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I D E O L O G Y

POLEMICS AGAINST POLISH AND YUGOSLAV THEORETICIANS

Summary: In conjunction with the general hardening of the internal political line in the Soviet Union, the historically well-known tendency to appeal for "increased vigilance" and to intensify polemics against certain currents and theoreticians in other socialist countries has emerged once again. The following report deals with two targets of such attacks: the first target is the Tadeusz Kotarbinski school of Polish philosophy whose theory is known in the East and West as "praxiology"; the second is the Yugoslav "neo-Marxists" identified with the journal Praxis.

The Warsaw professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski is one of the major exponents of what is known as "praxiology". This science falls somewhere between the disciplines of economics and business administration. Kotarbinski himself describes praxiology as "a general theory of a more effective organization of conduct, whose goal is the investigation of the widest generalizations of a technical nature. . . . We regard as the most important tasks the working out and establishment of norms relating to the whole". Further important tasks of praxiology, in addition to working out a system of general technical recommendations and warnings, are: the investigation of the dynamics of progress, of human capabilities and, above and beyond that, the analytic description of the elements of conduct as well as its most various forms:

One practical task of praxiology is the determination of general ways and means to increase the economy and reliability of work in a quantitative and qualitative respect. (1)

(1) See A. Rybalko: "O nekotorykh teoreticheskikh problemakh organizatsii truda i ikh oshibochnykh traktovkakh", No. 10/1970, p. 59, and the same author's article in Ekonomika Radyanskoi Ukrainy, No. 9/1970, p. 66f.

For purely methodological reasons the praxiologists separate the technical from the social areas, stressing the technical. Results of their investigations have received attention not only in Poland but also in the GDR and in some quarters of the Soviet Union itself. Several of Kotarbinski's works appeared as early as 1963 in Russian in Moscow; in 1965 the Polish economist Je. Strosziak's work, entitled Elements of Administrative Science, and those of other Soviet praxiologists such as P.G. Kuznetsov, D.M. Yaroshev and I.G. Usherov, also appeared.

Publications by some Western praxiologists, such as the Austrian L. Mises, the Belgian Gestel as well as several Americans, also have become available in the Soviet Union.

Soviet criticism concentrates on the methodological division of the technical from the social sector. For example, A. Rybaldo takes up his polemics against the praxiologists by recalling the recommendations in 1967 of the all-union conference on the scientific organization of labor (NOT) in Moscow. At NOT the following three categories of tasks were cited as the most important in the scientific organization of labor: 1) economic (growth of labor productivity); psycho-physiological (healthy working conditions); and social (work which should become the most important thing in life). Operating on the theory that social production represents a uniting of the labor process with its social form, the Soviet critics concluded that the praxiologists had dropped the dialectic method and were oriented only toward the principle of efficiency, and that they were concentrating on working out a "general theory of effective conduct" in order to set up "general recommendations". Referring to Lenin, the Soviet authors deny that such an undertaking is in any way scientific and condemn it as scholasticism and idealism. The belief that general principles of the organization of labor are isolated from the concrete political situation of the society in question, in their opinion, contradicts Marxism-Leninism. Rybalko said, "One can interpret such a wide and subjectivist definition in many ways, among others in a reactionary direction as well".

Such criticism of the praxiologists is not only alien to reality because it concentrates too much on the division of the technical from the social sectors but also because it falsely accuses the praxiologists of being against a consideration of the social sector. The Soviet theoreticians also attempt to construct

certain connections between the praxiologists and the theories of A. Bogdanov and O.A. Ermansky during the 1920's, although only the most superficial similarities exist.

There is sufficient indication that the true reasons for the attacks on the praxiologists can be found elsewhere than in a purely academic difference of opinion. The praxiologists' appeal in the Soviet Union once again raises the problem of what to do with a theory which has become popular outside the Soviet borders, outside the control of the Party bureaucracy; a theory whose basic tenets - in this case, on the scientific organization of labor - have not been coordinated with Soviet opinion. The fact that this may well be the motivation for the attacks is confirmed by the appearance of similar polemics against Yugoslav Marxists.

Attacks on the Yugoslav "Praxis"

Soviet polemicists have a long list of criticisms of the Yugoslav theoreticians identified with the journal Praxis. The most important of these criticisms will be treated here. For example, there is the following statement by I. Savel'ev:

Praxis, formally the organ of the Croatian Philosophical Society, is in truth a joint platform of revisionists and bourgeois philosophers from various countries, who in part get together because of the summer courses in Korcula. On the editorial board and the advisory board of Praxis there are about 30 foreign bourgeois philosophers and the same number of Yugoslav philosophers floating on one "philosophical ship". (2)

The Soviets are especially irritated that such Marxists as Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, Leszek Kolakowski, etc., who were banned long ago from Soviet reading lists have, in Praxis, not only the opportunity to write, but also to be evaluated as important contemporary Marxist thinkers. Savel'ev expresses disgust that D. Grlic, a Praxis writer, classified Bloch as "doubtless one of the greatest philosophers of Marxism". The Marxist orientation of Praxis is characterized as follows:

(2) I. M. Savel'ev: "Neomarksisty'bez maski", in Filosofskie nauki, No. 5/1970, p. 69 ff.

The Marxist philosophy in Praxis' columns can be related to all sorts of things: to the theory of alienation, philosophical anthropology, historical philosophy, "the philosophy of hope", "humanistic universalism", "naturalism", "humanism", "dialectic Verstand", humanistic utopia, up to a relentless criticism of everything which exists - but in all cases, one thing is negated - dialectic and historical materialism. All of this is not because of a concern for the creative development of Marxism, but solely with the tendency of undermining its revolutionary-critical contents. The attacks on dialectical materialism are directed by the authors of Praxis in the first place against materialism, because they really do understand that scientific-materialist philosophy is the foundation of revolutionary dialectic, without which it would become abstract and useless speculation.

In the course of such polemics, nearly all the important Praxis authors are mentioned and their works are quoted, albeit according to the well-known Soviet method of taking the quotes out of context and presenting them along with suitable accompanying commentary. The editors and writers of Praxis are accused of striving at all costs for a "pluralism" of Marxism. Such pluralism is nothing but "a last loophole of revisionism". According to Savel'ev's polemics, real Marxists cannot regard the ideological standpoint of Praxis and its theories as merely an argument among Marxists, as revisionists are above and beyond Marxism.

In Savel'ev's article several official Yugoslav criticisms of Praxis are cited, and it is claimed that "it is clearer to the Yugoslav communists what relationship Praxis has to socialism in their country". The following generalization is then added:

He who is familiar with the contents of the journal must notice that in its columns, as in the columns of the Belgrade "brother journal" Filosofiya, the transformation to a unification of Marxism with various currents of bourgeois philosophy, to a unification of Marxism with anti-communism, to a rejection of Soviet experience in the name of taking into consideration the particular characteristics of each individual country, to anti-sovietism, is taking place.

In the past such attacks on Praxis in the Soviet press were a

daily affair. Soviet sociologists refuse to write for the journal and they boycott any events it sponsors. Nonetheless, it is a very popular journal in socialist countries and it is necessary for the Soviets to resort to misinterpretation to represent it as an "anti-Marxist" organ.

Concerning the polemics against praxiology, the major role played here is the impossibility of controlling such theoreticians from Moscow. In the case of Praxis, this problem is compounded by the fact that the journal is extremely critical of the Soviet system of rule and the Soviet social model. Since any sort of criticism along this line is immediately considered "anti-Soviet" in the USSR, it is by their definition also anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist. In both cases, the inability of the Party leadership to conduct a fair and open internal dialogue with people of different opinions is revealed. Any sort of cooperation with representatives of these currents is seen as a danger to the state, and it is thus no accident that these polemics have been stepped up in recent months. They are an integral part of the ideological and political hardening of the line in the Soviet Union.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE ECONOMY OF MODERN CAPITALISM

by I. Sokolov

Never before has the tendency towards an internationalisation of economic life displayed itself with such force in the capitalist system as it does today. There has made its appearance a qualitatively new stage of it - integration. But it must be kept in mind that throughout the whole course of the history of capitalism, every step along the road to economic unity has given rise to fresh forces of economic separation and political rivalry. The present stage is no exception. In the capitalist world the processes which objectively lead towards integration inevitably intensify the opposite tendency, towards disintegration, towards a deepening of the contradictions within the system of international economic relationships.

The scientific-technical revolution creates a spasmodic acceleration in the collectivisation of production, which becomes internationalised to an unprecedented degree, and passes out of

the framework of national frontiers. At the same time, the evolution of the capitalist system of productional relationships creates new forms of mutual isolation of the national capitalist groups and a struggle between them for the maximum share of the common fund of surplus value pocketed by the international bourgeoisie. Within the framework of the capitalist world economy as a whole there is an interlacing of the processes of the concentration and unification of the economic resources within the "industrially developed" zone of the imperialist countries with a deepening of the economic "gulf" between that zone and the developing countries.

The process of integration became a characteristic feature of the economic life of capitalism precisely at the period when there emerged big shifts in the balance of forces between capitalism and socialism in the world arena - over a period of 50 years. This is not simply coincidence in time. In the field of economic relations between the imperialist countries, integration objectively assumes the main form in which capitalism adapts itself to the new conditions. In this field integration represents the particular "interlinking knot" of the processes engendered by the scientific-technical upheaval, the intensification of the State-monopoly character of capitalism, and the strategy of the consolidation of the forces of imperialism against the revolutionary movements.

Capitalist integration is a specific process, characteristic particularly of our own time, although its roots go back into the distant past. The loss by imperialism of economic hegemony in the world and the increasing acuteness of the battle between the two systems, the disintegration of the colonial empires, the increased intensity of the pressures of the working class and the democratic forces became the special "catalyst" and "accelerator" of those tendencies within the system of international economic relations which had been developing over a lengthy period and result from the operation of the natural laws inherent in capitalism.

As a form of the internationalisation of economic life, integration represents one of the stages in the development of tendencies leading to the creation of a single world economy, regulated by a common plan, a tendency which, as V. I. Lenin noted "clearly displays itself already under capitalism and will

undoubtedly undergo further development and complete consummation under socialism".

As a definite combination of qualitatively new features in the process of the internationalisation of productive forces, integration manifests itself both under capitalism and under socialism.

One of the specific features of capitalist integration is the fact that, right from the start, its political aspect stood out particularly clearly. That, in particular, was emphasised by many of the initiators of the Common Market, which, up to now is the most highly developed State monopoly form of integration. It was W. Halstein, Adenauer's protegee, who became Chairman of the EEC Commission with his support, who expressed this attitude in the terse but very expressive phrase: "We are not engaged in commerce, we are engaged in politics".

The whole history of "European integration" clearly demonstrates that anti-Communism was and continues to be one of the main political springs in the integration process. The creation of the EEC was one of the stages in the pursuit of that policy which was founded on Churchill's Fulton "programme", "Truman's Doctrine", the "Marshall plan", and the botching up of NATO.

But in the formation of the EEC each of the negotiating partners and their patrons pursued, along with the common objective of fighting against socialism and all revolutionary forces, also his own particular political objectives. In the formation of the EEC the Bonn leaders saw above all a step towards "political integration", to the creation of a national association, in which the monopolistic top layer of the FRG would be able, by using its economic superiority, to assume the dominating position. In other words, for this particular category of FRG politicians, integration appeared as a new means of achieving the aims which German imperialism had failed to achieve in the war. This attitude was expressed, less clearly than by W. Halstein, by another negotiator for the conclusion of the Rome Treaty, the member of the FRG Delegation B alk. "Formerly such big objectives were usually gained as a result of battles under the command of Field Marshals and Generals. Now we are gaining them with the aid of treaties".

The American strategists and their political agents in the

West European countries see in the creation of the EEC above all a means of building an economic base under NATO and in the long term view a step towards an Atlantic Association with the USA and Western Europe, which would consolidate the hegemony of American imperialism over the whole of the capitalist world.

But on a basis of the factors which are characteristic of the political forms of integration, and on the place it holds in imperialist strategy, some of our authors drew mistaken conclusions, as was proved by experience. They made the whole process identical with these forms and denied the objective conditioning of the policy of integration with the emergence of output beyond the limits of the national economy. In the course of time it became clear that such a presentation of integration did not cover the whole essence of the process. In many of the works of Soviet investigators dealing with the problems of integration, it began to be regarded as a new and more highly developed form of State monopoly capitalism, objectively conditioned by the internationalisation of economic life. At the same time, as a general rule, this form was linked up primarily with "European" integration.

It is true, of course that in its most developed variety, in the form of State monopoly alliances, capitalist integration did originate specifically in Western Europe. That was by no means accidental. A number of the Western European countries, lagging behind the USA in respect of the scale of capitalist collectivisation, tried to eliminate that lag by means of a specially intensive employment of the State monopoly levers. The creation of the EEC was a manifestation of this specific peculiarity of West European capitalism in the field of modern international economic relationships.

The West European monopolies could only compete with American imperialism in taking advantage of the benefits of the modern forms of specialisation of production by emphasis on the development of those forms along the State monopoly lines. At the same time, State monopoly methods were the only way in which to ensure such a consolidation of the forces of West European capitalism in the face of socialist Europe and all the revolutionary sections of modern times, for which it was not only the monopolistic circles of that continent sought eagerly, but also their North American partners and patrons.

But the longer it goes on the more obvious it becomes that capitalist integration is not confined to inter-State associations of the type of the EEC. It becomes more and more clear that the organic interlinking of integrational tendencies is connected with important qualitative shifts in the whole system of the international economic relationships of capitalism, in the dynamics and directions of the export of capital, in the character of the international private capitalistic monopolies, in the geographical and goods structure of international trade, etc.

In our opinion, integration should not be identified with the general historical process of the internationalisation of economic life, but should be regarded merely as a definite, qualitatively new stage in that process, which has developed in the course of the last 15-20 years.

Inter-State associations of the type of EEC naturally promote the productional integration of private monopolistic groups, but play only a small part in it directly themselves. Within the framework of these associations there is a regulation of the movement of goods (and partly also of capital and labour forces), and in some spheres a control over prices is introduced. But international specialisation and the cooperative conversion of production is still, as a general rule, the "preserve" of the private monopoly groups.

It is necessary to recognise certain limits in comparing "organised" and "unorganised" integration under capitalism.

There are two important points to be noted.

First, in so-called "unorganised" integration, State monopoly elements are very strong. The expansion of American capital into Europe, which M. V. Senin considers to be a manifestation of "unorganised" integration, depends on a whole arsenal of levers of State monopoly policy.

Second, groups representing "unorganised" (or "less organised" integration of the EFTA type) penetrate exceptionally energetically into the structure of "organised" integration. For example, Britain is not a member of the Common Market, but many of her monopolistic groups participate in the integration process in Western Europe. They are consequently most eager for Britain to join the Common Market because they want to get rid of the restrictions imposed on their participation by the regulating system of the EEC. On the other hand, according to the evidence of a large number of investigators, the American

international monopolies are even more active "promoters" of West European integration than the national monopolistic groups in the EEC countries themselves.

Observing the process of capitalist integration, it is necessary, in our opinion, to see its three main stages:-

- a) the appearance of new forms of international specialisation in production, giving rise to corresponding shifts in the structure of the flow of goods and capital
- b) the development of new forms of international monopolies
- c) the establishment of international State monopoly forms (including associations of the EEC type). This process is closely linked up with imperialist strategy, which pursues primarily military-political aims in the war against socialism and the revolutionary forces.

In the course of the fierce competitive battle between the monopolies of the USA and those of the countries of Western Europe, the latter more and more often form State monopoly pools for the solution of the more complicated scientific-technical problems. Recent examples are the combination of the forces of a number of European countries for joint production of big passenger capacity jet aircraft, the Anglo-French production of super sound speed jet aircraft of the Concorde type, the agreement between the FRG, Britain and the Netherlands for collaboration in the production of enriched Uranium. International monopolistic collectivisation is the objective process which governs the development of State monopoly forms of integration under capitalism.

Speaking figuratively, capitalist integration may be compared to an iceberg. Associations of the type of EEC and (as also narrower types of inter-State pools like the agreement between the FRG, the Netherlands and Britain covering the production of Uranium) which show above the surface, are only a minor part of the iceberg. As regards the main, "underwater" part, it is made up of hundreds of international inter-company systems of specialisation, and many thousands of agreements between individual monopolies.

The Common Market and other State-monopoly associations in Europe are a battlefield of fierce internal competition between their members, the centre of the clashes of the main forces of world capitalism in the fight for markets and spheres of economic influence. The EEC has survived a number of

serious crisis moments. More than once the question has arisen of its very existence in its present form. Similar periods of crisis could be seen in the development of the European steel and coal combination, of Euratom which eventually became a part of the Common Market system. Similar periods of crisis and reorganisation are inevitable in the future. But whatever form the further evolution of such "super-structural" State monopoly organisations may take, however much their form may change as a consequence, it is obvious that of themselves they are generated by profound changes within the system of international economic relationships of imperialism.

(World Economics and International Relations)

THE ZIONISTS' POLICY IS ANTI-SOVIETISM

by V. Bolshakov

The following analysis of the role and policy of Zionism was published in Pravda on February 18 and 19.

The logic inherent in the social and economic development of the two world systems - the capitalist and socialist ones - pre-determines the increasing sharpening of the ideological struggle between them. Imperialism is throwing into this battle ever new forces from among its dwindling reserves of specialists in persuasion and ideological subversion.

Zionist circles have been playing an increasingly active role in these imperialist activities directed against socialism and the progressive forces.

"Zionism serves as one of the instruments of imperialism in its global struggle and subversive political and ideological activities against the USSR and the entire world socialist system - activities aimed at undermining socialist regimes from within". So says the Communist Party of Israel in its theses on the subject of "The Jewish Question and Zionism Today".

Tool of Imperialism

Zionism has put itself at the service of imperialism, on the basis of the fact that they both have in common the same class essence. Modern Zionism is an ideology, a ramified network

of organisations and a policy pursued in practice by the Jewish big bourgeoisie, which has emerged with the monopoly circles in the United States and other imperialist powers. Militant chauvinism, anti-communism and anti-Sovietism make up the main content of the policy of Zionism today.

Zionist actions are not confined simply to supporting the State of Israel. The international Zionist corporation represented by the World Zionist Organisation and its periphery - the World Jewish Congress and numerous other branches and affiliated organisations - is a major association of finance capital and at the same time an international espionage centre and a smoothly functioning service of misrepresentation and slander.

It is symptomatic that we encounter financial tycoons of different nationalities among those who are now systematically subsidising the activities of Zionist organisations all over the world and who support with their money both the arms drive in Israel and the military gambles of that state.

Capital is cosmopolitan and those who own it are united, not by concern for their "blood brothers", but, first and foremost, by the class interests which they have in common.

When we trace the ties between big monopoly groupings, we see how closely their interests are intertwined. The bank of Lazard Bros. shares profits from Middle East oil with the groupings of the Rockefellers, Morgans and Kuhn Loeb and Co., and it closely co-operates with West German businessmen and bankers through the system under which they participate in various enterprises in Israel.

Their common profits also predetermine their common hatred - a hatred conditioned by their passion for profit-grabbing - of the people of the Arab oil-producing countries who are striving to be masters of their own wealth, in the same way as the capital lost as a result of the October Revolution united the Rothschilds and Rockefellers in their hatred of Soviet government. The vain hope of recovering what had been forfeited once and for all and the fear of a "chain reaction of Bolshevism", led them at that time to finance the intervention against the Soviet Union just as they are now impelling them to spend lavishly on subversive activities against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

"..... Politics", said Lenin, "is a concentrated expression of economics....." The causes of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet tendency of Zionism, as the practical policy and ideology of the Jewish big bourgeoisie, should be sought precisely in this.

Zionist ideologists, and in particular Vladimir Jabotinsky, who was born in Russia (he was founder of the extremely reactionary Heruth Party and has been posthumously idolised by the fascist Jewish Defence League), have made every attempt to camouflage the class essence of Zionism. In his work, The Jewish State, Jabotinsky said that the Zionists did not recognise any assessment of Zionism from the class point of view, whether proletarian or bourgeois. It had to be remembered once and for all, he said, that the renaissance movement of the Jewish people would not reckon with class views.

He wrote those words in 1936, but even today the Zionist ideologists continue tirelessly emphasising that all of Jabotinsky's fundamental theses remain intact and that his conclusions are absolutely correct for the past, the present and the future.

This was openly stated by Nahum Goldmann in March 1964, when he was president of the World Zionist Organisation: "We must wage a struggle face to face with the non-Jewish world and even inside the Jewish community for our right to live as an isolated minority, as a minority not identifying itself with any regime, with any country. We must guide the Jewish people in our efforts, in our struggle for our specific right to remain the same Jewish people as we have been for thousands of years, a people united behind our creative centre in Israel.."(1)

Following the dogmas of its founders, Zionist ideology continues today, too, to come out under the banner of class peace between the exploiters and exploited, between the Jewish millionaires, on the one hand, and the poor and the unemployed, on the other. By proclaiming mass emigration to Palestine (and now to Israel) as the only possible way of solving the "Jewish question", the Zionists have tried, and continue to try, artificially to set the Jews up against other nations and peoples, presenting them as "God's chosen people".

(1) Retranslated from Russian.

In present-day conditions, this policy does not, in the main, pursue the aim of geographical isolation, but rather socio-political and ideological aims. The theses of the Communist Party of Israel, referred to earlier, stress that Zionism rejects the possibility of changes in the position of the Jews as a result of their inclusion in the struggle of the workers and the masses of the people for democracy and socialism and that its activities are directed towards alienating them from the social struggle against the evils of capitalist society, including the struggle against anti-semitism.

Class interest

The class interest which the bourgeoisie have in the Zionists' work among Jewish working people along these lines is quite obvious. It was precisely for that reason that Zionists, from the very beginning, enjoyed the full support of the leading imperialist forces. The British colonialists and the German Kaiser, and in Tsarist Russia, such arch-reactionary political leaders as Plehve, Stolypin, and later, Kerensky, and in the Civil War the white guards and the Petlyura men - all of them made use of the Zionists in pursuit of their aims. The Zionists did not shrink from collaborating with them in an effort to keep the Jewish masses subordinate to themselves and prevent them from taking part in the Revolution, in the struggle for Soviet power and socialism.

An underground conference of Zeire-Zion, one of the Zionist organisations operating in Russia at that time, was held in Moscow on May 2, 1918. The programme it adopted was definitely aimed at fighting against communism. Socialism, that programme said, stood in the way of Zionism, and Zionism and socialism were therefore not just two opposite poles, repelling one another, but two elements completely excluding one another.

From the very first days of its existence, Soviet power waged a struggle against the Zionist underground, which actively worked hand in hand with counter-revolution. That policy on the part of the Soviet state was naturally not determined by any "anti-semitism" of the Bolsheviks, about which the Zionists were shouting then, just as they are today. They were indeed searching, with a magnifying-glass, for any kind of manifesta-

tion of anti-semitism by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet authorities in general and were infuriated by the fact that all their efforts in that direction proved futile. It could not have been otherwise, because the nationalities policy of the Bolsheviks was entirely hostile to anti-semitism, as it was towards any kind of nationalism in general. As long ago as 1905. Jabotinsky was writing that "anti-semitism, especially when 'elevated to a principle', is, of course, most convenient and useful as a pretext for Zionist agitation". That was precisely why Jabotinsky, while provoking anti-semitism, collaborated closely in the Civil War period with Petlyura. That was precisely why the Zionists took part in the "governments" of Denikin, Hetman Skoropadsky and Petlyura, and set up Zionist military units which fought against the Land of Soviets.

Anti-semitism was profitable for the Zionists, who regarded it as the best means of compelling the Jewish working people to rush into their arms, or, escaping from pogroms, to emigrate to Palestine, the colonisation of which was by that time in full swing, in accordance with a scheme of the international Zionist concern. Denikin and Petlyura and their supporters and the Bulak-Bulakhovich and Makhno bands assisted in those plans. In the period from 1918 to 1921 they staged 1,520 pogroms in the territories which they seized. In the course of those pogroms tens of thousands of Jews were tortured and murdered. It was only Soviet power that delivered the Jews from their suffering by throwing the white guards and the nationalist bands, together with their Zionist toadies, out of our country.

Jewish working people actively supported the Great October Socialist Revolution and the cause of building socialism in our country. This predetermined a crisis of Zionism in the Soviet Union and helped to eliminate the underground Zionist organisations.

Collaboration with nazis

It was not only with hardened reactionaries of the Petlyura and Denikin type that the Zionists collaborated.

Zionist agents who, during the war, were active in Western and Eastern Europe and in the occupied part of the Soviet Union, stained their hands by collaborating with the nazis. Many cases are known in which Gestapo men chose "trusties" in the death

camps and special "police" from among Zionists who had kept order in Jewish ghettos.

"The tragedy of Babi Yar", wrote Soviet citizens of Jewish origin living in the Ukraine, in a letter to P r a v d a, "will forever personify not only the monstrous barbarity of the nazis but also the indelible shame of their accomplices and followers - the Zionists".

Nazism was defeated. The Soviet Army saved millions of Jews from death. And paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, the Zionists have been unable to forgive socialism for this. Yet their propaganda claims to the role of saviours of the Jews and their wide-scale self-advertisement have been unable to erase from the memory of the peoples the exploits of the Soviet soldiers who put out the fires in the nazi death factories.

After the war the Zionists placed themselves entirely under the patronage of United States monopoly capital. When the State of Israel was formed on August 5, 1952, the Israeli A l H a m i s h m a r carried an "explanation" in connection with a pro-American speech by the then Foreign Minister in Tel Aviv, Moshe Sharett, in which he actually said the following:

"The active participation of us Jews in the building of our state depends on the extent to which Israel's foreign policy is integrated in Washington's global policy. Our Jewish brothers abroad will not help us if we are not obedient to the will of their government".

The obedience has proved to be complete. The branches of the international Zionist concern, both in Israel and in other countries of the so-called "free world", have become active champions of the reactionary foreign policy of the United States, which in the years of the cold war was characterised by intense aggressiveness of the Dulles type and by open anti-communism. This quite suited the Zionist leaders, whose hatred of socialism was inflamed by the fact that they were unable to continue with impunity their activities in Eastern Europe, where people's governments had been established.

Against socialist states

Zionism's undermining activities directed against the international communist and working-class movement and against

the socialist countries became particularly frantic and hysterical in the period when Israel's June aggression against the neighbouring Arab peoples was being prepared, and it became more active after the majority of the socialist countries had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel.

In December 1967 the Tel Aviv newspaper H a ' a r e t z, bursting with conceit, said that Israel (read "Zionism") had very great opportunities for dealing a blow at socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe. The London correspondent of that newspaper, who concealed himself behind the pen-name of Alif Shim, suggested that "difficulties" should be created in the socialist camp by stirring up nationalistic sentiments among the Jewish population in the socialist countries with the help of the news media controlled by imperialism, and especially radio and television. He wrote that Israel should play the part of a splinter in the body of the communist movement around which an abcess would gradually be formed.

There was nothing accidental in the fact that a political and ideological activation of Zionism against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries coincided with the adoption of the so-called "bridge-building theory" by the strategists of U.S. foreign policy.

That theory and the policy based on it, which Gus Hall, the general secretary of the United States Communist Party, described as a means of digging underground ideological tunnels, were put to their first practical test at the time of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia.

In the script for the "quiet counter-revolution", worked out in the United States, particularly by the Hudson Institute, the international Zionist concern was allocated no small role in the events of 1968 in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In particular, its task included the capture of the press and other mass media of Czechoslovakia. The Zionist centre undertook the actual leadership of that operation.

The Zionists tried to seize leading posts in all the mass media of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in order to conduct frenzied propaganda against the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, against the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the fraternal socialist countries. At the same time Zionist elements helped the imperialist intelligence agencies to gather

espionage information.

On May 30, 1968, a certain A. Bramberg arrived in Czechoslovakia with documents as a staff member of the United States Information Service. He had a meeting at the Aloron Hotel in Prague with A. Lustig, who has now settled down in Israel, as a "writer". It was precisely about Lustig that Ladislav Novome-sky spoke sarcastically at the May (1968) conference of Slovak writers. He described the verbiage of Lustig and his "Czech" colleagues over the television as being openly "pro-Israel and pro-Zionist", and pointed out that they were acting not as writers but as "approved experts on the Israeli question".

With Lustig's help, meetings were arranged for Bramberg in the editorial office of *L i t e r a r n i L i s t y* with the then leadership of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, headed by the Zionist Edward Goldstücker, and a visit to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was also arranged. In materials issued by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic it has been pointed out that among Bramberg's documents were "private information about the economic situation in Czechoslovakia and an analysis of the situation in the Czechoslovak Army and security bodies".

Role in Czechoslovakia

Numerous Zionist organisations took part in subversive activities against the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, ranging from the World Zionist Organisation and the World Jewish Congress to the "World Congress of Jewish Journalists".

Energetic activities were conducted at that time by the "Committee of Czechoslovak Refugees" in Vienna and the "Co-ordinating Centre of Fighters for the Freedom of Czechoslovakia" in Israel. The Israeli branch directly handled the collection of money for publishing the newspaper *L i t e r a r n i L i s t y*, the mouthpiece of the counter-revolutionaries of Czechoslovakia. The Israeli *M a ' a r i v* reported that donations were to be sent to the Discount Bank, Account No. 450055, Tel Aviv.

During the preparations for a counter-revolutionary coup in the Czechoslovak Republic, Zionist agents conducted energetic propaganda in favour of a resumption of diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Israel. Goldstücker, Sik and Kriegel played no small part in that campaign.

When, at the request of many thousands of Czechoslovak communists, including members of the central committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the troops of five Warsaw Treaty countries rendered internationalist assistance to the fraternal Czechoslovak people in the struggle against counter-revolution, the Zionist underground went over to illegal methods of struggle. Rabid Zionists, including "advisers" who were Israeli citizens worked at many secret radio stations which were operating in those days on Czechoslovakia's territory and spreading slanders against socialism.

The failure of the conspiracy of international reaction in Czechoslovakia frustrated the far-reaching plans of American imperialism and its Zionist henchmen. In Washington the advocates of "building bridges" were crowded out by the followers of a "tough line" in relation to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The breezes of cold war which blew from the American capital filled the sails of Zionist propaganda. Without abandoning the export of "quiet counter-revolution" to socialist countries, the international Zionist concern at the same time worked out plans for an extensive anti-Soviet campaign. They launched a new "campaign against Bolshevism" under the same tattered banner of "defence of the Jews" living in the USSR and other socialist countries. Things have gone so far that open terrorist attacks have been made against Soviet citizens working in other countries.

Simultaneously with the provocations and terrorist acts carried out for publicity purposes and the continued anti-Soviet propaganda, the international Zionist concern is organising attempts at direct interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs, and undisguised espionage and subversive activities. The actions of the "Jewish Defence League" are not the only example of this.

Recently 26 Zionist organisations in the United States knocked together a grouping called the "American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry", headed by Rabbi Herschel Schacher. This "Conference" has the broad support of the ruling circles in the United States and Israel. At the end of 1970 Schacher and Max Rischer, chairman of the Council of Jewish Federations and Charity Funds, were received by President Nixon in the White House. The nature of the activities of this "Conference" can be

judged by the strident anti-Soviet campaign which it is waging through all the channels open to it.

The anti-Soviet howl which is now issuing from all the Zionist dens, is caused by the Zionists' hatred of socialism, by their role as ideological saboteurs in the battle of ideas that is being waged by imperialism against socialism. In this battle the Zionist leaders are trying to discredit socialism and socialist ideas in the eyes of the working people of capitalist countries and to undermine whenever possible, the communist convictions of the working people of socialist countries.

In the last few years the international Zionist concern has been trying to smuggle into the Soviet Union Zionist literature in the Russian language and to organise something like a Zionist underground in our country with the help of tourists, certain western journalists accredited in Moscow, travelling businessmen and foreign students receiving training in the USSR.

Pocket-sized books, elegantly printed on thin paper, contain atrocious slander of the Soviet government's policy. Anonymous "well-wishers", claiming the right to speak for "all Jews" - an old trick that is still used by the Zionists - try to smear our system and the state of affairs in our country.

Intelligence service

They not only slander but also issue instructions, such as are to be found in the Zionist leaflet "Home". "The war", it says, "should be waged by any means - from anonymous letters to the West to open action".

They are not only eager to recruit new followers; they are in a hurry to familiarise the uninitiated with the Zionist rules. "The main principle governing a Zionist's day-to-day work is very simple", says one of the booklets. "A Zionist should remain a Zionist in his every action. He should take a close look at all the events of his life, large and small, and try to use them for the good of our cause. Not a single meeting or walk should be wasted".

It is not hard to guess what "cause" the Zionists are championing. "The Israeli intelligence centre (a constituent part of the intelligence service of the international Zionist centre -V. B.) exerts every effort to collect information of a military, political and economic character in socialist

countries, including the Soviet Union", (2) Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New York Times, frankly writes. Western "experts" grudgingly admit, however, that in the Soviet Union only a few renegades get caught in the net of Zionist intelligence. Our press reported the case of one of them, Solomon Dolnik, who was arrested on May 26, 1966, and imprisoned for anti-Soviet activities. What was it that led Dolnik to treason? An investigation revealed that his down-fall was brought about by long-standing contacts with staff members of the Israeli Embassy, which operated in Moscow before diplomatic relations with Israel were severed. Dolnik was subjected to intense Zionist conditioning and was made to believe that his homeland was Israel rather than the Soviet Union. This method of recruiting is usual for the Israeli intelligence service. A man converted to Zionism automatically becomes an agent of the international Zionist concern and, consequently, an enemy of the Soviet people.

It is sufficient to see who stands behind the publishers of the Zionist booklets in Russian already referred to. One of them is the Zionist Brooklyn millionaire Bernard Deutsch, who finances the fascist Zionist Heruth Party and the Greater Israel Movement and who subsidises the activities of the "Jewish Defence League" headed by Meir Kahane, which is responsible for anti-Soviet provocations and acts of terrorism. This same Deutsch generously finances propaganda tours round the United States made by renegades and traitors such as Sperling and Kazakov. The Brooklyn millionaire is not just a Zionist anti-Sovieteer who engages in philanthropy, but a confirmed fascist and a pathological extremist, connections with whom the "respectable" Zionist organisations are not altogether inclined to publicise. That is quite understandable. Deutsch, Kahane and other Zionist leaders of that ilk reek of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence and subversive agencies of imperialism.

Nevertheless, both the "respecable" and the hooligan Zionist organisations are doing the same dirty job, the only difference being in the tactics they employ. They are now hastily knocking together a "World Jewish Defence League" and are preparing

(2) Retranslated from Russian.

for an "international" anti-Soviet orgy, for a world Zionist conference "in defence of the Soviet Jews" scheduled for February 23-25 in Brussels.

The conference, as conceived by its sponsors - the World Zionist Organisation, the World Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith, and others - is supposed to be the culmination of the extensive anti-Soviet campaign which has been conducted over the past two years. It is one more brazen attempt to interfere openly in the internal affairs of the USSR.

"Psychological attacks" of this kind by Zionism arouse the justified indignation of all Soviet people, both Jews and Gentiles. The Soviet people will never recognise the "right" of the Zionist gang, which is guilty, in particular, of bloody crimes committed during the war against the nazis and in the occupied Arab territories, to speak on behalf of citizens of the USSR of Jewish nationality.

It is puzzling that these "claims" of the Zionists find support in government circles in the United States, Belgium and other countries where Zionist storm-troopers operate.

It is high time that the Zionists understood once and for all that there is no place, and cannot be any place for Zionism in our Soviet society.

GARAUDY: RECONQUEST OF HOPE

Summary: In his latest book, Reconquête de l'espoir, French Marxist ideologist Roger Garaudy has launched an appeal for a critical reappraisal of contemporary socialism. At the same time, he outlines briefly the path he would suggest be taken to the construction of socialism in a developed society. Garaudy focuses on the weak points of the Soviet "model" and repeatedly stresses its inapplicability in other countries.

The hope of mankind lies in the realization of socialism, but of socialism quite different from the political and economic system whose backbone is the "stalino-brezhnevist ideology" of the Soviet Union. Proceeding from this premise, the French Marxist ideologist Roger Garaudy has launched what he calls an "appeal", (1) for a reappraisal of contemporary socialism

(1) See Garaudy's article in France-Soir. 7/8 March 1971

for "an elaboration of a real perspective of struggle against capitalism and the elaboration of a model of socialist democracy". The appeal is entitled Reconquête de l'espoir (Reconquest of Hope), a slim volume containing three frank and compelling essays of which the first two will be discussed here: "That Is Not Socialism" and "The Alternative". (2) An accessible book brimming with concrete examples of its theoretical assumptions, Reconquête de l'espoir clearly ascribes the crisis of contemporary communism to the mistakes which the Soviet Union has made in attempting to proselytize its friends and foes with "the Soviet model" of socialist construction.

That Is Not Socialism

The first essay, which serves to introduce the book's purpose, points out the necessity of thorough reflection when dealing with a system which has produced such "crimes" as the "savagely repression" of Polish workers in late 1970, the Leningrad trials, and the anti-Solzhenitsyn campaign. Garaudy wastes no time in differentiating between what he considers the positive value of socialism per se and the negative nature of its Soviet version and the export of the latter to other countries. Not only is an economic system which is not a system (but rather a "theorization of empirical practice") being forceably implemented in the USSR and its sphere of influence, but the Soviet Union's political errors as well are being thrust on other socialist states. The greatest of these errors is "the absence of democracy, not of bourgeois democracy but of socialist democracy". This is manifest in such cases as the trampling of human rights in the Soviet Union, the persecution of Soviet writers, and the anti-semitic treatment of Soviet Jews. The December unrest in Poland was likewise in Garaudy's view a result of the absence of socialist democracy:

Concerning the worker's revolt in Poland, the misdeeds of importing the Soviet model appeared resoundingly... The fundamental demand was that for workers' self-management and self-government against bureaucratic centralism.

In Garaudy's opinion, these historic mistakes are to be compounded at the up-coming 24th Congress of the CPSU, which is preparing to sanctify the petrification of ideology, to produce

(2) The third essay, "Human Significance of Socialism (Marxism and Christianity)", focuses on the specific question of the Christian/Marxist dialogue. Editions Bernard Grasset, Paris 1971.

a dogmatic reaffirmation of bureaucratic centralism with all its consequences, all wrapped up in a few "revolutionary phrases in radical contradiction to real practice".

The question of what to do about these conditions is, Garaudy suggests, a matter of life and death for all communist parties. A "simple criticism of the dogmatic model" will no longer suffice; instead it is necessary to reflect critically on what is, project what might be, and above all to have the courage to counter Soviet attempts to absolutize a socialist model with the direct public statement: that is not socialism.

The Alternative

The second section of the book begins with an appeal for a modern definition of what Garaudy calls the principal enemy, namely capitalism. Pointing to the numerous qualitative and quantitative changes which capitalist society has undergone since Marx' and Lenin's definitions were formulated, he concludes:

If one relies in defining capitalism on outdated outlines, those which were valid in the 19th century context and which unfortunately are still being used today by importing them from a country where capitalism, a backward capitalism, was abolished in 1917, one passes over the real problems.

Garaudy regards these problems generically in a Marxist sense - concentrating on the term "alienation" - but stresses that in the specific they are the result of new contradictions within the system and must thus be approached in a new manner.

Garaudy's postulation of the social forces to be engaged in the struggle against this principal enemy sets his hypotheses apart from those of the Soviet - or French - communist party. Borrowing from Gramsci, he calls for a "new historical bloc". As modern science and technology have changed society, they have also changed class relationships to the extent that the old ideas of who performs "productive work" and who does not (i. e., who is sufficiently proletarian and who is not) have changed radically. Special reference is made here to "employed intellectuals", the number and historical importance of whom are growing congruently with the development of modern society.

Likewise, the concept of the revolution itself must, in Garaudy's view, be reexamined. He reflects on the course of the October Revolution, concluding that it led to the following "dangerous slippage":

.... the party spoke in the name of the class, then the apparat in the name of the party, the directorate in the name of the apparat. In the end, a single man is speaking in the name of the directorate.

Incidentally, Garaudy feels that the application of the word "Stalinist" to this phenomenon can be misleading, as "Stalin and his personal defects were not the cause of this perversion of socialism, but on the contrary an effect".

Garaudy's conclusion is that experience has revealed the Soviet concept of revolution to be undesirable, and thus inapplicable, for example, in France. Ironically, he asserts that the Paris Commune was the "first form of socialist democracy" and "contrary to this direct democracy, contemporary Soviet power has gone back to the former bourgeois dualism".

Thus, the problem becomes one of postulating the revolution in terms both of a true socialist democracy and of the developed society in which it is to be rooted. The following guideline of the three major tasks involved in this process is then drawn up:

- 1st. Destroy a certain number of illusions which mask the true nature of the socialist revolution.
- 2nd. Conceive correctly what the socialist revolution is.
- 3rd. Define its strategy and stages.

The rest of the second portion of the book is devoted to Garaudy's specific implementation of these guidelines for France (he does not, however, claim to have found the way and the truth with his observations, but wishes rather to present one possibility).

The "illusions" against which he pleads are: 1) that of the possibility of introducing socialism by means of a parliamentary victory on the party level (real power in the sophisticated state, he asserts, is centered outside of both the parliament and the political parties); and 2) that of the tenability of revolution from the barrel of a gun (real power is economic, not paramilitary, and the revolution can't be accomplished in one blow, anyway).

In sum, "a revolution is essentially a radical change in the production relationships and the whole of the social relationships tied to them".

Pointing to the necessity of an intelligent mobilization of the masses, Garaudy then moves on to a concrete description of the pattern by which socialism could be effected in France. Based on the sine qua non of direct democracy, his "system" starts at the level of personnel assemblies in the plants, progresses to workers councils, through a transitory period of dualism of power and workers' control, to the ultimate goal of self-managing socialism. Proceeding in this manner, Garaudy claims, bureaucracy and authoritarianism will be avoided. In a short excursion on the topic of the May 1968 "revolution", Garaudy notes that it was above all:

a movement of refusal, and that was fine, but this refusal was not followed by a perspective for the future, by positive objectives which alone could have given cohesion and strength to the movement.

However, he stresses that the implementation of his pattern for revolution will pose a greater challenge than would the simple formation of a new party or a faction within a party. It will be a matter of

bringing each trade union and each party to live a new life thanks to the initiatives of each manual or intellectual worker, to go beyond the old dualism of "leaders" and the "base" (the last residue of class dualisms, which implied this structure of dualist bureaucracy), to unite to constitute a single revolutionary force.

The bearers of the revolution will not be an exclusive elite nor will change be propagated for its own sake: the achievements of prior systems will be maintained if worthy of retention.

This anti-dogmatic approach is summed up at the close of this essay on the alternative in Garaudy's definition of the direct democracy which will thus be maintained:

..... when at every level the leaders do not present to the lower level prefabricated solutions to which they must respond with yes or no... when the base can at any moment show the consequences of decisions made and step in effectively next

to the most elevated levels when each citizen or each militant possesses complete information to make his choice and take his decision... when (there is) a permanent and operating dialogue between the base and the top.....

These are the prospects which "call on us to begin the long march toward a true self-managing socialism, this Long March toward the reconquest of hope".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

THE TWO TENDENCIES IN NATIONALISM IN THE OPPRESSED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

by G. S. Akopyan

(Extracts)

Experience shows that in the developing countries a steady process of separation is in operation between the progressive and the reactionary tendencies in nationalism. The murder of Patrice Lumumba and the assumption of power by the Right forces which followed it in the Congo, the disorders caused in Iraq by the Right Bathists and the murder of the Secretary General of the Communist party, Adila, the events in Ghana, the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Communists and the removal from power of the Left nationalists in Indonesia, the attempts of the reactionary Indian nationalists to overthrow the government of Indira Ghandi, etc., all go to prove that the forces of reaction and imperialism are trying, with the help of the reactionary Right nationalists, to suppress the progressive development of the liberation movement of the peoples.

But in a number of the Eastern countries a different tendency may be observed. Here there is an activation and unification of the anti-imperialist forces which results in a defeat for the forces of reaction and imperialism (the Sudan, Libya, Somalia). In some of the countries of Asia and Africa there is a closer approach in the points of view of different national parties and revolutionary organisations and a common platform for the patriotic and progressive forces is built up. The gradual strengthening of the revolutionary front is due, on the one hand, to the progressive national politicians of these countries abandoning anti-Communism and losing their distrust of Marxism,

and on the other hand to a definite evolution in the assessment by the Marxists in the developing countries of such social-economic transformations as have been carried out there by the revolutionary Democrats. Whereas, in the Arab Countries and other countries in Asia and Africa, nationalism embodied at one time not only an anti-imperialist but also to some extent an anti-Communist tinge, today the relationships between the progressive nationalists and other anti-imperialist forces, including the Communists of those countries, have changed considerably. We can point, in particular, to the collaboration among all progressive forces in the United Arab Republic in the defence of revolutionary conquests and joint resistance to Israeli aggression, and collaboration between the Left Baathists and the Communists in Syria. Some of the leaders of the Communist Party have been released from prison in Algeria. The same thing happened still earlier in the UAR. The revolutionary Democrats in the Arab countries now reject the theory and practice of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism and promote collaboration with the anti-imperialist forces inside their own countries and in the international arena. In India there is a process of fusion of the forces of the Left, which back the government of Indira Ghandi in carrying through progressive measures, and act against the reactionaries who try to prevent them from being carried out.

It has already been said that the character of nationalism in the developing countries is a dual one, in the same way as the character of the national and the petty bourgeoisie is a dual one. That this fact is understood was shown in a number of the speeches of representatives of the countries of Asia and Africa at the international Symposium held in Alma-Ata in October of last year. Aziz Sherif, Member of the World Council of Peace, stressed that "Arab nationalism underwent a number of trials and committed a number of mistakes before it arrived at a proper understanding of the historical reality of the present period". He said that some of the nationalist groups in the Arab countries tried "to achieve liberty through collaboration with this or that section of the imperialist beasts of prey" but that "the pro-imperialist ideology and reactionary pro-imperialist nationalism suffered a complete collapse".

Speaking at the Symposium, Da Silva (Ceylon) said that

"although the revival of nationalism has, in the main, a progressive character, it is not free from certain negative features". Da Silva considered these negative features to be that any advance in the reactionary tendencies in nationalism "leads to the development in some degree or other of national isolation and chauvinism. Acting under a mask of nationalism, the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie place patriotism into opposition with proletarian internationalism, spread racial and religious enmity and put obstacles in the way of the fight of the toiling masses for social progress".

We would refer also to statements made by the Prefect of one of the Departments of Dahomey, Ambruaza A. Agbatona, who wrote in 1968:- "After winning political independence, African nationalism took on a socialist tinge". But, "nationalism, which was a progressive factor throughout the whole period of the heroic war of liberation, carries an indisputable danger of becoming regressive when it develops into a factor of isolation or when it deteriorates, being converted into an instrument of deception with the object of the enslavement and exploitation of the popular masses after the proclamation of independence".

Therefore, an objective analysis shows that, in the developing countries there exists, on the one hand, an evolution of the progressive nationalists towards collaboration with the other advanced forces of the community and the reinforcement of the common front in the fight against imperialism, neocolonialism and internal reaction, and on the other hand an evolution of the reactionary nationalists towards alliance and collaboration with the imperialists, directed against the revolutionary movement of the toilers. That is the essence of the two tendencies in nationalism in the developing countries at the present stage.

Imperialist propaganda strives to put the nationalist movement of the countries of the East - in spite of its different shades and tendencies - into opposition to the democratic, socialist and Communist movements. Its representatives assert that Marxism-Leninism is intolerant of any nationalism, and that consequently, sooner or later, the nationalists will have to abandon any kind of collaboration with the forces of the Left, including the Communists.

The enemies of Communism try to identify the negative attitude of the Communists towards reactionary nationalism, and also to nationalism in the workers and Communist movements.

with the attitude of the Marxist-Leninist parties towards the progressive nationalism of the oppressed and developing nations. Spreading falsehoods of this kind, the ideologists of imperialism assume the mask of protectors and defenders of the interests of the countries of the "third world", and try to bring them over onto their side. Some of them manifestly exaggerate and inflate the rôle of nationalism in the communal life of the present day, with this object in view. They regard nationalism as being the main motive force of the liberation revolutions, and reckon to defeat the ideology of proletarian and socialist internationalism with its assistance.

The bourgeois sociologists ignore the class essence of nationalism, defining it as being some kind of super-class ideology of "pure, nationalist consciousness". Others equate the tasks of the nationalism of the oppressed and developing nations with the tasks of the national liberation movements of these nations, although the boundaries and aims of the national liberation movements are more extensive than the boundaries and aims of the nationalist ones. Yet others seek to identify the bourgeois nationalism of the developing countries, which tries to replace the rule of the colonisers by the rule of national capital, and the nationalism of the broad masses, who not only oppose imperialism and colonialism, but also want radical social-economic transformations.

The nationalism of the oppressed nations is often connected with the religious movements in the developing countries, although nationalism is in no way a variety or an offshoot of any religion or religious movement. More than that, in a number of well known cases, the movement of progressive nationalists clashes with the reactionary priesthood (Turkey, Indonesia).

In some of the works of Soviet writers, together with an explanation of the Leninist presentation of the question of nationalism in the oppressed nations, there appears a one-sided criticism of all and every form of nationalism in the developing nations. Those who adopt this line usually attack the "poisonous" character of nationalism and claim that it always interferes with the progressive advance of the countries of the "third world". Referring to the inclusion of reactionary features and tendencies in the nationalism of the oppressed and developing nations, some Soviet scholars make the one-sided comment that nationalism, even in the oppressed nations invariably re-

mains a reactionary feature and that consequently it can never play a progressive part.

Nationalism, naturally, always remains nationalism, with all the danger of its reactionary features making their appearance, particularly when the second tendency which we have described above is predominant in it. But the Leninist line calls for a distinction to be made between the nationalism of the deprived nations and the nationalism of the dominating nations, and demands that both its aspects should be taken into consideration. To dismiss all forms of nationalism in the oppressed and developing nations can result only in the proletariat losing possible allies in its liberation, anti-imperialist fight.

When considering the problem of nationalism in the developing nations, the progressive rôle played by the nationalism of the oppressed nations is often admitted only during the period of the fight for political independence (in such cases Lenin's definition of the part played by nationalism in the oppressed nations is taken into account), but it is denied that it can have any progressive aspect during the period of the fight against neo-colonialism for economic independence, during the period of the formation of the pre-conditions for the selection of a socialist orientation. The people who adopt such an approach to the problem of nationalism maintain that after winning political independence nationalism in the developing nations becomes an anachronism, an ideology confined only to the reactionary classes and a hindrance to the advance of the young countries.

Such a formulation of the problem is groundless. It ignores the true facts. As experience shows, the progressive nationalists, even in the conditions of political independence, continue to take part, even if it is sometimes of an inconsistent character in the anti-imperialist fight, and this side of their activities has the support of the Communists. It is only after power has been transferred to the working class and socialism has been victorious in any particular country that the progressive features of nationalism become exhausted, and its reactionary aspects come into sharp conflict with the growing influence of the principles of proletarian internationalism.

(Peoples of Asia and Africa)

MORE IDEOLOGY FOR ROMANIAN STUDENTS

A call for ideological training to be intensified in Romanian universities has been made by the Eighth Congress of the Unions of Romanian Students' Associations (UASR), held on February 21, 1971, within the framework of the Ninth Congress of the Union of Communist Youth (UTC).

In his report, published in the party newspaper, Scinteia, on February 22, the Chairman of the UASR, Traian Stefanescu, expressed gratitude for the responsibility given to youth by the party. The association, now in its 15th year, was "a revolutionary organisation, consolidated politically and organisationally as an active factor in the professional training and Communist education of young people".

Nevertheless, "some students show deficiencies in their theoretical equipment" and in places there was "not enough ideological hostility to the influence of retrograde attitudes and ideas". In the UASR's work some "formalism and superficiality" persisted. It had to be recognised that the union's political and ideological work had sometimes had an abstract character, presenting general theses and principles without direct connexion with topical questions of party and State policy, of the "state of mind in students' collectives".

"An essential task of the students' associations is to consolidate in the ranks of the students the political and moral characteristics of the militant activist in the cause of the party. As a student in Socialist Romania, to be a young revolutionary means bringing yourself to the level of today's requirements in science and culture, to assimilate organically the truths of dialectical materialist philosophy and party policy".

The way Stefanescu said things had been going wrong was illustrated by an article in Scinteia (January 12) on teachers' training courses in ideology. A discussion on "The Romanian Communist Party - the leading force in the Romanian Socialist Republic" among the staff of a school in Brasov had led to "disillusion" because a speaker had produced "an avalanche of detail about past events" without bringing out vital "basic ideas" such as that Romanian society was "advancing on the path of

progress". There was no time left to discuss "the leading role of the party in the present stage of building a fully developed Socialist society", which should have formed the kernel of the debate. There was no debate in the sense of a "real exchange of ideas to stimulate the effort to think" - rather just a "school seminar". Another discussion, at the Economic School in Medias on the development of literature, art and culture in Romania in the light of the documents of the Tenth Party Congress (August, 1969) had failed to discuss the really important topic in such a discussion, "the principal features of party policy in directing literature and art, a clarification of how the party conceives creative freedom". The emphasis had been placed not on a "confrontation of ideas" but on repetition of well-known facts; local party bodies would have to guide and control teachers' ideological discussions more closely in future.

Stefanescu stressed that internationally the UASR had "struggled to strengthen continually the unity of the IUS and broaden its ranks" (the International Union of Students is the Soviet-controlled students' front organisation). The UASR would continue to develop "relations of close international solidarity with the student body of all the Socialist countries, with the university youth of all continents of the world and at the same time intensify collaboration with national liberation movements".

In its final resolution, (also published by Scinteia, February 22), the UASR pledged itself to contributing "by its whole political - educational work, to the formation of Socialist consciousness among the specialists of the future and of a thorough Marxist-Leninist philosophical culture to consolidating militant political and ideological convictions among students", and to inculcating devotion to the party. The UASR would create new bodies in all the main university centres to co-ordinate the whole cultural and artistic life of the universities.

POLITICS

TALKS, YES - ILLUSIONS, NO

Any European security conference 'should include the Brezhnev Doctrine on its agenda'

by Raymond Fletcher

Summary: Britain's former Defence Secretary, Mr Denis Healey, recently went on record as supporting the proposal for a European security conference. A fellow Labour Member of Parliament, Raymond Fletcher, here comments on Healey's argument, drawing particular attention to the qualifications and cautions which formed an essential part of it but which have been very scantily reported.

For more than two decades successive leaders of the Soviet Union have talked of peace more loudly and more often than anyone else. Over the same period they have stationed 32 Soviet divisions in Central and Eastern Europe, trained some 630 medium-range nuclear missiles on targets in Western Europe, built the second biggest navy in the world (including 80 nuclear powered submarines out of a total of 370) and militarily suppressed three popular risings - in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Small wonder, therefore, that leaders of the Western Alliance have so far taken more notice of Soviet military actions than Soviet "peace-loving" words. The citizens of Western Europe remain reasonably safe and generally free today because those in control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation refused to be fooled then.

Yet, despite justified scepticism at the command levels of NATO, many Western statesmen now seem to take Soviet words a little more seriously than they did in the immediate post-Czechoslovakia period. President Nixon spoke, in his inaugural address, of "an era of negotiation supplanting the era of confrontation". West Germany's Chancellor Brandt has visited the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. And Mr Denis Healey, former Defence Secretary in the British Labour Government and probably its most tough-minded member, accepts that a European

Security Conference - called for by the Warsaw Pact organisation almost since its birth in 1955 - might be worthwhile.

None of these men could ever be accused of softness towards Communism, President Nixon is engaged in a shooting war with it in Indo-China. Chancellor Brandt courageously refused to compromise with it during his finest hours as Mayor of West Berlin.

But Mr Healey seems the most surprising of eminent recruits to the advocates of a Security Conference. For he, more than anyone on the Left, has consistently and vigorously argued against the characteristic delusions of the Left. In 1951 he edited a symposium, The Curtain Falls, in which exiled Eastern European Socialist leaders described the destructions of their organisations. The theme of the book was stated by the late Aneurin Bevan in his Foreword:- "The Communist Party is the sworn inveterate enemy of the Socialist and Democratic Parties. When it associates with them, it does so as a preliminary to destroying them".

Situation 'Transformed'

This remains true. It may be equally true, however, that the malignantly ideological content of Soviet foreign policy has diminished in the last five years. And, as a consequence, it may be possible to reach agreements with the Soviet Government that will be treated and honoured by them as they treat the commercial agreements they sign with the Confederation of British Industries.

At any rate, Mr Healey now thinks so. "I believe", he writes in the current issue of the Labour Party's publication International Briefing, "that we now have an opportunity for changing the whole context in which until now we have had to consider East-West relations in Europe. The whole situation in Europe has been transformed in the last 12 months by the courage and vision of the German Government under Willy Brandt".

He goes on to explain that "the Russian attitude to a Security Conference has changed in many respects over the past 10 years" that the relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites are no longer so rigidly directed from Moscow, and that the Russians' willingness to discuss strategic arms limitations with their main enemy, the United States, is a tentative step towards a kind of intercontinental rapprochement.

Mr Healey is not thinking such thoughts on his own. In May, 1970, the North Atlantic Council accepted a proposal made by the then British Foreign Secretary, Mr Michael Stewart. It was that the whole Alliance was prepared to discuss the formation of a permanent standing commission on European Security with the Warsaw Pact powers. This invitation to Moscow to talk about disengaging from military confrontation to establish machinery for diplomatic dialogue was supplemented by a declaration of support for the West German Government's "Ostpolitik" and the Soviet-American SALT negotiations on arms limitations.

But, assuming that serious talks between East and West are becoming possible, what should they be about? Meeting to exchange empty compliments, ideological insults or - worst of all - meaningless platitudes about peace - would be pointless. Hence the importance of the agenda, which must, in Mr Healey's view, include such thorny questions as the Brezhnev Doctrine and properly balanced mutual force reductions.

There is nothing new in the Brezhnev Doctrine. Czar Nicholas I proclaimed something similar as his troops suppressed insurrections in Russia, Poland, Hungary and was accurately denounced by Karl Marx as a menace to the whole of Europe.

Whether proclaimed by a Czar or a Commissar, it is a doctrine that NATO could not possibly accept. If the renunciation of force in the relations between European states is to be negotiated into reality, it must be an all-European reality. NATO forces did not invade Greece as that unhappy country slid into military paralysis and dictatorship. NATO cannot grant the right, in any negotiations, for anyone in the East to go tramping around like Nicholas I.

As for mutual force reductions in Europe, it is quite out of the question to embark upon them in the way suggested by the Warsaw Pact organisation. As Mr Healey points out, Soviet forces pulling out of Europe go back only 500 miles across land. American and Canadian forces withdraw 3,000 miles across an ocean. To calculate just what is a military balance of power requires more than simple arithmetic, in fact; and it is axiomatic that such a balance must be preserved throughout negotiations and in any military disengagement that follows.

How Russia sees it

Mr Healey, it is quite clear, has not abandoned the caution he always displayed as Defence Secretary. He has described the bristling difficulties of security talks with the East, yet he is prepared to grasp the opportunities. Is he right?

The only firm answer to that question lies on what Wellington used to call "the other side of the hill". Have the Communist rulers changed since the days when one of them wrote of pacifism: "We have to overcome this feeling in order to suppress it in the masses?". Perhaps they have not, but there is unmistakeable evidence that their idea of what is in their national interests is changing.

Observing NATO as antagonists, they see it more clearly than we do. They note that, despite its internal strains, it deploys two-thirds of the manpower, 40 per cent of the tanks and more than half the tactical aircraft of the Warsaw Pact. For an alliance that defends an allegedly tired, corrupt and collapsing system this is not only not bad: it is, and has proved to be, quite enough military power to deter aggression into the western half of Europe.

Soviet strategists, moreover, have problems bigger than the West's. They invested heavily in the Middle East and failed either to smash Israel or dislodge the United States. They now have, in the shape of China, their own Eastern problem. And since it took 300,000 troops to force the Czechs back into line, how many of their divisions would have to act as policemen in order to allow the rest to fight as soldiers?

The West, in fact, is stronger in relation to the East than it imagines. In these circumstances it can afford to parley with little risk - so long as its representatives do so without illusions and without dropping their guard.

(Forum World Features 1971)

CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION DESCRIBED BY EXPELLED YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST

Summary: Velimir Budimir, the Yugoslav correspondent of the Tanjug news agency in Prague, and

recently expelled from Czechoslovakia (2 February 1971) because of his alleged "non-objective reporting", in an article in the Belgrade weekly Nedeljne informativne novine (NIN) of 7 March 1971, dealt with the conflict between two opposing groups in Czechoslovakia. One group is said to be gathered around Party Secretary Gustav Husak, the other around the "extreme leftist and dogmatic" leaders. Budimir said that in December 1970 a plot against Husak was discovered within the Party. He also emphasized that a group of 25 Czechoslovak functionaries, who supposedly invited the Warsaw Pact troops to invade the country, does not include President Svoboda, Party Chief Husak and Prime Minister Strougal. In conclusion Budimir said that either the dogmatic forces would prevail or gradual reforms, based mainly on the ideas of January 1968, would again be initiated. There is no other alternative, with the exception of stagnation - which cannot solve anything. The following is a translation of Budimir's article titled "Paradoxes of Consolidation".

In connection with current internal developments in Czechoslovakia, one can now pose the question: Do they advance or harm not only Czechoslovakia's own socialist construction but also current changes in other countries of the socialist camp?

Even if one accepts the official thesis that the 1968 developments in Czechoslovakia were not an exclusive affair of that country but rather the concern of the whole socialist camp, it would be quite logical that such a thesis should also be valid today. However, the truth about the current Czechoslovak reality is, unfortunately, in total opposition to the processes and plans being developed in other socialist countries, even in those which sent their troops to Czechoslovakia in August 1968; in many of these countries social, party and economic reforms are being developed. If the latest situation in Czechoslovakia is observed in such a light, then one cannot say, even in the mildest form, that this situation has been in harmony with processes in other socialist countries, still less, that what is going on in Czechoslovakia furthers these processes, because it is of a retrogressive nature.

The process of internal consolidation which began with Husak's election as head of the Party in April 1969, must be observed

within the framework of a huge number of unsolved problems and obvious paradoxes which go beyond the country's borders. However, not even today - following a stormy period of purges (for which there has been no example even in the history of the Czechoslovak Party), when the Party faces its Congress - can one claim that the situation has been consolidated, still less that a solution or at least the chances for a solution of big social problems are at hand. One can only establish the fact that a forcible pacification of the situation and relationships has taken place, accompanied by a great amount of passivity and lack of interest among the popular masses and among a great number of already-tested Party members; they have no interest whatsoever in anything which is not connected with their personal existence.

Return to 1966: There are many reasons for such a state of affairs today: People cannot and simply do not wish to forget and abandon their own experience from the eras of Novotny, Dubcek and Husak. True, they are not allowed to oppose, but neither are they willing to accept serious accusations that everything in which they believed or did two or three years ago was of a counterrevolutionary or even treacherous nature. Such a state of mind is, in a special way, being supported by current official policies, because in all fields of life these policies take them back into an era which they wanted to overcome in 1968.

This is the chief reason why people are convinced that the country, in respect to the situation in the Party, the political and the economic sphere, has returned to the state of affairs which prevailed before the 13th Party Congress (held in 1966) when thoughts cropped up regarding the need to introduce changes in the whole social system.

Two Concepts: Most people in Czechoslovakia show lack of interest and are not willing to carry out tasks which they would, under normal conditions, consider as something indispensable, for the following reasons: a) the Novotny regime is now being condemned only for making possible the appearance and strengthening of the "rightist and revisionist forces"; b) everything which the January 1968 program announced has been practically abandoned; c) (Soviet) military intervention has been justified as a legal measure; d) old-style policies have returned in economic and political life (along with return of people who

in the Novotny era were removed as incompetent). All this, along with the fact that thus far no concrete and clear program has been designed to indicate the way in which, in the future, serious problems would be solved, has produced a lack of interest among the people.

Crisis Continues: From the very beginning it has been impossible to disregard several facts so important in understanding the essence of the Czechoslovak crisis. This crisis began and is today being continued within the Communist Party itself, not outside it, and not because of the outside danger but rather because of the conflict of the two concepts: the first, which is the preserving of outlived relationships, concepts and methods; the second, which demands far-reaching changes because it starts from the fact that Czechoslovakia, as the most industrially developed socialist country, long ago became too big for the narrow frameworks of administrative and bureaucratic socialism. In fact, this conflict continues although under different circumstances and people. And bearing in mind that this conflict has not been resolved, one cannot speak of any consolidation. On the contrary, Czechoslovak society continues to live in a stifled political, economic and ideological crisis.

Plot Against Husak: One of the attempts designed to find a way out of the crisis is also the newest political orientation introduced under Gottwald's slogan "A direct approach toward the masses". This new political line was announced at the end of 1970 with the aim of bridging a big gap between the Party and popular masses.

In September 1970 Gustav Husak, bearing this goal in mind, announced in Ostrava that an open dialogue would begin within the Party and in society, in general, about all problems. Husak criticized all people who slowed down consolidation and antagonized people by voicing their sectarian and "radical" views and demands. He requested a more tolerant attitude toward a mass of expelled Party members in order to give them the opportunity to return; he also attempted to extend his hand to a great number of offended socialist intellectuals.

However, nothing has come true because the same forces which considered the January (1968) policy to have been from the very beginning a "coup d'état", are now against such a policy line (of Husak). They have called it "inconsequential and tolerant vis-a-vis the rightist elements and the revisionists". The

situation has been sharpened to such an extent that on the eve of the December (1970) CC Plenum, people openly talked about a conflict between the two new currents: "the extreme leftist and dogmatic" against "Husak's centrist group". At that time a plot against Husak's leadership was discovered within the Party, especially against him personally. In order to prevent a new polarization of forces in an already shaken Party, the December Plenum did not end either in the way the one group wanted or according to the desire of the other group; instead a compromise solution was worked out which was expressed in the resolution dealing with unity. However, this resolution represents for both sides a sword with two edges. Which of these two edges will be used depends on the further development of events in Czechoslovakia.

A similar situation exists in connection with the alleged invitation to the five Warsaw Pact armies to invade the country. It is a well-known fact that the official (non-Czechoslovak) explanation has been that the armies of the Warsaw Pact had entered Czechoslovakia after having been invited by "some" members of the Czechoslovak Central Committee, government and National Assembly. This had been denied by an announcement of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Central Committee in which it was said that the Warsaw Pact armies entered Czechoslovakia "without knowledge of the President of the Republic, President of the National Assembly, Prime Minister or the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Central Committee and their organs". All members of the parliament, the government and the Central Committee publicly stated in September and October 1968 that they did not take part in the invitation of foreign armies. After their statement this topic was not discussed until the December 1970 Plenum of the Central Committee. In the document called "The Lessons" it is asserted that the invitation came from Czechoslovakia and that "thousands of Communists" had sent it, including the members of the Central Committee, National Assembly, the federal and the republican governments. During the Plenum the CC members received a list with the names of top functionaries who allegedly signed such an invitation.

Those Who Signed And Those Who Did Not: The problems and paradoxes concerning this affair are manifold. One of the most topical issues is that the list which circulated at the Plenum has

placed many of the present top Czechoslovak leaders in a very difficult position. Because the people mentioned in the list are called "the most persistent, most principled and most loyal people to the principles of proletarian internationalism", the question has been posed whether First Party Secretary Husak, President of the Republic Svoboda, Prime Minister Strougal, President of the National Assembly Hanes, prime ministers and chairman of the National Councils of Bohemia and Slovakia, and many other people whose names did not appear on the list - whether all of them are also to be considered the most persistent and most faithful Communists? Does this mean that in the future people characterized as "most principled" will one day replace "less principled" people? Obviously, the problem of the invitation (of the Warsaw Pact troops) is not easy to solve either in the domestic or the international point of view because it implies many things - the consequences of which would be far reaching.

An Open Dilemma: Bearing all this in mind, Czechoslovakia - not only because of its own internal problems - has found itself at a difficult crossroad; it has to answer the question of how to end the process of consolidation and to get out from the present closed circle. The compromises between the existing two groups (without considering the group which is stifled) are also possible in the future, but such compromises cannot be of a lasting nature nor can they solve the problems.

It seems that the period of compromises is nearing an end. The open dilemma of Czechoslovakia today is: either the forces, because of which the January 1968 changes had to be introduced, would prevail completely, or one would have to begin, perhaps gradually and cautiously, with introducing changes and positive movements designed to bring about new solutions which were initiated in January 1968, but which have now been totally abandoned.

There is no third way (with the exception of stagnation, which cannot solve anything). This is the acute problem of present-day Czechoslovakia.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

SOVIET PRIORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Soviet Union's efforts to extend and consolidate its influence in the Arab world have involved frequent reiterations of sympathy for the Arab cause and, most recently, support for the proposed union of Libya, the United Arab Republic, Sudan and Syria - the last three of which are heavily dependent on Soviet military and economic aid. Moscow's propaganda, as in relation to most moves towards greater unity among the Arabs, has concentrated on the "anti-imperialist" rather than the anti-Israeli aspect of the federation. However, the fact that the revolutionary Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, has been the driving force behind the scheme may cause misgivings in Moscow, as the extremists in all four countries may now feel encouraged to voice new demands for the crushing of Israel by force - thus complicating the Soviet leaders' efforts to prevent a further dangerous rise in tension in the area.

Another feature which must be unpalatable to Moscow is the suggestion that co-operation between the member countries' popular organisations should be a basic step towards union. This in turn would require the dissolution of all existing political parties and the formation of new "popular" bodies on the lines of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union. Such a move presents no difficulties in Libya, where there is no Communist Party, or for the Communists in the UAR, who dissolved their organisation six years ago. But it could prove a serious blow to the cohesion of the much more influential and well-established Communist Parties in Sudan and Syria.

The Sudanese coup of May 1969, when General Nimeri became Prime Minister and head of the Revolutionary Command Council, at first brought the Communists good dividends - members of the party or sympathisers were appointed to important posts in the Council and the government. But when the new regime began to call on the Communist Party to dissolve itself, so that its members could join a united revolutionary front, its Secretary-General, Abdel Khalik Mahgoub (who spent several months in exile in Cairo early in 1970 on Nimeri's orders), tried to avoid any action that would damage the party's separate existence. His relations with the régime deteriorated during 1970 as the pressure grew for the ending of all party activity, and shortly after his return from Cairo Mahgoub was arrested. But the

rift did not come until after his decision to reject the plan for Arab union outright and the expulsion (in September) of 12 members of the party's Central Committee for co-operating too closely with the régime. They included three of the four Communist members of the government - who have continued to hold their posts.

Divergent paths

Their calculation is presumably that the best road to the advancement of Communist policies, if not of winning power, lies through participation in the government. Mahgoub, on the other hand, appears to be looking further ahead, judging it wiser for the party leadership to avoid close identification with the régime to preserve the party's structure at all costs. Nevertheless, his manoeuvres so far have caused considerable damage to the Communist cause, for in mid-November three members of the Revolutionary Command Council known to be sympathetic to the Communists were dismissed from the Council and the government for having contacts with "subversive elements" and allegedly leaking State secrets. Mahgoub himself was again imprisoned.

On February 12, Nimeri denounced the Communist Party as a whole for working against the May 1969, revolution and "distinguishing itself by subversion and subservience to others". In Communist eyes anyone outside the party was considered unqualified for responsibility and was a "despicable reactionary", he said, and its leaders were prepared to trample on Sudan's national values and virtues in their search for power. Reaffirming that all the Sudanese political parties - including the Communist Party - had been dissolved as a means of uniting the people and ending "internecine fighting", he warned that the party would be crushed if it tried to re-emerge. But he added that his criticism did not mean that there would be any change in Sudan's relations with the Communist States.

Sudan began to turn increasingly to the Soviet bloc for military assistance after the May coup, and during 1969 President Nimeri visited Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union. In August, 1970, he went to China and North Korea, where he appears to have been less successful in securing offers of economic or military aid. Most of Sudan's

military advisers now come from the Soviet Union and her army has been largely re-equipped with Soviet weapons. But Moscow seems to have made less headway in the political field than in aid or trade, and there have been no recent suggestions of a high-level return Soviet visit to Sudan. The latest Soviet visitors have been the Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Patolichev, who signed a three-year trade agreement on January 13, and a member of the Academy of Sciences who examined the possibilities of co-operation in the use of solar energy. A series of Festivals of Soviet Culture is to be inaugurated in Sudan during 1971 to show economic, scientific and cultural progress in the Soviet Republics.

Soviet commentaries, which at the beginning of 1971 said that events in 1969 and 1970 had "confirmed the progressive line" of Sudan's "revolutionary régime", avoided all reference to Nimeri's anti-Communist speech. However, the Polish news agency, PAP, was probably reflecting Moscow's view when, in a brief report on February 15, it highlighted the President's wish to maintain good relations with the Communist countries and referred approvingly to the other Arab Communist Parties, notably that of Syria, which had endorsed the idea of the new Arab federation.

Asad in Moscow

One reason for the Syrian Communists' attitude is that the Prime Minister, General Asad, has not so far insisted on the dissolution of their party, possibly because he wishes to preserve his own Baath Party as a power base. And while the Communist Party is still technically banned, its leaders are probably anxious to avoid a clash with the government on an issue - joining the federation - which seems to have brought Asad considerable popularity. Moreover, Moscow's latest overtures to the Syrian leader are another reminder that it will always sacrifice the interests of an ineffective local party if there is a prospect of gaining influence with a nationalist and anti-Western régime, even if it is a military one.

The Soviet leaders had in fact been slow to recognise General Asad after his seizure of power in November - possibly because of their earlier commitment to his rival, General Jedid, the former Chief of Staff and assistant head of the Syrian

Baath Party, who had made Syria largely dependent on the Soviet Union for its military supplies. Early in 1969, one of Asad's close supporters, Mustafa Tallas (then Chief of Staff), had visited Peking, but the country's flirtation with China in 1968 and 1969 seems to have been unprofitable from the point of view of armaments and by the end of 1970 General Asad had probably become as dependent on Soviet supplies as his rival. But his decision in December to adhere to the proposed Arab union, together with a move towards avoiding provocative gestures, seems to have prompted a new interest on Moscow's part and on February 1 he arrived for his first visit to the Soviet Union - at the invitation of both the Soviet party and government.

In contrast with the coolness evident in relations between the two countries last September after Syria's invasion of Jordan, the Moscow visit was used as a demonstration of friendship and unity. The Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, endorsed the plan for a new union by welcoming the four States' efforts to "strengthen their united action in the fight against imperialism", and joined Syria in condemning Israel's policies. But he reiterated the Soviet Government's support for a Middle Eastern solution through implementation of the UN resolution and seemed to be criticising some of the Arab militants when he rejected the guidance of "extremist politicians" in the search for a settlement. The communiqué issued on February 3 hinted at remaining disagreements with its reference to the "frankness" as well as the friendly atmosphere of the talks. And while Moscow was prepared to praise Syria's "progressive reforms" and her "anti-imperialist course" in foreign affairs, the references to Soviet help in building the Euphrates Dam and expanding her oil industry gave no indication of further progress - though a delegation of Soviet power experts left Damascus on February 4 after a two-week visit to discuss work on the dam in 1971.

Meanwhile the fourth member of the proposed union, Libya, which began to look to the Soviet Union for technical assistance and military equipment after Colonel Qadafi's seizure of power in September 1969, has continued to hold the Soviet Union at arm's length and reiterated her devotion to Islam as the country's main inspiration. Addressing the Islamic Conference in Tripoli on December 12, Colonel Qadafi affirmed that "Islam is more progressive than Communism". It had laid the

foundations for labour relations, for prosperity and for justice, he said, and had provided guiding principles for the happiness of the individual and society. A commentary in the armed forces journal, *Al Jundi*, on February 13, cited the exposure of Communist subversion in Sudan as another proof of the falseness of the Arab Communists' claims to patriotism. The Communist Parties were simply hiding behind a "glittering façade", the newspaper said, while they were really manoeuvring to "impose their principles and aims on the Arab masses".

AFRICA'S FUTURE: A SOVIET VIEW

Soviet African experts have given a new and revealing insight into their thinking on African political development.

A new book, published in Moscow for a limited readership of Soviet specialists, gives an unusually frank picture of Soviet attitudes to political developments in Africa. The book, *The Political Parties of Africa*, was passed by the censors last October and has been issued under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute in an edition of only 3,700 copies.

Presumably because of the restricted readership, the dozen Soviet African experts who collaborated on the book under the editorship of V. G. Solodovnikov, the Africa Institute Director and a former Soviet representative at the United Nations, have been particularly outspoken both about conditions in Africa and previous Soviet analyses of the situation.

While African statesmen are criticised for "Utopian" views and other heresies by the Soviet experts, they point out that some of their own colleagues have taken an over-simplified view of African leaders. The book contains biographies of several African leaders to stress that there cannot be any automatic way of "defining political sympathies on the basis of social origin. . . . Like other continents, Africa knows examples of political leaders who have refused to serve their class. . . . These examples testify to the incorrectness of identifying the aristocratic stratum of chiefs with reactionaries, without any qualifications - a view disseminated quite widely in (Soviet) Africanist literature".

The book names those "revolutionary-democratic" parties -

in Guinea, Algeria, the UAR, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique - which the authors believe can become "reliable detachments of the African and international Communist and workers' movement". "Revolutionary-democratic" parties is the Soviet term for the kind of "national Socialist" parties with a mass membership familiar in developing countries.

The authors describe how present nationalist parties of a mass nature are to be "transformed" into Communist-type parties. Firstly, "the establishment of a single-party system of government is one of the most important political successes of parties of the revolutionary-democratic type". But the book warns Soviet specialists not to commit themselves to supporting present-day ruling parties of this type, since it was "impossible to exclude the possibility of a departure from a single-party system":

"This system corresponds to the present-day state of social relations in the progressive countries of Tropical Africa. But the social structures of African countries are going through a period of stormy changes, new social forces are emerging on to the historical arena, in particular the political rôle of the working class is becoming increasingly noticeable. Under these conditions any dogmatism in the evaluation of the single-party system in the concrete historical epoch of a given African country could entail serious mistakes".

Challenge planned

The implication is that Marxist opposition groups may be formed and that leaders now hailed by the Russians as "progressive" may be challenged by them when the time is ripe. The book predicts that the tendency towards one-man rule will inevitably fade away, "although it will probably be a long time before this problem is fully resolved". There are several references to the fact that opposition continues within and outside the single ruling parties and that although it can be repressed for a time, "sooner or later the moment of serious upheavals arrives, as a result of which it becomes clear that the single-party system cannot be regarded as a panacea".

Sometimes these "upheavals" have already taken place, producing a result not favoured by the Soviet authors. They say of

the military régimes now existing in Africa:

"The replacement of a régime of mercenary bureaucrats by often incompetent officers does not decide anything itself. . . . It is clear that it is impossible to implement even correct programmes by relying only on the army and deliberately rejecting political, i. e. party, forms of leading the masses. The soil for the regrowth of new parties inevitably remains in those countries where military régimes crush down political life in general".

Returning to the more progressive "revolutionary-democratic" parties, the book says that they have entered a new phase: "These processes are accompanied by a heightening of discussion around ideological questions, a growing interest towards the Marxist-Leninist teaching. The parties' success in the new phase will greatly depend on the extent to which these new trends will become consolidated in practice and how quickly the new tendencies will be understood and become the parties' norms."

"Facts demonstrate that the transformation of the present-day mass popular revolutionary-democratic parties into parties of a vanguard (i. e. Communist) type is being placed on the agenda. One cannot consider that there is unanimity on this question in the political thinking of revolutionary democrats. Although the process of transforming present-day parties into Socialist vanguard parties has in practice begun, it is continuing in an extremely slow and contradictory manner. . . ."

"In conditions whereby the influence of trade unions, the youth movement and peasant organisations remains strong within revolutionary-democratic parties, the tendency towards their transformation into vanguard parties begins to show increasingly clearly. This process in general corresponds to the logic of the class war. The former anti-colonial front slowly disintegrates and a dilemma arises before revolutionary-democratic parties - to continue to be allied to the bourgeoisie or to take the side firmly of workers and peasants. . . . The relative weakness of class contradictions in the towns and the communal survivals (i. e. traditional African village life) in the countryside. favour the durability of illusions about the possibly lengthy existence of parties common to whole peoples".

Class struggle

Here the Soviet long-term opposition to mass nationalist parties is clear, even though it is conceded that in Africa the social basis for the class struggle which the Russians would welcome is not very promising. The authors go on to indicate that, whatever the present situation, they expect the class struggle to emerge:

"It remains an indisputable fact that class differentiation is taking its normal course in Africa. . . . This process does not bypass single-party régimes either. . . . It may be that this struggle is being waged within a formally single party. . . . but its class basis is undoubted. Nor can one forget the illegal, extra-parliamentary opposition under conditions of single-party régimes".

Despite the relative lack of class conflict in Africa, the book attacks "revolutionary democrats" who deny that Communism can "have real roots on the African continent. One does not have to prove that these people are willy-nilly in the same camp as the anti-Communists and, as a consequence, as the defenders of capitalism".

A sign that the Russians are cautious about forcing the pace, thereby jeopardising their long-term plans, is the book's denunciation of "left-wing extremism". Nevertheless, the fact that a left-wing is emerging in revolutionary-democratic parties such as those in Algeria and Egypt is welcomed. Discussing a number of Marxist-Leninist parties on the African continent, the book declares:

"The basic programmatic theses of the revolutionary-democratic parties often coincide with (those) of Marxist-Leninist parties or those related to them. At the same time, the views of Communists and revolutionary democrats do not always coincide on many other questions.

"This is understandable. The revolutionary-democratic parties are not consistent Marxists. Their basic membership consists of peasants who have inherited from many years of colonial overlordship political and cultural backwardness and religious fanaticism. However, representatives of the African intelligentsia and the young working class, inspired by scientific Socialist ideas. . . . actively work in the central

organs of these parties as well as in their middle and lower ranks".

Sudanese example

The book cites the example of the Sudan, where following the take-over in May, 1969, Communists joined the government. It claims: "Communists do not strive for a political monopoly, ruled by some sort of egoistical considerations. This can be seen with particular clarity from the example of the activities of Sudanese Communists".

But on February 12, President Nimeri attacked the Sudanese Communist Party, claiming that it had been "perpetrating subversion against the production machinery in various ways, including interference with trade union work, wrecking production and disseminating secret pamphlets, disastrous rumours and harmful lies and spreading fear and dismay among responsible officials and the masses".

He warned that the Sudanese revolution would not allow the creation of a new party, secretly or overtly: "The revolution did not take place to support one group against another but to support the entire people".

Pointing out that difficult tasks lie before African Communists, the book ends with interesting insights into recommended tactics. The main task is said to be for Communists to attract to them not only a reliable and conscious minority, but the mass of the workers as well. Though "extraordinarily difficult", the task could be accomplished - "as the positive experience of Sudanese Communists shows".

"The working-out of correct tactics by Communists with regard to ruling revolutionary-democratic parties acquires particular importance. . . . In entering the ranks of mass revolutionary-democratic parties and carrying out daily work within them, Communists revolutionise these parties. . . .

"But entry by CP members into a ruling party is likened by Communists least of all to dissolution within it. On the contrary, they strive to raise a mass revolutionary party to the level of a conscious Socialist vanguard, to a close-knit union of genuinely like-minded people. It is natural that in doing this they have to rely mainly on the left-wing, more revolutionary elements and overcome the resistance of right-wing, nationalist

elements....

"The only way of putting an end to ideological pressure on the party by elements hostile to the spirit of Socialism is by means of periodically purging its ranks of alien and casual elements".

The book raises two basic possibilities for Communist take-overs in Africa: firstly, "revolutionising" ruling parties from within by creating "close-knit union(s) of genuinely like-minded people" who proceed to purge their opponents, and secondly, opposition from outside the ruling party:

"Making use of the experience of more mature Communist and workers' parties, African Communists are striving to master different forms of struggle for the basic interests of the workers - from peaceful and parliamentary ones to armed ones - in order to be ready for any change in the political situation".

THE 'COOLING OF AMERICA'

by Cecil Eprile

Summary: The protest movement in the United States may not be dead, but much of the steam has perceptibly gone out of it. In Congress, on the campuses and in the nation generally, the reaction to the incursion into Laos was mild compared with last year's demonstrations over Cambodia. What are the causes of this so-called 'Cooling of America'? Writing from New York, Cecil Eprile examines some of them.

In spite of the saboteurs' bomb in Washington's Capitol and other bombing incidents in the United States in the past year.... in spite of (and perhaps because of) the horrors of the Manson murder trial, the trial of the 13 Black Panthers and disclosures about the Bonnies and Clydes of the revolutionary "Weatherman" movement..... there seems to be a mood in America away from violence.

It might be premature to claim that the protest movement in America has collapsed. But certainly most of the sting, the fizz and the steam seem to have gone out of it. On the one hand the Black Panthers, in disarray with a torn leadership have shut down in city after city, while the outlawed Weathermen wonder what to do and where to go next. On the other hand, the reaction

in the streets and on the campuses to the incursion into Laos was significantly mild compared with last year's storm over the entry into Cambodia. In 1970 scores of college campuses were closed down after Cambodia and the disturbances and shootings at Kent State. In last month's peace rally in front of the White House, a few windows were broken and a few slogans shouted, and then the few hundred protesters departed.

While radical passions over the war in Indo-China have evidently simmered down, a political debate of a kind has flared up again; and this is being duly recorded by the news media almost as though it was engendering some sort of heat of its own.

And so we read (or hear) that Mr Jacob K. Javits of New York has told President Nixon that his political future is in "grave danger" if he does not "abandon his Vietnamisation programme for a policy of complete withdrawal from Vietnam". This has been hailed in some quarters as a significant public warning for a Republican senator to give to his Republican president, but it should be remembered that Senator Javits has a reputation to maintain for candour, audacity and a New York liberal brand of republicanism.

Announcing his early candidature for the Democratic Presidential nomination, Senator George McGovern said, predictably: "We must have the courage to admit that however sincere our motives we made a dreadful mistake..... There is no way to end it and to free our prisoners except to announce a definite, early date for the withdrawal of every American soldier from Vietnam. I make that pledge without reservation". He is one of 21 Democratic senators calling for complete withdrawal by the end of 1971.

'An Eerie Tranquillity'

Senator Edward Muskie, early front-runner in the Democratic presidential race and regarded as one of the "gentler" breed of doves, did not go along with McGovern's resolution; but some 30 other Democratic senators went along with Muskie on a resolution calling for withdrawal by "a fixed date" - generally understood to be the end of 1972. Both Muskie and McGovern have addressed "teach-ins" at eastern colleges, inaugurated by Yale President Kingman Brewster (who has described the new, quiet mood on the campuses as "an eerie

tranquillity").

Senator Edward Kennedy, a consistent critic of the Vietnam war, has added his piece. Averell Harriman, who negotiated the 1962 Geneva agreement providing for a neutral Laos, found it necessary to tell a University of Chicago audience that "expanding the war to Cambodia and Laos with our unlimited air support is not the way to end the war". Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield said something similar. And Mr Hubert Humphrey has let it be known that if he had won the Election in 1968 he would have guaranteed American withdrawal from Vietnam before he finished his presidential term.

But none of this seems to have communicated any sense of excitement to the nation. The significant thing is not that there is still dissent but that it is low-keyed and there is relatively little of it. The New Yorker magazine, in its own little protest, complains that "the people in Congress and in the country who have protested past escalations of the war have remained comparatively silent and inactive during this most recent and most grave escalation"; and it talks of "a numbness, even a paralysis, among the people from whom one might expect leadership in the current crisis". The New Republic, which has criticism of the Administration in its bloodstream, finds "an embargo on sanity" and says, dolefully, that the majority of senators wish McGovern and Co would "shut up and leave the war to the President".

Understandably, the war in Indo-China still tends to be an emotional issue, however subdued, rather than a rational one, in America. Somehow the facts do not seem to have been driven home that it is the North Vietnamese, long-time invaders of South Vietnam, who have for some time violated the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia; that to let them get away with it would do the opposite of furthering the cause of peace; and that Soviet Russia continues to finance and supply Hanoi's aggression, and, in spite of being co-guarantor, with the United Kingdom of Laotian and Cambodian sovereignty, has consistently refused to bring the matter to the conference table. The American public is preoccupied with America's role in the war.

Why, then, has the voice of Protest been toned down?

One reason may be that people are just tired of the Anti-war. Another reason is that President Nixon can be seen to be keeping his promise of a phased withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. By

May 1 this year fewer than 284,000 American troops will remain (of the original 543,000) and only 40,000 will be regularly assigned to combat duty. The cost of the war has been cut in half. American casualties are greatly reduced.

Few people appear seriously to think that Mr Nixon is seeking to widen the war, or that he is not committed, as a realistic politician, to disengage America from the war. The difference between the President and his "moderate" critics is that he is not prepared to encourage the enemy by announcing his timetable for total withdrawal while the enemy continues to attack.

Retreat from violence

Some of Mr Nixon's most serious critics realise that this is not the time for the big confrontation. Election year is a long way off. This kind of restraint and the radical trend towards a retreat from violence on the campus and elsewhere suggest a pattern. Some observers sense a mood in the country which Time magazine (with perceptiveness as well as ingenuity) has labelled "The Cooling of America".

As I had long suspected, and as one of the more meaningful Gallup Poll series bears out, the majority of American college "kids" have turned out to be more conservative and more concerned with orderliness and the "homely virtues" than television programmes would have had one think. Of course it is from the small pace-making minorities that the catalysts come. But a number of young radicals have admitted that last year's demonstrations over Cambodia and other issues proved to be counter-productive and that violence has consequences to be feared. How long they will remain in hibernation is anybody's guess. It is just conceivable they will let America get on with the peaceful Quiet Revolution which some of us regard as part of the process of Democratic Evolution.

A more mundane consideration is that, with an American withdrawal from Vietnam only a matter of time, the Vietnam war is no longer the big issue here. Bread and butter issues - employment, education, wages, prices, health insurance - are what count in America, 1971.

(Forum World Features, 1971)

LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TACTICS

The wave of kidnappings of diplomats and other prominent personalities by extreme left-wing terrorists which began in Brazil in September, 1969, and bred imitations in a succession of Latin American countries, reflects the continuing emphasis on urban tactics and the decline in rural guerrilla activities since the death of Che Guevara in October, 1967. It also shows that the accession to power of an extreme left-wing coalition government in Chile by peaceful, electoral means is not necessarily seen as relevant to the strategies employed by Communists and other extremists elsewhere.

Although rural guerrilla activities continue in a number of countries, in none do they represent a threat to the stability of established governments. In Bolivia, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), originally set up by Guevara in 1966-67, made an unsuccessful attempt to renew its rural activity in July 1970, when a group of 30 guerrillas attacked a gold-mining company in Teoponte, in North-Eastern Bolivia, kidnapped two West German engineers, and demanded as ransom the release of ten "political prisoners". A communiqué published in the Cuban Press on July 23 claimed that the guerrillas had "returned to the mountains"; but by October the ELN commander "Chato" Peredo, had been captured and the members of his group killed, captured or dispersed. About 15 may have managed to make their way back to the capital, where the ELN may still have a rudimentary urban base. Exiled to Chile at the beginning of November, Peredo told the extreme left-wing journal Punto Final (December 8) that the ELN still held the ideas expressed by Che Guevara and believed that political and social conditions in Bolivia were right for guerrilla warfare. His views have been repudiated by the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), however; a meeting of the PCB Central Committee, reported by Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress (December 4), criticised attempts to revive guerrilla activity and denied that these were the only valid revolutionary tactics in Bolivia.

The Venezuelan guerrilla movement, which was probably the most influential in Latin America in the early 1960s, is now in complete disarray. Repudiated in 1967 by the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), one of its original co-sponsors, and, apparently, abandoned by Cuba in 1969, it has few members and

is ideologically split and physically ineffective. The small remaining groups of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), led by former PCV Poliburo member Douglas Bravo, and the Castroite Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), reportedly formed a "revolutionary integration committee" in January, 1970, to coordinate their activities, but nothing has been heard of it since. The pacification programme launched by President Caldera's government in 1969, the legalisation of the PCV, and the termination of Cuban moral and material support (publicly denounced by Bravo in January, 1970), all contributed to the decline of the rural guerrilla movement. Sporadic raids still occur, but they are comparatively insignificant; and in January, 1971, there were persistent rumours that Bravo himself had died of cancer.

Rural guerrilla activities in Colombia have also declined, although three groups, geographically and ideologically separate, still exist. Lack of success has led all of them at various times to embark on urban operations, but they have made little progress. The Castroite Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is believed to have been responsible for a number of urban raids and kidnappings in 1970, has been weakened by a split in its main "José Antonio Galán Front", due as much to personal as to ideological rivalries, and aggravated by general demoralisation. In early January, 1971, unconfirmed reports said that ELN leader Fabio Vásquez had been "executed" by his own men. The pro-Chinese Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), virtually inactive during 1969, suffered further losses when it tried to resume operations in late 1970. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), numerically the largest group with about 150 members, has continued at a reduced scale the activities it resumed immediately after the April, 1970, elections. The pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party (PCC) still supports the FARC and that support continues to be endorsed by Soviet propaganda. Gilberto Vieira, PCC Secretary General, told the Uruguayan Communist Party newspaper El Popular (December 23, 1970) that "mass political struggle" was most important in Colombia at the present time, but the PCC believed that the guerrillas had to be maintained - even if their methods did not yet constitute the principal form of struggle - in order to defeat "the violence of the government against the peasant areas".

Kidnappings multiply

The swing from rural to urban tactics has been most marked in Guatemala, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina - all of which were the scene of much-publicised political kidnappings in 1970. In Guatemala - where members of the Castroite Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) in March, 1970, kidnapped the Foreign Minister, a US labour attaché and the West German Ambassador (the last of whom they murdered when ransom terms were rejected) - there has been comparatively little terrorist activity in the past few months.

In Brazil urban terrorism continues. In 1970, members of the Castroite Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR) and the Acao Libertadora Nacional (ALN) were responsible for the abduction of the Japanese Consul in Sao Paolo (March); the West German Ambassador (June); and the Swiss Ambassador (December) - thereby securing the release of a total of 115 "political prisoners". Both the VPR and the ALN plan to develop rural as well as urban activities, but the aim of the late ALN leader, Carlos Marighella, to make 1969 the "year of the rural guerrilla", did not materialise. The ALN itself, badly hit by the death of Marighella in November, 1969, suffered a further blow when his successor, Joaquin Camara Ferreira, died of a heart attack while resisting arrest in October, 1970. However, Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, produced in June, 1969 (which recommends kidnapping as one tactic), remains a basic handbook and its contents have been widely publicised by Cuban propaganda. The pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) (from which Marighella was expelled in 1967) is the only extreme left-wing organisation in Brazil to oppose violent tactics. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa (December 29, 1970) reported that PCB Secretary-General Luis Carlos Prestes had attacked kidnappings and urban guerrilla tactics in general in an article in a recent issue of the New International Review. He called such activities "adventurism" which caused grave harm to the revolution.

The most active and best organised of urban groups in Latin America is the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) or "Tupamaros" in Uruguay, who in July, 1970, kidnapped a Brazilian diplomat and a US AID official (murdering the latter), and in August a US soil adviser. On January 8, 1971, they seized

the British Ambassador to Uruguay, Mr Geoffrey Jackson. They have proved adept at carrying out other types of urban terrorism such as bank raids, attacks on foreign-owned property and murder of members of the security forces; but their vague ideological base, their increasing brutality and the adverse effects of their activities on some aspects of the economy (e.g. the normally lucrative tourist trade) have alienated popular sentiment. The Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU), which is currently pledged to united front tactics designed to emulate the electoral success of the Chilean Communists (the Uruguayan Frente Amplio was launched on February 7, 1971), does not openly support the Tupamaros, though it may welcome the atmosphere of unrest they have created.

One reason for the shift to urban tactics in Uruguay is the lack of isolated, mountainous terrain. The same factor has in part influenced the emphasis on urban tactics in Argentina, where many small terrorist groups have existed since mid-1968. Best known of the Argentine groups are the "Montoneros" (or the "Juan José Valle" Command, named after a Peronist general executed in 1956 under former President Aramburu for leading an attempt to restore Perón to power). The various terrorist groups, which show a continuing tendency to splinter and reform under new names, have few connexions with each other. But their exploitation of industrial unrest (as in the Córdoba riots in May, 1969) and sporadic raids and proclamations have aroused the resentment of the pro-Soviet Argentine Communist Party (PCA). This pursues "peaceful co-existence" and has been inspired by President Allende's electoral victory in Chile to seek the formation of a similar political front in Argentina - an ambition so far thwarted by the refusal of the Peronist movement to cooperate.

Lack of coordination

There is little evidence that any significant degree of international cooperation exists between the various Latin American guerrilla movements. Despite Guevara's failure and the disillusionment it caused the hope still lingers in certain quarters that Bolivia, being in the heart of the continent, may provide a suitable starting-point for a unified guerrilla movement. A committee of support for the Bolivian ELN was set up in Chile in January, 1970, but little is known of its activities. A number

of Chileans Argentinians, Brazilians Peruvians and Colombians allegedly joined the ELN in 1970: it was claimed that they signed an ELN communiqué, publicised by Cuban propaganda in July, calling for "a continental and coordinated armed response" to imperialism in Latin America. The ELN also claimed it had received assistance from the Uruguayan Tupamaros (the Cuban party organ, Granma, August 1, 1970). However, members of the extreme left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) in Argentina claimed in an interview published by Granma (December 12, 1970) that their group had held talks with the Bolivian ELN but these had broken down over the latter's insistence on leading any continental guerrilla organisation.

So far as is known, Cuba has given little or no material aid to Latin American guerrilla groups since mid-1969, although it is likely that some training facilities are still being provided in Cuba. This may be due in part (as Douglas Bravo alleged) to Cuba's increasing preoccupation with her own economic plight. Russian pressure may also be a factor since Soviet efforts at political and economic penetration in Latin America have continued in the past year. (The Soviet Union established relations with Guyana and Costa Rica at the end of 1970, and a number of important trade and aid agreements have been concluded or offered with Costa Rica, Bolivia and Peru). Castro may also be viewing the guerrillas with greater realism. Propaganda support nevertheless continues, including the publication of lengthy interviews with guerrilla groups in Granma (for example with the Tupamaros on October 8, 1970, and with various Argentine groups on December 10 and 12), full reportage of their activities and dissemination of Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla - which was re-issued in November in the monthly bulletin of the Havana-based Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organisation, Tricontinental.

Chile "an exception"

The Cuban Minister without Portfolio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, told a Press conference in Chile (published in Punto Final on November 24) that Chile's electoral result did not invalidate the armed struggle formula: Cuba and most revolutionary groups in Latin America had always viewed Chile as an exceptional case. In most countries democratic possibilities

were non-existent. The same point was made by Castro himself in an interview with Chilean journalists in Havana carried by the same journal in February, 1971. Chile's example could not be applied to other Latin American countries, in most of which armed struggle was still the only way to "liberation".

This may in part be posturing by a Cuban leadership that is anxious to retain a reputation for militancy. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that Castro's long-term aims have changed. It is also clear that the Russians are anxious to keep their options open in Latin America. Moscow has implicitly supported the Colombian Communist Party's maintenance of a guerrilla wing and has more directly incited Haitians to violence (a broadcast by the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress on February 4, 1971, criticised Haitians for not taking advantage of an opportunity to "eliminate" a group of tontons macoutes, reminding them that they could achieve this aim only by "determined actions").

The Russians have demonstrated that they will support armed struggle if they consider it to be appropriate to local circumstances. An article in the November, 1970, issue of the World Marxist Review gave approval to a new book, Lenin, Revolution, and Latin America, by Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party. Arismendi, it said, had pointed out that the choice of revolutionary paths should be left to each individual party. He had also categorically rejected "revisionist" attempts to distort the decisions of the 20th Soviet Party Congress and the statements of the 1957 and 1960 World Communist Party Conferences by claiming that these had directed Communists "exclusively" towards peaceful means of achieving Socialism. Arismendi "convincingly" showed that the Soviet party and the international Communist movement were "creatively developing the theory of the paths of revolution in the new conditions of history". His book also discussed guerrilla activities in Latin America "as one aspect of the armed rising of the proletariat and the oppressed". But, the review concluded cautiously, he "trenchantly" criticised those who sought to copy mechanically the example of Cuba: Cuba's experience could be applied in other countries "only after careful appraisal of the alignment of forces".

UNITY OF LEFT-WING FORCES AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN CHILE

by Nijaz Dizdarevic

Member of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the LCY

What impressions have you brought back from the Congress of the Socialist Party of Chile which you attended as the head of the delegation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia?

The Congress of the Socialist Party of Chile was held three months after the formation of the National Unity government under the presidency of the leader of party, Salvador Allende. The victory of the left-wing front in Chile (although not with an absolute majority) is an extremely important event for all Latin America and elsewhere; as far as Chile is concerned, it offers this country the possibility of a socialist orientation. Consequently, reactionary circles made attempts to prevent the left-wing forces from taking power. There were also other forms of resistance like the flight of capital, powerful propaganda campaigns and pressures from abroad, the murder of General Schneider by rightist terrorists, and so on.

The changed position of the Socialist Party of Chile and its responsibility, together with the other five parties in the left-wing coalition, for the country's destiny and for the social changes the people of Chile expect from this government, could but be reflected in the course and outcome of the Congress of the Socialist Party. Although foreign delegates were not able to follow the entire course of the Congress, and in spite of the fact that the final political document of the Congress has not yet been published, a number of basic assessments, or better said impressions can be formulated. In the first place, judging from all appearances, the basic programmatic orientation from the last Congress (in Chilana) has not undergone any essential change: pursuit of the quest for unity with left-wing forces, above all the Communist Party of Chile, for radical changes in the internal economic situation (agrarian reform, nationalization, etc.) and in internal and foreign policy through cooperation with all progressive and socialist forces.

The principal subject of debate was the question of timing for execution of the left-wing's programme and then also, to some extent the question of its sufficiency for the implement-

ation of a socialist orientation. And finally, the choice of the new Central Committee which provoked vehement discussions and brought about radical changes in leadership. Judging from the composition of the new Central Committee and Secretariat, headed by Secretary-General Senator Carlos Altamiran, the desire to "go faster" prevailed, which was described by some observers as a victory for the "hard-liners". However, this should also be regarded from the standpoint of the complex situation in the country resulting from dragging postponement of solution of Chile's serious development problems and the protracted exploitation of its wealth by American capital (great deficits, strong inflationary tendencies, the below-subsistence standard of 32% of the population, and bare subsistence for another 30%, and so on).

The limits of "dynamization" desired by the "Young Turks" in the Socialist Party of Chile are set by the fact that it is not the Socialist Party alone which is in power. Rather, it shares power with the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the MAPU, the API and the SD. In the opinion of some of the most responsible functionaries in the Socialist Party, appreciable changes in leadership, and the influx of younger cadres, would be indispensable for the party to organize better and expand its influence. Finally, the Congress should also be viewed in the light of the Socialist Party's preparations for district elections this year in April for which each party in the left-wing front will stand separately. Naturally, the Socialist Party wishes to utilize the dynamism and revolutionary mood of the young people for strengthening its own positions, through which it should become the most powerful factor in the National Unity Front both in relation to its other partners, and in the country generally.

Despite the considerable time needed for implementation of the agrarian reform, even when it is stepped up, this and all other parties in the government are faced with the growing impatience of the landless peasants (disgruntled at the procrastination of land reforms under the Demo-Christians and encouraged by the campaign promises of the left) who are now taking land on their own initiative, with all the attending excesses, inevitable in such a situation. Similarly intricate problems still remain to be solved so that the mines may be

nationalized (above all copper), as well as the banks, etc. In making good these and other promises of the election platform, new problems will crop up that the Congress in La Serena was able neither to predict nor to discuss. Probably one of them is the question of managing all nationalized property.

If the commentaries are any indication, the Congress provoked reactions among all parties, both those in power and those in the opposition. This launched a dialogue on the next complicated phase of government action and the relationship between the political parties in the government. Ideas have been put forward for the creation of a single revolutionary party but dilemmas have also been created by the problem of preserving the present unity in the teeth of oncoming difficulties.

In foreign policy, complete approval was given the policy which the government has already begun to implement by establishing relations with Cuba and China, and making preliminary contacts with Korea and Vietnam, as well as by announcing the inauguration of consular relations with the Democratic Republic of Germany. The Congress has given powerful support to the struggle of Vietnam, to the Arabs against Israeli aggression, to the rights of the Palestinians, to all aspirations for liberation in Latin America and elsewhere.

I must also mention the impression made on me by the democratic nature not only of the course of the Congress but also of the dialogue between the highest leaders and the people. I consider this to the great advantage of the socialist forces in Chile thanks to which they were able to achieve power through elections. But this must be invested with new dimensions and a class basis in workers' democracy through progressive social changes.

What, in your opinion, are the key points in the programme of Salvador Allende, which make his investiture as the leader of Chile an important turning point in the history of this country, and perhaps of Latin America?

Before replying to your question, I must stress the tremendous significance of the achievement of left-wing unity in Chile and the victory of that wing in the September elections. Apart from the fact that this is yet another confirmation of how indispensable it is for each nation to find its own road to socialism, and one

more effective negation of numerous pseudo-revolutionary and sectarian-adventurous theories which have flourished especially in Latin America where they did considerable damage to revolutionary forces and aspirations, this unity and the success achieved have given incentive to similar processes among left-wing forces generally. This is particularly significant, as we know how split these parties were, how they bickered, and in consequence how powerless they were to conduct the struggle successfully. A similar front has already been created in Uruguay where, in contrast to the Chilean experience, Demo-Christians have also joined.

Progressive forces in Europe are following the Chilean scene attentively. Allende and the Chileans naturally stress that they do not want to export their revolution or their model to anyone, but that they would welcome the establishment elsewhere of such a government of national unity and such an inception of socialism.

My own feeling is that Chile will pass an historic turning point through implementation of structural changes in the Chilean economy by nationalization, agrarian reform, development and utilization of the results of this development to raise the living standard of the broad sections of the Chilean population, preventing others from depriving them of these results. A responsible Chilean politician calculated that in the past six years of economic relations between Chile and the USA, America has "siphoned off" a clear 400 million dollars, which means that Chile has been financing development in the USA. This government does not wish to permit continuation of this situation which could no longer be tolerated by the Demo-Christian government either. Exploitation by domestic capitalists and landowners was similar in its outcome.

Of course, major changes will take place in society on this basis. To the extent that these changes are significant, resistance is appearing from within and pressure from without.

The resolve of the Allende Government to consolidate its independence, to establish ties with the whole world, to play an active role in the international community for the purpose of promoting and protecting the country's interests, has revolutionary significance both for Chile and Latin America. The basic goals are the quest for peace, for democratization of international relations, for assistance and support to peoples

fighting for their independence and against aggression, for more rapid closing of the gap between the developed and developing. It is clear that, given these aspirations, Chile is incorporating more actively into the efforts and aspirations of the non-aligned countries.

The international support which Chile enjoys and should enjoy will stand it in good stead, for along its role it will clash with forces that resist such development in this part of the world and in the world at large.

Many of the people who are following this exciting undertaking in Chile wonder if it will succeed. From the impressions and knowledge I have been able to gain, I would say that it will succeed if the left-wing forces of National Unity preserve, consolidate and expand their unity, and rally the masses to achieving the kind of future that was promised them in the election campaign. Only then would outside help and support be effective and only in this way will it be possible to overcome resistance and obstacles and ride out crises.

What is your appraisal of the present situation in relations between Yugoslavia and Chile, and the possibilities for development?

It is common knowledge that relations between Yugoslavia and Chile have been developing steadily. During his visit here last year, Edvard Kardelj was able to observe that they had reached a certain level which was not, however, commensurate with the possibilities.

The political trends to which I referred provide the basis for continued advancement of cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, cultural and other spheres. Certainly one of the dynamic factors in this cooperation are the traditionally good ties between Yugoslavia's League of Communists and Socialist Alliance on one hand and Chile's Socialist Party on the other, with all its former and present leaders, and with President Allende himself. Possibilities for broad cooperation with all progressive and democratic political organizations had existed before and been utilized. They are still there. One of the specific factors in this picture are the many Chileans of Yugoslav descent.

On the whole, and particularly in the economic, scientific

and technical fields, our working organizations can take advantage of the broad possibilities for cooperation that exist only if they make concrete approaches to the business of finding suitable forms for cooperation, for discharging the obligations they have undertaken or are in the process of undertaking, and appropriate organizational measures at home to solve the problems that inevitably crop up in such cooperation. There can never be too much efficiency in this respect, and that is what is needed now.

(International Review of International
Affairs, Belgrade)

E C O N O M I C S

SHARE OF WAGES IN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION COSTS FELL THROUGHOUT DECADE

Summary: The February issue of Voprosy Ekonomiki, discloses that the wages share of Soviet industrial costs fell from 20, 9% in 1958 to 16, 6% in 1968. This paper argues that the fact is evidence of the passivity and inertia of Soviet trade unions, comparing wage increases during the sixties with the figures for major W. European countries. It also uses statistics supplied by Soviet sources to show that during the past decade the share of real per capita incomes in the national income has fallen considerably.

The Soviet trade unions are notoriously passive bodies, which appear to believe that they are merely "transmission belts" for the Party, and which seem conspicuously inert whether they are run by Shvernik, Grishin or Shelepin. Some solid evidence for this point of view has just been provided by Voprosy Ekonomiki, (1) in an article on ways to improve productivity.

"Whereas in 1958, the material costs in industry averaged 76% of all production costs, and wages accounted for 20, 9% in 1968 the corresponding figures were 80, 3% and 16, 6%. These figures show that factories have greater opportunities for reducing the cost of materials than of wages. To increase profits or profitability by 2%, say, by means of reducing prime costs, the labor force must be cut by 12%, whereas material cost need only be cut by 2, 5%.

The logic of Voprosy Ekonomiki's argument seems impeccable, but its disclosure that the share of wages in Soviet industrial production costs fell by almost a quarter in percentage terms in the decade 1958-1968 is in itself a sharp indictment of the leadership of the AUCCTU.

In 1958 N. M. Shvernik was the chairman of that body, in 1961 he was replaced by V. V. Grishin, and in 1967 A. N.

(1) No. 2, 1971, by F. Veselkov and L. Mymrin "Incentives for the Growth of Productivity in Social Labor", pp. 3-14.

Shelepin took over. Yet the wages share of industrial costs went on falling steadily, which scarcely says much for their defence of the Soviet workers' interests.

One might ask what was happening to Soviet industrial profits during the decade. In 1958 they amounted to about 12 billion rubles, and by 1968 they had risen to 44 billion, (2) so that a scarcity of profits cannot be used to excuse the decreased share of wages in the cost structure.

If profitability is investigated as being a more comprehensive index than profits alone, the profitability of Soviet industry rose as follows in the past decade (taken as a percentage of basic production funds and material turnover funds): (3)

Industrial Profitability

1960	13, 6	1965	13, 0
1961	13, 4	1966	13, 3
1962	14, 8	1967	17, 1
1963	14, 0	1968	20, 1
1964	14, 0	1969	20, 5

The table and the more than threefold profit growth make it clear that neither a shortage of profits nor of profitability can be advanced as an explanation for the declining share of wages. In fact, because of depressed wages Soviet industrial profitability is now up to U. S. standards, since the average rate of return on equity in U. S. manufacturing was 19, 6% from 1967 through 1969. (4)

Incidentally, the table also shows the considerable impact of the Soviet economic reform on profitability, which rose from 13, 3% in 1966, when it was first introduced, to 20, 5% in 1969.

(2) Narkhoz SSSR v 1969 g. Moscow, 1970, p. 741

(3) Narkhoz SSSR v 1969 g. Moscow, 1970, p. 744

(4) Guardian, 3 March 1971

To show the effects of trade union passivity, one might compare the E. C. E. wage statistics, based on Soviet plan fulfillment reports, with wage trends in countries with free trade unions. The figures are not exactly comparable, since the Soviet statistics also cover employees in service trades, but they are the best available.

Average Nominal Wages

(Workers and Employees) % Charge of Previous Years

<u>Year</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>W. Ger. (5)</u>	<u>France (6)</u>	<u>Italy (7)</u>	<u>U.K. (8)</u>
1963	1, 6	7, 5	8, 5	16, 8	3, 9
1964	2, 9	8, 4	6, 8	11, 1	7, 8
1965	6, 1	9, 8	5, 9	7, 5	9, 3
1966	3, 6	7, 3	5, 5	3, 9	6, 1
1967	4, 1	3, 9	6, 8	6, 0	3, 3
1968	7, 5	4, 3	10, 2	4, 6	8, 5
1969	<u>3, 9</u>	<u>9, 0</u>	<u>8, 5</u>	<u>7, 5</u>	<u>8, 0</u>
Sum of 7-year % in- creases	29, 7	50, 2	51, 7	57, 4	46, 9

It appears that in terms of percentage change in cash wages (not real wages, for which figures are lacking), the Soviet trade unions did only about half as well as the Italian, and only two-thirds as well as the British, with France and West Germany in the middle of the spectrum. However, since the annual inflation rate in the USSR is lower than in Western countries, it is probable that a comparison of real wage changes would not be so dramatically unfavorable to the Soviet trade unions.

- (5) Increases in hourly wage-earnings in industry
- (6) ditto
- (7) ditto
- (8) ditto

In the decade 1960-69 the national income is reported to have grown by 83% in comparable prices, (9) and the population is known to have increased from 212, 000, 000 to 239, 000, 000. Yet real incomes per capita only rose by 50% between 1960 and 1969, according to Soviet statistics. (10) Evidently the real incomes share of national income during the decade has fallen, as well as the wages share of industrial costs.

To quote Professor E. C. Brown: (11)

How far the Central Council of Trade Union and other bodies go in pushing for higher wage levels is not known. CCTU staff members told how they kept in close contact with Gosplan at national and republic levels, and how the CCTU takes its recommendations to the Council of Ministers; but they added: 'We know what is possible'.

In the face of the statistics in Voprosy Ekonomiki, one must conclude that under Shvernik, Grishin and Shelepin the Soviet trade unions have failed their members. If they did in fact know what was possible, they have not achieved it. The lesson of what happened to Loga-Sowinski may perhaps have been learned in Moscow, but now it must be applied so that the seventies will not repeat the experience of the sixties.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGES WITH TOTALITARIAN TRADE UNIONS

Five vital questions answered by George Meany

We publish below documents regarding a projected written interview with AFL-CIO President George Meany by the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel.

In mid-September 1970, the Washington representative of Der

- (9) Narkhoz SSSR v 1969 g. Moscow, 1970, p. 557
- (10) Narkhoz SSR v 1969 g. Moscow 1970, p. 560
- (11) Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations by Prof. E. C. Brown, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1966, p. 274

Spiegel approached the AFL-CIO and suggested that President Meany answer for publication in the German magazine five questions, which were subsequently submitted in English and in writing. He wrote that "we will certainly guarantee that the answers will appear in full length in one of the next issues of Der Spiegel".

On November 18, Meany's replies to the five questions were sent to Der Spiegel. The director of the AFL-CIO Department of Public Relations, Albert J. Zack, stressed in his accompanying letter that "it is our understanding that his replies will be published in full".

After five weeks had passed without Der Spiegel publishing the questions and answers, Zack on December 30 cabled the magazine asking for information about the date of publication. Another two weeks passed until Der Spiegel submitted the German text of the questions and answers the magazine proposed to publish. A comparison of the two texts will show that Der Spiegel had made substantial changes in the original questions as submitted to President Meany as well as in the latter's replies.

First of all, the new version left out large portions of Meany's answers, as for instance his references to June 17, 1953, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow's policy of keeping Germany split in two parts, the ICFTU's ban on exchanges with Communist "trade unions". Other changes, too, were significant: Meany spoke of Soviet "trade unions" as "Soviet police agencies", Der Spiegel spoke of "organs of Soviet policy", "national unification in freedom" now read "peaceful unification". The last question in the new version of Der Spiegel was never submitted to Meany; otherwise he emphatically would have refuted the charge of being a "cold warrior". The original question Number 5 and Meany's reply to it were altogether scrapped.

In view of these changes, the AFL-CIO insisted on Der Spiegel honoring its pledge of September 17 to publish "in full" Meany's answers, and when Der Spiegel refused to honor its pledge we withheld from Der Spiegel the right to publish the interview in its changed form.

1. Original Spiegel Questions and Meany Answers

Question 1: You have criticized the contacts of the German association of trade unions with the Soviet trade unions. Why are you of the opinion that the Soviet trade unions are not workers' organizations?

Mr. MEANY: The "trade unions" of the USSR and other totalitarian countries are nothing but arms of the controlling dictatorship. The Constitution of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) stipulates that the organization works under the instructions and direction of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). As instruments of the single party dictatorship, the Soviet "unions" are not - like the DGB, TUC, AFL-CIO - free, voluntary organizations striving to protect and promote the interests of the workers, influence government legislation, or making the government more responsive to the wishes and interests of the people.

In the USSR, the situation is entirely reversed. Here, the so-called unions are Labor Fronts charged with the task of making the workers more responsive and submissive to the orders and decrees of the dictatorial government. As auxiliaries of the government, the Soviet "unions" serve as instruments for rallying mass support of all Kremlin domestic and foreign policies. In this role, the Soviet "unions" supported the Kremlin rulers' policy of crushing the revolt of the liberty-loving German workers on June 17, 1953 in Ulbricht's "paradise", the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russian and other Warsaw Pact Powers in 1968.

Furthermore, in compliance with a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Eighth Plenary Session of the AUCCTU decided in January 1970 that the "unions" must intensify their efforts to speed up production to make the laboring people work harder and more efficiently, and to denounce and discipline any workingman who produces below the norm set by the central planners and agents of the government. To make sure that the "unions" play the role of policemen in Soviet industry, this Plenary Session emphasized "the necessity of further strengthening the trade unions' ties with the People's Control Agencies in the struggle for a regime of economy".

In view of these facts, we see no reason why bona fide trade unions in Germany or elsewhere should get themselves involved in fraternal exchanges or dialogues with Soviet police agencies.

These involvements only give the Soviet Labor Front a badge of completely undeserved trade union legitimacy and democratic credibility.

Question 2: Do you believe that through an involvement with the real trade union organizations - especially those that are as successful as the ones in Germany - that officials and members of the Soviet trade unions could be positively influenced?

Mr. MEANY: The officials of the so-called unions in the USSR and other totalitarian countries are not chosen by the workers. These officials are selected by the Communist Party and the government which it runs. In the USSR Shelepin was made Chairman of the AUCCTU in 1967 by order of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party. Previously he was the head of the dreaded Soviet Secret Police - the Committee for State Security (KGB). This appointment was politically planned and carefully designed. In fact, Communist Party boss L. I. Brezhnev, in his report devoted to the 50th anniversary of "Great October", proudly proclaimed that, "In the conditions of a people's state, the ties of KGB agencies with the working people are especially strong". Dr. Ley was never that open.

Free trade unions which engage in dialogues and exchanges with the Communist Labor Fronts cannot seriously expect to influence their handpicked officials or reach their rank and file members.

In such dialogues, the Soviet "trade union" officials never permit any discussion of Soviet aggression or labor conditions - for instance, the USSR policy of keeping Germany split in two parts, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the arming of Egypt and Syria for a war of extermination against Israel, the penal system, or the extent of forced labor and concentration camps. Instead, these dialogues are always used by the Soviet "union" officials for hurling Communist diatribes against so-called German revanchism (desire for national unification in freedom), "American imperialism", and Israeli "aggression".

And, when Soviet "union" officials report on their visits to free countries, they always distort the facts and make caricature "findings" of a strictly negative nature regarding the conditions they observed abroad. Not one of the various Soviet "trade union" delegations which have visited the Federal Republic, upon the invitation of the DGB, has made an objective comprehensive report of what they have seen, observed

and learned. These reports have uniformly stressed only the negative aspects of what they have found. Only at great risk could they attempt to make a positive and truthful report. Let me illustrate. In 1967, the well-known Soviet poet Andrei A. Voznesenky was denied permission to leave Russia to read his poetry at an Arts Festival in New York. He got into hot water because of the friendship he showed American society and American writers during a tour of the U. S. in May of that year.

In this case, the role played by the "Union of Writers", as a self-degrading tool of the CP and government, led Voznesenky to protest that "the leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knocking peoples' heads together is standard practice. . . . What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruple. . . . I am ashamed to be a member of the same union as these people".

And the world-renowned Soviet writer, Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, who was recently awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, shed further light on "trade unionism" in the USSR when he stated that, "The leadership of the union (writers' union) cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution ended in exile, camps and death".

Question 3: On the whole, will the Soviet or the Western labor organizations be more strongly influenced by such contacts? Which is the greater danger: that a union member from the West might become a Communist through his conversations and visits in the Soviet Union, or that a Soviet official could be influenced by the West?

Mr. MEANY: In considering the problem of delegation exchanges between free trade unions, like the DGB, with state company unions of the USSR, Roumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany, the issue is not who will influence whom more. We do not believe that the top leadership of the free trade unions will be converted to Communism by Shelepin. But the association of the free trade union leaders with Communist "union" officials certainly makes it easier for the followers of the Soviet line in the free countries to promote Communist influence in the factories and to subvert the bona fide labor movement. Of course, there has never been any question of Western unions utilizing exchanges for subverting the Soviet state company unions.

Nor do we entertain any illusions about KGB-oriented "trade union" officials being won over to championing free trade unionism and democracy after being given the opportunity to observe freely conditions and people in Düsseldorf or Stuttgart. These Russian officials are opposed to democracy, not because they are ignorant of its values and virtues, but because they are Communists and therefore, prefer totalitarian dictatorship as a way of life for all mankind and as a higher form of democracy. This explains why throughout the years of experience with these exchanges not a single Soviet "trade union" official has been converted to democracy. If there has been such a conversion, the official has undoubtedly vanished into a concentration camp - at best.

The real issue here is that the so-called unions of the Communist world are not counterparts of the free trade unions in the democratic world (Germany, U.S., Britain, etc.) In fact, the Soviet "unions" are counterfeit labor organizations. This evaluation is not an American invention. In 1955, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) un-animously embraced the policy of opposing such exchanges. Over the years, this policy was re-examined and unanimously reaffirmed more than a dozen times. Until 1967, the representatives of the DGB supported the policy against such exchanges. The changes which have recently occurred in the Soviet Union do not warrant dropping this policy. Quite the contrary, the Soviet 1970 "labor legislation" only emphasizes the anti-worker role of the so-called Soviet trade unions. Unless, of course, the 1967 appointment of the ex-police chief Shelepin to head the AUCCTU can be considered a good reason for the bona fide unions discontinuing their policy of refusing to associate with organizations which are not their counterparts but their enemies.

The AFL-CIO continues to believe in the correctness of the aforementioned ICFTU policy which "emphasizes that elementary international labor solidarity, the most vital interests of human freedom everywhere, and world peace require that no free trade union organization should exchange delegations with any country which (1) denies its people the fundamental human rights specified in the Charter of the United Nations; (2) denies its workers the right of freedom of association and organization, the right of genuine collective bargaining and the right to strike;

and (3) penalizes workers for advocating free trade unionism and democracy".

Question 4: President Nixon initiated his term of office with the comment that the age of confrontation must give way to a time of negotiation. He has himself practiced this as evidenced by the disarmament talks with the Russians. Couldn't also negotiations between the trade unions of the West and East serve to promote a certain detente?

Mr. MEANY: Long before Mr Nixon was elected President, the AFL-CIO persistently favored negotiations between the democratic governments of the West and the Soviet Government in order to secure a just and sound foundation for world peace and genuine disarmament assured by adequate international inspection and supervision. In such negotiations, we have always maintained that these aims can be best furthered when the democracies negotiate from strength.

At the same time, we must not engage in self-deception. The history of the post-war world is a history of Soviet contempt for treaties and the breaking of agreements it has entered into with other powers. There is no reason why any German or American political or trade union leader should forget how the Soviet rulers have gone back on the pledge they made at the 1955 Geneva Conference to support German national unification in freedom or the way the Soviet government lied to President Kennedy in the Carribbean missile crisis.

When the government of the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States enters into negotiations with the government of the USSR, it enters into negotiations with its counterpart - government to government. But the situation for the DGB or the AFL-CIO entering into negotiations with Shelepin's Labor Front is totally different. The DGB and the AFL-CIO are bona fide free trade unions; the "unions" of Soviet Russia and other Communist countries are not unions, but arms of the totalitarian governments with which the democratic governments are already negotiating. On the trade union field, there is no comparable situation. Here the DGB and AFL-CIO, unlike their respective governments, do not have counterparts with which to negotiate.

Question 5: Trade unionists in Spain are being persecuted. What measures would you suggest which would restore the rights of the workers there?

Mr. MEANY: It is not for American labor to give the Spanish workers a blueprint for getting rid of their dictatorship and winning the right to freedom of association, to organize free trade unions, to strike, and enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining. We know that, especially in recent years, the Spanish workers have been fighting courageously to win the basic democratic rights and to use them for improving their conditions of life and labor.

American labor has vigorously condemned Franco's persecution of the Spanish workers. We have assisted the heroic Spanish freedom fighters. The AFL-CIO holds to the principle that the workers of no country should do anything to help the oppressors of labor in any other country. In this light, we would be prepared to join with world free labor in an economic boycott of the dictatorial Falangist regime.

In the same spirit of solidarity with the Spanish workers and hostility to the regime which oppresses them, we have sought the condemnation of the Spanish dictatorship in the court of world opinion and have advocated that no moral or material assistance should be given by our own or any other democratic government to the Franco regime. Hence, American labor opposed U.N. membership for Falangist Spain on the ground that it was, in principle and practice, against the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.

The fact that our government has relations with its counterpart, the government in Spain, does not mean that we of the AFL-CIO should enter into delegation exchanges with Franco's "unions", which are no more our counterparts than are Shelepin's Labor Fronts. Exchanges on our part with the government-dominated Falangist "unions" would lend credibility and respectability to them as bona fide labor organizations. This would not help but actually hurt the Spanish workers aspiring to freedom and democracy and thus play into the hands of the Falangist dictatorship.

HUNGARY: "WORKERS' RIGHTS" SLOGAN

"In the future trade unionists want to avail themselves to an even greater extent of their democratic rights and directly and indirectly to participate even more closely in everything concerning their working and living conditions" (Pártélet, February, 1971).

"Democratic rights" has become something of a slogan in Hungary. The country's leaders, especially trade union officials, appear to have set themselves the intricate task of co-ordinating enforcement of party control and consideration for management with the promotion of workers' participation in "political, economic and social questions".

Gábor Somoskői, TUC secretary, said in the February, 1971, issue of Pártélet, journal of the Party Central Committee, that, in general, senior trade union officials were aware that "the interests of society cannot be subordinated to the interests of a smaller community". Despite this, some factory managers gave priority, not to the requirements of the State, but to what was more favourable for their staff. In such cases trade union bodies "must take a resolute step and protest courageously even if this seems unpopular".

In Hungary there were about half a million trade union officials, including almost 200,000 "confidential representatives" who had proved particularly successful in places where "the party organization, the management and trade union bodies have shared responsibility for the development of factory democracy". It had become a general and correct practice for local party organizations not to interfere directly in discussions between trade union bodies and management, but to help trade union bodies by "political advice and backing".

In the trade union newspaper Népszava, (January 19), Gyula Virizlai, TUC secretary, advocated a "greater political rôle" for factory workers. "Democracy", he wrote, meant "the participation of workers in the directing of production". They should feel that they were "participants in power". Their views were important and it had become a political issue of great significance to ensure that leaders should "pay attention to the opinion of workers" and, as far as possible, satisfy their requests because "Workers watch developments very closely even if they don't voice their observations at once".

In general, workers were not yet consulted and they had only to carry out decisions passed by the management, which had a bad effect on their morale. Injustices of the wage system angered them and there was "plenty of injustice in the application of the wage policy". Workers disapproved of wage differentials and thought this was in contradiction with the "ruling power of the working class". "Outstandingly high incomes" gained at

the workers' expense hurt their "moral and political feelings". Virizlai conceded that workers' complaints were justified and asked for more appreciation for those who, by hard work, "put more on the table of the Socialist country".

Virizlai's views contradict those expressed by János Molnár, Deputy Minister of Culture, in a book entitled A Nagybudapesti Központi Munkástanács (The Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council). Published in 1969, the book deals with the aims and activities of the workers' councils during and after the 1956 uprising and their elimination in 1958.

The workers' councils, Molnár said, demanded, among other things, workers' participation in management, and "unrestricted rights to organise themselves" (p. 55). In the weeks after the armed defeat of the "counter-revolution", workers' councils gained considerable influence. Aware of the "ideological confusion" in the minds of the people, the party could not go too far at the beginning and therefore refrained, at first, "from using force against the Central Workers' Council". Only when the party was beginning to strengthen its position were "more rigorous" measures taken. On December 8, 1956, the Central Workers' Council was banned and some of its leaders arrested; more arrests followed. At the same time, Molnár said, the party conferred with members of the workers' councils and made it clear that councils would be allowed to function if they increased "forces faithful to Socialism" in their ranks "and the influence of the party" (p. 141). In 1957 and 1958, the book said, the party realised that in order to consolidate life it had to be ruthless in crushing the "counter-revolution" and "unmasking the demagogy of the workers' councils", (pp. 144-45). The workers' guards, the armed force of the workers' class, was formed and the armed struggle "taught the masses of workers to destroy..... democratic illusions disseminated by the revisionists".

Molnár's views on the workers' councils show that, fundamentally, the attitude of the Hungarian leaders has not changed: now, as then, "democratism" will be kept under strict Party control.

MOSCOW'S TACTICS IN THE OIL CRISIS

Soviet propaganda supported the demands of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) * for higher oil prices to be paid by the 22 international oil companies. The companies have basically accepted, in an agreement signed in Teheran on February 14, the terms demanded by the six Gulf producing countries; Libya - the major North African producing country - and Algeria are negotiating separately.

Soviet comment has seemed calculated to whip up anti-Western feeling, thereby tying the hands of the negotiators and provoking extreme demands from the producers - without going so far as to advocate the disruption of oil supplies. According to Moscow Radio, in Arabic and Persian on January 18, the OPEC's demands will force "international oil monopolies, sooner or later, to make concessions"; Some commentaries see the dispute as an argument for eventual nationalisation of all oil operations by the producer countries. Moscow Radio, in Persian on January 14, asserted that "the more the oil producing countries get for their oil, the more they will be able to devote to economic growth: consequently the more confidence and courage they will have in striving for industrialisation and economic and social independence. The experience of the Arab countries, especially Syria, has shown that the most effective means of ensuring independent growth for the oil producing countries is to nationalise their oil, so that the whole operation - extraction, refining, transport and marketing - is managed by the country producing the oil".

Another broadcast in Persian on January 26 was designed to impress listeners with "the disinterested nature" of the Soviet-led Communist economic grouping (CMEA) in providing "tremendous help" to the Middle East countries in developing their national oil industries and training staff. All this aid would count for little, however, if oil supplies to the West were cut off, for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could not possibly absorb the quantities bought by Western Europe and Japan - some 800 million tons a year.

The Soviet Union clearly does not therefore want to see a

* Its members are Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Algeria, Libya and Venezuela.

major upheaval in relations between producer and consumer countries. The Soviet rôle is depicted primarily in terms of the provision of technical assistance to national oil industries of oil-producing countries. Purchases of oil from them already agreed with the Soviet bloc are given less prominence, and there is no indication of Soviet readiness to buy more oil from OPEC countries, either on an emergency or long-term basis. Indeed, the Soviet Union's own annual oil production is expected to reach 470 million tons in three to four years.

Soviet propagandists tend to play upon the struggle of the developing countries against "imperialism" on the ground that "economic freedom and progress is a just cause". This view was supported, rather inconclusively, in an article by R. Andreasyan and A. Elyanov in the Economic Gazette (No. 50 1970) which added: "The oil-rich developing countries, including Arab States, receive extensive and diverse assistance in developing their national oil industries from the Soviet Union and other Socialist States. This assistance covers oil and gas exploration, the building of oil-gathering facilities and oil refineries, the setting up of vocational training centres, and growing purchases of oil from national companies". They went on: "Today it is clear as never before that the main aim of the Arab countries is to do away with the domination of foreign monopoly capital, establish effective control over oil production and create pre-requisites for oil nationalisation".

At the same time, the Russians disregard the vast international organisation needed to bring oil to the consumer. They make no helpful suggestions about how national oil concerns could undertake transport, refining and marketing operations outside the producer country without the co-operation of those possessing the appropriate facilities. The Soviet Union owns some minor installations abroad but is in no position to market oil products in Western Europe and Japan, since it lacks refineries or sales outlets under its own control.

Thus Soviet commentators have to steer a careful course. They seek to embroil Western oil companies and their governments with local opinion and with the oil workers; yet they know the Communist countries cannot themselves offer alternative markets for OPEC oil. Their tactic is therefore to offer ideologically based advice which, in practice, commits the Soviet bloc to nothing beyond its present rather limited support for national oil industries.

BULGARIA PROPOSES BOLD PLAN FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH GREECE

Summary: Bulgaria has recently proposed a bold new eight-point plan for economic co-operation with Greece which is more comprehensive than anything yet put forward by a Communist country to Greece. The plan is also particularly significant in view of the limited Bulgarian trade with the non-Communist world. The inclusion within this plan of a proposal for a Bulgarian zone in the Greek port of Salonika indicates that Bulgaria - and more importantly the Soviet Union, with the intention of using Bulgaria as a proxy - may be trying to establish a foothold in an area that is becoming of increasing strategic importance in Soviet policy.

Bulgaria's search for a more active Balkan policy has recently gathered more steam with a new initiative aimed at improving relations with Greece. This bold plan calls for increased trade and joint mining and manufacturing ventures as well as recommending that payments be made in convertible currency rather than by clearing accounts - the standard procedure among Communist countries. The new Bulgarian proposals are the most comprehensive ever put forward by a Communist-ruled country to Greece and are particularly noteworthy because of Bulgaria's limited trade with the non-Communist world. (1)

The eight-point plan proposed Bulgarian credits for industrial projects in Greece, joint mining and manufacturing ventures, increased trade (with accounts to be settled in free currency) as well as transit facilities for Bulgarian goods through the port of Salonika.

Bulgaria also proposed joint investments in manufacturing projects where the production would cover the requirements in both countries and expressed willingness to participate in

(1) The Sixth Five-Year Plan envisions that 83, 7 per cent of Bulgaria's foreign trade will be with Communist countries, 60 per cent with the Soviet Union.

Greek industrial developments, particularly mining, food processing, tobacco manufacturing, and textiles.

In addition the plan included detailed proposals for co-operation in the fields of electric power, transport, farming, food processing, and tourism, in which it was suggested that Turkey be invited to join.

Lastly, a proposal was put forward that joint Bulgarian-Greek committees with ministerial rank be created for economic, scientific, and technical co-operation.

The scope of Bulgaria's proposals is somewhat startling, even within the context of the increasing rapprochement which has taken place in relations with Greece in the last few years. Indeed, given the degree of cordiality that now exists between the two countries, it is hard to imagine that less than eight years ago relations were so hostile that there was no representation at the ambassadorial level between the two countries. The outstanding problem which until the mid-1960s hindered any reconciliation was the payment of Bulgaria's war reparations debt to Greece. (2) This major obstacle was finally overcome after years of polemics and Byzantine squabbling by a Bulgarian initiative which led to the signing in July 1964 of a number of agreements related not only to the reparations issue, but to increases in trade, tourism, cultural co-operation, and communications. (3) These agreements laid the formal groundwork for the improvement in relations which has occurred in recent years.

Relations did suffer a temporary setback with the April 1967 military coup, but the Bulgarian aversion to the staunchly anti-Communist junta in Athens was soon offset by considerations

(2) This was fixed by the Paris Peace Treaties in 1947 at 45 million dollars.

(3) For a complete list of the agreements see Rabotnichesko Delo, 10 July 1964.

of Realpolitik. (4) The signing of a five-year Bulgarian-Greek trade protocol in March of last year followed by the surprise visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev some two months later, ushered in a new "era of good feeling" which has continued unabated ever since. Shortly before his death last summer Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis went out of his way to laud the cautious attitude of the Bulgarian press toward the Greek regime, even stating that the Bulgarian coverage was more favorable to Greece than that of Sweden.

The improvement in relations initiated by Bashev's May 1970 visit has been furthered by several more recent developments: the signing last July of a protocol settling the frontier line on the Maritsa river bed; the visit of Greek Minister of Commerce Zappas to the Plovdiv Fair in September; the stopover en route to Ceylon of Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Avramov in December; and most recently the visit to Sofia of a special emissary from Premier Papadopoulos, Constantinos Tranos, who explored the possibilities of greater multilateral co-operation.

Symptomatic of this new desire for better relations has been the fact that at a time when Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are squabbling noisily over Macedonia once again, the Macedonian question has not been raised with Greece. Moreover, Bulgaria has by and large quietly overlooked the fact, that one third of Greece's NATO forces are concentrated on its border, preferring to save its ammunition for revanchist elements located farther afield.

(4) It should be noted that this tendency to put considerations of Realpolitik ahead of ideological differences has been two-sided. Athens has sought to increase its trade with Eastern Europe in no small part because opposition to the Greek military dictatorship in Western Europe has damaged its trade balance. (Greece signed a 30-million dollar trade and payment agreement with Rumania on 15 December 1970 which envisions a 28 per cent increase in trade between the two countries in 1971 over 1970). Moreover, in January 1970 the Soviet Union was granted "most-favored-nation" status by Greece - a long-sought-after goal which it had been unable to achieve under the liberal Papandreu government.

The dramatic new Bulgarian eight-point offer should be viewed within the context of the more active foreign policy that Bulgaria has been pursuing over the last nine months or so. This policy has emphasized multilateral co-operation and rapprochement with Bulgaria's Balkan neighbours and has coincided with Soviet policy objectives - as might be expected from Moscow's most faithful ally. At present a policy of Balkan co-operation harmonizes with the Soviet policy of détente in Europe, increased influence in the Middle East, and loosening ties within NATO (in this case on NATO's crucial southern flank).

That Soviet foreign policy objectives should be kept in mind when viewing the recent Bulgarian initiative is underscored by the inclusion of a proposal in the eight-point plan that Bulgaria be granted a zone in the Greek port of Salonika. This would not only satisfy the traditional Bulgarian desire for a trade outlet on the Aegean Sea, but could serve to increase Bulgarian influence in a region that is of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

THE CAR: STILL A STATUS SYMBOL?

The problem of car ownership is one of the most debated questions in Hungary today. During 1970, which was a record year, 45,000 new passenger cars were sold and, as a result, the total number of cars in the country rose to about 250,000. The discussion is mainly carried on in the provincial papers because the car's importance as a status symbol is much greater in the smaller communities where people know each other better than in the more impersonal milieu of the major towns. Tolna Megyei Népújság (February 23), a daily in southern Hungary, even went so far as to say that in the opinion of some people "under socialism a person is not a man if he does not own a car". It is common knowledge that young people are especially eager to have a car - even more than they want to have a child. A cabaret program which ran for some months in 1970 with the title "A Baby or a Car" epitomized the situation.

Some people, of course, are critical of such an attitude, but it is clear from the economic weekly Figyelo (February 3) that the regime is making strenuous efforts to satisfy the popular

demand for cars and an ambitious program exists under which the number of cars in Hungary would increase during the period of the present five-year plan by about 350,000-450,000. This would mean that the present number of cars in the country would be tripled. It is unquestionable that compared to previous five-year plans the situation has greatly improved. Between 1957 and 1965 fewer than 60,000 cars were sold to private persons, while in the Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) the number was 122,000.

Another indication of the effort that is being made to increase the number of cars can be seen in the fact that since 1969 the state organization dealing with the sale of cars has surpassed its target: in 1970 it sold 11,000 cars more than planned. The variety of cars available is also on the increase. In 1966 only seven different types of car were imported to Hungary, whereas last year 17-20 types were on sale, the majority of them from Communist countries.

All this does not mean, however, that the national demand has been satisfied. At the end of 1970 there were still 118,000 applications outstanding for cars, of which 108,000 were from private persons and the other 10,000 from state organizations. In 1971 it is expected that 50,000 cars will be available on the market, of which 42,000 will go to private persons - and this estimate may be exceeded, as has happened in previous years.

Only 6,000 of these 50,000 new cars will be imported from the West; 800 of them in fact reached Hungary last year, but will be regarded as part of the 1971 quota. Out of the total of 6,000 there will be 400 French Renaults, 1,000 West German Volkswagens, and 2,300 various types of Fiats; the state import agency has not yet been able to conclude the necessary agreements for the remainder.

Great hopes are attached to the new Soviet car built under a Fiat license in Togliattigrad. The first demonstration models arrived in February, and Esti Hírlap (February 27) reported that it may be possible for delivery dates to be advanced so that orders can be accepted in March or April. There have been no final commitments on the part of the Soviet export agency, but it is hoped that in the second half of 1971 delivery of new Soviet-built cars will begin. The name of this new model is Zsiguli, and 9,000 have already been promised for 1971. Payment will be made on a barter basis; Hungarian factories are supplying various components as part of this major car-

building program. Figyelo (February 3) said that Hungarian retail organizations will try to buy more of these cars, if the first technical tests produce the expected results.

Most car buyers are interested in small cars. The state-run purchasing organs are aware of this and more small models are imported than large ones.

The market for secondhand cars is also flourishing, and prices continue to be very high. A change in this situation will be possible only if car imports expand considerably. The planned large-scale importation of the Soviet-built Zsiguli could alter the position in a year or two.

There is another serious problem: the lack of spare parts. Figyelo offered some grounds for hope that improvements could be expected in this sector also. Importing agencies are writing into their contracts so-called "spare part clauses", and inability to guarantee a continuous flow of spare parts has already frustrated the conclusion of at least one such contract.

Although the supply of cars is improving, Hungary's motorists still have their worries. Improvements in the supply situation have not been matched by the creation of the necessary associated facilities. Highway construction is extremely slow, and there are few gas stations - and even fewer modern repair and service stations, specialist shops for motorists, proper tire shops, etc. These deficiencies combine to make motoring in Hungary still something of a problem rather than a pleasure.

C U L T U R E

COMMUNIST CONCEPT OF LEISURE TIME

The January issue of Filosofska Missal, the monthly of the Institute for Philosophy of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences discussed in theoretical terms the problem of the working people's leisure time and gave some details on the sociological research which has been carried out at various periods. The writer was Mitta Denchovska, who reportedly works with the BCP CC Agitprop Department. She rejected the classical definition of leisure time as "the sum of non-working hours - that is, the time remaining after a person has fulfilled his labor obligations to society". Mrs. Dunchovska's definition - borrowed from the Soviet theoretician G.A. Prudenki's work Time and Labor (Moscow, 1964, p. 309) - is as follows:

"Leisure time is that part of non-working time which is devoted to study, increasing one's qualifications, social or public obligations, entertainment, rest, relaxation, hobbies, etc."

She opposed this concept to the "capitalist" idea of leisure time, and said that "in the exploiters' society, the increase in the ruling class's leisure time is the result of a vast increase in the working class's working time". The socialist society, she added, eliminated this evil, especially in an environment of scientific-technological revolution, which has "caused a quantitative increase in leisure time as well as a qualitative change in it".

According to the results of sociological research carried out in 1965 or 1966, the per capita leisure time of the urban population is "not more than 15-20 per cent of non-working hours - that is, about four hours" (Dunchovska was quoting from Z. Staykov's Leisure Time, Sofia, 1966, p. 14). Therefore, she argued: "Labor and labor productivity create leisure time and increase it. The use of leisure time is nothing but useful labor in other, non-production spheres of activity". These are the "differences in principle" between Marxist and bourgeois sociology.

The introduction of the five-day working week in the districts of Gabrovo and Stara Zagora in 1968 proved that "total working hours are not decreased; it only reduced by 15-17 per cent the time spent in various production processes" (for example,

going to or from work). The five-day week and the increased leisure resulting from it have posed a number of problems which have not yet been solved.

Dunchovska stated that various studies in 1962, 1964, 1967, and 1968 had tried to analyze the situation on different levels: the Party cadres, the trade unions, youth, heavy industry, the entire nation. The aim of all these studies was to "find the most effective method of guaranteeing the proper use of leisure time". She hastened to add that "proper use" meant study, self-education, attending ideological courses, undertaking public and social tasks, sports, looking after and bringing up children, etc.". At present the most popular way of spending leisure time in Bulgaria, according to numerous sociological surveys, is reading.

Dunchovska said that various factors or groups of factors determine or influence reading - type of work, profession, education, age, number of social and public duties, etc. For instance, specialists and technicians on the co-operative farms read much more than stock- and cattle-breeders; the reason for this is that the latter's work still suffers from a very low level of automation. Women's position, given the present state of social and public services, is not much better, she admitted.

Income also plays a decisive role. The higher-paid workers, who are usually better educated and perform skilled work, have more leisure time and often higher-level intellectual needs.

Dunchovska expressed the regime's serious concern about what the people read, because reading is a means of achieving and "forming a personal Communist outlook". A great deal of research and many projects have been devoted to the study of this question, she said, but gave no statistics or details. The regime had "organized, mobilized, and involved thousands of working people" in its various agencies, institutions, and projects "with the aim of improving their use of leisure time and of intensifying the nation's economic development and culture". Unlike the capitalist society, she claimed, the socialist society "eliminates alienation and integrates the individual with society".

The real meaning of all this is that the regime wants to exercise greater control over individual's leisure time. This is especially true of the ideological indoctrination sector. Both lecturers and students in the ideological courses complained about their "lack of time to complete the planned work". On

On p. 81 of her article, Dunchovska summed up the situation in the F. Engels Industrial Complex in Stara Zagora District thus: the workers devote an average of 48-50 hours of leisure time annually to improving their ideological qualifications, while the curriculum requires about 150 hours. Their lecturers were asked: "What is the most difficult point in your work as propagandists?" and 58 per cent answered that they had not enough leisure time to complete their prescribed schedules; some of them had "two, three, four, or more tasks to fulfill during their leisure time", Dunchovska said. This might be an additional reason for the Party secretaries' distaste for ideological work.

Towards the end of her article, Dunchovska discussed the "individual's right to have at his or her disposal his or her leisure time". This, she said, was "not a purely personal question, because leisure time is a possession of society. . . . and our society is vitally interested in the manner in which this or that person uses his or her leisure time". Dunchovska quite frankly admitted that in this respect there is no freedom of personal choice under socialism; as she put it rather quaintly: "Freedom consists of the ability to make your choice from among the various positive opportunities offered by society".

This interpretation was followed by a long list of "negative" leisure-time-consuming "opportunities", shortcomings, and problems: inadequate living and working conditions, poor transportation, lack of public services, etc. Even Dunchovska allowed that it is high time these primitive conditions were eliminated, since they are serious obstacles on the road to "perfecting the Communist personality" of the Bulgarian of today. Her last example was frightening: a sociological research survey carried out by the Sofia Sociological Institute showed that "in 1967, the workers of Kazanlak (in central southern Bulgaria) spent 10 to 11 hours daily on their productive work and on matters related to it".

In conclusion, Dunchovska expressed her hope that in the future:

Under Communism everyone will be able to enjoy the unlimited freedom of "full-blooded participation" in all the basic spheres of social life. . . . in the production of material and spiritual values, in the management of social affairs.

The contradictions between Dunchovska's curious inter-

pretation of the concept of leisure time and the depressing examples she herself selects from the contemporary Bulgarian scene throw instructive light on the situation of Bulgaria's working people and the extent to which the regime has overlooked basic human necessities.

ANOTHER FAMOUS GERMAN "BELONGS" ONLY TO THE GDR:
HEINRICH MANN

During the "Beethoven year" of 1970 (the 200th anniversary of the composer's birth), East German arrogantly claimed that only in the socialist German state could Beethoven's music be truly appreciated and that "his music can no longer have any function in the state-monopolistic system of West German imperialism". (Neues Deutschland, 25 June 1970). Similarly, during the recent quinentenary commemoration of Albrecht Dürer's birth, the GDR stressed the alleged revolutionary and humanitarian nature of the artist's works. On that occasion, Minister of Culture Klaus Gysi went so far as to deny the FRG the right to celebrate Dürer's birth in his hometown of Nuremberg:

No misuse of Dürer commemorations, no attempt to free the city of Nuremberg in this manner from the odium of the brown past, will be able to hide from the eyes of the world the continuity between fascist party congresses and anti-communism and revanchism of today's Federal Republic as an essential characteristic of the policy of West German imperialism. (Neues Deutschland, 6 February 1971).

With startling logic, Gysi revealed the purpose of his dialectical exercise when he concluded that Dürer's true homeland is at present "the socialist German national state, namely our Republic", the only German state where Dürer's work is seen in its true significance. At the same time, Gysi deduced, the fact that Dürer's work has "nothing in common with the anti-humanistic, aggressive system of imperialism serves to prove the falsehood of "cultural convergence theories" which argue in favor of a common German culture. Since Dürer belongs only to the GDR, as Gysi tried to demonstrate before, there can be no common or "inner-German" culture.

The most recent "exclusive" East German acquisition is the author Heinrich Mann, an older brother of Thomas Mann, whose centenary was recently commemorated in East Berlin in a

festive gathering which included the diplomatic corps, numerous scientists and writers from both East and West, as well as the French mime Marcel Marceau. The meeting was addressed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexander Abusch, who read a speech by Walter Ulbricht, then still on leave in the Soviet Union. The speech, delivered under the motto of "Heinrich Mann - a Pioneer of Socialist Humanism", not only repeated Ulbricht's contention made originally at the "founding session of the Heinrich Mann Committee" (21 January 1971), namely that Heinrich Mann belonged to the GDR, but also and rather surprisingly took issue with West German commentators and literary critics who had contested the GDR's attempt to arrogate Mann exclusively for the East.

Some of these West German critics had recalled, for example, that during his exile in France, Heinrich Mann had rejected Ulbricht's abject subservience to Moscow, his orthodoxy and his intrigues and they had cited Mann's statement in this context:

I cannot sit at the same table with a man who suddenly maintains that the table at which we are sitting is not a table at all, but rather a duck's pond and who wants to force me to agree with him.

In a clear reference to Mann's condemnation, Ulbricht now stated:

After the founding session of our Heinrich Mann Committee on January 21, some West German newspaper concerns attempted to degrade the leadership of the Committee for the Preparation of a German People's Front by pointing out certain differences of opinions existing at that time. We won't hide that when in 1937, reactionary circles in France prepared the overthrow of the social-democratic government under Leon Blum, they also found some assistants who tried to sow discord among the ranks of the German anti-fascist People's Front committee. However, they (the West German papers) fail to reveal that afterwards, i. e. following talks between Wilhelm Pieck and myself with Heinrich Mann, complete unanimity was reestablished between us. (Neues Deutschland, 12 March 1971).

With a reference to the recent Bismarck commemorative ceremonies in the FRG, Ulbricht commented that every state has the ancestors in deserves:

Let the Federal Republic count Bismarck among its own... We in the GDR are proudly claiming Heinrich Mann among our

spiritual ancestors. . . . We have fulfilled our responsibility towards history for which Heinrich Mann called with his appeal for unity. The GDR is the socialist national state which Heinrich Mann desired.

Again, in conclusion, Ulbricht emphatically claimed: "Heinrich Mann is ours" therefore "we honor him as a pioneer of socialist humanism in our new community".

It is probably more a political than cultural question to wonder who, after Beethoven, Dürer and Heinrich Mann, will be the next German artist to be claimed the exclusive property of Walter Ulbricht and company.

ANDREI AMALRIK AND FUTURE OF RUSSIA

by Anatole Shub

The following condensed from "Survey", a journal of Soviet and East European Studies, is a "personal comment" on Andrei Amalrik's notable publication "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" by Anatole Shub, a veteran journalist keen student of Russian affairs and personal friend of Amalrik. Amalrik's publication was widely noticed all over the world. It was not allowed to be published in Russia and for publishing it abroad he has earned a long term in jail. Amalrik, a journalist, writer of plays, not published or staged, and author of "An Unwanted Journey to Siberia", has been in the bad books of the Russian Government for several years. In 1965 he was exiled to Siberia for two and a half years.

It is the great merit of Andrei Amalrik's Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? that it is free both of presumptions of goodwill on the part of the rulers and of sentimentality concerning the virtues and possibilities of the ruled. His analysis of the state of mind of Soviet workers and peasants is the most valuable part of his study, precisely because it is so unpromisingly depressing, so free of populist illusions about the special sanctity of the Russian *m u z h i k*. Amalrik is by no means the only Soviet intellectual who has arrived at a similar view - witness the portrait drawn of the Russian people in Tarkovski's film "Andreï Rublev", which is less about the real Middle Ages than it is about the Soviet Union today. It is, of course, encouraging that such young men as Amalrik and

Tarkovski have risen, clear-eyed, above the swamp.

The crucial question, of course, is how many such young men there are. To this question, a foreigner cannot even begin to approximate an answer, because of the limitations on human contact imposed by the Soviet police state - barriers formidable enough in Moscow and Leningrad, but insuperable in provincial cities which foreigners can visit only rarely and briefly, or not at all. Amalrik may be virtually unique, the 'least typical' Soviet citizen of Moscow, as one critic put it. On the other hand, who can pretend to know precisely what is going on in the minds of young scientists at Novosibirsk and Dubna, or of historians at Tomsk, or of naval officers at Kronstadt?

Even now, when Amalrik has become a world figure, many of the kindest, best-intentioned Western scholars find it incredible that he should have developed - independently - not merely an original mind but a remarkable grasp of the Western thinking about his country. Thus, in the otherwise excellent preface to the French edition of his essay, it is suggested that Amalrik must have learned what he knew about Western ideas on Russia, and Western modes of thought generally, through me - that I must have given him Western books, magazines, articles, etc. In fact, the only foreign language Amalrik reads is German, and the only German books I saw on his shelves were East German art books.

Soviet citizens' knowledge of the outside world, too, has been incalculably broadened by the transistor radio making foreign broadcasts readily accessible. I recently heard about a Russian living in Kutaisi, of all places - who was not only totally familiar with the standard fare provided by the BBC and the Voice of America, but had become an expert on Japanese fashions and cuisine through Radio Tokyo.

Second, my experience with Andrei Amalrik taught me to marvel at the mysterious indomitability of the human spirit under even the most difficult conditions. I hope I shall never again underestimate the inherent moral intelligence of Russians, Chinese or any other prisoners of totalitarian systems. In Solzhenitsyn's *F i r s t C i r c l e*, one of the characters is described as having known instinctively, as a young boy, that all the lies at the Moscow Trials were lies; he could tell it, feel it, simply by reading them in *P r a v d a*. Some Western readers expressed incredulity at this passage. But Solzhenitsyn

was not being a r o m a n c i e r. He was stating simple truth - about himself in this case, but doubtless about many others, then and later. Andrei Amalrik was and is one of them. He used almost the same language as Solzhenitsyn's in describing to me his own boyish reactions to the post-war lies of Stalin and his successors.

Due to circumstances beyond his control, Amalrik's essay was completed under pressure and in some haste. He originally talked of writing a full-length book; and he had barely started it when the KGB searched his apartment on 7 May 1969 as part of a massive swoop-down on Russian democrats (e.g. former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko was arrested the same day in Tashkent). Because Amalrik would doubtless have preferred to write at greater length and leisure, I for one do not wish to parse his every sentence, place his every word under a microscope, in the manner of what long ago was called the New Criticism.

I agree with Amalrik that Russia's future will depend largely on how rapidly the new "middle class" organizes itself to take advantage of the historical opportunities which the defeats of a decrepit regime will doubtless present. I am somewhat less pessimistic than he is about the evolution of the officially tolerated Soviet intelligentsia (perhaps because I do not know them as well as he does). Nevertheless, it seems to me that as time passes and the regime becomes more and more clearly anachronistic, the discontent now largely affecting literary circles will spread through the scientific and technical intelligentsia to the Party itself, and perhaps even to elements within the Party leadership. I do not expect this to happen overnight, nor even perhaps within the next decade. Such an evolution may indeed, as Amalrik indicates, come too late to avert an even more reactionary military dictatorship based on sheer chauvinism. Yet all those who know Russia recognize that there are no watertight compartments separating active members of the "democratic" movement, loyal but critical intellectuals, economic managers and Party officials. A definite intellectual osmosis has been going on for some time and is bound, it seems to me, to continue. The current Soviet economic crisis should, I would think, accelerate the process.

I do not find Amalrik's vision of Soviet disintegration in a war

with China as fantastic as have some Western critics. I rather suspect, in fact, that Kremlin "hawks" have been restrained from pre-emptive action against China largely by their fear of the consequences within and on the borderlands of the Soviet empire. The morale of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people has not been seriously tested since the Second World War - and the events of 1941 were certainly such as to make any future Soviet ruler think twice before committing Russian troops to extended combat. I, for one, am inclined to believe that the Kremlin would not have ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia if it had not already been assured that (a) the West would do nothing and (b) more important, the Czechs would not fight. The behaviour of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and the reactions of ordinary Muscovites during the anxious days between the invasion and the Moscow agreements of 26 August 1968 demonstrated a considerable edginess and insecurity.

To be sure, in a war with China all kinds of racist feelings could be mobilized to stimulate morale on the home front; but, as Amalrik points out, such a war would necessarily be long and difficult if waged solely with conventional weapons, as it would be once China acquired sufficient nuclear capacity to threaten half a dozen Soviet cities. Therefore, if such a war did break out (as Amalrik predicts) by the early 1980s, the disintegration of the Soviet empire might indeed be a likely result.

Most critics, including myself, find it easier to accept Amalrik's prophecy of the loss of Stalin's post-war protectorates in Eastern Europe than his belief that the USSR itself would be rent by nationalities conflicts. The evidence has, certainly, been far clearer in Eastern Europe - from the Titoist heresy of 1948 to the Erfurt crowds chanting "Willy, Willy, Willy, Brandt". The true state of the nationalities problem within the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is one of the matters about which we outsiders know least and should observe the greatest discretion. If anti-Russian feeling seems fairly evident in the Baltic States, and a sense of cultural superiority obvious in Armenia, the situations in the Ukraine and in Central Asia are most confused and contradictory.

In predicting anti-Russian movements among the other Soviet nationalities, Amalrik writes with both sorrow and anger - anger at the Russian Tsars and General Secretaries whose oppressions

have driven, are driving and (in his belief) will drive the other Soviet peoples into the same anti-Russian passions as the Czechs and Slovaks were driven on 20 August 1968. Amalrik is no Marxist, but he passionately shares Marx's belief that "no nation can be free so long as it oppresses other nations". Nor is he a Leninist, but he would be the first to volunteer the observation that matters were more hopeful when Lenin at least proclaimed the principle of self-determination, accepted (under duress, to be sure) the independence of Finland and the Baltic states, and did encourage genuine cultural (though not political) autonomy among other Soviet nationalities. He is, of course, fully appreciative of the fact that the Georgian Stalin was the worst Muscovite-centralizer and Russifier of them all.

Amalrik forecasts the disintegration of the old Russian Empire not with joy but with despair - the despair of a Russian who wishes freedom and humane civilization for his people rather than the false imperial "glory" which has enslaved it. In fact, his very despair is in a venerable Russian tradition.

So that Amalrik's prophecy of the dissolution of the empire in a Sino-Soviet conflict is hardly "anti-Russian" but very Russian. Should such a conflict indeed break out, the consequences for the USSR might well be those dolefully forecast by Amalrik.

However, I wonder if, within a decade, China will still resemble the China of Mao Tse-tung's declining years. Must it continue to be so internally dogmatic? Must it continue to be so tactlessly bellicose in its revolutionary pretensions?. Must it - and this is the most important question of all - remain in isolation, refusing to exploit the world power balance, and particularly the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle, to its own advantage? Much, of course, will depend on the conduct of other powers - the United States, in first place - but much will also depend on Mao's successors. Prediction is impossible - which is to say that China, by the time it can engage Russia in mortal combat, may no longer wish to do so.

BACK TO 'PRO' FOOTBALL

Hungary's decision follows erosion of team discipline

Summary: Why has Hungary reverted to an openly professional football system? This article, which gives the background to the decision, is by a Hungarian now living in West Europe who formerly, both as player and supporter, knew the Budapest football scene well.

Hungary's Council of Ministers recently announced that, from the start of the new season this month, the country's professional footballers will be bound to their clubs by firm contracts. These will cover player's rights and conditions; their pay and bonuses; and their professional and behavioural standards. The contracts are being negotiated between the clubs and committees nominated by the players and soon, to all intents and purposes, Hungarian footballers will be on a par with their Western counterparts.

In Hungary, as in the rest of East Europe, first-class footballers were professionals until 1948; then, with the Russian consolidation, professionalism in sport suddenly became taboo. In the imperialist countries of the West, declared the shrill voice of propaganda, players were tied by contract to money-hungry clubs owned by arch-capitalists. Traded like slaves reduced in dignity to the level of performing monkeys, they were squeezed dry and discarded when they had served their purpose.

"Socialist sportsmen", on the other hand, were depicted as a different breed. Sport was something to refresh the mind and harden the body, enabling its owner to "build socialism" and "fight for peace" as well as to perform well on the field.

How close did reality come to the ideal? Players did have nominal jobs in the concerns to which their clubs were affiliated. They usually went to work once a month, often by taxi - to pick up their pay packets. Bonuses for scoring goals and other special achievements were sometimes disbursed as "danger money" or payments for overfulfilment of quota, and were paid on occasion in front of an embarrassed plenum of factory workers.

By and large the players led a well-cushioned existence, and nowhere more so than in Hungary. There they are in the country's highest income bracket, move in the highest social circles and can often number Ministers among their friends. They are stars in every sense, whose names are invariably better known than those politicians whose protégés they are.

This situation often made it difficult to control the players. On one occasion, for example, an international whose fondness for the high life was proverbial was reprimanded by his coach and dropped from the team. Within minutes the coach received a phone call from a Minister warning him against further "persecution" of the man. Some clubs were virtually controlled by their players, who, if disciplined, would simply appeal to their influential friends for a transfer, possibly with a new car or flat thrown in.

When All Had To Run

Despite these abuses, the propagandist image of the Soviet sportsman persisted for many years. In 1951, a "mass sport movement" was declared throughout the Eastern bloc. In Hungary, it was known as MHK, or "Prepared for Work and Battle". All citizens between the ages of 15 and 50 were required, unless excused by a medical certificate, to participate in runs of up to five miles and other training sessions. Teenagers and grandads alike were to be seen puffing away during working hours.

A lot of water has flowed down the Danube since then, but those who wanted to revise the system feared openly to call for it - even during the euphoric Dubcek days of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Now at last Hungary has finally taken the step, and other Communist countries are expected to follow suit sooner or later. Acceptance of Hungary's decision springs from the realisation that football discipline can best be achieved under an openly professional system. The lesson has been hammered home by a decline in playing standards over the past decade.

It is easy to underestimate the importance which the Communist countries attach to success in international sporting events. The reason is not merely national pride, and the international prestige which success can bring. The good news is intended primarily for home consumption. Sport is a great

placebo for the dissatisfied and clamorous elements in society. In countries where this section of the population constitutes a majority, no regime can afford to ignore such an effective outlet for pent-up emotions.

(Forum World Features 1971)

INCREASING PRESSURE FOR CIVIL CEREMONIES

The question of civil ceremonies is discussed almost continuously in the Hungarian provincial press, and the regime has now seen fit to go a step further and to extend the category of persons who are expected to shun church ceremonies and use civilian forms of marriage, burial, etc.

Kisalfold, the Gyor-Sopron County political daily, published on February 21 an interesting article on this subject, emphatically stating that religion cannot be a matter of indifference to the Party, and asserting that only those who accept the principles of materialism and break with religious ceremonies can be Party members. This principle, of course, is already well known, but the article lays particular stress on a subsequent statement that these criteria are also valid for leaders who are not members of the Party but hold important positions in the state administration. This is something new, and its impact should not be underestimated - particularly on those officials who live in the rural areas and who have much stronger links with religious life than have people living in the capital or the major provincial towns. It is well known that religion has deeper roots in the villages than in the large towns and it seems likely that the new rule will not meet with widespread acceptance.

Kisalfold paid the customary lip service to freedom of conscience, a right anchored in the constitution, but at the same time reiterated that the struggle between materialism and idealism remains part of the "class struggle", which is, however, subordinated to the "building of socialism". What this means is that patience should be shown, at least temporarily, toward those who still adhere to religion, although, proselytizing on behalf of materialism is a continuing duty.

Kisalfold said that increasing numbers of civil ceremonies were taking place and that their standard had improved. But this statement must be viewed with some skepticism, as the

paper gave no figures to support its optimistic assessment.

HUNGARIAN HUMOR FACES A "CRISIS"

The 21 February 1971 issue of Magyar Hirlap published an article by Karoly Szalay (b. 1929) entitled "The Question of Humor Must Be Taken Seriously". Szalay is an aesthete, a literary historian, a writer, a holder of a candidate's degree in literature, an acknowledged expert in humor and theoretical questions of satire, as well as a practitioner of this literary form.

In his latest article, Szalay called his readers' attention to the signs of a "crisis" in humor. In his view, these symptoms have become increasingly frequent in television, radio, and cabaret programs. They consist of expressions of bad taste, such as cheap and clumsy pornography. The source of this nastiness often lies in the nepotism prevailing in the field of light entertainment: programs are decided upon and acted by dilettantes, their family members, business acquaintances, and friends. The witticisms of professional television and radio reporters at the expense of amateurs or ordinary people moving clumsily and self-consciously in front of the cameras are often offensive. Bad taste is sometimes combined with a lack of concern for high standards which afflicts not only the "dilettantes" but the "worthy joke-makers" themselves. A further sign of the crisis is the "sham courage" displayed when humorists indulge in seemingly very courageous allusions which are in fact hackneyed. They repeat things which have already been said or written a thousand times and which today are neither courageous, humorous, nor satirical. In the early 1960s, the truth, taboo up to then, "was still unusual" and a novelty. Today, however, no courage is needed to speak the truth.

Dilettantism is more and more crowding out professional ambition and ability. The reasons for this are that comedians, editors, and producers do not take their work seriously enough, and that critics do a disservice to the medium by being lenient toward programs which are amateurish and in bad taste. Thus the public "looks down upon, underrates, and treats this literary form without discrimination". Although, continued Szalay, it was not by accident that at the 10th Party Congress the

humorous genre was described as "light" (cf. the speech by Gyorgy Aczel in which he said: "The co-operation of established artists and authors is needed in those literary forms in which the end result is light, but high quality execution all the more difficult" Nepszabadsag, 27 November 1970). The "light" literary form fulfills an important need on the part of the masses.

Szalay pointed to the shortage of up-and-coming humorists:

Why do we have to make do with amateurs who have been advanced to the status of humorists, comedians, and cabaret artists because of their positional advantages, prerogatives resulting from birth or friendship, and other factors? Every profession organizes talent shows. Every profession has its schools. Only the humorists have none.

It is no use ignoring the "threatening crisis" in Hungarian humor, he said; only "savage and passionate" criticism will produce an improvement.

Two months before Szalay's article appeared, a round-table conference was held (on 18 December 1970) by the editors of Nepszabadsag, to discuss the "traditions and the present state of Hungarian humor". The conference was attended by authors and artists who contribute regularly to the humorous programs of Hungarian television and radio, and to the press; the editor acted as chairman. The conference reached the following conclusions:

Political humor is in general most highly developed in countries where democracy developed early. Before 1945 there was no democracy in Hungary and literature had little opportunity to be funny. Socialism is not against humor; the antipathy toward this form so characteristic in the early 1950s is not derived from Marx, Engels, or Lenin, the creators of scientific socialism. Hungarian humor has both good and bad traditions. The fact that the people view with suspicion anyone who deals ironically with the great questions of society, the people, or Weltanschauung, however correct his point of view, is one of the burdens inherited from the past. Humor is popular "high up" among the leaders and "low down" among the ordinary people; dislike of it is manifested between these two extremes.

Humor fulfills an important social function. Often more essential things are said during one hour of good cabaret than in four hours in the theater. Humor loosens up tension,

"mobilizes and stimulates". But a certain type of man (and of official) does not understand the language of humor; he is too sensitive. The thaw in humor occurred in 1954. Until then, a cabaret performance had been created by "morose people sitting in a corner and pondering how they could tell jokes without harming themselves". Today democracy has expanded, and truths which in the past could be expressed only in humorous form during a cabaret performance can now be stated openly in parliament or any other public forum. According to Western papers, the strengthening of humor in Hungary is proportional to the strengthening of the "opposition". The opposite is in fact the case. Political cabaret and freedom of political humor are the signs of a developing socialist public life, and not of so-called liberalization. There is still argument about "what can be discussed, when, and how"; but we have no reason to be so timid. Humor is limited by unnecessary taboos, such as the belief that "no caricatures of Hungarian politicians are permitted", or the fact that television "holds back a bit" on political humor. Indeed, political humor should keep up with the advance of public thinking and the rapidly increasing demands of the majority of the people. The type of cabaret humor which has become popular must be developed, and more satire is needed. Socialist satire is developing "silently and strongly". Humorous literature, the Nepszabadsag conference concluded, is another reassuring sign, and part of the development of intellectual public life and social sentiment.

This bringing into the foreground of the problems and symptoms of the "crisis" in Hungarian humor - especially political humor - is a noteworthy example of the fact that the Hungarian reform has had powerful repercussions in various departments of literary and intellectual life. Freedom of political humor has in fact a considerable tradition in Hungary; during the Horthy era and also between 1945 and 1948 it was salty and outspoken, and the Hungarian public of today is understandably dissatisfied with the present state of affairs.