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I D E O L O G Y

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE 'NEW LEFT'

by Robert A. Scalapino *

We live in an extraordinary age, and one full of ironies, but surely there is no political love affair more curious than that between some of our "New Left" and Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communists. No generational problem here. Mao is now 77, whereas most of his youthful Western admirers are in their 20's, although a few are over the hill, at 30 or beyond.

Seemingly, there are no cultural barriers either, despite the fact that Mao is in many respects, a singularly provincial man, typical of the Chinese interior, poorly informed concerning the outer world, and rigidly insistent that that world conform to his image of it. The true complexities of a society like the United States are quite beyond him, although he has simple Marxian doctrines and traditional Chinese perspectives with which to "explain" America.

Yet it is perhaps here that we have our first clue to the love match. Our "New Left" are also singularly provincial, and they have created their own exclusive "American interior", living and talking only among themselves, reading only their literature, and from it, creating their world, with the same rigid insistence as Mao that the real world then conform to their image of it. In point of fact, the "New Left" sees the world, including the United States, through a set of stereotypes no less narrow than those of Mao. Possibly nothing is more natural than that these two romantics should find each other.

Nevertheless, at first glance, this love affair seems unlikely. The "New Left" proclaims itself the champion of the total liberation of the individual. How can its adherents align themselves with a man who not only presided over mass liquidations during the "land reform" era and the purges of many of his most loyal supporters in the last decade, but who has recently supervised the sending of millions of urban youth involuntarily to the countryside, so that they may be converted into peasants, with scant hope that many will be allowed to return?

Nor is this the only arena in which individual freedom has been circumscribed. Educational institutions at all levels, and especially the universities, have been transformed into citadels of Mao Tse-tung Thought. "Bourgeois" professors have been removed, contrary doctrines banned, and entrance into the

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university determined on a strictly political basis, as we shall soon indicate.

Army Plays Major Role

The "New Left" also counts itself an unyielding opponent of "The Military Establishment", and rejects any role for the military in a democratic society. Yet under Mao, the Chinese Red Army has come to play the major role in administering China. Today, it is the single most powerful force in the society. It was the Red Army, moreover, which smashed those youthful Red Guard elements who tried to assert their own authority at the climax of the Cultural Revolution, and they did so in the name of law and order. And it is military men who play the leading role in the effort to rebuild the Communist Party at present.

In addition, the "New Left" talks much about "racism", and the need to fight against "racist, genocidal" policies. But Han (ethnic Chinese) domination of such regions as Tibet, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia has never been tighter than at present, and the minority peoples in China, although not a large percentage of the total population, have never been put under more intense pressure to conform to the policies and politics of Peking. Indeed, a number of minority leaders have been ousted from office on the charge that they fostered "narrow nationalism" in seeking to speak for the interests of their people, despite the fact that they considered themselves loyal Communists.

The "New Left" to be sure, has explanations for these policies, just as the "Old Left" found ways in which to defend Stalinism. And those policies which it cannot explain, it simply denies as existing - another familiar technique. Our primary concern here, however, is to seek a deeper explanation for the affinity between portions of the "New Left" and Maoism, an explanation which in some measure may yield a greater understanding of the "New Left" itself.

Five aspects of Mao, the man and the symbol, are of special significance in explaining the appeal which he has to some of our "radicals". Let us first look at Mao, the revolutionary. For those who regard themselves as profoundly alienated from their own society, revolution becomes a task to which all else may be subordinated. Indeed, the act of revolution itself may become

more important than the purposes toward which the act is directed. To denounce, to defy, to oppose, to destroy can rather easily become a way of life. It often serves certain therapeutic purposes for the individual concerned, even as a substitute on occasion for needed psychiatric help.

In the eyes of some of our radicals, Mao has now established himself as the supreme revolutionary. Mao continues to wage revolution even after achieving power, and against the very institutions which he himself built. He has transformed Trotsky's concept of permanent revolution into practice, and against his own state. He has proclaimed that the revolution will continue until every vestige of opposition has been removed, all class enemies liquidated, all forms of opposition to his brand of Communism destroyed. Thus, "the establishment" - even the new Communist establishment - continues to be on the defensive at least theoretically, subject to periodic assaults from those on the outside.

This "anti-establishment" or "anti-organization" image which our "New Left" have of Mao delights them, because they sense a kindred soul. Mao is seen as a complete iconoclast, a permanent revolutionist, hence, a pure man undefiled by power, unsullied by the acceptance of authority.

Selective Viewing

To hold this image of Mao, of course, requires some very selective viewing of the old man. It is true that Mao had a brief flirtation with anarcho-syndicalism before coming to Marxism-Leninism. It is also correct to note that Mao, coming from a rural, middle-peasant background and having had a relatively limited formal education, has often indicated a distrust of urbanism in general, including various forms of large-scale organization. One can discern a populist streak in Mao. His deep hostility to the urban intellectuals is one indication of that fact. Thus, on occasion, Mao has signalled an ambivalence toward power, at least power in the form of totally centralized, highly impersonal institutions. He has talked much about experimenting with small-group units, and - in the Confucian fashion - listening to the voice of the people.

To place too much emphasis upon these signals, however, is to misjudge completely the main thrust of the Maoist era. It is

no accident that the Maoist slogan most featured in recent years is the famous phrase, "Power comes out of the barrel of a gun". When Mao's own power within the party and state was threatened as a result of serious policy failures, he turned instinctively to the army to restore himself to a position of absolute authority. "Nothing happens in China today", reported a knowledgeable North Vietnamese to an Asian diplomat in Peking recently, "that does not have the approval of Mao Tse-tung". There is clearly one institution that must remain unchallengeable in the midst of "permanent revolution", namely, the institution of Mao Tse-tung.

Thus Mao has sought to make himself the supreme organization with the future of Chinese society hinging in some measure upon his omniscience. (That certain current trends, including those of renewed bureaucratism and more pragmatic economic/political policies, appear to be running counter to Maoist injunctions serves only to indicate the limitations of any one-man rule in a society of 750 million people.

Unfortunately, one can afford to be even more cynical about the Leftist image of Mao. Following the one occasion when the people were truly encouraged to criticize "the establishment", namely, during the so-called "One Hundred Flowers Bloom" era of 1956, an "anti-rightist" campaign got underway, with all serious critics put through humiliating ordeals. That was the last time when any Chinese would mistake the attitude of the Communist Party toward genuine criticism. The events of later years to prove conclusively that one could attack those in authority only if they had already been slated for assault by Mao and his cohorts.

Small-group organization, moreover, is not a modern, liberating force in its Chinese context, but a very traditional means of controlling human behavior now harnessed to CCP purposes. It is quite true that even under the Communists the Chinese state must continue to experiment with an allocation of power among the Center, the province or region, and the locality. No political system has been devised that could govern 750 million people solely from Peking. But the commune system, and the smaller nuclear groups that have been created for "criticism/self-criticism" sessions far from "liberating" the individual and presenting an alternative to bigness, are in

reality an integrated part of that massive organizational structure fostered by the party that has in fact eliminated all privatism. Nor does small-group organization in China represent any threat to the authority which the Center has retained to establish all of the basic policies - economic, social and political - that govern every individual's pattern of life.

Naturally, there is many a slip between what is ordered and what is done in a society as vast and as heterogeneous as that of China. Just as Mao cannot always enforce his edicts, so that the Party can be thwarted by its own massive bureaucracy, or that of the military or the state. As we have discovered in studying the Soviet Union, the party battle against bureaucratism is always fought - and lost. Organization triumphs, as it must in a command economy. Indeed, therein lies one of the supreme paradoxes implicit in Maoism, a paradox its "New Left" adherents are loathe to accept.

(Free Trade Union News, Washington, U.S.A.)

POLITICS

SOVIET CONGRESS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Brezhnev's contribution on foreign policy at the Soviet Communist Party's 24th Congress on March 30 was moderate in tone, containing nothing new and much that had strong propaganda overtones - in particular the disarmament proposals. He renewed the suggestion for simultaneous abolition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO (which dates back to the 1966 Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest), and called for a conference of the five nuclear powers as well as a world disarmament conference (both of which, if only because of Chinese opposition, he must know to be impracticable).

Even in China, Brezhnev maintained his tone of reasonableness - but other speakers, like Maskerov, the Belorussian party leader, and especially the party leaders in the areas bordering on China, were far less reserved in their criticism. Indeed, the congress was used as a platform for a strong propaganda attack - clearly concerted in advance - on the Chinese leaders. Grechko, the Defence Minister, told the congress that "our armed forces are always ready to chastise an aggressor even on that territory from which he dares to violate the frontiers of our homeland". A subsequent Soviet broadcast to China, by quoting Grechko's remark, has made clear that China was in mind.

In turning to the Soviet Union's relations with the other "Socialist" countries, Brezhnev strongly advocated the further development of "economic integration", but avoided using the word "sovereignty". This reticence contrasted sharply with the firm restatement of the sovereignty and independence of national Communist Parties by the Italian, Romanian and Yugoslav representatives. Conversely, especially in his comment on Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev implicitly reaffirmed the Soviet Union's right to intervene anywhere in the bloc where it considers "Socialism" is being jeopardised. Having repeated the claim that the Soviet Union was "responding to the appeal of the Party and State leaders, the Communist and working people" in invading Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev spoke of "class duty", "our loyalty to Socialist internationalism" and the "fate of Socialism" in Europe as the factors that justified Soviet interference. The emphasis given to justification was reinforced by the amount of time devoted to corroboration by the Czechoslovak party's First Secretary,

Husak.

On the question of the Soviet-West German Treaty, Brezhnev threatened that delay in ratifying the treaty would lead to a "new crisis of confidence" in the Federal Republic's whole policy and to a deterioration in the political climate in Europe. Brezhnev, however, must know that the West Germans insisted when the treaty was signed that ratification would depend on progress in the four-Power talks on Berlin as an earnest of Soviet good faith.

Similarly, in his speech to the congress on April 3, Foreign Minister Gromyko deplored NATO's insistence that a European Security Conference could take place only after a successful outcome to the talks on Berlin, and said that both sets of negotiations should proceed "in parallel". This seems to ignore the fact that if progress cannot be made over Berlin there would be little prospect of a fruitful conference on European security.

The question of a European Security Conference also exercised Kosygin, Prime Minister, in his address to the congress on April 6. Soviet concern at the possible expansion of the European Economic Community was evident in his promises of economic benefits that would supposedly flow from such a conference (including a single European power grid and cooperation over problems of pollution, etc). It was also evident in the usual attempts to present a security conference as an effective starting point for wider European cooperation and therefore an alternative to an enlarged EEC.

TITO AND THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Summary: Mijalko Todorovic, a member of the Yugoslav Executive Bureau and currently representing the Yugoslav Party at the 24th Soviet Party Congress, is one of the most outspoken critics of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By sending him to Moscow, Tito clearly indicated his and his colleagues' attitudes concerning Moscow's policy. Yugoslav correspondents in Moscow, especially the correspondent of Radio Zagreb, Boris Hrzic, are very critical of events taking place at the Soviet Party Congress. They have

especially attacked the acceptance of the so-called limited sovereignty theory and the uniformity of the Soviet bloc.

By sending Mijalko Todorovic, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Yugoslav Party Presidium, as head of the Yugoslav delegation to the 24th Congress of the Soviet Party, Tito has again demonstrated his and his colleagues' critical attitudes toward Brezhnev's policies. This attitude is clearly negative, despite efforts being made by the Yugoslav communist leaders to prevent any further deterioration of relations between the two Parties.

On 22 August 1968 - the day after the Soviet Army, assisted by the Poles, East Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians, invaded Czechoslovakia allegedly to "save socialism" in that country - Todorovic made a strong anti-Soviet speech at a pro-Dubcek meeting in Belgrade which was attended by more than 200,000 persons. Amid enthusiastic applause, Todorovic said that all Yugoslavs were "outraged" by the fact that "a socialist country has been invaded under socialist auspices and allegedly in the name of socialist goals and interests". Todorovic accused the Russians and their invading allies of having "soiled and disgraced the noble red proletarian flag of Marx and Lenin". He further charged the Russians with having invaded Czechoslovakia "not to defend socialism in that country from any foreign power" but rather to stop the further development of real socialism under Alexander Dubcek. (1)

Todorovic's views on the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia have not changed since August 1968. Neither have those of his colleagues. It is not surprising, therefore, that Todorovic was not welcomed in Moscow in the same manner as Ulbricht or Zhivkov, although his Russian hosts have avoided, thus far, everything which might have been interpreted as anti-Yugoslav propaganda. Of course, the attacks against "left and right revisionism" have for a long time been a "normal" procedure at such Soviet meetings. Yet the Yugoslavs cannot but consider such attacks to have been directed against them, even though Yugoslavia was not mentioned. Incidentally, the

(1) Politika, Belgrade, 23 August 1968.

Soviet leaders have recently been doing their best not to antagonize Tito too much. A tacit agreement exists between Moscow and Belgrade to divorce Party matters from affairs of state. A few days before the Soviet Congress convened, it was reported from Belgrade (but never officially confirmed) that Brezhnev was eager to have Tito personally head the Yugoslav Party delegation. Tito is said to have turned down Brezhnev's personal invitation and instead sent Todorovic.

The 24th Congress is the sixth Soviet Party congress since the war. The Yugoslav Party has held five congresses. Except for the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held in Belgrade in December 1964, no other Yugoslav Party Congress was attended by a Soviet delegation. The Fifth (July 1948), Sixth (November 1952) and Seventh (April 1958) were strictly anti-Soviet congresses. As mentioned above, the Eighth Congress was the only one attended by the Russians, with P.N. Demichev, a candidate member of the Politburo and a member of the Secretariat in charge of ideology, heading the Soviet delegation in Belgrade. Except for the Rumanians, no other ruling party delegation was present at the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav Party, held in Belgrade in March 1969. Between 1964 and 1969 much had changed in the relations between the two parties. One of the most outstanding events which influenced Soviet-Yugoslav relations was the purge in July 1966 of Aleksandar Rankovic - once Tito's heir apparent, and police chief. The purge took place only several weeks after Rankovic returned from the Soviet Union where he headed the Yugoslav delegation to the 23rd Soviet Party Congress in Moscow. Rankovic's dismissal resulted from the discovery that he had "bugged" not only Tito's offices but also his bedroom.

Yugoslavs Afraid of Brezhnev's Limited Sovereignty Theory

In spite of Moscow's boycott of the Ninth Yugoslav Party Congress in March 1969, Tito responded to Brezhnev's invitation by sending a Yugoslav delegation and so Todorovic became the second Yugoslav leader to attend a Soviet Party congress. No Yugoslav delegates attended the 20th (February 1956), 21st (February 1959) and 22nd (October 1961) Soviet Party congresses. Todorovic's speech on April 2 contained nothing sensational. He stressed the "favorable development"

of Yugoslav-Soviet relations "based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference" in internal affairs. (2) He added that the differences which existed among communist parties were "the source of creative strength" of socialism.

It is of some interest to note that in his speech of 1 April 1966 at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress, Rankovic did not use Todorovic's formula of "equality, mutual respect and non-interference". (3) Rankovic's speech was extremely warm toward Moscow and the Congress' participants responded on several occasions with applause and stood up applauding after Rankovic finished. The Yugoslav press reported that Todorovic's speech was received "attentively and with interest". (4) It may also be of some interest to note that Todorovic did not mention the European Security Conference, but only said that Yugoslavia has been supporting "all positive movements in Europe" designed to bring about the relaxation of tensions and construction of peace and security. (5)

Although Todorovic as a guest speaker was compelled to "beat around the bush" concerning actual Yugoslav views of Moscow's policies, Yugoslav correspondents in Moscow have been free to express their (i. e., Yugoslav) views openly. The most articulate has been Boris Hrzic, the Radio Zagreb correspondent. In one of his reports, Hrzic said that Soviet speakers at the Congress and their East European allies "have chiefly attacked rightist revisionism". In doing so, Hrzic added, they have "arbitrarily appropriated the right to define revisionism themselves without giving any necessary theoretical explanation. Simply said: revisionism is everything which is not pro-Soviet, everything which is not Soviet and the camp's policy, the Soviet and the camp's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism". (6)

(2) Borba, Belgrade, 3 April 1971.

(3) Borba, 2 April 1966.

(4) Politika, 3 April 1971.

(5) Borba, 3 April 1971.

(6) Radio Zagreb, 1 April 1971, 1930 hours.

Hrzic said that Ulbricht ridiculed all people preaching "separate roads to socialism" and attacked Husak for having "revived the theory of limited sovereignty". Of Husak's attacks against "rightist revisionism", Hrzic said:

If the rightist revisionism has been so vital, this means that the "real" socialism has been fading away. How is it possible that hundreds of thousands of Communists in Czechoslovakia have been expelled from the Party because of the rightist revisionist sin? (7)

Hrzic's report broadcast on April 5 is even more critical. He said:

Brezhnev's report, the statements of Soviet delegates and speeches made by the heads of delegations from the socialist camp, have confirmed that the whole socialist world today is represented by the socialist (Soviet bloc) community. The community is its chief group, the main force: political, material, ideological and military. (8)

Only people and states which "behave like any other country in the socialist camp" are recognized as socialist. "The socialist world, as seen from the (Soviet Party) Congress, is not too big; it is completely uniform". Said Hrzic:

In this context the idea of unity has some other implications: it is a unity which renounces the prerogatives of sovereignty; it is a unity which serves to fuse - politically, ideologically, economically and militarily - into one entity. The theory of limited sovereignty is thus no longer a theory; it has become reality. It is the policy of the camp. A group (of states) which was created by forcible unification is again turned - not by means of a plebiscite - into a firm organization of states in which independence is being more and more suppressed. (9)

Hrzic finally said that the Soviet speakers at the Congress acted "as if no problems exist in this big country". This Congress "believes that in the Soviet Union, socialism as a social system, has reached the zenith of its perfection".

(7) Ibid.

(8) Radio Zagreb, 5 April 1971, 1930 hours.

(9) Ibid.

A Zagreb daily found it strange that Leonid Brezhnev did not mention non-aligned countries and the policy of non-alignment. The paper said, in addition, that Brezhnev presented a rather "simplified picture of the world: there are two parts - the one represented by imperialism with the USA at its head; the other - the socialist system headed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact". (10)

Of course, Yugoslav correspondents in Moscow did not miss the opportunity to tell their readers that Berlinguer in the name of the Italian Party, and Ceausescu of Rumania, also demonstrated an independent attitude. They also mentioned the speech by the French delegate, Georges Marchais, who indirectly criticized Gustav Husak by having emphasized the principles of sovereignty and independence.

On the day (March 30) the 24th Congress convened in Moscow, Vjesnik of Zagreb published an interview which Miko Tripalo, a member of the Executive Bureau, gave the periodical Dometi in Rijeka. Tripalo's interview was reproduced in three successive issues of Vjesnik. (11) Unlike the optimistic Brezhnev, Tripalo presented rather pessimistic views concerning the situation within the world communist movement. Referring to his recent trip to Rome, Tripalo said:

In my discussion with the leaders of the Italian CP, I stressed that we have never been advocates of a socialist model, which is ideal and everlasting, or a model which needs just a slight push in order to be made perfect (you know that such theories exist). It seems to us, and the Polish (December 1970) events have confirmed our views, that the theory of "status quo" has definitely been defeated. We are convinced that socialism can develop only under the conditions of radical socio-political reforms.

In this connection, Tripalo said that there were not many countries, "especially no socialist countries", which have decided to carry out radical political and economic reforms. In communist countries "Stalinist forces" are still very strong and oppose any reform. Thus, "the success or failure of the

(10) Vjesnik, Zagreb, 3 April 1971.

(11) Vjesnik, 30 and 31 March and 1 April 1971.

so-called Yugoslav experiment influences by encouraging or discouraging all anti-Stalinist and anti-bureaucratic forces", Tripalo said.

The fact that Tito sent Mijalko Todorovic to represent the Yugoslav Party in Moscow, the way in which Yugoslav correspondents have reported on events at the Congress and finally the publication of Tripalo's interview clearly indicate that the ideological struggle between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Party has not diminished but has rather intensified.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

by D. Brezaric

There are always new elements in relations between the two super-powers indicating their increasing activity to solve crucial problems of special concern to them. The contacts and relations between the two powers have never been stable and have never followed a steady upward trend; instead they have zigzagged - moving onwards and then backing up again. Seemingly contradictory developments are now under way: as opposed to the confrontation and ideological attacks against Soviet communism and American imperialism and similar, on the one side, are the peaceful and constructive talks and offers of reasonable terms for business negotiations, on the other.

How do things stand today? There is no evidence of any changes in the basic trends of relations between Moscow and Washington: both super-powers are exerting great efforts to avoid a direct nuclear confrontation just as in the past they endeavoured to prevent even a minor, local and conventional-type of armed confrontation. After the Cuban crisis nothing like this was ever repeated even on a minor scale as evidenced by the development of the war in South East Asia and the crisis in the Middle East. Talks are continuing on such outstanding problems as the restriction of strategic arms (SALT), solutions are being sought for Berlin and the Middle East and it has never been said that other problems are not being talked over as well, which means that the list of topics being discussed by the American and Soviet negotiators includes many outstanding issues for which partial or complete solutions are being sought

or for which new situations are being created. But, on the other hand, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States continues on a very broad front, although the forms, motives and intensity differ. In fact, progress in the positive direction is slow and reflects all the complexity of the accumulated problems, the ever-changing distribution of forces in the world (the appearance of new powerful states and groups of states, new political forces with a historical role on the world scene, the development of increasingly perfect arms and many other factors) all of which accounts for the snail's pace at which the two super-powers are tackling the existing problems (which are not only their problems).

Today, we can no longer speak of a "good atmosphere" in relations between Moscow and Washington. For a whole year a minor propaganda war has been in progress: Moscow is being criticized because of the Middle East and the transfer of missiles to the area of the Canal, because of its infiltration into the Mediterranean, because of Cuba, Berlin, etc. and the USA is subject to intensified attacks because of the Middle East, its policy within NATO, its opposition to a conference on European security, its intensified anti-communist campaign and "subversive activity inside the socialist countries", etc. There have been no high-level Soviet-American talks apart from those which Minister Gromyko had with Secretary of State Rogers and President Nixon during the UN General Assembly meeting. Democratic presidential candidate, Edmund Muskie, and prominent veteran of American diplomacy, Averall Harriman, visited the Soviet Union. But those were representatives of the opposition. There have been meetings of scientists, mainly those concerned with space research, and it seems preparations are quietly being made for some important joint projects. Contacts are also being held at other levels, through permanent and well-organized diplomatic channels, in Washington and Moscow, in the UN, in Berlin, Vienna and Helsinki.

Much more has officially been said about Soviet-American relations in the USA than in the Soviet Union of late. Thanks to President Nixon's well-known report of February 25, it has been possible to draw a clear picture of these relations and particularly of the United States' attitude toward the Soviet Union and opportunities for future cooperation with this most important

of its partners. There has been no similar declaration on the Soviet side but it is expected that something on this subject may be said at the 24th Soviet Party Congress, meaning from the most important source of all. Nixon's statement and Brezhnev's expected speech at the party congress, taken together, will certainly represent an authoritative public dialogue between the two powers which have the greatest responsibilities in the world. But just as President Nixon's statement did not reveal any major novelties, one should not expect any sensational news in the documents of the Soviet Party Congress either, since after all the basic trends in relations between the two powers are generally known, having already been stated in various forms and pursued in practice.

In his statement President Nixon used some rather strong words when he referred to relations with Moscow and one sensed the presence of propaganda effects and a certain amount of "ideological anti-communism" but all for the purpose of drawing a line which cannot be passed now in negotiations and cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, in repeating the main theses from his speech before the General Assembly six months ago, President Nixon reiterated that the USA and the Soviet Union were the two most powerful countries in the world and that it would be "absurd for the two nuclear powers to permit a confrontation to take place between them since the consequences would be disastrous". He expressed readiness to recognize the legitimate rights of the Soviet Union wherever it may have such rights - in Europe, in the Far East and also in the Middle East - but he also addressed warnings to the Soviet Union concerning some matters in which he considered the Soviet Union to have surpassed the limit by strengthening its positions at the expense of the USA and the West. Nixon did not say as much openly but it is clear that there is much concern in the USA at the development of the situation in Europe, and because of the Moscow-Bonn agreement which is regarded as a success of Soviet diplomacy in the first place. There is also marked apprehension because of the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and the appearance of large Soviet naval units in other seas - in the Indian Ocean - and particularly because of Soviet presence in such an important region as the Middle East with its strategic routes and oil resources, this last element having provoked some particularly nervous reactions.

The US President also spoke sharply about Soviet behaviour in the matter of strategic armaments (the partial construction of an anti-ballistic system, the appearance of new missiles and similar), about the alleged base in Cuba, about attempts to divide the West and change the balance of power which in the new circumstances would inevitably lead to permanent friction and danger.

Discussing relations with the Soviet Union, President Nixon also tried to warn his European allies of the dangers that would ensue if there were no agreed, common policy in relation to the Soviet Union and if the Soviet Union were allowed to orient itself in Europe to "a differentiated détente confined to the Soviet Union and certain western European countries". This, according to President Nixon, would be illusory and it might create fresh sources of dangers so that instead of contributing to peace in Europe it would in fact postpone it. Also it has once again been made clear that there is to be no American withdrawal from Europe (a decision passed by NATO last December) unless the Soviet Union withdraws from the East European countries.

At this moment we can single out only the most important questions on which an intensive dialogue between the two powers is under way.

It looks as if the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna (SALT) will last longer than was expected among UN circles, for example. It is obvious that the two powers lack the strength to deal with this matter in isolation from the other upheavals and crises in international development. However, these are earnest talks for they have resulted from a rational, mathematical understanding of the vital connection between a solution of this problem and the existence of the negotiating powers themselves. Thus, in spite of all possible crises, these talks will go on and they are actually developing into an institution, into a sort of super-council of security but with the presence of only two powers. In our opinion this closed character of the discussion and decision-making involving just the two powers is at the same time the most serious weakness of the talks; furthermore it is definitely not a guarantee that this is the fastest or the best way of achieving a solution. It is therefore no coincidence that certain questions are allowed to "leak out" whenever it becomes necessary to put pressure on the other

side and resort to the method of cold war competition. Irrespective of all the arguments of the big, it will become less and less possible to maintain the talks on a bilateral basis for monopoly by the two powers is feared not only by the small and medium-sized non-atomic countries but is also opposed by such powers as France and the People's Republic of China.

The two super-powers have been conducting talks on the Middle East since the very beginning of the crisis there (historically speaking, the dialogue began much earlier, but its character was different then). However, now at the beginning of 1971, the role of the two powers is increasing and both aspire to have very nearly the decisive say on how the crisis should be settled. President Nixon said in his statement approximately the following: The Soviet Union has important interests of its own in this area, but the military and economic independence of the Middle East are of vital significance for NATO and Europe. The USA is not trying to establish its own domination and it therefore cannot allow others to impose theirs. What is necessary is a balance of all interests in the Middle East, and respect for the legitimate interests of the sovereign states in that area.

It is clear from this that the USA is behaving as a factor which has great ambitions with respect to its presence in that region. President Nixon actually invited the Soviet Union to negotiate a division of spheres of interest in that part of the world. In other words, a solution lies above all in an understanding between Washington and Moscow while, as we have seen, it is possible to mention also "the sovereignty of the countries in this region". In Washington it is probably thought, although this was not stated openly, that there is no need to hurry as time is working to the benefit of both Israel and the United States. What is alarming is certainly the efforts to have the Middle East crisis "incorporated" into the wider context of the dialogue and bargaining between Washington and Moscow. The current talks on the Middle East have revealed a substantial rapprochement on some basic approaches of the USA and the Soviet Union including a proximity of views in regard to the guarantees for and participation in international forces which would be stationed on the border between Israel and the UAR. In any case, the two superpowers have involved them-

selves in full measure and one can expect a long struggle for positions in the countries in that area.

The talks on Berlin are between the four powers but there is an obvious difference in the influence of the Soviet Union and the USA, on the one side, and France and Great Britain, on the other. There is a clear tendency towards normalizing the situation as ever since the end of the war Berlin has constituted a vulnerable spot on the European continent. The desire for a more long-term settlement seems to be shared by all, including the two Germanys. Nevertheless the West seems to think that after "all the concessions" made on its side - it is now the Soviet Union's turn to contribute its share, to ensure through concessions over Berlin the ratification of the agreements it signed last year with the German Federal Republic and to have western Europe accept for preparations for a European conference on security. This laying down of conditions is the result of the American view and estimate that the Soviet Union has achieved successes in Europe in an easy way. According to all the estimates, including public statements by Chancellor Brandt, it should be possible to end the Berlin talks in the course of this year and thus pave the way for new aspects of European cooperation and for a reduction of tension on the continent. Naturally, the two powers are very careful to make sure that the possible solutions will not jeopardize their present positions in Europe, which indeed they wish to see reinforced. However, it is hard to imagine that any real tendency towards relaxation and increased cooperation between the European countries could serve to strengthen the monopolies of the great powers and it is to be hoped that matters will evolve in precisely the opposite direction - towards the increased autonomy and affirmation of independent policy inside as well as outside the bloc systems.

A series of other questions of interest to the two super-powers are being discussed through less conspicuous channels. Irrespective of the difficulties, there are serious reasons to make the two powers seek to reach solutions to some of the problems as soon as possible, for things are changing from day to day and new independent forces with a policy of their own are emerging on the scene and coming out with increasingly louder demands for democratic methods of solving international problems and for a pattern of international relations very

different from that which the two powers are offering the world now.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

EAST GERMAN MEDIA'S ATTACKS ON HEINEMANN, SPD

During the past months East German media have repeatedly attacked FRG President Gustav Heinemann, the SPD, and "inner-German relations". The attacks were presumably triggered by President Heinemann's and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel's trip to South America. The numerous articles and major radio commentaries ("Deutschlandsender", 25 March 1971, 26 March 1971, 27 March and 29 March 1971; National Zeitung (East Berlin), 28 March 1971; Neues Deutschland, 26 and 29 March and 4 April 1971 etc.) all, more or less, offered the same argument; namely that during his recent visit in three South American countries, President Heinemann slandered the GDR in an attempt to prevent those states from normalizing their relations with East Germany. Heinemann was quoted as having stated in Caracas that he desired "more freedom and democracy for the Germans who do not live in the Federal Republic, that is those who live in the other part of Germany". East German media maintained that the statement represented interference not only with GDR internal affairs, but also with the affairs of any South American state that might wish to normalize their relations with the GDR. According to the East German media this statement of Heinemann's revealed what the FRG meant when it proposed "inner-German relations":

They mean - though in different words - the same revanchist goals which have been proclaimed by the CDU/CSU; they mean they are in a position to judge or even to determine, the GDR's foreign relations; they mean, ultimately, that the socialist society should be transformed into a state of "freedom and democracy" after Bonn's example. In short, they want to eliminate socialism and introduce the rule of the state monopoly regime. (Neues Deutschland, 26 March 1971).

As another example of alleged West German pressure on other states, East German media cited Foreign Minister Scheel's answer during a press conference in La Paz. When

asked what would happen if Latin American countries established diplomatic relations with the GDR, Scheel is reported to have declared that in such an event Bonn would "let itself be guided by its own interests". Even though this would appear to be a perfectly sensible statement, "Deutschlandsender" attacked Scheel's reply for being "threatening", "arrogant", and "clinging to the sole representation claim".

Following these attacks against West German's efforts to maintain friendly relations with Latin America, Neues Deutschland, (4 April 1971) published a theoretical article on the subject of "Social Democracy and Anti-Communism", authored by the Director of the GDR's Institute for Marxism-Leninism, Professor Dr. Günter Heyde. While the article did not substantially contain much new material, it once again repeated authoritatively that Bonn's new Ostpolitik is aimed merely "at subverting the socialist countries by means of social democracy". The article concluded with the following paragraph:

In view of this strengthened anti-communist campaign which emanates primarily from the leading political forces in the FRG, it is necessary to wage a continuous struggle against imperialist ideologies and against social democracy.

Another in this series of attacks against the FRG is another article by Peter Florin, State Secretary in the GDR Foreign Ministry, which appeared in Neues Deutschland on 2 April 1971. Under the title "An Answer to Mr. Scheel", Florin took issue with both President Heinemann and Foreign Minister Scheel whose remarks in Latin America, according to Florin, were nothing but "a new variation of the ill-famed Hallstein Doctrine". Besides arguing in favor of the full recognition of the GDR objectively serves to increase tensions and to prepare for a new war". Such an extreme accusation namely that the SPD/FDP coalition government is preparing to launch a war, was expressed only once before by an East German spokesman (Honecker's speech at the 14th SED-CC Plenum). The repetition of such an indictment nearly one year later would seem to indicate that the GDR's attitude towards the Federal Republic remains essentially the same.

THE SED'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY

The East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) on April 21-22 celebrated the 25th anniversary of its founding through a merger of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties in the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany in 1946.

A minority of Social Democrats believed that union of the two German "workers' parties" was essential to heal the political division which had made possible the rise of Nazism, but the Communists have consistently viewed their allies with hostility and distrust, periodically reviving a propaganda campaign against "Sozialdemokratismus" ("Social Democracy") - a term of contempt used to distinguish non-Marxist Social Democracy from the "Sozialistische Demokratie" ("Socialist Democracy") proclaimed by Walter Ulbricht. This campaign has been renewed since the Federal Chancellor, Herr Brandt, proposed "special intra-German relations" and initiated talks with the East German Prime Minister, Herr Stoph.

In 1945 Ulbricht and his supporters rejected overtures for a merger of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties, which came first from a group of Social Democrats in Berlin. The two most notable members of this group were the late Otto Grotewohl, who became the first East German Prime Minister, and Erich Gniffke, who fled to West Germany in October 1948, and has described the events leading up to the merger and its consequences in his memoirs (Jahre mit Ulbricht) published in 1966.

Ulbricht (and Stalin) thought in 1945 that the time was not ripe for a union of the parties. Instead Ulbricht proposed "unity of action" by the establishment of a "Joint Working Committee". But the Social Democrats had little say either in the decisions of the committee or in local administration. The Communists held the key administrative posts under the Soviet Military Administration, and enjoyed preferential treatment from the Soviet authorities in the allocation of transport, food supplies and facilities for printing and publishing.

By the autumn of 1945 the official Communist view changed in favour of union, partly because the Social Democratic Party proved a more serious rival than Ulbricht and Stalin had anticipated. The Communists were unpopular in the Soviet Zone and in the Western Zones the Social Democratic Party organisations opposed co-operation with them. Moreover, in

elections in Hungary and Austria late in 1945 the Communists had suffered heavy defeats and the party feared a similar fate in forthcoming council elections in Germany.

The SPD Central Council insisted that union must be a free decision of all members throughout Germany - not only in the Soviet Zone. The Communist leaders ostensibly agreed, but immediately began to organise the union of local party organisations in the Soviet Zone behind the backs of the Central Council. In December, 1945, and January, 1946, merger resolutions in the Soviet Zone had been passed by local party organisations - many achieved by pressure or trickery. The late Erich Ollenhauer, a former SPD Chairman in the Federal Republic, told a meeting of former political prisoners in Bad Godesberg on April 15, 1961, that between December, 1945 and April, 1946, when the final merger congress took place, more than 20,000 Social Democrats were arrested and imprisoned in the Soviet Zone.

The Social Democratic Party organisations in the Western Zones declared their opposition to a merger or to any electoral alliance with the Communists and on January 14, 1946, the SPD Central Council in Berlin issued a resolution repudiating the mergers at province, district and municipal level in the Soviet Zone. The Soviet authorities forbade publication of the resolution and the merger campaign went ahead in their Zone. A plebiscite on the merger, proposed by the Greater Berlin SPD organisation, was also banned in the Soviet Sector. In the three Western sectors 82 per cent voted against merger and only 12.4 per cent in favour. Nevertheless the merger took place at a joint KPD/SPD congress in Berlin on April 21-22, 1946.

When the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was constituted 53 per cent of its membership was Social Democrat. It was agreed that both parties should be equally represented on executives at all levels and an 80-man Central Executive was elected.

When the Second Party Congress was held in September, 1947, some SPD members were missing. An investigation revealed that many were in Soviet Zone prisons. During Easter week alone, 130 Social Democrats had been arrested in Halle, Magdeburg, Gera, Leipzig and Dresden. By March 1, 1947, 400 Social Democrats were being held in Zwickau prison and

900 in Dresden. The Soviet authorities had re-opened old Nazi concentration camps to house political prisoners; 800 SPD officials were in Buchenwald, the camp from which some of them had been released only two years previously.

On July 3, 1948, when the quarrel between Tito and Stalin was at its height, the SED Central Executive passed a resolution announcing that the SED was to become "a party of a new type". This followed instructions from Moscow that the East European Communist Parties should reorganise themselves on the same lines as the Soviet Communist Party.

Erich Gniffke's memoirs record that at the beginning of July, 1948, Ulbricht briefed officials of the Hall SED Provincial Executive on plans to purge "hostile elements". Ulbricht said the merger on a basis of parity had been a mistake. A much better procedure had been adopted in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries, where after dividing the Social Democratic Party, destroying its Right wing, and only then merging, the Communists had achieved a more satisfactory proportion of representation of seven Communists to two Social Democrats.

A wave of expulsions and arrests followed. And when the Third SED Congress in July, 1950, elected its first Central Committee, the 50 members and 30 candidates included only 11 Social Democrats. The rest were either in prison or had fled to the Federal Republic. Of the 21 members of the present Politburo, elected at the Seventh SED Congress in April, 1967, only two are former members of the Social Democratic Party. Of the 121 members of the Central Committee, only four are former Social Democrats.

Footnote: The Social Democratic Party was the largest political party in Germany before the rise of the Nazis. In the 1930 Reichstag elections Social Democrats polled 8½ million votes compared with the Nazis' 6½ million and the Communists' 4½ million. Ulbricht told the 15th party plenum on January 29, 1971, that one of the most important questions to be discussed at the Eighth Party Congress in June will be "Social Democratism in the period of the struggle of the working class for the transition from capitalism to Socialism, with special reference to the rôle of Social Democratism in the Federal Republic".

AFRICA IN THE SOVIET SCHEME

Summary: Doctrinaire attitudes have been affected by greater realism, but the basic Communist blueprint remains.

The agreement between China and Nigeria to set up diplomatic relations, announced on February 10, was part of China's renewed effort since the end of the cultural revolution to win recognition from African countries and extend her influence through normal diplomatic channels. But the establishment of a Chinese mission in Lagos, where the Soviet Union has backed its diplomatic presence with economic aid and support for the Federal Government during the civil war, is likely to import the Sino-Soviet dispute into yet another African arena.

In vying for the favour of the Nigerians, as of other nationalist governments in the developing world, both Peking and Moscow find it expedient to abandon ideological intransigence for a more flexible approach. There was little Soviet comment on the February arrests of the President and Secretary of the Communist-controlled Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC), Wahab Goodluck and Samuel Bassey, and of the editor of the NTUC newspaper, *Advance*, or on the strikes and unrest in the wake of the government's measures against extremists and agitators. The student disorders had been condemned by General Gowon on February 23, and the following month another prominent Nigerian Communist, Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, was arrested.

In July, 1969, by contrast, *P r a v d a* had protested strongly against the detention of Otegbeye and a fellow Marxist, S.O. Martins, on their return from Moscow, where they had participated in the world Communist conference. Praising their "patriotism" and work for "genuine independence", the Soviet party newspaper highlighted agitation within Nigeria aimed at securing their release, particularly the formation of a committee on which the NTUC was said to be represented together with the Soviet, East German and Polish Friendship Societies. Moscow's *R a d i o P e a c e a n d P r o g r e s s*, too, admonished the Nigerian Federal Government and said that it could not hope to achieve internal consolidation unless it stopped taking "reprisals against patriots and trade union leaders in the country". Commenting on the latest arrests in

Nigeria, *P r a v d a* on February 27 merely said that they had "not been satisfactorily explained or cleared up".

Although Moscow now prefers to avoid such open interference in the internal affairs of African countries, the long-term aim of spreading Communism has not been abandoned. Soviet propaganda still utters doctrinaire strictures about the policies of some of the African leaders or offers patronising advice, based on the assumption that all moves towards the "non-capitalist path of development" will aid the advance of Communism.

A R a d i o P e a c e a n d P r o g r e s s broadcast for Africa on March 13 on the need to distinguish between right and wrong kinds of "Africanisation" singled out Tanzania as being in the approved category of followers of the non-capitalist path. Though she has been criticised at other times for her traditional, idealistic views of peasant society, Tanzania was praised for systematically replacing foreign experts by Africans and nationalising "many industrial and finance enterprises". The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, was following the wrong line. Independence there had allegedly been accompanied by a rise in the number of foreign advisers and "at best, the replacement of European capitalists by African capitalists". Claiming that the majority of Africans were dissatisfied with this state of affairs and that "workers and other patriotic forces" were struggling for genuine Africanisation, the Soviet radio warned that this could only be achieved by embarking on a non-capitalist path of development.

New handbook

However, Soviet propaganda drops its differentiation between African capitalists and progressives when it is a matter of inciting them against "Western imperialists". Nigeria, which normally does not rank among the countries following the path preferred by Moscow, was encouraged in her demands for higher oil prices in the latest negotiations with the Anglo-Dutch Shell Company. In line with Soviet comment on the recent Teheran talks between the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the "imperialist oil monopolies", *M o s c o w R a d i o* stressed on March 17 that Nigeria badly needed the estimated extra £ 70 million a year from increased oil revenues for her development. The com-

mentary expressed general satisfaction at the trend towards the takeover not only of oil, but also of copper, timber and other natural sources of wealth by the peoples of the "black continent". Moscow saw this process as one of the most important forms of the fight for "real" freedom and independence.

The task of reading between the lines of Moscow's propaganda for Africa has been simplified by the publication of a Soviet book, *The Political Parties of Africa*, issued last October under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Science's Africa Institute in a limited edition of 3,700 copies destined for specialists. Apart from its detailed analysis of African political parties, the book outlines the tactics for ensuring the ultimate triumph of Communism. It specifically names the "revolutionary-democratic" parties of Algeria, the UAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Tanzania, as well as those of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, which the authors believe can eventually become "reliable detachments" of the international Communist movement.

Though the pattern of the future take-over by local Communists has to be pieced together from the various expert contributions to this Soviet compilation, it emerges sufficiently clearly. The authors envisage the transformation of the typical nationalist mass parties of the Third World into vanguard (i. e. Communist-type) parties through a process which "in general corresponds to the logic of class war". The establishment of "single-party systems of government" is counted among the most significant successes of the "revolutionary-democratic" parties, but the book warns against any indiscriminate commitment to ruling parties of this type. In keeping with its general aim of making more effective use of African studies through a more flexible application of Marxist-Leninist interpretations, the manual warns that any dogmatism in evaluating the single-party system of a given African country without due regard to its "concrete historical" situation could entail "serious mistakes". Though the authors admit that in Africa class struggle is still rudimentary, they make clear their belief in the transience of the nationalist parties - to think otherwise is to harbour "illusions". Growing class differentiation is seen as an "indisputable fact", which in time will create a basis more favourable to the implantation of Communism.

A cautious note

At the same time, the book's denunciation of "left-wing extremism" reflects Soviet concern not to jeopardise plans for Africa by forcing the pace, as well as probably being aimed at Maoist influences. The Sino-Soviet quarrel intrudes openly into the analysis of the situation in Senegal, where the outlawed *Parti Africain d'Indépendance* (PAI) has been split, with the added irony that a former party member is now head of the country's security. The Senegalese Government is criticised bitterly for arresting the pro-Moscow Marxists, while allegedly doing nothing to stop the activities of the "pro-Chinese schismatics".

A less dogmatic approach is advocated in respect of the popular national leaders in the emergent countries and some Soviet Africanists are criticised for their over-simplified categorisations on the basis of social origin alone. The book concedes that in Africa, as in other continents, there are political leaders who are not motivated by their class interests and concludes that "these examples testify to the incorrectness of identifying the aristocratic stratum of chiefs with reactionaries" - a view said to be held "quite widely" in the Soviet Union. The nationalist leaders are shown to have their uses for the present and their temporary ascendancy is not considered an insuperable obstacle to a Communist future since "the political education of the masses will inevitably provoke the fading-away of the tendency towards one-man rule" - though this may take a long time. Moreover, it is suggested that one-man rule can promote the strengthening of State and national unity in the initial stages of independence, despite the experiences of Ghana and Mali (once at the top of the list of Soviet protégés) which are seen as examples of the dangerous extremes of personal dictatorship.

The book reveals Moscow's dislike for military take-overs, which is less apparent in its guarded official reactions to the various African coups. It is argued that the replacement in tropical Africa of "mercenary bureaucrats by often incompetent officers" provides no proper solution and that the "soil remains for the regrowth of new parties" - presumably meaning Communist-type ones. The ground is judged no less fertile in countries under civilian rule. "Serious internal political upheavals" are forecast for Kenya, and even in

Tanzania progress is said to be hindered by the ruling TANU party's misconceptions about the peasant communes.

Correct tactics

The manual's choice of Sudan (where Communists joined the government after the coup of May, 1969) as a model of successful Communist tactics, was clearly made before President Nimeri's denunciation of the Sudanese Communist Party for "distinguishing itself by subversion and subservience to others". On the other hand, the book is candid about Communist reverses in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Lesotho, Senegal and Nigeria. While Communists in Algeria and the UAR, with whose governments Moscow has close relations, are criticised for having compounded their difficulties by their own "sectarian" mistakes, the book admits that Arab nationalism and African Socialism, as well as "distorted" Marxist views on religion, are powerful sources of anti-Communism. The authors argue that different world outlooks should not hinder the cooperation of believers and non-believers in building a Socialist society. But after stating that in countries set on the road of non-capitalist development Islam has been reinterpreted so that it can accommodate Socialist changes, the handbook tactlessly refers to the ultimate "overcoming" of religious beliefs among the working masses.

Communists are advised to bide their time and to revolutionise ruling parties from within by relying mainly on the "left-wing, more revolutionary elements" and gradually eliminating the resistance of "right-wing, nationalist elements". They are urged to make use of the experience of "more mature" Communist Parties to master a wide range of tactics - from the parliamentary path to armed struggle - in order to be ready for any change in the political situation.

The angry Soviet reaction to the discussion of this book in the West showed Moscow's sensitivity to the charges it has laid itself open to. Broadcasts for Africa on March 19 and 20 protested at length about the purity of Soviet intentions towards Africa; but even in rejecting the "falsifications" allegedly spread with the aim of undermining Moscow's growing prestige in the Third World, Soviet propaganda repeated its criticisms of the African "bourgeoisie", asserting that it could not ensure "genuine freedom" for Africa.

CHINA AND THE WORLD

The New China News Agency greeted 1971 with special reports on the progress of revolution and the "anti-imperialist struggle" in Africa, Latin America and "Oceania" (Australia and New Zealand), though with regard to Asia it gave prominence only to Communist guerrilla operations in the Philippines during 1970. While the groups supported by NCNA were all presented as "anti-US" and as oppressed peoples spontaneously revolting against monopoly capital, reactionary authorities and neo-colonialism, many are no more than militant opponents of legitimate governments. Nevertheless the NCNA broadcasts underlined China's reluctance to cool her revolutionary ardour in the process of initiating diplomatic ties. Indeed, Chinese diplomats and other officials now returning to posts in Africa and Latin America may intensify their subversive as well as legitimate activities in the hope that contacts with Chinese sympathisers there will offer a chance of fostering a Maoist opposition.

In Africa, wider diplomatic ties and growing economic involvement have brought no diminution in Chinese activities among the "liberation" movements and, in the independent States, among some militant opposition groups - despite past rebuffs. In January, 1965, Burundi broke off relations with China and expelled her disproportionately large diplomatic mission after some of its members had been accused of interfering in Burundi's internal affairs and aiding rebels in neighbouring Congo-Kinshasa (where the Chinese had no representation). Chinese arms and ammunition were also discovered in the country. In the Central African Republic, all Chinese diplomats, experts and NCNA correspondents were expelled in January, 1966, after Peking's hand had been disclosed behind a "popular army" - said to have been drawn up to assassinate the head of State and seize power. Less than two years later, Tunisia suspended relations with Peking because, according to a government statement, the Chinese Embassy had disseminated propaganda in a way amounting to "consistent interference" in Tunisia's internal affairs.

Chinese journalists and trade officials seem to have played a particularly active subversive rôle in Latin America, where China's only full diplomatic mission has been in Cuba. By

1960 NCNA had offices in eight Latin American countries, but the illicit activities of the agency's correspondents resulted in the office in Ecuador being closed in 1963 and the Venezuelan representative being arrested the same year. After nine Chinese - two of them NCNA correspondents and three members of the permanent trade office - had been arrested in Brazil in 1964, they were found to possess a list of Brazilian generals to be assassinated, literature on guerrilla warfare and information about a training camp for guerrillas about 50 miles from the capital. At the end of 1966 the Mexican authorities arrested members of a pro-Chinese "Marxist-Leninist Movement" which had been receiving funds through the NCNA office.

By 1970, only two of the five Peking-staffed NCNA bureaux in Latin America - those in Cuba and Chile - were still functioning, and after the death of Guevara and the guerrilla setbacks generally, China seemed to have given up her more ambitious plans to weaken the United States through the promotion of "people's wars". But she has not abandoned them completely.

Chinese propaganda continues to report the activities of the few remaining pro-Chinese parties and Maoist splinter groups and to highlight all anti-American actions, particularly those involving students and peasants. In the past few months, publicity has been given to the Brazilian peasants' struggle, to the "farce" of the Brazilian parliamentary elections and - for the first time in a year - to the operations of the Maoist *Ejercito Popular de Liberacion* (EPT) in Colombia.

Following the recent improvement in her relations with Cuba and Chile, however, China may prefer - like the Soviet Union - to concentrate on developing ties through official and semi-official channels. An exchange of greetings and diplomatic courtesies for Cuba's National Day in July and a visit to China by a Cuban friendship delegation were followed by the establishment of an office of the Cuban news agency, *Prrensa Latina*, in Peking in November. Shortly afterwards a Chinese ambassador was appointed to Havana (after a four-year gap).

Although Peking reacted cautiously at first to the election of the Marxist Dr. Allende as President of Chile in September

it eventually approved his programme as "anti-imperialist", and Chou En-lai, in a congratulatory telegram, spoke of the Chilean people's "just struggle against imperialist aggression for the defence of national independence". The Chilean Foreign Minister announced on January 5 that his government had decided to recognise China and that agreement had been reached to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible. Other likely targets for Chinese diplomatic and other overtures are Peru (which received relief aid from Peking after her earthquake last year), Ecuador and Bolivia.

Signals from several Asian States - India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand - that they would welcome a detente with China in the wake of her return to comparative normality have remained unanswered, and for the time being Peking seems to consider it more to its advantage to encourage armed insurrection against most of their governments. Of the 27 new Chinese ambassadors appointed within the past 18 months, only six have gone to Asian posts and one, the envoy to Cambodia, returned to Peking after the fall of Sihanouk. The other posts were in countries with which China has a tradition of good relations (Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal and Afghanistan), as well as North Korea. Similarly, over half the delegations to and from China in the same period came from more distant continents, and the Asian ones were limited to Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal and Japan, and such Communist neighbours as North Korea, North Vietnam and the "liberated areas" of Laos. Hostility towards the Japanese Government however, continues and the Chinese seem to have little desire to get on speaking terms with their powerful neighbour until the government abandons its ties with the United States.

Indeed, as far as most of their non-Communist neighbours are concerned, the Chinese leaders are chary of offering relations of "peaceful coexistence" at present, evidently setting greater store by promotion of militant Communist regimes and disruption of pro-American ones. Thus with regard to India, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, Peking's approach concentrates on supporting Communist guerrillas and inciting dissident national minorities to join them.

A good deal of Maoist propaganda is also circulated in

Singapore through a variety of channels and, according to the Indonesian army journal, *Chas*, on December 28, some of this is now being smuggled into Indonesia and distributed among the villages. *Chas* complained that Indonesia was becoming a "battleground" in the propaganda war between Moscow and Peking, with both sides seeking to restore some influence with the masses. But though the Chinese compete with Moscow for the loyalty of the local Communist Parties and denounce Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in Asia, they appear unwilling as well as unable to match Moscow's example in most countries in seeking to extend their influence through trade and aid and by showing the flag.

Pakistan and China remain opposed to a Soviet-inspired security system and Moscow has a sizeable task in seeking to extend ties with Pakistan at China's expense. President Yahya Khan was offered further aid while visiting Moscow in June 1970, and under a new five-year agreement effective from January 1, 1971, Soviet-Pakistan trade is to be expanded and diversified. Moscow also supplies arms to Pakistan in rivalry with China, despite Indian objections.

The Chinese, who had received the Pakistan President in Peking shortly before the election, reported it without comment. But they clearly do not intend to let their antagonism to all "bourgeois" forms of democracy damage their ties with Pakistan. The 200 million dollars of aid promised during the President's visit for Pakistan's next Five-Year Plan will make the Chinese contribution to the economy comparable with that of the Soviet Union. The inclusion in the Pakistan delegation of the head of the joint Chief of Staff Secretariat and the Director of Munitions Production also points to a further military aid agreement.

Afghanistan has a common border with China and the Soviet Union, and both Communist Powers have considerable aid projects as well as trade agreements there. The Soviet Union is also active on the cultural and educational fronts. The absence of any formal political parties (all members elected to the Afghan parliament stand as independents) has meant that Afghan Marxists committed to Moscow or Peking have formed unofficial groupings which turn mainly towards the student population for support. Reports suggest that the Maoists have also increased their student following in the past six months,

bringing this up to the strength of the Moscow sympathisers.

In Nepal, China has exploited recent strains in Indo-Nepali relations, with NCNA using the bilateral negotiations between India and Nepal on mutual trade and transit as an opportunity for anti-Indian propaganda. Dissatisfaction in schools and Nepal's proximity to the Maoist Naxalite insurgents in West Bengal also gives China a chance to reinforce her own influence. Eastern Nepal has witnessed growing activity by left-wing extremists, and reports have emerged of Mao's thought being propagated in schools in the area and of children being turned against their non-Communist parents. The lack of political parties, as in Afghanistan, means that students and young people offer the best breeding ground for Communist doctrine. The present office-bearers in the Tribhuvan University Students' Union in Kathmandu are Mao-sympathisers and led a student strike there in September.

China now provides about one-sixth of Nepal's total foreign aid - though her contribution remains far less than India's. China's projects in Nepal include a tannery and shoe factory, a hydro-electric scheme and a brick and tile factory, but her most substantial undertaking is in building roads. Nevertheless the highway between Kathmandu and Tibet may be of less use to Nepal than to China since there is little economic activity in the area it serves.

(Freedom First, Bombay, India)

THE GENERATION PROBLEM IN THE CPSU

Summary: A problem brewing under the surface became apparent at all 14 Union Republic Party Congresses: the gradual disappearance from the political scene of the Stalinist old guard. While representatives of this group still hold top positions, their speeches indicate their awareness that this was probably the last Party Congress at which their positions could go unchallenged. The Party Congresses revealed a concern for whether or not the youth would carry on the traditions of the older generation.

In their reports, the First CC Secretaries in the Union Republics gave rather detailed information on the status of

their Parties, growth in the last five years, number of basic Party organizations, and in numerous cases, on the communists engaged in production and distribution. Exact information on the present age structure, on the other hand, was rarely given. The First Secretary of the CC of the Latvian CP, A. E. Voss, said that 48.6% of the communists in the Republic had belonged to the Party for 10 years at the most, and "at the moment, more than half of the members and candidates of the Party are under 40 years of age". (1) The First Secretary of the CC of the Armenian CP, A. Je. Kochinjan, was one of the few to give information about the age structure of his Party. According to him, 3.4% of the members are under 25 years of age, 35.5% from 26-40, and 40% of the Communists had belonged to the Party for a maximum of 10 years. (2)

This "rejuvenation" of members and candidates will eventually have its effect on the filling of Party posts, and the Party bureaucracy's policy, resolved at the 23rd Congress and opposed by the young Communists, can no longer be instituted. The First Secretary of the CC of the Belorussian Party, P. M. Mazerov, said in his report:

In recent years, a series of leading functionaries has gone into well-deserved retirement for reasons of age and health. These were for the most part very good functionaries, who worked honestly and devoted all their strength to the service of society. With their help, good successors were trained to continue the work of the older generation securely. (3)

The First Secretary of the CC of the Kazakhstan CP, D. A. Kunayev, probably greatly to the irritation of the younger members, made some comments in his report indicating that the "deserving comrades" were not yet considering retirement unless they were invalid or senile. Kunayev referred to Lenin, saying:

V. I. Lenin criticized harshly those who spoke of a lack of cadres but did not encourage the young functionaries. He

(1) Sovetskaya Latviya, 26 February 1971.

(2) Kommunist, 26 February 1971.

(3) Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 23 February 1971.

suggested: "For such an organizer it is better to retire and leave his post to young forces whose energies will more than replace the usual and well-learned routine". (4)

Assuring a Continuation of Tradition ?

The speeches of numerous Party leaders confirmed that they, however, are not as sure as Mazerov that traditions will be carried on by the younger generation.

Some of the speakers condemned "a portion" of the youth in general. They were accused of "apolitical attitudes, nihilism, a tendency to hooliganism, do-nothingness, etc." The harsh criticism of the Komsomol leadership which was apparent at almost all Party Congresses is first and foremost a result of the fact that the Komsomol organizations are indifferent and opportunistic when it comes to combatting "negative phenomena" among the youth. Not only the First CC Secretaries, but the First Secretaries of the Komsomol as well spoke of this problem in some of the republics. One of them, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol CC, Kopto, was typical:

We are far from underestimating the danger of enemy propaganda. Yet it must be said that some Komsomol organizations do not always undertake the correct or necessary evaluation of the individual manifestations of apolitical attitudes, indifference, egoism and hooliganism among a portion of the youth. (5)

Such speakers as the head of the KGB in Belorussia, Ja. P. Nikulkin, also dealt with the "negative" manifestations among the youth. He said:

Analysis shows that asocial and apolitical attitudes and all amoral manifestations generally come about where the ideological-political education of the youth is too weak, where the necessary attention is not devoted to the struggle for communist morality. (6)

(4) Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25 February 1971.

(5) Radjanska Ukraina, 19 March 1971.

(6) Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 24 February 1971.

At the Party Congresses, some of the main speakers reported on measures for the supervision and direction of the Komsomol's activity. The First Secretary of the CC in Kazakhstan, Kunayev, reported, for example, that 25,000 young Party members were working in the republican Komsomol. (7)

The First Secretary of the CC of the Turkmenian Komsomol, T. Durdiev, reported that 31% of the Secretaries of the Komsomol basic organizations were Party members. That amounts to three times more than five years ago. Eighty per cent of the Komsomol organizations in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses and more than 50% of the Komsomol organizations in the plants and construction sites were led by Party members. (8)

The Party bureaucracy exhibited the greatest distrust of youthful writers and artists. At almost all Party Congresses, these groups were strongly criticized. The list of complaints is rather long. One accusation appears again and again; namely, that such people were interested in what was "fashionable" and had no interest in topics of political reality, especially from the "world of labour". At the Party Congress of the CC of the Ukrainian CP, the writer Ju.K. Smolych said:

In recent years, talented young people, mostly with university educations and generally having a high cultural level, have gone into literature. Now university educations and cultural preparation are not bad, but there is a lack of experience in life. Thus, the cases increase where these young people do not begin their literary careers with an understanding of the day to day interests and worries of the people, but they plunge into their juvenile and youthful observations, which have already been overtaken by the facts of our reality. And when facts from the present should appear on the horizon of such a literary beginner, individual young writers exhibit objectivism, apolitical attitudes or formal modernistic experiments. And from an idealess

(7) Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25 February 1971.

(8) Turkmenskaya Iskra, 22 February 1971.

modernism, as the history of literature proves to us, it is only a small step and one is exposed to hostile influences. (9)

The materials from the 14 Union Republic Party Congresses show that a growing portion of the youth within the Party is presenting the Party bureaucracy with new and rather unpleasant problems. Naturally, there are other reasons for the calls for order and a strengthening of discipline at places of work and in public life, but one of the reasons for the attention to youth is doubtless the problem of the generations within the CPSU, and the doubts of the representatives of the Stalinist old guard whether or not the newcomers will carry on in their path.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

E C O N O M I C S

BREZHNEV ON ECONOMICS AND PARTY AFFAIRS

Summary: This paper describes the new elements in the economics and party sections of Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Congress of his party. They were marked by a further increase in agricultural investment targets, by an ominous attack on "metal-eaters" who were accused of "subjectively" disrupting the consumer goods program, and by a clear echo of Poland ("a basic task of the TUs is defence of the legitimate rights of workers"). A purge of the Party is to be begun by exchanging Party cards, and future Congresses will take place every five years, thereby giving Brezhnev an extra year in office and enabling the Party to intervene more effectively in Government affairs.

Much more than a third of Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Congress of the CPSU was devoted to the economy, despite the fact that Kosygin is due to give the report on the 1971-75 plan. Much of what he said was already known from the draft directives of the 5-year plan, but he also had some new information which sheds a vivid light on the present domestic problems of the CPSU.

He began by repeating the curious boast that the main

(9) Rayanska Ukraina, 19 March 1971.

directives of the 23rd Congress were fulfilled, although it is known that every major heavy industrial target except one was under fulfilled and that the same applies to some of the consumer targets. During his speech, he referred several times to the importance of both material and moral incentives, but always in that order. It would therefore be mistaken to postulate any split between him and Kosygin in this connection.

During the 5-year plan 1971-75, the minimum wage is to go up to 70 rubles a month, and improved wages are to provide for 3/4 of the real growth planned for incomes. In accordance with the "new class" image of the CPSU today most of the wage rises are going to the medium income groups, as well as to doctors, teachers, nurses, and tractor drivers (the wage aristocrats of the Soviet countryside).

Those working in the labor deficit areas (the Urals, the Far North, W. Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Far East, East Siberia and Central Asia) are also to be given wage rises as inducements to stay on the job, which happens too seldom at present for the health of the economy. The average wage in industry is planned to go up to 146 rubles a month (at present it is about 124).

One distinct surprise in the Brezhnev package is his announcement of the early repayment of 2 billion rubles in 1974-75 from the state loans which were stopped in 1958 under Khrushchev. These total about 26 billions, and were due to be repaid between 1977 and 1996. The new repayment dates are now 1974-1990. This measure seems likely to accentuate the present inflationary pressures in the economy, which are already acute due to the 46 billion rubles now in the savings banks (an average of 575 rubles per depositor). (1)

His whole package of wage increases, better pensions, loan repayments, child allowances for poor families (an echo of Poland?) etc. is to cost 22 billion rubles, compared with 10 billion which he handed out in this way in the 1966-70 period. Here again the new consumer priority will be badly needed in the face of the rising tide of paper money.

Consequently the 1971-75 plan provides for the consumption fund to grow by 40%, and the accumulation (investment) fund to grow by 37%. The margin is not wide, but it is both welcome

(1) Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 3, 1971, p. 47.

and symbolic.

Discussing growth rate priorities, Brezhnev said that in 1970 Group "A" accounted for 74% of total industrial output while consumer goods provided only 26%.

The accumulated production potential, in the opinion of the CC, gives us an opportunity to allow for some faster increase in the growth rates of Group B, which will permit us to ensure the planned increase in the prosperity of the workers.

Brezhnev has obviously come under heavy fire from his "metal-eaters", because he was extremely defensive about the change in priorities and spent much time in excusing and explaining it. He argued that the accelerated development of the means of production would continue, that the Party would not reduce the attention paid to heavy industry, it had made the country great, high rates of growth for it still preserved their significance, it maintains defence capacity "at the proper level", etc., etc. But granted all the flattery and the praise of Group "A" priority in the past, the fact remains that this is the first five-year plan to accord priority in growth rates to Group "B".

His message for the Marshals was both more flexible and more subtle. He said that the "Soviet Army has been provided today with all the types of modern military technology", and that further growth of the defence industry will largely depend on the international situation. This formulation matches the 1971 plan, which is the first for many years to provide no increase in the overt military budget, whatever may be happening as regards secret funds.

Brezhnev even found it necessary to dig up a Lenin quote with which to confront the heavy industry lobby:

Permit me to remind you of the words of Lenin, who said that in the ultimate analysis the manufacture of means of production is necessarily connected with the manufacture of consumer goods, because the means of production are made not for their own sake but only because more and more producer goods are required in the branches of industry making consumer goods. This, comrades, is the definitive instruction of our leader for our party.

Brezhnev then told his heavy industrialists to follow the example of the defence industry, which, according to him, already delivers 42 per cent of its output for the civilian economy. If this is true, it is evident that the industry has sub-

stantial reserve capacity for its assigned role in the event of war. At all events Brezhnev was telling Group "A" to follow suit.

Investments

On this front, Brezhnev produced yet another of his creeping inflations of agricultural investments, which are now up to 129 billions (83 state, and 46 Kolkhoz) in 1971-75. Poland is certainly having a marked effect on the plan, which in July 1970 provided for only about 120 billions for agriculture. He also gave new targets for investment in light industry (8.7 billions) and in the food industry (14 billions). The former is an increase of nearly 100%, he claimed, but he gave no percentage growth for the food industry's allocation.

It is now possible to make a reasonably accurate estimate of the consumer-oriented investments of the plan, which evidently allow about 129 billions for agriculture, 23 billions for the light and food industries combined, about 60 billions for housing (in 1965-70 too this industry got 60 billions, so this estimate assumes no increase) and about 60 billions for services (also an estimate, assuming no increase). The consumer-oriented total would then be about 272 billions, out of an overall investment program of just under 500 billions.

His sharpest rebuke to the internal opposition came in a long condemnation of those who "subjectively" disrupt the consumer goods program:

Increased economic potential permits us to direct larger capital investments to consumer goods. Which is what we are doing. But, as in any other matter, success is not solely determined by objective factors. Subjective factors too are of great significance. In this connection the C. C. considers it important to direct the attention of planning and economic agencies, party Soviet and trade union organizations to the need for a serious change in their very approach to consumer goods. Behind us are the long years of heroic history when millions of communists and non-party people deliberately made sacrifices and underwent privation, were ready to be content with bare necessities, did not think they had the right to demand special daily comforts. This could not but have its effect

on the attitude to consumer goods, to their quality and variety. But what was explicable and natural in the past when other tasks were in the foreground is inacceptable, comrades, in present conditions. And if some comrades do not take this into account, the party has the right to see in such attitudes either a lack of understanding of the essence of its policy ... or the desire to justify their inactivity".

Nowhere else in the speech was such a strong threat uttered against people in high places in the USSR, and not since Khrushchev's attack on the "metal-eaters" in 1964 has the heavy industry lobby been so forcefully warned to change its approach. If its representatives do not heed Brezhnev's forceful and clear warnings, the forthcoming exchange of Party cards may well be used to remove them from the nomenklatura.

Confirmation of a Broader Role for the TUs

It will be recalled that in the draft directives there was evidence that the TUs have been given an expanded role in protecting the interests of the workers, presumably as a result of the fall of Gomulka and Loga-Sowinski. Brezhnev's speech confirmed this on the highest authority, for he made one remark in his passage on the trade unions which no Soviet Party leader has previously been heard to say:

The TUs take part in the teaching of a communist attitude to work and social ownership, they concern themselves with the satisfaction of the cultural and domestic needs of the workers and with their health. One of the basic tasks of the Trade Unions is the defence of the legitimate interests of working people....."

Ever since Kronstadt the proletariat of the USSR has waited, previously in vain, for a General Secretary to say that.

Party Affairs

Brezhnev is clearly bent on a purge of the Party ranks. For one thing it has grown too big (3,000,000 members have joined since 1966), and for another it is too bureaucratic (only just over 50% of the new intake in the past five years were workers). Brezhnev said that the quality of candidates is now a main concern, and boasted that he had slowed down the annual rate

of admissions to candidate membership from 760,000 a year under Khrushchev (1961-65) to 600,000 a year since 1966.

But even so the Party is still too big for his liking, comprising about 9% of the adult population. And he is certainly aware of what happened in Czechoslovakia when the Party became big enough to encompass a large number of progressively minded communists. The current purge in the USSR is aimed at "those who infringe party or state discipline, abuse their official position, or defame the name of a communist by their misconduct.

Politbureau Meets Once a Week

Brezhnev evidently had Gomulka's fall in mind when he disclosed, for the first time in many decades, that the Politbureau of the C. C. meets once a week regularly. (One of the most damaging charges against Gomulka was that his Politbureau had not met for about four months prior to the December riots). It examines "the most important and topical problems of the internal and foreign policy of the Party.

He also revealed more than any previous leader about the Secretariat, which "meets every day and concentrates on the selection of cadres and the checking of performance.

This information was designed to show how "democratic" the Party is, yet Brezhnev has never even bothered to explain why the present Congress is a year overdue. Such contempt for public opinion is scarcely the hallmark of a democratically run party.

Brezhnev paid a special tribute to the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee which, he said, "analyzes better the problems of party discipline, and reacts more sharply to cases of wrong conduct by communists". This may have been routine praise, but to many it may have sounded like a polite way of preparing for the retirement of A. J. Pelshe, who is Chairman of the Committee and 72 years of age.

Exchange of Party Cards

Brezhnev's drive to eliminate the dead wood and the dissenters from the Party is to be conducted by an exchange of party membership cards, the first such maneuver since 1954.

The new card, needless to say, will have a portrait of Lenin on it. Until the exchange has taken place, we can probably expect a period of quiescence within the party and a more than usually remarkable absence of criticism of the leading bodies.

Congresses Every Five Years

Brezhnev solemnly announced that one of the proposals made by many Party members before the Congress is that it should meet only once in five years, instead of once in four as set forth in the present Statutes. In fact this is what has happened during Brezhnev's rule since the previous two Congresses were in 1961 (Khrushchev) and in 1966 (Brezhnev).

The proposal is clearly the antithesis of democratization, since the nominally supreme organ of the Party will in the future, have even less say in its policies than at present. But from Brezhnev's point of view it has the advantage of giving him, possibly, a year longer in office (should he keep his job until 1976), and of enabling the party to interfere still more in economic affairs and Government business because future Congresses will coincide with the inception of future 5-Year Plans.

His announcement was received with applause, and little or no resistance to it need be anticipated, since many of the C. C and delegates are careerist enough to welcome the idea of an extra year in office, should they survive the party cards exchange, without the fear of being dropped in 1975.

Conclusion

Brezhnev's speech was a carefully balanced centralist effort, criticizing both the personality cult (i. e. Stalin) and subjectivism (i. e. Khrushchev). His concluding attack on those who adopt "non-class, non-party positions" was immediately followed by a blast against dogmatists who ignore the "great positive changes in our life".

On the internal scene, the only passage in which he lost his cool (and his balance) was the extensive warning to the "metal-eaters". They have been clearly threatened, and unless they eliminate the Party leader first, as they did when Khrushchev campaigned against them in 1964, he may well use his power and influence to make them either retire from the scene or begin to accept the new orientation of the economy.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

WHY PEOPLE LEAVE THEIR JOBS

by V. Boldyrev

In the last few years the problem of the drift of labour cadres has become specially prominent. This is not in any way the consequence of any increase in the unorganised migration of the labour force in our country. On the contrary, as compared to the conditions ruling in the period of the first five year plans, it has dropped to almost one quarter, on an average for the whole country. But accelerated scientific-technical progress and the increased complexity of technics and technology impose higher and higher requirements on the level of skill of a worker, and it is only the permanent cadres which can fully meet these requirements. Besides that, today when there is no superfluous labour force available, if a worker leaves his job, he cannot be immediately replaced, as used to be the case previously.

In the conditions existing today, the scale of migration, when the cadres of many enterprises are completely renewed every three or four years, cannot be regarded as being a normal state of affairs. Of course, this replacement is not an absolute, but a statistical one. The majority of the workers and employees remain in the same job over a period of many years. But there are some who change their jobs several times a year.

A consequence of the instability of the labour collective is a slowing up of the improvement in the productivity of labour, increased production of wasters and more frequent damage to plant and accidents to workers. The loss inflicted on industry and building because of this amounts to several milliards of roubles every year.

Besides material considerations, there is also the moral side. Shortage of labour, exaggerated by the unorganised migration of labour, makes many members of the management less demanding, shutting their eyes to many infringements of labour discipline.

The director of an engineering works reports: "In order to discover the reasons why workers and employees handed in their notices, we organised an enquiry to find out how many people left, and for what reasons. Ten per cent of the leavers stated that they were dissatisfied with the housing conditions. We built a new housing block. We increased the wages of certain categories of workers and made improvements in their working

conditions. The result was that the scale of migration dropped by one half of one per cent. If I was asked today to state a reason, I would find it impossible to give anything like a satisfactory answer".

Some directors resort to increasing wages above the socially acceptable level in order to attract labour and manage to secure a temporary improvement. Then the wage levels at neighbouring factories are raised, and a movement in the opposite direction sets in. Speaking more plainly, some people take the line of "enticing" labour away from their neighbours. It is obvious that such methods create no increase in the labour force available.

It cannot be regarded as being a normal state of affairs that wage scales and standards should be different for exactly the same kind of work at neighbouring factories producing the same kind of goods. The differences in the provision of housing accommodation for workers in different branches are very considerable and not always justified. It is obvious that one of the most effective economic factors in any reduction in the scale of migration of labour is a closer adherence to the provisions of the law of distribution in proportion to labour. It is a question of eliminating the variety in wage scales and norms which allow workers to increase their earnings by moving from one place of employment to another one.

It is not such an easy matter to put this obvious truth into practice, because of a number of objective circumstances.

Firstly, scientific-technical progress does not affect all branches of production simultaneously, and this is the cause of differences in the conditions of labour. Secondly, at any given period the necessity may arise to concentrate all effort on the decisive sectors of the national economy and to encourage the flow of labour to these sectors by offering definite advantages. Finally, as the economic reform places the volume of material benefits received by each individual into dependence on the success of the work of the particular collective, there develop differences in the wage scales and in the satisfaction of cultural and daily needs.

In accordance with investigation figures, about seventy per cent of the leavers receive higher wages at their new job than they did at the old one. Even workers who have been dismissed for offences against the labour discipline regulations can find a job with a higher wage scale.

We provide, on a huge scale, free training of cadres for all

the branches of our national economy. The community is entitled to expect that any individual graduating from the university, technical college or work school will work at his particular trade at the place to which he is sent. But often things work out differently. A proportion of the young specialists directed from the central areas to the eastern outskirts of the country never arrive at their appointed destination. Some of them settle down in the big towns and get jobs which have no connexion whatsoever with the speciality for which they have been trained.

Millions of houses are built in our country every year, mainly at the expense of the budgets and funds of enterprises. The grant of free housing accommodation valued at several thousands of roubles should be regarded by the worker as an advance made by the State and the collective. But if, after six months, the worker or employee moves to another job, retaining the legal right to his flat without any compensating payment for its cost, the whole collective has to stand the loss.

It would seem to be desirable to introduce measures under which each individual, would retain his freedom to choose the place where he will apply his labour, but under which permanent workers would be given advantages over the "migrants". This would affect wages, securing living accommodation, periods of leave and various benefits depending on the stage of his work at the factory.

Investigations into the question of migration show that instances are quite frequent where an individual switches over to work at a lower wage and under worse conditions merely because he does not pay enough attention to himself and his work, or because of bad relations with the management or with some members of the collective. When this side was investigated at the Leningrad "Svetlana" combine it was found that 21 per cent of the women workers dissatisfied with their jobs gave bad relations with the management as their reason, 48 per cent bad relations with their fellow workers, and 20 per cent gave bad relations with the quality inspector. A carefully worked out system of measures designed to improve the "social atmosphere" made it possible to reduce the migration rate in the combine to almost one third of the figure representing the average for Leningrad.

(Pravda, Moscow)

"SOCIALIST WAY OF LIFE" MORE IMPORTANT THAN
STANDARD OF LIVING?

Professor Dr. Günther Hoppe of the Institute for Social Sciences of the SED-Central Committee, has expressed the opinion that in Eastern European countries the creation of a "socialist way of life" was preferable to a further increase in standard of living. In the March issue of the journal Pädagogik, the professor claimed this to be the primary prerequisite for enhancing the attraction of the socialist system for the workers of the Western countries, particularly for the workers of the FRG. The existence of a "socialist way of life" in the GDR, Hoppe maintained, would encourage West German workers to overcome the "imperialist way of life" with its "moral decline" which, in his opinion, is the result of exploitation and the manipulation of people, of profit-making, of aggressiveness, chauvinist incitement, etc.

According to Hoppe, the socialist way of life will have a particularly revolutionary effect on West German workers since the alleged advantages of the material living standard that exists in West Germany have been attained at the high cost of an inhumane concept of life.

According to Hoppe, this Western concept of life has created serious doubt among West German workers about their personal future which - he maintains - has had a more destructive effect on their personalities than material deprivations.

In this connection, Hoppe attacked alleged attempts by "imperialist ideologists" to export the inhumane Western concept of life to the GDR. At the same time people who praise "Capitalist amorality", propagate sex, horror and drugs, according to Hoppe, want to undermine the socialist way of life and its revolutionary influence on the workers in Western countries.

ONLY ON A BASIS OF MERIT

by V. Nekhaichik

Flats in a new housing block are to be allocated. Who should get them? At first glance the answer seems to be simple. The factory or the institution has a waiting list, and housing orders should be made out in the name of the people at the head of the list. But would that really be a just solution? Let us consider

some concrete examples.

Our factory committee was holding an augmented session. It was to consider and decide the allocation of flats from the lists submitted by the shop committees. The housing commission presented a list of priorities. This list included milling machine operator V. N. Smarchenko, fitter V. A. Borisenok, foreman V. S. Kozlov and others.

The chairman of the commission V. I. Sokolov announced: "These comrades are good workers and have not committed any infringements of the labour discipline regulations or been guilty of absenteeism. They stand in need of housing accommodation".

V. A. Selitsky, chairman of the welded components shop committee and member of the factory trade union committee, stood up.

"I do not agree with the proposal of the housing commission. In our shop committee we have examined the list of applicants for housing accommodation. Since this housing block was built at the expense of the Social-Cultural Purposes Fund, we decided to adopt a different principle in the matter of allocating housing accommodation. We decided to allocate it to those workers who by their effort, application and technical skill did more to promote the accumulation of this Fund than the other workers have done. We analysed the record of the labour effort of each of the candidates. We found that the biggest contributions had been made, not by those whose names are at the head of the list, but by others whose names are below the top dozen. Take, for example, fitter V. V. Astahevich. He introduced a number of new methods into his work, which made it possible to make a 25 per cent increase in the productivity of labour, and produced a record output figure - two norms in the course of a single shift. In addition to that, Astashevich, because of a careful and businesslike handling of raw materials and components, made a saving of 310 kilograms of high quality electrodes and economised more than 10,000 kilowatt-hours of electric energy. Therefore the shop committee decided to present the first order for housing accommodation to him".

For second place the chairman of the shop committee named welder G. V. Kleopin. This worker fulfils his norms to the extent of 150-160 per cent, and has made economies to the

benefit of the enterprise to the amount of 275 kilograms of high quality electrodes, 98 cylinders of oxygen and about 8,000 kilowatt-hours of electric energy. He makes his work bench a model of good order, and he instructs the young workers.

Some members of the factory committee asked how did the record stand of those whose names figured at the head of the list. It appeared that these workers fulfilled their norms and also had no infringements of the labour discipline regulations recorded against them. But their output record and the contribution they made to making economies were considerably lower, although the possibilities were equal for all.

An argument developed on the question whether it would be just to by-pass these people and allocate housing accommodation to people whose names figured lower down in the list. Opposite views were expressed, but the majority supported the decision of the shop committee to present orders for accommodation to those who had applied the greatest amount of energy, application and initiative to the common cause. One of the comrades expressed it in this way. "The individual who makes the biggest contribution to the community should receive the most from it. There can be no question of some common level for all."

The collective understood this decision of the factory committee, and approved it. Whilst on previous occasions, after housing accommodation had been allocated, many people were dissatisfied, complaints were made and appeals sent in to higher authorities, on this occasion not a single complaint was registered against the factory committee.

The committees of the foundry and the engineering shops adopted the same principle in the allocation of housing accommodation.

Although in both these cases the factory committee and the management allocated housing accommodation to the best workers, disregarding the waiting list as an exception, taking into consideration the special service they had rendered to the factory, in our opinion, when it is a question of allocating accommodation which has been built at the expense of the Social-Cultural Fund, which has been accumulated through the joint efforts of the collective, the system should be established officially for the future. It is in complete accord with the spirit of the new Foundation of Labour Legislation, which stress that in the distribution of various material benefits (housing,

railway passes, leave periods, etc.) preference should be given to those people who provide the biggest contributions in labour to the production record of the collective. In other words, the key to a new flat is above all a recognition of the effort contributed by an individual to the common production cause, a reward for his labour and social services.

Until quite recently, I myself was working at a lathe, and we, the workers, when we heard who had been allocated housing accommodation, agreed among ourselves that the fact that your name was first on the waiting list did not provide the only grounds for being allocated a flat. Your claim should be supported by first class work. That is particularly true at the present time when, under the conditions of the economic reform, the labour contribution of every individual, his economical handling of raw materials, there depends the amount of the accumulation of the funds to be used for the improvement of the day to day social servicing of the collective. Surely, the allocation of housing accommodation is most certainly a material incentive for the worker.

Many enterprises build housing accommodation by their own efforts, making partial use of the labour of their own workers and employees. In my opinion, preference in taking part in the work of building and consequently in securing accommodation in that building should also be given in the first place to the leaders in production, the Communist labour shock workers, the rationalisers and the people who are active in social work. Incidentally, that is what is done at the Car and Cycle Works next door to us. In the present year they are putting up housing blocks by their own effort. Workers and employees cooperate in the building work, and they are given preference in the allocation of housing. Among them are honoured veteran of the factory, Communist labour shock worker, senior erector in the Electric Shop S. P. Mezin, and others.

In order to increase the interest of the collective of workers in raising the effectiveness of their labour, the law provides that housing accommodation built at the expense of the Social-Cultural Fund, as also the accumulations of the retail trade fund, or created out of profits in excess of the Plan or economies effected in excess of the Plan (over and above the sums contributed to the Fund of the enterprise) may be dis-

tributed by the enterprise itself. That is what is done in actual practice. But here a problem arises. What is to be done in respect of granting tenancy for accommodation which falls vacant in buildings constructed at the expense of the above-mentioned Funds? It is placed at the disposal of the Ispolkoms of the local Soviets of Deputies of the Workers. The Ispolkoms consider that the allocation of subsequent tenancy is their own privilege.

In our opinion, this system undermines the interest of the labour collectives in adding to the amount of housing available as a consequence of raising the economic efficiency of production. Housing accommodation built at the expense of the funds of an enterprise should be vested in the enterprise and it should have the right to determine subsequent tenancy by its own workers. That would promote the expansion of the building of housing accommodation at the expense of funds accumulated out of the economic organisation of production.

(Trud, Moscow)

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC PROGRESS

by V. Smirnov
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The steady growth of the political, economic and military might of the world socialist system has brought about a radical change in the conditions of development for the countries liberated from the colonial yoke in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their growing trade and economic co-operation with the U. S. S. R. and other socialist countries is becoming an increasingly important factor in their independent development and in their economic and social progress.

The development and strengthening of trade and economic co-operation between the socialist and the developing countries is one of the important features of present-day international economic relations, a process based above all on their community of interests in the anti-imperialist struggle. The vital tasks in the struggle for economic independence also confront the young independent states with problems which they frequently cannot solve on their own, without economic co-operation from

the socialist countries. More and more developing countries are coming to realise the hard fact that they cannot attain their goals of national revival, and effectively withstand the steady pressure on them from the giant imperialist political and economic machine, without assistance from the U. S. S. R. and other socialist countries, and without developing and strengthening mutually advantageous trade and economic co-operation with them.

The development of economic relations with the young national states also meets the economic needs of the socialist countries, because it enables the latter to make use of the advantages of the international division of labour for accelerating the growth of social production and raising their people's living standards. Consequently, economic co-operation between the socialist world and the developing countries rests on the objective needs of the co-operating parties and their very real mutual interests.

Of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union is the biggest trade partner of the developing states. Within a relatively short period, trade between the Soviet Union and the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America has been greatly boosted, the number of its trade partners in the Third World has been increased, and other forms of economic co-operation have been developed and consolidated. In 1969, Soviet trade with this group of countries was valued at over 2,500 million rubles, as compared with 300 million rubles in 1955.

In 1955, the Soviet Union had permanent trade relations with only 18 developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and had inter-state trade agreements with only 9 of them. Today, the U. S. S. R. trades with over 60 developing countries, with most of them on the basis of treaties and agreements.

By concluding trade agreements with the Soviet Union, the developing countries frequently obtain for the first time the possibility of realising in legal contractual relations the principles of equality and mutual advantage to the full extent, without any cancellations or restrictions. Trade operations with many of these countries under long-term interstate agreements provide a solid basis for the development of trade and the stabilising of external economic ties between the contracting parties, and they help to ameliorate some of the ill effects of the state of the world capitalist markets on the economy of the young states.

Of great importance to the developing countries is the fact that usually their payment for deliveries of Soviet goods is made in their traditional export products, which enables them to save the foreign currency they need so badly. And, by expanding the exports of their traditional goods and their newer products which they find difficult to sell on the world capitalist market, these countries can pay for a growing share of their imports of the manufactured goods, which they need to develop their national economy.

The developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America now hold an important place in the network of the Soviet Union's external economic ties, and today they account for almost 13 per cent of Soviet foreign trade, compared with 5 per cent in 1955.

The Soviet Union's trade and economic relations have developed most successfully with the liberated countries that have taken the road of consistently progressive social-economic change, like the U.A.R., the Syrian Arab Republic, and Algeria, with whom the Soviet Union has developed its trade at a fast pace: between 1960 and 1969 trade with Algeria increased from 2 to 107 million rubles; with the United Arab Republic, from 172 to 420 million; and with Syria from 17 million to 77 million rubles.

Relying on the economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the liberated countries which have taken the road of non-capitalist development set out to restructure their relations with the capitalist countries in order to become independent from the imperialist monopolies. This co-operation enables the developing countries to limit the destructive effect on their economies by the laws of the world capitalist economy, and gradually to transform their external economic ties into an effective instrument of national economic growth. The Soviet Union is successfully developing its economic relations with the neighbouring developing countries, including Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan, and also with India. The U.S.S.R. has an important part to play in the foreign trade of a number of countries; for instance, in trade with the U.A.R. and Afghanistan it ranks first, and with India, second.

The Soviet Union tries to organise its economic relations with the developing states in such a way as to promote to the utmost these countries' solution of the vital tasks of national revival. In contrast to the capitalist countries, the U.S.S.R. has never

delivered any goods to the young states that competed with the products of their own industries. The Soviet Union has structured its exports so that Soviet deliveries speed the pace of extended reproduction in the developing countries.

Machinery and equipment are a most important and are one of the most dynamic items of Soviet exports to these countries: from 1955 to 1969, the export of Soviet machinery and equipment went up from 5 million rubles to 565 million rubles. Today, these items account for 37.2 per cent of all Soviet exports to this group of states. The developing countries are now major buyers of Soviet machinery and equipment: in 1969, they took about 24 per cent of all Soviet exports in this line. Among the leading importers of Soviet machinery and equipment are India, the U.A.R., Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Complete enterprises make up the largest share of Soviet machinery and equipment exports. In 1969, these were valued at over 350 million rubles, or more than 62 per cent of the total Soviet machinery and equipment exports to the developing countries.

Apart from complete equipment, the Soviet Union also exports to these countries a wide range of other types of machinery and equipment, and when these are sold on the usual commercial terms Soviet foreign trade organisations allow credits to the developing countries' firms (at about 4 per cent per annum, and repayable in 5-7 years, and in some instances in 10 years).

Among other important items in Soviet exports to the liberated countries are oil and oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, sawn timber, pulp-and-paper goods, and chemical products. The bulk of Soviet exports to these countries consists of goods used for production.

The Soviet Union has become some developing countries' leading supplier of many products. In the last few years, it has accounted for almost 50 per cent of the U.A.R.'s imports of machinery and equipment, 100 per cent of coal and oil products, 60 per cent of crude oil, and over 30 per cent of sawn timber. For India the figures are: over 70 per cent for steam turbines, 60 per cent grain harvesting machinery, 70 per cent, bulldozers, and over 40 per cent for profile-milling machine tools. Soviet deliveries help Iran to cover almost 90 per cent of her import requirements in Portland cement, about 60 per cent in sawn timber, and 50

in pig iron.

Soviet purchases of the developing countries' traditional export products and goods turned out by their national industry are of great importance for these countries. The Soviet Union imports from these countries traditional export products like natural rubber, cotton fibre, skins, oil seeds, vegetable food oils, coffee, cocoa-beans, and fresh and dried fruits.

Manufactures and semi-manufactures are a growing item of Soviet imports from the developing countries. Many of these have pinned their hopes for a solution of their economic development problems on the diversification of exports, notably, an increase of the share of manufactures and semi-manufactures. However, these countries have found it hard to expand their export of manufactures because of the fierce competition from powerful monopoly groups on the world capitalist market. Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union's increasing purchases are becoming a factor in promoting the progressive process of restructuring the one-crop economies of the developing countries into diversified economies.

Already now manufactures and semi-manufactures are an important item among Soviet imports from a number of countries. For India, for instance, they are 45 per cent, and for the U.A.R. and Iran almost 33 per cent. The Soviet Union takes 35 per cent of India's exports of men's shirts, over 50 per cent of the leather footwear, and about 60 per cent of her fruit juices. In 1968/69, the Soviet Union imported 98 per cent of Iran's total export of knitted goods, 87 per cent of her made-up garments, and 85 per cent of her rubber footwear.

The introduction into trade of the new products of the young national industries of the liberated countries not only provides effective support for development in that part of the economy, but also creates a long-term basis, for the further growth of mutual trade.

The U. S. S. R.'s economic relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are not confined to trade. Economic, scientific and technical co-operation is being steadily developed. At present, the Soviet Union has agreements on economic and technical co-operation with 40 developing countries.

In a relatively short period of time, a number of important national-economic projects, erected with the U. S. S. R.'s economic and technical assistance, have appeared on the eco-

economic map of many young states. The existing inter-governmental agreements provide for construction or reconstruction with Soviet assistance of over 700 industrial enterprises and other projects in these countries, of which 340 have already been commissioned.

To pay for the deliveries of complete equipment and technical assistance the Soviet Union has given some developing countries credits totalling over 5,000 million rubles, which are made available at 2.5-3 per cent per annum, with repayments after completion of deliveries or of the running-in of the enterprise. As a rule provision is made for the repayment of Soviet credits with the traditional exports of the developing country, and in some cases with the products that are to be turned out by the enterprises built with Soviet assistance.

In payment of the credits made available and the cost of technical assistance extended, Algeria, for instance, is to deliver to the U. S. S. R. non-ferrous metals and oil, and India, rolled steel, hoisting cranes and reducers. These facts show that the assistance extended by the Soviet Union in developing various branches of the economy in the developing countries helps to change not only the structure of their economy, but also of their exports.

The Soviet Union's economic and technical assistance to the developing countries is of substantial importance for their economic growth, for fuller employment, and, ultimately, for overcoming their economic lag.

Assistance in the development of the national industry is a key line of Soviet economic and technical co-operation with the developing countries, and it accounts for almost 70 per cent of the total volume of Soviet economic and technical assistance to the developing countries. Over one-half of these resources go into the extension of assistance in building enterprises in the heavy industry.

Among the projects completed or being built with Soviet economic and technical assistance are 55 machine-building and metal-working plants, 30 combines, factories and shops in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 31 electric power stations (excluding factory power stations) and 57 enterprises in the light and food industries.

The data on the production capacity of the enterprises which

have been or are being built give an idea of the importance and economic potential of these enterprises. In steel, they produce over 9 million tons a year, rolled metal, approximately 4 million tons, iron ore extraction, almost 7 million tons, coal, 10.5 million tons, oil refining, 11.5 million tons, manufacture of electrical equipment, 3.2 million kw., metallurgical, mining, forging, pressing, hoisting and transport equipment, 150,000 tons. The rated capacity of all the electric power stations which have been or are being built with Soviet assistance comes to approximately 6 million kw. In agriculture, the Soviet Union has extended to the developing countries economic and technical assistance in erecting 151 projects, 6 per cent of the total Soviet credits going into this area.

Important national-economic projects are under construction with Soviet assistance in the sphere of transport and communications, and the scale of geological exploration is being extended. As the economic ties between the Soviet Union and the liberated countries are developed and strengthened, new forms and methods are being found and applied to create a basis for co-operation over a long period, and to make it much more effective. In this respect, production co-operation with some countries for the manufacture on a long-term basis of some types of products and assistance in building projects whose products are of interest not only for the economy of the developing countries, but also for the Soviet national economy, are an important and promising form of co-operation.

The Soviet Union has extended a great deal of assistance to the developing countries in training their own personnel. The problem of training skilled specialists who are dedicated to the national interests is one of the most acute, as the success in making good their technical and economic lag and achieving economic and social progress depends largely on its solution.

With the Soviet Union's help, 118 schools are being built in the developing countries, over 70 of them having already been opened. Thousands of citizens from the developing countries are enrolled at higher and secondary schools in the Soviet Union. In the last few years, Soviet specialists at building sites in the developing countries have helped to train about 200,000 skilled workers and technicians.

Economic co-operation between the U. S. S. R. and the other socialist countries, on the one hand, and the developing countries,

on the other, is of exceptional importance for the latter not only because it helps to create a rational economic structure with a complex of leading enterprises, but because this co-operation is designed to help in forming and developing the state sector.

In some developing countries the state sector, by concentrating peak positions of control over the economy, has become the main instrument for implementing the policy of industrialisation and overcoming the economic and technical lag. Strengthening the state sector is an effective means of rebuilding the old colonial economic structure, mobilising internal resources and of combatting the sway of foreign monopolies.

The trade and economic relations between the U. S. S. R. and other socialist countries, on the one hand, and the developing countries, on the other, have become a powerful means of support for the forces of national liberation in their fight against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and for freedom and economic and social progress.

The vital importance of this factor should not be gauged by quantitative indicators alone; any objective analysis calls for a close tying in of the quantitative indicators with the consequences resulting from the emergence and strengthening of the positions of the world socialist system in the sphere of international economic relations.

Because the developing countries are in a position to obtain from the U. S. S. R. and other socialist countries credits on easy terms, and machinery, equipment and technical know-how on a mutually advantageous basis, their position in the fight against foreign monopoly capital have been markedly strengthened. They have been enabled to make counter demands on the imperialist countries, and to force them to make some concessions, which imperialism has found impossible to resist because of the competition between the two world systems. Consequently, the growing economic co-operation with the socialist states helps to strengthen their hand in international economic relations, and enables them to carry on a more successful struggle to ensure more favourable conditions in their economic relations with the imperialist Powers.

Great importance in this context attaches to the help given by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to the young states in U. N. bodies, their support of the young states' struggle to root out the survivals of colonialism, to establish new, pro-

gressive principles in international economic relations, and to make their external economic ties an effective means of strengthening their own national economies.

The economic co-operation between the U. S. S. R. and other socialist countries has become an important factor in ensuring the developing countries' right to independent development. The successes of economic co-operation with the socialist countries have been scored in stubborn day-to-day struggle against the forces of local reaction in the developing countries themselves, and against imperialism, which is trying to maintain and improve its position in the Third World.

International reaction, taking the form of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, is conducting its propaganda and taking practical action in an effort to discredit the economic co-operation between socialism and the Third World, and to weaken their economic ties. The U. S. S. R.'s economic co-operation with the developing countries is a visible expression of the international duty of the proletariat of the country of triumphant socialism. However, this international duty cannot and does not have anything in common with the attitude sometimes taken by some circles in the developing countries.

The Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, opposes the unilateral demands made by some developing countries in an effort to classify the economically developed states not on the socio-economic principle but by "wealth", dividing all states into two groups: "rich North" and "poor South". This kind of approach does not create any sound basis for developing mutually advantageous co-operation. It only helps the interests of the imperialist Powers, who have to bear the main blame for the plight in which the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America now find themselves, and who hope to throw a part of their blame on the socialist countries.

It is a demand of the times that the developing countries should strengthen their trade and economic co-operation with the U. S. S. R. and the other socialist countries. The utmost development of this co-operation is the real alternative to the neo-colonial schemes of the imperialist Powers and the most important condition for the liberated countries' independent development along the way of social and economic progress.

(Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1971)

THE CRIME OF LOAFING IN SOCIALIST CUBA

Summary: One of Cuba's most consistent economic problems during Castro's first decade has been that of labour productivity and absenteeism. The use of moral and/or material incentives, reliance on emotionally-charged campaigns and the punishments provided by the 1965 Law of Labour Justice have done little to improve the situation. Soon, a Soviet-style "law on loafing" will replace the older Cuban methods of pursuing high labour morale and productivity. The following report deals with the new law and provides a brief background to it.

The Castro regime is about to implement a Soviet-style mechanism designed to do away with the chronic Cuban problem of absenteeism and loafing among the working class. Following years of a "carrot and stick" policy on the matter of labour productivity - sometimes appealing, in moral and material terms, to the Cuban labourers' socialist consciousness, sometimes delivering scathing verbal attacks on "Mongollón", the "lazy bird" - the Cuban authorities will soon be armed with a law on loafing, providing harsh punishment for those committing this crime.

Law of Labour Justice Insufficient

Years of high unemployment throughout the first half of the 20th century, in addition to climatic and cultural factors, had established what can be considered a tradition of low labour productivity in Cuba. With the advent of the Castro regime and its ambitious economic plans (such as a policy of prompt payment of foreign debts, or the 1970 10-million ton sugar harvest goal) and mass mobilizations, the employment picture changed. By the time of the 1970 "granzafra", workers were being recruited with record intensity to participate in some sector of the nation's economic production. Yet even this was not sufficient to meet the demands of Cuba's non-mechanized, agriculturally focused economic commitments. In several speeches, Fidel Castro appealed to the workers to cut down on absenteeism, loafing and simple unemployment, pointing to the role which such "subjective" factors were playing in the

failure to meet economic targets.

Not that Cuba has been without judicial means for dealing with these problems up until the present. In 1962, resolution 5798 was passed, instituting a drive against absenteeism and setting up a table of penalties for those accused of shirking their responsibilities. In 1965, the major Law of Labour Justice (Law No. 1166) was put into effect, setting up the mechanism for dealing with all labour offenders. In a speech broadcast on 27 October 1964 from Havana, Labour Minister Martinez Sanchez described the procedure which would be followed in dealing with those whom he described as "loafers and parasites". If a vagrant worker's immediate administrator meted out a punishment with which he was not in agreement,

..... the worker has 10 days to protest to the labour council (a five-member board of his fellow workers in the plant l.g.) ... The decision by the labour council can be appealed to a higher level, to the appeals council.... The worker can (then) appeal to the labour minister....

The punishments were divided into three classes and included public reprimand and similar forms of moral pressure, salary cuts, transfer to another, less desirable job at the same work center, or, in extreme cases, dismissal. (1) These were basically administrative measures, although harsh ones, and Minister Sanchez, among others, had glowing words of optimism for their prospects of solving Cuba's labour problems.

Draft Text of Law Against Loafing

The introductory passages of the new draft law against loafing indicate just how far short of the mark the Law of Labour Justice fell when it came to disciplining Cuba's labour force. Describing work as a "social duty for all able-bodied men and women", the introduction claims that:

there is a numerically small social stratum that, intent on living as parasites, without working, exhibits anti-social behaviour and provides a bad example for the new generations.

(2)

(1) See Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, New York, 1965, p. 184 ff.

(2) Text published in Granma Weekly Review, 17 January 1971.

Defining in more detail the activities of such parasites, the draft law lists those with no work connections whatsoever, dedicated to a life of idleness and crime; those who try to disguise their lazy ways with occasional work, quitting one job after another; and absentees upon whom all disciplinary measures adopted by the labour councils have no effect.

The seriousness of the situation is suggested in the passage defining the judicial status of an accused parasite in Cuba. In contrast to the Soviet law, (3) the Cuban statute assumes a criminal nature of such offenses:

the working class condemns all forms of loafing as crimes similar to robbery.... and demands that severe and effective measures be taken against those who, every day, around the clock, steal the social and material goods created through the efforts of the working people.

However, a distinction is made between the "crime of loafing" and the "precriminal stage of loafing": the former applies to all able-bodied male citizens (4) who are totally unemployed, the latter to those who have abandoned a job or have chosen not to respond positively to two labour council punishments for unjustified absence from work. However, this section of the law does not, in its present form, provide any further criteria for differentiating between criminal and precriminal loafers, as in the case of the "occasional workers" mentioned above. Should this paragraph stand as written in the final version, there would be much latitude for applying a straight "criminal" interpretation to any given worker's behaviour.

(3) According to at least one manual on Soviet law, "the (anti-parasite) statute is considered to establish only 'administrative' measures and not criminal penalties...." The Soviet statute notes that "If.... signs of a criminal offense are established in (the alleged parasite's) actions, his case shall be sent to agencies of the procuracy". See Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law, Cambridge (Mass.), 1963, p. 291-298.

(4) Strikingly, the Cuban law stipulates on the one hand that "all women from 17 through 55 are presumably physically and mentally fit to work" and thus have a social duty to do so. On the other hand, however, only (and specifically) male citizens are mentioned as potential criminal or precriminal loafers. Apparently, the old adage "a woman's work is never done" applies in Cuba.

"Rehabilitation Centers" to be Instituted

Regardless of the final verdict, however, the same punishment threatens both the criminal and precriminal loafers: that euphemism known as the "rehabilitation center". A criminal loafer will be sent to such a center for from six months to two years, "during which time he will do productive work". He may also be "permitted" to work outside the center (a handy escape clause for forced participation in the annual agony of the sugar harvests). The precriminal loafer will receive a sentence at such a center of not more than one year, under the same conditions. He may, however, instead be sentenced to one year of "surveillance by the workers of his work center and mass organizations in his neighbourhood" while living at home, a typically Cuban manner of dealing with "antisocialists", and a task that would presumably be carried out by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

The length of the sentence meted out, at least in theory, will be somewhat flexible. The court in charge may suspend the implementation of the sentence at any time, depending on the rehabilitation of the guilty party.

On the matter of accusation, the law provides for Cuban-style citizens' justice: the crime "may be reported by any person or mass organization to a unit of the Department of Public Order or other competent authorities". Here, too, the role of the neighbourhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution will be a major one.

Concerning jurisdiction and appeal, the law divides the accused into two groups. Cases of alleged criminal loafers and pre-criminal loafers accused of abandoning a job will be heard by the Regional Appellate Councils and may be appealed to the National Review Council, whose decision will be final. Cases of pre-criminal loafers accused of ignoring two labour council punishments for unjustified absence from work will be heard by the labour councils, then by the "general assembly of workers" at the plant of the accused. Such cases can then be appealed to the Regional Appellate Council, whose decision will be final. The moral pressure inherent in the employment of a general assembly of the accused's comrades is obvious.

But Will It Work ?

Although the law has yet to be instituted, there are preliminary reports that it has already had a certain effect in Cuba. According to one report from Havana, (5) "more than 40,000 Cubans, threatened by a vagrancy law (sic) with up to two years in a labour camp, have recently taken jobs", Labour Minister Jorge Risquet announced. The threat of something as foreign to the Cuban mentality as a Stalinist-style "rehabilitation center" has obviously prompted some of those to whom the law is directed to "join freely" in building socialism in Cuba. However, the threat of sheer force is unlikely to solve the problem of on-the-job productivity, a less blatant - but more significant - menace to Cuban economic progress. And if productivity levels are linked to that subjective phenomenon called "morale", it is doubtful that the new and singularly oppressive law will make a substantial contribution.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

CULTURE

BREZHNEV ON CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Summary: The portions of Brezhnev's speech at the 24th CPSU Congress dealing with cultural affairs are a restatement of the "middle-of-the road" position that has been a hallmark of the general Party line thus far. Balancing criticism of liberal tendencies with a warning to dogmatic elements, it appears the regime is not prepared to tolerate experimentation in either direction. As could be expected, the primary emphasis is still on ideological control, with the secret police serving as an important guardian of ideological purity.

Since Brezhnev's presentation of the Central Committee report at the 23rd CPSU Congress five years ago, many of the practices of the Stalin era have come under increasing criticism "from below", with a corresponding attempt by many Party and government agencies at all levels to contain or suppress this tendency. The phenomena of dissent, trials and demonstrations have now become part of Soviet life, publicized by means of samizdat. While reluctant to draw attention to this fact, official publications have had to admit to the existence of such unorthodox tendencies among "individual members" of Soviet society. At the end of last year, it was even found necessary to publish an authoritative article in Pravda (17 December 1970) criticizing dissidents by name.

In keeping with the regime's predisposition toward controlling rather than allowing the free interplay of ideas, it is not surprising that Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Party Congress contains virtually no proposals that hint at a liberalization of the present attitude toward the creative elements in society. Simultaneously, however, there is also a certain degree of restraint from either the crude attacks against the liberal intelligentsia such as those that have characterized the speeches of Pyotr Shelest, a dogmatic member of the Politburo, or from an overt "rehabilitation" of Stalin and his methods.

Without referring to any persons by name, Brezhnev censures those who gravitate in either direction. The first to be criticized, perhaps an indication of his order of priorities, are those "who

have sought to reduce the diversity of present-day Soviet reality to problems that have irreversibly receded into the past as a result of the work done by the Party to surmount the consequences of the personality cult", undoubtedly a reference to Solzhenitsyn and other members of the intelligentsia who consider it necessary to re-examine the Stalinist past, examine its causes, and prevent its reoccurrence in the future. On the other hand, Brezhnev also takes exception to those extremist writers "who are trying to whitewash the phenomena of the past which the Party has decisively and principally criticized". In a section of his speech dealing with foreign policy, Brezhnev refuses to agree to a Chinese demand that "the line of the 20th Congress", famous for Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, be rejected. Indirectly, therefore, a decision has been taken against the formal rehabilitation, or "white-washing", of the Stalin era. Both, according to Brezhnev, are "attempts to belittle the significance of that which has already been accomplished by the Party and the people. . . . The Party and the people have not and will not be reconciled with attempts, no matter from which side they originate, to blunt our ideological armament, to soil our banner. If a writer slanders Soviet reality, if he assists our ideological enemies in their struggle against socialism, then they deserve only one thing - public scorn". Hence, he clearly equates further attempts, not sanctioned by the regime, either to expose more fully the crimes committed during Stalin's rule or to exhume the man and his policies, with "slander" against "Soviet reality" - a crime punishable under existing Soviet law.

From subsequent remarks, it is apparent that Brezhnev would prefer that the embarrassing episodes of the past be entirely disregarded as subjects for further discussion. Conveniently, he sweeps critical issues aside by affirming without elaboration, that the shortcomings of the past have already been adequately analyzed and surmounted. "The experience of the last few years has convincingly confirmed that the overcoming of the vestiges of the cult of personality (Stalinism) and likewise the subjectivist errors (Khrushchev-ism) have beneficially influenced the general political, and first of all, the ideological situation in the country". Without resolving the question, Brezhnev would like to dismiss it by dictate, yet the question of Stalin and the anxiety felt by many persons over what they

perceive to be a gradual reemergence of Stalinist methods continues to exist as a major theme in samizdat that reaches the West. Significant in this regard is the text of an open letter reportedly sent by the well-known dissident Pyotr Yakir to the 24th Congress in which he warns against "the reappearance of Stalinism in the political, social and cultural life of our country. For the last few years a dangerous tendency towards the rebirth of Stalinist methods of government has become apparent in culture, artistic and historical literature and memoirs, and towards the rehabilitation of Stalin himself, one of the biggest criminals of the 20th century". (1) Far from diminishing as a topic of concern, Yakir reportedly states that alarm at this tendency is felt by "a huge, if not overwhelming, part of our creative, scientific and technical intelligentsia".

While not elaborating on the existence of ideas independent of and frequently contrary to the Party line, Brezhnev's emphasis on the need for continued ideological vigilance is tantamount to an admission that heterodox notions have not been eradicated. The Soviet citizen, according to Brezhnev, lives "in a situation of an unflagging ideological war" which is being conducted against the socialist world by "imperialist propaganda". "All methods affecting the mind that are at the disposal of the bourgeoisie - the press, films, radio - are mobilized in order to mislead people, in order to inculcate a feeling that life under capitalism is almost paradise, in order to slander socialism. The airwaves are literally saturated with all kinds of fabrications about life in our country and in the fraternal socialist countries". The youth of the Soviet Union continue to be among those, according to Brezhnev, who still require ideological regimentation. "It is our duty... to direct the ideological education of youth, to do everything in order that they properly continue the work of their fathers, the work of the great Lenin". Although Stalin's use of mass terror is not likely to be reimposed, it appears that the administrative methods of the secret police will continue to be applied, although in a somewhat restrained and selective fashion, as a means of opposing conflicting ideas. Brezhnev admitted that police agencies will continue to serve the function of guarding ideological purity. "In the conditions of a continuing subversive activity of imperialism, the organs of state security play an important role. During the period under review, their ranks were strengthened by politically mature cadres. The

(1) Reuter/UPI, DPA, 29 March 1971.

Party consistently educates these agencies in the spirit of the Leninist principles of the strict adherence to socialist law, in the spirit of unflagging vigilance in the struggle to guard Soviet society from the activities of harmful elements, from the intrigues of imperialist intelligence agencies". The perpetuation of such a system casts doubt on the veracity of Brezhnev's assurance that "each Soviet person, apparently, senses an improvement in the moral atmosphere in our Party and in our society".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

SOVIET FUTUROLOGISTS CAUGHT BETWEEN DOGMA AND REALITY

by Valeri M. Albert

Summary: Spurred on by the nascent Western science of futurology, Soviet and Communist newspapers have also decided to try their hand, since, they argue, social forecasting is what Marxism is all about. This venture does not, however, appear to be proving very fruitful. Early this year the Prague journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, devoted an entire issue to this topic, and the articles by Soviet and foreign communist authors showed that a genuinely scientific approach is still made well-nigh impossible by the compulsory adherence to dogmas.

Four leading Soviet theoretical journals - Kommunist, Voprosy filosofii, Voprosy ekonomiki and Problemy mirai sotsializma - all began 1971 with various articles dealing with long-range forecasting of social trends, which has also been the subject of a weighty monograph of 448 pages published by the USSR Academy of Sciences at the end of 1970. In it a team of Soviet economists, sociologists and Party theoreticians attempted a critical analysis of the methods and techniques of long-range economic forecasting in the developed capitalist countries, endeavoring to show that this is one of the means by which the bourgeois state tries to actively control social development. The need is apparently felt for imitation of this new science, since Kommunist writes: "Today social forecasting takes many forms and is carried out on a wide scale; it involves

many thousands of scientists, and dozens or even hundreds of organizations throughout the world. . . . It is especially important in the socialist countries" (No. 1, 1971, p. 13).

In deference to the growing keenness of readers to "see into the future", Problems of Peace and Socialism which is published in a variety of languages in Prague and though formally the theoretical and information organ of communist parties of the world, in fact a reliable voice of the CPSU, devoted the entire first issue (No. 1, 1971) this year to the topic. The main impression gained from the articles it contains is that Soviet and other communist ideologists are anxious to conceal the fact that growth of interest in this science has caught them somewhat by surprise. It is claimed that long-range crystal ball gazing is something Marxism can take in its stride, and the editors of Problems of Peace and Socialism write: "Scientifically-based forecasting is a characteristic feature of Marxist-Leninist parties. It is an important tool of the communist party and the socialist state in drawing up economic and social policy, and finding solutions to social problems" (ibid., p. 28) It is also said to fit in with the policy of "involving the masses actively in the march of history".

Soviet theoreticians, although emphasizing that the aims and methods of futurology are quite different in the socialist countries, are caught in a dilemma, however, because in the Soviet world any form of attempt to make scientific forecasts about the future has been severely hampered for decades by rigid Marxist-Leninist shibboleths regarding the laws of social development. Even now the theoretical basis for all Soviet treatment of forecasting of social trends is the tenet that the laws revealed by the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism have made it possible to predict with scientific accuracy the "inevitable end of capitalism and its replacement by a higher, more progressive social system, namely, socialism and communism" (ibid., p. 22). The task of sociological forecasters is merely to give specific shape to the "process of movement toward the general objective" (ibid., p. 30). As one of them puts it:

Sociological forecasting furthers socio-economic strategic planning, the optimal selection of routes and alternatives, which provide the basis for a correctly timed, purposeful and efficient concentration of social forces and a qualitative transformation in the process of achieving the Communist ideal. (ibid.)

This refers to the role of forecasting in countries where the socialist revolution has already taken place. Soviet ideologists also see it as a handy tool in hastening the spread of the socialist system in the capitalist world:

If the potential for carrying on the anti-imperialist struggle and extending the world revolutionary process is to be realized in our time, social forecasting must be developed. This is a most important instrument for stepping up the effectiveness of the revolutionary struggle, at a time when the scientific-technological and social revolutions are ever more closely related and will come to dominate the last three decades of the twentieth century. (ibid., p. 24)

The Soviet contention is that only Marxist-Leninist teaching is presently capable of giving true pointers to the future and indicating the correct paths for development of humanity. For this reason, it might be expected that specialists in this field would be unable to offer any forecasts essentially different from those first sketched by Marx and Lenin. In fact this is far from the case. Futurology, they are quite ready to admit, is emerging as a valid subject of study precisely because it takes account of developments in the social sphere which appear to be running counter to the Marxist-Leninist prescription for the course of history. The economic and socio-political processes taking place in Soviet society, the condition of and prospects for the world communist and workers' movement, developments in capitalism unforeseen by Marxism-Leninism and many other phenomena in the world today are persuading Soviet theorists to adopt a more realistic approach to probable social processes in the future on which can be based economic calculations as well as domestic and foreign policy. It is already, for instance, apparent that the 1961 CPSU Program which predicted that the USSR would be living under communism by 1980 was unduly optimistic, largely because the performance of the economy in fulfillment of the five-year plan has frequently been disappointing. Soviet efforts to catch up with the USA in the latter's headlong technological development drive are still not sufficing, particularly in the field of cybernetics, as is evident to Soviet economists and sociologists.

The Soviet press was given a strong impetus to focus attention on futurology by the appearance in the West of serious works on this topic, the practical worth of which had to be

conceded by some Soviet scholars. In general, however, Soviet critics have labelled such works "weapons in the ideological and political warfare against communism" (Kommunist, No. 1, 1971, p. 14). Even the researches of "progressive" economists and sociologists who also see the collapse of capitalism as inevitable but whose other findings do not coincide with the official Soviet view of the world are rejected as "erroneous" and harmful. Especially dangerous are said to be the "social-reformists", and the "right-wing" and "left-wing" revisionists who acknowledge the advantages of the welfare state, a mixed economy, and "socialism with a human face", thereby distracting the masses from the only correct - Leninist - view of human development (Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 1, 1971, p. 78).

Soviet critics group all these sociologists and economists together with apologists for capitalism who deliberately or otherwise adopt "class positions inimical to socialism and communism". Hence the same journal categorically states that: "Studying and fashioning the future cannot be left to the ruling circles of capitalist countries; one cannot remain passive in face of the danger that the future will be planned, propagandized and destroyed by the class enemy, for his own aims and interests" (ibid., p. 62).

Even now, say Soviet Party theoreticians, sociological forecasting provides an arena for bitter ideological and political struggle between the two opposing world systems, which, they say, will become even more acute. In trying to combat the theories of "bourgeois" and "revisionist" scientists, Soviet theoreticians realize that they cannot stick to threadbare predictions by Marx and Lenin, but, while professing allegiance to these predictions, have to resort to somewhat artful maneuverings to modernize or, as they put it, "creatively develop" Marxist-Leninist theory. The article by the Soviet economist Anatoli Shapiro (Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 1, 1971) is a case in point. Capitalist economic trends and their socio-political consequences, reports Shapiro, are presently the subject of investigation by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for World Economics and International Relations. Its aim is to study the capitalist economy and determine long-term growth rates, volumes and structure of the main macro-economic indices. Without refuting the Marxist tenet insisting on the uneven and cyclical development of capitalism,

Shapiro nevertheless introduces certain correctives to the former claims of Soviet theoreticians about the inevitable crises of over-production in the capitalist economy, which were expected to occur with ever greater frequency, shaking ever more deeply the foundations of bourgeois society. The postwar years, however, have seen a considerable "qualitative leap" in the development of productive forces throughout the capitalist world, rates of economic growth have been high, which have given rise to a "new wave of rehabilitation for the aid of the bourgeois society as a system offering universal prosperity" (ibid., p. 55). Shapiro considers that it would be erroneous to think that these new features are temporary. According to the estimates made by the Institute of World Economics, the average annual growth rates of industrial production in capitalist economies over the coming five-year period will amount to approximately 5-6.3 percent (4-5 percent for the USA and West Germany; 3.5-5 percent for Great Britain and 11-13 percent for Japan) (ibid., p. 58). Shapiro comments:

Naturally the forecasts shown in the table are only provisional. Nevertheless, in our opinion they reflect the main trends for the future development of the capitalist economy. In the immediate future, in all probability, capitalist growth rates will not slow down in relation to the previous period. (Ibid.)

A similar view is presented by Philip Bart, a member of the U.S. Communist Party National Committee, in his article entitled "The Two World Systems Today and Tomorrow":

It would offend one's sense of reality to expect imperialism to grow economically weaker with each passing year. The dialectical development of the modern world is such that, although from the general standpoint of the general balance of forces on a world scale, the position of imperialism is weakening, its absolute potential in comparison with previous stages is still growing. (ibid., p. 46)

Without assuming a rapid victory of socialist countries in economic competition with capitalism, or hazarding any guess as to the specific dates for achieving this victory, as the Soviet leaders were prone to do at one time, Bart suggests that the "ideological struggle will have an even greater effect on the antagonistic course of the two systems" (ibid., p. 48), whereas

until recently Soviet theoreticians were of the opinion that the main guarantee of the victory of socialism over capitalism would be the outcome of the economic struggle between the USSR and the USA. Bart attempts to depict the image of the world toward the end of the century, but he, like his Soviet colleague, Shapiro, refrains from speculating whether a world socialist revolution will have taken place by the end of the century. He only ventures to say that the "end of the twentieth century will bring great successes for socialism in its world-wide fight against a historically obsolete social system". Shapiro is even more reserved on this score: while stressing that the objective preconditions for increasing economic growth rates for capitalism are present, he concludes by cautiously asserting that capitalism will retreat and gradually surrender its positions in the competition with socialism.

One of the most interesting articles in the issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism under discussion is by V. Glushkov, Director of the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Entitled "Cybernetics and Social Forecasting", this article is somewhat heretical in its failure to support claims made only recently by other Soviet theoreticians about the possibilities for employing cybernetics and computers in futurological studies. Glushkov quite reasonably notes that no prognoses regarding social systems, unlike mechanical systems, can be absolutely exact. However, he considers that "use of sufficiently complex models which take the maximum possible number of factors into account, enable one to make social forecasting an effective instrument for solving specific tasks of social development" (*ibid.*, p. 37). He also agrees that without applying computer technology it is impossible to take account of the myriad factors needed for genuinely scientific prediction, and he rejects all doubts on this score. Possibly such doubts have been raised by the Party theoreticians who constantly stress that forecasting of social trends is only possible when made in conformity with the Party line and using Marxist-Leninist methodology. A computer, however, is not privy to Party attitudes and cannot be programmed to turn out the desired prediction upon request.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich)

ATTACKS ON "BOURGEOIS MORALITY"

One of the apparent signs of a return to the practice of the 1950s in Czechoslovakia is the increasing number of attacks on bourgeois morality and concepts of sex which, it is maintained, were artificially transposed into every category of art and into the literary and illustrated periodicals during the Prague Spring. For example, Jaroslav Kucera said recently over Radio Prague: "An analysis of these periodicals makes it clear that the superficial problems of bourgeois society, exaggerated sex, social scandals, un-Marxist interpretations of the youth problem, sensationalism, and mysticism predominate in them". (Radio Prague, 25 March 1971)

At the end of 1969 similar arguments were used against one of the most important Czech literary monthlies, Sesity pro Literaturu, Tvorba (22 October 1969) accused this periodical of publishing Western pornography (The Quiet Days in Clichy, by Henry Miller, and The Eighth Letter from Cappadocia, by Samuel Lewis), and of inoculating the youth (Sesity was a periodical for young authors) with decadent and immoral Western trends. After this criticism the publication of Sesity was discontinued.

The important Slovak literary publication Revue Svetovej Literatry was also attacked in the central press organ of the Slovak CP, Pravda (7 October 1970), for propagating decadent Western morality. Pravda alleged that eroticism, modeled on the American magazine Playboy, was the mainstay of this periodical.

In another attack in Pravda the author Vladimir Slavcansky asked, in an article entitled "Alien Ideas and an Alien World", why the editorial staff continued to mystify readers about the state and development of world literature. "Of late it has become the fashion to accept nonsocialist ideas about the arts and literature as dicta of general validity", Slavcansky wrote. "Kafka is described as the apostle of modern art. . . . indeed the editorial office has believed in false prophets and false ideas. We ask: Why, in its selections from world literature, does the editorial office deliberately accumulate this mass of social trash, moral cannibalism, and perversity?" (Pravda, 21 November 1970).

Kucera declared in his latest radio commentary, speaking in categorical terms, that it was no longer possible to tolerate the propagation of bourgeois models, and particularly meaningless imitation of them. He said that it was necessary to find new ways, and that "the creative writers will prove their constructive attitude toward socialism only when they find new socialist forms and new esthetic and ideological values" (Radio Prague, 25 March 1971).

To date the only remedy these new moralists have discovered is to take sharp administrative measures against individual artists, periodicals, and entire associations of artists, methods which are reminiscent of the practices of the 1950s.

HIGHER SALARIES FOR "COMMITTED" JOURNALISTS

At the beginning of this year the Czech Minister of Culture, Miloslav Bruzek, and his deputies declared on several occasions in statements in the press and on the radio that it was essential for cultural workers of every category to demonstrate a greater degree of political commitment and to contribute in this way to the successful conclusion of the so-called normalization process.

New regulations dealing with the salaries of journalists working as editors were recently issued which are designed to reward political commitment. On 1 February 1971 a new salary scale for Czechoslovak journalists came into force, and its political intentions emerge from an analysis by Jaroslav Trobl, the secretary of the salary co-ordination commission at the Center of Journalists of the CSSR (Novinar, No. 2, February 1971). Trobl said that the aim of the new scales was "to support by material incentives the political commitment of journalists in the decisive mass information media and to enable their editors-in-chief to grant clear salary advantages to those newsmen who commit themselves on behalf of the policies of the Party".

The method used in this new salary system is reminiscent of the practices which prevailed from 1948 until February 1952. At that time it was chiefly non-Communist newspapers and periodicals which were affected. After the Communist take-over in February 1948, the non-Communist Parties of the National Front and the mass organizations still had their own dailies and

weeklies in every regional town. However, after the great purges in these journals (at that time purges were not, as yet, carried out in the Communist press) and also because they had lost their own political programs, editorial office staffs were incomplete and there was little activity conforming to the new political situation. In these days editors-in-chief were entitled to give preference to committed journalists in the same manner as is provided by the new salary rules, and even freelance contributors were included in these benefits.

The new rules are intended to induce journalists to regard themselves as responsible political workers who should endeavor actively and in a committed manner to support the policies of the Party and the normalization process through their creative efforts. From the wage-political point of view the new salary regulations are designed to establish a method of remuneration that underwrites the political aims of the CPCS.

The new scales apply to some 4,700 journalists working in the press, radio, and television. Their basic pay is now fixed in accordance with the social importance of their work, and they are classified in five grades depending on the political importance of the individual information medium.

The authority of the editor-in-chief in this field is demonstrated by the fact that he has the right to make a temporary or a permanent reduction in the basic salary of a journalist who neglects his duties, or to transfer him to a lower job. The appointment of journalists to their posts and the determination of their basic salaries will also be the privilege of the editor-in-chief or his deputy. According to Trobl, a lack of political engagement on the part of a newly hired journalist may be reflected in a low commencing salary: this will at the same time help the editor-in-chief to create a fund for special political awards. Journalists who are politically strongly committed may be accorded by the editor-in-chief or his deputy a "personal salary" in lieu of basic salary, which may exceed by up 50 per cent, the upper limit for the basic salary valid for the group of the person concerned.

The new salary regulations also cover technical and administrative practices, such as bonuses for substitution, overtime pay, or remuneration for extra work.

A separate sector is that of rewards and shares. The new salary schedule introduces three kinds of rewards designed

to act as incentives. First, there are rewards for the successful performance of duties and exceptional efficiency; secondly, rewards for writing engaged journalistic, socio-political, and politico-economic material and programs which help to put across the Party political line; and thirdly, there are shares in over-all economic results. The new salary regulations will be introduced and put into effect step by step. They are an indication of the Party's eagerness - and difficulties - in enlisting the support of this section of the intelligentsia.

It is the editorial secretaries and the trade union organizations in the editorial offices who are to assist in the introduction of the new system. To assist them a commentary in booklet form is to be published in the next few days by the Novinar publishing house in Prague.

GDR REFUSES ALLOTTED NUMBER OF OLYMPIC TICKETS

In a preview of the 1972 Olympic Games, the East Berlin sports' paper Deutsches Sportecho remarked recently that the circumstances surrounding the forthcoming Olympics will make it more difficult for GDR sportsmen to represent "their socialist homeland in a dignified way". The paper recalled the previous games in Mexico City, and explained:

Our sportsmen will draw strength and self-confidence from the conviction that, just as then, millions will be with them. At that time, the bridge of togetherness between home and the far-away stadiums, from the American continent to the GDR grew daily. As the athletes fought for medals, numerous friends, relatives, acquaintances and unknown persons were with them. When ovations were presented to the magnificent Roland Matthes upon his return at the Erfurt railroad station, he pointed to the immense crowd as (being) a symbolic bridge and said: "We always felt this sympathy in Mexico. It has helped us immensely. . . ."

The 1972 Olympic games are scheduled to take place in Munich, a city just a few hours away from the GDR's borders. Tens of thousands of East Germans could, if allowed by the regime, personally encourage their team during various events.

In order to make it possible for East Germans to view the games in person, the International Olympic Committee has allotted 100,000 entrance tickets to the GDR. In addition to this

fixed number, the organizational committee for the Munich games has declared its readiness to grant East Germany as many tickets as it would require. However, the GDR National Olympic Committee ordered only 19,000 tickets from Munich, less than one fifth of what has been made available. In contrast, Switzerland, whose team's chances of earning medals are certainly less than that of the GDR, has already expressed a desire for tickets surpassing the 100,000 quota. The reason for the GDR's modesty lies in the regime's traditional reluctance to allow its citizens travel outside the communist world. By GDR standards Munich is not much nearer than Mexico City.

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR STUDY ABROAD

The tradition of Hungarians studying abroad is of several centuries' standing; even in the Middle Ages they were to be found in Italian, French, Polish, Dutch, Czech, and German university towns. The postwar change of regime in Hungary brought with it far-reaching changes in the scholarship system, and the majority of those studying abroad now do so in the East, while only a handful of students are enrolled in Western universities.

The scholarship system is completely covered by agreements between states and tuition and living expenses are included on a basis of reciprocity. Since 1968 the National Scholarship Council has selected the students who are sent to foreign universities. The Council is supervised by the Ministry of Culture - which is the ultimate executive authority - and deals with the day by day business of scholarship students (see Magyar Hirlap, 8 November 1970).

Basically speaking there are two types of scholarship. The first provides stipends for university entrants coming from high school and covers them until they graduate. The second is for those who need a postgraduate qualification in a field in which they have already achieved an academic degree or professional prominence.

The main criterion in selecting a field for a student to work in is that it should be one in which Hungary offers no facilities for study, and a secondary requirement is that it should have professional standards which are higher than at home. A little publicized reason for the state's interest in foreign study is

that it helps to decrease the overcrowdedness of Hungarian universities (see Magyar Hirlap, 13 October 1970).

The great majority of students who are selected to study abroad go to Soviet universities. In November 1970, 1,300 Hungarian students were studying in 82 different universities or higher educational institutions in 18 Soviet towns. A survey of the Academy of Sciences disclosed that between 1952 and 1966, some 2,247 Hungarian students graduated from foreign universities, including 1,914 in the Soviet Union. No specific figures have been released on those studying in other socialist countries, but their number runs into hundreds. (No students in this category are sent to the West.)

Much less information is available on the number of graduates studying abroad, and what is available applies only to Western countries. Tibor Vadasz, secretary of the National Council of Scholarships, declared last September (see Magyar Nemzet, 27 September 1970) that at present Hungary has cultural and scientific agreements with 20 Western or developing countries covering the training of postgraduates. These agreements are based on reciprocity and provide for total scholarships for 2,000 "months" in each direction. These 2,000 months may be broken down into weeks if necessary. In contrast to the opportunities available for study in the socialist bloc, these agreements provide only for individual scholarships for a limited time.

Curiously enough, full statistics are available only in respect of scholarship holders who study at the Hungarian Papal Institute in Rome. The Catholic weekly Uj Ember disclosed on 22 November 1970 that during the 1970-71 academic year the Bench of Bishops had sent eight priests to Rome. Their names and fields of study were stated.

Precise data for other fields and other countries are lacking, but it is reasonable to guess that the number of scholarship holders sent to the West is at most 10 in any one country. There is no information as to whether West Germany is included in the scheme.

It appears from the survey by the Academy of Sciences that the resettlement of students who have studied in the Soviet Union or in some other socialist country is not without its problems:

14.7 per cent of the students who have graduated there have complained of being unable to obtain suitable jobs, and 30.6 per cent of those who completed their courses in 1964 declared that they acquired no specialist knowledge which they could not have got equally well in a Hungarian scientific institute. Most of them feel that their studies abroad have been useful mainly because it enabled them to learn a foreign language.

In order to improve the present situation and to diminish the gap between Hungary's needs and the studies pursued by students abroad, the regime intends to make the selection system of specialists more rigorous and exacting and to co-ordinate the exact needs of ministries and other important state organs. A decree regulating the position of scholarship holders is in preparation, but it is not known when it will be published, since the authorities concerned are still uncertain of the best course to follow.

DETECTIVE STORIES - WITHOUT CONSIDERATION FOR GENRE

The popularity of detective stories is obvious. Sociologists say that the readers' interest in them increases year by year. But this popularity also has another aspect. There is a widely held opinion that this kind of literature is trivial, "second rate". What are the grounds for an opinion of this kind? What are the difficulties that the writers of detective stories have to contend with? What are their views about the lines along which the detective story will develop? These questions were discussed at a Literary Gazette "round table". (There follows a list of the writers, etc. taking part).

A. Bezzulov. Our genuine heroes, members of the criminal investigation organisation, operate in accordance with a fixed programme. Their rank badges and their outward appearance may be different, but they all live outside of any conditions of time or space. If foreign names were substituted in the story, nobody would guess what characters the story describes. Such stereo-type repeating itself in the book market has given rise to a contemptuous attitude towards the whole of a certain literary trend. It is publications of this type which have discredited the whole of a literary genre.

I am not attracted by the tendencies of recent years, when the heroes of detective stories are depicted as successful

individuals who solve any of the problems with which they are faced out of hand and without any difficulty. As an example I can name "A watch for Mr. Kelly" by A. and G. Vainer. Real life is a far more complicated problem, and it is our artistic duty to show up these difficulties.

Y. Klarov. It is well known that up to the war, there was no big distribution of detective stories in our country. It is only recently that there has been a big expansion. There is a good natural reason for this. Speaking plainly, the detective story is the one which corresponds most closely to the rhythm of life today. I have moved among many audiences and discussed matters with a large number of people, and now I can say with complete conviction that schoolboys of the senior classes are not going to read Leskov, although he holds the reputation of being a classic. I know that there are many of the works of Turgenev which the youth of today does not want to read. In any case, whole pages of description of landscapes will be passed over, because they are out of tune with the tempo of modern life. The detective story, on the other hand, is far more dynamic and will therefore attract more and more readers as the years go by.

A. Adamov. I want to express a serious reproach to the critics. Even the most highly qualified among them frequently display such an amazing ignorance of the material, of the nature of the genre, that one is left gasping. In the published book reviews there is often a completely superficial judgement of the detective story as something naturally second-rate, from which nothing is to be expected. And that at a time when a large group of young writers, who may be young but have already given proofs of high quality work, people like P. Shestakov, A. Bezgulov, Y. Klarov, L. Slovin and the Vainer brothers, have made their appearance in literature.

I found suprising the assertions of V. Smirnov and N. Leonov about the right of the detective story to avoid mention of world problems. In essence, they are providing grounds for the production of cheap stereotypes.

M. Maklyarsky. I also should like to voice my complaint against the literary experts. It is well known that the designation "detective story" came from the West. When the critics use it, they bring into its field anything that is written about invest-

igations into crime, intelligence agents, frontier guards, etc. But if we examine the foreign detective story, we find that Soviet writers employ a totally different method, dealing with quite different subjects. Why do we have to go on bearing the crushing burden labelled "detective literature"? How nice it would be to eliminate this label entirely out of our vocabulary.

A. Vainer. In general, I agree with M. Maklyarsky. That word has become so badly debased that it would be a good thing to eliminate it altogether. It seems to me that we should not go on discussing the existence of detective literature. What we should consider is the fact that, at the present time, many writers are producing literature which has for its subject crime and the means of discovering the criminals.

M. Polyakov. Arkadi Adamov is right when he says that today the critics make no distinction in their assessment of detective literature. The situation which has developed reminds me of the time when the critics adopted a similar scornful attitude in respect of science fiction. After all, only a matter of some ten years ago it was impossible to hope that even the most highly gifted work of science fiction would be published. The same thing applies to detective literature today. No distinction is made between writers who produce really serious literature and those who turn out pot boilers.....

Take an example which will be familiar to all of you. After reading three stories about Sherlock Holmes, any ordinary thinking person can forecast exactly how the fourth story will be composed. He knows the pattern that every subsequent story will follow. But why is it that after reading one story you are still interested in reading the next one? The answer is that each time the mystery helps to show up some new aspects of the moral character of the hero. In one story Sherlock Holmes possesses the gifts of a scientist. The next one throws light on his knightly attitude towards women. A third one gives an idea of his relations with his family, and so on. Every time there appears some ethical problem, and it is that which explains the real secret of the success of Conan Doyle. The point is that every moral problem, the whole social-psychological aspect, should find an extremely acute form of expression. That is to say that the structure of a detective story should embody exactness and good form in the way in which it is composed.

G. Brovman. Deserved reproach has been expressed here today against the critics. But, all the same, let us look the truth straight in the face. It is not criticism which will put things right, or government orders, or the rulings of highly placed authorities. The literature itself can and must establish its right to speak for itself.

Editorial Summing-up. So, on the one hand, there is a big demand from the reading public for detective stories. On the other hand among a considerable section of the readers and the critics, there is growing dissatisfaction with the artistic level of a great number of the stories in the detective literature genre. It would seem to us that the gist of this paradox was given by N. Toman, when he said that a big demand on the part of the readers creates the danger of pot boiling. If they read our stories, it means that we write well. So long as a story is "interesting, attractive", nothing else matters. How serious that danger is, is shown by the fact that statements have been made at this "round table" which have tried to provide "theoretical" grounds for the view that if something is "interesting and attractive", nothing else matters. Thus, V. Smirnov and N. Leonov, dealing with the specific peculiarities of the detective literature genre, said outright that it is incapable of raising any social problems. As they see it, detective literature is not subject to the general standards which apply to artistic literature. Naturally, the majority of the members of the "round table" opposed this point of view.

It seems to us that Y. Klarov's attempt to present the detective genre and its "dynamics" as being some kind of "sign of the times" is equally unacceptable. Surely, the social, philosophical, psychological novel, which shows up in full detail the character and the life of its subjects against a broad social background, is not in contradiction with our times? The exact opposite is the case. It is this type of book which arouses profound and lasting interest in the reader, and which becomes an event in literature. Obviously, it is equally wrong to adopt the view, expressed no doubt in the heat of polemics, that Leskov and Turgenev are "unreadable" and that the classic writers have become outdated.

What are the conclusions that are to be drawn from the discussion? The editors of periodicals and the publishing houses must apply to the detective genre the same degree of

ideological-artistic exigence that they apply to other genres of artistic prose. (Incidentally, special attention should be devoted to translated works. Foreign detective stories reach the readers in enormous quantity, and frequently, they are samples of very poor literary quality.)

It is obvious that in its best form the Soviet detective story is fully entitled to a place in our literature. It is capable of raising and carrying out an investigation into problems of social significance, capable of instructing the citizen-reader of our socialist Fatherland.

Equally obvious are the growing pains of this genre, and the numerous complicated problems still to be solved by the writers adopting this style of literature. This is why the Editors have the intention to continue the discussion which was started at our "round table".

(Literary Gazette, Moscow)

TOWARD THE LAST CIRCLE: SHOLOKHOV AND CHAKOVSKY
SPEAK AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

Summary: Two representatives of the official Soviet literary community, Mikhail Sholokhov and Aleksander Chakovsky, were among the delegates to the 24th CPSU Congress. The views which they express concerning literature and the arts are distinctly conservative in nature, favoring subordination of artists to Party, literature to ideology and artistic license to discipline. The re-election of Sholokhov to full membership and the election of Chakovsky to candidate membership in the Central Committee is a strong indication that such views are official regime policy.

Following Brezhnev's lead, delegates to the 24th CPSU Congress expressed comments on literature and cultural affairs in general, that are distinctly conservative in nature. Primary emphasis is devoted to subordinating the creative intelligentsia to the will of the Party, reducing the purpose of their creation to that of an ideological weapon, eliminating the possibility of compromise with or toleration of proscribed ideas, and suggesting that disobedience results in punitive action.

It is appropriate that Mikhail Sholokhov and Aleksander Chakovsky, the only two writers to speak at the congress and both representatives of the conservative point of view amongst the official literary community, were chosen to convey this message.

Both have traditionally been leading critics against liberal writers and have been among the most outspoken supporters of the regime. At the time of the trial of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel - the first major attempt by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to suppress attempts at freedom of expression - Sholokhov, several weeks after the trial, implied that execution without trial would be an appropriate fate

for the defendants, (1) while Chakovsky called for a "more severe punishment" than the total of twelve years in concentration camps meted out to the two writers. (2) Moreover, Chakovsky, as editor of the All-Union Writers Union Weekly - Literaturnaia Gazeta - is ultimately responsible for the numerous articles that have appeared in the newspaper attacking Sinyavsky and Daniel, other dissident elements and, very recently, Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

The Pre-eminence of the Party over the Artist

Both Chakovsky and Sholokhov, each in their own way, reinforce the conservative view that the Party is the decisive authority in literary affairs, superceding the role of the writer, and attempt to dispel any notion that literature in the Soviet Union can exist independent of Party control. Sholokhov even goes so far as to entirely eclipse the contribution of the writer and gives sole credit to the Party not only for the achievements of Soviet literature but for its very existence.

If it were not for the Party, which assembled us at this congress, our literature would not have had any successes, there would not be a Soviet literature. (3)

Chakovsky employs a different tack, although the message is the same. Adopting the role of an apologist for the regime, he recapitulates the formative period of the present regime's cultural policy, provides an interpretation that is heavily weighed in favor of firm Party control over literature and warmly approves the conservative policies adopted. Without mentioning

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- (1) At the 23rd CPSU Congress, Sholokhov lamented their lenient punishment, but in doing so also shed interesting light on the quality of Soviet justice in the 1920s: If these crafty lads with black consciences were around during the memorable 1920s, when people were tried not on the basis of the strictly demarcated articles of the Criminal Code but "guided by a revolutionary sense of justice," oh, these turncoats would have received a different kind of punishment. (XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Moscow, 1966, p. 358.
 - (2) The English translation of Chakovsky's comments in Literaturnaia Gazeta in the spring of 1968 is in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), In Quest of Justice. London, 1970, pp. 379-384.
 - (3) Pravda, 4 April 1971.

Khrushchev by name or elaborating the preliminary steps in the direction of the de-Stalinization taken during his rule, he points to the unsettling effect of the "thaw" on Party functionaries and conservative stalwarts who, rigidly bound to the totalitarian system formed under Stalin's rule and associated with his name, were unable to cope with the erosion of that system.

..... in the years prior to the 23rd Congress of our Party (i. e. prior to March, 1966) we, writers-communists, non-Party literateurs, very much wanted clarification in several important ideological questions, consistency, the liquidation of that voluntarist turbulence of which we had had our fill and of which we, frankly speaking, had become thoroughly tired during those years. (4)

Instead of describing the acute crisis of conscience and the search for a reappraisal of values that was characteristic of such writers as Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, Paustovsky and Tvardovsky, Chakovsky adopts the conservative position that writers sought ideological guidance rather than critical self-examination. Justifying the increase in Party control over the arts that has continued to be the present regime's policy for the last six years, he states approvingly that

The 23rd (Party) Congress and subsequent Party documents concerning ideological questions introduced this so-indispensable clarity.

It should be noted that the "clarity" introduced under the new regime at the 23rd Congress took the form of an endorsement of the punishment levied against the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel, an attack against Alexander Solzhenitsyn's A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, heavy criticism against the liberal journals Novy Mir and Yunost' and a clear indication that criticism of the "personality cult" was to be restricted. The essence of subsequent policy has been selective repression against uncompromising members of the intelligentsia and a quarantine on the Stalin issue imposed by a Central Committee plenum in April 1968 which declared the "consequences of the personality cult" officially liquidated. Arguing in the spirit of this trend,

(4) Pravda, 6 April 1971.

Chakovsky repeats criticism of "persons and works that bear the influence of bourgeois ideology, that distort Soviet reality and lasciviously flirt with our class enemies", dogmatically asserts that the decisions of the Party and its Central Committee on the manner in which the state is to be ruled are "the only correct method" and repeats Brezhnev's stricture against tampering with the subject of Stalinism. By depicting Party decisions under the present leadership as consistently correct while pointing to grievous errors of judgement committed by members of the creative intelligentsia, Chakovsky conveys the impression that the Party alone is indispensable and infallible and that the development of literature in the Soviet Union is possible only under the direction of the Party. Sholokhov succinctly expresses this view when he says:

Only our Party and the most noble ideas which guide it are capable of fusing into one the thousands of creative lives, beginning with Maxim Gorky and ending with the present-day thriving, young writers, and placing them at the service of the people, at the service of their interests.

Literature as an Ideological Weapon

In addition to this insistence on a guardian-ward relationship between the Party and the artist, both speakers further limit the confines within which a writer in the Soviet Union can exercise his talent. Frequently using military metaphors, they depict the writer as a soldier engaged in mortal combat with the ideological enemy and reduce the function of literature to that of a weapon. The mobilization of culture in para-military fashion quickly dispels the idea that the function of art is to provide an aesthetic rather than a propagandistic purpose. Indeed, according to Sholokhov, the quality of literature is to be measured by the purity and quantity of its ideological content. He proudly asserts:

It is generally recognized, that our literature - is the most ideological literature. Name one country whose literature can compete with ours in this regard. One can boldly assert that there is no such country in the world and there is no such literature.

While the utilitarian concept of aesthetics is routine Soviet

fare, Chakovsky adds the more extreme touch that a reconciliation of views, ostensibly between the socialist and capitalist worlds but also including nonconformist members of other communist parties ("renegades and revisionists of all shades" says Sholokhov), is impossible.

Since it would be inconvenient to admit that non-conformist views also spring from domestic sources, Chakovsky points to external sources such as foreign newspapers and radio stations. Yet at least one other delegate strongly implies that incorrect views, in particular nationalistic sentiments, are not only persistent, but are home-grown as well. I.I. Bodyul, the Moldavian Party First Secretary admitted that:

..... there is still a penetration into literature and art of works that reflect socialist reality in a distorted manner, and that are far-removed from the vital problems that concern Soviet people. One cannot, for example, consider normal the enthusiasm of some workers in the field of art for the archaic past, for the glorification and poetization in their works of customs and traditions that are long since obsolete, for contrasting them to our present-day, which they not infrequently depict in a prejudiced manner recognizing only the negative aspects of it. Gambling on the respectful attitude of the people for the past, on the feeling of national distinctiveness, the authors of such works in essence propagate the idea of a non-class, uncritical perception of the past and in so doing create the conditions for the activation of harmful remnants, especially amongst the youth, lay the soil for the penetration of points of view and attitudes alien to us into the consciousness of the people. (5)

Still concentrating on the foreign enemy, however, Chakovsky projects the vision of a mortal foe, and warns that the struggle will not cease.

..... while two antagonistic social systems exist, while the ideological battles thunder and the possibility of the penetration of bourgeois ideology into our sphere is not excluded.

The debilitating effect on the quality of literature under such a policy becomes apparent when he describes the type of books he considers suitable for emulation:

(5) Pravda, 4 April 1971.

..... books, infused with the spirit of militant party-mindedness, distinguished by high artistic merit.... books, that are a doubtless contribution to the literary Leniniana, novels, tales and poems in which the popular roots of the Great October (revolution) are portrayed. These are works that comprise the artistic chronicle of the revolutionary transformation of the country of the 1920s and heroic 1930s, books dedicated to the great strides of the party and the people during the Fatherland War and reflecting the glorious achievements that call forth the admiration of all civilized humanity. The heavy emphasis on self-congratulation to the exclusion of everything else is reminiscent of the sterility imposed on literature during the heyday of "socialist realism".

Critics Discouraged

Faced with intransigent writers and dissidents of various, but unacceptable points of view, the regime has taken sundry measures to decrease the incidence of non-conformity. On the eve of the 24th Congress, moral blackmail was again employed against Alexander Solzhenitsyn, (6) while writer and dissident Vladimir Bukovsky was arrested the day before the congress and faces the prospect of several years incarceration in prison or concentration camp. (7) Doubtlessly eager to silence critics, both Sholokhov and Chakovsky choose disparagement and social ostracism as their means of castigation. Although they refrain from identifying the object of their attacks by name, the former, repeating Brezhnev's phraseology, critically refers to writers "who deserve public scorn" while Chakovsky, in a thinly-veiled attack on Solzhenitsyn, criticizes "those few renegades who exchanged the dignity of a Soviet citizen for cheap popularity in the camp of our class enemies", and raises the spectre of the ubiquitous enemy as a rationale for suppressing all criticism:

(6) The monthly of the RSFSR Writers' Union is reported to have accused him of being an "internal emigre in the service of slippery and unpraiseworthy anti-Sovietism". (UPI, 31 March 1971).

(7) For reports on his arrest and speculation on his fate. see UPI, AFP. 2 April and the Washington Post, 3 April 1971.

..... at writers' congresses, at joint plenums of creative societies, at numerous meetings with toilers which were especially frequent prior to the 24th Party Congress, literateurs and artists..... (know) that they will be heard not only by their friends but also by foreign enemies who follow their every word in the hope of "profit"....

A strong indication that the conservative views expressed by Sholokhov and Chakovsky are favored by the regime is the re-election of the former as a full member of the Central Committee and the elevation of Chakovsky from an ordinary Party member to that of a candidate member of the Central Committee.

It appears that "public scorn" and the brand of a traitor are the semantic limitations of these two prominent delegates. Yet the real threat of an intensification of physical punishment against non-conformist elements - be they writers or no - is not far removed. A provincial Party secretary from the Caucasus, also a delegate at the congress, expresses an intolerant attitude toward "drifters", "drunks", "speculators", "thieves", "parasites" and "hooligans" (accusations which are not infrequently used by officials to arrest and silence lesser-known dissidents). (8) criticized "instances of indulgence and liberalism" in the treatment of such types, and rejected out-of-hand any potential arguments for clemency that might be founded on principle or humanitarian grounds:

.... one must not be afraid that someone will accuse us of being undemocratic or of inhumaneness. Self-discipline and discipline in our society are the highest category of socialist humanism. (9)

(8) It should be recalled that the writer Andrei Amalrik was sentenced to 2 1/2 years exile in Siberia with obligatory physical labor in 1964 on the charge of being a "parasite". See "Andrei Amalrik: An Individualist on Trial", CAA 11 November 1970, by GvD. A similar charge with a sentence of five years hard labor was levelled against the poet Yosif Brodsky in 1964.

(9) Pravda. 2 April 1971.

BOOKS

VUKMANOVIC DESCRIBES HIS LAST MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV; HOW RANKOVIC "BUGGED" TITO'S BEDROOM

Summary: Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the former chief of the Yugoslav TU organization, recently published his memoirs. In them - among other things - he describes his last talk with Nikita Khrushchev in the summer of 1963 at which time he saw a completely broken man. In another part of his memoirs Vukmanovic tells the story of the former Yugoslav police chief and Tito's heir apparent Aleksandar Rankovic, who had had concealed microphones installed not only in Tito's office but in his bedroom as well.

In his memoirs which have recently appeared in Belgrade in two volumes under the title Revolution on the Move, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, 59, once Yugoslavia's top Party leader (now in retirement), also describes his experience as a high-ranking Yugoslav Party and state leader. Parts of Vukmanovic's memoirs appeared in the Belgrade daily Politika. In the last few issues of this paper, (1) Vukmanovic tells of his last meeting in the Kremlin with Nikita Khrushchev and how Aleksandar Rankovic, once the omnipotent police chief of Yugoslavia (purged in July 1966) "bugged" Tito's bedroom.

At the end of 1961 Vukmanovic headed a Yugoslav TU delegation which took part in the work of the Fifth Congress of the World Federation of TUs. Before leaving for Moscow, the Yugoslav TU organizations published a document titled the "Theses" on the basis of which the Yugoslavs were ready to collaborate with other TU organizations in communist countries. Vukmanovic and his colleagues were received coolly in Moscow because the "Theses" insisted that the TU organizations be independent and that no interference in the internal affairs of individual national federations be tolerated.

In the Congress hall, says Vukmanovic, "no delegation from any socialist country found it necessary to talk with us".

(1) Politika, Belgrade, the issues of 14, 19, 20 and 21 March 1971.

Vukmanovic was not even elected to the Congress' Presidium. "It was obvious that it had been decided that we should be ignored", the Yugoslav leader says. Because of all this, Vukmanovic decided to leave Moscow in protest. In the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow he dictated a cable to Tito telling him of the events in the Soviet capital and that he had decided to return.

The next day the President of the Soviet TU organization Grishin urgently requested to see Vukmanovic. They met in a small room of the Congress Hall:

- There are rumours you intend to leave the Congress. - Grishin said. I did not want to ask from whom he had heard about my intention because I understood immediately that the office of our ambassador was bugged. I had dictated my cable to Tito in his office.

- Yes. I am leaving the Congress. - I answered sharply.

- Can we hear why? - Grishin said in the same tone.

- You know all this better than I do - I answered rudely.

- I can only tell you I will not allow myself to be discriminated against by you. I represent here the Yugoslav TU organizations and demand to be treated properly.

During further discussion Vukmanovic told Grishin openly that the inimical Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav delegates was result of the Yugoslav TU "Theses". Grishin admitted this indirectly when he said that the Russians were not ready to accept any other platform other than that advocated by the World Federation of TU's. Vukmanovic answered:

- This is not the problem. We can maintain different views about various problems and yet cooperate. However, you do not tolerate the fact that other people may maintain different views - views which are in opposition to yours.

Since Grishin did not answer, Vukmanovic continued by telling him that the Yugoslavs supported the platform of the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Party. "We do not need your support!" Grishin answered sharply. Afterwards they parted in a very unfriendly atmosphere.

The next day Vukmanovic, persuaded by Grishin to not leave Moscow, met Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders at a reception. In the hall where the reception had been organized, one section was occupied by the Soviet security organs, which meant that this section was reserved for the Soviet leaders.

After having seen that the Soviet leaders wanted to isolate themselves from other delegates, Vukmanovic decided to leave the hall in protest. But the Russians noticed his intention and immediately invited him to join Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov. Vukmanovic complained to Mikoyan about the discrimination against the Yugoslavs and the Soviet leader promised that things would be straightened out. Mikoyan even invited Vukmanovic to come and see him in the Kremlin, but the Soviet papers reported that it was Vukmanovic who requested the audience.

During the audience Mikoyan attacked the Yugoslavs for their nonaligned policy which he interpreted as an anti-Soviet move. Mikoyan ridiculed the Yugoslav attitude and said that without a mighty Soviet Union, a socialist Yugoslavia could not exist. In Mikoyan's opinion the Yugoslav thesis that revolutions could take place even without communist parties was something heretical. Vukmanovic disagreed and they parted.

Last Talk with Khrushchev

Vukmanovic describes his last talk with Nikita Khrushchev "in the first half of 1963" when a Yugoslav TU delegation again visited Moscow. Khrushchev was in Sochi in the Crimea, and Vukmanovic flew there to meet him. He found a "tired man" who had lost his familiar liveliness. Because of this Vukmanovic began by excusing himself for disturbing him during his vacation. Khrushchev answered unkindly: "Yes, you are disturbing me". On other occasions Vukmanovic would have immediately reacted to such a crude remark by leaving the room, but this time he saw a beaten man. In the presence of Grishin, Vukmanovic asked Khrushchev about his plans to reorganize the economic system. Instead of Khrushchev, Grishin answered:

- The wages of our workers depend on the profits made by enterprises. . . . Khrushchev, however, interrupted Grishin crudely:

- You talk sheer nonsense. We have resolved nothing because the most important problems of socialism are in question.

Khrushchev then continued to describe his vision of a socialist society as he would like to see it. Grishin was silent, but so was Vukmanovic, who says that he could only admire Khrushchev. The Soviet leader also talked about the installation of rocket sites in Cuba. Said Khrushchev:

- I suggested that the rocket sites be installed, but at the same time I warned the leadership that they should seriously consider whether such a decision should be made. It was later made unanimously after all of them had enough time to think about it. Nobody was against it. Was it not so, Grishin?

While Grishin nodded in affirmation, Vukmanovic says he wondered why Khrushchev felt he had to stress now that the decision had been unanimous and why he had wanted Grishin to confirm this. "I could not avoid the impression that the very people in the leadership who now attacked him, had agreed that the rocket sites should have been installed in Cuba", Vukmanovic says. About one year later Khrushchev was replaced.

How Rankovic was Purged

Before the Third Plenum of the Yugoslav Central Committee in February 1966, Tito invited Vukmanovic to come and see him.

Tito told me that relations between him and Rankovic were not good. I was not surprised because I knew that Tito was not satisfied with the work of the organizational section of the Central Committee headed by Rankovic.

Vukmanovic advised Tito to invite Rankovic to speak with him which Tito did, and at the Third Plenum Rankovic made "a good speech". Vukmanovic believed everything was all right. However, in the beginning of June 1966 Tito again invited Vukmanovic to come and see him.

As soon as I entered Tito's office on Uzicka Street, Tito said: "Somebody is eavesdropping on me". I was completely shocked and at first I did not know what to say. After having recovered from the initial shock, I asked: "But who would eavesdrop on you?" Tito answered: "Marko and Ceca". (2) I reacted spontaneously: "I do not believe this". Tito however said: "I have formed a technical commission which has established that my office has been bugged. Even my bedroom. Concealed microphones had been installed everywhere".

(2) "Marko" was the partisan name of Aleksandar Rankovic and "Ceca" was the partisan name of his "right-hand man", Svetislav Stefanovic, who was also purged in July 1966.

Vukmanovic was convinced but still could not completely believe what he had heard: "I cannot believe that Marko would do such things. After all, he was your closest collaborator". Tito answered that he had undeniable proof and succeeded in finally convincing Vukmanovic by telling him: "By the way, the bugging devices have also been installed in your house".

Several days later the Executive Committee (Politburo) was convoked and Tito attacked Rankovic directly. The latter denied all accusations but offered his resignation. Several days later Vukmanovic met Rankovic in the elevator taking them to their offices in the government building. Vukmanovic felt sorry for Rankovic and embraced him. The latter "started crying and kept repeating, Eh, Tempo, Tempo".

Before the famous Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee took place on Brioni Island on 1 July 1966, all CC members received the full report dealing with the Rankovic affair. There, for the first time, Vukmanovic discovered that microphones had been in his house since 1950. At the Fourth Plenum Rankovic was purged and it was Vukmanovic who attacked him mercilessly.

(Radio Free Europe Research)