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I D E O L O G Y

LUKACS' LAST INTERVIEW : RADICAL CRITICISM  
OF EASTERN EUROPE

by Kevin Devlin.

Summary: The French sociological quarterly L'homme et la société, has published a remarkable document: the partial text of an interview which the great Hungarian Marxist thinker, György Lukács gave to a French visitor a few weeks before his death. This "testament" constitutes a devastating criticism of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe (implicitly including his own). Lukács deplored in particular their lack of genuine socialist democracy, which results in a socially dangerous alienation of the working-masses -- as demonstrated by the recent disturbances in Poland. He did not believe that the regime bureaucracies could themselves introduce substantial reforms, but clung to the long-term hope of a democratic evolution.

Gravely and incurably ill -- indeed, only seven weeks before his death at the age of 86 -- György Lukács, the most eminent of contemporary Marxist thinkers, received a French intellectual Yvon Bourdet, in a house hidden in a forest near Budapest on 16 April 1971, and spent what must have been an extremely demanding hour and a half giving remarkably frank and penetrating replies to his questions. It was the last interview that the aged and ailing philosopher was able to grant to a foreign visitor--and it was perhaps the most provocative he ever gave during a long lifetime of often controversial intellectual activity. This "Marxist testament" constituted a radical indictment of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, for the bureaucratic degeneration of their power structures, their lack of genuine socialist democracy, their alienation of the discontented workingclass masses, and their failure to permit free and open discussions and research. Tape-recorded by Bourdet, a partial text of the interview-- dealing with the legacy of Stalinism, the bureaucratic étatism of the East European regimes and the Maoist contribution to revolutionary theory and practice--has been published in the current issue of the French Sociological review, L'homme et la société. (1)

After a discussion of "Austro-Marxism," during which Lukács evoked his decade in Vienna after the collapse of Bela Kun's Hungarian Communist Republic in 1919, Bourdet raised the controversial subject of the Soviet regime's treatment (or mistreatment) of its intellectuals; and he found his distinguished host serenely ready to grasp the hot iron:

Bourdet: From what one hears, there are at present in the USSR important differences in the treatment of the intellectuals: some of them--those who do scientific work--are apparently given a fairly wide freedom of expression:

on the other hand, when writers or artists formulate criticism they are treated as madmen and shut up inside psychiatric clinics. What do you think of this?

Lukács: You know, this is something which is not a matter of pure theory. To reply, one must consider Russia from an empirical viewpoint. Russia is the second greatest power in the world, and in order to keep that rank, she must have an army which is technically on the same level as the American army, especially with regard to nuclear arms. The natural result is that the (scientific) scholars -- whose researches are an indispensable condition for the technical perfecting of armaments -- are untouchable people: they can do what they like; they can say what they like. On the other hand, clearly, the intellectuals who do not defend interests so directly linked with the existence of the Soviet Union are in a rather bad situation. I do not know if you have read it, but I have written a little book about Solzhenitsyn, in which I demonstrate precisely that a literary criticism of the Stalinist period is at present impossible in Russia. Certainly, a Solzhenitsyn exists, but he is in a completely difficult, almost impossible situation. The difference between the writers and the scientists has its roots in the present situation of the building of socialism: in fact, if she did not commit herself fully and irrevocably to free scientific and technical research, Russia would not long continue to exist. This is quite clear, and it explains why all that area of science which concerns the techniques of war benefits from absolute liberty in Russia, whereas all other intellectual activities in all other fields can exist only insofar as the temporary interests of the socialist society permit this..

Omen of the Polish Explosion

When Bourdet asked how Lukács envisaged the possible evolution of such a regime -- could it "become less despotic in a gradual manner, or would it be through a sudden change?" -- his host came to the key theme of the need for genuine democratization, and illustrated his point through outspoken discussion of the Polish disturbances which had led to the fall of Gomulka four months earlier:

Lukács: You know, I believe that there are economic problems in each socialist country; and, in my opinion, these problems cannot be solved without a democratization of life, of the workingclass life. But the conditions for a democratization have not yet been created. You can see very clear proof of this in the recent events in Poland: one could observe, on this occasion, an indifference on the part of the working masses with regard to the workers' organizations. Well, in my opinion, this indifference secretes its own antidote, so to say, and creates a necessary and inseparable counter-weight; by this counter-weight I mean spontaneous, explosive (wildcat)

strikes. In this connection, I must add that it is a mistake to think that there is any great difference here between Poland and the other socialist countries: certainly, in Poland there was an explosion, and in the other countries there has not yet been an explosion; but everywhere the same indifference is found, and at any moment this indifference of workers, who feel that their organizations do not serve to defend their true rights, can become an indifference to everyday things, and this indifference can change any day, and suddenly, into a spontaneous strike, as happened in Poland. I feel that this danger exists in every socialist country: in each one of them what happened in Poland can happen tomorrow, or the day after.

"Transitional Regimes"

But in the event of such an upsurge of popular protest, Bourdet observed, "there remains the power of the Soviet Army and State, which can crush the movement." Lukács was not unduly deterred by this implicit reminder of the fate that befell "socialist democratization" in neighboring Czechoslovakia (in the published part of the interview he made no direct reference to the invasion of August 1968, against which he is known to have protested at the time):

Lukács: Yes, but, you know, it was quite some time ago that Tallyrand said, I think, that you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them; and a system that is based on having us sit on bayonets is not a solid system. Thus, it can be considered that all the countries of Eastern Europe are regimes of transition, in which economic problems necessitate an economic reform. But a true economic reform can only be achieved through a democratization of the daily life of the workers and, in this connection, questions are posed that have not been resolved.

Bourdet: Do you think that the bureaucracy in these Eastern regimes is capable of carrying out an economic reform which would raise the standard of living and, in this way, avert a revolt?

Lukács: I don't think so; I don't think so. In order to avert the explosion, it would be necessary for each side to know what the other wants, to know what it is possible to grant and what is impossible. By that I do not mean that all the workers' demands must be granted; but there must be a permanent dialogue between the party and the workers, so that (the party) may know what questions are troubling the workers, what matters are of deep concern to them at any given time . . . . This is why a permanent contact is necessary, and this contact is what I call democracy, the democratization of our society. Without such a democratization, I do not believe that we can carry out economic reforms.

The Bureaucratic Barrier

At this point Bourdet posed a provocative leading question: was it, in any case, not impossible for the ruling bureaucracy to carry out such a "permanent consultation without denying itself and contradicting itself?"

Lukács thought that this was true, since he had "never yet seen a reform carried out by a bureaucracy." Bureaucrats always believed that they knew what was right for the masses ("which is certainly not true"), whereas what was needed was the study of the life of the workers on a day-to-day basis, in order to know "what they really want, and how they intend to implement their justice".

At this point, Bourdet put another provocative question: "In your judgement, then, a gradual withering away of the state is not possible, and you think, like Marx, that it is necessary to smash the apparatus, the state machine". In reply, Lukács gently ignored the words that had been put into his mouth, and stressed again that he -- near death at the age of 86 -- was taking a long-term view:

Lukács: You know, this is a matter of something that is very, very far away. It is only within a democracy that this withering away of the state can take place. With the present-day bureaucracy, the state becomes ever stronger, more powerful, and one sees no sign of withering away, or even of change. I do not believe that a bureaucratic change can take place; and -- so far as one can judge these things -- I do not even think that there is a true will to move in this direction. When one reads what Brezhnev said at the last (CPSU) Congress, one sees that everything remains vested in the state, as it is today. In this connection, I do not think -- and this is a good thing -- that they want a Stalinist reaction, a return to Stalin; no, that they don't want; but they want to maintain this bureaucratic balance that we have today. And how long that can last, naturally, no one can say.

Bourdet: Well, then, do the working masses see this system as something that should be changed, or are they accustomed to this bureaucratic regime?

Lukács: They are used to it, but -- how shall I put it? -- it's a bad system (*une mauvaise habitude*) with which they are not in agreement. If one speaks to the workers, one always sees that they want something quite different from what the bureaucracy wants to give them.

Lukács went on to insist that what he himself wanted for the masses in a socialist regime was not more bourgeois democracy, but "a truly proletarian democracy, and by that I mean the democracy of the Soviets of 1917. I believe that without a return to the Soviets of 1917, we cannot carry out true reforms."



Provocatively, Bourdet suggested that this myth of a Leninist springtide of socialist democracy did not, perhaps, correspond to historical reality, since the Soviet state had certainly not started to wither away during Lenin's years of power. Courteous as ever, but perhaps a little nettled, Lukács insisted that "Lenin, I believe, was absolutely -- would have been absolutely -- against the kolkhozes as they are today, because they are purely bureaucratic organizations." Then, returning to the main stream of the discussion, he observed that it was necessary to distinguish between two kinds of socialism:

The first form consists in resting in permanent contact with the masses, in knowing what the masses want -- which as I have said, does not mean that one must always agree with what the masses want -- but there is always a permanent contact between the state, the party and the working masses. On the other side one finds a different kind of socialism: here, a minority makes the laws and rules through these laws. It must, however, be added that this system functions to a certain extent -- but only to a certain extent ... We must achieve true democracy, or we shall never achieve socialism.

Despite his devotion to Lenin, Lukács was, however, led by a skillful hypothetical question to concede that it would have been better for the cause of socialism if the revolution had triumphed not in backward, authoritarian Russia but in a Western society:

Bourdet: To explain the degenerative process of the Russian Revolution, the setback suffered by proletarian revolution in Western Europe after the First World War is often invoked. Do you think that if the proletarian revolution had taken hold in Germany, in England, in France, etc., the evolution of the revolution would have been very different, and that, perhaps, the bureaucracy would have been averted?

Lukács: I think that that would have made a great difference, because if it had not been for the attitude that the Soviets must be protected from the European counter-revolution, if this situation had not existed, there would have been a completely different kind of evolution; we would probably have had a much more democratic evolution. But it must be added that these are vain speculations: one cannot say how things in the past would have gone if they did not in fact take place.

#### Trotsky and Mao

There followed a discussion of Trotsky's criticism of Stalinist bureaucracy, which Lukács firmly refused to compare with his own. Trotsky, he explained, had himself always been a bureaucrat; it was a matter of one bureaucrat criticizing another: "Neither Stalin nor Trotsky was a true democrat ... The only difference is that Trotsky always had great international principles, and he judged the bureaucratization of the Soviet Union in the perspective of

internationalism. Stalin was a more prosaic and practical man: he considered tactics as the essential thing, and if he installed bureaucracy it was for tactical reason.

Having had little success with his invocation of Trotsky, Bourdet turned to a more eminent contemporary challenger of the Soviet system. Was it not true, he asked, that Mao Tse-tung had tried to fight against the bureaucratic failings common to the East European regimes, through his Cultural Revolution? And what, in general, did Lukács think of the Chinese Revolution?

Lukács moved on to this dangerous ground with urbane caution, pleading lack of the specialized knowledge required for informed judgment:

For my part, I feel myself quite incapable of understanding the true principle of the Chinese revolution. We do not know because we do not have for China what Marx did for the West -- that is, an analysis of the relations between the European economy and capitalism. Through this, we know the history of the medieval states, we know how they passed from feudalism to capitalism; but what existed in China was not feudalism. So far as China is concerned, the analysis remains to be achieved and for my part, I am not an economist, nor am I a specialist in Chinese affairs. What is needed, therefore, is that specialists on China, who know the economic principles of the old China, should now be able to analyze the transition which has taken place in China, and which certainly reveals new traits which for my part, as I have said, I do not know.

Bourdet's subsequent attempt to lure Lukács into a discussion of the "theoretical writings of Mao Tse-tung" was even less successful. The sophisticated scholar, skilled in semantics, took over as Lukács remarked upon the danger of imposing logical deductions on heterogeneous economic phenomena, reaffirmed his lack of competence to deal with the socio-economic history of China, and touched gracefully upon Marx's concept of man -- all without so much as mentioning the name of Mao Tse-tung.

Bourdet's unsuccessful efforts to lead Lukács along these subsidiary paths of discussion are, however, revealing: they demonstrate that his host's burning concern in this remarkable interview was with the societies of Eastern Europe. To his unsparing analysis of their failings and his prudent expression of long-term hopes for their evolution toward a genuine socialist democracy he brought not only manifest intellectual conviction but also, one feels, something of an emotional passion. If we take this as the political testament of György Lukács, we must conclude that it is a worthy one.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

(1) "Entretien avec Georg Lukács: critique de la bureaucratie socialiste -- questions de méthode, L'homme et la société, No. 20, Paris, April-May-June 1971, pp. 3-12.

### Death of Gyorgy Lukacs -- Mourning Shrouded in Politics

The death of Gyorgy Lukacs (June 4) and his burial (June 10) have again brought to the surface differences of opinion concerning his work and personality. While the Western press (including part of the communist press in the West) exhaustively analyzed the work of Lukacs, the press within the Eastern bloc has almost ignored his death (see Der Spiegel, 14 June 1971, page 125). To date, the only exceptions have been the Hungarian and Yugoslav media. On June 6 the Hungarian dailies published an obituary issued jointly by the HSWP CC and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The obituary extolled Lukacs as a great figure in Hungarian culture, one of international significance who, as a Hungarian and a communist, had won deserved fame for his party, his fatherland, the international labor movement, and the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism. The obituary referred to the fact, however, that Lukacs "was also engaged in discussion within the communist movement, of which he felt himself to be a part, right up to his death." But the obituary carefully concealed the nature and frequency of these discussions. Thus, for example, there is no reference at all to Lukacs's role in the Petofi Circle and in the 1956 Hungarian revolution and popular insurrection (as Minister of Education and Culture, he was a member of the Imre Nagy government and of the preparatory committee of the HSWP), to his deportation to Rumania after the crushing of the revolution, or to the fact that he was deprived of party membership for more than a decade (1956-1967).

In all probability, the Hungarian press, radio, and TV will in time deal with the death and collected works of Lukacs, and will probably provide frequent opportunity for both his followers and his opponents to review and evaluate his life and works. Here is a short passage from the obituary in the provincial paper Hajdu-Bihari Naplo, 6 June 1971:

It is extremely difficult to deliberate about the cruel games of fate. Just the other day, the volume My Way to Marx in the series of his collected works was published. It was published just prior to Book Week, but was not put on its list. Either it was forgotten or it was felt that it shouldn't appear on that list. But if ever there was a book with the power to create an ideology, then this is such a book. It could serve as a lesson that we have again noticed something too late.

The Yugoslav papers eulogized Lukacs's work in lengthy articles. The Novi Sad Magyar Szo (6 June 1971) wrote as follows:

The courage to think, the desire to pursue a trend of thought which, in the last analysis, really meant "the ways leading to Marx" (which is revealed by the title of his latest collection of essays, published just a few weeks ago) along with the disruptive forces and destructive interference of self-criticism, made under mental pressure or under pressure

of outside force, led him to assume a characteristic Galilean stance, one which meant requital and negation, and which well illustrated the defiant opposition contained in Galileo's statement: "and yet, it does move." . . . . The alternating current: of yes and no exemplifies not only the tragedy of a philosopher but also of an era which represented a genesis. The "revisionism" of History and Class Consciousness, the Bela Kun-Jeno Leander conflict, the dark years of the Stalinist purge, the Second World War, the new anathemas after 1948, and at home the events in 1956 in which the 40-years-old desire for action and thinking emerged; then this captivity in the Rumanian Carpathian Mountains, and again at home within the four walls of his apartment. Finally, the status of affirmative opposition as he communicated with the world from Budapest as the expert on Stalinism . . . .

Gyorgy Lukacs was the great philosopher of Hungarian Culture. The most important of his collected works have not yet been published in Hungarian. In the last analysis, Lukacs's place in this culture after 1945 was that of a respected and feared, but still distinguished, stranger. His name and figure were legendary. Loyal and often dogmatic followers and pupils represented his ideas. His significant collected works, however, will really begin to become a part of Hungarian intellectual life and public thinking only now.

The burial of Lukacs also proved that this person is very "controversial" within the bloc, although the report on the funeral in Nepszabadsag (11 June 1971) remarked:

The funeral was attended, besides relatives, by officials of the party and government, well-known personalities of our scientific and cultural life, as well as of the various social organizations. A number of the old rank and file of the labor movement, former fellow workers, pupils, friends, and acquaintances, among them many foreigners, paid their respects at the funeral . . . .

According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (12 June 1971) among the leading party officials only the historian Dezso Nemes, rector of the Political Academy of the HSWP CC and Politburo member, as well as Gyorgy Aczel, member of the Politburo and CC secretary, attended the funeral.) According to the Hungarian language Rumanian daily Elore of 12 June 1971, CC Secretary Miklos Ovari was also present.) The Italian Communist Party was represented by a special delegation (ilde Jotti, Franco Ferri) and the leader of the Italian CP, Luigi Longo, sent a message of condolence to Kadar. Tanjug (Belgrade Domestic, 10 June 1971, 1930 hours) reported the fact that the top officials of the HSWP were missing from the funeral. It is typical that the rather conservative economist Istvan Friss, CC member and director of the Institute

for Economics, delivered a speech at the funeral in the name of the HSWP and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Tibor Dery then spoke in the name of Lukacs's friends, and pointed out that the analysis of the works and life of Lukacs is the business of the outside world. " This remark exposes the unfortunate fact that no book has yet been published in Hungary summarizing the complete works of Lukacs, despite the fact that there have been numerous occasions since 1945 to do so. While in the West one book after another dealing with the works and the person of Lukacs has been published, in Hungary there have been no surveys, no popular introductory studies, no detailed analyses or collections of essays. To date, in Hungary, only articles in newspapers and periodicals have dealt with certain aspects of his life and works.

## THE REALITY BEHIND "COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION"

by Yuri A. Pismenny.

Summary: At the recent Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev reported on the progress being made toward achieving the Party's prime objective of building a Communist society. However, although the Party leader could point to some notable socio-political developments particularly in the sphere of education, many have been anticipated or are being paralleled to greater effect in the "capitalist" world, while the "new man," the selfless individual without whom a truly Communist society is hardly conceivable, shows as little sign of appearing on the scene as ever.

A substantial section of Soviet Party Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress was devoted to the question of building Communism in the USSR, an objective in whose name the Soviet people has been and is still being asked to make considerable sacrifices. The Soviet Party leader offered copious evidence that steady progress was being made in this direction (Pravda, March 31, 1971).

During the past Five-Year Plan period, said Brezhnev, the number of industrial workers in the USSR had risen by 8,000,000 to over 55 percent of the employed population. Their educational standard had also increased, 550 per thousand having a secondary or higher education as compared with only 386 in 1959. A similar development could be observed in the country, the proportion of rural workers with a secondary or higher education having soared from a mere 6 percent on the eve of the World War Two to over 50 percent at the end of 1970. More sophisticated equipment and rising cultural and living standards were making agriculture increasingly attractive, particularly for young people, and closing the gap between town and country. Not only was the number of intellectuals growing, but the scientific and technical intelligentsia had recently begun to show a growth rate higher than any other social group. Most of the new intellectuals, moreover, were coming from the peasantry and the working class. At the Pervouralsk New Tube Plant, 42 percent of engineers and technicians had a blue-collar, 32 percent a peasant and 26 percent a white-collar background, and these were quite typical figures.

These trends were a reflection of the Party's policy of "merging the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia" and "gradually overcoming the essential differences between town and country, between mental and physical labor." Further, old-age pensioners were to be given more opportunities to work, a number of measures had been taken to improve the lot of women, in particular the extension of maternity leave to female collective farm workers, and the needs of young people (over half the Soviet population is aged 30 and under) were also being given urgent attention.

Another vital trend in the development of Soviet society was the continuing perfection of "socialist democracy." Brezhnev spelled out the following ways in which this was being achieved.

Firstly, the rights of the local Soviets (councils) of working people's deputies, the organs of local government, had been extended in accordance with resolutions passed at the Twenty-Third Party Congress, and supervision of ministries and government departments by the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union republics had been intensified. It was further proposed to draw up a law defining and enhancing the status of the deputies of Soviets at all levels.

Secondly, legislation pertaining to such important spheres as the family, health, labor and nature conservation was to be improved, the state apparatus made more efficient and the level of its service to the general public raised, the "people's control organs" given more assistance in implementing Lenin's injunction calling for constant supervision of the work of the government by the "broad masses," and socialist law and order strengthened.

Thirdly, the country's two main mass organizations, namely the trade unions with over 93,000,000 members and the Komsomol with over 28,000,000, through which the workers participated in the direction of Soviet society, were to be given active encouragement and support by the Party.

For a start, it may be argued that if these are essential features of Communist construction, many non-Communist countries may also be said to be well on the way to Communism. One only has to think, for example, of the present modernization and liberalization of the West German civil and criminal codes; the British National Health Service; the Scandinavian Ombudsman; Swiss grass-roots democracy, which allows elections on major issues, even of national importance, at the canton level; and Italian and British trade unions, whose power is so great that they can even make or break a government. Better educated workers, a diminishing gap between urban and rural conditions due to technical progress, increasing numbers of scientists and technicians, and a growing readiness to seriously tackle the problem of nature conservation are also not confined to the Communist world.

More important are such facts as Brezhnev's reference to a beefing-up of the security service by "politically mature cadres brought up in a spirit of unremitting vigilance," a measure difficult to construe as conducive to democracy, and his failure to mention such an essential feature of a future Communist society as the principle that every citizen give according to his abilities and receive according to his needs. Also, how does Brezhnev consider the phrase "gradually overcoming the essential differences between mental and physical labor" can be applied to an academician and the charwoman who cleans out his study (leaving aside the difference in their pay)? And finally, the "new man" without whom the envisaged Communist society is unthinkable and who was blueprinted in such detail by Khrushchev and his ideological assistant L. F. Ilichev is

described by Brezhnev only in the vaguest of terms. There is no mention, for example, of the "new man's" caring for public property more than his own, or of his almost insatiable desire for "creative work." More realistically, Brezhnev spoke of "callous, rude and bureaucratically-minded officials," and of such "antipodes of Communist morality" as greed, bribery, parasitism, slander, and drunkenness. It was conspicuous that the pertinent subsection of Brezhnev's speech contained the term "new man" only once other than in the title, reference being made instead to the "Soviet man," who was described in an article by M. Igitkhanyan in the post-Congress issue of the Party's theoretical journal Kommunist bearing the resounding title "The Soviet People--Glorious Builder of Communism" as

... a consistent internationalist, collectivist and humanist and a glowing patriot. He is distinguished by political maturity... diligence... an ability to overcome any difficulties... on the way to the supreme goal of Communism, modesty and sympathy, magnanimity and efficiency ...  
(Kommunist, 1971, No. 6, p. 92)

Certainly, this too is not exactly modest. On the other hand, Brezhnev himself must at least be given credit for not following his predecessors' example and promising that Communism is on the horizon. Lenin, for example, declared on October 2, 1920, at the Third Congress of the Russian Communist Youth League, that "the present generation of 15-years-olds... will see a Communist society" (V. I. Lenin o literature i iskusstve / V. I. Lenin on Literature and Art, Moscow, 1947, p. 453) -- which means that those who died at 65 have already proved unlucky--and the Party Program adopted at the Twenty-Second Party Congress also ended with the triumphant declaration that "the present generation of Soviet people shall live in Communism!" (Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the C. P. S. U. October 31, 1961, Moscow 1961, p. 128). But as time goes on, the promised land of Communism must to the ordinary Soviet citizen be appearing more and more as something of a *fata morgana*.

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Munich.)



## MARXIST PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

### Birth Pangs of A New Science

Summary: Soviet party ideologist and social scientists until recently were partial to the thesis that philosophical anthropology was merely "a fad" of bourgeois philosophy. Since, according to their opinion, the subject of this science was an integral part of Marxist philosophy, they did not consider it necessary for Marxist philosophical anthropology to exist as an independent discipline. In the long run, however, this point of view could not be supported for several reasons. Following violent discussions among communist theoreticians both in the Soviet Union and in the communist movement generally, Soviet party ideologists and philosophers have, despite various objections, reached the consensus that Marxist philosophical anthropology as an independent discipline is indeed very useful.

Philosophical anthropology is particularly well known in Western Europe. As the philosophy of man it primarily investigates his position and behavior toward society and the world as a whole. Communist theoreticians held the opinion that Marxist philosophy was concerned with this problem and that it was therefore not necessary to create an independent science of Marxist philosophical anthropology. This belief of conservative Marxist theoreticians is perhaps best expressed in a quotation from the GDR Philosophical Dictionary:

... it is entirely contradictory to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to intend to complement the scientific philosophy of the working class with a special anthropology.

Socially humane circumstances are not created by following the fashionable trends of imperialist philosophy, such as philosophical anthropology or by speculating about the essence of man, but rather by fighting and working for the establishment of humane social circumstances where, in accordance with the historical process, man is able to fully develop his potentialities--by fighting, in other words, for socialism and communism. (1)

In the early sixties, philosophy in all communist countries passed through a severe crisis. "Anthropological problems formed the center of the discussions and conflicts. Best known, perhaps, is the so-called "Kafka discussion" which began in Czechoslovakia, later went on in other communist countries (especially Poland and the GDR) and which centered on the problem of man's alienation in socialist societies. This particular problem was thoroughly discussed at scientific conferences of communist philosophers. Numerous influential philosophers at that time investigated the "new aspects of alienation" in the socialist countries, largely admitting their

existence. A few of these philosophers were: in Poland - Adam Schaff, Zygmund Bauman; in Czechoslovakia - Arnost Koman, Karel Kosik; in the GDR - Robert Havemann, and others. The discussion was also carried over to the Soviet Union. Not only did individual articles appear in specialized magazines but also more voluminous studies dealing exclusively with "anthropological problems" were published. (2)

Here are some of the main points of the discussion. As already mentioned, the primary aspect was the problem of alienation. Also important were the discussions on whether there was any sense in the instrumental consideration of man in modern society. In this connection, there were serious attempts to redefine the Marxist concept of freedom ("recognition of historical necessity"). These efforts and tendencies may all be reduced to a common denominator: They are attempts to humanize the theory and practice in the communist states. The Czechoslovak events of 1967 and 1968 represented the climax of this trend.

In October 1969, the Institute for Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR organized a Soviet-Rumanian-Bulgarian symposium to discuss the problem of man in terms of present-day philosophy. However this was not fortuitous since the Soviet organizers invited only Rumanian and Bulgarian philosophers and anthropological problems were rarely discussed in their countries. Also at that time, in close adherence to the party line, the Bulgarian philosophers were carrying on a violent dispute with Yugoslav philosophers such as M. Markovic and G. Petrovic. The participants at the symposium admitted that Marxist ideologists and philosophers should "deal more intensely" with the problems of man, but almost all agreed that there was no need to create a Marxist philosophical anthropology as an independent discipline. According to the report in Voprosy filozofii, the Soviet philosopher E. V. Ilenkov, in his lecture on the "Alienation" and "essence of man" said:

... there is no reason to create a (separate) Marxist philosophical anthropology, since the general, integral directives for man's problems have been treated extensively in the "economic-philosophical manuscripts" written between 1843 and 1944, when a final conclusion was reached on the two thousand year development of this philosophical problem. (3)

It can be generally noted that after the military intervention in the CSSR (1968), a hardening of conservative and dogmatic points of view occurred in all theoretical fields. During the discussions on philosophical anthropology, the important facet was not only in the disputes of Soviet ideologists and philosophers with the so-called revisionists, but also in the attempt to eliminate a number of theoretical problems from public discussion which were unpleasant for the regime.

There are several indications which show that this conservative viewpoint can no longer be upheld. Groups of scientists in the Soviet Union are concerned with the problems of man and are demanding the creation of an independent Marxist philosophical anthropology. A scientific conference at the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Science in the Georgian SSR (Tbilisi) confirmed this new trend among Soviet philosophers. (4). There was a discussion at this conference of the compendium on Problems of Philosophical Anthropology which appeared in the Georgian language in 1970. A comparison, between the reports of this conference and those of the previously mentioned 1969 conference of the USSR Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, clearly reflects the interim changes. The Georgian scientists do not consider as binding the thesis that Marxist philosophical anthropology is superfluous and, expressing themselves diplomatically, they maintain that this is merely a "diskussionnaya problema." At the same time they are trying every possible argument to demonstrate that this science should finally find acceptance in the Soviet Union as well. The conference report also indicates that the Georgian philosophers are preparing encyclopedias of philosophical anthropology.

In summary, the disapprobation that attempts to create a Marxist philosophical anthropology "completely contradicts the spirit of Marxism-Leninism," have proven to be without affect. There are still strong birth pangs in this new branch of Marxist philosophy but, as was true with sociology, this new development can hardly be stopped at this point.

Radio Free Europe Research)

- (1) G. Klaus and M. Buhr, Philosophical Dictionary, "The European Book" Publishing House, Berlin 1964, p. 25.
- (2) For example, see Vasilyi Tugarinov: O tsennostiakhzhizni i kultury (About the Values of Life and Culture) Leningrad, 1960.
- (3) Voprosy filosofii, No. 3, 1970, p. 160.
- (4) Ibid., No. 5, 1971, p. 153 ff.

POLITICS BLOC DIALOGUE

D. BREZARIC

IN RECENT years, the dialogue between the blocs has become part of the European reality and of political developments on this continent. This dialogue is of paramount significance for Europe although its repercussions are far broader. As the blocs are headed by the two superpowers, it is impossible to gain insight into the European situation without considering it in the wider international context just as it is impossible to ignore the appreciable influence of Europe, both negative or positive, on the course of world events. Lately, the dialogue between the Atlantic Pact and Warsaw Pact has practically become a customary event on the political calendar, taking place at almost regular intervals: NATO meets in June and December and the Warsaw Pact, although it does not hold to a hard and fast schedule, endeavours to adapt the timing of its meetings to that of its Western partners. And so, the public debate has been in progress for two years now. Some of these meetings have become famous in diplomatic annals: the NATO meeting in Reykjavik which produced the familiar "Reykjavik Appeal" on the "joint and balanced disarmament of the two blocs (June 1968); the 1969 meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest which published the well-known "Budapest Appeal" for the convocation of a European security conference; last year's December session of the NATO in Rome when it was concluded inter alia that the NATO members would start multilateral preparations for a European security conference only after a satisfactory solution had been found to the problem of Berlin. This dialogue has been supplemented by public statements and messages by the most responsible officials in the USA and USSR as, for instance, the February Message to Congress of President Nixon, the Statement by the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party Brezhnev to the 24th Party Congress, and others. The characteristic feature of this public debate is that it gets more and more concrete, business-like and positive, whereas the old propaganda elements are less and less in evidence. If we compare the latest statements and communiqués from the meetings of these two bloc organizations with those of former days, it becomes patently clear that a thorough change has occurred not only in the vocabulary and tone but in the substance, in itself the reflection of the latered situation in Europe and in Washington-Moscow relations.

The new elements in the situation were also borne out by the results of the meeting of Atlantic Pact countries in Lisbon in June this year. The final statement to issue from the meeting was certainly the most moderate document of this type we have read so far. The communiqué attacks no one (formerly it had been impossible to imagine anything like it without a warning of the danger emanating from the USSR), there is no sword-rattling, no thunderous appeal for security measures; rather the statement acclaims the present trend toward relaxation of tension, supports the agreements signed

between Moscow and Bonn, upholds the initial agreements achieved between the USA and USSR in the SALT, refers in positive terms to the most recent offer made by Brezhnev relevant to the reduction of armaments in Central Europe and expresses temperate optimism in connection with solution of the Berlin problem! Something positive along the lines of relaxation and cooperation is said about every sector of the broad front extending through Europe and on the whole, it might even seem that relations are presented as better than is actually warranted by the reality.

There are a number of facts that can explain this state of affairs in inter-bloc relations but certainly one of the noteworthy circumstances is the process of relaxation by way of negotiations, and achievement of certain concrete solutions within that context between the big powers, meaning primarily the USA and USSR. It was recently made public in Moscow and Washington that the two countries have come to an initial agreement of principle which should by year's end, bring them to a broader agreement in the SALT (on offensive and defensive strategic missiles). It is not a coincidence that the matter of reducing armaments in Central Europe was also given a push in the right direction at the same time. Obviously, the two subjects are so closely related that the prospect of compromise on missiles could but open up vistas for a prospective reduction in conventional weapons. The Berlin problem is embarking upon a phase of serious negotiations and optimistic assessments foretelling the possibility of agreement by year's end and are not rare. Preparations for a European security conference are continuing, although multi-lateral contacts are impeded by and made to hinge upon the question of Berlin. The Eastern Office of Mr. Brandt has produced some palpable results and along these Central European lines one may truly speak of relaxation. Although this relaxation is not progressing at the same pace on all sectors, nevertheless the positive results of the policy of relaxation and intra-European cooperation are felt throughout Europe. Yet another fact is worthy of mention as one of the most positive in this process: so far, intra-European contacts, exchanges of opinion, and talks about European problems of security and cooperation have strongly upheld all the most important principles of peaceful coexistence, of the United Nations Charter and of non-aligned policy. It is particularly significant that independent policy and the anti-bloc approach to the solution of Europe's common problems have asserted themselves irrespective of the fact that this independent course on the part of a large number of European countries has alarmed the bloc structures and provoked a number of measures to keep members of the blocs in line and suppress independent, non-aligned and anti-bloc attitudes.

Under these new and relatively favourable conditions the foreign ministers of NATO member-countries concerned themselves in Lisbon with this problem of "their" geographic region, that is, Europe. Berlin was given pride of place as a problem central to the European situation. For the first time, the outcome of the negotiations was referred to with a degree of optimism, and the

end of this year was taken as a realistic time by which it would be possible to attain a mutually acceptable agreement. Apparently Minister Schuman, in the light of his recent talks in Moscow, was instrumental in the adoption of the view that prospects were more favourable in connection with Berlin. But even at the meeting in Lisbon, Berlin was not removed from the agenda as a condition for the launching of multilateral preparations for a European security conference, although the formulation produced was more flexible and much more acceptable to the USSR. The fact remains that attention will be trained on Berlin this year and, depending on the development of negotiations and the prospects for agreement, it is possible to perceive a more elastic approach by the Western countries to the preparations for such a European conference. Certainly, a compromise is possible. It is interesting to note that in bilateral dialogues the mood of a number of European countries belonging to NATO is far more positive in relation to the convening of a European conference than was the case during this most recent collective expression of views within Atlantic Pact frameworks. But this reflects the ripening of the situation and the indispensability of beginning multilateral preparations as soon as possible, as proposed by the Government of Finland.

As was to be expected, a big discussion was conducted about "joint and balanced reduction" of the armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. The latest proposal submitted by Leonid Brezhnev, on May 14 in Tbilisi, to the effect that the two blocs should initiate talks on armament reduction was obviously the focus of attention, as the initiative was acclaimed, accepted and followed by the proposal that soundings should be made and preliminary talks held to pave the way for organized negotiations about this complex subject matter.

Brezhnev did not state whether he referred only to foreign troops in European countries, which was the original Soviet idea, or to all troops, that is, also to national armed forces. But there is a perceptible tendency toward rapprochement between the USSR and NATO views, the latter having insisted on considering all armed forces, both foreign and national, in Central Europe. This would mean both Germany's, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, in other words the countries that were once encompassed by the Polish proposal known as the "Rapacki Plan".

Formally speaking, this is a typical bloc approach the solution of the question (reduction of armaments) which was responsible for persuading France to dissociate itself from the joint position. France pleads for European-wide talks on armament reduction, as the interests of all Europe and all European countries are involved.

The positions, conclusions and proposals presented in the official communiqué of the Lisbon meeting certainly offered food for thought and invited the other side to talks and action. And the other side did respond immediately, for the most part, positively. Only a few days after the NATO meeting, Premier Kosygin repeated that the USSR was willing to negotiate both with NATO countries on

the proposal to reduce troops in Europe, and with the USA on a "large number" of questions, The Secretary-General of the Soviet-Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, put things even more clearly when he stated recently that the USSR was ready, on the question of reducing military forces in Europe, to negotiate for the reduction of international (foreign) and national forces. This clarified a very serious point and overcame a considerable obstacle standing in the way of purposeful negotiations.

One would have to be an ostrich not to see the positive side of the development of relations between the two blocs, including preparations for the reduction of armaments in Central Europe. The efforts of all peaceminded forces have been directed along these lines-- toward relaxation, equitable cooperation among all European countries, and also concrete measures to pare down the huge arsenal of weapons which has stockpiled in Europe. We must, however, observe the inconsistency, ineffectiveness and monopolistic attitude of the blocs when it comes to solving problems of security. If something touches upon the vital interests of all European countries, and armament and disarmament are certainly among the foremost problems that do, then it would be normal for the approach to these matters to be democratized. If these matters were to be left up to the blocs alone, this would actually lead to a strengthening of bloc structures and the further division of Europe, and to the suppression and strangulation of independent policy which, in the final analysis, represents the greatest value and the best guarantee for the development of a European community of equal nations and states.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

## SOVIET PRESS STEPS UP ATTACKS AGAINST THE USA

by Konstantin Aleksandrov.

Summary: Partly because of the value of West Germany as a bogey has been reduced as a result of the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty, the Soviet press has in the last few months been stepping up its fire against the United States. The American domestic scene is described as being characterized by concentration camps and police atrocities, and the USA presented to her European allies as a barrier to better relations between them and the USSR.

For several months now the Soviet press has been pursuing a systematic and vituperative anti-American campaign of almost Stalinist scope and intensity. Hardly a day passes without the appearance somewhere in the Soviet press of scathing reports and commentaries depicting the United States as an aggressive, war-hungry fascist state and reviling the American domestic situation and way of life as the acme of terror, injustice and exploitation. In May alone, articles were published in Soviet newspapers bearing such titles as "The Criminal Countenance of United States Imperialism" (Pravda, May 6), "The USA: A Democracy of Concentration Camps" (ibid., May 9), "The Dollar Stands Accused" (ibid., May 13), "Terror and Lawlessness in American Cities" (Izvestia, May 4), "Police Rampage in the USA". (ibid., May 7) "Under the Standard of the Black Hundred" (ibid., May 11), "A democracy of Bullets and Truncheons" (Komsomolskaya pravda, May 7), "A concentration Camp at the White House" (ibid., May 6), and "Importing Murderers" (Literaturnaya gazeta, May 12). And this is only a small selection.

The new anti-American campaign in the Soviet press seems to have been dictated to a considerable degree by considerations of domestic policy. Firstly, the Soviet government's attempts to improve relations with Western Germany and induce Bonn to accept the status quo in Eastern Europe, and possibly even recognize the GDR as a sovereign state, has reduced the value of one of Soviet propaganda's favorite objects of abuse, but not diminished the necessity to frighten the Soviet population with tales of danger from outside in order to justify the country's heavy defense budget. Secondly, the Soviets want to discredit the USA in the eyes of the numerous Soviet citizens, particularly those belonging to the younger generation, who are favorably disposed towards her. The reader is to be convinced that, although the situation in the USSR may be far from ideal, in the USA it is infinitely worse. First among the "revelations" on the American way of life is that the United States is ruled by a "terrorist fascist regime" differing little from Hitler Germany. The use of terminology formerly applied to the Nazis is calculated to evoke the appropriate emotions in respect of the USA, which is repeatedly referred to as a country of concentration camps and police atrocities, etc. At the same time, it is emphasized that a large

section of the American public is actively opposing United States government policy, and that as a result there are deep cleavages of opinion.

An example of how the activities of American "reactionaries" are depicted in the Soviet Press is provided by the following excerpt from a Pravda article of May 13, entitled "After Police Repression, Legal Reprisals" concerning allegedly planned police beatings of demonstrators in Washington in May.

The range of voices singing the praises of police truncheons is unusually broad, stretching from the President of the USA to the "Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan." The Senate is adopting a special resolution praising the "effective action" taken by the Washington police. Minister of Justice Mitchell is calling the police heroes, and their "feats" an example worthy of imitation.

Further:

The unrestrained glorification of police atrocities is even embarrassing the bourgeois press, "Many of those arrested," one newspaper cautiously observed, "stated that they were merely passers-by." The embarrassment of the national press is easy to understand: 32 Washington reporters and one television cameraman found themselves behind bars in the very first day of police terror. Many of them physically experienced the weight of a police truncheon and the delights of the concentration camp on the football field of Kennedy stadium.

In a further Pravda item of May 9 entitled "The USA: A Democracy of Concentration Camps" we read:

Having fixed up street manifestations, the reactionaries have begun to settle accounts with those few congressmen who have expressed solidarity with participants in the anti-war movement. Yesterday, these Congressmen were subjected to crude attacks in the House of Representatives. The henchmen of the military-industrial complex in the Congress are demanding that their recalcitrant colleagues be severely punished.

Yury Zhukov, star Soviet press commentator on foreign policy questions, exclaimed in connection with the "bestial" behavior of the Washington police: "No, gentleman! Your war against Americans demanding peace in Indochina merely unmask the true nature of your regime, your system, your entire way of life" (Pravda, May 6, 1971). He couched his conclusion in the picturesque phrase: "America is reeling back from the mirror in horror after seeing her terrible reflection."

The second target of the Soviet press campaign is the crisis of the United States dollar, which is regarded as symbolic of the

USA's economic as well as moral decline. In an article entitled "Retribution" prefaced by Lenin's remark that "On every dollar is a lump of dirt.... On every dollar are traces of blood," Zhukov wrote:

The American multi-millionaires are still incredibly rich. But capital is incurably sick. And the way in which the faltering dollar has in the last few days flopped on West European stock exchanges is an eloquent reminder that sooner or later the American financial "Titanic" will finally go the bottom under the weight of all the crimes committed with the dollar's assistance. (Pravda, May 8, 1971)

A similar article entitled "On every Dollar --Blood" appeared in the May 14 issue of Komsomolskaya Pravda.

Another aspect of the American scene now being highlighted is the uncertainty about the future widely felt among the country's intellectuals. In an article headed "Baccalaureates with a Mop," S. Vishnevsky spoke of the majority of United States university graduates being forced to take up unskilled manual labor because they are unable to find employment commensurate with their abilities and qualifications:

How can one fail to understand the psychological shock experienced by the Doctors and Baccalaureates? Many generations of Americans, after all, have had it impressed upon them that a university diploma is a one-hundred-percent guarantee of serene social prosperity, an insurance against economic crises and unemployment. Middle-class fathers have put their savings into buying their children a higher education in the belief that such "capital investment" would probably help their sons and daughters to make their way in the world. And now, before everyone's eyes, yet another dogma of the American way of life is crumbling. (Pravda, June 5, 1971)

Related to the anti-American press campaign are sporadic attempts to discredit the Chinese within the World Communist movement on account of the relaxation of tension between Washington and Peking. On the one hand, it is said, stands the Soviet Union waging an uncompromising war against "American imperialism," and on the other a Communist China rendering the "imperialists" assistance in overcoming their crisis. Quoting the Czechoslovak newspaper Pravda, Literaturnaya gazeta, (May 26, 1971, p. 9) remarked:

The political aspects of Chinese "coquetry" with the United States are also not without interest.

This (coquetry) began right during the period of "Vietnamization", when the Nixon government was put into the pillory by its own people. Peking helped Nixon and enabled him to appear in the role of the first American



President ever to succeed in establishing contact with China. It is clear that Peking is giving the United States a chance of extricating itself from the involved situation in Asia.

A more surrealistic portrayal of the situation was given by Yevgeny Yevtushenko in a poem called "The Peruvian Woman" figuring in the same issue of Literaturnaya gazeta.:

Upon her back they sip their cocktails  
Hunt, Rockefeller, Onassis, Dupont  
Upon her numbed body  
Mao and Nixon bang away at the ping-pong table.

A major feature of Soviet Anti-American propaganda is the effort to drive a wedge between the USA and her West European allies. During recent weeks, Moscow has been trying to impress on Western Europe that their interests in no way coincide with those of the USA, which is merely trying to exploit them for her own ends, and that a United States departure from Europe would pave the way for fruitful cooperation between the latter and the USSR. At a ceremonial meeting of the Georgian Communist Party and Supreme Soviet, CPSU Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, in a reference to the forthcoming meeting of the Socialist International in Helsinki, declared:

The interests of the workers' movement and of world peace demand that those about to adopt resolutions in Helsinki do not forget the monstrous crimes being perpetrated by the imperialist aggressors in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and on the annexed Arab territories. The interests of European security demand that they neither forget the will of their own peoples, who desire the complete liquidation of the legacy of the "cold war" and the speedy establishment of an atmosphere of cooperation and neighborliness in Europe. Otherwise, participants in the session will be merely confirming that their "international" continues to prefer to listen not to the voice of the masses but to those who decide the policy of NATO. (Pravda, May 15, 1971)

According to the Soviet press, NATO policy is decided by the USA singlehanded. In an article entitled "The Members of NATO Are Being Forced to Save the Dollar from Inflation" we read:

As a prelude to the NATO meeting in Lisbon, a prelude which left its mark on the entire preparations for the meeting, debates recently took place in the American Senate during which representatives of official Washington circles once more confirmed that the USA did not intend to reduce her military presence on the European continent or cut down her 300,000-man-strong army stationed at NATO military bases in Europe. Here, the Pentagon and the United States State Department are pursuing a dual objective,

namely that of increasing pressure on the USA's allies with a view to preventing a further relaxation of tension on the European continent on the one hand, and of trying to force her NATO allies to enter a new round in the arms race on the other. (Pravda, May 29, 1971)

It is argued that the USA, sliding toward a "scandalous deficit in her balance of payments" as a result of waging an "aggressive war in Indochina" and "stepping up the arms race" (Pravda, May 13, 1971), is shifting the consequences onto the shoulders of her West European allies, who are thus being involved in her "military adventures." While the European states genuinely desire a relaxation of tension on their continent, the USA sees it in her interest to resuscitate the cold war and torpedo the policy of peaceful co-existence. In an article entitled "From a Europe of Conflicts to a Europe of Firm Peace" (Pravda, May 11, 1971), Boris Dmitriyev, after declaring that the USA was trying to persuade her West European allies that a European security conference with an agenda proposed by the "socialist countries" would have "little sense," asks:

Do not such arguments, repeated by Washington in the last few days, testify that the position of the United States, which became involved in European affairs as a result of World War 11 and penetrated here during the period of post-war expansion, is alien to the fundamental interests of the states of Europe? Washington is striving to prevent the expansion of intra-European cooperation as demanded by present European reality. In Washington, they would like the course of the states of Western Europe to be fully orientated to the USA's political interests.

The indications are, furthermore, that Soviet consent to American participation in a European security conference is a diplomatic maneuver, since Moscow still hopes to persuade the West European countries to agree to exclude the USA from such a conference, the ultimate objective being the disbandment of NATO, which, Moscow claims, would open the way to closer relations -- the Soviet press invariably refers to the "friendly atmosphere" in which visits to the USSR by West European politicians and government delegations have taken place, and the fruitfulness of the contacts hereby established.

In view of the ultimate objectives behind the present Soviet anti-American press campaign, the prospects for the latter's cessation seem remote. Indeed, it is likely that its scope and intensity will grow.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich)

## PRAVDA ARTICLE ON 50th ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The text of an article, by I. Alexandrov, on "The 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," published in Pravda on July 1, is given below. Cross-headings have been inserted in London.

THE FIRST Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Shanghai on July 1, 1921, half a century ago. It proclaimed the creation of the Communist Party of China as a proletarian party of a new type. The documents of the Congress said that the aim of the CPC was to win the dictatorship of the proletariat, to build socialism and to struggle for communism. They said that the party was connected with the Communist International.

Since then the CPC has travelled a long and difficult road. The party headed the Chinese people's struggle for national and social liberation, led it to the victory of the revolution and directed China along the socialist road of development.

The CPC succeeded in this task because the communists proceeding from the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism, expressed the aspirations of the people and waged continuous struggle against imperialism, the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal lords and against petty-bourgeois revolutionarism, "left" and right deviations, chauvinism and nationalism.

Continuous struggle by the Marxist-Leninist internationalist forces of the party against the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic forces, in the cause of the triumph of the ideals of scientific communism, is a characteristic feature of the history of the CPC.

### I

The formation of the Communist Party of China was the result of the growing political activity of the young Chinese working class and the upsurge of the revolutionary-democratic and national liberation movement in the country under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the successes of young Soviet Russia.

The first propagandist of Marxism in China, later one of the founders of the CPC and one of its leading theoreticians, the communist-internationalist Li Ta-chao wrote about the significance of the October Revolution's experience for China:

"We must welcome the Russian Revolution with pride as the light of a new world civilisation. We should attentively listen to news from the New Russia which is developing under principles of freedom and humanism. Only then will we keep in step with world progress."

The struggle in China for the social emancipation of working people was closely intertwined with the tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle. Imperialism, which had turned the country into a semi-colony, became in that period the main obstacle in the way of the revolution.

Lenin's conclusion about capital as "an international force" manifested itself with special clarity in the liberation struggle that developed in China under the leadership of the CPC: "It takes an international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood to defeat it," Lenin taught.

The CPSU, the Soviet people, the world communist and workers' movement became a reliable ally for the CPC and the working people of China.

The Comintern and the Soviet communists gave all the necessary practical aid to the Chinese revolutionaries in organising the first Marxist circles that appeared in China after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May Movement" in 1919. They helped to unite the circles on the basis of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology. The decisions of the Second Congress of the Comintern, and the speech that Lenin delivered at it on national and colonial issues, gave an impetus to and served as the ideological foundation for uniting the Chinese Marxist revolutionaries.

The Comintern helped the Chinese revolutionaries greatly in learning the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the Leninist Bolshevik Party.

### Anti-imperialist

From its establishment, the Communist Party of China was in the very midst of the national democratic revolution and set out an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme. The process of organisation and ideological growth of the Chinese Communist Party went on in the period between its First and Third Congresses, that is up to the year 1924.

In 1922, the Communist Party of China was made a member of the Comintern. At its Third Congress, in 1923, the party set out a policy for establishing a united national revolutionary front with the Kuomintang, which in those years was led by the great revolutionary and democrat Sun Yat-sen.

There was a mounting anti-imperialist movement of the masses led by the working class in China. That was why the party was faced with the urgent necessity of winning the hegemony of the proletariat in the national revolution. The Hong Kong -Canton seamen's strike, the general strike called by the working class of Shanghai and the growing peasant movement indicated that it was the proletariat which was the party's chief mainstay and the vanguard of the revolution, while the peasantry was the chief ally of the proletariat, an ally without whose support the revolution could not triumph in China.

The counter-revolutionary coup in 1927 by the Kuomintang's rightwing, led by Chiang Kai-shek, resulted in the disintegration of the united front. Bloody terror was used against the Communist Party of China and those who sympathised with it. Hundreds of thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese people fell victim to this terror. Among them were such prominent figures of the

Communist Party of China as general secretaries of the Communist Party of China central committee Hsiang Chung-fa and Chu Tsu-po, prominent leader of the peasant movement Peng Pai, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of China and organisers of the Young Communist League in China Chang Cheng, founder of one of the first revolutionary bases of the Communist Party of China Fang Chih-min and many, many others.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that during this period a rightwing deviation line emerged in the Community Party of China which led to the undermining of the party's links with the masses and prevented the use of the experience of the world communist movement and the putting into practice of the recommendations of the Comintern.

#### Sixth Congress

The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China, which was held at this critical moment for the party in 1928, discussed the tasks of the party in the new situation. Its decisions were worked out with due regard for the international experience of the revolutionary movement and covered such questions of vital significance as the strategy and tactics of the agrarian revolution, the construction of the armed forces and the creation of bases of revolutionary forces in rural areas. The directives worked out by this congress outlined ways for the development of the Chinese Revolution.

The late 1920's and the early 1930's were again a period of difficulty for the party. Communists were constantly persecuted by the reactionary elements, and petty-bourgeois elements were active within the party, elements that by the mid-1930's had seized key positions in the party.

Chiang Kai-shek's followers wreaked violence against the Communist Party of China and at the same time conducted an anti-Soviet campaign which was followed by armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontiers.

The internationalists in the CPC resolutely exposed the reactionary essence of Chiang Kai-shek's calls for war against the Soviet Union and his attempts to slander the USSR and accuse it of what he called "Red Imperialism."

We all know what suffering the counter-revolutionary course brought upon the Chinese people. Subsequent events showed that every time that the enemies of China, and the enemies of socialism within China, set out to weaken the revolutionary movement and lead it astray, they were sure to start an Anti-Soviet campaign. It happened during the years of struggle for the liberation of China and it was used by the nationalistic and bourgeois elements again and again.

During this difficult time for the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet communists initialled a powerful international movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The Comintern called on communists all over the world to give "every possible support to the Chinese Revolution."

The aggression by Japanese imperialism against China caused a regrouping in that country and made the nation's salvation the chief problem. Speaking at the Comintern in 1936, Georgi Dimitroff emphasised that it was up to the CPC to "secure the unity of the vast majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders."

#### Anti-Japanese Front

The CPC central committee called for the establishment of a united anti-Japanese front. The slogan was in accord with the basic interests of the Chinese people. Thanks to its important part in the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became an influential force in China.

The war with Japan was long and hard. The final liberation of China from the Japanese invaders became possible when German nazism and Japanese militarism were defeated. The Soviet Union played the decisive role in achieving victory over the most reactionary forces of imperialism. It created the most favourable conditions for the triumph of people's revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries, including China. The liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the far East, the rout of Japan's hand-picked Kwantung Army, the liberation of Manchuria with the active assistance of troops from the Mongolian People's Republic, the Chinese and Korean guerrillas all together led to Japan's surrender and the deliverance of China from foreign domination. It also determined the possibility of the subsequent defeat of Chang Kai-shek. An American intervention in China was averted thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union.

The military and revolutionary basis which the Chinese communists established with assistance from the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian experts in Manchuria was of tremendous importance for the triumph of the Chinese Revolution. It was the base which the newly reorganised and retrained People's Liberation Army, guided by the CPC, used to expel the Kuomintang reactionaries from China.

The victory of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution in China was a major event which greatly influenced world development. The triumph of this revolution was the triumph of Marxism-Leninism in China.

Internationalist solidarity, close contacts between the Chinese revolutionaries and the international communist and working class movement and assistance from the Soviet Union and other members of the world socialist system ensured victory after the long years of the selfless struggle of the Chinese people, the Chinese workers, the peasants and the intellectuals under the guidance of the CPC.

The victory of the revolution opened the way to the Chinese people for fundamental transformation in the political, social and economic fields. The objective requirements of the revolution's further development, the setting out by China on the socialist

road and the danger caused by imperialism, made it necessary for China to establish the closest friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries which could give the People's Republic of China the necessary political, military and economic aid and support.

True to the great principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet people, as in the years of revolutionary struggle, gave the Chinese people all the necessary support in the building of socialism.

More than 250 large modern industrial enterprises and installations were built in China with the assistance of the USSR. As the CPC leaders admitted, these enterprises formed the "backbone" of China's industry.

"The Soviet Union's assistance to our country's economic development is unprecedented in history both in size and scope," said People's Daily.

The groundwork of socialism, the economic basis that opened up possibilities for the further expansion of socialist construction, were laid in the country during the first decade after the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

The Eighth CPC Congress, which holds a special place in the history of the party and the life of the Chinese people, took place in 1956.

The keynote of the congress was the strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist forces in the party. It confirmed the general line of building socialism in close alliance with the countries of the world socialist system.

The Eighth CPC Congress administered a principled rebuff to the nationalistic and chauvinistic tendencies in ideology and politics that were manifesting themselves in the party and the country. The "Main Provisions of the Programme" of the CPC Rules, adopted by the Congress, emphatically stressed the ideological-theoretical basis of the party: "In its activities the Communist Party of China adheres to Marxism-Leninism."

#### Main Purpose

Having outlined concrete roads of continuing socialist transformations and determining the most important tasks of developing the country's national economy, the Eight Congress stressed that the main purpose of the party's entire work was "the maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the people's life."

In the field of foreign policy, the Congress specified as the prime task the need "to continue strengthening and consolidating the fraternal and inviolable friendship with the great Soviet Union and all the countries of peoples' democracy."

Realising the complexity of the tasks of socialist construction facing the party and the country and taking into consideration the lessons of the development of the CPC, the Congress urged the party to exercise vigilance and resolutely struggle against any

manifestations of great power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalistic ideology.

The resolution of the Eighth Congress said:

"If we give in to the influence of non-proletarian ideology, give in to conceit and self-complacency, if we imagine that we are infallible and do not study in all modesty, we shall not be able further to avoid the evil of subjectivism."

Subsequent events have shown how timely this warning was.

The great power-nationalistic forces in the CPC, harbouring their plans which were in fundamental contradiction to the policy of the Eighth Congress, did not consider themselves ready to implement them at that moment and, hiding their true face, were compelled to vote for the fundamental theses of the Congress.

Some time later, however, Mao Tse-tung and his followers resorted to actions directed at undermining the congress decisions. They opened the flood gates for the mounting wave of petty-bourgeois pressure on the party and the working class.

#### 'Left' slogans

Taking advantage of the Chinese people's desire to build socialism as quickly as possible, the exponents of this line plunged the country into the voluntaristic experiments of the "Great Leap" under "left" revolutionary slogans.

At the Lushan plenary meeting of the CPC central committee in 1959, the Marxist-Leninist forces of the CPC described this policy as a manifestation of the "petty-bourgeois" fanaticism which had already cost the Chinese people dearly.

The nationalist group in the leadership of the Communist Party of China continued to impose its platform upon the party and the country. Fanning nationalism and chauvinism, the nationalist group sought to subjugate China's domestic and foreign policy to the attainment of hegemonistic aims on the international scene.

The present leadership of the Communist Party of China came out against the policy of the international communist movement, which was worked out jointly by the Communist and Workers' Parties, including the Communist Party of China.

The present leadership of the CPC changed its own ideological political position on the main questions of international life and socialist construction to a position which was incompatible with Leninism.

Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties, upholding Marxism-Leninism, gave a resolute rebuff to attempts to revise Marxism-Leninism from "left" opportunist nationalist positions, the Peking leadership launched an unprecedented campaign of slander and subversive activities against our party and other fraternal parties, which became spearheaded not only against the socialist system and the communist movement, but against the whole anti-imperialist front.

This policy aroused displeasure in the ranks of the CPC and among the broad masses of the Chinese people. In order to suppress opposition to his policy, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage started a struggle against the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist leading personnel in the CPC and against the politically conscious workers, peasants and intellectuals.

It was precisely this that was the main task of the "cultural revolution" in the course of which a terrible blow was dealt at the CPC; many prominent veterans of the party and hundreds of thousands of communists became victims of repression and were hounded.

At the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China Mao Tse-tung and his entourage made an attempt to legalise their domestic and foreign political line of hostility to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism as a principle and to make it a long-term programme.

While speaking on the subject of the construction of socialism in China, they at the same time put forward the thesis about the "impossibility" of the victory of socialism before the triumph of world revolution.

Abandoning the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction, they set the task of "preparation for war" and of turning the whole country into a military camp as the aim of economic development of China and of the entire socio-political life of the country. Militant anti-Sovietism was raised to the level of a programmatic task.

Both the objective laws of socio-economic development and the vital interests of the people of China call for a genuinely socialist policy based on the principles of scientific communism.

However, the economic fundamentals of socialism laid down during the first decade of the PRC are being seriously deformed as a result of the policy pursued by the present Chinese leadership's desire to place all the country's resources at the service of their great power hegemonistic aims. This policy imperils the socialist gains of the Chinese people and impedes the country's development.

#### Additional obstacles

The attempts of the present Chinese leadership to denigrate the experience of the USSR and other fraternal countries and the attacks on the socialist community create additional obstacles for the construction of socialism in China.

As for the hostile fabrications about the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, they are resolutely repudiated by the Soviet people. Sowing seeds of discord between the USSR and China is particularly harmful in a situation where the imperialists are stepping up their hostile activities against the socialist countries and against the freedom-loving peoples.

U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism are hatching aggressive plans not only against the USSR, but against China as

well. The policy of flirtation with imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis and of support for the territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists, therefore, encourage the reactionary circles of the United States, Japan and other imperialist powers and cause damage to the anti-imperialist front.

The situation in the world and in Asia more than ever before demands unity and joint actions by anti-imperialist, revolutionary forces. This was re-emphasised by the International Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties in 1969. The course of contemporary international development fully confirms the urgency and tremendous significance of this conclusion.

The Soviet people and our Communist Party have regarded the development of relations of friendship and co-operation with the Chinese people and Chinese communists as one of the major prerequisites for consolidating the positions of world socialism and for strengthening the unity of the international communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist front.

This is precisely what determines the principled and consistent line pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and content, are clearly expressed in the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our party, of plenary sessions of the CPSU central committee and in statements by Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CPSU central committee.

The 24th CPSU Congress, after a comprehensive discussion of the problems involved in the relations between the USSR and China, fully approved and endorsed the principled Leninist policy and concrete steps by the CPSU central committee and the Soviet government in the field of Soviet-Chinese relations.

#### Unity

When the Chinese leaders came forward with an ideological and political platform incompatible with Leninism and with the aim of carrying on a struggle against the socialist countries and of splitting the international communist and the entire anti-imperialist movement, the CPSU central committee adopted a position of consistently upholding the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of all-round consolidation of the unity of the international communist movement and the defence of the interests of the socialist community.

At the same time, the CPSU is resolutely opposed to extending the existing grave ideological differences to inter-state relations, is striving to normalise relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China and is doing everything in its power to restore good neighbourly relations and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

The CPSU proceeds from the fact that the objective requirements of China's development along the path of socialism opens up opportunities for such normalisation. The long-term fundamental interests of the peoples of the USSR and China do not conflict; on



the contrary, they dictate the need to restore and develop mutual co-operation and friendship.

Numerous constructive steps taken by the CPSU central committee and the Soviet government with the aim of normalising relations with the People's Republic of China are well known and have received universal approval.

Soon after the meeting of the heads of government of both countries in Peking in 1969, held on Soviet initiative, Soviet-Chinese talks on border questions were started.

The Soviet side at all times displays a constructive approach, proposing both the adoption of measures contributing to an improved mutual understanding and a final solution to all disputed border questions through the conclusion of a new border agreement. Talks can be successful however, only if both partners display good will and make efforts to reach agreement.

The government of the People's Republic of China has recently made statements to the effect that ideological differences "must not interfere with inter-state relations between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence." We take account of the expressions of readiness by the Chinese side not to extend ideological differences to inter-state relations.

Expressing the will of our party and people, Leonid Brezhnev declared in the report of the CPSU central committee to the 24th Congress:

"We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The CPSU will continue tirelessly to work for the unity of the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis."

"At the same time, our party and the Soviet government are profoundly convinced that an improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be in keeping with the fundamental long-term interests of both countries and with the interests of socialism, the freedom of the peoples and the strengthening of peace. That is why we are prepared to help in every way not only to normalise relations but also to restore goodneighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and express our confidence that this will eventually be achieved."

#### Marxism-Leninism

This just and constructive position of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to the People's Republic of China meets with understanding and approval from the fraternal socialist countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties and all progressive, peace-loving forces, including the Chinese working people.

The complex path traversed by the Chinese Communist Party over the past half-century confirms that Marxism-Leninism alone equips revolutionaries with a clear understanding of the objective laws and tendencies of social development and a scientific approach to working out strategy and tactics in the struggle for remaking the

world and building socialism and communism.

Loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism ensure the success of the entire activity of the communists. Conversely, departure from these principles by any of the detachments of the international communist movement dooms this detachment to defeats and causes damage to the common cause of the world army of communists.

The Chinese communist-internationalists at all times emphasised that unity with the CPSU, the Soviet Union and the international communist movement was highly important for the victory of the revolution and the successful advance along the path of socialism.

On the day of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Soviet communists and the Soviet people pay tribute to the heroism and selflessness of the Chinese communists and to all those who, fighting to put into practice the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, spared and are sparing no effort to secure the victory of the Chinese revolution and China's advance along the path of progress and socialism.

## DRAFT TEXT OF MOON TREATY

The following is the text, submitted by the Soviet Government to the United Nations, of the draft Treaty Concerning the Moon:

The states parties to this Treaty, noting the successes achieved by states in the exploration of the Moon,

Recognising that the Moon, which is the only natural satellite of the Earth, plays an important role in the exploration of outer space,

Wishing to prevent the Moon from becoming an arena of international conflicts,

Being fully resolved to contribute to the further development of co-operation among states in the exploration and use of the Moon, its interior and near-lunar space,

Proceeding from the provisions of the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and also the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,

And taking into consideration the necessity for giving concrete expression, to, and developing these international documents as applied to the Moon, with due regard for further progress in space exploration,

Have agreed on the following:

### ARTICLE 1

1. The signatory states shall carry out their activities on the Moon and in near-lunar space in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter.
2. In conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the use of the force in any form, or the threat of force and any other hostile actions, and also the threat of such actions, are prohibited. The use of the Moon for committing such actions with regard to the Earth and space objects is prohibited.

### ARTICLE 2

1. The Moon shall be used by all the signatory states only for peaceful purposes.
2. The signatory states hereby undertake not to put into orbit round the Moon any objects with nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction and not to instal such weapons on the surface of the Moon or in its interior.
3. It is forbidden to set up military bases, installations and fortifications on the Moon and to test weapons of any type or hold military exercises there.

### ARTICLE 3

1. The signatory states will strive for co-operation on questions relating to activity on the Moon. Such co-operation can be effected

both on a multilateral and on a bilateral basis.

2. Each signatory state shall effect the exploration and use of the Moon with consideration for the interests of present and future generations and shall also observe the rights of other signatory states envisaged by this Treaty.

3. A signatory state which has reason to consider that another signatory state is violating its commitments under this Treaty, can ask for consultations of the signatory states concerned.

### ARTICLE 4

1. The signatory states shall effect the exploration and use of the Moon by reasonable means which ensure the prevention of disturbance of the existing equilibrium of the lunar environment.
2. The signatory states shall effect exploration and use of the Moon in such a way as to avoid any unfavourable change in the lunar environment or its pollution through the delivery of extra-lunar matter. In cases of necessity, consultations shall be held between signatory states concerned.

### ARTICLE 5

1. The signatory states can conduct their activity in the exploration and use of the Moon at any place on the surface of the Moon, in its interior and in near-lunar space.
2. With these aims in view, the signatory states can, specifically:

Land their space objects on the Moon, launch them from the Moon and put them into a near-lunar orbit;

Deploy their apparatus, equipment and personnel at any place on the surface of the Moon, in its interior and in near-lunar space.

Apparatus and personnel of the signatory states can move freely on the surface of the Moon, in its interior and in near-lunar space.

3. The actions of signatory states, in conformity with the provisions of Points 1 and 2 of this Article, must not create obstacles to the activity of other signatory states on the Moon. In the event of the possibility existing of such obstacles being created, the signatory states concerned shall hold consultations.

### ARTICLE 6

1. The signatory states can set up both unmanned and manned stations on the Moon.
2. The stations must be deployed in such a way as not to hinder free access for the apparatus and personnel of other signatory states conducting their activity on the Moon, in all areas of the Moon in conformity with Article 1 of the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

### ARTICLE 7

1. The states parties to the Treaty pledge themselves to take all possible measures to protect the lives and health of persons on the Moon. In this connection, they will regard any person on the Moon

as an astronaut in the meaning of Article 5 of the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and will also regard him as a member of the crew of a spaceship in the meaning of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, regardless of the duration of his stay on the Moon, his whereabouts on the Moon and his formal membership of a crew of any spaceship, and regardless of other similar circumstances.

2. The signatory states must grant persons in distress on the Moon, belonging to the personnel of another signatory state, the right to take shelter in their stations and in their apparatus, structures or equipment.

3. The signatory states conducting activity on the Moon shall take the necessary steps for the exchange of information on phenomena they have detected in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a hazard to the lives and health of people on the Moon, and also on the discovery of signs of any kind of organic life.

#### ARTICLE 8

1. The surface and interior of the Moon cannot be the property of states, international intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, or national organisations, whether or not they enjoy the rights of juridical persons, nor can they be the property of physical persons. The deployment of apparatus or equipment on the surface of the Moon or in its interior, including the building of structures inseparably connected with the surface or the interior of the Moon, does not create a right of ownership of the sector of the surface or interior of the Moon.

2. Sectors of the surface or interior of the Moon cannot be a subject for concessions, exchanges, transfer, purchase or sale, lease, rent, gift or any other agreements and transactions, with or without compensation, between states, international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, or national organisations, whether or not they enjoy the rights of juridical persons, nor can they be a subject for agreements and transactions between physical persons.

#### ARTICLE 9

In conformity with Article 8 of the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the signatory states retain the right to ownership of property, including structures, apparatus and equipment belonging to them and delivered to the surface of the Moon or to near-lunar space.

#### ARTICLE 10

A signatory state which has discovered that an emergency or forced landing or any other unpremeditated landing of a space object, not belonging to it, or the dropping of components of such an object,

has taken place on the Moon, shall inform the signatory state owning the aforementioned space objects or its components, and the United Nations secretary-general of what has happened.

#### ARTICLE 11

A signatory state, in addition to the provisions of Article 6 of the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, bears the responsibility for damage caused by its action or inaction, or the action or inaction of its personnel on the Moon, to the property or personnel of other signatory states on the Moon, unless it is established that the damage was not caused through the fault of this state and not through the fault of its personnel on the Moon.

#### ARTICLE 12

1. This Treaty shall be open for accession by all states. Any state that does not sign the present Treaty before it enters into force in accordance with Point 3 of the present Article, can accede to it any time.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification by signatory states. The instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the governments of . . . . . which are hereby designated the depositary governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five governments, including the governments designated as depositary governments of the present Treaty.

4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the present Treaty has come into force, it shall enter into force on the day their instruments of ratification or accession are deposited.

5. The depositary governments shall immediately inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession, the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty, and other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

#### ARTICLE 13

Any state party to the Treaty may suggest amendments to this Treaty. The amendments shall come into force for each state party to the Treaty accepting these amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the states parties to the Treaty and thereafter, for each remaining state party to the Treaty, from the date of acceptance by it.

#### ARTICLE 14

Any state party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification

to the depositary governments. Each such withdrawal from the Treaty shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification.

This Treaty, of which the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be forwarded by the depositary governments to the governments of signatory and acceding states.

In confirmation whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

## ANDREI KIRILENKO ADDRESSES CONGRESS OF MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

"We are coming out not only for the ending of open acts of aggression and for the elimination of breeding-grounds of armed conflict provoked by imperialism; we stand for a truly fundamental improvement of the whole of international life," declared Andrei Kirilenko, speaking at Ulan Bator, the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, on June 8.

Andrei Kirilenko, who is a member of the political bureau and secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was addressing the 16th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as the leader of the fraternal delegation from the CPSU.

"Pursuing the Leninist policy of peace on the international scene, the Soviet Union and socialist Mongolia, shoulder to shoulder with other socialist countries, always come out in support of all people's upholding the sacred cause of freedom, independence and social progress," he declared.

He emphasised that "the heroic people of Vietnam and the patriotic forces of Laos and Cambodia have received and will continue to receive assistance and support from us in their sacred struggle for the freedom and independence of their countries."

Referring to the Soviet Union's anti-imperialist stand in connection with the Middle East crisis, he said:

"The peoples of the Arab countries greatly appreciate our internationalist policy. We believe that any intrigues on the part of the enemies of friendship between the Arab peoples, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, on the other hand, will be fruitless. Mutual understanding and solidarity will continue to pervade our relations. This is illustrated clearly and convincingly by the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, which was signed at the end of May."

### Relations with China

In the course of his speech Andrei Kirilenko referred to Soviet relations with China and the Chinese Communist Party and said:

"Our party is doing everything in its power to strengthen the unity of the international communist movement. We believe that a return of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China to the positions of friendship and co-operation with the socialist countries and the world communist movement would accord with the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle and the strengthening of the entire anti-imperialist front."

"As for the CPSU, our principled line is directed towards improving relations with the People's Republic of China. We firmly adhere to this line and confirm it in practice, without abandoning either our principles or our national interests and while

upholding the purity of the Marxist-Leninist teaching."

"As is well known, as a result of initiative from the Soviet side, a certain amount of progress has been made recently in normalising the relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China."

"Soviet and Chinese government delegations are holding talks in Peking on a frontier settlement. We have exchanged Ambassadors, and our trade is expanding slightly. Although this process is proceeding slowly on the whole, we are patient enough, and we shall display a constructive and patient approach in the future, too."

"The 24th Congress of the CPSU stated quite definitely that our party 'is coming out for the normalisation of the relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China and for restoring good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.' And we hope that the need for joint efforts to normalise our relations will sooner or later be understood in Peking."

"This would be an important step in organising co-operation and good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China; it would meet the interests not only of the peoples of both countries but of the entire socialist camp and the world revolutionary movement and would deal a crushing blow at the schemes of the imperialists."

Andrei Kirilenko told the Congress that a good start had been made in the struggle to carry out the economic programme outlined by the CPSU. The plan targets for the first five months of 1971 had been reached by all branches of Soviet industry and industrial output in the January-May period had increased by 8.7 percent as compared with the corresponding period of 1970.

At the end of his speech, Andrei Kirilenko presented to the Mongolian comrades a picture showing Lenin's historic meeting with the Mongolian revolutionary leader Suhe-Bator.

"The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, by its consistent struggle to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community and the world communist movement, has earned well-deserved respect among all the communists of the world," says a message of greetings sent by the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 16th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

The message emphasises that the Soviet communists and all the Soviet people note with profound pleasure the further strengthening and development of the fraternal friendship and all-round co-operation between the CPSU and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic.

"We are fully confident that the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and in fraternal alliance with our country and with other socialist countries,

will win new and glorious victories in the construction of socialism and in the struggle for peace and friendship among the peoples," the message declares.

#### POLISH PREMIER'S MEETING WITH ALEXEI KOSYGIN

Piotr Jaroszewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Witold Trampeczynski, acting chairman of Poland's State Commission for Economic Planning, have paid a short visit to Moscow, during which the heads of government of the USSR and Poland outlined concrete measures for the further development of Soviet-Polish economic co-operation over the next five years.

The talks, which were held on June 8, took place in a cordial and comradely atmosphere.

Agreements were signed on the following subjects:

1. The further expansion of trade between the two countries in the period from 1972 to 1975 over and above the amounts specified for the three years in the long-term trade agreement;
2. The delivery from the USSR to Poland in the period from 1971 to 1975 of complete sets of industrial plant and the rendering of technical assistance to Poland in the construction and expansion of industrial enterprises and projects;
3. Production-technical co-operation between the USSR and Poland in the field of computer technology.

The two sides made a comprehensive examination of the ways and conditions for broadening and deepening production and technical co-operation in the fields of machine building and the manufacture of consumer goods and also in the joint development in the USSR and the Polish People's Republic of the production of certain types of raw materials and fuel with a view to meeting the demand in both countries more fully.

The heads of government of the USSR and the Polish People's Republic noted that the constant and steady expansion and deepening of the economic, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries was entirely in keeping with the interests of the Soviet Union and Poland and contributed towards the fuller satisfaction of the material needs of the Soviet and Polish peoples.



ANOTHER HONECKER APPOINTMENT -- NEW EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FOR "NEUES DEUTSCHLAND"

by Dorothy Miller.

Summary: This paper discusses the appointment of Joachim Herrmann as new editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland and the subsequent abolition of the State Secretariat which Herrmann had previously headed. It provides some background on the new editor-in-chief and reviews other major personnel changes since Erich Honecker's election to the first secretaryship of the SED. The conclusion is that, slowly yet methodically, Honecker appears to be moving his trusted associates into leading positions of the Party and the mass organizations.

On July 6, the East German Politburo appointed Joachim Herrmann to the position of editor-in-chief of the central SED organ, Neues Deutschland. (1) Herrmann replaces Rudolf Singer, who has been named chairman of the State Broadcasting Committee. Singer served as editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland since 1966 when he succeeded Hermann Axen in that position. (Axen, then a candidate member of the Politburo, had been made Central Committee Secretary responsible for international communist relations). While Singer's transfer might not necessarily be considered as a demotion, Joachim Herrmann's appointment is most certainly a promotion from his previous position of State Secretary for West German Affairs.

Joachim Herrmann was born in Berlin in 1929. In his own words, he belongs to the generation of Berliners who grew up in air-raid shelters. After the war, Herrmann started as a copyboy for the "Berliner Publishing House." He joined the Party in 1946 and since then his career has been on the rise. He helped to build up the youth paper Start, which the SED subsequently decided to close down because it presented too much competition to the official FDJ paper Junge Welt. Herrmann became editor of Junge Welt in 1952, a job he did not relinquish until 1962. His association with the East German communist youth organization (he was a secretary of the FDJ Central Committee in 1959/60) brought him in touch with Erich Honecker whose power base in the 1950's was the same organization.

In all his endeavors Herrmann showed a great deal of interest and zeal in trying to enliven the dreary style of the East German publications. He is credited with offering Berliners newspapers not quite as dull as Neues Deutschland, as a result of which the circulation of the papers managed by him soon surpassed the local edition of the central party organ. However, Herrmann apparently never tried to be original nor did he ever make an attempt to develop his own ideas: he was nothing but a faithful interpreter of party decisions, although he had a gift for putting the phrases into more acceptable German. In 1962 he moved over to the semi-

official East Berlin daily, Berliner Zeitung, and retained the editorship of that paper until late 1965.

Following the Central Committee plenum in December 1965 Herrmann became "State Secretary for All-German Affairs," an agency directly responsible to the Council of Ministers and not affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. At the time of this nomination, Walter Ulbricht justified the creation of the new post by announcing that the merely "technical relations" which previously existed between the GDR and the FRG should be developed into "direct relations with the West German government." Herrmann probably entertained no illusions about the nature of his new job, the purpose of which was not to effect a rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR, but "conquer" it is possible under the slogan of "peaceful coexistence" or that of "class struggle." His job, in effect, was to cement the division of Germany and to promote increased demarcation (Abgrenzung).

This latter purpose became quite clear when in 1967 the "State Secretariat for All-German Affairs" was renamed "State Secretariat for West German Affairs." The East German leadership justified the new title by claiming that since the end of 1966, "West German monopoly capitalists and their Bonn government, including the social-democratic ministers, had rendered such concepts as 'all-German' meaningless and devoid of substance." The Secretariat's major aim was stressed also by a series of pamphlets which, under the general title, At First Hand, offered information about the GDR: these pamphlets were clearly intended as propaganda for the West German public, since they were not distributed in the GDR itself.

The day after Herrmann's appointment to the editorship of Neues Deutschland, the Council of Ministers decided to abolish the "State Secretariat for West German questions." (2) This decision in fact represents the logical consequence of East Germany's hardened line towards the Federal Republic. It serves to emphasize that there is no need for a special office dealing with West Germany, and that the FRG is for East Germany as much a foreign a country as any other state.

Joachim Herrmann's appointment as editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland may serve to enliven the dull style and format of the paper, since he is a man with long journalistic experience. His background in East-West German relations appears to emphasize the importance attached by the Honecker regime to this complex problem -- a problem which Herrmann will undoubtedly handle in strict compliance with the SED's policy of delineation. Most important of all, perhaps, is the fact that this appointment is the most recent in a series of moves demonstrating Honecker's policy of entrusting his earlier associates with important party posts.

Within two weeks of his becoming First SED Secretary, Erich Honecker recalled Paul Verner from his position as First Secretary of Berlin, and reassigned him to "responsible tasks in the collective

of the Party leadership." (3) (After the Eighth Congress, it appeared that Verner had taken over the Central Committee's Secretariat for Questions of Security, a post formerly held by Honecker himself). Like Honecker himself, Verner had been one of the founding members of the FDJ youth organization, and has apparently justified Honecker's trust in him from the early days of the GDR.

The Eighth Congress also witnessed the advancement of a number of other persons formerly closely associated with Honecker into higher positions in the party hierarchy. Thus, from being Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agitation, Werner Lamberz rose to full Politburo membership. He worked with Honecker in the FDJ Central Council from 1947 onward and played a prominent role (together with Verner) in sabotaging the ultimately abortive SPD-SED speakers' exchange to which Honecker had always objected. Werner Krolkowski managed to skip over the customary intermediate stage of candidate Politburo member and advanced from membership in the Central Committee to full membership of the Politburo. Even though his association with Honecker is not quite as clear-cut, he is known to be a faithful and efficient agitator. The former Minister of State Security, Erich Mielke, became a candidate Politburo member, a move indicating the importance which Honecker attaches to the existence of a strong security apparatus, an organization with which he himself has long been associated. Horst Dohls became a member of the Central Committee Secretariat in addition to retaining his former post of Central Committee section chief responsible for organizational matters. Honecker had been his direct superior for a long time during his cadre work.

Personnel changes seem to be taking place also on other levels of the Party leadership. The Directorate of the East German trade union, FDGB, has announced that Rolf Berger, one of the vice-chairman of the organization, has been relieved of membership in that body. (4) He is said to have been replaced by Wolfgang Beyreuther, 43 years old, candidate member of the Central Committee and Presidium member of the FDGB. Until his new appointment, Beyreuther had been one of the nine secretaries of the FDGB. Beyreuther attended the SED Party high school and is a graduate social scientist. There does not seem to be any obvious political reason for Berger's replacement; according to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the reasons may be rather of a personal nature, related to Berger's own sphere of interests.

Be that as it may, one may conclude that while Erich Honecker is moving slowly to place his own people into leading positions, he is certainly moving methodically, and it can be predicted with some assurance that the appointments of Joachim Herrmann and Wolfgang Beyreuther will not be the last moves by Honecker to consolidate his power as the successor of Walter Ulbricht.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

(1) Neues Deutschland, 7 July 1971.

(2) Neues Deutschland, 8 July 1971.

(3) Neues Deutschland, 17 May 1971.

(4) Berlin ADN International Service: also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 July 1971.

## CHINA AND EAST EUROPE

China is continuing to foster friendly relations with East European countries. While a top level Romanian delegation led by President Ceausescu was in China New China News Agency (June 8) reported the arrival of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mirko Tepavac. On June 2 the newly-appointed Chinese Ambassador to Czechoslovakia presented his credentials to President Svoboda.

The warm welcome given to the Romanians, including a Peking rally attended by 10,000 people and meetings with Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders, reflects the importance attached to maintaining good relations with Romania, the only East European country remaining neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet concern over the visit was reflected in Moscow Radio's series of broadcasts in Chinese, accusing China of splitting the "Socialist" camp and trying to isolate the Soviet Union. The Romanians used the visit to reaffirm Bucharest's neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute and to appeal for unity among Communist countries.

In the joint communiqué, signed on June 9 by Prime Minister Chou En-lai and President Ceausescu, the two sides agreed to expand cooperation. They said that all countries should base their relations on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and supported the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries, the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the abrogation of all military blocs. China praised the Romanians for having "firmly withstood imperialist pressure" and "won important victories in their struggle to safeguard national independence and State sovereignty." The Romanians called for China's full participation in the United Nations, declaring that no thorough settlement of important international questions was possible without China. They added:

"The recent increasingly manifest tendency of certain capitalist countries to normalise their relations with the People's Republic of China is in the interests of cooperation between countries having different social systems and of peace and international security. The Romanian side firmly stands for the dismantling of US military bases from Taiwan, the inalienable territory of the People's Republic of China. The Romanian side reaffirms here its firm support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, the Security Council and other international organisations."

China accepted an invitation to send a government and party delegation to Romania.

During talks with Chinese leaders on June 2 Mao Tse-tung called on the Romanians to "unite and overthrow imperialism and all reaction." The delegation visited Nanking and Shanghai (June 5-7) accompanied by Chou En-lai.

At a Peking rally on June 8, Ceausecu thanked China for the loan agreed on last November and believed to be worth some \$200m. Three protocols to the loan agreement, concerning the supply of plants and technical aid, were signed in March during the visit of Deputy Prime Minister, Radulescu.

The rapid improvement in Sino-Yugoslav relations since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was underlined by Foreign Minister Tepevac's visit. In March 1969, the Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade visited Peking to sign a trade and payments agreement - the first ministerial contact for ten years - and last year Ambassadors were exchanged for the first time since 1958. At a banquet on June 9, Tepavac said the purpose of his visit was to discuss political, economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation. He expressed satisfaction with the expansion of economic relations and noted that the Zagreb International Fair and the Yugoslav Industrial Exhibition in Peking, planned for December, would open up new possibilities.

The Chinese Deputy Prime Minister, Li Hsien-nien, praised Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment and resistance to Soviet pressure and pledged China's support in her struggle "to oppose foreign aggression."

The Belgrade weekly, Nin, (Tanyug June 5) said Tepavac's visit was likely to result in "new expressions of friendship and common agreement on the principles of non-alignment, independence, non-interference and opposition to hegemony, to which Yugoslavia is highly dedicated."

Sino-Czechoslovakian relations have remained cool over the past few years. Czechoslovak criticism of China increased during the Cultural Revolution and in August 1968 China denounced the "Fascist" occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces and strongly attacked the Czechoslovak leadership. Prague was the last East European capital to receive a new Ambassador from China after their recall during the cultural revolution. Sung-Ke-wen, who presented his credentials to President Svoboda on June 2 was formerly counsellor and acting chargé in Prague, having previously served in 1964 as counsellor and acting chargé in Budapest. Sung told President Svoboda that basic disagreements should not be an obstacle to the normalisation of inter-State relations. Svoboda said conditions existed for further development of trade and for renewing cooperation in other fields (Prague Radio, June 2, 1971).

## POLITICAL PENETRATION THROUGH "FRIENDSHIP"

Summary: Friendship societies with primarily political motives are beginning to proliferate in Africa.

The expansion in the activities of "friendship" societies linking Communist and non-Communist countries is causing concern in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, where three Nigeria-China friendship societies have been competing for support since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lagos and Peking in February 1971. Other Communist countries, such as East Germany and North Korea, which are seeking wider diplomatic recognition, even in African States that already have links with Federal Germany or South Korea, have been waging a propaganda campaign to this end through the friendship societies.

An article in the Nigerian Morning Post on January 31, 1971 questioned the reason for and value of such groups in view of the objective of the Nigerian Government to be on friendly terms with all nations. It also questioned the claims of members of societies such as the Nigerian-Polish Friendship Society not to receive money from abroad, and of the Hungarian embassy to have no connexion with the Nigerian-Hungarian Society. It quoted Mr. Kanmi Isola Osobu, a Lagos lawyer who is Secretary-General of the Nigerian Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (NAASO)-an organisation similar in function to the societies-as saying that "the friendship societies and their associates have suffered from the canker-worm of opportunism - most of the organizations are now in the grip of elements using them to carry favours from and kow-tow to foreign embassies and their agents." Admitting the political function of the societies, he commented that "the whole exercise has terribly degenerated." The Morning Post concluded: "It is not outlandish to suggest that these bodies are being used for and are vulnerable to indoctrination."

In both the Soviet Union and China the activities of the friendship societies are controlled by central organisations: the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Both are ostensibly "unofficial" bodies which sponsor cultural and social exchanges but are in effect instruments of their governments policies. The Soviet organisation claims links with 102 friendship societies all over the world. A subsidiary organisation specially for Africa, the Soviet Association for Friendship with African Countries (SAFA), which was founded in 1959, claimed links with 1,300 public bodies and individual leaders by 1967. SAFA is also closely associated with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, another "unofficial" body, which is active in the same field. SAFA's Chinese counterpart is the China-African Friendship Association, formed in 1960. Among its first links with African States were the Congo-Kinshasa-China Friendship Association, established in 1960, and the Nigeria-China Friendship Society, established in 1961. Similar parent organisa-

tions exist in Eastern Europe, notably in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

#### Subversion Suspected

The Nigeria-China Friendship Society, set up in 1961, had ceased to be active by 1964, when it became a prey to internal disputes. Its leaders visited Peking but were disappointed at the lack of scholarships available to them. Another organisation, the Nigeria-China Friendship Association, came into existence in Kaduna in 1962 and later established branches in Jos and Kano. In 1965 it was reported to be under police investigation on suspicion of assisting Communist-inspired plans to overthrow the government. Nothing was heard of it between then and May 1971, when the General Secretary expressed support for the Federal Government's diplomatic recognition of China, "which gave impetus to our association".

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and China in February 1971, led to the formation of two new rival societies. The General Secretary of the Nigeria-China Cultural and Friendship Association, Mallam Isa Ozi Salami, claimed that the association, whose existence was announced on February 27, would open branches throughout the country with national headquarters in Kaduna and would establish a national library of literature about Nigeria and China. Salami said that the association aimed to give more backing to efforts to wipe out "neo-colonialism" in all parts of the black world. The second organisation is the Nigerian-Chinese People's Friendship Association, which held a photographic exhibition in Lagos in April. Peking's current campaign to establish diplomatic relations with more African States may lead to the proliferation of similar activities elsewhere.

East Germany, which has so far succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, the Somali Republic and Tanzania in sub-Saharan Africa, uses its friendship societies in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia to further its campaign for wider recognition. One of the most active is the Nigeria-GDR Friendship Society, formed in 1968, whose main function has been to urge the Nigerian Government to award diplomatic recognition to East Germany. In May 1970, the leader of the banned Marxist-Leninist Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (SWAFP), Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, issued an appeal on behalf of the Society for Nigeria's recognition of East Germany. The Society now has branches in Kaduna, Kano, Onitsha (opened in July 1970), Warri (where a symposium was held in January 1971, to mark the 22nd anniversary of the German Democratic Republic) and in the South-East State (opened in January 1971 and already claiming a membership of 350). It relies heavily on members who have been trained in East Germany. The General Secretary, M. O. Idowu, studied at Leipzig and is a member of the pro-Communist Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC). Others who are active in it and received their

training in East Germany include a former President, Dr. Bankole, who was leader of a Nigerian Marxist group in East Germany, Mrs. Agnes Bankole and Dr. M. E. Kolagbodi, a long-standing Communist who was one of the founder members of SWAFP, and who has been active in other pro-Communist organisations since the banning of political parties. Dr. Kolagbodi attended an East German-Africa "Friendship Conference" in Freetown in July 1969. The purpose of this conference was to enlist support for diplomatic recognition of East Germany.

#### East German help

At about this time a Sierra Leone-East German Friendship Society was established. But its meetings have been sparsely attended and the society has declined despite help from the East Germans, who have cultivated their contacts in Sierra Leone mainly by offering exchange visits. An attempt to instil new life into it was made at a meeting in May 1971, when its National President called for greater efforts. He sought co-operation with other East German societies in Africa and offered a prize for anyone who could suggest ways to bring success to the society.

The North Koreans (whose campaign for wider diplomatic links in Africa is described more fully on page 19) are also making full use of their friendship organisations, notably the Sierra Leone-North Korea Friendship Society, a small but active group, which was set up after the visits of several North Korean delegations to Sierra Leone in 1970. Its President, Monty Cole, is active in youth and peace movements, and is a frequent visitor to Communist countries. In April 1971, the society held a one-day seminar to mark the birthday of Kim Il-sung. A six-man delegation of North Korean journalists, headed by Jung Tae-hwa, called on the society during its visit to Sierra Leone at the end of April and beginning of May, and publicised its activities at a Press conference. On May 15, the Sierra Leone newspaper, We Yone, published a full-page announcement of a meeting of the Sierra Leone-North Korea Friendship Society, which was described as "the Kim Il-sung Study Group and Committee for Solidarity with the Korean People."

NEW SOVIET DELIVERIES BOLSTER UAR AIR FORCE

Summary: According to recent reports appearing in the Western Press since September 1970 nearly 100 Mig 21s and 16 troop carrying helicopters have been delivered to the UAR. If these aircraft are additional to the known strength, and not simply replacing obsolescent Mig 15s and 17s, the UAR should this year almost regain its numerical strength before the heavy losses of the Six-Day War. The evidence suggests that the Israeli Air Force will also regain approximately its 1966 numerical strength this year. But the qualitative advantage, in pilots, bomb-load and range, remains with Israel.

To judge by the latest reports in the US press, another phase of rapid expansion of Soviet aircraft deliveries to the UAR has begun. "Nearly" 100 MIG-21s and 16 helicopters are reported to have been sent since September 1970. (1) In spite of the latest deliveries, the numerical strength of the UAR Air Force in aircraft today remains slightly less than it was immediately before the disastrous Six-Day War of 1967, in which the Egyptian forces and their Soviet equipment suffered a severe set-back.

The rise and fall of the UAR Air Force since September 1966 can be shown in the table on the next page. (2) The Tu-16 is a medium bomber, the Il-28 a light bomber, the Mig-19 an allweather fighter, the Mig-21 an interceptor. The Mig-15s and 17s are used in a fighter-bomber role like the Sukhoi 7, while the Il-14s and An-12s are transport aircraft. The Mi-1, 4, 6 and 8 are helicopters. The C-45/47s are medium transports:

1966 (Sept.)	1967 (Sept.)	1968 (Sept.)
30 Tu-16	----	10 Tu-16
40 Il-28	20 Il-28	40 Il-28
130 Mig-21	100 Mig-21	110 Mig-21
80 Mig-19	45 Mig-19	80 Mig-19
150 Mig-15 and 17	60 Mig-15/17	40 Su-7
70 Total: Il-14 An-12 liaison planes)	40 Il-14 (Total) An-12	120 Mig-15/17 40 Il-14
	30 Mi-4/6	20 An-12 8 C-45/47
<hr/>		
Total Operational Aircraft: 550	Total Operational Aircraft: 295	Total Combat Aircraft: 400
<hr/>		
AA Command 20 Batteries SA-2 Ground/Air Missiles	AA Command 20 Batteries SA-2 (six Launches ea.)	AA Command 30 Batteries SA-2 (six launches ea.)
1969 (Sept.)	1970 (Sept.)	
12 Tu-16	15 Tu-16	
30 Il-28	28 Il-28	
100 Mig-21	150 Mig-21	
90 Su-7	105 Su-7	
120 Mig-15/17	165 Mig-15/17	
40 Il-14	40 Il-14	
20 An-12	20 An-12	
50 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6, Mi-8	70 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6, Mi-8	
<hr/>		
Total 400 Combat Aircraft.	Total 415 Combat Aircraft.	
<hr/>		
30 Batteries SA-2 (six launches ea.)	25 Batteries SA-2 (six launches ea.)	



The record shows that with the recent shipment of about 100 additional Mig-21s, the numerical strength of the UAR Air Force in combat planes is rapidly nearing the 1966 level (say 531 of 550). As to the reasons for the recent build-up, a number of arguments can be advanced:

- (1) the Kremlin is building up the UAR Air Force to the pre-Six-Day War level;
- (2) the Mig-15s (more than 20 years old as a design) have now reached retirement age, and are being replaced by the more modern and more efficient Mig-21s. in which case no great numerical expansion is necessary.

A third possibility (much less likely, but it should still be considered) is that the USSR is contemplating the withdrawal of the 100 Mig-21-Js which are flown by Soviet Pilots in Egypt, and that the new aircraft are designed to replace them, using newly trained Egyptian pilots.

The recently-signed Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation might perhaps be viewed as part of the pay-off for a Soviet decision to build up the UAR Air Force to the 1966-67 strength of 550 aircraft, after three years (1968, 1969 and 1970) in which its strength was maintained in the 400-415 range.

But this interpretation cannot be put forward with confidence until it is known that the elderly Mig-15 and 17 fighter-bombers are not simply being replaced by the new Mig-21 interceptors. If a replacement operation is under way, although the number of operational aircraft could well stay in the 415 range there would be an appreciable change in the quality of the UAR Air Force while not necessarily affecting the military balance between the UAR and Israel.

Between 1966 and 1970, the size of the Israeli Air Force has fluctuated within much narrower limits, due to the fact that its casualties in the Six-Day War were so much smaller. The yearly totals of combat aircraft were as follows, in September in each case:

(All figures from The Military Balance, I. S. S. London)

<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
350	230	270	275	330

In the Israeli case, too, the Air Force has not yet reached its 1966 numerical strength, but on the other hand only ten of its aircraft are pure interceptors (the Super Mystères, which have no fighter/bomber capability), whereas at least 50%, if not more, of the UAR Air Force planes are interceptors without bomber capability.

At present, according to Aviation Week, (3) some Lockheed C-130 transports are being delivered to Israel, together with 30 US-made pilotless aircraft for air reconnaissance over the Canal Zone.

Consequently it seems quite probable that, if the present Mig-21 deliveries to Egypt are continued for a few months and are additional as opposed to replacement aircraft, 1971 may well see the return of both air forces to their pre-Six-Day-War numerical strengths. But qualitatively, and particularly in terms of deliverable bomb-load and range, the Israeli Air Force remains greatly superior to that of the UAR, a fact which is almost certainly appreciated both in Cairo and in Moscow.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

- (1) New York Times, 12 and 13 July 1971. Reuter, UPI, 12 July 1971.
- (2) All data from The Military Balance, published by the Institute for Soviet Studies, London, for respective years.
- (3) As quoted by Le Monde of 14 July 1971.

ECONOMICS

THE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM: CHASING AFTER INNOVATIONS

by Andrei V. Babich

Summary: The Soviet economic reform launched in 1965 is coming to a standstill as a result of the resistance it has met with in the very system of central economic planning itself. Not only that, some of the common-sense practices that had evolved before the reform-- notably, the establishment of "direct links" between enterprises subordinate to different ministries--have been done away with in the course of trying to implement the reform. The statements of Brezhnev and Kosygin at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress suggest the difficulties and urge renewed efforts to overcome them, even to the point of literally running after progress.

That the Soviet economic reform has been a flop was cautiously but unmistakably admitted by Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and other Soviet leaders at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress. Said Kosygin:

..... it must be noted that individual ministries are still making little use of the new methods of production management. Not infrequently, the independent accounting rights of enterprises are being violated, and economic methods replaced by bureaucracy. At the same time, the experience gained has made it possible to clarify those aspects of the economic reform that are in need of further refinement and development. It is obvious that methods of planning and incentive and the criteria for evaluating the performance of enterprises and associations must be further perfected in order to make the reform more effective in speeding up scientific and technical progress, improving the quality of production, increasing labor productivity, and enhancing the interest of enterprises, associations and ministries in greater plan assignments. This is now the main thing. (Pravda, April 7, 1971).

What needs to be said is that it was also the main thing in the early days of the reform. Launched in September 1965, the reform was originally scheduled to be carried out in two years. The time for completion was subsequently extended by a year. Later, it was put off by yet another year. Now, Kosygin and other speakers at the Congress have called for "supplementary measures"--in effect, a reform of the reform. Sounding the approach, V. V. Scherbitsky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, said:

Practice has shown that we must carry out certain additional measures to increase the interest of all enterprises and building organizations in taking on optimum plan assignments, including ones in respect of introducing new equipment. (Ibid.)

From the beginning, the objectives of the economic reform were, in order of priority: to stimulate scientific and technical

progress, improving the quality of products; to encourage enterprises to work out intensified plans, mobilizing all their reserves; and to enhance the initiative and independence of individual enterprises and economic regions, permitting a degree of local managerial autonomy. The principal measures taken towards this end were as follows. First, the republican and territorial national economic councils were dissolved, and the economic branch ministries existing under Stalin and until 1957 were reestablished. Second, the "Statute on the Socialist Enterprise" was issued guaranteeing enterprises autonomy in planning and accounting. An third, gross production was replaced by sold production as a main planning indicator, with profit serving as a key index of efficiency. To help enterprises make a profit, arbitrary prices that had unduly favored certain industries were replaced by wholesale prices based on labor expenditure. Enterprises that fulfilled the plans were entitled to allot funds for worker incentives, expansion of production, and other similar purposes.

The truth is that none of the reform's objectives have been attained. Particularly serious is the failure to achieve the accelerated pace of scientific and technical progress necessary in a mature industrial economy. The gravity of the situation was clearly reflected in the speeches of Kosygin and Party Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev at the Congress. Urging a comprehensive study of the problems of scientific and technical progress, Kosygin went on to say:

..... We must improve the system of national economic planning indicators to orient all economic units towards raising the technical level of production, rapidly applying the results of technical research, and systematically renewing production. Plans for technical innovation must become an organic component of the entire national economic plan, but at the same time the national economic plan itself must be based on scientific and technical progress. The system of technical and economic norms used in planning must be further elaborated. We must have at our disposal scientifically founded norms for the consumption of raw materials, fuel, electric power, materials, and labor. Planning organs must receive norms in good time in order to ensure that they are directly linked with technical achievements. (Ibid)

Brezhnev spoke of the socio-economic implications of scientific and technical progress, saying that isolated brilliant achievements are all very well, but that a high overall level of progress must be attained. Soviet science must become more effective, basic research must be expanded, and efforts must be concentrated on vital and promising areas of scientific and technical development. On the one hand, science must be more closely harnessed to mass production, he declared, and on the other

..... conditions must be created such as to force enterprises to turn out new production models and

literally chase after scientific and technical innovations instead of, to speak figuratively, shying away from them like the devil from incense. (Pravda, March 31, 1971)

Specifically, Brezhnev recommended bringing large numbers of scientists into industry, forming associations between research institutes and enterprises, creating giant "science and production complexes," and generating scientific and technical information. He concluded:

Scientific and technical progress is the main lever for creating the material and technical basis of Communism... the prospects are that the revolution in the development of productive forces begun under the influence of science and its discoveries will become more significant and profound. Before us, comrades, lies a task of historical importance, namely, to organically unite the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system, to develop more extensively our ways, inherent in socialism, for uniting science with production. (Ibid.)

There are many explanations why the Soviet efforts to spur scientific and technical progress have been so disappointing. The Soviet economist, V. Pavlyuchenko, points out that to assess the potential economic effectiveness of a plan for scientific and technical development, what is necessary is suitable methodology and adequate information. While maintaining that Soviet economists have devised the right methods, he argues:

But the second condition necessary for appraising and choosing directions for scientific progress--namely, the possibility of acquiring information and the degree of its reliability--has not been investigated---here, we are not just up against the colossal difficulties of getting information, but occasionally up against the impossibility-- in principle--of disposing of the necessary information, and hence of determining the economic effect... at the present time, most economists acknowledge the impossibility of calculating economic effectiveness or economic potential. (Voprosy ekonomiki, 1970, No. 7, p. 30)

Judging by past informed predictions, says Pavlyuchenko, the greater the advance in science and technology represented by an invention or technique, the less reliable is the forecast of its anticipated economic influence. This even held true, he adds, when technical innovations had begun to find practical application and there was no doubt that they would come into their own, as, for example, in the case of hovercraft, lasers, magnetohydrogenerators, and space technology. A striking example is the way in which the prospects for the influence of the computer were at first underestimated in the USA. Pavlyuchenko concludes:

... the informational limitation placed on the applicability of evaluations of economic effectiveness is of a gnosiological character, deriving from the laws of cognition; it is not a consequence of the imperfection of existing methods of determining effectiveness. Therefore, it cannot be overcome whatever methods of evaluating the effectiveness of research work and technical innovations may be used. (Ibid., p. 32.)

Pavlyuchenko's conclusion, which seems to reflect the views of other Soviet economists, is in contradiction with the Party's efforts to subject scientific and technical progress and its economic effects to long-term planning: Even the five years since the beginning of the reform have proved this point. If forecasts in the United States of the potential for computers at first underestimated the possibilities, forecasts in the Soviet Union overestimated the possibilities. In the same way, Soviet projections in 1965 of scientific and technical progress proved not to be justified, as did the prognosis for the economic reform as a whole.

The main reason why the Soviet economic reform is grinding to a halt is that the Soviet planning is still failing to take sufficient account of demand, while trying to control the overall direction of the economy. Although centralized planning can forecast trends in demand, it cannot accurately enough foresee what the quantitative expression of these trends in demand will be. These observations are true not only for ordinary consumer goods, the demand for which is notoriously capricious, but also for capital goods, the demand for which is especially uneven in a time of scientific and technical revolution.

A particular handicap to the successful implementation of the reform has been the rigid centralized price system. On July 1, 1967, for example, new wholesale prices for tens of thousands of industrial products were established, but by the time the prices were made public they had become obsolete because of intervening technical developments and changes in supply and demand. However, although no longer economic... for the consumer if not for the supplier--they had to be adhered to. As a result, it happened that even model enterprises could not make profits or provide material incentives for their workers because of the excessively high prices they had to pay for components and semi-products. Particularly serious were the costs of technical innovations, which as a rule made production unprofitable. The result has been that enterprises have shied away from new techniques. Under these circumstances, working morale and labor productivity naturally fell off. During the 1966-70 Five-Year-Plan, the growth rate of labor productivity was lower than before the reform, falling in 1969 to a mere 4.8 percent (Pravda, January 25, 1970)

Not only has the reform been ineffective. Efforts to implement it have killed off a number of progressive practices in the Soviet economy. The "direct links" established before the reform between enterprises subordinate to different ministries have been replaced

by what are sarcastically labeled in the Soviet press as "crooked links." The new arrangement works against the interests of both supplier and consumer. What it means in practice is that an enterprise in Riga, for example, may be forced by its parent ministry to deal with a factory as far away as Novosibirsk for parts, when it could get the parts much more easily from a neighboring plant that happens to be under the jurisdiction of a different ministry. The result has been under-utilization of production capacity and excessively long freight journeys. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (1968, No. 22, p. 12) reported that in the Ukraine alone "long-distance deliveries of products to places outside the republic in 1968 were almost double those in 1965."

A related development is that branch ministries have proceeded to dissolve the inter-branch concerns, which before the reform were rapidly growing up among--for example--casting, stamping, and forging enterprises. Often, these inter-branch concerns had a common water supply and other facilities, and ran their own "dwarf" shops. An example is an auxiliary shop built by a factory in Khartsyzsk with the idea of cooperating in the production of 12,000 tons of malleable cast iron per year for enterprises in the Ukraine as well as twelve factories in the RSFSR. In 1968, the factory was taken over by the Ministry of Communal, Building and Road-Building Machinery, which limited the factory to using the shop only for its own purposes. At the Congress, Kosygin himself conceded that, by ignoring inter-branch links and territorial planning, branch ministries had harmed the entire national economy. He urged:

The branch principle of management, which determines the unity of economic and technical policy in the branch, must be better combined with a system of rational economic links within republics, economic regions and oblasts... the responsibility of ministries for developing inter-branch links, in particular for the execution of deliveries on a cooperative basis, must be increased. Socialist management is fundamentally incompatible either with departmentalism, which violates rational production links, or parochialism, which weakens the unity of economic activity. (*Pravda*, April 7, 1971)

The economic reform aimed at combining centralized planning and management with local initiative. But, in the event, the forces of centralism proved too strong, and despite Kosygin's exhortations, the chances of the Soviet economy's escaping from the Party's stifling tutelage seem remote.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munchen).

## GOOD HARVEST PROSPECTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Summary: Recovering from the disastrous weather conditions that seriously affected the grain harvest last year, the outlook for 1971 appears distinctly favorable. Winter cereal crops will reach normal 1966-69 levels again and the outcome of the corn crop is as yet undetermined but nonetheless favorable. The normal volume of grain imports will again be the rule, however.

There will be a distinct improvement in the harvest of farm crops in Eastern Europe this year, compared to the depressing performance of 1970 when an overall grain shortfall of 12 per cent was registered. This occurrence had a serious impact on several Comecon economies and contributed to the political disturbances in Poland.

This year there was no repeat of such natural disasters as floods, excess winter-killing, and droughts that marked the cropping season everywhere in Eastern Europe last year, with the exception of Bulgaria. On the contrary, there was very little loss among the fall-sown grains. The spring season was on schedule--neither too early nor too late--and moisture conditions were favorable, at best a little excessive. Plant growth was accelerated by the warm, dry temperatures during May, aided by subsequent heavy rains during June. The composition of the cropping structure remained heavily oriented on grain, both cereal and feed, with some change toward expansion of the area planted to feed grains. The development reflects the central decision to improve conditions for livestock production so as to raise the supply of meat and livestock products for domestic consumption.

A solid improvement in the harvest this year must be seen in the prism of last year's debacle. In 1970 grain production fell by nearly 10 million tons in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. Since the region is already a grain deficit area, a sudden 12 per cent cut-off in output caused severe reverberations. Imports of grain had to be increased by Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and more meat and food products were contracted in the West for internal use, which contributed to imbalances in the foreign trade accounts. So the prospects of a good harvest augers well for the regimes and consumers alike.

While it is still somewhat early to forecast the harvest with precision because of the late-maturing maize crop in the southern countries, nonetheless the general direction of the 1971 grain output is clearly discernible. In the aggregate, it will be significantly above the poor harvest of the preceding year, at least by 10 per cent. In the non-maize northern countries it can be reasonably projected at this rate of increase. In the following run-down by countries, they will be divided into non-maize and maize areas, since the former gives clear indications of the state of the harvest outlook.

Poland: the largest grain producer in Eastern Europe, enjoyed favorable winter conditions. Because most of the grain is fall-sown rye and wheat, the absence of unusual winter damage made for a

strong stand, and favorable growing conditions indicate a good, solid harvest. Some areas report a "much better" outlook than last year. Fertilizer supplies were normal, but the balance of plant nutrients could be improved. Machinery shortage, and lack of spares are the main problems. Under the new regime the supply of fodder, building materials and supplies has improved and the increase in prices for livestock have sparked the incentive motive of peasants. With the enhanced prospects for higher grain and potato crops this year, the general attitude in the villages is better now than under Gomulka last year. Grain imports were 2,6 million tons, about 1 million tons above normal.

Czechoslovakia: had a good growing pattern early in the season that got crops off to a good start. Lately, however, heavy frequent rains and hail have caused some concern and the soil is water-logged in some eastern areas. The overall grain outlook is favorable for a good crop this year but the impact on potatoes and sugar beets cannot yet be determined. Wet weather has made for a rank weed growth that will complicate harvesting. The shortage of machinery-- a perennial problem-- is reported in the press. The country imported 2.5 million tons of grain last year, but the improved prospects could reduce this amount by a million tons this year.

Rumania: the third largest grain producer in Comecon, is perhaps the most secretive source for estimating grain prospects. The season was considerably earlier, with abundant rains, but there was none of the disastrous flooding of last season. In fact, moisture is excessive since some regions report water-logged soils. Because almost two-thirds of the grain harvested is maize, it is still too early to determine the progress of that late-maturing crop. Mid-summer weather will determine its outcome. Nonetheless, wheat prospects are good. The country had a net import balance in grain last year as a result of the flood damages to the grain crops.

Hungary: had favorable growing conditions prevailing this spring with excessive heat spells, however, followed by rain and hail during May. Its corn and wheat crops suffered last year, but the outlook for the small grains this season is for a good crop.

Yugoslavia: alone among the East European countries follows the Western practice of printing an official crop forecast. At the end of May, the Institute for Market Research estimated a minimum harvest of 4.5 million tons of wheat, or 17 per cent higher than last year and on a level with the 1965-9 average yield. There was no projection made for the corn crop, about half of the total, since it still depends on mid-summer weather conditions. Last year the country imported 1.5 million tons of grain.

Bulgaria: based on present conditions may field a record crop depending on the corn output and if harvesting losses can be overcome. The winter grains are excellent and with the irrigation of corn, a record performance could be achieved this year. The press seems more concerned with the usual shortages of spares, the difficulties of combining a heavy stand than over the precise state of the crop. Bulgaria was a net exporter of grain last year-- being the only country to outdo the 1969 harvest.

The early season outlook for grain and other crops is favorable with some quantitative variations among the countries. There will be a decided improvement in cereal output this year over the disastrous preceding season. It is still too early to appraise the size of the corn crop but, here too, the picture is favorable.

Improved weather conditions, more intensive use of material inputs and firmer purchase prices all contribute to a distinct improvement over last year. Further appraisals over the harvest will appear as more reports are received.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

## FASHION AND THE ECONOMY

A. Levashova. Director.  
Artistic Head of the Special Artistic-  
Design Bureau of the Ministry of  
Light Industry of the USSR.  
I. Gordon. Economist.

Today almost three-fifths of the total volume of the retail trade is made up of clothing, footwear, textile materials, haberdashery and other products of Light Industry. Year by year the sales of such articles amount to tens of milliards of Roubles. But they can also gather dust on shelves if they do not come up to the quality which we describe by the all-embracing designation-fashion.

Take clothing. The purchase of a suit, an overcoat, a dress, is quite an important event in the life of an individual. Everyone wants to feel well dressed.

Today the creation of fashion is a complicated process, involving primarily industry, the retail trade and the customer. The laws governing it change and the psychology of demand still awaits investigation. But it is quite clear that the renewal of clothing has become an aesthetic necessity for the human being.

The retail trade organisations must have sufficient information about the demands and the tastes of the population.

It must be admitted, however, that the retail trade, and also industry, do not, at present, make a sufficiently thorough study of demand and fail to respond quickly to changes in it. We have no specialised shops for the sale of the latest fashions.

Instead of preparing itself, in good time and with the necessary thoroughness, to renew its productions, industry sits back and waits until the retail trade gives it an order. Today, in the theatres, you can see more and more women in long skirts, and on the streets, in long coats. At the present time, these are practically all home-made articles. The dress-making establishments could produce them of better quality and more attractive finish. But the retail trade intends to order, for 1972, only 20 per cent of the longer style women's clothing.

As the broad market becomes more fully supplied with goods, the problems connected with fashion become more acute. The main obstacle here is a psychological one. Should trousers be wider or narrower, should skirts be long or short, what kind of overcoats should be produced, are questions which nobody can venture to answer until the street confirms what fashion it wants.

The trouble is that we have practically no rational system for the production and distribution of fashionable goods. The works of the design organisations, industry and the retail trade is not coordinated. The articles which make up a complete outfit are made in different styles. Having bought a coat, you have to spend time before you can find the handbag, the hat and the shoes to go with it. The artistic advisers of the industrial undertakings are not linked up with one another. The result is that, for example, the articles

produced by the Moscow "Red Rose" and the Sverdlov Silk Combines for linings do not correspond in colour to the textile material for coats produced by the "Liberated Labour" and "Peter Alexeev" factories.

New styles in clothing, footwear, handbags, gloves are usually decided by the Good Experts at the time when orders from the retail trade are formalised by the industrial undertakings. They operate quite independently of one another. Under a system of this kind, it is impossible to get any unity in the style of clothing. As a general rule, the Goods Expert does not have the necessary about tendencies in the demand for new articles. He naturally turns to what was in the demand last season, and often issues repeat orders for articles which are going out of fashion.

One of the conditions hampering the production of new styles is the complicated procedure for approving models, technical conditions and prices. This takes up many months. The price lists in force make it unprofitable to turn out whole groups of articles of women's wear, which either disappear altogether from the assortment of the dressmakers (lined costumes, velvet trousers), or else are produced in insufficient quantities (women's silk blouses). In fixing the prices for new articles, even the average profit margin for identical articles is not preserved.

We need effective methods of forecasting, which could provide the answers to the questions, not only what quantity and in what localities there will be needed, today and tomorrow, clothing, footwear and other articles, but also in what variety, colour and at what average price.

Today the fashion centres do not always take into account the real possibilities of industry, and the collection of new articles which they prepare fail to reckon with the needs of the population. Our special artistic-design bureau, considering models for new articles for Light Industry, organised the manufacture and sale of novelties in women's wear in small quantities. Experience proved that that was a good way of sounding out demand. On the basis of sales figures, we were able to collect information about what assortment of articles pleased the customer. For example, fashionable costumes - trousers or skirts with a waistcoat proved to be more popular than ordinary style costumes. Decorated sheepskin and quilted coats of man-made fibre are bought up very quickly. Experimental sales even make it possible to establish what colour and what kind of textiles are preferred by the customer.

There is a lot of talk about fashion. But we must always keep in mind that trade turnover, reckoned in dozens of milliards of Roubles, is subject to the laws of fashion. That is why it calls for serious attention and must be dealt with both psychologically, and economically and base itself on a genuine raw material foundation.

(Pravda, Moscow)



## DEALING WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Romania promises repatriation of profits from joint ventures.

The need to increase trade between East and West Europe is part of the catechism of international relations. But many Western companies have been put off dealing with Communist countries by the restrictions imposed on the use of capital, the shifting of profits and the likelihood of having to accept goods in part payment for goods. Romania has a reputation as something of a maverick among Comecon countries. A.H. Hermann looks at how Mr. Ceausescu is tempting Western capital to Romania.

Romania has become the first country in the Comecon area of Eastern Europe to introduce legislation which will allow Western capital participation in companies to be established on its soil.

The new laws, just introduced in Bucharest, differ from the law introduced in Yugoslavia in 1967—and later amended. The Romanians are not, for example, stipulating that some of the profits will have to be re-invested in Romania and they are offering some guarantees of repatriation for the invested capital.

The basic idea, the Romanians say, is to provide a very wide legal framework which, by agreement of the parties concerned, could be adapted to suit a variety of different situations.

### Equity stake

Romanian corporations participating in joint investment ventures would have to hold at least 51 per cent of the equity but the other party would be allowed to name a co-chairman. There can also be a built-in State assurance that profits, after deduction of taxes, may be transferred abroad.

Whether the transfer of profits would take the form of remittances or exports of Romanian products or services is a matter to be agreed between the partners.

In general, the Romanian Government is not likely to be keen on joint investment ventures concluded for a period shorter than five years, but I understand that a shorter period could be agreed in special circumstances.

The State guarantee for the repatriation of foreign capital covers also cases when unforeseen circumstances made it necessary to wind up the venture before the end of the agreed period.

The field open for such joint venture by the new Romanian Foreign Trade Law is very wide, including industry, agriculture, construction, transport, scientific and technological research and services.

The enactment of the new law came after a two-week visit by Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian head of State for the U.S. last October. The visit appeared to be closely linked with a radical shake up in Romania's economic administration.

Mr. Ceausescu is believed to have asked the White House not only for most-favoured-nation status, but also for greater understanding of Romanian investment needs on the part of the U.S.

Shortly after his return Mr. Ceausescu announced measures aimed at some decentralisation of the Romanian machinery of foreign trade. In March followed the enacting of the New Foreign Trade Law.

On May 24, M. Alexander Niculescu, the chief executive of Romanian foreign trade corporation Terra, and formerly a departmental director in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, signed an agreement with Mr. Robert Anderson, formerly of the U.S. Treasury, setting up a mixed company for the promotion of trade between the U.S. and Romania. So far the main effect of this has been unfavourable comment in Moscow.

A number of joint ventures already agreed between Romania and Western countries is likely to be institutionalised by the setting up of mixed companies in Bucharest in the near future.

### Moscow reaction

One may expect the setting up of a computer factory with Swedish participation, of a company for the construction of thermal power stations with West German and French participation, of another for the construction of automated greenhouses with Dutch and French shareholders and of a plant for the production of industrial ceramics together with the Italians.

The opportunities open to British suppliers in Romania have been demonstrated by the placing of an £8m. order for irrigation equipment with George Wimpey last November, only a year after a £23m. order for similar equipment had been placed with a consortium headed by Taylor Woodrow. Most of the major British companies, including ICI, Unilever, Massey Ferguson, BAC, Shell, GKN, Rank Xerox, and Hawker Siddeley either have concluded important deals with Romania or are actively studying the existing opportunities. Lazard Brothers have been prominent among London banks in promoting barter deals which would enable Romanians to place orders in Britain.

### Tourists

A field particularly fertile for British participation seems to be the development of tourist facilities, through the construction of hotels and restaurants or supply of air-conditioning equipment. Profits and capital repatriation could be effected through tour operators. Already, it is reported that four American Holiday Inns are to be built in Romania.

One field of joint activity which the Romanians appear to be very keen to develop concerns the supply of oil drilling equipment to developing countries, in particular India and Latin America.

Romania's endeavour to maintain a high degree of political independence in the framework of the Warsaw Pact goes hand in hand with its efforts not to be prevented by Comecon planners from developing to the full its considerable natural resources and buying the best equipment available East and West.

The intention has been expressed in Romania's five-year plan, to step up foreign trade by 55 per cent, between now and 1975 and

to import in this period goods of the value of some £1,000m. from all countries (using the official exchange rate). Industrial equipment will have a lion's share of these imports.

(Financial Times, London)

### SOCIAL TENSION BETWEEN THE WEALTH AND THE POOR

The living standard has steadily, albeit moderately, increased in Hungary during the past few years. Above and beyond the general increase, there are people who have cleverly managed to press their private advantage, mostly using the opportunities offered by the reform, and have succeeded in pushing their living standard considerably above the average. The outward signs of this are the private car, the private apartment, a country home, trips abroad, etc. This inevitably arouses the envy of many people, and to a certain degree produces a general feeling of distrust. In this distrustful and generally envious reaction, the line often becomes blurred between honestly obtained and legally accepted "socialist wealth" and illegally obtained "bourgeois" wealth. In addition, many people believe that there has been a revival of some sort of "bourgeois ideology" and they connect all this with the economic reform and the opportunities provided by that reform. This way of thinking emerges in a report published in the provincial paper Somogyi Neplap (27 May 1971). It is interesting to note that it is the provincial press which deals with this problem more often than do the metropolitan dailies:

Many people see a connection between the reform of the economic mechanism and the revival of /certain/symptoms /in our society/. Their train of thought -- with some simplification -- is as follows: materialism is one of the characteristics of a bourgeois mentality, and the reform has laid increased emphasis on financial interest.

The Somogy County daily, along with the domestic press and radio in general, tries to convince the public that there is no causal relationship between these "bourgeois" symptoms and the reform. The last analysis, it is maintained, the reform tries to provide the proper harmony between individual and social interests while guaranteeing primacy to social interests. However, it is true that many people are trying to take care of their own individual interests at the expense of social interests:

The common characteristic of all kinds of petits bourgeois is their support of individual interest over social interest, their endeavor to reach individual goals at any cost, even at the expense of other people (Somogyi Neplap, 27 May 1971).

While, on the one hand, there is a growing endeavor to gratify individual interests at any cost, there are, according to the domestic media, also people who cannot distinguish between this kind of selfishness and the achievement of "socialist wealth" by "honest means." A radio Budapest report of June 6 1971 pointed out that enrichment is not a "social symptom" per se:

Many people still mistake wealth achieved by exploitation for that resulting from work, because it is impossible

to tell at a glance whether the mansions on Lake Balaton were built as the result of exploitation or of work. And because it is impossible to tell them apart, it is also not clear to many people whether the goal achieved by money-grubbing has become the property of somebody to the injury of society, or whether the goal was pursued in such way that its owner has enriched the whole community by achieving his purpose.

The fact remains, however, that the public is greatly concerned about this problem. Certainly, Hungarian propaganda tries to emphasize the significance of "communist labor morals," which one of the provincial papers, (Eszak Magyar-ország (25 May 1971), defined as follows:

In our country, the value of a person is not determined by that person's earnings but by how conscientiously he performs his work, to what degree moral motives determine his relationship to work, and how solicitous he is about the growth and protection of social wealth.

The fact is, however, that these "communist morals" are quite artificial, and in reality many people disregard such principles, because they are, above all, interested in acquiring financial wealth and in pursuing their own interests rather than "social" interests. Radio Budapest (6 June 1971) aptly remarked:

Often people who were known earlier as socialists retire into their shells, their enthusiasm cools off, they obviously have had enough of the struggle. In short, they have met with success. They have "arrived" before society has arrived at socialism. They have arrived at their own specific "communism."

These are a few of the characteristic features of this extremely complicated and manifold problem--undoubtedly the major social and political problem confronting Budapest's domestic policy. These problems can be summed up as follows:

- a) The economic reform has emphasized the principle of financial interest;
- b) This has resulted in a situation wherein many people pursue their own individual interests instead of the social interest;
- c) The economic reform has given scope to the development of a materialistic attitude, which is undoubtedly quite extensive;
- d) The considerably greater wealth of some people--regardless of whether this was obtained by work, by their "bourgeois" attitude, or even by illegal means--has aroused the envy of other people.

Thus, definite social tension can be felt between those "who have arrived at their own communism" and others, the less wealthy masses. The problem is the more serious since it generates an anti-reform sentiment in many people. Despite the fact that official propaganda tries, in vain, to convince the people of the

merits of "honest" work and of the value of social appreciation for it, the public sees more value in a private car, a mansion, or a beautifully furnished apartment. And the one who fails to acquire them frequently feels understandable resentment toward those who do.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

"PRAVDA": IN PRAISE OF HUNGARIAN EXPRESSOS

Summary: Pravda's correspondents in Hungary draw attention to the fact that during Kadar's rule the size of the catering trade has been doubled. Moreover that part of it in private hands (the family-run bars, buffets and wine cellars) are "several times" more efficient in terms of turnover per employee than the state sector. Individual craftsmen in repair work are earning such high incomes that the government has decided on a great expansion of the state services, with substantial funds being advanced on local credits. The implication is that the USSR should follow Hungary's example, and that there is no ideologized objection to the private expresso business.

At least two of Pravda's correspondents in Hungary seem to be enjoying their stay there. M. Odinets and M. Stepichev have just produced a trumpet blast in honor of the Hungarian catering industry, (1) in which they succeed in making the point that private enterprise, in this sector at least, is far more efficient than state catering.

The ideological framework is that the service trades are working for the convenience of the workers, and therefore should be developed. In pre-war Hungary only the rich could visit restaurants, according to Pravda, whereas now the workers celebrate their birthdays, anniversaries and weddings by going out to dine.

It appears that in Rakosi's day (1953) there were 5,920 restaurants, confectioners expressos, buffets and snack-bars in Hungary, whereas after 15 years of Kadar there are 13,729. In addition there are 3,013 factory canteens, and thousands of caterers in the villages. "A certain proportion of them are 'shops' in private hands, run by one family--these are usually buffets, bars, or wine-cellars."

"The turnover of the big restaurants and canteens is about 2 billion forints a year. The turnover of the smaller institutions is slightly less. But it must be said that the microcafés and expressos enjoy the respect of Hungarians. The average monthly turnover per worker in enterprises where only one or two people are employed (2) is several times higher than in restaurants employing fifteen-seventeen workers."

After delicately putting the economic case for private enterprise in the expresso business in this way Odinets and Stepichev switch to a description of the current Hungarian debate on the service trades. They point out that although the sales of consumer durables (TV sets, radios, household machinery) have expanded twenty times since 1960, the repair services have grown only insignificantly. "Society loses much thereby."

Moreover the smaller private repair firms have a section of the market, and Pravda seems to approve of this since it permits its correspondents to write:

The work of small-scale craftsman, which is aimed at improving the services for the people, is supported.

Many pensioners are craftsmen. But at the same time the public and some worker's collectives have raised the question as to whether individual craftsmen are not beginning to receive too high incomes.

Therefore the government has decided to greatly expand the state sector of the service trades. Dry cleaning is to grow by 80% in the next few years (not further specified), the volume of repairs to flats is to double, and automobile servicing is to be more than doubled. Financial expenditure on the services is to go up by 60% in the present five-year plan, compared with a growth of 30% in the last.

The cost is expected to be 1-1/2 billion forints in this five-year period, and 300 million forints are being allocated in 1971 alone for local credits to develop the services.

The two Pravda correspondents conclude their warmly laudatory article with a brief outline of the Hungarian training system, including both schools and higher educational institutes, for the catering profession. Since they know that the difficulties in recruiting for it in the USSR are caused by the low wages and by the low opinion held of the industry by the public, they conclude with the question:

"What drew you into the service trades?"

They claim that in Hungary they frequently received the reply:

"The pride of working in a field in which you are making life pleasant for people."

The significance of the article lies not only in its approbatory tone concerning the present Hungarian efforts to expand the service trades, but also in the clear implication that the USSR should do likewise. It is many years since Pravda published such a convincing account of the greater productivity achieved by private enterprise in the catering sphere, and presumably the hint will not be missed by the numerous Soviet families in the resort areas who are looking for higher incomes and a more independent way of life.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

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(1) Pravda, 2 June 1971.

(2) i. e., those in private hands, to a large extent.

## CHINA PREPARES FOR TOURISTS

China is now actively developing her tourist industry in preparation for the foreign visitors who are expected when tours there are resumed, probably towards the end of this year. Many places were prohibited to foreigners during the cultural revolution are now accessible and foreign diplomats resident in China are being allowed greater freedom of movement.

At the end of April, several large parties of diplomats and foreign visitors were allowed to visit the Forbidden City - now officially known as the Old Palace. This is believed to be the first visit permitted since 1967 when the cultural revolution was at its height. During the past two months, three identical tours of China have been organised for diplomats - again the first since 1967. Each tour followed the same itinerary, covering Hupeh, Kwangtung and Honan provinces, and was designed to show Chinese self-sufficiency in various fields and to point to developments in the economy. Visits were made to factories, including the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works, to people's communes, to a hospital, to the Red Flag Canal in Linhsien, to the Canton Fair and to the site of the National Institute of Peasant Movement, of which Mao was the first director and which was founded by the Kuomintang in 1926.

Ching Peng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister, accompanied the first tour (April 10-22), Chiao Kuan-hua, Deputy Foreign Minister, the second (May 8-20), and Fu Hao, Director of the General Office of the Foreign Ministry, the third, (May 28-June 9). Representatives of local revolutionary committees joined the groups at various stages (New China News Agency, April 24, May 22 and June 11).

In May, a visit to Canton was made by foreign military attachés and deputy attachés from various countries at the invitation of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence. They visited the Canton Fair, factories, a commune, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit and saw an exhibition of military skills by militiamen. They were accompanied by Chu Kai-yin, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence (NCNA, May 15).

Recent visitors to China have included representatives of tourist organisations from several Communist countries. NCNA (May 1) reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Li Hsien-nien had met tourist delegations from North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania. Reporting the departure of the Albanians, NCNA (May 29) said talks had been held with the China Travel and Tourism Administrative Bureau concerning the exchange of tourist delegations. The Bureau, founded in 1964, is becoming more active and an Australian, Mrs. Lenore Taylor, arrived in Peking on June 5 for a visit at its invitation. Among those who met her at the airport was Li Chuan-chung, a Deputy Director since 1965, (NCNA, June 5). On June 10, the Bureau gave a banquet for a visiting delegation from the Romanian Ministry of Tourism.

Travellers returning from Canton have reported that the city, which already receives large numbers of foreign visitors at its Spring and Autumn Fairs, is being intensively developed as a

tourist attraction. Beauty spots are being renovated and the China Travel Service (Luxingshe) is planning to recruit secondary school students as guides.

It is ironic to recall that four years ago China was attacking the Soviet Union for encouraging tourism. People's Daily (July, 3, 1967) accused the Russians of using the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution as a "money-making" affair.

THE FIFTH USSR WRITERS' CONGRESS REAPPRAISED

Summary: A fuller account of the Fifth USSR Writers' Congress which met from June 29 to July 2, has now been officially published. The original impression that it was a distinctly conservative affair remains, supported not only by the ideological orthodoxy of most of the speeches but also by the proposed changes in the Writers' Union Statutes. If any shift in policy is evident, it is reflected in the proposed changes to the Statutes and favors a more stringent official control over literary affairs.

The scant information available about the Fifth USSR Writers' Congress as it was drawing to a close has now been supplemented by the account published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the weekly newspaper of the USSR Writers' Union. The last two issues to be received (June 30 and July 7) cover delegates' speeches in considerably greater detail than was previously available and offer new vantage points from which to assess the congress. The picture that emerges however, is still not complete. Four major speeches delivered on the opening day appeared to have been published in full although there is no designation that they are indeed the complete text, while the remainder, as the editors footnote, are published "in an abbreviated form of the verbatim report."

The initial impression that the congress was a distinctly conservative affair remains, with indications of an even greater hardening of the arteries in some quarters than had earlier been supposed. Neither the election of the ideologically orthodox writer G. M. Markov--a party functionary--as first secretary of the Writers' Union (replacing the aging incumbent K. A. Fedin--not a party member--who has been elevated to the newly-created honorary post of Chairman of the Union)--nor the reshuffle of the administrative personnel of the Union herald any liberalization of existing policies. Perhaps the most notable developments in this regard are the changes instituted in the regulations of the Union.

Bright Shades of Grey

On the basis of what has been published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the overwhelming majority of speakers at the congress engaged in rapid and monotonous repetition of ideologically orthodox, hackneyed phrases, the essence of which has already been described -- and this will be for many the most outstanding characteristic of this congress. Yet, amid the torpor of a seemingly endless recitation of ideological cant, some points of interest did emerge. Apparently of the opinion that discretion is the better part of valor, none of the Soviet delegates, save one, questioned the changes in the Statutes. Albert Yansons, the delegate from Latvia and a member of the USSR Writers' Union Secretariat, however, declared that it was "hardly expedient" to institute changes in the old admissions procedure. His basic thesis is that new and young literary talent can best be attracted to the Union not through the constant manipulation of regulations, but through a

change in attitude toward young writers, suggesting they be given greater freedom of intellectual maneuver:

Very often we try to introduce some kind of organizational changes where there should be genuine, vibrant work (instead). The Statutes must be reliable and constant, and changes should not be proposed, for an applicant seeking membership in the Union will thereby not bank on the hope that the next (writers') congress will adopt new statutes which will facilitate membership in the writers' organization. The Statutes must be demanding, but the very attitude toward literateurs must also become more effective, more vibrant, so that we can attract them into genuine literary life, so that we can create the conditions under which the young (writers) could do more work, and could better exhibit their abilities.

(emphasis supplied)

Another delegate, Afanasii Salynskii-- also a secretary of the Union--tweaked the censor's nose by complaining of the bureaucratic meddling in the affairs of the theatre. In times gone by, the final version of a play was the product of consultations between the playwright, the director of the theater, and the actors. At present, however, the path from script to stage is "unjustly complicated."

The fruitful creative cooperation between the playwright and the theatre is now undermined to a significant extent. It is characteristic that the responsibility for contractual arrangements is gradually being transferred from the hands of the theatre into the hands of departments.

Using a clever metaphor, Salynskii illustrates the difficulties imposed by the censorship and points to the sterility of plays after they leave the censor's hand.

Sometimes the path of a play (from the script) to the theatre is reminiscent of the path of a fish towards its ancient spawning ground. The fish struggles against the concrete walls of dams partitioning rivers for the good of civilization. . . . So also do plays, going toward the theatrical stage, sometimes struggle against bureaucratic impediments. I recently read in the newspaper that our scholars have developed a new type of fish--a bastard, a crossbreed between a white sturgeon and a sterlet. The most amazing thing in their remarkable success is that the hybrid is able to spawn anywhere at all. The address of the ancient spawning grounds is not inscribed on its genes. Naturally, we can ultimately develop a similar hybrid in our dramatic compositions! Without memory, without a mind, without passions, but with great resemblance to a real play.



The most colorful speaker at a very drab congress, however, was undoubtedly Yevgeny Yevtushenko. According to a Western reporter in Moscow, his speech was "the talk of the literary community." Unquestionably, his comments are pregnant with evocative themes--the reaction of the younger generation to the revelations of crimes committed under Stalin's rule, the gerontocracy that monopolizes literary affairs, the issue of censorship, the neo-Slavophile current among some of the intelligentsia. His rousing, metaphorical phrases stand in relief from the drone of most other speeches, and on a number of issues he speaks more forcefully than others. For the most part, however, the thrust of his remarks does not stray from the official path.

Raising the issue of Stalin's crimes and very likely alluding to Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, he recalls "some tragic aspects of the past" disclosed during the 1950s. Yet he projects the spirit of atonement for and criticism of very likely his own statements, and certainly those of others made in reaction to the shock of the revelations about the crimes committed during Stalin's rule.

Some of us lost our heads--for we were still so young!-- and occasionally lapsed into reassessing all values offhand. The decisive turn in history gave rise to a certain proportion of skepticism among some of our generation and to nuances of political distrustfulness which occasionally evolved into the snobbery of non-participation or the snobbery of counterposing oneself to society.

At the same time, in a thinly veiled reference to the writer V. Kochetov, one of the more prominent figures among the present-day neo-Stalinists, he takes exception to those who would characterize his generation as all politically suspect, although he does admit the existence of "individual mavericks." While not using the same words, this amounts to a position similar to that taken the recent party congress where criticism was levelled against those who dwelled on mistakes that have been relegated to the past as well as those, such as Kochetov, who appear prepared to "whitewash" the Stalin era.

Similarly, he agrees with the officially accepted view that the party has "condemned once and for all the personality cult and the practice of regarding people as cogs" thereby burying an unresolved issue that is still of burning concern for many, adding that his peers are prepared "to do everything in our sector so that the past mistakes are not repeated"--sentiments with which the present regime, also unwilling to resort to Stalinist methods although for reasons of their own, would very likely concur.

Is Yevtushenko also on safe ground when he rebukes the conservative literary establishment for not entrusting his generation with more responsibilities, for not entrusting them with "the helm of our literary journals?" Perhaps, in view of his assurances that the embarrassing candor of the past is now effectively muffled and

that new blood in positions of responsibility does not mean the inoculation of unorthodox ideas.

Many of my contemporaries, myself included, were very vociferous and declamatory during a certain period of our literary life. Well, as they say, everybody comes into this world with his own horn to trumpet his modesty, otherwise nobody would notice this modesty. But it seems to me that this is not the time for noise and shouting. A shout flies around for a while and is swallowed by a dog. As an old shouter I know this from experience. This is a time for profound philosophical analysis, a time for interpreting the path which has been travelled, our own achievements and errors, and the achievements and errors of others.

On the question of censorship, he regales against "prohibited questions... there is nothing as dangerous as a forcible repressed question," yet his conclusion is subject to more than one interpretation for, while categorically asserting that there should not be any "prohibited themes," he agrees to "a prohibited approach to themes." It could be argued that, using this formula, one could freely be allowed to discuss the theme of, say, the role of the Soviet military leadership in the 1930s, but prohibited from approaching the theme calculating the impact of the purges on the military hierarchy.

Finally he criticizes with reasonable safety those who withdraw intellectually to the time of pre-revolutionary Russia--the present-day neo-Slavophiles, and concludes by enjoining his fellow writers to scan the horizon with their critical eye--attending both to foreign affairs--the bomb explosions in Vietnam--and domestic problems, although without specifying any in particular.

In order to place these three speakers into perspective, one must take into consideration that over 35 other delegates hailed the party, Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Homeland, the successes of Soviet literature, and vilified ideological laxity at home and ideological enemies abroad with nary a word on the issues touched upon by Yansons, Salynskii and Yevtushenko. And their remarks are perhaps more appropriately termed "controversial" if considered in this relative sense. While differences of opinion off-stage are indicated in Sartakov's speech and the delay in completing the proposals for the new Statutes, the conservative views appear to have the upper hand, for the changes that have already been proposed, and doubtless accepted, are clearly geared toward greater conformity and less experimentation. If the congress is intended as a beacon to illuminate the path for Soviet writers over the next five years, the road appears to be straight and narrow.

### SOVIET SCIENTIST INDICTS GOVERNMENT ON JEWS

The eminent Soviet scientist, Andrei Sakharov, together with two other members of the Soviet civil rights movement, is said to have written to the Supreme Soviet deploring harassment of Soviet Jews and appealing to the authorities to grant exit visas to all those who wish to emigrate. The appeal, which according to unconfirmed reports was delivered to the Supreme Soviet on May 20, states that a situation has developed in the Soviet Union where "one set of illegal actions leads to another. The authorities find themselves obliged to interfere illegally in protest actions. At the same time official propaganda spreads unkind and unreasonable reports about the connexion between the ideas of repatriation to Israel and Zionism".

Sakharov and his fellow signatories criticise the presentation by the Soviet Press of Zionism as "a reactionary, practically fascist political trend" when in reality Zionism "is no more than the idea of having a Jewish State". Even more nonsensical, they state, was the official claim that Soviet citizens who wish to emigrate to Israel are against the Soviet system - an assertion which the authorities "are now trying to prove by holding trials, such as those in Leningrad and Riga, in which they accuse Jews of anti-Soviet activity when their only aim was to protest against the illegal refusal to give them visas for their repatriation."

Andrei Sakharov, one of Russia's most prominent and respected scientists, has in the last few years become a vigorous campaigner for civil rights. Born in 1921, he has had a spectacular academic and scientific career, receiving a doctorate when 26 and being elected to the Academy of Sciences six years later at a virtually unprecedented age. He played a key rôle in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb.

His preoccupation with civil rights in the Soviet Union appears to date from the mid-sixties: in March, 1966, he joined other prominent intellectuals in appealing to Brezhnev against the rehabilitation of Stalin. The same year he protested against the additions to Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code as endangering the exercise of civil liberties guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.

Sakharov is probably best known for his controversial essay, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom", published in June 1968, and for the part he played in founding the Committee for Human Rights in November 1970, with two other well known scientists, Chalidze and Tverdokhlebov.

Other protests sponsored by Sakharov have included:

1. In 1970, a letter to Brezhnev demanding that an end should be put to all repressive measures taken for ideological reasons.
2. December 28, 1970, an open letter addressed both to President Podgorny appealing for clemency on behalf of the Soviet Jews sentenced to death in the Leningrad hi-jack trial and to President Nixon appealing on behalf of Angela Davies.

3. March 30, 1971, a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs protesting at the recent "illegal" arrest of a number of dissidents. These included the writer Vladimir Bukovsky and several Jews arrested during a demonstration at the office of the Chief Prosecutor. In the letter Sakharov also raised the case of the two other civil rights protesters, Borisov and Fainberg, who are confined in mental institutions. He appealed for the Minister's assistance "to liquidate this violation of human rights and medical ethics in psychiatric establishments and correct this illegal procedure." He expressed concern, too, at the search carried out by the KGB at the flat of his colleague on the Human Rights Committee, Valery Chalidze.

The fact that Sakharov has himself so far avoided arrest is partly due to the respected position he occupies in Soviet society and the support he derives from fellow-scientists. It is also a fact that he has tried to work within the law and has avoided provocative actions. Unlike some other dissident Russians, he has not sought publicity at home or abroad. Sakharov, however, has lost many of his scientific positions and he and his colleagues on the Human Rights Committee have been warned by the Chief Prosecutor against continuing their activities.

## SOCIAL SCIENCES UNDER PARTY TUTELAGE

"To get to the Root of the Matter" was the theme of a broad discussion on current political problems in the social sciences held in the editorial offices of the weekly Tribune last March, in which leading members of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences took part: Jindrich Filipec, Frantisek Charvat, Jaroslaw Kucera, and Radoslav Richta (Tribuna, 31 March 1971). The discussion brought out the fact that the destructive incursion of revisionism into the social sciences poses the chief obstacle to progress. According to Kucera, "To state that revisionism merely affected the social sciences is too mild an expression in my opinion. . . . The fact is that our social-science front failed completely in the years of 1968-1969."

According to the conclusions arrived at during the discussion, the right-wing forces had evolved a complex and comprehensive system for revising Marxism. Rejection of the class approach in analyzing society and its development was the foundation on which this system rested. The categorical imperative resulting from the discussion can be summarized in a single sentence: "The non-Marxist concepts of the social structure which gradually gained the upper hand in Czechoslovak sociology must be abandoned and replaced by a firmly Marxist-Leninist orientation."

In order to fulfill this task the secretariat of the CPCS CC instructed its Education and Science Department to arrange for a conference of party members in the social science centers of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences to be held in Prague on June 29, 1971.

The president of the academy, Jaroslav Kozesnik, delivered the opening speech at this meeting. Reviewing past developments in the social science centers of the Academy, he declared that many of them had become "components and often actual creators of the policies of the second center" (Radio Prague, 29 June 1971). He ended his speech with a warning that in future every worker on the social science front would be judged according to the degree of his commitment to the cause of communism.

The keynote speech on the situation in the social science sector and on the tasks incumbent on it after the 14th CPCS Congress was delivered by the CPCS CC secretary Jan Fojtik. He described the transition from a chiefly extensive economy to an intensive one as the main task for the future, and declared that science ought to help by waging a decisive struggle to create "a socialist profile of man," just as it ought to help to bring about the final victory of the cultural revolution as conceived by Lenin (Radio Prague, 29 June 1971).

Once again the slogan "To complete the Cultural Revolution" is sounded, as it was 12 years ago when Ladilav Stoll declared, at the state-wide conference of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers in March 1959, that the first task was to settle accounts with revisionism and to complete the cultural Revolution.

At the end of his speech Fojtik declared that in any event the upsurge of international revisionism must not be underestimated, since this would lead to toleration of individual theses and ideas "which the revisionists expounded in this country and which they used to prepare for the counterrevolution."

A broad discussion followed Fojtik's address, and the conclusions arrived at were summarized in a letter sent to the CPCS CC which said that the party members in the social science centers would endeavor to see to it that the social sciences adhered firmly to a Marxist-Leninist position and dealt with all revisionist and bourgeois theories.

Since February a large number of persons have been deprived of their means of livelihood for political reasons, and dismissals for such reasons are continuing -- hardly a **guarantee of "certainty"** for the population of Czechoslovakia.

The refusal of the Czechoslovak government contravenes the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights adopted by the Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, though Czechoslovakia voted in favor of this document, which says in part: "The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group in society . . . . responsible for the care and education of dependent children."

## SOCIOLOGY IN HUNGARY

"Marxist sociology" in Hungary is a means by which the country's leaders implement party policy and keep themselves informed about the mood of the population. Explaining its rôle, the party newspaper Népszabadság of May 30, 1971, said that this sociology was always opposed to "bourgeois" sociology and concerned itself with the political activities of the workers' movement. Earlier, sociology had been muzzled and misunderstood but in recent years it had developed vigorously. Communist sociologists, at a conference in Varna in 1968, had described Marxist sociology as an independent science - which did not, of course, mean an independent ideology but individual methods.

The Agitprop Committee of the Hungarian party Central Committee, Népszabadság went on, decided early in 1966 to intensify political and sociological research, and start courses in sociology at the Party Academy. Since then, sociological work had been carried on primarily by the Institute of Social Sciences and the Party Academy and also by the Sociological Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences and the Mass Media Centre of Hungarian Radio and Television.

The Institute of Social Sciences specialised in political research. It analysed the main economic, social, political and ideological motives which influenced working people and examined day to day questions such as "democracy" and the participation of workers

in the "exercise of power." Papers were prepared on the wages, income, way of life and achievements of workers of the Csepel Iron and Metal Works (one of the country's most important plants) and, in view of the increasing importance of the intelligentsia, on their position and prestige in various regions of the country.

"Party study" had become a new subject. It analysed the rôle, social position and conditions of party functionaries and political figures. "Sociological research on youth" would be the task of a special unit in the near future. The Mass Media Centre of Hungarian Radio and Television dealt primarily with political public opinion polls, which helped agitation and propaganda work to take the correct line.

Discussions among sociologists, Népszabadság concluded, sometimes revealed erroneous views and "dangers." They reflected confusion and "misrepresented correct relations between politics and sociology." It was the duty of Marxist sociologists "to reject any attempt to question the fundamentals of party policy from any 'critical' standpoint or to produce alternative political conceptions." It was therefore important to teach sociology, and especially political sociology, at university level in the Party Academy.

Népszabadság may have been reflecting official concern to avoid the "deviations" which in late 1968 and early 1969 led to personnel changes. In a communiqué issued by the Central Committee Secretariat on November 18, 1968, András Hegedüs, then Head of the Sociological Research Group in the Academy of Sciences, was reprimanded for "ideologically erroneous and politically harmful rightist views." According to the party theoretical journal Társadalmi Szemle of February, 1969, he was replaced by Kálmán Kulcsár. Pártélet, journal of the Central Committee, in March 1969, published an Academy resolution accepting unreservedly Party criticism of the "unhealthy situation" which had earlier prevailed in its Sociological Research Group.

#### BULGARIAN TEEN-AGERS AND POP MUSIC

The fortnightly Srednoshkolsko Zname (no. 32, 18 May 1971), put out by the Sofia City Komsomol Committee, contained an article on the popularity of pop music among high-school students in Sofia. The article also discussed the hippy-like behavior of Sofia teen-agers, who call themselves "groupers" (that is, persons belonging to a certain group, primarily a group sharing the same tastes in clothing or interest in pop music and art; the term is one of the latest slang words invented by the Sofia teen-agers). It might be added that hippy-type hair styles, clothes, and behavior were sharply criticized in Zemedelsko Zname on June 10, 1971.

However, the main accent in Srednoshkolsko Zname's article was on the amateur high-school bands:

the majority of these bands try to interpret compositions of well-known English (and American) orchestras which, in the final analysis, is beyond their abilities, for two reasons: first, they play by ear, since they have no written music; second, the interpreters sing in English, but at best they know no more than 10 English words.

The article mentioned several exemplary bands in Sofia high schools, as well as individual singers and instrument players. In general it was surprisingly favorable to the marked interest in pop music, and in its conclusion stressed the fact that the "existence of a great number of high-school bands playing pop music is a constructive phenomenon".

The great interest in pop music among Bulgarian youth was the subject of a special study (see BTA, 20 May 1971). The Todor Samodoumov Research Institute in Sofia has carried out an anonymous inquiry among students in 35 cities and towns, asking them "What is your favorite piece of music?" Some 5,000 youngsters between 11 and 18 took part.

About 54 per cent of the participants indicated a preference for pop music. Among the most popular hits were "Delilah" (sung by Tom Jones) and the Beatles' songs. The inquiry also reflects changes in musical taste as the young people grow older. Some 60 per cent of 12-year-olds go in for pop music and only 12 per cent for operatic music, while among the 18-year-olds these percentages are 36, 6 per cent and 24, 4 per cent respectively.

This growing trend among the teen-agers was noted earlier in another publication, Narodna Prosveta (No. 11, 1969), monthly of the Ministry of Education. The same age groups were queried on the same subject, but on a nationwide basis. At that time, in 1969, some 60 per cent indicated a preference for pop music, primarily Western hits; again Tom Jones's "Delilah" was the most popular song. One interesting fact was that the highest number of those queried gave the melody as the reason for their preference, which proved the validity of Mozart's statement: "Melody is the soul of music." The analysis of the findings of that inquiry, however, concluded on a somber note:

It is not at all a cheerful sign that the number of pop music fans is constantly increasing at the expense of symphonic, folk, revolutionary, and mass music and songs.

The latest attitude toward Western pop music taken by Srednoshkolsko Zname and BTA, as well as the general tone of the analysis of Narodna Prosveta (despite its pessimistic conclusion), stand in sharp contrast to the recent anti-Western musical hits position adopted by some of the regime publications (see Narodna Mladezh, 11 October 1970, and Bulgarian SR/38, RFER /EERA/, 29 October 1970, Item 3). Obviously the regime gradually began to realize that it was alienating the nation's youth by its "dull and toneless" ready made mass songs and revolutionary marches (see Rabot-nicheskoo Delo, 27 March 1970). The total failure of the party's policies on the so-called musical front has been repeatedly discussed, with hardly disguised alarm (see Otechestven Front,

24 September 1970, and Rabotnichesko Delo, 22 January 1971). The greatest concern, however, was voiced by Professor Venelin Krustev, secretary of the Bulgarian Composers' Union (BCU), at the annual BCU meeting held last January (see Narodna Kultura No. 3, 16 January 1971). In his report to the gathering Krustev said:

I do not want to overestimate the purely political aspect of entertainment music of Western origin, but we can only be alarmed by the pronounced orientation of our youth toward beat music and the latest Western and American pop music hits . . . . That harmless, and at first glance musico-aesthetic fact has already acquired a political influence (and significance).

Later, in a two-part article (in Narodna Kulture Nos. 19 and 20, 8 and 15 May 1971), Krustev courageously criticized the "over-all system of management /on the musical front/ and the structure and forms of administration of musical life in Bulgaria. Krustev bolstered his extremely sharp attack by mentioning numerous "weaknesses" made possible by the "present-day system /of management exercised by the Committee on Culture and the Arts - CAC/, which is open to criticism." Pavel Matev, the CAC chairman, admitted in the party daily Rabotnichesko Delo on 4 March 1971: "A new system of propagating the cultural values must be worked out. The present system is not decisive enough, it is chaotic and must be completely reorganized."

In other words, the regime has good reason to be alarmed by the influence of Modern Western art, which appears to be making deeper inroads among the Bulgarian teen-agers. It is possible that the latest change in the tone and attitude toward pop music may be a cautious effort to counteract the alienation of the youth. In this respect it may be recalled that one of Radio Sofia's three new programs -- "Horizont" -- also seems to be an attempt to meet youth's growing interest in pop music, and to regain estranged audiences (see Item 3 above, and all references to Radio Sofia's "New Look" therein).

## YUGOSLAVIA'S NEW "UNORTHODOX" "WHO'S WHO"

Summary: The newest Yugoslav edition of "Who's Who" deserves particular attention because of its impartial treatment of many political enemies of the present communist regime. Several famous Yugoslav "unpersons" have been "reinstated," and even such individuals as Milovan Djilas and Aleksandar Rankovic are treated objectively.

The newest edition of Yugoslavia's "Who's Who", issued recently by the Belgrade publishing house Hronometar, represents a radical change in the usual communist approach to biographical and encyclopedic manuals. (\*) Publicly familiar figures from all social levels and occupations, as well as many anti-communists and former party leaders expelled for deviationist activity, are represented in a balanced manner. Thus, among the 10,000 people registered in this valuable manual, one can find in addition to politicians and party activists, figures from the fields of science, culture, the arts, sports and religion. Besides containing material on Yugoslavia's two top party and state leaders -- President Tito and his closest collaborator Edvard Kardelj--the manual also has extensive biographical data on Yugoslavia's two top "heretics"--Milovan Djilas and Aleksandar Rankovic. Thus, the Yugoslav publishers have broken with familiar communist practice and have reinstated two of the most famous Yugoslav "unpersons."

The careful reader will find few exciting moments while analyzing the descriptions of the present party and state leadership. It is, however, significant that in comparing the volume of space given to leading personalities, only two men are treated at exceptional length. While biographical data on the most prominent party leaders was registered in an approximately one-page column, Tito and Kardelj got two-and-one-half and two columns, respectively.

Biographical data on some purged party leaders, however, is more interesting. Milovan Djilas, one of the most prominent Yugoslav Communists and a famous author who was purged in 1954 for his reformist ideas was covered, as were present leading party officials such as Vladimir Bakaric and Mijalko Todorovic, in about one column. Aleksandar Rankovic, a former vice-president of Yugoslavia, and the powerful police chief who was purged in 1966 because of his misuse of power, received slightly more than one column of copy. All party and state functions occupied by Djilas during his political activity are mentioned objectively. As far as his conflict with the party leadership in 1954 is concerned, one is informed that "his practical work, concepts and public activity were assessed as contrary to party policy," and that "he was then dismissed from all state and party functions." "Later, because of his public activity against the interests of socialist Yugoslavia, he was twice sentenced and jailed." The column concludes with a note that all his books published in Yugoslavia and abroad are registered.

Aleksandar Rankovic is treated in a similar way. It is stated that "he was dismissed from all political and state functions because his activity was assessed and condemned as contrary to the policy of building the self-management democracy and because he was one of the main representatives of bureaucratic forces in the state and party apparatus."

Other prominent purged party officials have also found their place in "Who's Who." The Serbian Communists, Sreten Zujovic and Blagoje Neskovic, purged because of their attraction to the Cominform and their allegiance to the Soviet Union, are included as are the Croat Communists Ivan Krajacic and Marko Belinic, who were purged because of their suspicious ties with some people condemned for their various "racketeering" activities. The new Yugoslav "Who's Who" also objectively registers many Croat oppositional national Communists such as Dr. Marko Veselica, Petar Segedin, as well as their Serbian counterparts Miodrag Bulatovic, Brana Crncevic, Matija Beckovic and Dobrica Cosic. Finally, one can also find listed all prominent Yugoslav religious dignitaries, beginning with the Catholic Cardinal Seper and the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch German.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

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(\*) Jugoslovenski savremenici--Ko je ko (Contemporary Yugoslavs - Who's Who), Hronometar, Belgrade, 1970.