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IDEOLOGY

'POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY' IS LATEST FASHION IN BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGY

We live in conditions of unabating ideological war waged with particular ferocity by the imperialists against our country and against the socialist world.

Slander against socialism and various distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice have, in recent years, been supplemented by particularly energetic attempts to distort the prospects of mankind's further development. These attempts follow two principal lines.

In the first place, there is the line of distorting the future prospects of capitalism and socialism.

The ideologists of imperialism try to divorce the successes of socialist countries from their progressive economic, social and political system and to ascribe the successes to an alleged steady "drawing closer" and growing "similarity" of socialism to capitalism.

Whichever of the numerous bourgeois theories we take - the theory of "economic growth stages", of "integral industrial society", of "convergence", of "de-ideologisation" or of "evolutional liberalism" - in each of them capitalism is always presented as the model to be followed.

Futile hope

This is a quite obvious attempt to prove the "attractiveness" of capitalism, to defend it and, at the same time, to provide a "scientific" foundation for the futile hope of restoring capitalism in socialist countries.

The second line seeks to depict the social system which it is alleged will follow the present one in a form which suits the anti-communists - an "industrial" society, as the bourgeois ideologists describe it.

A picture of a social system which, it is claimed, will establish itself after capitalism and socialism "converge" or draw closer to each other, is given in the theory of "post-industrial society" - the latest fashion in bourgeois sociology.

Bourgeois sociologists use glowing colours to depict a "synthesis of the best sides of the two systems", their "hybridisation" and the like.

All this is designed to persuade innocents that there really could be a merger of public ownership of the means of production with the capitalist system, or a fusion of a people's state with the political power of the monopolies.

Basically, "post-industrial society" is capitalism projected into the future.

This kind of talk is not new. It is completely in accord with the well-known bourgeois reformist conception of the evolution of capitalism, which excludes revolutionary, qualitative changes and the creation of a fundamentally new economic, social and political order.

Bourgeois ideologists are greatly concerned to divert people from the class struggle. And the theoreticians of "post-industrial society" pursue this reactionary aim, too.

Sociologists of the U. S. Academy of Sciences regard the basic criteria of this "new" society to be: "the development of worldly, pragmatic, utilitarian culture" and "the accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge", etc.

They also write about "the development of cybernetics", the development of an economy of services", the development of a state sector, as compared with the role of the market" and "the decline of interest in advancement among the middle classes" as the characteristic features of "post-industrial society".

As we see, the features of the "new society" are, on the one hand, the result of a purely quantitative development of various processes which in one or another measure are already characteristic of state monopoly capitalism; and, on the other hand the hope that ideological tendencies convenient to the ruling elite of capitalist countries will appear among the rank and file.

While embellishing capitalism in every possible way, these forecasts cannot help reflecting such inherent vices of capitalism as unemployment and inequality of incomes.

The calculation quoted in the book Towards the Year 2000 show that in "post-industrial society" only half the able-bodied population will have employment and half will find themselves fully or partly jobless. Two-thirds of all families will have a smaller income than the average income level throughout the country.

But that is not all. The society depicted by the authors of the book will create suitable grounds for the phenomenon which is

usually described as "alienation", for a rise in crime and for an increase of such symptoms of social pathology as mental disease, neuroses and suicide.

The authors prophesy that in the general climate of alienation on the part of the middle class, there may appear relations of indifference or even approval of riots and destructive acts, while disappointment in the ideals of American democracy and free enterprise, combined with the absence of an acceptable mass ideology, will promote general spiritual and political bankruptcy.

These admissions by the theoreticians of "post-industrial society" reflect the feeling of alarm and uncertainty about the future which is inevitable under capitalism.

Well, capitalism is, indeed, doomed by history. But are there grounds for the discouraging, pessimistic conclusions drawn by the theoreticians of imperialism?

Wouldn't it be more correct to draw the conclusion that working people having come up against new privations and having experienced the grave social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution under capitalism, will not only not throw themselves into the abyss of moral bankruptcy but, on the contrary, will raise the level of their political maturity, strengthen their class consciousness and join ranks in a broad anti-imperialist front?

This is the optimistic prospect envisaged by the international communist movement.

Neither are nations likely to accept the forecasts of the theoreticians of "post-industrial society" with reference to the underdeveloped countries.

The authors of Towards the Year 2000 claim that by that year the underdeveloped part of the world will not only not have decreased but will have increased and that the gap in per capita national income between the industrially developed and underdeveloped countries will have increased from 12 to 18 times.

This forecast is supplemented with calculations that for example, Colombia may take 358 years to reach the per capita level of the USA, Nigeria will take 339 years, and Indonesia 593 years.

These calculations are also built on sand, however. Nations are resolutely rejecting neo-colonialism and all attempts to prevent the economic and social progress of the countries that have won national sovereignty. They are steadily extending their

liberation struggle, which is turning into a struggle against exploiter relations, both feudal and capitalist.

All the world over ever broader strata of working people, intellectuals and youth are joining the anti-imperialist struggle. Afraid of these forces, the bourgeois ideologists are doing their best to split them.

'Society of scientists'

With this aim, the theoreticians of "post-industrial society" are striving to win the support of the intellectuals and, especially, of the scientists. These are depicted as the chief social forces in the society of the future, which is sometimes described as "a society of scientists".

This view is particularly characteristic of the American sociologist D. Bell, who proclaims that while owners of enterprises and businessmen are the dominating figures in the "old industrial" society, in the new "post-industrial society" the leading role will be played by scientists, mathematicians, economists and engineers, while research corporations, experimental laboratories and universities will become the leading institutions.

However, he makes the reservation that, although major decisions on economic development will not be made by the government, they will be based on government support of research and development, and the decisions themselves will acquire an increasingly technical nature.

This makes us put the question: what, except the unfounded claims about the decisive role of scientists and scientific institutions in society, is new in all that?

The great role of science and scientists, especially in conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, is beyond dispute. But the nature and trends of the scientists' work and, the main thing, the application of the results of their research, depend to a decisive measure on the class nature of the social system.

The question of the social sources and nature of the utilisation of scientific discoveries arises more acutely today than ever before.

The whole world knows that the imperialists are crippling and raping science, turning it into an instrument for deriving profits

and into a means of exploitation, utilising it for political purposes and for creating powerful means of destruction and the annihilation of people and material values.

Incidentally, Chapter 7 of Towards the Year 2000 examines with cold-blooded cynicism various versions of thermonuclear war.

The realisation of the growing social responsibility of scientists to society is making the best representatives of the intellectuals in the capitalist world raise their voices in protest against the monstrous crimes of imperialism, jeopardise their material well-being, their careers and sometimes their very lives, but preserve their honour and clear conscience and prove by deeds their affiliation with the people and with the forces of social progress.

The imperialists' growing concern about the stand taken by the intelligentsia is indisputable.

Hence their attempts to paint an idyllic picture of complete unity between the men of bourgeois science and politics and, moreover, to play up to the intellectuals, promising them the inviting prospect of occupying the "leading position".

Bourgeois ideologists are trying to prevent people from understanding the real meaning of the present processes of social development and are distorting the real trend of human history.

The reactionary theory of "post-industrial society" was created with the aim of defending capitalism.

Anti-communist by its very nature, at the same time, it reflects the alarm experienced by the ruling capitalist class in face of the advancing social, scientific and technological revolutions and is an attempt to lull this alarm with the aid of new illusions.

PEKING'S PLAN FOR BLOC AIMED AGAINST WORLD SOCIALISM

"The chief purpose of the doctrine of 'struggle against two super powers' is to give ideological substantiation to China's exclusive role as leader of this 'struggle' and to act as cover for the Chinese leadership's hegemonistic plans", Grigory Apalin said in an article in Izvestia.

According to this artificial pattern invented by Peking, there exist in the world, on the one side, "two Super powers" - the

USA and the Soviet Union - who are trying to "re-divide the world into spheres of influence and to establish world domination" and, on the other side, "small and medium states" whose "struggle against the policy of strength of the two super powers is an unrestrainable historic movement".

According to this pattern, which is being strongly imposed on other countries, it turns out that it is permissible to join up with a "small" or "medium" country with a reactionary regime and impermissible to join up with a big country, even if it is a socialist one; more than that, it is necessary to carry out a struggle against it, Grigory Apalin observes.

Non-class concept

This doctrine of "struggle against the monopoly of two super powers" is a non-class concept and, therefore, inconsistent and false, because it does not reflect and, more than that, deliberately distorts the actual alignment of forces in the world.

It also shows, he says, "how far the Chinese leaders have gone in revising the principled line of the internationally communist movement".

Peking's concept of "two super powers" is consistent with ideas which have long been fostered by reactionary circles in the West, and, in effect, has been taken from the arsenal of imperialist ideologists and politicians, he adds.

It is the concept expressed by the West German revanchist leader Franz Josef Strauss in his book Challenge and Response - A Programme for Europe, which was published two years before the Peking doctrine appeared.

The concept of "two super powers" is also preached by the West German anti-communist Mennert, who visited China a few months ago and enjoyed the hospitality of the Peking authorities.

The Peking doctrine of "struggle against the monopoly of two super powers", Apalin continues, shows that in order to further their international aims, the Chinese leaders find it profitable to ignore the division of the world into two opposing social systems and the genuine nature of the class struggle in the world.

"How otherwise can they explain the artificial pattern under which the bulwark of world imperialism, the United States, and

the Soviet Union, which is building socialism and whose entire might is directed at struggle against imperialism, are placed on the same footing?

"How otherwise can they justify their policy of aggravating international tension?

"The core of this policy of Peking is a plan to take China out of the struggle between the two systems, to provoke a military conflict between the USSR and the United States and between socialism and imperialism and then to build on their ruins a civilisation a thousand times more magnificent, to turn China into the world's only 'super power'".

This non-class approach to world events also suits the Chinese leaders because it gives them the possibility, for the sake of attracting various forces to their side, of turning a blind eye to movements which a year or two ago were labelled by Peking as "anti-socialist", "anti-democratic", "anti-Chinese", "special detachments of American imperialism", etc.

The memory is fresh, for example, of the Chinese leadership's negative stand on the non-alignment movement and the unpleasant words uttered about a number of non-aligned countries.

Lack of principle

"The Chinese leaders are now changing their attitude to this movement, counting on adapting it to the needs of their doctrine of 'struggle against two super powers' and to give it an anti-Soviet direction".

Under its aegis, Apalin says, Peking plans to form a bloc spear-headed first of all against the USSR and world socialism.

Individual socialist countries, developing countries and even some imperialist states are to be drawn into this bloc.

The concept of "two super powers", he adds, is further evidence of the lack of principle of the Chinese leaders, of their habit of going back on previously proclaimed principles and, disregarding the common tasks of anti-imperialist struggle, of making major policy turns at a moment when they see a chance of reaching some agreement with imperialists which would be advantageous only for the national or, to be more accurate, the nationalistic, interests of China.

The new doctrine did not prevent Peking, which pays lip service to implacability towards American imperialism and

urges "small and medium" countries to struggle against the United States, from deciding to develop contacts with the United States at a moment when the American military are waging an aggressive war against the countries of Indochina.

The approach to the world as a sort of conglomerate of peoples and countries in which "small and weak" states should seek China's protection against "the domination of two super-powers", Peking's deliberate distortion of the alignment of class forces in the world and its creation of confusion in the minds of people about the nature of struggle on the international scene, Apalin says, weaken the anti-imperialist front and play into the hands of imperialist politicians and ideologists who would like to present the main conflict of modern times, not as a struggle between two social systems, but as a collision of narrow state interests.

Welcomed in West

It is understandable, therefore, that China's new doctrine has been welcomed in the West.

It has also been welcomed in the West because it is a modernised variant of Peking's attempts to set the peoples of various countries against the Soviet Union, to weaken the attractive force of socialist ideas in the national liberation movement and to undermine the anti-imperialist unity of the forces of world socialism and the national liberation movement.

The doctrine of "struggle against the monopoly of two super powers" and the practical actions of the Peking leadership carried out in accordance with it, run counter to the tasks of the anti-imperialist forces and the fundamental interests of the Chinese people, of whom imperialism has been and continues to be, the enemy, Apalin says.

NO SOFTENING ON STALIN

A new article on Stalin in the Historical Encyclopaedia * offers little comfort to those who may be seeking to revive his reputation and confirms the overall impression that Brezhnev's

* Soviet Encyclopaedia of History, Volume 13, published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

hard ideological line does not portend a return to Stalinism. While giving him some credit for his early achievements, it is if anything slightly more critical of his later "mistakes" than earlier biographies, such as those in the two 1969 editions of the party history and the version issued by the party newspaper, Pravda, in December, 1969, to mark the 90th anniversary of his birth. But like those assessments, it reveals uncertainty about the best way to approach his career, suggesting that the present leadership still wishes to avoid the embarrassing problem of explaining how and at what stage he succeeded in assuming dictatorial powers.

While Volume 13 of the Encyclopaedia was sent to the printers in November, 1969, its publication date ("passed for printing") was given as February, 1971 - an exceptionally long period even for a work dealing with several tricky subjects. The lack of a clear-cut line is particularly noticeable in the article's total silence about the post-war period of Stalin's life, though its repetition of the old formula that the "distortions" connected with the cult of his personality harmed the process of Communist construction but did not and could not affect the "nature of Socialist society" is clearly intended to inhibit further debates about the relationship between Stalin's dictatorship and the system. In recent years, the article asserted, the Communist Party had done "enormous work" in restoring the Leninist norms of party life and Leninist principles of leadership in all fields of activity.

The present biography takes Stalin's errors back to the period of collectivisation and is more explicit than most previous post-Khrushchevian versions in blaming him for some of the "mistakes and excesses" committed during the campaign. Before this, his career is treated almost entirely factually, and while Lenin's warning about Stalin's character in his last Testament (his letter to the 13th Congress) is quoted more extensively than in 1969, the party is again excused for ignoring his advice and re-electing Stalin General Secretary. The only warm references to his activities throughout these early years, however, centre on his struggle against the Trotskyists; the article repeats the 1956 Central Committee resolution's praise for him in this connexion before deploring Stalin's growing belief in his own infallibility and departure from "Leninist principles" of collective leadership.

In a brief section on his wartime record, Stalin is commended for mobilising the people and leading the armed forces, but blamed for "serious miscalculations" about the timing of the German attack - on this point it reverts to the harsher judgement of the first of the two 1969 party histories. Stalin as a theoretician is given short shrift throughout. Whereas the one-volume 1969 history had maintained a discreet silence on the "short course" history of the party always associated with Stalin's name, it is now criticised for having presented some issues from his "subjective" position - in other words for glorifying his role.

His own books and speeches are dismissed in a final paragraph which remarks that some are of interest to historians while others were of some use as "popular expositions of Marxism-Leninism". His major work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (published in 1952), which became the required textbook for all discussions of economic problems, is now said to contain "mistaken theses". In 1969 it was ignored, though it had been heavily attacked in 1962. Thus in general Stalin is given strictly no more than his due and he is criticised for a wide variety of failings - though not for using (in a particularly ruthless manner) the apparatus bequeathed to him by Lenin.

HUMANISM AND THE MARXIST-LENINISTS

Summary: African States are frequently called upon to defend their concepts of Socialism against Communist ideologists.

Soviet criticism of the efforts of African States to develop their own forms of Socialism has provoked a Zambian attack on the Russians' doctrinaire view. According to Dr Mbelo of the Zambian Ministry of National Guidance, Marxist-Leninists either ignore or are unaware of the differences between their type of Socialism and African Socialism - particularly Zambian Humanism. In a Lusaka Radio commentary on July 22, Dr Mbelo linked Zambian Humanism firmly to the "wide spectrum of political thought in modern Africa generally referred to as African Socialism", though it had unique features. Both Zambian Humanism and African Socialism traced their origin to the African traditional society, which was predominantly egalitarian, or communalist, in character.

Soviet journalists and academics have on a number of

The Belgrade students protested against the banning and, as a result, the Croatian authorities banned the whole issue of Praxis. (3) One assumes that Praxis was also banned because of Kangrga's article although there are unconfirmed reports that another article in the same issue of Praxis (Nebojsa Popov: "Forms and Character of Social Conflicts") was actually the reason why the Croatian authorities banned the periodical.

After reading these two articles one cannot but come to the conclusion that both are very hot. Both Professor Kangrga and Popov (as did most of the articles in the more than 300-pages long issue of Praxis) presented their ideas in a typical "new left" way. It is a well-known fact that during the student riots of June 1968 it was the editors and collaborators of Praxis who supported the students in their protest against "social inequality" in Yugoslavia and against the abandoning of "real" socialist principles. One of the two chief editors of Praxis, Professor Gajo Petrovic, was even expelled from the party.

The conflict which the Praxis people had with the Croatian party leaders was manifold. They accused - mostly indirectly - the Croatian party leaders of having abandoned the road of socialism. In their turn, the Croat leaders accused them of having completely neglected the nationality problem. Consequently the party leaders (not only in Croatia but elsewhere and including Tito) succeeded in removing the "new left" danger spread by the people around Praxis by using, what may be called "new right", i. e., by nationalistic forces. One of the loudest opponents of Praxis was Professor Marko Veselica of Zagreb who was recently expelled from the Croatian party (together with his colleague Professor Sime Djodan) for his nationalistic outbursts and anti-leftism. (4) This time Veselica and Djodan came under fire from the "left-wingers" in the party, especially by the people around Praxis.

In other words, the party first used the "new right" to neutralize the "new left", and later it used the "new left" to remove the "new right" danger. The present banning of both Praxis and of some periodicals which have been in opposition to Praxis shows that the party has continued to play the old game of using one wing against the other and hitting both when necessary.

Bourgeois Class Leading Party

One really cannot say who is more dangerous to the party; the nationalists with their narrow-minded views concerning other nations, or the "real socialists" who see the development in Yugoslavia moving toward a wrong direction. While the nationalists attack the party leaders (especially in Croatia) saying that they have "betrayed" national interests, the "new left" followers accuse the party leaders of not being good socialists. Professor Kangrga even claims in his banned article that the bourgeois class in Yugoslavia has actually infiltrated the party. One cannot but suspect that Miko Tripalo of Croatia is under attack by Kangrga when the latter asserts that some "ideologists of the middle class" would like to see national interests be above class interests. Kangrga insists that the nationality problem could be solved only if the "socialist revolution" has been totally carried out. He says:

Only the communist movement of this country (in our case the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) can, relying primarily on the working class and on the Marxist (left) intelligentsia, be the standard-bearer, guarantor and implementer of the socialist revolution; only it can implement the self-management system and thereby solve both the class and nationality problems. It, however, must possess enough internal strength to remove and purge from its ranks (i. e., to make their activities impossible) all inimical elements recruited from the ranks of bureaucracy, the middle class and technocracy (which is one and the same position). (5)

In his article Nebojsa Popov is even sharper. He attacks the ruling "professional revolutionaries" who assume the power in the country "as the victors" creating a special class which Popov calls "the politocracy". This class was involved in a conflict with "Russian Stalinism" using it as a pretext to strengthen the "political police". The power has been concentrated in the hands of a small number of professional revolutionaries" hierarchically organized. The only real road to socialism is the one shown by the workers and students who go on strike, Popov said. "So long as one cannot clearly explain against whom the workers have been striking, the absurd thesis will remain according to which the workers strike against them-

selves; this is as absurd as the possible claim that the working class is the first ruling class in history which voluntarily abandons the power by leaving the country as economic emigration", Popov added. (6)

Popov too writes about a "new class" whose way of ruling has aggravated the nationality problem in Yugoslavia. A regime based on the theory of "monolithic unity" cannot but defend its own interests. In 1966, at the time when Aleksandar Rankovic was purged, there was an excellent opportunity to come closer to a solution of the class problem. However, efforts were made instead "to present the political police as an instrument of the Serbian nation's hegemony over the whole nation, while Stalinism was present as 'Serbo-Communism'. This recalls the official line of the Comintern (in 1935), which accused the whole Serbian nation of hegemony in 'Versailles' Yugoslavia", Popov said.

In Popov's opinion it is not possible to liberalize economic life without liberalizing political life too. He claims that the emigration of about one million workers from Yugoslavia has weakened the working class in Yugoslavia. As a result the "small owners" who have remained in the country are inclined to think that the only solution is a strong arm regime - "the bourgeois dictatorship". It is the workers, students and intellectuals in Yugoslavia which have shown the correct way toward the achievement of socialism by organizing strikes and demonstrations, Popov said. It is impossible today to be neutral: "To be neutral means to be on the side of those who are stronger".

It is ironical that while party leaders in Yugoslavia labelled the people around Praxis as "Stalinists", Soviet information media calls them "anti-communists". On their part the Praxis people consider the Soviet party theoreticians as "arch-revisionists". Here the circle is closed.

- (1) Vecernje novosti, Belgrade, 10 August 1971.
- (2) Webster: "Phenomenology, the science dealing with phenomena as distinct from the science of being (ontology)".
- (3) Vecernje novosti, 27 August 1971.
- (4) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 28 July 1971.
- (5) Praxis, p. 446.
- (6) Ibid., p. 334

(Radio Free Europe Research)

POLITICS

MOVES OF HIGH DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Ljubomir Radovanovic

The post-war international situation was long marked by the sharp division of states into organized groups headed by the two antagonistic world powers. They enjoyed great international authority - and still do - deriving not only from the victory they won together with other countries in their coalition but also from the fact that their military might, material wealth and economic potential left all their other allies far behind. Moreover, the development of these other allies depended in substantial measure on their assistance and protection. Consequently, the dynamics of post-war international life were generated in large extent by these two world powers, depending on their initiative, subject to their control, and reflecting their antagonisms not only within the context of their immediate interests and bilateral relations, but also outside of these, on a broader world plane. The center of these two organizations was located in Europe, but the sparks emanating from their clashes were borne aloft to other parts of the earth.

The focus of their activities were the two blocs formed by them and consisting of many other countries of various sizes, attracted to them by ideological affinity or lured by the prospect of assistance and protection.

A feature of this bloc division, a European phenomenon for the most part with a broad radius of influence and pressure on other continents, was not only the grouping of countries around two centers of world power, and their diametrically opposed ideologies and interests, but the almost total disruption of normal communication in political relations and economic exchange. In a picturesque turn of speech, Winston Churchill described the situation in his address at Fulton by saying that an iron curtain had been lowered between the two parts of Europe. Although we may not agree with his interpretation as to who brought the curtain down and what was to be found behind it, the fact remains that the process of international negotiation and cooperation came to a halt after the war, just as though it had been severed by an impenetrable iron curtain.

That period, the subject of much lengthy study and discussion,

has been left behind and the international scene of politics has been taken by new and livelier movement on the part of the centers of bloc grouping but also of other states, relieved of the pressure of bloc discipline and disburdened of ideological rigidity. Previously the monopoly of a few developed countries, international policy, under the impact of world developments, became a domain of activity by a growing number of countries on all continents. The force of attraction of bloc centers declined and the positions of the world powers were exposed to the influence of major changes.

The principal vehicles of bloc politics - the Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts - trace their origins to European problems, having emerged as opposing reactions to deterioration of the European situation and inter-allied relations after the war. However, the European situation simmered down and the focus of international crises moved to other areas, the Middle and Far East, outside the reach of these pacts. There, each one of the big powers search for new foundations for world balance and a new doctrine of international strategy. This detracted from the general significance of the blocs as improvement of the situation in Europe acted to ameliorate European rivalries between the big powers which shifted to the wider stage of world politics.

Two important processes manifested themselves in this respect, one reflected in new elements in the policies of the United States of America and the Soviet Union and the other in the sudden appearance of the People's Republic of China on the international political scene. The impression gained from observing these processes is that a new game has been started by the big powers on the chessboard of world politics.

During Nixon's administration, and particularly during the second half of the American President's tenure, one discerns the outlines of moves which intimate that profound transformations are in the offing in United States foreign policy. From these moves, it would be warranted to conclude that the United States wishes above all to reduce its obligations to Europe under the Atlantic Pact and to extricate itself from the pressure of the Soviet-American complex in Europe and the American-Chinese complex in the Far East. This disburdenment of the United States in Europe and Indochina depends however on

revision of relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The economic and political situation of Western Europe has undergone a radical change in comparison with the time when the United States in economic arrangements and in the Atlantic Pact, undertook financial and military obligations in this region. Now the problem of security is no longer characterized by the sharpness and exclusivity it once possessed. Also, West European economy has become a competitor of the American economy. Now the economic and political obligations requiring American presence in Western Europe began to seem unjustified and unfair to many Americans. American statesmen were therefore led to search for new foundations for the Atlantic partnership in Europe and a different formula for European security. They are seeking them in a revision of the basis for American-Soviet relations and a redistribution of obligations in Europe, not from positions of strength but through removal of the sources of disagreement, through bridling the arms race. That this is so is indicated by the dialogue between the American and Soviet governments on disarmament, revision of the status of Berlin and also by the still partially reserved but basically positive attitude toward the Brandt government's Eastern policy.

For its part, Soviet diplomacy attaches great significance to the idea of an all-European conference on security and co-operation hinging, in part, on improvement in American-Soviet relations. The dialogue with the United States on disarmament, indirectly speaking, and last year's Soviet-German agreement directly speaking, are apart from other things also the Soviet contribution to this notion. We do not know as yet precisely what the Soviet Union expects from such a conference but in any case the anticipation is that it would create conditions conducive to the consolidation of peace in Europe. Thence the consolidation of peace in Europe, in terms of the security of the Soviet Union, acquires growing importance, especially against the background of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations and the new orientation in the international policy of the People's Republic of China.

The conclusion of the Soviet-German agreement in August last year was actually a treaty of renunciation in the interests of peace and cooperation. The Soviet Union renounced the right of independent coercive action in relation to the Federal German

Republic, as a former enemy state, under Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations, and the Federal German Republic renounced territorial demands and pretensions to changes in the present boundaries. In its general effects, the Soviet-German treaty is a move providing the Federal German Republic with a certain degree of security while consolidating the positions of the Soviet Union in Central Europe.

During this entire period, Soviet diplomacy has been extremely dynamic. In the course of one year alone, the Soviet Government concluded three important international treaties which introduce changes into the overall picture of Soviet positions in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The treaty with the Federal German Republic, mentioned above, and those with Egypt and India, differ in substance and motivation but all of them reflect the new Soviet strategy in defining and consolidating positions in those areas of world politics where its interests confront those of other world powers - the United States in the Middle East, and China in Asia. But these treaties do have a common feature in the sense that they demonstrate the Soviet Union's abandonment of certain slogans which previously obstructed its activities in developing more cordial international relations with states outside the Warsaw Pact. Among these slogans the most important were those expressing a negative attitude toward and condemnation of the policy of non-alignment. In its agreement with India, the Soviet Government gives voice to respect for this policy, considering it "a significant factor in the maintenance of general peace, international security and relaxation of tension in the world". This attitude will certainly be acclaimed by the non-aligned countries.

The Soviet-Egyptian treaty, confirming the already existing foundations for Soviet-Egyptian friendship, was motivated by certain unpleasant manifestations in Soviet-Arab relations the dissemination of which the Soviet Government wished to prevent. Internal conflicts among Egypt's political leaders, and recent events in the Sudan in consequence of which an anti-Soviet mood began to be carried over to certain Egyptian circles, could but detract from the warmth of Soviet-Egyptian relations which this treaty endeavours to preserve in this important sector of American-Soviet rivalry and confrontation.

Other changes in the positions of these two powers are in evidence in the Middle East. The United States initiative to act

as mediator in direct contracts with Egypt mirrors the desire of the American Government to take some of the rough edges off of its pro-Israeli behaviour in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The circumstances surrounding Soviet-Arab relations as a result of internal political conflicts in certain Arab states go a long way toward facilitating the labours of American statesmen to restore, at least in part, influential American positions in those Arab countries which see the United States as the principal culprit for their failure to prevail in the Arab-Israeli controversy. However, just as the United States aspires to repair its prospects in Egypt by mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict, so is the Soviet Union demonstrating the wish to soften its posture of diplomatic isolation of Israel through contacts between unofficial intermediaries and personal contacts with certain Israelis. The disruption of relations with Israel greatly hampered the possibility for the Soviet Government to bring any influence to bear on Israeli policies and placed it, in a sense, in an unequal position in comparison with the United States which has preserved these possibilities and can communicate with both belligerent sides. The Soviet Government is endeavouring to correct its exclusive stance by pursuing this type of contact in the desire to counter-balance the expanded influence of its rival in the Arab world.

Great attention was aroused by President Nixon's initiative to inaugurate direct talks with Chinese leaders. Just as revision of American policies in Europe hinge upon improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, so does the disburdenment of the United States in Indochina depend on improvement of relations with China. If a basis is found in the forthcoming talks for a common viewpoint and behaviour as regards Far East problems - a highly intricate matter - the normalization of American-Chinese relations could be a major contribution to the consolidation of peace in a part of the world where nations have for centuries been the victims of enemy conquest and foreign intervention.

In any case, the American endeavour to achieve a higher degree of understanding and cooperation with China has a twofold significance for the United States. In the first place, it could facilitate the liquidation of Indochinese pressure on the political life, economy and authority of the USA which has become a grave internal and external problem for this country and in the second

place (although some accord this first place) it could introduce certain new elements into American-Soviet relations. Under this assumption, it is thought that Nixon's initiative in regard to China is a move designed not only to bring relief to the United States in the Far East but also to improve prospects for agreement with the Soviet Union on unsettled mutual problems, presuming that the Soviet Union will not permit itself to be placed in an insecure and subordinate position on both sides. Certain signs would seem to indicate that the Soviet Union eyes American-Chinese contacts with suspicion. Apparently, this suspicion is not unfounded considering the degree of tension in Sino-Soviet relations and the profound ideological and political antagonism between the two countries. It would therefore be quite possible to assume that both the American and the Chinese parties will regard their scheduled talks through the prism of their stances toward the Soviet Union.

China's prolonged absence from international affairs, partly the fault of the United Nations and partly its own, has caused neglect of the extraordinary importance of this vast country both by the United Nations and leading factors of world policy. This could not, however, diminish the pressure of this abnormal state of affairs on the course of international events. China figures significantly in the development of the international situation and its influence on it is not confined to the Far East. Nor can we expect its orientation in international affairs to be restricted to its own geographic area. For China's importance derives not only from the circumstance that it is the most populous state on earth, has an immeasurable potential power, and pursues a specific social doctrine, but also from the fact, as confirmed by events, that the other world powers, cannot either in their mutual relations or in activity in the Far East settle anything without reference to China, or independently of their relationship with China.

For China, normalization of relations with the United States would be a momentous move in the strategy of its opening up to the world and its active inclusion in world politics. In the first place, this would remove the pressure emanating from all neighbouring countries (from South Korea through Taiwan to Thailand where the United States has buttressed anti-Chinese feelings) which could together with Japan represent a potential anti-Chinese encirclement of China.

But irrespective of the outcome of talks in Peking and any possible maneuvering around the chessboard which they might serve, China's activation does not trace its source only to Nixon's initiative nor does it depend on the upshot of that initiative. Even more important are the initiatives of the Chinese Government itself which are reflected in the establishment of diplomatic relations and growing exchanges of official visits with other countries, in livelier commercial contacts, in the clearer evidence of interests in admission to the United Nations and other signs of vigorous diplomatic activity and readiness to be included in active international policies in a more open, systematic and determined way than has hitherto been the case.

And this is without question an event of major significance in the Far East and on the world scene generally.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

ACCORD ON BERLIN

In a demonstration of quiet diplomacy, the Ambassadors of the four Powers responsible for Germany - the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union - announced on August 23 after nearly 17 months of negotiations that they had reached accord on a draft agreement for Berlin, stressing that it could only be signed when the text had been examined and approved by all the governments concerned. Welcoming the agreement the following day, the Federal German Chancellor, Herr Brandt, described it as a "significant interim result" of his government's policies - thus underlining that it represented only a step on the path to reducing tension in Europe. And even the Berlin Agreement will not be complete until East and West German officials have discussed the details of implementing it and the two stages have been tied together. Moreover, while the preliminary agreement has been widely acclaimed for its contribution to guaranteeing West Berlin's position under Allied supervision and easing its contacts with East Berlin and East Germany, the Wall, built almost exactly 10 years before, will remain.

Both the Federal German Government and the Berlin Senate were quick to convey their approval of the draft, a statement from Bonn noting that their interests had been properly safe-

guarded and that the pact should help towards relaxing tension in Central Europe. They also welcomed the fact that their three principal demands - recognition of the links between the Western Sectors of Berlin and West Germany, easier access for West Berliners to East Berlin and the GDR, and unimpeded traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin - had been adequately met.

From the Western point of view, the access provisions are one of the most important features, embodying Moscow's acceptance of the principle that civilian traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic will be unimpeded and that access remains the responsibility of the Four Powers. The USSR and East Germany thus seem to have abandoned their claim since 1955 that access for civilians (as opposed to Allied military traffic) is a matter solely for the "sovereign" Republic of East Germany, through whose territory the overland routes to Berlin lie. It has now been agreed that individual travellers are to be controlled by East German officials only to the extent of showing an identity document. A point of particular satisfaction to Bonn is that in spite of Moscow's denunciations of all activities by West German politicians in West Berlin, the Four Powers have now acknowledged that Berlin's links with the Federal Republic should not only be maintained but developed, though some Federal political activities in West Berlin will be reduced. In addition, the Russians have formally accepted that Bonn should represent the Western Sectors of Berlin abroad and in international organisations, and have agreed that West Berliners may use Federal passports.

For the citizens of West Berlin there is special satisfaction in the promise of improvements in communications between the two halves of the city, including the right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin and East Germany under the same conditions as apply at present to non-Berliners. Extra crossing points are to be opened in the Wall.

Both Moscow and the East Germans are making the most of the enhancement of East Germany's status implied by the references to the Republic by name and the acknowledgement that it has some competence on the access routes. The Soviet Union has increased its presence in West Berlin, particularly by securing Western acceptance of its demand for a Consulate-General there. But the status of Berlin as a whole and the con-

tinued rights and responsibilities there of the Four Powers have not been affected by the agreement, and for the time being the East Germans seem to have retracted their previous view that West Berlin is an "independent political entity" on their territory.

Cool reception

While most Eastern commentators and the West Germans themselves welcomed the draft agreement as representing a good bargain, the Soviet Press was at first cool, merely reporting the accord and quoting the UN Secretary-General for the view that it was a good omen for future East-West relations. In one of the first Soviet comments on August 29, the party organ, *Pravda*, said that the agreement amounted to an important step towards détente, but claimed that "imperialist reaction" was still likely to cause difficulties on the road to a stable peace.

For their part, the East Germans seemed to be putting as good a face as possible on a pact that conspicuously fails to give them many of the points on which their propaganda had laid so much stress. But the official news agency seemed to be exaggerating when it reported "complete unanimity of views" on all subjects between the ex-party leader, Herr Ulbricht, and the Soviet Ambassador in an encounter immediately after the latter's final meeting with the Western Ambassadors on August 23. The visit to East Berlin earlier in the month by the Soviet Foreign Secretary, Mr Gromyko, and his talks with the East German leader, Herr Honecker, were no doubt largely prompted by the need to force the East Germans into line.

On August 24, the East German Council of Ministers met to discuss the agreement and paid a special tribute to the Soviet Government's part in the negotiations, asserting that the pact was in "complete accord" with East German interests. It also expressed East Germany's readiness to contribute towards implementing the agreement.

SLOGANS AND DEEDS OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP

'Pravda' article by I. Alexandrov

The present epoch is characterised by gigantic revolutionary transformations that are fundamentally changing the face of our planet. The forces of world socialism and the communist and working-class movement and of national liberation are increasingly developing their offensive against the positions of imperialism. This historic confrontation encompasses all aspects of the life of society - the economy, politics, ideology and culture.

Life itself convincingly confirms the correctness of the conclusion drawn by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 that "the world system of socialism is the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle".

It has become a powerful accelerator of the historic progress that was started by the Great October Revolution, a mighty bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples.

In the socialist countries pursuing a Leninist course in domestic and foreign policy the working people of the whole world see a reliable bulwark of peace, freedom and social progress. The stronger the fraternal alliance of the socialist countries, the stronger become the positions of the forces of peace and progress in the whole world and the more resolute becomes the rebuff administered to any aggressive schemes of imperialism. The support and aid given to heroic Vietnam and to the peoples of Laos and Cambodia by the USSR, the other socialist countries and by all the progressive forces are a vivid example of this.

At the same time, the members of the anti-imperialist front of struggle cannot but be alarmed by the anti-Leninist, great-power chauvinistic course of the present leadership of China directed towards undermining the unity of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces and doing grave harm to their common cause.

More than ten years have gone by since the moment when the Chinese leadership came out openly, for the first time, with a special ideological-political platform on the main questions of our times, of the development of world socialism, and of the communist and working-class movement.

They revised the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction and foreign policy which had been implemented

during the first ten years of the existence of the People's Republic of China and which were recorded in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (1956). Some time later, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist policy of the international communist movement, jointly worked out by the Communist and Workers' Parties, including the Communist Party of China, the Chinese leaders put forward their own "left" theses which, allegedly, were to facilitate the speediest destruction of imperialism and an acceleration of the world revolution by any means, not excluding a thermonuclear world war. They tried to impose this platform on the international communist and working-class movement.

Domestic policy

In reality, the "leftism" of Maoism only served to camouflage the presumptuous hegemonistic plans of the Maoists, to which Peking's entire domestic and foreign policy was subordinated.

In the field of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage decided to put at the service of their aims the economic base, the foundations of socialism that had been laid in the country during the first decade after the victory of the revolution.

Having discarded the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China aimed at the planned building of socialism and the improvement of the people's wellbeing, Mao Tse-tung and the group which he led, plunged China into the voluntarist adventure of the "great leap", of building the "people's communes", proclaiming the intention of achieving the transition to communism in from three to five years, declaring that "three years of hard work will bring ten thousand years of happiness". Apart from other things, the course of the "great leap" pursued the ambitious aim of taking a vanguard position among the socialist countries. This appealed to the hegemonistic desires of the Maoists.

Built on an anti-scientific, subjectivist-voluntarist conception and being in contradiction with the objective laws of socialist construction, the "great leap" became for the Chinese people a tragedy of vainly wasted efforts; it led to a serious economic crisis and to the already low living standards of the people falling still lower.

In order to direct the discontent of the masses of the people away from themselves, the Mao group blamed the failure of the "great leap" on party and state cadres who had allegedly "poorly followed Mao's instructions".

Then followed a sharp zigzag in the tactics of the Chinese leadership, when it stated that it was impossible to build socialism in China in the lifetime of the present generation and that this would take many decades, if not centuries. It proclaimed poverty to be the "basis" of a revolutionary spirit, while a desire to improve the life of the people was "revisionism" and "bourgeois economism". They galvanised the old Trotskyite, anti-Leninist theses about the "impossibility" of successfully building socialism before the triumph of the world revolution.

In the sphere of foreign policy the Maoists pursued a policy of sharpening international tension and pushing other countries and peoples towards military conflicts. They rejected any proposals aimed at easing international tensions.

Peking received with hostility the treaties on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and on the non-proliferation of such weapons, and on banning the deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor. The idea put forward by the Soviet Union for creating a system of collective security in Asia was rejected and so were many other constructive proposals of the socialist countries.

Attitude to war

This course was covered up by noisy "leftist" slogans about the need for immediately destroying imperialism. Recourse was had to calls for a "people's war" in all countries and on all continents. The thesis: "The world can be changed only with the rifle" was proclaimed as a universal truth.

No matter what ultra-revolutionary phraseology was used to cover up this course, its essence remained unchanged: the striving for hegemony in a world devastated by war. In this connection, even a nuclear missile war in which, as Mao Tse-tung estimated, half of mankind might perish, was declared to be a sort of blessing. Speaking with the American journalist Anna Louise Strong in 1965, Mao called on the peoples of the world not to fear nuclear war because "China will survive it". On the ruins left by that war the Maoists intended to build

"a civilisation a thousand times more wonderful" and to do this, naturally, in accordance with their own recipes. Mao Tse-tung spoke in detail precisely about this in his conversation with Jawaharlal Nehru and in his speech at the 1957 Moscow Conference.

These ideas were developed in a number of Chinese articles printed in April 1960 in connection with the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin and also in the subsequent period, for instance, in an article in the May 14, 1969, issue of Liberation Daily.

But the Chinese leadership itself was not at all eager, and is not eager to rush into battle against imperialism. For achieving its plans it would like to use the military and economic might of socialist countries, the strength of the international working class and the possibilities of the national liberation movement, trying to turn them into a tool of the Chinese leadership's own great-power thirst for hegemony. Although the Maoists declare that they are "prepared for the greatest national sacrifices", their deeds present a different picture. They prefer the position of "sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight".

The Marxist-Leninist parties of the entire world resolutely rejected the ideology, policy, strategy and tactics of Maoism, subjecting them to broad principled criticism as alien to Marxism-Leninism, objectively untenable and harmful from the point of view of the international and national tasks of the communist, working-class and national liberation movement. The Maoist apologia of war aroused the indignation and protests of the broadest sections of the public throughout the world.

Together with the other fraternal parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union consistently upheld the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, pressing for a strengthening of the positions and of the unity of world socialism and for the cohesion of the world communist movement and the national liberation democratic and peace-loving forces in the struggle against imperialism, reaction and war.

So the leaders of the Communist Party of China took a course aimed at splitting the communist movement, creating Maoist groups and trends opposing the fraternal parties in other countries, and undermining the socialist community.

Struggle against USSR

The Chinese leaders directed their struggle against our mother-

land and against our party and its consistent Leninist policy.

The Maoists demanded of the Soviet communists that they should repudiate the decisions of the 20th Congress and the programme of the CPSU; they embarked on intensive anti-Soviet propaganda and from the middle of 1960 began systematically to organise provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, developing them to the point of armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. In the atmosphere of the anti-Soviet hysteria and militarist frenzy that was simultaneously generated in China, a policy hostile to the Soviet Union was proclaimed official doctrine at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Mao and his entourage are steadily scaling down economic and other ties with the USSR and other Socialist countries, while simultaneously expanding in every way ties with leading imperialist powers, and above all the United States.

Suffice it to say that the share of socialist countries in the foreign trade of the People's Republic of China dropped to 25 per cent in 1966, as against 68 per cent in 1959. The volume of Soviet-Chinese trade in 1969 was about 80 per cent below the 1966 level.

It is significant that Peking is developing its relations with imperialist countries on the basis of undisguised anti-Sovietism, to the detriment of the interests of world socialism and the revolutionary, national liberation movement.

But all the efforts of the Chinese leadership to split the international communist movement, to create in Peking a centre opposed to it, to gain ground in achieving their great-power hegemonistic ambitions by laying claim on the international scene to some sort of exclusive position for China and a role as leader of the "Third World", the "World Village" as against the "World Town" and thereby to establish an anti-socialist, anti-Soviet front, proved futile. The untenable nature of the strategy and tactics of the Maoists was laid bare by the course of historical development and their adventurist aims turned out to be unattainable.

The subversive Maoist groups and factions in various countries, which were actually based on an anti-communist, anti-Soviet platform, began to disintegrate. In pursuing their plans for securing leadership in the "Third World" on the basis of their extremist platform, the Chinese leaders came up

against the resistance of peace-loving developing states, and especially neighbouring ones on whom they made territorial and other claims.

The jarring failures in domestic and foreign policy led to a socio-political crisis in China and to wide-spread dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Communist Party of China and among the working people. A split developed in the leadership of the CPC. The Maoists faced a real danger of having to bear grave responsibility towards the party and the country.

Precisely these causes prompted Mao and his grouping to carry out what actually amounted to a political coup in the country, implemented in the form of the "Cultural Revolution", which, as the Chinese leaders have themselves admitted, was a "struggle for power". A military-bureaucratic system began to be implanted in the country.

Party, trade union and youth organisations and unions of creative workers were routed in the course of the "Cultural Revolution" and the constitutional bodies of people's power were paralysed. Large masses of communists, workers, peasants and especially intellectuals were subjected to persecution. The ideal of "democracy" proclaimed in China was the turning of the entire people into "loyal soldiers" and "obedient oxen of the Great Helmsman".

A blow was dealt first of all against those communists who saw the danger to the cause of socialism in China involved in the voluntaristic ideas of the "great leap" and the anti-popular line in foreign policy, and against those who in the period of the escalation of American aggression in Vietnam proposed that differences with the CPSU be settled and unity of action achieved among the socialist countries in the struggle against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

At the same time, the organisers of the "Cultural Revolution" continued the campaign of hatred and slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, trying to ascribe to them plans for creating a "circle" round China in collusion with imperialism. Under this pretext the Maoists set out on the militarisation of the country, calling on people "to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war". It is an astonishing thing but nevertheless a fact that the Maoists began to call for a "Cultural Revolution" in other socialist countries, claiming that without such a revolution "capitalism will be restored". Peking went so far as to call

for the "assertion of the banner of Chairman Mao's ideas over the entire globe".

The Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in 1969, was called upon to legalise the military-bureaucratic system in China. Mao Tse-tung and his group actually started to build the Communist Party anew, throwing aside the political, ideological and organisational principles of a Marxist-Leninist party. Mao's ideas were presented at the congress as "the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch". Proclaiming a "ruthless struggle" against "modern revisionism", by which Peking means the leadership of most socialist countries and Communist Parties, the Ninth Congress of the CPC marked in this way a new stage in the evolution of the ideological and political theses of Maoism as an anti-Leninist, petty-bourgeois chauvinist ideology.

Collapse of plans

The Maoists, however, did not obtain the results they wanted either from the "Cultural Revolution" or from the line of the Ninth Congress of the CPC. On the contrary, in the period from 1966 to 1969 they brought about a worsening of the state of crisis and led the country into even greater international isolation. Though the Chinese leadership, by using methods of violence, terror and demagogy, succeeded in suppressing open resistance to its policy and in imposing that policy on the country, it could not help seeing that it would not be able to overcome in that way either the domestic crisis or international isolation.

All the more so the Chinese leaders could not fail to realise the entire depth of their defeat and the collapse of their plans when the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow reaffirmed the unwavering loyalty of the world army of communists to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and demonstrated the strengthening of the unity of the communist ranks on this principled basis. The conference strengthened the positions of the international communist and working-class movement as the most influential political movement of our time and the vanguard of the anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of peace, national liberation and socialism. The conference highly assessed the role of the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the liberation struggle and the peace-loving foreign

policy of the USSR.

The development of the present international situation is characterised primarily by the growth of the forces of world socialism, the consolidation of the unity of the world communist movement and the cohesion of the forces of the anti-imperialist front. The historic offensive by the revolutionary forces against the positions of imperialism and their growing activity in the struggle for peace and the security of the peoples are compelling the Peking leaders to review their tactics and to employ methods which are often the opposite of those which they only recently proclaimed.

The time came when the Chinese leaders had to put some of the ultra-left slogans in moth-balls and even remove from the front of the stage the persons who had most compromised themselves by their excessive zeal in promoting the "Mao line" during the "Cultural Revolution". The Maoists are making a new zigzag in their policy. And once again Mao and his group are trying to put the blame for the barbarous nature of the "Cultural Revolution", with its mass persecution and excesses, on those whom they themselves raised up against the Communist Party of China, by using whom they cleared the way to the establishment of their domination. A "respectable" appearance is being hastily given to Peking's policy, which is now being pursued with more refined methods.

The facts show, however, that if any changes have been made in Peking's tactics, they only amount to abandoning attempts at an accelerated implementation of the old line, but not abandoning the aims of that line, to the use of subtler methods of manoeuvring intended to deceive the Chinese people and also to confuse the international revolutionary and liberation forces.

Whereas previously the policy of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems, that is being consistently promoted by the USSR and other fraternal countries, was described in Peking simply as a "betrayal" and as "collusion with imperialism", now the Chinese leadership is even beginning to teach others how to pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese government has officially proposed that the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" be made the basis for relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States. At the same time it has strengthened its contacts with many western countries, having established diplomatic relations

with a number of them. Peking has dropped outright propaganda for the thesis of the inevitability of a thermo-nuclear world war, and, furthermore, is now trying to pretend to a love of peacefulness.

United Nations

The tone of Chinese propaganda statements with regard to the United Nations organisation has also changed. China has begun to give expression to an obvious desire to have its rights in that organisation restored, although only recently it was being claimed in Peking that they did not want to have anything to do with the organisation. As is well known, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have invariably come out in favour of the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations and continue to do so.

In the course of a review of their tactics in the sphere of foreign policy, the Peking leaders, as is evident, came to the conclusion, that the Hungweipings were first and foremost damaging China's prestige not only in the socialist and developing countries, but in the West as well. Outwardly the anti-Soviet campaign in official statements by Chinese leaders was somewhat altered. In 1969 the Chinese leaders agreed to the meeting of heads of government of the USSR and the People's Republic of China proposed by the Soviet side and also to the holding of Soviet-Chinese talks on border and other questions of intergovernmental relations.

Striving for the easing of international tensions and for the strengthening of peace and the security of the nations, people of goodwill would like to see a manifestation of elements of realism in China's foreign policy in the changes in the method of action of the Chinese leadership, elements that could serve the aims of strengthening the anti-imperialist front and the cause of peace and friendship among the peoples. The Soviet people, too, sincerely want this.

The following question naturally suggests itself: What, in reality, is the essence of the changes in the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership at the present stage, and to what extent do they accord with the aspirations of the peoples, including the people of China? In fact, this is a question about the correlation and mutual connection of the Chinese leadership's strategy and

tactics in the present conditions. Only facts and a thorough and objective analysis of facts can produce an answer to it.

The facts are such that neither in its statements nor in its practical deeds has the Chinese leadership as yet renounced a single provision of its special ideological-political platform, incompatible with Leninism, on the main questions of international life and the world communist movement. The "militant tasks of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China" and the bringing to the fore of the "intensification of preparations for war" were reaffirmed at the plenary meeting of the central committee of the CPC in the autumn of 1970.

The Chinese leadership comes out against the achieving of collective security in Europe and Asia and against the USSR's and Poland's treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany. Peking spares no efforts in transferring the situation of military hysteria to Albania in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the Balkans by this or other methods. Using loud declarations as a cover, the Chinese leadership comes out as before against concrete steps directed towards reaching agreements on questions of disarmament and of prohibiting nuclear weapons. The government of the People's Republic of China rejected the Soviet proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear powers, stating that "China's nuclear weapons are still in the testing stage. . . .".

The Chinese leadership continues to engage in intensive hostile propaganda against our party and our country. It is in the Soviet Union, in the policy of the CPSU and in the successes of the working people of our country and the fraternal socialist countries that it sees the main obstacle to achieving its hegemonistic ambitions in the international arena. The Maoists are trying to prevent the Chinese people from knowing facts which shed light on the life of the Soviet people and show the real course of the historic struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism.

Everything good connected with the Soviet Union, which supported the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people throughout many decades and gave them fraternal assistance in their advance along the road of socialism, is being deliberately driven out of the minds of the Chinese people.

The Chinese leaders are continuing to declare that they will wage an "implacable struggle" against the Soviet Union and the

other socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist parties. At the close of 1970, when speaking to an old acquaintance of his, the American journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Tse-tung said that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the Communist Party of China were "irreconcilable".

The Chinese leaders are continuing to conduct subversive activities against the world socialist community. They oppose the collective international organisations of socialist countries - the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. At one time the men in Peking found it possible to come out in solidarity with the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia and with their imperialist patrons and then to bemoan the failure of their counter-revolutionary plot. Vicious attacks against socialist Poland sounded from Peking in unison with the anti-communists.

The policy of the Chinese leadership towards socialist countries clearly reveals a desire, which coincides with the machinations of imperialist reaction, to set the socialist states at loggerheads, to set them one against the other and to prevent the implementation of the joint political line of the fraternal countries in the international arena.

Whereas formerly Peking waged a broad propaganda offensive against all socialist countries, at the present time it is trying to "narrow" the field of struggle, and adopts a "differentiated" approach to socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them into the orbit of its policy. In so doing it makes alluring gestures and promises. For the time being Peking does not ask much of those with whom it is flirting. The Chinese leaders would be pleased with any step which, in their opinion, could cause a crack, even if only a small one, in relations between socialist countries.

Lenin once wrote: "Capital is an international force. To vanquish it an international workers' alliance, an international workers' brotherhood, is needed. We are opposed to national enmity and national discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists". (Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 293, English-language edition). Contrary to Leninism and contrary to the communist logic of class struggle, the men in Peking reject the idea of united action of socialist countries, of all the revolutionary forces in the struggle against imperialism. The Chinese leadership thereby assumes a heavy responsibility for

creating an opportunity for the imperialists to step up their actions and make attempts to go over, on a number of sectors, to a counter-offensive against the world revolutionary movement, to suppress the liberation movement in South-East Asia and to support Israeli aggression in the Middle East.

Persistent propaganda on behalf of the demagogic thesis about struggle against the "two super-powers", a thesis absolutely alien to Marxism-Leninism, has become for the Chinese leadership a means of continuing on its course hostile to the Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership tries to place U.S. imperialism, which is striving to play the role of guarantor and custodian of the international system of exploitation and oppression that brings destruction, death and suffering to many peoples of the world, on the same footing as the Soviet Union - the homeland of Leninism, the first socialist country and the bulwark of the anti-imperialist struggle of all the revolutionary forces.

The leaders in Peking need the "super-powers theory" for the same purpose as they did their old "theory of the struggle of the world village against the world town". In both of these "theories" nationalistic, great-power motives take the place of a class approach. Having failed in its attempts to divide the world into the economically developed "town" and the developing "village" or the "village" fighting for its liberation, the leaders in Peking decided to narrow the "front of attack" and direct it, first of all, against the Soviet Union. Now they are urging all countries - capitalist, developing and socialist countries - to fight against "the two super-powers" and furthermore the Chinese press emphasises in every way that China will never be a "super-power", and it is being stressed during personal contacts between Chinese leaders and representatives of different countries that China is the best defender of countries fighting against "the two super-powers".

False thesis

The term "super-power" was borrowed by the Chinese leaders from the imperialist ideologists of the United States. The latter invented it in order to defend capitalist principles to mislead the American people, in the first place, and the public throughout the world and to camouflage in some way the imperialist, aggressive nature of the U.S. line in foreign policy.

Characteristically, the expression "one-two super-powers" is mentioned now and then in Peking during the efforts to establish Sino-American contacts. Apparently it was decided there, in expectation of Nixon's visit, to soften the tone of propaganda: "It is not you we have in mind".

The putting forward of the utterly false thesis of "two super-powers", allegedly opposed to all the other states is in fact an act of class betrayal. The men in Peking are trying in this way to play down the confrontation between the two world systems - socialism and capitalism - and are trying to evade - and do evade in practice - the real struggle against imperialism. They even go so far as to give advice to West European states and monopolies on how they should pool their efforts in the best way in order to oppose the "one-two super-powers". Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have legalised their own political flirtation with the U.S. ruling circles.

In an attempt to "corroborate" theoretically the rupture with world socialism and the actual betrayal of the class interests of the working people and to justify their policy aimed at collusion with imperialism, Mao Tse-tung and his associates deliberately confuse questions concerning the contradictions of the contemporary world, substituting the Peking-fabricated formula of "four big contradictions" for the real contradictions, and the main one among them - the contradiction between imperialism and socialism. If this formula is cleared of rhetoric, its essence boils down to uniting the world in the interests of achieving Peking's hegemonistic goals under the pretext of resolving these contradictions and of struggling against "the two super-powers". Not long ago, in an article in the magazine *Red Flag*, this formula, proclaimed at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, was directly adapted to the demagogic concept of "the two super-powers". And following the usual ultra-revolutionary phraseology about the "colossal upheavals" and "regrouping" of forces taking place in the world, the article attempts to justify the tactics of China in forming blocs with any forces, including imperialist ones, for the purpose of achieving Peking's aims in the sphere of foreign policy. It would not be irrelevant to recall that the thesis of the "regrouping of forces" was repeatedly used earlier by Mao Tse-tung for purposes of political intrigue.

The article openly justifies tactics of political double-dealing, under the name of "revolutionary dual tactics". One of the latest examples of recourse to "revolutionary dual tactics" by Peking in relation to the Soviet Union, is the recent interview which the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai gave to the New York Times correspondent Reston. Chou En-lai noted the anti-Soviet essence of Peking's platform and of its steps aimed at a rapprochement with Washington. He threw over to Reston, who was happy to catch it in the air, the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China. In another interview, with a correspondent of a Yugoslav newspaper, Chou En-lai discoursed at length about "one-two super-powers" and again spoke about the mythical threat to China from the north, from the USSR, not failing to put emphasis on some special "liberating" mission of China in Asia.

As for the threat to China "from the north" it is well known that the Soviet Union has never put forward and does not now put forward any territorial claims against China and believes that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have no cause for conflicts.

The CPSU and the working people of the Soviet Union, like the fraternal parties and the working people of the other socialist states, have regarded and continue to regard the development of relations of friendship and co-operation with the Chinese people, with the Chinese communists, as one of the important conditions for strengthening the positions of world socialism, for consolidating the unity of the international communist movement and of the entire anti-imperialist front.

It is precisely this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet state with regard to China, a line that has been authoritatively reaffirmed in the report of the central committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the party and in a resolution of the Congress, in the decisions of plenary sessions of the central committee of the CPSU and in speeches by the general secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev.

Our party and people unanimously approve of the fact that the central committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government showing restraint and not yielding to provocations, have done and are doing everything the USSR can do to achieve the normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China and the

restoration and development of mutual friendship and co-operation between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The constructive line of the CPSU and the Soviet government with regard to the People's Republic of China meets with the understanding and approval of the fraternal socialist countries, of the Communist and Workers' Parties and of all the progressive, peace-loving forces. It arouses the sympathy of all who cherish China's true national interests, which are inseparably bound up with the interests of world socialism and of friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Soviet foreign policy

This line is an inalienable part of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy and of the all-embracing programme of activities of our party and of the Soviet state in the international arena - a programme of struggle for the further consolidation and development of the forces of socialism, for the easing of international tension and for strengthening peace, for rallying the ranks of the world communist and working-class movement, for the consolidation of all the forces coming out against imperialism and colonialism, reaction and aggression. The peace programme put forward by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, meeting the vital interests of the peoples of the entire planet, has already become a most important factor in contemporary international life.

In the Soviet Union people regard with due understanding the development of normal relations between states, and on this plane, the normalisation of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States is no exception. But Soviet people cannot help paying attention to the fact that in its overtures to Washington, the Chinese leadership again openly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet Union.

In so doing, it certainly realises that the ruling imperialist circles, and above all the United States, draw appropriate conclusions from "respectable" manoeuvres of this kind on the part of the Chinese leaders and their anti-Soviet slant. And it is not by chance, evidently, that allusions to Peking's present "obliging attitude" and the possibility of imperialism cashing in on it, are slipping into the pages of the American bourgeois

press.

Of course, while waging a resolute ideological-political struggle against the great-power chauvinistic theses of Peking in its foreign policy course, we are doing everything to protect the interests of the Soviet people, who are building communism, and the interests of our friends and allies from any encroachments.

Seeing the lack of principle and the nationalistic pragmatism of the Chinese leadership, the public in many countries throughout the world is asking the question: Is it the case that a deal against socialism is being prepared behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence and freedom?

An examination of the Maoist slogans and Maoist practice both at home and in the international arena gives weighty grounds for posing such a question.

The ideological-political essence of the Maoist platform, its strategic aims, in spite all the tactical manoeuvres of the Chinese leadership, remain unchanged. The conceptions of the Chinese leadership and its actions have been and continue to be based on the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist ideology of Maoism.

Maoism has exposed itself in deeds as a petty-bourgeois ideological-political movement basically alien to Marxism-Leninism, living as a parasite on the principles of scientific socialism and on the desire of the masses of the Chinese people for socialism. The goals and practice of Maoism are incompatible with the tasks of the world communist and liberation movement. Here one should fully take into account the fact that Maoism, in its present struggle against the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the communist movement and the socialist community, objectively converges with the most diverse political forces hostile to socialism - the imperialists, racialists, Trotskyites and reformists, forming a kind of "united front" with them.

Practical test

Experience shows that if certain steps forward have been taken in some spheres of the Chinese economy in recent years, this has not been due to Maoist concepts but has happened in spite of them. None of the concepts of Maoism, none of Mao's ideas has stood the practical test of socialist construction in China or the development of international life. Maoism is devoid of any constructive content. All the more dangerous

therefore is the striving of Peking leaders for hegemony in the world communist movement and for leadership in the Third World. The aims and practice of Maoism are doing tremendous harm to the international communist and working-class movement and to the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle.

The recipes of the Maoists are doing irreparable harm to those who give them credence (we all remember the tragic fate of the Communist Party of Indonesia and certain other Communist Parties whose leadership harkened to advice from Peking).

The communists face the task of enhancing in every way their political vigilance in face of the hostile ideology and subversive actions of Maoism, the task of carrying out a further profound exposure of the real essence of Maoist ideology and policy. The communists are fighting resolutely and on a principled basis against the theory and practice of Maoism and against the machinations of the Maoists in the world communist movement, in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front. They are waging a consistent ideological and political struggle against the anti-socialist, anti-Leninist platform of Maoism so that the Chinese people can again take to the path of alliance and fraternal cooperation with the socialist countries, with all the revolutionary progressive forces of the day, the forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

PEKING AND ARMS CONTROL

Proposals that the People's Republic of China should be involved in international disarmament negotiations have failed to produce any encouraging response from Peking. The PRC government, while proposing sweeping measures for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, has denounced the steps toward disarmament which other countries have taken. These steps, Peking says, are a plot by the "superpowers" to preserve their military superiority.

The Chinese press has yet to report or comment on the new Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear conference made by Leonid Brezhnev on March 31. Robert Keatley, writing for *The Wall Street Journal*, said that during a discussion with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking he was given the impression that the Chinese would turn down the Soviet invitation.

Nuclear weapons, in Mao Tse-tung's view have only limited importance in warfare. Man, he says, remains the key element. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Peking advocated nuclear-free zones, in particular in the Asian and Pacific areas. It denounced the 1963 partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the first major international agreement designed to limit the nuclear arms race. Peking also protested the 1967 treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space, the 1968 treaty to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the recent treaty to ban nuclear weapons from the seabed.

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, which began in November 1969, were dismissed by Peking as "big plot" in which the United States and the Soviet Union are contending with each other, each seeking to maintain its own nuclear superiority by restricting the other".

(1)

Chinese Proposal

On July 31, 1963, just six days after the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was initiated, Peking proposed a summit conference of all nations to discuss the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. The Chinese overture was conveyed by Premier Chou En-lai in a letter to numerous heads of government. A similar move was made by the Peking government after China successfully detonated its first nuclear device on October 16, 1964.

The idea of a world summit meeting on the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons was revived last November in a joint statement issued in Peking by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a Japanese Socialist Party delegation, which said:

"The delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party supports. . . . China's proposal that a summit conference of all the countries of the world, big and small, be convened to sign an agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on not using nuclear weapons. The Chinese side expresses thanks for this". (2)

Pakistan and Morocco appear to be the only countries to have commented officially on the Chinese proposal. A joint communique on November 14, 1970, ending Pakistani President Yahya Khan's visit to China, said that "the Pakistan side noted

with positive interest China's proposal for a summit conference of all the countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons". (3) Abdellatif Lakhmiri, the Moroccan Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to the PRC, speaking at a March 3 reception in Peking, described the Chinese proposal as "a proposal worthy of interest". (4)

Peace Council Boycott

Peking has withdrawn from the activities of the World Council of Peace (WCP), presumably on the grounds that this body has taken a pro-Moscow line. The last WCP meeting in which China participated was that held in Geneva in June 1966. In the meantime, no information has been forthcoming on the China Peace Committee (CPC) since early 1967. On January 5 that year a letter of protest was lodged by the CPC with the Secretariat of the World Council of Peace alleging that "leading members" of the WCP Secretariat in Vienna had contrived to prevent the Chinese member of the Secretariat from renewing his Austrian visa, thus forcing him to leave his post.

Chinese participation in the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs ceased in 1966, the year of the 12th Conference in Japan. The Japanese Government refused to allow entry to Liu Ning-yi, leader of the Chinese delegation to the conference, and the entire Chinese delegation returned to Peking.

(Current Scene, Hong-Kong)

- (1) Peking Review, No. 46, November 14, 1969.
- (2) NCNA, November 1, 1970.
- (3) NCNA, November 14, 1970.
- (4) NCNA, March 3, 1971.

NIXON'S VISIT SEEN FROM PEKING

The change of tactics towards the United States, dramatically illustrated by the Chinese invitation to President Nixon to visit Peking, has been given theoretical justification in an article in the September issue of Red Flag.

Ostensibly an analysis of an article written by Mao Tse-tung in 1940 in which Mao formulated the tactics the CCP should adopt in its fight against the Japanese, the piece has a message that is clearly relevant to the present international situation.

Mao's article, "On policy", is described as "a brilliant example for us to follow in correctly analysing and handling the complicated alignment of the various classes at home and abroad, in uniting the people, in winning allies, and in isolating and defeating the enemies". The idea is to exploit the differing interests of the various hostile forces to one's own advantage, to decide which enemy at any given moment is the major one and then to "unite all the forces that can be united" to isolate and defeat it, thus eliminating enemies one at a time. In 1940, the main enemy was Japan and temporary alliance was made even with "pro-British and pro-American big landlords", provided they were in favour of resistance to Japan. Today, it is clearly implied, the principal enemy is no longer the United States, and so Nixon can be treated as a temporary ally against, for instance, the Soviet Union.

The Red Flag article stresses repeatedly that it is a duty and not a betrayal of principle to have certain tactical dealings with the enemy - always providing that the situation has been correctly analysed in the first place:

"Our principles must be firm, we must also have all permissible and necessary flexibility to serve our principles... The art of waging all kinds of struggle in a flexible manner is a requirement of the proletariat... We will also overcome thinking in absolutes so that our thinking will remain in keeping with changing objective conditions".

Although government in China is not so subject to the pressures of public opinion as it is in many other countries the Chinese leaders are clearly anxious about the reactions of their own people, suddenly confronted with the prospect of a visit from the leader of a country which for the past twenty years has been presented to them as their most implacable

enemy.

Cadres and party officials have doubtless been to some extent ideologically prepared - for example by the July 1 joint editorial marking the 50th anniversary of the CCP. At one point, the editorial referred to Mao's remark "How to give tit for tat depends on the situation. . . . If they wanted to negotiate, sometimes not going to negotiations was tit for tat and sometimes going to negotiations was tit for tat". This was taken at the time to refer to the situation in North Vietnam; in retrospect, however, it can be seen as relevant to the subsequent announcement of Nixon's visit.

Only the first sentence of this quotation, which comes from Mao's 1945 essay "On the Chunking Negotiations", is in the italics which normally denote a Mao quotation. The subsequent sentences thus read as a contemporary gloss on the original Mao statement, and in this way their significance is emphasised.

An interpretation of the Nixon visit that is likely to be acceptable is the one publicised by the North Koreans in Nodong Sinmun of August 8. This stressed the "bankruptcy" of American policy in Asia and claimed that "the visit to China, which Nixon plans in such a predicament is not the march by a 'victor' but a trip of the defeated". It also quoted a comment by Kim Il-sung that "this is a great victory of the Chinese people and a victory of the world revolutionary people". The Chinese have not publicly taken this line themselves but Peking Radio's home service (August 10) has twice broadcast the text of the North Korean editorial, and it is likely that this interpretation will be much used in discussions among party officials.

U. S. AND PEKING: A FRENCH VIEW

by Robert J. Donovan

How do the best-informed Europeans regard President Nixon's new China policy and his impending visit to Peking?

A conversation this week with an eminent diplomat, Maurice Couve de Murville, foreign minister of France during the De Gaulle regime, offers an insight.

Having fairly recently returned from China himself, what does Couve de Murville feel about Nixon's plans?

"I think it is only common sense for the American President to begin to enter into relations with China", he said. "It ought

to have been done a long time before. From the domestic political point of view it needed some courage, I suppose, for President Nixon to act.

"Potentially, China is the biggest power in the world. Actually it is not that, but, because of its potential, it already plays an enormous role. Of course, China is the center of that part of the world where things are going to happen in the next generation.

"The international game has been blocked in Asia for 20 years by the United States, which did not see fit to acknowledge China's existence. It was an artificial situation and could not last forever. Now there is going to be a political game in that part of the world with all the countries directly affected participating".

The Big Obstacle

What is the chief obstacle in Sino-American relations?

"It is Taiwan, not Vietnam. Vietnam is not the proposition. Taiwan for the Chinese is a Chinese problem, a national one. Vietnam is a foreign problem. It is not the same.

"You can imagine diplomatic relations between the United States and China with the Vietnam war going on, but not with the United States recognizing Taiwan as the Chinese government or as a foreign country vis-a-vis China. The theory that it is a separate country is unrealistic".

What bearing, then, will China have on the war?

"It is impossible to imagine that the Vietnam situation can be solved without the participation of China. That is just a fact of life.

"If you are really trying to disengage yourselves, to stop the war, to recall your forces, then you are aiming at the political settlement which has always been the only way out. If you think of political settlement, you can't do it without the participation of China. China is more directly involved than the Soviet Union.

'54 Geneva Accord

"Political settlement is another way of saying that those countries of Indochina must be free of any foreign intervention, be it of the United States or China or any other country. In other words, it is the Geneva settlement of 1954, which means neutrality and no foreign intervention.

"China will cooperate in bringing this about, of course. It is in China's interest to do so. It is in their interest to see the war stopped at their door and to make sure nobody intervenes in those countries of Indochina - nobody including themselves.

"If there is any logic in President Nixon's new approach to China, the United States is trying to disengage from Vietnam".

What about the situation coming up in the United Nations this fall over the seating of mainland China?

"I think you are in a very difficult position, because in effect you have the entire world against you. This is so if you want to keep the position that there are two Chinese governments - one in Peking and one on Taiwan - or if you want to have one China and one Taiwan. That is not going to work.

"The problem for you, I imagine, is the military position. You are sort of allies with Taiwan. You have military forces there and the 7th Fleet and all that. I don't think the security of the United States depends on Taiwan. You have positions of strength all over the Pacific, not only in your own territory like Hawaii, but in the Philippines, Japan and other places. You don't need more".

Helped '64 Tie

As foreign minister, Couve de Murville helped negotiate the arrangements under which China and France resumed diplomatic relations in 1964. Now that the United States is heading in the same direction, do the results of recognition seem satisfactory to France?

"The results have been good. But when we recognized China it was an enormous scandal in the Western countries. We were told we were playing against the free world. But from our point of view it put an end to an abnormal situation. We have developed our relations with China both in politics and in trade".

What of the future in Vietnam?

"Your preoccupation is with having a non-Communist regime in Saigon. That is really what you are seeking for reasons of prestige much more than for reasons of national interest.

"Why do you care? There is going to be a South Vietnamese regime. No person can say what it will be like. The only thing that you and anybody have to worry about is that it is an independent regime, not a satellite of anybody, be it of the U.S. or China or the Soviet Union. As long as it stays a national

regime it will be alright. The regime in the North is a national regime.

"It is a fact that foreign intervention, which is American intervention in Vietnam, has a way of identifying what is Communist and what is national. What I mean is that wherever you intervene in Southeast Asia those who are against you are the Communists.

"It is the same in Thailand now. With occupation you have succeeded in creating opposition which is both national and Communist. It is the same in Laos and Cambodia. That is the real domino theory. You are developing Communism by intervening, because the only reaction against foreign intervention is the Communist resistance".

(International Herald Tribune)

TOWARD DETENTE WITH PEKING

by Anthony Eden

A major cause of difficulty in handling Far Eastern affairs in recent years has been lack of contact between the United States and mainland China. Admittedly, such contact would not of itself have prevented grave differences over such a contentious issue as Indochina, but it could conceivably have provided an opportunity to stop their escalation into war.

If there was earlier too much optimism as to the strength and durability of Kuomintang China, there was later too much determination to avoid direct communication with Communist China in the conference room or even in informal exchanges outside of it. Even the experiment of an Anglo-Soviet chairmanship of the Indochina conference was an inadequate substitute for direct contact.

Against this background President Nixon's decision to visit Peking is to be welcomed, and its skillful arrangement to be applauded. Whether this visit results in any agreement or not, it will at least provide an opportunity for both parties to move at last to a middle course of policy in which both sides realistically assess their mutual attitudes and interests. If this could be achieved, even after a period of years, there would be a real gain.

There are factors in the present situation which should be helpful to both sides. During the long months of the Geneva Conference of 1954, I became increasingly convinced that the Chinese sincerely believed that any American military presence on the Asiatic mainland must be directed against them. Nor is such a belief altogether extraordinary in the light of some of the language then being used by the China lobby. Now there is no room for any further misunderstanding on this score.

Stating the Solution

The ideal solution of the Indochina conflict is easier to state than to execute. It should aim at the guaranteed neutrality of the area, Laos and Cambodia at once and Vietnam over an agreed period which gives North and South their independent life meanwhile. There could be advantage for all in such an outcome, even for Hanoi.

There is another element in the situation which is not entirely new but has become more acute in the last few years - Sino-Soviet relations. While China will never take any action which she would regard as a betrayal of North Vietnam, Peking is certainly as deeply concerned with the 2,500-mile frontier with Russia as with any southern problem.

Nor is the position of the United States uninhibited. Even China's membership in the United Nations, desirable though it is, should not be bought at too high a price; but some change in Formosa's present overemphasized representation will obviously be inevitable.

Danger Signals

All the signs are that the remaining years of the 20th century will be more anarchic and dangerous than those which we have lived through. In such conditions it is especially urgent to reduce the risks, which is not the same thing as buying a little present ease at the expense of greater trouble in the future.

Just as, in Europe, the way to improved relations with Soviet Russia can be found only through the closest ties between the United States and the Western European countries, so progress in negotiation with China will call for the maintenance of solidarity in Southeast Asia and of friendship with Japan.

The aim should be to work slowly toward a new relationship between the leading powers concerned, among which Japan must certainly be numbered. There is a possibility of making progress in this way, but only if the temptation is firmly resisted to sacrifice past friendships or to weaken the position of other developed or developing countries in Asia or Europe.

The American administration will have all these difficult equations well in mind; and I have no doubt that the Peking government will also be conscious of most of them and have others of its own to ponder. The chief hope is that both parties will understand that their relations over the years have been sharper than they need have been. Certainly some reduction in tension and some clearer comprehension of each other's point of view could make life easier for these two great powers and for the wider world around them.

FRESH MOVE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

A new phase in Sino-Japanese relations may open as a result of the personal welcome accorded by Prime Minister Sato to Wang Kuo-chuan, Vice-Chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who is the first CPR official with whom Mr Sato has spoken since he assumed office. The occasion was the funeral on August 26, 1971 of Kenzo Matsumura, a senior member of the Liberal-Democratic Party and staunch advocate of friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples.

Shaking hands with Wang before the ceremony, Sato thanked him for making the long trip from Peking and asked him to convey "his best regards" to Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Earlier, Sato had told newsmen that if a suitable moment occurred he would confer with Wang on the subject of future relations between their two countries (Kyodo, August 26, 1971). However, apart from the encounter at the funeral ceremony no other meeting has been reported.

Wang had talks with Tomomi Narita and other officials of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), to whom he explained that there was nothing surprising about the proposed talks between President Nixon and Chinese officials since China had maintained its dialogue with the United States at ambassadorial level in Warsaw for the past 16 years. He also reiterated Chinese views on the need for continued struggle against US aggression and on

Indo-China and Taiwan, (Kyodo, August 27, 1971).

The same day, Wang had talks with Takeo Miki, former Foreign Minister; Kenzo Kono, President of the House of Councillors, and Seiichi Tagawa, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Member of the House of Representatives. Wang was present at the inaugural meeting of the Japan and China Agriculture and Farmers Exchange Association (Kyodo, August 27).

On August 28, he talked with Hideji Kawasaki, an LDP member who is to visit China in September. During a meeting the same day with Kanzo Nakajima of the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (orthodox), Wang extended Chou En-lai's invitation to the Association to send a mission to Peking. Nakajima expressed the hope that this visit would take place in late September.

One of the successes of Wang Kuo-chuan's tour was his attendance at the joint meeting in Tokyo on August 29 of the two factions of the Japan China Friendship Association (orthodox) which have united for the first time since their split two-and-a-half years ago. (Kyodo, August 29, 1971). (The original Japan China Friendship Association split in 1966 into the JCFA and the JCFA (orthodox). The latter then split again into two rival factions; it is these two elements which have united.) In its account on August 29, of Wang's speech to the joint meeting, New China News Agency omitted all references to splits and factions, concentrating on the unanimous and overwhelming support of the JCFA (O) for overthrowing the reactionary Sato Cabinet and realising the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations.

Wang has meetings with leading businessmen in the coal and steel and other industrial fields. He also had long discussions with the representatives of Korean residents in Japan, at which joint struggle against Japan's restrictions on Korean emigration and immigration figured prominently, (Kyodo, August 29).

In the course of discussions with Ikko Kasuga, Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) Wang said he would pass on the DSP request to send a mission to the CPR. Kasuga advocated a visit by Sato to China and asked Wang if the Chinese would be prepared to accept such a visit. Wang's response was along the conventional line that such a visit would depend on whether the Sato Cabinet would change its China policy.

(Kyodo, August 30). Wang's visit ended on August 31.

On August 30, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda expressed in a news conference his wish to visit Peking to discuss ways of restoring diplomatic relations. "There is the need to tackle China problems on the assumption that diplomatic relations should be restored between the two nations. I will unhesitatingly go to China", he said (Kyodo, August 30, 1971).

The Managing Director of the Japan China Memorandum Trade Office of Tokyo returned home on August 29 after a month in Peking, during which agreement was reached on beginning talks on the 1971 Memorandum Trade Agreement on or around November 10. He also secured Chinese agreement to the enlargement of the Liaison Office staff from six to ten. Before these negotiations get under way, however, a high-powered businessmen's mission is hoping to visit China to have exploratory talks with Chinese industrial and other commercial organisations. (Kyodo August 30 and 31, 1971).

While Wang was in Japan, he appears not to have met the pro-Chinese factions of the JCP. But at the same time the Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party (pro-Soviet) has been busy maintaining good relations with Communists in Romania, Italy and North Vietnam. Chairman Miyamoto travelled to Romania via Moscow, where he talked with Suslov and other Soviet party leaders but did not meet Brezhnev - though this would normally have been expected by accepted protocol standards. No startling alliances are expected to result from the current tour which, it is thought, is designed to confirm the existence of a common concern for the independence of smaller parties within the Communist movement.

CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE

China's re-emergence on the international scene has been nowhere more apparent than in Eastern Europe. Peking, in its efforts to expand Chinese influence in that area, has over the past year re-posted ambassadors in all East European capitals, restored commercial ties and hosted a number of high-level delegations from Eastern Europe. Rumania and Yugoslavia have received perhaps the heaviest attention from Peking in recent months.

In June, Peking was host to Rumanian President and Party

chief Nicolae Ceausescu. The lavish treatment given Mr Ceausescu throughout his visit underscored the special regard in which his country is held in Peking. A member of the Warsaw Pact alliance, Rumania has nevertheless consistently taken an independent stance on foreign policy issues and rejected the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" for Communist states, which Moscow invoked in 1968 to quell the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Rumania is also the only East European country that has remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Premier Chou En-lai, speaking at a Peking rally on June 8 for the Rumanian President, observed: "Medium and small countries in the world are uniting to oppose the hegemony of the 'super-powers' . . . and this has become an irresistible revolutionary line". The Rumanian Government has insisted that Communist states should enjoy complete independence, without any interference in their internal affairs by another Party. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr Ceausescu, in response to Chou's remarks, should have rejected the principle of uniting to oppose the "super-powers". He noted, rather: "The solution of the major problems facing the world today requires the active participation of all countries, big, small or medium".

Peking and Bucharest pledged to expand bilateral ties in a joint communique signed on June 9 by Chou En-lai and President Ceausescu. The Rumanian leader thanked Peking for a loan negotiated last November, which Japanese Foreign Ministry sources estimate amounts to \$244 million. This ranks the PRC second only to West Germany among Bucharest's creditors. China also gave Rumania over \$26 million worth of goods as flood relief last year.

Three protocols to the Chinese loan were signed in Peking in March during the visit of Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu. The main protocol, among other things, provides for the supply by China of complete industrial plants. Reports from Bucharest, meanwhile, claim that Chinese-Rumanian trade rose by 187 percent in the 1966-1970 period, as compared to the first half of the 1960's. Two-way trade between the two countries increased by one third in 1970 alone.

Muted Polemic

A slow but steady improvement in Sino-Yugoslav relations

was underlined in June by the visit to China of Belgrade's Foreign Minister, Mirko Tepavac. His arrival in Peking followed by only eight days that of Nicolae Ceausescu. Mr Tepavac said he had come to Peking to discuss political, economic and cultural cooperation between his country and the PRC. He lauded the renewal of Sino-Yugoslav economic ties and noted that the Zagreb International Fair and a Yugoslav industrial exhibition in Peking, planned for December, would open up new possibilities. PRC Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien, in his response, praised Belgrade's policy of non-alignment and its resistance to Soviet pressure. He also pledged China's support in Yugoslavia's "struggle to oppose foreign aggression".

Although Yugoslavia recognized the PRC in October 1949, ambassadors were not exchanged because of President Tito's conflict at the time with the Cominform. Formal diplomatic relations were not established until January 1955. Relations broke down in 1959, when Peking embarked on a vociferous campaign against Tito's "new revisionism". Later, as the Chinese leadership began to lose faith in Soviet policy, Peking unleashed an assault against the Yugoslav leadership that was, in reality, the first public criticism of Nikita Khrushchev. The Sino-Soviet dispute subsequently turned into an exchange of recriminations by proxy. Peking attacked Moscow by denouncing Yugoslavia, while Moscow returned the attack by denouncing Albania.

This situation took a dramatic turn in August 1968, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Peking suddenly found itself strangely allied with Belgrade in condemning Moscow. The public side of the Sino-Yugoslav polemic was subsequently suspended, and customary references to the "revisionist Tito clique" dropped from usage in the Chinese press.

The first tangible result of the thaw in Sino-Yugoslav relations appeared in March 1969, when Belgrade's Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade visited Peking to sign a trade and payments agreement. His visit marked the first ministerial contact between the two countries in ten years. In November of that year Peking and Belgrade agreed to restore diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Belgrade posted its ambassador in Peking in May 1970; Peking's envoy arrived in Belgrade in August of the same year.

Peking-Prague Ties

Czechoslovakia was the last country in Eastern Europe to which China reappointed an ambassador, attesting perhaps to the troubled relations between the two countries in recent years. Tsung K'e-wen, Peking's new envoy, said on presenting his credentials that basic disagreements between his country and Czechoslovakia should not be an obstacle to the normalization of state-to-state relations. President Svoboda noted that conditions existed for further development of trade and for renewing co-operation in other fields.

Prague's unqualified support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet polemic has figured prominently in its relations with Peking. In July 1963 the Czechoslovak Government expelled three New China News Agency (NCNA) correspondents for circulating material critical of Soviet policy. Two members of the Chinese Embassy in Prague were later expelled for allegedly circulating material "crudely attacking" Czechoslovak Party leaders.

Prague's criticism of the Peking leadership was most pronounced during the Cultural Revolution. Peking, for its part, denounced the "fascist" occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 and condemned the Prague leadership for its alleged complicity with Moscow in the affair. In August 1970 Peking protested to the Czechoslovak Government for "unreasonably sealing off the Cambodian Embassy in Prague" and for providing diplomatic protection to the ambassador of the Lon Nol Government.

In recent months relations between the two countries have been highlighted by a mixture of polemics and moves to restore economic ties. In May, for example, Czechoslovak Party leader Gustav Husak declared at the Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress that the Chinese leadership in Peking is "enshrouded in left-wing pseudo-revolutionary phrases, and is oriented toward splitting the unity of the Socialist countries". His remarks were made less than two weeks after Peking and Prague had concluded an agreement on the exchange of goods and payments.

(Current scene - Developments
in Mainland China)

SOVIET PRIORITIES IN INDONESIA

Although the outcome of Indonesia's general election, officially confirmed on August 7, did not gratify Moscow's hopes of seeing a sizeable leftist element returned to parliament, it is unlikely to alter Soviet plans for improving relations with Djakarta. Indonesia's growing importance in South-East Asia as she emerges from the disarray left in the late ex-President Sukarno's wake makes her important to the Russians, while her willingness in principle to come to terms with Peking, if the Chinese were to cease their subversive activities in Indonesia, is an added incentive.

Moscow's search for a rapprochement is discernible despite the continuing hostility of its propaganda and its long-term aim of advancing the cause of Communism in Indonesia. A recent book, Economy and Economic Policy of Indonesia, 1945-1968, put out by the Eastern Literature Division of the Nauka publishing house in Moscow, indicates that the current tactic is to criticise Sukarno's handling of the economy, which received heavy Soviet backing at the time, in order to facilitate the approach to his successors. Some Soviet sources are still reluctant to condemn Sukarno's more orthodox policies such as nationalisation. For instance, a review of the book by the Novosti Press agency (July 8) questioned the author's assertion that Sukarno's nationalisation of Dutch property in 1957 had added to the "financial and economic instability and confusion" characteristic of his government and suggested that a Marxist researcher should look for the true causes of the corruption. Novosti did not, however, dispute that "confrontation" with Malaysia - approved by Moscow at the time - had been conducted at the cost of economic sacrifices by the people or that the rising cost of living and mass unemployment had played a part in Sukarno's overthrow.

The book displayed considerable sympathy with the present government in the problems it faces and was not entirely critical towards its economic policies. But it made much of the alleged danger of accepting large-scale Western capital investment and credits. Moreover, much of the government's economic success since 1965 was ascribed to favourable climatic conditions and "capitalist" aid and a warning was given that Indonesia could not continue to rely on these.

The hope of undermining the West's economic influence

probably underlies the Soviet leaders' more forthcoming attitude to President Suharto's government. The agreement reached in Moscow in August 1970, by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, for repayment of the debts incurred by Sukarno to be rescheduled over 30 years, was followed by a Soviet offer of resumed economic aid. A technical delegation from the USSR, due in Djakarta on August 24, will examine two Soviet projects suspended in 1966 - a steel mill and a superphosphate plant - with a view to completing them. The Russians are also offering a market for Indonesia's two principal cash crops, rubber and coffee, in exchange for Soviet machinery. In March, Mr Malik reported that the Soviet Union was ready to sell spare parts for the many ships and aircraft supplied to Sukarno which are now out of service.

However, Ministers in Djakarta have explicitly rejected trade on the basis of the Soviet Union's usual method with the developing world, the barter system. The Trade Minister said in March that Indonesia would only deal with Moscow on a cash payment basis, and commented that Soviet willingness to barter machinery against raw materials reflected political motives as well as an awareness of Third World needs. On March 25, the Foreign Minister also emphasised that the "easy terms" on which the Russians had offered to sell military spare parts did not imply a credit arrangement. But Soviet foreign trade organisations have offered Indonesia credit for other purchases.

Concern at interference

The Indonesian leaders' circumspection also stems from their fears of Soviet interference in their internal politics. On June 5, Djakarta Radio reproved Soviet broadcasters for intervening in the election by putting the Communist case to the electorate on issues which were already being handled by the legal political parties. It also warned against clandestine Communists who contrived to be elected to parliament on legal party programmes and who, once in power, obeyed the instructions of the banned Communist Party (PKI) leadership. For more than a year before the election, which was held on July 3, Moscow Radio had attacked the government's measures against the PKI and derided the election as a "farce". Yet Moscow showed enough interest in their outcome to use left-wing emigrés in the Soviet Union,

quoting from their own publications, as propagandists over Moscow Radio. After the abortive coup of 1965, members of the PKI and of the extremist wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI-ASU) took refuge in Moscow, from where they now urge the remnants of the PKI to fight "colonialism and imperialism" and eradicate "feudal rule" in Indonesia.

A notable feature of the election was the failure of the Nationalist Party (PNI), the largest party of the Left and Moscow's favourite, to emerge in any strength - suggesting that the appeal of Sukarno has considerably diminished outside Communist Party ranks. Unlike the Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Scholars' Party), which was runner-up to the pro-government Sekber Golkar (Functional Groups Organisation) and increased its majority in some constituencies, the PNI failed to hold its 1955 supporters. While Sekber Golkar won 72 percent of the elective seats in parliament, the success of Nahdatul Ulama points to the freedom of the poll.

The Soviet international weekly publication New Times (No. 29) asserted that the elections had been manipulated. It claimed that members of the opposition parties had been wrongfully detained as Communists, though the evidence shows that many PKI members have indeed penetrated the other parties - one of them, Soeharto, rising to be Chairman of a branch of the Moslem Party (Parmusi). At present Moscow urges its followers from the PKI, which it describes as the "Marxist-Leninist" group, to use parliamentary methods, and in a commentary on June 14, Moscow Radio recommended united front tactics. The PKI should align itself with "all anti-imperialist forces" to form a "progressive" government, it said. Commemorating the PKI's 51st anniversary on May 23, the radio urged unity with all "patriotic" forces and told the Communists to "expand political work among the masses".

Moscow Radio on June 14 also warned PKI members against the "harmful" and "adventurist" influence of Mao Tse-tung, and a New China News Agency report (July 4) of a statement issued in Peking by Jusuf Adjitorop, self-styled "head" of the PKI Central Committee delegation there, corroborated the impression of a party divided between Moscow and Peking. Dismissing the election as a "fraud", Adjitorop attacked the Russians' line that parliamentary tactics were a valid means

to power, citing Mao's dictum that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". But any disagreement over tactics within the PKI is probably being magnified by the Communist Powers to serve their own dispute. Inside Indonesia, there seems to have been a temporary agreement among the leaders of the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions to sink some of their differences before the election.

THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

It lasted little more than a decade - from Stalin's death in 1953 to his deposition in 1964 - but the era of Nikita Khrushchev was critical for the Soviet Union and the world. There were other statesmen of stature and repute in his day - Eisenhower and Kennedy in the United States, Eden and MacMillan in Britain, De Gaulle in France, Mao in China. But the Khrushchev color and flamboyance, his crude panache, his occasional recklessness combined with fundamental shrewdness, made the decade peculiarly his own.

Nikita Khrushchev took the Soviet Union out of the dark night of Stalinism, out of that pervasive fear which made the Kremlin a symbol of terror for the Russian people and all their neighbors. He broke a long tradition in his country of eliminating political rivals with the bullet, and an almost equally strong tradition which judged all nations by their ideological purity - as determined by Josef Stalin. In a land that had long sacrificed bread to arms and factories, he paid more attention to bread.

His failures were numerous, and some of his ventures were dangerous in his own time and still carry a threat: He injected Soviet power into Cuba and evoked the missile crisis; he extended that power to the Middle East, with ultimate results that have not yet been made manifest; he exacerbated relations with China, and the end of that drama is not in sight. Much of this turmoil may be attributed to the defects of the Khrushchev qualities.

Yet Stalin's rigidity would not have tolerated a Nasser as ally. Geared to the tank columns and swarming infantry of his great patriotic war he would not have vaulted to the stars, like Khrushchev's cosmonauts, or leaped the Atlantic with missiles. Neither could Stalin grasp the total threat of nuclear destruction involved in his own rejection of any curb on the Soviet Union's

nuclear development; neither could Stalin conceive of "peaceful coexistence" - that phrase which Khrushchev took from Chou En-lai and Nehru.

That Khrushchev died a "nonperson", his passing marked initially by an atmosphere of punctured secrecy that paid no honor to him, or to the government that succeeded him, indicates that the Byzantine thinking of the Kremlin has not altered completely since Stalin's day. That he died in bed seven years after his fall from power, shows that it has altered considerably. And if a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and Middle East on the brink of war may be considered part of his legacy, so are the Berlin agreement, the SALT talks, the prospect of a European security treaty.

For good or ill, Nikita Khrushchev, with his peasant cunning and his extravagant gestures, forcibly propelled the Soviet Union into the real world of the last half of the 20th century. And on balance, the world must find more good than ill in his highly flavored reign.

(International Herald Tribune)

SOVIET MILITARY CHANGES SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

Realistic Russian War Games

Summary: A new study of Soviet military power highlights the changes since the Khrushchev era. The technocrats are on the way up, and the old soldiers are beginning to die. Naval expansion is well-known but not so familiar is the fact that real radioactivity is used in ground manoeuvres, and that the Soviet Air Force has become a formidable and flexible force.

Most observers agree that since Mr Khrushchev fell from power in 1964 Russia's military build-up has proceeded apace. There are divergent arguments about the policy behind it; some say Khrushchev's "minimum deterrent" posture has been abandoned in favour of "parity" with the United States; some say "superiority" is the aim; some say "pragmatism" which can mean many things. The arguments also continue over whether strategic policies are concerned with nuclear or conventional war, and whether with defence or attack. A new report - Soviet Military Power * - by Professor John Erickson

* Published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1.

of the University of Edinburgh, author and editor of several works on the Red Army and Soviet military affairs, spices this familiar field of argument by considering what is "new" since Khrushchev - and comes up with some interesting results.

By the mid-1960s the Soviet officer corps was by far the oldest in the world, almost to a man aged over 60, an "old boy net" in the literal sense, whereas in 1945 it was the youngest in the world. This can in part be explained by the politico-military arrangements in Russia: the political "collective leadership" is also old by Western standards (63 is the exact average age). There is at the moment no commander-in-chief of Russian armed forces, and the General Staff appear to carry out command functions. It has been suggested that a political figure could be designated supreme commander. "Planned rejuvenation" has in fact been going ahead, and although the old guard who have seen war service are still preponderant at the top, the middle ranks now contain younger, better educated men with technical skills. By the end of 1969 it was claimed that 80 per cent of the officer corps were made up of "engineer officers". There is also evidence of an increased managerial element in the general staff.

It is well-known that Russia has "closed the missile gap" with the United States in an amazingly short time: this report points up Russian preoccupation with gaining a "first-strike" position, and emphasises as well the support of other capabilities for the strategic deterrent, that is, Russia's capacity to wage general war if deterrence fails. The refurbishing of the ground forces, together with improvements in regional weapons systems demonstrates the seriousness of the Soviet preoccupation with waging and winning a European campaign with a variety of weapons; the use of nuclear weapons in the main battle areas seems nevertheless to be rated most likely. The report comments that training exercises conducted over "radio-active terrain" are made grimly realistic by the use of real radio isotopes.

Parachutists

During the "DVINA" exercises of Soviet Ground Forces in 1970 the "scenario" was a combined nuclear and conventional one and a force of 8,000 parachute troops with 160 vehicles was dropped in 22 minutes. This exercise illustrates the revolution in Soviet air-lift capability and increased logistical

and operational mobility of the Soviet Air Force which, Professor Erickson thinks, may well prove to be the most significant factor in the 1970s after the build-up in strategic weapons. The professor comments that "we are mesmerised by the small flotillas but the growing air transport armadas largely escape our attention".

The report comments on the Soviet naval presence since 1964 outside the main fleet areas, and states that this was to some extent in response to the shift of the "deterrent" to the oceans initiated by the United States. The report traces Russian naval expansion in the Mediterranean, and sees a similar pattern in the Soviet naval movement since 1968 suggesting the beginnings of a standing naval force for the Indian Ocean.

The report does not comment on satellites or the Soviet space programme, both of which are relevant to military matters. It seems likely that spy satellites have to some extent replaced high flying observation aircraft, and a glance at a globe suggests that the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean must be an important link in the radio and satellite tracking chain.

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ECONOMICS

BLOC INTEGRATION: BALKAN STRAINS

Though prepared to play host to the CMEA Council, Romania stands firm against any form of supranational planning and like Yugoslavia opposes Moscow's version of Communist solidarity.

Only four days after the 25th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) ended in Bucharest on July 29, Moscow announced that a "friendly meeting" of East European leaders had taken place in the Crimea. Ostensibly on holiday, they were said to have voiced serious satisfaction at the CMEA's acceptance of a long-term programme of co-operation. In addition they "touched on" the development of the world Communist movement and other foreign problems, reaffirming the correctness of the 1969 Moscow conference decisions as a basis for unity. In fact, that meeting was notable for its acknowledgement of the divisions within the movement rather than for its contribution to cohesion, and the current lack of unity in the movement has been underlined by Romania's absence from the Crimean summit and by Moscow's scarcely veiled criticisms of both Romania and Yugoslavia for developing friendly ties with China.

The need to secure the position in Eastern Europe is clearly a major Soviet preoccupation following the announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking. However, public criticism from other Warsaw Pact members has not deterred the Romanian President from pursuing his own road. On August 9, he invited the leaders of two European Communist Parties now at loggerheads with Moscow - the Spanish party and the dissident section of the Greek party headed by Andreas Brillakis - to join him at Mangalia near the Bulgarian border. Others present included Portuguese, French and Irish Communists; Communists and Socialists from Belgium, and one Russian, Mikhail Lesechko, a Deputy Prime Minister and Moscow's principal CMEA representative. The occasion was said to have been marked by a comradesly atmosphere and expressions of Communist unity and solidarity. Not to be outdone, the Bulgarians gave a reception on August 13 for foreign Communists on holiday near Varna, though the only prominent figure mentioned was the Mongolian

leader, Tsedenbal, who also attended the Crimean meeting. The Bulgarian party First Secretary, Todor Zhivkov, echoed the Crimean communique's appeals for Communist unity based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism", citing the veteran Bulgarian leader, Giorgi Dimitrov, to reiterate that the criterion for "true" proletarian internationalism was one's attitude to the USSR.

Moscow's dissatisfaction with the present trend of Romanian foreign policy emerged clearly from articles in the Soviet and East European Press obliquely criticising Romania's course - to which the Romanians have responded at length and in uncontrite terms. They argue that their first duty is to build a fully developed society based on "Socialist patriotism" and that the broad anti-imperialist front must be unified. The Soviet aim seems to be to isolate Romania politically while discouraging other Warsaw Pact members from emulating her.

Mounting pressure

Pointed lectures were given by the Polish party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, on July 30 and the Hungarian weekly, Magyar Hirlap, on August 13, both of which were reprinted in the Soviet Press. Geared mainly to Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking, the editorial in Trybuna Ludu attacked the Chinese leaders for "anti-Sovietism", for trying to split the Communist movement and for deliberately neglecting the normalisation of their relations with the Communist States. There could be "no neutrality or ambiguity" about anti-Sovietism, the newspaper said, for a country's attitude towards the Soviet Union and its Communist Party was a touchstone of its devotion to the anti-imperialist struggle and the "fundamental interest" of the Socialist community - a warning clearly intended for Bucharest as well as Peking. Ceausescu's tributes to the "victory" of China's cultural revolution during his visit there in June seem to have been the target of the complaint that "all nods of approval" for Peking's policies amounted to harming Communist unity.

The Hungarian newspaper concentrated on the implications of China's growing interest in the "strategically important" Balkan area and claimed that Prime Minister Chou En-lai was planning to visit Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania later in the year

- possibly with the aim of establishing an "anti-Soviet axis". This could create an "extremely dangerous situation", Magyar Hirlap asserted. But reports from Belgrade suggest that the next high-level Communist visitor to Yugoslavia is likely to be Brezhnev rather than Chou En-lai.

While talks with the Russians would probably do little to alter the Yugoslavs' suspicions of Moscow, they might help to reduce immediate tensions. The Yugoslavs feel that any concessions must come from the Soviet side if relations are to be improved. Editorials in two Belgrade newspapers on August 16 were critical of military manoeuvring or other forms of pressure to force greater subservience to Moscow - though without naming the Soviet Union. Borba, organ of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance, rejected the Hungarian newspaper's story as a "nightmarish" hallucination, while the evening newspaper, Vecernje Novosti, complained that recent troop exercises amounted to a "new demonstration of force and pressure on those countries, primarily Balkan ones, which do not believe that this is the only and best way to protect Socialism and peace". Yugoslavia preferred negotiation and wanted the whole region to become one of peace "free from outside meddling".

The Zagreb Radio commentator, Milika Sundic, described the Hungarian newspaper's views as "palpably not its own", since most of Yugoslavia's northern neighbours were well aware of her views on blocs. Though there was no precise information about a visit by Chou En-lai, he said, Yugoslavia would welcome him as any other visitor seeking peace and international co-operation; moreover, it was "inane" to argue that relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR must be bad because Yugoslavia had good relations with China. Sundic attacked the "demonstrations of strength" along his country's borders, which he regarded - together with "a variety of articles and commentaries" in the Press - as ominous signs of the Soviet bloc's "concern". The publicity recently given by Hungary to the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty constituted a threat to the independence of Yugoslavia and of all those who did not wish to share a similar interpretation of "Socialist internationalism", he warned.

Troop movements

By mid-August, one series of Warsaw Pact exercises, in-

volving Soviet, Hungarian and Czechoslovak troops and apparently on a fairly modest scale, had already been completed on Hungarian territory. But there were reports that Soviet units would be sent to Bulgaria for exercises later in the month which might involve the passage of troops through Romania.

The Romanians have consistently opposed troop movements across their country without prior parliamentary permission. At the Geneva disarmament conference on August 3, the Romanian delegate reiterated that his country objected to all manoeuvres by the armed forces of one country on another's territory and called for the transformation of the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear weapons and foreign bases. The Romanian response to Moscow's latest propaganda campaign has been equally robust. Ceausescu, in a series of speeches during August, stressed each country's "right to decide its own road of development" whatever its relations with other States, and said it was "inadmissible" for another country to attempt to dictate economic or social development or the way a people organised its life, since the Communist movement no longer needed "a centre". Romania intended to continue to seek friendship and co-operation with all Communist States, he affirmed in Tulcea on August 5, in the belief that this would lead to greater unity.

The party newspaper, Scinteia, asserted on August 11 that the strength of the contemporary revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement lay in the fact that it was not restricted to countries with the same system or to organisations having "identical opinions and beliefs", but comprised a variety of peoples and social forces - and "often governments too". As the world Communist movement was a catalyst for all these forces, it was all the more important to restore cohesion to its ranks and to "abandon any narrow concept, any sectarian move"; the Romanian party would develop ties with all Communist Parties and States to consolidate unity, while expanding contacts with Socialists and democratic organisations in the West. The Yugoslav news agency Tanyug saw the article as a reply to recent "open and indirect criticisms" of Romania's policies and stressed Bucharest's willingness to co-operate with Social Democrats as well as Communists.

CMEA compromises

After the CMEA meeting, the Romanians were also concerned to underline the importance of their trade with the non-Communist world as well as with the Soviet bloc and to refute all suggestions that integration would be accompanied by the creation of "supra-national bodies" or by interference with national planning.

Scinteia on August 1 stressed that Romania valued CMEA as an organisation which could make an outstanding contribution to the economic advancement of its members - but only as long as it acknowledged each country's equality and sovereignty and right to decide its own development programme. Scinteia expressed particular satisfaction that the CMEA session had crowned two years of "laborious activity" with unanimous endorsement of the new comprehensive programme of integration.

In fact, both the communiqué on the session - attended by the Prime Ministers of seven of the eight member States, the acting Prime Minister of Mongolia and representatives from Yugoslavia (an associate member) - and the 25,000 word programme published a week later show signs of a Romanian hand in the drafting - possibly as a reward for Bucharest's support for the programme as a whole. The programme states that "Socialist integration proceeds on a completely voluntary basis and is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs and does not affect questions of domestic planning". The communiqué also notes that non-CMEA countries could participate in the long-term plan of activity, while the members themselves would continue to expand links with the developing world and with the capitalist States on the basis of "peaceful co-existence, equal rights, mutual advantage and respect for sovereignty" - Bucharest's usual formula.

However, the programme - even if it is at present only an outline rather than a formal agreement - is far-reaching. The process of integration may acquire a momentum which one country such as Romania would find difficult to resist. Most of the safeguards are on paper only and Romania remains dependent on Moscow and its close allies for supplies of all kinds and for over half her trade (though this is below East European average). Due to be implemented gradually over the next 15-20 years, the programme seeks to ensure adequate supplies of fuel, power and raw materials for all, to provide more modern

equipment, agricultural produce and consumer goods and to bring closer together the levels of development in the different countries. Mongolia is to be given special help, though she already receives large amounts of Soviet aid. The communiqué expresses the hope that greater integration will strengthen CMEA countries' defence capacity and by consolidating their political unity help to fight against "imperialism".

The means envisaged include more multilateral and bilateral consultations on policy, greater co-ordination of short- and long-term plans, intensified specialisation, particularly in science, technology and computerisation, and the pooling of efforts in the production of fuel, power and raw materials. Trade with non-member Communist countries and with "other" States, as well as within the CMEA group, is to be further developed - though the problems of quality, pricing and currency convertibility which act as impediments to trade with the West were largely glossed over. In intra-bloc trade, prices will continue to be determined on the basis of world prices, "stripped of the harmful influence of transient factors in the capitalist market" - which seems to mean continued acceptance of average world prices over a certain period as the starting point in bargaining.

However, there appears to be a new effort to make a reality of the "transferable rouble" - the unit of account devised to enable CMEA members to balance their trade multilaterally instead of through bilateral arrangements. The last CMEA Council meeting (in Warsaw in May, 1970) agreed that the work of the CMEA's International Bank for Economic Co-operation, established in 1964 to operate the transferable rouble mechanism, needed improving. Little progress seems to have been made and the injunction has now been repeated. A major difficulty is that acceptable goods are usually not available in exchange for the roubles since quality goods are already allocated in national plans. Hopefully the new CMEA document looks forward to the transferable rouble being used by foreign countries trading with the Soviet bloc, particularly the developing States, and even sees this "collective currency" taking its place alongside the major world currencies. Full convertibility of the rouble into these currencies, however, does not appear to be envisaged for many years - a realistic acceptance that the conditions for convertibility do not exist.

Long-term plans

Nothing was said about new tasks for the CMEA International Investment Bank, which was created in July, 1970, but which Romania joined in December, and the only organisational changes made were the upgrading of the Commission for Technical and Scientific Co-ordination and the formation of a Committee for Co-operation in the domain of planning - of possible future importance in moves towards a single CMEA plan - and a Commission for Post and Telecommunications. There appears to be a plan to extend the transmission and pipe lines for the supply of oil, gas and electricity to all member countries. But few of the long-term joint projects were referred to in detail, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, in an interview on July 30, mentioned only three: a metallurgical combine and a cellulose plan in the Soviet Union and a scheme to develop the manufacture of heavy-duty trucks in Hungary. The metallurgical combine, to be based on the ores of the USSR's Kursk field, is expected eventually to produce 10-12 million tons of steel a year, though to judge by past Soviet experience 20 years might be needed to bring it into full production. Moreover, the problems involved in reconciling the various national interests were referred to by many participants. A Moscow Radio commentator on July 31 spoke of both "objective and subjective" difficulties, while the Polish Trybuna Ludu admitted that the drafting of the programme was "not an easy undertaking as differences of opinion posed many problems". The Romanians too, noted the complexity of the discussions, but in general gave surprisingly little publicity to the high-level meeting in their midst. This and the almost obsessive assurances in the Press that Romania's national sovereignty would be fully respected in the new integration plans suggest that Ceausescu remains uneasy about the implications - a feeling no doubt intensified by the summit meeting in the Crimea to which he was not invited.

PROSTITUTION AND THE TOURIST TRADE

In 1950 Hungary closed its brothels and banned professional prostitution; the police registration of prostitutes was terminated at the same time. Five years later, it subscribed to the international agreement on the "suppression of the white-slave traffic and the exploitation of prostitution" which had been

signed on 21 March 1950 in New York. Paras. 282-287 of the Penal Code - codified by government decree No. 5/1961 - describe "professional prostitution" as a crime, as are "the promotion of professional prostitution", "the keeping of a mistress", and "white-slave traffic". In spite of the threat of imprisonment, prostitution has since then become active once more not only in Budapest but also in the provincial towns and summer resorts, especially in the region of Lake Balaton.

Articles published in the press indicate that Hungarian prostitutes prefer Western tourists, and on this account believe that theirs is an economic mission of genuine national importance. Miklos Morus, in a report on "Prostitution" (Elet es Irodalom, 13 September 1969) quotes a Budapest prostitute as saying:

We bring grist to the mill of the state. If anybody counted up all the hard currency the Western tourists and businessmen spend on us, some of our great and wise guardians of morality would be struck dumb. If the customer pays in dollars, we exchange them; if he pays in forint, he has already exchanged his hard currency to get the forint. And the money remains here either way.

A close connection between prostitution and tourism is indicated in Livia Mohas's article on "Girls on the Market" (Elet es Irodalom, 1 August 1970). In her opinion the existence of prostitutes "is now legally ignored". She quotes some young people's views on prostitution, including those of her 17-year-old son, that "it encourages tourism", "it provides hard currency for the country", etc. Mrs. Mohas thinks that although society does not legally recognize prostitution, it "makes allowances in the interests of business".

Denes Foldassy, in an article headed "The Italians Are Coming" (Dunantuli Naplo, 17 August 1971), reported that the Italian invasion of the southern Transdanubian town of Pecs has started. The youth of Italy, he said, are prevented from indulging promiscuous love-making at home by the "hard bonds" of public opinion. "In Hungary, (however) there are beautiful girls who are lovable and who just love Fiat cars. There is no prostitution, but moral standards are not so tight either". Foldassy does not talk in terms of prostitutes but writes of "dreaming girls" who stand about in front of Pecs's famous Hotel Nador trying to pick up Italians. Nevertheless, the dimensions of the Italian

invasion - there are more Italians this year in Pecs than West Germans and Yugoslavs combined - suggest that "the profession" is flourishing there.

In its weekly review, "168 Hours", Radio Kossuth (4 September 1971) dispensed with euphemism in its report on prostitution in Budapest and on the Hungarian girls' preference for Italians.

This program - which was introduced on 6 February 1971 deals systematically with "shocking" themes. For example, on August 7 it carried a report about an agricultural co-operative purchasing agent who had established a brothel in his Budapest apartment. The program reported in detail on how the brothel was run.

The September 4 program in this series dealt with the experiences of a group of 100 to 150 prostitutes - all of them 17 or 18 years old - on the basis of taped interviews. The beau ideal of these prostitutes is the Italian male, who, they say, appreciates the beauty of the female body and knows how to make love. Some Italian gain access to the prostitutes through agents on a fifty-fifty basis, although often they simply stop their cars and directly proposition the girls on the street. According to "168 Hours", some people believe that "Hungarian girls are the cheapest in Europe", that they will go to bed with anybody for the smallest foreign trinkets (stockings, panties, pullovers, etc.), and that this news has reached Italy - which is why so many Italian tourists visit Hungary.

Prostitutes can also be found in the Lake Balaton region, and it is said, that they specialize in Arabs during the winter. Hungarian men, they say, are brutal and don't know how to appreciate a woman.

The darkness of the picture that emerges from the program - which was full of spicy details - is not whitewashed by the denunciatory comments of honest citizens which were included in the broadcast, as was made clear by a closing passage referring to an earlier joke: "Unfortunately, the malaise and its far-reaching consequences are anything but a joke".

Time and again the Hungarian press carries reports of trials at which defendants are sentenced to imprisonment on the basis of paras. 282-287 of the Penal Code. But in spite of this, it is clear from the press reports summarized above that prostitution continues to flourish in Hungary.

CULTURE

SOVIET READERS AVID FOR CRIME FICTION

by Yuri A. Pismenny

Summary: Over the last few years, crime fiction has won itself a firm place in the hearts of the Soviet reading public, and this has placed the Party ideologists in something of a dilemma. Complete banishment of this popular literary genre from the Soviet literary scene would arouse a storm of protest from readers, but the regime disapproves of Western detective stories, because of the glimpse they provide of life outside the "socialist world". Even the native Soviet product contradicts the official thesis that crime cannot exist in a truly "socialist" society.

The detective story has at last "arrived" on the Soviet literary scene. Such was the unanimous opinion expressed at a round-table conference recently organized by Literaturnaya gazeta and reported in the February 10, 1971, issue of the same newspaper (p. 5). In the words of one of the participants, Nikolai Toman, author of the detective stories Imenem zakona (In the Name of the Law) and Silneye strakha (Stronger Than Fear):

The atmosphere for the development of the detective story (in the USSR) is favorable: the readers are interested, the publishers are interested, and to a certain extent even the critics as well. The fact that we have been invited to sit at the round table of Literaturnaya gazeta, a newspaper which follows the literary process, shows once more that confirmation of the detective story as a worthwhile literary genre depends on how seriously we ourselves are going to work.... the demand for this literature is great and the editions are large; this turns our head and gives the impression that we are writing what the people need and that we are doing a good job.

Yuri Klarov, co-author with Anatoli Bezuglov of the popular Konets Khitrova rynka (The End of Mister Slyboot's Market) and V polose otchuzhdeniya (In the Right of Way) also predicted that the detective story would "win more and more admirers as the years go by". The editors of Literaturnaya gazeta also spoke of its being on the upgrade in the USSR, but they revealed

why they are keen to see Soviet authors feed the home market: the detective stories at present available are nearly all by Western writers and being translated in "tremendous quantities". According to an article by G. Andzhaparidze in Literaturnaya gazeta (January 20, 1971, p. 13), most of the examples of Western literature to be found in Soviet magazines are detective stories, and this is not at all to the liking of the arbiters of the Soviet literary scene: Andzhaparidze complains of a veritable "epidemic" of foreign detective stories during 1970 in publications such as the Belorussian journal Neman, the Uzbek Zvezda Vostoka, Literaturny Azerbaidzhan, and even in the provincial Russian journals, Don, Prostor and Podzem.

Agatha Christie is the most frequently translated author (four of her novels were published in the Soviet Union in 1970 alone, making a total of fifteen of her books over the last five years, some of these appearing in such unlikely journals as Selskaya zhizn (Rural life) and Aziya i Afrika segodnya (Asia and Africa today). This British monopoly of crime fiction for Soviet readers annoys Andzhaparidze, and stings him to comment that "one does not have to be a specialist to assume that in many countries there are more important and talented writers than Agatha Christie". He mentions approvingly Georges Simenon, whom he describes as a gifted writer whose works are characterized by democratism, social criticism and profound psychological insight. However, since the best of his work has already been published in the USSR in two thick volumes, he questions whether it is "worth translating any old novel of his just because Maigret figures in it". Other popular writers, such as Stout and Chase, are given low marks, although the Soviet acknowledges crime fiction pundit that Chase has skill and ability to penetrate into the "darkest recesses of the human soul". The damning feature of his work is that he is a fervent admirer of the propertied class and his characters are to an inordinate extent at the mercy of their passions and urges.

The present Soviet "permissiveness" with regard to publication of foreign crime fiction may be gauged from the fact that in 1970 Zvezda vostoka, carried three detective novels in nine issues, and Prostor had three novels in seven issues (ibid.). Before World War II, as Klarov pointed out during the round-table discussion, this type of fiction "was not very widespread

in the USSR" - something of an understatement, since only a tiny minority of Soviet writers, such as Marietta Shaginyan, A. Adamov and N. Panov, occasionally tried their hand. The reluctance to produce crime fiction becomes understandable in the light of the following definition given in the Kratkaya literaturnaya entsiklopediya (Short Literary Encyclopedia) (Vol. II, Moscow, 1964, col. 606):

Detective literature is devoted to the unravelling of an involved mystery usually connected with a crime. The emergence of detective literature was promoted by the development of the bourgeois city, the growth of crime, the appearance of a regular police force, the dissemination of newspapers with criminal reports.

The Soviet advocate of purity in the nation's literature may well ask what detective literature - if it is a typical bourgeois product - is doing in a country which not only claims to be "socialist" but also has a long tradition of scorn for all light reading. At a time when in the West a mass reading public was enjoying the works of an Edgar Allan Poe and a Conan Doyle, pre-revolutionary Russia had to be content with the cheap adventures of Nat Pinkerton and Nick Carter, cooked up by nameless writers who were possibly out-of-work Russian students for the entertainment of Russian schoolboys. Literary critics and the "thoughtful" reading public looked down on literature written purely for amusement on the ground that literature should edify and deal with burning philosophical, social and political issues.

In an attempt to provide a convincing explanation for the detective story's triumphant march through the columns of the Soviet press, Andzhaparidze alleges that "the main argument of those who favor the continuous and copious publication of translated detective stories is that these books reveal the nature of the bourgeois way of life and the vices of capitalist society". He demolishes this "argument" by observing, quite correctly, that it only applies to "extremely few detective stories (principally Simenon's works, or British political detective stories with a pronounced anti-Fascist trend, such as the novels of John Le Carré or A. Hall)". He reminds the Soviet reader that the moral values exhibited by the heroes of most Western detective stories are "exceptionally equivocal, even at the most

fleeting glance", and that many stories convey the general impression that "nice, respectable and even generous millionaire-philanthropists exist".

Here Andzhaparidze is being disingenuous, because he is doubtless as aware as anyone else that foreign detective stories are hardly read in the Soviet Union for such ideological reasons as that they reveal the "vices of capitalist society" or the "nature of the bourgeois way of life". The Soviet reader simply enjoys them for their own sake, whether written by foreign or native authors, and whether or not they are of the highest quality, as a change from the uninspiring literary fare dished up to him year in year out under the name of "socialist realism". And it is only natural that circulation-conscious Soviet publishers, largely indifferent to what Andzhaparidze terms the "tremendous moral and spiritual losses suffered by the readers as the result of low-quality literary production," strive to satisfy this demand.

The ideologists are thus in a dilemma. On the one hand, crime fiction has won a firm place in Soviet literature from which, for political as well as psychological reasons, it can now hardly be dislodged (neither would it be economically expedient, since detective stories are a good money-spinner for the state-owned publishing trade). On the other hand, this sort of fiction must inevitably remain something of a foreign body in Soviet literature, a child of the West with no tradition in Russian literature, either pre- or post-revolutionary, and in many respects departing markedly from "reality", not to speak of the "socialist" variety. The Western detective story, moreover, is even something of a Trojan horse in Soviet literature inasmuch as it is an uncensored source of information about life outside the "socialist" world, a source of "ideological infection", in fact, since the life led by some of the characters of crime fiction may sometimes appear glamorous to the average Soviet reader. By no means everyone of them can feel revulsion toward the "good, rich philanthropists" and the "white Mercedes" which Literaturnaya gazeta frowns upon. Even the Soviet detective story runs counter to Party ideology insofar as it treats of something which theoretically should not exist at all in a truly "socialist" country, namely crime. As observed by the Short Literary Encyclopedia, the popularity of crime fiction is closely connected with an increase in the Soviet crime rate.

Not all those Soviet writers invited to express their views at the Literaturnaya gazeta round-table conference thought that Party ideologists should make such heavy weather of the readers' liking for the detective story. Nikolai Leonov and Viktor Smirnov submitted that crime fiction, not being a suitable vehicle for airing of social problems, should confine itself unashamedly to entertainment. This common-sense standpoint was, however, opposed by the majority of the discussants, as well as by the editors of Literaturnaya gazeta:

It is clear that the Soviet detective story, as represented by its best samples, is a fully-fledged genre in our literature which is capable of... examining socially significant problems and educating the reader - the citizens of our socialist homeland.

It is equally clear that a detective story forced into the ideological corset of socialist realism will scarcely be deserving of the name. But the Party has yet to make an official pronouncement on this issue, and so the discussion in the columns of Literaturnaya gazeta is to be continued.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich)

TEENAGERS' CRUCIFIXES ANNOY THE REGIME

A recent Hajdu-Bihari Naplo article by Zsuzsa Nagy suggests that the ostentatious wearing of crucifix neck-chains is fashionable among Hungarian teenagers. The author, a columnist on the staff of the provincial daily who writes a weekly feature called "Thursday Letters", said in a letter addressed to an imaginary teen-age acquaintance "Gabi" that she found it necessary to reject his request for a golden crucifix that she had inherited from her grandmother.

Gabi, she said, would undoubtedly fix the crucifix to a neck-chain and wear it ostentatiously to demonstrate his feelings and to annoy the older generation, because this sort of thing is fashionable today even among pop singers. Mrs. Nagy argued that the flaunting of a neck-chain of this kind would certainly be misunderstood by the public and said that a lot of people would take it as an indication of a Weltanschauung. Some religious people might even be offended by it. Although such neck-chains may provide a good vehicle for the display of teen-ager defiance,

they are not really worth the candle. She appealed to Gabi's firm materialistic creed and to his lack of concern with religious matters; she mentioned the Weltanschauung of his family, friends and teachers and called upon him to confess his materialism in every possible way and not to surrender his beliefs if his prospective mother-in-law asks for a church wedding. Any children he might have, she said, must be grounded in a proper ideology.

A man's outlook cannot be altered by administrative measures, but only through persuasion and the power of facts. There are people, she said, who hold that the main characteristic of "your age group" is defiance. In this case, however, rebellion as such is of no use; no one should, merely out of opposition to the established order, let himself drift into a situation where he has nothing to do. The true and inspiring revolutionary task is to disseminate and strengthen the scientific Weltanschauung.

If a young man wants to wear a neck-chain, said Mrs. Nagy, there are many examples of fine workmanship available in the shops from which he can choose.

The whole article clearly reflects the highly irritating effect which the wearing of crucifix neck-chains by certain Hungarian young people has on the authorities.

NEW BOOKS

MARXISTISCHE IDEOLOGIE UND ALGEMEINE KUNSTTHEORIE

by Hans-Dietrich Sander
ed. Kyklos-Verlag, Basel; and J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)
Tübingen, 285 pages, DM 37.

It is rather unusual to write an English review of a book that has been published only in German. However, the special importance of this book justifies an exception to the rule and this in turn conveys the hope that an English translation will be available soon.

The author, H-D. Sander, has carried out a search of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and many other prominent early socialists, in order to discover the theoretical basis and roots of the Marxist theory of art. The existence of socialist realism is usually accepted without any reference to the theoretical background. Sander's assumption that at least some indication in that direction had to be gleaned from the early Marxists was quite an obvious one to any serious student of the philosophy and history of art and aesthetics. His findings are revealing and of fundamental importance.

The book was written as a doctoral thesis. Consequently, the language is somewhat laborious, to say the least. Working through the text is a daunting, though nevertheless an extremely rewarding task. As far as I know, the book is the first of its kind to bridge this gap in the history of art. Its importance goes far beyond the simple fact of reporting what the sages of ancient socialism have or have not written on art.

It lays bare the foundation of a form of art which is loaded with a political content instead of with an expression of the artist's inner feelings.

On the negative side, it should be noted that the political subjects in the book are better formulated than their art historical counterparts. The relation and difference between basic concepts such as social romanticism, social realism and socialist realism are not always as clear as they should be.

These minor "Schönheitsfehler" and the absence of a good index of subjects do not detract from the scientific quality of the book. The fundamental importance and the great general importance of the subject justify an edition in (readable) English as soon as possible.

YUGOSLAV REVIEW ATTACKS SOVIET BOOK ON REVISIONISM

Summary: The Zagreb daily Vjesnik (8 July 1971) has published a very critical review of a new book in which the Soviet ideologist Sergei Trapeznikov (Director of the Science Department of the CPSU Central Committee) attacks "right-wing and left-wing revisionism". The review, by the paper's Moscow correspondent, Milan Bekic, takes particular objection to the fact that Trapeznikov describes the (Yugoslav) system of "self-managing socialism" as a type of "anarcho-syndicalism". The only Yugoslav theorists attacked by name in the Soviet work are Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Dedijer. Following is a translation of Bekic's review, entitled, "Another Book on Revisionism Published in Moscow".

Another book on revisionism recently went on sale in Moscow bookshops under the title At the Turning-points of History. Its author is Sergei Trapeznikov, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Director of its Science Department. The book was published by the Moscow Mysl' Publishing House, has 270 pages and is to be used by party cadres and by teachers in Soviet schools. The new book appears to be more complex and in its own way more interesting (above all because of its author) than previous works (on this subject).

In his book Professor Trapeznikov analyzes revisionist phenomena of the past and their present implications. Trapeznikov explains how "rightist" and "leftist" revisionism have always presented the greatest danger for individual communist parties and for "all healthy forces within the world socialist system".

In the sharp struggle "which is today being waged between two ideologies, imperialism most frequently and most successfully acts through revisionism".

Four Phases

The author begins with a historical survey of revisionism and analyzes "four historical phases of the struggle" against the deviations from the science of Marxism. Briefly, his conclusion is that the first phase began in the middle of the last century, when bourgeois ideology attempted to prevent the affirmation of Marxism as a science, but Marx's ideas prevailed.

The second stage began at the end of the last century; it was

characterized by the appearance of revisionism within the Marxist movement. The most prominent advocates of the revisionist tendencies were Bernstein and Kautsky.

The third period began after the October Revolution, especially after Lenin's death. The chief standard-bearers of revisionism at that time were Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rikov, Tomsky and the others. About each of them Trapeznikov reveals interesting and sometimes new details.

This was a phase when revisionism suffered its greatest defeat and when "Marxist-Leninist science, thanks, above all, to the tested pupils of Marx and Engels in the Soviet Bolshevik Party", celebrated its greatest victory over all types of revisionism.

Finally, the fourth phase deals with contemporary revisionism, and most of the book is devoted to it; in it the author sees the greatest danger. This phase, he says, began in the forties of this century.

Trapeznikov begins his discussion of this contemporary phase by analyzing the concepts of "the hot-head of contemporary revisionism - Milovan Djilas", who in articles published in the bourgeois press is said to have called on the reactionary forces to start a "crusading war against the Soviet Union". Trapeznikov added that Djilas' "friend Vladimir Dedijer also sharpens a knife to wield against the Soviet Union".

In the same hostile tone the author mentions that Djilas and Dedijer were expelled from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but adds that they still boast of having been partisan colonels. This leads Trapeznikov to attack them in the following polemical terms:

A question must be spontaneously posed: whom could they have joined if not the partisans? Hitler did not spare either the social democrats or the "rightist" and "leftist" revisionists.... There was no other way out but to join honest Communists who enabled them to become colonels.....

Trapeznikov then recalls the Hungarian events (in October 1956) which first showed what dangers emerge if revisionists are allowed to act within the socialist countries. They directly serve the reactionary forces and "carry out a common program".

This was demonstrated even more clearly - the author recalls - by the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Stalinists and Anti-Stalinists

The Soviet theorist further writes that the contemporary revisionists have lost every scrap of reputation and dignity because in their slavish service of imperialism they have gone much farther than all past revisionists did. The most prominent revisionists, says Trapeznikov, are those who have begun dividing communists into "orthodox and non-orthodox, conservative and progressive, Stalinists and anti-Stalinists; recently new terms have been coined such as neo-Stalinists and ultra-Stalinists".

In the opinion of the author these are the newest methods by means of which the strategists of the other side (the imperialists, of course) have made repeated attempts to water down the democratic socialist system from within. Thereby both "rightist" and "leftist" revisionists try "to increase their price by spreading nasty anti-Soviet smears, by trying to awaken the meanest instincts toward the glorious Soviet Party"....

Trapeznikov, however, also reminds his readers that the logic of the development is such that "all healthy forces continually narrow the maneuvering space available to the renegades from the proletarian front and fill their ranks with new fighters....". These healthy forces successfully resist all those "who speak of one's own model of socialism", a phrase which veils the reactionary petty-bourgeois substance of petit-bourgeois ideology.

At this point Trapeznikov speaks about the factors which lead to the appearance of revisionism in history, mentioning two sources and four causes.

The first source comes into being "due to the pressure of bourgeois ideology and uncontrolled petit-bourgeois actions"; the second source is a result of "the varying composition of the working class in different regions".

Trapeznikov lists the following four causes of revisionist activity:

1. Periodical scientific-technical revolutions in the productive process such as the one which is now taking place throughout the world;
2. The strengthening of the petit-bourgeois strata, especially in economically developed regions;
3. The activity of the bourgeois fifth columns, infiltrated into the Communist movement; and

4. Periodical changes of generations and the transfer of ideas from one generation to the other.

If we observe contemporary developments more closely, Trapeznikov goes on, we cannot but see that much of all this is taking place precisely in our era. In this way a whole "bunch of revisionist theories" have appeared, such as: "the theory of democratic socialism", "humanist socialism", "society of producers", "classless society", "industrial society", etc.

The author then deals with the bourgeois ideologists who, in our era, have been trying, by using the revisionists, to impose "capitalist economic methods upon the socialist economy". However, the experience of the construction of socialism shows that wherever the state planning system has been weakened, the uncontrolled market, economic system appears. This process is then justified by (the appeal to) "various roads to socialism" which is nothing but nationalism in disguise.

"Anarcho-Syndicalist Little Ideas"

Trapeznikov writes: "The idea of 'national communism' is now being proclaimed as a 'self-managing socialism' which is based on 'associations of producers'". He adds that all this is nothing but "a repetition of the old anarcho-syndicalist notions of Lasalle concerning 'workers' self-management' or the 'producers democracy'".

The author also writes that "Marxists and Leninists considers that under contemporary conditions socialist society can be administered only if it is based on the principles of democratic centralism. It is only the socialist state which can carry out this task "in the name of the working class". All other systems are unviable and dangerous.

Throughout his book Trapeznikov emphasizes the danger posed to the world socialist system by these above-mentioned and similar types of revisionism. This is why he repeats several times in his book that the time has come to settle accounts with revisionism. On page 63, for instance, he writes, using italics:

The current task is to liquidate the fourth phase of revisionism, to defeat it completely in an open ideological struggle; it is in this way that we shall fulfill our duty toward the international working class.

Or on page 126, where again emphasis is added through italics:

The end of this revisionism is approaching. It is absolutely clear that we have entered a new era in which revisionism will be destroyed and shattered.

It is not quite clear against whom all these threats are directed and how one should interpret them. As far as self-managing socialism" and the "workers' self-management" system are concerned, it is quite clear that such a socialism exists today only in a single country.

IN QUEST OF JUSTICE

by V.K. Sinha

A long wintry night of brutal repression ended with the death of Stalin in 1953. Thirty years of inhuman repression of even the most faint murmur of dissent had crippled Soviet cultural life. Denied all freedom of expression, Russian literature became dreary, mechanised, inane and insufferably dull. The novels written under the so-called "Socialist Realism" portrayed heroines whose exclusive and overwhelming passion was to overtake production targets. Heroes expressed sublime passion through love of tractors. The death of Stalin, chillingly portrayed by Sinlavsky in his *O n T r i a l*, left a whole generation of Russians in a bewildered and ambivalent state.

In 1956 came the secret speech of Khrushchev in the Twentieth Party Congress indicting Stalin and his rule. One almost feels that Khrushchev was expressing his and party colleague's feelings of long years spent in humiliating subservience to Stalin. The cult of leadership was rejected and the Party was proclaimed as the real guardian of the Revolution. Khrushchev's speech had consequences which probably the Soviet leaders never visualized. Several questions began to be asked for which no clear answers could be given: one of the principal questions which seemed to puzzle many young Russians was that if Stalin were such an autocrat, what were the present leaders of the party doing. Were they accomplices of Stalin's dark deeds? The Party could ill afford to give clear answers to these questions, lest it undermine its own authority.

Stalin's death led to a thaw. Writings began to appear which

seemed to break away from the dreary forms of socialist realism. Ilya Ehrenburg's *T h a w*, Dudintsev's *N o t B y B r e a d A l o n e*, promised a new resurgence. But the thaw somehow never led to spring. Stalin had been repudiated, but not Stalinism. The Party after initial laxity in control of literature, swamped down on all writing not in keeping with its ideological aims. Repression with occasional mild doses of laxity has continued till today.

However the Stalinist past could not be revived and questioning among intellectuals and writers could not be halted. From mid-fifties to mid-sixties, the writers began to clamour for greater freedom of expression, freedom to portray real emotions in literature, and to assert the autonomy of private feelings. However, the protesting voices did not question the validity of socialism, nor were the dissenters anything but ardent patriots. Their demands were for literary and not political freedom.

A turning point came in the history of protest movement in Russia with the trial of Siniavsky and Daniel in February 1966, a trial which would go down in history as one of the great landmarks in the struggle for freedom. It is this trial that jolted writers and intellectuals not only in the USSR but in the entire communist world. In the USSR itself, writers realised that artistic freedom could never be secured without at the same time ensuring civil liberties. An incipient movement began in Russia demanding just and equitable application of laws. A struggle in quest of justice was launched. What the protesters demanded was protection and guarantee of the Fundamental Rights which were already in the constitution of the USSR. What they further demanded was making real the Rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the USSR was a signatory. The Siniavsky-Daniel trial exposed most vividly the gulf between the professed law of the land and its actual perversion by the courts.

Since the 1966 trial, there has been a growing movement of writers and intellectuals, scientists and artists, even among some peasants and workers, demanding fair justice and greater freedom. This has been extensively documented in *I n Q u e s t o f J u s t i c e**, a remarkable collection of documents on

* In Quest of Justice, Edited by Abraham Brumberg, Praeger Publishers 1970.

protest and dissent in the Soviet Union today. It includes protests demanding artistic freedom; protests against perversion of laws; demands for religious liberty; and protests from 'subject' nationalities against "Russification". Most of the writings in this volume have appeared earlier in the journal *Problems of Communism*.

Brumberg's volume comprises three parts. The first part consists of 'Commentaries' - informative, well studied articles on intellectual and religious dissent, Soviet law and problems of nationalities. The second part of documents is the most extensive and remarkable section in the book. No mere reportage or analysis can do justice to this section of letters and petitions, transcripts of trials and appeals for justice. They are a witness to the great struggle for civil liberties going on in the Soviet Union today. Bukovsky and Litvinov, Grigorenko and Ginzburg, Galanskov and Larisa Daniel and host of others by their remarkable courage and sacrifice have shown that no totalitarian system, however strong and efficient, can destroy the urge for freedom. A Russian writer (unknown) while referring to the Siniavsky-Daniel trial, wrote: "Siniavsky and Daniel denied the charges of anti-Soviet activities. And well they might. Such writings as theirs can only be beneficial. Just think, old friend. In the courage of Siniavsky and Daniel, in their nobility and their victory, there is a drop of our blood, our sufferings, our battle against humiliation and lies, against murderers and traitors of all sorts. What is slander? You and I remember the Stalin era - the concentration camps on an unprecedented super-Hitlerian scale. Auschwitzes without ovens, where millions perished. We know the corruption, the bloody corruption of those in power who, having repented, to this day do not want to tell the truth...."

Censorship in the Soviet Union has compelled many young writers to seek "non-official" channels to express their creative urges. Typed and some even clandestinely printed, "underground literature" in Russia today "occupies a unique position in the Soviet literary world". A sample of this is included in part three of this volume. It includes historical and political essays (none of them could be even remotely considered slanderous of Soviet Union), literary criticism, short stories and poems. It includes a remarkable piece of literary criticism. ('In Defence of Pyramids') on Yevtushenko by Siniavsky, a touching story by Bukovsky, two

short chilling stories by Karaguzhin ('Stalin's Charm' and 'Stalin's Smile') and Kushev's (tried and convicted in 1967) long interesting poem 'Decembrists'.

The battle for freedom continues to rage in Russia, despite farcical trials and KGB threats. There are signs that the struggle for civil liberties in the Soviet Union is even assuming more organized form. The document included at the end in Brumberg's volume seems to confirm this. It is a petition addressed to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. And what is significant is that it is signed by a body (names are given) which calls itself "The Initiative Group for Defence of Civil Rights in the U.S.S.R.". No ringing down of curtains yet on the Soviet drama in quest of justice.

(Freedom First, Bombay)

BELGRADE MONTHLY REVIEWS ARTHUR LONDON'S
BOOK ON STALINIST TRIALS

by Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: Following the recent Yugoslav publication of Arthur London's book, The Confession, a Yugoslav reviewer of the work (for which London wrote a special introduction) described it as a valuable contribution in the struggle against Stalinism in Eastern Europe. The reviewer believes that London's revelations do not harm - contrary to the Russians' claim - but instead aid the socialist cause. The most important thing, he says, is to ultimately abandon the practice of worshipping the Communist Party and its leaders as deities.

According to a Yugoslav writer, only a "radical de-Stalinization" and definite rejection of the Communist Party and its leaders "as deities" will prevent the repetition of show trials of the sort described by Arthur London in his book, The Confession. The book, published in Slovenian, was recently reviewed in the Ljubljana monthly Delo by Zdenko Roter and then reproduced in the Belgrade monthly Gledista. (1) Arthur London wrote a special introduction to the Slovenian edition of his book extolling Tito and the Yugoslav Communists for having been the first to oppose Moscow's domination within the world communist movement. Said London:

One should also say that the main source of the revival of Communism after the (February 1956) 20th Congress of the Soviet Party and afterwards in the struggle against neo-Stalinism was precisely Tito's NO (to Moscow's diktat). Your nations, who after 1948 steadfastly maintained their own Yugoslav road to socialism - despite all difficulties stemming from the political boycott and economic reprisals of the socialist camp - were an example and encouragement for the Czech and Slovak people during the Prague Spring in 1968.

For Roter the crucial questions regarding London's book and the subsequent film based on his work are: 1) How was it possible for prominent Communists - Party members of long-standing - to confess to "the most disgusting crimes" during the show trials in East European countries? and 2) Do publications (and films based on material) such as Arthur London's book, which describe Stalinist methods, harm or help socialism? Roter said that in July 1970, the Soviet literary periodical Literaturnaya Gazeta, for instance, called Costa Gavras' film, "The Confession", "anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, Trotskyite, revisionist, etc". While employing this "tested method", said Roter, the Soviet paper failed to mention that "London in a documented way described his thorny road through Stalinist purges in Czechoslovakia". Roter also quoted Costa Gavras from a discussion in Zagreb in July 1970. Gavras was asked whether his film was not being misused by the enemies of Communism in their anti-Communist propaganda. Gavras answered:

Yes, our enemies can misuse it. They can use it for their own purposes. However, I believe that the rightist groups have benefited much more from the (Russian) intervention in Czechoslovakia (in August 1968) and from show trials in the past; I think that those actions have been more damaging than our film. He who claims that enemies can use our film for their purposes, presents the problem in a false way. Obviously this happens to be the only way to hide the real essence of the problem. (2)

In Roter's opinion - which is very likely the opinion of a majority of Yugoslavs - every exposure of Stalinist practices in the Soviet Union and elsewhere helps rather than harms

the socialist cause. If Arthur London and thousands of Communists in Eastern Europe were "persuaded" crimes which they never committed, believing that in so doing they had "helped the Party", such a way of thinking and acting must never again be repeated. It is the truth which in the long run will prevail, Roter said. He then continued:

I think that the correctness of such a claim is of great significance for the international communist movement and even for our own (Yugoslav) situation. The "purity" of a political movement cannot be preserved by concealing the truth, by glossing over in silence of mistakes, great and small ones, by claiming that any open discussion about mistakes might be used by enemies, class enemies or any others. Not only the passing over in silence about a truth but even the manipulation of it helps Stalinist drags within the communist movement to continue considering the Party and its leaders as deities. A radical de-Stalinization must definitely abandon such manipulations. Confess truth and not confess anything which is untrue (even though the interest of the Party is generally emphasized) is our conclusion concerning the confessions.

The crux of Roter's argument is that once and for all the Party and its leaders should stop being worshipped as deities. In this connection Roter quoted Yves Montand, the French film actor who played the role of Arthur London in "The Confession". Montand stated in Zagreb: "I believed in an almost religious way that the Party would solve all the problems". But the Party has been unable to solve the problems, Roter says; it has made them even worse. This almost pathological way of believing in the Party in a "religious sense", believing in the Party as a deity, says Roter, is best understood from Lisa London's letters to her husband while he was in prison. She wrote: "I do not doubt you, Gerard, but I believe in the Party. If the Party has approved such measures (against you), I keep telling myself then there must be something which justifies them... From the bottom of my heart I forgive you for everything bad you did to me, but I cannot forgive you for things concerning the Party".

In Roter's opinion it was not the tortures which London and many other Communists had to endure that made them confess to things they had never done. It is a pathological belief in the

Party - "in an abstract Party". Said Roter:

The religious cult of the Party, of its words and norms, of its leaders, of the decisions of its leading agencies, is an integral part of the Stalinist system. For this reason a real de-Stalinization requires not only the removal of the Stalinist police and its methods, but also ridding the Party of its "religious image" and changing the relationships within it.

For this reason Roter considers Arthur London's book an extremely valuable contribution to the struggle against the remnants of Stalinism which still exist in all countries of Eastern Europe.

(1) Gledista, Belgrade, No. 2, February 1971. The periodical, a theoretical monthly published by Belgrade University and the youth organization of Serbia, has only recently appeared on the newsstands.

(2) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 15 July 1970.

DIE MAOISTEN, PEKINGS FILIALEN IN WESTEUROPA

by Dr. F. W. Schlomann, 300 pages, ed. Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.

Chinese Communism is concentrating more and more on Western Europe. Schlomann has tried to recognize the scope of this slow and hidden penetration. He has discovered groups, people and organizations working under the guidance of Peking and Tirana. He cites also frustrated idealists suffering from some kind of political yellow fever after having been bitten by the Mao bug.

Schlomann's account of the role of Peking Embassies in the West is absorbing, as is that of trade missions, press agencies and the like.

In fact this is the first book to my knowledge, to give an outline of the organizational pattern of Communist China's silent approach to the West.

The book gives a good deal of data, distinguishing cautiously between "it is rumoured" and "it is". Attention is paid to the political - not the gastronomical - role of the Chinese restaurants and the organization in which the communist restaurateurs are often the leading men.

Nor has the writer avoided the embarrassing subject of the export of narcotics from China. It is sad to read that communist propaganda in the West seems to be financed largely from the proceeds of opium and other narcotic sales.

Especially interesting and important is the information on the many pro-Chinese splinter-parties in Western Europe, their struggle for life and, incidently, their ferocious fight to obtain recognition from Peking or Tirana.

Interesting and important though the book may be, it falls short on one very important aspect, viz. Chinese communist industrial and technological espionage. I can hardly conceive that Dr. Schlomann should have forgotten this and I entertain the hope that one day he will apply himself to this much refined practice of "brain-sucking".