonable that a ship did *not* deliver oil in South Africa – the Bureau looked for data that indicated a ship had actually delivered oil.¹³³

Second, every source – as informers and trade statistics – was handled as potentially unreliable, because it was possible that the Bureau would be fed with incorrect information.¹³⁴ The Bureau used denying hypotheses also to judge whether a document was forged. Subsequently, the SRB had to check and double check every source. The Bureau used supplemental sources to complete initial sources, and sources to check the reliability of the information of the initial sources (7.2.2). By working with hypotheses in combination with this wide variety of sources, the SRB tried to produce data with a high reliability.

Third, there were the investigations on gap tankers and incorrect calls (7.2.1, cycles). The SRB formulated all kind of hypotheses. These were necessary because data could be forged. Simply analyzing data from Lloyd's was no longer sufficient. The Bureau checked these hypotheses by comparing, for example, the data from Lloyd's.¹³⁵ In both the case of a gap tanker and an incorrect call, the Bureau wanted to deny hypotheses. This led to answers for a hypothesis such as 'the case of tanker X cannot be deleted on the basis of the "documentation" submitted by the government of country Y. The documents have clearly been forged.'¹³⁶

Acknowledgment of sources

A public reference to a document or source was in many cases not possible for reasons of source protection. The Bureau made references or links to sources in two ways. First, in pre-publication phases not open to the outside world in which all the data that was to be presented later was linked to sources. Second, on

¹³² Though in general, the SRB-researcher looked for information about a ship that did not deliver oil (in order to reduce the number of ships), a slightly different attitude was taken when someone known to deliver oil to South Africa was the object of research. The analyst paid extra attention to such cases, and such a person could be the starting point of the investigations. Nevertheless, also in these cases, denying hypotheses remained a central working method.

¹³³ 7.2.1. The SRB, of course confirmed its hypothesis, when it obtained proof that a ship had delivered oil.

In the case of its 1985 Rotterdam survey, the SRB had the presumption Rotterdam did not play any significant role in the shipments of oil any more. The Bureau formulated this presumption as an hypothesis. Then, the Bureau checked this hypothesis with, among others, data of Lloyd's and of the harbor authorities (See headings 'Rotterdam survey' in 7.2.2 and 7.2.3). Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹³⁴ An example of incorrect statistics concerned, for example, the Dutch foreign trade statistics on the Mobil Weser owned by Marimpex in November 1982. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 25, 117.

¹³⁵ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹³⁶ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 130.

several instances the SRB named sources of (individual) shipments, as open sources (such as periodicals and newspapers), answers obtained after sending the preliminary findings, or (leaked) reports.¹³⁷

Correct representation of viewpoints

A continuing issue was the extent to which it was correct to make a reference to 'the' oil embargo. The use of 'the' oil embargo in the survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles led to criticism from Foreign Affairs and Shell. In an internal confidential memo from Foreign Affairs, the comments on the use of 'the' oil embargo by the Bureau are as follows:

'The challenged report gives the impression of the existence of a world wide general ban on oil supplies to South Africa, and the strong involvement of the Netherlands in the evasion of this. It is out of the question there is not such an "international oil embargo," and thus there is no "evasion." There is no reason for a possible action on behalf of the government against those parent [oil; GdV] companies.'¹³⁸

In its unpublished concept press release, Shell put its criticism as follows:

'The content and way of publication of the report makes clear the action groups want to raise the impression at the public, there would exist a world wide general ban on oil supplies to South Africa. To avoid this misunderstanding it is pointed out there is no general embargo on oil supplies to South Africa, although a large number of oil exporting countries have adopted destination restrictions.'¹³⁹

What did the SRB write on 'the' oil embargo? In its survey, it wrote '[s]ince at least the beginning of 1979, every member of OPEC has embargoed the supply of oil to South Africa, as have most other oil-exporting countries'¹⁴⁰ The SRB repeated its statement regarding OPEC in the first main report.¹⁴¹ In this main

¹³⁷ For example, sources of (individual) shipments were mentioned on the following pages of the main reports: SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 31-32, 80-81; SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 45, 51, 53, 55; SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 15, 17-18, 20-22, 35, 57, 61; SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 59, 92, 97, 99; SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 14, 18-19, 35, 37, 41, 43, 45, 49-51, 69, 71-73; SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 11-12, 22-23, 49, 51, 57, 62, 64, 91, 93-94.

To quote a source, however, does not mean this will prevent a protest. An example of this did not take place in the main reports, but rather in a SRB *Newsletter*. The SRB used information from the UK based weekly *Private Eye*. In this article, a member of parliament of the British Conservative Party – Alan Duncan – was accused of coordinating oil trade between Brunei and South Africa for Marc Rich. After the Bureau used this information, the parliamentarian denied his involvement and protested against the SRB. The Bureau published this denial two issues of the *Newsletter* later (SRB, *Newsletter*. Second quarter 1992, no. 27, 4-5; and fourth quarter 1992, no. 29, 6. The original source of this information appeared in *Private Eye* of 8 May 1992). Rumors about Duncan's involvement reappeared in the media in 2000, after US-president Bill Clinton had pardoned Mark Rich in January of that year. *The Guardian* quoted telexes in which Duncan was linked to these supplies (*The Guardian*, 4 May 2000). Duncan denied his involvement and maintained these documents were sent to him by mistake (*The Guardian*, 5 May 2000).

¹³⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 3 February 1981, 2.

¹³⁹ Unpublished concept press release of Shell, 30 January 1981.

¹⁴⁰ SRB, *Oil Supplies to South Africa*, 1981, 1.

¹⁴¹ In the first main report, Chapter 1, 'Introduction,' the Bureau wrote 'since at least the beginning of 1979, every member of OPEC has embargoed the supply of oil to South Africa' (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 1).

report, the Bureau also dealt with resolution 34/93F of 12 December 1979 of the UN General Assembly. In this resolution, the assembly requested states to stop oil deliveries to South Africa and to take effective legislative or other measures against such supplies. On this resolution the SRB made the following comments:

'It should be emphasized that this United Nations General Assembly resolution has no binding power. In this respect, it is different from a mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council (such as was used for the trade embargo against Rhodesia), which United Nations members are obliged to enforce with the force of law. No *Security Council* resolution implementing an oil embargo against South Africa has yet been passed, and in no Western country is it yet illegal to be involved in the supply of oil to South Africa. Companies involved in supplying oil to South Africa from some Third World oil-exporting countries may, however, be legally liable for breach of contract, if the contract under which they purchased the oil specified that it must not end up in South Africa.'¹⁴²

Contrary to the survey, the SRB claimed explicitly, in its first main report that there is no mandatory embargo, and it is not illegal for Western countries to be involved in supplying oil. The Bureau even left open the possibility that OPEC-countries 'might have secretly decided that they are after all willing to supply South Africa.'¹⁴³ While the position of the SRB was accurate, it was formulated succinctly in the survey. The reaction of Foreign Affairs and Shell seems to be an overstatement, probably caused partly by the way Kairos and the HCSA publicized the survey.¹⁴⁴ Foreign Affairs reported the position of the Bureau on 'the' oil embargo in an earlier evaluation of SRB's advanced papers much more exactly and accurately.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, criticism is possible on the Bureau's presentation of the commitment countries had to keep to an oil embargo. This criticism concerned the first main report (but not the survey with its succinct formulation). The SRB presented and interpreted, in the first main report, the result of the voting on UN General Assembly resolution 34/93F, 12 December 1979. The Bureau said '[t]he 124 countries voting in favor have therefore made the implicit commitment to seize any tanker (and its cargo) which has violated the embargo.'¹⁴⁶ Further in its report, the SRB named the Netherlands as one of the 124 countries voting in favor of the resolution.¹⁴⁷

First, you can question the interpretation by the Bureau of the implicit commitment 'to seize' any tanker, supplying oil to South Africa. Second, and this is even more important, the Netherlands made reserves. These reserves are found in the correspondence between the Netherlands and the UN. The chairman of the Special Committee against apartheid referred to resolution 34/93F, while it

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁴⁴ See: Telex HCSA and Kairos of 9 January 1981, announcing a press conference at Nieuwspoor (The Hague) on 13 January 1981. Reminder telex HCSA and Kairos of 12 January 1981. Telex HCSA and Kairos of 13 January 1981, press statement on 'illegal oil deliveries of Shell from Oman to South Africa, and heavy involvements of the Netherlands Antilles in supplying oil to South Africa.'

¹⁴⁵ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, memo International Organizations Department, no. 257/80, 29 December 1980.

¹⁴⁶ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 9.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

presented the advance SRB papers to the Netherlands.¹⁴⁸ The Netherlands answered that they 'voted in favor of General Assembly resolutions to that effect, most recently resolution 35/206D, although we had to reserve our position on the call, contained therein, for legislative and other measures to be enacted by individual member states.'¹⁴⁹ Thus, the SRB interpreted the Dutch vote in the UN without taking the accompanying reservation into account.

A final comment. The Netherlands never considered oil to be part of an arms embargo or boycott. Pagan International explained that a possible opposite position in its secret report written for Shell '[i]t is often argued that an oil embargo is enforceable through the existing mandatory arms embargo, because oil is a "munition of war" under South African law and certainly a "war related material,"' of which '10% is consumed by the security forces.'¹⁵⁰ In July 1986, a spokesperson for Shell admitted on Dutch radio that the company was supplying fuel to the South African police and armed forces. In a written statement this spokesperson later denied this.¹⁵¹

Conclusion

The SRB presented data on shipments correctly. Denials by the Netherlands Antilles of shipments listed by the SRB proved to be incorrect, as shown by information from Shell. When the Bureau spoke in the beginning of the 1980's of a large Dutch involvement, this was downplayed by the authorities for political reasons. In retrospect, however, this involvement was even larger than the SRB had guessed. The South African harbors listed by the Bureau were correct (Deuss contract), although Foreign Affairs had its doubts.

Generally, the SRB did not publish data if it was not completely convinced of its accuracy. An exception concerned people already well-known for delivering oil to South Africa. In these cases movements of these people could be listed if SRB was 'almost sure'.

While the filing system was traditional and somewhat primitive, it was effective. The SRB used hypotheses in a correct way. The Bureau mentioned public sources sometimes publicly. In internal documents, information was linked to sources. Public acknowledgment was in most cases not possible for reasons of source protection.

Nevertheless, some critical comments can be made. In the second and third report, the data presented was not as complete as possible; the names of individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East, were not mentioned.

¹⁴⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, letter chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to Dutch Permanent Representative UN, Reference PO 230-SOAF (2-2-1), 15 December 1980.

¹⁴⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, letter Dutch Permanent Representative UN to chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, UN, 22 January 1981, no. 521.

¹⁵⁰ Pagan International, "Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy," Summary Assessment, 5; and Appendix XII, 5.

¹⁵¹ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 5, September 1986, 9. The broadcasting program was *VARA* radio, "De Rode Draad," 2 July 1986. For more on Pagan, see 6.3.2.

When you look for other comments, two minor points can be mentioned. First, the representation of the lines of responsibility at Shell was a bit too simplistic. Second, the presentation of ‘the’ oil embargo was sometimes a bit forced, though the facts were as such presented correctly.

In general, this criterion was met, even in the pursuit of perfectionism. The only major criticism is that, for political reasons, not all the data available was mentioned in the second and third report.

7.2.4 Criterion 4 – to be plausible and convincing

Criterion 4	The analysis and presentation of data, arguments, and conclusions needs to be <i>plausible and convincing</i> – replicable and verifiable
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<p><i>a) information is best and most balanced of that moment;</i></p> <p><i>b) make unavoidable bias explicit; content of report is consistent; consumer understands what producer means; producers write what they mean; show what is established knowledge, and what is an underpinned judgment; arguments and information are relevant for conclusion; clear use of reliability and probability; clear structure of argument and report;</i></p> <p><i>c) explanatory research: show strength of causal relationships, and plausibility of findings; eliminate alternative explanations;</i></p> <p><i>d) explanatory & prognostic research: a judgment rests on defined and clarified assumptions;</i></p> <p><i>e) prognostic research: principle of continuity; argument is made explicit, patterns are drawn; if possible make use of theory</i></p>

The SRB tried to be as convincing as possible by explaining why a ship was listed. The Bureau often presented the route a ship had followed. Sometimes, it referred to sources, such as newspapers, or ship owners who admitted a delivery (7.2.3, ‘Acknowledgment of sources’). In cases of a denial, an explanation was given as to why a shipment was listed. Furthermore, the SRB gave a judgment in its analysis by presenting the likelihood a ship delivered oil.

Bias

In 7.2.2, biases related to sources were discussed. In this section, biases caused by other factors are given. The following four biases can be ranked from being less political touchy to more.

First, the SRB did not deal with ships with a deadweight-tonnage of less than 50,000. These smaller ships had a much more irregular trading pattern than the large crude oil tankers. Therefore, they were more difficult to investigate. At an early stage the SRB abandoned the investigation on the more complex and smaller products and chemical tankers.¹⁵² Subsequently these ships will be underexposed. The Bureau made this clear in the summary at the beginning of the reports.

Second, shipping companies and oil brokers that were known to have delivered oil to South Africa received extra attention from the Bureau. The same

¹⁵² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 129. In later years, the UN IGG made an attempt to investigate this kind of shipments (8.3).

applies also to methods used to cover up a shipment, such as harbors used for incorrect callings. This means, that once they had come into the spotlight they received more attention from the SRB than others. This was, for example, the case with John C. Deuss and Marc Rich. Because Deuss acted in a less complex way the SRB soon discovered his shipments, whereas Rich remained longer a dark number – till mid-1983 – in the SRB statistics.¹⁵³

A third bias was caused by political priority. In Norway there was a lot of pressure on ship owners not to deliver oil to South Africa. Anti-apartheid groups used data on Norwegian shipments effectively in local campaigns. Being part of a political campaign, the SRB paid extra attention to Norwegian ship owners.¹⁵⁴ This type of bias fitted with the goals of the Bureau – both to uncover as much as possible, and to campaign as goal-oriented as possible with limited resources.

Biased and veiled reporting 1981-1984

The fourth bias needs special attention. This bias took place during the period 1981-1984. During that period, the Bureau deliberately did not mention the names of some oil producing countries. The countries not named were allies of the ANC. As a result of political pressure, the SRB only referred to these countries as the ‘Arabian Gulf’ or Persian Gulf. For more on the data deleted in Table A of these reports, see 7.2.3, ‘Complete.’

How could this veiled and biased reporting happen? In the first main report, some of the countries accused of delivering oil to South Africa were OAPEC-countries. These countries had endorsed an oil embargo. The SRB and the ANC had agreed earlier that the ANC could make itself familiar with the raw material of the pre-publication findings. The ANC also ‘would be allowed to give its advice as to the way of publishing findings, and to make use of pre-publication material at the diplomatic level.’¹⁵⁵ Because of the protest by political allies – through, for example, the UN Special Committee against Apartheid – the ANC put pressure on the Bureau. For the second report, the ANC and the SRB agreed ‘the research findings would be presented in a manner as to “avoid the impression” of blaming the oil-producing countries primarily and to “stress the responsibility of companies.”’¹⁵⁶ This led to a presentation, for example, such as ‘four of these Shell ships sailed from the Arabian Gulf to South Africa, and then immediately returned to the Arabian Gulf. To the best of the Shipping Research Bureau’s knowledge, every oil-exporting country in the Arabian Gulf embargoes South Africa, and had stated so publicly and officially.’¹⁵⁷ The SRB no longer specified the names of those gulf countries – instead of, for example, for Saudi Arabia it wrote the ‘Arabian Gulf’ or Persian Gulf.

¹⁵³ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 140, 145-150. For more on Deuss and Rich: 7.2.2, ‘Bias and accessibility.’

¹⁵⁴ -, “Toekomst SRB- besproken punten-standpunten op KZA-vergadering 14 August 1984.”

¹⁵⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 62.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁵⁷ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 25.

During this period the SRB recruited a second staff member. The ANC was seriously concerned that this staff member should only do research and not campaigning.¹⁵⁸ In those years, the relationship with the ANC, and other like-minded organizations, in regards to international campaigning and independence were the subject of continuing internal discussion at the Bureau.¹⁵⁹ This was not only because of uneasiness inside the SRB, but it was also a consequence of outside pressure. The policy to be soft on OAPEC-countries led to a diminishing credibility of the SRB in Western countries. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, said that this presentation placed an emphasis on oil transporting countries rather than oil producing countries. All the names of the oil producing countries failed, with the exception of Brunei. The argumentation on page 20 of the second report did not convince the minister, because the SRB mentioned in its *preliminary findings* the names of these other countries.¹⁶⁰ Within the Bureau this kind of criticism was discussed internally.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, the media start to ask questions. The Bureau was accused of publishing biased reports, and this accusation became difficult to dismiss.

Ultimately the SRB changed its policy. The first reason was because the Bureau did not want to lose its credibility. Second, the ANC attempted in vain to execute a successful silent diplomacy with nations that publicly supported this liberation movement.¹⁶²

The Bureau was aware that its integrity and credibility of the reports were at stake. The effectiveness of the SRB was closely related with its credibility.¹⁶³ Credibility was according to the Bureau 'our single most important weapon.' Therefore, integrity received the highest priority. After discussions about the extent to which the publications had to be in accordance with the wishes of the ANC, the SRB finally claimed its independence instead of seeking approval. From then on, the Bureau sets its priorities.¹⁶⁴ In retrospect, SRB-research director Jaap Woldendorp (1985-1991) wrote in an internal memo:

'The Israelis were using our information to identify the individual oil-exporting countries and accused us of protecting the Arabs. And of course they were right! It was, and I still think it is, a serious blot on our otherwise unblemished record. I felt we could not go on like this. Certainly not when both the report of the South African Advocate-General of 1984, which the Bureau had obtained, and our past correspondence with governments of oil-exporting countries made it abundantly clear that they were indeed no innocent victims of western companies. On the contrary, they appeared to be heavily involved in the trade and refused any cooperation with the Bureau.'¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁸ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 100-101.

¹⁵⁹ Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB: discussiestuk," 23 July 1984, 1-2.

¹⁶⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, letter Minister of Foreign Affairs/ International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982.

¹⁶¹ Confidential memo of Bernard Rivers for the SRB on 27 August 1982.

¹⁶² -, "Future of Shipping Research Bureau," 7 July 1984, 3.

¹⁶³ Other aspects of the effectiveness were the frequency of publications, the type of publications, the backing by the HCSA and Kairos, the backing by the ANC, SWAPO, and the UN, and, the support of action groups (-, "Future of Shipping Research Bureau," 7 July 1984, 3).

¹⁶⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 71, 97-101.

¹⁶⁵ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 11.

The Bureau began naming the individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East in its 1985 *Newsletter*, surveys and in the following fourth main report of 1986 (7.2.3 'Complete'). Woldendorp wrote 'I think this was the right decision, although it should have been taken much earlier than in the course of 1985.'¹⁶⁶ After this change, the SRB did not receive serious accusations for producing biased reports (for other effects: 8.2).

Replicable and verifiable

A Rotterdam statistician brought up the issue of reproducibility. In *Embargo*, the SRB commented:

'There was very little "scientific" criticism of the Bureau's work – chiefly because it was not in any way related to the academic community and *vice versa*. On one rare occasion, a statistician of the Port of Rotterdam claimed to have discovered a fundamental flaw in a report by the SRB on the role of the Rotterdam harbor in oil supplies to South Africa. The Bureau had not mentioned its *sources* when it referred to tankers departing from Rotterdam with a cargo of oil for South Africa; according to the critic, this meant that the investigation did not meet the scientific criterion of repeatability. Even now, the researchers will not reveal the names of many informers for fear that the latter will lose their jobs. What the critic mainly showed was that he had difficulty interpreting his academic textbook lessons in a creative manner. Of course the study was repeatable! He was advised to have a go at it himself and was given the assurance that he would come to the same conclusions.'¹⁶⁷

As explained in 3.1, intelligence and security agency reports are not academic publications. For intelligence and security agency reports, the norms of acknowledgment, mentioning sources publicly, differ from scientific reports. The Rotterdam statistician missed the point of the nature of the work of the SRB. Furthermore, the research by the SRB may not have been replicable in an academic sense, but it was reproducible in a way acceptable with intelligence commands. And it actually was replicated by journalists, the UN IGG and the Israeli delegation at the UN.¹⁶⁸

Structure

The two surveys and all the main reports (except for the 7th main report) had a clear structure. The reports were aimed at guiding the consumer through the report. These reports had an index, an introduction, and a summary. A conclusion was absent. However, the summary – which was placed in the beginning of each report – functioned as the conclusion. The two surveys and all main reports (except for the 7th main report) had background information on the SRB. Accessibility was further enhanced by the uniform structure of the successive reports.

In Table 7.3, the primary exception of the SRB-publications is the last and seventh main report. This report was published in a less elaborate format as part

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 123.

¹⁶⁸ 8. 2 (last footnote) and 8.3 'UN IGG.'

of *Newsletter* 26, first quarter 1992, and was reprinted as a separate publication in March 1992.¹⁶⁹ The report was a kind of survey, and had the structure of research findings published in a special section of a *Newsletter*. It was smaller and lacked an introduction, index, and a clear structure. In terms of its structure, it is the least accessible of all the reports.

Another point concerns the absence of a consistent policy whether or not to make recommendations. In the Rotterdam survey, the SRB made elaborate recommendations (pages 45-50). This seems logical, for the Bureau wrote this report for a specific consumer. In the survey on the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, however, recommendations were absent. The SRB wrote the main reports for a diverse audience, so it was less easy to establish to whom recommendations should be directed. In the first report, the Bureau made no recommendations. Whereas it did in the second, third, and fourth reports. However, in the fifth report recommendations were absent, but they reoccurred in the sixth.

Table 7.3 Structure SRB-reports

	intro- duction	summary beginning report	recommen- dations	clear arrangement	consequent arrangements of successive reports
first main report	yes	yes (principal findings)	no	yes	not applicable
second main report	yes	yes	yes	yes	basically like the first main report, but with adaptations and refinements
third main report	yes	yes	yes	yes	like the second (with some minor differences)
fourth main report	yes	yes	yes	yes	like the second and third (with some minor differences)
fifth main report	yes	yes	no	yes	like the second, third, and fourth (with some minor differences)
sixth main report	yes	yes	yes	yes	like the second, third, fourth, and fifth (with some minor differences)
seventh main report	no	yes	no	absent	no
Neth./N. Antilles survey	yes	yes (findings)	no	yes	not applicable
Rotterdam survey	yes	yes (together with conclusion)	yes	yes	not applicable

¹⁶⁹ SRB, *The Oil Embargo 1989-1991*, 2. Pages 7-16 of the *Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa*, no. 26, first quarter 1992 were pages 3-12 of the last main report.

Conclusion

The SRB presented its research results in a convincing and plausible way. It supported its claims as to why a shipment was listed, for example by presenting its voyage history. In general, the publications had a clear and accessible structure.

Most biases were, or were made, explicit – and seem to be excusable. It seems logical – and it was explicitly recorded that the Bureau would not investigate small shipments. Extra attention was paid to people and organizations known to be involved in oil deliveries to South Africa. The extra attention on Norway was more political because of the strong and effective anti apartheid lobby located there.

One bias was a serious problem. In the second and third main report, the Bureau deliberately did not name individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East. For political reasons, the SRB only referred to these countries as the ‘Arabian Gulf.’ After 1984, this biased and veiled reporting ceased.

In general, criterion 4 was met, except for the biased and veiled reporting of the oil exporting countries from the Middle East in the second and third main report.

7.2.5 Criterion 5 – to be of relevance for the consumer

Criterion 5	The information, conclusions, and options presented need to be of relevance for the consumer it is written for
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) <i>policy relevant: directed towards danger, threats, and risks;</i> b) <i>report: being in time, brief, clear & direct;</i> c) <i>explain what is unknown; support statements by arguments;</i> d) <i>explanatory research: present cause-and-effect patterns;</i> e) <i>prognostic research: sketch possibilities of (width of) future developments, indicate factors that can be manipulated; be aware of relevant forces & speed of intervention</i>

Since the SRB-reports were focused on presenting statistical data, they were not intended to expose dangers, threats, or risks. The information that remained unknown concerned data on oil deliveries that were not discovered (8.1, ‘Discovered oil supplies’).

In time and relevance

The data presented by the SRB was in time in the sense it was the most recent overview of oil deliveries to South Africa in the world, although the processing of a certain period took a year and a half.

The data was useful and timely for campaigning endeavors. In the survey on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles, the Bureau planned to make it public just before the parliamentary debates in the beginning of February. The SRB and its parent organizations the HCSA and Kairos did this to obtain a political impact. In the beginning of January 1981, the press release by the Netherlands Antilles

became public. This was weeks before the SRB planned to publish the report. It was '[t]his was no cause for unalloyed joy for the Shipping Research Bureau, since it had been planning to announce its research results at its own press conference to be held later in January 1981.'¹⁷⁰ Although the publicity did not follow the exact time schedule of the SRB, Foreign Affairs was aware of the timing of the report and the intended political impact:

'It is obvious the Dutch producers of the report have carefully chosen their timing, for reasons of the parliamentary debate next 4-5 February, in which a follow up of the Scholten-resolution undoubtedly will play a role, now even stronger than was to be expected after the imploring stories of the last time. The political waters could become violent again!'¹⁷¹

Brevity and relevance

Concerning brevity, the reports were for a large part composed of tables. In these tables, data was presented from different angles. This was necessary to serve many different consumers as policy relevant as possible. Different consumers had different expectations as to which aspects they wanted to be informed on for their campaigning and lobbying. Sometimes the data simply functioned to exert pressure on some consumers. By presenting certain data from different angles, consumers did not need to work out specific conclusions themselves. The consumers could simply find the information they needed in the shortest time possible. This explains the volume of the reports.

Clarity and relevance

In general, the information was presented in a clear way. For the first main report, however, an additional comment has to be made. In the first main report, the SRB named ships that called at South Africa, but that did not deliver any oil. On the basis of data by Lloyd's on shipping movements, the main source of the Bureau, conclusions could only be reached on sailings and calls. When a ship 'sailed from' a certain oil exporting country from the Middle East, this did not mean it had collected oil there. The oil could be from another country. 'Sailed from' could be a lead to the country where the oil for South Africa originated from, but nothing more than that. It also could be the ship had bunkered fuel only. The term 'called' has a similar position. When a ship 'called' at a South African port this does not necessarily mean it had delivered oil there. It was a lead to be checked with other information. It could be that a ship bunkered fuel, picked up new crew members, or needed repairs. Such options were possible, as South Africa had a strategic position between the Indian and Atlantic Ocean.¹⁷²

The publication of the first main report led to protests from those cases, in which the SRB named ships that called at South Africa, but did not deliver any

¹⁷⁰ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 65.

¹⁷¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 68/80, 30 December 1980, 2.

¹⁷² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 89.

oil. Although the Bureau explained the difference between ‘calling’ and ‘delivering oil’ in its report,¹⁷³ shipping companies were not at all happy to see their names listed. In the next SRB-reports, the Bureau placed an emphasis on ships that actually delivered oil, and not on ships that only called.

Conclusion

The SRB-reports were in time in the sense they presented the first overview of oil deliveries in a certain period. The timing to publish a survey, furthermore, was carefully chosen to reach a maximum political effect.

Concerning brevity, the reports were lengthy. To serve different consumers by presenting data from different angles received more weight than to be as succinct as possible. This practice, supported the reports to be more widely relevant.

The content of the publications was clear. On the first main report, however, there was criticism by some consumers whose ships were mentioned although they only called at South Africa, but did not deliver oil. Although the SRB explained this difference in its first report, this way of reporting was abandoned for the subsequent confusion it caused.

This criterion was met, although one minor point can be made concerning the confusion surrounding the explained terms ‘calling’ and ‘delivering oil’ in the first report.

7.2.6 Criterion 6 – warning

Criterion 6	The timely and well-urged <i>warning</i> makes clear the nature, gravity, duration, and timing of the threat, as well as the likelihood the threat will become reality
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) warn when evidence is a reasonable basis for action, not when harm will occur; do not only warn, but also urge that measures are taken; b) danger is not a product of the imagination; avoid bias of worst-case scenarios; a warning is not a summing up of all the dangers possible; c) indicate nature, gravity, probability of occurrence, timing, and duration; what indicators are available to observe a threat; what are the intentions of the opponent; is the threat unambiguous, or does a opponent's actions serve other purposes; is a threat mandatory or optional d) make recommendations

During its existence, the SRB carried out an experiment that it characterized as an early warning. The Bureau used this expression to identify a ship that was planning to sail to South Africa to deliver oil. The Bureau sometimes obtained such information. The SRB experimented with early warnings in the period September - December 1984.

The Bureau perceived the outcome of the experiment as a negative one. First, of the five ships that were identified, two did not sail to South Africa. Second, ships could change plans and deny that they were sailing to South Africa. Third,

¹⁷³ SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 12-13, 16-17.

it cost the SRB a lot of time and stress, especially when the early warning was not followed by an actual delivery. Fourth, the media seemed not to appreciate all the extra effort. The media were more interested in the main reports with all the data, than such incidents.¹⁷⁴

A decisive reason to stop the early warning was the SRB's opinion that an incorrect early warning could damage the Bureau's reputation of reliability.¹⁷⁵ After 1984, the SRB used such shipments as a case study in its reports. This was then still useful, for example for unions that employed blacklists.¹⁷⁶

From the available material, it remains unclear if the warning worked as a self-defeating hypothesis.

Conclusion

When a warning prevents danger – in this context this is an oil delivery to South Africa – this is seen as an intelligence success (2.2.3). It is unclear if this was the case for the two mentioned shipments that did not deliver oil. The Bureau itself felt the warning experiment conflicted with its reputation of producing reliable results.

Too little information was available to conclude (to what extent) this criterion was met or not met. Subsequently the criterion is not applicable.

7.2.7 CONCLUSION

To summarize the conclusions of the previous sections, the following can be said. The first and second criterion – on design and on different angles of investigation – were met.

The third and fourth criterion – concerning being correct, complete, accurate, plausible and convincing – were generally met. Apart from a few minor points, there is one serious point of criticism on the second and third main report. In these reports, the SRB purposely omitted, for political reasons, the names of individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East in Table A. The Bureau generally pursued perfectionism in terms of presenting data.

The fifth criterion – concerning relevance – was met, albeit there was confusion in the first report around the tables illustrating 'calling' and 'delivering oil.'

On the sixth criterion – regarding warning – too little information was available to conclude the extent to which this criterion was or not met. Subsequently the criterion was not applicable.

¹⁷⁴ - , "Evaluatie vroegtijdige waarschuwings-akties en recente rapportage: Sep 84 - Dec 84," 17 December 1984, 1-2 (internal SRB discussion paper).

¹⁷⁵ Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB. Discussiestuk voor KZA en Kairos," 10 August 1984, 5. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996. see also *Embargo*, 1995, 126.

¹⁷⁶ Although the SRB concentrated on its own work, the Bureau was sometimes consulted for its expertise on tracking movements of ships, as an incidental assist given to Greenpeace (Staff SRB, "Over het huidige en toekomstige werk van het SRB," 30 October 1992, 9).

To conclude, the first five criteria were met, including the applicable specific indicators. Only one serious point of criticism in the second and third main report was encountered. The reports were generally of high quality. The fourth, fifth, and sixth main reports were of high quality, including all specific indicators.

8 Quality – complementary elements

What complementary evidence, concerning quality, can be found? First, because the SRB published its findings a series of its reports could be evaluated. Subsequently the effect and impact they had could be traced. In addition, reports on the same issue by other organizations were also available. This complementary evidence is evaluated in this chapter to provide extra information on the quality of the SRB-publications. For various reasons, these issues were not dealt with in chapter 5 – and thus not evaluated in chapter 7.

In 8.1, a comparison is made between the quality of successive SRB-publications. As this is not limited to one specific report, it could not become part of the standard of chapter 5.

In 8.2, issues such as the effect, impact, diffusion, and knowledge use of the SRB-publications are dealt with by focusing on the way third parties judge the quality of a report, how they use such reports, and how these reports have influenced action. As the Bureau published its findings, there is – for intelligence reports – a rare opportunity to investigate the impact, diffusion and knowledge use. As this seldom happens, it therefore did not make sense to have formulated a special criterion for them in chapter 5 – although these elements are definitely indications of the quality of a report.

In 8.3, a comparison is made between SRB-publications and reports by other organizations who also investigated the oil trade on South Africa. Such a cross-case analysis cannot be incorporated in the standard of chapter 5, as this focuses on testing only one report. Moreover, such material is not often available.

In short, complementary material is available to judge the quality of the SRB-publications. Nevertheless, this material needs to be evaluated from perspectives that – for the mentioned various reasons – cannot be incorporated in the standard of chapter 5.

8.1 QUALITY OF SUCCESSIVE REPORTS

What was the amount of discovered oil supplies in the successive publications? On what issues did the Bureau report on in its successive SRB-reports?

Discovered oil supplies

The SRB estimated the oil import in South Africa and then compared it with the tonnage of discovered oil supplies. The Bureau assessed that in the years up to 1990, it normally uncovered 50-60% of the oil supplies. After 1990, the SRB gained access to new sources from South Africa. From then on, the Bureau could

trace 85% of the shipments.¹ The increase of the total coverage was notably the largest between the first report of March 1981 and the last publication *Embargo*, 1995. The SRB stated in its first report, for the period 1979 to the first quarter of 1980, that twenty three tankers were 'considered most likely to have delivered crude oil when they called at South Africa.' In *Embargo*, the Bureau identified sixty-four ships for the same period.²

Successive uncovered shipments from Rotterdam

The reason for the difference of the number of uncovered shipments, of before and after 1990, was explained (access to South African sources). Also before 1990, an increasing number of shipments were uncovered throughout the years as a result of access to new and better sources. To illustrate this, a comparison is made between the number of shipments from Rotterdam that were uncovered in the first four main reports and in the Rotterdam survey.

In the first main report, the SRB named Mobil Progress, Erviken, Champlain, and Oro Chief in the list of tankers that sailed only to South Africa. However, the Bureau did not mention any of these ships in the first main report's list of ships most likely to have delivered crude oil. In all the other main reports the missing cases were mainly the last cases, which were probably still being investigated.³

It is difficult to estimate to what extent the Rotterdam research was complete, but in the ten years following, the Bureau was only able to trace one other case of an oil delivery from the Netherlands to South Africa during the period of 1979-1984. This concerned the Marakanda, which delivered oil in January or February 1980 to South Africa. Vitol owned the cargo. While this ship was already under suspicion during the Rotterdam survey, the SRB could not sufficiently prove this case.⁴

¹ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996; Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 121-122, 356 (note 21).

² SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, Table D, 79-83. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 206-207.

³ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 18. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 87-88, 139-140. Scholtz, "Drive Now and Pay Forever," *Embargo*, 1995, 266.

⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 207. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998.

Table 8.1
1979-1984: Ships that apparently delivered oil from Rotterdam to South Africa⁵

Name ship	Rotterdam Survey 1985 Departure Rotterdam (day/month/year) – called South Africa (month year)	First Report 1981 mentioned: yes-no	Second Report 1982 mentioned: yes-no	Third Report 1984 mentioned: yes-no	Fourth Report 1986 mentioned: yes-no
Mobil Progress	25/1/79 – 3/79	no*	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Erviken	2/2/79 – 2/79	no*	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Champlain	28/3/79 – 4/79	no*	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Oro Chief	21/7/79 – 9/79	no*	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Maasrix	27/8/79 – 9-10/79	no	no data 1979	yes**	yes
Maasbree	2/9/79 – 9-10/79	no	no data 1979	yes**	yes
Karama Maersk	18/10/79 – 11/79	no	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Ras Maersk	26/11/79 – 12/79	no	no data 1979	no data 1979	yes
Karoline Maersk	22/2/80 – 3-4/80	no	yes	no data 1980	yes
		end research First Report			
Ras Maersk	31/5/80 – 6-7/80		yes	no data 1980	yes
Karoline Maersk	12/8/80 – 8-9/80		yes	no data 1980	yes
Argyle	23/9/80 – 10/80		yes	no data 1980	yes
Garden Green	23/10/80 – 11/80		yes	no data 1980	yes
Robert Maersk	23/10/80 – 11/80		yes	no data 1980	yes
Konkar Dinos	28/11/80 – 12/80-1/81		yes	no data 1980	yes
Dagmar Maersk	15/1/81 – 2/81		yes	no data ½ '81	yes
Cast Fulmar	30/4/81 – 5-6/81		yes	no data ½ '81	yes
St. Marcos	19/7/81 – 8/81		no	yes	yes
Høegh Hill	14/8/81 – 9/81		no	yes	yes
Recife	1/10/81 – 10-11/81		no	yes	yes
St. Marcos	23/11/81 – 12/81		no	no	yes
			end research Second Report		
St. Marcos	5/7/82 – 7-8/82			no	yes
St. Tobias	9/8/82 – 8-9/82			no	yes
Mobil Weser	8/11/82 – 12/82			no	yes
St. Benedict	1/12/82 – 12/82			no	yes
				end research Third Report	
Puma	21/4/83 – 5/83				yes

* The SRB only named these ships in the list of tankers that sailed to South Africa. Nevertheless, it did not mention any of these tankers in the first report's list of ships that are most likely to have delivered crude oil.

** The SRB named these cases as examples in a section on Rich. The period as such was not object of investigation.

⁵ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 21-22, 28-30. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 3, 40-55, 80-83. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 30, 41-55. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 18, 52-67, 82-84. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 23-27, 56-71, 87-90.

Issues reported on

It is assessed whether the SRB wrote on the issues that it promised to report on. Issues reported on are related to the criteria of 7.2. It follows naturally from the line of the specific indicator on the structure (criterion 2), and it is linked to the issue of clear and direct reporting (criterion 5). It is not included in the criteria because it is not as directly related to quality as criteria 2 and 5. However, it gains significance when successive reports can be investigated. This provides additional insights into the structure and the clear and direct reporting by the SRB.

Unlike the BVD, the SRB did not have a legal framework of tasks. Nevertheless, the Bureau had clear objectives, which it published in its reports. These objectives were constant throughout the years. They were: 1) to conduct in-depth research on oil shipments to South Africa; 2) to conduct research on legislative and other means whereby countries could more effectively enforce sanctions; and 3) lobbying. The main purpose was in-depth research on oil deliveries.⁶ Besides these main objectives, a report would contain background information, in order to gain a better understanding of the issues in question.⁷

Main reports

The principal purpose of the SRB was to conduct in-depth research on oil deliveries to South Africa. Between 61% and 87.5% of the text of the main reports was focused on this principal purpose. In terms of the total number of pages, this resulted in an average of 70% coverage of all the reports.⁸

Including the three objectives together, the coverage was between 66 and 87.5%. The average coverage of the three objectives for all the reports was 73%,

⁶ In this first report, the Bureau did not mention the three objectives; there is no special appendix on 'background information regarding the SRB and its founding organizations' as in later reports (SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 1, 90). In the other main reports, it mentioned the three central objectives every time. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 91. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 101. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 104. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 76. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 98.

The Bureau mentioned in its sixth main report a new research activity, being the monitoring of coal exports from South Africa. This activity started in March 1989. This goal was additional to monitoring oil, which remained the central activity of the SRB (SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 98). Therefore, the extra objective in the sixth and seventh report could have been the export of South African coal. The Bureau chose, however, the concept of a report about oil. In its *Newsletters*, the SRB paid in special sections attention to the issue of coal.

⁷ This will be, for example, on measures and resolutions taken against South Africa, an explanation of the method used, background information on the organization itself, or a bibliography. Furthermore, a publication contains information on data like copyright.

⁸ The total number of pages of the seven reports is 584 (blank pages not included). The total number of pages on the principal purpose is 411.5. Therefore, $411.5/584 = 70\%$. The total of the principal purpose as an average of percentages would be a bit higher, namely 73% ($= 511.5\% : 7$). This is caused by the high coverage of the small seventh report. To balance a bias caused by a small report, the average of pages is chosen for counting the overall coverage.

in terms of the total number of pages.⁹ This average ratio between objectives (73%) and background information (27%) seems reasonable, as you would expect some background information on the central items.

There are major differences between the attention paid to the three central objectives. The principal purpose was to inform oil deliveries. This explains the average coverage of 70% of the first objective. The second objective, to conduct research on legislative and other means through which countries could more effectively enforce an embargo, had a total coverage of 3%. As such, this is not a remarkable figure. Nevertheless, there was an 8% coverage of attention paid to related background information, namely on resolutions and other measures taken against South Africa. This means, that the attention paid to the related background information was higher than to the objective itself. The information on resolutions was mainly a general description of developments concerning sanctions.¹⁰ Implementing sanctions was also the reason for the existence of the SRB. The relatively overemphasis may be caused by the need that the Bureau felt to explain and to defend the kind of research it did. As the SRB had no legal framework of tasks, it may have felt the need to justify its activities by referring to these resolutions. Another reason will have been that the Bureau wanted to put pressure on countries that had not taken measures.

In its reports, the SRB seldom made reference to its lobby-activities, its third objective. Sometimes, the Bureau presented these activities in a more implicit way. Unlike the first two objectives, lobbying is an activity on its own, and therefore not primarily intended to be published in main reports.¹¹

Netherlands & Netherlands Antilles survey and Rotterdam survey

In the Netherlands & Netherlands Antilles survey, the coverage of the three objectives is almost the same as in the main reports – 72%. 28% is on background information. Because the SRB did not write for a specific group of consumers, it did not make recommendations. Probably because it was one of the earliest products of the SRB, almost all the attention was on data regarding shipments and the explanation of terms (91%).

In the Rotterdam survey, the coverage of the three objectives is slightly lower than the main reports: 60% whereas the background information is 40%. The attention paid to the SRB and history of the report is larger (11%) than in the main reports

⁹ The total number of pages of the seven reports is 584. The total number of pages on the three objectives is 428. Therefore, $428/584 = 73\%$. The total of the principal objectives as an average of percentages would be a bit higher, namely $76\% (= 528.5\% : 7)$. This is caused by the high coverage of the small seventh report. To balance a bias caused by a small report, the average of pages is chosen for counting the overall coverage.

¹⁰ The SRB wrote about its lobby activities in its annual report. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa*, 1981, 7-11. SRB, *Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981*, 1982, 1-8. SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 3-6, 27-31, and 42-46. SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 3-4, 28-48. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 22-30. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, VII, 25-35, 37-44.

¹¹ For example: SRB, *Annual Report 1982-1983*, 7; SRB, *Annual Report 1988*, 4-5; SRB, *Annual Report 1989*, 9-10.

(always 4% or less). This is largely caused by the extra attention paid to the history on how the survey was commissioned by the city of Rotterdam.

It is also the only one in which the section on recommendations and measures that can be taken (second objective) is larger (13%) than the reproduction of resolutions (10 %). This can be explained by the survey being both commissioned by and made for a specific consumer, the city of Rotterdam. It is easier to make recommendations for a specific consumer than for a diverse audience.¹²

8.2 EFFECTS & IMPACT, KNOWLEDGE USE, DIFFUSION

What was the effect and impact of the SRB-publications? What was the diffusion and knowledge use? These elements can be used to judge the quality of the SRB-publications. When necessary this even may be tested in a more formal way. This is not done so here, because it would require the development of a separate framework – adapted for the field of intelligence – that will rarely be used because such material is only seldom available. Therefore, only an overview will be provided.

First, attention is paid to how others judged the quality of the SRB-reports. Second, the focus is on exploring how others used SRB information – internally or externally. Third, speculations on the information position of the Bureau are traced. Fourth, given that the aim of the SRB was to block or to hinder the oil supplies, the focus is on whether someone stopped to deliver oil, or whether costs were enhanced as a result of activities of the Bureau. Fifth, diplomatic activities that were triggered by the reports are investigated, as these may be an indication for their quality. Because the focus is on the Dutch context, Dutch diplomatic responses are explored. These include diplomatic moves that were a result of the biased and veiled reporting on oil exporting countries from the Middle East during 1981-1984.

How others judge the quality

An indication of the quality of a report can also be illustrated by how the other two networks – government and business – labeled the SRB-publications. The most critical reactions can be expected from those whom the Bureau targeted its activities towards. For example, the Dutch government, ship owners, and South African authorities.

Foreign Affairs, after verification in 1980-1981, was of the opinion that SRB-data were generally reliable.¹³ The ministry reiterated this opinion later in public.¹⁴

¹² The SRB made recommendations in reports written for specific consumers.

¹³ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 8 September 1981.

¹⁴ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, marginal note International Organizations Department in letter Minister of Foreign Affairs/International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982.

For the period 1981-1987, ship owner Bergesen – whose company featured in separate sections of several main reports¹⁵ – wrote to the Bureau ‘[l]ooking back on your reports since 1981, we find them rather accurate, however not entirely perfect.’¹⁶

In 1990, the SRB gained access to sources from within South Africa. After 1990, the Durban branch manager David Hitchman of World Wide Maritime, who acted as port agent for visiting tankers, labeled the SRB-findings as ‘very accurate.’¹⁷

Also at the UN – its own anti apartheid network – there were positive reactions. The chairman Anthony Nyakyi of UN IGG (8.3) thanked the Bureau: ‘the information provided by the SRB proved to be invaluable to our work.’¹⁸

How others use SRB-information

All three networks – anti apartheid, government, and business – used SRB data. On several occasions, Foreign Affairs used SRB-information. Officials at Foreign Affairs criticized each other in internal memos, thereby referring to the ‘grosso modo reliable data of the Shipping Research Bureau’ to give their own argumentation more authority.¹⁹ In internal memos, the ministry referred to the names of tankers involved, Dutch harbors, oil trading companies, oil producers, and oil refineries.²⁰ For the identification of possible measures to be taken and companies involved – like Shell Tankers Inc., Transworld Oil at Berg en Dal, SHV at Utrecht, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme, and Ton Trading – Foreign Affairs made use of SRB-data.²¹ To formulate its policy, Foreign Affairs took the SRB

¹⁵ SRB, *Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982*, 1984, 22; SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 18; SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 18; SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 20.

¹⁶ Letter Bergesen Gruppen to SRB, Oslo, March 4 1988, Op.dep. 01/83.

¹⁷ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 121.

¹⁸ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 30, first quarter 1993, 8. Such positive reactions were noticed by the Dutch embassy in South Africa. In December 1993, for example, the embassy wrote that the Tanzanian chairman declared the UN IGG could be dissolved, as a result of the changes within South Africa. In his speech, he expressed his great appreciation for the way the SRB had carried out its research (Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, 1991-1994, 999.214, File 849, message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1993, XXX-16319).

¹⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no 29/81, 8 September 1981.

²⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1977 - 1984, File 847, memo International Organizations Department, no. 45/82, 31 March 1982.

²¹ The SRB proposed such measures in its reports. At a certain time, Foreign Affairs did not prefer a gentlemen's agreement with no explicit commitment, as in the case of the oil embargo against Rhodesia. It was too noncommittal. In the case of South Africa, the ministry favored direct agreements. Foreign Affairs had a problem with shipment from third countries. Officials also discussed an earlier Norwegian proposal of international consultations with oil producing and transporting countries. Officials saw a role for the pressure of the public opinion and organizations like the SRB, as far as these concerned voluntary ones (Memo International Organizations Department, 31 March 1982. This memo is present in Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990. File 847; Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5934; and Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907. See also: Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5934, memo International Organizations Department, 17 September 1981, no. 32/81).

data explicitly into consideration.²² SRB-publications influenced the (inter-) departmental thinking on what sanctions could be taken – concerning the transport and ownership of oil.²³ Also in official documents of Dutch parliament, Foreign Affairs referred explicitly to SRB reports and data.²⁴

Foreign Affairs asked the Bureau for information. In turn, the SRB supplied Foreign Affairs with reports, brochures, newsletters, annual reports, and even – which the Bureau anonymously obtained – a blueprint describing which company was at what place drilling for oil and gas in South Africa.²⁵

Finally, the SRB made in its Rotterdam survey a series of recommendations – presented as ‘suggestions’ – for the city of Rotterdam. These recommendations were focused on the issue of how to prevent oil being transported from Rotterdam to South Africa. Foreign Affairs internally reported on these recommendations.²⁶

One example of the business network concerns Shell. To counter anti-apartheid activities, Shell asked Pagan International for help (6.3.2). In a secret report that Pagan International wrote for Shell, SRB-data was an important source to analyze the energy situation and the exposure of Shell in South Africa. There were twenty one instances (out of a total of thirty four), in which the SRB or Bailey – one of the two advisors who helped to develop the SRB-method – was quoted as the source: a score of 62%.²⁷

In addition, organizations such as the Erasmus University and the UN IGG used SRB-data as a main source of information for their own research (8.3). Israel also used SRB-data to criticize UN-reports in which data on links between South Africa and Eastern European or Arab countries was deleted. Israel managed to raise doubt about the role of African countries (8.3, ‘Khalifa-lists’).

How others judge the SRB-capabilities

The SRB had a simple filing system (7.2.3, ‘Sound processing’). Nevertheless, there were speculations about the capabilities of the Bureau:

²² Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 847, working paper ‘ban on the transport of oil’ by International Organizations Department, 12 November 1981, 9 and 12.

²³ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 84/82, 23 July 1982.

²⁴ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, letter Minister of Foreign Affairs/International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982. *Lower House*, Session 1982-1983, 17 895, no. 3, 17 June 1983, 29-30.

²⁵ SRB-archive: letter SRB to A.P. Wegerif, UN Political Affairs Department, Political Affairs Section, 1 October 1986; letter Jaap Woldendorp, SRB to R.H. Cohen, African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, Southern Africa Section, 8 August 1988.

²⁶ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 45-50. Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1990, 553.12, File 467, confidential memo of official of Transport Adviser, no. 240/85, 9 October 1985. See also: Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1550, memo official of Transport Adviser, no. 251/85, 17 October 1985.

²⁷ Pagan International, “Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy,” Appendix XII “The Energy Situation And Shell Exposure In South Africa.” The Pagan report hardly made use of notes for the presented facts. The exception was Appendix XII.

'In the shipping industry it was widely believed that the Bureau had an advanced computer system keeping track of the movements of all tankers. We did nothing to dispel this belief.'²⁸

Furthermore, some newspapers speculated that the Bureau might even use satellites.²⁹ However, this was impossible for budgetary reasons.

Effects of SRB-publications

In retrospect – in 1991 – the SRB's retiring director Woldendorp saw the extra costs South Africa had to pay for its oil as the main effect of its publications and its lobby.³⁰ These extra costs were not only the result of the activities of the Bureau.

The extra costs South Africa had to pay for its oil – the extra commission to middlemen and traders, and the costs of additional South African measures – were estimated to be more than \$ 2 billion a year.³¹ The monitoring activities of the SRB were seen as essential in reaching this effect. The order of magnitude of the extra costs to obtain oil came close to South Africa's gross foreign debt, estimated between \$ 15 to 20 billion by the end of the eighties. It is likely that the 1985 South African debt crisis would not have emerged if the diverse oil sanctions and monitoring had not taken place.³² Many commentators see the refusal in 1985 of the international banks to renew their short-term credits to South Africa as the final blow to the system of apartheid.³³

Besides the economic costs, South African measures also took their toll regarding the principles of the democratic legal order. The oil trade became a secret affair. Immediately after Iran ceased to supply oil, South Africa announced a new law to make the publication of data on the oil trade a criminal act.³⁴ An effect of the SRB using data and reporting on it publicly, resulted in information, that was obtained from Lloyd's, becoming increasingly more incomplete and incorrect (the Bureau reacted to this by refining and supplementing the main research design – 7.2.1, 'Conclusion'). At the same time, the secret oil trade did not draw attention to its most noble oil brokers. As a result, South Africa paid a lot of money to middlemen and crooks. South Africa paid hundreds of millions of dollars more than necessary, or money simply was lost, because the secrecy triggered off a lack of control that would have been present under normal democratic surveillance. Investigators and members of parliament, who were attempting to supervise this process became

²⁸ Gudim, "A Defeat for the Shipping Lobby?" *Embargo*, 1995, 282.

²⁹ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 115.

³⁰ Woldendorp, "The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991," 24 January 1991, 4-6, 10.

³¹ SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 28-40. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 22-26. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 25-33. See also: Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 72-73.

³² Van Bergeijk, "The oil embargo and the intellectual," *Embargo*, 1995, 344.

³³ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 204. See also the 1977-analysis of the Dutch embassy in South Africa: 8.3.

³⁴ Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, Secret Archive, 1977-1983, 613.211.451, confidential message embassy Cape Town to Foreign Affairs, undated (sent between 23 January and 7 March 1979), 2.

frustrated. Some of them even became an object of investigation themselves. South African members of parliament warned that the 'potential for corruption in this area is absolutely colossal.'³⁵ The South African journalist and editor Kevin Davie was of the opinion that the secrecy had little to do with protecting the oil lifeline, but rather everything with hiding the massive extra costs of apartheid.³⁶

In the beginning of the 1980's, SFF/Sasol³⁷ paid \$ 200 million more than necessary for two of its oil contracts. SFF/Sasol not only misinformed its minister about a contractor, but they also did not reveal that they had paid \$ 4 more, per barrel, than necessary. SFF/Sasol requested that further inquiries and investigations into these oil deals be stopped, as this was, in their view, jeopardizing the oil flow to South Africa. Officials who wanted to report on these practices became the object of research themselves, because of the classified nature concerning the oil trade. While SFF/Sasol had the option to reclaim \$ 144 million from one of their contractors, the Dutchman John C. Deuss, this never happened because of the atmosphere of secrecy and the frustrating nature of the investigations.³⁸ Deuss' position was so dominant that SFF/Sasol strongly stressed the need for more diversification. They did so, not only because of the dependency on Deuss, but also because of the publicity Deuss got (see also 7.2.3 'A large involvement?').³⁹

Another case was the so-called Salem affair. Several European countries – including the Netherlands – investigated this fraud. One of the suspects was the Dutchman Anton Reidel and his company Beets Trading.⁴⁰ Dutch authorities wanted information from South Africa, the central victim in this fraud. Nevertheless, from 1981 onwards, the Dutch did not receive any cooperation from South African authorities. South Africa wanted to avoid publicity at all costs.⁴¹

The South African policy led to bureaucratic deficiencies. In the second half of the eighties, the Dutch consulate in Cape Town, South Africa, complained:

³⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 84. Quoting: Hansard 14 February 1989, col. 692-3.

³⁶ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 84. The journalist Davie first was editor of the magazine *The Executive*, and later editor of the South African *Sunday Times Business Times*.

³⁷ SFF/Sasol: Strategic Fuel Fund Association/South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation.

³⁸ Scholtz, "Drive Now and Pay Forever," *Embargo*, 1995, 261-262. See also Davie, "Apartheid and the Cost of Energy Self-Sufficiency," *Embargo*, 1995, 250-151.

³⁹ Secret letter director SFF, D.F. Mostert, to director-general of the Mineral and Energy Affairs, 13 April 1982, 11.

⁴⁰ *Algemeen Dagblad*, 13 June 1981; *Athen News*, 9 April 1985; SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 44. Italy had convicted Reidel for fraud (Foreign Affairs, Code 4, 1985-1990, 40 {Netherlands - South Africa. Cooperation police authorities concerning the VLCC Salem, Part II, 1985-1988} File 44. For more see: Foreign Affairs, Code 4, 1985-1994, 40 {South Africa, Police, 1986-1987}, File 50).

⁴¹ Foreign Affairs, Code 4, 1975-1984, 40 (Netherlands - South Africa. Cooperation police authorities concerning the VLCC Salem, 1981-1984), File 687. Nevertheless, the South African embassy was interested in criminal investigations against activists who had done damage to the office and the library of the Nederlands-Zuidafrikaanse Vereniging at Amsterdam, in January 1984 (Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1975-1984, 912.1, File 5585, memo African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, no. 303/84, 19 November 1984).

‘many of the measures taken are so poignant bureaucratic, as well as often the answers given on the daily press briefings by the Department for Information [GdV: = Inligting], that one wonders if a determined central policy is being pursued, or if everybody tries – on his own authority – to act according his masters voice.’⁴²

While these effects were caused by more than just the work of the Bureau, its publications and lobbying activities were occasionally useful in applying pressure directly on oil exporting countries to stop exporting oil to South Africa. With the cooperation of the Commonwealth and media (*the Observer*), the SRB succeeded into cutting off the oil flow from Brunei.⁴³ In addition to influencing countries, the Bureau also influenced companies involved. The Dutch-Swiss company Vitol, for example, stopped delivering oil after publicity by the Bureau.⁴⁴ The SRB described this effect as the ‘hassle factor,’ caused by negative publicity.

The Bureau helped to keep the issue of the oil embargo alive within UN circles. Woldendorp wondered whether the UN IGG would have been established, if the SRB had not been created.⁴⁵ Amer Salih Araim, the former secretary of the UN IGG, wrote:

While the oil embargo against South Africa was initiated by governments and supported by the United Nations, it could not have gained such attention internationally without the persistent efforts of anti-apartheid groups, particularly the Shipping Research Bureau.⁴⁶

This quote leads us to the next section, the diplomatic activities caused by the SRB.

Diplomatic activities

Actions of Foreign Affairs, during the early 1980’s, illustrate the kind of activities that SRB-publications could give rise to. It began with a curious message in August 1980. The Dutch UN permanent representative somehow got hold of a telegram, dated 17 July 1980, that had been sent by Bosgra (HCSA) to E.S. Reddy, director of the UN Center against Apartheid. It is unclear, how the permanent representative obtained this telegram, but he sent the full text of Bosgra’s telegram in a confidential coded message to Foreign Affairs.⁴⁷

In December 1980, the SRB was preparing both its survey on the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles and its first main report. It checked data not only in

⁴² Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1994, 613.211.45, File 1561, confidential message consulate Cape Town to Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1986, 2.

⁴³ Woldendorp, “The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991,” 24 January 1991, 4-6, 10.

⁴⁴ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 195.

⁴⁵ Woldendorp, “The Shipping Research Bureau and the Oil Embargo against South Africa 1985 - 1991,” 24 January 1991, 4-6, 10. For more on the UN IGG, see 8.3.

⁴⁶ Araim, “The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa,” *Embargo*, 1995, 238 (and 234). Amer Araim was Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs at the UN. From 1986-1993, he was the secretary of the UN IGG.

⁴⁷ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5928, New York, no. 15993, confidential, 7/8 August 1980.

the Netherlands, but also in Curaçao. Before it was published, the *Dutch* government, checked and double-checked the data it had received as confidential preliminary findings. There were several reasons to do so. First, the Dutch political atmosphere was extremely strained on the issue of oil deliveries. The government wanted to know exactly what was going on. Second, Foreign Affairs had already received, in 1979, signals that oil deliveries might take place from the Netherlands Antilles. In March 1979, the ministry obtained a confidential message from its embassy in Lima, Peru. The oil company Petro-Peru began to offer its oil under the condition, it would not be delivered to South Africa. Thus, the ambassador wrote, South Africa is, for its South American oil and oil products, now dependent on Ecuador and Venezuela (and Curaçao).⁴⁸ Third, in December 1980, the UN Special Committee against Apartheid sent confidential advance copies of the first main SRB-report to the Dutch government and asked them to 'study and investigate the information in the attached report,' and to advise the Committee 'urgently of the results of the investigation.'⁴⁹ The Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN passed the letter onto Foreign Affairs.⁵⁰

When the information arrived at Foreign Affairs, the ministry produced, during the Christmas vacation, internal memos concerning the advance copies.⁵¹ The first internal reaction was that the data in general did not show anything that the ministry did not already know, or expect.⁵² Nevertheless, Dutch Foreign Affairs discussed the possibility of sending an 'advance warning to Willemstad,' given its leading position among countries from which tankers sailed to South Africa.⁵³ Furthermore, in an internal memo the International Organizations Department advised to contact the Netherlands Antilles in case of oil sanctions, 'as the Netherlands Antilles play an important role in that transport.' In this memo, a Dutch official questioned the position the Netherlands Antilles took concerning its

⁴⁸ The main oil refinery of the Netherlands Antilles was at Curaçao. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5927, confidential message embassy Lima to Foreign Affairs, reference 8683, 29 March 1979. Later, the Dutch embassy at Caracas told Foreign Affairs, this country kept itself strict to the OPEC-embargo. (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, telex by embassy Caracas to Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1982).

⁴⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, letter B. Akporode Clark, Chairman Special Committee against Apartheid, to Dutch Permanent Representative UN, Reference PO 230-SOAF (2-2-1), 15 December 1980.

⁵⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Permanent Representative UN, 19 December 1980. Through all the years, Foreign Affairs – and not the Permanent Representative – was the first to answer the SRB. See, for example, Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1985-1994, File 846, confidential message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, no. 6237/1389, 12 April 1988; followed by confidential message Minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, 26 April 1988; in turn finally followed by: SRB-archive; letter H. Wagenmakers, Head of the UN Political Affairs Department, to Jaap Woldendorp, Director SRB, no. DIO/149.663, 26 April 1988.

⁵¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, memo International Organizations Department, no. 257/80, 29 December 1980 (2 pages); and confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 68/80, 30 December 1980 (3 pages).

⁵² Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, memo International Organizations Department, no. 257/80, 29 December 1980.

⁵³ Page 23 of the SRB report. Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential memo International Organizations Department, no. 68/80, 30 December 1980, 1.

involvement. This official had its doubts as a result of the talks between Foreign Affairs and Shell.⁵⁴

In January 1981, the first public uproar took place in the Netherlands. SRB's allegation, in its (preliminary) findings, that oil shipments took place from the Netherlands Antilles to South Africa triggered intense consultation activities – between the Netherlands Antilles, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry Transport and Public Works, and Shell. The aim of these activities was to determine a public response that would be presented to the UN.⁵⁵ Foreign Affairs considered the fact the whole government needed to 'speak with one tongue.'⁵⁶ Being a touchy subject, the Dutch government felt the need to respond to Ambassador Clark of the UN Special Committee.⁵⁷ The Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN stressed the need of a reply at short notice, as Clark was going to visit a conference of parliamentarians on the oil embargo at Brussels.⁵⁸ In the letter sent to Clark, the Dutch Representative wrote that his government had carefully studied the SRB-report, and while he promised to verify the data, the Dutch could not take measures against companies delivering oil, for there was no mandatory oil-embargo or a voluntary effective embargo imposed by a sufficient number of relevant countries.⁵⁹ Foreign Affairs had verified, checked and rechecked the data on several occasions.

On 6 January 1981, news reached Foreign Affairs that the Dutch press agency ANP had made public the denial from the Netherlands Antilles that they had a substantial role in transporting oil to South Africa. A press release from the Netherlands Antilles, based on a reaction to the then still unpublished SRB-data, caused this media attention. This surprised the SRB (7.2.5 'In time and relevance') and the Dutch Foreign Affairs. In the press release, the Netherlands Antilles admitted two of the shipments, named in the SRB advance papers, but denied the other eight. Foreign Affairs urgently asked the Netherlands Antilles whether this media report was correct.⁶⁰ This time, the acting governor replied

⁵⁴ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 235/31, 22 October 1981. See also 7.2.3 'Correct and accurate.'

⁵⁵ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Minister of Foreign Affairs to governor and prime minister in Willemstad (Netherlands Antilles), embassy South Africa, and Permanent Representative UN, 13 January 1981; and memo International Organizations Department to Minister, International Organizations Department, African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, Director-General Political Affairs, Director-General International Cooperation, and Secretary-General, no. 16/81, 15 January 1981.

⁵⁶ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, memo International Organizations Department, no. 15/81, 14 January 1981.

⁵⁷ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, 14 January 1981.

⁵⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Permanent Representative UN, 21 January 1981. See also: Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Minister to Permanent Representative UN (and ten embassies), 21 January 1981.

⁵⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, memo Permanent Representative UN to Akporode Clark, chairman Special Committee against Apartheid, no. 521, 22 January 1981.

⁶⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to governor and prime minister at Willemstad, 13 January 1981; telex minister of Foreign Affairs to governor and prime minister at Willemstad, 14 January 1981.

that one ship with supplies went to South Africa while the others only bunkered or left for another destination.⁶¹ Foreign Affairs checked the statements of the Netherlands Antilles with representatives of Shell, when data concerned them. Shell did *not* subscribe to the statement of the Netherlands Antilles. Consequently, Foreign Affairs left the denials of the Antilles as the view of Willemstad (7.2.3 'Correct and accurate'). Meanwhile, at a press conference on 13 January 1981, the SRB released the report titled *Oil Supplies to South Africa: The Role of Tankers Connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles*.⁶²

On 22 January 1981, soon after the publication of the survey, the government stated that while there was no legal basis for an oil embargo, it would still verify the data contained in the Shipping Research Bureau's report.⁶³ Foreign Affairs discussed how to respond further. In February 1981, in a confidential internal memo, the International Organizations Department advised temporarily not to comment on an indirect Dutch involvement, for even that 'would add fuel to the fire of the supporters of unilateral Dutch sanctions.'⁶⁴ The SRB-survey concerning the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles was primarily aimed at serving the direct political or publicity goal of applying pressure on the Dutch government.

Shortly afterwards, the SRB published its first main report on 11 March 1981, and handed a copy to Akporode Clark of the UN. The Dutch government had already agreed to verify the data. Again, Foreign Affairs wanted to be in control of the exact answers given by the administration to third parties. The ministry also asked the Permanent Representative to the UN for the text of the letter that he had sent to Clark of the Special Committee.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, Ambassador Clark sent a letter to Groenendijk, chairman of Kairos and the SRB. In return, the Dutch Representative to the UN reported this contact between Groenendijk and Clark to Foreign Affairs.⁶⁶ Two months later, the SRB-report was praised at a conference on sanctions against South Africa. The UN and OAU organized this conference, held in Paris, 20-27 May 1981. One hundred and twenty four countries participated, including the Netherlands. At this conference, the focus of criticism was not on the Netherlands, but on the Nordic countries.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 987, confidential message Acting Governor to minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 January 1981.

⁶² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 66.

⁶³ Press communiqué HCSA, 11 March 1981.

⁶⁴ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, confidential memo International Organizations Department, 3 February 1981, no. 29/81, 2.

⁶⁵ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, telex 660443 Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN; and telex 665369 Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 11 March 1981.

⁶⁶ The Permanent Representative quoted in full the letter of Clark to Groenendijk. Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 988, telex 665429 Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1981.

⁶⁷ The Dutch ambassador in Paris advised Foreign Affairs to get in touch with Norway in anticipation of the next conference on a possible oil embargo. He expected this conference to be held in the beginning of 1982. Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990. File 847; confidential message embassy Paris, reference 12789, 29 May 1981. See also the report on the

Later that year, the International Organizations Department reminded its minister that Foreign Affairs had only written to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid that the government would verify its accuracy ‘*without* promising to publish the results of this investigation.’⁶⁸ Foreign Affairs discussed its position internally. The International Organizations Department advised to say that the government was of the opinion that the report was generally correct. In turn, the Transport Adviser suggested that the reaction to the report provided important data that could be verified. Foreign Affairs still hesitated to respond. While no reaction could be interpreted that something was wrong, still the government was responsible to parliament and not to pressure groups.⁶⁹ Then, in September 1981, the ministry internally categorized the first main SRB-report as ‘generally reliable,’ and officials used the data for internal discussions.⁷⁰ After almost a year, the minister wrote in a public reaction that the SRB-report supplied interesting data, which needed to be evaluated more closely.⁷¹ Finally, in July 1982, the government publicly said it held the opinion that the data of the SRB was, in general terms, a reliable picture of the oil shipments to South Africa.⁷²

In 1982, Foreign Affairs assumed a defensive attitude. The SRB published its second main report in June 1982. Before this publication, the (new) chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, A.Y. Maitama-Sule, submitted a memorandum prepared by the Bureau to the Dutch government.⁷³ As the Dutch political situation was still sensitive and many shipments from the Netherlands Antilles were named, the minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Member of the Council of Ministers of the Realm for the Netherlands Antilles on 27 January 1982. The minister wrote, that he did not want to respond to the preliminary findings, but did ask the Member of Council of Ministers for a verification of the facts, and wanted to be informed on the outcome. Furthermore, the minister stressed the urgency of his request, which he made on 23 October 1981 to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles, to join a

International Conference On Sanctions Against South Africa, Unesco House, Paris 20-27 May 1981, Report of Technical Commission (26 May 1981) PA-81-125, 9-17. The criticism on Norway was a result of a special SRB-publication on Norway of December 1980.

⁶⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, marginal notes by International Organizations Department, in memo Economic Cooperation Department, no. 213/81, 23 October 1981, 3.

⁶⁹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, marginal notes by International Organizations Department, and Transport Adviser in memo Economic Cooperation Department, no. 213/81, 23 October 1981.

⁷⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 29/81, 8 September 1981.

⁷¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo Minister to International Organizations Department, Secretary-General, and Director-General International Cooperation, 16 November 1981. See a similar reaction in the letter to the HCSA and Kairos: NiZA-archive; letter by the Minister/International Organizations Department, Political Affairs Section, to Jan de Jong, HCSA/Kairos, DIO/PZ-348085, 15 December 1981.

⁷² Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, marginal note International Organizations Department in letter Minister of Foreign Affairs/International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982.

⁷³ In later years, the SRB itself would directly send its ‘Summary Data Sheets’ to UN ambassadors. The UN received copies simultaneously, to be able to take action. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 71.

possible future Dutch, oil embargo.⁷⁴ The next day, after contacting the HCSA, Foreign Affairs discovered that not only were the Netherlands Antilles involved in shipments, but also the Netherlands itself. This information had not arrived from New York and the minister of Foreign Affairs, Max van der Stoel, immediately contacted the Permanent Representative to the UN to obtain this information.⁷⁵ Again, Foreign Affairs wanted to coordinate the answers to be given in respect to the letter of the UN Center against Apartheid. Of special interest is an extract of the standard answer, sent to the Permanent Representative to the UN and the Prime Minister at Willemstad (Netherlands Antilles). This answer was based on verification of the data. In this standard answer, there is a ring of uneasiness on the use of the UN by the SRB as a channel for the verification of its data (quote in verbatim text):

‘regarding possible oil deliveries in the past which are the subject of the data presented to the special committee against apartheid by the shipping research bureau, the position of the netherlands government is that, until very recently there have been no legal or other measures in the netherlands aimed at the curtailment of oil deliveries to south africa. it goes without saying that this implies that there was no government agency that monitored or controlled the movement of oil tankers to south africa so that accurate verification of the data of the shipping research bureau by the netherlands government cannot be guaranteed. for that reason the government prefers to abstain from commenting on the accuracy of these data.

furthermore, it would appear to the government that the shipping research bureau, being established in the netherlands, could perfectly well communicate with the government directly rather than through the special committee.’⁷⁶

Actually, the Netherlands was interested in an accurate verification. This verification also led to the belief at Foreign Affairs, that the data presented by the SRB was generally accurate.⁷⁷ The accuracy of the already checked data and the actual Dutch involvement in oil deliveries probably contributed to the *public* statement that an ‘accurate verification’ ‘cannot be guaranteed’ and ‘for that reason the government prefers to abstain from commenting on the accuracy of this data.’

At the same time, Foreign Affairs was also curious to learn about the lobbying activities of the SRB and the HCSA in parliament. On at least one occasion, Foreign Affairs had surreptitiously obtained information that these organizations wanted to address an open letter to parliament about the Dutch

⁷⁴ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, letter minister of Foreign Affairs/International Organizations Department to the Member of the Council of Ministers of the Realm for the Netherlands Antilles, no.: DIO/XX-2293, 27 January 1982, 2.

⁷⁵ The information on the Netherlands Antilles already reached Foreign Affairs on 29 December 1981. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs/International Organizations Department to Permanent Representative UN, reference 1390, 28 January 1982. See also the answer the next day: Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, confidential message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 29 January 1982.

⁷⁶ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN and Prime Minister at Willemstad, 19 February 1982. At 23 February 1982, the Permanent Representative to the UN sent this standard answer the Director UN Center against Apartheid.

⁷⁷ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department to International Organizations Department and Director-General, International Cooperation, no. 29/81, 8 September 1981.

involvement in oil deliveries to South Africa. Knowing this, Foreign Affairs prepared itself through memos stating that while there was an involvement, it was not a *big* involvement as the Bureau said.⁷⁸ This defensive attitude remained also in 1983, by the ministry then writing that it could not verify the data accurately.⁷⁹

In 1984, the third SRB-report, unlike the first two, did not trigger off so many diplomatic consultations or verifications in the Netherlands. The Bureau sent the first of a series of topical surveys – on oil deliveries made by a Norwegian shipping company – to UN representatives of all member states. In this letter, which was also sent to the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN, the Bureau included a standard clause, saying ‘we are well aware of the determination of your Government to tighten the oil embargo against South Africa.’⁸⁰

Later reports did not have the impact on Foreign Affairs, as the first two had. In 1985, the SRB asked the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN to verify possible Dutch involvement in nine oil deliveries.⁸¹ Foreign Affairs simply answered that the SRB oil shipments to South Africa were not illegal, and therefore they did not verify the data.⁸² In 1988, the SRB asked the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN for information on the possible involvement of the Dutch enterprise Transworld Oil (Deuss) in an oil delivery. The Permanent Representative passed it, as always, to Foreign Affairs. As before, the ministry did not give information, because it was not part of the Dutch oil sanctions, but wondered, internally, ‘we must have had such letters before. Don’t we have any standard answer to the same effect?’⁸³ In those years, in the Netherlands, oil deliveries were no longer a very touchy subject. The anti apartheid movement had lost momentum in parliament and the Dutch involvement had decreased in the second half of the eighties.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, memo International Organizations Department, no. 11/82, 5 February 1982; and memo International Organizations Department, 8 February 1982. For more on the degree of involvement, see: 7.2.3 ‘A large involvement?’

⁷⁹ SRB-archive, letter International Organizations Department to SRB, DIO/PZ-276940, 14 October 1983.

⁸⁰ Letter SRB to Permanent Representatives UN, 28 November 1984.

⁸¹ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1994, 613.211.45, File 1559, open message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1985.

⁸² SRB-archive; letter Head of the UN Political Affairs Department to SRB, no. DPV/PZ-175.548, 18 June 1985.

⁸³ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1985-1994, File 846, marginal notes on open message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 12 April 1988. The SRB was not the only one to receive formal answers. The UN IGG also received answers to the same effect, if it got an answer at all (Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1985-1994, File 846, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, reference no. 9263, 23 July 1987).

⁸⁴ Finally, the emphasis on oil transports changed from Europe (Norway) to Hong Kong. See biannual reports and Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1557, open message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 14 April 1989.

Direct contact

The SRB and Foreign Affairs were also in touch with each other in a more regular way. Not every lobby group received answers from Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs used criteria to assess whether to respond or not to groups actively involved in anti-apartheid issues. First, a response should not be an open letter. In the letter it should also explicitly be written that a response would be highly appreciated. Second, the organization in question was a political factor. For example, the ministry saw the biggest union FNV⁸⁵ as a political factor, concerning the anti apartheid struggle. Third, Foreign Affairs took into account the amount of publicity that they had already given to a certain issue.⁸⁶

As the SRB was a political factor – through the UN and its lobby in Dutch parliament – Foreign Affairs answered its letters. A letter from the SRB even could trigger a meeting of different ministries. This happened, for example, after a letter on alleged oil deliveries from the harbor of Rotterdam. It resulted in a meeting between the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In an internal memo, Foreign Affairs wrote that they highly appreciated the presence of those invited.⁸⁷

Besides letters, the SRB could also meet in person. Foreign Affairs had several meetings with members of the board of the SRB.⁸⁸

Consequences of biased and veiled reporting 1981-1984

According to the Bureau, the biased and veiled reporting in the second and third main report did no permanent damage.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, there was more to this issue than just the credibility as the SRB thought. It also had effects at a diplomatic level.

⁸⁵ FNV: Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging – it is the largest Dutch Union.

⁸⁶ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 852, memo International Organizations Department, no. 125/81, 22 May 1981.

⁸⁷ The meeting took place on 29 June 1983. Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, International Organizations Department, no. 103/83, 27 June 1983.

⁸⁸ January 1982: Foreign Affairs prepared themselves on this meeting through some urgent memos (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, memo ('urgent') African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, no. 14/82, 26 January 1982; and Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, 1975-1984, 921.30, File 639, memo ('urgent') International Organizations Department, no. 6/82, 27 January 1982. See also: NiZA-archive; letters HCSA to Foreign Affairs, 18 December 1981 and 22 January 1982. Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, 1975-1984, 921.30, File 639, memo Van der Stoel to Secretary General, no. 6/82, 4 February 1982); May 1982 (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, report African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department of meeting of 25 May 1982, made on 26 May 1982. NiZA-archive; letter HCSA/Kairos by Peter Sluiter to Foreign Affairs, 22 April 1982. See also: NiZA-archive; letter African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, Central and Southern Africa Section to HCSA, Peter Sluiter, no. DAM/CZ-138362, 19 May 1982; and Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5930, memo Parliamentary Contacts Official to Minister, no. 21, 31 March 1982). or, August 1988 (SRB-archive; letter Jaap Woldendorp, SRB, to R.H. Cohen, African and Middle Eastern Affairs Department, Southern Africa Section, 8 August 1988).

⁸⁹ Minutes of the discussion of 29 January 1991 on "JJW's Personal Note over Zes Jaar SRB," Richard Hengeveld 30 January 1991, 1.

Dutch Foreign Affairs was aware of the pressure that was applied on the SRB by the ANC and OAPEC-countries. The ministry knew how the bias of deleting individual names of these countries, had crept into the SRB-reports. Already in July 1982, the International Organizations Department wrote ‘it has heard from the UN Center against Apartheid, that the Arab countries have insisted on the removal of this data.’⁹⁰ At the same time, Foreign Affairs wrote to the Dutch parliament that this way of reporting had led to a bias of applying pressure on oil transporting countries. Foreign Affairs argued that this bias was not necessary, because in its preliminary findings the SRB named Arab countries and harbors.⁹¹ Also to its UN-representative, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that Arab countries left ‘the multinational, carriers, insurers, etc., to carry the can.’⁹² The Dutch minister wanted the focus to be shifted onto the countries that joined the oil embargo. He wrote that it was the other way round that they passed on the responsibility of the OPEC-embargo to the carriers. This was ‘businesslike incorrect and politically undesired.’ According to the minister, a solution to the possible transport problem lay in the first place in the hands of the producers. ‘The only thing the producers – and anyway after having put their affairs in order in the first place – could ask the carriers was not to undermine their embargo measures willfully.’⁹³

As a result of this diplomatic game – and other considerations – the Dutch, at the UN, wanted a low key approach, both towards a conference on oil supplies to South Africa, and towards the co-sponsorship of UN-resolutions.⁹⁴ It did not want to join conferences and committees anymore. To its parliament, however, it wrote that the Netherlands had not been invited to join the UN expert group

⁹⁰ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, marginal note of International Organizations Department in (the draft version of) the letter Minister of Foreign Affairs/ International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982.

In a confidential memo from Foreign Affairs to its Permanent Representative to the UN, the ministry made a direct link between on the one hand leaving the oil transporting countries carrying the can and the activities of OPEC-countries at the UN group of expert that discussed “the effective implementation of the embargoes imposed by oil-producing and oil-exporting countries”, and, on the other hand, leaving out the names of oil exporting countries from the Middle East in the SRB-report. Reddy, head of the UN Center against Apartheid, had informed Foreign Affairs on this issue (Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, 10 November 1982). The Dutch Permanent Representative saw the same Reddy as the one who politicized the meetings of this group of experts (Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, confidential message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 17/18 February 1983. This group of experts was the predecessor of the UN IGG).

⁹¹ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 907, letter minister of Foreign Affairs/ International Organizations Department to Dutch parliament, no. DIO/XX 199171, 29 July 1982.

⁹² Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, 10 November 1982.

⁹³ Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, 10 November 1982. See also: Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, appendix of memo International Organizations Department to Director-General Political Affairs, International Organizations Department, and Director-General International Cooperation, no. 164/82, 29 November 1982.

⁹⁴ Foreign Affairs, Central Mail and Filing Division/Secret Files, 1975-1984, 613.211.4, File 670, secret message minister/International Organizations Department to Permanent Representative UN, no. 415945, 11 October 1982.

studying an oil embargo.⁹⁵ The Netherlands was not the only country complaining. Norway also had a problem with leaving the oil transporters to carry the can. Still, Norway was willing to join an international conference on the oil embargo, but only if it was clear beforehand this would not end up in “empty resolutions and statements.”⁹⁶

The diplomatic game continued throughout the eighties. When in later years statements were made in UN-documents such as ‘while oil-exporting States have committed themselves to an oil embargo against South Africa, very few major shipping States have done so,’ an official of Foreign Affairs wrote in the margin ‘passing the blame. Nevertheless, if the producers do not export to S.A., carriers do not have anything to transport.’⁹⁷

The change in 1985 by the SRB on the policy of reporting also led to positive reactions. From this time on, no more criticism of biased or veiled reporting by the SRB can be traced at Dutch Foreign Affairs. Also, for example, the opinion of the Israeli UN-delegation of the Bureau improved as soon as the SRB – the now ‘highly reputable, non-political’ ‘independent agency’ – mentioned the names of the oil exporting countries from the Middle East in its reports.⁹⁸

8.3 SIMILAR REPORTS BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

What was the quality of reports written by others? The Bureau was not the only one to produce reports on oil and South Africa. In this section, reports by others – that had also relevance within the Dutch context – are investigated, but only from a limited perspective. Attention is only paid to differences in quality compared to the SRB-reports.

This may lead to additional insight in the quality of the SRB-publications, and to factors that influence the quality of reports (12.2). This involves a cross-case analysis.

This section is explicitly *not* aimed at an assessment of the quality of these other reports. This is outside the scope of this research and, furthermore, would be more relevant to chapter 7. The reports that are discussed include – a report

⁹⁵ *Lower House*, session 1984-1985, 17895, no. 21, 17 June 1985, 7. For the atmosphere in this group of UN-experts, see footnote in: 8.3.

⁹⁶ Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 613.211.45, File 5931, confidential message embassy Norway, reference 14325, 29 June 1982.

⁹⁷ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, 1983-1990, File 837, fax Permanent Representative UN, 22 November 1988, 1620, 4 and marginal notes.

⁹⁸ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 104. Original source: Meir Joffe, Statement in the Fourth Committee, New York, 1 October 1986; and Statement by Benjamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly, 6 November 1986, issued by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, Jerusalem. Before 1985, Israel cross-checked the veiled SRB-data with Lloyd’s Voyage Record. The Israeli Permanent Representative at that time was Benjamin Netanyahu, later prime minister of Israel. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 103-104. During the Gulf war of the 1990’s, Israel had its own sophisticated system to monitor ship movements. This turned out to be a help for the allied blockade of Iraq (De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 383).

by the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, publications by the UN, and an analysis by the Dutch embassy in South Africa.

Report of the Erasmus University at Rotterdam

At the end of 1984, the municipality of Rotterdam commissioned a complementary research. It asked the Erasmus University of Rotterdam – together with the SRB – to investigate the trade links between Rotterdam and South Africa (6.3.3 ‘Rotterdam survey’). The municipality asked the Department of International Economic Relations of the Erasmus University to investigate the effects on Dutch employment, if oil shipments to South Africa were stopped. In its report, the Erasmus University focused on three scenarios: 1) a one sided oil embargo against South Africa; 2) a stop of all exports; and 3) retaliation by South Africa.⁹⁹ According to the report, the one sided oil embargo had minor consequences.¹⁰⁰

This study included a contact between the university and the SRB. The Bureau described early consultation between itself and the Erasmus University as indispensable.¹⁰¹ For its econometric calculations, the university needed the SRB-data on oil shipments. As the Bureau was still working on it in April 1985, it could only supply the university with temporary findings. In its letter of 4 April the SRB explicitly wrote that the data was provisional and could only be used internally as an indication.¹⁰² On 18 June 1985, the Bureau submitted to the university the final data. According to the SRB, this was weeks before the completion of the report by the university, which had said it hoped to finish the report in the first week of July. During the next contact, on 8 July 1985, the researchers from the university said – again, according to the SRB – that the report would be typed next weekend, and the definitive figures of the SRB would be used.¹⁰³ As this data was crucial for the university’s calculations, an overview follows.

⁹⁹ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 9. Dell, Viaene & De Vries, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, preface and 1-2.

¹⁰⁰ In internal memos Foreign Affairs was of the opinion, that the bias was too much on the econometric effects, and the university hardly argued political effects, as the reputation of Rotterdam as a free port (Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1990, 553.12, File 467, confidential memo of official of Transport Adviser to the Transport Adviser, no. 240/85, 9 October 1985, 3 pages. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1550, memo official of Transport Adviser, no. 251/85, 17 October 1985). As such, this criticism is correct, but does have a scientist on econometric calculations to describe political effects? Furthermore, the university mentioned on page 28 the effect of the reputation of Rotterdam – a political effect.

¹⁰¹ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 55.

¹⁰² Letter SRB to Mike Dell, Erasmus University, 4 April 1985 (Compare: Report of visit of Jan de Jong & Richard Hengeveld to Erasmus University Rotterdam, 12 March 1985, 2). SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 23.

¹⁰³ SRB-note on contact by telephone with Mike Dell, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 18 June 1985. SRB-note on contact by telephone with Mike Dell, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 8 July 1985. Handwritten notes attached to memo: SRB, “Enige kanttekeningen bij de notitie over olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika t.b.v. de openbare vergadering van de Cie. H&EO d.d. 16-10-1985 (agendapunt 15),” Amsterdam, 14 October 1985.

Table 8.2 SRB-data submitted to Erasmus University¹⁰⁴

Data \ Year	4 April 1985: provisional data	18 June 1985: final data
1982	quite sure: 750,000 tons maximum extra: 250,000 tons	final data: 545,000 tons (the SRB expected this final figure to be lower than the provisional data, due to its method of reducing the number of cases to be investigated)
1983	quite sure: 215,000 tons maximum extra: 735,000 tons	final data: 80,000 tons
1984	quite sure: 0 tons maximum extra: 2-800,000 tons (the SRB expected it to stay on 0 tons)	final data: 0 tons

You would expect the university to take into account the most recent year for its calculations: 1984. In this year 0 tons were shipped. However, the university chose SRB's *provisional* data from 1982. The university calculated this figure by simply counting up both figures (quite sure and maximum extra).¹⁰⁵ The university also did not estimate the probability of the provisional data. As the SRB-method was to reduce the number of suspected cases, the tonnage could be – and actually was – remarkably lower.

The entire Erasmus-report is a mixture of provisional and final data, and also of different years taken as a starting point. In chapter one, the university took 1984 as a starting point to describe trade and employment, but it did not work with the 1984-data for its calculations on an oil embargo. The university did not only choose 1984 as an example of a 'good overview of our trade with South Africa,' it also stated that in this year no crude oil was exported.¹⁰⁶ This means, that the university began with quoting the *final* 1984-data in its report. However, at the very moment the university began its calculations, it suddenly referred to *provisional* data of *another* year.¹⁰⁷ Further in the report, the university even made the assumption that ten oil tankers transported a total of one million ton crude oil a year.¹⁰⁸ Even, according to the SRB-data of 1982, four tankers supplied South Africa with oil, not ten.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, the university presented the loss of man-years, calculated on this assumption – which was disputable, because it was already too high – as a *minimum* estimate.¹¹⁰ Finally, the

¹⁰⁴ Letter SRB to Mike Dell, Erasmus University, 4 April 1985. SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 20. Handwritten notes attached to memo: SRB, "Enige kanttekeningen bij de notitie over olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika t.b.v. de openbare vergadering van de Cie. H&EO d.d. 16-10-1985," 14 October 1985.

¹⁰⁵ Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 14. See also table 13, page 29.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 3. See also the table on page 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 14. See also table 13, page 29.

¹⁰⁹ SRB, *Olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 20.

¹¹⁰ Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 14 (see also table 13, page 29). The Bureau criticized the university at a public meeting of the municipality of Rotterdam of 16 October 1985. According to the SRB, the one million tons was not a relevant

university did not present an overview of the SRB-data, or referred to the trend of diminishing numbers of transports. On the other hand, however, the university did give this kind of data and information about trends for both the overall employment,¹¹¹ and for the employment and income from the transfer of crude oil.¹¹²

In the introduction of its report, the university wrote that some of the data of the SRB was provisional.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the university showed that it knew the definite figures (page 3 and 4 of the report). The choices made are unsatisfactory. Compared with the Erasmus university report, the SRB did not juggle with data. A reason for this difference between the university and the SRB is difficult to provide (see: 12.2).

United Nations, the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa (UN IGG)

In 1986, oil exporting and oil shipping countries agreed to establish an intergovernmental group to monitor oil shipments and the embargo against South Africa. Through the General Assembly resolution 41/35F of 10 November 1986, the UN established the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa (UN IGG).¹¹⁴ The UN IGG did research in the same field as the SRB.

The aims of the UN IGG were twofold. First, the UN IGG monitored the oil supply to South Africa and published annual reports.¹¹⁵ Second, it encouraged and assisted governments to enact legislation and comparable measures to impose an oil embargo on South Africa.¹¹⁶ To monitor the oil supply, the SRB

scenario (Handwritten notes attached to memo, and memo itself: SRB, "Enige kanttekeningen bij de notitie over olieleveranties aan Zuid-Afrika t.b.v. de openbare vergadering van de Cie. H&EO d.d. 16-10-1985," 14 October 1985). Still, all parties judged the effects on employment as a result of an oil embargo as limited. Foreign Affairs joined the conclusions of the Erasmus-report (Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 17 and 28. Foreign Affairs, Documentary Information Systems Service - Cabinet, 1985-1990, 553.12, File 467, confidential memo of official of Transport Adviser, no. 240/85, 9 October 1985; Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 613.211.45, File 1550, memo official of Transport Adviser, no. 251/85, 17 October 1985. Compare also: Municipality of Rotterdam, "Agenda voor de openbare vergadering van de Commissie voor de Haven en Economische Ontwikkeling op woensdag 16 oktober 1985," no. H.B. 82/686, 5).

¹¹¹ For the year 1981 and 1984. Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 10. This is worked out in table 6 on page 11.

¹¹² For these last issue, the figures for the years 1979-1983 were given. Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 12. This is worked out in table 7 on page 13.

¹¹³ Dell a/o, *Werkgelegenheidsaspecten van een Olieboycot tegen Zuid-Afrika*, 1985, 2.

¹¹⁴ 126 Countries supported this resolution. There were 5 countries against and 15 abstentions, among them the Netherlands. Norway was an initiator of this resolution. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 6, January 1987, 12.

¹¹⁵ The early monitoring reports appeared on November 1987, November 1988, and November 1989. In 1990, there was extra reporting. On 12 June 1990, the UN IGG presented an interim report. On 6 August 1990, it produced a report on a model law for an oil embargo (released on April 1991). In November 1991, there was a report on a hearing on the oil embargo, held of 15 August 1991. The UN IGG presented the fifth annual report in September 1991.

¹¹⁶ Aram, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 238-239.

was the most important source of information.¹¹⁷ In fact, for a longer period the UN IGG was almost completely dependent on the input of data by the SRB,¹¹⁸ in particular for the complete sets of preliminary findings.¹¹⁹ Besides supplying data, the Bureau also advised, through extensive memos, the UN IGG on how to improve the quality of its work.¹²⁰

In 1988-1989, the UN IGG wanted to establish an independent database. The goals were to verify the SRB-information and to expand the research to all ships capable of carrying oil.¹²¹ Like the Bureau, the UN IGG reached the conclusion that Lloyd's had to be the main source of reliable information to carry out such an investigation: 'The company in question is the sole provider of a unique service. Such data is not available from any other original source [...] There is [...] no alternative to buying it from Lloyd's.'¹²² After the contract with Lloyd's, the SRB remained an important source for the UN IGG.¹²³

There were some differences between the UN IGG and the Bureau. SRB-investigations did not include the smaller product and chemical tankers.¹²⁴ From a certain moment, the UN IGG wanted to include in its research, calls to South African ports from all vessels with petroleum-carrying capabilities. This encompassed not only crude oil, but also refined petroleum products, petrochemicals, and liquid gas shipped by smaller tankers. The latter had much more irregular trading patterns, such as calling at different harbors, than the more straightforward trading patterns of the large crude oil tankers. The SRB already had more or less abandoned the regular investigation on the more complex trade by smaller tankers, which were also often used for shipping non-petroleum products. These investigations were requested for political reasons by

¹¹⁷ For example, the SRB brought up more than 60 cases for the second report of the UN IGG of November 1988. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 14, January 1989, 1.

¹¹⁸ Richard Hengeveld, "Een paar opmerkingen n.a.v. JJW's Personal Note over Zes Jaar SRB," 29 January 1991, 2.

¹¹⁹ Araim, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 239. And: Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 129.

¹²⁰ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 129.

¹²¹ Araim, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 239.

¹²² UN IGG, internal memo, 3 September 1988, reference: Lloyd's Seadata contract.

The UN IGG wondered if the SRB obtained the expensive Seadata or the more inexpensive Voyage Record and Shipping Index. The Bureau used all. The UN IGG wondered 'It is my suspicion that the SRB, which has never been overly informative about its methods, may be doing just that. If they have unlimited access to volunteer labour it might make sense to do this' (UN IGG, internal memo, 14 September 1988, reference: Lloyd's hard-copy publications).

¹²³ An example of such a lead for the UN IGG was a broadcast by the Norwegian television on 21 April 1989 based on information provided by the SRB. This is reported in an internal memo of the UN IGG (UN IGG, memo from Paul Conlon to Amer Araim, 30 April 1989, reference: recent port calls in South Africa).

In turn, the SRB often referred to the UN IGG, for example in its *Newsletter* (SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 6, January 1987, 12-13; no. 8, July 1987, 8; no. 10, January 1988, 6-7; no. 14, January, 1-6; no. 18, first quarter 1990, 7-8; no. 20, third quarter 1990, 3; no. 21, fourth quarter 1990, 8; no. 22, first quarter 1991, 4; no. 23, second quarter 1991, 10; no. 24, third quarter 1991, 4; no. 25, fourth quarter 1991, 6-7; no. 26, first quarter 1992, 5-6; no. 27, second quarter 1992, 2; no. 29, fourth quarter 1992, 7; no. 30, first quarter 1993, 3 and 8; no. 33, fourth quarter 1993/first quarter 1994, 2, 6).

¹²⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 129.

certain member states that wanted to divert the attention from crude oil shipments towards western-dominated transport of chemicals and related products. They consumed a lot of time, both of the UN IGG's secretariat and of the SRB, which assisted the UN IGG in spite of its experience that such research was not very likely to yield solid outcomes.

Another category of port calls, which took a lot of time to investigate, were duly reported (as opposed to secret) as calls by combined carriers, so-called OBO's that can transport oil as well as dry cargo. The SRB used to investigate these calls, but had learned quickly to discern between calls that were unrelated, and therefore not reported to a government, and those that were possible oil deliveries.¹²⁵

The diplomatic pressure was difficult for the UN IGG, due to the political nature of the organization. For example, when a document was forged, in the opinion of the SRB, the Bureau did not delete the case of a tanker on the mere ground that a country had handed over the document. The UN IGG – although aware of this problem – did not want to put aside such documents, in order to not lose the cooperation of those governments. This led to difficulties, especially when two governments gave conflicting answers on the same case. In 1988, at the presentation of the second report, the UN IGG complained that governments should scrutinize the authenticity of the documents presented, and that they should be more alert to prevent companies forging such documents.¹²⁶

Two illustrations of this problem are presented – on the Berge Enterprise and on the Beatrice. The Berge Enterprise was an ultra large crude oil carrier, owned by the Norwegian Bergesen. On 2 June 1987, the SRB had already handed over detailed information to the UN IGG about the possible oil delivery by this ship.¹²⁷

'This ship delivered a cargo of 300.000 tonnes of crude oil, collected in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to South Africa in April 1987. In 1989 Qatar sent the Group [GdV: UN IGG] a certificate which stated that the cargo had been discharged at Singapore in April 1987. An earlier certificate provided by the Saudi Arabian Government stated that the cargo had at the same time been discharged in Egypt. Despite the fact that the discharge story lacks cohesion and that Bergesen, the Norwegian owner of the ship, confirmed that its ship had delivered oil to South Africa, the case was deleted [GdV: by the UN IGG].'¹²⁸

In its third report, the UN IGG deleted incorrectly the Beatrice on the basis of a false certificate:

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 129. Interview with Hengeveld by the author, 4 July 2000. The UN IGG made extensive lists of, for example, ORE and bulk carriers (UN IGG, un4.igg: lloyd's mardata, 01/18/89 library, u#pbq19721,east,sm). From internal memos, it is shown that the approach of the UN IGG can be inspired by its fear to imitate the SRB too closely (UN IGG, "Memo on general strategy," file date: 1989-02-09, point 6 and 7).

¹²⁶ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 129-130.

¹²⁷ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 8, July 1987, 8.

¹²⁸ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 18, first quarter 1990, 7. The Bureau published this Saudi Arabian document in: SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 14, January 1989, 3; and SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 11. The routing is given in SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1998, Appendix I, Table G, 68-69. The Bureau analyzed this case again in: SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, Appendix I, Table F, 78.

'This ship made an oil delivery to South Africa in May/June 1986. The "sufficient evidence" to delete the case, was based on a certificate of discharge provided by Iran, which stated that the Beatrice had delivered her cargo in Genoa, Italy. However, this certificate shows certain errors. In the first place it is riddled with grammatical mistakes. Secondly the certificate was not even correctly falsified, and thirdly the Beatrice could not possibly have sailed to Genoa in the time mentioned. Again, the ship owner confirmed the delivery to South Africa. Also the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations wrote to the Shipping Research Bureau in August 1989 that according to their information the Beatrice had not discharged any oil in Genoa: "*this could indeed substantiate the conclusion that the documents in question were falsified.*"'¹²⁹

In 1991, the UN IGG reopened 11 cases in which it suspected forged documents were in play, among them the Berge Enterprise and the Beatrice.¹³⁰ The UN IGG saw as its main success that it had ensured the cooperation of many states.¹³¹

In comparison, the Bureau managed to filter out manipulated data and forged documents, contrary to the UN IGG, which was not able to put aside forged documents for diplomatic reasons. The SRB could list such deliveries, because it was not dependent on the diplomatic circuit.¹³² For the same reason, the Bureau could drop time-consuming and non-effective research, such as focusing on OBO's. Besides the problems in the diplomatic sphere, the SRB was of the opinion that 'there was no catching up with the Shipping Research Bureau's lead on investigatory experience.'¹³³

United Nations, the Khalifa-lists

The UN produced other reports on sanctions and South Africa. The so-called Khalifa-lists were listings of companies and people having connections with South Africa. The lists were named after its Egyptian chairman, Ahmad M. Khalifa of the UN Center for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland.¹³⁴ In

¹²⁹ SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 18, first quarter 1990, 7. The Bureau published the forged document in SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 42. It gave the routing in: SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, Appendix I, Table F, 65.

¹³⁰ The UN IGG reopened three other cases because of suspect calls. SRB, *Newsletter*, no. 25, fourth quarter 1991, 6-7. Internally, the UN IGG was already in 1989 aware of having a problem here 'Neglecting to pursue leads generated by the IGG's own recent research efforts will seriously impair the credibility of the IGG in the future' (UN IGG, Memo from Paul Conlon to Amer Araim on "IGG's scope of activities," 5 June 1989, page 4 of 5).

¹³¹ Araim, "The United Nations and the Oil Embargo against South Africa," *Embargo*, 1995, 239.

¹³² Problems with oil research as a result of diplomatic entanglements were endemic within the UN. The UN IGG was preceded by a group of UN-experts. In 1983, this UN-group prepared a report in order to come to an effective oil embargo. The atmosphere within the group got worse. First, there were the already existing differences and confrontations between oil transporting and oil producing countries. The Norwegian delegation, who attended this group of experts, was the opinion the draft of this UN-report did not even meet the standard of a 'schoolboy's paper': it was biased, left the Western countries to carry the can, and was meant to whitewash the OPEC-countries from which countries 90% of all the oil that was supplied to South Africa originated from. Second, also according to the Norwegian delegation, the Kuwait chairperson of the group caused an 'indecorous atmosphere' as a result of its 'despotic chairmanship' (Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.214.9, File 2324, confidential message Permanent Representative UN to Foreign Affairs, 30 September 1983).

¹³³ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 72.

¹³⁴ Besides the Khalifa-list, there was also the Khalifa-report. In practice there was a close link between them, but formally they were not connected. There were updates of the Khalifa-list. Foreign Affairs,

February 1986, the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva wrote 'as known, Khalifa has the discriminating habit to omit certain unpleasant facts on Arab and East-European countries, concerning their commercial trade (oil) with South Africa. These gaps were, accurately documented, and filled in by the Israeli ambassador.'¹³⁵

In October 1986, the discussion was repeated at the UN in New York. This discussion gained in intensity as the Israeli delegation denounced the East-European and Arab commercial interests in South Africa.¹³⁶ The Israeli delegation used SRB-data (8.2) on occasions like these. Despite sharp Arab reactions, the contribution of Israel aroused doubts among some African countries.¹³⁷ The criticism of the 1986-list was not an isolated incident.¹³⁸

Although the Bureau knew a period of veiled reporting, this was a minor incident compared to the practice of the Khalifa-lists. In the case of the Khalifa-lists, unpleasant data over a long period was simply completely omitted.

Dutch Embassy in South Africa/Foreign Affairs

Already in 1977, the Dutch Embassy at Pretoria identified credit and oil as the two vulnerable spots of South Africa. According to the embassy, only the large-scale withdrawal of long-term capital would have a damaging, political effect on South Africa.¹³⁹ This 1977 message turned out to be quite prophetic for the 1985 debt crises; although it was the refusal of *short-term* credit that actually triggered the crisis (6.3.4). The only difference between the analysis by the embassy and the SRB-approach was the assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions.

Also in later years, Foreign Affairs showed that it was capable of making accurate assessments, as it did in the dispute over shipments from the Netherlands Antilles to South Africa (7.2.3).

On 18 June 1986, the Dutch newspaper *de Volkskrant* published that during a press briefing Foreign Affairs had said that Libya had made a contract with South Africa for oil supply. The SRB wanted to know whether the ministry did have information on such contracts. Foreign Affairs responded to the Bureau, by saying that even though it did not have such information, it was an assumption that some oil exporting countries did supply South Africa with oil, while saying,

UN, 1975-1984, 999.232.154, File 1274, memo International Organizations Department, no. 104/79, 6 July 1979.

¹³⁵ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, File 841, November 1984 - May 1986, message Dutch Permanent Representative at Geneva, date 17 February 1986.

¹³⁶ Foreign Affairs, UN Political Affairs Department, File 842, June 1986-August 1987, open message Permanent Representative UN, 10 October 1986.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ For criticism on the 1982-list, for example, see: Foreign Affairs, UN, 1975-1984, 999.232.154, File 2605, confidential message minister of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative UN, reference 15720, 7 October 1982, 1-2.

¹³⁹ Dutch Embassy at Pretoria, South Africa, Secret Archive, 1977-1983, 613.211.451, confidential message embassy Pretoria to Foreign Affairs, 16 August 1977, 1-2.

in public statements, that they joined the embargo. However, the SRB wanted to know on what information Foreign Affairs based their assumption. In its reply, Foreign Affairs wrote that no further information could be provided to the SRB.¹⁴⁰

The then SRB co-director Hengeveld had the impression that Foreign Affairs was talking drivel on Libya. The reason Hengeveld insisted on an answer from Foreign Affairs was that he wanted to have this in black and white, if only to allay the suspicions – leveled at the Bureau – that it was reluctant to follow-up on leads that did not fit into its preconceived views.¹⁴¹ As such, the Libya-statement by Foreign Affairs was not an analysis, but rather empty talk or a slip of the tongue at a press conference. Therefore, it cannot be used to compare it to the quality of the SRB-publications.

8.4 CONCLUSION

In 8.1, it was shown that in successive reports the number of unveiled shipments increased throughout the years. The two largest increases were after the first report, and after 1990 when the Bureau gained access to South African sources.

In the successive report, the SRB found a good balance between the objectives it wanted to report on, and background information. One minor point was that the Bureau did not have a consistent policy on making recommendations in its main reports.

In 8.2, the effect, impact, knowledge use and diffusion of the SRB-publications was explored. The political targets of the Bureau were positive on the quality of SRB-data (Foreign Affairs, Bergesen, and South African official). They – and others – used (internally) SRB information to give their arguments authority, and to underline their views (Foreign Affairs, Pagan International, and Israel). The information potential of the SRB was sometimes overestimated. The Bureau played to an extent – which cannot be accurately estimated – a role in enhancing the costs South Africa had to pay for its oil. Some publications by the SRB were a direct reason for stopping oil deliveries (Brunei, Vitol). The SRB helped to keep the issue of the oil embargo alive at the UN. In the Netherlands, the Bureau was taken seriously and treated in a way similar to a major labor union. Foreign Affairs even had to take a defensive attitude, and the SRB-publications led to diplomatic maneuvering. Activities of the Bureau and its lobby were closely followed and on some occasions this occurred even in a more unorthodox way.

¹⁴⁰ SRB-archive: letter SRB, Richard Hengeveld, to Acting Head UN Political Affairs Department, Political Affairs Section, A.P. Wegerif, 20 June 1986; letter Head of the UN Political Affairs Department, Political Affairs Section, J.Th. Hoekema, to SRB, Richard Hengeveld, no. DPV/PZ-172.705, 2 July 1986; letter SRB, Richard Hengeveld to Head of the UN Political Affairs Department, Political Affairs Section, J.Th. Hoekema, 3 July 1986; and, letter Acting Head UN Political Affairs Department, Political Affairs Section, A.P. Wegerif, to SRB, Richard Hengeveld, no. DPV/PZ-175.548, 28 July 1986.

¹⁴¹ Interviews with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998 and 4 July 2000.

All this complementary evidence points to the accuracy and influence of the Bureau, and is an indication of the high quality of SRB-publications. There is one exception. Omitting the names of individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East in the second and third report led to a low key approach by the Netherlands, both towards a conference on oil supplies to South Africa, and towards the co-sponsorship of UN-resolutions. After this biased and veiled way of reporting was abandoned, the Bureau's reports were praised by countries like Israel, which had been earlier very critical.

When the quality of the SRB-publications is compared to the reports from Erasmus University, the UN IGG, and the Khalifa-lists, the quality of the SRB-publications is higher. They are more accurate on details (in comparison to Erasmus), and there is less bias (in comparison to UN IGG, Khalifa).

Concerning the general analysis, the quality of Dutch Foreign Affairs seems to be at the same level of that of the Bureau. No comparison can be made regarding details, because of the differences in status of the material (Libya, slip of the tongue at press conference).

To compare the results of chapter 7 and 8

The findings of the criteria – chapter 7 – and of the complementary evidence – chapter 8 – show a similar pattern. Overall, the SRB-reports were of a high quality. Also there is a similar pattern in which four different periods can be distinguished.

The first period encompassed the first two surveys and the first main report. They were a test case for the Bureau, especially concerning the accuracy of the data presented. This accuracy was crucial for the authority that the SRB was able to build. The government of the Netherlands Antilles directly cast doubt on facts presented in the survey on the Netherlands Antilles. Nevertheless, Foreign Affairs was aware that the Bureau was right. However, the first publications suffered some teething troubles. Subsequently, in later years, the SRB-staff started saying that the first report was out of print.¹⁴²

In the second period (second and third report), there was sharp criticism, when the SRB omitted in Table A the names of individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East. Despite this these two main reports were generally of good quality. The main problem was the possible implication concerning the SRB's credibility and its diplomatic effects. Nevertheless, the Bureau managed to gain a better insight into the networks of oil traders.

In the third period (fourth and fifth report), the veiled and biased way of reporting was abandoned. Countries like Israel, which had expressed sharp criticism now welcomed SRB-publications. From 1985 onwards, no criticism is traced in the archives of Foreign Affairs. The main reports – and the Rotterdam survey – were now of high quality.

¹⁴² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 60.

In the fourth and last period (sixth and seventh report), the SRB gained access to new South African sources that enhanced the number of ships discovered.

9 The case of the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst)

What is the quality of a security agency report on anti democratic elements within a legal protest movement? This question will be answered in this case study on a report by the BVD – the Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, in English known as the National Security Service.

This second case study comprises three chapters. Chapter 9 introduces the case study. In chapter 10, the BVD-survey is tested against the criteria of chapter 5, to identify the extent to which the survey meets the set demands. In chapter 11, complementary aspects concerning its quality are investigated.

In 9.1, information, about the survey, is presented and which is evaluated in chapters 10 and 11.

In 9.2, an introduction to the BVD, the organization that produced the survey is presented. Information is provided about its structure and aims.

In 9.3, the societal and political context of the issues mentioned in the BVD-survey is explained.

Finally, in 9.4, an explanation is given as to why this BVD-survey was selected as the second case study. Insights are also given in regard to the sources consulted.

9.1 THE INVESTIGATED SURVEY

The particular security agency report that is the object of this case study focused on anti democratic elements within a legal protest movement. It was published in a quarterly survey – the fourth quarterly survey of 1981.

The BVD produced different types of intelligence products. For internal use, it made daily and weekly surveys. For external use, the BVD produced monthly surveys, which in 1978 changed to quarterly surveys.¹ There were also other products, such as reports written for a minister.² Of course, there were also a wide variety of intelligence products – ranging from raw intelligence to final analysis – that were exchanged with sister agencies.

The three main groups of BVD-products included periodical background information, information on phenomena and ad-hoc information to be used for short-term actions.

The main consumers of the BVD-products were ministers, the Lower House (committees), the Public Prosecutor, the police, other public bodies, social

¹ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

² These so-called ‘governmental’ letters were official messages by the agency to the government or a minister. These letters belonged to the most balanced way of reporting by the BVD (interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996 and 7 March 2001).

organizations, and corporate business. The BVD supplied consumers with oral and written information.³

The intelligence product that is central in this case study is a quarterly survey. Surveys were not aimed at a specific policy issue. The aim of the surveys was to provide background information. It was distributed in an edition of 400 to 500 copies. The main consumers were municipal and regional police forces. Other consumers, for example, were the security sections of the Royal Military Police and sister agencies. Within a police force, the mayor, the head of police, and the local intelligence unit could access a survey. Although a quarterly survey was primarily focused on background information, a policy maker – like a mayor – was free to consider this information in policy considerations. Furthermore, these surveys were also a means to indicate to police officers from local intelligence units as to which issues were worth investigating. Although surveys served these different functions, within the BVD they were seen as a routine action. However, they did not have the same status as, for example, a letter to a minister. The BVD produced this periodic background information until 1989.⁴

The surveys were classified as confidential. Generally, the BVD prevented the distribution of (parts of) a quarterly survey. ‘In certain cases [...] but only after permission was obtained from the BVD,’ was it possible to distribute a survey.⁵ In confidential reports like quarterly surveys, the majority of the information was from open sources. The rest of the information – not from open sources – was processed in such a way that it looked as if they were from open sources. Information that could not be traced to a specific source or sources was only used.⁶

Fourth quarterly survey of 1981

Most reports by the BVD never reached publicity, at least not completely. One exception is the fourth quarterly survey of 1981. This survey was leaked to and subsequently published in *Bluf!* (an Amsterdam-based left wing activist periodical).⁷ It was, among others, composed of articles focusing on activities by and discussions about squatters, anti-militarists, and activists who were against nuclear energy. Besides, *Bluf!* focused on international developments and other activist related issues.

³ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 6 (BVD, FOIA-file 71758, 6 December 2000).

⁴ Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996 and 7 March 2001.

⁵ Fourth quarterly survey of 1981 by the BVD (this report will be further referred to as ‘quarterly survey’), introductory page.

⁶ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

⁷ The quarterly survey of 1981 was published as an appendix of *Bluf!* no. 267. In the 1980’s, on a few more occasions (parts) of reports reached the public. A week later, for example, in *Bluf!* no. 268, some extracts of a monthly survey from 1977 were printed. In 1981, there was commotion concerning two leaked reports on Dutch peace movements (De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 93-99). In 1980, the BVD put a photocopier up for auction which contained three secret documents (*Trouw*, 18 June 1980).

On 29 April 1987, the authorities attempted to prevent *Bluf!* from publishing the leaked BVD-survey. A 45-person strong police unit raided the premises at the request of the BVD. As a result, they confiscated more than 2000 copies of *Bluf!* No. 267 that were ready to be distributed. The police unit also arrested three people and confiscated address files, logs, and minutes of meetings. A *Bluf!*-fellow worker has maintained that he had no idea how the survey was leaked from the BVD.⁸

Despite this raid, the police unit did not find the offset plates. A fellow-worker involved in the publication claimed that the offset plates were present during the raid, simply stored in garbage bags in a corner of the room.⁹ The following day on 30 April 1987 – a national holiday to celebrate the Queen's Birthday – *Bluf!* published the quarterly survey. The authorities decided not to raid *Bluf!*'s premises or to confiscate the publications because of public order issues. On Queen's Birthday, the center of Amsterdam is crowded. The authorities not only feared that *Bluf!* had a duplicate, but that it had also had made a triplicate copy of the survey.¹⁰

After a series of legal proceedings, *Bluf!* brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights. On 9 February 1995, this court sentenced the state to a fine of f60,000.- (euro 27,273). The court argued that the right to freedom of speech had been violated.¹¹

The most accessible part of the quarterly survey has been chosen for an in-depth investigation. This is the section concerning anti-democratic developments within the Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)¹² – page 29-39 of the survey (9.4). As this text is so central in this study, and because it cannot be found in public sources, it is enclosed as Appendix 2.

9.2 ORGANIZATION

To understand the functioning of the BVD, insights into the organization and its aims are necessary. The BVD – a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs – was founded in 1949, after the dissolution of its predecessor Centrale Veiligheidsdienst (Central Security Agency). The BVD was part of the Dutch intelligence community, which in turn is part of the security policy system.¹³ Within the security policy system there is, to some extent, a division between international (or

⁸ *NRC Handelsblad*, 30 May 1987; interview with Wijnand Duijvendak by the author, 27 October 1994.

⁹ Confidential interview with an anonymous voluntary worker.

¹⁰ *Proceedings Lower House*, 74-3803, *Weekly Bluf!*, 12 May 1987.

¹¹ European Court of Human Rights, *Case of Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. The Netherlands*. Press release issued by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights News 352, 24 August 1994, 1-4. *NRC Handelsblad*, 9 February 1995.

¹² MANE in Dutch: Anti Kernenergiebeweging (AKB).

¹³ For more on Dutch public agencies of the 1980's, see: Kluiters, *De Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten*, 1993; and: Kluiters, *De Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten. Supplement*, 1995.

foreign) intelligence and domestic security. However, an agency may collect information in both fields.¹⁴ In the domain of foreign intelligence, agencies gather information to verify arm treaties, to warn about war or international terrorism, to assist strategic planning, and concerning the nature, possibilities, and intentions of foreign opponents.¹⁵

The BVD, however, focused itself mainly on domestic security. The field of domestic security includes combating espionage, terrorism, and political violent activism. These activities were rooted in the first task of this agency, as described in section 8, paragraph 2a of the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 1987. For this, the agency gathered data on – as a result of their goals and activities – organizations and people who were a threat to the existence of democratic legal order, for the security of the state, or for other important interests of the state. In the line of responsibility, it is the minister of Home Affairs – and not the BVD – who determines organizations or people that are to be the object of investigation.¹⁶

The division between domestic and international security was not that strict in the Dutch community. To fight proliferation was also a task of the BVD. Although domestic aspects are present, it is intertwined with aspects of international security.¹⁷ This became even more so after December 1993, when the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers dissolved the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Agency, the IDB.¹⁸ From then on, the BVD monitored the production and export of weapons, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁹ The BVD also took part as a National Security Authority in the consultations with the NATO Security Committee and the WEU Security Committee,²⁰ a field more to do with international security. Until 1990, there was a special branch of the BVD – the Foreign Policy Staff – that produced reports on developments in communist countries and communist parties in non-communist countries. This field is typical for international security (11.3.3).

The BVD did more than gather information. It was a security agency, having preventive and protective security functions. As a part of its tasks, the agency carried out background investigations on individuals who needed a security clearance for a (government) position. In addition, the BVD had to safeguard information. These security tasks were respectively the second and third task of the

¹⁴ A security agency is a (government) agency active within a country, aimed at countering threats manifesting itself within that country. A foreign intelligence agency, is a similar agency operating abroad and getting information on anything it wants to know about foreign actors. Both types of agencies produce intelligence – checked and analyzed information (Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004).

¹⁵ Probst, "Intelligence as a Force Enhancer," Winter 1987, CIA/SII, 64-66.

¹⁶ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 4.

¹⁷ *Lower House*, session 1989-1990, 21819, no. 2, 9.

¹⁸ In Dutch: Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (IDB). Both the military intelligence and security agency and the BVD took over the tasks of the dissolved Foreign Intelligence Agency. The then domestic agency BVD also carried out tasks for international security. The agency became responsible for liaisons with foreign sister agencies, the processing of the data obtained, and some foreign operations (BVD, *Jaarverslag 1992*, 5). The effects of dissolving the IDB were so drastic, new legislation was prepared that came into effect in 2002 – the BVD became the AIVD

¹⁹ Interview with Dick Engelen, 7 March 2001.


²⁰ BVD, *Jaarverslag 1998*, 65.

agency (section 8, paragraph 2b and 2c of the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 1987).

During the Cold War, communism was the main target of the BVD. In the 1970's, a new main target stepped into the lime-light: terrorism. In general, the BVD responded to infringements – often physical or psychical – that were systematic, secret, deceptive, or improper. At the end of the 1980's, there was a shift of emphasis to elements such as corruption, proliferation, and economic espionage.²¹

The composition of the BVD changed somewhat throughout the years – especially concerning the naming of its different divisions. In the 1980's, the BVD was organized into directorates, departments, and sections. An overview of the situation in the 1980's is presented in terms of their tasks, main input, and main output (see also figure 9.1).²²

**Figure 9.1 Main structure of the BVD in the 1980's
(reorganized in 1990 and 2002)**



Some parts were aimed at primary and others at secondary activities. The Director General's private Office, called the Cabinet, maintained the national (KVB) and international (KEB) contacts. The Cabinet also had to take care of legal matters (KJA), the preparation of policy reports, and the secretariat for the leadership of the BVD. The organization had just started to function at the end of the 1980's with the appointment of an organizational adviser. Department F, Finance, was responsible

²¹ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 5-6, 19, and 28.

²² Figure 9.1 is based on: Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, appendix 1; and supplemented with the help of the notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004

for the financial administration, transport and internal security. Section A was responsible for general administration and logistical support.²³

The primary activities were concentrated in the Directorates B, and C, and Department D. The main activities of Directorate B focused on Dutch left and right wing extremist (sometimes violent) political movements, Dutch anti-societal movements, Dutch terrorism, terrorism related to foreign countries, in addition to liaising with local intelligence units within the municipal and regional police forces, the PID's and RID's.²⁴ The input of information was mainly composed of open sources, the PID's, (military) authorities, sister agencies, agents, informants, and – rarely – citizens who spontaneously delivered messages.

Directorate C was charged with protecting the security of the state against activities by agencies of foreign (communist) states. The prime target was intelligence activities by the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, by the Peoples Republic of China. This target was supplemented by intelligence activities of Soviet satellite states – such as Czechoslovakia, a country that was very active in the Netherlands, or East Germany (HVA) – and hostile agencies in general. In practice, activities were aimed at intelligence officers in embassies and other representations (*rezidentura*), illegal intelligence officers, operations by communist countries aimed at Dutch citizens who visited these countries, intelligence activities from Soviet ships, and the recruitment of emigrants. The input of Directorate C was composed of information from sister agencies, agents and informants, observation and surveillance activities, telephone taps and other technical intercepts, the PID's and RID's (not very often), and – rarely – open sources and citizens who reported suspect activities. Intelligence produced by Directorate C could be used for the protection of vital objects against hostile foreign intruders, a responsibility of Department D.

Department D was responsible for prevention. Its activities were mainly focused on the security of corporate business, public bodies and organizations, and supervising the positive vetting systems for these bodies. This included security issues such as prevention strategies against the abuse of vital technologies, the violation of automated data systems, and theft of high-tech information. In total, Department D was responsible for about 700 organizations. The input was composed of information from ministers, parliament, NATO, WEU, Euro Control, sister agencies, and colleagues of Directorates B and C.

The Foreign Policy Staff focused on mainly the same states and ideologies as Directorate C (communist). Its brief covered the analysis of phenomena abroad that could have consequences for home security. It produced its information for use within the BVD. In addition, it regularly supplied external consumers with reports. Its main sources of information were openly available information, signal intercepts, and information from allied foreign agencies.

²³ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 12; Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

²⁴ Politieke/Plaatselijke/Politie Inlichtingendiensten; in English, Political/Local/Police Intelligence Agencies. They existed locally under all the three different names, and have the same abbreviation in Dutch. Regionale Inlichtingendiensten; in English, Regional Intelligence Agencies.

The Departments E and T were responsible for the secret collection of information outside the domain of human intelligence (running of agents). In the case of Departments E, its activities included observation, surveillance, translation, mostly of intercepts (telephone and microphone), and positive vetting. Department T supplied Department E with the technical means necessary. Their main clients were the Directorates B and C.²⁵

The BVD obtained 70% to 80% of its information through open sources, including free, accessible, oral contacts, that is people and institutions who could be approached without the use of special means of intelligence. The other 20% to 30% was obtained through observation, surveillance, taps, other technical means, and agents.²⁶

At the end of the 1980's, the first stage of BVD's reorganization began. This was necessary to counter the many organizational problems. The reasons were rather complex. For instance this included redefining the political relationship between the BVD and other government agencies (especially within the ministry of Home Affairs), the motivation had to be improved (many staff felt the agency had become too cautious), the work processes needed to be made more efficient, operations were conducted almost independently from political needs, and more modern managing tools and processes needed to be introduced. A major reorganization was carried out after the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix presented a report at the request of the BVD's new Director General, Arthur Docters van Leeuwen.²⁷

On 29 May 2002, a second major change followed as a result of the new Intelligence and Security Services Act. The BVD was transformed into the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) – the General Intelligence and Security Service, which includes a Foreign Intelligence Directorate to collect intelligence regarding other countries. These activities focus on the international legal order, peace and security, and the position of the Netherlands in the international arena.²⁸

As a result of these reorganizations, conclusions valid for BVD-reports of the 1980's cannot be extrapolated to today.

²⁵ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 8 - 11, 20; Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004. The names in Dutch are as follows: Leadership of the BVD - Dienstleiding; Cabinet - Kabinet; Personnel Department - Personeelszaken; Organization - Organisatie; Directorates B and C, - Directies B and C; Departments D, E, F, T, and Section A - Hoofdafdelingen A, D, E, F, and T; Foreign Policy Staff – Staf(afdeling) Buitenlandse Politiek.

²⁶ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 7, 19, 24 and 30; Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

Concerning open sources, the media is a major source for agencies to obtain data from (Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," Fall 1987, 26). Computers play an increasing important role at the BVD. The agency invested in a stand alone network (*Vrij Nederland*, 21 December 1991, 36).

²⁷ Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

²⁸ General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), *General Intelligence and Security Service. Duties and Organization*, 2002.

In this case study, the emphasis is on data from Directorate B of the BVD. Most of the information the author was able to collect – from basic data to final reports – is from this directorate. As noted, Directorate B focused on issues related to the political extremist field. In the 1980's, within the BVD, this was referred to as 'anti-democratic movements, organizations, and people.'²⁹

While access to material from other directorates and departments was more difficult, reports could be collected from the Foreign Policy Staff. Attention is paid to this section in 11.3. Material in this section is used to assess more specifically the factors that contribute to a high or low quality report (13.2).

Now that an introduction has been given on BVD, the following section focuses on the BVD-survey. In the following section, attention is paid to the subjects mentioned in this survey.

9.3 SOCIETAL CONTEXT OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE SURVEY

What was the societal setting of the issues reported on in the survey? Some background information is presented to gain an understanding of some of these issues. In the BVD-survey, the main subjects were MANE, Joost van Steenis, and Van Steenis' past in Red Youth and Red Help. 43 % of the text was on MANE, 24% was on the history of Van Steenis before his appearance in MANE, and 21% linked Van Steenis to MANE and his role in MANE. In 10% of the survey, other anti-democratic elements were evaluated – such as specific groups of anarchists and radical squatters (11.1).

This was not the first time that the BVD reported, in its surveys, on issues related to MANE or on Van Steenis. Earlier surveys on MANE concerned monthly surveys 2 and 4 (1977). These surveys described the involvement of the CPN (Communist Party Netherlands) in the demonstration against the enlargement of the UCN (Ultra Centrifuge Nederland) that produced centrifuges to enrich uranium. The BVD reported on Van Steenis and the groups in which he was active, in the monthly surveys 4 and 5 (1977).³⁰

In addition, the BVD reported, during this period, on groups and people mentioned in the fourth quarterly survey, such as specific groups of anarchists (quarterly survey 2, 1981) and radical squatters (quarterly survey 3, 1982), or on related groups such as autonomous groups (quarterly survey 2, 1980).³¹

The Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)

A large part of the BVD-survey focused on MANE. In the following, an overview is given of the main groups who were active against nuclear energy at

²⁹ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

³⁰ BVD, "Inzagedossier diverse maand- en kwartaaloverzichten, No. 71758," 1-9. The UCN is the Dutch company producing ultra-centrifuges for Urenco, a Dutch-German-British organization to enrich uranium.

³¹ BVD, "Inzagedossier diverse maand- en kwartaaloverzichten, No. 71758," 10-21.

the time the BVD-survey was written. Most of them are mentioned in the BVD-survey. Also attention is paid to the basic principles of MANE, as these are crucial in discussing the BVD-survey.

Overview of the movement

MANE was at its peak at the end of the 1970's and during the first half of the 1980's. Together with the peace movement, anti-militarists, the feminist movement, the squatters' movement, and the anti-apartheid movement, it was pre-eminently the left-wing political activism exponent of the 1980's. These six movements managed time after time to gain the media's attention through their spectacular actions or mass-activities.

In the 1970's, the protest against nuclear energy was growing. There was an increasing number of demonstrations and protesters.³² During the years, protest transformed into resistance. In 1979, there was a most significant break in this trend by the founding of Breek Atoomketen Nederland (BAN), in English: Break Atomic Chain Netherlands. BAN wanted to apply non-violent direct action to cause delays to the atomic program, and had as its ultimate goal its abolition.³³

In the 1970's, before BAN was founded, two types of groups were already active. First, there were Energy Committees.³⁴ While these were locally organized, they had also a national organization – the National Energy Committee (NEC).³⁵ This was an amalgamation of political parties and organizations, for instance the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth International, Aktie Strohalm, NIVON, and the Verbond van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers.³⁶ As a result of the participation of political parties, these committees were more oriented towards parliament than the second type of groups, Power Groups, which developed more towards a concept of resistance.

Power Groups were committees of people.³⁷ The principle was that people joined these groups personally. No political party was allowed to dominate a

³² At the end of the 1970's, the CPN played a role in the organization of demonstrations against the UCN at Almelo. Yet, the role of the CPN was less than marginal concerning direct actions, as blockades of nuclear power plants and transports to dump nuclear waste in the sea. The BVD describes the role of the CPN against the UCN in its monthly survey number 2 of 1977 (page 8-10) and its monthly survey number 4 of 1977 (page 6).

³³ Before 1979, direct actions were already carried out incidentally. In 1977, activists occupied a drilling rig to protest against test drilling for the storage of nuclear waste. In 1978, activists occupied a lock at Velsen to prevent *Makiri Smits* – loaded with nuclear waste – to sail (LAKA (Landelijk Kernenergie Archief), *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 11, 15 en 16).

³⁴ In Dutch: Energie Komitees.

³⁵ In Dutch: Landelijk Energie Komitee (LEK).

³⁶ *Nijmeegs Universiteits Blad*, 4 November 1977. The last organization – the *Verbond van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers* – is characterized as a front organization of the Dutch communist party, the CPN (Olink, *Over communisten, spionnen en saboteurs tijdens de Koude Oorlog*, 2002, 107).

³⁷ In Dutch: Stroomgroepen.

group. In 1974, the National Power Group Stop Nuclear Energy (NPGSNE)³⁸ was founded. From 1977 onwards, the protest gained momentum and the number of local groups grew fast. In the beginning of the 1980's, the Power Groups of Gelderland started to play a major role. The center of their attention changed from the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar – just across the border in Germany – to Dodewaard, the Dutch nuclear power plant. By 1979, NPGSNE decided to be represented in NEC.³⁹

During a camp in May 1980, activists discussed – initiated by the Power Groups of Gelderland – the possibilities of direct actions against Dodewaard. This camp coincided with a controversial emergency permit⁴⁰ for the storage of extra nuclear fuel rods at the plant. An overwhelming majority of the people who were present elected to occupy this site as a first step. The second option was for a non-violent blockade if it became clear that occupying the site could lead to the danger of violence and escalation. Because of the way that the authorities reacted, the activists prepared for a non-violent blockade. Many of them organized themselves into the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down (DSD) grassroots groups.⁴¹

In the beginning, BAN was skeptical about the blockade, but later, joined in the preparations. BAN saw the demands of the 'Dodewaard-Shuts-Down' as unrealistic. BAN followed a different strategy – that of actually delaying the atomic program through direct resistance which they hoped would finally result in its abolition. Furthermore, BAN was of the opinion that its own model – in which training in non-violence was a crucial factor – was not widespread enough. The actual blockade of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down 1980 (DSD'80) was a non-violent one.⁴²

The following year, in 1981, another large mass action took place at Dodewaard. This action had a more vicious nature. In retrospect, an explanation can be given. On one hand, there was a lot of dissatisfaction among activists, because until then there had hardly been any direct success. The demands of the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down were also not met. The dumping of nuclear waste into the sea still continued. This dumping caused tension with international treaties. During the preparation of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down 1981 (DSD'81), some activists placed more emphasis on the extra option of barricades than in 1980. Nevertheless, no clear decision was reached as to what should be the course of the action.

³⁸ In Dutch: Landelijke Stroomgroep Stop Kernenergie (LSSK). In the beginning, the 'K' of 'Kernenergie' (Nuclear energy) stood for 'Kalkar' (a fast breeder reactor).

³⁹ *Nijmeegs Universiteitsblad*, 4 November 1977. *Vrije*, 1979, no. 2, 18.

⁴⁰ In Dutch: gedoogvergunning.

⁴¹ -, *Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder*, 1981, chapters 2, 3, and 4. DSD-grassroot groups in Dutch: Dodewaard-Gaat-Dicht basisgroepen.

⁴² BAN, *Breek Atoomketen Nederland, het Aktiemodel*, 1981, 5. Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993.

On the other hand, the response of the authorities hardened. The police acted more viciously during smaller actions that took place between DSD'80 and DSD'81 at Dodewaard and an increasing number of activists were wounded. At Dodewaard, the Acting Mayor Goldberg was installed. Some activists feared the worst, because they saw this mayor as a hard-liner.

DSD'81 showed many features of a battlefield. The authorities used massive amounts of tear gas in addition to employing anti-riot squads. Many hundreds of people were wounded. After four days, the action was broken off early. During the following weekend, there was a massive and non-violent final demonstration at Arnhem.⁴³

MANE was not a monolithic block. It was a collective name for different groups with different backgrounds, strategies, aims, and means. The nature of the groups also differed – from participating on behalf of a political party to personal committees and affinity groups.

Some groups – like BAN, the Power Groups, and the DSD-grassroots groups – were explicitly focused on nuclear energy. For others, this link was less direct. For example, the only thematic link that the anti-militarist Onkruit had concerned its claim that civil nuclear energy also served military purposes. For squatters' groups, the thematic linkage between squatting and nuclear energy was even more remote.

A factor complicating a clear arrangement between the different groups was that the same people were often members of more than one group. This especially applied to thematic groups, like the anti-UCN-committee, Stop Borssele, and Stop Doodewaard.

At first sight, it seems difficult to gain an overview or to identify a common factor within MANE. Nevertheless, patterns developed and agreements were reached between different groups. Activists developed basic principles for the large mass actions at Dodewaard. The various descriptions of the basic principles of Dodewaard-Shuts-Down – and MANE in general – concerned more or less the following:

1. openness;
2. non-violence;
3. to avoid to be criminated;
4. wide support of the population (national and local);
5. grassroots democracy;
6. right of resistance.⁴⁴

⁴³ For more: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 147-152.

⁴⁴ *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 46. See also: *Onderstroom*, May 1980, no. 29; 2, 6, 12. *Milieudefensie*, June 1980, 4-7. *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30; 3, 6, 18. "Handboek 'Dodewaard dicht'", *Onderstroom*, (1980) 5, 10-15. *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 6.

Concerning nonviolence, there were within the MANE endless discussions on 'fundamental nonviolence' (like BAN) and 'in principle non-violent' (some of the DSD-grassroots groups). Source: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 152-158.

These basic principles of DSD are helpful in analyzing the relationship between DSD and the authorities. The response of the authorities could be a factor concerning radicalization, for instance formulating the right to resist (BAN).⁴⁵ Authorities could directly intervene by employing a particular response. In regards to intelligence, direct intervention could occur when someone is an agent and a provocateur and as a result a cross-fertilization of democratic and anti-democratic concepts of action could be promoted (10.2.1, Cees van Lieshout).

In 1980 and 1981 at actions against the dumping of nuclear waste into the sea, activists simply divided the road into sections, so that each group could carry out its own type of action.⁴⁶ The basic principles of the different groups and their particular actions provide a framework for analyzing – and tracing the developments within – multiform movements, like MANE.

Joost van Steenis

In the BVD-survey, the agency paid a lot of attention to one person: Joost van Steenis. Van Steenis was in the 1960's and 1970's active in various Marxist-Leninist/Maoist groups; Red Flag (Rode Vlag), Red Youth (Rode Jeugd), and Red Help (Rode Hulp).

The BVD had both Red Youth (Summer 1966 – March 1974) and Red Help (– December 1976)⁴⁷ under surveillance. From actions ascribed to (members of) both groups, this was not a surprise. In the early 1970's, Red Youth was involved in several bombings – against Philips and a police officer's car – in which there were no casualties.⁴⁸ It also had contact with foreign terrorist groups for instance the German Rote Armee Fraktion, the RAF (13.1.2). In 1974, Red Youth ceased to exist and was succeeded by Red Help.

In 1975, during his period in the Red Help, Van Steenis developed the concept of Small Violence or 'soft' violence. In this concept those seen as the ruling elite were attacked, rather than goods or the common police officer. Van Steenis did not advocate 'heavy' violence against people, like the German RAF did. His concept of Small Violence was to carry out continuous and nerve-racking harassments.⁴⁹ This concept of Small Violence differed from those within Red Help who finally elected for the option of terrorism. In 1976, some Red Help-members visited PFLP, a George Habasj training camp in South

⁴⁵ Doubts in traditional demonstrations increased after a mass demonstration at the UCN, March 1978. Both the limited demand (against enlargement of the UCN, instead of against the UCN) and the way the parliamentary decision making had taken place, changed attitudes. Actions by BAN were not aimed at the government anymore, but at the right to resist and to delay the nuclear industry. The deeper cause that led to the foundation of BAN was the lack of trust in parliamentary decision making (Van de Laar & Bökkerink, "Geen hiërarchie in beweging tegen kernenergie!", *Vrije*, 1979 no. 2, 18-19. *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 4. Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993).

⁴⁶ *Vrije*, 1980, no. 10, 19.

⁴⁷ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 13, 68, 147.

⁴⁸ *NRC Handelsblad*, 26 October 2000.

⁴⁹ Van Steenis, *De macht van het familiekapitaal en wat ertegen te doen*, 1980, 70, 72, 76, 83, 84. *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 February 1985, 5.

Yemen. One of them – Lidwien Janssens – was arrested later that year at Tel Aviv airport, Israel, when she carried out a reconnaissance in preparation for a PFLP hijacking action.⁵⁰ In 1976, articles appeared in the Dutch media stating that Red Help-members gave support to members of the RAF, who were in hiding in the Netherlands.⁵¹ In 1976, Van Steenis left Red Help. By the end of 1975, there were already clear tensions between Van Steenis and Red Help on the course of action.

Later, Van Steenis was active in different groups. In 1978, he was one of the founders of *Stichting Macht en Elite* (the Foundation Power and Elite) that issued a paper under the same name. At the end of the 1970's, Van Steenis was also a candidate at elections with his political party the *Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur* (the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule).⁵²

In 1979, Van Steenis moved to Amsterdam. He joined a squatters' group in which he was responsible for the contact with MANE.⁵³ The BVD feared that the concept of Small Violence might cross-fertilize to the other groups that Van Steenis was active in. This is the underlying reason why the BVD wrote its survey on anti-democratic developments within MANE. This fear provided a legitimate reason to carry out an investigation and to make an assessment on Van Steenis and his perceived influence. During his Red Youth period he had been active in delivering training. In 1972 and 1973, he held weekly evening classes in the theater *De Brakke Grond*, in Amsterdam, in which he for example, explained how to make simple bombs to people who attended his classes over a long period of time. The *Anarchist Cookbook* was used for this.⁵⁴

Van Steenis' concept of Small Violence was characterized by secrecy, to be disconnected from the population, to commit criminal acts, violence, and to carry out actions in small groups. In contrast the basic principles of MANE were openness, gaining wide support of the population, to avoid to be criminated, non-violence, and mass-action. In 10.2.4, the basic principles of DSD and the concept of Small Violence are compared, and the possibility of cross-fertilization is assessed.

In 1982, there was a deep crisis between Van Steenis and left-wing activists.⁵⁵ In this year, Van Steenis published his new book *De macht van de autonome mens; theorie en praktijk van het aanvallen van personen* (The Power of the Autonomous People; Theory and Practice to Attack People). The book naturally focused on his ideas of dealing with members of the elite. In his book, he gave examples of actions of harassment. One example was to use stickers with the text 'A Fuck? Call Promptly [...]' followed by the private number of a manager. Women groups – but also men from grassroots groups – considered this a sexist action that implied violence against women, because it ultimately

⁵⁰ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 141-142.

⁵¹ *De Telegraaf*, 2 October 1976; *Het Parool*, 5 October 1976. See also: *Het Parool*, 19 January 1977; *Accent*, 16 October 1976, 29-30.

⁵² Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 69.

⁵⁵ For the tension of earlier data, see: De Valk, *BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 203.

harassed a manager's wife. Frustrations about this proposed method of action came to a crisis during a short visit that Van Steenis made to Amelisweerd in 1982 (in Amelisweerd, activists protested against the construction of a new freeway). He was expelled from the camp. This incident signaled the end of his association with MANE.⁵⁶ In the 1990's, Van Steenis established a website that gives insight into his past and present ideas.

9.4 CASE-SELECTION AND SOURCES

The BVD was selected as the second case study because it is a Dutch public organization. First, it is a relatively large and publicly well known security agency. Of all Dutch agencies, the BVD received the most media coverage and the most attention in parliamentary debates. Military agencies could have been an alternative. During the 1980's, however, there was a large reorganization in which the three separate military agencies had to merge into one agency. Focusing on four organizations – the military agency and its three predecessors – would have made this study complicated.⁵⁷

To avoid legal complications and to avoid endangering security, reports from the 1980's were a better option than recent ones. Furthermore, requests under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are time-consuming. A lot of BVD-documents quoted in this study took at least a year – and in some cases more than five years – to be released. Finally, it is difficult to obtain recent reports under the Dutch FOIA.

Authentic and complete text

There are several thousand pages of files and reports available from the BVD. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the number of reports that can be analyzed. As noted, a report can only be released following a FOIA-request. The problem with these released reports is that there is no indication as to which parts of a report are not released. In the fourth quarterly survey of 1981 from the BVD, for example, there is a section on anti-democratic developments within MANE. The full version is eleven pages long. The released part following the FOIA-request, is only four pages long. There is no indication as to which seven pages are deleted.⁵⁸ The released parts concerning MANE are those that the BVD explicitly characterized as bona fide. There is no indication in the released section that this survey is 45%

⁵⁶ Van Steenis, *De macht van de autonome mens*, 1982, 54-56. Undated circular to grassroots groups of a (male) grassroots group from Nijmegen, "Seksueel geweld tegen vrouwen als linkse aktie – nooit." Letter by Joost van Steenis, dated 4 August 1982 to the editors of *Bluf!*, *Onderstroom*, *Vrije, Afval*, and *De Klinker*. Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993. Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

⁵⁷ This reorganization was preceded by the so-called Fatima-affair. This was an infiltration – not allowed by the responsible ministers – into unions of the army. This infiltration became public after the anti-militarist activist group Onkruid unveiled documents that it obtained after a theft at the 450 Counter Intelligence Detachment in November 1984.

⁵⁸ The BVD released only page 29-32 – the first four pages of the report (BVD, FOIA-file 71758).

about Van Steenis, who is perceived as the main anti-democratic element. This practice makes it difficult to take released reports as a starting point in investigating their quality.

In the FOIA-documents there is a practice of deleting names. Having to guess who is involved makes research very difficult and indistinct.

Those reports, therefore, have to be selected based on their authenticity and whether they are complete. Subsequently this limits tremendously the number of reports that can be investigated. In fact, only two (leaked) reports could be obtained that meets both demands – one quarterly survey (1981) and one report on East European manipulation of Dutch peace movement,(1981). But even in the case of this last report, more versions exist (see following heading). Furthermore, knowledge of Russian was necessary to completely check this last report. Parts of the 1981 quarterly survey, on the contrary, could be studied in-depth more easily, in particular to the section on anti-democratic elements within MANE.

Debates in the Lower House showed that the BVD-survey of 1981 was authentic. A further indication of its authenticity is that on 29 April 1987 the BVD informed the chief prosecutor in Amsterdam. The agency explained it concerned its quarterly survey, fourth quarter of 1981. The activities against *Bluf!* was also based on this BVD information.⁵⁹ Three different copies of the text on anti democratic elements within MANE could be studied. In the publication *Bluf!* No. 267, page 35 was missing. However, this page is included in this study.⁶⁰ The three different copies show that there is only one version of the complete authentic text.

The Communist Party Netherlands (CPN) and front organizations

For this case study, an option could have been to study BVD-reports on the CPN and its front organization. After several FOIA-requests, there are now hundreds of pages of material and reports available on this issue. In the few instances that a report or a survey was likely to be complete, Russian sources could have been consulted for an accurate assessment of their quality. In almost all these cases, however, it was not completely sure whether a report was indeed complete, and sometimes names were deleted. This was a disadvantage compared to the survey on anti democratic elements within MANE.

Of the few reports that were likely to be complete, there was only one that could be used to check both authenticity and completeness – the 1981 report on East European manipulation of Dutch peace movement. From debates in the Lower House, it is clear that the report is authentic.⁶¹

There are two different versions of the text. One version was complete and was obtained through a leak – in German, and 26 pages long. Another version

⁵⁹ *Proceedings Lower House*, 74-3802/-3803/-3806; *Weekly Bluf!*, 12 May 1987.

⁶⁰ This study is based on the complete original text, and not on the text as printed in *Bluf!* apart from the missing page 35. The names of people have also been removed from the *Bluf!*-publication.

⁶¹ *Proceedings Lower House*, 74-3795 - 74-3806, *Weekly Bluf!*, 12 May 1987.

was obtained following a FOIA-request – with its deletions and without the names of the Dutch people that had secret contacts with East European communists. This version was in Dutch and was 20 pages long. It had a more compact lay-out. The German and Dutch version is largely the same, except for some minor points.⁶² The last part of the Dutch conclusion is not present in the German version. It concerns – to a large extent inconclusively – an assessment on the extent to which the Dutch reorientation on nuclear arms could be attributed to a hidden East European manipulation.⁶³

According to debates in the Lower House, the leak of this report was unauthorized, and the concerned intelligence officials were confronted with disciplinary measures.⁶⁴

However, it was not because of these differences, but mainly because of Russian sources that needed to be consulted, that it was not selected as the central report of this case study. Nevertheless, it is discussed briefly in 11.3.2.

Anti apartheid organizations

Another option could have been to analyze BVD-reports on anti apartheid organizations. As in the case of the CPN and its front organizations, there are – through several FOIA-requests – hundreds of pages with different types of documents available on anti apartheid organizations.

Parts of these files are BVD-reports on organizations such as the AABN, the HCSA, and the predecessor of HCSA, the Angola Committee (6.2). These reports could have been selected as the second case study for reasons of thematic coherence with the first case study (SRB). Moreover, the BVD wrote in a letter during 2001 that HCSA, Kairos and related organizations (including the SRB) were never under surveillance from the agency – only certain people or activities⁶⁵. This would not have been a barrier in selecting these reports as the second case study.

Again, the problem is the completeness of reports. For example, in a 1978-report on the South African sympathy committees, text is deleted on many pages.⁶⁶ Another option could have been a report on the Angola Committee – the predecessor of the HCSA – written in 1972 for the Minister of Home Affairs.

⁶² The deleted parts in the Dutch FOIA-version could easily be restored with the help of the German version.

⁶³ BVD, “Een verholde factor in de kernwapendiscussie,” 1981, 19-20. BVD, “Ein verborgener Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen,” 1981, 26.

⁶⁴ *Proceedings Lower House*, 16 December 1982, 1283, 1288; *ANP* 115 4 bin 173 819-bp. bvd., tk-bvd-vredesbeweging. 271506 jun 83.

⁶⁵ BVD, letter to Kairos (1758106/01), 29 October 2001, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Deleted parts are on pages 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18. On pages 13 and 15, it is even unclear whether passages are deleted. Such parts can be of special interest for a quality check, as for example on page 9, which apparently concerns the support of Portuguese refugees and deserters who fled to Sweden with false papers. It may point to the actual topic of the BVD to write the report. Source: BVD, 29 October 2001, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001 (South African communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998), 1 of 6 (HCSA incl. AABN), BVD-analysis of 25 May 1978, “De solidariteitscomité’s m.b.t. Zuidelijk Afrika,” 19 pages.

Again, however, text is deleted on many pages.⁶⁷ This absence of completeness made it difficult to assess the exact interest of the BVD. Without having the possibility to assess the focus of attention of the BVD in a clear and unambiguous way, it is difficult to analyze it as an in-depth case study. It would have led to similar problems as encountered with the four FOIA-pages – instead of the full 11 pages – in the 1981 quarterly survey.

In the case of the South African sympathy committees, there is a lot of material in the BVD-files that is helpful in reflecting on the reports. First, this material provides information to assess who the agency was interested in. Communist oriented people from the ANC who visited the Netherlands had the attention of the BVD. For example, the visit of Oliver Tambo to HCSA and BOA⁶⁸ on 17 and 18 October 1981 ended up in a BVD-file. His visits to the Dutch minister of Development Cooperation (Jan Pronk), the minister of Foreign Affairs (Max van der Stoel), and the Prime Minister (Joop den Uyl) also ended up in a BVD-file.⁶⁹

Second, this material is helpful to evaluate how the network of the BVD functioned. It gives insights into how information concerning demonstrations, manifestations, and meetings held by the HCSA and Kairos – often in combination with local anti apartheid groups – was collected.⁷⁰

Finally, while other material is useful to assess the width of the collected information,⁷¹ if it is not complete, then it cannot be used for this second case

⁶⁷ Deleted parts are on pages 1, 2, 7, and 8. On pages 5 and 6, it is even unclear whether passages are deleted. Source: BVD-archives, BVD, 29 October 2001, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001 (South African communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998), 1 of 6 (HCSA incl. AABN), Letter of Head of the BVD to the minister of Home Affairs, 19 September 1972 + analysis, "Het Angola-Comité," 8 pages.

⁶⁸ Boycot Outspan Actie. In English: Boycott Outspan Action.

⁶⁹ Tambo visited these ministers on 5 and 6 October 1977. BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 (HCSA), pages 40, 42-43, and 58 of 132.

⁷⁰ A lot of this information was presented to the BVD by the intelligence units of the municipal and regional police forces. Especially the police at Arnhem, Deventer, Groningen, Haarlem, The Hague, Heerlen, and Rotterdam appeared to be active in reporting to the BVD. This included information about either a request to hold a demonstration or to make a collection. Such local intelligence units could make use of standard forms to inform the BVD. Other places in which events ended up in BVD-files were Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, Beverwijk, Den Helder, Dokkum, Hengelo, Leiden, Rotterdam, Schimmen, Tilburg, and IJmond. The former state police made its own overview of events, which it handed over to the BVD (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 to 6 of 6).

From the BVD-file, it is clear that in 1982 the SRB was *not* a household name for the intelligence unit of the Amsterdam police forces (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 3 of 6 (SRB), pages 3 - 4 of 4).

Also the information flow from Foreign Affairs could result in a more complete insight. For example, Dutch Foreign Affairs informed the South African embassy at the Hague when Kairos and the HCSA held a demonstration opposite to its building (Foreign Affairs, Code 9, 1975-1984, 912.1, File 5585, memo of the Protocol Department, 7 June 1983, no. 89. This message was also sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs, O.B.Z.). It was not only the embassy that was informed on such occasions (BVD-archives, HCSA-file available for perusal, no. 2.241.336-75. Miscellaneous reports).

⁷¹ Especially during the 1980's, most events reported on were meant to put pressure on Shell. But issues such as the Paralympics (1980), a visit from George Bush sr. (1989), or articles in national newspapers, as by the spokesman of the HCSA Sietse Bosgra were also reported. Even a speech held by the president-director of Shell – L.C. van Wachem – could end up in the BVD-files (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, 1 of 6 {132 pp} to 6 of 6 {Kairos 55 pp} {Speech by Van Wachem for the meeting of shareholder at 11 May 1989}).

study. A complete version of these reports – following further FOIA-requests – may result in a good case because of other material that they provide.⁷²

Sources

The focus on MANE was the longest section of the quarterly survey. Subsequently, a lot of information can be investigated. All the facts presented by the BVD could be checked in open sources.⁷³ Openness was a foundational stone of MANE.⁷⁴ People could easily join MANE, and activists could also easily hold coordinating positions. Furthermore, it was a movement of predominantly young people. This made it comparatively easy to check data and to obtain information – even years afterwards. It was also possible to obtain in-depth data on Red Youth and Red Help, both by information from the BVD and by those targeted by the BVD, Van Steenis, among others.

To carry out this case study, a variety of sources have been consulted. To obtain a balanced as possible picture, information originates from the BVD, ministries, courts, the police, MANE, Van Steenis, and a wide range of media and (academic) publications. A series of interviews were also held with people active in groups mentioned in the BVD-survey, to check the BVD-data. Furthermore, (former) BVD-officials were interviewed, and were asked to comment on drafts of this study.

With the help of other partly released surveys, it is to a certain extent possible to analyze the consistency between several surveys (11.1). In some occasions, the text of these surveys was obtained through sources other than a FOIA-request. In these cases, the reconstructed text is presented, rather than the text received following the FOIA-request. These reconstructions could be achieved through researching archives, and through publications and quotes in *Bluf!* and *De Telegraaf*.

⁷² Although the media interest will be primarily on reports on RARA (Dutch abbreviation of Radical Anti Racist Action), it is not possible to carry out such a case study. RARA carried out a series of arson and bomb attacks in mainly the second half of the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's. Only a few documents could be found. At Foreign Affairs, it is found that to cope with such violent actions Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – asked the British company Control Risks at London to investigate the matter. The BVD, Shell, and the Dutch employers' organization VNO could be present at such meetings. The Netherlands was seen as 'the seat of the European headquarters of extremist elements' (Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 611.7, File 1060: Stockholm, no. 2167 confidential, 21 January 1987; minister Van den Broek, no. 604 confidential, 20 January 1987; Brussels, confidential, 21 January 1987; Madrid, confidential, 26 January 1987).

Also a confidential report by Control Risks obtained on this issue was not suited for this study. Only small sections on pages 23 and 57 focused on the Netherlands. Also the contents were not that promising for an in-depth research. On page 57, for example, it is reported that groups such as RARA stem 'from the Movement – an amalgam of squatters, criminals, drug-traffickers and protesters.' Apart from the description being indistinct, it is the only source found in which these groups are put together, and are characterized as the Movement. Control Risks is apparently poorly informed about 'the Movement' (Control Risks Information Services Limited, "South Africa: The Prospects for Business. A Cris Special Study," 1986 or 1987).

⁷³ There was only one minor exception. This was the comment on Van Steenis being unemployed. See: quarterly survey, 37; and interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

⁷⁴ This even applied to internal discussions. See, for example: -, *Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder* (1981). See also: *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 18 ff.

In this case study, the conclusions are restricted to the limited BVD-material available only. A different sample of material may have led to different conclusions about the BVD. This, therefore, does not provide an overall picture of the state of affairs at the agency.

As a final comment, it may be helpful to have an overview of the main events of importance for the issues mentioned in the BVD-survey and its setting. A chronological overview is presented in the following table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Facts and dates in relation to issues in the BVD-survey⁷⁵

	BVD	Van Steenis, Red Help/Red Youth	MANE	Society & Politics
1970 - 1975		<p>1971: Six Red Youth' members (including Van Steenis) visit China</p> <p>1972: most (bomb) attacks by Red Youth</p> <p>1974: dissolution of Red Youth</p> <p>1975: paper by Van Steenis and Tom de Booy on Small Violence</p>	<p>1972: Harcourt Klinefelter, former employee of Martin Luther King, moves to the Netherlands</p> <p>1973: in article <i>IDOC-NORTH AMERICA</i>, April 1973, no. 52, pp. 61-67: plea is held for non-violent, international campaign against nuclear energy (inspires Dutch activists)</p> <p>1974: foundation of National Power Group Stop Nuclear Energy</p>	<p>1974: Dutch attaché at embassy in Washington leaves office after criticizing fast breeder reactor</p>
1976		<p>Van Steenis leaves Red Help</p> <p>Media report Red Help helps RAF</p> <p>Red Help members visit PFLP training camp in South Yemen</p>		
1977	<p><i>Monthly survey 2:</i> UCN and CPN</p> <p><i>Monthly survey 4:</i> UCN and CPN</p> <p><i>Monthly survey 4:</i> Small Violence</p> <p><i>Monthly survey 5:</i> Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule</p>			<p>Minister refuses Lower House disclosure of report on storage of nuclear waste</p>
1978		<p>Van Steenis, De Booy and Rietveld found Foundation Power and Elite</p>	<p>4 March: mass demonstration against UCN</p>	<p>Report Ministry of Health claims no death caused by nuclear waste on KEMA site</p>

⁷⁵ Sources are mentioned in this case study, or are from: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, chapter 5 (especially the parts in the column Society & Politics). This overview is not meant as a balanced picture of the developments, but to support the analysis of this case study.

	BVD	Van Steenis Red Help/ Red Youth	MANE	Society & Politics
1979		<p>Arrest of Capelse Group</p> <p>Van Steenis moves to Amsterdam and joins local squatters group</p>	<p><i>2-4 March:</i> Klinefelter trains first BAN-group in non-violence</p> <p><i>12 May:</i> first BAN-action (at UCN, Almelo)</p> <p><i>16-17 June:</i> BAN and Power Group Haarlem/IJmond blockade transport of nuclear waste</p> <p><i>October:</i> attempts to occupy Seabrook (nuclear site USA) inspires the Dutch MANE for DSD'80 action; one BAN-member is present at Seabrook</p>	<p><i>March:</i> accident at Harrisburg (USA)</p> <p><i>April:</i> customs officer tries to confiscate from a journalist documents on a German hearing on nuclear energy</p>
1980	<i>Quarterly survey 2: autonomous, anarchist & squatters scene (Queen's Birthday 1980)</i>	Van Steenis present at DSD'80	<p><i>16/17 March:</i> 8 activists wounded at non-violent action Borssele</p> <p><i>May:</i> anti-riot squad officer expresses reserves to act against MANE-activists</p> <p><i>24/25 May:</i> Whitsun-camp: plan for blockade or occupation of Dodewaard, start of DSD-grassroots groups</p> <p><i>9/10 June:</i> different groups with different methods claim their own part of the route during actions against dumping of nuclear waste</p> <p><i>26 September:</i> BAN occupies site of interuniversity nuclear reactor at Delft</p> <p><i>5 October 1980:</i> MANE decides to blockade (and not to occupy) Dodewaard</p> <p><i>19/20 October:</i> DSD'80</p>	<p><i>January:</i> commotion in Lower House on leaked German report: possible dangerous flaws at Dodewaard</p> <p><i>beginning 1980:</i> changing answers to local politicians on security measures at Dodewaard</p> <p><i>24 March:</i> Dodewaard accused of having too many nuclear fuel rods in basin; no emergency storage left</p> <p><i>28 March:</i> without interference by Lower House, minister gives a more elastic permit for storage nuclear fuel rod storage at Dodewaard</p> <p><i>April:</i> KEMA-employee admits death of children caused by KEMA-waste</p> <p><i>Spring 1980:</i> press publishes that Netherlands may import Namibian uranium contrary to the 1974 UN General Assembly decree</p> <p><i>second half 1980:</i> commotion in Lower House on secret contracts between Borssele and Cogéma</p> <p><i>1980:</i> Dodewaard-employee forced to quit job after criticism on hasty servicing; 38 incidents at nuclear plants of Borssele and Dodewaard, three times power reduction/cut needed</p>

	BVD	Van Steenis Red Help/Red Youth	MANE	Society & Politics
1981	<p><i>Quarterly survey 2:</i> anarchists and left wing activism</p> <p><i>Quarterly survey 4:</i> anti- democratic elements within MANE</p>	<p><i>May:</i> Van Steenis enters press group of DSD'81</p> <p><i>September:</i> Van Steenis present at DSD'81</p>	<p><i>20 April:</i> 7 activists wounded at action Dodewaard</p> <p><i>17 May:</i> preparation of DSD'81</p> <p><i>18/20 June:</i> many activists wounded at blockade UCN</p> <p><i>2/3 September:</i> actions against dumping nuclear waste</p> <p><i>5 September:</i> board labor party (PvdA) publicly supports upcoming blockade Dodewaard</p> <p><i>9 September:</i> emergency by-law against barricades at Dodewaard issued by actions mayor Goldberg</p> <p><i>19-22 September:</i> DSD'81: only on Saturday afternoon (19/9) over 130 activists wounded during riots</p>	
1982	<p><i>Quarterly survey 3:</i> squatters, MANE & anti militarists</p>	<p>Van Steenis publishes <i>The Power of the Autonomous People</i></p> <p>Activists expel Van Steenis from camp at Amelisweerd because of views expressed in <i>The Power of the Autonomous People</i></p>		

10 BVD-survey and criteria

What is the quality of the BVD-survey on anti democratic elements within MANE? The quality of this BVD-survey is evaluated per criterion.

The two case studies – on the BVD and the SRB – are structured in a similar way. Nevertheless, this case study does differ somewhat from the SRB study, mainly because the material that is investigated is different. First, the BVD-survey is largely descriptive research, with some explanatory elements contained within it – rather than the encyclopedic data of the SRB-reports. Second, because of the scarcity of complete, authentic, and verifiable BVD-material, only one survey is analyzed in-depth. Third, since the BVD-survey was confidential, there is little outside criticism to reflect on. This requires extra background information on issues such as organizational factors and the quality of basic files. Fourth, in the BVD case study a direct link between survey and available basic files is absent. The information available is too limited and too fragmented to be useful for an analysis in relation to the contents of the BVD-survey.¹ The issue of basic files is discussed separately in 11.2. Finally, it remains unclear as to what method was used in the case of the BVD-survey, if there was a method used at all (10.2.1). Therefore, additional comments are made about the possible effects of the sources used, such as agents (13.1.2).

10.1 HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE QUALITY OF THE SURVEY

What is the quality of the BVD-survey, tested with the help of the criteria presented in chapter 5? This is carried out per criterion. In 5.2, specific indicators were developed for each criterion. These indicators are also included in the investigation.

10.2 CRITERIA AND THE BVD-SURVEY

For the evaluation of the BVD-survey the main criteria and the specific indicators will be used. By discussing these specific indicators, the extent to which a criterion was or not met can be argued more precisely. The BVD-survey was mainly descriptive research, with some explanatory elements in it. Therefore, many specific indicators on explanatory research – and in almost all cases on prognostic research – will not be applicable. The applicable specific indicators are mainly those that concern descriptive intelligence and on those of a general nature.

¹ Such information was for the large part released after procedures by the VVV (Vereniging Voorkom Vernietiging) – Association to Prevent Shredding – or in other procedures by the chairman of the VVV, Roger Vleugels.

The quality of the BVD-survey is investigated per criterion, as it was with the SRB case study. The following six sub-sections of 10.2 are headed by the criterion in question and all the specific indicators – including those not tested as noted above.

10.2.1 Criterion 1 – design

Criterion 1	New intelligence research has to be subject to careful <i>preliminary designing</i>, a standard research is designed according to an established protocol
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<p>a) <i>preliminary designing: research question, methods & techniques, initial literature exploration, to define terms and concepts;</i></p> <p>b) <i>explanatory research: high alpha- & low beta-chance;</i></p> <p>c) <i>prognostic research: to estimate strengths & purposes, forces & factors to influence opponent, room to act, factors leading to unexpected developments, indicators of change, events to trigger major shifts</i></p>

The BVD began its research of the anti-democratic elements within MANE – through ‘meticulous observation and study.’² Because there is an absence of more explicit information, its design, definition of objects of investigation, and method is assessed by tracing implicit elements.

First how the BVD defined its research question and its objects of investigation is evaluated. Second, the extent to which the research design was descriptive, explanatory, or prognostic is assessed. Third, the methods that were used for the research design are assessed.

Research question and (definition of the) object of investigation

A BVD-inquiry needs a legal foundation. The research question has to fit within the setting of legal tasks of the Intelligence and Security Services Act. This check precedes the actual inquiry. The BVD-survey was headed ‘Anti-democratic developments within the movement against nuclear energy.’ After this heading on page 29, the agency formulated its research question as follows:

‘Given the strong suspicion, that anti-democratic elements attempt to abuse the as such bona fide Movement Against Nuclear Energy for its resistance against the functioning of the parliamentary democracy, meticulous observation and study of these attempts seems desirable.’

The BVD wrote that MANE as such was bona fide. An inquiry into anti-democratic developments within MANE was legal because the research question fitted within the legal setting of tasks (6.2).

The BVD established the objects of investigation as anti-democratic elements. But who and what is exactly meant by anti-democratic elements? This is not defined in the BVD-survey.

The consumer had to identify from implicit comments the groups and people that the BVD considered as anti-democratic. Subsequently this notion is vague

² Quarterly survey, 29.

and which is further blurred by a quarterly survey nine months later.³ This leads to problems for the receptivity and readability of the survey concerning the objects of investigation. An attempt is now made to indicate which groups and people the BVD apparently characterized as anti-democratic.

- *Joost van Steenis*. From the text, it is evident that the BVD saw him as anti-democratic because of his activities, ideas, and writing. Van Steenis was also of the opinion that he was object of investigation according to the setting of tasks of the BVD.⁴ From earlier BVD-surveys, it is clear Van Steenis was object of investigation.⁵
- *Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers*.⁶ From the text, it is clear that the BVD saw Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers – who committed sabotage on power pylons – as objects of investigation.
- *Onkruid*. There are implicit indications Onkruid was an object of investigation. First, the BVD made a link between Onkruid and Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers. The agency assumed that ‘these activities are if not carried out at the least inspired by Onkruid activists.’⁷ Second, the BVD wrote in the quarterly survey that Onkruid was involved in violent activities. A third indication is from an interview between the journalist Henk van Hoorn and the then minister of Home Affairs Van Thijn. The minister stated ‘As far as acts of sabotage and other violent affairs are in preparation, they have, of course, the interest of the BVD.’⁸ The BVD made a link between Onkruid and sabotage. A fourth indication is that the BVD frequently reported on Onkruid.⁹ A fifth indication is that no information has been released on ‘data connected to anti-militarist subjects and organizations, such as Onkruid,’ following a request based on the Freedom of Information Act.¹⁰ From other sources, the author could reconstruct that their role has been completely censored in released surveys of this period.¹¹ Therefore, the assumption that Onkruid had the interest of the BVD can be concluded.

³ In this 1982-survey, the BVD suddenly typified the ‘bona fide’ MANE as in resistance against the current democratic legal order (11.1).

⁴ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

⁵ BVD, “‘Klein Geweld’ in Nederland,” Monthly survey 4, 1977, 10-12; BVD, “Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur (VAW),” Monthly survey 5, 1977, 24-25.

⁶ Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers, in Dutch: Willy Wortel en de Lampjes. The group named itself after the personage of *Donald Duck*.

⁷ Quarterly survey, 33. The BVD could also have had other indications, for example the destruction of an antenna of the company Securicor. According to this company, Onkruid incorrectly had concluded that Securicor protected the plant at Dodewaard (-, *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 1981, 144. *NRC Handelsblad*, 17 October 1980).

⁸ VARA, *In de Rooie Haan*, 20 February 1982, Hilversum I, 13.03 and on. Interview of minister Van Thijn by journalist Van Hoorn. Not corrected text from *Beleid Beschouwd*, no. 4540, 23 April 1982, 10. *NRC Handelsblad*, 3 December 1981.

⁹ See, for example: Onkruid, *Dossier CID*, report by the Section Security, Desk B-1, minutes with the actions commander, 10 June 1982 at The Hague. Moreover, a reference to a BVD-report on Onkruid is found in: LUID, ISAM 6/84, III 8.

¹⁰ Letter of Head of the BVD – S.J. van Hulst – to the author, 17 November 1999, BVD-reference 1496661/01, 2.

¹¹ For example, by combining the deleted passages in the BVD’s FOIA-files no. 71758, released on 17 November 1999 with the lead found in: LUID, ISAM 6/84, III 8.

- *Radical squatters.* The BVD linked radical squatters to violence during actions against the dumping of nuclear waste. In an earlier survey of 1980, there are indications that the BVD already saw a part of the squatters' movement as an object of investigation, for instance Landelijk Overleg Kraakgroepen (LOK) – the National Consultation Squatter Groups. Squatters who incited violence in combination with having goals other than housing, such as 'resisting the repression of "the authorities, militarism, and capitalism"' were objects of investigation.¹²
- *Anarchists.* Like radical squatters, the BVD linked anarchists to violence during actions against the dumping of nuclear waste. Earlier in 1981, the agency reported on anarchists and in particular 'anarchists of actions.' In this earlier survey, the BVD wrote that these 'anarchists of action' sought contact with, for example, the squatters' movement, because 'they are of the opinion that these groups/movements offer a good point of departure to attack the capitalist system. [...] A (clear) product of this new course is, for example, Groningen's Anarchists Collective (GAC): this group plays an important role in the local squatter activities [...]'¹³ In internal discussions on the character of anarchists and anarchist movements, the dominant position within the BVD stated that, in general, anarchists as such should not be the subject of investigation, as they were deemed to be (radical) democrats. Only anarchists of action (violence) and anarcho-syndicalists – who undermine the legal order – should be objects of investigation.¹⁴

From the survey, it is unclear whether the BVD also saw other groups as anti-democratic. The agency linked a number of the Power Groups Stop Nuclear Energy and grassroots groups with terms such as 'harsh opinions' and 'hard-liners.' The BVD wrote about activists who 'were given the opportunity to have a more substantial say.'¹⁵ What the agency exactly meant by this, can only be conjecture. These terms are so vague that it is impossible to conclude whether the BVD used these to refer to anti-democratic elements. It does not make sense to categorize everything 'harsh' as anti-democratic. While 'harsh opinions' are sometimes also taken in parliament, these are not judged as anti-democratic.

The BVD remained vague when it referred to other indications, such as an occupation of a nuclear plant, a blockade, and short small-scale actions. Furthermore, the BVD characterized BAN explicitly as bona fide,¹⁶ and it was BAN who were, among others, inspired by the occupation the site of the nuclear power plant in Seabrook (USA). One of the founders of BAN had been present at the actions in Seabrook. BAN also occupied the site of the Inter-university

¹² BVD, Quarterly survey 2, 1980, (32 and) 33.

¹³ BVD, Quarterly survey 2, 1981, 38.

¹⁴ Notes and comments by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

¹⁵ Quarterly survey, 30-31.

¹⁶ Quarterly survey., 29-30.

Reactor Institute at Delft on 26 September 1980.¹⁷ To declare yourself in favor of an occupation of a site, therefore, cannot be interpreted as anti-democratic.

The BVD characterized MANE 'as such bona fide.'¹⁸ It is concluded that, when the BVD wrote on BAN and DSD-grassroots groups it concerned 'bona fide' groups. In cases in which the BVD made a link to violence and sabotage, it is assumed that the agency referred to anti-democratic elements. In retrospect, W.P.J. Keller – head of the Training Section EO at the BVD from 1980-1986 – summarizes that MANE as such was not an object of investigation, only anti-democratic sections and particular people within this movement. In the case of MANE, these anti-democratic elements concerned political violent activists.¹⁹

From this, it is assumed that the BVD characterized five groups and people as anti-democratic: Joost van Steenis, Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers, Onkruit, radical squatters, and specific groups of anarchists.²⁰

In the BVD-survey, however, the consumer missed crucial information to clearly understand in an unambiguous way, who was the object under investigation. The definition of the objects under investigation is absent or too vague. This is a crucial absence since the surveys were also intended to inform consumers – such as local police intelligence units – which groups they needed to monitor (9.1).²¹

Research design – descriptive, explanatory, or prognostic?

Because the style of the survey had a narrative, rather than an analytical nature, it is not clear as to what kind of research was carried out. There is no visible structure. It is a succession of data without a clear direction of the argument. An agency can easily write on a miscellaneous movement like MANE, using a narrative style, without taking into account the diversity of trends and opinions within it.²² The narrative style was a common approach of that time. Until 1990, the BVD was of the opinion that it should restrict itself to passing on information. This opinion did not only apply to quarterly surveys, but also to letters written for a minister.²³

¹⁷ *Vrij Nederland*, 4 October 1980.

¹⁸ Quarterly survey, 29.

¹⁹ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000. In 1987 when *Bluf!* published the leaked quarterly survey, the then minister of Home Affairs Van Dijk did not want – contrary to Van Thijn and Keller – to comment what groups were, or were not, object of investigation of the BVD: 'I repeat that on questions about organizations object of observation of the BVD no answer can be given, neither in a positive nor in a negative sense' (*Proceedings Lower House*, 74-3802, *Weekly Bluf!*, 12 May 1987).

²⁰ Information could not be fully obtained on the next items: 1) According to the BVD, *what* groups did contribute to anti-democratic developments?; 2) according to the BVD, *why* were these groups anti-democratic; what did the BVD mean by anti-democratic; what criteria did the agency use to make this term operational?; and, 3) according to the BVD, what indicators were used to determine whether a faction within a group – or a group as a whole – *developed* an increasing anti-democratic tendency.

²¹ Other means to steer these units were, for example, educational conferences.

²² There were also BAN and DSD-grassroots groups. There was an increasing overlap. A complicating factor is that BAN was primarily a model of how to carry out actions and not an action group (BAN, *Breek Atoomketen Nederland, het Aktiemodel*, 1981, 1).

²³ Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996 and 7 March 2001.

When you look closer at the composition, the BVD-survey was mainly descriptive. However, there are both explanatory and prospective elements present. One explanatory element was the final sentence of the survey – that ‘some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.’²⁴ One prognostic element in the survey was the comment by the BVD on possible future acts of sabotage by Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers.

For the following, the survey will be approached as descriptive research, except for the two mentioned comments above. These will also be tested for their explanatory and prognostic aspects.

Methods used for the research design

As noted, the survey was mainly descriptive. What methods were used for this descriptive research? The BVD wrote in its opening sentence, that it did its research by ‘meticulous observation and study.’ First, some general comments are made. Then, the ‘meticulous observation’ receives special attention in a sub-section on agents.

Most of the research was descriptive. Both the disputable structure of and the many factual mistakes in the survey (10.2.3/5) give the impression that no method was used at all for the descriptive section, at least not in an acceptable way.

What method was used for the explanatory element of the survey? The explanatory element is presented in the final sentences of the survey. The BVD wrote that Small Violence ‘has until now only been used incidentally by small groups. That is possibly the reason why some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.’²⁵ Although the incidental use of Small Violence may be the ‘possible’ reason to *turn* to a new strategy, the BVD clearly states *that* Van Steenis strategized to ensure that Small Violence infiltrated within a mass movement, like MANE. In 10.2.4, this issue is evaluated and will show that the agency made an explanatory comment, that actually was an incorrect assumption. The BVD did not use any method to filter out this incorrect conclusion (10.2.2).

What method was used for the prognostic element of the survey? The BVD describes some acts of sabotage – as causing ground shorts and phase shorts of high-voltage cables – by Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers:

‘During the preparatory phase of the second large action at Dodewaard the first attempt at sabotaging the national grid was made. [...] A next attempt at Maarheeze [...] and the next one at Anna Paulowna [...].’²⁶

²⁴ Quarterly survey, 39.

²⁵ Quarterly survey, 39.

²⁶ Quarterly survey, 33.

The agency continues with the prognostic element that 'it is questionable whether we will have seen the last of them.'²⁷ What method was used to assess whether it would end with the described ground and phase shorts?

First, the BVD did not mention the data of the described events. For Dodewaard, the date was 18 April 1981; at Nederweert-Maarheeze, the events were 8 and 24 June 1981;²⁸ and at Oudesluis/Anna Paulowna, 9 October 1981.²⁹ In the case of Nederweert-Maarheeze, the BVD only referred to one of the two acts of sabotage.

Second, more acts of sabotage would follow. In October 1981, five or six acts of sabotage took place.³⁰ These all occurred within a period of two weeks after the action at Oudesluis/Anna Paulowna, the final action mentioned by the BVD. On 24 October, *De Gelderlander* reported on these new acts of sabotage.

Could the agency have had knowledge of these new actions when it wrote its quarterly survey? In other words, had the prognostic element already taken place in the BVD-survey? An answer to this question is found by checking the dates of sources used by the BVD in its survey. The agency quoted from an issue of *Vrije* and in this issue it is reported, on another page, about an event that had taken place on 19 October.³¹ Was this issue of *Vrije* published before 24 October – the day *De Gelderlander* reported on new acts of sabotage? No, *Vrije* was only available at the bookstore on 27 October.³² This was three days after the report in *De Gelderlander*, and the same day that *de Volkskrant* also wrote about these new acts of sabotage. The BVD could only have quoted from *Vrije* after the media had already reported on these 'expected' acts of sabotage.

Finally, the agency offered the quarterly survey with a short covering note. This note was dated January 1982. In this note the following was written: 'The Head of the BVD has the pleasure to offer you a copy of the, per ultimo last month closed, BVD-Quarterly survey.'³³ In December, the quarterly survey was ready for publication. In other words, the *expected* acts of sabotage had already taken place *two months* before the quarterly survey finally was ready for publication.

To summarize, the method used for its prognostic element was not an acceptable one, such as modeling, expert judgment, scenario building, or trend extrapolation (3.2.3). The method used was actually a form of deception, because the BVD's expected acts of sabotage, were based on prior knowledge.

²⁷ Quarterly survey, 33 & 34.

²⁸ *NRC Handelsblad* mentioned 18 June as date. As in this article also another date was mentioned incorrectly – for the act of sabotage of 8 April at Dodewaard, the newspaper reported that it was 11 April – the author took over the sources that gave 8 June as date.

²⁹ *NRC Handelsblad*, 9 April 1981; *de Volkskrant*, 10 April 1981; *Schager Courant*, 9 October 1981; *NRC Handelsblad*, 28 October 1981; *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 29-30.

³⁰ *De Gelderlander*, 24 October 1981; *de Volkskrant*, 27 October 1981; *Barneveldse Krant*, 28 October 1981; *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 30.

³¹ In this issue of *Vrije* – October 1981, no. 9, 25 – it is written: 'Monday 19 October at 9.15 hours, the lasts three squatters are released.' On page 34, the BVD quotes from this issue of *Vrije*.

³² Administrative note on selling a consignment, Athenaeum News Center, Amsterdam.

³³ Quarterly survey, enclosed notice.

Observation and agents

The agency stated that it used 'meticulous observation' in its research. From this it can be assumed that agents were active in the various groups described by the BVD. This really happened. During the actions at Dodewaard, some agents were active within MANE. Agents from the BVD and its local intelligence units were also active in other groups, who were only marginally described in the BVD-survey, such as radical squatters.³⁴

The method of using agents can be a good source of information – especially concerning issues such as intentions. Nevertheless, special care is necessary to employ this method, in particular on how to guide an agent in actions and how to report on information that has been obtained from an agent. Specific techniques need to be employed for some fields in which problems may arise. This includes for instance representing viewpoints correctly (specific indicator of criterion 3) and dealing with the particulars of deception.

Two examples will be explored, concerning representing viewpoints, correctly. One concerns Joop de Boer and the other Cees van Lieshout. Joop de Boer lived in Tiel. In the media, he became known as Joop Tiel. According to De Boer, the Police Intelligence Section of Nijmegen approached him two weeks after DSD'81.³⁵ De Boer took part in the National Consultations, the coordinating meetings of the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down action.³⁶ Information about De Boer could have been available at the BVD, because the survey was written at least five weeks after DSD'81.³⁷ It is even possible that De Boer was active for the BVD or the local intelligence unit, before 1981. *HP/De Tijd* discussed the possibility that he could have worked for the BVD since 1953.³⁸

After DSD'81, he was an agent for many more years. In 1990, he was identified as an agent. For at least nine years, De Boer had been active in about 15 organizations. He only attended meetings when he received a payment for expenses. One of these organizations was the National Platform against Nuclear Energy,³⁹ in which the PvdA (social democrats), GreenLeft, Stichting Natuur en Milieu, and the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth International were members. As member of the board of Fonds Milieuvriendelijk Energiebeleid – in English: Fund for Environment-Friendly Energy – De Boer saw 'it his task, especially, to raise money for more radical actions, like blockades.'⁴⁰

If De Boer insisted that such groups' raised money for more radical actions, then reports are not dealing anymore with actual developments, but rather with

³⁴ De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1981, 71-79, 231-239.

³⁵ -, *De tragiek van een geheime dienst*, 1990, 187-188.

³⁶ He was present, for example, at the National Consultation of 17 May 1981 (Minutes of the meeting of the National Consultation, 17 May 1981).

³⁷ DSD'81 took place from 19-22 September 1981. In December, the quarterly survey was closed. At least until 27 October, the BVD gathered data (see previous part on Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers).

³⁸ *HP/De Tijd*, 9 November 1990, 20.

³⁹ In Dutch: Landelijk Platform tegen Kernenergie.

⁴⁰ Volkert Vintges in: *de Volkskrant*, 14 November 1990.

developments manipulated by an agent. This way of running an agent causes tension with the specific indicator of criterion 3, to present a correct viewpoint of those involved.

The second example on the issue of representing viewpoints correctly concerns Cees van Lieshout.⁴¹ In the media, he became known under his alias Rob Kamphuis. Similar to De Boer, it was said first that the Police Intelligence Section in Nijmegen ran Van Lieshout. Afterwards, it was said that Van Lieshout was a BVD agent.⁴² His activities for the Police Intelligence Section and the BVD, in left wing groups began in 1978 and ended in 1982. He worked also on other projects and was active as an agent for 15 years.⁴³ He worked under the code name Homerus (Dutch and Latin for: Homer).

Van Lieshout was especially active in groups like the Red Resistance Front (In Dutch: Rood Verzetsfront). In the Red Resistance Front, former members of the Red Youth and Red Help were active.⁴⁴ In addition, Van Lieshout had also been active at Dodewaard. It is known that he incited people to confrontational actions that went farther than originally planned. This sometimes led to an obvious incorrect reporting of these events.⁴⁵ The example discussed here concerns MANE. During a DSD-camp in 1980 – very probably the Whitsun-camp – Van Lieshout went with a number of people to the gate of the nuclear power plant at Dodewaard. On *VPRO*-radio, a former *ANP*-journalist for Nijmegen, Ineke Zijlmans, commented:

‘At the action at Dodewaard, it was agreed very clearly in advance that it would be a soft action, therefore no blockades. It would only be a camp. And then, he still wanted to drive past, to still drive past the plant.’

Van Lieshout provoked young activists. He said something like:

[Zijlmans:] “But we don’t let this happen. We have to do something more there, don’t we.” Then, these boys still walked to the gate and the security guards arrived. Then, some badgering took place. And then, at a particular moment, the boys walked away, not knowing quite what to do. And then, they went to the car, and just got the hell out of Kamphuis,[Van Lieshout] he said “is that what you call carrying out an action. I didn’t teach you to do it like this” [...]. And he himself remained in the car [...]. They were really young boys, 18, 19, 20 years old.

[Interviewer:] They roamed around him?

[Zijlmans:] Yes. Where he had picked them up, I don’t know. They were not from Nijmegen in any case, these boys I am talking about now. They were, I would almost say, involved in a kind of training to commit also real terrorist acts.

[Interviewer:] He had them, so to speak, under him, as a kind of trainer, as a tough activist?

⁴¹ For more on Van Lieshout, see: OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*.

⁴² In the radio broadcasting of *VPRO*, the Argos-redaction first calls Oolbekkink, head of the Police Intelligence Section of Nijmegen. Oolbekkink refers Argos to the BVD.

⁴³ From 1976 to 1978, he was active with the criminal intelligence unit of Nijmegen. From 1978-1982, he infiltrated the left-wing scene. From 1982 to 1986, he occasionally gave information to the criminal intelligence unit. From 1986 to 1990, OBIV writes he was at times in touch with Soviet diplomats, maybe for a Dutch agency (OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 190, 203).

⁴⁴ The Red Resistance Front existed from 1977-1985 (OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 57).

⁴⁵ OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 190, 88-89, 95-98, 101-102, 104-108, 120-124, 127-128, 146. *VPRO*-radio, Argos: BVD, 21 May 1993. For an illustration, see 13.1.2.

[Zijlmans:] Yes, they loved him. It was “Rob this and Rob that, and Rob you are really some guy” [...]. I think, there were four of them.⁴⁶

Van Lieshout incited – contrary to the agreements made within MANE – escalation. This is an example of how the actual actions of an agent can result in an incorrect representation of viewpoints. This does not imply that the BVD or the local intelligence unit had a policy to provoke. However, without the agency, Van Lieshout would not have been involved and there would not have been an incitement to violence and provocation. In the case of MANE, the BVD analyzed a hardened atmosphere⁴⁷ to which the local intelligence unit of Nijmegen had made a contribution.

It can be theorized as to what methods the agencies used to run Van Lieshout. It probably is partly a case of negligent supervision. It is also questionable whether the local intelligence unit and the BVD were able to control this agent⁴⁸ Nevertheless, elements in his behavior are similar to the Milgram-experiment in which the potential for obedience to authority was investigated. Under supervision of an authority, a selected group of ‘test’ people had to give electroshocks to someone, on the understanding that this would improve the persons learning performance. If they hesitated in giving a more powerful shock, the accompanying authority incited them to still do it. The results of this test showed that 65% were willing to give the most powerful – deadly – shock, even after the person had protested, cursed, and expressed pain.⁴⁹ The experiment showed the extent to which individuals can be persuaded to give up their autonomy to serve a larger social organization. Milgram calls this the *agentic state*, the condition persons are in when they see themselves as an agent for carrying out another person’s wishes. From a subjective standpoint, this happens when a person defines himself ‘in a manner that renders him open to regulation by a person of higher status. In this condition the individuals no longer views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others.’ This is opposite to that of *autonomy*, when people see their actions as their own.⁵⁰ In the example on the younger activists at Dodewaard, Van Lieshout was in a position of authority. He functioned ‘as a kind of trainer.’ This is even farther reaching than that of a provocateur. It is possible that the BVD became entangled in a situation similar to the Milgram-experiment.

The other issue concerns the methods used to deal with the particulars of deception. The example presented here became publicly known as the affair of the man with the frog’s eyes. This affair has been named after the striking bulging eyes of the BVD-employee involved. The man with the bulging eyes

⁴⁶ VPRO-radio, Argos: BVD, 21 May 1993.

⁴⁷ Quarterly survey, start of page 34.

⁴⁸ OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 171, 193.

⁴⁹ The person on the receiving end was an actor. No real electric shocks were given.

⁵⁰ Milgram, *Obedience to Authority*, 1975, 133-134. See also: Atkinson a/o, *Introduction to Psychology*, 1987, 609-611.

was an agent runner in the province of Brabant.⁵¹ This example does not concern MANE, but Red Youth, which the BVD-survey also focused on.

The first version of this affair is the one that appeared in the press. According to this version, the BVD-agent runner handed over a fire-arm to his agent Danny Mulders. The aim was to compromise the Red Youth-member Evert van den Berg, by ensuring his fingerprints were on the weapon. This failed, because Mulders changed allegiance. Subsequently, Mulders told Van den Berg everything and as a result the BVD-agent runner – the man with the bulging eyes – was publicly made to look a fool.⁵²

The second version is by the former BVD's head of Foreign Policy Staff Ad de Jonge. He said that the agent runner had told him that it was Mulders who proposed that a fire-arm should be handed over to Van den Berg, not the agent runner. Within the agency, the proposal was intensively discussed. De Jonge took part in these discussions. A request for a weapon had only been discussed once before. The discussion focused on three aspects. First, the ethical aspects were discussed. Second, its operational and technical aspects were evaluated. Third, the risks of inflicting losses were considered. Finally, it was concluded that the operation could take place. The agent runner – the man with the bulging eyes – and his direct superior – who was directly subordinate to the head of operations – met Mulders to deliver the fire-arm. In retrospect, it is still questionable for De Jonge whether Mulders had already turned before he made his request for a fire-arm. In this case, Mulders is likely to have been in touch with Van den Berg to create the affair. De Jonge also thinks it is also possible that Mulders turned later, as reported in the media.⁵³

There may be a preference for De Jonge's version because the agency always claimed that provocations were not carried out by the agency itself, but by BVD-*agents* who acted, more than likely, on their own initiative.⁵⁴ Activists managed to mislead the BVD in other instances.⁵⁵ In regards to other cases, under the responsibility of BVD-official Leijendekker, agents were involved in provocations. While this makes it difficult to assess Leijendekker's actual operating mode conclusively – which may be somewhere between negligent supervision and pushing things too far – it does show that the method of running an agent to obtain an accurate view can lead to complications. In this case, the view was blurred by deception – possibly used by both parties involved.

To obtain a correct representation of viewpoints and to deal with deception, specific techniques to employ agents well are needed. However, an overall design

⁵¹ He was replaced to the north of the country after this affair (interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000).

⁵² The BVD confirmed this affair during the appeal of a criminal case against Lucien van Hoesel (*Vrij Nederland*, 17 August 1974; *De Waarheid*, 31 December 1981; Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 64-67).

⁵³ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

⁵⁴ Compare: Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 97.

⁵⁵ An example is an occupation at Volkel-base to mislead John Wood/Gardiner, who was – on several occasions – paid by the BVD (*De Valk*, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 75). See also 13.1.2.

of running agents either was absent or did not function in practice. Former BVD-official Hoekstra noted that a mechanism was absent, at the agency, to stop excesses.⁵⁶ In methodological terms, this poses the risk of creating an artifact – a validity problem caused by measuring something different than reality, as a result of the measurement itself. From the number of examples found, this problem seems to have been a structural one.⁵⁷ In 13.1.2, this issue will be returned to, in particular in terms of its relation to deception.

Conclusion

The formulation of the research fell within the legal tasks of the BVD. From the survey, however, it was not clear who was or was not the object of investigation. When possible, the consumer had to identify this information from implicit comments. This absence is felt even more since surveys were also intended to inform local intelligence units as to which issues to focus on.

No preliminary designing had taken place. The survey was torn between different concepts, if there was a concept at all. In the descriptive section, the use of a method cannot be traced – at least not in a correct way. For the explanatory element, the absence of a method did not filter out an incorrect assumption. In the case of the prognostic element, the BVD made use of deception instead of a method because the agency wrote that it expected acts of sabotage when it already had prior knowledge.

The method of using agents was well developed. For this method, special techniques are needed to ensure a correct representation of viewpoints, and to deal with deception. It is likely that a mechanism did not exist to stop excesses.

The BVD-survey did not meet this first criterion.

10.2.2 Criterion 2 – different angles of investigation

Criterion 2	Research is carried out by researching through relevant <i>different angles of investigation</i>, oriented at relevant options to be formulated
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<i>a) descriptive research: triangulation of sources, biases by problematic accessibility;</i> <i>b) explanatory research: competing hypotheses, high alpha & low beta chance, robustness, profoundness;</i> <i>c) prognostic research: robustness, width, options & openness (& their strengths and weaknesses), dissenting opinions</i>

As a matter of principle, the BVD did not reveal its sources or its information position. It was not only the BVD's explicit policy, but also its legal responsibility. At the time of the leaked survey published by *Bluf!*, the then minister of Home Affairs Van Dijk refused to comment on the survey

'It will lead us to the possibility of analysis and deduction and all things that you cannot do with a quarterly survey. It will lead us to questions about organization, mode of operation, and state of knowledge of the BVD.'⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 40.

⁵⁷ De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 71-79, 231-239.

⁵⁸ *Proceedings Lower House*, 74-3796 and 74-3802; *Weekly Bluf!*, 12 May 1987.

Triangulation of sources

For this quarterly survey, the consequence is that the sources and information position need to be traced from direct and less direct clues. However, these indicate a strong information position by the agency:

- The BVD collected publications by a wide range of groups – ranging from MANE, to anarchists (quoting *Vrije*) and Van Steenis (referring to Small Violence and the Foundation Power and Elite).
- The agency had access to the reports and minutes of meetings of most of the mentioned groups, such as MANE.⁵⁹
- The BVD collected detailed information – including personal matters – on people active in the groups mentioned in the survey.⁶⁰

Table 10.1 Sources: what information on what groups of the survey⁶¹
(in italic, if this specific information position is only assessed)

	Publications	Minutes/ reports	Taps, observations	Agents	Personal: character analysis, family situation, photo's
Van Steenis (incl. Red Help, Red Youth)	yes	yes, including deceptive reports	yes	yes	yes
Gyro Gearloose & the Little Helpers	yes	<i>probably not applicable</i>	<i>likely</i>	<i>likely not</i>	<i>likely</i>
Onkruit/ anti militarists	yes	yes	yes	<i>possibly/ likely</i>	yes
Radical squatters	yes	yes	yes	yes	<i>likely</i>
Specific anarchists	yes	<i>likely</i>	yes	yes	<i>likely</i>
BAN, DSD, other MANE	yes	yes	<i>limited to observation?</i>	yes	<i>yes, possibly limited</i>

Through a wide variety of means, the following information was obtained:

- Publications could be simply obtained by subscription or by buying them.
- Agents were active in all groups mentioned in the survey.⁶² They not only obtained publications and minutes of groups, but also taped meetings.⁶³
- The BVD tapped phones or carried out (electronic) observation – directly, or indirectly through local intelligence units.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Quarterly survey, 29-32, 33. For comparable examples, see: BVD, FOIA-file 2.239.432-A9, 1996, 1 & 3.

⁶⁰ For such information obtained in comparable cases, see: a series of VVV FOIA-files (for example: BVD, FOIA-file, 2.231.778-30, BVD, 1996/1997; BVD, FOIA-file 2.239.432-A9, 1996, 4-6, 15-16).

⁶¹ Sources are mentioned in this case study, or are from other BVD-surveys/reports, VVV's BVD FOIA-files, Andersson Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," or publications by Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, Buro Jansen & Janssen, AMOK, and OBIV.

⁶² 10.2.1; De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 71-82 + 231-238.

⁶³ In Operation Black, an agent taped Red Youth-meetings (13.1.2). John Gardiner/Wood taped meetings during his period in the Netherlands in 1983-1984.

- The agency obtained information through official sources, other than local intelligence units. City Halls were a source of information, for example to copy pictures handed over by an object of investigation during a request for a passport, or to copy charters of a foundation obtained from Chambers of Commerce.⁶⁵

Biases by problematic accessibility

The easiest data to collect, for intelligence research, is that on macro and meso-levels. Data at the micro level is less accessible – you need to be close to the object of investigation.

In the case of the BVD-survey, there were *no* problems in obtaining detailed insights at the micro level. It is likely, for example, that the agency had several agents in all groups described in the survey.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the agency was capable of gathering data in all the necessary different fields.

Competing hypothesis

To carry out explanatory research, use can be made of competing hypotheses. In 10.2.1, a comment was made on the final sentence of the survey. The BVD wrote that Small Violence ‘has until now only been used incidentally by small groups. That is possibly the reason why some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.’⁶⁷ In 10.2.4, the accuracy of this comment is discussed – it will be shown that the agency concluded an explanatory comment, which was actually an incorrect assumption.

Nevertheless, it was also a central issue and sincere concern of the BVD that Van Steenis might infiltrate Small Violence within MANE. How do you approach such a concern? In the case of the survey, the assumption should have been tested by reformulating it as a hypothesis. One of the possible techniques to test this was evaluated in 3.2.2 – Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH).

To illustrate how such an approach could have looked like, the matrix of step 3 from ACH is worked out regarding BVD’s concern that Small Violence might infiltrate MANE. In step 3 of ACH, the diagnosis of the evidence and the argument is identified. To assess which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of a posed hypothesis, a matrix is developed with the hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side.

⁶⁴ According to one source – Sjoerd Bos – some *local* intelligence units used all methods mentioned, including illegal ones as (illegal) taps, burglary, or breaches of the mail confidentiality (Sjoerd Bos, former head PID-Zaanstad, in: *Nieuwe Revu*, 6-13 December 1990, 31-32; *Nieuwe Revu*, 13-20 December 1990, 38).

⁶⁵ For information obtained in a comparable case, see: BVD, FOIA-file 2.239.432-A9, 1996, 4-14.

⁶⁶ De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 71-82, 231-238.

⁶⁷ Quarterly survey, 39.

Table 10.2⁶⁸

Question: what is the possibility of a security threat caused by a strategy of Van Steenis to infiltrate his ideas of Small Violence within MANE?

(H = hypothesis; E = evidence)

Hypotheses:

- H1. Van Steenis had no such strategy, and did not strive for it (absence).
- H2. Van Steenis had no strategy, but only would have pushed for it, if he had the opportunity (opportunism).
- H3. Van Steenis had such a strategy, and worked towards it (active presence).

		H1	H2	H3
E1*	Van Steenis says he had no such strategy to infiltrate Small Violence.	+	+	+
E2*	Van Steenis wrote in radical periodicals that everyone should think and decide for themselves what actions they wanted to carry out.	+	-	-
E3*	Other DSD'81 press group members said that he did not have a strategy, but only talked sometimes about Small Violence.	+	-/+	-
E4*	Van Steenis organized and took part in MANE actions focused against people (Small Violence is aimed against people).	-	+	+
E5*	Actions of MANE plus Van Steenis always kept within the concept of MANE (the concepts of MANE and Small Violence are opposite to each other).	+	-	-
E6*	Van Steenis talked about all kinds of actions – such as acts of sabotage – even when they did not fit within his concept of Small Violence.	+	+	-
E7	The assumption that Van Steenis would push his concept of Small Violence within MANE, because he had done so for years (implicit assumption by the BVD-analyst).	-	-	+
E8	The logical deduction that Van Steenis – compared with the 1970's – entered a completely new type of group in which he needed rapport. This need of rapport limited largely the possibility to infiltrate his ideas.	+	+	-
E9	The logical deduction that it is impossible for a single person to take over a grass roots organized movement of autonomous groups in order to infiltrate particular ideas.	+	-	-

* For sources, see footnote at the top of table 10.2

While the matrix of step 3 of ACH *could* be filled in as in as above, the way it is filled in should lead to discussion. Table 10.2, illustrates that evidence 1 has no diagnostic value as it is answered positively for *all* three hypotheses. This type of answer implies that you could doubt Van Steenis' words. However, if you are of the opinion that Van Steenis always says what he means you could fill this out differently. In that case, evidence 1 has to be filled in as in table 10.3.

Table 10.3 The revised evidence 1 (E1)

		H1	H2	H3
E1	Van Steenis says he had no such strategy to infiltrate Small Violence.	+	-/+	-

⁶⁸ Sources of evidence 1-6. E1: Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993. E2: *Vrije*, October 1981, no 9, 8. E3: Interview with Rob Stomphorst by the author, 19 April 1993. E4/E5: *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 109; *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 30; Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993. E6: *NRC Handelsblad*, 20 August 1980; *Vrije*, 1981, no 8, 6; *Vrije*, 1981, no 9, 8.

If you have reasons to believe Van Steenis' words, evidence 1 has diagnostic value. The matrix is helpful when others disagree with your judgment – it can be used to highlight the precise area of disagreement. The subsequent discussion can then focus productively on the ultimate sources of differences.

It is not a fixed rule to make a general notation in the matrix with plus or minus symbols only. You can refine it by using a numerical probability. In that case, you add a scale to show the intrinsic importance of each item of evidence. In a further refinement, you could even show the ease with which items of evidence could be concealed, manipulated, or faked, or show the incentive of a party to do so.⁶⁹ This refinement, for example, could be useful for revised evidence 1 in Table 10.3. For other evidence you may, for example, value evidence 9 as the one with the most intrinsic importance, while the others have more or less the same value. In that case evidence 4 seems to balance evidence 5 and evidence 7 seems to balance evidence 8. This leaves evidence 2, 3, 6, and 9 as the critical ones. Although step 3 of ACH is definitely not the final one in this process, it does appear to provide a first provisional preference for hypotheses 1 and 2, in which hypothesis 1 seems to be supported slightly more than hypothesis 2. In step 5 of ACH, you attempt to disprove hypotheses (3.2.2). If you manage to do so for either hypothesis 1 or hypothesis 2, the analysis is likely to result in a strong and unambiguous conclusion.

Conclusion

The BVD had an excellent information position concerning all groups mentioned in the survey – even on MANE. For all groups mentioned in the survey, the agency used a triangulation of sources. Information was not only present at the easy to obtain macro and meso level, but also at the more difficult micro level. There was no bias because of problematic accessibility of sources.

The central concern of the BVD was that Small Violence might infiltrate MANE. The agency concluded that Van Steenis had a strategy to infiltrate Small Violence within MANE. This was, however, an incorrect assumption. It should have been formulated as a hypothesis, and could have been tested, for example, by ACH. The absence of hypothesizing is a serious flaw in the research.

Criterion 2 was met as far as it concerned the descriptive aspect. There was an excellent information position with a triangulation of sources on all aspects and objects of the research.

Criterion 2 was not met as far as it concerned the explanatory element of the research. The incorrect concluding comment of the survey should have been tested as a hypothesis instead.

⁶⁹ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 8, page 5 of 9.

10.2.3 Criterion 3 – to be correct, complete, and accurate

Criterion 3	Data and information presented need to be <i>correct, complete, and accurate</i>
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<p>a) <i>sound processing (collectors also); take notice of reliability; be unambiguous on certainty; be critical on consistency;</i></p> <p>b) <i>pay attention to data lacking; do not ignore deviant data; aim at denying a hypothesis;</i></p> <p>c) <i>acknowledgment of sources; correct representation of viewpoints</i></p>

Because a series of comments by the agency included more than one type of failure – as being both incorrect and incomplete, or an incorrect representation of viewpoints combined with incomplete information – all the different aspects of the criterion are discussed in one evaluation of a quote. This is carried out to avoid duplication. Flaws are discussed per group or person. At the end of this section, an overview is provided of aspects and specific indicators that were or not met

Break Atomic Chain Netherlands (BAN)⁷⁰

The BVD wrote that BAN ‘based as it is on the American example of “affinity-groups” and for a large part trained by Americans.’⁷¹ While, BAN did base itself on an American example⁷² the comment that Americans trained BAN, for a large part, is not correct. The American connection was composed of the following elements:

- It is true that there was an American living in the Netherlands who delivered training – Harcourt Klinefelter, a former employee of Reverend Martin Luther King. Since July 1972, he lived in the Netherlands. During this time he worked at Volkshogeschool ‘Overcinge’ at Havelte.⁷³ From 1975, ‘Overcinge’ offered training in non-violent resistance.⁷⁴ On 2-4 March 1979, this training – in cooperation with Centrum voor Geweldloze Weerbaarheid – was delivered to members of MANE. They were active in

⁷⁰ In Dutch: Breek Atoomketen Nederland (BAN). In March 1979, training initially took place for the first action of BAN (12 May 1979). BAN was dissolved in February 1982 (Meth Medura, *Training in Meth Medura of 1979 until 1983*, -, 3 and 6). After February 1982, many who had been active in the BAN-concept still took part in actions against nuclear energy.

⁷¹ Quarterly survey, 30.

⁷² An important and early source of inspiration for direct actions against nuclear energy was an article in *IDOC-NORTH AMERICA*, no. 52, April 1973, 61-67. On pages 66-67, a plea is made for a non-violent, international campaign against nuclear energy. This article influenced the debate in a number of European countries and, finally, also in the Netherlands (Interview with Harcourt Klinefelter by the author, 11 October 1994).

⁷³ Volkshogeschool is an education center for courses in different fields, open to large parts of the population (Volkshogeschool ‘Overcinge’ in cooperation with Centrum voor Geweldloze Weerbaarheid, “Training voor geweldloze acties,” Summer courses 1984).

⁷⁴ This concerned mostly a training session of one week, and – on requests of groups – a number of shorter training sessions. Police officers were also invited to some sessions. The then senior police officer Ben Voulon – also active in the police union Politiebond – for example, was invited to a course on training in non-violent action in which, among others, the participants discussed nuclear energy (Letter Harcourt Klinefelter of 8 December 1981 to the participants of the course ‘Training in Geweldloze actie,’ 18-23 December 1981).

the Power Groups Stop Nuclear Energy, NEC, the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth International (Vereniging Milieudefensie), and the World Information Service on Energy (WISE).⁷⁵ Klinefelter called it one of his most successful short training sessions, because two months later these people held their first BAN-action by blockading the gate of the UCN. Afterwards, Klinefelter delivered more training. Eventually these were taken over by the community Meth Medura.⁷⁶

- Pieter Lammers – at BAN from the very beginning – was involved in the occupation of the site in Seabrook, USA. Back in the Netherlands, he shared his experience and knowledge with BAN.
- Two women – Addy Wartena and Yvonne de Bruijn – had followed and then coordinated courses and training in the Philadelphia Life Center (USA). In the Netherlands, they were active in Meth Medura. After the first actions in 1979, they were asked to deliver training as a preparation for an action of BAN at Almelo in October 1979. The cooperation between Meth Medura and BAN was deepened. Together with BAN-activist Abel Herzberger, they delivered many training sessions.⁷⁷

The BVD's assumption that Americans largely trained BAN does not match the facts, rather it is exaggerated and biased.

Directly after the comment on the Americans, the BVD wrote that in the affinity-groups activists got to know each other very well and were on the same wavelength playing 'psycho-therapeutic games.'⁷⁸ According to Herzberger, BAN made use of two types of games. First, there were games to strengthen the team spirit. Second, there were role-plays and simulations games. According to Herzberger, it is out of the question that these were psycho-therapeutic games.⁷⁹

While the BVD may have had reasons to hold a different opinion to Herzberger, it did not mention any. No information could be found that supported the statement of the BVD. The explanation of Herzberger seems to be the most plausible one. The terminology of the BVD may give rise to an atmosphere of psychic manipulation, yet voluntarism was a crucial element in the BAN-model. The characterization by the agency therefore appears inaccurate.

The BVD suggested that, as a result of BAN, the initial occupation of the site of DSD'80 developed into a blockade: 'The aforementioned BAN – until then the

⁷⁵ Notes by Harcourt Klinefelter of 11 January 1979 for the preparation of the course of 2-4 March 1979. See also: "Verslag van het weekend in Havelte," by Lex, undated report on the training weekend of 2-4 March 1979.

⁷⁶ Interview with Harcourt Klinefelter by the author, 11 October 1994.

⁷⁷ "Training in geweldloze sociale verandering 30 juni - 7 juli 1979," Meth Medura, *Training in Meth Medura van 1979 tot 1983*, -, 3-4. Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993.

⁷⁸ Quarterly survey, 30.

⁷⁹ Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993.

most active part of MANE – still had a strong influence in 1980 [...]. And so the original plan to occupy of the precincts became a blockade [...].⁸⁰

This passage by the BVD is invalid. In addition to BAN, the Power Groups of Gelderland were also very active. For years, the central aim of these Power Groups was to protest against the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar (Germany). The Power Groups were active for a longer period (from 1974 onwards, with a clear growth from 1977 onwards) than BAN (12 May 1979). There was also a difference in the development of both groups towards direct action. From its beginning, in May 1979, BAN carried out direct actions whereas the Power Groups only became involved later in this type of action (1980: DSD'80).

The BVD suggested that BAN opposed the occupations of sites. One of the ten founders of BAN – Pieter Lammers – had joined the occupation of the site in Seabrook, USA. Furthermore, BAN occupied the site of the nuclear power plant of the Inter-university Reactor Institute at Delft on 26 September 1980 (10.2.1). It is not correct to link BAN to opposing, in general, the occupation of sites.

What was the position of BAN on DSD'80? In the beginning, BAN had its doubts about DSD'80, but for completely other reasons than the BVD suggested. BAN's doubts were related to its aims, and training in non-violence. BAN opted for direct action, because of a lack of trust in the proceeding of parliamentary decision-making, in the case of the UCN.⁸¹ BAN was goal-oriented, on actually delaying the atomic program. 'In the long term, the largest delay possible is shutting it down.'⁸² For BAN, the large Dodewaard-action came too early. The BAN-model – in which training was essential – was not widespread enough. Moreover BAN saw the demand of 'Dodewaard Shuts Down' as unrealistic. BAN did not expect that the blockade would lead to an immediate shut-down.

The initiative of the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down-action came from the Power Groups of Gelderland. Like BAN, they were inspired by the action at Seabrook. The Whitsun-camp of 24 and 25 May 1980 served to prepare for the large Dodewaard-action of that year. While BAN was not present as a group at this camp, because of the objections mentioned, individual BAN-activists were present.⁸³

Two days after the discussion-weekend – on 27 May 1980 – BAN carried out its own delay-action at Dodewaard.⁸⁴ During this action, BAN-activists said that they did not want to have anything to do with the Whitsun-camp. In turn, the

⁸⁰ Quarterly survey, 31.

⁸¹ BAN-activist Herzberger explains this as follows: 'In 1978, it seemed like that the enlargement of the UCN may not take place. Then, a majority of the Lower House – including CDA-member Van Houwelingen – opposed the enlargement. The party discipline of the CDA created a majority. As a result of such affairs, BAN had no trust in the way of parliamentary decision making.' The parliamentary way of protest was also ended (Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993). A second point of dissatisfaction concerned the slogan of the demonstration at Almelo: the limited 'against enlargement,' instead of 'against the UCN.' This dissatisfaction can also be traced at the Power Groups (*Vrije*, 1979, no. 2, 18-19).

⁸² BAN, *Breek Atoomketen Nederland, het Aktiemodel*, 1981, 5.

⁸³ Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993.

⁸⁴ LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 24.

Power Groups of Gelderland – organizers of the Whitsun-camp – distanced themselves from the BAN-action.

A point of criticism of the initiators from the Power Groups of Gelderland was the secretive and closed way BAN prepared its actions. They advised openness and cooperation with the local population.⁸⁵ Rob Stomphorst – an organizer of DSD'80 – also criticized the effect of BAN-actions: 'your form of action is a means to achieve your goal, but these BAN actions did not yield a lot of results. When a means turns out not to work anymore, in the sense of bringing in results, you choose another means.'⁸⁶

The activists said that the contact between both groups were not close.⁸⁷ A couple of weeks later, both groups settled their disputes and together they turned their efforts towards Dodewaard.⁸⁸

As noted, the BVD suggested a link between BAN and its reluctance to occupy sites. The agency made this comment without any further explanation, passing over the following information:

- A founder of BAN had taken part in the occupation of the site at Seabrook, USA.
- In September 1980, BAN had occupied a site at Delft.
- The objections of BAN were aimed at the demands of 'Dodewaard-Shuts-Down,' which it saw as unrealistic, and at the timing of the action (the BAN-model had to be more widespread). This preceded the question whether BAN wanted to occupy the site.

The BVD did not explain why these three points were not influential. The agency made suggestions that were contrary to these facts. For more, see the history of the twin-track decision in the following section.

Dodewaard Shuts Down 1980 (DSD'80)

The Power Groups Stop Nuclear Energy of Gelderland – the PGSNE's of Gelderland – took with the Whitsun-camp of May 1980 the initiative for the preparation of DSD'80. The BVD reported on DSD'80:

'However, during the preparation phase of the October action MANE in its entirety proved less radical and resistance-minded than was assumed by MANE circles from their Nijmegen and Amsterdam divisions, who had originally come up with the idea of a lock-in of the precincts. Despite the harsh opinions coming from PGSNE-Nijmegen, from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht grassroots groups and from Onkruid circles, a considerable number of grassroots groups preferred a blockade to lock-in.'⁸⁹

⁸⁵ *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 15-17.

⁸⁶ *Vrij Nederland*, 31 May 1980. Shortly before the Whitsun camp of May 1980, Stomphorst made a similar analysis in *Onderstroom*, May 1980, no. 29, 4-5.

⁸⁷ *Arnhemse Courant*, 27 May 1980.

⁸⁸ In *Onderstroom* – the periodical of the Power Groups of Gelderland, no. 30, June 1980, 14 – overtures were already made. On 22 June of that year, further talks took place. Aim: 'We hope that, among others, these points are talked over and that we now can continue together.'

⁸⁹ Quarterly survey, 30.

Some components of this extract need to be discussed. First, it was the Power Groups Stop Nuclear Energy of Gelderland that – at the Whitsun-camp of 1980 – took the initiative for the preparation of DSD'80. The BVD-passage 'Nijmegen and Amsterdam divisions, who had originally come up with the idea of a lock-in of the precincts' needs correction (or must be further explained by the BVD).

Second, the advocates of a lock-in of the site not only came from the mentioned large cities or from Onkruit. 'Passionate advocates for the occupation of the site were also found in groups from Valburg and Herveld (not from Dodewaard itself, although sympathizers from that place were also present). This was very much a source of satisfaction for the organizers.'⁹⁰ Other advocates for a lock-in were from Het Land van Cuyck and a part of Arnhem (another part was against).⁹¹ Within Nijmegen the women's group objected: 'We do not feel like arming ourselves, to become like the riot police.'⁹²

Third, the BVD correctly wrote on page 29 that during the Whitsun-camp 35 of the 41 groups voted for a lock-in, but the agency only reproduced a part of the decision. In the closing statement of the Power Groups of Gelderland it was recorded that:

- 35 groups wanted a lock-in;
- 4 groups wanted a blockade;
- 2 groups were against the proposal (they wanted to take their concerns to parliament);
- of the 35 groups, 10 wanted to switch to a blockade, because a lock-in was probably not realistic;
- a majority of the groups proposed in the case of 'of it being impossible to occupy the site (as a result of a confrontation with the riot police) to switch to a thorough blockade of all supply roads.'⁹³

MANE already took during the Whitsun-camp the twin-track decision of a lock-in or blockading the plant. The reaction of the authorities was such that it turned out to be a blockade.

Fourth, MANE did not choose a lock-in because of the basic principles of DSD; openness, non-violence, to avoid to be criminated, wide support of the population, grassroots democracy, and the right to resistance.⁹⁴ Such deliberations of this twin-track decision can be found in publications of MANE.⁹⁵

In terms of the four points above, the comment of the BVD – that MANE in its entirety showed that it was not as radical and resistance minded – is beside

⁹⁰ *NRC Handelsblad*, 27 May 1980.

⁹¹ *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 20-21. Debate of the group discussion. Those from Dodewaard stated 'to occupy is the best, for practical reasons a blockade is the most realistic.'

⁹² *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁹⁴ Undated document of the planning group: "Konsept aksieplan 'Dodewaard gaat Dicht,'" 1-2. *Milieudefensie*, June 1980, 4-7. *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 3, 6, and 18. "Handboek 'Dodewaard dicht,'" *Onderstroom*, 1980, 5, 10-15. *de Volkskrant*, 27 May 1980.

⁹⁵ For example in: "Handboek 'Dodewaard dicht,'" *Onderstroom*, 1980, 6-7.

the point. MANE as a whole kept itself to its twin track decision from the beginning. The BVD did not explain the expression 'harsh opinions' other than making a link to an occupation of the site. What the BVD actually did was to represent only half of the twin tracks decision of the Whitsun-camp and subsequently gave an incorrect picture of the toughness of large cities. Because this eventual link is biased and incorrect, strong opinions are classified under the bona fide MANE (10.2.1).

The BVD said that an occupation of a site had until then only been used abroad, and then only at *construction* sites of plants: 'Thus, the Netherlands would be the first to experience the lock-in of a running plant.'⁹⁶

First, as far as it concerned DSD'80, it retained the *idea* of a lock-in. Was this the first time?

Second, it is possible that the actual lock-in of a running plant did happen for the first time, during a *large scale* action. Before DSD'80, a *small scale* lock-in had already taken place on the site of a *running* nuclear power plant – the lock-in by BAN on the site of the Inter-university Reactor Institute at Delft, on 26 September 1980. This action received large media coverage, because the police used a new measure – the square stick. In the weekly *Vrij Nederland*, the heading 'Next time, the riot police will come with garrote chains' was used.⁹⁷ In addition to the wide media coverage, questions were asked in parliament by Van der Spek (PSP).⁹⁸ Despite all this attention, the BVD apparently missed this BAN-action.

The BVD wrote about the ending of DSD'80: 'The action group responsible for the illegal broadcasting station "Radio Aktief" at some point started broadcasting the suggestion to terminate the action.'⁹⁹ This is not correct. BAN-activist Herzberger – and not the group that kept Radio Aktief in the air – spread this message.

Discussions about the end of the action preceded Herzberger's statement. While the majority of activists wanted to end the action, a minority wanted it to continue because the aim of the Dodewaard-Shuts-Down-action had not been reached. This refers to the initial objection of BAN that the aim of the action was not realistic. Herzberger commented that 'this brought the action to a close.' It resulted in an impasse in which the activists had little to say anymore among themselves. Herzberger – originally not a supporter of the large Dodewaard-action – permitted the action to end with his statement. Although a majority shared his opinion, it did lead to protests.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Quarterly survey, 29.

⁹⁷ *Vrij Nederland*, 4 October 1980.

⁹⁸ *Lower House*, session 1980-1981, question 448 of Van der Spek (1 October 1980); appendix, 883; answer Wiegel (6 January 1981).

⁹⁹ Quarterly survey, 31.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Abel Herzberger by the author, 27 May 1993.

Between DSD'80 and DSD'81

The BVD wrote:

'In short, the action [DSD'80] was branded as a "flop" and the "hard-liners" among the activists were given the opportunity to have a more substantial say in the matter.

This resulted in grassroots democracy and -autonomy living up to its promise and in any case the "Dodewaard Shuts Down" movement agreed to organize itself into grassroots groups, while in addition the concept "short-timed, small-scale action" to be organized by individual grassroots groups made its entry.'¹⁰¹

At several points, this extract is incorrect. First, the BVD suggested a link between hard-liners who got a more substantial say and lived well up to the promise of grassroots democracy and -autonomy. The agency made this link in an incorrect way. For a long period, BAN discussed issues by consensus, based on the importance of participation in decision-making processes. It gained considerable experience.¹⁰² Grassroots democracy and -autonomy were definitely not, as the BVD suggested, showpieces of the tough ones (whoever is meant by it). As such, it was correct to state that the grassroots concept was developed more deeply before DSD'81.¹⁰³ The BVD-survey also lacked internal consistency. On pages 30 and 31, the BVD discussed BAN in-depth, followed by an explanation of consensus democracy, grassroots democracy, and grassroots autonomy. In this passage, the BVD apparently was convinced that other groups than the hard-liners, also worked with these concepts.

A second objection concerns the passage 'and in any case the "Dodewaard Shuts Down" movement agreed to organize itself into grassroots groups.' In relation to the preceding sentence, the BVD made it look like that the decision was taken after DSD'80. Actually, this decision was taken before DSD'80, on the preparatory Whitsun-camp of 24-25 May 1980.¹⁰⁴ During the preparation of DSD'80, many DSD-grassroots groups were founded.

Third, the BVD said that the short-timed, small-scale action made its entry *after* DSD'80: 'the concept of a "short-timed, small-scale action" to be organized by individual grassroots groups made its entry.' Before DSD'80, individual grassroots groups already organized short-timed small-scale actions. A week before DSD'80, a consultation on short-timed small-scale actions took place at Amsterdam. Also at the time of DSD'80, there was a consultation on short-timed small-scale actions. During DSD'80, the following short-timed small-scale actions took place: on Saturday, at the castle of the Queen's Commissioner Geertsema; on Monday, at BAM in Kesteren; on Monday-night, at Vihamij-Buttinger in Nijmegen; and on Tuesday, at Kerstens in Elst and Holec.¹⁰⁵ In 'Konsept Aksieplan Deel 2' of the planning group¹⁰⁶ five main

¹⁰¹ Quarterly survey, 31-32. Such a short-timed, small-scale action is called in Dutch: prikactie.

¹⁰² BAN, *Breek Atoomketen Nederland, het Aktiemodel*, 1981, 3, appendix 'Konsensus besluitvorming.'

¹⁰³ Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993.

¹⁰⁴ LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 23.

¹⁰⁵ -, *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 1981, 39-41, 108-110, 126-127.

¹⁰⁶ Undated. This was probably the Amsterdam planning group (-, *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 1981, 108).

points were presented for DSD'80. The fifth point referred to the short-timed small-scale actions: 'To carry out actions elsewhere in the surrounding area' (page 2). A group from Amsterdam gave the following motivation for carrying out short-timed small-scale actions:

"We refuse to be cannon fodder for whatever side. From now on, we have the motto: WISDOM IS BETTER THAN STRENGTH." "Of the three remaining possibilities, we choose the last one.
 - protest demonstration: old hat.
 - demonstration ending in a confrontation through a breakthrough or blockade: we do not want it.
 - smart actions that reflect the seriousness of our intentions and that could create disorder amongst those who control the power machine, or make it look ridiculous."¹⁰⁷

Some of the activists from Amsterdam – a city that the BVD characterized as a hard-liner – had apparently doubts concerning the mass action at Dodewaard.¹⁰⁸

The BVD wrote about the actions against dumping of nuclear waste in 1980 and 1981:

'As early as 1980, a number of activists opposing the transport of light radio-active waste from ECN at Petten to IJmuiden where it had to be transshipped, had shown rather a taste for violence; in 1981 the route from Petten to IJmuiden was divided into one part for non-violent activists and another for those preferring tougher action. Partly as a result of the mounting frustration that their actions were not yielding any direct results and partly due to the fact that MANE actions are not only carried out by "open sandals and woolly socks idealists" but also by radical squatters, Onkruid activists and anarchists, increasing talk of violent actions [...] can be heard within MANE [...].'¹⁰⁹

First, the BVD wrote that *light* radio active waste was dumped. Activists said, however, that not only was low and middle radio-active waste dumped, but also cooled high radio-active waste.¹¹⁰ Did the BVD want to take a position in a discussion on the nature of waste dumped?

Second, the BVD suggested a radicalization and exemplified this by activists who split the route in 1981. In 1980, *Vrije* reported:

'I want to give another example of an action in which, in my opinion, co-operation was good. That was during this spring, at actions concerning the dumping of nuclear waste into the sea. In Petten, BAN-people sat on the ground with their method of non-violent resistance; Onkruid attempted a (failed) blockade; there was a demonstration at the locks; and in the harbor itself, there was a blockade by Greenpeace.'¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Amsterdam planning group quoted in: -, *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 1981, 108.

¹⁰⁸ For a risk analysis, how to interpret short-timed, small-scale actions is of interest. Do you see a short-timed, small-scale action as a way to avoid a possible escalation of violence, or as an indication of a continuing radicalization? The BVD did not deal with this. The agency limited itself to an inaccurate representation of the facts.

¹⁰⁹ Quarterly survey, 34.

¹¹⁰ *Noord Hollands Dagblad*, 23 May 1980.

¹¹¹ *Vrije*, 1980, no. 10, 19. It is referred to the actions against the dumping of 9-10 June 1980. 10 days later, on 20 June, Onkruid carried out their own action against General Shipping. See also: LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 24-25.

Contrary to the suggestion of the BVD, already in June 1980 – this is even before DSD '80 – the route was divided and four different types of actions took place next to each other – a blockade on the road, a barricade on the road, a demonstration, and a blockade on the water in the harbor.

Onkruid

The BVD linked Onkruid to violence against people and objects:

'Partly as a result of the mounting frustration that their actions were not yielding any direct results and partly due to the fact that MANE actions are not only carried out by "open sandals and woolly socks idealists" but also by radical squatters, Onkruid activists and anarchists, increasing talk of violent actions against people and objects directly or indirectly involved in nuclear energy can be heard within MANE.'

Wijnand Duijvendak – in the beginning of the eighties who was active in Onkruid – denies categorically that Onkruid would have advocated violence against people.¹¹² The disputed BVD-statement needs to be supported by evidence or it needs to be reformulated to prevent misunderstanding.

Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers

In 10.2.1, a quote concerning Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers is already discussed for its prognostic aspect.

Joost van Steenis (pre-MANE-period), Red Youth & Red Help

The BVD wrote about Van Steenis: 'He holds a grade in mathematics and physics, which he taught for some time. At the present time he is unemployed.'¹¹³ Van Steenis said, he had studied mathematics, physics, and *chemistry*. The comment on his unemployment is the only information in the BVD-survey that could not be traced from open sources.¹¹⁴

Joost van Steenis – MANE-period

The BVD wrote:

'Thus, in the spring of 1981 on the NC-DSD an old acquaintance suddenly came back into view, in three capacities: Joost van STEENIS who under his own name joined the press group DSD-1981. As "Joost" he submitted a proposal for a program for the action week program, in which 23 September was scheduled as a "high-voltage day," explaining this as follows: "the sawing down and digging out of power pylons, not forgetting the distribution stations. Take a hike into nature and find your own power pylon." In addition, he wanted to act as a provisional

¹¹² Interview with Wijnand Duijvendak by the author, 27 October 1994.

¹¹³ Quarterly survey, 37.

¹¹⁴ In the past, he had applied for a teaching post at a school in The Hague. Van Steenis met all the requirements, but to his surprise he saw the advertisement again in the newspaper some time later. He was neither called nor offered the post. His investigations ended in vagueness. It is possible that he was prevented from pursuing his profession (Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993).

coordination address for short-timed, small-scale actions at electricity companies, power pylons, and suppliers, through PO-box 1005 in Amsterdam.¹¹⁵

Apparently, the BVD did not know that Van Steenis had already participated in DSD'80 and that he was even present during the preparatory National Consultations. In 1979, Van Steenis moved to Amsterdam. He joined the squatters' movement and he became involved in MANE. For his *squatters'* grassroots group in the Amsterdam quarter De Pijp, he subsequently took responsibility for contacts with MANE.¹¹⁶

A short comment regarding 'As "Joost" he submitted a proposal.' It was quite acceptable in MANE, during this time, to use only your first name.

Two other disputed passages on Van Steenis during his activities in MANE are discussed in 10.2.4:

- the statement by the BVD that Van Steenis had a strategy to infiltrate his ideas within MANE (also 10.2.2)
- the representation by the BVD about the relationship between Van Steenis and acts of sabotage and barricades. Among others, it will be shown that the agency incorrectly ascribed a quote in *Vrije* to Van Steenis.

Conclusion

There were a lot of flaws and mistakes in the survey. When we only look at correctness, for example:

- the statement by the BVD that BAN was trained by Americans is exaggerated and colored,
- BAN denied categorically the characterization by the BVD that its games were psycho-therapeutic,
- contrary to what the BVD said, a lock-in of a nuclear plant had already been carried out (by BAN),
- a lock-in was advocated by more groups than large cities and Onkruit,
- the twin-track decision – with the alternative plan of a blockade – had already been taken during the Whitsun-camp,
- the group responsible for 'Radio Aktief' did not spread the ending of DSD'80, but rather BAN-activist Herzberger,
- grassroots democracy and autonomy were not, as the BVD suggested, showpieces of only hard-liners,
- the first short-timed, small-scale actions, to divide the road between Petten and IJmuiden at actions against the dumping of nuclear waste, the founding of DSD-grassroots groups, and the appearance of Van Steenis all happened one year earlier (1980) than the BVD stated (1981),
- the BVD 'expected' acts of sabotage which it already had prior knowledge of from the media (10.2.1),

¹¹⁵ Quarterly survey, 34.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

Table 10.4 Aspects and specific indicators: illustrations on criterion 3

Aspects	Met/ not met +, -	Illustrations
correct	-	all the presented illustrations
complete	-	BAN on DSD-lock-in; comment on MANE & resistance minded; lock-in Delft; short-timed, small-scale action; study Van Steenis; Van Steenis at DSD'80; political goal Van Steenis (10.2.4)
accurate	-	all the presented illustrations
Specific indicators		
sound processing	-	comment on resistance minded; prognosis Gyro Gearloose (10.2.1); quotes <i>Vrije</i> (10.2.4)
take notice of reliability		
unambiguous on certainty	-	<i>light</i> radio active waste; prognosis Gyro Gearloose (10.2.1)
critical on consistency	-	comments on grassroots concept; inconsistencies between surveys (11.1)
pay attention to data lacking	-	many examples, as: BAN on DSD-lock-in; lock-in Delft; split up route dumping 1980
do not ignore deviant data	-	BAN on DSD-lock-in; comment on MANE & resistance minded; lock-in Delft; political goal Van Steenis in <i>Vrije</i> (10.2.4)
aim at denying hypothesis	-	comment on MANE & resistance minded; Van Steenis strategy (10.2.4)
acknowledgment sources	-	quote <i>Vrije</i> – 43-years old, 25 years active (10.2.4)
correct representation viewpoints	-	BAN on DSD-lock-in; comment on MANE & resistance minded; Radio Aktief; quotes <i>Vrije</i> – editorial & contents (10.2.4)

None of the aspects of criterion 3 – correct, complete, and accurate – were met. For eight of the nine specific indicators, several examples can be given in which these were not met.

The many flaws may indicate the absence of any design and method (10.2.1), especially when this is seen in the light of the excellent information position of the agency (10.2.2).

It is striking that almost all examples concern MANE, and Van Steenis' MANE-period. On Van Steenis' past – with 24% of the text, the second largest component of this survey (11.1) – only one minor point can be traced. This gives rise to the assumption that two different authors worked on this text – one on Van Steenis' past, and the other on MANE and Van Steenis' role in it (13.1.2).

Criterion 3 is not met.

10.2.4 Criterion 4 – to be plausible and convincing

Criterion 4	The analysis and presentation of data, arguments, and conclusions needs to be <i>plausible and convincing</i> – replicable and verifiable
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<p>a) <i>information is best and most balanced of that moment;</i></p> <p>b) <i>make unavoidable bias explicit; content of report is consistent; consumer understands what producers mean; producers write what they mean; show what is established knowledge, and what is an underpinned judgment; arguments and information are relevant for conclusion; clear use of reliability and probability; clear structure of the argument and report;</i></p> <p>c) <i>explanatory research: show strength of causal relationships, and plausibility of findings; eliminate alternative explanations;</i></p> <p>d) <i>explanatory & prognostic research: a judgment rests on defined and clarified assumptions;</i></p> <p>e) <i>prognostic research: principle of continuity; argument is made explicit, patterns are drawn; if possible make use of theory</i></p>

A number of comments by the agency included more than one type of failure. To avoid duplication – as in 10.2.3 – all the different aspects of the criterion are discussed in one evaluation per BVD-quote. At the end of this section – by referring to the following examples – it is indicated what aspects and specific indicators were met or not met.

Van Steenis (pre-MANE-period), Red Youth & Red Help

The BVD wrote about Van Steenis' discussion paper on Small Violence:

'This paper received a very bad reception within "Red Help", and resulted in Van STEENIS no longer playing a major part in this group. A point in case is that Van STEENIS, contrary to a number of other members of "Red Help" who were of a lesser political standing, was not invited partake in a stay at a PFLP terrorist training camp at Aden (South-Yemen) in 1976.'¹¹⁷

What did the agency find a case point? That Van Steenis had an argument, and therefore was passed over? Or that he did not join the others at South-Yemen, because this training camp was not in accordance with his opinions on Small Violence? In this passage, the function and aim of mentioning the training camp remains unclear.¹¹⁸ It is unclear for the consumer to understand what the producer intended.

Van Steenis – MANE-period: Small Violence

The final sentence of the BVD-survey was: 'This is possibly the reason why some time ago Van Steenis adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his

¹¹⁷ Quarterly survey, 37.

¹¹⁸ Van Steenis wonders why the BVD mentioned the training camp, and not his visit to China in 1971. For the delegation of the Red Youth, this visit became an ideological letdown: President Nixon visited China and Lin Piao's airplane crashed (Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993. *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 Februari 1985, 5. *Haagse Post*, 9 January 1988, 25).

theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.¹¹⁹ Already in 10.2.2, some attention was paid to this comment in combination with a competing hypothesis. In this section, the focus of attention is on whether it is plausible and convincing.

According to the BVD, the strategy of Van Steenis was ‘to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.’ This passage can be investigated in three ways:

1. Did Van Steenis *want* to infiltrate his theories?
2. Was it *possible* that Van Steenis could infiltrate his ideas?
3. Did Van Steenis *succeed* in infiltrating his theories?

Sub 1. Did Van Steenis want to infiltrate his theories?

The BVD formulated its final sentence in such a way that it assumed a positive answer to the first question. Is this correct? A strategy supposes that there is an intentional way of actions. Van Steenis denies this: ‘It was not an intentional aim.’ At the same time, his concept of Small Violence was still part of his body of ideas. He talked with others about it during Dodewaard.¹²⁰

The BVD may argue that – if Van Steenis denied that this strategy was an intentional aim – this denial is propaganda or deception. Therefore, the intention of Van Steenis is also analyzed by checking other sources, such as *Vrije*. There is a distinction between using a strategy to infiltrate your ideas, and presenting just your opinion. Between these two extremes, there is a sliding scale. What was the position of Van Steenis on this scale? This becomes clear in an article in *Vrije*, from which the BVD paraphrased other passages. After Van Steenis explained that activists had to think about what they could do – for example, against the actions of special, arrest squads – he continued:

‘You must not think, however, that this is a plea to raise a rigid organization, in which all the plans are devised in advance and everyone has a precisely defined task. This would only copy the present societal organization and we would have a power struggle between one power apparatus against the other, without human beings being involved as thinking souls. This is a plea to convince people that if they do something – may be to demonstrate, to blockade, to hunt plain-clothes police officers, to squat, to throw stones, etc. – they will begin to think about it in advance as much as possible about what they can do, both alone and together. This process means that they have to think about their own possibilities, because not everyone wants to throw a stone and not everyone is capable of running equally fast. But the more aware people are in taking part in an action, there is more of an opportunity to bring success.’¹²¹

Van Steenis pleaded for thinking and awareness, but not for infiltrating his own ideas. Van Steenis did not want a rigid organization and he did not force the use of violence upon others.

The agency also wrote that Van Steenis suggested that blockades and short small-scale actions ‘must be organized more systematically for future

¹¹⁹ Quarterly survey, 39.

¹²⁰ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹²¹ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 8.

actions.’¹²² To the extent the consumer of the BVD-survey may assume that systematic meant ‘to prescribe from above’, this impression needs correction. In *Vrije*, Van Steenis advocated for ‘more consultation and especially also more thinking in advance, by people, about what they themselves’ could contribute to the action.¹²³

His statements in *Vrije*, of the preceding month, support the impression that Van Steenis wanted everyone to carry out their own actions. He wrote about the ‘electricity day:’

‘Some will propagate the Giro-blue-action, others will go a bit further and occupy an electricity building [...] In Amsterdam, there are plans to march into fields with hundreds of people, to saw down, with metal saws, the power pylons that bring atomic power to the city.’¹²⁴

The possibility remains open that Van Steenis presented his ideas on Small Violence. His statements, however, tend to indicate an opinion rather than a strategy to infiltrate his theories.

Sub 2. Was it possible that Van Steenis could infiltrate his ideas?

The second question concerns the *possibility* that Van Steenis could infiltrate his ideas. Because there is a negative answer to the first question, this second question has already largely lost its relevance. Three more points however, indicate against this possibility.

First, the ideas of Van Steenis were received with mixed feelings. In the early days of the press group, members even wondered whether he was a provocateur. Finally, they leaned towards the opinion that this was not the case. There was some caution towards Van Steenis. Rob Stomphorst – who like Van Steenis, was also a member of the press group – said: ‘Joost did bring forward Small Violence. The sentiment was “does it have to be this way?” The reaction was reserved, and it took a while before you realized that he meant it seriously.’¹²⁵

Second, one way to infiltrate your ideas is to take over the organization. This is a top-down approach. The success of such a strategy depends both on the effort you can put into it, and on the receptivity of the target group. Attempts by groups to take over organizations that have a rigid organizational structure with an active top and an inactive basis have prospects for success. The CPN, for example, had infiltrated effectively into a number of organizations. In the past, CPN-members occupied strategic posts in organizations led by a small active group with a large inactive basis, such as the Amsterdam student union ASVA (Maagdenhuisbezetting).

¹²² Quarterly survey, 35.

¹²³ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 9.

¹²⁴ *Vrije*, 1981, no. 8, 6. Giro-blue-action: an action, composed of complicated payments of the energy bill by citizens, to bring disarray to the booking systems of energy companies involved in nuclear energy. It was a protest against nuclear energy, especially against the fast breeder at Kalkar (Germany) in which the Netherlands took part in.

¹²⁵ Interview with Rob Stomphorst by the author, 19 April 1993.

What is the difference with MANE? To start with, Van Steenis was – concerning his ideas – a solitary individual in MANE. He did not operate as a group. Therefore, Van Steenis lacked the possibility to occupy, with followers, different posts in order to take over the organization. Furthermore, MANE had a decentralized structure. All over the country, there were more or less autonomous groups that defined their own course. These autonomous groups were composed of people that carried out actions themselves. They were established according to the principle of grassroots democracy. It is much more difficult to take over such a movement than, for example, a student union. Both factors – a solitary individual and the structure of MANE – made a takeover quite unlikely. Although the BVD described elaborately the structure of MANE,¹²⁶ it did not use it in relation to Van Steenis's possible strategy or the likelihood of him being successful to infiltrate his ideas or to take over MANE.

Third, Van Steenis is of the opinion that the aim of bringing MANE into line with the concept of Small Violence was too bold: 'Small Violence was not the model of action of DSD'81. Not because it was not possible to put this forward, but because it was not expedient: DSD'81 was a mass-action [...] I do not have the power to change the other peoples' thoughts.'¹²⁷ This observation links well with the incompatibility of the basic principles of both Dodewaard Shuts Down and the concept of Small Violence. They are opposites (table 10.5).

Table 10.5 Principles and concepts of Dodewaard Shuts Down and Small Violence

Basic principles of Dodewaard Shuts Down	Concept of Small Violence
openness	secrecy
non-violence	violence
to avoid to be criminated	committing criminal acts
large scale mass-action	to carry out actions by small groups
wide support of the population (national and local)	being disconnected from the population

All three arguments – reception, take over capabilities, and conflicting concepts – point towards the same outcome. The *possibility* that Van Steenis could infiltrate his ideas was very low if possible at all.

Sub 3. Did Van Steenis succeed to infiltrate his theories?

With the results of sub 1 and sub 2, the third question – if Van Steenis *succeeded* to infiltrate his theories – seems superfluous. Nevertheless, it is explored by focusing on publications and actions that may hold elements of Small Violence.

¹²⁶ Quarterly survey, 30-32, 36.

¹²⁷ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

The BVD gave no examples of such publications in MANE, although data in relation to this can be found. While Van Steenis did not call for Small Violence in similar publications, some elements of his thinking can still be traced. In *Vrije* No. 8 1981, for example, he revealed the private addresses of Kistemaker, Sickinghe, Goedkoop, Pelser, and Dee. Concerning the last three people he added: 'Just make contact with these gentlemen.'¹²⁸

Also in relation with actions actually carried out, the BVD could have presented data. During DSD'80, Van Steenis drove – for a short small-scale action – to the castle of the Queen's Commissioner Geertsema with a few people.¹²⁹ On 11 April 1981, a Broad Street Debate¹³⁰ was organized before the house of professor Kistemaker.¹³¹ These actions were composed of an element similar to Van Steenis's ideas: they were aimed at people. While Van Steenis not only joined these actions, he more or less arranged them.¹³² They did not match with the concept of Small Violence, in the sense that both actions proceeded quietly and violence was absent.

The BVD appears to have missed the point concerning elements of Small Violence. This impression of misunderstanding is reinforced when the BVD tried to link Van Steenis to acts of sabotage and to riots with the police, even though these did not contain elements of Small Violence. The BVD focused on for example, the Tuesday program of the short small-scale actions of DSD'81. Tuesday was power pylon day (see following heading 'Van Steenis – MANE-period: sabotage and barricades'). The agency should have paid attention to the Monday program instead. Monday was the day of the nuclear lobby.¹³³ Of interest are Van Steenis's notes for the press conference of 19 August 1981 – meant for preparing DSD'81. On his list for the short small-scale actions of Monday – the day of the nuclear lobby – were heads of electricity companies, leading politicians (Geertsema, Van Aardenne), scientists (Kistemaker), and high ranking people from business and finance, 'but also specially recruited people who have to tell lies, such as Van Loon of KEMA and Wasser of public relations GKN.'¹³⁴

¹²⁸ *Vrije*, 1981, no. 8, 5-7. Making this kind of contact is not the same as Small Violence. Also in reputable newspapers, similar calls do occur. An example is the article of Ted Gup in the *International Herald Tribune* of 25 January 1996. Gup could not, after several efforts, contact Idi Amin by phone. Finally, he wrote 'The best I can do is share with the world his home phone number.'

¹²⁹ See also: -, *Met je hoofd in de wolken*, 1981, 109. Minimally during one, but possibly during both the mass-scale blockades of Dodewaard, the castle of Geertsema served as command center of the police.

¹³⁰ The action was paraphrasing the Broad Public Debate – a nation-wide and government-inspired discussion on nuclear energy, that took place at that time.

¹³¹ LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 30.

¹³² Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹³³ *5e Energiekrant*, 2. See also: *De Waarheid*, 18 September 1981.

¹³⁴ Notes by Joost van Steenis for the press conference of 19 August 1981 on DSD'81. The conference was held in the squat De Grootte Keyser at Amsterdam. GKN: company that owned Dodewaard.

KEMA is the Dutch quality-control institute for electrical materials and appliances, like the National Bureau of Standards. Children in the neighborhood of KEMA died because KEMA had been extremely negligent with its nuclear waste on its site. After many years of denials, an employee finally admitted this crime (see, table 9.1, 1978 & 1980. Sources: *Utrechts Nieuwsblad*, 16 December 1978; *de Volkskrant*, 23 December 1978; *De Tijd*, 15 February 1980; *NRC Handelsblad*, 28 February

During DSD'81, hardly any short small-scale action was carried out, even fewer against people, and not one was found that fitted the frame of Small Violence. Van Steenis' ideas could not or hardly be traced within MANE.

Conclusion

To summarize, the agency missed the point. First, the comment from the BVD that Van Steenis 'adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE' is neither based on, nor supported by arguments – and it is also neither plausible nor convincing.

Second, in its presentation the agency missed data that included possible elements of Small Violence – actions and publications aimed at people. The BVD paid attention to sabotage instead, an approach that does not fit with the concept of Small Violence.

Van Steenis – MANE-period: sabotage and barricades

The BVD wrote about the relationship between Van Steenis and sabotage & barricades.¹³⁵ Sabotage and barricades did not fit with the concept of Small Violence. How did the BVD report on this relationship – and did the agency report on this in a plausible and convincing way?

Sabotage

Around DSD'81, there was an increasing number of acts of sabotage against power pylons. Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers claimed these actions. The BVD wrote that Van Steenis presented a plan for actions against power pylons:

'As "Joost" he submitted a proposal for a program for the action week program, in which 23 September was scheduled as a "high-voltage day," explaining this as follows: "the sawing down and digging out of power pylons, not forgetting the distribution stations. Take a hike into nature and find your own power pylon." In addition, he wanted to act as a provisional coordination address for short-timed, small-scale actions at electricity companies, power pylons, and suppliers, through PO-box 1005 in Amsterdam.'¹³⁶

Van Steenis was of the opinion that the possibility of sabotage had to be presented at a National Consultation: 'I represented these people from the concept of a grassroots democracy.'¹³⁷ Press group member Stomphorst commented:

'It was not clear if he consulted supporters, or if there were supporters. There were people who thought the same as he did. He was not afraid to say controversial things, and he also did do

1980; *Haarlems Dagblad*, 25 April 1980; *Algemeen Dagblad*, 26 April 1980; *Haagse Courant*, 26 April 1980; *de Volkskrant*, 26 April 1980; *Brabants Dagblad*, 19 March 1981; *De Gelderlander*, 30 March 1981).

¹³⁵ Quarterly survey, 34 and 36.

¹³⁶ Quarterly survey, 34.

¹³⁷ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

something. Nobody was in a position to tell someone else that they had to leave. He was listened to with mixed feelings [...]. He did not have a wide and solid rank and file. If he was not present, you did not hear this voice, or if you did, the tone was different.’¹³⁸

Van Steenis doubted whether he would have joined this form of sabotage: ‘The violence practiced in MANE did not fit within my range of ideas.’ ‘It [the will to commit acts of sabotage] is present, so you must not reject it. Everyone must be able to carry out actions in their own way.’¹³⁹ In the absence of activists who pleaded for sabotage, Van Steenis presented the possibility of sabotage without necessarily supporting it. From his perspective, it is logical that he looked for other ways than a massive confrontation with the police. As a result, Van Steenis pushed for a thematic day to commit sabotage to power pylons. He did this within the frame of short-timed, small-scale actions, which were supported by others.¹⁴⁰ Van Steenis told *NRC Handelsblad* that on electricity day people would march into the fields to saw down with metal saws power pylons that transported electricity from Dodewaard. This happened during a press conference at which he was the chairperson – the members of the press group took turns at being the chairperson. Fred Gersteling – also a member of the press group – commented: ‘The proposal caught on well with many activists, knowing though that it would not happen.’¹⁴¹

Van Steenis capitalized on what was already going on inside MANE. From 1978 onwards, there were discussions within MANE on the possibility of soft sabotage. The social-democratic party PvdA even took part in these discussions, but it said committing sabotage or occupying a construction site was a boundary that the party would not step over.¹⁴² During the Whitsun-camp for the preparation of DSD’80, the possibilities to commit sabotage at power pylons were also discussed.¹⁴³

As far as the author is informed, no acts of sabotage were committed during DSD’81, but some were carried out during the following weeks. The role of Van Steenis is best described as an informant, in the sense of informing. A consequent course can be traced in the actions of Van Steenis – everyone had to think for themselves, everyone had to carry out their own action.¹⁴⁴

Also in another context, the BVD linked Van Steenis to sabotage. The agency reported that Van Steenis eulogized Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers.¹⁴⁵ Yet, the passage that the BVD is referring to, is not from Van Steenis. It concerns an editorial commentary from *Vrije*.

¹³⁸ Interview with Rob Stomphorst by the author, 19 April 1993.

¹³⁹ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹⁴⁰ Undated document, signed by Joost – grassroots group Amsterdam – de Pijp, 1-2.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993.

¹⁴² *Nijmeegs Universiteitsblad*, no. 3, 12 October 1978. Discussion on a paper presented in September 1978, “Geweldloos weerbaar als basis voor een strategie.”

¹⁴³ *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 18 and 20. Van Steenis was absent here.

¹⁴⁴ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 8. See also preceding heading ‘Van Steenis – MANE-period: Small Violence.’

¹⁴⁵ Quarterly survey, 34.

The BVD quoted, from pages four to nine inclusive, from the October 1981 issue of *Vrije*. Page 4 began with an editorial commentary of *Vrije*, ending with the comment: 'Below, two articles follow on "Dodewaard still shuts down-week by people who were present.'¹⁴⁶ On page 4, an article from an anonymous author began and on page 6 it ended. At the bottom of page 6, the following article started, written by Van Steenis. This article ended on page 9. While the BVD attributed the following to Van Steenis it was not from him:

'In a recent article of the anarchist monthly "De Vrije," Van STEENIS states that "the struggle for the environment against capitalist exploitation of energy sources and against anti-democratic decisions is becoming increasingly vicious." In some respects he compares the activities of MANE activists to the Vietcong struggle against the USA, likening our present Minister of Home Affairs to Goebbels, while eulogizing in the same breath the "Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers."¹⁴⁷

Those who read the article by Van Steenis, will search in vain. All these comments are from the editorial commentary. It is almost incomprehensible that the BVD did not know which text was from Van Steenis, and which was not. First, it was clearly stated in the same editorial commentary that people, who had been at Dodewaard wrote two of the following articles. Second, the BVD only quoted from the editorial commentary (page 4) and the article by Van Steenis (pages 6-9), but the agency entirely overlooked the intermediate article by the anonymous author (pages 4-6).

In the quote, the BVD stated that '[i]n some respects he compares the activities of MANE activists to the Vietcong struggle against the USA.' The agency raised the impression that the struggle of MANE showed some features of a guerrilla warfare. This theme would fit in with the passage of the BVD-survey on Red Youth and Small Violence. This is not correct for two reasons. First – as noted – Van Steenis did not write the passage, but rather it was an editorial commentary. Second, the editorial commentary had a completely different tenor. In *Vrije*, it was written:

'The state began a new way of fighting what they saw as undesirable phenomena. Tear-gas generators.¹⁴⁸ The same that hung under American helicopters in Vietnam to smoke out the resistance. The same that caused many deaths among the Vietnamese civilians. A TNO-researcher (D.M.W. Elskamp), in his study of literature on the use of CS- and CN-gas had never heard of evidence that it caused death. His advice was implemented as policy by [Minister of Home Affairs] Wiegel (more gas, fewer demonstrators). The forbidden tear gas CS has been used! Forbidden in wartime, but used in peacetime, because it is not forbidden explicitly. Plain-clothes officers use tear-gas sprayers to arrest people, or "just" to eliminate them.'¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 4, editorial commentary.

¹⁴⁷ Quarterly survey, 34. This last comment is the one on Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers.

¹⁴⁸ A comment has to be made on the passage in *Vrije* on tear-gas generators. They were most likely fire extinguishers. At Dodewaard, police officers made, among others, use of tear gas hand grenades. These hand grenades were placed on sticks. The police officers also carried fire extinguishers. 'The combination of both pieces of equipment – fire extinguisher on the back and stick in the hand – has probably been the cause for the assumption that tear gas was spread with the use of fire extinguishers' (Letter of 14 December 1981 by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, "De gebeurtenissen bij de demonstratie in Dodewaard in de periode van 19 t/m 22 september 1981," *Lower House*, session 1981-1982, 17240, 10).

¹⁴⁹ *Vrije*, October 1981, 4.

The agency not only ascribed it incorrectly to Van Steenis, but it also gave an extremely tendentious representation. It is an example of deception by the BVD to its consumers to arrive at a particular opinion based on an improper and incorrect use and processing of sources.

The BVD reported on pages 6-9 in *Vrije* (this article was written by Van Steenis): 'In addition, Van Steenis considers MANE only one of the many expressions of social disaffection, all of which have in common the essential struggle for another social and political order. In this respect, he sees no distinction between MANE and the squatters' movement.'¹⁵⁰ The BVD did not give an indication of the composition of this other order. Van Steenis mentioned it in his article:

'I do also think that it reaches beyond nuclear energy [...] The goal of the action is also to aim towards a more small-scale (energy)production, so people are more involved in what they do in their lives. So that the people can determine more what they do themselves, and are less determined, governed, steered, bullied, and unnecessarily kept under tutelage by "above."
The "Dodewaard-Shuts-Down"-movement has precisely come into being from a feeling of discomfort that demonstrating is not sufficient. Something else has to happen! And that something else has to be found in both the aim of the action (for example, to strive for a more small-scale energy production, by which nuclear energy is not possible anymore), and in the method of the action (the use of the model of grassroots democracy, in which all elements are enclosed of another society).'¹⁵¹

According to this quote, the other order was composed of elements such as small-scale production and more involvement of citizens. These elements would not have been out of place in a program of the PPR political party of those days.¹⁵² Also according to the BVD, PPR-ideas were never a danger to the state.

From the same article in *Vrije*, it can be shown how the BVD obtained some of its data. Van Steenis wrote in *Vrije*:

'But without thinking in advance about the usefulness and the aim of actions, I – as a 43-year old person – would not have been able to be active for about 25 years in different movements aimed against the existing social structure.'¹⁵³ [italics supplied]

The BVD wrote in its survey:

'Lately, Joost van Steenis, age 43, for some 25 years actively involved in groups and movements aimed against the existing social structure [...].'¹⁵⁴ [italics supplied]

There is nothing wrong with this paraphrase – although the agency chose now not to refer to *Vrije*, contrary to the other quotes. Because of its other deceptive

¹⁵⁰ Quarterly survey, 35.

¹⁵¹ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 6.

¹⁵² In English: Radical Political Party. It was a left-wing split-off from the center-oriented KVP (Catholic People's Party). The PPR took part in government during 1973-1977. During its period in government, it influenced the decision on the nuclear program to the extent that no new nuclear power plants were built.

¹⁵³ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 7.

¹⁵⁴ Quarterly survey, 37.

paraphrases, however, the agency would have served its consumers better, if it had enclosed the original article of *Vrije*, as this would have prevented many mistakes.

Barricades

Like sabotage, barricades were a form of action that did not fit within the concept of Small Violence. The BVD wrote:

‘[...] Van STEENIS [...] acted as background leader and source of inspiration for the first construction and the repeated reconstructions of barricades at the dikes later on. He knew how to motivate a large number of activists to return time and again with a persistency verging on the fanatic [...].’¹⁵⁵

According to Van Steenis, he was mainly in the press tent. The other members of the press group were more regularly at the barricades.¹⁵⁶ Even if the BVD agreed that this statement by Van Steenis was correct, the agency could still maintain Van Steenis was ‘background leader and source of inspiration,’ because Van Steenis arrived in a truck full of materials for barricades.¹⁵⁷ A few comments on this argument.

First, during the preparation – after long discussions – the option of building barricades was explicitly open.¹⁵⁸ In a number of cities, activists agreed to build these and they collected the necessary materials. These groups were responsible for the construction of barricades. Their own initiative was central to this activity.

Second, Van Steenis criticized activists for taking materials for barricades with them, but, in the period preceding the action, they did not think about what kind of things were needed.¹⁵⁹ This evaluating criticism, which was made after DSD’81, had ended does not indicate that he was background leader and source of inspiration.

Third, Van Steenis wanted another type of confrontation. He wanted to deal with the members of the elite personally, not the riot police. About barricades and riot police, he said: ‘From my ideas on Small Violence, I am not at all in favor of mass-actions. I do not feel at all the need to have people antagonize the riot police time after time.’ In regards to the riot police, he wrote: ‘The riot police is a stick which, if necessary, the ruling class can use to keep the population quiet. During an action, you may try to take that stick away, but the ruling class is always able to make new sticks.’¹⁶⁰

Fourth, as someone had to be in the press tent, which was about a ten minutes walk from the barricades, Van Steenis was present:

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 36.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Rob Stomphorst by the author, 19 April 1993.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 7.

¹⁶⁰ Van Steenis, *De macht van het familiekapitaal en wat ertegen te doen*, 1980, 72.

‘Therefore, it seems physically impossible for me to hustle and bustle them on the dike. How then could I cause a commotion repeatedly on the dike? The BVD has no idea how this action passes off. The BVD thinks groups hustle and bustle other groups. People were hustled and bustled by circumstances, and by the response of the police. If people mount the dike then they are themselves actively involved, not because they are hustled and bustled.’¹⁶¹

Press group member Gersteling confirms this idea: ‘After the response of the riot police [the first afternoon, over 130 activists were wounded], everyone was furious. There was no need for Joost to hustle and bustle them on the dike.’¹⁶²

In short, you cannot say that Van Steenis had nothing to do with barricades, but the role of leader ascribed to him by the BVD is exaggerated. In 10.2.1 ‘Observation and agents,’ the role of PID- and BVD-agent Cees van Lieshout was discussed. At an earlier action at Dodewaard, Van Lieshout remained in the car and incited young activists to badger the security. He behaved like a trainer of these young people. He is more qualified to be ‘the background leader and source of inspiration’ than Van Steenis, a year later at the barricades of DSD’81.

During DSD’81, however, there were situations in which Van Steenis fulfilled a leading role. These are not mentioned by the BVD. One example was on Tuesday morning, 22 September 1981. Van Steenis talked – together with Sible Schöne and a few others – to a crowd that had a negative attitude towards the action. According to Van Steenis, his leading role was composed of:

- keeping the activists in the camp;
- sending the riot police away (who actually retreated);
- talking to the crowd.

His aim was to de-escalate the tensions between activists and the population. Moreover, he had agreed with a group in Amsterdam to guard the camp.¹⁶³ This last information could not have escaped the notice of the BVD. It was written in the article of *Vrije*, which the agency used as a main source for its survey. Van Steenis wrote: ‘After a simple phone call on Monday night to people in my grassroots group, 40 to 50 people with helmets and clubs were ready in de Pijp on Tuesday afternoon to come to Dodewaard to help defend the squatted site.’¹⁶⁴

The response of the authorities also can create leading roles. During DSD’81 – probably during the Sunday night – the Acting Mayor Goldberg visited the camp. He wanted to consult with Van Steenis. Van Steenis, however, wanted to sleep and someone else attended the meeting.¹⁶⁵ It is not that surprising

¹⁶¹ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹⁶² Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993.

¹⁶³ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993. Sible Schöne remembers the discussions with the hostile crowd as taking place on Monday. Not all the dates in this article are correct, for example, the period when Van Thijn was minister of Home Affairs (*NRC Handelsblad*, 23 October 1999).

¹⁶⁴ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 8, 8. The squatted site: the activists camp was built on a squatted site. The farmer who owned the land supported the DSD-action. Therefore, he did not need to ask for permission from the authorities. During the preparation, the authorities had made clear that a permit to build a camp would not be given.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

authorities want to speak to someone who they perceive as radical and influential. In the case an agreement can be reached, it will be accepted more easily by the participants, than agreements reached with a softie. Nevertheless, this may also result in pushing (radical) leaders into organizations that have a grassroots structure, such as MANE. Such a possible result has relevance for a risk analysis – is it desirable that authorities push for a radical, such as Van Steenis, to be a leader? It must also be said that neither Van Steenis, nor the press group as a whole, were in the position to make such an agreement. During the action, the activists took decisions at large grassroots meetings. In this respect, it is interesting that the BVD elaborately described the grassroots structure, and grassroots democracy of MANE, including the autonomy of the grassroots groups. Nevertheless, the agency characterized – incorrectly – Van Steenis as a background *leader*.

In relation to the role of a leader, a final comment is made on the press group. On 17 May 1981, Van Steenis joined the provisional press group. At that time, the press group had to be supplemented with some experienced people from Nijmegen. The activists agreed that the press group should not act on its own. The press group was only responsible for the organizational aspects of the action. Policy issues and the course of actions were discussed at National Consultations. Rob Stomphorst was the permanent chairperson at these National Consultations, The press group had – as central to the action – to give an account to the National Consultation. At every meeting, the function of the press group was a point of discussion.¹⁶⁶ Within the press group, someone from Nijmegen was the permanent chairperson. During press conferences, the members of the press group took turns at being the chairperson.¹⁶⁷ Most of the controversies and tensions within the press groups were aimed at Van Steenis.¹⁶⁸ However, during the preparation phase the atmosphere improved.¹⁶⁹

Conclusion

To summarize, the agency linked Van Steenis to sabotage and barricades in a way that did not confirm the actual relationship. The analysis and presentation by the BVD was neither plausible nor convincing. On several occasions, the presentation was deceptive.

To understand what the producer means; the producer writes what he means

In the survey, in many instances use was made of normative language. When this is combined, for example, with elastic concepts, it may result in phrases in

¹⁶⁶ Minutes Dodewaard-Shuts-Down, meeting 17 May 1981. Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹⁶⁸ In the background, tensions between the (squatters') movement from Amsterdam and Nijmegen were influential.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Fred Gersteling by the author, 14 July 1993.

which it is difficult to understand what the producer means. The opening sentence of the survey is an illustration:

‘Given the strong suspicion that anti-democratic elements attempt to abuse the as such bona fide Movement Against Nuclear Energy for its resistance against the functioning of the parliamentary democracy, meticulous observation and study of these attempts seems desirable.’¹⁷⁰

Concerning the issue of understanding what the producer means, the following comments can be made:

- ‘[T]o abuse the as such bona fide Movement Against Nuclear Energy.’ In Dutch, to abuse – ‘misbruiken’ – means ‘to make a wrong or bad use (of something).’¹⁷¹ What is the BVD focusing on – a lock-in, barricades, acts of sabotage, or Small Violence? After reading the survey, it is not clear whether the BVD also included the first two items.
- ‘[R]esistance against the functioning of the parliamentary democracy.’ This is a catch all concept that raised objections in parliament – both from left and right-wing parties.¹⁷² Was the functioning of the parliamentary democracy at stake when someone strove for small-scale production and more involvement of citizens, such as Van Steenis? Was there resistance against the parliamentary democracy when BAN, carried out actions against decisions it found at odds with democratic values? Or did resistance against parliamentary democracy refer to types of action such as sabotage? These questions remain unanswered in the BVD-survey.
- ‘[O]bservation and study.’ In Dutch, to observe – observeren – means ‘to detect, to notice’ or ‘to spy (on), to watch.’¹⁷³ It includes information obtained from agents such as Cees van Lieshout. This raises a new question when this is combined with elements that strive to abuse MANE. Did the BVD include or exclude the activities of agent Van Lieshout – such as inciting young activists to badger the guards at Dodewaard, against the agreements made within MANE – as a form of abuse?

Normative language combined with disputed facts makes it difficult to understand what the producer means. For example, the BVD stated that it ‘could really not be blamed on Joost’ not ensuring that DSD’81 was sustained¹⁷⁴. ‘Really not to be blamed’ – in Dutch: was echt niet de schuld – is the circumstance that you have done something wrong, refrained from doing something, or was remiss in fulfilling your responsibility.¹⁷⁵ This is contrary to the facts:

¹⁷⁰ Quarterly survey, 29.

¹⁷¹ *Van Dale*, 11th revised print, 1989.

¹⁷² *Lower House*, session 1990-1991, 21819, no. 3, 7: ‘Summarizing, Mr. Dijkstal {conservative-liberal VVD} said that the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence and security agencies {...} increases when the more clear the concepts are defined of “security of the state,” of “democratic legal order,” of “other important interests of the state,” of “maintenance of social life,” etc.’

¹⁷³ *Van Dale*, 11th revised print, 1989.

¹⁷⁴ Quarterly survey, 36.

¹⁷⁵ *Van Dale*, 11th revised print, 1989.

- First, DSD'81 was an action – as the BVD wrote – organized by a movement that held to a grassroots democracy. Therefore, to blame *one* person is not expedient.
- Second, Van Steenis advocated that everyone needed to be aware of the action and to think about their role in it themselves. He did not advocate that the responsibility was on one person. The BVD – not Van Steenis – stated this assumption (see previous section on 'Sabotage').
- Third, the BVD raised the impression that 'the rest wanted to leave, but Joost did want to continue.' Yet, Van Steenis advised activists to leave the camp to head for home. Van Steenis wrote this in the same article of *Vrije*, from which the BVD quoted extensively.¹⁷⁶

The use of the normative word 'blame' is not in line with the facts. The information that falsifies this BVD-characterization is found in an article that the agency quoted from. It is difficult to assess what the BVD meant by it.

Some other examples of normative language – in which it is difficult to understand what the producer means – are already evaluated. These concern issues such as 'strong opinions' and tougher ones' (10.2.1 'Research question and object of investigation;' 10.2.3 'Dodewaard Shuts Down 1980' & 'Between DSD'80 and DSD'81;' and, 10.2.4 'Barricades').¹⁷⁷ In the final sentence, the BVD stated 'This is possibly the reason why some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as MANE.' The formulation implies that the BVD was not completely sure about the *reason* why Van Steenis had turned to a new strategy. Yet, the formulation does imply *that* Van Steenis had turned to a new strategy. Despite this there was no such strategy (10.2.4). The BVD presented a *judgment* as an *established fact*.

In turn, the judgment on future acts of sabotage – 'it is questionable whether we will have seen the last of them' – appears to concern acts of sabotage that the media had already reported on. Here, the BVD presented *established facts* as a *judgment* (10.2.1).

To state an established fact as a judgment – or the other way around – not only hinders the consumer from understanding what is meant, it can also lead to the consumer being deceived, as in the case of the 'expected' acts of sabotage.

¹⁷⁶ *Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 8.

¹⁷⁷ A first additional example is that the BVD linked hard-line activists to Van Steenis in his alleged role as background leader and source of inspiration for the construction of barricades (Quarterly survey, 36). It remains unclear who the BVD had in mind concerning hard-line activists. The BVD risks giving a *reductio ad absurdum* proof, as 'when you were in touch with Van Steenis, you were a hard-line activist.'

A second additional example is that the BVD wrote: 'He knew how to motivate a large number of activists to return time and again with a persistency verging on the fanatic, even when they were being chased away repeatedly with tear gas and long flat truncheons' (Quarterly survey, 36). Van Steenis opposes that he persuaded activists again and again to mount the dike (Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.; see also in the above of this 10.2.4). The BVD linked a normative description – with a persistency verging on fanaticism – as a disputed fact.

Structure

A clear structure of a survey enhances its accessibility and readability. It also supports the producer to stay within the research design. The report on the anti-democratic development within MANE was one of the eight sections of the quarterly survey of 1981. Both the structure of the survey as a whole and the structure of the section on anti-democratic elements within MANE are evaluated.

Structure of the sections in the survey

There was no uniformity between the eight sections of the survey. The first section – six pages on ‘The “Satellite Agencies” in the Netherlands’ – included an introduction and conclusion as did the eight pages long section on ‘The Press Agency Novosti: instrument for the CPSU and the KGB.’¹⁷⁸ The six pages long section on ‘Rapid developments in the CPN’ contained passages that could be interpreted as introductory and concluding in nature, however the layout did not support this clearly. An introduction and a conclusion were absent in the sections ‘Setting out for a progressive majority’ (four pages long) and ‘CVC-summit in Noordwijkerhout (three pages long).’¹⁷⁹ The longest section (eleven pages) – ‘Anti-democratic developments within the Movement Against Nuclear Energy’ – and the four page long ‘Representation Arab League in the Netherlands’ included an introduction, but did not have a conclusion. This latter section was titled, in the index, ‘The Arab League.’ The six pages long survey on ‘Security of Personnel’ had an introduction and its conclusion was presented as ‘Final Remarks.’

Composition of the quarterly survey

The eight sections of the quarterly survey were classified into four categories:

- I. Activities of Foreign Intelligence and Security Agencies.
- II. Anti-democratic Movements.
- III. Minorities – Activism – Terrorism.
- IV. Security.¹⁸⁰

The BVD characterized Novosti as an instrument of the CPSU and the KGB.¹⁸¹ The agency did not classify this as ‘Activities of Foreign Intelligence and Security Agencies,’ but rather within ‘Anti-democratic Movements.’ For an outsider, this categorization appears to be illogical. Articles were classified

¹⁷⁸ CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

¹⁷⁹ CVC: Dutch abbreviation of (Prague) Christian Peace Conference.

¹⁸⁰ Quarterly survey, index.

¹⁸¹ Quarterly survey, 7 and 15.

according to their main topic, by authors that were responsible for this area in the branch.¹⁸²

Structure and narrative style

The section on MANE, did not include a conclusion. This is caused by both the absence of the article having a clear structure and the narrative style of the survey. Until 1990 – as noted – the narrative style was the dominant feature at the BVD (10.2.1 ‘Research design’).

In 4.1.2, six less optimal writing strategies were presented. It cannot be assessed whether these less optimal writing strategies have played a role. Specific information is lacking to analyze this further.

Structure and argumentation

There were serious flaws in a number of the crucial argumentations such as the link between Small Violence and the concept of MANE, between Van Steenis and sabotage, and between Van Steenis and barricades. Besides representing data incorrectly there was also no structure in the argument presented. For example the BVD completely ignored the description of MANE’s grassroots structure when it discussed the possibility of an infiltration of Small Violence within MANE. A structure – as in the Toulmin-model (4.2.1 ‘Structure’) – would have had resulted in a more focused argument.

Conclusion

The survey was not convincing and plausible in terms of the three main links made – the link between the concept of MANE and Small Violence (intention, possibility & actual); between Van Steenis and sabotage; and between Van Steenis and barricades (including his role as leader). In discussing these links, the BVD was, in several instances deceptive towards its consumers.

The poor quality of these three links is felt even more, as these comprise the crucial elements in a risk and threat analysis. Risk and threat analyses belong to the core business of the agency. It is worrying that the agency was not capable of describing even one of these links accurately.

To obtain a better quality, a Review Section could play a role. The answers on the Review Section’s questions could provide the following (2.3.1):

- *Question 1. Does the conclusion of the assessment arise from the available data?* No. The concluding sentence of the BVD – that Van Steenis had the strategy to try and infiltrate Small Violence within MANE – is an inaccurate assumption. In relation to MANE, the data on Van Steenis focused on sabotage and barricades, rather than Small Violence.

¹⁸² Compare: notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

- *Question 2. Is another legitimate conclusion possible?* Yes. You could conclude that Van Steenis did not have such a strategy, and even if he did his chance of success was almost nil (incompatibility of the concepts of MANE and Small Violence & lack of capabilities). Concerning radicalization, the BVD could have drawn conclusions about the role of and the room to act available to its own authorities (compare 11.3).
- *Question 3. Has all relevant data been taken into account (3A), and are the facts that have not been taken into consideration capable of altering the product's basic premises (3B)?* 3A: No. The political aims of Van Steenis (in *Vrije*); actions against Kistemaker and Geertsema; and the basic principles of DSD, of Small Violence, and of the authorities at Dodewaard (11.1) are absent. 3B: Yes, the facts mentioned in 10.2.4 would have altered the premise that Van Steenis had a strategy to try and infiltrate his ideas within MANE.
- *Question 4. Do the conclusions exaggerate or underrate the description of the situation?* In its concluding sentence, the BVD exaggerated that Van Steenis had a strategy to try and infiltrate his ideas within MANE.¹⁸³

The use of normative and vague language hindered the consumer in understanding what the producer meant. This language was often interspersed with inaccurate information.

A structure was absent, both in the composition of the survey and within the argument put forward.

The two aspects of criterion 4 – being plausible and convincing – were not met. For all of the applicable specific indicators, one or more illustrations can be given that these were not met.

It is striking that, all the main aspects in which this criterion was not met concerned Van Steenis' role in and with MANE. As in 10.2.3, only a few minor mistakes were made concerning Van Steenis' past – totaling 24% of the second largest component of the survey. This leads to an assumption that two different authors worked on this text – one on Van Steenis' past, and the other on MANE and Van Steenis' role within it (13.1.2).

Criterion 4 is not met.

¹⁸³ In 11.1, the elements are presented to answer the fifth question:

Question 5. Are there incongruities between two products that deal with the same issue? Yes. the BVD described in the Monthly survey 4 of 1977 Small Violence more accurately (only referring to the Red Brigades) than in the Quarterly survey 4 of 1981. In the Quarterly survey 4 of 1981, MANE was bona fide, but in the Quarterly survey 3 of 1982 it was suddenly a part of the scene against the democratic legal order. In the Quarterly survey 4 of 1981, the BVD linked Van Steenis only vaguely to the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule, contrary to concrete statements made in the Monthly survey 5 of 1977.

Table 10.6¹⁸⁴
Aspects and specific indicators: illustrations on criterion 4

Aspects	Met/ not met +, -	Illustrations
plausible	-	links: concepts MANE-Small Violence, Van Steenis-sabotage & Van Steenis-barricades
convincing	-	links: concepts MANE-Small Violence, Van Steenis-sabotage & Van Steenis-barricades
Specific indicators		
explicit bias	-	quotes <i>Vrije</i> : Vietnamese guerrilla & political goal Van Steenis
consistent content	-	grassroots MANE & possible strategy of Van Steenis; grassroots MANE & leader Van Steenis; classification of four sections of the survey (Novosti); between surveys (11.1)
consumer understands	-	Van Steenis not present in Yemen; editorial quote <i>Vrije</i> ; who abuses MANE; what is resistance; blaming Joost; harsh opinions & hard-liners
producer means writing	-	quotes <i>Vrije</i> : editorial and contents
show established knowledge	-	expected acts of sabotage
show underpinned judgment	-	intentional strategy Van Steenis
info relevant for conclusion	-	info on electricity day or on actions against Geertsema/Kistemaker
clear use reliability & probability	-	Van Steenis intentions; Van Steenis' leading role at barricades
clear structure	-	differences in composition of each section survey; composition of MANE-Van Steenis section; structure of argument

¹⁸⁴ From the specific indicators, only the applicable ones are mentioned. The prognostic comment on expected acts of sabotage, for example, was of such a nature it cannot be used to check all those indicators.

10.2.5 Criterion 5 – to be of relevance for the consumer

Criterion 5	The information, conclusions, and options presented need to be of relevance for the consumer it is written for
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<i>a) policy relevant: directed towards danger, threats, and risks;</i> <i>b) report: being in time, brief, clear & direct;</i> <i>c) explain what is unknown; support statements by arguments;</i> <i>d) explanatory research: present cause-and-effect patterns;</i> <i>e) prognostic research: sketch possibilities of (width of) future developments, indicate factors that can be manipulated; be aware of relevant forces & speed of intervention</i>

A number of elements are evaluated to assess whether the survey was of relevance for the consumer. These elements indicate that the survey was not as policy relevant as it could have been:

- The BVD did not use relevant material to underpin (or to falsify) a number of its assumptions and arguments (10.2.4).
- The agency used vague language, mixed with disputed data, which resulted in unclear and convoluted text (10.2.4).
- The majority of the text of the survey (67%) did not focus on what the BVD agreed to record – that is it focused on MANE itself (43%) and Van Steenis's *past* (24%), rather than on anti-democratic elements within MANE.¹⁸⁵
- In the survey, no insight was given on aspects that the authorities could influence most – their own room to act and the impact of their own actions – from which cause-and-effect patterns could have been drawn (compare 11.3).

The report by the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix – which led to the reorganization of the agency in 1990 – makes it clear that the absence of a policy relevant orientation was more widespread in the BVD than just in the case of the quarterly survey: ‘the wishes of consumers and the usefulness for them of the information collected was insufficiently taken into account; collecting has become more than desirable a goal in itself.’¹⁸⁶ A former head of the BVD – De Haan – explained: ‘Through the years, this file expanded into an inconvenient and incoherent entity, by which its practical utility has been reduced substantially.’¹⁸⁷

Not only in the collection, but also in the presentation, the general BVD-approach did not contribute to writing policy relevant reports. Already under the first head of the BVD, Einthoven, the agency was of the opinion that ‘if we write down the facts, then the readers can draw their conclusions.’ In retrospect,

¹⁸⁵ 11.1.

¹⁸⁶ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 14.

¹⁸⁷ *de Volkskrant*, 9 November 1991.

Engelen said this thought 'was maybe somewhat naive.' Before 1990, recommendations were not part of company philosophy.¹⁸⁸

In the 1990's, the BVD dropped the narrative style and turned to an analytical style to undertake risk, security, and threat analyses.¹⁸⁹ Nowadays, the agency draws conclusions and makes recommendations. BVD-reports have become more future oriented. After 1990, the benefit of BVD-reports reflected an 'expertise, especially in the field of the capability to predict the development of threats and the societal ability to resist.'¹⁹⁰

Prognostic elements

Prognostic elements help to enhance the policy relevance of a survey. Three prognostic elements are now discussed.

First, the previously mentioned 'expected' acts of sabotage by Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers that were actually established facts (10.2.1). Second, the assessment of the possible infiltration of Small Violence within MANE which was the central concern of this survey. In 10.2.4, this possibility was assessed as very small. As the probability of a infiltration by Small Violence was very small, a third element becomes of interest. What would happen if Van Steenis and the (MANE-) scene went separate ways?

In the material, consulted by the BVD, the elements to assess more or less Van Steenis' possible future attitude are present. Such an analysis requires Van Steenis political aspirations and the way in which he hopes to achieve this political end – his strategic goal and objective. The strategic goal is subordinate to the political end since it is the means to reach the political end.¹⁹¹

Van Steenis's political end changed drastically during the second half of the seventies. During his time in Red Flag, Red Youth, and Red Help, his political goal was in line with Maoism. Then it changed. During his period within the squatters' movement and MANE, his political goal was a mixture of working on small-scale societal issues and participation, with a focus on individual thinking and individual responsibility for your actions (10.2.4). These successive political ends were characteristic for the successive groups Van Steenis was active in. These successive political ends of Van Steenis are, however, quite contradictory: 1) large-scale Maoism is diametrically opposed to a small-scale society; 2) to focus on individual thinking and individual responsibility for your own actions is quite the opposite of Maoism which is oriented towards a collective philosophy.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996. The exception to this general practice was the analyses of the small Foreign Policy Staff (11.3.3).

¹⁸⁹ Besides, the BVD produces official reports for the Public Prosecutor. *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 1-2, 15, 51, and 58.

¹⁹⁰ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 21.

¹⁹¹ In publications on war – as by Von Clausewitz – this distinction is known as 'Ziel' and 'Zweck.' 'Das Ziel' is the strategic objective of the confrontation. 'Der Zweck' is the ultimate political end. (Aron, *Clausewitz*, 1983, 61. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 1966, 888, 907, 909). The distinction between these two constructs – Ziel and Zweck – showed to be useful even to analyze a non-violent conflict (De Valk, "Meccanismi della nonviolenza," *La Nonviolenza come Strategia di Mutamento Sociale*, 1992, 154-175).

Although his political end changed drastically, his strategic goal – the way he wanted to reach his political ends – remained more constant. His violent revolutionary concept changed to a moderate violent guerrilla concept – Small Violence which he developed. This concept targeted the elite through harassment.

While Van Steenis changed his political end the strategic goal, albeit subordinated remained unchanged. Attempting to win a conflict for a completely different political end, but by still using the same strategic concept, does create doubts about its effectiveness and efficiency.¹⁹²

Although Van Steenis changed groups, he remained steadfast to the concept of Small Violence. This leads to two hypotheses. One relates to his psychological nature in which it can be hypothesized that Van Steenis's change of ideas stems from his need to find a new home for his activism. When he joined the squatters' movement and MANE, he was in a situation in which both these movements did not share his political views (Maoism) and his strategic concept (Small Violence). To gain a better rapport – the underlying argument of this hypothesis – he could either change his political ends or his strategic views. A hypothesis may be 'as long as he remained steadfast to Small Violence, Van Steenis was even willing to change his most important goal, namely his political end.' If so, this indicates Van Steenis's extent of opportunism (to be willing to change his political ends), but also the limits of his opportunism (to remain steadfast to Small Violence, the concept he had developed himself).

A second hypothesis deals with his future behavior if the squatters' movement and MANE ever ceased to exist – or whether he would be expelled from it (9.3). How would Van Steenis react? An element in this assessment is his tenacity to his strategic concept of Small Violence. A hypothesis could be 'as Small Violence is in its essence a revolutionary concept, it is likely he will move towards a more revolutionary political end, once he discontinued his activism within the squatters' movement and MANE.' The change to a more revolutionary political end in the future – the underlying argument of this hypothesis – is likely to be caused by cognitive dissonance reduction. If other information confirms this hypothesis, a warning has to be given as soon as he leaves the squatters' movement and MANE (10.2.6).¹⁹³

The survey focused on Van Steenis and his role in MANE. Generally spoken, three fields of information are vital for such an overall analysis: 1) a political-strategic analysis – including the capabilities of the parties involved, 2) a description of the

¹⁹² Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 1966, 888. See also Clausewitz' letter of 22-12-1827 to major G. von Roeder (Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 1966, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers 280, 1119-1120).

¹⁹³ Many years after he left the movement, in September 2000, Van Steenis wrote on his website: 'I never had any sympathy for the many groups, which restricted themselves to peaceful actions (...)' (<http://members.ams.chello.nl/steenis/whoisjoostvansteenishtm>).

There is a clear difference in tenor compared to a statement he made when he was in the scene. Then he made a plea 'to convince people that if they do something [...] they will begin to think about it in advance as much as possible about what they can do, both alone and together. This process means that they have to think about their own possibilities [...] the more aware people are in taking part in an action, there is more of an opportunity to bring success' (*Vrije*, October 1981, no. 9, 8).

interests, and 3) an estimate of the intentions.¹⁹⁴ An evaluation of these aspects is likely to yield policy relevant results.

Conclusion

The applicable specific indicators were not met. Too many mistakes were made on analyzing possible threats and risks. The quarterly survey was not focused, only one-third of the total of the survey was on the issue that the BVD agreed to record. In addition, relevant material was not included. The style of the survey was narrative, not analytical. Statements were not supported sufficiently by robust arguments. Essential cause-and-effect patterns were absent.

The specific indicator of being in time has less relevance for the quarterly survey. The comment that the BVD made about ‘expected’ acts of sabotage, when it already had prior knowledge, illustrates that this indicator was not met. Apart from this, no other attempt was made at using data to assess future developments.

The survey contained on one hand too much material that did not have relevance for the consumer, and on the other hand overlooked information that would have been of relevance. The main aspect of criterion 5 was not met. For each of the applicable specific indicators, examples can be given in which these were not met.

Criterion 5 is not met.

10.2.6 Criterion 6 – warning

Criterion 6	The timely and well-urged <i>warning</i> makes clear the nature, gravity, duration, and timing of the threat, as well as the likelihood the threat will become reality
<i>Specific indicators</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a) warn when evidence is a reasonable basis for action, not when harm will occur; do not only warn, but also urge that measures are taken;</i> <i>b) danger is not a product of the imagination; avoid bias of worst-case scenarios; a warning is not a summing up of all the dangers possible;</i> <i>c) indicate nature, gravity, probability of occurrence, timing, and duration; which indicators are available to observe a threat; what are the intentions of the opponent; is the threat unambiguous, or does an opponent’s actions serve other purposes; is a threat mandatory or optional</i> <i>d) make recommendations</i>

Criterion 6 is not applicable, as the survey was not intended as a warning.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ The three main fields of information cannot only be found in intelligence and security agency reports but also in related military literature. You can find these elements in, for example, J.D. Singer’s formula on the relative effectiveness of a deterrence system (D): D = estimated capabilities x estimated intentions. For non-military concepts of conflicts, Johan Niezing converted this formula. He defined the effectiveness (E) as the product of instrumental conditions (IC) and psychological conditions (PC), both as perceives by the opponent (ES). In short: E = (IC x PC) ES (Niezing, “Modeling Utopia,” *Research on Civilian-Based Defence*, 1996, 76-85).

10.2.7 Conclusion

To summarize the conclusions of the previous sections the first, third, fourth and fifth criterion were not met. However, the second criterion was met concerning the descriptive, but not concerning the explanatory part. The sixth criterion was not applicable. None of the applicable specific indicators were met – except for only one of the nine specific indicators of criterion 3. This concludes that the quality of the BVD-survey was inferior.

Some results of this case study raise concerns. First, the survey included misleading elements – such as the predicted acts of sabotage and the paraphrasing from *Vrije* (on MANE and Vietnam). As noted in 4.1.2, to be misleading is the worst criticism possible. You may lose your credibility.

Second, the results of this case study show that the author of the survey did not master even the most elementary skills that are characteristic for this discipline. The excellent information position of the BVD (10.2.2) strengthens this impression.

Third, the BVD-survey may contribute, intentionally or unintentionally, to marginalize people and groups that have been described.¹⁹⁶

To marginalize

The BVD visualized an atmosphere of radicalization between DSD'80 and DSD'81. The agency did so by incorrectly allowing matters to take place in 1981, whereas in 1980 they intervened – for example the first short-timed, small-scale actions; the first time of dividing the road between Petten and IJmuiden at actions against the dumping of nuclear waste; the founding of DSD-grassroots groups; and the first appearance of Van Steenis. There is a bias in the BVD-survey – the appearance of Van Steenis is incorrectly recorded as coinciding with radicalization and concerning this radicalization BVD made incorrect suggestions on Van Steenis, and concerning guerrilla warfare.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ When the BVD-report had been an intelligence estimate, a negative warning could have been given on the possibility of the infiltration of Small Violence within the MANE. A recommendation should also have been made to pay extra attention to possible changes in Van Steenis's political ends – and behavior – as soon as he left the squatters' movement and MANE (10.2.5).

¹⁹⁶ In his sociological study, Van Reenen distinguishes a soft and a hard strategy to marginalize. The soft version is directed at condemning acts. The hard version is composed of ascribing negative characteristics to a group. For more: Van Reenen, *Overheidsgeweld*, 1979, 39.

¹⁹⁷ There was a radicalization between DSD'80 and DSD'81 though. Among some activists, there was a frustration that they were not successful. The BVD put this correctly. There was a militant atmosphere. The blockade of DSD'81 had to be more effective and it had to take less the nature of a demonstration. A number of matters were less well dealt with by the BVD. The possibility to build barricades was presented more explicit for DSD'81, but this was in principle also possible for DSD'80 (minutes DSD-meeting, 8 October 1980, 2.). The same goes for the possibility to block the river Waal. The BVD only mentioned this for DSD'81, but activists also discussed it for DSD'80 (this happened at the Whitsun camp of 24-25 May 1980 {*Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 19}). The pasture to raise the camp was squatted (quarterly survey, 33) with the assent of the farmer who owned it (not mentioned by the BVD). Official permission was not possible for legal reasons. The plan to occupy the site was definitely off for DSD'81. In that respect, even a de-escalation was the case.

The BVD wrote, in contrast to the facts, that Van Steenis had made a comparison between MANE and the Vietcong. The agency also linked him, in an incorrect way, to sabotage and barricades – as ‘background leader and source of inspiration’ in a role in which he ‘knew to how to motivate a large number of activists to return time and again with a persistency verging on the fanatic.’ On the other hand, the BVD did not mention the moderate political ends of Van Steenis – of being committed to small-scale activities and to more citizen involvement – which were recorded in *Vrije* from which the agency quoted from.

Elements of a strategy to marginalize can also be traced concerning other groups. The BVD linked, for example, BAN to psycho-therapeutic games (BAN challenges BVD’s characterization ‘psycho-therapeutic’) and training undertaken by Americans (incorrect). The BVD raised the impression that there was an atmosphere of brainwashing by foreigners.

The BVD also missed a number of relevant insights by leaving out the role of the authorities. In 1981, the tougher actions of the police contributed to radicalization. The role of agents and provocateurs makes the issue of a strategy to marginalize even more relevant. Agent and provocateur Van Lieshout, for example, incited young activists – contrary to the agreements made within MANE – to badger the guards at the nuclear power plant at Dodewaard. This way, the BVD may – probably unintentionally – contributed to developments that the agency subsequently judged as negative. Through such a combination of marginalizing and provoking, a risk of the agency producing a self-serving report was created.

The strategy to marginalize has a twofold function; ‘the isolation of a – politically seen – threatening group from the rest of the population, in order to make it politically not dangerous, and as an extra justification for intended or prior violent actions from the authorities.’¹⁹⁸ Because the author of the BVD-survey did not master the basic techniques of writing a survey, it is assumed that to marginalize people and groups that were described was unintentional, and rather a by-product of other mistakes and failures made in the survey.

For the period between DSD’80 and DSD’81, I would like to link this radicalization to items such as: 1) symbolic or effective blockade (during the preparation of DSD’81, the feeling dominated that this action had to be more far-reaching than DSD’80. DSD’80 had been ‘too much a demonstration-model’); 2) fundamental nonviolence or in principle non-violent; and, 3) the policy of the authorities and of the police towards the activists. For more on the discussion on nonviolence and on the policy of the police, see De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 147-152, 154-157).

The biggest watershed of radicalization – bigger than any shift between DSD’80 and DSD’81 – took place in 1979 by bona fide BAN. It was a watershed for two reasons. First, there was the means. BAN started in an organized structure with direct actions. Second, there was the reason to use this means: the lack of confidence in the parliamentary decision making. BAN did not direct itself to decision making bodies, but it trusted on its own power.

¹⁹⁸ Van Reenen, *Overheidsgeweld*, 1979, 39.

11 Quality – complementary elements

What complementary evidence on quality can be found? Unlike the case of the SRB, only one completed survey was evaluated. Because the BVD did not publish its findings, its effect and impact is almost impossible to trace. In these two respects, this chapter will differ from its corresponding chapter which focused on the SRB (chapter 8). Other elements, however, still can be evaluated and compared. This chapter focuses on the complementary evidence that provides extra information on the quality of the BVD-survey.

In 11.1, the issues that the BVD reported on are evaluated. Other BVD-surveys on the same issue are also considered, even though they are incomplete because they were obtained officially following a FOIA-request. This limits the possibilities of an in-depth comparison between the surveys, compared to the SRB-case.

In 11.2, the quality of the basic files at Directorate B is evaluated. As the basic files on which the quarterly survey were based were not available for this research, an overview of their quality will be discussed as circumstantial evidence. It may help to gain additional insight into the relationship between the excellent information position of the BVD (10.2.2) and the poor quality of the quarterly survey will also be explored (10.2.7).

In 11.3, the BVD-survey written by Directorate B and other reports about the 1981 action at Dodewaard will be compared. To provide a more in-depth cross-case analysis other BVD-reports are also discussed – from Directorate B and the Foreign Policy Staff.

While complementary material is available to judge the quality of the BVD-survey it needs to be evaluated from perspectives that for various reasons cannot be incorporated in the standard of chapter 5.¹

11.1 ISSUES REPORTED ON & SUCCESSIVE SURVEYS

Which issues did the BVD report on in its survey? How was this related to the agreed task? What can be learnt when the released parts of successive surveys are compared?

Issues reported on

Whether the SRB wrote on the issues that it promised to report on is assessed. To report on the agreed issues is related to the criteria of 7.2. It follows naturally from the line of the specific indicator on the structure (criterion 2), and it is linked to the issue of clear and direct reporting (criterion 5). It is not included in the criteria because it is not as directly related to quality as criteria 2 and 5, but

¹ For an explanation of these various reasons, see the introduction of chapter 8.

rather provides an additional overview of the structure of reports and the clear and direct reporting by the BVD.

The agency operated within a legal setting of tasks. In its opening sentence, the issue that the BVD agreed to write on fell within this legal setting of tasks – to investigate the anti-democratic elements within MANE (10.2.1).

The BVD-survey was composed of a number of items. The percentages of these items as part of the total text are presented in the following table 11.1.

Table 11.1 Items in order of size
(*in italics: to describe anti-democratic elements within MANE*)

Subject of BVD: anti-democratic developments within MANE (if this applies to a sub-issue, this is printed in italic)	percentage
• description of DSD, BAN, and National Consultations	43
• history of Van Steenis before his appearance in MANE	24
• <i>linking of Van Steenis to MANE and his role in MANE</i>	21
• <i>sabotage (Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers) and the connection with Onkruid</i>	6
• <i>linking of violence and radicalization of means to MANE</i>	4
• <i>Introduction</i>	1
• <i>formulation of the strategy of Van Steenis in MANE</i>	1
	100

The BVD set itself the task to write about anti-democratic elements within MANE. The two largest items of this survey, however, were outside the scope of this task. First, there was the description of ‘bona fide’ MANE (43%), and second there was an historical section on Van Steenis before his appearance in MANE (24%). Both items served as background information. This means that 67% of the text was background information. Only 33% of the text was on the task that the BVD had set itself – the five smallest items. The ratio between the agreed issue (33%) and background information (67%) does not seem reasonable.²

There are more imbalances. First, the BVD devoted 45% of the text to solely one of the five anti-democratic elements (Van Steenis: 24% on his past and 21% on his role in MANE). This contrasts sharply with the 10% for the other four anti-democratic elements (6% on Gyro Gearloose and Onkruid, and 4% on radical squatters and anarchists). In those years, the BVD reported on all the mentioned anti democratic groups – so differences in reporting cannot explain this imbalance.³

Second, the agency wrote in detail on bona fide groups, covering aspects such as 1) action objects, 2) methods, and 3) structure of the group. This differs

² To compare: in the SRB-reports, between 66 and 87.5% of the text was on the primary objectives (8.1).

³ BVD, “‘Klein Geweld’ in Nederland,” Monthly survey 4, 1977, 10-12; BVD, “Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur (VAW),” Monthly survey 5, 1977, 24-25. BVD, (title of report unknown, as it was not released), Quarterly survey 2, 1980, 32-34. BVD, (title of report unknown, as it was not released), Quarterly survey 2, 1981, 38-39. BVD, (title of report unknown, as it was not released), Quarterly survey 3, 1982, 29-31. See reference to a 1982 BVD-survey on Onkruid in: *Dossier CID*, report by the Section Security, Desk B-1, minutes with the actions commander, 10 June 1982 at The Hague. Moreover, a reference to a BVD-survey on Onkruid is found in: LUID, ISAM 6/84, III 8.

from groups that the BVD characterized as anti-democratic. Concerning three of the five anti-democratic elements – Onkruid, radical squatters, and specific groups of anarchists – no concrete statements were made. Only some suggestions were made. For example, a *possible* link was suggested to Gyro Gearloose. In vague terms – and without examples – the BVD linked disturbances during actions against dumping of nuclear waste to these groups. The agency only presented, in the case of Van Steenis, a similar detailed picture as it did in the case of the bona fide groups.⁴

Third, there is an imbalance in the choice of people mentioned by name. The people named in the survey are: John Hontelez, Hans Wiegel, Joost van Steenis, Ed. van Thijn ('our present Minister of Home Affairs'), Henk Wubben, Lucien van Hoesel, Tom de Booy, Rob Groenhuijzen, and Machteld Rietveld. Two of these people represented authorities. Naming two ministers of Home Affairs is not surprising since the BVD referred to them in context of MANE. Naming Van Steenis speaks for itself. Slightly less logical was the naming of Hontelez. While he is not perceived as an anti-democratic element, he can be identified without being an object of investigation. The remaining five names all belonged to the *past* of Van Steenis. In short, of the nine people mentioned by name, only one was connected to an anti-democratic element within MANE – the issue that the BVD agreed to write about.

Successive surveys

The possibility to compare successive surveys is limited, because the surveys obtained under the Dutch FOIA-act are incomplete and no indication is given as to what and how much text is deleted, or for what reason. Therefore, comparing how the same groups or developments that are presented in successive surveys are limited. Where there are incongruities, these are discussed.

Small Violence

Van Steenis developed the concept of Small Violence. The concept of Small Violence was aimed at targeting the ruling elite, but not properties or the riot police.⁵ Contrary to the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), he did not want to use heavy violence against people, but so-called soft violence or Small Violence. This is best described as continuous and nerve-racking harassments.⁶

The BVD wrote concerning Small Violence: 'The analogy with the methodology of the "Red Brigades" and the RAF is evident here.'⁷ Is it logical to mention the RAF? At a Red Youth-meeting, Van Steenis stated that the German approach (the RAF) was at a dead end. There was a discussion about

⁴ For more see: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 167-169.

⁵ Those in charge at the police may also be a target of Small Violence.

⁶ *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 February 1985, 5. Van Steenis, *De macht van het familiekapitaal en wat ertegen te doen*, 1980, 72.

⁷ Quarterly survey, 38. Red Brigades: left-wing Italian terror-organization (Brigate Rosse).

how an armed resistance should take shape. Van Steenis tended to hold to the view of the Red Brigades – to deal with the elite here and now, then the rest would follow as a matter of course. According to this perspective, he saw himself less a First World-representative of the struggle in the Third World, as the RAF did. The RAF followed this Third World-course particularly during its formative years. However, Van Steenis did not want to follow the RAF-concept, in which you ‘had to be 150% a fighter.’⁸

It may look like splitting words to say that the BVD would have been more accurate if the agency had not mentioned the RAF. The BVD did not mention the RAF, however, in an earlier survey (1977) titled “Small Violence” in the Netherlands: ‘This means – so the discussion paper – that they, as analogous with the Italian Red Brigades, want to deal with “power in the form of people.”’⁹ The BVD provisionally concluded in this survey:

‘A provisional conclusion is that a series of “attacks” with fire bombs, Molotov cocktails, stones, and the like entirely fits in the concept of Small Violence, which has been adapted in the Dutch context by Joost van STEENIS – inspired by the Italian Red Brigades.’¹⁰

This 1977-survey is more accurate than the later description of 1981, in which the agency also included the RAF.

The Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule

In the 1981-survey, the BVD wrote that Van Steenis at least was the spiritual father of the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule.¹¹ The agency did not mention any clearer connection than this. At the end of the 1970’s, Van Steenis was a candidate for the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule that had joined the election as a political party.¹² Earlier, the agency had elaborately reported on the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule in survey 5 (1977), in which it reported on the elections for the Lower House of 25 May of that year. It was reported that the Alliance had taken part in this election, and had received 4172 votes. The BVD also described Van Steenis’ role, made a link to his concept of Small Violence, and referred to the local celebrities of the Alliance.¹³ While the BVD reported concrete links in survey 5 (1977), four years later in 1981, it only reported a weak link.

Concerning the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule, in 1977, BVD reports also were inconsistent. In survey 4 (1977) – that preceded survey 5 (1977) by one month – the agency wrote that the Alliance ‘keeps completely silent’ about its members.¹⁴ However, the lists of the candidates for the different

⁸ Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

⁹ BVD, “‘Klein Geweld’ in Nederland,” Monthly survey 4, 1977, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹¹ Quarterly survey, 38. Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule, in Dutch: Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur (VAW).

¹² Interview with Joost van Steenis by the author, 19 October 1993.

¹³ BVD, “Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur (VAW),” Monthly survey 5, 1977, 24-25.

¹⁴ BVD, “‘Klein Geweld’ in Nederland,” Monthly survey 4, 1977, 10.

districts of the national elections were already publicly known, including those of the Alliance that BVD wrote about in survey 5. The kind of reporting in survey 4 makes the BVD open to criticism for writing inflated stories.

MANE

In the survey of 1981, the BVD characterized MANE as bona fide. Nine months later in 1982, the agency categorized MANE as ‘in resistance against the current democratic legal order.’ In survey 3 (1982), the BVD wrote:

‘Besides the aim of a resistance that is as broad as possible, for which non-violent and violent actions against the same object is coordinated, it can be established that members of squatters’ movement, MANE, and anti-militarists in an increasing degree are taking part in each other actions. In their own set, they preferably speak of the “Movement.” This common feeling is in particular confirmed because they consider that they are a resistance against the current democratic legal order, in accordance with the much-heard slogan “this legal order is not ours.”’¹⁵

In this quote, the crucial statement is the ‘Movement’ being ‘a resistance against the current democratic legal order, in accordance with the much heard slogan “this legal order is not ours.”’ Some comments can be made about this quote. First, as far as MANE was concerned, indications that could trace changes in its basic principles (as formulated in 9.3) could not be identified. Only one major change took place during the nine months between both surveys. In the summer of 1982, Van Steenis was expelled from MANE because his published methods were viewed as improper and sexist. From the perception of danger from anti-democratic developments, the BVD should have interpreted this as a change for the good. In the released parts of the 1982-survey, however, any indication of this crucial development is absent.¹⁶

Second, the slogan ‘this legal order is not ours’ stems from the squatters’ movement, not from MANE. It became popular after March 1980, when the authorities ordered the removal of the barricades in Vondelstraat, Amsterdam. The authorities removed these barricades with the help of not only the riot police, but also the military who utilized military tanks, and special units licensed to use live ammunition in case of resistance. This response from the authorities was questioned widely within Dutch society. The military commander of the first tank at the Vondelstraat, for example, had serious doubts. He said he was trained to fight the Russians at the river Elbe, not his own citizens. When he joined the army, no-one told him he might have to do so. He had sleepless nights because of this response.¹⁷

Third, what was meant by the slogan ‘this legal order is not ours?’ Does it mean the legal order as whole, or rather specific aspects of the way the authorities governed and which were also criticized widely within Dutch

¹⁵ BVD, “Activisme anno 1982,” Quarterly survey 3, 1982, 29.

¹⁶ BVD, “Activisme anno 1982,” Quarterly survey 3, 1982, 29-31.

¹⁷ *VPRO*, *Andere tijden, Nederland 3*, 20.20 onwards, 12 March 2000. The squatters did not resist during this operation. Another slogan of those days was ‘you cannot live in a tank.’

society? In the case of MANE, it is even more unclear as to what the BVD could have meant. In the released sections of the 1982-survey, the BVD provided no supporting arguments. The agency risks a reproach for upgrading the danger from the aims of MANE and of stigmatizing it without underpinning evidence.

Fourth, in 1982 the BVD amalgamated everyone, and stated they were against the democratic legal order. The agency did not make clear who actually supported the slogan. It just reported that activists took part in each other's actions in an increasing degree. Yet, this was *not* new. Already in the 1981-survey, the BVD described how radical squatters and anti-militarists carried out actions against nuclear energy. It also does not provide any evidence that all activists supported the slogan 'this legal order is not ours.' In its 1981-survey, the BVD made a distinction between bona fide groups and anti-democratic elements within *one* movement. Yet, nine months later the agency did not do so, even when it concerned *three* different movements.¹⁸

There was a lack of consistency between surveys, primarily due to an increasing lack of accuracy over time and stigmatization because of the style of reporting.

11.2 FILING

In 10.2.2, it was concluded that the BVD had an excellent information position. At the same time, the survey was rated as being poor in terms of quality. To obtain more insights as to how this could happen, the steps between the information position and the writing of the survey – that is the filing, is evaluated.

Basic files are a main source of information from which to write a survey. These influence the quality of a survey. Unlike the SRB-case, it is not possible to investigate the basic files of the 1981-survey. These files remain behind the closed doors of public agencies, in contrast to reports written for consumers. Nevertheless, to some extent an evaluation can be made. A Dutch group – the Vereniging Voorkom Vernietiging (VVV), in English: the Association to Prevent Shredding – succeeded in obtaining some of the personal files. As the basic files discussed here are not directly related to the 1981-survey, the following section will serve as circumstantial evidence only. The sections of the VVV-files that deal with the issues described in the 1981-survey are too small and too fragmented to evaluate.

To evaluate these personal files in a correct context however, it is important to note that these files are not reports or final intelligence products and therefore incoming data could end up in these files without being reflected upon. However, when data was used for an intelligence product, an evaluation took place. After 1990, this system ceased. The new system required BVD-employees to look at the value of the data, and whether it was needed, at receipt of the information.¹⁹

¹⁸ The intelligence unit of Nijmegen made until 1983 a distinction between squatters' movement and other movements and groups. From 1983 onwards, it uses the concept 'the scene,' which implied the whole spectrum of left-wing non-parliamentary groups (OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 94).

¹⁹ Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 7 March 2001.

Quality of data

The VVV obtained dozens of personal files²⁰. According to the VVV, these BVD-files contained numerous mistakes. Facts and actions were both over and underestimated:

- The BVD wrote: ‘She worked for an East-European embassy.’ The woman involved commented: ‘I have done the dishes there once.’
- The BVD wrote: ‘Has been to the GDR four times.’ The person involved commented: ‘Around fifty times.’
- The BVD wrote: ‘Made in the 1960’s often trips to the GDR.’ The person involved commented: ‘Before the fall of the Wall, I had never been in the GDR, after the fall once.’

Personal files contained many other mistakes. For example, the BVD referred to an application. The person involved indeed applied for a job, but not at the company mentioned by the BVD. In the same file, the BVD referred to a visit to a congress at Warsaw. The person involved commented that while he visited a congress, it was not the one mentioned by the BVD. The BVD-files also knew cases of mistaken identities. The most striking one is that the BVD reported that the person in question was married to a particular person. However, the person in question did not know the supposed spouse.²¹ Such mistakes were more often made. In the file on the journalist Igor Cornelissen, for example, first it was reported that he had a relationship with someone, whom he cannot recall. Further on in his file, Cornelissen – who is married to Herma – was recorded as being married to Corine Hovy, whereas in fact Cornelissen and his wife Herma rented a house from Hovy.²²

BVD-official Engelen estimated that ‘the real errors have to be put in *tens of percentages* rather than in percentages. The agency carried out tens of thousands of positive vettings.²³ The result of these failures is that the people involved missed a job or promotion. Since Engelen only referred to actual errors, this does not necessarily include investigations in which the BVD represented facts incorrectly, or made other mistakes.²⁴

²⁰ Personal file: in the terminology of the BVD a ‘PD.’

²¹ VVV, “VVV Nieuwsbrief,” no. 15, March 1996, 1.

²² Data in BVD’s FOIA-file no. 2.290.788-26: Cornelissen, “Mijn inzagedossier,” *De Trotskistenangst van de BVD*, 2001, 82-84.

²³ Engelen, *Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 1995, 373.

A well-known example concerned engineer J.T. Wilman. As a controller for the Royal Marine, he controlled the quality of products by Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM). RDM was of the opinion that Wilman was too critical, and was able to remove him by accusing him incorrectly of communism and other gossip. As a result, Wilman remained unemployed. In 1967, Wilman heard about the negative report, and protested. In February 1994, Lower House asked for his rehabilitation. At the end of 1999 – 22 years later – the minister of Home Affairs Bram Peper rehabilitated Wilman and offered him financial compensation (*NRC Handelsblad*, 18 February 1994; *de Volkskrant*, 18 February 1994; *NRC*, 10 November 1999; *Vrij Nederland*, 13 November 1999).

²⁴ For example: the ombudsman, M. Oosting, corrected the BVD in the case of the former adviser on the minority policy of the Amsterdam police forces, E. Sinester. Several data in his file were incorrect. Although these mistakes did not impair the conclusions of the BVD-report, Oosting wrote that the BVD had an serious obligation to guarantee the accuracy of the information in its reports, for

The Van der Spek-files

The file on Fred van der Spek is useful in understanding the different types of inadequacies that occurred in personal files.²⁵ Van der Spek was for many years a member of parliament for the PSP, first for the Upper House, and then later for the Lower House.²⁶

As noted earlier, the perspective in which the contents of these files should be viewed is as unfinished products that have not had the benefit of close reflection. However, having said this some sections had already undergone a certain type of reflection or evaluation. With or without an evaluation, when a basic file is used for a report or a final intelligence product, its quality will influence the quality of the final intelligence product.

First, there is inaccurate data, or data challenged by Van der Spek. The BVD reported, for example, that a member of Black Panther stayed the night at the Van der Spek-family home on 24 March 1974. He denies this categorically. Van der Spek showed his calendar to the author in which it can be seen that only a meeting was held of the PSP-committee on foreign relations.²⁷

The BVD also used another incorrect observation in a note that had been produced years earlier. This note of 1966 stated that in 1952 Van der Spek placed an election poster in the window of his parents' home while his parents were on vacation. As such this was correct. What was not correct was that the BVD reported that it was a CPN poster (the Dutch communist party). According to Van der Spek, it was a Socialistische Unie poster.²⁸ The Socialistische Unie was a predecessor of the PSP, a third way party opposing NATO, although it was not a pacifist party like the PSP.

In 1969, the BVD reported, accurately, contacts with the *trade delegation* of the GDR, in relation to the GDR gaining recognition. In 1970, the BVD reported on contacts with the *embassy* of the GDR. However, there was no embassy. An embassy was only installed after it was recognized years later. Likewise, 11.1, highlights other examples that illustrate how the BVD reported more accurately in an earlier survey than in a later one.

Despite this some reporting was very accurate. The BVD, for example, described Van der Spek's position on East-Germany, the GDR. On 1 February 1973 during a meeting with a broad coalition for recognizing the GDR, Van der Spek argued why he – after its recognition – did not want to take part in a

it is impossible for citizens to control the accuracy of data. According to Oosting, the BVD failed in its obligation concerning the incorrect data, and that this behavior of the agency was not decent (Decision by ombudsman of 4 March 1993 in: *AB* (Administratiefrechtelijke beslissingen/Nederlandse Jurisprudentie), 1993, No. 271, 739-743. See also: *de Volkskrant*, 8 March 1993 and 10 February 1993).

²⁵ After 1990, this way of keeping personal files stopped (Interview with Dick Engelen by the author 7 March 2001).

²⁶ PSP: Pacifist Socialist Party – left and radical third way party, being anti Moscow and anti Washington.

²⁷ Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 10 February 2000. Van der Spek-files, 1996/1997, file no.: 2.231.778-30.

²⁸ Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 10 February 2000. Van der Spek-files.

redesigned committee that would serve as a cultural society. He was of the opinion that in the future it would inevitably be perceived as a continuation of GDR's foreign policy. According to Van der Spek, the BVD presented the position he defended at this meeting painstakingly accurately correct and in perfect detail.²⁹ In the basic files, a consistent quality was lacking.

Second, contradictory information ended up in the Van der Spek-files. One example includes a number of comments regarding Trotskyism, the IVth International. In a note from 1970, the BVD reported that '[i]t had been told that A.G. v.d. Spek would not be a member of the IVth International.' In a BVD-note concerning Van der Spek in 1971, the agency wrote 'One thinks that the person concerned is spokesman for the IVth International.' Van der Spek comments that the first statement is correct, while the second one is drivel.³⁰

Another example concerns an alleged trip that Van der Spek made to Poland. In 1967, the BVD reported that on 27 March of that year six members of the PSP left by plane for Poland for 'a stay of ten days.' Later in 1967, the BVD reported that Van der Spek returned on 10 April from the GDR. Van der Spek states that on 27 March he went to the GDR by *train* for *six* days and then returned on 02 April.³¹ According to Van der Spek, he never visited Poland. Van der Spek commented in an ironic way that he knew of only one link between the word 'Polen' – in Dutch, Poland is spelled as Polen – and himself: occasionally he attended meetings in the Amsterdam-based restaurant-hotel Polen.³²

How did the BVD deal with the contradictory notes from 1967? The agency had reported two destinations for one trip in one period of time. In a BVD-survey of trips made – produced in 1972 or shortly afterwards – the agency simply listed both a trip to the GDR and to Poland. Van der Spek's response to this was that the contradictory notes concerning trips to the GDR 'apparently did not lead to a correction in the survey.'³³

Third, there is the dubious charge or suggestion of a sensitive ethical and political nature present in the Van der Spek-files. In the file, the following was noted in 1965:

'Concerning possible safe-houses, it is very probable that this is no problem for Van der SPEK. In World War II, he had to go into hiding with his wife (Both are of Jewish blood).'

In this same file, the following lines were noted on 14 April 1966:

'Both Van der Spek and his wife are of Jewish blood. During the war (from 1941-1945), they went into hiding.'

²⁹ For more details by the BVD, see the agency's note on a meeting of 3 April 1973, in which Van der Spek announced he would no longer work for the committee (Van der Spek-files).

³⁰ Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 10 February 2000. Van der Spek-files.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 3 November 1999. On other places in the Van der Spek-files, restaurant-hotel Polen is named as a place of meetings held.

³³ Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 10 February 2000.

According to Van der Spek, not only is he not Jewish, but also his wife never went into hiding. Van der Spek did go into hiding from mid-1944 to 1945, after he returned from a Nazi student deportation.³⁴ Apart from the inaccuracies the message implies a dubious charge. It creates a conspiratorial atmosphere against Jewish citizens who had to go into hiding because of the holocaust.³⁵

Within the BVD, background files could contain any information, including information on race or religious convictions and the like, especially when this information could explain, support, or defeat an argument. However, this kind of data should never be included in a report leaving the agency.³⁶

Fourth, there is the fabrication of data. Lack of data led to the fabrication of information. In 1964, the BVD wrote:

‘Never anything has been noticed that main players of the PSP, like A.G. van der Spek, are in contact with personnel from the Russian embassy. Apparently this contact is painstakingly kept secret from members of the PSP who are not involved.’³⁷

If you look at Van der Spek’s position on the GDR – he did not want to be an extension of the foreign policy of this country – this position does not support having secret contacts with the Soviet-embassy. It points rather to the opposite.³⁸ Van der Spek also denied that he had had contacts with personnel from the Soviet-embassy during this period, or even before.³⁹ The BVD-quote is an example of the *reductio ad absurdum*. The quote is vulnerable to criticism as an incorrect product of a paranoid mind.

Evaluation

The many types of inadequacies in a personal file will ultimately limit its utility, which may be as low as the weakest link. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of mistakes may give rise to a threat. If you combine some of the intelligence fallacies in the Van der Spek-files – 1) he put a CPN-poster behind a window, 2) he is a Jew who knows how to go into hiding, and 3) he kept his contacts with the Soviet-embassy painstakingly secret – it is possible to have the impression that you are dealing with a crypto-communist, who knows how to carry out

³⁴ The student deportation was a punitive measure against students who did not sign the Nazi declaration of loyalty. Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 10 February 2000. Van der Spek-files.

³⁵ The worst atrocities in Dutch history were committed by the Nazi’s. And the group that suffered most were Jewish citizens. Of the 140,000 Jewish people that lived in the Netherlands, 107,000 were deported by the Nazi’s. Only 5,000 of this group survived the holocaust. Of the 140,000 Jewish people, about 12,000 lived in mixed marriages. They were left out of the deportation. More than 20,000 Jewish people who went into hiding survived the holocaust (Stuldreher, “Vervolging,” *Spiegel Historiae*, year 17, no. 7-8, 380. For more, see: De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, 1978, part 8, second half, 673; Presser, *Ondergang*, 1985, part I, 417-418).

³⁶ Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

³⁷ Van der Spek-files.

³⁸ Also in other instances, the BVD described the critical attitude of Van der Spek.

³⁹ Later, in 1968, he was once in contact with the embassy. This contact was restricted to the technical preparation of a visit of a delegation to the USSR. Interview with Van der Spek by the author, 3 November 1999.

subversive activities, and who is experienced in hiding from his opponents. However, the possibility of wrongly characterizing someone as a result of cumulative mistakes is not limited to basic files. It also took place in surveys for external use (10.2.7 ‘To marginalize’).

Although this criticism of the Van der Spek-files is serious, it has to be seen in perspective. The data was not necessarily *evaluated* data. At the BVD, data was evaluated before it was used further along the intelligence process. Data was labeled with a system of letters and numbers to indicate the reliability of the information. This system – ranging from A1 to F6 – indicated both the reliability of the source and the reliability of the information. Often, information was only given to other parties when it was checked or confirmed by another source.⁴⁰ Information obtained from a single human source rarely – if ever – obtained A-status, even when the source was reliable. Moreover, if intelligence stemmed from a single source that was evaluated as low, the information was not treated as fact – unless it was confirmed by a second source or other indications. Information that was evaluated as low and used externally, for example, by police forces, could easily be attributed with a validity that was too high.⁴¹

From this perspective the Van der Spek-files may have been unevaluated information that would not have passed the test during an evaluation at the BVD. Nevertheless, some of the discussed information contained evaluative elements of a worrying nature (GDR/Poland trips, proof of contact with Soviet-embassy).

Filing

There were different types of files, at the BVD. Most of the data, by far, was personal, which was stored not only in personal files, but also in subject files.⁴² The BVD also had operation files that contained information from a human source. While operation files included information about the agent in addition to information that the agent provided these two types of information were kept separate. The information provided by agents concerned data on people and subjects.⁴³

One problem was that traditionally the BVD did not have a company mentality that promoted sound filing. This culture had its origins in the aftermath of World War II, when today’s Dutch agencies were founded. An employee was entrusted with filing. If he asked, for example, a colleague for the contents of his desk an answer could be ‘If you take anything, I’ll shoot you.’ Former BVD-employee Storm (pseudonym) commented that this attitude ‘was normal at that time.’⁴⁴ Individual employees could collect information that the agency did not want or develop their own filing system on issues that the BVD

⁴⁰ Frits Hoekstra in: *IKON*, Desmet Live, Radio 747, 6 October 2004, 15.00-15.45 hours.

⁴¹ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 118.

⁴² *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 3, 62, 64.

⁴³ *Lower House*, session 1994-1995, 22036, no. 8, 6-7.

⁴⁴ Arnoldussen & Olink in: *Het Parool*, 17 October 1998, appendix, 2.

was not interested in – as Henk Bootsma did. He had a ‘hobby’ of collecting data concerning student protests. After Bootsma’s retirement, his collection ended up in the incinerator.⁴⁵ Within the company culture of the BVD, over the years, operations was the most prestigious. In the internal pecking order, processing, analyses, reports, and administration held a lower status.⁴⁶

In more general terms, the administrative discipline at the BVD had many bottle-necks. The management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix (9.2) mentioned the following:

- ‘operational documents and other information are registered and documented separately and differently.
- the different parts of the agency (especially B and C) document data in various ways, and in addition different approaches can be identified within these directorates.
- at this moment, the ultimate administrative responsibilities are split between too many departments, divisions and sections.
- the decentralization of the documentation is rarely carried out systematically or in a structured way.

For an information factory such as the BVD, it is absolutely necessary that this situation is improved.’⁴⁷

Mistakes were made in the beginning of the intelligence chain that were not corrected further on in the process. To put it in the words of Andersson, Elffers & Felix: ‘What goes wrong in the first chain of the primary process – the collection of information – cannot be corrected any more because of a lack of clear criteria and integral steering.’⁴⁸ External experts – apart from sister agencies – were rarely consulted. This lack of external impulses blocked the possibility of breaking through this routine and prevented innovation. To improve this, strong social coaching is required in which attention is given to aspects, such as covering up mistakes and taking refuge in operations.⁴⁹

Those responsible for filing also influenced the quality of the filing. In the past, individual BVD-employees compiled files. This was carried out in a somewhat random manner, meeting the information position that the employee needed.⁵⁰ In the 1980’s, it was mainly analysts and non-specialized administrative employees, without specific training in documentation, who composed files and kept them up to date. The quality of these basic files was generally not supervised by heads of sections, and not at all by the directors. Checks only occurred on special occasions, for instance as a result of an external dispute concerning information in a report. While information could be actually right or wrong, there could also be insufficient information to make a realistic judgment on whether a specific piece of information was or was not correct.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 22.

⁴⁶ Engelen, *Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 371.

⁴⁷ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 16 and 18.

⁵⁰ *Lower House*, session 1994-1995, 22036, no. 8, 6-9.

⁵¹ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

Because of computerization in 1976, the registration of files became more structured.⁵² After 1986, all data not related to BVD-activities was judged on criteria concerning policy, tasks and topicality. In 1986, an archivist was appointed, but it was only in 1999 that the central department RDA (Registration, Documentation and Archive) became operational. Its purpose was to make the registration, documentation, and archiving at the BVD more uniform.⁵³

A complicating factor at the agency may be the need-to-know-principle.⁵⁴ Most information dealt with in this study was related to Directorate B, the directorate focusing on extremism, such as communism and political extremist groups. The analysts of this directorate did not receive data directly obtained by human intelligence or covert means. A small section between operations and analyses filtered the information. All elements that may identify the source or the means used were deleted. This small section also paraphrased information. The filing of personal and subject files took place after this filter.⁵⁵ Thus, analysts and those taking care of personal and subject files were often unable to check reliability and possible biases within the information presented. This filter was a barrier blocking control and correction. Incorrect representation of data will continue longer in situations of high compartmentalization, compared with, for example, a wider exposure.⁵⁶ This policy was in place at Directorate B in 1984. In one section of Directorate B – the Section Special Operations – analysts and agent runners were already working together for a long period.⁵⁷ When necessary, agent runners and analysts were generally allowed to be in touch with each other. Because of this, compartmentalization was not judged as a reason for the poor quality report.⁵⁸

This section illustrates other factors such as a lack of analytical capability may explain why an excellent information position still resulted in the production of a poor quality survey. The accessed basic files show that many types of mistakes occurred. Furthermore, the unprofessional way that the documentation and filing

⁵² In turn, files were stored in archives. The four main types of archives were:

- 1) the dynamic archives. These were the decentralized archives of the BVD which were frequently consulted;
- 2) the semi-static archive. This was a central archive which were rarely consulted;
- 3) the operational archives were composed of files of BVD-operations; and,
- 4) the personal archives. The access to those files was the most limited one. Employees only can use those files after they consulted the employee who composed that file. These files were on former BVD-employees, politicians, and sensitive sources. After 1991, no new personal archive-files were created (*Lower House*, session 1994-1995, 22036, no. 8, 6-9).

⁵³ BVD, *Jaarverslag Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 1999*, 83.

⁵⁴ This principle is explicitly taken up in the new bill, section 34. *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 1-2, 14.

⁵⁵ Engelen, *Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 1995, 119.

⁵⁶ In 2.4.3, former CIA-director Colby pled for the openness of reports as point of departure. He argued that criticism from independent sources will lead to extra expertise. Compartmentalization makes it easier mistakes become long-lived ones.

⁵⁷ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 24. At Directorate C, agent runners and analysts worked in one section since 1977 (*ibid.*, 20, 26-27).

⁵⁸ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

was organized may easily have influenced the quality of reports negatively. Despite this, hard evidence from the 1981-survey is missing because of a lack of sufficient material being accessible.

11.3 REPORTS BY OTHERS – OTHER BVD-REPORTS

What was the quality of reports written by others? The BVD was not the only one to produce reports on DSD'81. At about the same time that the BVD-survey was circulated, the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice presented a letter about this issue to parliament. Also a report by the police at Dodewaard is discussed.

In addition to the reports concerning Dodewaard, other (types of) BVD-reports were obtained from for instance Directorate B and the Foreign Policy Staff. These intelligence products are explored.

In this section, other reports are investigated, but from a very limited perspective. Attention is only paid where there are differences in quality compared to the BVD-survey. This may lead to additional insights into the quality of the BVD-survey, and also of factors that influenced the quality of reports (13.2). While this involves a cross-case analysis the aim is explicitly *not* to assess the quality of these other reports. This is outside the scope of this research.

11.3.1 On DSD'81

In this section, two other reports on Dodewaard are discussed. The first one – a letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice – is of interest because it includes the interaction between the authorities and the objects of the research. The second one – a report by the police at Dodewaard – is of interest in discussing the reliability of observations.

Letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice

To assess the interaction between the objects of research and the actions of the own authorities is of interest for a security agency report – especially in terms of a risk analysis. It can provide insights into what you can influence most – your own actions. This element is absent in the BVD-survey.⁵⁹ In the letter about DSD'81 to the Lower House, by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, such insights can be distinguished. This letter was written, after the events at Dodewaard had caused turmoil in the political and public debate, for parliament and outlined the three basic principles of the authorities at Dodewaard:

⁵⁹ In the BVD-survey, more or less the only exception was the passage 'the authorities at a rather early stage made known that a blockade would not be tolerated as it limit the freedom of movement of plant personnel' (Quarterly survey, 33).

1. The right to demonstrate should not or rarely be limited.
2. The freedom of movement of locals had to be hindered as little as possible.
3. The plant had to keep on functioning.⁶⁰

In appendix III of this letter eyewitnesses expressed their doubts as to whether these three basic principles had been clear to the demonstrators. Eyewitnesses maintained that the police first allowed material to be brought near the nuclear plant to build barricades, but then they acted very harshly when the barricades were being built, and even against human blockades:

‘Demonstrators were not allowed to enter a larger area. Suddenly, there was a reaction against the human blockades, whereas they would be tolerated. Subsequently the demonstrators did not know where they stood.’

Further on this appendix:

‘The demonstrators were jammed in between the police, taking action from two sides, and their own barricades. They experienced this as a trap set up by the authorities. This response from the police – in which tear gas was used – also gave the impression that the authorities and the police were bent on responding harshly. The amount of tear gas that had been used has been experienced as disproportional much. The use of tear gas as a collective means of violence against the whole group of demonstrators, when only a few of them were using violence, was perceived as disproportional. Furthermore, the use of collective violence endangered the whole group, which subsequently led to an escalation of violence, according to the opinion of those invited. The use of tear gas and the actions of special arrest squads, plain-clothes police officers, has been criticized sharply. They disapproved of police officers posing as demonstrators. In terms of the communication between authorities and demonstrators, they were of the opinion that the authorities had not understood sufficiently how the demonstrators were organized differently. The opinion was that the demonstrators were given too little time to calm down and to make decisions. The authorities had not understood sufficiently that the demonstrators made decisions democratically, at grass roots, and that this therefore takes some time.’⁶¹

The BVD elaborately described the type of decision making at MANE, but the agency did not use it to explain a possible escalation in relation to the interaction that occurred with the authorities.⁶²

On the first day (Saturday), according to this letter to the Lower House, 606 tear gas grenades were fired.⁶³ On Sunday, a new stock of 3,000 grenades was

⁶⁰ Letter of 14 December 1981 by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, *Lower House*, session 1981-1982, 17240, 3.

⁶¹ Letter of 14 December 1981 by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, *Lower House*, session 1981-1982, 17240, appendix III, 19.

⁶² Another example of an interaction between authorities and activists: after Dodewaard, a final demonstration was held without incidents. Within MANE, activists explained this was caused by the de-escalating policy of the police: only police officers in normal uniform as escort, and no visible presence of the riot police (LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet*, 1987, 36-37). For more on elements that may have contributed to a heated atmosphere: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 131-152.

⁶³ In the above mentioned daily report of the national police, the commanders then estimated that about 1000 tear gas grenades were fired.

available.⁶⁴ The ministers expressed doubts in their letter about the massive use of tear gas.⁶⁵ On page 10, they wrote:

‘It has been established that at the actions on Saturday afternoon, especially at Waalbanddijk [a dike], a large amount of tear gas grenades were used within a short period. We understand that because of this, doubts have risen on whether, in this situation, that this amount was necessary already so instantaneously.’

Concerning the tear gas holders on a stick:

‘If not enough distance is kept, there is a danger of burns as a result of the released heat at ignition. Also there is a health danger since this approach results in people being temporarily exposed to unacceptable high concentrations. Therefore, we are of the opinion that, concerning the risks involved, the use of these holders on sticks has to be examined critically.’

On page 10 of their letter, the ministers wrote that the use of tear gas spray cans by special arrest squads was not correct. Over thirteen hundred people reported on the use of tear gas. Both the ministers ordered an investigation concerning the dangers of tear gas. They asked other authorities to use tear gas as restrictively as possible during this investigation.⁶⁶

The press complained that press passes to cover riots – riot cards – were also handed out to police officers. In their letter, the ministers wrote on page 11: ‘We hold the distribution of these permits to others than representatives of the press as incorrect.’

The BVD did not include such elements. Subsequently it not only missed gaining insights into the interaction between authorities and activists – and the escalation that ensued, but also missed gaining insights into the causes that could have facilitated anti democratic elements in gaining an influence within MANE. On a methodological level, this refers to issues such as reliability and the problem of creating an artifact.

Insights into the interaction between authorities and society can be presented in an intelligence or security report. On another issue – the possible outburst of violence in the old quarters of Rotterdam – insights are presented in a report by the local intelligence unit of Rotterdam. Local authorities were accused of an ostrich policy. The intelligence unit reproached the responsible administrators for only dealing with recurring problems on an ad hoc basis and almost only within the context of public order. Furthermore, the majority of the Rotterdam police officers did not have the sufficient knowledge in responding to a multicultural society. The deeper causes were rarely tackled, according to the intelligence unit. The intelligence unit concluded that the low degree of organization within both the autochthonous and allochthonous population was

⁶⁴ National police forces, “Periodieke bespreking diverse commandanten, 20 september 1981 te 20.00 uur in het commandocentrum. No. 15,” 2.

⁶⁵ Letter of 14 December 1981 by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, *Lower House*, session 1981-1982, 17240, 9-10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

the reason why there had not yet been an outburst.⁶⁷ The assessment turned out to be quite accurate. After people from the Spangen quarter began to organize themselves against drugs gangs, confrontations ensued. Only then, did this issue appear on the permanent agenda of the responsible authorities.

To exclude, almost completely, the interaction between the demonstrators and the authorities is an omission of the BVD-survey. It was dealt with better in the ministerial letter. The Rotterdam-report shows that such issues can be included, even when criticism is leveled at the own police.

Commanders of police at DSD'81

The BVD explicitly refers to the technique of observation in its opening sentence of the 1981-survey. The following example is presented to put into perspective the reliability that is generally attributed to observations.

During the blockade of the nuclear power plant at Dodewaard, the police commanders held daily meetings. The way the police reported these meetings does not support making a comparison with the BVD-survey. Nevertheless, one comment on observation can be discussed. During one meeting, Commander Van Kampen said: 'Tonight, Amsterdam demonstrators will return home. Probably, this will be some 140 to 150 men (including the tough guys).'68 To convert this comment by Van Kampen into data fit for a calculation, the following assumptions have been formulated:

- The comment by Van Kampen was based upon an observation.
- The police officer who made this observation – after being trained with pictures from police files – had the following percentages of recognition: the police officer recognizes tough guys from Amsterdam with a reliability of 95% as tough guys from Amsterdam; the police officer recognizes other activists with a reliability of 90% as other activists.⁶⁹
- 10.000 activists were present, including 150 tough guys from Amsterdam.⁷⁰

What is the chance⁷¹ that the activist who was recognized as a tough guy from Amsterdam was indeed a tough guy from Amsterdam? The answer is calculated as follows:

⁶⁷ Report of the local intelligence unit of the Rotterdam police forces "Van Onlust naar Onrust," quoted in: "Rotterdamse politie waarschuwt voor uitbarsting in oude wijken," *de Volkskrant*, 16 November 1992.

⁶⁸ Federal Police Forces, "Periodieke bespreking diverse commandanten, 20 september 1981, te 20.00 uur in het commandocentrum. No. 15," 20 September 1981, 3.

⁶⁹ Concerning this aspect, an article by Heuer in 'Studies in Intelligence' shows a possible gap. Heuer would put the correct recognition – say 90% – without making a specification for the different groups. Yet, it is possible an observer has a correct judgment of a higher percentage for one group, compared to another. In that case, the outcome of the example presented would differ significantly. Compare: Heuer, "Biases in Evaluation of Evidence," 36.

If an agent report had been the source, the reliability will have been higher.

⁷⁰ The exact number of activists is not known. 10,000 is a conservative estimate. Some sources suggested that 15,000 activists had been present at the 1981-blockade (LAKA, *Tien Jaar Verzet tegen Kernenergie*, 1987, 34).

- The police officer recognizes in 90% of the cases other activists correctly as other activists (90% of 9,850): 8,865.
- The police officer recognizes in 10% of the cases other activists incorrectly as tough guys from Amsterdam (10% of 9,850): 985.
- The police officer recognizes in 95% of the cases a tough guy from Amsterdam as a tough guy from Amsterdam (95% of 150): 142.5.
- The police officer recognizes in 5% of the cases a tough guy from Amsterdam incorrectly as another activist (5% of 150): 7.5.

This results in 8872.5 counts of an other activist as an observation, and 1127.5 counts of a tough guy from Amsterdam. Identifying a tough guy from Amsterdam, through observation, was only correct 142.5 counts out of 1127.5. The other 985 counts it concerned an incorrect observation of an actual other activist. The chance that the police officer's statement, that the person that he identified as a tough guy from Amsterdam, actually was a tough guy from Amsterdam is 142.5/1127.5 – or a *chance of correct recognition of only 13%*.⁷²

11.3.2 Directorate B – the covert factor report

Till now, data and reports produced by the BVD got criticized. This was based on a small sample of basic files and (weekly and monthly) surveys. This sample concerned information on organizations and people such as the CPN, the PSP, MANE, and Joost van Steenis. One directorate carried out all these investigations. Prior to 1990, this was Directorate B, in Dutch: Directie B. To present a general overview is almost impossible. The quality of the reports varied within the directorate. To illustrate this difference, the following report is discussed.

This report, written by Directorate B, is of a much higher quality than the 1981-survey. It is the only other report that could be obtained and of which it was certain that it is both complete and authentic. The focus of the report concerns Dutch communists that cooperated with East European countries to manipulate the Dutch peace movement. This confidential report, of February 1981, was titled 'The covert factor in the Dutch discussion on nuclear weapons' and was written by Anne Douma,⁷³ partly based on material provided by Frits Hoekstra.

In the introduction, the BVD wrote that the Soviet Union wanted to manipulate public opinion towards favoring Soviet nuclear interests.⁷⁴ The agency focused on two issues: 1) the frequent consultations between members of the Dutch Communist Party, the CPN⁷⁵ and representatives of the Soviet Union;

⁷¹ Chance has to be interpreted as an average. A calculation of probability is nothing more than an estimate.

⁷² For more information – especially related to cognitive illusions – see *Nature* of 21 March 1996 and 29 August 1996. In Swanborn's *Evalueren* similar examples are presented, such as on the (low) chance of a correct diagnosis of an actual child being molested (Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 47).

⁷³ NPS, Dokwerk, De geheime dienst, Nederland 3, 18 October 2004, 21.00-22.00 hours.

⁷⁴ BVD, "Ein verborgenen Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen," 2.

⁷⁵ In Dutch: Communistische Partij van Nederland.

and 2) the use of front organizations by the CPN, like Stop the Neutron Bomb.⁷⁶ As such, contacts between the CPN and the Soviet Union are not that surprising – these can occur as a result of an open democratic system. The point that the BVD made was in regard to the secret nature of these activities.⁷⁷ The agency was not allowed to monitor the Dutch peace movement, but the responsible ministers repeatedly said that East-European manipulation was a legitimate target for the BVD to investigate. The BVD described the peace group Stop the Neutron Bomb as ‘a real front organization,’ and maintained that the campaign to stop the neutron weapon had a Soviet origin.⁷⁸

The BVD investigated covert factors of funding and ideological influence. In particular the funding was often denied. These denials were not limited to communist circles only. After the disclosure of East European archives, concrete evidence was uncovered in regard to covert funding of Stop the Neutron Bomb by, at least, the GDR and the USSR.⁷⁹ In relation to the BVD targeting Stop the Neutron Bomb, there is a remarkable statement by the then minister of Home Affairs, Van Thijn, who said he had read the report and maintained that Stop the Neutron Bomb was *not* an object of investigation.⁸⁰ The BVD was right to carry out its investigation, and Van Thijn’s statement was incorrect.⁸¹

In reporting on Soviet manipulation, you first have to make it clear that there was a covert endeavor to manipulate. Convincing information on this is presented in the report. Second, you may present information about the political intention and the way the manipulation is undertaken. In this way it is not only apparent as to what danger may occur, but also how to counter it, if the Soviet attempt was successful.⁸² Third, possible future developments can be assessed.

⁷⁶ For the political context of Stop the Neutron Bomb, see: De Graaf, *Over de muur*, 2004, 90-96, 105-106.

⁷⁷ *Proceedings Lower House*, 16 December 1982, 1287, comment by minister Rietkerk: ‘This results in that other to us less well-disposed bodies may make use of it and abuse it in a secret way. We have to live with this reality. There is not one reason to change therefore our democratic relation. It still is of importance we do not to loose sight of our alertness on this matter.’

⁷⁸ BVD, “Ein verborgenem Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen,” 9, see also 25.

⁷⁹ For an international forum by Stop the Neutron Bomb, the CPSU (USSR) and the SED (GDR) donated probably half of the budget of approximately 135,000 Euro. In 1977 and 1978, Stop the Neutron Bomb received about 45,000 Euro from the GDR (Horstmeier, “Stop de Neutronenbom!” *Around Peter the Great*, 1997, 77. For details on the sources and destinations of the financing, see 73-75).

⁸⁰ Van Thijn: ‘The peace movement is composed of a number of organizations focused on combating militarism and nuclear arms – that is IKV, Stop the Neutron Bomb, and a number of others. In the Lower House, I have guaranteed that those organizations, mentioned by name, do not have the interest of the BVD.’ VARA, *In de Rooie Haan*, 20 December 1982, Hilversum I, 13.03 and the following. Interview with minister Van Thijn by the journalist Van Hoom. Text borrowed from *Beleid Beschouwd*, 23 April 1982, no. 4540, 10.

⁸¹ There was a bad relationship between head of the BVD De Haan and minister Van Thijn. This cumulated in a crisis of confidence, probably after a conflict on the observation of former Red Youth-member Van Wijk (Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 35).

⁸² In the introduction, for example, the BVD wrote the Soviet-manipulation was not decisive in the discussion, but the covert factor had not to be ignored. BVD, “Ein verborgenem Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen,” 2.

The BVD correctly pointed to the link between on the hand the crisis within the CPN as a result of attacks of former party leader Paul de Groot, and on the other hand the effort of the CPN to improve

On what aspects did the BVD report? The agency discussed the following issues:

- (2%) Introduction.
- (10%) Soviet-union: organization and contacts.
- (78%) Netherlands: organization, activities, media coverage, and open and covert contacts (including contacts with the Soviet-union).
- (6%) Political course: Soviet-union, Dutch government, Dutch peace movement, and front organization (Stop the Neutron Bomb).
- (4%) Conclusion.

Of the three aspects that can be reported on – 1) description/examples of secret contacts and efforts to manipulate, 2) political courses, and 3) estimate of future developments – the first issue is over-represented. Together, the discussion on peace organization, activities, and media coverage, is 78% of the total. On the second issue, political courses, only a few comments are made, scattered over a relatively large number of pages.⁸³ The third issue, an estimate of future developments, is absent.

An interesting point, for example, would have been understanding whether there were any discrepancies between how the Soviets and the CPN publicly reported on their political course, and the course they actually followed. This is of more interest, because CPN's major player Hoekstra, as the BVD described on page 15, publicly declared during an election meeting how the campaign successfully influenced social- and Christian-democrats. On page 5, the BVD reported in general terms on the Soviet-course, as published in the Soviet-media.⁸⁴ If there were discrepancies between its public course and those that were covert this would have been of interest and could have been evaluated extensively. Possible discrepancies are an indication of the possibility of covert manipulation. These discrepancies are of relevance in estimating future developments. To evaluate whether the non-communist peace movement was aware of communist front organizations is of interest in order to estimate the possible success of future efforts to manipulate.⁸⁵ The BVD had collected the

relations with Eastern European parties (BVD, "Ein verborgenen Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen," 6). In the literature, Stop the Neutron Bomb is described as 'a reflex as an emergency measure against the attacks' by De Groot. The success of the campaign was not the central aim: 'The CPN stumbled accidentally upon one of its largest successes ever' (Horstmeier, "Stop de Neutronbom!" *Around Peter the Great*, 1997, 77).

⁸³ BVD, "Ein verborgenen Faktor in der niederländischen Diskussion über Nuklearwaffen," 5 (course of TASS and Nowoje Wremja), 11 and 25 (aiming at unilateral measures and nature), 14 (Kruisinga), 15 (CPN-pressure on other parties), willingness participation (16), and position Dutch parliament and government (21).

⁸⁴ The Soviet-position on Dutch developments were known to non-communist groups in the Netherlands, see for example: Vermaat, *Wij Nederlanders en de Vrede*, 1980, 47.

⁸⁵ 'Stop the Neutron Bomb' always stressed its independence, and formally, it was. Yet, despite this formal independence, a closer look shows clearly that its activities were CPN-dominated. This was already known in those days among the political élite: it caused the left-wing parties the PvdA (Labour Party) and the PSP (Pacifist Socialist Party) to distance themselves from *Stop the Neutron Bomb*. It is doubtful, of course, whether it was clear to everyone who signed the petition, but still there was enough information available to demonstrate the major role the CPN played in *Stop the*

main elements needed for such an interesting analyses. The reason that the agency did not realize this was more or less a consequence of the company philosophy of the BVD in those days – of presenting only the facts.

Besides the above criticism – that mainly can be attributed to the company culture of the day, rather than the analyst in question – the report was of a much higher quality than the quarterly survey of 1981. The report brought into the open what was unknown until then – the covert factor in the discussion on nuclear arms. The report also breathes a sense of realism that was absent in the 1981-survey. The report was praised by American and European sister agencies.⁸⁶ In short, this report is an example of the benefits an intelligence and security agency can generate.

11.3.3 Foreign Policy Staff

One section of the BVD was recognized for its high quality products – the Foreign Policy Staff, in Dutch: Staf Buitenlandse Politiek (SBP).⁸⁷ This staff had a special position within the agency. It had no authority to give instructions, and it had a duty to report to superior levels.⁸⁸ The Foreign Policy Staff was established in 1963 and it functioned until the reorganization of 1990. Its aim was to study international phenomena, developments in communist countries and communist parties in non-communist countries. Its competences were limited to those developments that could pose a threat to the democratic legal order, the security of the state, or other important interests of the state. According to literature, its information was used, for example, to inform agents of the BID/IDB.⁸⁹ The most important function of this staff was to produce reports that promoted an exchange of information between other agencies and that presented to Dutch Foreign Affairs what the agency had at its disposal. In this way, the BVD could impress sister agencies and Foreign Affairs. The BVD was the only domestic agency that had such a section. Within the Netherlands, the Foreign Policy Staff held more or less a monopoly position.⁹⁰ The staff began with one person, but grew to 6 to 8

Neutron Bomb to everyone that was interested' (Horstmeier, "Stop de Neutronenbom!" *Around Peter the Great*, 1997, 66). The use of front organizations by the CPN was known to other left wing and peace groups, even on a local level (for example, *NRC Handelsblad*, 18 December 1982). This reduced the danger of this secret method.

⁸⁶ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 95.

⁸⁷ Compared with similar reports by the foreign agency IDB, the quality of reports by the Foreign Policy Staff was that high that it led to jealous reactions at the IDB (Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 29, 124-125).

According to the first circular, it was called Staf Buitenlandse Politiek. Most BVD-employees, however, refer to it as Stafafdeling Buitenlandse Politiek: Foreign Policy Staff Section.

⁸⁸ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

⁸⁹ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 222.

⁹⁰ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000. Within the Dutch intelligence community, it was decided that only the BVD should make such analyses and not the BID/IDB (De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 222). In other instances, not enough manpower was available to make such analyses. At Foreign Affairs, for example, the department for Eastern Europe had only two employees. They were not in the position to make extensive analyses (Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000).

employees. Contrary to the rest of the BVD, all its analysts were academics.⁹¹ Throughout the years, these academics were from different disciplines, such as jurists, political scientists, historians, a Sinologist, a theologian, and a classicist.⁹²

In many ways, this section was an oddity within the BVD. It was a small section which delivered excellent reports. The brains of the agency were gathered here, but their attention was not focused on the field of domestic security (the core task of the BVD). While its official prime purpose was to serve Dutch security, in practice the spin-off to sister agencies became more important. It was dissolved during the 1990 reorganization, and it was decided to allocate such a capability to both main directorates B and C.⁹³ From the point of view of intelligence exchange, you could argue that the BVD made, in 1963, a strategic choice by installing the Foreign Policy Staff. The agency was, after 1963, in a position to exchange material with sister organizations, because of being able to offer high quality reports.

According to De Graaff and Wiebes, colleagues, within the BVD, did not value so much the reports and analyses of the Foreign Policy Staff. Many of them were said to dispose the reports unread in the shredding box.⁹⁴ According to Keller, however, most colleagues he knew did value these reports, just as he did. These reports and analyses set the standard for good reporting.⁹⁵ The staff had a good reputation outside the BVD. Its reports and analyses were highly appreciated by Foreign Affairs and foreign sister agencies, like the CIA and the BND. The foreign sister agencies were receptive to the qualities of the analysts within the Foreign Policy Staff. They visited the staff regularly, among them CIA-official Sherman Kent.⁹⁶

One analyst, within the Foreign Policy Staff, was appraised in particular: W.A.H. (Ad) de Jonge. De Jonge was the former head of Department B, the department focusing on extremism and the predecessor of Directorate B.⁹⁷ In the beginning of 1960, he became the head of the Foreign Policy Staff.⁹⁸ De Jonge was highly valued for his analytical and estimating capabilities. Former CIA-officials characterized De Jonge as the brains of the BVD and by far the most intellectual person in the organization. One focus of attention of the staff was China. De Jonge was, among others, praised for his analyses on China and it was said that he predicted the Chinese Cultural Revolution.⁹⁹ The success story on China was realized through a series of reports written by the Foreign Policy Staff. De Jonge

⁹¹ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

⁹² Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 29.

⁹³ Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

⁹⁴ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 223.

⁹⁵ Notes by Peter Keller to the author, 26 November 2004.

⁹⁶ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 223, 265, 330, 331, 339. Kent's insights are included in chapter 2 of this study.

⁹⁷ Engelen, *Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 1995, 379.

⁹⁸ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 330. Kluiters, *De Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten*, 1993, 32.

⁹⁹ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 243, 330-331.

explicitly said that one of his excellent younger subordinates also produced some of the highly valued reports.¹⁰⁰

To reach his analyses, De Jonge made use of mainly two techniques. First, his success was largely a result of the technique of empathy, of putting himself in the position of the object of investigation. In this way, he managed to gain understanding of how the other would think and what the agency could expect in terms of how this opponent would act. This approach was not common within the BVD at that time. Second, he analyzed the institutions and the political system of China and the USSR. This helped him to predict, for example, the Cultural Revolution. He did this by combining the first signs of purging in China with the dynamics of this communist system. He paid attention to the institutions and the political systems that created the Chinese leaders and officials involved. From this, De Jonge managed to analyze the priorities of the players in question, what their strengths and weaknesses were, whether they got their priorities right, and whether they were playing the game correctly.¹⁰¹

For his analyses, De Jonge made use of two different types of sources. First, there was information from abroad, such as *Neues Deutschland*, Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), intelligence reviews from foreign sister agencies, National Intelligence Estimates (Sherman Kent), and information from abroad collected by (the predecessors of) TIVC.¹⁰² A second type of source was the operational source – the feedback from former members of the Dutch communist party, the CPN. With the help of these former members, he was able to trace the processes that took place in a communist bureaucracy and he could also gain an understanding of possible future developments. With these sources, the staff managed to cover 80 to 85% of the field that its larger foreign sister organizations were dealing with. A special quality of the staff was to estimate intentions. Compared to its sister agencies it often managed to make faster and more in-depth analyses of intentions, in particular in connection with the Soviet-Union and to a lesser extent to China. Contrary to the practice of many other sections within the BVD (10.2.1) De Jonge drew conclusions from his analyses. When Sinninghe Damsté became head of the BVD in 1961, De Jonge received more opportunities to draw conclusions himself.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

¹⁰¹ Interviews with Ad de Jonge by the author, 27 November 1999 and 28 June 2000.

¹⁰² Technisch Informatieverwerkingscentrum (TIVC); in English: Technical Information Processing Center. It originally started in 1947 with MARID Verbindingsinlichtingen (VI), the information processing unit of the Marine Intelligence Agency. It was renamed as Wiskundig Centrum (Mathematical Center). In 1985, it got its name TIVC (For more on TIVC, see Kluiters, *De Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten*, 1993, 235, 237-238). Later, the TIVC was renamed and reorganized into the Nederlandse Afdeling Verbindingsinlichtingen. Throughout the years, there were numerous plans to rename and reorganize the SIGINT capabilities. The newest plans are to organize the SIGINT capabilities in a new organization. This National Sigint Organization then would function separate from the AIVD and the MIVD, as a third agency similar like the US National Security Agency and the British Government Communication Headquarters. To set up this National Sigint Organization is a jointly project of the civil and of the military agency, the AIVD and the MIVD (AIVD, *Jaarverslag 2003*, 91).

¹⁰³ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000. In those days, the military intelligence community was also capable to produce future oriented – and with it, policy relevant – analyses (for example in: LUID, ISAM 6/84, IV.6-8, point 20-27. It concerned the same type of periodical report

The actual reports by the Foreign Policy Staff differ considerably from the 1981-survey of Department B in chapter 7. The reports by the Foreign Policy Staff are clear and accessible. The arguments – which could be structured in short separate sections – are presented in a matter-of-fact style and analytical way.¹⁰⁴ The argument is limited to the issue at hand. The structure is logical, and the conclusion follows naturally from previous arguments.¹⁰⁵

If we take the Sino-Soviet split, for example, we can trace a stable policy in the assessment made. There is an emphasis on the developments around 1960 (to withdraw 1,390 Soviet-experts from China and the issue of Albania) and the winter of 1963-1964 (the exchange of letters between China and the Soviet-Union, and the final publication of these letters by China on 8 May 1964).¹⁰⁶ In its typical matter-of-fact style, the actual split is explained and it is concluded that the developments show that consultations between these two countries were not expected within the near future.¹⁰⁷

The international popularity of reports by the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff can partly be explained by looking at a sister agency such as the CIA. Although, from a very early period on, CIA-analysts such as Ray Cline (from the Office of Current Intelligence) accurately assessed that the Sino-Soviet-conflict would result in an actual and definitive split,¹⁰⁸ many members of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff insisted that 'the whole thing was a mammoth deception operation designed to catch us off guard.' Even in the early 1970's, the idea of it being a deception operation remained alive to members of the Counter Intelligence Staff.¹⁰⁹ The director of the Counter Intelligence Staff – James Angleton – was so impressed by the analytical skills of the Soviet-defector Golitsyn, that he allowed himself to be fed with deceptive information, that the political and military split between China and the Soviet Union was a fake, and part of a Soviet master plan. A KGB-defector in London – Colonel Oleg Gordievskiy – explained that this was possible because 'Angleton displayed disgraceful ignorance of the KGB and the Soviet system as a

as the BVD-survey, only being a monthly one. In this report, the former Air Force Intelligence Agency LUID made estimates of future developments on Onkruid, on Grassroots Groups against Nuclear Violence and Militarism (in 1983 the successor of the DSD-grassroots groups), and on the peace movement. Although this prognosis did not prove to be correct for every aspect, it was generally – except for the final sentence – characterized by a businesslike approach and it refrained from spreading panic and wishful thinking).

¹⁰⁴ For example in: BVD FOIA-file headed *Beginperiode van het China-Sovietconflict en aanloop naar en beginperiode van de Culturele revolutie in de 60-er jaren*, No. 340386-2002, report "Briefwisseling CPSU - CP-China," 25 maart 1964, 2 pp; and report "Overzicht SBP," 1964, 2 pp (pages 1-2 and 15-16 of the file).

¹⁰⁵ BVD FOIA-file, No. 340386-2002, March 2003, 82 pp.

¹⁰⁶ BVD FOIA-file, No. 340386-2002, March 2003, "Overzicht SPB betreffende briefwisseling CPSU - CP China," 1964, 7 pp.

¹⁰⁷ BVD FOIA-file, No. 340386-2002, March 2003, report "Overzicht SBP," 1964, page 2; "Overzicht SPB betreffende briefwisseling CPSU - CP China," 1964, page 7.

¹⁰⁸ Cline based its assessments, among others, on evidence from the early sixties that showed an abrupt departure of Soviet-advisers and -technicians from China, and failing Chinese progress without Soviet presence. Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, 1991, 90.

¹⁰⁹ Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 1976, author's note, 330-331.

whole.’¹¹⁰ Others suggested that Angleton ‘tended to disregard facts, evidence, developments, and conclusions that did not fit his basic frame of reference.’¹¹¹ If so, this approach differed significantly from De Jonge. This may account for the differences of accuracy between De Jonge and Angleton’s assessment of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

11.4 CONCLUSION

The quarterly survey is not balanced in terms of the attention paid to the issue at hand (1/3 of the text), compared to other information (2/3 of the text). Also, attention is paid, in more detail, to bona fide groups than to the four, out of the five, anti-democratic elements. There is not an even distribution of attention paid to different anti democratic elements. Of the nine names mentioned, only one belonged to the target group that the agency agreed to write on.

If you look at successive surveys on similar issues, several inconsistencies are striking. Repeatedly, the BVD described concepts and groups more accurately in previous surveys than in later ones (Small Violence, the Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule). Also the characterization of a group – such as MANE – suddenly changed drastically. In this particular case, the slogan of another group (concerning squatters) was also simply ascribed to MANE. In the meantime, the anti-democratic element that worried the BVD most – Van Steenis – was actually forced to leave the scene.

Gaining thorough access to the basic files, from which the 1981-survey was based, was not possible, or too fragmented to be conclusive. However, in similar files, many mistakes were traced. One illustration revealed that not only many mistakes occurred in a personal file, but also many different types of mistakes were made – inaccurate data, contradictory information, dubious charge or suggestion, and the fabrication of information. The combination of these different types of errors may lead to new biases. There is a similarity in the pattern of intelligence failures in both the personal files consulted and the 1981-survey. The same types of mistakes – for example, the dubious charge or suggestion and the fabrication of information¹¹² – are evident in both instances.

The filing and related administrative processes did not meet the professional standard you would expect from an organization that processes information as its core business. The management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix, wrote a report commissioned by the minister, in which it made a series of significant comments about these processes.

¹¹⁰ Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, 1991, 84, 85, 87. For a short review of Golitsyn’s *New Lies for Old*, see: De Jong, *Schild en zwaard van de Oktoberrevolutie*, 2004, 296-298.

¹¹¹ Burris, “The Uses of History in Intelligence Analysis,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 1993, vol. 6, no. 3, 300.

¹¹² Insinuation: 1981-survey (brainwashing by foreigners at BAN); Van der Spek (Jewish citizens and safe houses). Invention of information: 1981-survey (representation quote from *Vrije*); Van der Spek (contact with USSR-embassy).

Compared to other reports, a letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice from exactly the same period was more accurate in terms of describing the interaction between activists and authorities at Dodewaard. A local intelligence unit also included information about this interaction.

Significant differences in quality have not only been traced between different directorates and departments, at the agency, but also within one directorate or department. As noted in chapter 10, there were even large differences in quality between sections of the BVD-survey. In 13.2, attention was given to factors that may have influenced these differences.

The Foreign Policy Staff was recognized for producing high quality outputs, but also Directorate B could produce valuable reports.

To compare the results of chapter 10 and 11

In chapter 10 and 11, the same type of results reoccur in the 1981-survey. First, there are similar imbalances traced in the survey. Second, there are similarities in the intelligence mistakes that were made (survey and Van der Spek file). Third, the survey was of a poor quality (10.2.7). It was also not the most accurate product concerning this issue at that time (letter by ministers).

12 Factors influencing the quality of the SRB-reports

What factors contribute to a higher or a lower quality of a report? There are limitations in trying to answer this question. In this research, many variables are present, but only a limited number of cases. Therefore, these factors cannot be traced through statistical generalizations. Instead, use is made of analytical generalizations. This means that this part of the study will be, to a large degree, exploratory in nature.

First, factors related to the SRB and its reports are discussed (12.1). Second, reports by other organizations on the same issue are surveyed to identify differences to trace additional insights regarding factors that influence the quality of reports (12.2).

12.1 FORUM, DECEPTION, AND OTHER FACTORS

An organization such as the SRB who published its reports, will differ from the BVD that rarely made anything public. The SRB is also an example of a non-commercial non-governmental organization. The SRB differs vastly from the BVD in terms of different kinds of feedback from different forums (12.1.1) – which may lead to more insight than when more of the same type of agency were investigated.

In addition, special attention is paid to the factor of deception (12.1.2), as discussed in 3.3. Finally, a series of other factors are discussed, such as political engagement, wages, motivation, size of the organization, and education (12.1.3).

12.1.1 Forum

Feedback, corrections, and criticism about a report can stem from different forums. It can come from internal forums, limited to the organization that produced the report, or from external forums, such as consumers of a report. As the effects of the different forums are entwined with the discussion on openness and secrecy, attention will also be paid to this issue.

Internal forums

At the SRB, internal forums are discussed from three angles. First, there is the forum on the design and research method. Second, there is the forum for individual cases of oil shipments and third, there is the role of the board of the Bureau.

Design and method

As described in 7.2.1, the economist Rivers and the journalist Bailey played an important role in the design of the SRB-method, and also later when refining the method. The initial research design was developed before beginning any research. The existence of this forum *before* starting any research was likely to be of a positive nature. Also in later years, the SRB forum for design and method was well-developed and well maintained.

During the existence of the SRB, internal discussions took place on the method and future of the Bureau. Four main discussions can be distinguished: the first in August and September 1982; the second from July-October 1984; the third from October 1986-January 1987; and the fourth and final one in 1992.

The reasons for these discussions varied. The 1982 and 1986 discussions were aimed at gaining understanding whether other methods of investigations could be implemented. These discussions could be raised by SRB staff (1982) or its parent organization (HCSA in 1986).

The 1984 meeting was convened after the research director had announced his departure from the Bureau.

The fourth discussion (1992) was organized because the SRB expected that the ANC would soon request an ending to embargo-politics.¹ It also focused on whether some of the money remaining could be spent on a publication about the work of the SRB.² In 1995, as a result of this discussion, the SRB published its book *Embargo*.

As some issues remained an item throughout the years, these are presented in a thematic way. From the beginning, the SRB, internally, discussed all kinds of possible research methods, and in particular the journalistic approach. A related point was topicality – what was the most optimal way to apply political pressure and to be involved with publicity? During an internal discussion more in-depth research was proposed which reflected the investigative journalistic approach of Martin Bailey.³ After internal discussions, a new publicity function was created inside the Bureau. In 1983, Jaap Rodenburg became the first staff member responsible for public affairs.⁴ Other, sometimes outrageous, ideas included monitoring tankers by satellite; Greenpeace-research together with actions on the high sea, and Wallraff-research – selling oil to South Africa and covering the deal with print and film.⁵

¹ Hengeveld, "Iets over de 'toekomstdiscussie' van het SRB," 13 April 1992, 3-5.

² Ibid.

³ -, "Possible Activities of the Shipping Research Bureau in the Future," 2/9/82, 3 point E.

⁴ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 375.

⁵ Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB: discussiestuk 23 July 1984," 3. Rodenburg referred to the German writer and activist Günter Wallraff, who worked undercover to unveil abuses. His best known activities are his undercover work as a journalist at the German daily *Bild*, and as a Turkish worker at several companies.

A continuous point of discussion involved what the SRB called the retrospective and the prospective approach. The retrospective approach is a method that analyzes all kinds of databases for primary biannual reports. The prospective method is a journalistic approach focusing on exposing recent oil deliveries. The prospective approach was more related to the kind of work of SRB's parent organizations, and therefore the Bureau saw this more as an appropriate activity for HCSA and Kairos.⁶ In addition, the SRB, feared that the prospective approach would reduce the investigation to exposing incidents, as has been the case before 1980. The Bureau was not looking for alternative actions, but rather alternative methods of research. The journalistic investigation was too close to campaigning.⁷

The journalistic approach, however, had advantages at times. The absence of a journalistic investigation led to the undesired effect that the Bureau, was intimidated by letters received from companies who denied being involved in oil deliveries.⁸ Journalists made their own investigations on the spot and consequently obtained information that was not uncovered by the Bureau. Attempts were made to combine both ways of working. One success of the combination of the journalistic approach and the SRB method was in uncovering the activities of Marc Rich.⁹ In later years the Bureau gave journalists scoops in exchange for services. The SRB also leaked on purpose preliminary findings to a journalist, in order to advance publicity. In that case the Bureau could quote this journalist – actually being the SRB's own preliminary findings – without waiting for the time-consuming procedure of sending letters and reminders to ship owners, oil brokers, and governments before publishing the data. This was called the method of 'creating sources.'¹⁰

Another discussion concerned the possibility of investigating oil traders and oil companies instead of tankers. A problem of this type of approach was that it not only deviated from the systematic approach of investigating tankers, but also the information itself often turned out to be vague. It was time-consuming and often led to meager results.

To summarize, there was a well developed forum functioning in terms of design and method. Nevertheless, all the discussions on method and future rarely influenced SRB policy. Most of the times, changes were not a result of elaborate discussions with the parent organization, but rather took place in every day practice – and with advice from Bailey and Rivers. However, this forum-function was useful in identifying the items that the Bureau had difficulties with and prevented them from being inward looking.

⁶ De Jong "Toekomst Shipping Research Bureau," 13 September 1984, 3-4.

⁷ De Jong "Toekomst Shipping Research Bureau (2)," 2 October 1984. See also: Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB. Discussiestuk voor KZA en Kairos," 10 August 1984, 4.

⁸ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 173.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 126, 139, 161, 177.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 66, 124.

Cases of individual shipments

In addition to discussing method, the SRB established a small forum that focused on difficult cases concerning oil supplies. SRB staff members held sessions in which they formulated and evaluated hypotheses to analyze certain ship movements, sometimes over a relaxed glass of wine.¹¹

Board

As explained above, the board played a role in discussing the future of the Bureau. When a weak point was identified in the internal forum structure of the SRB, it was, however, controlled by the board. The board of the Bureau – dominated by its parent organizations – was primarily interested in obtaining data for their campaigns, as fast as possible. It rarely concerned itself with the way research was carried out.¹² The board of the SRB was almost ‘systematically shielded from hearing about research problems.’ Of an average of 8 items on board meeting agendas only one concerned the ‘technical research of the SRB.’¹³

A discussion between members of the board and analysts of the Bureau illustrates this. A member of the board asked for more emphasis on aspects other than just tanker-oriented research. The SRB explained that it had put a lot of effort into related issues, but this kind of research involved tackling difficult aspects. The Bureau sometimes simply missed concrete evidence for solid statements.¹⁴ The conclusions drawn from this discussion varied. Board member Bosgra was of the opinion that the discussion had helped to change the emphasis of SRB’s work into a direction desired by the HCSA. The SRB-analyst was of the opinion that the discussion was helpful because board members finally saw that the Bureau was already for years working in the way that HCSA wanted.¹⁵

External forums

The external forums of the SRB were diverse and well developed. There is a division between the confidential external forum and the open external forum. In an implicit way, these forums have already been discussed in 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.

The confidential external forum was composed of reactions of the Bureau’s preliminary findings. The SRB sent its confidential preliminary findings to business and governments (and ANC, SWAPO and the UN). The reactions served as a source of information and criticism (7.2.1).

There were also other options. SRB-consultant Rivers suggested in a confidential memo that distributing a confidential newsletter to selected parties

¹¹ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

¹² Interview with Ruud Bosgraaf (HCSA/board SRB) by the author, 29 January 2000.

¹³ Rouweler, “Voorstellen voor de toekomst van het Shipping Research Bureau,” 3 October 1984, page 4, point 17.

¹⁴ Minutes of the meeting of 17 November 1986 by SRB, HCSA, and Kairos, 1 December 1986, 2-3. Minutes of the meeting of 14 January 1987 by SRB, HCSA, and Kairos, 16 January 1987, 1-3.

¹⁵ Minutes of the meeting of 14 January 1987 by SRB, HCSA, and Kairos, 16 January 1987, 1-3.

may be worth considering, '[t]he newsletter could be free, or we could charge for it.' The Bureau never took this idea or carried it out.¹⁶

There was also the open external forum. This forum responded to SRB publications. Since anyone could criticize the findings, it encompassed almost all kinds of sources – from governments to ship owners, from journalists to trade-unions. Actually, the open external forum represents many sub-forums. It served as an extra source of expertise. One example concerns a counter-report by Norwegian ship owners concerning the first SRB-survey, written about Norway (7.2.2).

Openness - secrecy

The Bureau's well developed external forum may contribute to providing insights into the discussion on openness and secrecy of intelligence and security agency reports (2.4.3).

Two overall effects of the external forum can be traced. First, it served to provide quality control. The quality of reports improved throughout the years, partly because of the extra expertise and insights that was obtained from the response to public reports. A second effect concerns temporary extra bias because of the way publicity gave rise to additional pressure. Both effects are discussed in relation with intelligence literature. In 2.4.3, former CIA-director Colby pleaded for openness in reports as a starting point. He argued that criticism from independent sources would lead to extra expertise. This idea of extra expertise is supported by the SRB-case. After the first main SRB-report and -surveys were published, the publications were the object of criticism. This led to improvements. First, the SRB optimized its method of investigation. Second, the Bureau improved its method of verification, and it began to consult also with companies. Third, it obtained additional information such as the mentioned counter-report by Norwegian ship owners (7.2.1, 7.2.2).

Nevertheless, the SRB-case also shows a – temporary – period of additional bias as a result of reports being public. The pressure from OAPEC-countries and ANC led to individual names, from oil exporting countries from the Middle East being deleted in the second and third main reports. These countries did not like seeing their names published while they were publicly supporting the oil embargo. The same openness eventually led to a correction of this practice. This was not only caused by criticism of oil transporting countries and organizations, but also by others such as journalists, Israel and the internal uneasiness of the Bureau concerning this SRB/ANC policy. This criticism was more intense, as the names of individual oil exporting countries from the Middle East were mentioned in the preliminary findings (7.2.4, 'Biased and veiled reporting 1981-1984'). The Bureau eventually had to correct its biased and veiled reporting

¹⁶ Confidential memo Bernard Rivers to SRB, 27 August 1982, 7.

because otherwise its credibility was at stake. This pressure was a result of the policy of openness.

What is special for the case of the SRB was that its objectives were not limited to intelligence. They also were concerned with lobbying. It is likely, this made this agency more vulnerable to pressures from allied organizations, like the ANC.

From the SRB-case, it cannot be concluded that one factor in the forums was decisive. After the publication of the first main report, the design and method – positively influenced by the well developed internal forum – was still flexible to being further improved based on feedback from the external forum. Also in the external forum, not one factor was decisive. After the first report, the main political pressure came from the ANC and its allies. This one-sided influence provoked a bias, but was later balanced by criticism from other parties.

What seems to be decisive positive effect on the quality in the SRB-case is the combination of different forums from different backgrounds. Not all aspects of the openness of the reports provoked, in the short or medium term, a positive influence – although the majority of these aspects did do so. The different forums from different backgrounds had the most clear positive influence.

The worst situation seems to be when there is only one political or diplomatic motivated forum – whether this is an internal or external forum. Additional bias is then most likely to be present. This calls for a *triangulation of forums* – composed of *different* backgrounds – which is more likely to be a decisive factor than just openness. In the case of the Bureau, a triangulation of forums was clearly present and well established – and turned out to have a self-refining potential in the long run.

The Bureau had a policy of secrecy in order to protect vulnerable sources. A staff member never revealed the identity of a source to someone else. This policy also applied to colleagues amongst the SRB itself. If there was a change of staff within the SRB, a source was usually handed over in an (oral) briefing.¹⁷

In the SRB-case, source protection was rarely an issue in relation with reports being made public. Only in a very limited number of cases was data not presented fully. To circumvent such difficulties, the SRB informed the parties involved confidentially, or it first leaked information to the media, and then quoted from the publications.¹⁸ The secret sources from South Africa never caused a problem, and actually improved the quality of the publications without leaving a trace to their source.

Hypotheses

In 2.4.3, hypotheses were developed to assess some of the relationships about the issue of openness and secrecy.

¹⁷ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 115.

¹⁸ The Bureau used both options in the case of Marimpex and the Soviet oil: 7.2.2 'Rotterdam survey.'

HYPOTHESIS 1: If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.

In the case of the Bureau, diplomatic feedback – by the ANC and OAPEC countries – was not the only feedback. During the second and third main report, however, this type of feedback, while it was at its strongest, produced the most negative influence. It was the only period of biased and veiled reporting by the SRB. This bias is undoubtedly connected to pressure from the ANC. For the fourth and following main reports, the Bureau took a more independent course. The diplomatic factor was not dominant anymore, and its negative influence disappeared in the reports.

The outcomes of the SRB-case support hypothesis 1.

HYPOTHESIS 2: If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, this will lead to a worsening of the information position caused by a decrease of and manipulation of sources – especially of secret sources.

For this hypothesis, two effects can be traced in the SRB-case study. First, sources were indeed manipulated and shielded. These concerned (semi-)open sources, rather than secret ones. Characteristically only the information on South African oil supplies was affected, whereas other information remained intact. As a result of other information being available, the Bureau adapted its methods of analysis and kept its analyzing potential intact (gap tanker cycle, incorrect call cycle). In short, although there was manipulation of (semi-)open sources, the analyzing potential of the Bureau was not affected by it. It may be that at least as long as the general information of an issue remains available, the manipulation of and shielding of data within this issue is not a decisive factor for the quality of a report.

Second, the access to secret sources was not affected in the case of the Bureau. On the contrary, the Bureau gained access to a growing number of secret sources over the years. The quality of these secret sources also kept improving, ending with high quality secret sources from within South Africa.

As far as the SRB-case is concerned, hypothesis 2 is rejected in terms of secret sources and the negative influence on the analyzing potential.

HYPOTHESIS 3: If intelligence and security agency reports are publicly shared, their quality will increase because the positive effect caused by the feedback from different forums will dominate.

In the long term, the experience of the SRB supports hypothesis 3. Nevertheless, in the short and medium term, the picture is more ambivalent. On one hand, the feedback from different forums helped the Bureau to overcome the teething problems in producing the first main report. On the other hand, the diplomatic pressures – also provoked by the policy to publish the reports – resulted in

biased and veiled reporting for some years. Finally, the positive effects caused by feedback from different forums – including sharp internal and external criticism on this biased and veiled reporting – dominated the fourth and following main reports.

If a priority must be given to of what was useful in keeping the negative effects of publicly shared reports as limited as possible, the focus must be on limiting the influence of the diplomatic and political factor. At least, that is the outcome of the SRB-case – see hypotheses 1 and 2. The SRB-case supports hypothesis 3, with the condition that the negative influence from diplomatic feedback needed to be managed so that it remained within set limits.

12.1.2 Deception

In 3.3, Angleton's model of an opponent's potential to use deception was presented. On one hand an opponent can feed an agency with manipulated information – or it can prevent it from receiving information. On the other hand, an opponent can try to get inside information from an organization.

In this section, first an investigation takes place to understand whether elements of deception were present. Second, the response of the SRB is explored and finally, the effect on the quality of the reports is assessed.

Input and output

At the input stage – when incorrect information is given by an opponent – a number of elements of deception can be discovered.

First, ship owners stopped calling at Lloyd's (7.2.1). Already in 1982, the Bureau experienced that calls to not only South Africa were being kept secret, but also the chartering of tankers in the Persian Gulf and Brunei.¹⁹ In South Africa ships were forced to call under coded names or utilized radio silence. Another popular method was to paint over or to cover the ship's name when unloading at Durban or Cape Town. A subtle method included using old tankers, bought from lay up and making their final voyage, using this trip to deliver oil to South Africa. Another method was trans-shipment of oil on the high seas or ship to ship transfers in third countries.

Second, false calls were made (7.2.1). Companies reported fake calls at harbors, reported the nature of cargo incorrectly (chemicals instead of oil), concealed movements, or secret loaded oil. A difficult trick to tackle was for instance a ship that was reported as having sailed to Ain Sukhna (with a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea); and this tanker had a falsified Romanian report that identified it as a ship that sailed the Mediterranean Sea to transport oil to Romania. Oil brokers paid Romania for these falsified documents. Sometimes, South Africa itself was involved in forging these documents.

¹⁹ -, Possible Activities of the Shipping Research Bureau in the Future, 2/9/1982, 1.

Third, to frustrate investigations – not only from the SRB – people like Marc Rich made use of an empire of (short term) companies based in different countries. This was complicated by the complex way in which Rich chartered ships.²⁰

Fourth, South Africa made laws and took special measures to enforce the secrecy of oil supplies. Examples of these laws were the National Supplies Procurement Act (1970), the Petroleum Products Act (1977), the Petroleum Products Amendment Bill (1979), the National Key Points Act (1980), the Petroleum Amendment Bill (1985), and the State Oil Fund Act. Sometimes, South Africa used these laws in combination with the Internal Security Act, the Customs and Excise Act, and the Publications Act. The South African authorities not only used laws, but they also monitored and commented on the way oil supplies took place.²¹ Other additional measures were taken, such as the press censorship on movements of ships, which was extended to all South African harbors.²²

Fifth, storytellers purposely fed the SRB with disinformation (7.2.2 ‘Other sources’).

Besides input, there is output – when an opponent tries to gather inside information covertly. The SRB had to deal with attempts of infiltration, ranging from people presenting themselves as a journalist to a South African conscientious objector, who persistently wanted to meet the SRB staff in their own office.

One person, who gained the deepest access to the SRB, later became known as the wastepaper man. He said that he collected wastepaper for a school in Amsterdam.²³ At the time, the Bureau needed the help of a trusted volunteer. The Christian research organization Osaci – later Oikos – suggested its long-time volunteer Marcel Paul Knotter, alias Paul Oosterbeek. Although SRB staff were not sure if they could trust him, he was taken on as a volunteer for more than three months at the beginning of 1989.²⁴ Afterwards, he was dubbed the wastepaper man because he gained access to several Third World solidarity organizations through collecting waste paper on behalf of a school. The school indeed received the proceeds. Only after some time, when documents were quoted, among others, in

²⁰ SRB, *South Africa's Lifeline*, 1986, 17. SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 9-10, 20-21. SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 3, 5, 9-11, 17, 39-42. Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 152, 160. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996

²¹ South African authorities were worried oil deliveries took place in a trading pattern they judged as too regular: ‘4.2.1 They intend to use only two ships, which names will be changed from time to time and which will load at various ports in the Middle East. We feel this method too easily will create a pattern that can be detected and exposed by the anti-South African groups, and therefore a greater diversity of ships is necessary’ (Personal and confidential letter D.F. Mostert of SFF/Sasol, to Director General of the Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 15 May 1981. See: Hengeveld & Rodenburg, *Embargo*, 1995, 162).

²² Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1975-1984, 614.51, File 3037. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1990, 614.51, File 2152. Foreign Affairs, Code 6, 1985-1994, 613.211.45, File 1564, Pretoria no. 7137/1171, 21 October 1986.

²³ Hengeveld, “Tankers tellen en tipgevers bellen,” *Ons Amsterdam*, vol. 48, March 1996, 81-82.

²⁴ Letter of SRB to Marcel Paul Knotter (alias of Paul Oosterbeek) of 22 December 1988 (Oosterbeek's voluntary work) and 22 April 1989.

the conservative newspaper *De Telegraaf*, it transpired that the waste paper was not given to the school immediately. In 1995, after Oosterbeek had been exposed, the SRB was still confident that it – as opposed to some other organizations whose confidential correspondence had been quoted – had ‘kept a watchful eye on the contents of its waste-paper bin.’²⁵ However, this did not prevent Oosterbeek from stealing a glance at some older files, such as ‘Libya 1980-1982’ and ‘Internal Correspondence.’ This turned out to be the case when some of these documents were later quoted in *De Telegraaf*, and the apartheid friendly periodical *Sta-vast*. The quotations showed many inaccuracies and spelling mistakes. The SRB concluded that the wastepaper man had hastily copied the documents by hand. He had not made photocopies.²⁶

Oosterbeek used his alias Marcel Paul Knotter. After his activities were exposed in 1994, his real name was uncovered. He worked for Peter J.W. Siebelt’s Vinkenveen-based company Algemene Beveiligings Consultancy (ABC).²⁷ ABC was founded in 1986, as a bureau for investigation and advice.²⁸ The approach of ABC was not appreciated by all Dutch private agencies. In particular Control Risks Benelux criticized ABC and said that people who want to trace corporate espionage must not commit this espionage themselves.²⁹

Target

The incomparable degree of deception is to attack physically. In September 1982, three suspects were caught and charged in Britain after a series of burglaries. These burglaries were aimed at the then British based ANC, PAC, and SWAPO offices. The burglaries were committed in July and August 1982. Edward Nicholas Aspinall, a suspect who pleaded guilty to the charges, referred to a planned operation against a ‘shipping front,’ indicating that SRB was the

²⁵ Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 374. See also Hengeveld, “Tankers tellen en tipgevers bellen,” *Ons Amsterdam*, 81-82.

²⁶ *Sta-vast*, March 1990, 113-114. Letter Hengeveld to Lubbers, 18 November 1996.

²⁷ The SRB was not the only target of ABC. The consultancy did its wastepaper work on dozens of pressure groups. As an organization it could collect many documents from AWEPA, of which Scholten was the leader. It possibly also had access to documents of Kairos.

ABC might have been a BVD-target. In its 1992 annual report, the BVD wrote malafide traders on information tried to obtain their information with the most various means, sometimes with similarities to spying practices. In 1994, the BVD visited all organizations on corporate intelligence. After a FOIA-request by the author on ABC, the agency could not release any information. This file may be still operational. This may be an indication of the sensitivity of the ABC-file at the BVD. Seven organizations that were victim of the affair complained to the police about the roles of Oosterbeek and Siebelt, and accused them of swindle and participation in a criminal organization. The police interrogated both Oosterbeek and Siebelt. Yet, the case did not come to a further prosecution. Lubbers, “Liefdewerk Oud Papier wordt vervolgd,” *Welingerichte Kringen*, 1995, 57-66, 71-71, 73, 77-79. Letter of the BVD to the author, 1631512/01, 6 December 2000.

²⁸ Oosterbeek was, during his cover as a wastepaper man, difficult to get in touch with. His post office box, which was finally traced during a reconstruction, turned out to be the same as the one placed in an advertisement ‘Dutch shock trooper seeks employment’ in the July 1985 edition of the periodical *Soldiers of Fortune*. His father had been a civil servant at the Ministry of Defense. Lubbers, “Liefdewerk Oud Papier wordt vervolgd,” *Welingerichte Kringen*, 1995, 63-67.

²⁹ Sietsma quoted in Lubbers, “Liefdewerk Oud Papier wordt vervolgd,” *Welingerichte Kringen*, 1995, 73.

target.³⁰ Furthermore, in 1982, an ANC member, Frene Ginwala, warned the Bureau that papers, which had been found on the suspects, showed that the next target was ‘an office opposite the Amsterdam Central Station.’ The office of the SRB had its entrance on Prins Hendrikkade 48, which is indeed opposite Central Station.³¹ Uncovering this address could happen although the Bureau had tried to keep its location secret.

Kairos – one of the parent organizations – was the target of an abortive bombing attempt in 1989. If the bomb had detonated, the building would have been reduced to a pile of rubble.³² A Dutch police officer, who investigated the bombing attempt, said that this type of explosive had not been used in Europe before.³³ This may support the hypothesis that a (professional) foreign hit team could have been involved. Nevertheless, information that could contradict this possibility is found in BVD-files. The BVD wrote in its weekly survey – No. 46 of 1989 – on “Terrorism and other relevant events and developments:” ‘The clumsy fabricated bomb did not detonate, because the time mechanism did not function in an optimal way.’ In the information released by the BVD, no indication can be found regarding possible suspects.³⁴

The Shipping Research Bureau

Largely, the SRB could cope with most of the mentioned forms of deception.³⁵ These forms of deception had the effect of slowing down a SRB-investigation. In most cases it took some time to uncover a new form of deception, or to deal with it.³⁶ When a deception was discovered by the Bureau, additional activities could be identified in three fields – extra interaction, the development of new sources, and the employment of extra research proceedings.

³⁰ In March 1982, the ANC Mission had even been bombed. AAM Archives Committee, “Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on South Africa’s Illegal and Covert Activities in the United Kingdom,” 13, 17. Peter Casselton told the former major of the South African Police Eugene de Kock, that the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, knew about this bombing (De Kock, *A Long Night’s Damage*, 1998, 71). The planning of the bombing is said to have been the work of Craig Williamson, and the explosives were said to be sent to London via the South African diplomatic bag (Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness*, 1995, 43-44, 169).

³¹ Hengeveld, “Tankers tellen en tipgevers bellen,” *Ons Amsterdam*, 81-82. Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 September 1998.

It is possible that the South African hit team obtained the address actually quite simply through consulting the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. At least it is likely the BVD obtained this way the address of the SRB. In this BVD-file, the statutory address is Prins Hendrikkade 48, Amsterdam (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, on South-African Communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998. File 3 of 6 {Shipping Research Bureau}, page 2 of 4).

³² Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 373, 375.

³³ Interview with Erik van den Bergh by the author, 1 October 1998, and 7 May 1999. This does not mean the explosives were produced in South Africa, as South African hit squads have made use of explosives from other countries, such as China or the USSR (De Kock, *A Long Night’s Damage*, 1998, 116, 174).

³⁴ BVD, FOIA-file 71758, 6 December 2000. Report belonging to letter no. 2112.307 of 27 November 1989, “TERRORISME en overige relevante gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen, week 46/89”.

³⁵ SRB, *South Africa’s Lifeline*, 1986, 17; SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, 9-10, 20-21; SRB, *Fuel for Apartheid*, 1990, 3, 5, 9-11, 17, 39-42; Hengeveld, *Embargo*, 1995, 152, 160.

³⁶ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

Extra interaction was mainly internally oriented. Rivers and Bailey were asked for advice or help to solve new research problems caused by deception. In addition, SRB-analysts held sessions to tackle difficult cases of possible oil deliveries.

The extra sources covered many different fields. Throughout the years, for example, the Bureau gained access to a variety of sources – including secret informants – within the oil business. After 1988, it gained access to sources within South Africa.³⁷

Extra research proceedings were also employed. The SRB developed new standard research processes for ‘no calls’ and ‘false calls’ (7.2.1). Companies suspected of delivering oil received as standard, extra attention.

Finally, the Bureau protected itself against deception by changing the degree of certainty a ship had delivered oil (7.2.2 ‘Biases and accessibility’). It also tried to protect itself against infiltration, as carried out by ABC.

For a complete overview of the interaction between SRB-sources, counter-measures, and the Bureau’s reaction on these countermeasures, see 7.2.2 table 7.2.

Hypotheses

A variety of new forms of deception were implemented throughout the years. At the same time – as we saw in 8.1 – the quality of reports improved. This correlation is now discussed in combination with the two hypotheses from 3.3.

***HYPOTHESIS 4:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.*

***HYPOTHESIS 5:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.*

There seems to be most support for hypothesis 5. The quality of reports indeed increased while at the same time more and new forms of deception were employed. This increase of quality was caused by extra consultants and contacts, the development of new sources and by the development of and utilization of extra research procedures.

Some effects of Wilensky’s big policy decision (3.3) can be traced in the case of deception as well. Deception led to the mobilization of new resources and an improved information flow which in the end led to analyses of a higher

³⁷ To tackle such a form deception, the mentioned tanker with falsified Romanian report can be taken as an example. The SRB was able to check this information after 1988, when it obtained information directly from a deep throat in South Africa. Only then the Bureau could prove the documents for first half of the voyage – to Ain Sukhna – were forged.

quality. Discovering deception appears to some extent activate high-quality intelligence. The urgency caused by the discovery of deception appears to lead to the shaping of many decisions, and freeing the flow of information. In short, the discovery of deception triggered some of the elements Wilensky mentioned, which eventually leads to a higher quality of intelligence than when no deception was found.

12.1.3 Other factors

In this section, other factors are discussed that may have influenced the quality of the reports. These are factors on which less material was obtained

Staff members of the Bureau were politically motivated to do their work. They wanted to support the anti-apartheid struggle. This is also expressed in the low wages they received.³⁸

There is no clear or consistent connection that can be traced between political motivation and the low wages and the quality of the publications. There is, of course, the period of biased and veiled reporting (1981-1984),³⁹ caused by trying to serve the ANC and its allies. However, being politically motivated provided highly educated people, while receiving low wages, to delve deeply into this issue for years. Overall, to be political motivated and to receive low wages did not seem to influence the quality of reports in a negative way.

In 12.1.1 'Internal forums,' the discussion on the retrospective or prospective approach was presented. This discussion was also related to another issue – the motivation of a researcher. During 1983, tension developed within the SRB because the reports did not receive an adequate follow up in the form of publicity and political pressure (within the Netherlands). This led to a reduction of people enjoying their work, which ultimately led to Janwillem Rouweler leaving. In 1984, the announcement of his leaving led to an extensive discussion on goals, structure, and methodology of the Bureau.⁴⁰ A diminishing lack of enjoyment – caused by a lack of motivation – can lead to a lower quality. In a worst case scenario, a brain drain takes place. This did *not* happen at the SRB. If an effect can be traced, it was that the quality of the reports improved during the following years, because in 1985 the Bureau abandoned its policy of veiled and biased reporting. The internal discussions and new personnel helped to change this policy.

There are no indications that the size of the Bureau – very small – influenced quality in a positive or negative way. In 2.3.1, it was noted that it is possible that a small think tank working solely on the basis of open material provides more

³⁸ In fourteen years, the total budget of the SRB was less than \$ 2 million (6.2).

³⁹ But the quality of the research process itself was not affected by it.

⁴⁰ Rodenburg "Toekomst SRB. Discussiestuk voor KZA en Kairos," 10 August 1984, 1.

valuable information than a large and ineffective functioning agency. Size as such does not appear to be a decisive factor.

All staff members of the Bureau had an academic education, such as political science and economics.⁴¹ The way analysts worked and the structure of their publications bore features of a scientific approach. The academic background and scientific attitude of the SRB staff members contributed to this approach. Research skills were the main criterion for selection of staff members.⁴² It had a positive influence on the quality of the reports.

To summarize, there is no consistent outcome of most factors – political motivation, low wages, low motivation, or size of the organization – on the quality of the publications. Overall, they do not appear to have influenced the quality in a negative way, including the factor of low motivation. Their relationships with quality appear to be weak.

One factor had a more clear and positive effect on the quality – the scientific background and the scientific attitude of the researchers.

12.2 SRB AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

What factors contributed to differences in quality between SRB-publications and reports by other organizations? As noted in 8.3, the reports by other organizations were only evaluated marginally – for their differences with the SRB-publications. It encompassed the cross-case analysis of the SRB-case study.

In the case of the Erasmus-report, it remains unclear as to which factor(s) contributed to a lower quality compared to the SRB-report. It may have been pressure of time. It may have been a lack of expertise with this kind of fieldwork. It may have been that an emphasis on analysis, prognosis – at the same time neglecting the painstaking labor of retrieving reliable data – led to making a calculation regardless of the data. But there is little to calculate with the number zero.⁴³

In the case of Foreign Affairs, the good information position is likely to have contributed to accurate assessments (6.3.2). To trace other factors is too complex for this context. It may be that the often-criticized bureaucratic culture – in which documents are passed round a merry-go-round of officials and departments – created a well-developed internal forum, that in turn had a positive effect on the quality of an analysis or assessment.

⁴¹ Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 14 December 1995.

⁴² Interview with Richard Hengeveld by the author, 29 February 1996.

⁴³ If the definite 1984 figures were used – 0 tons of oil – there was nothing left to be calculated for the effects on employment and trade, because there would be no effects in the case of an oil embargo (8.3).

A factor that produced a negative influence on quality is diplomatic pressures. Diplomatic pressures are capable of seriously harming the quality of a report. It had harmed, to some degree, the quality of the second and third main SRB-report (12.1.1).

The negative influence of the diplomatic factor already loomed large in UN IGG reports. For diplomatic reasons, the UN IGG carried out extra investigations on smaller and more complex transports that scarcely led to any findings. In addition, the UN IGG made use of documents handed over by governments. Although the UN IGG was aware that these documents were sometimes forged, they, for diplomatic reasons, did not put these falsifications aside. The UN IGG deleted cases, even when a party involved admitted oil deliveries to South Africa. The degree of this bias dwarfed the one of the mentioned SRB-reports.

The diplomatic factor played an even extremely negative role in the UN Khalifa-lists, especially in regard to the continuous deletion of data about East European and Arab countries. Khalifa ignored outside criticism. This reinforces the idea already presented in 12.1.1 that not openness, but feedback by forums from different backgrounds is likely to be a more decisive factor.

Hypothesis

This cross-case analysis of the SRB-case leads to an outcome for one factor – the diplomatic one.

***HYPOTHESIS 1:** If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.*

The UN IGG reports and the UN Khalifa lists were produced by diplomatic units. The diplomatic factor was present in a dominant way. First, it was incorporated within the research unit itself. Second, the units took a dependent attitude towards the diplomatic networks in which they functioned. The reports and lists were affected in a negative way by the diplomatic factor, to an extent that the Bureau did not experience.

Concerning Dutch Foreign Affairs, no conclusive insight was obtained of the effects by the diplomatic factor. To be more conclusive regarding Foreign Affairs, attention, in future research, should focus on the interaction between the diplomatic factor and the culture in which documents are passed round a merry-go-round of officials and departments.

The cross-case outcome of this case study supports – as in 12.1.1 – hypothesis 1.

12.3 CONCLUSION

Factors that influence the quality of reports can have three effects – positive, negative or a negligible effect. Second, the SRB-case is interesting from the point of view of openness. Attention is given to the effects of reports that are made public.

Factors of positive effect

Different factors have shown to have a positive effect on the quality of reports. First, to obtain feedback from forums appears to be an important factor in improving the quality of a report. Especially a triangulation of forums – different forums from different backgrounds – are promising. This means that if one forum does not function well, as was the case with the SRB board a problem does not arise. It is possible that the forum-function at the Dutch Foreign Affairs was enhanced by its culture in which documents are passed round a merry-go-round of officials and departments. One forum has a negative influence – the diplomatic forum (see heading ‘Factors of negative effect’).

Second, the discovery of deception is likely to raise the quality of a report. As a result of discovering deception three responses were taken by the Bureau – extra interaction, the development of new sources, and the employment of extra research procedures. The effects at the SRB after the discovery of deception supports hypothesis 5: if an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than when an opponent did not employ a policy of deception.

Third, the scientific background and scientific attitude of researchers appears to have enhanced quality. A force enhancer for a scientific approach may be a combination of forums to discuss design, preliminary findings, and the reactions of third parties.

Fourth, a good information position enhances quality. The improvement of the quality of SRB-reports was parallel to the improvements of its information position. Also the accurate assessments by the Dutch Foreign Affairs is likely to have been influenced positively because of its accurate information position.

Factors of negative effect

A factor that showed to have a negative effect on the quality of reports was diplomatic pressure. It was traceable as a within-case effect for successive SRB-reports. It was also traceable in different cases – the Bureau, the UN IGG, and the Khalifa-lists. These point to the large destructive potential that diplomatic pressure has on quality. Although this destructive potential is large and in all cases the diplomatic pressure ran its course, a public price in terms of credibility and influence had to be paid. The effect of diplomatic pressure on secret reports could not be assessed, as no information was available.

In the SRB-case, some indications are found that any political motivated forum may lead to a potential lower quality. Nevertheless, not enough data was available to make a firm statement on this.

Factors for the larger part of indifferent effect

The factors of political motivation, low wages, low motivation, or size of an organization do not produce a consistent outcome. The relationship to quality appears to be weak. Generally, they all appear not to have influenced quality in a negative way, including the factor of low motivation.

Openness

Openness as such is not a single factor. It is related to a series of indicators. The positive effect of openness is undoubtedly that it creates an external forum. A negative effect is that it may trigger additional diplomatic pressure.

To assess the effect of openness more specifically, some additional comments are explored. In the SRB-case, the power of the external forum showed, in the long term, to be stronger than the power of diplomatic pressure. The positive effects finally dominated totally. Here, openness eventually had a complete self-refining potential.

A different occurrence concerns the Khalifa-lists. In this case diplomatic pressure was stronger than the external forum. At the same time, a process took place that paralleled with the observation of manipulation, made in 4.1.2 – ‘if the same group [...] [is] caught out a second or third time, their credibility will probably be dead for good. [...] They have not only lost all hope of directly influencing policy, they have lost [...] the indirect influence which they might have exercised through an honest contribution to the debate [...].’ In the Khalifa-case, a self-refining potential of a different nature was traced – those who did not adjust their report lost their credibility and their influence.

In the SRB-case, source protection was scarcely an issue in relation to reports being made public. Still, the Bureau had vulnerable sources, such as secret informants in the shipping industry and it even obtained valuable documents from within South Africa. In this respect there is hardly any difference between public agencies.

The Bureau solved the issue of source protection quite easy by not always being consequent about the degree of certainty that a ship had delivered oil, or by leaking purposely information to the media. In terms of source protection, the openness of reports was not only *not* a negative influence on quality, it was also almost a non-issue. Contrary to the assumption of 2.4.3 (table 2.4), openness in relation to source protection showed, in the SRB-case, to be more of a mentality issue, than something that affects quality. Source protection did not interfere with the external forum – and its positive effect on quality. The SRB-case indicates that source protection cannot be used straightforward as an excuse for a lack of openness of reports.

13 Factors influencing the quality of the BVD-survey

What factors contribute to a higher or a lower quality of a report? There are limitations in answering this question. In this research, many variables are present, but only a limited number of cases. Therefore, these factors cannot be traced through statistical generalizations. Instead, use will be made analytical generalizations. Subsequently, this part of the study is to a large degree exploratory in nature.

First, factors related to the BVD and the survey are discussed (13.1). Second, the reports of 11.3 are surveyed for differences to trace additional insights on factors that influence the quality of reports (13.2). Finally, factors of a positive and a negative effect are listed.

13.1 FORUM, DECEPTION, AND OTHER FACTORS

The case of the BVD – part of the government’s administration – will differ from that on the SRB – a private non-profit organization. First, the BVD forum was much smaller, because it did not publish its reports. Only a relatively small number of surveys were distributed to a select group who had to keep its contents secret. This hinders investigating direct feedback on this specific survey. However, some comments can be made regarding the different forums that served to control, to correct, and to steer the agency (13.1.1).

As in the case of the Bureau, attention is paid to the factor of deception. In this field, the BVD as a larger and governmental organization could respond in a way that the SRB was not capable of – by running a large network of agents through its agent runners. The effects of this network on the factor of deception are discussed (13.1.2).

Finally, a series of other factors will be discussed, such as motivation, wages, size of a section, education, and selection (13.1.3).

13.1.1 Forum

To control, correct, and steer an agency – and its reports – can stem from different forums. It can come from internal forums, limited to the organization that produced the report, or from external forums, such as consumers of the report or the legislative power that controls the agency. As the effects of the different forums are entwined with the discussion on openness and secrecy, these are included in this debate.

Internal forums

The type and quality of the internal forums at the BVD varied between sections. The analysts at the Foreign Policy Staff, for example, submitted their products to

each other in the expectation that these products were reviewed in a critical way. At other directorates, such as Directorate B, while there was rarely any peer review, control had a hierarchical nature.¹ There were also differences in executive qualities and the emphasis given to the quality of intelligence products by the heads of directorates. Directors closely supervised reports to external consumers, but they only exercised this in general terms rather than by checking its detailed elements of information.² With the exception of the Foreign Policy Staff, the internal forum was poorly developed.

At the time the reports were written, there was no quality manager at the BVD. A quality manager was appointed after the report by Andersson, Elffers & Felix.³

External forums

There are different types of external forums that could have served as a factor concerning the quality of reports. There are the domestic and international networks that the BVD functioned in. There are also the political steering and control undertaken by ministers and parliament. Finally, there is public debate.

Networks

The networks that the BVD functioned in may have functioned as external forums. In the 1980's, the most important Dutch network for the BVD was formed by the so-called PID's. PID was an abbreviation for the local intelligence units, who had different names. In Dutch, this abbreviation stood for Plaatselijke/Politie/Politieke Inlichtingendiensten; in English: Local/Police/Political Intelligence Agencies.⁴

Former head of the PID-Zaanstad, Sjoerd Bos, wrote that the control that was exercised on the activities of the PID's – carried out by the then head of operations of the BVD, Luc Leijendekker – was minimal. Although Leijendekker was interested in the information from the PID's – Bos wrote – he was not interested in how this data was obtained.⁵ However, this is important in judging the reliability of intelligence and in estimating possible biases. If Bos is correct, then the procedures initiated by Leijendekker may have had a negative influence on the quality of reports. More problems in this field have been identified.⁶ The BVD-

¹ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

² Ibid.

³ Interview with BVD-employee Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996.

⁴ In the 1990's after an extensive reorganization of Dutch police from a local into a regional structure, these PID's were transformed into RID's: Regionale Inlichtingendiensten (in English Regional Intelligence Agencies).

⁵ *Nieuwe Revu*, 6-13 December 1990, 32.

⁶ In 1965 through circular 769150, for example, the BVD let the PID's know that it did not want to receive any correspondence on individual PSP-membership, only if it concerned a supposed extremist character. On 15 December 1966, through circular 852190, the BVD asked to meet certain standards for both registration and reporting. In general, the agency only wanted registration and reporting of persons with a communist, Trotskyist, or anarchist background (BVD, 15 December 1966, no. 852190. Subject: PSP, signed by head of the BVD J.S. Sinninghe Damsté). On 22 October 1979, the BVD formally closed the file on the PSP through a secret official message. Former head of the PID-Zaanstad – Sjoerd Bos – wrote

official Hoekstra also complained about the poor situation that he was confronted with, when he succeeded Leijendekker. Because of this, Hoekstra found it completely incomprehensible that Leijendekker was later promoted to deputy head of Directorate B.⁷

The communication problems between the BVD and the PID's would have hindered the forum function. These communication problems were deepened by the fact that the BVD had to be in contact with over 160 municipal and regional police forces, all of whom had their own approach to carry out their tasks. Furthermore, some of the most important police forces – such as Amsterdam, the Hague, and Rotterdam – were reluctant to pass on intelligence to the BVD. For various reasons – including an incorrect understanding of the war record of the deputy head of the BVD Hassan Neervoort – the BVD was sometimes excluded from receiving this information. The intelligence unit of Rotterdam even had a stamp with the text 'Not for the agency.' The Dutch central criminal intelligence agency CRI (Centrale Recherche en Informatiedienst), also had a problematic relationship with the BVD, in particular regarding the issue of the shared use of the local intelligence units of the police.⁸

Concerning the international networks, scarcely anything is known about its possible forum function. One exception concerns the Foreign Policy Staff. Foreign sister agencies were receptive to the qualities of the analysts from the Foreign Policy Staff. They visited the section regularly, among them CIA-official Sherman Kent.⁹

Political steering and control

The political steering and control in those days was poor, even almost absent. This did not contribute to the forum functioning. The main interest of successive ministers was that they did not want to have any political turmoil. From 1981 onwards, the agency had to present to the minister a list of BVD-targets.¹⁰

However, noticeable is the absence of ministerial feedback. At the end of the 1970's, head of the BVD De Haan (1977-1986) doubted whether the agency needed to invest a lot of energy on the CPN. In 1981, minister Van Thijn tended to lean towards the opinion that the BVD had to discontinue. Before a final conclusion could be reached, a governmental crisis interrupted this discussion about CPN. The BVD produced a memo in which it proposed what should and should not be

his PID-unit registered until 1982 all members of the PSP in his region – sixteen years too long (*Nieuwe Revu*, 20-27 December 1990, 50-51).

In this article, Bos incorrectly refers to a 1979-statement of the then minister of Home Affairs Hans Wiegel that registration was only allowed to be aimed at infiltration by anti-democratic persons. This would imply that he collected such information three years too long. Already on 15 December 1966, however, the BVD requested the PID's through circular 852190 that these should for registration and reporting only aim at members with a communist, Trotskyist, or anarchist background (BVD, 15 December 1966, no. 852190. Subject: PSP, signed by J.S. Sinnighe Damsté).

⁷ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 37, 113-114, 116-120.

⁹ De Graaff & Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze*, 1998, 223, 265, 330, 331, 339.

¹⁰ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 34-36, 56.

covered. In 1982, under minister Rood – Van Thijn’s successor – the BVD adopted a new policy on the CPN.¹¹ Subsequently, the BVD did not focus on the entire CPN as a target group, but rather only a number of aspects. These included the main developments within the CPN: 1) ideological and political developments of the party in theory and practice; 2) international contacts and resulting activities; 3) covert and coordinated activities concerning societal organizations; 4) activities that – by their nature or means used – actually exceeded the limits of the legal order; and 5) party leadership.¹² In 1985, the agency still monitored these aspects. On 6 March 1985, however, the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies wrote: a) the CPN as such is not the object of investigation anymore; and b) the committee noted that ‘the viewpoint of the government, concerning the CPN, is that no other policy will be carried out than on any other party actually functioning within the parliamentary-democratic frame.’¹³ Shortly afterwards on 15 March 1985, head of the BVD De Haan wrote that the reflection of the committee would lead to wrong conclusions. On 2 April 1985, the BVD complained that minister Rietkerk did not tell the committee that he objected to their reflection.¹⁴ In January 1987, Blom, the head of the BVD and successor of De Haan informed Cees van Dijk (CDA), the successor of Rietkerk as minister of Home Affairs, that the policy was still being carried out and the committee knew of it, ‘but has represented it in a garbled way in its report. The Minister did not oppose it.’ The BVD did not opt for a minister who did not act and who hoped that no damage would occur regarding the wrong impression that the public had about BVD-activities concerning the CPN. The agency wanted the committee to communicate correctly, or the agency would need to change its policy on the CPN. Furthermore, the BVD wrote that the Lower House would conclude ‘concerning the CPN that indeed “a different policy is carried out than on any other party.” I have the impression, the Minister will have little to say about that.’¹⁵ On 19 May 1987, the BVD again warned the minister that the Lower House remained ignorant of the policy.¹⁶ In 1987, the BVD reduced drastically its intelligence activities towards the CPN.¹⁷ The situation of responsible politicians giving only half of the information however, continued. For instance on 8 February 1991 the Lower House asked questions to the then minister Ien Dales, on 2 February 1995 to her (interim) successor Joris Voorhoeve, on 24 June 1995, and on 26 May 1997 to minister Dijkstal.¹⁸ Although the BVD emphasized repeatedly about giving

¹¹ Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 7 March 2001.

¹² Letter of the Minister of Home Affairs to the committee, 6 (or 8) September 1982. Memo BVD for minister Rood, “BVD-bemoeienis met de CPN,” 20 August 1982, 3-4.

¹³ This position was repeated in a BVD-memo of 20 January 1987, “Bemoeienis van de BVD met de CPN.” In this document, on page 2 it is referred to the meeting of 6 March 1985.

¹⁴ Quotes from BVD-memo of 20 January 1987, “Bemoeienis van de BVD met de CPN,” 2.

¹⁵ BVD-memo of 20 January 1987, “Bemoeienis van de BVD met de CPN,” 2-3.

¹⁶ At the same time, the information position of the BVD within the CPN was reduced to open sources. Letter of Head of the BVD to the minister, 19 May 1987.

¹⁷ *Vrij Nederland*, 4 October 1997, 28.

¹⁸ *Lower House*, session 1990-1991, appendix, 759: questions by Willems (GroenLinks); answers by minister Dales. Questions by Oedayraj Singh Varma (GroenLinks), 30 June 1995, answer 1 August

correct information, the responsible controlling bodies – the permanent committee and four successive ministers – did not correct the garbled statements or the giving of only half the information.

This is not unique. As noted in 11.3, the BVD investigated correctly Stop the Neutron Bomb, a communist front organization. Nevertheless, Van Thijn stated the opposite in public. In those years the steering and control from responsible ministers, is mainly characterized by a lack of interest and political games.

Despite this, there is parliamentary steering and control. In the Netherlands, the most important role is taken by the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies.¹⁹ Besides controlling the agency, the committee is also informed about events and developments. This may concern thematic and periodical reports, oral briefings, and ‘eyes only’ documents.

The committee was limited. The committee was composed of the leaders of the main parties in the House.²⁰ These leaders had overburdened agendas. As a result the committee did not meet often. Moreover, it was not composed of specialists. This also limited their control. For decades, the committee was criticized that it did not control the BVD adequately. This criticism was not only expressed by members of parliament, but also by a former member of the committee itself. In 't Veld, Social-democratic (PvdA) member of the Upper House, had the impression that members of the committee did not control the BVD adequately. He assumed that members were too busy with other affairs.²¹ Former Christian-democrat member of the committee, Willem Aantjes, wrote that the work of the committee could not even be more or less identified as adequate parliamentary control. No real issues were on the agenda, but rather only a few minor affairs, which kept on absorbing the meetings.²² According to Aantjes, the quality of reports and analyses was never an issue or a point of discussion of the Permanent Lower House Committee on

1995. *Lower House*, session 1996-1997, appendix, 2911; questions Singh Varma (26 May 1997), answers minister Dijkstal (19 June 1997). The actual proceedings became public after a publication in *Vrij Nederland* of 4 October 1997, 26-28. For confusion in the media, see for example: *Gelders Dagblad*, 24 June 1995; *Trouw*, 24 June 1995 and *Trouw*, 4 August 1995.

¹⁹ This committee is mainly meant to control the agencies. The policy and coordination of the BVD is the responsibility of the minister of Home Affairs, of the ministerial committee for the intelligence and security agencies (in Dutch: Ministeriële Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, MIVIC. Chairperson is the prime minister), and of the committee united intelligence and security agencies (in Dutch: Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland. Chairperson is the coordinator of the intelligence and security agencies of the ministry of General Affairs). The Auditor General controls the budget of the BVD. Yet, the head auditor of the ministry of Home Affairs controls the secret expenditure of the BVD. Complaints are investigated by an interdepartmental procedure, the Permanent Lower House Committee on Intelligence and Security Agencies, or Ombudsman. Besides, citizens may start a case at an administrative or civil court. Even a criminal investigation may be started. *Lower House*, session, 1991-1992, 22463, no. 3, 9-10, 13. *Lower House*, session 1994-1995, 22036, no. 8, 4. *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 3, 78-79. BVD, *Jaarverslag 1998*, 81-82. For more on aspects of lawfulness, rightfulness, and efficiency, see *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 25877, no. 3, 81. After the period under investigation, a new body was installed, to control the rightfulness of the agency.

²⁰ This is contrary to, for example, the situation in the United Kingdom or Germany in which also other members of parliament take place in the committee. *Lower House*, session 1997-1998, 24714, no. 5, 6-7, 9.

²¹ *Het Parool*, 11 April 1962.

²² Willem Aantjes in: *Hervormd Nederland*, 17 June 1995, 7.

Intelligence and Security Agencies in the period that he was a member of it.²³ BVD-employee Hoekstra confirms that the control function was almost completely lacking. The Committee did not even meet for years to read the annual confidential report by the BVD.²⁴ In short, almost any forum function related to the quality of security agency reports was absent.

Other

A more public forum function was only created after the period of investigation – in the 1990's. The BVD was a very closed organization up until 1990. In the 1990's, the BVD began to publish annual reports.²⁵ The BVD also began to commission research to third parties. These pieces of research were published.²⁶ Nowadays, the agency – reorganized and renamed as the AIVD – publishes reports on its own web site.

The publication of reports (commissioned) by the BVD is a positive initiative to further the forum function. It also develops the public debate and the quality of the arguments used in this debate, and it shows the agency's accountability to the public and the value it has in serving the democratic legal order.

In one sense, the agency developed in a contrary way. After 1990, the number of agent runners decreased. It is argued that this is resulting in the AIVD missing information on the micro-level, which is necessary for its work and analyses.²⁷

Openness - secrecy

As in the case of the SRB, there is no consistent outcome in the relationship between openness and secrecy, *and* quality. In the case of the BVD, this lack of an outcome is mainly caused by insufficient information available. Still, two indications can be assessed. First, there are indications that the forum function plays a role in achieving quality. The more – and diverse – this forum function is present the better the (average) quality of reports (Foreign Policy Staff).

Second, to be outward oriented does not only involve making reports public. The number of agent runners active at the agency also plays a role. The more agent runners you have, in more cases, means that you are likely to gain access to (additional) information on the micro-level. We will return to this issue in the next section, in the context of agents and deception.

²³ Interview with Willem Aantjes by the author, 26 January 2000.

²⁴ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 34.

²⁵ In 1991, the minister promised three documents would be published on the BVD: a public survey of risks threatening the domestic security, an explanatory memo on the budget, and an annual report. *Lower House*, session 1990-1991, 21819, no. 7, 1.

²⁶ Two early examples are: Buijs & Van Donselaar, *Extreem-rechts*, 1994; Van Vugt & Boet, *Zuiver handelen in een vuile context*, 1994.

²⁷ Former BVD-official Hoekstra argues that the Red Youth/Red Help could be controlled well by employing so many agents. This was contrary to RARA, in which the BVD had a poor information position. The knowledge on RARA was mainly based on technical means as observation and taps. Therefore, Hoekstra pleads for infiltration as a vital means (Hoekstra, "Infiltratie in de praktijk," *Justitiële Verkenningen*, year 30, no. 3, 2004, 106).

Hypotheses

In 2.4.3, hypotheses were developed to assess some of the relationships regarding the issue of openness and secrecy.

***HYPOTHESIS 1:** If the dominant forum function is performed by political or diplomatic feedback, this will influence the quality of the intelligence and security agency report in a negative way.*

In the case of the BVD, the feedback by its ministers about the CPN and its front organizations resulted in the BVD advancing without clear steering. Minister Van Thijn even contradicted – apparently for political reasons, because the issue of nuclear weapons and the peace movement was very sensitive within his party, the contents of the BVD-report on Stop the Neutron-bomb. As far as it can be traced, the political feedback did not influence the contents of reports directly.²⁸

The outcomes of the BVD-case does not support or deny hypothesis 1 concerning the issue of the quality of the report itself. Nevertheless, the political feedback did leave the agency floundering about its preliminary question – concerning which issues to focus on and how to report on them.

A lack of (access to) relevant information, for the period under investigation, about the BVD-case has not yielded any results for the other hypotheses.

In the SRB-case, the many forums contributed to the quality of the reports. In the BVD-case, the indications identified (Foreign Policy Staff compared to Directorate B) show that they are in line with the results of the SRB-case.

13.1.2 Deception

In 3.3, Angleton's model of an opponent's potential to utilize deception was presented. On one hand, an opponent can feed an agency with manipulating information – or information can be blocked. On the other hand, an opponent can try to gain access to inside information from an organization.

In this section, first elements of deception that were present are investigated. In the quarterly survey of the BVD, two groups received the most attention, MANE (43%), and Red Youth/Red Help (24%).

Second, how the BVD reacted is discussed. In the survey, there were large differences in quality regarding how these groups were described (10.2.3 & 10.2.4). The question of whether eventual differences within the policy of deception that both groups utilized had effects on quality is addressed. Attention is given to the use of agents. While their use is a means to combat a policy of deception by an opponent, it may, nevertheless, yield additional elements of deception itself. Finally, the hypotheses on deception are discussed.

²⁸ It is not likely the political feedback has strongly influenced the security agency reports. First, the company philosophy was just to present the information. If no conclusions are presented, no steering can take place on conclusions (10.2.5). Second, Ad de Jonge of the Foreign Policy Staff – the section that did draw conclusions – commented that he never experienced – neither internally nor externally – any pressure not to write something (13.2).

MANE

MANE had no specific policy of deception towards authorities – and especially not in the case of the mass actions at Dodewaard. Openness was the starting point of the MANE. This even applied to internal discussions.²⁹ It was easy to gain access to this movement. People could join MANE without any barrier, and they could also easily obtain coordinating activities.³⁰

Goals were made public, and they maintained these. For example, MANE took, during the 1980 Whitsun-camp, the twin-track decision of a lock-in and blockading the plant. The activists agreed to base their final decision on the reaction of the authorities. Since the authorities would not tolerate a lock-in, MANE decided finally to opt for a blockade. The actual development was in accordance with the original decision – the twin-track decision – during the Whitsun-camp. There was no secret or hidden agenda.

Red Youth & Red Help

In Red Youth and Red Help, elements can be traced of an active policy of deception. Hard-core members of these groups who carried out this policy of deception were – for instance Willem Oskam, Joost van Steenis, Henk Wubben, and Aat van Wijk. They had a high level of security awareness and a policy to double agents. The policy of doubling agents received media attention, as in the affair of the man with the frog's eyes – the BVD-agent runner who ran Danny Mulders (10.2.1) – and the doubling of BVD-agent Geert Paulussen.³¹

Red Youth/Red Help also tried actively to obtain information about the Dutch security who were investigating them. Red Youth/Red Help did not have a mole, but they had first and second hand sources. For example, they obtained information concerning the BVD and the police through friendly journalists. They also tried to obtain information through a friend of Wubben's girl friend, who was the daughter of an officer in a special police unit at Eindhoven³², in addition to more regular sources, such as lawyers, information by the Ministry of Justice or the CRI. They also managed to obtain some BVD monthly and quarterly surveys that focused on them. The affair that received the largest media attention was the so-called Capelse Group – a group whose ideas were in line with the Red Youth/Red Help approach. During November 1975 - March 1976, the Capelse Group took pictures of about 170 BVD-officials. In 1977, this group was arrested and, amongst other objects such as weapons and chemicals, these pictures were found.³³ Previously, Red Youth in the Hague had observed

²⁹ For example, *Met je hoofd in de wolken en je voeten in de modder* (1981); *Onderstroom*, June 1980, no. 30, 18 ff.

³⁰ BAN prepared some action in secret, but carried them out in the open. Together with its open structure, and to take its responsibility in public, this can hardly be called policy of deception.

³¹ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 53-54.

³² Leena Malkki, draft of her upcoming dissertation (planned for 2006), the Department of Political Science of the University of Helsinki (Finland).

³³ *Vrij Nederland*, 7 April 1979; Dekker & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 74.

the main BVD building and had compiled a list of number plates belonging to assumed BVD-related cars.³⁴

The nature of their activities also indicated that they had a possible policy of deception, such as having contacts with foreign terrorist groups like RAF, dealing with weapons and explosives, and taking part in a terrorist training camp. There are enough elements traceable of a policy of deception on behalf of Red Youth/Red Help. In this, there is a significant difference compared to the attitude of MANE.

The BVD

The observations by Red Youth in the Hague of the BVD, led to new measures by the agency. For example, every agent runner received a company car with a screened number plate. Lamps were installed at the entrances of the BVD that were switched on when the security detected that the agency was being observed. This warned BVD-staff not to enter or to leave the building.³⁵

It may have been difficult for the BVD to gain accurate insight, because Red Youth/Red Help doubled BVD-agents and tried to feed the agency with false information. However, the BVD managed to run many agents within Red Youth. A main entry point into Red Youth was through session organized by Oskam and Van Steenis in 1972 and 1973. Because it took some time before someone was trusted sufficiently to join a revolutionary cell, those who were recruited were those who had attended these evening sessions over a long period of time. This led to the BVD in Amsterdam gaining an excellent information position. In Utrecht, the agency had a secret informant who, for example, made it possible to arrest Van Hoessel. The number of BVD-agents in the Red Youth was characterized as ample – but sometimes three out of four members in one revolutionary cell were BVD-agents.³⁶ Such an incidental overkill was the result of the overall policy at the BVD to maintain a good overview of violent groups by having at least one agent in each cell.³⁷

The following illustrates the possible impact an agent can have. In the so-called Operation Black (in Dutch: Operatie Zwart), an agent was deeply actively inside Red Youth. This agent had a past in the CPN, where he had led strikes in the Amsterdam harbor. Afterwards, he was active in various Maoist groups, and finally in Red Youth. Because of his past, Oskam trusted him. Since his house was strategically located, Red Youth used it for meetings with RAF-members. These meetings were taped by the BVD. Simultaneously, the agency observed such meetings from outside the building. In these years, five RAF-members were caught in Amsterdam – on the Prinsengracht – with the help of this agent. These RAF-members were deported without any formality, across the border, where the German authorities were already waiting. On another occasion, the

³⁴ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 76.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 69-71, 75, 175.

³⁷ Hoekstra, "Infiltratie in de praktijk," *Justitiële Verkenningen*, 2004, no. 3, 105.

agent handed a revolver to a female RAF-member – an action which was also observed by the BVD.³⁸

It is without doubt that this agent supplied the BVD with a lot of information. Combined with the number of other active agents that the BVD had, a state of affairs was created in which the agency did not have to fear uncontrolled violence.³⁹

The BVD was not only dependent on its network of agents to obtain information. The agency could read Red Youth/Red Help publications, carry out observations, tap phones, and make use of other technical means.⁴⁰ Besides the BVD, the Dutch police and the CRI also targeted Red Youth/Red Help. This could lead, however, to problems in terms of agents who were run by the BVD and/or the police.⁴¹

Besides this triangulation of Dutch sources, the BVD had its international contacts, assuming that the liaisons with these countries worked well. Some of these countries include the following. (for each country, information is given to indicate the different aspects that the BVD could benefit from).

The *Federal Republic of Germany* played an important role as a source for the BVD. Concerning the RAF, the Dutch and German agencies cooperated intensively – especially between the Dutch BVD and the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the German Bundes Kriminalamt (BKA).⁴² Publicly known is the so-called Celler-Loch affair, in which the German authorities tried to infiltrate the RAF. In this attempt, the Dutch and German agencies attempted, in vain, to ensure that Wubben played a role in it.⁴³ There are leads that the agencies cooperated from an early period onwards. In the beginning of the 1970's, but maybe years earlier, Red Youth-members helped American soldiers, in Germany, to desert via the Netherlands, to Scandinavia.⁴⁴ From other BVD-documents, the impression is given that helping deserters was observed by Dutch security.⁴⁵ In the 1970's, there were contacts between Red

³⁸ In 1974, the agent drove a RAF-member and explosives to Germany. He put this RAF-member on the train in Arnhem, and the agent continued alone with the explosives in his car to Germany. Through a technical failure at the BVD, his telephone call to the agency on this activity was not responded to. It cannot be excluded that the explosives were used some weeks later in the attack on the US-military base at Heidelberg – one of the best known RAF-attacks (Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 170-173).

³⁹ It also led to ethical thoughts at the BVD. Many weapons were paid by agents – which was more or less obligatory if you were active for a longer period at the Red Youth – and it was questioned if this group would have been able to keep functioning that way without these agents (Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 174-175).

⁴⁰ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 75.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 143.

⁴³ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 41-47.

⁴⁴ Such contacts may already have taken place from the end of the 1960's (Verbij, *Tien Rode Jaren*, 2005, 154). Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 59.

⁴⁵ From reports on the Angola Committee and the HCSA, it is evident the BVD had special attention for – in this case Portugese – refugees that went into hiding in Sweden. Especially, if this happened with the help of false papers and clandestine routes (BVD, FOIA-file no. 248633-2001, on South-African Communities in the Netherlands 1948-1998. File 1 of 6, "De solidariteitscomité's m.b.t. Zuidelijk

Youth/Red Help and the RAF, among others, to help RAF-members to go into hiding or, more incidentally, to supply the RAF with weapons and explosives.⁴⁶ The agency also could simply read Red Youth-publications in which some relationships were almost directly traceable, such as between Red Youth-member Van Wijk, and RAF-member Werner Hoppe. Another known contact was between Henk Wubben and the German Sigurd Debus, who carried out RAF-like actions in Hamburg, but who was not actually a RAF-member. The agent who proposed to Wubben to free the detained Debus was part of the Celler Loch affair.⁴⁷ When Van Hoessel was detained, he had corresponded with (people around) the RAF.⁴⁸ The BVD was aware of other contacts, such as between the Dutch Paula Meijer and RAF-member Knut Folkerts,⁴⁹ and – as mentioned in the previous section – meetings in Amsterdam as part of Operation Black.

The BVD cooperated very likely with US sister agencies concerning the issue of Vietnam deserters. Another example is a Dutchman, who was arrested in the USA for arms smuggling on behalf of the IRA. As he was relatively mildly punished – and because he still lives with his partner in the USA – this was likely to have been a result of an information exchange between the Dutch and US counterparts.⁵⁰ In general, there was a close cooperation between Dutch and US-agencies.⁵¹

Sharing intelligence also took place with the *British* counterparts and clearly in regards to the mentioned Dutchman in the USA and arms smuggling. At the PFLP terrorist training camp in Yemen, that Red Help-members visited, an IRA-member was also present.⁵² Generally, the BVD worked close together with MI5 and MI6 concerning anything related to the IRA, and the British were very well informed regarding all kinds of Dutch Maoist groups.⁵³

There is traditionally intelligence cooperation between the Netherlands and *Israel*. This cooperation is also a sensitive one, because the Israeli occupation of Palestine territories is a politically sensitive issue in the Netherlands.⁵⁴ In September 1976, Israel arrested Red Help-member Lidwien Janssen, who was involved in a reconnaissance, for the PFLP, at Ben Goerion airport in Tel Aviv. Israel was interested in the PFLP camp at South-Yemen, of which it had aerial pictures. During the interrogations, Janssen was hardly asked to give extra

Afrika,” 25 May, 1978, 9; *Ibid.*, “Angola Comité,” 19 September 1972, 4). Analogue, it is likely there had been special attention for US military who deserted from the Vietnam war and went into hiding.

⁴⁶ Already in 1976, Dutch media wrote about such contacts: *De Telegraaf*, 2 October 1976 or *Het Parool*, 5 October 1976. See also: *Het Parool*, 19 January 1977; *Accent*, 16 October 1976, 29-30. Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse Stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 144-145. Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 70-71, 74.

⁴⁷ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 40-41.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁴⁹ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 75.

⁵⁰ Oral source.

⁵¹ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 126-135.

⁵² This becomes clear from law suit files on Lidwien Janssen. For other contacts with the IRA, see Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 86-87.

⁵³ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 78-80, 135, 169.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 144.

information about the Red Help, because the Israeli authorities were already well informed.⁵⁵

It is likely that there had been some intelligence contact between the Netherlands and *Japan*. The Japanese Red Army – who was in contact with the PFLP – carried out an action, in September 1974, against the French embassy. In May 1986, the Japanese Kikumura – of whom convincing proof that showed he was a member of the Japanese Red Army was lacking – was arrested. He had explosives with him, which were likely meant for the summit of world leaders at Bremen. His Dutch contact was said to be Paul Moussault, who had been active in circles close to Red Youth/Red Help.⁵⁶

The BVD possibly shared intelligence concerning Red Youth/Red Help with agencies of a number of other countries, including Greece and Portugal. With hindsight, former Red Youth-member Wubben believes that a Greek resistance organization, for which the Red Youth transported explosives, was a false flag operation⁵⁷ organized by the Greek government. Red Youth was also in contact with a Portuguese resistance organization, which was likely to have been a Portuguese false flag operation established to trace international contacts.⁵⁸ It cannot be simply said that the BVD was in touch with these agencies before the early 1970's, because the agency had kept some distance because of the nature of these governments.⁵⁹

Although Red Youth/Red Help had a policy to double agents, the BVD was more likely to have been in control. Other Dutch security organizations also targeted Red Youth/Red Help, as did many foreign sister agencies. They covered many aspects of their activities. The wide range of triangulation of sources that the BVD utilized is likely to have helped in overcoming the difficulties caused by Red Youth/Red Help's policy of deception. This does not mean that every operation ended successfully – as was the case of the Celler-Loch affair – although most did. Some operations by the BVD were so effective, that even nowadays, former Red Youth members still feel frustrated.⁶⁰

The BVD organized extra activities and remained sharp in case of deception. Former head of the Training Section EO at the BVD, Keller, commented that the less experienced analysts at the BVD analyzed open organizations.⁶¹ Better analysts carried out analyses on groups like Red Youth and Red Help, and

⁵⁵ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 137, 140.

⁵⁶ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 60-64.

⁵⁷ In a false flag operation, you behave like one of the opposite group, to attack the opponent.

⁵⁸ Leena Malkki, draft of her upcoming dissertation (planned for 2006), the Department of Political Science of the University of Helsinki (Finland). Compare: Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 58-59.

⁵⁹ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 148.

⁶⁰ Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 68, 73-74.

⁶¹ Interview with Peter Keller by the author, 28 November 2003.

Another factor of influence on the level of the author was the consumer a report was written for. A letter for a minister was in general written by the better analysts, a survey more often by a Young Intelligent Employee (YIE) – for more on YIE see 13.2, Foreign Policy Staff (Interview with Frits Hoekstra by the author, 1 December 2004).

subsequently the quality of the reports were better. The whole agency was more or less organized this way. Keller explained that in cases of deception – to shield or manipulate information – the BVD paid close attention, and all the stops were pulled out. An investigation was given to the better analysts, and extra sources and other means of investigation were mobilized. After 1989, when Docters van Leeuwen became head of the BVD, this approach became the official paradigm.⁶² What is described by Wilensky, as a more or less an unintentional socio-organizational process – in which the urgency functions as the catalyst to overcome information pathologies⁶³ – was, at the BVD, an intentional structure to organize work in the case of deception by an opponent.⁶⁴

These Wilensky/Keller mechanisms provide an explanation concerning the differences in quality in the 1981-survey between the section on MANE and the section on Red Youth/Red Help. Fewer mistakes were made about groups that followed a strong policy of deception, because more means were allocated and generally, the better analyst worked on it.

Different echelons of analysts at the BVD apparently contributed to the (initial material of the) 1981-survey. In chapter 10 and 11, the different ways of analyzing led to different results. By focusing on the amount of text reserved for different groups, it is possible to conclude that the agency actually wrote about MANE (43%), by far the largest sub-item of the text. By looking at the quality of the information presented, the vast majority of mistakes and inaccuracies were made about MANE. This means that the group that received the most attention was actually represented the least adequately of all the groups described. This seems contradictory.

Plurality in research approaches may lead to contradictory conclusions, but should, at the same time, lead to a solution, which explains a better understanding of the exact causal process.⁶⁵ In the case of the BVD-survey the contradictory results on MANE (most attention, least adequately described) could most likely be explained by the Wilensky/Keller-mechanisms – MANE was *not* the object of investigation. Only the less prominent analysts at the agency dealt with MANE,⁶⁶ and the stops were *not* pulled out as they were in the case of Red Youth/Red Help. MANE probably received a lot of attention because a less prominent analyst wrote the survey, someone who did not know how to compose a report. The role of Van Steenis *inside* MANE was also represented poorly. The whole issue of Van Steenis being active in MANE apparently was not one of the core issues of the BVD at that time.

⁶² Interview with Peter Keller by the author, 28 November 2003.

⁶³ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 77.

⁶⁴ If an organization becomes crisis-oriented, Wilensky expects the effects of urgency on intelligence may be modified (Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 81).

It is likely, the AIVD embraces this paradigm by Docters van Leeuwen still today (Letter & appendices by the minister of Justice and of Home Affairs to the Lower House, 5319045/04, 10 November 2004, page 26 of 60)

⁶⁵ Swanborn, *Evalueren*, 1999, 303-304.

⁶⁶ An undisclosed source stated the report was written by a so-called Young Intelligent Employee (YIE) – for more on YIE see 13.2, Foreign Policy Staff.

Agents and deception

To some extent, the issue of agents and deception was discussed in 10.2.1. Here, some additional comments are made. Observation by agents was an important instrument for the BVD in coping with Red Youth/Red Help. Also years afterwards, former members were still being observed by agents.⁶⁷

Embedded in the employment of agents is a risk of deception. Agents can be part of an operation in which it finally becomes unclear as to which activities are authentic to the target under observation, and which have been manipulated by the operation. Such operations often serve other goals:

‘For example, the recruitment of informants is not only aimed at obtaining information, but a subsidiary goal is also to raise suspicion and to make activists reserved, sometimes it is even the only goal. This has a “cooling-off effect,” for example political commitment in a peace movement is discouraged.’⁶⁸

More in general active measures of feeding disinformation are used to put an opponent on the wrong track, to provoke them, or to carry out a false flag operation.⁶⁹ As noted, former Red Youth-members are of the opinion that their Greek and Portuguese contacts were false flag operations, established by agencies of these countries. Agents served this function.

As a result of different possible security goals, or when an agent acted on its own authority, operations may affect the course of the objects of the investigation.⁷⁰ These new developments – that would have been absent if there was no operation – can be of such a nature that they in turn could be described as a threat.

How would this become clear in reports? Many examples of provocations are known, in which the original activities were upgraded, or in which activists were provoked to commit actions that they did not have in mind.⁷¹ BVD-officials denied again and again that provocation was a policy of the agency.⁷² Although

⁶⁷ For example, in 1982 two agents – Ine van den Akker and Fred van Dijk – were asked to observe Evert van den Berg and Theo Engelen, who were then active for the PSP at Eindhoven. In the past, both Van den Berg and Engelen had been Red Help-activists (Lower House, session 1981-1982, appendix 2027-2028. Questions 28 April 1982; answer 17 May 1982. *Proceedings Lower House*, 3 December 1981, 788. *NRC Handelsblad*, 28 April 1982; *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 28 April 1982; *Trouw*, 29 April 1982; *de Volkskrant*, 29 April 1982; *Vrij Nederland*, 1 May 1982; Dekkers & Dijkman, *'n Hollandse stadsguerrilla*, 1988, 13, 19, 28, 64, 87, 90-91, 101, 103).

Another example: In 1979 at a School of Social Work in Den Bosch, there was a group studying the theory of encirclement by Lin Piao. This group had been evolved out of the Red Youth and was monitored through agents (*De Groene Amsterdammer*, 10 October 1979. See also: *Welzijnsweekblad*, 5 October 1979, 17).

⁶⁸ Peter Klerks in: *de Volkskrant*, 10 November 1990.

⁶⁹ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 164, 195.

⁷⁰ *Agent love* – the phenomenon that an agent runner experiences criticism on his agent as criticism on himself – also may hinder the view on such new courses.

⁷¹ Examples of such activities by the agents and provocateurs Lex Hester, Cees van Lieshout, and John Wood/Gardiner are presented in: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 72-77, 223-236.

⁷² Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 97. The then head of the BVD Arthur Docters van Leeuwen reacted in *VPRO*, Argos, 21 May 1993:

this position is very likely to be true, its agents did repeatedly carry out provocations.⁷³ There was a lack (of means) to control such agents. At the BVD, there was an absence of mechanisms to stop excesses.⁷⁴

One example concerns the already mentioned Cees van Lieshout, who was active in groups such as the Red Resistance Front in which former members of Red Youth and Red Help took part (10.2.1).⁷⁵ In March 1980, there was a controversial eviction of a squat in Nijmegen which involved four female squatters who had wide political support. Agent Van Lieshout, arrived on the scene and tried to escalate the situation. After the eviction, Mayor Hermsen informed the town council that the squatters wanted to place iron wires on the premises at the height of the neck. However, this was one of Van Lieshout's ideas for booby traps that was not taken over by the squatters. The briefing by Mayor Hermsen did not describe the authentic developments, but instead the failed manipulations of an agent and a provocateur active for the BVD.⁷⁶ In methodological terms, this provocation created an artifact.

In such situations, agencies no longer report on the authentic developments of a movement, but rather on a new reality manipulated by an agent. Policy makers – reading an intelligence and security agency report – are not able to perceive the extent to which reports of one agency is influenced by, or is an effect of the actions of an agency. This can lead to self-serving reports, and even to self-deception. It is possible to maintain that provocation was not the policy of the BVD, but if the agent had not been present, the provocation would have been absent. This conclusion remains principled, even if the agent carried out this provocation on his own authority.

In general, there was criticism on the way operations were carried out. In 1989, the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix wrote in its report:

‘[...] it is insufficiently anticipated and steered to reach a particular result. Subsequently, operations receive an irresponsible amount of autonomy (l’art pour l’art). In addition, results tend to too often shape chance hits [...]’⁷⁷

‘To incite to violence is inconceivable. For the rest, we do sometimes have problems that resembles problems that undercover agents have in drugs trade (...). That type of problem ‘it should not be provocation,’ we also know (...). That do is a clear answer. We are not provocateurs.’

⁷³ This does not exclude the possibility that some BVD-officials, as Leijendekker, might have pushed things too far sometimes.

⁷⁴ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 40.

⁷⁵ In relation with his activities in the Red Resistance Front, Van Lieshout was in touch with the German terrorist scene. It is possible, he played to some extent a role in the arrest of a few of them (OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 82-88, 181).

⁷⁶ OBIV, *Operatie Homerus*, 1998, 105. In the case of agent and (not on behalf of the BVD) provocateur Wood – who was in a few instances paid by the BVD – his activity could be traced back in a report by the former Air Force Intelligence Agency – (in Dutch: Luchtmacht Inlichtingendienst, LUID), in its report ISAM 6/84 – Appendix E, of chapter IV (For more: De Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, 1996, 74-77).

⁷⁷ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 16.

Hypotheses

The inner circles of Red Youth/Red Help carried out a policy of deception against the BVD and other security forces. It triggered special attention at the BVD. Such a policy was absent at MANE. In the survey, the section focusing on MANE was of a poorer quality than the section on Red Youth/Red Help because MANE did not trigger additional activities – including the use of a better analyst to write the survey.

In 3.3, two hypotheses were developed in relation to deception and quality

***HYPOTHESIS 4:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.*

***HYPOTHESIS 5:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.*

In the material investigated, there is a strong support for hypothesis 5. In the case of the SRB this was mainly caused by the more unintentional socio-organizational mechanisms as described by Wilensky, which at the BVD this was the result of an intentional policy of how to organize work in the case of deception (Keller). Intentional or unintentional, the Wilensky/Keller mechanisms in both case studies, additional and different activities were generated at the agencies in response to a policy of deception by an opponent.

Some effects of Wilensky's big policy decision (3.3) can also be traced in the case of deception. Deception led to the mobilization of new resources and to an improved information flow – that in the end led to an analyses of a higher quality. Discovering deception appears to some extent to activate high-quality intelligence. The urgency caused by the discovery of deception appears to shape many decisions and frees the flow of information. In short, the discovery of deception triggered some of the elements Wilensky mentioned – but at the BVD this was an intentional policy.

13.1.3 Other factors

In this section, other factors, in which less material was obtained, are discussed that may have influenced the quality of the reports.

The elements identified concerning motivation are not consistent. In a reworked version of the report, for parliament, by Andersson, Elffers & Felix the minister

added that the characteristics of BVD-officials included loyalty to the agency, sense of responsibility, and devotion to the job⁷⁸ - highly motivated personnel.

Some of the conditions, however, were such that it apparently had a negative effect on motivation. In an article from the quarterly survey of 1981, the agency made a comment regarding privacy within the (positive) vetting procedure. The BVD wrote that for the classification of data, it had to be certain it is 'in accordance with the interest of the document contents and the security of the State. Too much or incorrect classified data often has a disastrous influence on motivation.'⁷⁹ At the same time, in contrast, the agency was on the leading edge, world-wide, with its automated filing system.⁸⁰

The management could have influenced motivation in a negative way. During the period when Aart Blom was head of the BVD, and Kees de Kloet head of Directorate B, there was a complaint that there was a lack of flair and energy at the level of management. There are serious indications that qualified personnel may have chosen therefore to leave the agency.⁸¹ Furthermore, instruments were not used sufficiently to reward motivated personnel that distinguished themselves positively.⁸² Insiders characterized the situation, at the BVD at the end of the 1980's, as 'rather desolate.'⁸³

Although different elements of influence on motivation can be traced, no information was found concerning its effect on the quality of reports.

At the agency, wages were higher than those of officials, in a comparable position, elsewhere. There was also compensation for irregular times, extra rewards for agent runners, and personnel could retire early.⁸⁴ This so-called 'BVD-plus' system hampered that personnel would apply for a job outside the agency,⁸⁵ albeit this was an actual aim of this system in order to keep the number of insiders as limited as possible.⁸⁶ In turn, the lack of circulation may have hindered the recruitment of new higher educated personnel. Nevertheless, information is lacking to make a conclusive statement on the relationship between payment and quality of reports.

Size does not appear to influence the quality of analyses. A small section, such as the Foreign Policy Staff, produced high quality reports. At the small Department E IX, however, the quality of a report could be poor. It depended on the quality of the employee in question. The composition of personnel at this department was characterized as 'mishmash.' In one report, an employee from this department claimed to have had 'a good an informative conversation' with

⁷⁸ Lower House, session 1990-1991, 21819, no. 2, 8.

⁷⁹ BVD, fourth quarterly survey 1981, 49.

⁸⁰ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 29.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 15, 30-31.

⁸² Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 1990, 18.

⁸³ Abels & Willemse, "Veiligheidsdienst in verandering," *Justitiële Verkenningen*, 2004, no. 3, 89.

⁸⁴ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 37-28.

⁸⁵ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, "Een nieuwe BVD," 17.

⁸⁶ Abels & Willemse, "Veiligheidsdienst in verandering," *Justitiële Verkenningen*, 2004, no. 3, 88.

the deaf-and-dumb landlady of a BVD-target.⁸⁷ A large section, such as Directorate B, was very likely to produce both high and low quality reports

There are indications that up to 1980 personnel were recruited and judged on its reliability, rather than quality.⁸⁸ A network factor can also be traced. For years, those from the Group Albrecht, a resistance group from World War II, dominated management.⁸⁹

In addition, there were some problems in recruiting high quality personnel. Former head of the BVD – Sinnighe Damsté – once characterized a large number of his personnel, who had earlier worked in the Dutch colonies, as ‘driftwood from overseas.’ Some others, who had been active in the Dutch resistance during World War II, actually did not fit into normal society anymore. Furthermore, those who had not completed their study had to bridge the gap created by a lack of academics. Only after 1989, the policy that officials needed to be academics was established.⁹⁰

At the BVD, a muddling through policy that was carried out, for too long, towards personnel did not function well. This hampered the possibility to attract good quality personnel⁹¹

The BVD had its own six-week basic education program. Although the level was acceptable, the period was too short to typify it as an in-depth knowledge course. Special courses primarily focused on issues such as running agents and practical exercises.⁹² In general, training courses were limited to a certain function. It has been said that management paid too little attention to training courses outside this framework.⁹³

To summarize, there is no consistent outcome, or a lack of information concerning most factors discussed – that is motivation, (high) wages, or size of a section. The relationship of these factors with the quality of reports appears to be weak.

Recruitment and personnel policies, in addition to the reward system, in general, do not appear to have contributed to the well functioning of the agency. Nevertheless, their relationship with the quality of reports could not be established.

One factor did have a clear and direct relation with the quality of a report – the skills of the official in question.

⁸⁷ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 28.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 28, 33.

⁸⁹ NPS, Dokwerk, De geheime dienst, Nederland 3, 11 October 2004, 21.00-22.00 hours.

⁹⁰ Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 2004, 17-20.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 42-44.

⁹³ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 2004, 17.

13.2 THE BVD AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

What factors contributed to differences in quality between the survey by Directorate B and reports by others? As noted in 11.3, the reports by others were only evaluated marginally – for their differences with the BVD-survey. This encompassed a cross-case analysis of the BVD-case study.

In 11.3, other reports were discussed – the letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice on DSD'81, the hidden factor report by BVD's Directorate B, and reports on China and the Soviet-Union by the Foreign Policy Staff of the BVD.

Letter by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice

To begin with, two factors are likely to have contributed to differences in quality between the letter on DSD'81, sent to the Lower House by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, and the BVD-survey⁹⁴.

First, there is the issue of empathy and interaction concerning the object of the letter. In Appendix III of this letter, it is clear that there have been contacts between the ministry and MANE in order for the report to have been written. The description of the interaction between activists and authorities provides insights into what you can influence most, the actions of your own authorities. To make this analysis, a sense of empathy was present. As is shown in the Rotterdam-report, relevant insights on such an interaction can be presented, even without having contacts with opposing groups (11.3.1).

Second, it is more likely that more attention was paid to the letter that the ministers wrote than to the BVD-survey, which had possibly been a mandatory 'rush job.' Extra attention was paid to this letter because of the public and political turmoil that was caused by the violence at Dodewaard. What may have played a role, in the background, was the tough policy at Dodewaard carried out by the Queen's Commissioner, Geertsema, and Mayor Goldberg (9.3 10.2.3/4) – who held a right-wing law and order spectrum of politics – contrary to the (inner-party) position of the left and social-democratic minister Van Thijn. Max van den Berg, the chair of the PvdA (Van Thijn's own party), had together with the PvdA-board, expressed his support for DSD'81.⁹⁵ This called for a careful formulation by Van Thijn.

Because there is a lack of access to sources, no conclusive information could be obtained on other factors of influence on the differences in quality. One possible factor may have been that the ministry officials, who wrote the letter, could have been higher educated than those at the BVD.

⁹⁴ Letter of 14 December 1981 by the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, "De gebeurtenissen bij de demonstratie in Dodewaard in de periode van 19 t/m 22 september 1981," *Lower House*, session 1981-1982, 17240.

⁹⁵ This support was controversial within the PvdA though. According to the board, the action had to pass off as nonviolent (*de Volkskrant*, 5 September 1981).

Directorate B – the hidden factor report

Some factors are likely to explain the differences between the hidden factor report by Directorate B – on Dutch communists who cooperated with East European countries to manipulate the Dutch peace movement – and the 1981-survey by the same Directorate. In the case of the hidden factor report, the opponent carried out a policy of deception, contrary to MANE, and which was presented inadequately in the 1981-survey. This policy of deception led to the noted utilization of extra means such as taps, observations, and agents. As this deception was carried out by a superpower (Soviet-block), this would have triggered more extra means than in the case of the quarterly survey, in which the investigation of the possible deception concerned mainly only one person (Van Steenis).

The whole hidden factor report was better than the 1981-survey. The difference is possibly explained by the following. First, an experienced official wrote the hidden factor report. Second, the hidden factor report was also a product that was to be exported, and therefore received extra attention. The 1981-survey, on the contrary, was likely to have been a mandatory ‘rush job,’ meant for the domestic market, and not written by a ‘top gun’.

Foreign Policy Staff

The Foreign Policy Staff was known, even internationally, for producing high quality reports. Directorate B was not. Directorate B very likely produced reports ranging from poor to good quality. Between both sections, the average level of the quality of the reports differed. In the following more general factors are explored that could explain the mean differences between both sections.

First, former leading officials at the BVD – De Jonge and Keller – both mention the differences of quality between different analysts. This difference in quality was largely explained in terms of differences in the level of education. The analysts at Directorate B had primarily a secondary school education,⁹⁶ whereas, at the Foreign Policy Staff, analysts were educated to university level.⁹⁷ This resulted in those more academic working at the Foreign Policy Staff. All the six to eight analysts active at the Foreign Policy Staff were academics. At Directorate B, there were dozens of analysts from different levels of education.⁹⁸ This difference in the level of education had a deeper societal origin. From the mid-1960’s, the BVD had a problem in recruiting academics. Compared to the CIA or the NSA, the position of the BVD was less advantageous. In order to solve this problem, the BVD

⁹⁶ The Dutch HAVO, VWO, or HBO.

⁹⁷ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000. Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

⁹⁸ Besides analysts, agent runners were active at Directorate B. They needed to have at least two qualities. First, they had not to be fooled by the informants they ran. Second, they had to bring back the information the analysts needed. In total – including administrative staff – close to a hundred people were working at Directorate B. The whole unit of the Foreign Policy Staff was only composed of 6 to 8 analysts, plus one administrative employee to support them.

focused on ‘Young Intelligent Employees’.⁹⁹ These Young Intelligent Employees had – at least – finished their secondary school education and were open to an academic way of thinking. Nevertheless, they were not academics. An additional problem was that the agency, in those days, was rarely in contact with academic world. Consequently, many analysts were not trained in academic thinking or in making analyses. Their limited capabilities hindered them from dealing with information and in making analyses. At the most elementary level, these employees were able to verify information. At the middle level of analysis, they could draw conclusions by combining information. However, only a very few were capable of making a prognosis.¹⁰⁰

Second, the different level of education led to a different type of control mechanism. The analysts at the Foreign Policy Staff submitted their products to each other in the expectation that these products would be reviewed critically. While there was rarely any peer control, in other sections of the organization, there was hierarchical control.¹⁰¹

Third, there were differences in executive qualities and in terms of the attention paid to the quality of intelligence products, by the heads of directorates and departments. Directors controlled reports to external consumers, but not those concerning general details.¹⁰²

Fourth, the recruitment for the Foreign Policy Staff differed from that of Directorate B. In comparison, the process of recruitment was longer for the staff.¹⁰³

Fifth, there were differences concerning the amount and the quality of information obtained.¹⁰⁴ The Foreign Policy Staff had a relatively autonomous input line, and was scarcely affected by problems with filing, as described in 11.2.

Some factors were explicitly declared as *not* being the reason for intelligence products giving rise to differences in quality. Keller stated that compartmentalization did not play a role in explaining the differences in quality between both sections of the BVD.¹⁰⁵ De Jonge also supports this impression. He said that at Directorate B, when necessary, agent runners and analysts were in contact with each other.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, analysts were not manipulated to write a particular perspective, and thus does *not* explain differences in quality. De Jonge never experienced – neither internally or externally – any pressure *not* to write something.¹⁰⁷ No indications were identified of intelligence-to-please.¹⁰⁸

⁹⁹ In Dutch: Jonge Intelligente Medewerkers: JIM's.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000. For more on YIE's, see: Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD*, 18-19

¹⁰¹ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

¹⁰⁴ Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Ad de Jonge by the author, 28 June 2000.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. During his career, De Jonge was in different ways in touch with Directorate B. He had been head of Department B, the predecessor of Directorate B (11.3.3). At the end of the 1950's, he wrote – together with Cees van den Heuvel – the so-called ‘future letters’ meant to split the CPN (*NPS*, *Dokwerk*, *De geheime dienst*, Nederland 3, 11 October 2004, 21.00-22.00 hours). He could also be consulted when a special operation was carried out at Department B, as was the case in the affair of the man with the frog's eyes (10.2.1).

Hypotheses

The cross-case outcomes of the BVD-case highlights the issue of deception – hypotheses 4 and 5.

***HYPOTHESIS 4:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – disconnected from the fact if this is or is not discovered by your agency – this will influence the quality of your analysis in a negative way.*

***HYPOTHESIS 5:** If an opponent has a policy of deception – and this policy of deception is discovered – this will trigger off such additional or different activities within your agency, that in the end better analyses are produced than if the opponent did not employ a policy of deception.*

The results of the hidden factor report by Directorate B are most consistent. The policy of deception by Dutch communists and the USSR, resulted in a lot of means being made available to cope with the deception.

The outcome of the Foreign Policy Staff is less visible. The top analysts worked there, because they could deal with more complex material than others – including deception. If an indication is to be derived from this, hypothesis 5 rather than 4 appears to be more relevant.

The cross-case outcomes of this case study supports – as in 13.1.2 – hypothesis 5.

13.3 CONCLUSION

Three effects may occur as a result of factors influencing the quality of reports – a positive effect, a negative effect, and no or negligible influence.

Factors of positive effect

Different factors have indicated that they had a positive effect on the quality of reports. As in the SRB-case, the discovery of deception at the BVD led to a better quality of the eventual analysis. This discovery of deception led to extra activities and sharpness. One difference occurred in the BVD case, and that the response was informed by an intentional policy (Keller), whereas in the SRB case the response was more a natural – unintentional – process (Wilensky). Despite being either intentional or unintentional, these Wilensky/Keller-mechanisms triggered extra quality and availability of means. These mechanisms can even be found within one report. In the 1981-survey, the section on MANE (where there was no deception) was of a significantly poorer quality than the

¹⁰⁸ Intelligence analyses are then steered toward political wishes. This is also characterized as the issue of his master's voice (compare: Hoogenboom, "Inlichtingenwerk en ethiek," *Justitiële verkenningen*, year 30, no. 3, 2004, 125).

section on Red Youth/Red Help (deception was present). Also the cross-case results illustrate the Wilensky/Keller mechanisms (hidden factor report Directorate B, Foreign Policy Staff).

To gather feedback from different forums had a positive effect on quality. At the Foreign Policy Staff, this was established by a process of peer review and the attention that was paid to reports at the management level. This feedback appears to develop more naturally with groups who have an academic background. Empathy was a skill that had a positive influence on the quality of a report (letters by the ministers, report by the Rotterdam intelligence unit).

Two positive effects that cannot be assessed conclusively are filing and the attention paid to a report. Contrary to Directorate B, the Foreign Policy Staff did not suffer from the many problems connected to filing that were common at the BVD. It is plausible that a report meant for foreign use (hidden factor report) received more attention than the mandatory 'rush job' that was customary for reports destined for the domestic market (1981-survey).

Factors of negative effect

As such, the employment of agents is a tried and tested method to cope with deception. In addition to being a better control on groups, its positive effect on reports provides a better assessment of developments and intentions of an opponent. However, agents need to be steered and coached well. If this is absent, a negative effect on the quality of reports may be a subsequence, resulting in the creation of an artifact. There is a risk that this might result in self-deception or the production of self-serving reports.

Factors for the larger part of indifferent effect

The lack of political steering and control had a negative effect on the agency as a whole. It allowed the BVD to more or less flounder as to what, and how, to report. Nevertheless a direct negative effect on one single analysis could not be traced.

Factors such as (high) wages, the recruitment policy, and personnel policy, also had some negative effects on the agency as a whole. Again, no direct negative effect on one single report was traced.

No relationships were traced between quality and motivation, or between quality and the size of a section.

Openness

Contrary to the SRB-reports, none of the BVD-documents were intended to be made public. Also from cross-case outcomes (as the letter by the ministers), insufficient information was available to be able to conclude the role of openness.

14 Conclusions

In the introduction, the central research question was presented:

How can the quality of intelligence and security agency reports be measured, what factors influence the quality of a report, and how can high quality reports be achieved?

To answer this question, this study was structured as follows. First, criteria were formulated for intelligence and security agency reports to meet. These criteria were derived from literature on methodology, on the practice of research by professionals, and on intelligence – with a reference to relevant Dutch laws. With the help of these criteria, it was intended to do more with intelligence and security agency reports than to conduct the usual post mortem analysis. Post mortem investigations have the problem of hindsight biases in its evaluation of intelligence and security agency reports. These biases are caused because – once an event has occurred – it is impossible to erase it from your mind, therefore it is not possible to reconstruct your thought process for a point earlier in time.¹ The criteria of chapter 5 do not fit a post mortem evaluation. These criteria do not have as a starting point the available intelligence and information – typical of post mortem evaluations – but rather their starting point is correct design, research approach, processing, and representation of data. For this the criteria derived are from insights found in literature on methodology, the practice of research by professionals, and intelligence.

Second, two case studies were carried out. One case-study was on a private non-profit organization, the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB). The second case-study was on a public agency, the BVD. The functions of these case studies were twofold. First, the criteria of chapter 5 were investigated to discover how they would work in practice, when applied to an evaluation of genuine intelligence and security agency reports. Second, the criteria were used to assess the quality of the investigated reports.

Third, the factors that contributed to a higher or lower quality were investigated. To trace these factors and to gain an understanding of how an intelligence product could be improved not only required assessing the quality of an intelligence and security agency report, but also to attend to the conditions under which the report was produced. If you know which factors influence a high or a low quality, you can learn from it and improve your product.

Accessing material was different in both case studies. In the BVD case-study the sample of information gathered was so accidental that only conclusions can be drawn on the reports investigated, rather than the entire agency itself. To investigate the quality of BVD-reports in general was *not* the aim of this study.

¹ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, chapter 13, page 4 of 7.

The aim was to trace factors that influence the quality of single reports. In the case of the SRB, it was possible to investigate all the main reports. This made it possible to evaluate the influence of factors on a succession of similar reports.

Finally, the issues of openness and of discovering a policy of deception received special attention in the research. There are lively, but also to some extent inconclusive debates on these issues in the intelligence literature. To further this debate, hypotheses were formulated on these issues. It was expected that information could be obtained, which would generate new insights for the ongoing intelligence debate.

14.1 TO MEASURE QUALITY

To answer the first part of the central research question – *how can the quality of intelligence and security agency reports be measured* – criteria were developed. Within these criteria, specific indicators are embedded to ensure a more precise assessment.

With the help of these criteria and specific indicators, it was possible to assess the quality of reports. It was assessed that the main reports by the SRB were of a good quality, whereas the BVD's 1981-survey was of a poor quality. The assessment of the quality of those reports was confirmed by the outcomes of chapters 8 and 11 on supplementary elements – including the between-case elements of these two chapters.

The criteria and their specific indicators functioned in such a way that even within one case it results in leads of factors that influenced the quality of a report. In the BVD's 1981-survey, for example, it results in a lead caused by the tension between the excellent information position (criterion 2), and the poor final text (other criteria). Furthermore, in some parts of the 1981-survey many mistakes were made (on MANE), whereas scarcely in others (on Red Youth/Red Help). These outcomes, within the context of the single case study, could directly be used to discuss hypotheses 4 and 5.

14.2 QUALITY INVESTIGATED REPORTS

In the two case studies on the SRB and the BVD, reports were judged on their quality. The scores on the six criteria for the two cases are presented in the following table 14.1.

Table 14.1 Criteria met by the reports central in the case studies

Criteria	SRB's main reports	BVD's 1981-survey
1. Preliminary designing	criterion was met, including specific indicators	criterion was not met
2. Different angles of investigation	criterion was met, constant effort of improvement	criterion was met for descriptive element (excellent information position), but not for explanatory element
3. Correct, complete, and accurate	criterion was met (hung to perfectionism). Except: not mentioning all data in the second and third main report	criterion was not met, eight of the nine specific indicators were not met
4. Plausible and convincing	criterion 4 was met. Except: not mentioning all data in the second and third main report	criterion was not met, none of the nine specific indicators were met
5. Of relevance for the consumer	criterion was met. Minor point: confusion on the explained terms 'call' and 'delivering oil' in the first report	criterion was not met, none of the applicable specific indicators were met
6. Warning	not applicable	not applicable

Concerning the quality of the reports, some complementary elements were identified. The quality of the SRB-reports was higher than most reports that were produced by other groups active in this field. This was the case with the research by the Erasmus University and reports by the UN IGG and the UN Khalifa-lists.

The SRB had a good cost-benefit rate. This not only refers to the Bureau's low budget in comparison to its contribution to the high extra costs South Africa had to pay to obtain oil, but it also refers to its low budget, small size, and staff in comparison to the key role its reports played in international debates.

When all the elements – quality of the reports, political influence and authority, and size and budget of the organization – are taken into account, the SRB is very likely one of the top intelligence analysts of the 1980's. Especially the fourth, fifth, and sixth main report were of a very high quality.

An opposite outcome of the complementary elements was identified in the BVD's 1981-survey. It was apparently a mandatory 'rush job' which was carried out by a less prominent analyst at Directorate B. It was not the best report of that period. During the same period the ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice wrote a letter about Dodewaard 1981. In it, some superior and more relevant assessments were made concerning escalation and the functioning of the protest movement in question.

It was also not the best report produced by Directorate B. The report on the hidden factor in the debate, concerning nuclear arms, was of a much better quality. Both the 1981-survey and the hidden factor report were written for external consumers. The 1981-survey was intended for the domestic market. The

hidden factor report, which was produced for the international market, was positively received. Also reports by the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff were judged as high quality – including in the international comparison.

14.3 FACTORS AND QUALITY - PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSES

In the case studies, the quality of the reports was assessed. Between the reports analyzed, there were significant differences. In this section, factors that influence the quality of a report are discussed.

To present these factors so that they can be transformed into recommendations to improve the quality of reports, they are reorganized in two types of factors. First, there are factors that condition the primary processes. These processes are directly related to the research process concerning the production of an intelligence and security agency report. In addition to these primary processes, there are secondary processes. The factors that shape the secondary processes do not directly concern the research process, but rather deal with issues such as organizing the collection and storage of data, the size of an organization, lines of warning, and management. These factors will exert – although mostly indirect – their influence on the quality of intelligence products and the research process.

At first sight, there are some striking differences between Directorate B of the BVD *and* the SRB and the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff. The last two units – in comparison to Directorate B – were small in size, defined more or less their own object of investigation, managed their information input themselves, and had a similar intellectual culture (stimulated by a tradition of peer review). A superficial evaluation could lead to the conclusion that these factors consequently contribute to a higher quality. This is only true to a limited extent. Also at Directorate B, reports of a fairly acceptable quality were produced. There is more to this issue. In the following sections, co variations are evaluated. Where possible the results of the case studies are related to expectations that are more general from the literature.

As said, the two case studies are reports of a different nature, produced by organizations that differed in structure – and the SRB published its reports whereas the BVD did not. In evaluating issues such as the role of feedback, these differences gave rise to a broad spectrum of alternative types of feedback. More can be discussed than when only secret reports are researched. Each identified type of feedback is assessed in terms of the contribution it makes in the production of a high quality report. The presented results will be exploratory in nature and indicate factors that apparently influence the quality of reports in a positive and a negative way.

Primary processes

The case studies resulted in the following outcomes that influence the primary processes.

Feedback and forum-function

To produce high quality products, feedback during – or after – the production of a report is crucial. Feedback and forum-function can be established in three ways. First, as a peer review from within the unit the analyst is working. Second, there are different kinds of management feedback. This can be by the actual involvement of the manager, or by other organizational measures, such as the installation of a Review Section. The third type of feedback is external criticism, after a report is published, leaked, or has reached its consumers.

In the literature on intelligence, feedback and forum mechanisms are addressed. This ranges from the installation of a Review Section, which is judged as positive, to the discussion on the openness of reports as a starting point. It is argued that releasing reports allows for independent external criticism and as a result additional expertise is elicited.

From the case studies, the reports of the highest quality were all products in which feedback and forum mechanisms occurred at more than one level (SRB: peer review and outside criticism. Foreign Policy Staff: peer review and the critical assessment by its director). This is in contrast to the 1981-quarterly survey (by Directorate B) in which feedback was potentially absent on all three levels (peer review, management, and outside criticism).

Besides a comparison between the cases, there is also a within case argument. In the case of the SRB, publishing reports contributed to an increasingly higher quality. The successive reports gained in quality as a result of the public forum function. This supports the statement from the literature that the release of reports leads to additional expertise.

Nevertheless, this development is not without problems. For a while – in its second and third main report – the SRB, because there was a conflicting interest, presented some data on oil producing countries that supported the ANC politically in a veiled way. This veiled reporting was the result of political pressures on the SRB, through the ANC, by certain oil producing countries. The principle of openness resulted in that this veiled way of reporting was abandoned – mainly because of the criticism that was received by oil transporting countries. This latter criticism could have affected the credibility of the reports. Finally, the SRB presented data on all countries from which oil originated from – as in the first main report – combined with the additional knowledge as a result of the feedback it received by its policy to publish reports. Ultimately, the fourth and successive main reports, could take advantage of the additional knowledge caused by the external forum function that prevailed over diplomatic and political pressures.

In the cases investigated, the active application of a well-developed principle of feedback and forum-function was likely to have contributed to high quality intelligence products being produced. This conclusion is not only derived from literature on intelligence. It is also supported by the between case comparison and the within case analysis. It can be explained in a self evident way and it is also conforming to scientific methodological theory.

The principle of protocol

The principle of protocol includes the active use of methods and procedures. To protocol methods implies a discussion on the methods that will be chosen. Methods are standardized. The gathering of data and analyses are protocolled so others can check them – as intersubjectively testable. Protocol procedures are part of current management insights. They indicate the more general need to protocol methods and procedures.

In the literature on intelligence, scientists with an intelligence background – such as Steele – advocate, more in general, for a system of criteria and standards. In the intelligence literature, the way decisions are taken in order to reject or accept hypotheses is discussed, such as the Analysis by Competing Hypotheses, that is advocated by former CIA-official Richard Heuer. Furthermore, attention is paid to protocol procedures that focus on how to quote sources. The literature highlights that a non-documentation system is a form of job protection for the mediocre analyst.

In the case studies, the methods utilized, did not follow a fully written form of protocol. If you look at the units, which produced high quality products, the following comments can be made. The SRB extensively discussed methods with advisors, before the research phase began. An overview of the method of investigation was presented in the SRB-reports. Later, additional elements were released in *Embargo*. In the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff, the analysts devoted time to develop methods to process incoming information. Both units produced high quality reports.

This differed from the situation at Directorate B, in the case of the 1981-survey. The survey was seen as a mandatory 'rush job'. It was not possible to discover whether the author in question used any established method. However, to write the 1981-survey, some kind of narrative method was used. Second, this report was an example in which the conclusion actually should have been a hypothesis that needed to be tested. Moreover, some data presented in the report contradicted this hypothesis. Third, sources were quoted inaccurately, in some cases to an extent that resulted in forms of deception. Following protocol in terms of documentation – even if it had occurred through a number reference to protect sources – would have avoided this issue of non-documentation. Following protocol would have helped, because it opens the way for an objective evaluation – objective in the sense that statements can be checked by making comparisons with the method embraced, or the sources used.

In the case studies, there is a relation between high quality reports *and* an (informal) protocol concerning the method, of how sources should be checked and a notion of how to evaluate hypotheses. When these three elements were absent, this was accompanied by a poor quality report.

The conclusion is that establishing a protocol in terms of methods and procedures will enhance the overall quality of reports. This relation can be derived from intelligence literature – especially concerning issues such as evaluating hypotheses and documenting sources. It also conforms to scientific tenets and is supported by the between case comparison. This comparison draw attention to the advantages of even an informal protocol procedure concerning method.

Operations

Concerning the collection of information, one issue is typical for intelligence. This is the issue of operations. There are a variety of ways by which operations affect the quality of reports. This issue is unique to the field of intelligence. Operations do not only serve to collect information, but also to control a target – for instance by preventing that person from committing violence.

In the literature on intelligence it is argued that units tend to report too positively about their own operations.

In the case studies, however, also aspects concerning operations were traced that were different from those described in the literature. Operations led to a lot of noise in the incoming information. These operations changed the acts of, or the reality around, the research target which ultimately created an artifact – a validity problem caused by measuring something different than the reality, as a result of the measurement itself. The effect is that the readership could not rely any more on the information. This is for some part also caused by the other function of an operation – controlling the target.

Presentation of a report in relation to the reception by consumers

This issue is composed of several aspects. The intelligence literature addresses aspects of presentation, such as structure, recommendations, and what or what not to emphasize on. However, the literature does not weigh these aspects against each other. Special attention is given to raising awareness of the audience you are writing for.

First, the structure and how the presentation of a report influences its reception. The literature on intelligence – and in intelligence manuals – provides examples of how reports should be structured.

In the case studies the reports with a clear structure were the most accessible. This relation is best shown between the low quality of the BVD's unstructured 1981-survey, and the high quality of the very structured SRB-reports, and the high quality of the well-structured reports by the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff.

This relation is also present in the within case explanation. The high quality reports of the SRB used a fixed structure for all their reports. Its last main report was the only one without a clear structure and the least accessible.

The literature and the case studies support each other in advocating that the structure of intelligence and security agency reports should be clear and logical.

Another issue concerns the analyst's attitude about how to report. In the intelligence literature, two ideal types of approaches are described – the traditionalist and the activist approach. Traditionalists advocate for reports that respond to requests for data and analysis rather than initiating direct interactions with consumers. They want to protect their objectivity. The activists advocate for a closer relationship through a two-way flow of information and feedback. They think this is needed to provide consumers with relevant reports and analyses. Through the decades, there has been a shift towards a somewhat more activist approach.

In the case studies, the two units of the BVD, Directorate B and the Foreign Policy Staff, represented a more traditionalist model. This distanced approach changed after 1990. The SRB was even beyond an activist approach, it was political activism. Based on these three intelligence units, no relation was found between the quality of reports and an activist or a traditionalist approach. One issue of influence was only of a related nature – diplomatic and political pressures tended to decrease the quality of intelligence products.

Although there has been, through the decades, a growing preference for the activist approach – it does not relate to the quality of intelligence and security agency reports. This absence of a relation may be explained by that both approaches do not so much address the primary process of collecting and analyzing the data, but are more concerned with a secondary process concerning the presentation of the conclusions.

One last aspect is related to the above. In the literature, it is argued that reports must be policy relevant and future oriented. Reports must meet the specific information need of the consumers.

The issue of being future oriented did not apply to the SRB-reports, as these concerned encyclopedic data. Nevertheless, comments on the element to report on the specific needs of the consumers can be made. After 1990, the policy of the BVD, in order to improve the quality of its products, was to report on specific needs. Publishing reports on specific topics was also a practice at the SRB. Recommendations were made, so the anti-apartheid lobby could apply more pressure. In some cases, this had political results. In both cases, there is a notion of quality in focusing on the specific need of the group of consumers in question.

Another relationship was also present in the case studies. The 1981-survey of Directorate B was written, without a specific group of consumers in mind. Within the BVD, many saw these reports as an obligatory exercise, and

consequently put little energy into them. In this case, a lack of dedication – caused by an unspecified audience – may have contributed to a lower quality.

In a communication strategy, some aspects do matter while others are of lower importance. In relation to quality, a positive relation, in the limited number investigated, was found in reports 1) with structure, 2) which informed policy relevant and were future oriented, and 3) which made recommendations. In the case studies no relation was found between quality and a traditionalist or activist approach.

Secondary processes

The secondary processes are related to the organization of the collection and storage of data, lines of processing intelligence, management, and size and structure of an organization. These factors have an indirect effect on the quality of reports, mainly by influencing the conditions of the research process.

Management of data

In the intelligence literature, the issue of organizing data collection and management is mainly limited to large-scale networks that they apply only, in a very limited way, to the investigated Dutch organizations. Within the Netherlands, information on Dutch related literature and research was very limited. The main source was a report on the BVD by the management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix.

In the case studies, there is a relation between the way data is collected and the quality of the report. Both of the high quality units – SRB and the BVD's Foreign Policy Staff – collected, managed, and processed their own input. Reports of both high and low quality were traced at Directorate B in the BVD. Based on the incidental information of these case studies, it is not possible to draw the straightforward conclusion that collecting data and the subsequent processing of reports had to be organized in one small unit.²

The division of work in an agency, that is the collection, management and processing of data, and the analyses process, requires a high degree of coordination. The general idea appears to be that supply and demand between collectors and analysts needs to be synchronized. Analysts must know how data is collected and they must be able to inform collectors what their requests are. Collectors must record the reliability and the origins of a source, and they must be able to inform analysts about peculiarities of sources. This general idea is maintained when it is supported by a protocol, from the collection of data to the research process itself. It helps the different actors obtain insights. In addition, the way collectors and analysts inform each other could be supported by a

² Besides, to put all collecting activities in one small unit is often also impossible in practice if, for example, a combination is needed of signal intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT).

protocol. At a very small agency – such as the SRB – these insights do not seem to be applicable.

In the case studies, the main problems were at Directorate B. The lack of recording the reliability and the origin of sources was a major problem. This was partly caused by a lack of commitment to do so and partly by the task of data collection and analysis being separate.³ A further complication was the old BVD-tradition of employees developing their own collection based on issues they preferred. This led to a jigsaw puzzle of personal preferences and hobby's. Even after collection was centralized, biases remained which diminished the relevance of the collection. Towards the end of the 1980's, there was, at last, an archivist appointed at the agency. This resulted in a lack of uniform and professional structure to explore existing data.

Coordination between and the management of two core activities – collection and analysis – in an agency is necessary to create the preconditions of producing high quality reports. This management and coordination direct themselves to the issues of the primary processes. From the literature and the case studies, it has been shown that attention has to be paid to prioritizing what should be collected and recording the origin and reliability of sources.

External aspects of sources

The issue of sources is also interesting from another point of view – shielding data and manipulating data by *third* parties. In the literature on intelligence, this issue is discussed in relation to a different aspect. One of which is the disclosure of reports. It is feared that through disclosure an opponent may know which sources are used, and as a result manipulate or shield these sources. At the same time, no clear support or denial is found that this will lead to a lower quality of reports.

In the case studies, no relation was found between shielding or manipulating data and the quality of reports. On the contrary, the only report in which all the relevant sources – except for one unimportant minor detail – were open and not manipulated was the one with the lowest quality (the 1981-survey by Directorate B). Reports based on information that was more difficult to get access to were of better quality (Foreign Policy Staff).

There is also no relation, even not at the level of the within case comparison. Although South Africa tried to shield more and more of its sources and oil-transporters were increasingly manipulating their data concerning shipments, the SRB increased the quality of its reports, including the number of unveiled shipments. The fact that general information about shipments was accessible could have influenced this.⁴ Because the reports were made public, they played

³ Within the BVD, however, it was argued that this structure was of no influence on the quality of reports, because – if needed – employees were in touch with each other. Yet, the research results do not support this (poor report by Directorate B).

⁴ Within the CIA, the opinion is already secrecy is superfluous in most cases of economic information needed for policy formulation (Casey, "Economic Intelligence for the Future," CIA/SII, 94-3).

a central role in the public debate. This increased the market value of an intelligence or a security agency.

This leads to the hypothesis that manipulation and shielding sources is not a decisive factor for the quality of a report – at least as long as general information concerning an issue remains accessible.

In the literature on intelligence, it is stated that absence and redundancy of information can lead to biases. This is especially the case when it stems from one source.

In the case studies, no relation was found between the quality of a report and the issue of absence and redundancy of information. Again, the report of the lowest quality (1981-survey) was the one in which a possible absence, or redundancy, of information – also in relation with the one source issue – played hardly or no role.

Management and control

Management influences the quality of reports. It affects the agency as an information factory. In turn, this affects the quality of reports. In the literature, almost every aspect of management is mentioned. In the BVD-case, a management consultation agency identified the factors that affected practice – the strategic concept, the formulation of activities and products, the criteria for the employment of people and means, progress reports, planning priorities, and steering information.

A special issue is personnel management. In the literature on intelligence, the importance of recruiting highly qualified personnel is highlighted. Attention is also paid to networking with universities.

In the case studies, the two units almost exclusively composed of academics produced the reports of the highest quality. An explanation may be that academics are better trained in analyzing techniques and methods, especially in regarding new situations and phenomena. For a long period, the BVD had difficulties in recruiting the academics it wanted.

In the literature in intelligence, emphasis is placed on the need to recruit highly qualified personnel as a precondition for high quality intelligence products. This relation is supported by the results of the between case study and the within case analysis.

In the literature and in the case studies, examples are found of consumers (politicians) that distorted or simply denied the contents of a report. Responsible politicians even reported incorrectly – and did not correct afterwards – who the targets of the intelligence community were. Within the Dutch context, politicians view agencies primarily as unavoidable, rather than the backbone of the democratic legal order. This coincides with the attitude of not compromising themselves with agencies and of lacking control. The factors cited were found at all levels of political involvement – ministers, the parliamentary watchdog

committee, and – with the exception of a very few, very critical – members of parliament. These factors coincide with a long lasting problem of attracting the academics agencies needed. It had a negative effect on the quality of reports, although it deals only remotely with the line of cause-and-effect pattern. It partly and indirectly contributed to the development of a company culture which was not sufficiently familiar with academic research methods and intellectual attitudes.

In the intelligence literature, it was explained that more interaction with politics – for example triggered by an intensified political control – leads to a greater appreciation of these consumers. In the case study on the SRB, such a positive chain was present. Information was highly appreciated by the political environment, and the SRB had no problem in attracting highly qualified staff members, even in spite of poor payment. The Bureau could still recruit highly qualified employees even when one SRB-employee did resign when, within the Netherlands (but not the UN), attention decreased. The attention and appreciation of their work was a direct influence on the ability to recruit skilled employees.

Size

In the literature on intelligence, attention is paid to the large potential of small intelligence units. Small intelligence units have the potential to deal with any analytical aspect crucial for an agency, including a negative warning, that is a warning that is difficult to produce. Small units are also effective as an analytical catalyst in enhancing the quality of the whole intelligence organization (Review Section).

One small unit assessed future developments very accurately, also when compared with larger units. Assessments were not limited to small issues, but also concerned major events such as the Foreign Policy Staff's assessment of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the China-Soviet conflict. A small unit (SRB) also assessed, very accurately, encyclopedic intelligence, also in comparison to larger organizations (UN). Nevertheless, smaller units, (BVD's Department E IX), had serious problems. In the case studies, the large potential of small units is only present in part. Apparently, some preconditions need to be met first – such as the quality of the employees in question – before size can play a role as a factor.

In closing one explanation for the supposed benefits of small units is that coordination and communication is easier. However, an opposing argument is that a large organization can employ more specialists. A consistent explanation was absent.

Summary

When you look at the directness of the relationship between quality and the strength of evidence, the following elements show the most dominant effect on the quality of intelligence and security agency reports:

- Feedback and forum-function.
- The proper use of established methods and hypotheses (a precondition seems to be the education of the analyst).
- To present reports in a clear structure and to inform on the specific needs of the consumer.
- To use a documentation system to quote sources.
- To record and to check the origin and the reliability of sources.

The most remarkable factors that were *not* of influence on the quality of a report were:

- Third parties that shield of data.
- Third parties that manipulate data.

It seems to be of far more importance that a sound method to judge the reliability of data is used rather than whether data is reliable. The underlying explanation seems to be that in cases where deception is discovered additional or different activities within an agency are triggered. Consequently, a better analysis is produced than when an opponent did not employ a policy of deception.

Agencies in their traditional secret setting appear to be 0-2 down from the start. First, their forum function is seriously reduced by the secret nature of their work. Second, what is left of this eviscerated forum is often, for a considerable part, composed of political and diplomatic feedback, including their associated pressures. And exactly these political and diplomatic pressures have a serious destructive potential on quality.

In this context, agencies struggle their way through, hoping to make the best out of it. Recommendations are made in the following section to improve this disadvantageous situation.

14.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section, recommendations are made regarding how to produce high quality reports. This links with the third part of the central research question – *how can high quality reports be realized*.

To make recommendations for reports that are obsolete may appear extraordinary. Situations have altered. While one agency has been dissolved, the other has been completely reorganized. Nevertheless, the mentioned factors, to some extent, still have an influence on the quality of reports. Agencies, in their

traditional setting, continue to suffer from their disadvantageous position. There are some limitations in implementing them without reflection, but while the traditional setting does not change, the recommendations are helpful in improving the quality of intelligence and security agency reports.

These recommendations are mainly based on the conclusions. Because the relations identified in the primary processes were the strongest these are the focus of the conclusions. Besides these primary processes, other factors contributed to an environment that facilitates the production of high quality reports. As these factors are more indirect in nature these are presented as secondary.

The following measures are strongly recommended.

Evaluation and feedback on reports

Feedback on reports is crucial and it was shown that it works best when it takes place at more than one level. The three levels that can be distinguished are: 1) peer review; 2) management type measures, including the installation of a Review Section; and 3) disclosure of reports as a starting point to obtain additional expertise and criticism. Disclosure is possible for reports concerning past issues and produced with past, non-sensitive methods and techniques. To reach this, also a political discussion should take place that focuses on the relation between the quality of reports and their disclosure (2.4.3).

Within the Dutch context, it is not likely that the disclosure of reports, as a starting point, will become the established policy of public agencies in the near future. Therefore, peer review, internal evaluation by managers, and the installation of a Review Section are three options that can be carried out by public agencies themselves, without having to wait for a change in policy, of establishing a policy of openness. For peer reviews, it is recommended that management facilitate the surfacing and working out of conflicting views, among participants, in the process of analysis.⁵ When a wider scope can be incorporated, outsiders such as scholars and consultants, who can provide an impartial perspective and consumers, can complete the evaluation.⁶

A separate issue is the possible negative impact that political and diplomatic feedback and pressure exerts on the quality of reports. One remedy could be to reorganize the political and diplomatic forum to one that reflected different backgrounds. One element of this could be that the legislative power would also commission and consume reports alongside the executive. Within the Dutch situation, an extra advantage is that the legislative is composed of a number of parties, rather than being dominated by two. Subsequently, the number of different backgrounds that this gives rise to is a promising condition for a triangulation of feedback in this field.

⁵ It furthers the reflection-in-action. See: Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, 1983, 253-254.

⁶ If consumers think intelligence is not useful, it is better to know that than to ignore it (Hulnick, "Controlling Intelligence Estimates," *Controlling Intelligence*, 1991, 95).

In general, the policy needed is one which diversifies the channels through which feedback is obtained and which includes informed outsiders.⁷

Establishing a protocol for using methods

To obtain a stable and high quality of reports, a protocol for utilizing established methods and techniques can be developed.⁸

In the protocol, attention needs to be paid to the design of the research. After having defined the consumers and their needs, the goal of the intelligence issue, at hand, is then formulated. This leads to the definition of the problem. In turn, this indicates which methods and techniques are useful to carry out the investigation. This avoids using fixed patterns of analyses to analyze a changing world.

In the protocol, special attention needs to be paid to hypotheses, in terms of both the generation and the evaluation of hypotheses.⁹ However, there is a difficulty in establishing a protocol for working with hypotheses. Although the literature discusses how to *evaluate* hypotheses within protocols (ACH), such an approach is not present concerning how to *generate* hypotheses. Although some elements concerning how to generate hypotheses are mentioned in the intelligence literature, this is an area that has for the large part still to be developed, arranged and protocolled.

In the protocol, attention is paid to 1) empathy,¹⁰ 2) the prevention of mirror imaging, and 3) awareness of absent data. Attention is also paid to the structure of the argument (for example, according to the Toulmin-model), the structure of reports and how to inform consumers about their specific needs. Assessments need to be both policy relevant and future oriented.

⁷ Compare: Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 175.

⁸ To protocol, however, can not be dealt with as an universal rule of thumb. In the literature, it is emphasized that methods used must be fit in the notion of a changing world. To understand a new situation – in which old methods and procedures only lead to blunt analyses – empathy is needed. This notion of a changing world is not only described in the literature, it also was present in the case studies (most present and traceable at the SRB, but also at the Foreign Policy Staff). The intelligence units with the best outcomes were those that both protocolled (although informal) and improved on their method continually. For this, empathy is needed.

⁹ Not aiming to deny hypotheses can be illustrated by more than the 1981-survey. Until the mid-1950's, the BVD worked with exaggerated estimates on some activities of the CPN. On the interpretation of data by the BVD, Engelen wrote 'Furthermore, it was natural in the climate of the Cold War to consider almost on beforehand statements and acts by the communists to be subversive, and to interpret any data on it in accordance with it.' (Engelen, *Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, 1995, 249-251) It seems that the cause of these exaggerated estimates was that the BVD judged data on its value of confirming hypotheses instead of denying them. The agency did not analyze according a certain theory or method. The idea of starting an investigation was 'beginning from the known' (Interview with Dick Engelen by the author, 14 March 1996).

¹⁰ The analyst assumes the opponent wants to achieve *his* aims, in the best way *he* conceives. The rationality referred to must be the opponent's rationality, and not the one of the analyst (Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and methodology of intelligence," *Intelligence and national security*, October 1989, 712).

To establish protocol procedures concerning sources

The establishment of protocol procedures about sources comprises three aspects. The first is to establish a protocol for the management and collection of data, and to set priorities. An element of this is to record the origin and the reliability of sources.

The second is to develop a protocol for all phases of the process, when and how to check and double check sources.

The third involves establishing a documentation system to quote sources, or to refer to sources in intelligence and security agency reports. This can be achieved by a number system that does not lead to the nature of the source. However, this system is connected to another document, which retains a full list of sources to carry out a quality check.

The need of a standard for analysis

A standard is helpful in assuring quality. The criteria of 5.3 could inform such a standard. As shown in the case studies, this kind of quality check was helpful to indicate where things went wrong in (processing) a report. Assessing where things go wrong, is the first step in implementing improvement measures. A standard can be a helpful instrument to solve problems and to implement improvement measures. Furthermore, standardizing a desired quality, by formulating criteria that have to be met, has the potential to contribute to the professionalization of intelligence.

These criteria are not only useful in determining, internally, whether a report meets a certain standard, but also they are useful in addressing outside pressure in order to alter reports. The experience of the SRB shows that a sound method is not sufficient in all cases to reach the best possible quality. Not naming the individual countries in the Gulf area was – according to the criteria of 5.3 – the only serious oversight. If a standard had been developed for SRB-reports the Bureau could have defended itself against outside pressures by using the standard as a shield. In such occasions, analysts can argue that they are not able to meet these kinds of requests for change since the report has to meet set criteria. The openness of the SRB-reports, which led to a temporary imbalance, illustrate that they had, in the long term, a self-refining capacity. To avoid problems in the short or medium term, it is advisable to implement a standard to guide the process of openness of intelligence and security agency reports.

The combination of establishing a protocol for methods and developing a quality standard for a report to meet is likely to be a robust combination to achieve quality and to prevent or to resist manipulation.

Some recommendations are not aimed at the primary processes. However, some of these recommendations will facilitate or promote the production of high quality reports, even when the relationship is an indirect one. Recommendations of this order include the following.

Organization

The management consultation agency Andersson, Elffers & Felix already made recommendations that were largely implemented by the BVD. These will not be repeated here. These especially concern problems in terms of filing and management at the BVD during that period. Most of these recommendations have already been implemented in the agency.

For larger organizations in which top management may be out of touch, it is important to develop interpretive skills, and to integrate collection and evaluation at every point where important decisions are made.¹¹

*Education*¹²

Extra attention needs to be paid to education. This is relevant to establishing intelligence studies within the Dutch university context, for all who want to be involved with intelligence professionally, such as employees of agencies, politicians, scientists, journalists, and lobbyists.

Education provides a vehicle to develop examples of how reports ideally should be structured and present alternative paradigms and methods, which can be used to achieve a high quality intelligence output. It also allows for the discussion of intelligence failures, analytical obstacles, and practical problems. In particular, these last aspects include exploring psychological and sociological aspects of research and analysis¹³ and different types of bias.

There is also more need for conceptual, analytical, and scientific literature as opposed to memoirs, histories, and polemics. For example, data on foreign intelligence systems, strategies, publications on international legal rights and responsibilities, studies on how information is transformed into intelligence analysis or how covert operations may be treated in an unbiased way, and information on how to manage an intelligence collection.

¹¹ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 175.

¹² During the 1980's, there was a relatively large intake of new staff at the BVD. Until that time, the agency offered only three introduction courses (the same courses for its own staff, for police officers working in the [police] local intelligence sections, for similar officers of the Royal Military Police, and for staff of other intelligence or security agencies). After these courses, a six month rotation scheme over the main organizational elements followed for analysts and future agent runners. Finally, a varying period of on the job training closed off the training (and probation) period. New agent runners were sent abroad to follow specialized courses with sister agencies. This system of decentralized, on the job training became inefficient in the eighties, and the need became apparent to increase the level of training. So the Training Section EO of Department E created and organized two levels of general introductory courses and a number of specialized courses. In these specialized courses, the actual teaching and counseling was in the hands of experienced BVD-staff, having both a good theoretical and practical understanding of the subject, including middle management. In the courses for analysts, extra attention was paid to the value and practical use of open sources. Keller – head of the Training Section EO at the BVD during 1980 to 1986 – put that it would be interesting to compare the quality of reports before and after the introduction of these courses. He wonders if a direct relationship can be traced between internal education and the quality of reports (Letter by Peter Keller to the author, 26 June 2000).

¹³ -, "Teaching Intelligence," CIA/SII, 42, 43, 46, 48.

An education program needs to not only address the quality of intelligence products, but also organizational aspects, for example, strategic concepts, the formulation of activities and products, the criteria for the employment of personnel and means, progress reports, planning on priorities, and steering information.¹⁴ Management, communication and coordination need to be addressed from the angle of secrecy.

Research

Intelligence studies is an emerging discipline. Research needs to be carried out on many issues and topics. In relation to this study, some issues are of special interest.

Reflective research is promoted through a partnership between practitioner-researchers and research-practitioners. Attention is paid to frame analysis, repertoire building, action science, and to the study of reflection-in-action.¹⁵ Best and worst cases analyses need to trace success and failure. Self-evaluating organizations can learn and prosper from their experiences. The possibility to act depends on the climate of opinion that favors experimentation.¹⁶

A striking point for further research is the relationship between operations by an agency, and their influence on quality – including potential biases that may result from such an operation. In particular, the employment of agents is of interest. Agents may transform the reality that is reported, to an extent that sometimes results in escalation. However, this could also reveal additional information concerning intentions. This is an effective means to control violence – especially when there is an active agent in every cell. Internal education for case-officers, who run agents – covering in particular ethical issues – is very much needed.

To establish an institutionalized platform for the intelligence community

In one Dutch research that focuses on ‘practice as science,’ Van Strien pleads for an institutionalized platform to debate and think about the sound exercise of a profession. He argues that complaints about the activities of a professional will have three characteristics. First, there are mistakes concerning knowledge. Knowledge refers to the correctness and accuracy of the statements that are made, and the care from which these are derived from the available information. Another aspect includes awareness of developments in the profession. Second, there are mistakes concerning skills, such as inappropriate advice. Third, there are mistakes concerning choices made such as irresponsible or careless actions in which danger is not taken serious enough, or not undertaking a thorough investigation.¹⁷

¹⁴ Andersson, Elffers & Felix, “Een nieuwe BVD,” 1990, 15.

¹⁵ Compare: Schön, *The Reflective Practitioner*, 1983, 323.

¹⁶ Wildavsky, *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*, 1987, 235.

¹⁷ Van Strien, *Praktijk als wetenschap*, 1986, 146.

Competition

Those who finance agencies should create more competition. Research should also be contracted out to other parties. Through competition, agencies are forced to deliver quality reports in order not to lose their share of the market.

Although research can be contracted out to parties outside the Netherlands – theoretically even to foreign public agencies – caution is needed to prevent investigations from being carried out beyond the mandate allowed by Dutch law.

Inside an agency, constructive rivalry could be established.¹⁸

Control

It is important that agencies are accountable to a competent – strong and independent – authority.¹⁹ External control has to be improved. In the Netherlands, the control of public agencies was poor on all levels. The lack of control applies to the committee on the intelligence and security agencies, the responsible ministers, and the top officials responsible to steer the agencies. There was a serious lack of commitment.

As agencies cooperate more and more internationally, control at the level of the European Community also needs to be established. The European Parliament could play a central role in this process of control.

14.5 DISCUSSIONS

To conclude some comments are made to set this study within the larger context of developing intelligence as a discipline. As stated in the introduction, this study is only one step in the process of moving towards a qualitative framework for analysis.

Specifically concerning the *ex ante* instrument, three additional comments need to be made. The first is an obvious one and concerns the sixth criterion – concerning warning. This sixth criterion was not tested in the cases because the reports did not involve warnings. Subsequently, no assessment could be made as to whether this criterion would work.

Second, this study contained *post mortem* elements, for instance the reports belonged to past events. They were dead cases, and sources could be consulted after the events. This can be an acceptable approach when developing an *ex ante* instrument, especially in the field of intelligence in which research about actual events could lead to security issues. In this study, the *ex ante* instrument was

¹⁸ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 175. For criticism concerning the idea of competition, see: Stack, "Competitive Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, Winter 1998, 196-201. For the concept of Alternative Analysis (key assumptions checks, devil's advocacy, Team A/Team B, red cell exercises, contingency 'what if' analysis, high impact/low probability analysis, scenario development) see: George, "Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Fall 2004, 393-398.

¹⁹ Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence*, 1967, 176.

tested on dead cases. Now, it is ready to be tested on living reports for which the outcome of the events is still open. This implies, that the ex ante instrument may need to be adjusted.

Third, the focus of intelligence and security reports may concern issues other than quality. For instance, reports could be used to intervene in events, such as influencing an opponent's behavior by showing what is known about them and their intentions. It could be argued that the ex ante instrument is limited in its scope when this is the focus. Indeed, the ex ante instrument is focused on assessing quality and not at its effectiveness to intervene in events. Nevertheless, quality is an important aspect, because when a report is misleading, its credibility is at stake. As is argued by Sherman Kent, the credibility of its producer will be 'dead for good' if this happens two or three times.²⁰ The limitations to manipulate were also shown in the SRB-case. The Bureau was sharply criticized when it referred in a vague manner to countries in the gulf area.

This other focus of reports – to intervene in events – may be object of future research. There may be a class of reports, in which quality plays a role of a different nature. In such future research, the emphasis will be on psychological and political dimensions. The impact of reports on the target groups will be measured. If research is carried out on the effectiveness to intervene, it will complement the results of this study on the ex ante instrument.

²⁰ See: 4.1.2. Kent, "Estimates and Influence," CIA/SII, Summer 1968, 19-20.

Appendix 1 Summary in Dutch/Samenvatting

Wat is de kwaliteit van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten waarmee politici, bedrijven en non-gouvernementele organisaties werken? Deze vraag is in hoge mate onbeantwoord. Voor een belangrijk deel wordt dat veroorzaakt omdat inlichtingenstudies een nieuwe discipline is.

De aanslagen op de Twin Towers en het Pentagon op 11 september 2001, de Amerikaanse en Britse rapporten over vermeende massavernietigingswapens in Irak, en de politiek en religieus geïnspireerde moorden in Nederland hebben geleid tot hernieuwde aandacht voor het inlichtingenwerk. Het inlichtingenwerk zal een meer centrale plaats innemen in de discussie over veiligheidszaken. Tegelijkertijd is het taxeren van de kwaliteit van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten grotendeels een blinde vlek.

Voor professionalisering – en daarmee verhoging – van de kwaliteit van rapporten is er een grote behoefte aan de mogelijkheid de kwaliteit ervan te kunnen taxeren. De gedachte is om een ex ante instrument te ontwikkelen om de kwaliteit te kunnen schatten van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten. Het verdient de voorkeur een test te ontwikkelen waarbij men de kwaliteit kan taxeren zonder dat men hoeft af te wachten of het bewuste rapport juist bleek te zijn. Dit is effectiever en wenselijker dan de huidige praktijk van zogeheten post mortem analyses, waarin achteraf terug wordt gekeken naar het rapport in kwestie. Rapporten worden bij een post mortem analyse meestal slechts bekeken vanuit de optiek of een waarschuwing had moeten worden gegeven. Zo een analyse leidt veelal tot vertekeningen omdat je de uitkomst al weet. Tevens blijft daarbij ook de onderliggende vraag onbeantwoord aan welke criteria kwalitatief hoogwaardige inlichtingen dienen te voldoen. Het ontwikkelen van een ex ante instrument kan in deze leemte voorzien.

Voor het toepassen van een ex ante instrument is het van belang zorg te dragen dat de evaluaties die zijn gebaseerd op dit ex ante instrument ook daadwerkelijk zinvol zijn. Daarvoor worden twee soorten literatuur onderzocht – literatuur over methodologie en literatuur van praktijkmensen vanuit het inlichtingenwerk.

Tot slot dient er aandacht te worden besteed aan factoren die bijdragen tot een hoge of lage kwaliteit van een rapport.

Probleemstelling en compositie

Bovengenoemde punten leiden tot de volgende probleemstelling:

Hoe kan de kwaliteit van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten worden gemeten; welke factoren zijn van invloed op de kwaliteit van een rapport; wat draagt bij aan het vervaardigen van kwalitatief hoogwaardige rapporten?

Het onderzoek daartoe valt uiteen in drie delen. Het eerste deel is gericht op literatuuronderzoek en gaat in op verschillende relevante elementen van inlichtingenstudies als discipline. Het uiteindelijke doel is het formuleren van criteria van een ex ante instrument. Het eerste deel besluit dan ook met dit ex ante instrument, alsmede met de voor het onderzoek relevante hypothesen.

Het tweede deel bevat twee casestudies. In de eerste casus staat het Shipping Research Bureau (SRB) centraal. Dit is een kleine en private non-profit organisatie die in de jaren tachtig de olieleveranties aan het Zuid-Afrikaanse apartheidregime in de gaten hield. Het SRB werd opgericht door twee Nederlandse antiapartheid organisaties – het Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika en Kairos. De tweede casus heeft de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) als uitgangspunt. Deze voorloper van de huidige AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) was groter dan het SRB en maakte deel uit van het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. In deze twee casestudies zullen rapporten van beide organisaties worden getoetst met behulp van het in het eerste deel ontwikkelde ex ante instrument.

In het derde deel wordt nagegaan welke factoren van invloed zijn op de kwaliteit van een rapport. Het onderzoek wordt afgesloten met conclusies en aanbevelingen.

Voor het onderzoek is getracht de bronnen zoveel mogelijk te diversificeren, zowel wat betreft het type bron – bijvoorbeeld interviews, archiefonderzoek en literatuurstudie – als wat betreft herkomst – bijvoorbeeld informatie afkomstig van zowel de betrokken organisatie (SRB en BVD) als van personen, groepen of landen die onderwerp van onderzoek waren in deze rapporten.

DEEL 1 DISCIPLINE EN EX ANTE INSTRUMENT

Het concept inlichtingenwerk (*intelligence*) wordt gebruikt voor de analyse van informatie(processen) binnen publieke en private organisaties welke functies vervullen in de preventie en repressie van (georganiseerde) misdaad, fraude, en aantastingen van de democratische rechtsorde. Inlichtingen betreffen informatie die is verzameld, verwerkt en/of geanalyseerd voor actoren of beleidsmakers.

In het algemeen wordt de productie van inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten gekenmerkt door de volgende karakteristieken: 1) interdisciplinair van aard; 2) toekomstgericht; 3) moeilijk toegankelijke gegevens; 4) een kleine kans op een gebeurtenis, maar met een grote impact indien ze plaatsvinden; 5) toegepast van aard (gericht op meer concrete en specifieke gebeurtenissen dan bij gangbaar wetenschappelijk onderzoek); 6) de dienst is in de positie van toeleverancier; 7) controle is gecompliceerd.

Het inlichtingenproces brengt producten voort zoals waarschuwingen, inlichtingen over actuele zaken, encyclopedische inlichtingen, taxaties en ruwe inlichtingen.

Wat verstaan we onder kwalitatief hoogwaardige inlichtingen? Wilensky gaf hiervan een omschrijving die de volgende elementen omvat – kwalitatief hoogwaardige inlichtingen zijn helder, tijdig, betrouwbaar, geldig, adequaat en zijn breed opgezet in de zin van het kunnen bereiken van doelen.

Typen inlichtingen

In de inlichtingenliteratuur worden drie typen van rapporten als kenmerkend voor het vakgebied genoemd. Zij komen overeen met drie onderzoekstypen.

Typen van inlichtingenonderzoek

Onderzoekstype	Doel van het inlichtingenrapport
beschrijvend onderzoek	de essentiële kenmerken van een situatie beschrijven
verklarend onderzoek (post hoc)	de oorzaken en voorwaarden van actuele ontwikkelingen verklaren
prognostisch onderzoek (ante hoc)	toekomstige ontwikkelingen taxeren

Elk van deze typen kent zijn eigen karakteristieken. Hieronder worden deze karakteristieken beschreven met betrekking tot de punten waar ze afwijken van meer gangbaar (academisch) onderzoek. Door rekening te houden met deze karakteristieken kan een zo relevant mogelijk ex ante instrument worden ontwikkeld.

Bij beschrijvend inlichtingenonderzoek is er in de relatie tussen onderzoeker en onderzochte vaak sprake van de volgende zaken – er is geen samenwerking, er is geheimhouding en manipulatie, en de observatie verloopt gecompliceerd. Bronnen zijn moeilijk toegankelijk.

Het verklarend inlichtingenonderzoek is bijna altijd gericht op het verklaren van een unieke situatie, hetgeen kenmerkend is voor toegepast onderzoek. Men richt zich op elkaar beconcurrerende hypothesen opdat een logische verklaring niet over het hoofd wordt gezien. In het inlichtingenonderzoek stelt men de alpha-kans – de kans dat je ten onrechte concludeert dat er een significante relatie tussen fenomenen is – hoger dan gangbaar, en de beta-kans – de kans dat een zwakke relatie *niet* wordt ontdekt – lager. Op deze wijze voorkom je dat je te laat waarschuwt en mogelijke verbanden over het hoofd ziet. Tot slot is het onderzoek robuust – er worden verschillende technieken en methoden toegepast – om te voorkomen dat de conclusies berusten op toevallige factoren.

Kenmerkend voor prognostisch inlichtingenonderzoek is dat er een kleine kans is dat een gebeurtenis plaatsvindt. Deze kans is bovendien niet lineair verdeeld, maar curve-lineair. De kans dat een riskante gebeurtenis plaatsvindt is daardoor moeilijk te voorspellen, terwijl de impact en consequenties vaak groot zijn.

Vakliteratuur over inlichtingen- en veiligheidsrapporten

In de inlichtingenliteratuur is er veel aandacht voor vertekeningen in een analyse. Opvallend groot is de aandacht voor vertekeningen die worden veroorzaakt door psychologische factoren van de analist en door de eigen dienst. Opvallend ondervertegenwoordigd is de aandacht voor vertekeningen die worden veroorzaakt

doordat men een bepaalde methode hanteert. Daarentegen is er wel weer aandacht voor niet-optimale technieken en manipulatie.

Voor het inlichtingenwerk kenmerkende oorzaken van vertekeningen zijn het ontbreken van sleutel informatie, dubbelzinnige of niet perfecte informatie, misleiding door de opponent, veiligheidsparanoia, de organisatiecultuur van de dienst, en een gebrek aan inlevingsvermogen of het spiegelen van de opponent aan zichzelf.

In de inlichtingenliteratuur is er veel aandacht voor zaken die – ten opzichte van de gehanteerde methoden en technieken – meer van secundaire aard zijn, zoals presentatie, woordgebruik, notenapparaat, en de structuur van een rapport. Aandacht voor de structuur van de argumentatie (bijvoorbeeld het Toulmin-model) is weer ondervertegenwoordigd.

Ex ante instrument en hypothesen

Op grond van de bevindingen in de literatuur over methodologie en de inlichtingenliteratuur worden criteria – elk voorzien van specifieke indicatoren – opgesteld waaraan rapporten moeten voldoen. Daarbij wordt rekening gehouden met eisen die in twee relevante Nederlandse wetten zijn vastgelegd – de Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten en de Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht. Op grond van deze drie elementen – methodologie, vakliteratuur en recht – zijn er in dit onderzoek de volgende zes criteria ontwikkeld.

1. Nieuw inlichtingenonderzoek betekent dat het wordt *voorafgegaan* aan door een zorgvuldig *ontwerp* van het onderzoek, een standaardonderzoek wordt uitgevoerd volgens een geïjkt protocol.
2. Het onderzoek is gericht op het bestuderen van relevante *verschillende invalshoeken*, en gericht op relevante te formuleren opties.
3. Gegevens en informatie dienen *correct, compleet en accuraat* te zijn.
4. De analyse en presentatie van gegevens, de argumentatie en de conclusie dienen *logisch en overtuigend* te zijn – en daarmee herhaalbaar en verifieerbaar.
5. De informatie, conclusie en opties die worden gepresenteerd dienen *relevant te zijn voor de consument* voor wie het is geschreven.
6. De tijdige en met de juiste aansporing benadrukte *waarschuwing* scheidt duidelijkheid over de aard, ernst, duur en tijdstip van de dreiging, alsmede over de waarschijnlijkheid dat de dreiging realiteit wordt.

Deel 1 wordt afgesloten met hypothesen over de invloed op de kwaliteit van rapporten door politieke en diplomatieke feedback, door het openbaar maken van rapporten, en door een beleid van misleiding door een opponent. Deze hypothesen zijn opgesteld met het doel nader inzicht te krijgen in factoren die van invloed zijn op de kwaliteit van rapporten. Over deze zaken is in de inlichtingenliteratuur onvoldoende informatie, of zijn er tegenstrijdige opinies.

DEEL 2 CASESTUDIES

In deel 2 wordt de kwaliteit getaxeerd van rapporten van het SRB en de BVD met behulp van het in deel 1 ontwikkelde ex ante instrument.

Shipping Research Bureau (SRB)

Bij het SRB is ervoor gekozen alle zeven hoofd rapporten – die ongeveer om het jaar verschenen – te toetsen. Verder worden er enkele voor Nederland relevante rapporten onderzocht – over de betrokkenheid van de Nederlandse Antillen en van Rotterdam bij olieleveranties aan het Zuid Afrikaanse apartheidsregime. De hoofd rapporten zijn van invloed geweest op de Nederlandse politiek via de anti-apartheidslobby in het parlement. Binnen de Verenigde Naties (VN) is de invloed tot uiting gekomen in het Speciale VN Comité Tegen Apartheid.

Enkele opvallende punten aan de SRB-rapporten in relatie met de criteria van het ex ante instrument zijn de volgende. Ten aanzien van het eerste criterium – het *voorafgaande ontwerp* – is er vooraf uitgebreid nagedacht hoe het onderzoek moet worden aangepakt. Het SRB heeft daarvoor gebruik gemaakt van de ervaringen en kennis van de Britse econoom Rivers en de Britse onderzoeks-journalist Bailey. Een onderzoek verloopt volgens een vooropgesteld stappenplan waarin ruimte is om nieuwe informatie in te passen. Speciale technieken zijn ontwikkeld voor tankers die zich aan het monitoren proberen te onttrekken.

Ten aanzien van het tweede criterium – de *verschillende invalshoeken* – valt op dat het SRB voortdurend bezig is geweest met diversificatie van bronnen. Op deze wijze heeft de SRB bronnen gecontroleerd en is het nieuwe olie leveranties op het spoor gekomen. Uiteindelijk krijgt het SRB zelfs toegang tot verschillende soorten bronnen binnen Zuid-Afrika met informatie die van uitstekende kwaliteit is. Een probleem blijft echter de toegang tot bronnen binnen olieproducerende landen.

Ten aanzien van het derde criterium – *correct, compleet en accuraat* – kan worden gesteld dat informatie juist en accuraat is. Publiek geuite twijfels over de juistheid van SRB-gegevens blijken ongegrond. Dit vergroot de reputatie van het SRB bij onder meer het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken dat via Shell vertrouwelijk over de juistheid van de SRB-gegevens is ingelicht. Een punt van kritiek is echter dat in het tweede en derde hoofd rapport de namen van individuele olieproducerende landen zijn weggelaten na druk van OPEC-landen op het ANC. Het SRB gebruikt vage termen als ‘Arabische Golf,’ terwijl de namen van individuele landen wel beschikbaar zijn. In latere rapporten worden de namen van deze landen weer genoemd.

Ten aanzien van het vierde criterium – analyse en presentatie zijn *logisch en overtuigend* – valt op dat het SRB zo overtuigend mogelijk probeerde te zijn door weer te geven welke route een olietanker had gevolgd. Indien mogelijk werden er bronnen genoemd. Op het laatste rapport na – dat de vorm van een nieuwsbrief heeft – volgen alle rapporten een strakke en toegankelijke structuur.

Over het vijfde criterium – *relevant zijn voor de consument* – valt te vermelden dat het SRB weliswaar ongeveer anderhalf jaar over de productie van een hoofdrapport doet, maar daarmee zijn de gevonden gegevens wereldwijd nog steeds de meest recente en volledige.

Het zesde criterium, de *waarschuwing*, is niet van toepassing: de rapporten waren geen waarschuwingen.

Met behulp van het ex ante instrument – de criteria en de daar bijbehorende specifieke indicatoren – kan men een gedetailleerde beschrijving en goede taxatie van de kwaliteit van de SRB-rapporten maken. De SRB-rapporten zijn van hoge tot zeer hoge kwaliteit.

Ook de complementaire elementen – om de onderzoeksresultaten van ex ante te toetsen – leiden tot eenzelfde resultaat als het ex ante instrument. Door de jaren heen verbetert het percentage van ontdekte olieleveranties van 50% naar 85% van de geschatte totale olieleverantie. In de rapporten is sprake van een logische verdeling tussen de hoofdonderwerpen (73%) en achtergrondinformatie (27%).

De politieke impact van de rapporten is groot, evenals de verspreiding ervan. Dit is opmerkelijk voor een kleine en low-budget organisatie als het SRB. Velen hebben SRB-rapporten gebruikt als bronnenmateriaal. Binnen het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken is SRB-materiaal met nadruk als bron gebruikt om argumentatie kracht bij te zetten en autoriteit te verlenen. Het is een indicatie voor de hoge kwaliteit van de rapporten.

In vergelijking tot anderen die over dit onderwerp hebben gepubliceerd is de kwaliteit soms vergelijkbaar. Nog vaker is de kwaliteit een stuk beter dan bijvoorbeeld een universitair of VN-rapport. Een bericht van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken springt eruit door de vroegtijdige en accurate taxatie van de zwakke plek van het apartheidsregime.

Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD)

BVD-rapporten zijn weliswaar te verkrijgen via een verzoek op grond van de Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur, compleet zijn deze rapporten dan geenszins – persoonsnamen, maar ook complete bladzijden, zijn zonder enige indicatie weggelaten. Het aantal rapporten dat de openbaarheid heeft bereikt waarvan vaststaat dat ze zowel compleet als authentiek zijn is extreem schaars. Een rapport waarvan dat beide wel vaststaat is het vierde kwartaalverslag 1981. Dit verslag is in een oplage van 400 à 500 exemplaren verspreid onder politie, Koninklijke Marechaussee en zusterdiensten. In deze casus staat een rapport uit dit kwartaalverslag centraal. Het rapport gaat over antidemocratische ontwikkelingen binnen de anti-kernenergiebeweging (AKB). De BVD schrijft dat de AKB als zodanig bonafide is. Echter, personen als Joost van Steenis – voorheen actief in de Rode Jeugd en de Rode Hulp, organisaties die connecties hebben gehad met bijvoorbeeld de RAF, IRA en PFLP – zijn onderwerp van onderzoek.

Enkele opvallende punten aan het BVD-rapport in relatie met de criteria van het ex ante instrument zijn de volgende. Ten aanzien van het eerste criterium – het *voorafgaande ontwerp* – valt op dat een onderzoeksopzet afwezig is. De lezer kan uit het rapport niet duidelijk opmaken wie wel en wie niet onderwerp van onderzoek is. Het onderzoek is vooral beschrijvend, maar bevat ook een prognostisch element – de BVD voorspelt nieuwe sabotagedaden tegen hoogspanningsmasten, die ook inderdaad plaatsvinden. Echter, reeds tijdens het schrijven van het BVD-rapport maken de media melding van deze nieuwe ‘voorspelde’ sabotagedaden. De dienst voorspelt daarmee iets waarvan het reeds heeft genomen.

Met betrekking tot het tweede criterium – de *verschillende invalshoeken* – valt op dat de BVD een uitstekende informatiepositie heeft met een grote differentiatie aan bronnen, zowel qua type als aantallen.

Veel informatie in het rapport is niet *juist, compleet of accuraat* – waarmee niet wordt voldaan aan het derde criterium. Zowel tendentius als onjuist is bijvoorbeeld de suggestie dat een deel van de AKB – Breek Atoomketen Nederland – door Amerikanen zou worden getraind onder gebruikmaking van psychotherapeutische spelletjes. De BVD beschrijft een radicalisering tussen de ‘lieve’ blokkade van de kerncentrale in Dodewaard van 1980 en de compleet uit de hand gelopen actie in 1981. Er is inderdaad sprake van een radicalisering in deze periode, maar de BVD voert de verkeerde feiten aan – de eerste prikacties, het verdelen van de weg tussen Petten en IJmuiden tijdens acties tegen het dumpen van nucleair afval, het oprichten van Dodewaard-Gaat-Dicht-basisgroepen, en het verschijnen van Joost van Steenis geschieden alle een jaar eerder (1980) dan de BVD beweert (1981). Er ontstaat daardoor een verkeerd beeld van een radicalisering die samenvalt met het verschijnen van Van Steenis.

Ten aanzien van het vierde criterium – analyse en presentatie zijn *logisch en overtuigend* – valt op dat de BVD op cruciale punten onjuiste verbanden legt. Zo concludeert de dienst ten onrechte dat Van Steenis de strategie heeft zijn theorie van Klein Geweld – waarin men de heersende elite het leven zuur maakt door voortdurende en zenuwslopende pesterijen – in de AKB te doen doordringen. De BVD verzuimt deze onjuiste conclusie – feitelijk een aanname – als hypothese te herformuleren en vervolgens te toetsen, hetgeen wel zinvol is. Verder beschrijft de BVD op onjuiste wijze de relatie tussen enerzijds Van Steenis en anderzijds sabotagedaden, barricades en zijn leidersrol in de AKB. Opmerkelijk is een opmerking van de BVD over het anarchistische blad *Vrije*. De BVD stelt over een artikel in dit blad dat Van Steenis de strijd tegen kernenergie in sommige opzichten vergelijkt met de strijd van de Vietcong (Vietnam) tegen de Verenigde Staten. Ten eerste is dit citaat niet van Van Steenis – het is een redactioneel commentaar. Ten tweede staat er in dit redactioneel commentaar iets geheel anders – in Nederland is traangas ingezet dat in Vietnam doden onder burgers heeft veroorzaakt toen het door Amerikaanse helikopters over de bevolking is gespreid.

Het rapport is niet *relevant* genoeg voor de *consument* – waarmee niet wordt voldaan aan het vijfde criterium. Relevant materiaal om aannamen en argumen-

ten te onderbouwen (of te weerleggen) blijft ongebruikt. Het merendeel van de tekst (67%) gaat niet over hetgeen de BVD belooft te schrijven – antidemocratische ontwikkelingen binnen de AKB – maar over de bonafide AKB (43%) en het *verleden* van Van Steenis (24%). De dienst geeft geen inzicht in die elementen waarop autoriteiten het meeste invloed hebben – hun eigen handelingsruimte en de uitwerking van hun handelen.

Het zesde criterium, de waarschuwing, is niet van toepassing.

Met behulp van het ex ante instrument kan men een gedetailleerde beschrijving en goede taxatie van de kwaliteit van het BVD-rapport maken. Het BVD-rapport is van lage kwaliteit. De vele vertekeningen in het rapport kunnen, onbedoeld, hebben bijgedragen tot marginalisering van personen en groepen die de dienst beschrijft.

Ook de complementaire elementen leiden tot eenzelfde resultaat als van ex ante. Inhoudelijke consistentie tussen opeenvolgende kwartaalverslagen is vaak afwezig. Er zijn in die tijd grote problemen bij archivering en dossiervorming, hetgeen mede een verklaring kan zijn voor het voldoen aan criterium 2, maar niet aan de overige criteria. Het kwartaalverslag is niet het beste rapport over Dodewaard 1981 – een brief van de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en van Justitie is relevanter en van betere kwaliteit.

Toch heeft de BVD ook kwalitatief hoogwaardige rapporten geproduceerd. Met name de Stafafdeling Buitenlandse Politiek heeft zich onderscheiden – onder leiding van topanalist Ad de Jonge – door kwalitatief hoogwaardige rapporten over de breuk tussen China en de Sovjetunie en de Chinese Culturele Revolutie. Deze stafafdeling heeft ook internationaal een uitstekende reputatie genoten. De analytische inzichten van De Jonge over de breuk tussen China en de Sovjetunie zijn superieur aan die van James Angleton, het toenmalige hoofd van de contra-inlichtingen van de CIA.

DEEL 3 KWALITEITSFACTOREN EN CONCLUSIES

In het derde deel is er aandacht voor de factoren die van invloed zijn op de kwaliteit van rapporten, de conclusies en de aanbevelingen.

Bij de toepassing ervan in de casestudies blijkt het ex ante instrument goed te functioneren. Er is duidelijk een onderscheidend vermogen ten aanzien van de onderzochte rapporten. Tevens leidt het tot indicaties over factoren die van positieve en negatieve invloed zijn op de kwaliteit van deze rapporten. Een kanttekening hierbij is dat het zesde criterium – de *waarschuwing* – niet is getoetst bij gebrek aan relevante beschikbare rapporten.

Twee factoren die van invloed zijn op de kwaliteit van rapporten verdienen extra aandacht.

Ten eerste is er de invloed van een beleid van misleiding door een opponent. Indien een opponent zo een beleid voert – door het voeden met onjuiste informatie of door het afschermen van informatie – leidt dit bij ontdekking ervan tot rapporten die van hogere kwaliteit zijn dan bij rapporten waarbij geen sprake is van misleiding. Dit mag tegenstrijdig lijken. Echter, de ontdekking van misleiding leidt tot extra inzet van middelen, van bronnen van informatie en tot het ontwikkelen van nieuwe technieken om het probleem op te lossen. Het leidt ook tot een verbeterde informatiestroom, bijvoorbeeld door extra overleg tussen medewerkers. Dit mechanisme is terug te vinden bij zowel het SRB als bij de BVD.

Bij het SRB leidt de ontdekking van misleiding tot een nieuwe onderzoeks-aanpak zoals bij de zogeheten ‘gap tankers’ en ‘incorrect calls’. Ook bij de BVD zien we zulke effecten – de dienst plaatst betere analisten op het onderwerp, zet (extra) informanten in en haalt allerlei technische hulpmiddelen van stal. BVD-rapporten waar de mogelijkheid van misleiding een grotere rol speelt – over Stop de Neutronenbom en rapporten van de Stafafdeling Buitenlandse Politiek – zijn van betere kwaliteit dan die van het bewuste kwartaalverslag uit 1981.

Een verschil tussen beide organisaties is dat bij het SRB deze extra inspanningen en mobilisatie van middelen het resultaat zijn van meer natuurlijke sociologisch organisatorische processen (Wilensky). Bij de BVD is dit daarentegen bewust beleid (Keller). Hoe dan ook – niet-intentioneel of intentioneel – de Wilensky/Keller-mechanismen verklaren de hogere kwaliteit van rapporten indien men bij een opponent een beleid van misleiding ontdekt, dan bij rapporten waarbij geen sprake is van misleiding.

Ten tweede is er de invloed van feedback en forum. Indien er sprake is van verschillende soorten fora met feedback vanuit verschillende invalshoeken vormt dit een belangrijke positieve factor voor de kwaliteit van rapporten.

Een speciale plaats wordt ingenomen door politieke en diplomatieke feedback. Deze blijkt een negatieve uitwerking te hebben op de kwaliteit van rapporten. Bij het SRB leidt de druk van olieproducerende landen op het ANC ertoe dat het SRB in het tweede en derde hoofdrapport de namen weglaat van individuele olieproducerende landen uit de golfregio. Dit wordt uiteindelijk weer gecorrigeerd in latere SRB-rapporten doordat de andere externe fora dominant blijken te zijn aan de politieke en diplomatieke druk. De terugkoppeling door een veelzijdigheid van externe fora blijkt daarmee een zelfreinigend vermogen te hebben. Bij onderzoeken door groepen waarbij de diplomatieke en politieke factoren dominant blijven (Khalifa), heeft deze druk een permanent negatieve uitwerking op de kwaliteit van rapporten tot gevolg. In deze context valt op dat het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken veelal hoogwaardige rapportages heeft geproduceerd. Dit kan mogelijk worden verklaard doordat het ministerie een parafencultuur – waarbij een document verschillende ambtenaren ter commentaar en goedkeuring passeert – kent die feitelijk functioneerde als een goed ontwikkeld intern forum.

Ook bij de BVD-casus komen we tot soortgelijke resultaten. De enige afdeling die peer review als onderdeel van het analyseproces heeft gekend – de Stafafdeling Buitenlandse Politiek – heeft de kwalitatief meest hoogwaardige rapporten geleverd. Overigens heeft de BVD van nature in een lastige positie gezeten – de mogelijkheid om gebruik te maken van fora is beperkt, zeker wat betreft externe fora, en de dienst is bovendien onderhevig geweest aan politieke druk. De politieke sturing en controle heeft te wensen overgelaten – en kunnen worden gekenschetst als onderontwikkeld, laks (aspectenbeleid CPN) of verstoord door politiek gemanoeuvrer (Van Thijn en het Stop de Neutronenbom-rapport).

De onderzoeksresultaten wijzen erop dat te allen tijde voorkomen dient te worden dat diplomatieke en politieke feedback het enige, of het dominante, forum is. Zo een situatie kan dodelijk zijn voor de kwaliteit van het werk van een dienst. Het verdient aanbeveling om in ieder geval – ook indien meerdere fora voorhanden zijn – de kwaliteitsnormen voor rapporten te protocolleren, alsmede het gebruik van methoden en procedures.

Tot slot enkele korte aanvullende conclusies. Ten eerste is er de discussie of, en zo ja in hoeverre, de openbaarmaking van rapporten leidt tot een verminderde kwaliteit van rapporten – bijvoorbeeld door het verlies van bronnen. De onderzoeksresultaten van de SRB-casus lijken de conclusie te rechtvaardigen dat – zolang informatie over een onderwerp in het algemeen toegankelijk is – er geen negatief effect optreedt voor de kwaliteit ook al wordt bepaalde informatie wel degelijk afgeschermd of gemanipuleerd. De compensatie door de Wilensky/Keller-mechanismen lijkt in belangrijke mate hiervoor verantwoordelijk te zijn. Wel kan men bij openbaarmaking van rapporten de vruchten plukken van de additionele expertise die het resultaat is van feedback door externe fora.

Ten tweede is er het vraagstuk van het inzetten van agenten (informanten) als informatiebron. Agenten zijn van positieve kwaliteit op rapporten, met name voor het kunnen achterhalen van informatie als intenties. Tevens blijken agenten een cruciale – en mogelijk onontbeerlijke – rol te spelen bij het kunnen controleren van geweld door groepen die onder observatie staan. Agenten hebben daarmee echter ook het potentieel de werkelijkheid te beïnvloeden. In het onderzoek zijn voorbeelden te vinden dat het voor een beleidsmaker niet meer duidelijk was of hij is geïnformeerd over de authentieke ontwikkeling van een groep, of over een geradicaliseerde realiteit die is getransformeerd door de activiteiten van een agent (en provocateur). Aangezien de inzet van agenten van cruciaal belang is, zal ter bestrijding van de negatieve effecten ervan aandacht dienen te worden besteed aan het begeleiden en sturen van deze agenten.

Een derde en laatste opmerking is misschien een open deur, maar is van doorslaggevende invloed op de kwaliteit van rapporten – het opleidingsniveau en de training van analisten. Het verdient aanbeveling hier niet alleen zorg en aandacht aan te besteden, maar ook de analist vertrouwd te maken met de verschillen tussen en karakteristieken van academisch en inlichtingenonderzoek.

Appendix 2 Text BVD-Survey

This Appendix contains the complete text of pages 29-39 of the BVD's Fourth Quarterly Survey, 1981. The text is treated in full detail in Chapters 9-11 of this thesis. The report was classified as confidential and only released in part. This means that the full original text is – contrary to SRB-reports – not available. It is presented here for reasons of verification.

The text follows the Dutch original as closely as possible. Proper names are printed in capitals or quotation marks are used. An English translation of the names of Dutch groups and organizations is given in brackets following the original. The translator has tried to translate the meaning of the text while maintaining the ambiguity of several expressions and constructions used in the original. The beginning and the end of each page is indicated. Items such as illustrations and confidential classifications – on the top and the bottom of each page – have been deleted. Following a request based on the Freedom of Information Act, the BVD released pages 29-33 of the Quarterly Survey to the author. This text is identical to the text published in issue 267 of *Bluf!* However, the text in *Bluf!* is incomplete: page 35 is missing. This page is included in this Appendix. It was reconstructed after research of archives, which are not open to the public.

For the complete Dutch text of this BVD-report the reader is referred to: Giliam de Valk, *De BVD en inlichtingenrapportages*, Appendix 1, pp 248-255.

[BEGINNING OF PAGE 29, BEGINNING OF SECTION]

III. MINORITIES – ACTIVISM – TERRORISM

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY

Given the strong suspicion that anti-democratic elements attempt to abuse the as such bona fide-Movement Against Nuclear Energy for its resistance against the functioning of the parliamentary democracy, meticulous observation and study of these attempts seems desirable.

In May 1980 during an encampment of the Anti-Kernenergie Beweging (AKB) (*English: Movement Against Nuclear Energy (MANE)*) 35 of the 41 grassroots groups present – representing approx. 5000 persons – had in principle agreed to proceed with a lock-in of the nuclear power plant site at Dodewaard in the fall break. This lock-in would take place if the Dutch government did not heed the ultimatum demanding the closure of the power plant. Until then, lock-ins had only been used as a method abroad and only for construction sites and sites allocated for nuclear power plants (e.g. Seabrook, Gorleben, Brokdorf and Malville). Thus, the Netherlands would be the first to experience the lock-in of a running plant. 'For many of those who fight nuclear power the proposal comes at a opportune moment' thus, John HONTELEZ, member of the Landelijk Energie Komitee (LEK) (*English: National Energy Committee, NEC*) and one of the front men of AKB (*English: MANE*), summarized the sentiments within the movement at the time. 'The waiting has lasted long enough; it's time something happened. At the same time, the organizers are well-aware of the fact that a lock-in alone doesn't decide the fight against nuclear energy. Therefore, information campaigns and such must continue without fail. But the power of AKB

(*English: MANE*) needs to be converted with strong action from protest into resistance.’ The fact that this concerned a running plant provoked HONTELEZ’s early prediction that the authorities would take a tough stand: ‘The lock-in will be prevented at all costs by the authorities. A lock-in action will be faced with Special Duty Police, Military Police and maybe even elite army troops.’ Quoting from a pamphlet by the Stroomgroep Stop Kernenergie (SSK-Arnhem) (*English: Power Group Stop Nuclear Energy (PGSNE-Arnhem)*) HONTELEZ added: ‘The nature of the Seabrook action is one of non-violence. This is in principle also our aim, but is questionable whether we will be able to avoid any form of confrontation in October.’

[END OF PAGE 29, BEGINNING OF PAGE 30]

Adding to this, and speaking for himself: ‘If the fat is in the fire, many will join to combat the Special Duty Police, even if this wasn’t their initial intention. In this were to happen the organizers couldn’t possibly distance themselves from it. WIEGEL has already shown clearly at the preparations of the Coronation festivities that he’s dying to get his hands on us. His election campaign will not be a liberal one, but one of law and order. A battlefield at Dodewaard is just what he needs.’

However, during the preparation phase of the October action the AKB (*English: MANE*) in its entirety proved less radical and resistance-minded than was assumed by MANE circles from their Nijmegen and Amsterdam divisions, who had originally come up with the idea of a lock-in of the precincts. Despite harsh opinions coming from SSK Nijmegen (*English: PGSNE Nijmegen*), from Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht grassroots groups and from Onkruid circles, a considerable number of grassroots groups preferred a blockade to lock-in. Above all they wanted to prevent violence of attack and therefore preferred to abandon the idea of a lock-in, although they did want to try and approach the plant as closely as possible. In their aversion to violence the considerable influence of BAN (Breek Atoomketen Nederland) (*English: Break Atom chain Netherlands, BAN*) may be noticed, based as it is on the American example of ‘affinity groups’ and for a large part trained by Americans. These are groups of twenty to thirty individuals who have come to know each other very well and can capitalize on each individual’s strengths and weaknesses. This is achieved by a long series of meetings, during which everybody talks for hours about what they think and feel, and psycho-therapeutic games are played. The same concept underlying affinity groups underlies the ‘grassroots groups,’ where grassroots or consensus democracy is practiced.

‘Grassroots democracy’ in its most ideal form is ‘a system in which justice is done to the say of all those concerned as much as possible. The antithesis in parliamentary democracy between representative and represented is eliminated by putting the say in many areas directly into the hands of those directly concerned. This say takes shape in councils, such as neighborhood, factory, school, office and village councils. On issues transcending such neighborhood levels, representatives from councils decide together. An important principle of direct democracy is the possibility to revoke the elected. Also, the elective are chosen by mandate and after consultation.’

[END OF PAGE 30, BEGINNING OF PAGE 31]

In combination with the concept of grassroots autonomy, on the basis of which everyone has the right to stick to their own opinions and act accordingly if actions ensue even when an overwhelming majority has come to accept another opinion, grassroots democracy results in united action only with relatively small groups. In a larger context there will always be a number of groups that do not keep in line and carry out their own actions. The aforementioned BAN – until then the most active part of AKB (*English: MANE*) – still held a strong influence in 1980, not in the last place owing to the goodwill it had acquired due to its absolute non-violent approach at actions. And so the original plan to occupy the precincts became a blockade and the authorities were able to take appropriate measures. They made the precincts inaccessible, surrounding them with large barbed-wire barriers within which large numbers of Special Duty Police were positioned under orders to refrain from any use of violence except in cases of extreme necessity. This turned the blockade into a rather playful affair. Special Duty Police asked for and obtained Anti Nuclear Energy buttons and at times sang lustily along with the AKB (*English: MANE*) activists’ songs. It was not only due to – brutal – weather conditions that the blockade was broken up relatively fast. The action group responsible for the illegal broadcasting station ‘Radio Aktief’ at some point started broadcasting the suggestion to terminate the action. While this was still under fervent discussion in one blockading group others had already complied, so that the action fizzled out.

Whatever ‘organizers’ still existed now that the grassroots groups method was being applied ever more often and more consistently, were blamed for having fallen short. Among other things, it was argued

that not enough meetings had been held on the matter of the lock-in, while in particular from Amsterdam and Nijmegen the AKB (*English: MANE*) was criticized for their 'cute' behavior towards the Special Duty Police. In short, the action was branded a 'flop' and the 'hard-liners' among the activists were given the opportunity to have a more substantial say in the matter.

[END OF PAGE 31, BEGINNING OF PAGE 32]

This resulted in grassroots democracy and autonomy living up to its promise and in any case the 'Dodewaard Shuts Down' movement agreed to organize itself into grassroots groups, while in addition the concept of a 'prikactie' [a 'prikactie' is a short-timed, small-scale action (GdV)] to be organized by individual grassroots groups made its entry. In November 1980, the need and necessity for monthly Landelijk Overleg (LO) (*English: National Consultation, NC*) meetings was questioned: from then on the matter was founded more on a regional basis. In other words: each Consultation was named after its target. And so the regional consultation 'UC Nee' (*English: UC No*) and the regional consultation 'Geen Afvaldumping in Zee' (*English: No Dumping of Waste in Sea*) were called into being. Because groups from the rest of the country, not from the immediate vicinity of the target, were equally interested, these meetings were soon again referred to as 'national,' so that we now know a LO-Dodewaard Gaat Dicht (DGD) (*English: NC-Dodewaard Shuts Down, DSD*) een LO-UC Nee (*English: NC-UC No*) and a LO-Geen Afvaldumping in Zee (*English: NC-No Dumping of Waste in Sea*) which are held respectively in Utrecht, Deventer and Haarlem, of which the DGD (*English: DSD*) meets monthly and the other two only if actions are being prepared. It is strange that until now the nuclear power plant at Borssele has remained the exclusive territory of BAN or groups sympathizing with BAN, although lately the name Borssele is being mentioned more and more often at the LO-DGD (*English: NC-DSD*) which is thus slowly acquiring the tradition of being *the* LO of AKB (*English: NC of MANE*).

In the beginning of 1981, within the LO-DGD (*English: NC-DSD*) the position was taken that AKB (*English: MANE*) could only retain its credibility if the action at Dodewaard be continued until the plant shut down. Although initially a large-scale action during the Easter holidays was agreed upon to fall within the schedule of the plant's annual servicing stop, activities were limited to a number of relatively small actions in the Spring and Summer of 1981. In March 1981, another Fall action from 19 until 26 September was agreed upon.

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The new action would take the form of a blockade raised of both material and human barricades on the three access roads to the plant while at the same time the possibility of blockading the river Waal was being considered. The original intention was to have the material barricades take the shape of 'anti-nuclear villages' on the access roads, which villages would also offer protection against the activities of the Special Duty police. As the authorities at a rather early stage made known that a blockade would not be tolerated as it would limit the freedom of movement of plant personnel, who at previous actions had shown in no uncertain terms that they would not accept any further impediments, it was decided in the end to move the actual 'residing' during the action to a nearby field, which would have to be squatted.

During the preparatory phase of the second large action at Dodewaard the first attempt at sabotaging the national grid was made. This had been suggested before, following the line of argument that if you could stop the full discharge of a running plant the operation of the plant itself would have to stop. Unfortunately for 'Willy Wortel en de Lampjes' [*English: Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers*, after the Donald Duck cartoon character (GdV)] – the group in this case responsible for sabotaging a Dodewaard nuclear power plant cable – the plant was not in operation at the time. The perpetrators only managed to cause a ground-short at one of the high-voltage cables for a very short time. A next attempt at Maarheeze caused a phase-short between two parallel high-voltage cables and resulted in a thirty-minute power failure in the province of Limburg. Between these acts of sabotage and the next one at Anna Paulowna – a 90-minute power breakdown in the north of North-Holland – a booklet entitled *Short circuit, sabotage in your spare time* was issued by the Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers, in which propaganda is made for and information given on how to cause a short circuit at high-voltage cables. Investigations into the perpetrators of the aforementioned acts of sabotage has not yielded any results so far, but the impression is given that these activities are if not carried out at the least inspired by Onkruid activists.

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These acts of sabotage – and it is questionable whether we will have seen the last of them – are typical for a change in attitude within the AKB (*English: MANE*). As early as 1980, a number of activists opposing the transport of light radio-active waste from ECN at Petten to IJmuiden where it had to be transshipped, had shown rather a taste for violence; in 1981 the route from Petten to IJmuiden was divided into one part for non-violent activists and another for those preferring tougher action. Partly as a result of the mounting frustration that their actions were not yielding any direct results and partly due to the fact that AKB (*English: MANE*) actions are not only carried out by ‘open sandals and woolly socks idealists’ but also by radical squatters, Onkruid activists and anarchists, increasing talk of violent actions against persons and objects directly or indirectly involved in nuclear energy can be heard within the AKB (*English: MANE*). Thus, in the Spring of 1981 on the LO-DGD (*English: NC-DSD*) an old acquaintance suddenly came back into view, in three capacities: Joost van STEENIS who under his own name joined the press group DGD-1981 (*English: DSD-1981*). As ‘Joost’ he submitted a proposal for the action week program, in which 23 September was scheduled as a ‘high-voltage day,’ explaining this as follows: ‘the sawing down and digging out of power pylons, not forgetting the distribution stations. Take a hike in nature and find your own power pylon.’ In addition, he wanted to act as provisional coordination address for short-timed, small-scale actions at electricity companies, power pylons and suppliers, through PO-box 1005 in Amsterdam.

In a recent article of the anarchist monthly ‘De Vrije,’ Van STEENIS states that ‘the struggle for the environment against capitalist exploitation of energy sources and against anti-democratic decisions is becoming increasingly vicious.’ In some respects he compares the activities of AKB (*English: MANE*) activists to the Vietcong struggle against the USA, likening our present Minister of Home Affairs to Goebbels, while eulogizing in the same breath the ‘Front of Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little Helpers.’

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In addition, Van STEENIS considers AKB (*English: MANE*) only one of the many expressions of social disaffection, all of which have in common the essential struggle for another social and political order. In this respect, he sees no distinction between AKB (*English: MANE*) and the squatters’ movement.

Next, Van STEENIS indicates in his article why in his view the actions at Dodewaard may be considered a failure. For this, Van STEENIS makes a distinction between demonstrating and campaigning. The only thing required for a demonstration is to be present at a site, while for a campaign it matters what you do while you are there. Van STEENIS’ criticism boils down to the fact that although everything that might happen at Dodewaard and other places during the action week was discussed ahead, everyone parted afterwards without having discussed or thought about what they could do by themselves or as part of a grassroots group.

Yet, all of this was necessary, for the program was tough enough: constructing (prohibited) barricades, carrying out short small-scale actions, and organizing a massive final demonstration at Arnhem. The desire to do something was definitely felt, but most people did not translate this desire into practical activities, according to Van STEENIS.

Still, Van STEENIS manages to see some good points. Despite a ban to bring building material, which had been made known extensively, some demonstrators carried with them pieces of wood or other materials. Yet, for most of them, this was an impromptu initiative. Nothing showed they had planned for this in groups.

However, Van STEENIS argues, it indicates a beginning of a change of mentality within AKB (*English: MANE*) and other protest movements. Van STEENIS calls on action-minded Netherlands to start reflecting right now on what one should do at a next action at Dodewaard or anywhere else, so that one can act more powerfully. As a result, such actions would not stay within the limits of certain norms set by the authorities.

If one wants to achieve something one has to cross the boundaries of the rulers’ laws. Van STEENIS suggests that the construction of blockades and the execution of damaging short small-scale actions must be organized more systematically for future actions and replace ‘old style’ demonstrations.

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Proof of Van STEENIS considerable influence among hard-line activists despite the failure of the 1981 DGD (*English: DSD*) action, are the developments on 19 and 20 September 1981, where he acted as background leader and source of inspiration for the first construction and the repeated reconstructions of barricades at the dikes later on.

He knew how to motivate a large number of activists to return time and again with a persistency verging on the fanatic, even when they were being chased away repeatedly with tear gas and *lange lat* (a long flat truncheon [GdV]). That the action could not be sustained until 26 September 1981 – people left as early as 22 September 1981 under the pressure of the threatening attitude of a large number of locals – could really not be blamed on Joost, but more so on the concepts of grassroots autonomy and democracy, which made the building of an organization sound and ready for the fray, in effect, one that is centrally organized, impossible. Either way, the Dodewaard syndrome caused by the Special Duty Police actions and the ‘public outrage’ did not do much to dampen the AKB (*English: MANE*)’s willingness to demonstrate: on 26 September 1981 as many as 26.000 persons joined the peaceful final demonstration at Arnhem.

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A closer look at Joost van STEENIS

Lately, Joost van STEENIS, age 43, for some 25 years actively involved in groups and movements aimed against the existing social structure, has taken on a special position within AKB (*English: MANE*). He is a strong character with organizational talents and a good head on his shoulders. He holds a grade in mathematics and physics, which he taught for some time. At the present time he is unemployed.

In 1966, he emerged as one of the leaders of the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (*English: Red Youth*). Before, he had already been active in the ‘Rooie Vlag’ (*English: Red Flag*) organization. Both groups were orthodox Marxist-Leninist. In the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (*English: Red Youth*) and later in the ‘Rode Hulp’ (*English: Red Help*) – after discontinuance of the aforementioned group in 1974 – Van STEENIS set out the ideological course, at first in competition with Henk WUBBEN, later with Lucien van HOESEL. It may be assumed that as one of the top-ranking men of the ‘Rode Jeugd’ (*English: Red Youth*) he had at least prior knowledge of the bombing attacks by this organization, executed mainly in 1972. In particular multinationals such as PHILIPS were preferred targets. However, there was never sufficient evidence to prosecute Van STEENIS.

Towards the end of 1975 he tried to prove quite explicitly that he owned the ideological leadership of the ‘Rode Hulp’ (*English: Red Help*). During a meeting he put forward a discussion paper which he had probably drawn up in collaboration with his friend Tom de BOOY. This paper received a very bad reception within the ‘Rode Hulp’ (*English: Red Help*) and resulted in Van STEENIS no longer playing a major part in this group. A point in case is that Van STEENIS, contrary to a number of other members of ‘Rode Hulp’ (*English: Red Help*) who were of lesser political standing, was not invited partake in a stay at a PFLP terrorist training camp at Aden (South-Yemen) in 1976.

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In the discussion paper, Van STEENIS put down his main political ideas and he postulated his theory of ‘Small Violence.’ His main proposition was: ‘The aim is to create armed struggle here and now.’ In order to prevent antagonizing the population against the guerrilla by bloody and terrifying acts during the erection of the force organization, one would, or so Van STEENIS would have it, at least at the start, only use so-called ‘Small Violence.’ This implied that the ‘powers that be’ – i.e. the society’s elite – had to be dealt with. The analogy with the methodology of the ‘Rode Brigades’ (*English: Red Brigades*) and the RAF (‘you have to punish one to educate a thousand’) is evident here.

Yet, Van STEENIS realized that in particular the Italian situation – to ‘shoot down’ those in power – had to be translated, at least for the time being, into Dutch terms – to torment those in power. The theory of ‘Small Violence’ was implemented among others by the so-called ‘Capelse Group,’ centering around the notorious Rob GROENHUYZEN.

In 1976 Van STEENIS turned his back on the ‘Rode Hulp’ (*English: Red Help*). Some time afterwards at several locations attacks and attempts at attacks were carried out using Molotov cocktails and firebombs. The objects of these assaults can be considered representatives of business and state machinery: captains of industry of large enterprises, members of the Public Prosecutor and high-placed civil servants were targets.

Responsible for these actions were groups such as ‘Helder van Geest/ Schoon van Lichaam’ (*English: Clear Mind/Clean Body*) and the ‘Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur’ (*English: Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule*). Both action groups operated from a central line of thought. It can assumed

without doubt that Joost van STEENIS (with Tom de BOOY) was at least the spiritual father of the activities of both groups.

In the middle of 1978, Joost van STEENIS together with Tom de BOOY and Machteld RIETVELD founded the 'Stichting Macht en Elite' (*English: Foundation Power and Elite*). The foundation issued a magazine of the same name in the years of 1978 and 1979.

Van STEENIS – meanwhile unemployed – mainly dedicated himself to studying the formation of the elite in society in general and to tracing the actual rulers in the Netherlands in particular for 'Power and Elite.' In particular this last point caused a great deal of controversy, also because it received ample attention in the national press.

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It was not assumed the board of the foundation would turn to actions against rulers, but – in the words of Tom de BOOY – acts of hot-heads could not be answered for.

After all, 'Power and Elite' magazine indicated exactly who should be dealt with and how. The methodology thought up by Van STEENIS has until now only been used incidentally by small groups. This is possibly the reason why some time ago Van STEENIS adopted the new strategy to try and infiltrate his theories inside the broader frame of a mass movement such as the AKB (*English: MANE*).

[END OF PAGE 39, END OF SECTION]

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