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## IDEOLOGY

### SELF-MANAGEMENT - THE SOCIAL AND NATIONAL LIBERATION OF MAN

Every process, and this is particularly applicable to social processes, has its high points, condensed periods of time when steps are taken that guide development in new and more efficient directions, when society sloughs off that which has become an obstacle and makes an endeavour to find answers to questions, both passing and long-term in nature. During these condensed periods, all the contradictions deriving from development come to the surface. All social interests clamorously take the stage. Their confrontation and coordination frequently acquire dramatic forms and directions. At such times it is up to the politically conscious and vanguard forces to fight for and establish orientations that will propel social processes forward toward the set objectives and assure the maximum satisfaction of the vital interests of the largest possible number of members of the community.

The present changes in the political and social system in Yugoslavia are precisely one of these condensed periods, a crossroads as it were, and not for the peoples of the Yugoslav community alone. They are extremely meaningful also for the fate of socialism as a movement, in its entirety, precisely because they are in line with the struggle for liberation of the working class and man, for their total social and national emancipation, for self-management. Because of the comprehensive and profound nature of the social changes it engenders, self-management brooks no shortcuts. There are also objective contradictions, as well as difficulties and resistance that are subjective in source, hampering the more rapid advancement of self-management. All that might be summed up as obsolete, that traces its roots to the still living remnants of socio-economic relations from the near and distant past, that still exists in the institutions and political structures of Yugoslav society, in the minds of people, offers resistance and surrenders to what is new only with difficulty.

In the discussion of the constitutional changes; political system; socio-economic, class and national relations, some extremist demands have been put forward which are tantamount to the negation of the very foundations of these changes, the negation or contradiction of self-management and direct democracy; all

of these may be classified into two types of what we might conditionally call doctrinairism. The first type appears in the form of insistence on a monolithic society and the second on disintegration and isolationism. The champions of the former are unwilling to see their partners as equals, in unity, although on this depends everything that we consider unified and common, and also the future of the common good in the social, material and spiritual spheres; the latter are incapable of perceiving that in modern times all manifestations of life are bound together in their separation, that separateness can exist only in a relationship of interdependence with others, for otherwise this separateness is irrationally ostensible and temporary. Both extremes have political and economic monopoly inherent in them, irrespective of whether they are generated by such monopoly or generate it themselves. Both extremes belong to the category of historically obsolescent relationships or the ideologies of force; both forms of extremism are essentially undemocratic, intolerant, generators of mistrust and bias, social and national, showing lack of faith in human solidarity and engendering chauvinism.

The problem of the relationship between the general and the particular, the individual and the common good is as old as the human community itself. It arose when people began to live together in communities, no matter how primitive. What is involved here is material and social development, class relations, freedom and non-freedom - individual, class and national. Solving the problem of the relationship between the individual and the community, the particular and the general, depends on the degree of material culture, on the socio-economic foundations and the nature of relationships in production.

The stability and durability of a system have depended on the extent to which it solved this relationship. Class societies, systems of class rule in which human labour could be appropriated on the basis of property, inheritance, management or other class features, could solve this problem only temporarily. Parallel with material and spiritual development and progress, and the development of class struggle, this problem, or better said this complex of relations and interests, has always arisen in new form. Each time it was resolved in a new way, by evolution or revolution.

Socialism as a society in which socialist social relations are being created, also faces this problem. True, unequally and unevenly so, not only as between various socialist countries, but also in a single country at various stages of revolution and development. Yugoslav society also encounters this problem in its development of a modern socialist community.

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie and nationalization of the means of production do not automatically solve the problem. It can be solved on a more lasting basis only parallel with solution of the question of material and spiritual development and emancipation of the working class and man as an individual from all forms of alienation, social and national inequality and lack of freedom.

In Yugoslav society, the two extremes of monolithism and isolationism have appeared more intensively during periods of economic and political difficulties when society faces dilemmas or exists in a state of prolonged uncertainty. However, to the extent to which society's progressive forces succeeded in finding the right solutions to the economic and political requirements of development, to the extent that the foundation of the system and of policies was broader and the working man and working class played a greater economic and political role, to the extent that political and economic democracy, national equality and the sovereignty of peoples - that is, self-management, strengthened, to that extent were contradictions surmounted more effectively, the material and social roots of unitarism and isolationism nipped more easily and the less national intolerance, force and threats to man's liberty there were.

Many of the laws governing processes taking place in Yugoslavia are also at work in other places, both in socialist and capitalist countries, to one extent or the other. Unfavourable manifestations and tendencies or opposition of a social or ideological nature which appear in this country, although they may resemble or have some affinity with similar ones abroad, must first of all be conceived as reflecting the state of our material and social being. It is not inherent in the socialist democratic movement to label all disagreement, provincialism, spiritual and religious backwardness, the consumer spirit and egoism as representing deviations, anti-patriotism and treason. If the revolutionary objectives of society are to be achieved

then political and economic democracy, national equality and tolerance must strengthen through the advancement of self-management and direct democracy, thereby coordinating and solving the relationship between the individual and the common good, the narrow and the broad interest, and transcending disagreements and antagonisms, backwardness and provincialism, imitation and the uncritical acceptance of foreign, imported models.

The unified Yugoslav political movement personified by the Socialist Alliance, its all-people's democratic and patriotic character and the need for it to play a growing role in society, is the best political response to all those who are counting on disunity in Yugoslavia. The Socialist Alliance is at the same time an immeasurable political force on which rest both the system and the resolve of the community to defend by force of arms the integrity, sovereignty and democratic self-managed order of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and each one of its members.

A society like that of Yugoslavia, striving for revolutionary objectives and democratic transformation, is all the more in need of revolutionary theory and an ideological vanguard capable of elucidating various phenomena and mobilizing the working class and all the working people for implementation of the programme of economic and social development and steady advancement towards the goal of the full economic and political emancipation of the working class and the individual man.

The durability and stability of such advancement depend in large measure on the democracy and mobility of the political movement itself, on its ability to stimulate the achievement of consensus in line with self-management, to bring the interests of the working people on to the political and social stage, to make political institutions and the entire system more responsible to the social base and to line them up more closely with the authentic interests of self-management, direct democracy and national equality, to develop into an organization for political consensus and unified action in the endeavour to strengthen the system of self-management in terms of greater democracy for the masses and for the working class rather than for social elites.

The Yugoslav socialist movement has behind it a long road

and wealth of experience in the struggle for national and social liberty and for a humane society that fully releases human potentials. Running the risks of foreign pressures and internal conflicts and disproportions, underdevelopment and demands for modernization, our movement has at all crossroads found the strength and power to transform a step backward into a step forward, a crisis into incentive for new searches and new achievements; it has succeeded in avoiding the pitfalls of fatal disagreements with the working class which many others in Europe have not managed to evade. The present constitutional changes in this country, attended by heightened tones and rising temperatures, misunderstandings and confusion, demonstrate that social changes, particularly when they touch upon the sphere of alienated political and economic power, cannot unfold painlessly. They also show that at such times, progressive, clearly-oriented forces must play an active role, while taking into consideration and respecting the interests of the entire community and each individual member of it.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

#### GROWING SOVIET CRITICISM OF YUGOSLAV THEORETICIANS

Summary: Recently, increasingly harsh attacks against Yugoslav philosophers, sociologists and economists have been appearing in Soviet scholarly publications. A major target of the Soviet articles is the group identified with Praxis. The following report provides a short review of the two of the most important articles to have appeared recently.

The 70-year old philosopher M. B. Mitin, chairman of the Scientific Council for Problems of Economic Trends Abroad in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, published an article in the last issue of Voprosy filosofii in which he deals with the struggle against bourgeois ideology and anti-communism. (1) Mitin directs his polemics at Yugoslav communist theoreticians, claiming that they are basically tools of anti-communism. He bases this assumption on Yugoslav propagation of a thesis which is widely accepted in Marxist circles; namely that the Soviet model of society is not universal in nature and that it is not

binding for other socialist countries. Mitin does not attempt to analyze the arguments, but confines himself to claiming that this very thesis serves the weakening and undermining of the international socialist community:

In order to achieve this goal, the concept, so to speak, of long-term strategic action is initially spread - the concept of the "non-universality" of the model of the October Revolution, the thesis of the "conservative nature" of the Soviet Union which is allegedly blocking the contemporary progressive development of socialism, of both the social system as well as the international system, the thesis of the theoretical necessity of a growing pluralism in the social organization of a new type, of a pluralism which, according to the ideas of its propagandists, should bury general conformity in socialist development and hollow out everything international (and) held in common which is essential for the transition from capitalism to socialism, for the development of the unfolding socialist society and the further progress of communism. (2)

Following this enormously long sentence, the retired philosopher Mitin, who merits the title of party philosopher, attacks B. Pribicevic, professor at Belgrade University, and author of the book Relations Between Socialist Forces. (3) His judgement of this work is given in the following words:

Such a cynical book, claiming to be a theoretical analysis of contemporary problems in the world socialist system, but in truth aiming at decomposing and dividing the socialist countries and the international socialist movement, has not come out for a long time. (4)

Mitin is especially irritated by Professor Privicevic's claim that the "elements of pluralism are becoming more and more the typical characteristic of the life of a communist party". Mitin claims that everything speaks for the contrary, and refers to the resolutions of the international meeting of communist and workers' parties on unity in the struggle against imperialism, which were passed in the presence of guests who were representatives of the communist, national democratic and leftist socialist parties, at the 24th Party Congress.

#### Pluralistic Marxism Serving Anti-Communism

S. M. Morozov has published an article in the reputable

journal, Filosofskie nauki, dealing entirely with "pluralistic Marxism". (5) His polemics are directed against the Praxis group. He does not limit himself to the Yugoslav philosophers and sociologists, but deals also with those Czechoslovak communist theoreticians who were publishing their articles in Yugoslav journals in 1967/68 or emigrated to Yugoslavia. The main thrust of his attacks are directed at the Yugoslav Marxist theoretician Predrag Vranicki, author of the well-known work, A History of Marxism, and at the philosopher A. Stojkovic, Morozov cites Vranicki's thesis according to which the particular characteristics of individual countries result in practice, in a variety of theoretical concepts, not only in various methods. This thesis, which certainly conforms to the spirit of Marxism, is treated by Morozov as follows:

According to this "theory", every communist country and every communist party could and should have their own variation of Marxist philosophy and their own Marxist structure based on their own experiences. The other variations of Marxist philosophy, whatever they are called, are supposed to take their place next to dialectic historical materialism. Literally, this means that in such a case Marxism would not be the only theory, if it were branched out, but would consist of various currents and come from different roots... In essence, the theory of pluralistic Marxism denies the principle and criterium of a unified theoretical construction. Thus, it does not strengthen the ties between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice; on the contrary, it destroys them, as was the case with Karl Kautsky and other theoreticians of the 2nd International. (6)

Morozov concludes:

The problem of different variations of Marxism arose in revisionist literature as an attempt to contrast the social-reformist view with the outlook of Lenin's theory, an attempt which is basically directed at refuting Leninism as the theory and practice of the socialist revolution and as a new stage in the development of Marxist philosophy. The adherents of pluralism represent Leninism as the "Eastern" variation of Marxism... which basically complies with the conditions in countries with a large rural population, while the industrially developed countries need other "Western" variations of

Marxism, behind the mask of which the theories of rightist Social Democracy are generally hiding. The philosopher-revisionists try to apply the characteristics of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and to dissolve the latter in one of the many other philosophical "ism's". (7)

Particularly the Czech philosopher M. Prucha is attacked for having conducted such "experiments at watering down". The "pluralistic" theory, or as Morozov calls it, "polyvariated Marxism", is only an expression of:

the ideology of the petit bourgeoisie, which, as we know, swings back and forth between proletariat and bourgeoisie, according to which is exerting the greatest influence. By closely identifying with the concept of "national communism", a concept which by nature aspires to a division of the working class and to a division of the peoples in the socialist countries, pluralism is directed at the internal disintegration of socialist ideology. (8)

#### Yugoslav Emigrant Involved in Polemic

"Anthropological problems" play an important role in the Soviet discussions of Yugoslav and Czechoslovak theoreticians. The topic of "alienation" is of central importance. Characteristic of this discussion is the publication of an article by Stance Markovic Brailovic, candidate of philosophical sciences and a scholar at the Institute for Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences, in Voprosy filosofii directly after Mitin's article. (9) Brailovic is apparently a Yugoslav emigrant who has successfully made his way into the ranks of the Soviet philosophical elite. He claims that a group of philosophers in Yugoslavia, as well as outside the country (for example, the French Marxist, Roger Garaudy), are directing their efforts at a "rapprochement" of Marxism and existentialism; in other words, at a rapprochement with the phenomenologist philosophy upon which existentialism is, in part, based. In Yugoslavia, the philosopher G. Petrovic, as well as D. Filipovic and others, are supposed to belong to this group. The article contains a critical examination of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. As the latter had characterized Marx as the "philosopher of alienation", the Yugoslavs and "revisionist" philosophers in general are, in Brailovic's opinion, trying to use Heidegger's arguments for a Marxist "theory of alienation". Brailovic

concentrates above all on an article which Petrovic dedicated to Heidegger on his 80th birthday and in which Petrovic recommended that Marxists engage in a "fruitful dialogue" with Heidegger.

#### Mitin's Call to the Philosophers: To the Offensive

To be sure, these polemics against the Yugoslav philosophers and sociologists are part of the campaign being conducted by the Soviet leadership against the "Yugoslav model" in general. Similar criticism is directed, for example, at the Yugoslav economic model or at adherents of "socialist market theories". On the other hand, however, the polemics are also symptomatic of the party leadership's efforts to move Soviet theoreticians to a crusade against "revisionists" in general. In his article, Mitin admits that "some of the basic problems of the contemporary ideological struggle have not yet been illuminated sufficiently", that "there are still many unsolved problems". (10)

Mitin lists the following deficiencies which must still be overcome:

- a) the lack of a basic text on the bourgeois concepts of the scientific-technological revolution;
- b) the lack of basic research into the historic role of the working class in the contemporary world;
- c) the lack of critical studies on the ideas of such "rightist" theoreticians as Bochenski, Vetter, Brzezinski, Fainsod, Ulam, Wolfe, Löwenthal, etc., as well as the theories of Frankfurt School (Adorno, Habermas, Fromm) and the Tübingen School (Fetscher, etc.)

Mitin also lists a number of tasks which the Soviet philosophers have yet to carry out, leaving the question unanswered as to who is to solve them, and how. There are very few Soviet philosophers who have followed recent developments in Marxist philosophy outside the Soviet Union, and who would thus be in a position to keep polemics with these Marxist theoreticians on a scholarly level. Actually, the Party should not really need to conduct such a discussion with "revisionist" philosophers, for, in the Marxist-Leninist sense, philosophy, as a social science, does not have the task of dealing with "philosophizing", but of helping the Party in its political-pedagogical work. This is the explanation for the congealed state of Soviet philosophy and for its defensive nature.

- (1) M. B. Mitin, "Problemy bor' by protiv burzhuznoy ideologii i antikommunizma", Voprosy filosofii, No. 7/1971, p. 28, et seq.
- (2) Ibid., p. 35
- (3) B. Pribicevic, Odnosi izmedju Socijalistickih snaga, Belgrade, 1963.
- (4) Mitin, loc. cit., p. 35
- (5) S. M. Morozov, "O revizionistskoy kontseptsii 'polyvariantnogo marksizma'", Filosofskie nauki, No. 4, July.
- (6) Ibid., p. 125.
- (7) Ibid., p. 129.
- (8) Ibid., p. 130
- (9) S. M. Brailovic, "Ob odnoy popytke sbizheniya marksizma i eksistentsializma", Voprosy filosofii, No. 7/1971, p. 39 et seq.
- (10) Mitin, loc. cit., p. 38

(Radio Free Europe Research)

#### SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA'S CADRES

The Chinese press has had much to say in recent months on the need to improve leadership at all levels. In these commentaries, Chinese cadres have been repeatedly admonished for their alleged "arrogance, complacency, and erroneous ways". The Chinese Party journal, R e d F l a g, has also joined in the campaign. Since its New Year's editorial on the subject, no less than 20 articles dealing with leadership problems have appeared in R e d F l a g.

While much of this criticism encompasses ideological shortcomings, various editorials have frankly admitted that senior cadres are reluctant to accept instructions from higher levels because central directives do not take into account "special" conditions in the provinces. Local authorities, for example, have been taken to task for questioning official guidelines on the development of small-scale rural industries on a geographically decentralized basis.

#### Studying Mao's Philosophy

China's cadres are told that, if they are bewildered by their present plight, they have only to read five essays on philosophy by Mao Tse-tung. These are On Contradictions and On Practice,

written in 1937; the 1957 article, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People; a 1957 speech before the CCP's National Propaganda Conference; and the 1963 article, Where Do Correct Ideas Come From? These five essays are said to provide the criteria for deciding which cadres are taking the right road and which are guilty of "erroneous ways". Significantly, the five philosophical tracts have apparently replaced the "Little Red Book" of quotations by Chairman Mao as prime instructional works. Chinese planners may well have come to the conclusion that the "Little Red Book", originally designed for use by People's Liberation Army personnel, is of limited value in the cadre training program.

The "Mao philosophy" campaign was introduced in 1970, with daily media accounts of how cadres were benefiting from Mao's five philosophic essays. A joint People's Daily-Red Flag-Liberation Army Daily National Day editorial on October 1 noted that leading cadres at all levels, and senior cadres in particular, were in "special" need of Mao's guidance. The rationale of the campaign was later outlined in an editorial in Nanking's New China Daily on October 28, which, among other things, lauded Mao's philosophy as "the theoretical foundation of the proletarian revolutionary line and the essence and basis of the Thought of Mao Tsetung". In a practical sense, however, the campaign was probably inspired by the suspicion that Chinese cadres were beginning to feel complacent at a time when Peking leaders were particularly concerned about political and economic priorities.

#### "May 7" Cadre Schools

The Chinese press continues to give considerable publicity to a thought reform program for cadres through work and study at "May 7" cadre schools. The name of the schools stems from a "special instruction" issued by Mao on May 7, 1967, stating: "Going down to do manual labor gives vast numbers of cadres an excellent opportunity to study once again". According to Peking's New China News Agency (NCNA), currently some 90,000 government and Party cadres are attending more than 100 "May 7" schools. Rehabilitation reportedly involves intensive political indoctrination and arduous physical labor.

A recent article in R e d F l a g suggests that the cadre schools will be around for a long time. According to the article:

"The operation of 'May 7' cadre schools is not merely for the purpose of re-educating the cadres not on active duty, because according to Chairman Mao's instruction, the cadres on active duty must also be sent down group by group to do manual work. We must regard the sending of cadre to do manual work as a system and firmly adhere to it over a long time... We must seriously regard the successful and indefinite operation of 'May 7' cadre schools as a great plan against revisionism in the next hundred years".

In one of his essays on philosophy, Where Do Correct Ideas Come From, Mao makes much of the lack of expertise among China's cadres. It is therefore necessary, he wrote:

"to educate the cadres in the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, so that they can orient their thinking correctly, become good at investigation and study and at summing up experience, overcome difficulties, commit fewer mistakes, do their work better, and struggle hard".

Inexperience must be an even greater problem now, following the dismissal in the Cultural Revolution of so many professionals. With a National People's Congress and a new five-year economic plan in the offing, Peking must delegate increasing responsibility to the cadres for the mobilization of the country's productive energies. There is, however, a strong suggestion in the recent outpouring of press commentaries that, while the Chinese leadership in Peking may expect the cadres to shoulder new burdens, it nonetheless has some apprehension that their lack of political fervor and experience may wreck even the most well-laid plans.

Cadres are Peking's "transmission belt" for the transforming of centrally-formulated policy into action by the masses. Chinese press comment, however, leaves little doubt that reluctance to commit themselves to once-condemned policies is obstructing efforts to stimulate the peasants into greater efforts. There is also in this comment clear evidence of dilemma plaguing Chinese planners: how can cadres be created who are, and will remain, both "red and expert" - officials, technicians and activists who are both ideologically pure and administratively efficient.

(Current Scene - Developments in Mainland China,  
Hong-Kong)

## POLITICS

### CHINA, THE USA, AND THE USSR

Dr Ranko Petkovic

The presages of normalization in relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China have placed a number of new political themes on the agenda, among them the following one: what kind of changes may be expected in future in the relations between the three superpowers - China, the USA and USSR?

Before endeavouring to reply to this question, let us see how relations between the three superpowers have developed in the post-war period.

The first variant: the USSR and China in confrontation with the USA. Actually, this refers to relations between the USSR and China on one side and the USA on the other during the first ten-odd post-war years, that is, from the time of the founding of the PR China in 1949 to the rift between the PR China and the USSR at the end of the fifties. This was the period that saw the flaring up, the culmination and the extinction of the cold war, the period of bloc division of the world in accordance with ideological and political criteria. Although the PR China did not formally belong to the military bloc created at that time by the USSR, the two big socialist countries behaved and acted as allies in international relations. Confrontation between them and the USA was particularly sharp during the Korean War which was, apart from other things, a sizing up of the military power of the USA and PR China and an acrimonious political duel between the USA and USSR.

The second variant: the superpowers in confrontation "each on its own". This was the period of cleavage between the USSR and PR China towards the end of the fifties and up to the inception of bilateralism between the USA and USSR in recent years. All the superpowers were in a state of confrontation with each other. The rift between the USSR and PR China reached its culmination in boundary conflicts and territorial claims. Relations between the USA and PR China hit a new low during Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam. The USA and USSR confronted each other in various geographic and political spheres, particularly within the context of the

war in the Middle East, the foci of conflict in Southeast Asia, and so on.

Although in the final analysis each one of the superpowers has its own interests and objectives, in consequence of which the period when "everyone is against everyone else" might have stretched out interminably in their mutual relations, it did not do so in view of the possibilities for partnership and for gains to be won from a game of roulette between the threesome.

The third variant: partnership between the USA and USSR and the isolation of China. After the waning of the cold war in which the USA and USSR had been the principal protagonists, a constellation took shape in which a growing degree of relative identity of interests was demonstrated in relations between the USA and USSR where the world's business was concerned, particularly as regards the regulation of their mutual relations and respect for their mutual interests as well as in the direct or indirect isolation of PR China from decisionmaking on major international issues. Conducive to such a development, or even predetermining it, were the boundary clashes between the USSR and China, the sharp confrontation between the USA and China over Vietnam, Taiwan and so on, on the one hand, and arrangements between the USA and USSR in the sphere of nuclear armament and certain other spheres, on the other.

This period still endures and will probably continue to be prolonged as the USA and PR China endeavour to achieve some sort of rapprochement. For the moment, it would be difficult to imagine the USA as willing to sacrifice its relatively good relations with the USSR for the sake of normalizing relations with the RP China. Rapprochement between the USA and PR China does not preclude the further advancement of the dialogue with the USSR. However, neither can we exclude the possibility of certain negative repercussions of the American-Chinese rapprochement on American-Soviet relations although, we repeat, this should not assume undue proportions, at least not in the near future.

The fourth variant: partnership between the USA and PR China against the USSR? This variant is more a theoretical than a practical possibility and is based above all on the publicistic euphoria provoked by the recent news of President Nixon's planned visit to the PR China. It would be difficult to find in the present international constellation any objective factors which

could cause such a redeployment among the superpowers.

The fifth variant: a triumvirate of the superpowers? This is a theoretical although also to a certain extent a realistic possibility. Two of the three superpowers, the USA and USSR, have demonstrated in their diplomatic practice that they are in certain circumstances inclined to the establishment of spheres of influence and that they are likely to accept arrangements which delimit and consecrate their interests. The unknown quantity is and is not the PR China which is only beginning to participate in the world's work and which is still waiting to assume its legitimate responsibilities in the international community. One could find, in the history of the PR China and in its present political and economic situation, arguments for the thesis that precludes any such pretensions on its part within the confines of the triangle of superpowers. However, there is certainly an objective affinity among the big powers for deciding in the name of and at the expense of other countries. In one scheme which appeared in the world press, a triumvirate of the superpowers could rest on delimitation of interests between the USA and USSR in Europe, the USA and PR China in Asia, and all of them together in Africa. Other schemes along these lines have also been put forward. It would appear, however, that any tendency toward the establishment of a triumvirate by the superpowers would have to face up to an international community that could show considerable resistance to these three countries. This involves circumstances such as those that did not permit the formation of a duumvirate in the past. It is precisely for this reason that the outlook for establishment of a triumvirate of superpowers is reduced, both by the immunity of this or that power toward arrangements of this type, by the objective tendency toward the further enlargement of the circle of superpowers and above all by the forces of the independent countries which are increasing steadily.

Following are some of the most important problems in relations among the superpowers over which they will continue to cross swords, not only between themselves but also within the broader international context in which many other factors and interests are operative:

In relations between the USA and PR China:

a) cessation of the aggression in the Indochina area which poses a direct threat to the security of the PR China;

b) cessation of American support of the Chiang kai-shek regime on Taiwan which is an integral part of the PR China;

c) a change in the American attitude toward representation for the PR China in the United Nations;

d) the establishment of a modus vivendi between the PR China and USA in the Asian area on the basis of respect for the real interests of both sides.

In relations between the USSR and PR China:

a) cessation of the ideological-political cold war in the international workers' movement and in international politics;

b) the regulation of questions deriving from the immediate political and other kinds of presence in the Asian area, and in other geographic and political spheres.

In relations between the USA and USSR ?

a) cessation of the political, and indirectly the military, confrontation in the Middle East, in the Indochina area and at certain other points which introduces elements of tension into their mutual relations;

b) limitation of the arms race in spheres in which it is particularly explicit against the background of the present scientific and technological revolution;

c) a reduction in the points of friction between the military-political alliances headed by these two powers.

Naturally, this is not a complete "inventory" nor can such an enumeration be confined only to the interests and activities of the powers involved.

All the foregoing variants in relations between the three superpowers - the only possible ones, irrespective of whether they have already occurred or whether they could occur, although based on altogether realistic premises have inherent in them a considerable dose of scholastic thinking. For no matter how powerful these countries are, and no matter what political, economic or military levers they have at their command for the pursuit of their special or common conceptions and interests, their separate, independent power of decisionmaking is not unlimited. It might even be said that neither past, present, nor future deployment in the triangle of the superpowers depends entirely on them alone. In the intricate and increasingly dynamic structure of the international community, many objective factors place limitations even on the behaviour of the superpowers.

- Can any one of the superpowers or all three of them together decide the fate of a major industrial country like Japan, or let us say of India, a subcontinent unto itself, or do they in their political moves and mutual delimitations have to take into account the interests and activities of these countries and the broader geo-political environment in which they exist?

- Can any one of the superpowers or all three of them together decide the fate of Europe, either the Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals or the Europe from Brest to Bucharest, without regard to the interests and activities of the political factors and economic capacities of this continent?

- Can any one of the superpowers ignore in the long run the increasingly explicit interests and aspirations of other countries, even those within their spheres of interest?

- Can any one of the superpowers afford to neglect without damaging its own long-term interests the interests and aspirations of the large number of non-aligned and other small and medium-sized countries?

- Was the superpower that has engaged not only its economic and political but also its military forces in the Indochina area in a position to achieve its plans or did it have to take the consequences of its confrontation with the power of peoples who are fighting for their liberty and independence, and could any one of the superpowers or all three of them together realize projects in that area that had not been accepted by the peoples involved?

Trends in relations among the superpowers are an expression, a component part of and important factor in processes taking place throughout the entire international community. Thanks to their economic and military power, their ideological and political influence, the superpowers have broad and special responsibilities in the international community in consequence of which their mutual relations and their behaviour singly have always been exceedingly important. No equation marks can be placed between them in any sense, ideological, political, economic or military, in spite of their immanent inclination to behave like big powers. On their concrete behaviour hinges the concrete assessment of their international role: either negative or positive in the final analysis.

With this in mind, the entry of the PR China into the circle of the superpowers, in the capacity of a partner whose opinions

must be accorded increasing respects with the passage of time and the maturing of the economic and other potentials of a nation whose population is nearing the billion mark, has a significance which cannot be overestimated. Although this fact makes it necessary to do some thinking about the possibility of a triumvirate, basically this is an elaboration on the theme of the duumvirate and signifies the further movement of the international community in the direction of greater polycentrism and democratization. In view of the objective and inevitable preoccupation of China with the solution of its numerous and complicated internal problems, and its affinity for the policy of active and peace-minded coexistence, its effect on the triangle of the superpowers, and outside it, can, and we hope will, be positive and constructive also from the standpoint of the entire international community.

#### QUESTIONS WHICH WILL ONLY BE ANSWERED IN PRACTICE

##### Pravda on President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking

Under the heading "Questions Calling for a Practical Answer", Pravda on August 10 carried an article by Georgi Arbatov, director of the USA Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, concerning the planned American-Chinese summit meeting. The text of the article is given below:

The news about the forthcoming visit of the President of the United States to Peking is no longer news. The initial sensationalism in bourgeois press comments on this news is gradually giving place to a discussion of questions which really interest world opinion: How do the apparent changes in the relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China affect the international situation - either towards a certain relaxation and normalization, or towards greater tension and the complication of existing and the emergence of fresh situations of conflict in the world?

Although the agreement on President Nixon's visit to Peking in itself does not yet provide a basis for any definite conclusions on the future of American-Chinese relations and their influence on developments in the world, some considerations already suggest themselves today.

Let us start with the question of which forces in the U.S. stand behind the turn in the policy of that country with regard to China, which became apparent some time ago.

At first sight, the answer to this question may seem a simple one - everyone knows that U.S. policy with regard to China began changing only when the hostility of the Chinese leaders' policy towards the Soviet Union and their splitting policy in the revolutionary and liberation movement was revealed. One cannot, however, deduce from this that all Americans who are in favour of improving relations between the USA and China are motivated by aims hostile to other socialist countries.

The picture is not so simple. No doubt the above-mentioned factor played a big part in changing U.S. official policy and in changing the position of a number of American politicians who at one time nearly labelled as a traitor anyone who dared hint at the need to recognize the People's Republic of China and to stop the hostile actions of the USA against China and the Chinese people.

Many of these today are the most active champions of a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. This, of course, cannot but make one think. One cannot ignore the fact that in many countries those who come out for a U.S. rapprochement with China are rabid haters of the Soviet Union, including representatives of the counter-revolutionary emigration from the countries of socialism and belligerent Zionist elements.

At the same time one can find other people, too, among those who favour an improvement of American-Chinese relations. In particular, the progressive circles of the USA and a section of the liberals have long come out against the cold war policy and demanded an improvement in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including the People's Republic of China, as well as the organization of co-operation with them aimed at strengthening peace.

The developments in China itself in recent years, the transition of the Chinese leadership to chauvinistic, great-power positions in foreign policy, naturally, caused disillusionment and concern among progressive people in America.

And although these people have serious doubts about the motives behind the changes emerging in USA official policy, their belief that this policy with regard to China ought to be changed,

that the legitimate rights of the Chinese people in the United Nations ought to be restored and that an end should be put to all manifestations of the cold war in American policy, no matter whom it concerns - the USSR or China, the German Democratic Republic or Cuba - remains unaltered.

All the more so since progressive U. S. circles justly believe that in the trials that have been the fate of the Chinese people and for which the Peking leaders bear the main responsibility, the blame also goes to the policy of imperialism aimed at isolating China and creating difficulties for peaceful construction in that country.

These, so to speak, are the two extreme poles in the rather motley mixture of various moods and trends behind the changes in U. S. policy vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China.

However, it is not only a question of the moods which can be detected at the poles of U. S. political life, there have also been changes in the mood of American opinion at large.

A definite role here has been played by the active campaign in favour of improving relations with China which progressives and liberals have been conducting for many years. All the more so, since the very idea of the need to eliminate the aftermath of the cold war and for an easing of tension is enlisting growing support among the public in the USA under the influence of the difficulties which have arisen both in foreign policy and domestically. Nor can this fact be ignored by the ruling circles of the country.

This reason, however, is far from being the only one, especially if it is borne in mind that it is also a question of changes in the depths of capitalist public opinion, which is largely formed under the influence of official propaganda.

In recent years this propaganda, which for a long time whipped up hatred for the People's Republic of China, has seriously changed its tune and even directions. These changes cannot but be connected with the transition of the leadership of the People's Republic of China to anti-Soviet positions and with Peking's splitting line in the revolutionary and liberation movement.

It might appear that the "cultural revolution" with all its excesses, Peking's support for left-adventuristic forces and extremist alignments in various countries, including the USA, its propaganda against peaceful co-existence, and, finally, the

fierce attacks against the USA and its government have shocked and frightened bourgeois - philistine America.

In fact, however, something quite different has happened - this America has proved to be not at all so gullible, and has formed its opinion on Chinese policy not by Peking's loud words, but by its deeds. And these deeds have convinced the pragmatic American bourgeoisie that China by no means presents any real threat to the U. S. policy which it damns in words, and that therefore one can do business with it, whatever the Peking leaders say or the Chinese press writes. Abuse, as the saying goes, doesn't stick.

### Vietnam

To bourgeois and petty-bourgeois America, which, as a rule, supports Washington's official foreign policy until it brings about a major calamity and difficulties, the belief that China has ceased in fact to be so "revolutionary", so "communist", has engendered the hope that, with Peking's help, the USA may be able to end the Vietnam war on terms quite suitable to the American bourgeoisie. This hope has been reinforced by the very fact of the agreement on President Nixon's visit to Peking, for it was reached at a very peculiar moment.

The heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people to the U. S. aggression, the support for its struggle by the socialist countries and the progressive and democratic public of the world, have long ago put enormous difficulties in the path of Washington's imperialist aggression.

Even in America itself this war has become the most unpopular one in the entire history of the USA, where an especially tense respect - the publication of the secret Pentagon documents emphasized once again how deep is the political rift caused by the war.

The increasing pressure on the part of the American public, at a time when the new peaceful initiatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam have indicated a clear road to peace, faced Washington with the need of either stopping the war, or taking a still greater political risk.

The news of the forthcoming Peking meeting was used for another delay in ending the Vietnam war, while evading an

answer to the peace proposals of the Vietnam side and building up in certain U.S. circles the illusion that it was possible to settle the question behind the back of the Vietnamese people.

Although the position of the People's Republic of China on this question constitutes a special theme, we cannot but say a few words about it, too.

The very fact of the invitation of the President of the United States to Peking can seem sensational only to credulous people who took seriously the propaganda clamour created to prove the implacability of the Peking leaders towards American imperialism.

The timing of this invitation, however, as a step inflicting obvious damage to the struggle of the Vietnamese patriots, could not but surprise many people both inside and outside the USA.

The New York Post was puzzled in this connection and said that why the Chinese communists had decided to ease the President's position at this moment was a problem for the China experts and Maoists.

Let us return to the USA, however. Analyzing the moods in that country, we can note that Washington's latest contacts with Peking and the decision on President Nixon's visit to China had met with wide support there, though with different and often diametrically opposite motives.

Let us note, incidentally, that expectations of such support obviously also played a big part in the taking of the decision on the meeting. On the eve of the coming Presidential elections in the USA, the Administration is particularly interested in actions which would help to ensure victory for the ruling (Republican) party over its political rivals.

These differences in motives for various political groups and sections of the U.S. public supporting the very idea of improving relations with China are important not only to explain the reasons for the latest events, but also to analyze some of their possible consequences.

As the development of American-Chinese relations approaches the stage of political decisions, such differences, which at first remained in the shadows, will increasingly begin to come out into the open.

Evidence of this can already be found today both in press comments and in statements by U.S. political and public figures. It is becoming obvious that many Americans are worried above

all, by the possible long-term consequences of the Administration's political move.

### The price

For some people this is a question of the Administration, having reached an agreement on President Nixon's visit to Peking, once again evading a reply to a number of major and acute political issues on their merit, especially issues like an end to the war in Vietnam, or a change in the existing methods of taking political decisions under which the President can plunge the country into a grave war without the knowledge of the public and even of Congress.

For many people there is the question of the price which may have to be paid for an understanding with China. They ask how this understanding will affect Soviet-American relations and the prospects of a limitation of the arms race and a general détente in the world.

The anxiety among a considerable section of the ruling circles over the effect the decision on the meeting in Peking may have on the relations of the USA with its allies in Western Europe, with Japan and other countries, is also beginning to make itself felt, for in many of those countries the news of the forthcoming visit was met with unconcealed alarm, let alone the confusion it caused in the camp of the American puppets in Taipei, Seoul and Saigon.

These, and many other issues are increasingly clearly making themselves felt in the discussion which has developed in the USA in connection with the agreement on the President's forthcoming visit to Peking. Even people who wholly welcome the visit are aware that a meeting in itself, even at the highest level, will not automatically solve the problems which exist.

Furthermore, some American leaders are afraid of possible disappointments in the near future, which, following great hopes, may become a political boomerang.

It would also appear that some leaders of the ruling party are also worried by such questions arising from President Nixon's visit to Peking as the general effect on the elections in the autumn of 1972. To put it in a nutshell, did the President take everything into account when he agreed to the visit?

They realize that U.S. policy faces many complex problems which cannot be bought off by clever diplomatic moves, for they

political decisions which, not infrequently, are painful for Washington.

As a matter of fact, the U. S. President himself found it necessary at a press conference a few days ago to cool the ardour of those who voiced rosy hopes about the forthcoming meeting and to come out against what he called "illusions".

Many questions connected with the planned Peking trip of the U. S. President and, all the more so, with the future of American-Chinese relations and U. S. policy as a whole, therefore, remain without any clear answer - and, by the way, nobody in Washington and Peking is in any haste to provide that answer, obviously preferring to deepen the atmosphere of secrecy and reserve on many matters concerning their relations.

Judging by the American press, the public in the U. S. are particularly interested in this connection with the possible impact this step by the United States Administration will have on relations with other socialist countries, and, first of all, with the USSR.

Bearing in mind the political, economic and military might of the Soviet Union and its place in contemporary international relations, which is determined both by the might of the country and by the peaceful and constructive nature of its policy and the role played by the USSR in the development of world events, this is quite understandable.

Quite a number of people in the USA realize very well that a great deal depends on the direction and course of development of U. S. relations with the Soviet Union - both for the people of the two countries and for the entire international situation.

It is already apparent that the anxiety felt in the USA on this score is differently stressed by different Americans. Some of them come out with appeals to combine efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China with no less vigorous efforts to improve Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole.

Others discourse on how to be smart and use any step for a rapprochement with Peking to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union for the purpose of blackmail and to "squeeze out" concessions. Still others loudly indulge in general talk about the need, as the extreme right-wing paper the New York Daily News wrote, for "a long-term policy of setting the governments of Red China and Red Russia against each other".

### U. S. assurances

As to the official U. S. line, it so far boils down to assurances that the Peking meeting and the normalization of U. S. relations with the People's Republic of China will not be pursued at the expense of other countries or to their detriment.

It goes without saying that Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the American press itself gives such official assurances rather ambiguous interpretation. The Washington Post, for example, said this:

"Despite all America's official assurances to the contrary, officials in Nixon's Administration privately voice the opinion that it is not in the U. S. interest to dispel completely the Soviet Union's suspicions with regard to the understandings between the USA and China, which Moscow may not find to its liking or may worry about".

It is also worth noting a certain tendentiousness in the commentaries in the American press about the recent hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Speaking before the committee were former staff members of the State Department who were victimized in the years of McCarthyism for favouring an American-Chinese rapprochement.

Explaining their position of that time they stressed that they regarded such a rapprochement as a means of detaching China from the Socialist camp and of driving a wedge between the USSR and the People's Republic of China by utilizing Mao Tse-tung's readiness, revealed back in the 1940's, to seek ways of improving relations with Washington.

In its commentaries on this matter the American press is obviously peddling arguments to its readers about the advantages of a rapprochement with Peking with a view to stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.

Such a policy is evidence, at least, of the extreme political shortsightedness of its masterminds. A dialogue on a broad range of problems has long been underway between the USA and the USSR. This dialogue is very important, but not an easy one, both because of the complexity of the problems and, above all, because confidence is needed for their successful solution.

There can be no greater blow to confidence than unscrupulous diplomatic manoeuvres, backstage intrigues and ambiguity.

We would like to remind the authors of such commentaries of this. Let us leave these commentaries however, for the time being on the conscience of the American journalists.

How are Washington's official assurances concerning its actual intentions to be treated?

We would like to say, above all, that for over 20 years the USSR has been advocating the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the USA and other western countries with the People's Republic of China and respect for its lawful rights in the international arena.

It is to be regretted that the USA has stalled over recognition of the realities for such a long time and, only now, in circumstances which make its position rather ambiguous, has begun to take the first steps towards renunciation of the cold war policy towards the People's Republic of China.

Practical deeds, and not words about Washington's intentions, will provide the reply to another question: what really lies behind these changes in American policy? In the final analysis, what policy is being crystallised as a result of the struggle between various forces and motives promoting this policy?

#### The test

President Nixon called his forthcoming Peking visit a journey in the cause of peace. Washington wants to explain this action as one of the practical steps in the policy proclaimed by the U. S. President a few years ago of changing over "from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiations".

The sincerity of any statement, naturally, is tested only by practice. This now is the case too. All the more so, since world public opinion is well aware that the words and assurances of American politicians have often diverged from and been directly contradicted by their actions.

There are many questions on which the U. S. government could give a practical demonstration of what motivates its policy, whether it is a matter of seeking peace, relaxing tension, normalizing the international situation, or whether it is a matter of new imperialist diplomatic manoeuvres within the traditional pattern of a "positions of strength" policy; these are questions connected with Vietnam, the Middle East, European security, limiting the arms race and U. S. relations with the socialist countries.

If American policy combines the steps towards improving

relations with the People's Republic of China with a turn towards a more constructive position on these and other current questions, well, then, in this case there will be grounds for taking the statements about Washington's peace-loving intentions and good will seriously.

There is no doubt that such a turn would be positively assessed in the Soviet Union, too. The Soviet people have always given and will give not only understanding, but full support to a sincere policy of relaxation. The same can be said with regard to assessing the true intentions of Peking.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy is aimed at bringing about a change in the development of international affairs and at getting on to the practical implementation of measures required to improve the situation and strengthen peace and security throughout the world. This is the essence of the foreign policy course outlined by the 24th CPSU Congress and the peace programme it adopted.

The USSR, as was again confirmed by that congress, is ready to improve its relations with the Chinese People's Republic and the USA, and to develop relations with all other countries and is ready to strengthen bilateral, regional and international co-operation between states in the interests of stronger peace and security of the peoples.

#### China's participation

Among the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, there are also those whose examination requires the participation of all the big powers, including the People's Republic of China.

The positive participation of the People's Republic of China in discussing and deciding international problems, including such major questions as limitation of the arms race and the complete banning of all weapons of mass destruction and the replacement of the systems of closed military blocs by systems of collective security on the various continents, would be of great importance.

Naturally, such a development of events would be in the interests of all the peoples, including the peoples of the USSR, the People's Republic of China and the United States. So far as the Soviet Union's policy is concerned, the road is open.

There are today, however, many grounds for expecting that events will develop in another direction whereby in every sphere

apart from relations with China, U.S. policy will remain unchanged and its course will, as before, be the main obstacle to eliminating sharp international conflicts and to easing and normalizing the situation in the world.

In these circumstances the point of Washington's steps towards a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China will become absolutely unambiguous. Quite naturally, such a development of events will suggest appropriate conclusions, and these, undoubtedly, will be drawn.

The positions of the USSR and of world socialism are sufficiently strong to face any possible turn of events with confidence.

The answer to the basic questions connected with the U.S. President's visit to Peking and the changes in American-Chinese relations, therefore, will not be provided in the words nor in the diplomatic manoeuvres of these states, but rather in their actions, in the practical affairs of the next few months.

It is quite natural that in the Soviet Union, as in other countries, these affairs and developments will be watched with close attention. For this is a matter of great importance for the Soviet people, for world socialism, for the entire international situation and for world peace.

### CHOU EN-LAI: THE TOUGH NEGOTIATOR

'Mao is the brain and Chou is the mouth'

by Eric Chou

Summary: Eric Chou has met Chinese Premier Chou En-lai face-to-face 'more times than I can count'. The Chinese leader asked him twice to work as his personal secretary. This is a searching profile of the man who will parley with President Nixon at the forthcoming Peking visit.

When the Sino-American Summit talks begin in Peking, the man sitting across the conference table from President Nixon will be Premier Chou En-lai, who has handled all vital negotiations on behalf of Chairman Mao since 1936.

Unlike most top Communists, Chou almost bursts with personal charm, heightened by his quick wit and sense of humour. With an analytical mind and a photographic memory, the Chinese Premier seldom refers to his notes when he speaks or argues with an opponent. An extremely patient negotiator, he persists

and persists until he has put his points over. Even when he is angered, few can tell, since the only sign is a slight raising of the eyebrows.

As General Chang Chih-chung (the Nationalists' chief negotiator during the peace talks between them and the Chinese Communists in the 1940's) once remarked: "It is possible for one to disagree with Chou En-lai, but it is practically impossible for one not to like him. He is such an obstinate bargainer that sometimes you cannot help wondering whether you should still hold your side of the bargain".

Indeed, Chou En-lai's personal charm and outward calmness can be illusory. In past negotiations he seems to have achieved what Mao Tse-tung wanted, or he would not continue to be entrusted with such a role. One of his advantages as a top Communist negotiator is that he can always render Communist ideology and ideas into a plain language less repulsive to the Western ear. But this does not mean that he will depart from the line firmly laid down by Chairman Mao. Mao is the brain and Chou is the mouth.

Mr Nixon may be a past-master of international affairs, but this time he must be psychologically prepared to crack the hardest nut that has come his way. He will have to encounter a man with Edward Heath's firmness, Harold Wilson's elusiveness, and, above all, Brezhnev's shrewdness.

In the West, Chou En-lai's position is often likened to that which Mikoyan occupied in the Soviet hierarchy. But if one dispassionately examines Chou's past career and present position in the Peking regime, one is inclined to consider him a cut above the Russian leader. After all, Chou has been the chief executive of the Chinese Government ever since 1949. Moreover, he has survived more power struggles in the Chinese Communist Party than Mikoyan did in the Kremlin, if one traces his career back to the days of the Kiangsi Soviet in the early 1930's.

### Wrong Horse

At the onset of his career as a Communist, Chou En-lai actually bet on a wrong horse. In the late 1920's, he sided with Li Li-san, a protégé of Moscow who, as the then Chairman of the Central Committee in Shanghai, laid it down that urban uprisings were the correct revolutionary line. This almost

brought the party to extinction and was duly condemned by the Party Conference in 1930. Among the disgraced exponents, Chou was realistic enough to confess his errors. He switched his allegiance to Mao Tse-tung who had by then established the Kiangsi Soviet in the interior as an alternative power base. Gradually and steadily, Chou won Mao's favour and became the party's No. 3 leader, after Mao and Marshal Chu Teh. It was not until 1936, however, that Chou En-lai emerged as the party's chief representative in external relations. He successfully negotiated the terms for the uneasy Nationalist-Communist alliance at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. At a time when the Chinese Communists were in a very weak bargaining position after their heavy losses throughout the Long March, Chou was able to win his party the chance for regrouping and future expansion.

Internally, he patched up the difference between Mao and Lin Piao (Mao's present heir-apparent) over military strategy. Under the influence of Chou's persuasive tongue, Lin abandoned his military base in South Shansi and went up to Yen-an to join Mao. In view of the later developments of the Chinese Communist revolution, this must be regarded as Chou En-lai's master stroke in consolidating the solidarity of the party hierarchy.

But success did not make Chou lose his head. When Liu Shao-chi began to gain his ascendancy in the party machine in 1939, Chou was already the Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee. It was probably his pragmatism that led him to surrender this position to Liu, who controlled all the underground workers in the Nationalist-held areas and was also responsible for the organizational work in the Yen-an headquarters. Presumably Chou realized that he was not Liu's match in the powerstruggle, since he had not built a big following in the party; or perhaps he deferred to Liu in order to make things easier for Mao, who could not dispense with Liu's support when he had yet to extend his firm control. One way or the other, Chou could at least congratulate himself on having convinced Mao of his willingness to play second fiddle. This is why Chairman Mao has never regarded him as a potential menace to his throne.

That Chou En-lai is believed to be more pragmatic and realistic than the other Chinese leaders may have something to do with his background. Born in 1898 to an upper-middle class

family in the province of Kiangsu, he was first educated in Tientsin and then in France. His handsome appearance and suave manner make him look so distinctively different from most of his comrades. It could be his inborn petty bourgeois instinct that restrains him from taking a greater risk than absolutely necessary. Not that he lacks the ambition to reach the top, but, being a practical man, he tends to weigh things more carefully than most revolutionary leaders. Never a theoretician in the party, he recognizes that his present position is as far as he can reach in a Communist state: but he also knows that as the top administrator of China he is indispensable.

#### Most Respected

Of all Chinese leaders, he is probably the most respected. Happily married to Teng Ying-chao, one of the leading Chinese women Communists, he has never been involved in any personal scandals. A hard and thorough worker, he demands as much of himself as of his subordinates. To him a working-day means 16 to 18 hours. A few games of table tennis or a private view of a film is all he allows himself for relaxation. He does not smoke, nor is he a drinker in the Western sense. But when the occasion arises, he can outdrink most people. (I have seen him draining numerous glasses of Mao-tai, the Chinese equivalent of vodka, on quite a few occasions.)

He has a working knowledge of both French and English. The fact that he insists on speaking Chinese only at any international gathering stems from his national pride. A quick thinker, he certainly does not need the interval of interpretation to collect his thoughts.

His toughness as a negotiator was fully demonstrated when General George C. Marshall of the United States served as the mediator in the protracted and fruitless peace talks between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists in the 1945-6 period. Firm as a rock, Chou maintained his position. Nevertheless, General Marshall expressed considerable admiration for Chou by calling him "the Chinese statesman" to his aides. It was also during these years that the Chinese leader impressed international newspapermen with his integrity and eloquence. Though the talks achieved nothing then, Chou successfully swung press opinion to his favour, and thus to the advantage of the Chinese Communist Party.

If Mr Nixon fails to score any points in the forthcoming Peking parley, the whole thing could turn out to be a successful publicity campaign for the Chinese Premier.

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#### PEKING REJECTS PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

The text of the statement of the government of the People's Republic of China rejecting the Soviet proposal for the calling of a conference of the five nuclear powers has been circulated in Peking by the New China News Agency.

This proposal was contained in the statement of the Soviet government that was handed to the governments of the United States, China, France and Great Britain. It stressed the need for persistent efforts leading to nuclear disarmament.

In an article in Pravda on August 15, Alexei Lukovets commented that the statement by the Chinese government rejecting the Soviet proposal was in sharp conflict with the wide support given to it by world public opinion.

Peking's statement was hypocritical through and through, Alexei Lukovets declared.

"This act by the Peking leaders stems from the adventurist policy of intensifying international tension which the Peking leaders are pursuing.

"Whose interests does this serve? By rejecting the Soviet Union's peaceful initiative, the government of the People's Republic of China is deliberately playing into the hands of imperialist reaction", he says.

While conducting a vicious anti-Soviet campaign, Chinese propaganda from time to time condemns imperialism in words, but this has the purpose of covering up the real aims of the Peking leaders.

Alexei Lukovets quotes the comment by the Czechoslovak communist newspaper Rudopravo:

"The United States leaders readily forgive China this verbiage, which has replaced class struggle. What is most important for the United States now is the anti-Soviet direction of Chinese policy".

(Soviet News)

#### "HOC TAP": WAR CAN BE SOLVED ONLY THROUGH TALKS WITH HANOI

Summary: A few days after the appearance of a North Vietnamese army daily article warning about the disruptive effects of Chinese reconciliation with the US, the authoritative party journal Hoc Tap warns that the solution to the Vietnam problem can be sought only through direct talks with the Vietnamese.

An article appearing in the latest issue of the theoretical journal of the (North)Vietnam Workers' Party, Hoc Tap, (1) appealed to the United States not to expect a solution to the Vietnam problem through negotiations with Peking. The authoritative journal, whose editorials express the thinking of the Hanoi leadership, warned:

If the Nixon Administration truly wants to find a solution to the Vietnam problem, there is no alternative but to talk directly with the genuine representatives of the people of South and North Vietnam. Only those who are fighting the Americans can raise a decisive voice about the future of their own country.

The major theme of the editorial is the same that was elaborated upon earlier this month in an article appearing in the North Vietnamese army daily: the Nixon doctrine. Hoc Tap expresses the same concern as voiced by the army daily article, about the negative effect of the Nixon doctrine on the rest of the communist world:

As for the socialist camp, the Nixon doctrine advocates administering the insidious scheme of carrying out provocations against and sowing disunity among the socialist countries, putting one component of the socialist camp against another, and, depending on the real situation prevailing in each area and in each period of time, carrying out subversive measures through violence or adopting the "peaceful evolution" measure in order to restore capitalism.

The above phrases, like those used in the army daily article, create the impression that the North Vietnamese leadership is genuinely concerned about the possibility that other communist countries might fall for the "scheme". The editorial goes on to remind its readers that the Vietnamese people "are standing

in the front line to oppose the US imperialists' aggression". It has had "the great honor" of being the "shock force" and "standing in the front line" of the peoples' world struggle against the enemy. As something of a reminder, the article maintained that

many fraternal parties have asserted that their attitude toward the Vietnamese people's anti-US national salvation resistance is a touchstone of proletarian internationalism.

It is pointed out that foreign aid has played a secondary role in the fighting:

In the present (struggle) our people have mainly relied on their own strength, while paying great attention to the moral and material support from fraternal socialist countries, first of all from the Soviet Union and China, and from the communist and international workers' movements...

Further, the point is made that "international unity" is something of a prerequisite to victory:

We have unswervingly and firmly maintained the policy of international unity and we have fought the common enemy... International unity is one of the victorious factors of our national revolution. We have incessantly strengthened our unity with the brother parties and countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

Moreover, it is being stressed that the struggle in South-east Asia is also being waged for the benefit of all other communist countries - the entire bloc:

In fighting and defeating Americans we have positively contributed towards protecting the socialist camp, protecting the independence of various nations. The defeat of the US imperialists in Indochina weakens them in other parts of the world...

Most of the above points, as expressed in Hoc Tap, are not new. They have been voiced or elaborated upon in various other articles appearing in the Vietnamese press since the Chinese announcement of the Kissinger visit to Peking and the invitation extended to President Nixon. The significance of this particular article lies in the fact that it appeared in the Party's central theoretical journal. Thus, the points expressed therein have become a part of the official policies of the VWP, presumably approved by Le Duan and other top Party leaders.

(1) "Firmly grasping the lines of independence and self-reliance and heightening revolutionary heroism, let us resolutely and completely defeat the US aggressors". Editorial on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the August revolution and the formation of the DRV. Hoc Tap, August 1971 issue.

## RUMANIA - A BENEFICIARY OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

by Konstantin Aleksandrov

Summary: Rumania has again displayed her skilful exploitation of the Sino-Soviet conflict to win greater independence within the Soviet bloc by the recent Ceausescu visit to Peking. This event was virtually ignored in the Soviet press - a further illustration of the quandary in which the USSR finds herself: military action against her recalcitrant ally is ruled out in view of Rumania's firmly orthodox internal Party regime - in contrast to Czechoslovakia in 1968 - and direct protest not followed up by effective action would merely draw attention to Soviet impotence.

On June 26 it was reported in Izvestia and other Soviet papers that a Rumanian Party and government delegation, led by Party Secretary General and State Council Chairman Nicolae Ceausescu, had paid a visit to Moscow on the way back from a visit to the Far East, and had been received at the airport by Soviet Premier Kosygin and other ministers.

The fact that neither Party Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev nor Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny put in an appearance was a breach of protocol which demonstrated Soviet displeasure at the fact that the Rumanians' tour had also taken them to the "splitters" in Peking. Indeed, the latter visit and the circumstances in which it took place constituted a major setback for the USSR in her conflict with the Chinese Communists. In beginning this conflict, which meant nothing more nor less than destroying the "monolithic unity" of the Communist camp as it existed under Stalin, Moscow reckoned firmly with the active support of at least all the states of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Albania). This, however, was a grave miscalculation, for although it was at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party, held June 18-24, 1960, that the first open clash occurred between Khrushchev and the Chinese, the Rumanians from the very beginning adopted a neutral position and subsequently made every effort to exploit the quarrel between the two Communist giants for their own interests. These tactics become understandable when it is remembered that, at the time, Rumanian relations with the USSR were strained by Moscow's endeavors to turn Rumania into a mere supplier of cheap raw materials to the rest of the Soviet bloc.

The fence-sitting policy initiated by Rumanian Party leader and head of state Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was continued by his successor, Ceausescu. The Rumanians often sided openly with the Chinese, as when they promptly took up an observation made by Mao Tse-tung in a conversation with Japanese socialists in the summer of 1964 to the effect that Soviet postwar frontiers in Europe and Asia had to be subjected to revision and demanded that Moscow return to Rumania the territories of Bessarabia and North Bucovina. This demand, reiterated throughout 1965, provoked extreme irritation on the part of the Soviets, especially the leadership of the Moldavian SSR. Moldavian Party First Secretary Ivan Bodyul, for example, retorted angrily at the republic's Twelfth Party Congress in March 1966:

Apologists of the bourgeoisie are striving to discredit and belittle the gains of the Soviet Union and sow dissension and animosity among the socialist countries, kindling nationalism and chauvinism, advancing territorial claims on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and demanding a revision of the consequences of the Second World War. (Sovetskaya Moldaviya, March 2, 1966)

Rumania's unique position in the Soviet bloc was brought even more sharply into focus by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Rumania not only took no part in the occupation but declared that any attempt to treat her in the same way would meet with determined and active resistance, and systematically frustrated all attempts to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers on her territory. She also established contacts with like-minded Yugoslavia.

Moscow was somewhat at a loss to know how to cope with such recalcitrance. Military sanctions were out of the question because Ceausescu, like his predecessor, pursued an internal policy of almost Stalinist rigidity which rendered any excuse of "saving Rumanian socialism" ineffective, while economic sanctions were countered by intensified Sino-Rumanian economic links. On November 25, 1970, a treaty was signed under which the Chinese gave their first-ever credit to a Soviet-bloc country, and March 22 of this year saw Rumanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu and Chinese Finance Minister and Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien signing in Peking a credit agreement under which China will supply diverse heavy industrial equipment and technical assistance to a value, according to Japanese sources,

of 250,000,000 US dollars. Although a detailed breakdown of these deliveries is not available, the indications are that military aid too is involved.

It is a fair assumption that Peking would hardly have agreed to render such large-scale assistance if she were not sure that it would not fall into Soviet hands, and the Chinese have presumably let it be known that should the USSR undertake any military action against Rumania they would not stand idle. On July 31, 1970, the Rumanian Defense Ministry took the unprecedented step of holding a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 43rd anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (reported by Hsinhua, on August 1, 1970). Besides senior Rumanian Defense Ministry officials and top-ranking army officers, the meeting was attended by the Chinese Ambassador, Chang Hai-feng, and the entire staff of the Chinese military attaché.

It is, however, Ceausescu's recent visit to the Far East, which took him to Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam and the Mongolian People's Republic, which has really irked the Soviets. The Soviet press confined itself to laconic reports on Ceausescu's departure (Pravda, June 2, 1971) and return (ibid., June 10, 1971), with not a single word on the mass meeting in Peking attended by Ceausescu and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

Although the anti-Soviet flavor of Ceausescu's visit to Peking was in a measure reflected in the speeches of his Chinese hosts, the latter took care to comply with the Rumanians' desire not to give the Soviets the slightest reason for official complaint. The Soviet Union was, for example, not mentioned once by name, attacks against her being in oblique terms. The general tenor of official Chinese pronouncements was that, in the words of the Communist Party mouthpiece Jenminjhpao (June 1, 1971):

As before, we will always support the Rumanian people in its just struggle to preserve its national independence and state sovereignty against foreign interference and in the building of socialism, in which Rumania is relying solely on her own resources.

Similarly, Chou En-lai declared at a banquet given by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Chinese State Council in honor of the Rumanian guests on June 1, the day of their arrival: "We are glad that the Rumanian people, under

the leadership of the Communist Party led by comrade Ceausescu, has scored a victory in its fight against great-power chauvinism and in the building of socialism" (Hsinhua, June 1, 1971). The implications here are that at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia there also existed a danger that a similar fate would befall Rumania, and that Rumania, as distinct from the USSR, which, according to Peking, is in the process of restoring capitalism, is continuing to build socialism along correct Marxist-Leninist lines, Chou went on:

Relying only on its own resources, the Rumanian people has overcome countless difficulties and succeeded in developing its economy extremely rapidly. . . . The Chinese people expresses its pleasure over the revolutionary spirit with which the Rumanian people has resisted coercion. (Ibid.)

The Chinese leaders see future Sino-Rumanian relations in particular and world developments in general in the context of a confrontation between small and medium-sized countries and the super-powers, which Jenminjhpao accused, just before Ceausescu's visit, of "sitting on the necks of the small countries and committing all possible crimes". At the mass meeting in Peking on June 8, Chou En-lai proclaimed, somewhat optimistically:

The medium and small countries are uniting in fighting against the hegemony of the super-powers in defense of their national interests and state sovereignty, a struggle which has already turned into an invincible revolutionary stream. . . (Hsinhua, June 8, 1971)

Ceausescu agreed, observing more cautiously that "medium and small states are playing an important part in international life" (Agerpress, June 8, 1971), but he made no attempt to define exactly where Rumania stood in the world constellation, although he could well have followed the example of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac, who following his arrival in Peking on June 8, before Ceausescu's departure, told Li Hsien-nien at a banquet given in his honor: "We are not against the super-powers a priori, only against politics from a position of strength" (Hsinhua, June 10, 1971). That the Rumanians do share the opinion of the Chinese and regard the USSR as an aggressive super-power is evident from the following excerpt

from the joint Chinese-Rumanian communiqué issued at the end of Ceausescu's visit:

Both sides noted that for several years now an increasing number of small and medium-sized countries have been uniting in defense of their freedom and independence against the position-of-strength policy pursued by the super-powers. This is an important component of the fight against imperialism and neo-colonialism. (Hsinhua, June 9, 1971)

The Rumanians, too, rate the USSR as an "imperialist" and "neo-colonialist" power, and Moscow has reacted to this charge: on June 17, Pravda reprinted an article by General Secretary of the United States Communist Party Gus Hall which had been originally published in the Party's mouthpiece, Daily World. Hall rejects the application of the term "super power" to the Soviet Union on the ground that "in countries where the working class is in power, class interests and national interests actually merge. This applies to internal affairs as well as international relations".

Among other statements made by Ceausescu during his recent visit to China, mention may be made of those in which he spoke favorably of the present situation in China, thereby disavowing Soviet propaganda claims that for China the cultural revolution has spelt catastrophe and that the country was being ruled not by socialism but by a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Ceausescu announced unambiguously:

The Rumanian people is following with particular interest the Chinese people's struggle to build a new society and is rejoicing over the successes of the Chinese workers. . . We are pleased by the great transformation (the cultural revolution) which has resulted in China becoming a powerful socialist state. . . (Agerpress, June 1, 1971)

The Rumanian leader paid further compliments at a subsequent mass meeting:

I last visited the Chinese People's Republic seven years ago, and I must say that the successes achieved in this short space of time in all spheres of life have impressed me greatly. These successes are all the more impressive for having been achieved in most difficult international conditions, during a struggle against imperialism and reaction, and during the great

proletarian cultural revolution. (Ibid., June 8, 1971)

As regards the Sino-Soviet conflict itself, Ceausescu played this down as an unfortunate misunderstanding which could relatively easily be overcome - possibly with Rumanian assistance. At the last-mentioned meeting, he declared simply and undramatically that his country was "fighting to overcome existing dissent and broaden cooperation among the socialist countries" (ibid.).

The circumstances attending the Rumanian delegation's visit to China were in themselves significant: it took place during the Eight Congress of the East German Socialist Unity Party and the Sixteenth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, at neither of which Ceausescu saw fit to appear. Moreover, just as the East German Party Congress was due to open, Rumania sent a parliamentary delegation to Western Germany.

To sum up, Soviet policy of isolating China has failed in the very area where it might have been expected to be most successful, namely Eastern Europe. Both Rumania and Yugoslavia have opened China doors into the very heart of the Soviet empire. This is realized in Moscow, as was well illustrated in a review by I. Trofimova, published during Ceausescu's visit to China in the journal Novoye vremya (No. 23, 1971) of a recently published Soviet monograph on Chinese foreign policy. Declaring that the Maoists are basing their relations with socialist countries upon "national-chauvinism" and "unsuccessfully trying to split the forces of world socialism", the reviewer mentions as targets of this Chinese probing which had remained steadfast such countries as Eastern Germany, North Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia. The name of Rumania was conspicuously absent.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich)

#### OPPOSITION TACTICS IN ITALY AND FRANCE

While the Communists continue to form the largest opposition parties in both Italy and France, they must have allies in the search for power.

The most striking result of the local elections in Italy on June 13 and 14 for the region of Sicily, 160 municipal councils (including those of Rome, Genoa, Bari and Foggia) and for the

provinces of Rome and Foggia, was the increase in the neo-Fascists' vote. The fact that the Communists made no significant advances, despite the overall swing against the Christian Democratic Party - the main component of the ruling Centre-Left coalition - indicated that in several areas the extreme Left is being replaced by the extreme Right as the party of protest. Nevertheless, with only one-fifth of the voters going to the poll and half of them being concentrated in Sicily, the results are not typical of the country as a whole.

The neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) made its biggest advance in Sicily, where it won 16.3 per cent of the vote, compared with 6.6 per cent in both the 1967 regional elections and the 1968 general election. The Christian Democrats' vote fell from a little over 40 per cent in 1967 and 1968 to 33.7 per cent. The MSI's gains were less dramatic in Rome, where the movement was already relatively strong. Compared with 11.7 per cent in the 1970 regional elections and 9.5 per cent in the 1968 general election, it won 16.2 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democrats' figure has fallen only slightly and the Liberals seem to have been the main casualties. A similar pattern emerged in Genoa, with the Christian Democrats even gaining a little compared with 1970. In these two cities there has been a redistribution of right-wing votes rather than a substantial swing towards the neo-Fascists.

The two other coalition partners - the Socialists and Social Democrats - and the Republicans held their own and in some places showed gains. But the extreme Left continued to decline. While the Communists remained at their former strength in Sicily, Rome and Genoa, they suffered losses in Bari, where their vote fell to less than 16 per cent. The small Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), which broke away from the Socialists in 1964 and often stands to the left of the Communists, lost votes in virtually all areas - mainly to the Socialists. A consolation for the Christian Democrat Party was that its losses were generally offset by its Centre-Left partners' gains, which may help to keep the situation stable and prevent a trend to the Right. However, its leaders are likely to be more wary than ever about allowing any flirtation with the Communists.

The overall vote of 14 per cent for the MSI, compared with

its average figure of only 5.2 per cent in last year's regional elections, clearly affected the Communists particularly sharply, for it is on the basis of its own steady vote that the PCI demands a decisive "move to the Left" - although it still stops short of asking for a share in government. Moreover, the Communists suffered the additional blow of losing votes to the Right in a situation in which there was no serious challenge from extremists on the Left or from Maoists. The party campaigned mainly on criticism of the government for failing to fulfil its promises of reform and not acting strongly enough against corruption. It reaffirmed that its strategy is one of seeking power through the democratic process and trying to build left-wing majorities wherever possible, comprising Socialists and left-wing Christian Democrats as well as its own adherents.

#### Problem of disorder

It also continues to work for the consolidation of the party base at the local and regional level (where in some cases it is already in power) and for a greater hold on the trade union movement. But the election results, with the evidence of growing public concern for an end to disorders and strikes (for which the Communists are often blamed), suggest that there may be a difficult period ahead for the party. Its prospects are slightly better in the trade unions, where its supporters have recently tightened their grip. This and progress towards reuniting the major trade union federations could improve the Communists' bargaining position in the political arena. However, since the next general election does not take place until 1973 they probably see a situation of relative calm on both the political and industrial fronts as providing the best background for their manoeuvres. The dissensions of 1969, which culminated in the expulsion of the radical Manifesto group and many of its sympathisers, was a warning of the threat to the PCI's cohesion from the Left. Its main concern probably remains that of being forced on the defensive by the risky activities of the militants inside and outside the party.

In France, too, the Communists are concerned to avoid being outflanked on the Left, though there is less danger of this now than in 1968, when the revolutionary initiative lay with the students rather than the workers. Like the PCI, the French Communist Party (PCF) has increasingly turned its attention

to the formation of a leftist front that could effectively challenge the government, for without allies none of the left-wing parties can hope to win power. Yet the PCF's response to the plan of Socialist-Communist cooperation put forward by the Socialist Unification Congress, held near Paris from June 11 to 13, was surprisingly cool. A statement issued by the party's Political Bureau on June 17 urged the rank and file to continue the search for common action with all "workers and democrats", but the PCF leadership expressed doubts on the true intentions of the newly-formed Socialist Party on this subject and clearly feels that as the major partner in any front the PCF is in a strong bargaining position.

The most successful electoral pact of recent years was that formed for the Presidential contest of 1965, when the candidate of the Left, M. Mitterand, won enough votes - including those of most Communists - to make a second round necessary before General de Gaulle's re-election. Following the Paris upheavals of May, 1968, and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, new rifts appeared in the Left, and Communist-Socialist cooperation dwindled to a minimum. In the municipal elections earlier this year various agreements were made between the PCF and the Socialists for one party's candidate to stand down in favour of the other's in order to avoid splitting the vote, but the pacts were less extensive than the Communists had wished and remained local rather than national. The Communists clearly hope that the new French Socialist Party which emerged in mid-June will eventually agree to a more lasting arrangement including a common programme.

#### Dialogue with reservations

The Unification Congress had the twin objectives of fusing the old Socialist Party, SFIO, led by M. Alain Savary, with M. Mitterand's Convention des Institutions Républicaines (CIR) and other smaller "socialist" groups, and of defining the new party's relationship with the numerically stronger Communist Party. Superficially, both aims were achieved - though the composition of the new 81-man Directing Committee, in which all currents of leftist opinion are represented, may make decisions more difficult. M. Mitterand was preferred to the Socialist leader, M. Savary, for the post of party First Secretary, but he won only a narrow victory for his party programme which includes a future

dialogue with the Communists. It recommended the opening of talks on the "concrete problems of government" connected with initiating a Socialist transformation of society and said that the party was ready to proceed on the basis of a "programme for government". However, he added the reservations that the programme would not be finalised until a special National Convention had been held early in 1972 and that no agreement could be concluded until the Communists gave adequate assurances of their attitudes on sovereignty, democratic liberties and free elections.

This scheme will supersede the spasmodic exchanges between the two parties over the past two years aimed at establishing common ideological ground and goes some way towards meeting the Communists' demand for a common programme. However, the PCF leadership seems to have been disappointed at the leisurely timescale and it expressed dissatisfaction at the ambiguities of the proposal, which it said had been supported by anti-Communists and opponents of unity as well as those in favour of a common programme. The Communists' reaction has made it clear that a political agreement will be far from easy. Indeed, the PCF would probably have preferred to do business with M. Mollet (a recent but enthusiastic convert to joint action) and has misgivings about M. Mitterand, who dealt firmly with the Communists during his period as Minister of the Interior under the Fourth Republic. The PCF continues in its guarded reaction to his policies and its deputy head, M. Marchais, has criticised M. Mitterand's proviso that an alliance should be conditional on the PCF offering pledges of its respect for democratic rights. For its part, Moscow seems inclined to encourage the formation of any left-wing alliance in France which would allow the Communists to emerge from their political isolation. The response of the Soviet news agency, Tass, to the proposal put forward by the Unification Congress was more enthusiastic than that of the PCF.

#### ..... COMMUNIST EDITOR BACKS OSTPOLITIK

Most striking confirmation so far of the significance which the Warsaw Pact countries attach to the Federal Government's Ostpolitik has come from the influential Polish weekly Polityka.

The editor of the Warsaw periodical, in a published debate on the division of Europe and proposed European security conference with the editor of the London Economist, published simultaneously in both publications, writes:

In Warsaw the dominant conviction is that the changes which are now taking place in the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries are putting an end to the causes which in the past made it difficult to call an all-European conference. Up to now the initiatives taken to improve the political climate in Europe and the transition to wider and richer forms of co-operation have been frustrated by the German problem.

The official attitude of the previous west German governments froze every, even the most sensible proposal. By starting the process of normalizing relations with the east European countries, by acknowledging the postwar state of affairs in Europe, the Brandt-Scheel government has had a decisive influence in bringing about a complete change in the whole situation on our continent.

For almost a quarter of a century all political ideas, both in the east and in the west, were conceived in the shadow of the German problem. Now, as a result of the agreements already concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and with Poland, the source of countless political conflicts between east and west is drying up.

The visible improvement in the political climate between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries is an excellent confirmation of our oft-repeated thesis that the acknowledgement by West Germany of the postwar state of affairs in Europe is essential for the strengthening of peace on our continent. Speaking realistically, the improvements already attained between Bonn and the capitals of the socialist countries, and the further steps still to come, are demolishing the last barrier on the road to an all-European conference.

We have, therefore, a new situation in Europe. A new page is opening in the history of postwar Europe.

(German International)

## ECONOMICS

### SOLID GROWTH DESPITE HEAVY COMMITMENTS

by Michael Simmons

There is probably more selfawareness and critical self-examination present in the discussions going on in the Soviet Union today about economic planning and management than there has been at almost any other time in the country's history. The commitments of the country have meant unprecedented burdens for the national economy, and it is not surprising that Mr. Brezhnev, the Party leader, himself should have unequivocally told the recent Party Congress that there was "an urgent need" to improve planning methods.

Precisely how this urgent need will be fulfilled remains an open question, but the present leadership, in most respects unchanged since the going of Mr. Khrushchev towards the end of 1964, has not hesitated to speak of unresolved shortcomings and problems.

#### Post-war growth

This is not to deny the massive achievements of the country, particularly in the postwar era. Nor is to deny that even when the growth rate for industrial output slipped to 7 per cent, a couple of years ago - against 10 per cent two years before that - that the increase was very considerable by, say, West European standards. The overall growth rate set for last year, important on the Soviet calendar as Lenin's centenary year, was at 6.3 per cent, one of the lowest ever forecast - but was still high and, according to the official statistics, was comfortably exceeded.

But the burdens, economic as well as military and political, undoubtedly do mean pressures and, on occasions, the diversion of much-needed resources. Leading the working-class movement, like maintaining the secure frontiers of those countries under Communist rule, costs money. But Mr Brezhnev was able to assure the Congress delegates that the Soviet Party would "continue to promote" multi-lateral inter-party ties.

In some respects, the burdens must have been of an unexpected nature. Discussing progress on the national economic front over the past five-years period, Mr Kosygin, the Prime Minister, stated that "the aggravated international situation"

had affected Plan fulfilment. This gave rise, he said, to the need to carry through additional measures of a defence character, calling for "some diversion" of resources and manpower.

Mr Kosygin, not unexpectedly, did not say what "aggravations" he was talking about - but it can safely be assumed that the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia, the movement of manpower and military equipment to the long Chinese frontier, as well as the commitments to assist Egypt, have all meant unforeseen new spending. An estimate of total Soviet aid to Egypt, not given by the Russians themselves, but by the Institute for Strategic Studies, is as high as \$ 4,500m.

#### Sought co-operation

But the leadership, in its endeavours to maintain secure frontiers for the socialist camp, has - particularly in the last year or so - sought to marry its thinking with appeals for co-operation with the West. If these appeals were met, then the Russians, like the Western leaderships to whom they are addressing themselves, would be able to re-divert resources back into industry.

They would also, if their ends were achieved, be able to enter into some uncharted territories so far as international economic co-operation was concerned. Thus, the calls for a European Security Conference have taken in suggestions that closer economic and technical co-operation between East and West could be placed on the agenda. The willingness to discuss strategic missiles with the Americans, and possibly to cut back on the number of troops based in Europe, could obviously lead to significant savings on the economic front.

#### Convergence theory

But none of this should be mistaken for any notion that socialism and capitalism might one day "converge". The convergence theory is rejected by the Soviet leadership, and Mr Brezhnev, speaking of economic developments in the non-Communist world, declared "the general crisis of capitalism has continued to deepen".

On the domestic front, the Russians see computerisation as one of their most important life-lines in the years ahead. As what the East Europeans like to call "the scientific and technical

revolution" gathers momentum, so the role of electronic equipment will increase. Mr Kosygin acknowledged this to the Congress, when he said: -

"In the present conditions, the improvement of the system of planning and economic management requires the broader application of economic and mathematical methods, the use of computers, managerial equipment and advanced means of communication. The use of computers will speed up the receipt and processing of information, the elaboration of many variants of the Plan and the finding of optimal Plan solutions".

The State Planning Commission, he went on, as well as the Commission for Material and Technical Supplies and the Central Statistical Office, have set up computer departments. In the newly started five-year period it is planned that at least 1,600 automated control systems should go into operation in industrial and agricultural production units, as well as in the sectors of communications, internal trade and transport.

How this will be achieved, and the precise nature of the role to be given to the computer, also remain open questions, and are the subject of keen debate in Moscow. Nor is it yet clear where all the computers are to come from, and how sophisticated they will be. A large proportion, certainly, will be produced by domestic manufacturers, but at least an equally large proportion probably, will be imported. The apparently fruitless talks aimed at co-operation held with International Business Machines some months ago must have come as something of a setback to the planners.

The chief aim of domestic policies, of course, is to achieve "full Communism", when "each will receive according to his needs". Mr Khrushchev, in an impetuous moment, suggested this might be achieved by 1980. This date has now been quietly shelved, and any Party member worth his salt, in Moscow or elsewhere, would concede that fixing a date of such a millennium is a very difficult exercise. Mr Brezhnev made it plain in his report that, despite the failure of certain key economic sectors to reach the targets that were set for them in 1966, there had been "another great stride forward" in the past five years. But he also warned the 6,000-odd people present that there could be "long decades dividing the sowing from the harvest".

In its determination to raise the living and cultural standards

of the population, the leadership has taken another discernible step. As other articles in this survey indicate, much stress in the economic discussions is being laid on the need for more and better consumer goods. The coming on stream of the huge car plant on the Volga, built in co-operation with Italy's Fiat and scheduled soon to produce 660,000 cars a year, is evidence of this.

In the world economic context, the main centres of what Moscow calls "imperialist rivalry" are seen as the U.S., Western Europe (above all, the Common Market countries) and Japan. Growth rate comparisons, however, are currently restricted to the U.S., Britain and West Germany. Comparisons are not made for obvious reasons, with Japan, just as when the integration and effectiveness of the Moscow-based Comecon organisation are being discussed, no comparisons are made with the relatively efficient Common Market. The latter, after all, is an organisation the Russians would rather did not exist - though there are indications that a modus vivendi with it might prove acceptable.

#### Unmentioned reform

There was little specific mention during the Congress of the economic reform, introduced by Mr Kosygin in September 1965. This presumably is partly because, as a programme for action, it is taken as read, and partly - as I was told during a conversation with senior officials of the State Planning Commission - because it has produced some of its own difficulties. It did not, for one thing, give a long enough perspective for forward planning; it did not solve the gnawing problems connected with productivity; and it did not go far enough to influence the quality - as opposed to the quantity - of goods being produced.

Mr Brezhnev, warning that the "class struggle" between socialism and capitalism was in fact being intensified and this had to be taken into account, emphasized that there had to be an improvement in building standards, that there had to be more efficient accounting, that science and technology had to be mastered, and that living standards had to go up. Even he, one fancies, would not be reluctant to admit that secure frontiers and a strong army are not the only evidence of Soviet might.

(The Financial Times)

### THE WAY TO WIN BUSINESS IN EASTERN EUROPE

There seem to be two schools of thought on trade with eastern Europe. The first contends it is the latter day equivalent of the search for the perpetually elusive Holy Grail. The second sees it more as a trial by ordeal, from which the salesman who shows fortitude can emerge with profitable orders and the satisfaction of knowing that he has helped cement the growing bonds of mutual trust between east and west.

The arguments of both sides should be heard with sympathy. The truth of the matter is the first school tends to consist of people in the consumer goods field. The second is largely made up from those who trade in technological products and industrial machinery. The point is that eastern Europe needs western technology and mechanical know-how, but regards almost anything else as superfluous luxuries.

Thinking in Whitehall reflects this. Trade experts by no means underestimate the diplomatic value or the potential profits in east-west trade, but, at the same time, they are chary of doing too much to encourage businessmen to attempt to break into the market with a range of consumer products.

Trade with eastern Europe - especially in consumer goods - requires a flexibility of approach that many British companies find hard to master. Selling is usually a very lengthy process - the somewhat bureaucratic buying process is unlike anything found in Britain; the conditions of purchase are stringent; and often the spectre of barter looms on the horizon.

But recently there have been indications that some Comecon countries are at last relaxing their policy of clamping down on private consumption. The USSR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have all acknowledged that there are consumer needs that must be satisfied and, to a greater or lesser extent, are making plans to put more consumer goods on the market.

This must at least put new hope into businessmen whose deals fell by the wayside, but hope is a pretty useless marketing tool. Preparation, market knowledge and flexibility are essential for trade with eastern Europe. A good case-study is provided by Personna International (United Kingdom) - the British subsidiary of the Philip Morris group. Personna, which markets and manufactures such things as razor blades, first started its campaign to penetrate eastern Europe three years

ago. Its original approach has helped it build up a valuable bulk market for its products.

Mr Ray Dallow, Personna's marketing director, says: "We were looking for new markets. Trade in Britain was not showing the growth that we wanted and, naturally, we thought of eastern Europe. We started from square one and decided that as barter would be the most likely basis for trade, we had better become experts at barter".

Barter is the main basis for Personna's trade with eastern Europe. It started off on a simple bilateral basis. Personna would send out razor blades and receive some other commodity in return, which it would then sell elsewhere.

Barter can have hidden advantages. One can make a profit on the razor blades and profit on the goods one receives in payment. But the process is fraught with pitfalls and, in barter, the rule is to hasten slowly.

The selling approach is equally important. Patience is needed, plus market knowledge and a reasonable head for languages. Personna has about four salesmen working on the eastern European business. The sales manager, Mr Christopher Smith, is improving his German, he speaks adequate French and will shortly start studying Russian. One salesman already speaks about six languages and the other two are preparing for language laboratory courses. Mr Dallow's secretary speaks fluent Polish and Russian.

Mr Dallow said: "To sell in eastern Europe, you have to be known; you must not be pompous in your approach; and you must be absolutely straight and honest with them. You have to win their trust, and if you lose it you are completely cut out. Samples must arrive on time and delivery schedules must be adhered to precisely".

There is usually a considerable lag between the first approach and the initial order - if any. Personna decided to expand its small trade with eastern Europe three years ago, but it took at least a year before its efforts bore any real fruit.

Some businessmen argue that this time lag and the regular visits that must be made to the purchasing enterprise mean that the expenses involved in east-west trade are top high to justify in terms of profit. Mr Dallow agrees that salesmen must make a number of visits before they can clinch a deal, but denies that the cost burden is too heavy.

He said: "If you try to break into a sophisticated western market, the costs can be very high. It is not just a matter of the salesmen's expenses, there are very heavy advertising and marketing costs to bear. This is not the case in dealing with eastern Europe".

The approach the company takes is to seek to establish distributorship arrangements with one of the purchasing enterprises. This usually entails an initial visit to talk in general terms, plus regular follow-up visits at, say, three-monthly intervals. As a sales aid the company uses literature and films prepared in the prospective customer's own language.

When a deal is proposed the purchasing enterprise submits a list of goods it can offer for barter and then Personna's barter specialists get to work. So far they have managed to sell such diverse products as : machinery, nails, dried prunes, clothes pegs, cement sacks and peeled walnuts.

"It is a very interesting business", said Mr Dallow. "When you get known as being quite good at barter, you are often approached by third parties - people who buy from eastern Europe. Usually the deal is that that they exchange the razor blades we want to sell for the commodity they want to buy and charge us a commission. That way they can make a saving and we can make a sale".

The whole rigmarole seems to present ample opportunities for complications and confusion but, says Mr Dallow, the business pays well. One of the advantages is that it provides long production runs - "When you talk of Russia, you are talking about very big business" - and this eases such problems as complying with the buyer's packaging requirements.

Personna's best eastern European customer so far is Czechoslovakia. Trade, as in other Comecon countries, was initially channelled into supplying the "dollar shops" where western goods are sold to the general public in exchange for "hard" western currencies. But gradually, as a rapport has been established, selling outlets have broadened to include ordinary stores and country cooperatives. So far, Personna have been building up this rapport through personal contact, though the company is currently investigating the sales opportunities offered at the big east European trade fairs.

But while their approach is enthusiastic - "The salesmen we are after are the self-starters, the young tigers" - it is not

naive. They realize the pitfalls facing the businessmen in western Europe - such as the need to be circumspect in all personal relations there, not only those with one's business contacts. They have also had their share of frustrations, for instance, when a man with whom they had been negotiating for nine months was transferred to another department, and the talks went back to square one.

Above all they realize that despite the considerable difference in business methods, there is no lack of acumen in eastern Europe. They are chary of the easy deals for hard currency. Too many suppliers have had their fingers burnt by supplying goods to eastern European countries only to find them being reexported at a profit to the west. Which only goes to prove that the communists are not against the profit motive... providing it is a public one and earned in the west.

(The Times)

#### EEC SETS SIGHTS ON EAST EUROPE

by Michael Lake

The EEC has agreed in principle to harmonise its external trade policy towards the Communist world by the end of 1974. This means that all existing, bilateral arrangements between Western and Eastern Europe, including Britain's, would be superseded. It also means, theoretically, that the Soviet bloc would be forced to recognise the Common Market.

But the outlook is by no means that certain. Unless there is major progress towards a political detente in Europe in the next two and a half years, and unless the Soviet Union undergoes a radical change of heart, Eastern Europe is unlikely to recognise the EEC in that time.

It is not difficult to detect readiness for a confrontation. Communist observers say that if the Community countries refuse to carry on normal trade without the umbrella of a Community mandate then the trade levels will fall off to everyone's mutual disadvantage - especially that of Western exporters.

Some Western diplomats say the Soviet bloc will be faced with a fait accompli, but that since our trade balance with the Communists is generally unfavourable, and since the proportion of trade going eastwards is relatively tiny, we should have little

to lose if the Eastern block played it rough.

It is likely, in the event, that more moderate views will prevail. Britain's trade with the Communists is only three per cent of our total trade, but it is worth £250 millions a year and some of its suits us very well.

If, for instance, Russian supplies of soft wood dried up, we should be short of this building material by 22 per cent of our consumption and there could be a crisis in the construction industry. If we stopped buying Soviet diamonds we should lose the valuable commission we make on re-exporting them.

The Communists take a predictably gloomy view of the whole business, partly because Soviet policy dictates that they have to, and partly because they have genuine fears that their trade will be damaged.

One fear is that in harmonising the liberalisation of trade - doing away with tariff and quota restrictions - the enlarged Community will harmonise downwards, towards a low common denominator.

There is still a good deal of trade which is not liberalised, in order to protect home industries from cheap competition; the Eastern block fear that the weaker industries and smaller countries will prevent the bigger, bolder industries and companies from going the whole hog.

Trade liberalisation is a continuing problem; much has been done but the more items freed, the closer you get to the hard core. For instance we have quota restrictions against Soviet watches and clocks. Their television sets are offered at £19 against a minimum ex-factory price in Britain of £40. Radios are also heavily restricted.

The recent Open General Import Licence lists such restricted items as tableware, enamel hollow ware, footwear made of rubber or plastic material, certain textiles and gloves and Christmas tree decorations made of glass.

But Communist fears that liberalisation will be retarded in an enlarged Community are dismissed by Western trade experts. The bigger countries, more ready to liberalise, have the political weight. In any case there is no provision for going backwards - for reimposing restrictions on goods already freed for trade.

Britain has begun negotiations aimed at liberalising trade in step with the Community, so that should we join on January 1, 1973, we should be in line with the Community, open for most

trade with the Eastern block.

An illustration of how ready is the request Britain has made for exceptional transitional periods, before full free trade with the Eastern block - two years for hats and five years for gloves.

Contrary to Communist forebodings, it is also highly likely that the Community will take steps to try to preserve the Soviet block's vital sales of food to the West - the main source of convertible currency with which they buy Western technology. At the moment Poland stands to lose £25 millions in food sales to Britain alone.

A Polish delegation has just spent three days at the Department of Trade and Industry seeking some assurances for her sales of butter, bacon and processed food and fruits here. Britain, for her part, is asking the Community for help in maintaining Poland's food trade, particularly in bacon, on the grounds that it is no more excusable to damage trade with an old trading partner like Poland than it is with Australia or New Zealand.

Indeed the Government is prepared to demand action under the "disruption clause" which Mr Rippon negotiated specifically to safeguard Australian exports in order to protect Communist food exports.

In any case, the general trend is for trade with the Eastern block to increase rapidly. It is still only a small part of Western Europe's total trade, but it has ceased to be marginal and is expanding faster than the Community's trade with the outside world as a whole.

The real problem of East-West trade remains that the Communists are not producing the goods we want. Their industrial exports are frequently out of date and of poorer quality. Economic reforms in Eastern Europe may change things for the better, but it will take time.

The EEC Commission believes the most urgent need is a system of long-term credits to enable the Communist countries to import the sophisticated equipment they lack, and thus, in fact, to be able to trade on a more equal basis.

The Commission believes that a harmonised policy towards Eastern Europe will in fact produce, a more dynamic approach rather than a diminishing of contacts, and that EEC investment, credit and technological policies should help the Communists where they need help most.

(The Guardian)

### EAST EUROPE HAS ITS UNCOMMON MARKET

It has long been a familiar paradox that the so-called capitalist economies of western Europe have made more progress towards integration than the planned and supposedly brotherly economies of eastern Europe. Yet East Europe's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, known in the west as Comecon, does move haltingly forward towards forms of economic coordination that can be seen as a blurred reflection of the Common Market, if the comparison is not too close.

The latest plan approved in Bucharest and now published in Moscow maps out a series of intentions which should help East Europe to develop her trade and resources more rationally. The most important of these is for a joint convertible currency backed partially by gold. If this proves workable it should have considerably more effect on the economic development of the area than past attempts at planning a rational division of labour. It should also facilitate east-west trade and could even remove some of the obstacles to Russian membership of the IMF. Significantly, the date for a decision on a single exchange rate for Comecon currencies is 1980, which is also the target date for a common currency in the Common Market. Hence there is a prospect of two big new convertible currencies emerging to keep company with the dollar.

There are many hurdles to be cleared on the way. In sober truth Comecon is not even potentially a mirror image of the Common Market, largely because it is dominated by the huge size and power of the Soviet Union. Integration has tended to mean subservience to Moscow which is one reason why so many east European countries have resisted supra-national bodies. Moreover, the pattern of trade is dominated by the Soviet Union's export of raw materials to East Europe and her import of manufactured goods in return. This inhibits interchange of goods among East European countries and with Western Europe.

More difficult still, the area's internal and external trade has had to be conducted largely on a barter basis because its currencies have not been convertible. Surpluses built up in trade with one country have not been easily available for buying goods from another. Early efforts at integration were devoted largely to trying to impose plans for specialization that had as little relation to economic realities as the centralized plans adopted

within each country during the Stalinist period.

The new phase can therefore be seen partly as reflection of the new attention being given to the market in the various types of economic reform adopted by different countries in Comecon. A mechanism has somehow to be found for coordinating plans in a way that allows the economies to respond to the national and international markets and puts their own relations on a true economic basis.

The trouble at the moment is that each country has its own eccentric pricing system, often unrelated to real costs and different for the domestic and foreign trade. Values are so distorted that it is almost impossible to calculate which goods can be most profitably exported, or in which country a major investment should be made. Any steps towards a convertible currency will therefore have to go hand in hand with reform of pricing systems. If the currency is to be truly convertible in the west, the price systems will also have to be related to world prices. This would be a very big step with considerable political implications, for in countries where economic power is mostly in the hands of the state economic reforms are bound in some degree to be political reforms as well.

(The Times)

### USSR AWAKENS TO ITS ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM

by Boris R. Pusta

Summary: The Soviet Union, covering one-sixth of our earth's battered surface, is now, even more belatedly than the West, facing up to its grim pollution problem which threatens to destroy the ecological balance of the whole vast territory. The main causes are erosion, squandering of timber and water resources, and growing industrial effluent, coupled with a traditionally smug belief that Soviet man can "change Nature" with impunity.

At long last, man appears to have become aware of the fact that his headlong technological advance has become self-defeating by destroying his natural environment at an alarming rate. The fatal consequences of the pollution of air, water and soil by domestic and industrial waste products, the plundering of natural resources for material gain, the destruction of ecological cycles,

etc., do not need to be recapitulated here. Human depredations have already resulted in the loss of 500,000,000 hectares of arable land, two thirds of the world's original forestland, and over 150 species of animals and birds. Whereas Western experts maintain that this process of environmental destruction is part of the price being paid for material progress by all societies, irrespectively of their socio-economic system, their Soviet colleagues claim:

Under socialism, economic development does not take place for the sake of private gain but is planned in the interests of all society for the purpose of achieving a higher standard of living for all citizens, as well as for society as a whole. Therefore no contradictions can arise between the individual and society in either the production or the consumption sphere. Under conditions of a plan-based economy, purposeful and rational utilization of natural resources is possible. (Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1971, No. 5, p. 110)

This optimism is scarcely justified, since there is growing evidence in the Soviet press that the vast natural resources of the Soviet Union are being plundered at a rapid rate for purely utilitarian purposes as though they were inexhaustible and that this is a source of increasing concern both to the authorities and to the general public. Referring to availability of arable land, USSR Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich recently sounded the alarm:

The area of land suitable for agricultural use amounts to 608,000,000 hectares, including 224,000,000 hectares of arable land. The rapid increase in population, the extensive and often scarcely justified removal of land from agricultural use for various kinds of construction and other non-agricultural purposes is leading to a perceptible decrease in the area of arable land. Whereas in 1958 arable land per head of the population totalled on average 1.06 hectares, it is now only 0.94 hectares. This process will inevitably continue. (Vestnik selskokhozyaistvennoi nauki, 1970, No. 2, p. 19)

Wind and water erosion is largely responsible for this development, which in a short space of time can destroy a fertile layer of soil which nature took several thousands of years to create. As observed by Matskevich himself, in the late fifties, as the

aftermath of Khrushchev's ill-considered virgin-land campaign, wind erosion became particularly rampant in the eastern regions of the country; while the tilling of huge additional areas of excellent chernozem (black earth) soil increased grain production considerably, the simultaneous ploughing of large areas of light sandy and sandy loam soil caused much soil to be lost through this type of erosion, and over 45,000,000 hectares in these regions are now threatened in this way.

A serious situation also exists in the south and southeast of the European USSR, where erosion is affecting tens of millions of hectares of fertile chernozem soil and menacing still greater areas of arable and pasture land. Experts have calculated that in the European USSR alone, approximately 50,000,000 hectares are affected to various degrees by water erosion, and in 1969, wind erosion hit the southern regions of the USSR as never before. According to local agricultural authorities, from January 2 to 7 of that year, winter crops were completely destroyed over an area of 820,000 hectares and badly spoiled over an area of 634,000 hectares in the Krasnodar and Stavropol Krai and the Rostov Oblast. Considerable damage was also done to irrigation works. In the Krasnodar Krai, 1,527 kilometers of canal were silted up, over 3,000,000 cubic meters of earth having to be moved from silted-up canals.

Soviet forests are also being subject to severe depredation. In 1965 Leonid Leonov, author of the novel Russky les (The Russian Forest) wrote a long article on the subject in Literaturnaya gazeta (March 30, 1965), charging that every year 350,000,000 cubic meters of timber were felled, 300,000,000 by the state and the rest by collective farms. A tremendous amount was wasted: 100,000,000 cubic meters consisted of wastage in the form of stumps, twigs, tree crowns and leaves, most of which was burnt; 170,000,000 cubic meters were wasted during factory processing, and one half of the 20,000,000 cubic meters used for cellulose were lost, owing to inefficient chemical processing methods. Leonov's words of warning went unheeded, despite the fact that forests are of tremendous importance for water and soil conservation. In the USSR, this applies particularly to the mountainous regions of the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Crimea and the Carpathians. As Sovetskaya Rossiya wrote (July 17, 1968):

Immediately after the war, when, on account of the need to rebuild a shattered economy, the demand for wood was particularly great, the timber men pounced greedily on the Caucasus. It was nearer the center, it had roads; where else should the timber have come from? Disregarding the warnings of the experts, they felled up to 6,000,000 cubic meters a year... Patches of aspen and elder appeared in the high-standing mountain forests.... The regime of the rivers changed visibly. From being quiet and even it became turbulent and flood-like. Without forests, mountains hold no water.

Forests are the prime natural resource of Abkhaziya (in Georgia). They conserve the soil and the fast-flowing rivers, and are responsible for the area's favorable climate. The 512,000 hectares of Abkhazian forests are nevertheless dwindling at an alarming rate. "In the ten years from 1955 to 1965", reported Literaturnaya gazeta (June 23, 1966), "the amount of timber felled in Abkhazian forests increased by over 15 times, from 300,000 to 3,700,000 cubic meters (these figures have been rounded up)". Further:

In the course of seven years, over one half a million hectares of coniferous forest containing 21,000,000 cubic meters of timber have been destroyed or damaged... In the Transbaikal region, the felling of large areas of forest... has led to extensive wind erosion, which in places has assumed catastrophic proportions: drifting sands are blanketing fields and meadows, and many rivers are drying up. (Ibid., December 13, 1967)

The situation is no better in Siberia:

In the past ten years alone, losses of wood during rafting have amounted to about 2,000,000 cubic meters. In many places, the bed of the Kama is like a parquet floor, being covered with five to six layers of wood. (Komsomolskaya pravda, April 20, 1968)

This squandering of timber is outstripping the rate of reforestation:

During the past 25 years the total area of unreforested felled

or burnt areas has amounted to about 18,000,000 hectares. The annual gap between felled and reforested areas continues to this day. (Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva, 1970, No. 2, p. 8)

There is also growing concern in the USSR over water pollution. In its April 3, 1968, issue, Komsomolskaya pravda predicted that if radical measures were not taken, the volume of harmful substances entering the nation's water reserves would increase six- or seven-fold by 1980. According to another report, 18,000,000 cubic meters of unpurified, and millions of cubic meters of imperfectly purified effluent were being allowed to flow into bodies of water in the RSFSR every day (Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 14, 1968). Elsewhere we read:

Siberia is a territory extremely rich in fresh water. According to calculations made by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, however, in 1968 Siberian industry required 150,000,000 cubic meters of water every day. In the next ten to fifteen years, Siberian industrial production is to increase six-fold. Siberian industry will therefore require in a day more water than the Yenisei and the Ob together carry into the ocean. This means that in ten to fifteen years Siberia may be deprived of pure water. (Nedelya, February 24, 1968).

The situation is also acute in such areas as the Urals, the Central Chernozem Region, the southern Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Professor S. Vendrov wrote, for example, that

The Volga has an "effective production" of 253 cubic kilometers of fresh water per year... thirty years ago the national economy of the USSR swallowed up about one half of the yearly discharge of the Volga: now it needs one-and-a-half Volgas... The total annual discharge of all our country's rivers is 4,360 cubic kilometers. For our children the amount of water would seem to be adequate. If nothing changes, however, it might not be, for water consumption is growing too precipitately. (Literaturnaya gazeta, June 17, 1970, p. 11)

When it is considered that, as pointed out by Izvestia (June 16, 1970), "in order to smelt a ton of steel about 300 tons of water are required, and in order to grow 100 kilograms of wheat 100 tons of moisture are needed", and that "a large metallurgical combine uses about 2,000 million cubic meters of water per year"

(ibid., February 4, 1967), the fears expressed by Professor Vendrov begin to make sense. Vendrov drew attention to another danger:

Hydroelectric power stations on rivers running through flat areas are large, sometimes grandiose structures. The current here is slow, and in order to obtain a large head of water, gigantic water reservoirs are required. These sharply and brutally alter the natural water system, including the subterranean regime. This immediately has an impact on the soil and the forests, and on their inhabitants, as well as the local climate. To put it briefly, we have for some years been abruptly destroying ecological balance which took thousands of years to form. (Literaturnaya gazeta, June 17, 1970)

Environmental interference has also had a disastrous effect on the Soviet fishing industry. A striking example is the Caspian Sea, on which Candidate of Biological Sciences G. Sibirtsev has the following to say:

The Caspian accounts for 90 percent of the world catch of sturgeon and the yield of black caviar, and up to 70-80 percent of the vobla (Caspian roach) catch. . . . Compared with pre-war days, however, it contains far less valuable fish and animals: about 2.3 times less seals, three times less bream, 4.5 times less sazan (a freshwater fish belonging to the carp family), 9 times less pike perch, 10 times less vobla and 150 times less herring. The sturgeon haul has decreased by three times. White salmon are virtually non-existent. One-third of a century ago, valuable fish accounted for 84.4 percent of catches in the Caspian, but now only 17 percent. (Ibid.)

As reasons for this disastrous development Sibirtsev gave the sinking level of the Caspian Sea (on January 8, 1970, Komsomolskaya pravda reported that "in recent decades" it had fallen by over two meters and was "continuing to drop catastrophically"), unsystematic fishing, the pollution of in-flowing rivers by industrial effluent, oil pollution of fish feeding grounds in the southern Caspian (Sibirtsev described the sea bed as being "turned into tar") and, first and foremost, the disruption of the water regime by hydroelectric power stations on the Volga. The dam of the Volgograd Hydroelectric Power Station in particular has completely cut off beluga (white

sturgeon), white salmon and herring from their spawning grounds, and sturgeons and sevruga (a kind of sturgeon) from many of theirs. The Caspian is not the only Soviet lake the level of which is dropping as a result of human interference. Since 1961, the level of the Aral Sea has been falling because increasing quantities of water are being taken from the rivers Amudarya and Syrdarya for irrigation, industrial and other purposes. Komsomolskaya pravda (August 11, 1968) reported that in 1968 the level of the Aral Sea dropped by no less than 176 centimeters and its volume shrank by 110 cubic kilometers. Lake Balkhash is endangered by the construction of the Kapchagai water reservoir and large irrigation works in the lower Ili:

. . . in the next 7-8 years, 8,000,000 cubic meters of water annually will be collected from the Ili for irrigation. The amount of water taken to fill the water reservoir and irrigate the basin of Lake Balkhash, both of which projects are to be carried out simultaneously during the next 6-8 years, may reach the dangerous level of 9,600 million cubic meters, that is, 65 percent of the discharge of all the rivers flowing into the lake. . . . Most probably, in six years time the Balkhash will be 2.5-3 meters shallower. (Literaturnaya gazeta, March 25, 1970)

Among the large bodies of water in the USSR which are threatened by ruthless exploitation of the environment the huge Lake Baikal, which contains 23,000 cubic kilometers of pure, transparent and pleasant-tasting water and accounts, in fact, one-fifth of the world's reserves of fresh water valued at millions upon millions of rubles. The lake is now fast being polluted by factories along its shores, in particular the Baikal Cellulose Plant, and by rafting operations:

In the last ten years about one-and-a-half million cubic meters of wood have sunk to the bottom. Over 50 rivers with a total length of 3,700 kilometers have, as a result of contamination by timber, lost their spawning and fishing value. (Komsomolskaya pravda, September 19, 1968)

Indiscriminate ploughing and tree-felling are causing erosion which is denuding the slopes leading down to the banks of the lake and increasing the threat of sand drifts. Lake Baikal is on the way to suffering the same fate as the Great Lakes of North

America, whose water is so polluted as to be unfit for man or fish, the denudation of their banks also having led to their complete salinization. Particularly seriously affected is Lake Erie, which is almost exactly three-quarters the size of Lake Baikal.

Thus, although the USSR is a "socialist" country where economic development "does not take place for the sake of private gain, but is planned in the interests of all society", it is no more immune to environmental destruction than the rapaciously capitalist West. And this brief survey has made no mention of such other evils as the indiscriminate hunting of animals and birds, air pollution in industrial centers and the squandering of useful minerals. At least the Soviet authorities are conscious of the menace and anxious to take measures to deal with it. It is too early, however, to pass judgement on the actual results.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR)

#### CAPITALIST MARKETING TODAY

by D. Kostyukhin, Dr.Sc. (Econ.)

The profound changes that have taken place in the structure of the capitalist economy and the world capitalist market since the turn of the century have been reflected in the way in which the monopolies operate on the market, in their approach to organising their production, financial, scientific, technical and marketing activities.

At the monopoly stage of capitalist development, the concentration of production and capital create new conditions on the market. The monopolies have increasingly moved away from organising their activities around their production, and are orientating on marketing and market research, and they are trying to work less and less for unknown markets.

An important area of sales for the monopolies is the demand created by the bourgeois state, particularly for arms production. In many industries, government orders account for the bulk of the output of the leading corporations. At the same time, other marketing outlets become better known to the monopolies as a result of their studies of demand and of market research into the changing demand, etc.

The monopolies are trying increasingly to improve their system of programming production, which has become a component part of their whole system of organisation. Intra-company programming has now reached a fairly high degree of perfection.

In programming their production, the monopolies make extensive use of the latest computing machines. Electronic computers are used on a massive scale, because they make it possible to keep abreast of the day-to-day fluctuations in supply and demand, and even to estimate the inter-sectoral balances on a national scale.

It was Lenin, who, in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, stressed the fundamental changes in the policy of the monopolies and their attitude to the market, at the imperialist stage of capitalist development. Lenin said that concentration had reached a point where an approximate calculation of all the raw material sources was being made, and a rough calculation of the size of the market, which the monopoly associations divided between them.

Today, this tendency, which Lenin had discovered, has developed further, reaching massive proportions, and developing into a "new philosophy" in the whole sphere of business in the capitalist companies, and which has become known as the system of "marketing" among businessmen and in economic writings in the capitalist world. This is a product of the imperialist stage of capitalist development.

In the last few decades, the meaning of "marketing" has undergone a fundamental change. The traditional commercial meaning of "marketing" as a method of sale, which was concerned with finding buyers for the product which the company was capable of producing. This is becoming the thing of the past. The corporation used to be guided by the following principle: to produce as much as possible, to try to "push" the products into the market by any available means, and to sell them in an unknown market.

The modern idea of marketing rejects this approach, regarding it as one of the causes of the constant discrepancy between supply and demand, as one of the causes of the crisis of overproduction. The new concept of marketing is based on the principle of organising the production of goods which can definitely be sold on the

market. In view of the massive manufacture of products and the increasingly acute competition, the problems that business faces are not so much the problems of manufacturing a product, as the possibilities of selling it.

The new idea of marketing is that the whole activity of corporations, including their research and development programmes, capital investments, finance, use of manpower and also sales programmes, technical servicing, etc., should be based on a knowledge of consumer demand, and of any probable changes in it over the short term. Moreover, one of the purposes of modern marketing is to bring out the latent demand among buyers.

Consequently, marketing makes the manufacture of products functionally dependent on consumer demand. On the strength of this, the apologists of the monopolies get out to prove that modern monopoly capital is allegedly not guided by a drive for profit, but by a desire to meet the buyers' demand, and the needs of the population. One bourgeois apologist of this concept, T. Levitt, says: "The difference between selling and marketing is more than semantic. Selling focusses on the needs of the seller, marketing on the needs of the buyer. Selling is pre-occupied with the seller's need to convert his product or service into cash; marketing with the idea of satisfying the needs of the customer. . . ." This idea is a result of wishful thinking by the apologists of monopoly capital. Even under the new system of marketing, the basic aims of the corporations remain the same, that is, to make the maximum profit and to achieve a high degree of competitiveness on the market. Capitalist marketing is a new instrument, used by the monopolies in fighting for markets in a new situation, with fundamental changes in the structure of the capitalist economy, and against the background of the competition and struggle between the two world systems. The monopolies engage in market and consumer demand research in order to get ahead of their rivals in the fierce battle for markets.

The modern concept of marketing and its main functions have yet to be fully defined. It still needs to be clarified by business circles and Western economists. A considerable number of companies and sales specialists still assume marketing to be no more than a new name for sales activities. In this context a characteristic definition of marketing can be found in a glos-

sary of business terms, published by the Alexander Hamilton Institute in the U.S.A., which states that marketing is "the business activities which are concerned with the flow of goods and services from producer to consumer".

Writers on advertising frequently state that marketing is a branch of advertising. Specialists in technical servicing and in other spheres of business often assume that under present conditions the term marketing can also be applied to their own particular sphere of activity. In effect, these fields are only component parts and functions of the new system of marketing, which is a system of organising all the activities of the modern giant corporation in manufacturing and selling goods, or in providing services, on the basis of a profound and comprehensive knowledge of the market and of the actual demand and requirements of buyers. The main purpose of marketing is to create the best possible conditions for the active control of the market and of prices, to assure the maximum profits for the corporations.

A new system of marketing envisages the following main elements of organisation and management of corporate activity:

establishing the existing and potential demand for goods and services through complex research into the state of the market, and into its future prospects;

organisation of research and development in developing new brands and models of products, and organising the manufacture of these products to meet the consumer demand;

co-ordination and planning of production and finance;

organisation and improvement in the system and methods of sales and distribution of products;

regulation and direction of all corporate activity, including management of production, transport, packaging, sales, advertising, technical and other services and measures to boost sales.

The modern conception of marketing has placed market research at the centre of corporate activity. Market research is the complex study of the market, and implies the study of the market in all its basic sectors and aspects in order to make the results of this research available for the formulation and successful realisation of the whole programme of corporate activity.

Modern market research is a method formulated in great detail and designed to ensure an effective solution for all the

corporation's problems arising out of its production and sales activities.

The general scheme of market research includes the following elements:

the study of the market - the characteristics of the commodity market and of the product, the demand for new products, the competitiveness of a given product, the quality of packaging, the study of rival products, the possible new uses of a given product;

the study of the capacity of a given market. This includes: the size of the market, the possibility of expanding the market, ratio of leading producers in the total sales of the given product on this market (monopolisation of the market); changes in the market capacity over a given period;

the study of sales methods: quotas of sales or division of sales territory, effectiveness of marketing outlets, marketing costs, storage and other service premises, prices and rebates, bonuses, etc.;

advertising: types and methods of advertising, advertising media and their comparative effectiveness;

the technical servicing of the product;

the prospects for developing a given branch of the economy: market forecasting (short-term projections), long-term forecasting of the market, trends in the development of the economy, manpower requirements, forecasting of profits analysis of the forecasting of the location of production enterprises and storage premises, demand from companies, the production at company's enterprises abroad;

the study of export markets: products research, size of markets, sales methods, advertising and the other aspects listed for the domestic market.

Companies use the same methods in market research at home and abroad, but research into export markets is much more difficult.

The results of market research are taken as a basis for all the production, finance, research and development, advertising, sales and other corporate programmes. In particular, they are used by the corporation to formulate its programmes and plans for the manufacture of products, for fixing the prices and working

out specifications, decisions on the range of products, the timing and the extent and the number of modifications and changes in design of the products, and the amount of research and development.

Market research is the basis for determining the basic lines in the price policy (the level and dynamics of domestic and export prices), marketing policy and market planning: the most rational sales methods, choosing the most promising markets, etc., advertising methods, the organisation of after-sales services to provide the consumer with the fullest range of services in the most rational use and enjoyment of the product.

An example of the modern organisation of the giant corporation under the new system of marketing is provided by the U.S. John Deere Corporation, which is owned by four major corporations manufacturing farming machinery at home, and which is among the hundred leading corporations in the U.S.A. The corporation has 20 plants and a ramified sales network across the whole of the U.S.A. The structure of the sales network divides the country into 17 zones, each of which has a wholesale depot operating as a subsidiary of the corporation.

John Deere formulates long- and short-term programmes for manufacture and sales of their products. This is done on the basis of the extensive information about the state and prospects of the market, which is provided by the 17 zonal wholesale depots. Using these assessments, the corporation plants, on the basis of an analysis of the production and sales of their products for the past year they work out a short-term programme, for the year ahead, every three months. These programmes are consolidated by the corporation's central office, and are the basis for the executive decisions on the volume of output and sales of products for the 12 months ahead. Plants may only modify these programmes by a 5-10 per cent margin. The corporation engages in long-term programming, draws up five-year plans of production, capital investment, manpower and finance. Let us note that a new five-year programme is projected every year.

Alongside the long- and short-term programmes for developing production, the corporation formulates plans for introducing new technical equipment and the manufacture of new models of machinery. As a rule, for new products the corporation makes market forecasting for the next 15 years. The programme for

the manufacture of new products is based on the forecasting of the size of the market and on the rate of profit which the corporation can expect to make on the sale of the new product. Let us note that the time between the decision being taken to develop a new model to the moment it reaches the farmer, is about five years.

John Deere's marketing system is typical of large and medium corporations in any industry, not only in the U.S.A., but in other industrialised capitalist countries.

The extent of the market research and the degree of checking depends on how developed the monopolies are in the given country. That is why the new approach to market research, the organisation of corporate activity and the ultimate creation of the new system of marketing was first used in the U.S.A. back in the 1930s, whereas it first became important in Western Europe only in the 1950s. More than 90 per cent of U.S. corporations have market research departments, and the largest corporations have marketing directors. The monopolies have special marketing departments to carry on market research, who not only carry out their own studies of the market with their own personnel, but also organise market research through every sector of the monopoly apparatus, and also use the services of specialised firms of consultants and specialist research centres to this end.

The first corporations specialising in the study of the sales markets arose in the U.S.A.; in the last ten years, their number has also been growing rapidly in the West European countries. In 1967, Britain had over 5,000 specialists engaged in market research, as compared with about 2,000 in 1954. In 1967, over 500 British companies were engaged in fullscale market research.

Special national marketing institutes have been set up in the U.S.A. and many West European countries. A large network of specialised schools is being set up, as well as various courses on marketing at universities and other institutions of higher learning associations, etc.

The bourgeois economists' active elaboration and the monopolies' application of the new system of marketing, with their urge to beat their rivals and secure the highest profits also has another equally important purpose. The formulation

and extensive application of the new system of marketing is another attempt by the monopolies to find a way of easing or forestalling crises of overproduction, and of ensuring a balance between supply and demand under capitalism.

However, no amount of regulation of economic development under capitalism, whether conducted by the bourgeois state or by the monopolies, can help to avert the operation of the elemental forces of capitalism and to do away with competition. Nor can it ensure a balanced development on the scale of the whole economy, because production continues to be based on capitalist ownership of the means of production, and the exploitation of wage-labour.

(Foreign Trade, Moscow)

## CULTURE

### SOVIET DUALITY TOWARDS RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS

The ceremonial election of a new All-Russian Patriarch contrasts with the plight of believers in the Soviet Union, where citizens' rights remain strictly circumscribed.

The enthronement of Patriarch Pimen as head of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Yelokhovskiy Cathedral in Moscow on June 3 was attended by many foreign ecclesiastics, including delegates from the Vatican and other Christian denominations, but by no senior members of the Soviet or East European atheist régimes. Yet the former Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna, who the previous day had been elected Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia by a large gathering of orthodox clergy and laity at the Zagorsk monastery, is not likely to prove an embarrassment to the Soviet Government. He has championed its foreign policies unreservedly at the World Council of Churches and other international ecumenical meetings. By contrast, the first incumbent of the post after the 1917 October Revolution, Patriarch Tikhon, started his tenure of office by excommunicating the Bolshevik Government and persisted in his defence of the Church's rights despite his arrest and the execution of many of his followers.

On the eve of his election the 60-year-old Pimen, who as Acting Patriarch since the death of Alexis in April 1970, had been a particularly strong candidate, expressed thanks for the "consistently benevolent attitude" of the Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, towards the Russian Orthodox Church. He even declared that it enjoyed full freedom and that the authorities respected the law on the free exercise of religious worship. In its account of the election and enthronement on June 5, the government newspaper, *Izvestia*, highlighted equally the Church's appeal to Christians to struggle against American interference in South-East Asia and Israeli expansionism in the Middle East.

The presence in Moscow of Cardinal Willebrands, President of the Vatican's Secretariat for Christian Unity, was in keeping with the Roman Catholic Church's current policy of maintaining regular contacts with the Russian Church and reflected the Soviet Government's encouragement of ecumenical contacts that enhance its "peaceful" image and can be exploited for the activities of its front organisations. The rescinding on June 2 of

the 300-year-old anathema against the schismatic Old Believers, and the Church Council's resolution to work for unification with the Orthodox Church in exile, were other gestures likely to enjoy government approval, especially as a means towards the re-establishment of central control over dissident religious groups. According to the Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, Nikodim, relations with the Old Believers, an extreme conservative group which opposed Greek influence within the established Russian Church, were now "sufficiently improved" to lift the excommunication of 1666. Earlier clandestine reports indicated that the group's leadership had been infiltrated and demoralised.

The limited freedom of the Russian Orthodox Church to pursue unity with other Christian denominations for its own sake was reflected in the failure to invite a representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury to attend Patriarch Pimen's enthronement. One of the main reasons for the coolness towards the Anglican Church may have been the publicity given in Britain to the difficulties of Christians in the Soviet Union.

### Samizdat testimony

Evidence of continuing religious persecution, despite Soviet constitutional and legal guarantees, is to be found in every number of the underground samizdat publication of the civil rights movement, *Chronicle of Current Events*, whose 18th issue last April marked three years of regular appearance. Although not the only voice of the clandestine movement, which publicises the violations of human rights and Soviet law within the USSR, the *Chronicle* has proved its reliability and comprehensiveness. In material gathered from all parts of the Soviet Union it reveals the sanctions used by the régime to cow dissenters, notably the confinement of political prisoners in psychiatric hospitals, which has now superseded the cruder Stalinist reprisals. Two years ago a samizdat document put the number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union at more than half a million. *Chronicle* No. 18 lists new examples of arrests and persecution of Ukrainian nationalists, Crimean Tatars attempting to return to their homeland from settlements in Central Asia, Jews desiring to emigrate to Israel, persons found to be in possession of underground literature and various religious groups.

Among the last are mentioned the break-away Baptist Initsiativniki; a Ukrainian sect akin to the Uniates (who acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope) known as pokutniki; and some Lithuanian Catholic priests. The latter circulated a petition from 61 signatories and revealed a fall since 1940 in the number of seminaries in Lithuania from four to one and the reduction of students from over 460 to an upper limit of 30. The Chronicle also reported that a large crowd had attended the funeral of the 70-year-old Boris Talantov, a lay member of the Orthodox Church, who wrote a series of protest letters about the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. He was tried in September, 1969, for "anti-Soviet propaganda" and (according to Chronicle No. 10) sentenced to two years in a labour camp.

#### Pretext for trial

Believers are often charged under Article 142 of the Criminal Code - "violation of the laws on separation of Church from State and school from Church" - which the authorities themselves frequently infringe. This was one of the accusations levelled against the well-known Russian religious writer, Church historian and former priest, Anatoli Livitin-Krasnov, who was given a three-year labour camp sentence in May. He had been released last August after nearly a year's detention under investigation and his clandestinely circulated account of how he maintained his life of prayer in prison may have contributed to his present conviction. His friend, the religious painter Yuri Titov, was also recently arrested with his wife and confined to a mental institution.

The tenacious Initsiativniki, who broke away from the main Baptist Church in 1965 because they objected to the compromises of their leaders with the régime, are particularly active and over 500 of their members have suffered imprisonment in the last ten years. The reprisals taken against them were described in March 1969, in an appeal to the party leadership, in which 1,453 women signatories said that their children were victimised and beaten up at school and sometimes forcibly removed by the secret police to children's homes. The persecuted Baptists have a regular samizdat monthly and quarterly and the Council of Baptist Prisoners' Relatives, which was formed in 1964 and

held its second congress in Kiev last December, recently circulated a series of 20 documents appealing against religious repression.

A new atheist manual for teachers and parents, published in Leningrad under the title Children and Religion, shows that the authorities are concerned at the persistence of religious practices among the young, though they have found some of the methods used to eradicate them counter-productive. The book, produced by the head of the Faculty of Scientific Atheism, Ethics and Aesthetics at the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute, admits that despite half a century of Communist indoctrination only about 40 per cent of all school-leavers are "convinced atheists". Aimed at the Orthodox Church, the Baptists and other surviving sects in the Soviet Union, the manual recommends that teachers should treat religious children "like a doctor healing a sick person" - rather than by punishment and discrimination when marking their work.

Though the Soviet Press is usually reticent about the cases of religious persecution documented in samizdat, an article in Kommunist Tadzhikistana of May 20 described how a Baptist religious education meeting in Ordzhonikidzeabad, attended by children of 5-12 years old from a wide area, was broken up by the "public" - presumably by druzhinniki and other strong-arm "volunteers" who watch over these matters. The article attacked local Baptist leaders and their "illegal activities" (religious teaching in schools is forbidden under the Constitution), suggesting that it was high time for the Procuracy to call the "fanatics" to account and that social organisations and enterprises employing Baptists should examine their record more closely. It looks as if social and work pressures are to be applied more intensively to supplement the legal proceedings used to intimidate believers.

#### SAMIZDAT SOURCES REVEAL RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

**Summary:** The many Samizdat documents which are reaching the West reveal the extent of religious persecution in the Soviet Union. They also show that the peaceful forms of protest against this are becoming an important part of the civil rights movement.

The Soviet Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to practise his religion and states that anyone who prevents him from doing so is liable to punishment. Samizdat sources, however, not only provide evidence of religious persecution but also show that Soviet laws are so framed as to enable the authorities to imprison believers for nothing more than the normal practice of their faith.

Most Samizdat documents on religious matters to reach the West come from Russian Orthodox and Baptist sources although some protests have been made by Catholics, Uniates, Jews and Muslims. Religious protesters have tended to be preoccupied with their own denominational affairs. Only a few individuals, notably the religious writer A. E. Levitin (pseudonym Krasnov), have signed other non-religious protest documents; but it seems probable that, like national dissidents they will become increasingly a part of the civil rights movement in the Soviet Union.

Modification of the Constitution is one of the believers' chief demands because it prevents real freedom of worship. Since May, 1929, when the Constitution was amended to bring it into line with the still-valid law of April 8, 1929, "Concerning Religious Associations", "freedom of religious propaganda" has been excluded. Believers do not have the right to teach religion to children or to adults (other than in officially recognised seminars). Soviet believers have also appealed for their Constitutional rights; petitioned the officially approved religious authorities to allow a democratically elected hierarchy; appealed for the registration of illegal sects (such as the dissident Baptists), for the reinstatement of dismissed churchmen and against the closure of churches.

#### Imprisonment of believers

Believers are frequently charged under Article 142 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code (or its equivalent in other Republican Codes) - "violation of the laws on separation of Church from State and school from Church" - for which the maximum punishment is three years' deprivation of freedom. They may also be charged under Article 227 for encouraging religious activities "harmful to the health of citizens" or inciting people "to refuse to participate in social activity or to fulfil their civic obligations". Since 1961 this has carried a

maximum sentence of five years' deprivation of liberty or exile. Some Samizdat documents report sentences of five years under Article 142 plus five years under Article 227; or five years under Article 142 plus five years' exile. Both sentences are illegal. The longest known sentence on believers were those of 15, 13 and ten years' imprisonment given to leaders of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People in Leningrad in 1967 and 1968. This group had produced a political programme for democratic reform.

In prison, believers are often subjected to additional discrimination. In My Testimony (published in the West but circulated clandestinely in the Soviet Union) Anatoli Marchenko gives some indication of the large numbers of religious prisoners:

"Religious prisoners are the ones who have been arrested and tried precisely because of their religion. And what variety there is. Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia, Orthodox Christians, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Evangelists, Sabbatarian and many others. . . . Here, in the cells I was thrown together with a large number of them. Almost every cell had its Evangelist, Sabbatarian, or Jehovah's Witness, and in some cells there were several together. The prison authorities humiliated them in every possible way. I had seen that on my very first day. Many believers had a rule that they must wear beards, yet they were all forcibly shaven while wearing handcuffs".

According to a protest letter sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1969 by the imprisoned writers Daniel, Ginzburg and Galanskov, believers are prohibited from receiving any religious literature and may not even have a Bible while in prison.

One result of putting so many believers in prisons and labour camps has been that they have sometimes formed religious groups there. Mikhail Sado, serving a long sentence in one of the strict régime prison camps for criticising Khrushchev, founded the All-Russian Social-Christian Alliance, according to a Samizdat document written and distributed by Alexander Petrov-Agatov, himself a prisoner.

### Churches closed down

Many churches have been forcibly closed and others are used for storage, workshops, etc. In his essay Along the Oka (published openly only in the West), Solzhenitsyn said the secret of the peaceful influence of the Russian countryside was in the churches

"But when you get into the village you find that not the living but the dead greet you from afar. The crosses have been knocked off the roof or twisted out of place long ago. The dome has been stripped, and there are gaping holes between its rusty ribs.... The murals over the altar have been washed by the rains of decades and obscene inscriptions are scrawled over them. On the porch there are barrels of lubricating oil and a tractor is turning towards them. Or else a lorry has backed in at the church doorway to pick up some sacks. In one church there is the shudder of lathes. Another is locked up and silent".

Protests by believers against such treatment are only known to have succeeded on one occasion - after a Catholic Church in Belorussia had been turned into a grain-store. According to the Chronicle of Current Events No. 16 (October, 1970), local peasants said "they could not live without the church" and refused to work for several days or to send their children to school. Eventually the chairman of the collective concerned ordered the removal of the grain. The church was repaired and the ritual plate restored.

### Dissident Baptists

A great deal of documentation about persecution of their members has been provided by the Evangelical Christian Baptists or Initiativniki, who broke away from the Baptist Church in 1965 and have never received official recognition. They have at least two regular Samizdat publications - including a monthly, Bratsky Listok, and a quarterly, Vestnik Spaseniya.

The Initiativniki, who had objected to the compromises made by the leaders of the Baptist Church to placate the Communist region, are particularly active, and some 500 of them have been imprisoned since 1961. The repressive measures taken against them were described in an appeal to the party leadership by 1,453 women in March, 1969. They said their children were

victimised and beaten up at school and sometimes forcibly removed from the parents by the KGB (secret police) and placed in children's homes. They had addressed thousands of petitions to the authorities begging for an end to persecution but it became even harsher:

"Fines beyond our means, beatings-up, dismissal from jobs and institutes, confiscation of flats, arrests of fathers, husbands and, improbable as it may seem, mothers - this is the reply we have received so far from you to all our complaints....."

### Russian Orthodox Church

Less is known about the treatment of rank-and-file members of the Orthodox Church but the cases of three leading dissidents have been reported in the Chronicle. A. E. Levitin, who was arrested in September, 1969 and subsequently released, but whose trial was reported to be imminent by the London Times of January 18, 1971, has signed a number of protests about the abuse of civil rights in the Soviet Union and about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. After his arrest, a number of documents were circulated attesting to the excellence of his character and the legality of his actions. A letter from seven Christians, addressed to the World Council of Churches in September, 1969, said:

"Anatoly Emmanuilovich was doing his duty as a Christian and none of his activities..... infringed Soviet laws....."

Boris Talantov, a lay member of the Orthodox Church, who wrote a series of protest letters about the lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, was tried in September, 1969, for allegedly publishing "anti-Soviet propaganda". Chronicle No. 10 (October, 1969) reported that he was given a two-year sentence in a labour camp.

Neither the charge against the Orthodox priest Pavel Adelheim, arrested in December, 1969, nor his sentence is known, but his character was smeared by Pravda Vostoka (the Uzbek Republican newspaper) which accused him of sadism towards his wife and children. According to Chronicle No. 13 (April, 1970) however, his initiative and energy had enabled believers in Kazan to build a new, stone church. He was

"... a young, well-educated priest and a good preacher, enjoyed great love and authority among his parishioners. His ecclesiastical activity was beyond reproach from the viewpoint of civil law".

#### Ukrainian Uniate Church

Increased activity of the Uniates, who acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope (but have been illegal since 1945); has been matched by increased persecution. According to Chronicles Nos. 7 and 8 (April and June, 1969), priests have been detained and beaten up by the police. On October 18, 1968, the homes of ten were searched and religious objects confiscated. In January, 1969, Bishop Velichkovski, who is about 70-years-old and in poor health, was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for infringing regulations. (Bishop Velichkovski had been sentenced to ten years' hard labour when the Uniate Church was forcibly integrated with the Orthodox Church in 1946).

Further information has come from a Samizdat essay of January, 1970, Chronicle of Resistance, by Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian historian. He condemned the appropriation of religious works of art from a Uniate Church in the Kiev area, which belonged to a strongly nationalistic minority, the Hutsuls. Arguing that religion and national culture had become inseparable in Eastern Europe, he said:

"One must inevitably conclude that a fight against the Church is a fight against the culture. The anti-religious struggle is, in fact, a kulturkampf. It is more convenient to destroy the foundations of a nation as a whole under the guise of a struggle against religion...."

According to the Chronicle No. 17 of December, 1970, Moroz has since received a 14-year sentence for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". The penalty consists of nine years in a special régime labour camp and five years' exile.

#### The Catholic Church

Evidence of the persecution of the Catholic Church, particularly in Lithuania, emerged in a declaration dated August, 1969, and signed by 40 priests of the Archdiocese of Vilnius. They said the Church had been undermined since Lithuania was taken over by the Soviet Union in 1940. Only two bishops, both nearly 80,

remained, and neither was permitted to reside in the capital, Vilnius. Two younger bishops had been deported. In 1940 there had been 12 bishops, four seminaries and about 1,500 priests.

Only one seminary now existed and restrictions on the dwindling number of priests made their work difficult. They were not allowed to assist a neighbouring priest; they could not take part in meetings or retreats, and bishops were not always permitted to visit parishes or confer the sacrament of confirmation.

Not one Catechism had been published in Lithuania since the Soviet takeover, and permission had never been given for the publication in 1968 of a Missal which was to have carried a brief exposition of the truths of the Faith. Priests were forbidden to prepare children for their First Communion and two who did so, Frs. Gylos and Zdebskis, were sentenced to three years' forced labour.

#### Sectarrians

Few Sektarian protest documents have come to light other than those of the Evangelical Christian Baptists, but Chronicle No. 14 (June, 1970) reported the case of a woman Adventist from Belorussia who was detained in December, 1969, and illegally searched. Her money was confiscated without a receipt. In April, 1970, her house was searched and religious literature confiscated. Chronicle No. 15 (August, 1970) noted that ten-year sentences had been passed on two women members of the schismatic True Orthodox Church and sentences of ten years and seven years plus five years' exile on two Jehovah's Witnesses.

#### Judaism

The first issue of the clandestine Jewish journal Exodus in April, 1970, described how the synagogue had become the centre of Jewish spiritual life in the Soviet Union. But it had been unable fully to answer the people's needs and questions, partly because "the active hostility of the State towards all religions in the country is strongest perhaps against Judaism, the 'religion of the enemy from within' ", and fearing repercussions, the synagogues had been meekly agreeing to all the authorities' demands. It was also partly due to "advanced assimilation" which had caused linguistic and cultural alienation between the synagogues and the Jews (many of whom cannot speak Hebrew and are not permitted to receive instruction in it from the

Rabbis or study with them the Jewish observances and traditions). Some, seeking religion, have been turning to the Orthodox Church - "one more step on the road to assimilation".

### Islam

As in the case of the Uniate Church and Judaism, Islam has close ties with nationalist aspirations. Clandestine Islamic documents have not reached the West, but their existence was revealed by the Soviet party organ Pravda on March 29, 1970, when it spoke of one called Extracts from the Decision of the Congress. This had been compiled by Murids in the Chechen-Ingush Republic at a secret congress held in the Nazranov district. The document instructed "every person of Ingush nationality to comply strictly with the 'ten commandments' or else break 'all contacts with other people' ". Following the Soviet custom of attacking religion by smears or exaggeration, Pravda accused the Murids, who have fought for national and religious freedom since the mid-19th century, of favouring "the kidnapping of young girls, kalym (bride-money) and blood feuds" - customs virtually obsolete among Soviet Muslims.

Some very limited successes from these protests have been reported. The officially recognised Baptist Church, has gained a small measure of independence in the appointment of its churchmen - for example, since 1966 its Moscow headquarters has been staffed solely by Church members. And a few churches have been saved from closure or conversion into atheist museums.

The continuing existence of the Evangelical Christian Baptist despite increasing persecution may also be regarded as a success. Indeed, the activities of believers and the circulation of clandestine publications have not been reduced by retaliation; rather, the religious issue has been brought before a wider audience and more Soviet citizens, especially young intellectuals, are now taking an interest in religion.

### RUSSIA: TOWARDS HEREDITARY ELITE

S.S. Voronitsyn

A growing discrepancy is developing in Russia between the number of young people finishing secondary school and the

number who have the opportunity of receiving higher education. Some two-and-a-quarter million pupils are released each year by the secondary day schools and a further 700,000-800,000 complete their secondary education at evening classes and so-called "shift schools" or through correspondence courses, giving a total of about three million, for whom no more than 500,000 full-time study places at higher educational institutions are available.

The first signs of a serious discrepancy between the number of pupils leaving secondary school and that of places available at higher educational institutions began to appear in the middle fifties. The present situation is that, although since 1951 the number of places available for full-time day study at higher educational institutions has doubled, the number of secondary-school graduates has risen by 650 percent.

This development will clearly bring social problems in its wake. There is certain to be widespread disillusionment among secondary-school leavers who fail to enter a higher educational institution and who, lacking professional qualifications, are forced to accept unskilled employment. It is therefore not surprising that many secondary school leavers who fail to secure admission to a higher educational institution regard this as the end of all their personal plans and hopes.

This mass of discontented young people is growing year by year. Aware of the social and economic implications of the problem, Soviet specialists recommend that vocational training and psychological preparation for the world of labour be intensified in general secondary schools. The educational authorities are now trying to interest school-children in the less attractive trades.

At the core of the educational problem in the Soviet Union lies the influence of social origin on the whole of a young person's future career. The children of the more privileged social groups have a far better chance of realizing their ambitions than their less fortunate classmates, i. e., the privileges of the parents are passed on to the children. This inequality begins in the nursery schools and reaches its peak when it comes to admission to an institution of higher education.

On completing the eighth or ninth grade, schoolchildren have their first opportunity of leaving school. Here, an automatic process of social selection takes place in that many of those

from less privileged families have to go out to work either because their wages are needed to supplement the family income or because the ten-year school is too far away from their homes.

In various ways, the odds are heavily in favour of the children of wealthier and more influential parents. Although in theory all are equal in the competitive entrance examinations, admission to a higher educational institution often depends not on intelligence alone but also on a number of social prerequisites that are largely possessed by certain social groups. The results of entrance examinations prove that the best chances are enjoyed by the children of wealthier parents of higher social and cultural standing, particularly of those living in the larger cities.

The official position and influence of parents, relatives and friends also play a large and frequently decisive role. As a Russian journal has observed: "They literally lay siege to the examination and enrolment commissions and take them by storm. If this assault is repulsed, the telephone calls begin. At first the fathers and mothers, the grandfathers and grandmothers telephone, then the "influential" "venerable", "responsible" and "nomenclature" contacts are brought in. They request that "particular attention" be paid to a certain candidate who did not get top marks in the school-leaving examination, or that his "case be reconsidered". These and many other legal, semi-legal and illegal devices do much to create a social imbalance among students accepted by higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union.

It will have become clear that in the sphere of higher education the Party leaders in the Soviet Union are confronted with problems somewhat reminiscent of those facing politicians in capitalist countries that have reached a comparable stage of economic development: the questions of the "overproduction" of intellectuals, and the progressive self-isolation of what has come to be known in the West as the "establishment". On the former question, it may be said that in the Soviet world such an "overproduction" of - possibly unruly - intellectuals is particularly dangerous, since according to the Russian revolutionary tradition the "intelligentsia", the more highly educated stratum of society, has a highly-developed class consciousness of its own. As a result, unemployment in this stratum, which in the non-Communist world is mainly a source of purely personal difficulties, in Russia rapidly becomes a

social and hence also a political problem. As to the second, despite the creation of "preparatory" faculties or departments, opportunities for receiving a higher education remain largely a privilege confined to children of the present ruling stratum.

(Freedom First, Bombay, India)

#### BEAT MUSIC GAINS IN POPULARITY

Since the early 1950s Hungarian youth has been strongly influenced by Western jazz, beat, and pop music. All efforts made by the Hungarian regime to control the impact of this music and canalize the so-called "beat movement" have been ineffectual so far.

In Hungary beat music is "more popular now than ever before", according to an article by journalist Laszlo Hegedos in Magyar Hirlap (July 28) entitled "Four Thousand Bands, An Audience of Millions. Beat Variations", in which he described the changing tastes of the beat fans and what the amateur bands are doing.

Beat fans, he said, are becoming more interested in serious music, because the new trends in beat contain elements both of serious music and of jazz. This new approach stems from a sound knowledge of the theory of music and is rooted in Hungarian musical education, which is internationally respected. In the absence of any serious analysis of beat trends in Hungary, cultural propaganda has so far done nothing to guide people's tastes in music of this sort.

Hegedos said that the establishment of a "beat aesthetic" has suddenly become a topical question, because during the last few months the composition of the leading beat bands has changed remarkably. This may be accompanied by a basic change of style and by a formal and substantial enrichment of the genre. The amateur beat bands, some 4,000 in number, usually imitate the style adopted by the professional bands and, since these amateurs have a steady audience of roughly 1,000,000, the impending changes on the beat scene will influence the masses.

Listening to beat music is already a habit in Hungary. The radio and television beat programs attract a large audience, and relatively cheap imported records, mostly from Britain, are very popular. The youngsters usually put these discs on tape by forming groups with 50-100 members which buy records and

tape-record them in so-called "magno clubs" which have been set up all over the country under the aegis of the House of Culture in Budapest. But such tapes meet the needs of relatively few people. About a million listen to the amateur beat bands which play in the youth clubs (of which there are 2,800), in houses of culture, at school concerts, in Pioneer houses, and generally in places of amusement for youth. Some 74 per cent of those who play in these bands have some education in classical music and only 26 per cent are self-taught. Hegedos ended his article by enumerating the major difficulties which hinder these amateur enthusiasts from becoming professionals.

In the August 4 issue of Nepszava, an article signed Zs.G. and entitled "Discs - From Under the Counter. Hundreds Get Them but Tens of Thousands Want Them" provides further data on the great popularity of foreign records of beat. Owing to the shortage of foreign currency, the number of these discs legally imported cannot satisfy the high demand for them, and the black market is flourishing. The latest long-playing records of foreign beat bands are among the articles which are "imported" for business purposes by Hungarian tourists, and the private shopkeepers are doing excellent business with beat discs. A small Budapest shop situated in a courtyard, for example, can make a large profit by lending out records for 50 forint a day for tape recording purposes, and ultimately selling the same discs at 250-350 forint each.

According to the writer of this article, the official agencies for importing and selling beat discs, the Kultura Book and Newspaper Foreign Trade Enterprise and the Record Producing Enterprise, are guilty of laxity and neglect in this sphere and are trying to cover their default with "cultural-political excuses".

Such articles as the two summarized above demonstrate anew that Western beat music is casting a tremendous spell over Hungarian youth and is presenting the regime with something of a problem.

### UNIVERSITIES: "NUMERUS CLAUSUS" SUPPORTS CLASS SELECTION

The politicization and Sovietization of the system of higher education, intensified in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia since the beginning of this year, has succeeded in nullifying practically all the progress made during the time of Czechoslovak Minister Vladimir Kadlec in 1968 and Czech Minister Vilibald Bezdicek in 1969.

Purges among students and teachers and strict application of "class" criteria in selecting new students have been supplemented by a newly introduced policy of numerus clausus (i. e., quota restriction). The latter has had an extremely serious effect on the divinity and liberal arts disciplines. This year, the highest number of students since 1950 finished their studies, were ordained, or graduated from the Catholic Theological Faculties - a total of 78 students. As explained by the well-informed Muenchner Katholische Kirchenzeitung (11 July 1971) "owing to the fact that numerus clausus had been abolished in 1968, many more students were able to study theology than could do so in the preceding years; among these were a number who had not been allowed to finish their studies earlier". Now, it is unlikely that any more than 25 students will be admitted to the theological faculties.

Michal Gregus, deputy Minister of Education of the Slovak Socialist Republic, has had to admit that a virtually catastrophic situation exists in the philosophy department of Comenius University in Bratislava. Out of a total of 1,434 applicants, the faculty has only admitted 460. At the Bratislava Law School, only 290 students were enrolled out of a total of 950 applicants, only 360 of the 1,105 applicants were admitted to the medical school (Pravda, 10 May 1971).

A few days ago the Prague press and radio released reports on admissions to the largest university in the country, Charles University in Prague. According to Vecerni Praha (14 July 1971) 4,550 applications were received; the numerus clausus policy, however, permits only 2,000 new students to be enrolled. A Radio Prague commentator, Eva Evanova, said (on 25 July 1971) that only one eighth of the applicants could be admitted to the philosophy department of Charles University, to the social science and journalism faculties only one quarter, and one half

to the law school.

On the other hand, applications for the technical faculties fell short of the number of places available. The Czech Technical College in Prague, which has long been known for its liberal attitude, fared best in this respect: its vacancies were 95 per cent filled. At the Brno Technical College the figure was 77 per cent, and at the Mining College in Ostrava 55 per cent (Radio Prague, 25 July 1971).

As far as Slovakia is concerned, exact figures are known only with regard to the Engineering College of the Technical University in Bratislava. This faculty was entitled to admit 600 students, but only 379 applied. It can be assumed that the situation at the other faculties is similar.

No change in the class approach to the selection of new students at the institutes of higher education can be expected from the new Czech Minister of Education, Josef Havlin; nor can it be expected that the quota policy will be relaxed, since he was an advocate of both these measures while he was still Hrbek's deputy.

A commentary broadcast over Radio Hvezda (22 July 1971) characterized the current enrollment policy at institutes of higher education as follows: "Under a socialist system, it is chiefly young people who have been taught a correct attitude toward the socialist system, the party, and the working class from the beginning who must study at institutes of higher education".

#### CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MASSES AND THE ELITE IN HUNGARY

The relation between culture and democracy and the improvement of the masses' cultural taste through education are two topics which are much discussed in Hungary. The latest contribution to this discussion has come from Vilmos Farago, an Elet es Irodalom editor, who claims that the gap between the cultural taste of the masses and that of the creative few is widening.

In an Elet es Irodalom article of August 7 entitled "The Gap Between Good and Bad Taste" (Az izlesollok szarnya), Farago gave a rather pessimistic picture of the situation and said that hopes of a convergence in cultural taste had not been fulfilled; on the contrary, the situation was worsening. The new Hungarian poetry, fine art, music, serious plays, and films do not meet a public demand which asks for "comprehensible" cultural

products and tends to accept everything, good and bad alike, that is offered to it. The responsibility for this situation, according to Farago, rests on the mechanism which transmits culture to its consumers. We are unable, he said, to transmit "true culture" successfully to the broad masses; we fail to lay the foundations of good taste in our schools; our mass media fail to inspire artistic competence; and our resources are inadequate to allow us to demand high-quality cultural work from those who are in close contact with the population.

Farago criticized the "cultural sociologists" who have assailed cultural work among the public and the satiation of the masses with the products they demand. He said that the main cause of all the trouble, according to these people, lies in the undemanding nature of the "mass man" or the "little man", but this line of argument is fallacious and leads to an involuntary defense of the "elitist culture model" and to the antidemocratic cultural pessimism of the bourgeoisie.

Defending the "culture of the masses", he argued that genuine culture cannot be diluted or spoiled by technical means such as the record, radio, television, or books through which it is transmitted to the masses. Nor, he said, is amateurism in acting, singing, or reciting bad, because it is a source of vital cultural experience.

The sociological concept of the "undemanding, shallow, narrow-minded little man" who demands only trash and ruins real culture is basically false, Farago said. He called for a vigorous search to be made for effective methods of disseminating culture among the masses.

The provincial daily Nepujsag of Heves County also dealt with the cultural gap recently. In its August 4, 5, 6 and 8 issues the paper carried a series of articles on the interdependence of culture and trade and gave an account of the cultural policy and practice of the Belles Lettres Publishing House (Szepirodalmi Konyvkiado), the Records Producing Enterprise (Hanglemezgyarto Vallalat), the Fine Arts Fund (Kepzomuveszeti Alap), and the National Bureau for the Arrangement of Cultural Events (Orszagos Rendezo Iroda).

The primary object of these articles was to explore the role of money in cultural life and investigate how far cultural products have been treated as commodities. It is recognized that there is no uniform socialist culture in Hungary; conflicting

cultural traits exist, reflecting the objective reality that Hungary is not wholly socialist. Relations between culture and trade and between the arts and the public are not what they should be. In spite of state subsidies, the cultural institutions and enterprises are compelled to produce lucrative trash in order to provide the money to support their more "elevated" activities. The enterprises which are concerned with cultural values are bound by the same economic fetters as their industrial counterparts and consequently have to manage themselves economically. Money is becoming increasingly important in relations between culture and the public, and it has therefore to be considered how the NEM's comprehensive system of economic regulators and indicators can be refashioned more fittingly in the cultural sphere. Organizational weaknesses and lack of good taste aggravate the situation. Economic measures alone cannot be expected to solve the problem, Nepujsag concluded.

The articles summarized above give further proof that a lively discussion of the NEM's influence on culture and of the narrowing of the cultural gap between the masses and the elite is going on in Hungary, and that both theoretical and practical solutions for the various problems involved are constantly being proposed.

NEW BOOKS

JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. - PARTNERS AND RIVALS \*

K. Popov

"Life demonstrates the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of struggle between the imperialist Powers and between the capitalist monopolies for spheres of influence. Industrial and commercial competition is growing sharper, and the financial and currency war is spreading", I writes the author of this book.

This statement is illustrated by an analysis of the economic relations between the U.S.A. and Japan in the postwar period. After the surrender in 1945, Japan first found herself in the position of junior partner to the U.S.A. During this period the U.S.A. used these relations to subordinate the Japanese economy and policy to its own interests.

In the 1960s, however, with the growth of her economic potential, Japan turned into a dangerous rival of the U.S.A. The author shows how the relation of forces in the U.S.-Japanese union is changing.

The book reveals the basis of economic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. and analyses the positions these two major Powers hold in world trade. In the volume of trade Japan is far behind the U.S.A., but in the rate of economic development she is far ahead. According to Japanese economists, by 1975 the growth rates of Japanese foreign trade will have been twice those of the other developed capitalist countries. Japan's trade expansion will no doubt affect the whole of international trade.

Recently a great deal has been written in the foreign press about the U.S.-Japanese trade war. The book under review also devotes much attention to this matter. Not so long ago the main

\* S. Ignatushenko, Japan and the U.S.A. - Partners and Rivals, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1970, 308 pp. (in Russian).

1 International Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Documents and Materials), Moscow, 1970, p. 296.

news item about this war was the penetration of Japanese textile and various electrical household appliances into the American market. In the more recent period, Japanese exports to the U. S. A. have been supplemented with such items as motor cars (much cheaper than American), precision machines and mechanisms, optical apparatus, some valuable chemicals and drugs.

The author shows the changes that have taken place in U. S. - Japanese trade in recent years. Nowadays, the U. S. A. exports to Japan mainly industrial raw materials (oil, scrap metal, coking coal, cotton and timber), while Japan delivers the most varied manufactures to the U. S. A.

Reports have appeared in the foreign press about the threat of Japanese dumping. In this context, the author writes that some 45 to 50 per cent of Japanese exports consist of the cheapest goods in the capitalist world (because of very cheap labour in the country). A special section of the book is devoted to U. S. anti-dumping measures and their influence on Japanese exports.

Dealing with the Japanese policy of trade liberalisation, the author believes that with time "it will be more and more difficult for the Japanese Government and monopoly capital to defend their exclusive right to their home market against the advance of other industrial countries, particularly against the U. S. A." (p. 152).

At present, the author writes, the penetration of U. S. capital into Japan is chiefly limited to the petrochemical industry and electrical engineering. The Japanese legislation in this respect is the most rigid as compared with all the other industrial capitalist countries (pp. 212-213).

The book pays special attention to the U. S. attempts to impede trade between Japan and the socialist countries. And this is an important point because, in the interest of certain business groups, the Japanese press spares no effort to camouflage the real state of affairs and to prove that Japan is not being led by the Americans.

Many big, medium and small businessmen in Japan are being interested in trade with the Soviet Union. It is stated in the book that under certain circumstances, which would largely depend on Japan herself, conditions could be created for the further development of mutually advantageous economic ties between

the U. S. S. R. and Japan.

Among the questions requiring special attention and which have not been adequately dealt with in the book, we should mention the prospects of economic development in the U. S. A. and its possible influence on the Japanese economy. This is especially important because Japan still depends largely on the U. S. A., both financially and for imports of raw materials, and there is a possibility of a new economic crisis hitting the U. S. A.

Despite the optimistic estimates of the economic position of the U. S. A. indulged in government quarters, there are more and more unfavourable signs causing uncertainty in U. S. business circles. One should bear in mind that the past world economic crises (especially those which broke out in 1920 and 1929) hit the Japanese economy hard. What effect may all this have under the new conditions in postwar Japan? This is a very complex question, but it is of special importance in this context.

This book would be useful to those interested in U. S. - Japanese relations.

(Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1971)