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**THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI)
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**
by Cornelis van Dijk

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For fuller details of Indonesian politicians, parties and organizations marked in the text thus^(*), the reader is referred to the Index.

I. The PKI between the World Wars

By the time the legal PKI was reestablished in 1945 the Party already had a history dating back thirty years. Following several abortive uprisings the Party had been banned by the government of the Netherlands East Indies, only to resume activities underground a few years later.

From the foundation of the PKI in 1920 to the outbreak of the revolts, contacts with the Comintern * had been minimal. Communications with Moscow were difficult and in any case the interest shown by Moscow and the Comintern in Indonesia was insignificant. Moreover, the information on Indonesia and Asia in general, which was available in Moscow, was highly limited.

This resulted in criticism by Tan Malaka * of the decisions taken at the 2nd Comintern Congress in 1920. According to him the Congress decisions on Islam, the severe condemnations of the Pan Islamic movement and the exhortations to Communist Parties to combat reactionary religions and feudal tendencies were all having a harmful effect on the national liberation struggle.

At present, Pan-Islamism is a nationalist liberation struggle, because Islam for the Moslems is everything: not only religion, but also the State, the economic system, the food, in fact everything. Thus Pan Islamism now means the fraternity of all Mohammedan peoples and the liberation not only of the Arabian, but also the Indian, Javanese and all other oppressed Mohammedan peoples ¹⁾.

Following these criticisms the Comintern changed its attitude in 1922 at the 4th Congress, explaining that since the Pan Islamic "religio-political watchwords" had now been replaced by "concrete political demands" co-operation with the Islamic parties was now possible ²⁾.

This decision had the effect of removing one of the obstacles standing in the way of PKI compliance with Comintern directives.

In those days communist theoreticians set great store by the

1) Jeanne S. Mintz, *Marxism in Indonesia*, p. 179.

2) Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in South East Asia*, p. 84.

colonial and semi-colonial territories. Reverting to Marx's claims that Ireland and not England would deliver the decisive blow to the British ruling class, they in turn took the view that a revolution in Asia could accelerate the proletarian revolution in Europe and that the decisive struggle against capitalism could in fact be launched in a continent which, in terms of capitalism, was still underdeveloped. Just how far the emphasis should be laid on revolution in the Third World remained a bone of contention. Important communists operating in Asia such as Roy* and Maring (alias H. Sneevliet*) felt that the Comintern had got to devote its attention to Asia as a matter of priority. Diametrically opposed to this was the view put forward, among others, by Serrati* that there could be no revolution in Asia until the revolution in Europe had been carried through.

The Communist Parties in the Third World had to pursue the "united front from above" tactics evolved at the 2nd Comintern Congress and work together with the non-communist, nationalist revolutionary movements. The only party with which the PKI might be able to co-operate in a national front was the Sarekat Islam*. Co-operation was made difficult, however, by the fact that the Sarekat Islam was not averse to Pan Islam and also because of extremely bad relations between the PKI and the Sarekat Islam, following an abortive PKI attempt to seize the leadership of the latter.

Comintern's new conception of the Pan Islamic movement, as formulated in 1922, failed to bring about any change in relations between the PKI and the Sarekat Islam. By 1921 the breach between the two parties had become final. A resolution was passed at the sixth national congress of the Sarekat Islam in 1921 making it impossible for members of this party to hold simultaneous membership of another political party. Whereupon the communists had left the Sarekat Islam and set up alternative Sarekat Islam sections. These sections, the "Red Sarekat Islam", were later reorganized into the Sarekat Rakjat (People's League).

These developments failed, however, to arrest the growth of the PKI. "In the entire archipelago there were at the end of December 1924 thirty-six sections of the PKI with a total membership of 1,140, while the number of subsections (Sarekats Rakjat) was thirty-one with a total membership of 31,124. Around May

1926 there were sixty-five PKI sections -----" 3).

The first stirrings of revolt

As a result of these rather favourable developments and misled by the outbreak of a number of strikes, the PKI headed by Alimin* and Musso* (who had fled to Singapore to evade arrest by the Netherlands Indies government) was deluded into making an overoptimistic assessment of the chances of a successful revolution. Stalin had already given warnings to the contrary a year before the outbreak of the Java and Sumatra revolts.

In a speech to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East on May 18, 1925, he simultaneously criticized underestimation (rightish deviationism) and overestimation (leftish deviationism) of the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movements. He warned the PKI against falling into the trap of leftish deviationism and neglecting to form a united front.

"The second deviation consists in overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and in underrating the importance of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. The communists in Java, who recently erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet government for their country, suffer, it seems, from this deviation. This is a deviation to the left, which threatens to isolate the Communist Party from the masses and to transform it into a sect" 4).

In view of this warning and the confidence which Moscow placed in the united front tactic, it is unlikely that the PKI was able to enlist any support for its plans in that quarter. However, Brackman believes that Alimin and Musso, who visited Moscow

- 3) The Governor-General's Report of January 1927. Politieke Nota over de Partij Kommunist Indonesia, being a summary of findings on the activities of the Indonesian Communist Party (Netherlands Indies Communist Party), Section of the 3rd International, from July 1925 to December 1926 inclusive. In : Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, The Communist Uprisings 1926-27 in Indonesia: Key Documents, p. 18.
- 4) Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, 1942, p. 22.

in 1926, managed to obtain Stalin's blessing for a revolution 5). Brackman relates this to the struggle going on at that time between Stalin and Trotsky. According to him, Alimin and Musso succeeded in convincing Stalin that Tan Malaka, who had come out against the Alimin and Musso plans, was a Trotskyist sympathizer.

Tan Malaka had already made it plain at the 5th Party Congress of the PKI in 1924 that he would oppose party executive plans to prepare for a revolution on Java and Sumatra, as he did not believe that the time was yet ripe. He was to repeat this warning in his pamphlet Massa Aktie (Mass Action), in which he pointed out that, while the PKI might be in a position to carry out small-scale local actions, it was not yet sufficiently powerful to organize national action 6).

The failure of the ill-prepared Java and Sumatra revolts at the end of 1926 and beginning of 1927 meant the end of the PKI for some time to come. Local sections were rounded up by the government, more than 4,500 people received prison sentences and well over 1,300 were interned in the Boven Digul internment camp on West Irian. It was not until 1935 that Musso, during a clandestine visit to Java, succeeded in setting up an underground PKI.

Meanwhile, after the setbacks suffered by the communist movement in such places as China and Indonesia, the Comintern had changed its attitude towards the non-communist, nationalist movement. At the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928 the "united front from below" was introduced. Instead of collaborating with the nationalist movements, the Communist Parties were now urged to win over the supporters of the nationalist movements. In its "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movements in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries" the 6th Comintern Congress defined as one of the PKI's most important tasks --- "work within all the mass nationalist organizations, in which the Communist Party must establish factions and rally round it national revolutionary elements" 7).

5) Arnold C. Brackman: Indonesian Communism, a History, 1963, p. 16.

6) Tan Malaka, Massa Aktie, 1947, p. 61.

7) Charles B. McLane, p. 100-01.

Anticipating the Congress decision, and on Stalin's orders, the PKI broke an agreement concluded earlier with the Perhimpunan Indonesia *, the association of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. The PKI had entered into this agreement without waiting for Comintern approval. In the agreement the PKI had given an undertaking not to try and set up a new nationalist party.

After 1935 the Indonesian communists adopted the Dimitrov Doctrine ("anti-imperialist united front"), formulated that year at the 7th Comintern Congress. To begin with, the Dutch were seen by Russia and the Indonesian communists alike as the imperialists. Slowly but surely, however, a shift became apparent and opposition switched to Japanese and German imperialism.

The Indonesian communists now entered the nationalist movements working in collaboration with the Dutch, Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia * and Gabungan Politik Indonesia *. During the Japanese occupation the struggle against Japan was continued underground. On October 21, 1945, Mohammed Jusuf * re-established the legal PKI 8).

8) On October 21, 1945, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) reemerged under the leadership of Mr Mohammad Jusuf (the Party actually emerged into the open on November 7, but Jusuf claimed it had been reestablished on October 21). George McTurman Kahin Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 1955, p. 158.

2. The PKI and the Indonesian Revolution

After the declaration of independence of August 17, 1945, not all communists joined Mohammed Jusuf's PKI ⁹⁾.

Amir Sjarifuddin * founded the PARSI (Partai Rakjat Sosialis Indonesia - Indonesian Socialist People's Party). Following the amalgamation of this party with Sutan Sjahrir's PARAS (Partai Rakjat Indonesia - Socialist People's Party), there emerged at the end of 1945 the Partai Sosialis * (Socialist Party). Belonging to this party, as well as to the Partai Buruh * and the Pesindo *, were many communists who were later to rejoin the PKI in 1948, when Musso reassumed the leadership of the Party ¹⁰⁾.

Another group which did not join the PKI consisted of a number of prominent communists who had broken with Stalin before the war and, contrary to the general line, had collaborated with the

9) Moh. Jusuf's position within the illegal PKI is very obscure. According to George McTurman Kahin, he did not belong to the illegal PKI. Arnold C. Brackman, on the other hand, claims that Jusuf belonged to a group inside the illegal PKI which was dissatisfied with the Party's wait-and-see attitude adopted after the declaration of independence. According to Brackman, Jusuf was then responsible for reconstituting the PKI on his own initiative. There are indications that later PKI leaders refused to accept Moh. Jusuf as a leader. Thus Musso (Djalan Baru) writes that after the declaration of independence the PKI did not realize that the political situation in Indonesia had changed. The PKI encouraged those who wanted to establish a party to set up a legal PKI and thus presented the Trotskyist adventurists with an opportunity to establish the Indonesian Labour Party.

10) At the end of August 1948 Amir Sjarifuddin announced that he had been a member of the illegal PKI since 1935. Similar announcements were made by Setiadjit and Tan Ling Djie. It was also at this time that the Indonesian Labour Party and the Indonesian Socialist Party decided to join forces. Earlier (Feb. 1948) Sjahrir had resigned from the Socialist Party to set up the Indonesian Socialist Party.

Japanese. The most important of these were Tan Malaka and Achmad Subardjo *. During the Japanese period both had played an important part in the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka * (School for Free Indonesia), a school sponsored by the Japanese rear-admiral Tadashi Maeda, where young Indonesians could follow courses in Marxism. The type of communism taught was unorthodox, national, anti-imperialist and anti-Western. At the time Subardjo had been political adviser in the Japanese Consulting Office on Political Affairs.

After independence those communists who had stayed outside the PKI assumed important positions. Subardjo was Indonesia's first Foreign Affairs Minister as well as chairman of the short-lived unity party, Partai Nasional Indonesia*, which lasted only nine days ¹¹⁾. Amir Sjarifuddin was Prime Minister from July 3, 1947, until January 29, 1948. Prior to this he had been vice-chairman of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat * - KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee) and Minister of Defence. Tan Malaka was able to secure an important position for himself by forming the Persatuan Perdjuangan* (Fighting Front), membership of which extended to 141 parties, including the reconstituted PNI and the Masjumi*.

The influence of Tan Malaka and Subardjo soon diminished, however. After a conflict between Tan Malaka and Sjahrir* a number of leftwing parties left the Persatuan Perdjuangan. Tan Malaka retaliated by threatening to seize power himself and in March 1946 he was arrested. A second and more serious attempt to seize power by Tan Malaka in July 1946 also failed. Following this attempt, Subardjo was also arrested.

Also hostile to the government of the Republic was Moh Jusuf's legal PKI. This hostility came to a head in February 1946 in anti-government activities on West Java, leading to the arrest of Mohammed Jusuf.

a. United front policy

After these events the PKI changed its course, as a result of which it was rehabilitated in the eyes of the international

11) The Partai Nasional Indonesia was intended as a unitary party and must not be confused with the subsequent political party of the same name.

communist world. Sardjono* assumed power in the PKI, the activities of Moh. Jusuf were condemned and undertakings were given to support the Republic. A manifesto adopted at this time described the new regime as "a democratic government which embraces all classes and parties, unifying all the progressive forces of the people"; ultimately, the manifesto said, the objective was a communist society, but "as a first step in achieving this goal, the PKI joins in the defence of the Republic of Indonesia" 12).

The first Russian press reports on Indonesia did not appear until September 1945. On September 12 Pravda announced that Timor had been occupied by British troops and on October 24 mention was first made of fighting between Dutch and Indonesian troops 13). Russia took a friendly position vis-a-vis the Republic.

In an article in New Times in November 1945 A. Guber described as absurd Dutch charges that the independence movement had been inspired by Japan. Nevertheless he did draw a distinction between the independence struggle in Indonesia and in Vietnam. In contrast to the revolution in Vietnam, he declared, the Indonesian revolution was led by people who had collaborated with the Japanese 14).

The Russian attitude in the immediate post-war years and the Russian leadership's tactics for the colonial territories emerge quite plainly from E. Varga's Izmeneniya 'v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroj mirovoj vojni (Changes in Capitalist Economy after World War II). He attributes one of the factors behind the changed political situation in the colonies to the fact that "the economic development of the colonies strengthened the native bourgeoisie and the native proletariat - exactly those classes which generally take a leading position in the struggle

12) Charles B. McLane, p. 283.

13) Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution, 1962, p. 3

14) A. Guber, What's happening in Indonesia and Indo-China? New Times, November 11, 1945. In Charles B. McLane, p. 285-86.

for independence" 15).

That Russia's attitude towards Indonesia had remained unchanged was confirmed in a speech made by Zhdanov on September 22, 1947, in Wiliza (Poland) to mark the founding of the Cominform. In his speech Zhdanov had divided the world into two camps: an imperialist, anti-democratic camp led by America, and a democratic, anti-imperialist camp led by the Soviet Union. According to him, Vietnam and Indonesia were associated with the democratic, anti-imperialist camp 16). There was to be no change in the Soviet attitude until the fall of the second Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet in January 1948.

The PKI, too, held firmly to the united front strategy and supported the Indonesian government. Opposition to the government came principally from the Masjumi and the PNI and culminated in the discussions on concessions which the government proposed to make to the Dutch. The Linggardjati Agreement triggered off a brief political crisis. In order to prevent the signing of the agreement, the Masjumi withdrew from the National Concentration (Konsentrasi Nasional*), a grouping which had enjoyed government backing since the collapse of the Persatuan Perdjuangan. Together with the PNI, the Masjumi then founded the Benteng Republik* (Republican Fortress).

After these events the Konsentrasi Nasional was reorganized into the Sajap Kiri* (Left Wing), which also included the Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the PKI. When, in June 1947, Sjahrir was once more compelled to make concessions to the Dutch government, the Sajap Kiri at first withdrew its support and the government resigned. However, the Sajap Kiri parties later changed their position on the insistence of Setiadjit*, who had just returned to Indonesia from Eastern Europe.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Setiadjit was merely passing on Moscow's instructions. It is more likely, however, that a feeling of alarm had been created by Sjahrir's resignation with consequent fears about the formation of a new cabinet and the diminution of influence this would entail. It is

15) Ruth T. McVey, 1962, p. 5.

16) *ibid.* p. 24 et seq.

difficult to point to a direct link between the PKI and the Soviet Union in the years immediately following the declaration of independence. To a very large extent, however, the Soviet and PKI policies ran parallel. Moscow, like the PKI, allowed its policy to be guided by the position of the PKI in Indonesian politics and by the international political situation.

b. Harder line

Prior to the fall of the second Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet and the formation of the Hatta* cabinet (January 1948), in which Sajap Kiri representation was restricted to a few members of the rightwing Socialist Party group, Moscow's harder line (as exemplified by the Zhdanov doctrine) had no effect on Russia's attitude towards Indonesia. Indonesia, in fact, was regarded as belonging to the anti-imperialist camp. Subsequently, however, Russia was forced to admit that a cabinet "composed of pro-American elements" had been formed in Indonesia and that "the situation in Indonesia has become strained since the American imperialists succeeded in removing the government of Amir Sjarifuddin and creating a cabinet of extreme rightist pro-American elements" 17).

However, criticism of the Indonesian government was stopped temporarily, only to be resumed with renewed ferocity in November 1948 after the failure of the Madiun revolt. Indeed the Indonesian government faced considerable embarrassment when, in May 1948, the Russian government announced the unilateral ratification of an agreement on the exchange of consuls, concluded during the Amir Sjarifuddin administration. Hatta, the new Prime Minister of Indonesia, refused to sign the agreement. After the fall of the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet the Sajap Kiri, with the exception of a wing of the Socialist Party led by Sjahrir, had gone over to the opposition. Meanwhile the political differences between Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin had become so great that in February 1948 Sjahrir left the Socialist Party and founded the Partai Sosialis Indonesia* - PSI (Socialist Party of Indonesia).

During the same month the Sajap Kiri was also reorganized,

17) *ibid.* p. 38-39.

resulting in the emergence of the Front Demokrasi Rakjat* (People's Democratic Front). The attitude of the PKI and the other leftwing parties now hardened - all the more so when, after a visit by young cadre members to the International Youth Conference, the "Two-Camp Doctrine" became more widely known in Indonesia. Heavy emphasis was laid on the two-camp theory during the South East Asian Youth Conference (Calcutta, February 19-25, 1948) and although Indonesia was commended for her resistance to the Dutch imperialists, the bourgeoisie - and so too the Indonesian bourgeoisie - was rated among the imperialist camp 18). In Indonesia this hardening of attitude was expressed in the rejection by the Front Demokrasi Rakjat of the Linggardjati and Renville agreements.

One of the most significant events for the PKI itself was the return of Musso to Indonesia on August 11, 1948, after an absence of more than twenty years, interrupted only by a brief visit in 1935. After assuming the leadership of the PKI, Musso outlined a new policy which he formulated in Djalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia (A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia). Musso not only criticized the reformist currents which were determining the Republic's foreign policy, and which in his view had resulted in the signing of the Linggardjati and Renville agreements with the Netherlands 19), but he also pointed out that the leadership of the country had fallen into the hands of the "compradore" bourgeoisie. Furthermore, there were indications that the "reactionary government was sliding into a counter-revolutionary posture" 20).

Musso described the Indonesian revolution as a "new-type national revolution", while nevertheless being a "bourgeois-democratic revolution" 21). It was for the PKI to take over the leadership of this revolution. The PKI, however, was not capable of carrying through the revolution on its own and so a national

18) *ibid.* p. 38 et seq.

19) Musso, Djalan Maru untuk Republik Indonesia, 1953, p. 17 et seq.

20) *ibid.* p. 21.

21) *ibid.* p. 30.

front had to be formed. "The PKI is convinced that at this moment the party of the working class cannot alone accomplish the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and for this reason the PKI must work together with other parties" 22).

The new national front must not be of the type which had existed during the early years of the Republic (Persatuan Perdjungan, Onsentraasi Nasional), since the latter had been nothing more than conventions between organizations or leaders of organizations and had collapsed at the first sign of conflict between the leaders 23). "A genuine National Front must be formed from below; all members of parties which have agreed to the National Front must enter it individually" 24).

It was imperative that the national front should be under the leadership of the PKI. In this connection Musso stressed the importance of a close-knit, well organized workers' party and called on the parties of the Front Demokrasi Rakjat to unite within the PKI. This drew rejoinders from such people as Amir Sjarifuddin and Setiadjit (one of the leaders of the Partai Buruh) that they already were PKI members of many years' standing. Similarly, in matters concerning international politics Musso showed himself to be equally committed to the Moscow line by his statements that there were only two camps in the world and that Indonesia must belong to the anti-imperialist camp 25). Musso desired to take over the leadership of the revolution by peaceful means. Only if the PKI were to fail in this course, would one be compelled to resort to arms 26).

In September 1948, however, the PKI leaders were taken by surprise when a revolt broke out in Madiun. Both they and the Front Demokrasi Rakjat threw in their lot with the rebels, but the revolt proved to be a total failure. In December the Indonesian Army announced that 35,000 communists (mostly military

22) *ibid.* p. 31-32

23) *ibid.* p. 31.

24) *ibid.* p. 32.

25) *ibid.* p. 18.

26) George McTurman Kahin, 1955, p. 275.

personnel) had been arrested 27). Most of the leaders of the PKI and the Front Demokrasi Rakjat were also arrested. Musso himself was killed and a number of other leaders were executed in December 1948.

27) *ibid.* p. 300.

3. The move towards peaceful coexistence

When Dipa Nusantara Aidit* and M. H. Lukman* returned to Indonesia from Vietnam and China in July 1950, the PKI's prospects for the future were not exactly rosy. Even though the communists arrested at the time of the Madiun revolt had been freed by the withdrawing Indonesian troops during the second Dutch policing operation, the majority of the leaders arrested, including Amir Sjarifuddin, had been executed.

Attempts by other political parties such as the PNI, PSI and Tan Malaka's newly founded Murba* party to fill the vacuum created by the PKI were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, when in January 1951 Aidit took over from Alimin as leader of the Communist Party, there could be no talk of unity within the communist ranks. Apart from the PKI, the Partai Buruh Indonesia* and the Partai Sosialis were still active. It was not until October that, at the insistence of Aidit, the two parties disbanded and their members joined the PKI²⁸).

Initially Aidit and Lukman joined the Agitprop (agitasi propaganda) section of the PKI. On January 7, 1951, the Central Committee of the PKI elected a new Politburo consisting of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto*, Sudisman* and Alimin. In October 1953 Alimin was dismissed from the Politburo and replaced by Sakirman. At the 6th PKI National Congress in 1959 Aidit was appointed chairman of the CC (a newly created position), with Lukman and Njoto as vice-chairmen. The three men were to hold these positions until 1965.

These developments and the formulation of the PKI party programme took place at a time when both Russia and the People's Republic of China were adopting a more moderate line towards Indonesia and the other countries of the Third World. Originally Russia and China had both pressed for armed resistance to the government of Indonesia, now recognized as independent under international law. On January 15, 1950, an article in Izvestia had spoken of the need for "intensifying armed struggle against

28) On October 19, 1950, the executive of the Indonesian Labour Party recalled the decision taken by this party (Sept. 30, 1948) to amalgamate with the PKI. (Bintang Merah, Vol. VI, No. 6, Nov. 1, 1950, p. 187.

the so-called 'Hatta government' " 29).

Once again there were references to the treachery of the national bourgeoisie. In June 1949 a meeting had been held in Moscow of the Learned Councils of the Institute of Economics and the Pacific Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The most prominent speaker was E. M. Zhukov, Director of the Pacific Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and one of the most important ideologists to have had a hand in formulating Soviet policy towards the Third World.

In his speech Zhukov made a scathing attack on the national bourgeoisie and on the attempts of a number of countries to pursue a neutralist foreign policy. The imperialists led by America, he went on, had been quick to exploit the situation in the ex-colonial territories, so as to enlist the support not only of the feudal forces but also of the national bourgeoisie. He pointed out at the same time that the "national reformists" purporting to pursue a neutral line in international politics, were nothing more, in fact, than tools of the imperialist camp working in league with the national bourgeoisie.

The national bourgeoisie, having defected to the imperialist camp, could not retain the leadership of national revolutions and this leadership had to be assumed by the proletariat. Co-operation with the national bourgeoisie was certainly still possible, but only if the working class played the leading role in such a coalition.

The ultimate goal of the liberation movement was no longer a bourgeois democracy, but a people's democracy. In the Third World the rate of progression for the transition from a people's democracy to socialism was slower than in the countries of Eastern Europe. The cause of this retardation lay in the special character of these countries, in which a people's democracy is confronted with all kinds of bourgeois-democratic problems demanding a solution³⁰). It was characteristic of this area that the aspirations of the national bourgeoisie should be thwarted by imperialism and that the role open to the bourgeoisie should be different from in the West.

29) M. Charles B. McLane, p. 415.

30) Charles B. McLane, p. 365.

In the East, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is naturally possible to have a broader national front against the imperialist forces than in the West. It can without doubt include those sections of the bourgeoisie which are suffering from the ruination of local industry as a result of the dumping of goods from the metropolis. However, the basis of this front is the same as that in European countries; that is, the bloc of working classes - the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie - under the leadership of the proletariat³¹⁾.

The example in mind was the People's Republic of China. According to Liu Shai-chi, the Chinese model implied, among other things, the formation of a strong people's liberation army and co-operation with all forces opposing imperialist exploitation. "The communists must establish anti-imperialist collaboration with the national bourgeoisie which is still opposing, and which is not opposing the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses. If the communists do not take such collaboration seriously and, on the contrary, oppose it or reject it, they are committing an exceptionally great mistake. Such collaboration must be established, even though it is temporary, unstable and unreliable"³²⁾.

In January 1951 came the first signs that Moscow and Peking were changing their position and assuming a more moderate attitude. Soon they were to recognize that the pursuit of a neutralist foreign policy by countries of the Third World was a working possibility. It was during this time that Stalin indicated that war should not be regarded as inevitable. A few months later Zhukov called into question the universal validity of the Chinese model for the Third World.

At the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1952 Indonesia was still referred to by Malenkov as "a country suffering from protracted imperialist aggression..... and rapacious exploitation..... by the imperialist West. Such countries had abandoned their independence and had become American lackeys"³³⁾. Nevertheless, Russia adopted a more friendly attitude, particularly after the fall of the Sukiman* cabinet,

31) Zhukov in :Ruth T. McVey, 1962, p. 78.

32) Charles B. McLane, p. 365

33) In:Arnold C. Brackman, 1963, p. 168.

after a political crisis brought on by Foreign Minister Subardjo's acceptance of American economic aid (Mutual Security Act) and after the rejection of a Pacific Act.

Likewise the People's Republic of China also began to lay stress on peaceful coexistence. The good contacts existing between the People's Republic and the Asian countries, based on the five principles of neutrality (mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence)³⁴⁾ were soon to culminate in the signing of treaties with a number of countries, including Indonesia, on the status of the Chinese minorities in these countries, the peaceful settlement of border disputes and the Chinese role at the Bandung Conference.

34) Known under the name of Pancha Sila, not to be confused with Pantjasila, the Indonesian state ideology.

4. The PKI and the united national front

Aidit, after his return, found it impossible to pursue the Chinese model of armed struggle in the countryside. The differences between Indonesia and China were immense. In China the Communist Party enjoyed great prestige as a result of its struggle with the Kuomintang. In Indonesia there was a general distrust of the Communist Party, in view of its involvement in the Madiun revolt; at the same time the CP faced an army which was trained in guerrilla warfare.

In a speech to the Central Committee in 1953 Aidit also drew attention to the geographical and political differences existing between Indonesia and China, a warning which he was to repeat later. - "There are certain party members who, having made a brief study of the Chinese revolutionary experience, believe that, because the top priority is to rouse the peasants into taking an active part in the struggle, all communists should leave the towns and work among the peasants. Such a view is, of course, erroneous.

"In the first place, it must be made quite clear that the Chinese communists have never played down the importance of activities among the workers. Quite the reverse. In fact, they have always attached great importance to activities in the towns, especially when a guerrilla war is being waged outside the towns. Secondly, there are specific differences in the geographical situation and the political development of Indonesia and China which must be borne in mind" 35). A few pages earlier on he had already pointed out that only about 7% of the peasant population was organized 36).

In contrast to the building up of a strong, revolutionary liberation army, the building of a united front was not impossible. Recalling Musso's New Road for the Republic of Indonesia, Aidit

35) D. N. Aidit Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia in: Rutusan2 sidang pleno Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia, 1953, p. 40. Practically the same speech was published in 1955 under the title Pidato sebagai Laporan Central Comite kepada Kongres Nasional Ke-V PKI dalam bulan Karet, 1954. Aidit was to repeat the warning in an article marking the 37th anniversary of the founding of the PKI. D.N. Aidit: Study much, so also improve the practice of our Revolution, Review of Indonesia, Vol. IV, No. 6, June 1957, p. 26.

36) D. N. Aidit, 1953, p. 36.

canvassed for collaboration with all progressive forces.

In 1952, in a speech marking the thirty-second anniversary of the PKI, Aidit declared: "... it is the duty of every communist strenuously and unceasingly to spur on the members and lesser officials of the Indonesian Socialist Party, the Labour Party, the Masjumi, the Murba and the other parties to form a national united front, or fronts, in the factories, in the villages and wherever else it is possible to do so" 37). Aidit defined the people as the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie 38).

There were two factors which reduced the strength of the national front. The first was the role of the national bourgeoisie, the second the role of the peasants. Even though the PKI had, in fact, been collaborating with the national bourgeoisie in a united front since 1935, the Party was constantly obliged to reckon with the possibility that the national bourgeoisie, owing to its weak economic and political position, might go over to the other side. That the national bourgeoisie was capable of such an act had been demonstrated in 1948 39).

The national front, which had to be based on co-operation between workers and peasants, was further weakened by the fact that as yet peasant participation was non-existent, or at best

37) D. N. Aidit, Menempuh Djalan Rakjat, 1952, p. 22.

38) *ibid.* p. 24.

39) D. N. Aidit, Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia, 1955, p. 49-53. The PKI distinguishes five phases in the history of the national front:

- (i) 1920-26, the phase when the PKI suffered from leftist deviationism and was unwilling to form a national front;
- (ii) 1935-45, the phase when an anti-fascist national front was formed with the national bourgeoisie;
- (iii) 1945-48, the phase of the armed national front against Dutch imperialism. This period ended in betrayal by the national bourgeoisie during the Madiun provocations;
- (iv) 1948-51, the phase when the national bourgeoisie left the national front and sided with the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government;
- (v) the period after 1951.

very slight. The strength of the national front was substantially reduced, since, without the participation of the peasants, it only comprised at the very most 30% of Indonesian society 40).

According to Aidit, in a period when workers and bourgeoisie were beginning to work together more and more closely, the links between peasants and workers still remained weak. This presented the danger of a shift to the right, i. e. exaggeration of the importance of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie and underestimation of the importance of the alliance with the peasants and the need for the workers to assume the leading role 41).

The ultimate aim of the Communist Party in an independent Indonesia was socialism. Nevertheless, co-operation with the national bourgeoisie was still possible, since it was ridiculous to talk of socialism at this stage and, in any case, the socialist revolution was not the immediate goal which the Indonesian communists had in mind. First the bourgeois-democratic revolution had to be completed.

a. Combating imperialism and feudalism

Since Indonesian society was still semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the first requirement was the achievement of complete independence and the expulsion of feudal elements. To begin with, the semi-colonial character of Indonesian society could be easily proved by pointing to the Round Table Conference agreement, in which the Netherlands officially recognized Indonesia's independence and also by pointing to the role which Dutch concerns still played in the Indonesian economy. "The semi-colonial character of Indonesian society is clearly demonstrated by the fact, that, economically, Indonesia is still not independent. Even today the imperialists (the big foreign capitalists) still dominate the Indonesian economy. They are exploiting their position of economic domination, so as to be able, with the help of their lackeys, to interfere in the political decision-making machinery also.

"The imperialist companies such as Bataafsche Petroleum Mij. (a subsidiary company of Royal Dutch Shell), Caltex Pacific Petr. Mij.

40) *ibid.* p. 35-36, 53

41) *ibid.* p. 52.

and Standard Vacuum have our country's petroleum reserves under their thumb. A large part of the land is controlled by foreign real estate companies and shipping is dominated by the Koninklijke Paketvaartmij. (Royal Dutch Shipping Company).

"Foreign and domestic trade continues to be determined by the so-called "Big Five" firms: Internationale Crediet- en Handelsvereniging "Rotterdam", Borneo Sumatra Handel Mij. (Borsumij), Jacobson van den Berg & Co., Lindeteves-Stoviks and Geo Wehry & Co. Important services, e.g. transports and communications, are controlled completely, or to a large extent, by the big foreign capitalists. The big banks which dominate Indonesia's economy, e.g. the Factorij, the Handelsbank, the Escompto, the Chartered Bank, the Great Eastern Bank and others are controlled, without exception, by the Dutch colonialists and other imperialists" 42).

In such a society the national bourgeoisie is a potential ally of the PKI. Even after the Round Table Agreement had been broken and the Dutch concerns nationalized, the PKI still adhered to its definition of Indonesia as a semi-colonial power. According to the party programme approved at the 6th PKI National Congress in September 1959, Indonesia was still not completely independent. Not only was West Irian still occupied by the Dutch colonialists, but in addition the Dutch influence could still be felt in the economic, political and cultural fields. At the same time the PKI drew attention to the ever increasing influence of America in the economic, political and cultural fields 43).

The first detailed examination of the semi-feudal character of Indonesian society coincided with attempts by the PKI actively to extend its influence among the peasants. In The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement 44) Aidit speaks of the impossibility of an economically developed Indonesia by pointing to, among other things, the monopoly rights of the

42) D. N. Aidit, Die Indonesische Gesellschaft und die Indonesische Revolution, Grundfragen der Indonesischen Revolution, 1959, p. 37-37.

43) Dokumen-dokumen Kongres Nasional ke-VI Partai Komunis Indonesia. Bintang Merah Spesial Kongres Nasional ke-VI PKI, 1960, p. 289-93.

44) D. N. Aidit, Hari Depan Gerakan Tani Indonesia Bintang Merah, Dec. 1951, in Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-63, 1969, p. 33.

big landowners, the share-cropping system and the debt burden of the peasants. In view of the nature of Indonesian society and in view of the PKI's resolve to become a mass party, the extension of PKI influence among the peasants was a logical outcome of the importance which the Party attached to the peasants.

The peasants were seen as an indispensable branch of the United Front - without whose co-operation the Front's strength would be substantially weakened. For this very reason, moreover, they were regarded as an essential force for the success of the revolution which would inevitably lead to the establishment of a democracy. Such was the importance attributed to the peasants that the 1954 Party Congress defined "the basic and most immediate task of the Communist Party" as follows: "to mobilize the peasants and to draw them into the struggle to eliminate the remnants of feudalism and to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution" 45).

One has the impression from the foregoing that the PKI placed the emphasis on the struggle that had to be waged in Indonesia against the class enemy. This, however, is not the case. Despite the fact that both the struggle against feudal remnants and the struggle against imperialism remain indispensable for the completion of the revolution, the battle against the feudal elements in Indonesian society is nevertheless subordinated to the struggle against imperialist forces.

According to the Communist Party, it was impossible to undertake both tasks simultaneously. Since it is "on the shoulders of the Indonesian people that imperialist oppression weighs most heavily and brutally", the revolution must, in the first instance, be directed against imperialism 46). However, since the difference between the struggle against feudal forces on the one hand and imperialist forces on the other was based on tactical considerations only, and since in practice both these forces are interrelated, this does not mean that the struggle against feudal elements in Indonesia need be neglected.

The notion of "first completing the national revolution" and

45) Donald Hindley, p. 162.

46) D. N. Aidit, 1959, p. 46.

only then "tackling the anti-feudal, democratic revolution" is false and dangerous. To complete the national revolution "without fighting for the liberation of the peasants from the remnants of feudalism is tantamount to excluding the peasants from the revolution, failing to win them over to the revolution" 47).

Moreover, the PKI regards feudalism as "the social basis of imperialism" and conversely, without the presence of imperialist elements, feudalism could not continue to exist in Indonesia. There is a close relationship between specific groups in Indonesian society and imperialism. At the same time imperialism can draw on the services of its henchmen who have been infiltrated into every walk of Indonesian life - government, armed forces, press and political parties - and without whose collaboration the imperialists would not have a leg to stand on in Indonesia.

b. Class analysis

According to the pronouncements of the 4th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia in July 1956 there are three, on the whole countervailing, political forces active in Indonesia: the progressive forces, the forces of the centre and the die-hards 48). These last are the tools of imperialism and it is against them that the struggle of the people and the PKI must be directed in the first instance. The PKI distinguishes between various classes in Indonesian society which, on the basis of their objective economic position, can each be allocated to one of these three groups: the big landowners, the bourgeoisie, the peasants and the workers.

The bourgeoisie is further subdivided into two groups. First, the upper middle class (or "compradore" bourgeoisie), which in general serves the interests of imperialism and/or maintains trade relations with foreign capitalism or is paid by the latter. Second, the national bourgeoisie which in contrast to the "compradore" bourgeoisie is not reactionary per se, but whose

47) *ibid.* p. 49.

48) D. N. Aidit, *Unite to Achieve the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution* (Report of the Politburo to the Enlarged Fourth Session of the CC Plenum of the PKI - end of July 1956). Review of Indonesia, Supplementary Issue, September 1956, p. 10-12.

attitude is ambivalent and which, despite the fact that its development is restricted by feudalism and imperialism, shows no whole-hearted desire to break free of imperialism.

This ambivalence of attitude is due to the fact that most of the national bourgeoisie are merchants. For this reason they are very largely dependent on imperialist-dominated foreign trade, and especially on imports. At the same time imperialism restricts their development. Feudalism is an obstacle to a developing domestic market and the middle-class traders, just like the (still weak) national industrial bourgeoisie, are hampered in their development.

In its composition the petty bourgeoisie is a heterogeneous group. It includes not only the poor strata of the urban population, the small traders, labourers and fishermen living under the yoke of the big bourgeoisie, the feudalists and imperialists and facing potential ruin at any given moment, but also the intellectuals and the professions. According to Aidit the students and intellectuals form a definite class, "except that their class position is determined by their social origins, living conditions and political attitudes" 49). One of the characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie is that, on the whole, they do not exploit others - or if so, then only on a very small scale.

Hindley points out that the definition given by Aidit in Masyarakat Indonesia dan revolusi Indonesia (Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution) is almost a direct translation of parts of The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in which Mao Tsetung analyses the Chinese petty bourgeoisie. In imitation of Mao, Aidit now described the petty bourgeoisie as the driving force of the revolution, whereas in the PKI party programme of 1951 only the intellectuals are referred to by name 50).

This change of attitude probably occurred in 1955. In the amendments to the party constitution accepted at that time the original definition of the driving force of the revolution as "the working class, the peasants, the intellectuals and national producers and other elements harmed by imperialism" was

49) D.N. Aidit, 1959, p. 54.

50) Donald Hindley, p. 42.

altered to "the working class, the peasants, the class of the petty bourgeoisie and the other democratic elements harmed by imperialism" 51).

c. The rural population

Aidit and Mao Tsetung also concur in their analysis of rural society. Both divide the peasantry into rich farmers, medium-sized farmers and poor farmers. The rich farmers display a number of feudal characteristics. The labourers in their service are not free; they also act as landlord, moneylender, "idjon"* or "tengkulak"*. However, they must be classified as belonging to the peasantry and not to the big landowning class, since they till a part of their land themselves. Moreover, in the event of a struggle against the big landowners, they can be prevailed upon to adopt a neutral attitude.

The medium-sized farmers are economically independent. They till the land themselves and usually earn enough to support their families. Yet they have to be very careful, on account of their economically unstable basis, lest they fall prey to the moneylender or "tengkulak". Only a small number of them succeed in working their way up to become rich farmers. The rest of them, like the rich farmer, are easily won over, not only to the anti-feudalist and anti-imperialist struggle, but also to socialism. In general their position is similar to that of the petty bourgeoisie. For the poor farmer or "semi-proletarian" the cultivation of the land does not provide an adequate existence. The poor farmer, along with the agricultural labourer, makes up the majority of the rural population.

It is clear from the foregoing class analysis of Indonesian society that the workers, agricultural labourers and small farmers can be regarded, without further comment, as constituting the progressive forces and that, according to the PKI, the "compradore" bourgeoisie and the big landowners make up the die-hards 52). The progressive forces also include the petty bourgeoisie and the medium-sized farmers.

51) Putusan-putusan sidang pleno Central Komite Partai Komunis Indonesia, 1953, p. 56-57.

52) For a detailed treatment of the class composition of Indonesian society, cf. D.N. Aidit (1959) p. 52-54.

Of more importance for the formation of a national front and the successful completion of the revolution by peaceful means is the position of the centre forces, the national bourgeoisie and the wealthier farmers. Since both of these groups are also penalized by feudalism and imperialism, they too may be regarded as potential collaborators with the progressive forces. There can be no guarantee, however, that they will not betray the struggle and go over to the side of the "die-hards", as they have economic links with imperialism and feudalism and themselves display definite feudal characteristics. Should this happen, it could result in a heavy blow for the progressive forces.

This, of course, is one of the dangers to which a national front is exposed. In view of the national bourgeoisie's weak political and economic position, however, it is not difficult to retain them as an ally by pursuing just policies.

The PKI has not ruled out the possibility that, under specific circumstances, a section of the die-hards may also rally to the support of the people. "In other, more sharply defined situations (as opposed to a situation where the national bourgeoisie is an ally), for example, when the policy of the Party at a given moment is aimed only against an imperialist country, it may even be possible to win over a section of the 'compradore' bourgeoisie to oppose that specific country. Despite all, the 'compradore' bourgeoisie remains a thoroughly reactionary class, whose one aim is to crush the Communist Party, the labour movement and all democratic movements" 53).

The same is true of the big landowners. Like the Chinese, the PKI also distinguishes between good and bad landowners. In Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution, however, the big landowners are still regarded as a monolithic class, all of them being seen as enemies of the revolution. Later, and especially after the acceptance of the Agrarian Basic Law and the law governing rotation of crops, a distinction was made between the patriotic landowner who does not stubbornly resist these laws or oppose the setting up of an Islamic state and the bad landowner who actively opposes the peasant movement, the above-mentioned laws and government policy in general 54).

53) *ibid.* p. 53.

54) Cf., for example, D.N. Aidit, *Kaum Tani mengganjang setan2 desa* (1964) p. 20-21.

5. Peaceful co-operation

At the 4th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the PKI at the end of July 1956 Aidit defined the PKI's foreign policy as follows: "The political line of the Indonesian Communist Party ----- is: to exert all efforts and indefatigably strive to develop the progressive forces, unite with the middle-of-the roaders and to isolate the die-hards" 55). He made it clear at the same time (and here he cited one of the resolutions of the PKI 5th Party Congress) that parliamentary methods are inadequate for the achievement of the immediate PKI goal, viz the establishment of a people's democracy 56).

Until a few years before its collapse in 1965, the PKI persisted in the belief that, as far as it was concerned, the achievement of a people's democracy via parliamentary methods would indeed come about. The establishment of a people's democracy was possible since the position of the national bourgeoisie, both economically and politically, was still very weak in view of the semi-feudal/semi-colonial character of Indonesian society. The establishment of a people's democracy, moreover, was vitally necessary, since only under a people's democratic government could the 1945 Revolution be completed. At the same time the PKI was firmly convinced that the completion of the Revolution did not mean the assumption of power by the bourgeoisie. Power would be assumed by a united front government which would represent the interests of all anti-feudal and anti-colonial classes and which would prepare the way for the transition to socialism.

According to the PKI, however, it would appear in practice that the parliamentary struggle in itself is not enough. History has shown, not only in the case of Indonesia, but also in other countries, that where governments have enjoyed communist support (e.g. Indonesian cabinets between 1945 and 1947) or where the communists themselves have exercised control (e.g. the two Amir Sjarifuddin cabinets), neither eventuality has led to the establishment of a people's democracy. The failure to implement revolutionary policies is the fault not of the progressive forces, but of the die-hards.

55) D.N. Aidit, *Unite to achieve the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution*, Review of Indonesia, Supplementary Issue, September 1956, p. 10.

56) *ibid.* p. 25. Cf. also Aidit's speech following his return from the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU. Review of Indonesia, No. 7, July 10, 1956, p. 8.

The imperialists, the "compradore" bourgeoisie and the big landowners are bound, by force of circumstances, to accept a relatively progressive government during specific periods. Nevertheless, they will not fail to seize on any opportunity that arises, in order to bring down such a government and to crack all opposition to the remnants of feudalism and colonialism. The only way out, according to the PKI, is to mobilize the masses. In this the workers must set an example and evolve into a great class-conscious group which will champion the cause of other progressive and centre groups. Only the strength of the progressive and middle-of-the-road forces will deter the die-hards from using extra-parliamentary means to impose their will and destroy progressive measures which promote the interests of the people.

a. Analysis of the political parties

The most important political parties in Indonesia can be classified according to the ideological group from which they derive the most support. Roughly speaking, Java, which is inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people, can be divided into four different important groups: the "abangan", the traditional "santri", the modernist "santri" and the "prijaji". The "abangan" - sometimes known as statistical Islamites - are best described as nominal followers of Islam. While they are Islamic in name, in their everyday life they display many animistic Hindu characteristics. The "santri" are more orthodox in their practice of Islam and take their Islamic duties much more seriously. Together they make up the peasant population, the "santri" probably being the richer of the two groups. A section of the "santri", and in particular of the modernist "santri", is associated with the merchants and traders. The "prijaji" is made up chiefly of the civil servant class.

The PKI relied for the bulk of its support on the "abangan". The chief source of support for the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) was the "prijaji" and, via the civil service apparatus, the "abangan" also. The two Islamic parties, the Nahdatul Ulama - NU and the Masjumi, looked for their support to the "santri", the NU's chief source of strength being the traditional "santri" and that of the Masjumi the modernist "santri".

The possibility of co-operation between the PKI and these parties was restricted by a number of factors. Co-operation

with the PNI was rendered difficult by the fact that in their efforts to mobilize support - especially during elections - both parties concentrated on the "abangan". Co-operation with the Islamic parties was complicated by the increasing ferocity of the conflicts between orthodox and unorthodox Islamites.

An additional factor was that a large part of the Masjumi supporters lived in the outer provinces, while the PKI was a Java-oriented party. From the beginning relations between the PKI and the Masjumi were bad. Like the leaders of the small PSI headed by Sutan Sjahrir, the Masjumi leaders were regarded as reactionary die-hards.

Up to the introduction of guided democracy in 1959 there was a period of extremely close co-operation between the PKI and the PNI. Equally, relations with the Nahdatul Ulama and the smaller Islamic parties such as the PSII and the Perti were by no means hostile. Conversely, the Islamic parties showed themselves to be not entirely averse to communism and to Russia and China. During the Fifties leaders of the Islamic parties, including the Masjumi, visited Russia and China and expressed their appreciation of developments there and of the attitude taken by these countries towards Islam. Thus in July 1956, for example, the then Masjumi Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Z.A. Achmad, praised the freedom of worship which existed in Russia. During the same month Wahib Mohammad (Nahdatul Ulama) and Dr Ali Akbar (Masjumi) expressed their appreciation of the support which the Moslems in the People's Republic of China were receiving from the government ⁵⁷).

The PKI regarded the PNI and the NU as middle-of-the-road forces and considered them both to be parties of the petty bourgeoisie. "A party whose organization is possibly not very good, whose leadership definitely does not consist of only petty bourgeois elements, but which in its election campaign represented the thoughts and sentiments of this class (i. e. the petty bourgeoisie), which generally 'goes neither this way nor that' and which generally seeks out the middle of the road, the safest way, can receive a lot of votes. In measuring up the forces of society, our comrades frequently forget to take account of this objective fact and because of this, they cannot

57) Review of Indonesia, No. 7, 1956, p. 10.

possibly understand the PNI and the NU victories" 58).

The distinction drawn by the PKI between parties representing the interests of the "compradore" bourgeoisie, such as the Masjumi and the PSI, and parties representing the interests of the petty bourgeoisie - in the case of the PNI the national bourgeoisie also - was clearly highlighted in practice by the PKI's domestic political attitudes during the liberal democratic period, i. e. up to the introduction of Guided Democracy.

b. PKI-PNI co-operation

Following Indonesia's abolition of the federal form of government imposed upon her by the Netherlands at the time of the Round Table Conference and after her emergence as a united state, the Natsir cabinet (Sept. 6, 1950 - Apr. 27, 1951), drawing mainly on Masjumi support, was formed. Together with the PNI, the PKI went into opposition. It should not be forgotten that in the course of the ensuing PKI-PNI co-operation both parties displayed considerable similarities, so that in many respects they constituted a common front against the Masjumi and the PSI. Like many Indonesians, including President Sukarno, the PNI took the view that the achievement of formal independence had not resulted in the completion of the revolution and that the Dutch still wielded immense influence in the social, economic and political fields. In this they stood diametrically opposed to the Masjumi and the PSI.

These differences in evaluation also entailed divergent foreign policy assessments. The PKI in particular, but also the PNI, continued to regard the West as the embodiment of imperialism and there were calls for the immediate tearing up of the Round Table Agreement and for the retrocession of West Irian. The Masjumi and the PSI pursued a more Western-oriented policy. The increasingly close co-operation between the PKI and PNI continued undiminished, even after the mass arrests of communists in August 1951 during the Sukiman cabinet, most of whose members came from the Masjumi and the PNI. Aidit

58) D. N. Aidit, Preserve the Republic of the 1945 Proclamation (The Struggle to Preserve National Independence, Peace and Democracy Following the Parliamentary Elections) Review of Indonesia, Special Issue, November 30, 1955, p. 6-7.

and Lukman were among those forced to go underground. Having learnt a salutary lesson from the Madiun revolt, the PKI later declared that it was not in rebellion against the government and instructed its members to continue working normally above ground and to ignore provocations. No attacks were made on the PNI, even though this party formed part of the Sukiman government.

The PKI continued in its criticism of the government of Sukiman, Subardjo and Wibisono* (all three members of the Masjumi) 59). The PNI, for its part, criticized the reasons given by the government as justification for the arrests. Another important event during the Sukiman administration occurred when the Foreign Minister concluded a Mutual Security Aid Agreement with the United States - without cabinet approval. As has been seen, this was one of the first occasions when Russia began to show signs of a friendlier attitude towards Indonesia.

Despite continuing co-operation between the PNI and the Masjumi in the subsequent Wilopo* cabinet (Apr. 3, 1952 - Aug. 1, 1953), slowly but surely a split occurred between the two and increasingly the idea of co-operation with the PKI gained ground within the PNI. During the first Ali Sastroamidjojo* cabinet (PNI, Aug. 1, 1953 - Aug. 12, 1955) the PNI chairman Sidik Djojokusarto instructed the various sections of the PNI itself to work closely with the PKI and the NU. In his opinion this amounted to no more than an acceptance of the realities of the situation, in view of the support which the PNI and the NU were giving to the cabinet 60).

When in 1955 the Masjumi and the PSI tabled a motion of no-confidence in the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, the Masjumi's principle grievance against that cabinet, according to the PNI spokesman S. Mangunsarkoro, was the fact that it had refused to follow the example of the Sukiman cabinet and institute mass arrests of communists. He went on to accuse the PSI of being opposed to the achievement of complete independence 61).

59) Cf., for example, D. N. Aidit, 1954, p. 34 et seq.

60) Donald Hindley, p. 246.

61) Monthly Review of Events in Indonesia, No. 1, 1955, p. 5.

For its part, the PKI also pursued an extremely pragmatic policy. Through its close co-operation with the PNI it was afforded a certain protection which guaranteed immunity from a repetition of the events of 1951. At the same time it was able to claim joint responsibility for the popular measures carried out by the government, while continuing to criticize less "progressive" measures and calling on the government to accede to further demands. Internally the PKI justified its action by claiming that to withhold support from the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet would be "opportunist" and would only pave the way for a Masjumi-PSI government. On the other hand, the PKI was quick to point out that it did not regard the present cabinet either as a national united front government or as a genuinely progressive government ⁶²).

By giving its support to governments in which the PNI was represented, the PKI managed to recover from the loss of prestige suffered at the time of the Madiun revolt. In the 1955 general elections the PKI obtained 16.4% of the votes, thus becoming the fourth largest party in Indonesia. In terms of votes it was inferior only to the PNI (22.3%), the Masjumi (20.9%) and the NU (18.4%). In the regional elections of 1957 the PKI obtained two million more Java votes than in 1955. These gains were achieved mainly at the expense of the PNI. Yet, however favourable these developments may have been for the PKI - not only the good election results but also the spectacular increase in membership - they did not prevent criticism of party policy within the PKI.

On March 25, 1956, Alimin sent a letter to several PKI members criticizing the Party's united front policy and also the party leadership. He drew attention to the fact that the PKI had been founded, among other things, "to oppose right opportunism and combat centrism" and went on to attack the Party's "class-collaboration" policy. After these criticisms had been made public, the Secretariat of the Central Committee reiterated its view that only through co-operation with the other democratic and patriotic forces could imperialism and feudalism be stamped out, adding that in the early years of its existence

62) For details of the PKI attitude to the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet cf., for example, D.N. Aidit, 1955, p. 38 et seq.

the PKI had been afflicted with precisely the same kind of left-wing opportunism, as a result of which the Party had been alienated from the masses and become the potential victim of provocations ⁶³).

A few months later (October 1956) Sukarno announced that he had devised a formula for a Guided Democracy. As he was to explain in 1957, this was based on the thesis that there must be a cabinet in which all the important parties were represented. The proposal was supported by the PKI. In November 1955 at a meeting of the PKI Politburo Aidit had already stressed that a national coalition government (anti-colonialist united front government) must be formed. In support of this claim he pointed to the fact that so far no Indonesian government - whatever its composition - had shown itself capable of putting through reforms which had led to an improvement in the living conditions of the people.

"The PKI is of the opinion that if a National Coalition Government is formed in which all important political trends in society are represented, such as the Islamic, Christian, nationalist and communist political trends, then a new stage will open up in Indonesian history, a stage in which the unity of the people in a new form will rapidly grow stronger. If this occurs, not a single section of the Indonesian people will be harmed. The only people whose interests will be harmed are the foreign imperialists and their lackeys" ⁶⁴).

In the past the PKI had not directly ruled out the notion of co-operation with the Masjumi. In supporting those cabinets in which the PNI was a co-partner with the Masjumi (e.g. the Wilopo cabinet, Apr. 3, 1952 - Apr. 9, 1957), the PKI justified its position by pointing out that such cabinets were relatively progressive and the Masjumi influence was more than neutralized by the ability of the progressive forces to block reactionary

63) Statement by the Secretariat of the PKI Central Committee, issued in connection with Comrade Alimin's statement of March 25, 1956. Review of Indonesia, No. 7, July 10, 1956.

64) D.N. Aidit, 1955, p. 11.

65) Cf. for example, Program Partai Komunis Indonesia (disahkan oleh Kongres Nasional Ke V Partai Komunis Indonesia, Maret 1954), p. 23-24; See also D.N. Aidit, 1956, where Aidit observes that the PKI supports the government and its progressive measures, but that the PKI cannot be held responsible for negative cabinet measures, since the Party does not support the die-hards in the cabinet, who themselves are responsible for these negative measures, p. 3, 26-27.

measures 65). PKI support for the concept of guided democracy was facilitated by the banning of the Masjumi and the PSI for alleged complicity in the revolts against the central government in the outer provinces.

6. The PKI and the world communist movement in the post-Stalinist era

From February 19 to 25, 1956, the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow. On the last day of the Congress Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered a speech sharply critical of Stalin and attacking the personality cult. The speech referred, among other things, to the mass arrests, Stalin's alienation from the masses, his disregard of information and his absolute power.

Destalinization came as a great surprise to the Indonesian Communist Party. Hitherto the Party had always in theory abided by the Stalinist doctrine. Thus on the second anniversary of Stalin's death in March 1953 Njoto had described the programme of the PKI as "the creative application of the general truth of Stalinism adapted to the national peculiarities and characteristics of our country, adapted to the history, culture, character and qualities of Indonesia" 66).

Present at the Congress was the general secretary of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, who afterwards visited the People's Republic of China, North Korea and Czechoslovakia. Upon his return to Indonesia he issued a statement on the various points which had been dealt with at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU. He expressed admiration at the extent of the self-criticism he had witnessed at the Congress.

Although he was in broad agreement with the criticism of Stalin, he nevertheless felt that, in view of the way the bourgeois press was abusing these criticisms, the CPSU should take steps to publish a separate statement listing not only Stalin's faults, but also his good points: "... in view of the fact that, since the Congress, the bourgeois press have falsified many things concerning this question, it is very necessary for the CPSU to make an official statement on Stalin's correct actions and his mistakes" 67). Aidit shared completely the view of the

66) Review of Indonesia, No. 4, April 1, 1955, p. 20-21.

67) Review of Indonesia, No. 7, July 10, 1956, p. 9; cf. also Aidit's assessment of the 20th Party Congress in Aidit 1956; D. N. Aidit: The October Revolution and the Peoples of the East, Review of Indonesia, Vol. VI, No. 10-11, Oct.-Nov. 1957.

Communist Party of China that the works of Stalin must continue to be studied as "an important treasure of history" 68).

The PKI also found it disturbing that Russia had not held prior consultations with the CPs of other countries on an important decision which had international implications.

Following a renewed attack on Stalin at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, the PKI set out its own attitude in greater detail. Aidit pointed out that to a certain extent destalinization could be regarded as an internal CPSU matter, since Stalin had been one of the leaders of this party. Viewed in this way, the matter was outside the jurisdiction of other parties and need not concern them. On the other hand, however, Stalin had also been an important international figure and an important fighter of fascism, so that in this respect other people were certainly entitled to express their opinions of the man.

The PKI supported the anti-Stalinist criticisms vis-a-vis the personality cult. Criticism of the personality cult was necessary, since a cult of this kind hampered all initiative and creativity on the part of the masses. Furthermore, criticism was a means of strengthening the bond between the Party and the masses. The PKI still believed, however, that a distinction must be drawn between the negative aspects of Stalin's administration, e.g. the personality cult, and the positive aspects of the administration. Russia's achievements between 1924 and 1953 are also Stalin's achievements, while many of Stalin's writings and speeches on the revolution in Asia are as valid today as they ever were 69). In 1959, true to its belief that Stalin must also be remembered for his good points, the PKI published Stalin dan karjanja (Stalin and His Works). This was the translation of the section on Stalin which had been included in the editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia published after the 20th Party Congress.

68) Review of Indonesia, No. 7, July 10, 1956, p. 9.

69) D. N. Aidit, Soalnya bukan siapa jang akan keluar tetapi siapa lagi jang akan masuk kubu Sosialis. Harian Rakjat, Dec. 15, 1961, Cf. also the statement by the PKI Politburo on the position adopted by the Indonesian delegation at the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU, Harian Rakjat, Dec. 16, 1961.

a. The PKI and the Sino-Soviet dispute

In addition to the launching of the destalinization programme, two other items figured prominently on the agenda of the aforementioned Russian Party Congress (1956): the much emphasized peaceful coexistence policy and the possibility of achieving socialism by parliamentary means. None of this met with any criticism from the PKI. The view that wars could be converted as a result of the great advances made by the socialist system and the peace-loving forces was universally accepted throughout the communist world and fitted in, moreover, with the resolution passed at the Bandung Conference.

As far as the use of parliamentary methods was concerned, the PKI made it quite plain that, provided the Party had its way, socialism would be achieved by this means. The PKI considered that the immediate aim which must be kept in mind was the attainment of complete independence and the eradication of feudal remnants.

Up to 1961 the PKI persistently dismissed any notion of a split in the communist world. It continued to speak of the socialist camp led by Moscow, repeating as a rider that the Russian model and theories were not to be emulated blindly and without question. "Ever since the dissolution of the Comintern (Communist International) in 1943, the Communist Parties in all countries, and that means the PKI too, have not been part of any Communist International organization. The Indonesian communists, in striving for their ideals of a just and prosperous society in Indonesia, base themselves on the concrete realities in Indonesia" 70).

The situation in China and the works of Mao Tsetung (e.g. On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People are also acclaimed as a model 71) and there is endorsement of

70) Aidit in an interview with the Indonesian correspondent of the PIA Review of Indonesia, Vol. VI, No. 3, March 1957, p. 3.

71) This article was used by Njoto as the starting point for his attack on Yugoslav revisionism. Njoto: Some matters concerning Yugoslavia and Indonesia considered from the philosophical point of view, Review of Indonesia, Vol. V, No. 10, October 1958, p. 30-34. On the correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People has been discussed in detail by Dahono in Review of Indonesia, p. 31, 32, 29.

the definition of imperialism as paper tigers ⁷²). Nevertheless, on the occasion of the "37th anniversary of the combining of the General Truth of Marxism-Leninism with the Concrete Practice of the Indonesian Revolution" Aidit made an attack on those former PKI leaders who had wanted to follow the Chinese example, regardless of the special circumstances prevailing in Indonesia ⁷³).

In support of its claim that the socialist camp was united, the PKI instanced the joint declaration by the prime minister of Russia and the prime minister of China on January 18, 1957, as well as the joint communiqué issued by Khrushchev and Mao Tsetung following Khrushchev's visit to the People's Republic in August 1958. In addition the PKI could point to the Peace Manifesto (1957) which had been issued by 64 communist and workers' parties attending a conference in Moscow in honour of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. The PKI attributed the 1956 revolutions in Poland and Hungary to the American and West European imperialists who had incited the big landowners, capitalists and fascists to revolt. These attempts had failed thanks to the "unselfish" conduct of the Russian Army in Hungary. Subsequently the prestige of the Russian and Hungarian CPs had reached hitherto unprecedented heights.

In connection with the Russian invasion of Hungary, Sudisman attacked the Indonesian government for delivering a protest note to the Soviet government ⁷⁴).

b. Open rift

The rift between Russia and China, which dates in fact from 1956, came to a head during a world congress of 81 communist and workers' parties held in Moscow in November 1960 to mark the forty-third anniversary of the October Revolution. At this congress the CPSU attempted to persuade the other parties to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In a CPSU circular distributed to the delegates even before the congress got under way the Russians accused the Chinese of failing to abide by the 1957

72) Review of Indonesia, Vol. VI, No. 2, Feb. 1959, p. 4.

73) D. N. Aidit, June 1957

74) For a summary of this lecture cf. Review of Indonesia, Vol. III, No. 12, Dec. 1956, p. 3-5.

Peace Manifesto, of endangering communist unity by their attitude and of contributing, essentially, to the consolidation of imperialism. During the congress itself the CPSU tried to secure a general condemnation of factionalism as well as a ruling that all CPs must abide by the collective decisions of Congress.

Teng Hsiao-ping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China, accused the Soviet Union of opportunism and revisionism. The Chinese delegation attacked Russian views on disarmament and peaceful coexistence (which, according to the Chinese, is only useful as a tactical weapon). They also attacked Russian theories on the peaceful parliamentary road to socialism. At the same time the Chinese stressed that the minority does not always have to accept the point of view of the majority, adding that history would show who was right in the end. In this connection, Teng Hsiao-ping reminded his listeners, even Lenin himself could be accused of factionalism, since he it was who had split the Social Democratic Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ! ⁷⁵)

The PKI tried not to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In so far as it was at pains to retain a certain measure of independence, in specific respects it tended almost automatically towards the Chinese view. In other respects, however, its views coincided much more closely with the Russian position.

There are many similarities between the position adopted by the PKI after this congress, and also after the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU (1961), and the position which it had pursued after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Criticism was expressed of the way in which the Soviet Union viewed relations between the various CPs and there was criticism in particular of the high-handed manner in which Khrushchev had pushed through his destalinization programme. Nevertheless, the Party was in agreement on a number of important points, such as peaceful coexistence and the peaceful road to socialism.

At the 1960 world congress the PKI had been among the few parties which had supported the Chinese and Albanians on specific points. According to Crankshaw, the only delegations to support the People's Republic were those from Albania, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, Japan and Australia. Crankshaw also claimed that Vietnam and Indonesia had supported

75) For congress proceedings cf. William E. Griffith: The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction in \$; Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (Eds) Polycentrism, p. 107-27.

China in the preparatory commission. In addition, Indonesia had supported the Chinese over the personality cult question. China had yielded reluctantly on this question, but had refused to condemn the notion of factionalism 76).

Equally, the PKI did not accept Russia's criticism of Albania. These attacks by Russia, and by those Communist Parties favourably disposed towards Russia, were intended not so much as a condemnation of Albania but rather as an indirect attack on the People's Republic of China. However, like the other Communist Parties, the PKI still went on trying to create the impression that the communist world was united. The final communiqué of the 1960 conference, which was issued as a separate pamphlet, was described by M.H. Lukman as a "very important historical document" 77). In his commentary on the statement he also pointed out that "unity and co-operation between the countries of the socialist camp was growing increasingly" 78) and that it could be concluded from the statement that PKI efforts to form a united front with the nationalists were correct 79).

After the 22nd Congress of the CPSU (October 1961) Aidit openly criticized CPSU policy in a speech at the 3rd Plenary Session of the CC of the PKI (Dec. 30-31, 1961). At the same time, however, the PKI had set itself the task of "doing everything possible to consolidate unity in the socialist camp" 80). Party members were urged to study not only the documents of the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU, but also the documents of the other parties involved in the controversy 81).

The PKI backed up its refusal to criticize Albania by referring to the declaration by the 81 Parties which had been issued after the 1960 conference and which stipulated that all CPs had equal rights and could determine their policy on the basis of any given

76) Crankshaw: Observed May 6, 1962, quoted in William E. Griffith p. 121 and Crankshaw, 1963, p. 120-21.

77) M.H. Lukman, PKI dan Pernyataan 81 partai², in M.H. Lukman, Njoto 41 Tahun PKI, p. 21.

78) *ibid.* p. 24.

79) *ibid.* p. 29.

80) Keputusan sidang pleno Ke III CC PKI (Dec. 30-31, 1961) p. 5.

81) *ibid.* p. 6.

concrete situation 82). The CC fully supported the attitude adopted by Aidit at the congress and his refusal to criticize Albania. Aidit felt that Albania could not be expelled from the socialist camp and he issued a press statement to this effect on November 23:

"During and after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU the imperialists, revisionists, Trotskyists and reactionaries were beside themselves with glee over the criticism of Albania and the renewed criticism of the late Joseph Stalin and the anti-party group etc. In the case of Albania they have created an atmosphere implying the question "who else is going to leave the socialist camp?..... In reality, however, the problem is quite different..... Divisions within the socialist bloc are not determined by subjective evaluation, but by the objective realities in a country where socialism is being constructed..... Albania is a country engaged in the building of such a society. Comrade Khrushchev is in no doubt about this".

Aidit then added that what matters is not who is leaving the socialist camp, but who is joining it. He produced three reasons why he had not criticized Albania.

In the first place, he had gone to the congress with a statement drawn up by the Politburo and there had been no advance knowledge whatsoever that Albania was to be the object of criticism at the congress. Secondly, he was not convinced that criticism was the real way to resolve the problems which had arisen. Thirdly, members of the PKI, reared as they were in the spirit of the 1957 Peace Manifesto and the declaration of the Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, would not understand his criticism 83). Up to mid-1963 the PKI maintained that the differences which had arisen within the communist world were of a temporary nature only. Considering the great number of Communist Parties, it was quite logical that differences should

82) *ibid.* p. 9, 10.

83) D.N. Aidit, Soalnja bukan siapa jang akan Keluar tetapi siapa lagi jang akan masuk Kubu Sosialis, Harian Rakjat, Dec. 15, 1961.

exist; these differences, moreover, testified to the communist world's dynamic qualities. The PKI urged that both parties, having accepted that they shared the same aims (eradication of exploitation and creation of a socialist, communist world), should apply themselves to resolving their problems by democratic means and through negotiation.

The starting-point for a solution and a platform for all CPs must be sought in the international communist documents: the documents of the First International, the documents of the Comintern, the 1957 declaration and the declaration of the Congress of 81 Parties in 1960⁸⁴). The PKI felt that no solution could be reached by mutual recriminations and in 1963, during the 1st Plenary Session of the 7th CC of the PKI, it attacked any party deviating from this principle.

"The prediction we made in 1961 concerning the bad habit of launching mutual attacks at the congress of a party has been proven by events in the recent congresses of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, the Socialist Workers' Party of Italy, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. These congresses failed to demonstrate the unanimity of resolve of the communists of the world in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism"⁸⁵).

The PKI welcomed Khrushchev's appeal that any differences should be resolved "within the family" and that party congresses should not be used as platforms for criticizing other parties.

Mindful of Khrushchev's appeal, the PKI newspaper *Harian Rakjat* had stopped the publication of a series carrying material supplied by both parties in the dispute. The PKI continued, however, to oppose classical and modern revisionism and classical and modern dogmatism. It was essential that Indonesian communists should be communists "who firmly uphold the principles

84) D. N. Aidit, *Untuk Demokrasi Persatuan dan Mobilisasi in Madju terus Dokumen-Dokumen Kongres Nasional ke VII*, p. 61.

85) D. N. Aidit, *Dare, Dare and Dare Again*. Political report presented on February 10, 1963, to the first plenary session of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1963, p. 61.

of Marxism-Leninism, but are flexible in applying these principles"⁸⁶).

c. The PKI and Yugoslavia

Officially the PKI still refused to take sides in the conflict in the communist world. For the Party, however, this did not mean adopting a neutral position. It was necessary to learn from the experiences of other CPs, while at the same time remaining vigilant lest one fall into the trap of "modern dogmatism" and allow oneself to become directly identified with the position of any one party. The PKI was - in its own words - receptive to all ideas which could be adapted to the Indonesian situation.

The only ideology to be denounced in its entirety was that of the Yugoslav CP. Having accepted the general line, the PKI unequivocally rejected Yugoslav revisionism. Following the return of a PKI delegation headed by Njoto to the 7th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the CC of the PKI issued a statement saying that the PKI could not accept the policies of the Yugoslav CP. In particular, it was critical of Yugoslavia's attacks on the Soviet Union which had had a disruptive effect on communist world unity - a unity which had proved indispensable for the building of an anti-imperialist front⁸⁷). In a special article Njoto denounced Yugoslavia for placing too much emphasis on the "national peculiarities", while at the same time overlooking the universal laws governing the revolution and the socialist construction of a country. He also criticized Yugoslavia for disputing the right of other countries to describe the Yugoslav programme as un-Marxist or otherwise⁸⁸).

Even in later years the PKI continued to remain opposed to the Yugoslav CP. It did so not because of any dogmatic attitude

86) *ibid.* p. 63-64, 67-68.

87) PKI political statement: Impossible for the PKI to alter its attitude towards revisionism, *Review of Indonesia*, Vol. V, No. 8, Aug. 1958, p. 6-7.

88) Njoto, Some matters concerning Yugoslavia and Indonesia considered from the philosophical point of view, *Review of Indonesia*, Vol. V, No. 10, October 1958, p. 30-35.

towards this party, but because it saw no reason for departing from the 1960 declaration (which it regarded as the basis for a rapprochement between the Russian and Chinese CPs). In reality, the PKI attitude was probably determined largely by Yugoslavia's attitude to Indonesia.

Yugoslavia was a vociferous advocate of the "third way", a neutralist foreign policy which was sharply condemned by Indonesia and the PKI. The Yugoslavs refused to support the Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia and criticized the formation of a Nasakom government - a government made up of representatives of the nationalist movement (PNI), the religious political party and the Communist Party. "Moreover Tito's connections with the West made difficult the PKI's task of persuading Indonesia's leaders that to achieve true national independence it was necessary for them to break political, economic and cultural ties with the West - the source of support for the PKI's enemies - and to replace them with ties with the communist bloc. Moreover the Yugoslavs at an early stage entered into close relationship with the Indonesian Army, which was to be the PKI's principal enemy in the Guided Democracy period" 89).

PKI documents and publications during this period usually equated modern revisionism with Yugoslavia. As yet no open attacks were made on the CPSU, although occasionally the criticisms of modern revisionism were aimed indirectly at the Soviet Union also. An example of this is the speech which Aidit delivered on September 25, 1963, to the Party School of the Kwantung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.

In this speech he dwelt on China's successes in the economic field. In contrast to the CPSU, the PKI had never criticized the Chinese communes or the Great Leap Forward. Aidit spoke warmly of the communes and of Chinese economic developments, just as he had done at the time of his 1959 visit.

After pointing to the enormous advances made during 1958-60 - the years of the Great Leap Forward -, he went on "... the imperialists, the reactionaries, the revisionists will certainly

89) Ruth T. McVey, Indonesian Communists and China, p. 37

not be happy about this. Just one year ago they predicted that China would not recover from its economic difficulties. They miscalculated. They also ridiculed the policy of self-reliance advanced by China. Now this policy pursued by China has proved that your country is independent both politically and economically" 90).

90) D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution is an Inseparable Part of the World Revolution, p. 107.

7. Radicalization and decline

In the second half of 1963 the PKI was to assume a more radical position in the field of foreign policy and relations between the various CPs. This action followed the radicalization of foreign policy by the Indonesian government, whose foreign policy was becoming increasingly influenced by the distinction made by Sukarno at the summit conference of non-aligned countries (Belgrade, 1961) between the "new emerging forces", the communist and nationalist countries, and the "old established forces", the imperialist countries.

After 1963 President Sukarno viewed this conflict as much more uncompromising than he had considered hitherto. This resulted not only in a more radical foreign policy but also in a worsening of relations with Russia and a rapprochement with the People's Republic. Among the points of contention between Russia and Indonesia were the Russian criticism of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement on West Irian, the Russian condemnation of Indonesia's decision to leave the UN and the Indonesian refusal to support Russian efforts to gain admission to the second conference of Afro-Asian countries, due to be organized in 1966. Relations deteriorated to such an extent that V. A. Zharov, in his assessment of Indonesian-Soviet relations, characterized the post-1963 period as an era marked by the emergence of extreme nationalism and adventurism 91).

The PKI, too, gave great prominence to the contradictions between the emerging forces and the old established forces and, on the basis of these contradictions dominating the world, rejected the notion of a third way in international relations. According to Aidit, there are four important contradictions: a) between socialism and imperialism; b) between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; c) between the oppressed peoples and imperialism and d) a contradiction between the imperialist states.

The most important contradictions are those between socialism and imperialism on the one hand, and the oppressed peoples and imperialism on the other. In addition, these two factors

91) Moscow, Djakarta and the PKI, Mizan, Vol. XI, No. 2, March/April 1969, p. 106.

influence the other contradictions. It was this theory which underlay the PKI's public criticism of the Soviet policy of co-existence at the end of 1963.

"..... we cannot close our eyes to the fact that there are also socialist countries whose state leaders are striving to eradicate or at the very least to gloss over the contradictions between socialism and imperialism by speaking fine words about US imperialism, by praising the leaders of the foremost imperialist state, or in other ways. They say, for example, that world problems can be solved if there is co-operation between the two great powers, between certain socialist countries and the USA; they say that Eisenhower is peace-loving and, what is even worse, after Kennedy's death they proclaimed him a peace hero, mourned deeply over his death and shed bitter tears....." 92).

In 1964 Aidit declared that the root of the peaceful coexistence problem lay in the divergent concepts of what constitutes the basic contradiction 93). In 1963 he had already pointed out that the principal contradiction was that which existed between the oppressed peoples and imperialism and that the revolutionary situation in the Third World was increasingly coming to fruition. He now made the specific accusation that Russia had given excessive prominence to the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. As for the view that the most important contradiction lay within the capitalist states of Europe, he regarded this as evidence of Eurocentric thinking.

Citing Lenin as his authority, Aidit maintained that the assault on imperialism must be directed against its weakest links, i. e. in the Third World. In 1964 he attacked the view that the most important contradiction was the contradiction between imperialism and socialism and that the socialist system could carry the day by means of peaceful, competitive co-existence. According to Aidit, one must not argue from this fiction, but must recognize that the most important contradiction is that which exists between the oppressed peoples and imperialism.

Attacks were made not only on Russian views of peaceful co-existence, but also on other aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

92) D. N. Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit, Ever Forward, No Retreat.

93) *ibid.* p. 78-98 and D. N. Aidit, Politik luar negeri dan revolusi Indonesia, 1965, p. 7-12.

Previously the PKI had recognized only the Chinese claims in the border dispute with India. It now cited the implacable contradiction between the exploited peoples and imperialism and condemned Russian military and economic aid to India.

This aid "does not in any way lessen India's alliances with the imperialists". Aidit also referred expressly to the Algerian armed struggle - an example which was being followed by Angola and Portuguese Guinea. "This path differs from that taken by many other African countries, which are only independent in name, but which are in essence still under the domination of the imperialists" 94).

Aidit was also critical of the tripartite agreement on the partial banning of nuclear weapons, concluded on August 5, 1963.

Originally the PKI, true to its principles of impartiality, had been at pains to show both sides of the coin in the dispute between Russia and China over the conclusion of the test ban treaty. The new PKI attitude makes it clear that, while the Party accepts that Russia's intentions are peaceful, it views imperialist intentions in quite a different light. According to Aidit, this treaty had had the effect of paralysing the world peace movement, quite apart from the fact that it had done nothing to prohibit underground tests 95).

a. The peaceful road to socialism

Despite the fact that the end of 1963/beginning of 1964 also marked a radicalization of PKI domestic policies, the PKI has never openly assumed an oppositional posture. In its analysis of the domestic situation and the role the Party must play, the PKI was much closer to the Moscow-line view of a peaceful road to socialism than to the Chinese model with its emphasis on revolution.

The idea that it is possible to follow a peaceful road to socialism - an idea already mooted by Khrushchev in 1956 - was further developed in the framework of the 1960 conference of 81 communist and workers' parties. The starting-point of the

94) D. N. Aidit, 1964, Set Afire, p. 72-73.

95) *ibid.* p. 98-103.

argument was Lenin's theory that the revolution in the Third World would pass through two phases. The first (nationalist phase) is directed by the national bourgeoisie, while in the second phase of the revolution the leadership will be assumed by the communists. The communists, it was stated quite categorically, could now assume the leadership by peaceful means.

Fundamental to this argument is the claim that the peasants have been disillusioned by their collaboration with the national bourgeoisie after the achievement of independence and that they are now seeking co-operation with the workers. The workers and peasants must take over the leadership of the revolution from the national bourgeoisie and form the nucleus of a national front consisting of workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie and progressive intellectuals. In a national democracy this national front will form the government. Such a national democracy will serve as the point of departure for a non-capitalist development, leading ultimately to socialism.

The transition to this non-capitalist development, a phase which in 1960 had still not been reached by a single Third World country, is made possible, among other things, by the provision of foreign aid in enlarging the state sector of the national democracy. By 1962 Indonesia was counted among those countries where a transition to the non-capitalist way was regarded as possible.

The Communist Party of China, on the other hand, argues from the premise of a new-type democracy. It is suspicious of the national bourgeoisie and draws no sharp line between the two phases of the revolution - the bourgeois revolution phase and the socialist revolution phase. Even as the bourgeois revolution is in progress, the Communist Party must seek to secure control over the leadership of the United Front and consequently of the revolution.

The addition of the term "new-type" is designed to demonstrate that the bourgeois revolution (new-type) is not bound, as in Europe, to discharge itself in a capitalist system, but that the revolution is directed against feudalism, capitalism and imperialism. In addition, the emphasis is laid more on the role of the peasants and on armed struggle.

The PKI pursued a middle course. In its foreign utterances it tended towards the Chinese view. Aidit's feelings on the provision of Russian aid to India and his references to Algeria

are pointers in this respect. There is also an implied rejection of the peaceful path to socialism. In its analysis of the Indonesian domestic situation, however, the PKI was closer to the Russian position. In a speech on May 2, 1965, Aidit supported Russian views on the national democracy. Ruth McVey draws attention to an article dating from 1962, in which Aidit submitted that Indonesia was a national democracy ⁹⁶).

This is best illustrated by the 1963 theory on the two aspects of state power ⁹⁷). According to this theory, the state reflects the economic situation in its dual aspect. In the first place, there is the pro-people aspect which represents the interests of the people (popular aspect); secondly, there is the anti-people aspect representing the interests of the enemies of the people (anti-popular aspect).

The popular aspect was regarded by the PKI as the most important (main) aspect of state power, largely determining the policy of the Indonesian government. On the other hand, the Indonesian revolution still had not been completed and the communists' role in the government was utterly subordinate. Only 3 out of the 77 (and later 102) ministers in the Dukora cabinet were members of the PKI. The anti-popular aspect was still the dominant aspect of state power and this explained why, from time to time, the government took reactionary measures. By peaceful means the PKI was striving from above and from below (i. e. by employing parliamentary methods and by mobilizing the peasants and workers) to secure pride of place for the popular aspect.

This complicated theory reflects a likewise complicated balance of power during the Guided Democracy period and exemplifies the precarious situation in which the PKI found itself. The PKI dared not appear overcritical of government policy, for fear of losing the support and good offices of President Sukarno. Were such a thing to happen, it would lead to the immediate liquidation of the PKI by the Army and the

96) Ruth T. McVey, 1968, p. 373. The article she quotes is D. N. Aidit: Programme KPSS i bor'ba narodov za pl'noe national'noe esvobozhdenie, Kommunist, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1962), p. 92-95.

97) Cf. D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1964, p. 40-44 and p. 80-88.

the Islamic groups.

The PKI, through its writings and publications, zealously furthered the cause of "100% implementation of the President Sukarno concept". In 1960, moreover, it had already been urging its supporters to "place the interests of class and of the Party below the national interests" ⁹⁸) and in 1963 it closely aligned its own programme with the government Manipol* programme. Naturally differences did exist between the PKI programme and the government programme, e.g. over the question of which class must exercise the leadership of the government. The PKI, however, saw this as no reason for withdrawing its support from the government, but rather for strengthening the popular aspect of the power of the state. At the same time, the PKI was made clearly and painfully aware of the growing enmity of the Army, e.g. by the temporary bans imposed on communist dailies and monthlies and by a series of mutual intimidation attempts.

b. The PKI and the Army

Despite this enmity the PKI still regarded the Army as part of the popular aspect of state power. On June 29, 1963, in a lecture to students at the Seskoad (army cadre school) Aidit described the Army as anti-fascist, democratic, anti-imperialist and inspired by the ideals of socialism ⁹⁹). He identified the Army with that aspect of the state which represented the interests of the people.

Stressing the unity between people and Army, Aidit went on to declare that the Indonesian army is an "army of armed peasants". Theoretically, this is explained by two factors. In the first place, the Indonesian army is a reflection of the general character of the Indonesian people, of which the majority are peasants. Secondly, the PKI held the view, shared also by the Army, that the latter had sprung from the people during the Revolution. Since then an unbreakable bond had existed

98) D. N. Aidit: Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan Feodalisme, Harian Rakjat, Jan. 2, 1961.

99) D. N. Aidit, Pertahanan Nasional Harus Tunduk pada strategi umum Revolusi Indonesia, Harian Rakjat, June 29, 1963.

between the Army and people as a result of the mutual assistance rendered by peasants and Army during the guerrilla war.

By its attacks on the bureaucratic capitalists (kabir), however, the PKI did bring indirect criticism to bear against the Army. The bureaucratic capitalists were a new group which together with the old enemies of the people - landlords, "compradore" bourgeoisie and imperialists - were seen as part of the anti-popular aspect of state power. The brunt of the PKI's attacks on the bureaucratic capitalists was directed at the Army, which, following the take-over of the Dutch concerns, had succeeded in acquiring control of the latter.

The emergence of the bourgeois capitalists did not mean, however, that the PKI now regarded the peaceful road as impossible. Like the Chinese, and in contrast to the Russian communists, Aidit looked on the bourgeois capitalists as enemies. But there was no need as yet for a struggle against these elements (and thus against the government), since they had failed so far to rise to a position of dominance. - "But, at the present, bureaucratic capital has not developed in Indonesia to the extent it did in old China, where it was highly concentrated and mainly centred in Four Big Families" 100).

c. The collapse of Guided Democracy

The final year of the Guided Democracy era was marked by a growing polarization and by increasing tensions within the national united front between communists and national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie was alarmed by Sukarno's increasingly radical foreign policy as well as by a number of domestic developments. In Djakarta the pro-Western army leadership had come out against confrontation with Malaysia and was attempting to hamper operations against that country.

More significant, however, for the internal rift within the national united front were the so-called unilateral actions. These actions were undertaken by the small farmers and landless peasants who took matters into their own hands, in order to speed up implementation of the 1960 land reform laws. The ensuing occupation of land belonging to the big landowners resulted in bloody conflicts in the countryside. The actions were supported

100) D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1964, p. 73.

by the PKI. In addition to the conventional armed forces and police, the PKI also pressed for the setting up of a fifth force, viz an army of armed peasants and workers which would intensify the confrontation with Malaysia. The conventional armed forces opposed this plan most vigorously.

In the ensuing tension between the PKI and the armed forces the PKI could count on the support of the left wing of the PNI, the leadership of the air force and, increasingly, of President Sukarno himself. The armed forces, for their part, looked mainly to the Islamic parties for support.

At the end of September 1965 tensions reached breaking-point. Alarmed by reports that President Sukarno was seriously ill and prompted by rumours of an impending take-over by a so-called Council of Generals, on October 5 (Army Day), a number of young officers attempted to carry out a coup d'état on the night of September 30/October 1. Following the assassination of the most important members of the Council of Generals, Major-General Suharto, commander-in-chief of the Kostrad (strategic reserves), assumed control of anti-rebel operations and thwarted the coup.

There are a number of theories about the part played by the PKI in the attempted coup 101). They range from the view that the coup was purely an internal army affair to the claim that the entire operation was prepared by the PKI.

On the grounds that the PKI had committed high treason, all the Party's activities were immediately banned. Tens of thousands of PKI members and members of mass organizations associated with the PKI were arrested or (and this was particularly the case in the countryside) killed. On March 12, 1966, the PKI was declared a prohibited party. The same day Suharto was appointed acting president of Indonesia. On March 27, 1968, he formally succeeded Sukarno who had become unacceptable to the new men in power on account of allegations that he had been closely implicated in the coup d'état.

101) For the various interpretations of the coup cf., for example, Basuki Gunawan Kudeta, coup d'état in Djakarta; John Hughes, The end of Sukarno, the coup that misfired: a purge that ran wild; Mering, B., The downfall of Sukarno Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, July/Sept. 1969, p. 1-9; Bas, Jerome R., the PKI and the attempted coup Journal of South East Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1970, p. 96-105 and Weatherbee, Donald E., Interpretations of Gestapu, the 1965 Indonesian coup World Affairs Vol. 132, No. 4 March 1970, p. 308-16.

8. The PKI after 1965

After September 30, 1965, those members of the PKI and the left wing of the PNI who had not been arrested or killed were compelled to go into hiding. A number of them took up the underground struggle against the government. Both inside and outside Indonesia there emerged a pro-Chinese and a pro-Russian group within the PKI.

Peking is the headquarters of the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia. The head of this delegation is Jusuf Adjitorop*, who before the coup was a member of the Politburo and who at the time of the coup was in Peking. The official organ of the Delegation of the Central Committee of the PKI is the Indonesian Tribune, printed in Albania. Contacts with the CC delegation are maintained through the Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity. The Peking-based publications Suara Rakjat Indonesia (People's Voice of Indonesia) devotes a great deal of attention to statements by the Delegation of the Central Committee of the PKI.

Also operating abroad is the Underground Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia. This pro-Russian group has good relations not only with the East European CPs, but also with the Communist Party of India. The mouthpiece of the Underground Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia is Tekad Rakjat (People's Determination), published in Moscow. The Group also uses the publication channels of the Communist Party of India.

The guerrillas active inside Indonesia operate above all in Java and also in Borneo along the frontier with Sarawak. The Indonesian government has conducted repeated military actions against both groups. One result of this was the arrest of Sudisman in December 1966. Before the coup Sudisman had been head of the PKI Secretariat and a member of the executive committee of the Politburo. After the disappearance from the scene of other important leaders he had taken over control of the party and set about building up an illegal PKI. He himself claimed that he had assumed the party leadership following the arrest of Lukman in May 1966 102).

102) Berkas berita atjara persidangan perkara Sudisman dalam peristiwa Gerakan, September 30, II, p. 95. Aidit and Lukman had already been killed in 1965.

a. The attitude of the pro-Chinese group in the PKI

On August 17 the PKI Politburo published Sudisman's Tegakkan PKI jang Marxis-Leninis Untuk Mamimpin Revolusi Demokrasi Rakjat Indonesia (On the Establishment of a Marxist-Leninist PKI to lead the Indonesian People's Democratic Revolution) 103). In this self-criticism an analysis was made of the PKI's past mistakes, which had led to the decline of the Party after the 1965 coup. The study also mapped out the future strategy to be adopted by the illegal PKI.

Sudisman began by stating that the independence struggle, which was a "new-type bourgeois-democratic revolution" and which ultimately should have led to a socialist revolution, had not achieved its objectives. The reason was that, as a consequence of its "theoretical weakness and inadequate knowledge of Indonesian society", the PKI had failed to assume the leadership of the revolution. According to Sudisman, the PKI's subsequent abdication of state power after the resignation of the second Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet presaged the end of the revolution. In his view A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia was formulated too late to be able to undo the PKI's past mistakes.

Central to his criticism of Aidit's leadership is his state power theory. According to Sudisman there is one absolute prerequisite for the success of a revolution, viz that the oppressed class seizes control of state power by violent means and eliminates the old machinery of state. Specially singled out for attack is Aidit's 1963 theory on the two aspects of state power.

Sudisman acknowledges that the Indonesian government of the day had implemented a number of progressive measures and that a contradiction existed between the "compradore" bourgeoisie and the pro-imperialist landowners on the one hand (anti-popular aspect) and the national bourgeoisie on the other (popular aspect). But this in no way invalidates the Marxist-Leninist theory that the state is the instrument of the ruling class and that, as Lenin put it, the abolition of the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution. According to Sudisman, there was a contra-

103) This self-criticism appeared in, among other publications, Indonesian Tribune, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1966. The author has made use of the Dutch translation which appeared in Sunschrift No. 19.

diction not only between the popular and the anti-popular aspect (which had opened the way in fact, for proletarian participation in the government), but a contradiction also existed within the framework of the popular aspect between the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Dominating the popular aspect was the national bourgeoisie. In other words, the democratic aspect of state power was "in reality at the service of the national bourgeoisie". In its practical application the theory of the two aspects of state power had, according to Sudisman, "deprived the proletariat of its independence within the united front with the national bourgeoisie and had made the proletariat an extension of the national bourgeoisie".

Although the above-mentioned theory forms the principal object of Sudisman's attack, this does mean that he regards the PKI's deviation from the correct course as dating back no further than 1963. He also expresses criticism of the way in which the PKI subordinated class interests to the struggle against imperialism at the time of the confrontation with West Irian (1961).

As for the future of the PKI, Sudisman points out that Indonesian society is still semi-colonial and semi-feudal in character and that, under the present government, oppression is growing. This means that, just as in 1945, conditions still exist for the outbreak of a "new-type bourgeois-democratic revolution". The difference compared to 1945, however, is that now the imperialists exert only an indirect influence. Therefore the struggle cannot be waged directly against the imperialists: first the tools of imperialism, the feudal landlords, "compradore" bourgeoisie and new class of bureaucratic capitalists must be brought to their knees.

In order to achieve this and bring the armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat to a successful conclusion, Sudisman formulated the "three banners of the Party". The requirements which the Party had to meet were set out as follows:

- (1) continuation of the modern reconstruction of the PKI in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, so as to create a party which is free of all forms of opportunism, which consistently combats modern revisionism and sub-

- jectivism and which organizes and mobilizes the masses- especially the workers and peasants;
- (ii) preparation for a protracted armed struggle, linked directly to the peasants' agrarian revolution;
 - (iii) formation of a united front comprising all forces opposed to the military dictatorship of the rightwing generals, Suharto and Nasution* - a united front founded on an alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat.

Later the members of the pro-Chinese group were to delve back even further in their search for past mistakes committed by the PKI. Jusuf Adjitorop sees the 4th Plenary Session of the 5th Central Committee as the moment when modern revisionism began to infiltrate the Party. According to him, this session witnessed the underwriting of the 20th CPSU Party Congress line and launched the PKI on the parliamentary road to socialism 104).

The party programme of the Politburo published in November 1967 records that "Khrushchevite modern revisionism" was accepted by the PKI at the 6th Party Congress in 1959 105). The compilers of the programme claim, however, that even before this (i. e. before the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU) there had been talk of opportunist and revisionist mistakes. While the Politburo accuses the PKI of having pursued a revisionist course ever since 1951, only the 1954 5th Party Congress is referred to specifically. Admittedly this congress did dwell on the need to mobilize the masses, since the parliamentary way in itself fell short of achieving socialism. The Politburo is quick to point out, however, that nowhere was any mention made of an armed struggle.

The Politburo also attacks the PKI distinction between a general programme aimed at the establishment of a people's democracy and a Programme of Immediate Demands setting out a number of reforms which the bourgeois government ought to

104) Jusuf Adjitorop, Victory will Surely Belong to the Indonesian People, p. 3.

105) Programme of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) For People's Democracy in Indonesia, Indonesian Tribune, Vol. II, No. 9, 1968, p. 5-15.

introduce. The manner in which the PKI sought to realize these reforms, i. e. by linking the immediate demands with the government programme, "engendered the illusion among the people that bourgeois rule in the era of the general crisis of capitalism was still capable of improving the living conditions of the people". According to the Politburo, this only served to put a brake on the development of class awareness. This criticism is not meant to imply that one should not strive for reforms. It must always be remembered, however, that reforms alone will not free the masses from oppression and exploitation.

In view of the PKI's past mistakes, the Politburo regards it as essential that a new programme should be formulated. Requirements in the political, economic and cultural fields include the destruction of the "state machine of the Suharto-Nasution fascist dictatorship" and the liquidation of economic domination by foreign monopoly capital, bureaucratic capitalists, feudal landlords and the "compradore" bourgeoisie. Present-day Indonesia is described as "a new-type colony of United States imperialism" and Indonesian society is characterized as semi-feudal.

Armed struggle is called for, if this programme is to be implemented. The struggle must be led by the proletariat and will be launched in the first instance in the countryside. In naming the PKI's most important weapons, the programme cites only two of the three banners of the Party: armed struggle and the formation of a revolutionary united front. This front must comprise the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the other democratic elements. As long as the national bourgeoisie does not betray the revolution, co-operation within the united front must be extended to this group also.

One outcome of the PKI's self-criticism and of the new party programme was the setting up of revolutionary bases in the countryside. For a long time the PKI's most important base was the area south of Blitar in the eastern part of Gunung Kidul (Southern Mountains), situated in the east of Java. From here many guerilla actions were launched into surrounding districts. In the second half of 1968, following a government military operation involving at least four battalions, this base was wiped out. Among those arrested during the operation was Hutapea who had assumed the leadership of the PKI after the

arrest of Sudisman 106).

b. The attitude of the pro-Russian group in the PKI

The pro-Russian group, too, published a self-criticism and a programme. In April 1968 there appeared a special number of Tekad Rakjat entitled Kepada saudara setanahair dan kawan-kawan diluarnegeri jang ikut berdjjuang melawan imperialisme, untuk kemerdekaan, perdamaian, demokrasi dan sosialisme - Untuk djalan jang benar bagi revolusi Indonesia (To our friends at home and abroad, co-fighters in the struggle against imperialism, for freedom, peace, democracy and socialism - For the correct management of the Indonesian revolution) 107).

Unlike Sudisman's self-criticism, the Tekad Rakjat document is not an out and out rejection of the parliamentary road to socialism and co-operation with the government. There is the feeling, however, that, particularly after 1960, co-operation with the government was carried too far. According to the compilers of this self-criticism, the former PKI leaders had realized that it would be a long time before there could be a revolution in Indonesia. They had also realized the possibility of achieving a people's democracy by changing the balance of power between the die-hards and the proletariat.

Such a line could only be pursued, the document went on, after a hard struggle inside the PKI against "rightist and leftist opportunism". The rightist opportunists wanted to preserve the form of organization which had existed up to the publication of

106) The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Since September 1965, p. 570.

107) Kepada saudara-saudara setanahair dan kawan-kawan diluarnegeri jang ikut berdjjuang melawan imperialisme, untuk kemerdekaan, perdamaian, demokrasi dan sosialisme. Untuk djalan jang benar bagi revolusi Indonesia. Tekad Rakjat nomor istimewa, April 1968. Possibly this is the same self-criticism as that mentioned by Rex Mortimer (1968), which appeared in the organ of the Communist Party of India Party Life (July, August and September 1967). Kepada saudara2 displays striking points of similarity with the self-criticism from which Mortimer quotes.

A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia. They wished to limit themselves to parliamentary and legal methods and envisaged a situation where there would be other leftwing parties existing alongside the PKI. The leftist opportunists, on the other hand, were pressing for armed struggle.

As in Sudisman's document, there was also criticism of the way in which class interests were subordinated to the national interest; in addition, the party programme and the government programme were too closely linked. The Tekad Rakjat document distinguishes between the 1951-60 period and the period after 1960. The mistakes made during the second period were largely the result of organizational shortcomings in the pre-1960 period.

Prior to 1960 excessive emphasis had been placed on increasing the membership figures (during the period 1952-60 membership rose from 7, 910 to 1, 500, 000) and this had resulted in a consequent deterioration in the quality. According to the self-criticism, however, the leaders had ignored the fundamental fact that a Communist Party must be made up of the best members of the working class. As result of this policy, there had been an influx of new members from the petty bourgeoisie, so that it became impossible to distinguish the PKI from other mass organizations. The petty bourgeoisie acquired control of the mass organizations as well as of many sections and those cadre members who had secured positions in the representative bodies and government agencies were swamped in the ensuing bourgeois tide.

These cadre members, in their desire to remain acceptable to the national bourgeoisie, attempted to tone down the Party's revolutionary activities. At the same time, the Party's independence was also being eroded by the fact that party funds were derived not from members' contributions, but from voluntary donations made by a few rich members and sympathizers. All this was reflected, after 1960, in "collaboration with the national bourgeoisie" and a discrepancy between the leftwing slogans of the PKI and its actual conduct in the domestic political arena.

In this self-criticism the pro-Russian group also gives prominence to the role played by the PKI during the Sino-Soviet dispute. Initially, Tekad Rakjat claims, the PKI had taken a correct line and refrained from making a priori judgements or

placing the blame on either party in the dispute. Subsequently, however, the PKI attitude changed and the bond of friendship between the PKI and the CPSU quickly weakened.

The upshot of this, according to Tekad Rakjat, was that economically, politically and ideologically the PKI became increasingly dependent on the People's Republic of China. Equally significant is the fact that in 1965 Indonesia became the proving-ground for China's adventurist policies. These developments have their origin, it is alleged, in the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Congress of the PKI (1962). This congress ruled that the most important contradiction was that between the oppressed peoples and imperialism, and not the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. This is a view which deviates from the 1960 conference declaration. At the same time, it is pointed out, evidence of a PKI rejection of peaceful coexistence was now becoming increasingly clear.

The programme of the pro-Russian group, Tugas 2 mendesak bai gerakan Komunis Indonesia (Urgent Tasks for the Communist Movement in Indonesia), is especially critical of armed struggle, as advocated by the pro-Chinese group 108).

According to Urgent Tasks, the revolutionary forces in Indonesia are too weak to embark on such a struggle. Priority must be given to the rebuilding of a PKI firmly founded on a Marxist-Leninist basis. Naturally work must begin on the building of armed units, but they may be deployed in large-scale action, only where a genuinely revolutionary situation has been created.

Before this stage is reached, the armed units must be deployed in swift retaliatory actions against present-day Indonesian government measures, for the purpose of executing provocateurs and tyrants, for assaults on prisons and for confiscating enemy funds. In the view of Urgent Tasks, massive armed actions only play into the enemy's hands. The Indonesian Maoists with their armed struggle propaganda are still following

108) Tugas 2 mendesak bagi gerakan komunis Indonesia Tekad Rakjat nomor istimewa, April 1969. Has also appeared in the form of a Communist Party of India pamphlet (May 1969). According to this English translation, the original text was written in Dutch; according to the Tekad Rakjat version, the programme was drawn up in February 1969 in Djakarta.

"the old road of leftist adventurism". According to the pro-Russian group, they seek to promote the interests not of the working class, but of the People's Republic of China.

In the view of the "Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia" the PKI's most important task is to change the political balance of power in Indonesia. To this end the masses' confidence in the PKI must be restored and the people must be made aware that the present-day Indonesian government is not concerned with furthering their interests.

The people must be made to realize that the mistakes of the past are not the mistakes of the PKI or of any one man, but of a group of leaders who "fenced themselves off from the Party and deliberately or unwittingly represented alien interests to the Party.....". In order to restore confidence in the PKI, it is also essential that the Party should concern itself with the day-to-day needs of the peasants and workers. This, according to Urgent Tasks, is an aspect which Sudisman's self-criticism totally ignores.

The group also considers it essential that unity be restored in the international communist world and, in particular, that a national united front be formed of all genuinely patriotic and anti-imperialist forces. Within this front - which must be a new association, not a concentration of existing political parties and organizations - the Communist Party must retain its ideological and organizational independence.

c. Relations between the two groups

A comparison of the two self-criticisms reveals clear differences of emphasis. Sudisman's self-criticism stresses the revisionist line pursued by the PKI between 1951 and 1965. The pro-Russian group's self-criticism stresses PKI mistakes in the field of foreign policy, while approving in principle the Party's domestic policy. The only criticism levelled against the PKI on the domestic front is that it went to excessive lengths to reach an accommodation with the government, this being the outcome of the PKI line in the years immediately preceding the coup. - As has been seen, those years were marked by an increasingly radical international policy on the one hand and a fairly moderate domestic policy on the other.

It is clear from the self-criticisms that relations between the

two groups are not good. In March 1971 Major-General Yoga, a high-ranking officer in the military section for the restoration of order and security (a section responsible for combating anti-government activities), spoke of the anticipated upsurge of communist activity, timed to coincide with the forthcoming elections. He then went on to claim that the Indonesian communists had succeeded in synthesizing the views of the two respective groups ¹⁰⁹). If PKI publications abroad are anything to go by, however, this certainly would not appear to be the case.

109) Abadi, March 4, 1971.

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ADJITOROP Jusuf

Has lived in exile in Peking since 1965; member of the PKI Politburo and head of the CC delegation of the PKI in Peking.

AIDIT Dipa Nusantara

Important communist leader, born July 30, 1923, in Medan; prior to World War II executive member of the Gerindo (q.v.); joined the illegal PKI in 1943; participated in the declaration of independence of August 17, 1945; arrested by British troops late 1945 and handed over to the Dutch; spent the next seven years in exile on the island of Onrust; mid-1946 active in the Central Committee of the PKI; 1947 elected a member of the CC as chairman of the PKI group in the KNIP (q.v.); mid-1948 to mid-1949 secretary of the executive council of the FDR (q.v.); beginning of 1948 candidate member of the Politburo; August 1948 member of the Politburo; fled to China after the Madiun revolt; returned in 1950 and was elected First Secretary of the PKI on January 7, 1951; became general secretary in October 1953 and chairman of the CC of the PKI in 1959; subsequently a member of the High Advisory Council, of Parliament and of the National Defence Council; at the same time held office as vice-chairman of the National Front; appointed ministerial vice-chairman of the Congress November 13, 1963; shot dead November 22, 1965, while evading arrest.

ALIMIN

One of the leaders of the PKI; actively engaged in the preparation of the PKI revolt in the Twenties; in 1925 went to Singapore to enlist the support of Tan Malaka (q.v.); subsequently accompanied Musso (q.v.) to Moscow to secure Comintern approval; remained in exile until 1946 in Russia and China; afterwards became a member, and subsequently head, of the PKI Agitprop section; after the death of Musso until the return of Aidit (q.v.) leader of the PKI; January 7, 1951, elected a member of the Politburo; March 1954 lost his position in the CC repeatedly criticized Aidit's leadership (e.g. in 1956), whom he accused of pursuing a too moderate line.

ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO

Born 1903 in Magelang; former chairman of the PNI (q.v.) and leader of the left wing of the PKI.

AMIR SJARIFUDDIN

One of the leaders of the Gerindo (q.v.) before the war; self-proclaimed member of the illegal PKI since 1935; after the war vice-chairman of the Working Committee of the KNIP (q.v.) Minister of Defence and Prime Minister (July 3, 1947, to January 29, 1948); leader of the Socialist Party (q.v.) and one of the leaders of the FDR (q.v.); executed on December 19, 1948, following the Madiun revolt.

ASRAMA INDONESIA MERKADA (School for Free Indonesia)

Founded by the Japanese rear-admiral, Maeda; provided instruction in a wide variety of political and economic fields for young Indonesians; lecturers included Hatta (q.v.) and Sjahrir (q.v.); the school's director was Wikana (member of the illegal PKI).

BENTENG REPUBLIK (Republican Fortress)

Federation of thirty political parties, including the PNI (q.v.) and the Masjumi (q.v.), opposed to the Linggardjati Agreement.

COMINTERN

Abbreviation for Communist International; founded March 1919, dissolved May 15, 1943; the first Comintern Congress was held in March 1919; the second July-August 1920; the third June-July 1921; the fourth November-December 1922; the fifth June-July 1924; the sixth July-August 1928; the seventh July-August 1935.

FRONT DEMOKRASI RAKJAT - FDR (Front for a People's Democracy)

Federation of leftwing parties, set up in 1948; the Front was made up of the PKI, the Partai Sosialis (q.v.), the Partai Buruh Indonesia (q.v.) and the Pesindo (q.v.); it was supported by the SOBSI (PKI-affiliated trade union) and the BTI (PKI-affiliated peasant organization); disbanded following the merger of the Socialist Party (q.v.) and the Indonesian Labour Party with the PKI.

GABUNGAN POLITIK INDONESIA (GAPI)

Federation of (nationalist) political parties; founded May 1939; the GAPI included the Gerindo (q.v.) and the PSII; disbanded in the Japanese period.

GERAKAN RAKJAT INDONESIA - Gerindo (Indonesian People's Movement) Revolutionary nationalist party founded in April 1937; the Gerindo included members of the disbanded Parkindo (one of the parties set up after the dissolution of the PNI); in 1939 the Gerindo entered the GAPI (q.v.).

HATTA

Nationalist leader; for many years Vice-President of Indonesia.

IDJON SYSTEM

System whereby merchant purchases (as yet unharvested) rice at a very low price.

KOMITE NASIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT - KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee)

Indonesia's provisional parliament until August 1950; originally possessed advisory powers only; founded August 29, 1945; on October 16, 1945, was vested with legislative powers also.

KONSENTRASI NASIONAL

Coalition of political parties set up as a counterpart to the Persatuan Perjuangan (q.v.), formed in May 1946; following the Masjumi (q.v.) breakaway, reconstituted as the Sajap Kiri (q.v.).

LUKMAN M. H.

Important communist leader; born February 26, 1920, in Tegal; at the beginning of 1948 elected a member of the CC and in August 1948 of the Politburo; like Aidit (q.v.), fled to China after the Madiun revolt; returned in 1950 and reentered the Politburo; in 1953 was elected first vice-secretary (later first vice-chairman) of the PKI; held office as an MP and from March 6, 1962, as ministerial Deputy Speaker of Parliament; killed at the end of April 1966.

MANIPOL (Manifesto Politik)

In November 1959 President Sukarno's "rediscovery of the Revolution" speech (August 17, 1959) was proclaimed as the Political Manifesto of the Republic. In 1960 its content was

coined into the slogan USDEK: Undang2 Dasar '45 (Basic Law of '45); Socialism Indonesia; Demokrasi dipimpin (guided democracy); Ekonomi dipimpin (guided economy); Kepribadian Indonesia (Indonesian identity).

MASJUMI (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia) Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems; founded November 1943 under the auspices of the Japanese; co-ordinating organ of the Islamic organizations; following the PSII and NU breakaway in 1952, the Masjumi became a Western-oriented and modernist party; disbanded in 1960 after strong pressure from the Indonesian government.

MOHAMMED JUSUF
Reestablished the PKI in November 1945.

MURBA
Political party founded by Tan Malaka (q.v.) on November 7, 1948; January 6, 1965, Murba activities prohibited; September 20, 1965, the party was banned; rehabilitated at the end of 1966.

MUSSO
Born 1898; PKI leader; actively engaged in the preparation of the revolt in the Twenties; went to Moscow in 1926 to secure Comintern (q.v.) approval for this revolt; arrested in Malaya on his way back, but released shortly afterwards; except for a short period in 1935 when he returned to Java to found the illegal PKI, remained in exile in Russia and China until 1948; returned on August 11, 1948, and was elected Party Secretary; on October 31, was shot dead during the Madiun revolt.

NASUTION
For many years commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces; currently chairman of the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS).

NJOTO
Born 1925 in Djember; editor-in-chief of Harian Rakjat; member of the secretariat of Lekra (communist artists' association) and one of the leaders of the central secretariat of the FDR (q.v.); from mid-1948 member of the PKI Politburo; in 1953 elected second vice-secretary of the CC of the PKI; former member of the KNIP (q.v.) and leader of the minority in Parliament; after

September 2, 1964, Minister attached to the Presidium of the Cabinet; killed at the beginning of December 1965.

PARTAI BURUH (Labour Party)
Breakaway group of the Partai Buruh Indonesia (q.v.); broke away after failure to reach agreement on plans by the Partai Buruh Indonesia to amalgamate with the PKI.

PARTAI BURUH INDONESIA - PBI (Indonesian Labour Party)
Founded November 1945; September 1948 decided to amalgamate with the PKI; officially disbanded February 1951.

PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA - PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
Founded by Sukarno in July 1927; 1930 disbanded; most of the membership subsequently joined the Partindo, with which Sukarno became associated in 1932. The PNI was reestablished in 1945. In the final years of Guided Democracy there arose within the PNI a left wing, led by Ali Sastroamidjojo (q.v.) and Ir Surachman, and a right wing, led by Hardi and Hadisubeno. The left wing was eliminated after September 30, 1965.

PARTAI SOSIALIS (Socialist Party)
Arose in 1945 as the result of a merger between Amir Sjarifuddin's (q.v.) Indonesian Socialist People's Party and Sutan Sjahrir's (q.v.) Socialist People's Party; on February 12, 1948, Sjahrir and his supporters left the Socialist Party and set up the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (q.v.), because they disagreed with the Socialist Party's leftwing course; in February 1951 the Socialist Party amalgamated with the PKI.

PARTAI SOSIALIS INDONESIA (PSI)
Founded in February 1948 as a breakaway group of the Socialist Party (q.v.); the PSI was disbanded in 1960 after government pressure.

PEMUDA SOSIALIS INDONESIA - Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth)
Leftwing youth league

PERHIMPUNAN INDONESIA
Association of Indonesian students in the Netherlands; founded in 1908 as the Indies Association.

PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN (Fighting Front)

Founded by Tan Malaka (q.v.); mid-January 1946; within a month 141 political and military organizations had joined the PP. The Masjumi (q.v.) was not a member and the Socialist Party (q.v.) swiftly withdrew. Following the arrest of important leaders the PP's influence quickly waned; disbanded July 1946.

ROY M. N.

Prominent Indian communist

SAJAP KIRI (Left Wing)

Successor of the Konsentrasi Nasional (q.v.); a federation of leftwing parties: PKI, Partai Sosialis, Pesindo, Partai Buruh Indonesia and Gerakan Republik Indonesia; reconstituted in January 1948 as the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (q.v.).

SARDJONO

Elected PKI Secretary in March 1946; held this office until Musso's (q.v.) return (August 1948); executed December 19, 1948, after the Madiun revolt.

SAREKAT ISLAM (Islamic League)

Indonesia's oldest political party; founded in 1911 under the name of Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association); originally the SI had many communist members, but after a conflict in 1921 the communists withdrew. The SI's successor was the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia - PSII (League of Indonesian Islamites' Party).

SERRATI

Italian communist

SETIADJIT

Before World War II one of the leaders of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (q.v.); after the war member of the Dutch Parliament; after returning to Indonesia became a leader of the Partai Buruh Indonesia (q.v.) and the FDR (q.v.); claimed to have been a long-standing member of the illegal PKI; in November 1946 became vice-chairman of the SOBSI (CP-affiliated trade union); from July 1947 to January 1948 held the post of second Deputy Prime Minister; prior to this he was Deputy Minister of Communications.

SJAHRIR Sutan

Leader of the PSI (q.v.); branded as a "rightist socialist by the PKI.

SNEEVLIET Hendrik (alias Maring)

In 1914 founded the Indies Social Democratic League (predecessor of the PKI); exiled in 1920; 1922 Comintern (q.v.) agent in China; broke with the Comintern in the mid-Twenties.

SUBARDJO (Achmad)

During the Japanese period played an important part in the Asrama Indonesia Merkada (q.v.); political adviser in the Japanese Consulting Office on Political Affairs and adviser on the independence preparatory committee; from August 31, 1945, to November 14, 1945, and from April 1951 to April 3, 1952 Minister of Foreign Affairs; chairman of the PNI united party; arrested June 1946 for anti-government activities; joined the Masjumi (q.v.) around 1950 and became one of its most prominent politicians.

SUDISMAN

Prominent PKI member; born July 27, 1920 in Surabaya; joined the illegal PKI during the Japanese occupation; became secretary-general of the Pesindo (q.v.); 1947 became a member of the executive committee of the Sajap Kiri (q.v.) and subsequently of the FDR (q.v.); 1948 candidate member of the PKI Politburo; August 1948 elected a member of the PKI Politburo; June 1949 arrested by the Dutch; from March 21, 1950, to October 1953 one of the leaders of the PKI Secretariat; August 1956 again a member of the CC Secretariat; 1965 head of the PKI Secretariat and member of the Politburo executive committee; presumed leader of a pro-Chinese group within the PKI towards the end of the Guided Democracy period; Member of Parliament; executed October 29, 1968.

SUKIMAN

Prime Minister from April 27, 1951, to April 3, 1952.

TAN MALAKA

Born 1893 in Sumatra; represented the PKI at the 4th Comintern (q.v.) Congress in 1922; exiled in 1923; from 1923 to 1927 Comintern representative for South East Asia and Australia; opposed PKI plans to organize an uprising; member of the PKI

until 1927; was accused of Trotskyist sympathies and in 1928 broke with the Comintern; after the declaration of independence founded the Persatuan Perjuangan (q.v.); arrested by the Indonesian government in March and July 1946 for anti-government activities; released in 1948; November 7, 1948, founded the Murba (q.v.); executed April 16, 1949, for renewed opposition to the Indonesian government.

TENGGULAK

Middleman who buys up peasant products and sells goods to the peasants, of which they are in need.

WIBISONO

Prominent member of the Masjumi (q.v.).

WILOPO

Member of the Masjumi (q.v.); Prime Minister from April 3, 1952, to August 1, 1953.

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