

April 1971
Vol. V, No. 4

EAST-WEST *contacts*

A Monthly Review

International Documentation and
Information Centre (Interdoc)
The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10
Netherlands

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
<u>IDEOLOGY</u>	
- Will the 24th Congress begin Restalinization?	1
- Direct and Indirect Contacts with Bourgeois Influence	8
- Some Theoretical Aspects of Self-Management in Yugoslavia	11
- Architecture and Ideology in Bulgaria	17
<u>POLITICS</u>	
- The Soviet Nationalities Question from Samizdat Sources	23
- Peking's Growing International Contacts	31
- Improving Sino-Japanese Relations	34
- Double Standards on Nationalism	36
- Reemergence of the "Bourgeois Military Line?"	41
- China Establishes her Priorities	46
- Resistance in Soviet Concentration Camps	48
- Allende's Government in Action	51
- The Human Cost of Soviet Communism	56
<u>ECONOMICS</u>	
- The Engineer in the Soviet Plant	64
- Soviet Popular Car Industry's Start	66
- The Perennial White Elephants	70
- Hypocrisy of Soviet Aid to Developing Countries	73
- On the Eve of Yugoslav Self-Manager's Congress	76
- Soviet-Japanese Trade Developments	82
- Yugoslav Comments on Liberman's Self-Criticism	83
- Housing Hardships in Hungary	86
<u>CULTURE</u>	
- Atheistic Propaganda in the Soviet Union	90
- Modified Approach to the Hippy Movement	92

I D E O L O G Y

WILL THE 24TH CONGRESS BEGIN RESTALINIZATION?

Summary: On the basis of a speech made by a secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Prague, numerous Western press reports are beginning to appear which speculate on the likelihood of a return to Stalinization at the 24th Congress. This paper discusses some of the evidence for and against such a development, concluding that the Congress will probably continue the "centralist" Brezhnev-Kosygin line adopted at the 23rd Congress in 1966, rather than embark on a new and potentially hazardous ideological adventure.

After the publication by Le Monde (1) of a report of a speech by a secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Prague, Starikov, a number of Western newspapers have begun discussing the possibility of restalinization at the 24th Party Congress. As L'Express puts it: (2)

Ce n'est pas encore une certitude; tout au plus une rumeur.

Starikov's theme was that the struggle against the personality cult launched at the 20th Congress by Khrushchev had been harmful to the international communist movement in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. "Khrushchevism is a poison in the arteries of the movement", he is quoted as saying. "This poison must be eliminated if the movement is to recover its health".

"Fourteen years have proven the justice of Stalin's thesis concerning the aggravation of the class struggle in the conditions of socialism and concerning the penetration by the class enemy into the party. By rejecting this thesis the 20th Congress prepared for the penetration of the enemy into the ranks of the CPs. The 24th Congress must change that".

Since the Soviet Embassy in Prague has long been known as a hive of neo-Stalinists (Udaltsov is a case in point (3)) it is not surprising that such statements should be made there. But

(1) 12 January 1971.

(2) 18-24 January 1971.

(3) I.I. Udaltsov was Minister-Counselor at the Embassy in 1968. Since September 1970 he has been head of Novosti.

its problems are distinctly different from those of the USSR as a whole, although no one doubts that there is a strong and active group of neo-Stalinists in the KGB and Armed Forces especially, but also in the provincial party organizations, the CC apparatus and even the Politbureau itself, who would like to see Starikov's prophecy come true.

But by and large these men do not control the Politbureau, nor the press, nor the Party, nor the economy. Moreover, Starikov's dream overlooks the fact that the 23rd Congress did not revive these Stalinist themes, and it was prepared, organized, orchestrated and conducted by much the same group of elderly Politbureau "centralists" who are now busily setting up the 24th Congress.

The main difference on this occasion is that nine of the eleven men who ran the 23rd Congress and expect to run the 24th (Shvernik has died and Mikoyan has retired in the interim) are five years older and therefore still less inclined to admit former mistakes or to risk new ideological departures.

In fact the "centralist" formula which they found for the 23rd Congress, a condemnation of right-revisionism and local nationalism (i. e., Yugoslavia, Rumania, et. al) on the one hand and of leftist-sectarianism (i. e., Mao, Hoxha, etc.) on the other has served them remarkably well. The leadership has remained stable (or immobile, if you will) for a long period, and at least some of them (Pelshe, for example, but perhaps also Podgorny and Kosygin) can eventually look forward to honorable retirement à la Mikoyan instead of drastic removal à la Khrushchev or Gomulka.

Moreover under this immobile conservative oligarchy the USSR seemingly has grown stronger in its foreign political influence, its economic base, its strategic weapons systems, and its capacity for long-range intervention in the period since the 23rd Congress. But if there is no compelling reason why they should wish to rock the ideological boat now, there are plenty of minor ones.

The need, as they saw it, to invade Czechoslovakia, the fall of Gomulka, the still unsolved problem of the ideological and geopolitical struggle with China, the continuing deviations of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania and the growing tendencies to independent action among the Western CPs are some of the foreign policy considerations urging a reappraisal. At home

there are the increasing strength of the civil rights movement, the dissident scientists, the unruly artists and writers, the apolitical tendencies of the young, the tenacious persistence of religion and numerous signs of nationalism among Ukrainians, Jews, Tatars and the peoples of the Baltic and the Caucasus to impel them to action.

Yet they almost surely know that few of these problems could be solved by a return to Stalinism, and many of their difficulties would be aggravated to an alarming extent by such a move. The grounds for inaction appear to be at least as persuasive as the arguments for putting the clock back. But all this is in the realm of speculation. It is certainly worth examining what these men have actually done.

In 1970 they restored a bust to Stalin's grave, in a row behind the Kremlin wall in which all the other graves have busts. In 1969 Pravda published an editorial on Stalin's 90th birthday which made it clear that they still condemn his excesses and mistakes.

Late in 1970, when K. S. Karol visited the USSR, he was told:

A few months ago the party secretariat decided to put a stop to the rising tide of 'Stalinism', and called together all the top press and propaganda officials to hear a stern oral warning against poems such as Chuyev's, against memoirs like those of Marshall Govorov and against the interview given by Patolichev (a foreign trade official) in the weekly illustrated Ogonek which cited Stalin's name no fewer than 50 times. But this communiqué was never published in any form. (4)

Karol's information has not yet been confirmed by any other source. Nevertheless it appears inherently plausible because it is a fact that Stalinist poems such as that by Chuyev are not currently being published in the press.

In November the Chinese Party sent a message to Moscow of congratulation on the 53rd anniversary of the October Revolution. It said, in part:

The Chinese people are firmly confident that the Soviet people, educated by the great Lenin and Stalin..."

(4) New Statesman, 1 January 1971.

When Pravda published the text, it simply deleted the words "and Stalin", (5) which does not lead one to place much confidence in the predictions of a political rehabilitation.

Stalin's birthday falls on 21 December. In 1970 the Soviet press ignored it completely. Looking ahead to 1971, after the 24th Congress is over and almost forgotten (except by the specialists), the official Soviet Calendar, with a circulation of 16-1/2 million copies (more than Pravda and Izvestiya together) blandly notes that Marshal Rokossovsky was born on that day and ignores Stalin altogether. Yet from 1954 until 1970, every Soviet annual calendar had dutifully recorded Stalin's birthday. This one was sent to press on 15 May 1970, and it is clear that there had, at that time, been no decision to rehabilitate Stalin. The probability is that such a decision has not yet been taken.

The next event in this context was the 1971 plan. It held the overt military budget at the 1969 level, it scheduled a faster rate of growth for consumer goods than for heavy industry, and it planned a substantial increase in agricultural investment (i. e., in one of the consumer industries). None of these can be regarded as neo-Stalinist measures.

If this is what was happening at the nuts-and-bolts level (the one which is of primary significance), it is only necessary to turn to Kommunist (6) to learn what is happening on the ideological plane. Here we find a review of a book called Lenin's Teaching on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. It was written by an "authors' collective" and published in 1970 under the chief editorship of Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, V. M. Chkhivadze.

The review contains the following key sentences:

In the USSR, where socialism has triumphed fully and finally, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission, and from the point of view of internal development has ceased to be necessary. With the victory of socialism,

(5) 13 November 1970.

(6) No. 18, 1970, pp. 119-121.

the state of dictatorship of the proletariat is raised to a higher level, it becomes an all-peoples' state, an organ for expressing the interests and the will of all the working people in a socialist society."

Hence, for the USSR at least, the theoretical justification for mass terror again has been abandoned, as it was in the Party Program of 1961 and has been repeatedly at intervals ever since. It does not follow that Starikov's formula for terror in the Eastern European countries could not be applied by the Congress to those states which are still said to be "building socialism", but it does follow that any such move in the USSR is most improbable, since Kommunist is unlikely to have to reverse itself in only three months.

The most startling piece of evidence which points to an avoidance of restalinization is provided by Marshal I. K. Bagramyan's new book of memoirs, That Is How The War Started. It was issued in December 1970, only a few months before the Congress is due to convene, by the Military Publishing House in Moscow. (7) It not only breaks the six-year-old rule of treating Khrushchev as an unperson, but more astonishingly, Bagramyan is allowed to give remarkably high praise to the fallen leader.

Here are two samples:

Khrushchev is a rational, even-handed man. I like him. I can even say I am very fond of him. I have always admired him for his sober mind, his party spirit, his wide-ranging knowledge of military affairs, his incorruptible integrity and straightforwardness.

Not since October 1964 has any Soviet author, still less a respected Marshall who is now in favor with the Party and until recently was a Deputy Minister of Defense, been allowed to write in such glowing terms about the man allegedly responsible for "subjectivism and hare-brained schemes".

Bagramyan also praises Khrushchev for his courage during the German attack on Kiev ("He alone did not abandon his office"), and writes that Khrushchev successfully prepared the mobilization of the entire population.

(7) New York Times, 19 January 1971

Although the city later fell to the Germans, it is abundantly clear that Bagramyan is now blaming Stalin for its loss rather than Khrushchev. He says that the decision to try to hold Kiev "at any price" was taken by Stalin only because the latter had assured Mr. Harry Hopkins, the envoy of President Roosevelt, that the Red Army would hold the line west of Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad.

Evidently neither Bagramyan nor the censors at the Military Publishing House think that there is much likelihood of any major degree of restalinization in the near future. They are quite probably at least as well informed as Starikov.

As for the Leningrad trial, it is not solely a manifestation of anti-semitism. Before every Party Congress the KGB and the agitprop apparatus need a xenophobic scare as a means, they hope, of protecting the nation against Western influences. Before the 23rd Congress, the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial served their purpose well, because the two writers had had their materials published in the West.

Before the 24th Congress, the KGB and agitprop group at first may have hoped to use Solzhenitsyn in the same way, but his skillful avoidance of credible attempts to link his name with the West defeated their purpose. Even when he was awarded the Nobel Prize, he was wise enough not to go to Stockholm to receive it, and therefore to make it impossible for the regime to refuse him readmission.

So the Leningrad case at first may have been intended in part as a substitute for a drive against Solzhenitsyn. It had the advantage, from the KGB-agitprop point of view, of serving to intimidate hijackers, Jews, civil rights supporters, and all would-be emigrants simultaneously. Moreover, only minimal publicity needed to be given since the stage managers could be certain that Jewish protests and Western broadcasts would make the case known widely throughout the USSR.

What they misunderstood and underestimated was the strength and degree of Western reaction. The protests poured in so fast, from European governments, Western CPs, distinguished intellectuals in the West and in the USSR, and free newspapers all over the world that eventually the regime commuted the death sentences and suspended the trials in other cities which were originally supposed to follow.

The KGB had initiated a campaign which got out of control, and the very fact that the Politbureau itself probably had to give the instructions to suspend the subsidiary trials and to commute the death sentences (i.e., to reverse a KGB-inspired action) will not make it more inclined to give the secret police more scope after the Congress.

Conclusion

The available evidence suggests that there have been and will be attempts made by certain groups with a neo-Stalinist orientation, such as the KGB, some of the marshals (not Bagramyan), some Party provincial officials and some government ministers, to obtain some degree of restalinization at the Congress.

But few of these neo-Stalinists appear to be in leading positions and the men who are were subjected to the same pressures before the 23rd Congress. They resisted them successfully then, and since have had five years in which to entrench their positions and surround themselves with subordinates willing to follow a "centralist" line. It seems likely that they will continue to do so, until either pressure from below (which at present seems not yet strong enough to be effective), or the new appointments following retirement of the older men, change the balance of power in the Politbureau decisively enough to make the evolution of new policies inevitable.

Should the 17th Chronicle fail to appear, or should the members of the Human Rights Committee be arrested instead of being given permission to emigrate, (8) some degree of restalinization would seem more probable. In that case, 16-1/2 million calendars would have to be amended, the Military Publishing House and Pravda's editors will be taken by surprise, while the editors of Kommunist would have to change their view that "the dictatorship of the proletariat..... has ceased to be necessary".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

(8) As in the case of Boris Tsukerman, Reuter, 22 January 1971.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH BOURGEOIS INFLUENCE

Bulgarski Zhurnalst (No. 12, 1970), the monthly of the Bulgarian Journalists' Union, contained an article by Georgi Tomov, Party Secretary of the Burgas District BCP Committee, in which he elaborated on the results of sociological research related to ideological work in the district, but did not state when that research was carried out.

Burgas is situated on the Black Sea Coast and has a number of summer resorts within its bounds. Following a well established tradition, the regime is very active on the ideological front during the months preceding each coming tourist season. The previous season's achievements are usually evaluated and discussed, and new measures are planned for ideological indoctrination of people directly engaged in the tourist industry and of the population as a whole. According to the latest available statistics, Bulgaria was visited last year by more than 2, 500, 000 tourists from 126 countries (Zemedelsko Zname, 2 February 1971, p. 4).

Against the background of the tourist boom, Tomov noted that the struggle against "bourgeois influence" is the most important of the Party's tasks. This "struggle" was actually initiated in its present form by Todor Zhivkov in his speech to cultural leaders on 15 April 1963 (see Rabotnichesko Delo, 24 April 1963). Since then a number of plenums and conferences devoted to the problem have been held, primarily in the Black Sea Coast resort areas.

In Tomov's opinion, one of the sources of "bourgeois influence" is the direct and indirect contact with Western holiday-makers visiting Bulgaria. He said that the Party, the Komsomol, the Fatherland Front, the trade unions, and the schools in the Burgas District on all levels are involved in ideological activities. He admitted, however, that certain weaknesses and shortcomings still existed, and that this fact had been the reason for the sociological research to which he alluded at the beginning of his article. The goal of the research was to determine how and to what extent "contacts" with Western tourists influence the people's ideas about certain capitalist countries and about various aspects of the capitalist way of life. Special emphasis was put on reactions of young people to these

questions.

The survey had also tried to assess the effectiveness of the Party's ideological efforts among the population. The starting point was the assumption that "contacts with the capitalist way of life and a critical attitude toward it are a kind of yardstick of political stability, ideological maturity, and national dignity".

Tomov indirectly confessed that the Party had failed to achieve much among the younger generation. The reason, in his own words, was that "Certain young people and other citizens who have had similar contacts, possessed a faulty knowledge of capitalism as a (social) system". He then assured his readers that the majority of the Bulgarians have a "negative attitude toward those contacts", and immediately added that the effort to neutralize "certain negative phenomena and after-effects" was only a half the task; the other half consisted in "influencing (ideologically) our capitalist visitors and winning them" for the cause of "socialist Bulgaria".

The second important problem discussed by Tomov was the role played by "foreign" mass information media. According to the author, whenever socialism's "class enemy" makes direct contact with local people, it tries to convince them of the superiority of democracy and of the (capitalist) culture, technology, and way of life, of its young people's situation, and of the material advantages of capitalism. He openly admitted that the Bulgarian mass media had proved inadequate in their opposition to capitalist propaganda, the main targets of which become "naive and inexperienced youngsters".

In this connection, Tomov distinguished two basic approaches of Bulgarian journalists: objective ("positive" from the regime viewpoint) and objectivistic ("negative"). He called on journalists to report in an "objective" manner on the situation under capitalism - that is, to accompany statements of fact with class-Party-minded commentaries. As a praiseworthy example, he mentioned the articles recently published in the Komsomol daily Narodna Mladezh; probably he had in mind the set of articles by Ivayla Valkova and Stefan Stanchev on the "plight" of Bulgarian refugees in the West (September 1970).

Tomov's assessment of the results of the survey mentioned above is that it showed that people who are not interested in reading the (Communist) press or in listening to the (regime) radio are those most likely to be influenced by "capitalist dis-

information". He praised today's Bulgarian mass media highly for their efforts to popularize patriotism (i. e., love for the socialist fatherland) and Communist internationalism (i. e., love for the Soviet Union).

The other major points dealt with in Tomov's article were the "illusions and aspirations" of certain individuals who looked for easy ways of becoming rich. He also mentioned the role of fashion in the dissemination of bourgeois influence. "Fashion as such", he said, cannot be a channel of bourgeois influence, but "perverted fashion, typified by certain Western visitors to Bulgaria..... causes indignation and offends the healthy taste and morality of the Bulgarian people", while "young people who have contacts with the Western way of life are uncritical of these perverted customs". The author appealed to the press for more frequent and more serious discussions on problems of pop music and films. He demanded from ideological lecturers and instructors skillful work aimed at "completely convincing the people of the final victory of our Communist ideas all over the world". Tomov's exhortations seemed to imply that the Party has not been entirely successful in its ideological campaign to date.

Tomov concluded his article with the statement that: "a bourgeois influence still exists among a portion of the Bulgarian people, and it should be taken into account along with the ever-increasing changes in our social environment resulting from increased contacts". He proposed that certain measures be taken to meet this challenge: the offensive character of ideological indoctrination and struggle should be strengthened; the whole nation should be involved in this project; and varying approaches should be made to different groups, especially those of the younger generation, who have contact with Western tourists.

Tomov's article is yet another proof of the fact that the international tourist boom has become a matter of serious concern to the regime, especially after the Czechoslovak events of August 1968. Since then the BCP has abandoned its sporadic campaigns before each holiday season and has started round-the-clock indoctrination with three characteristics: publicity for Bulgarian resorts addressed to prospective visitors abroad; warnings against "bourgeois influence" and possible "undesirable" consequences for people on the domestic scene; and, last but not least, "organized and systematic" measures

against "imperialist ideological diversion". But the question remains to what extent will these measures be practically, psychologically, and intellectually effective?

SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Neca Jovanov

Worker self-management is a universal category and hence it can be considered from several angles: philosophical, sociological, economic, ideological, political, legal, moral, psychological, etc. However, within the limits of so short an article it is hardly possible to make a scrutiny of self-management from the view-point of every scientific discipline. We shall therefore limit ourselves to a theoretical consideration of self-management, and within this framework try to determine the concept and substance of self-management. A special reference will be made to the relation between worker self-management and some other social phenomena.

The Concept and Substance of Self-Management

We shall begin by stating what exactly we make worker self-management to be. We, of course, do not pretend to give it a final definition but only to stress its essential elements and characteristics.

1. Self-management is first of all a system of social relationships based on the social ownership of the means of production. Ownership of the means of production is the basic production relationship which determines the entire system of social relationships. This means that the character of the political system of government, ruling ideology, politics, sciences, culture - the social system as a whole - depend on who own the means of production.

2. Worker self-management is a social process which in its essence means the process of transforming the government on behalf of the working class, created during the revolution and immediately after it, into the government by the working class and working people, entailing the disappearance of all classes, including the working class. This is the process in which the government by the representative of the working class (embodied

in the state) becomes the government of the working class and working people themselves. In this case the government of the working class constitutes itself as the government of self-management and of self-managers. The social power of the working class, on the other hand, can be truly revolutionary and liberating and historically justified only if it establishes itself and acts as the power of self-management and self-managers over the conditions and results of human labour. The social power of the working class is irrevocably tied to the social power of self-management. Unless a government of self-management and self-managers is established, the government of the working class is neither possible nor real.

In this respect, self-management is a revolutionary movement of the working class designed to eliminate the basis for any polarization of society into the owners of the means of production and managers on the one hand, and hired labour and objects of rule on the other. In this manner the proletariat dominates the class structure of society, prevents its reconstitution on the class basis and abolishes itself as a class.

Therefore, self-management as a process does not only imply the abolition of the bourgeoisie's power over the working class but also the abolition of any kind of rule by some people over others. It is essentially the process in which man is liberated from another man's rule and controls natural and social laws, as well as the conditions and results of his labour. Self-management in this sense is a process of liberating man's personality and of achieving social cohesion, integrating people into a system of social relationships based on social ownership over the means of production.

3. Self-management is furthermore such a system of social relationships which fosters the material motivation of the producers in developing productive forces but also in developing and implementing self-management, because the results of production depend also on who decides on what. Self-management therefore, as a system of social relationships, is both humane and economically efficient and profitable, and shows up advantages over other social systems.

4. Self-management is also a political, legal and moral institution in which the producers (workers in the broadest sense of the word) indirectly and directly decide on the terms and results of their labour. To us a producer is any man who

works on social means of production and who, during his labour - directly or indirectly - creates surplus value over that which he consumed in the process of his labour.

5. Self-management implies the responsibility of those people who participated in the process of decision-making for the consequences of the decisions taken. Self-management is not a simple participation of men in decision-making, but above all a qualified and responsible decision-making. Without responsibility for the adopted decisions of those who participated in the process of decision-making, self-management in fact would not be a real and genuine self-management. Irresponsibility, anarchy, lack of discipline, etc. - all those are alien to self-management. A society is a self-managing one only to the extent to which it has resolved the question of responsibility.

6. In the present stage of development, self-management does not yet mean that all the working people decide on all the questions that call for a decision. We believe that a specialist in production, who is daily tied to a machine, working for his own livelihood has no real chance, at the present stage of development of self-management, to assert himself as a universal self-manager.

Emancipation of man in his totality is the final aim of a self-managing society which can be implemented only if in individual stages of this process some parts of man's personality are liberated. To expect a self-management in which everyone decides on everything would be quite unreal and utopian. A certain allocation of rights, duties and responsibilities within the self-managing structure is at this moment indispensable; it is in fact one of the essential prerequisites for the realization of self-management.

The Relationships Between Self-Management and other Social Phenomena

Self-management cannot be explained nor evaluated by itself. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the relationships between self-management and those other social phenomena which are directly relevant to self-management. We shall review the relationship between self-management and the following four other social phenomena:

1. State
2. Ownership over the means of production

3. Class or socio-economic structure of society

4. Political party of the ruling class

The relationships will be discussed in the form of theses.

1. Relationship between the State and Self-Management

The process of the withering away of the state and the process of implementing self-management are substantially one and the same social process, described by two different names. The volume and intensity of the implementation of self-management depends on the volume and intensity of the withering away of the state. This means that self-management can only be implemented inasmuch as the state withers away, no less and no more. The process of implementing self-management is in fact the process of socializing the functions of the state, the process of its withering away. It is the process of transforming the classical state structure into a self-managing socialized structure. It is self-evident that the process of the withering away of the state in itself does not necessarily mean the realization of self-management. The process of the withering away of the state is only a first political condition for the implementation of self-management. However, the process of implementing self-management necessarily implies the process of the withering away of the state, the socialization of its functions. The Yugoslav stand on the withering away of the socialist state and on realizing self-management is based on Marx's thesis that "the working class needs only that state which withers away".

2. Relationships between Ownership over the Means of Production and Self-Management

It is on the extent and intensity of state socialist ownership over the means of production (the lower form of socialist ownership) becoming social ownership over the means of production (the higher form of socialist ownership), that depend the extent and intensity of implementing self-management. Wherever the socialist state owns the means of production, no self-management is possible. However, social ownership over the means of production, being a higher form of socialist ownership, presupposes the existence of self-management. Since ownership over the means of production is the basic production relationship which determines a whole series of social relationships of a given society, the degree of realization of self-management is equal to the degree of realization of the social ownership over the means of production. The process of

realizing self-management does not only imply the negation of capitalist ownership over the means of production and negation of the relationship: capitalist profits vs. hired labour, but also implies the negation of state socialist ownership and the relationship: state capital accumulation vs. workers' wages, and consequently, the abolition of any ownership monopoly on the one hand, and the wage labour position of the workers on the other. Self-management as a system based on social ownership over the means of production implies control over the newly created value, and decision-making about conditions in which this new value is created. Self-management in its final analysis means the negation of any differences in holding the power of decision-making and in distributing the newly created value.

3. Relationship between the Socio-Economic Structure of Society and Self-Management

It is on the extent and intensity of the process in which the classical structure of society is transformed into a socio-economic structure, consistent with social ownership over the means of production, and the process of the withering away of the state, that depend the extent and intensity of realizing self-management. That means that self-management is not only a social process (as well as relationship) in which the classical class structure of society is being abolished, but also a social process (as well as relationship) which engendered (and abolished) any basis for polarizing society into the owners of the means of production and managers on the one hand, and the objects of rule and wage labour on the other. Self-management means not only the abolition of this division of society into the bourgeoisie and working class and their class conflict, but also the abolition of a possible or true division of society into the working class and bureaucracy and their possible or real contradiction and conflict.

4. Relationship between the League of Communists and Self-Management

It is on the extent and intensity in which the political party of the working class (the communist party) transforms itself from the party in power into the ideo-political factor of the system of self-management and into its integral part, that largely depend the extent and intensity of realizing self-management. Wherever a political party directly and factually performs the function of government, there can be no self-management.

In our case the implementation of self-management depends on the extent to which League of Communists transforms itself from a classical political party in power into the ideo-political factor of the struggle for implementing self-management and into its integral part. The League of Communists as a political party of the working class consciously renounces its power in favour of the working class. This is in fact the process of transforming the government of the political party of the working class into a government of the working class itself. The political organization of the working class is in this process the deciding subjective force which exercises the government of the working class itself and self-management. In order to assert itself as a leading and decisive subjective force in the struggle for the implementation of self-management, the League of Communists must, and does, democratize its own internal life. It can efficiently struggle for the implementation of self-management (a continuous democratization of social relationships) only with the force and authority of democracy of its own internal life. Herein is the meaning of the constant transformation of the League of Communists and of its reorganization.

5. Summary

The process of the withering away of the state, the process of transforming the state socialist ownership into the social ownership over the means of production, the process of abolishing the classical class structure and society into the socio-economic structure consistent with social ownership over the means of production, the process of transforming the political party of the working class from a party in power into an ideo-political factor of the struggle to implement self-management and into its integral part is essentially the same global social process, designated by five different names. This is not to say, of course, that each of these five social processes does not exist in its own right. Each of them is relatively self-sufficient and has its own internal logic. But none of these five processes is possible without the other four and, consequently, none can be explained or evaluated without a study of their mutual interrelationships.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

ARCHITECTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN BULGARIA

Summary: This paper analyzes the situation of Bulgarian architecture today in the light of communist ideology.

On 28 and 29 January 1971, a conference on ideological problems of architecture took place in Sofia. It was organized by the Union of Architects in Bulgaria (UAB) with the active participation of the Union of Soviet Architects. One Bulgarian and two Soviet reporters were read to the conference, but their texts have not yet been published even in summary form. Several preliminary statements were, however, published before the opening session, and the conference was described by the Bulgarian press as the first serious step taken in preparation for the 11th World Congress of Architects which will be held in September 1972 in Varna on the Black Sea Coast.

The Theme

The subject of the conference was "Communist Ideology in Architecture". The head of the Soviet delegation, Andrey Ikonnikov, Director of the Institute for Theory of Architecture and Architectural Research in Moscow, defined it as follows:

Socialist architecture is developing on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology. . and, unlike bourgeois architecture, it can solve urban problems as a complex (of interrelated components) and in perspective; it takes into consideration the socialist human being's needs both as they are today and as they will be tomorrow. (1)

About a decade ago an even stranger definition of "socialist architecture" was given by Marin Grashnov, the then chairman of the Committee on Architecture and Urbanization, at the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly:

(1) Vecherni Novini, 28 January 1971, p. 1.

Our socialist architecture is producing its own style, although it is still in its initial stages: socialist realism is reflected in our architecture and town planning; our aim is to create a Bulgarian style in architecture, national in form and socialist in content. (2)

However, both concepts of a "special" socialist architectural style distinguished by the hallmark of socialist realism have been flatly rejected by Professor Alexander Obretenov, Director of the Institute for Theory of Art at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and BCP CC member. In an interview published in the Party daily (3) he said:

The misinterpretation of the concept of "socialist" architecture has led in the past to the absurd piling up of ornaments, symbolic decorations, and non-functional forms, and the waste of expensive materials.

Obviously, Obretenov had in mind the products of the Stalinist "gingerbread" style which characterized Bulgarian architecture from the late 1940s till the early 1960s (the center of Sofia -- the BCP CC Headquarters, the Grand Balkan Hotel, and the Central Department Store -- is a perfect example of this style).

Present Situation

a) Theory and Housing Construction Practices. In his interview, Obretenov stated that contemporary Bulgarian architecture is determined by two factors: a style of building characteristic of a mature socialist society, and the scientific-technological revolution. In theory, this means that the socialist society creates new social functions for modern Bulgarian architecture, while the technological revolution radically changes the entire nature of the architectural process.

(2) Rabotnichesko Delo, 20 December 1960, p. 4.

(3) Ibid., 27 January 1971, p. 3.

Obretenov also claimed that changes in sociohistorical formations allegedly bring about qualitatively new elements in architecture, because of the fact that every historically new class comes to power with its own qualitatively new needs, views, and aesthetic demands. In this way, Obretenov built up a case for the "proletarian" class character of architecture. Immediately afterward, however, he admitted that the experience of certain West European, American, Japanese, and other architects, "in spite of their working under the conditions of the most reactionary type of society - imperialist society", should be critically studied and followed. Once again, Obretenov indirectly contradicted the recently adopted Party line in the field of so-called "socialist" architecture. The BCP daily blamed modern Bulgarian architects for imitating "capitalist" models. (4)

Architect Stefan Stamov, head of the UAB's Theory, Creative Work, and Qualification Department, was more precise and down to earth when he defined the most urgent and most important problem of contemporary Bulgarian architecture:

The greatest problem of our architecture is the housing environment in which socialist man leads his life. (5)

In the last decade, as a result of demographic changes, housing construction in Bulgaria has advanced rapidly. Certain villages, towns, and cities have doubled and tripled their housing capacity. (6) Today, some 60 per cent of the urban population live in one-family houses or flats, while a higher percentage of those in the rural areas live under the same conditions. According to official Party sources, the current trend is such that by 1980 every Bulgarian family will have its own house or flat. Commenting on this ambitious project, Professor Obretenov appealed for more flexible planning of housing construction, for bolder experiments, for greater individuality in architectural work, and for an attempt to be made to meet the wishes and needs of individual house owners.

(4) Ibid., 22 February 1968, p. 4.

(5) Ibid., 9 January 1971, p. 3.

(6) See Rabotnichesko Delo and Otechestven Front of 28 January 1971

Architect Pissarski, President of the UAB, backed up Obretenov on this point. In his interview in Otechestven Front (7) he sharply criticized "certain imperfections in housing construction which have by now become disgusting stupidities". Pissarski had in mind the poor quality of house architecture, both in theory and practice.

According to 1965 statistics (which are of course already outdated), three-member families predominate in Bulgaria (25.6 per cent), with one-member families next (23.4 per cent), and four-member families close behind (23.2 per cent). This means that the numbers of one- and three-room flats available should correspond to these percentages, but it is well known that in practice the two-room apartment is the standard size in today's Bulgarian housing construction. A perfect example of this is the Momkova Makhala Housing Complex in Sofia, where all the buildings consist of two-room flats. Both Obretenov and Pissarski spoke indignantly of the present situation in housing planning: "Not a single complex in Bulgaria has ever been completed as designed", Obretenov complained, (8) but he refrained from blaming anybody, because he would have had to involve the regime's cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus in the argument. In the same newspaper, however, Architect Stefan Stamovent went a step further than Obretenov, and criticized the "anonymity" of this bureaucratic machine. (9)

Stamovent also spoke of architectural criticism, and said that: "Even to this very day, architectural criticism is virtually non-existent; it is just unknown in our press".

In fact, the urgent need for architectural criticism has been repeatedly and fruitlessly discussed in the last decade. (10)

b) Urbanization. Today's situation in Bulgarian town planning is the result of a long series of mistakes and miscalculations admitted in the years that have elapsed between Todor Zhivkov's

(7) 28 January 1971.

(8) Otechestven Front, 28 January 1971.

(9) Ibid.

(10) See Otechestven Front, 24 June 1962 and 22 January 1970; and Rabotnichesko Delo, 17 May 1970.

1959 statement (11) and that of Obretenov. (12) It is universally acknowledged that a great number of Bulgarian villages, towns, and cities have lost their "faces" without acquiring new ones. The conflict between standardization of construction processes and building aesthetics is still a problem awaiting solution through up-to-date technological methods, a creative approach, and creative personalities. Worst of all is the fact that there has been no sociological, psychological, physiological, or other research work on the findings of which it would be possible to base the town planning of the future. This fact was repeatedly stressed in the material published prior to the theoretical conference.

Planning projects for the villages have proved an even greater failure. On January 31, Zemedelsko Zname published an article by Nikolay Trufeshev, member of the Institute for Fine Arts at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. In Trufeshev's opinion, stereotyped and trite planning has abolished the individuality and distinctive national features of the modern Bulgarian village. The overly ornate Stalinist style still flourishes there: heavy, expensive Party and cultural houses decorated with superfluous stucco figures and emblems, similar to the buildings of the Permanent Soviet All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow; naturalistic monuments; and unnecessarily luxurious administrative buildings.

Trufeshev published another article in Problemi na Izkustvoto, No. 4, 1970, the quarterly of the Institute for Theory of Art in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, in which he ardently defended the national character of Bulgarian architecture, and

(11) Rabotnichesko Delo, 3 November 1959

(12) Rabotnichesko Delo, 28 January 1971. For more references, see Narodna Kultura, No. 1, 7 January 1961; Vecherni Novini, 22 June 1962; Otechestven Front, 24 June 1962; Rabotnichesko Delo, 13 September 1963 and 16 March 1965 - Material on the National Conference on Urbanization; Rabotnichesko Delo, 22 February 1968; Zemedelsko Zname, 19 March 1969; Narodna Kultura, No. 22, 31 May 1969; Rabotnichesko Delo, 30 November and 10 December 1970, and 9 January 1971.

contrasted it with the pseudo-Victorian (that is, Stalinist) style widely practiced in the years of the personality cult.

The weekly of the Bulgarian Journalists' Union, (13) recently published an interesting article by Architect Stanislav Konstantinov on problems of "the city in the third millennium". Konstantinov's ideas - whether they are truly his own or not - are extremely original and bold, and he illustrated his text with pictures of projects conceived by Japanese and Italian architects.

Conclusion

Bulgarian architecture has achieved world-wide recognition during the last decade. (14) Along the Black Sea Coast a great number of hotels and other accommodation for the booming tourist industry have been built in an imaginative manner, in sharp contrast to the dull style still generally prevalent throughout the country. Obviously, the commercial requirements of international tourism and the cultural exchange programs have had a beneficial influence on modern Bulgarian architecture, especially by increasing its readiness to experiment with up-to-date concepts and methods. Nonetheless the practical execution of the best architectural projects falls short of the original intention - a fact repeatedly observed by those interviewed by Rabotnichesko Delo and Otechestven Front. Under these conditions it is no longer possible for the regime to keep Bulgarian architecture within the narrow framework of Stalinist Zuckerbaeckerstil, as has become evident from the statements made even by conservatives like Obretenov, who have demanded still more courageous experiment.

Against the background of the current situation and ever-changing conditions, it appears that the recent conference on ideology in architecture was nothing more than lip service to the universality of Marxism-Leninism, and a belated attempt on behalf of the regime to accommodate itself to the pace of the technological revolution. But it is a hopeful sign that the mistakes made in the past have been recognized, and that there is a manifest eagerness to eliminate them.

(13) Pogled No. 4, 25 January 1971.

(14) The competition for planning the city center of San Francisco was won by two Bulgarian architects, to mention only one example.

POLITICS

THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES QUESTION FROM SAMIZDAT* SOURCES

Summary: The Soviet Union is a signatory to a United Nations Convention concerned with ensuring basic political, economic, social and cultural freedoms for all, regardless of "race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin". Clandestine Soviet publications, however, provide a wealth of evidence of repression of non-Russian nationalities.

A number of the Soviet national republics have, during the past few months, celebrated 50 years of Soviet rule, and speeches at each anniversary have stressed the good relations between Russians and non-Russians. Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, speaking in Armenia on November 29, claimed that:

"The fraternal peoples of our land always stand together, whether it be in days of stern trial or in glorious days of triumphs. They share both the joy of victories and the bitterness of failures. They have common thoughts and travel a single road.

"Under the leadership of the Communist Party, and relying on the disinterested fraternal aid of other Soviet peoples, they built up in their ancient land a new, young and just society, which knows not exploitation, oppression and class and national hostility. They built Socialism".

Unofficial Soviet sources, however, show that national differences and resentment of Russian domination are still widespread.

Samizdat documents, including the Chronicle of Current Events, have contributed much to this picture and have shown that repressive measures taken by the authorities against non-Russians have led to an increase rather than a decline in national consciousness. Two nationalities are now producing documents on the same lines as the Chronicle. In January, 1970, the first issue of

* Literally "self-publication" - i. e. handwritten or typed documents circulated clandestinely to circumvent official censorship.

the Herald of the Ukraine was produced, listing numerous cases of repression in the Ukraine in 1968-69; and in April, a similar Jewish publication, Exodus, began to appear.

National dissidents, together with civil rights and religious protesters, comprise the three main categories of political prisoner in the Soviet Union. Samizdat publications show that many non-Russians are serving prison or labour camp sentences for "nationalist" offences. They continue their fight for legal rights in prison by means of hunger strikes and the smuggling out of petitions and other documents.

It is frequently pointed out by national dissenters that they are only demanding rights that have been formally granted to them by the Constitution. Protests have so far largely taken the form of: Requests by deported nationalities to return to their native lands (Crimean Tatars and Meskhetians); appeals for linguistic and cultural rights (by Ukrainians, Balts, Crimean Tatars and Jews); and requests by Jews to emigrate to Israel.

Although there have been isolated cases of anti-Russian riots (Chronicle No. 8, June, 1969 reported race riots between Uzbeks and Russians in Tashkent which continued for several weeks during the summer) and isolated acts of sabotage (by the Chechens), protests have on the whole taken the form of rational demands for basic rights. Many peaceful demonstrations have been organised, particularly by the Crimean Tatars, although all have been forcibly dispersed by the militia or the KGB (secret police). Demands for secession have largely come from the Ukraine, although one or two general documents have supported them: A letter written by seven political prisoners at the end of 1969, and signed by both Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg, pointed to the dangers of not acceding to nationalist demands. It said:

"Many problems of national relations are still unresolved, are causing dissatisfaction and friction and are swelling the numbers of convicted youth. The latter are put in prison... for propagating ideas of national self-determination; from the legal point of view this is directly contrary to the law, since the USSR Constitution proclaims the 'right of nations to self-determination and to secession'. Putting people into prison for spreading the idea

of national self-determination leads only to the kindling of national hatred, enmity and the alienation of nations".

The majority of the dissidents, however, have not raised the issue of secession, possibly to avoid provoking any militant anti-nationalist reaction on the part of the authorities.

Protest documents have emerged from many areas of the Soviet Union. The exceptions are Georgia (apart from appeals from Georgian Jews) and Armenia, due possibly to the greater cultural autonomy enjoyed by those republics; and Central Asia, where the traditional way of life is still widely practised in the largely rural communities. Resistance to russification however exists, but takes on a more elusive form: refusal to intermarry, to have social relations with Russians or to speak Russian.

National dissent, unlike other forms of protest except religious dissent, has involved nationals from all levels of society, not simply the intelligentsia. According to General Grigorenko, and on the evidence of the large number of signatories to the protest documents, almost the entire Crimean Tatar population has taken part in the movement to obtain permission to return to the Crimea. Several Ukrainian workers have protested at linguistic and cultural restrictions.

Several writers have pointed to an increase in national consciousness as a result of the repressive nationalities policy. A well-known Ukrainian historian, Valentin Moroz, in a samizdat article entitled "Chronicle of Resistance", argued that the deportation and repression of the Chechens, for example, had led to a strengthening of national loyalties, whereas groups that had not been subject to such pressure, like the Mordvinians, were less opposed to assimilation. A letter from a russified Ukrainian, written in June, 1968, and reported in Chronicle No. 10 (October, 1969), described how in the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs he recently encountered a hostility to Russians and Europeans that had not existed before the war.

While the mounting Jewish national consciousness is due in part to external factors - the present Middle East situation - official discrimination against Jews, the denial of most forms of Jewish cultural expression and the denial of almost all contact with Israel (except for a limited amount of emigration)

have clearly contributed.

Element of solidarity

The plight of non-Russians has aroused the active sympathy of a number of Russians - an important new element in the nationalities' dissent movement. As late as 1965, when the Ukrainian writer Ivan Dzyuba wrote Internationalism or Russification, he regretted that Russian dissidents gave no support to non-Russian demands. The Crimean Tatars were supported by the late writer Kosterin and continue to be supported by General Grigorenko. Kosterin's funeral in 1968 was attended by several Crimean Tatars and Grigorenko spoke of their cause. Andrei Sakharov and Andrei Amalrik have both written about the nationalities question. The Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn has portrayed non-Russian characters in his works sympathetically. And a document entitled "Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union", written in 1969 and signed by "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltics", backed up the struggle for "national liberation" of minorities and said that this

"... should be linked in the closest way to the common democratic struggle. The way to national liberation lies through democratisation of all Soviet society, and national liberation will only be achieved through civil freedom".

It called for the political self-determination of nations through a referendum with the participation of an UN observer commission.

Non-Russians have played a prominent part in the civil rights movement generally. When the Action Group for the Protection of Civil Rights in the USSR made its first protest in 1969, more than a quarter of the signatories were non-Russians.

Similarly national dissenters do not limit their protests to their local problems but refer to the question as a whole. The Ukrainian writers Chornovil, Dzyuba and Moroz have all applied the Ukrainian example to the general nationalities problem. The works of a young Ukrainian poet, Symonenko, who died in 1963, which called for autonomy for the Ukraine and other non-Russian nationalities, are now widely (though clandestinely) circulating in the Ukraine. In 1966, Dzyuba gave an address on "Babi Yar" -

the massacre of the Jews during the German occupation of Kiev - in which he linked the repression of Jewish and Ukrainian cultures.

Repressive measures by the Soviet authorities tend to differ in degree according to different nationalities. The Crimean Tatars, for example, have been singled out for harsher treatment because of their more concerted protest. But despite the imprisonment of ten leaders of their movement in July 1969, their campaign for return to the Crimea has continued unabated. Chronicle No. 14 (June, 1970) said that a protest document signed by 456 Crimean Tatars had been sent to the Soviet party Central Committee, to the President of the USSR Supreme Soviet and to other bodies. Chronicle also reported new trials of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan. In January and May, 1970, two Tatars were arrested in Tashkent and charged with helping to compile information bulletins on their cause.

Jews are discriminated against on both national and religious grounds. The samizdat document Exodus has collected numerous Jewish protests which give a picture of almost total suppression of cultural rights and of the enormous difficulties in obtaining permission to emigrate. Applications for emigration visas frequently lead to increased persecution. It is estimated that about 240,000 Jews have applied for permission to emigrate - some eight per cent of the total Jewish population. Many of the civil rights dissenters are russified Jews.

Because of the size of the Ukrainian population (more than 37 million), this represents one of the more important national problems for the Soviet authorities. Disaffection exists in many of the towns including Kharkov, Lvov, Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano Frankovsk and Kiev. Several intellectuals have made extremely outspoken protests and many others are clearly sympathetic, if less actively, with the dissenters' aims.

Sympathy among Ukrainian officials may account for the relatively light measures taken against some intellectuals. The publication in the West in 1968 of Ivan Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification did not immediately lead to reprisals against him. However, Chronicle Nos. 11 and 12 (December, 1969 and February, 1970) reported that in late 1969 he was expelled from the Ukrainian Writers' Union. At the union meeting only two members voted for his expulsion but a restricted session was held two weeks later and it was carried out. In December, 1969

Dzyuba wrote to the Presidium of the Union dissociating himself from his foreign publishers and attacking them, and was subsequently reinstated.

The journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil was sentenced in 1967 to 18 months in a labour camp following publication in the West of his petition against the arrest of young Ukrainians in 1965-66. This later appeared in book form as the Chornovil Papers. During his imprisonment, Chornovil went on hungerstrike for seven weeks in protest against illegal prison measures, according to Chronicle No. 7 (April 30, 1969). Two months before his release he was moved into solitary confinement at the Lvov KGB headquarters and told that a new investigation had begun into his case. He refused to co-operate, regarding this development as illegal, and the investigation was closed.

Illegality and force

Less well-known intellectuals have been more harshly treated. A document which recently reached the West, "Ukrainian Intellectuals tried by the KGB" describes illegal searches of homes, arrests and illegitimate methods used to obtain confessions from prisoners. Statements have been falsified and defence evidence distorted. The document notes that illegal and brutal KGB methods against intellectuals are more frequent in the former Polish city of Lvov than in Kiev. From various issues of Chronicle it is evident that disaffection and reprisals are also particularly common in Dnepropetrovsk.

Chronicle Nos. 11 and 12 reported the arrest of three dissidents, I. Sokulsky, N. Kulchitsky and V. Sarchenko, who were found in possession of an "Appeal to Creative Youth" - a protest at the oppression of free-thinking intelligentsia in Dnepropetrovsk. The document discussed the dismissal from their work of people devoted to Ukrainian culture and gave facts about enforced russification.

On June 1, 1970, Moroz was arrested a second time for "nationalist offences" (reported in Chronicle No. 14) following the confiscation from his home of books published in the Western Ukraine before 1939 and manuscripts of his own works on nationalist repression. He has since been sentenced to a reported nine years' imprisonment. His Chronicle of Resistance describes Ukrainian resistance to assimilation and gives some

hitherto unknown information on a Western Ukrainian minority, the Hutsuls. Moroz protests at attempts to destroy their national heritage and recalls that a valuable iconostasis was "borrowed" from a Hutsul church by a film-maker, but that repeated demands for its return have been refused.

Attempts to confiscate or destroy Ukrainian cultural records have been revealed by the Chronicle of Current Events. In 1969, the most important archive of Ukrainian history in Kiev was destroyed in a fire that is widely believed to have been an act of sabotage. A similar fate befell the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev in May, 1964. Proof that the latter was an act of sabotage appeared in a samizdat document published by the émigré Ukrainian journal Suchastnist, No. 2, 1965.

Many citizens of the Baltic republics are in the Mordovian camps and Vladimir Prison, having been convicted of nationalist offences, according to Chronicle No. 11. The edition No. 15 (August, 1970) reported the sentencing of a laboratory assistant at Tartu University, Estonia, to five years' imprisonment and of three others to shorter terms for allegedly "keeping arms in order to overthrow the Soviet régime in the event of conflict between Estonia and the Soviet Union".

Chronicle No. 9, (August 31, 1969) revealed that two Baltic dissidents convicted at "nationalist" trials received sentences of 25 years. The length of the sentences is itself illegal as the criminal codes of all republics provide for a maximum sentence of ten years - or 15 years for especially dangerous State crimes. Also, under Soviet law, if a man is prosecuted on a number of charges, he cannot receive a sentence greater than the maximum permitted for the most serious charge. Thus 15 years is the absolute maximum period of detention to which a man may legally be sentenced.

"War criminals"

There are still large numbers of prisoners who have been convicted for taking part in nationalist movements during and after the Second World War. The letter from seven political prisoners, written in late 1969 and signed by Ginsburg and Galanskov, said that 17- and 18-year-old youths had been turned into 40-year-old invalids, and asked: "What crime are they now expiating after 25 years?"

One document that has been smuggled out of a Soviet labour camp is by Alexander Petrov-Agatov, who was sentenced to seven

years' imprisonment in January, 1969, having already spent more than 20 years in prison during Stalin's time and since. Written at the end of 1969 in the form of an open letter to Boris Polevoi, editor-in-chief of the popular youth magazine, *Yunost* (Youth), it reveals that "No. 17 camp-point" in the Potma area holds "war-criminals - as a rule illiterate, emaciated old men of 60-90 who are spending their third decade inside without hope of release".

The Soviet authorities are concerned at the links that now exist between national and other groups of dissidents; at the relative decline in the Great Russian and increase in non-Russian population; and at the dangers of nationalism at a time when Communist ideology is losing its cohesive force. They must also fear that the increase in nationalist feeling in Eastern Europe may have repercussions in the Soviet Union and indeed tenuous links do exist across the Soviet border. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was deplored by certain non-Russian groups - in particular in a document published by Estonian intellectuals in 1968. But as Andrei Amalrik says in his essay Will the USSR Survive until 1984? the policy of Great Russian nationalism, which is being to some extent fostered to replace Communist ideology, can "with its inherent cult of force and expansionist ambitions, only aggravate the nationalities problem".

Andrei Sakharov, in his *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, wrote that nationality problems would continue to cause unrest unless all departures from Leninist principles were acknowledged and analysed, and firm steps were taken to correct mistakes. He went on:

"All peoples have the right to decide their own fate with a free expression of will. This right is guaranteed by international control over observance by all governments of the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man'".

PEKING'S GROWING INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

Summary: As a result of Nigeria's decision to recognize Communist China, the Peking regime now maintains diplomatic ties with 51 countries, including 16 African states. This paper outlines some of the recent trends in Chinese foreign relations and concludes that diplomatic recognition is not always a precondition to good business-like contacts with the CPR. Conversely, Peking's willingness to maintain an ambassador in any given country is not necessarily a sign of cordial relations between that country and the CPR.

Nigeria's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists once more calls attention to Peking's new diplomatic offensive in various parts of the world. The communique issued in Lagos yesterday recognizes the CPR as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people" and calls for the immediate establishment of ambassadorial relations between the two countries. (1) The issuance of the document concludes an interesting phase in Nigerian foreign policies during which that country recognized both Taiwan and the CPR without, however, maintaining diplomatic contacts with either of them.

The Chinese Communists are presently concentrating on broadening their relations with countries throughout the world. The drive consists of two separate but interconnected phases. In the first place Peking is interested in achieving diplomatic recognition by countries which either failed to recognize either of the Chinas (such as, for instance, Austria or Ireland), or have previously maintained relations with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. In all cases, the price of recognition is the professed willingness of the given country to acknowledge Peking as the "sole legal government of the entire Chinese people". Whenever possible, the Chinese Communists also insist on the recognition by the other country of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. This latter condition has, however, been dropped in some cases, such as in the documents on recognition by Canada and Italy. While recognizing the CPR as the "sole legal government", both of those countries merely "took notice" of the

(1) Reuter from Lagos, 10 February 1971.

Chinese claim concerning sovereignty over Taiwan.

Peking's recent diplomatic achievements include full recognition by a wide array of countries such as Canada, Italy, Equatorial Guinea, Chile, Ethiopia and, finally, Nigeria, bringing the total number of countries with which the CPR maintains diplomatic relations to 51.

While the recent recognitions appear to reflect some improvement in the international image of the CPR, in the field of international relations Peking still remains far behind the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. In addition to Taiwan's continued membership in the United Nations, the Nationalists maintain full diplomatic relations with 65 countries, of which 22 are located on the African continent. At the same time only 16 African countries maintain relations with Peking, including four Arab states in North Africa.

In addition to its drive for recognition, the Chinese foreign political activity has lately centered on the gradual return of ambassadors to countries with which it has long maintained diplomatic relations. The process of appointing new ambassadors in the place of those recalled during the Cultural Revolution has been going on for almost two years and is now almost completed. Since the last Party congress, which is generally considered as having signaled the end of cultural-revolutionary upheaval, 35 ambassadors have been dispatched, (2) leaving only a handful of embassies abroad under the leadership of charge d'affaires ad interim. The process of filling ambassadorial posts abroad is sometimes viewed as a sensitive barometer of Peking's relations with the countries involved. This is, however, only partly the case. While it is true that during 1969 Peking only dispatched new ambassadors to countries with which its relations were cordial, in 1970 ambassadors were also sent to countries that made no secret of their differences with the CPR, such as some Communist states of Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union. Yet, even in the latter instances, the return of the ambassadors represented a certain subsidence of ideological

- (2) Of the 35 ambassadors sent out between May 1969 and February 1971 two have thus far been recalled. (Kang Mao-chao left Cambodia in May 1970, following China's breaking of relations with the new Cambodian regime; Chinese ambassador to Albania, Keng Piao, returned to Peking in January 1971).

polemics and a mutual effort to create normal working relations, although only at the state level.

The virtual completion of the process of returning ambassadors calls attention to the exceptions, i. e., the countries to which the Chinese have not appointed new diplomatic representatives of full ambassadorial rank. It is interesting to note that of the handful of such countries, three are members of the Communist camp, namely Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia. Chinese contacts with the above three countries have been limited to the merest formalities during the past years. Even Bulgaria's initiative of returning its own ambassador to Peking (shortly after the Soviet Union had done so) did not change Peking's apparent disinterest in improving relations with the Sofia regime.

The remaining countries in which China is still represented by charge d'affaires ad interim consist of an interesting group of states. Three African countries - Kenya, Uganda and Morocco - were at one time or another engaged in polemics with the Chinese Communists which resulted in the reduction of contacts and the recall of their ambassadors from Peking. India, which has lately been showing some semi-official interest in improving relations with the CPR, has thus far received little official encouragement from the Chinese capital. At the same time, the intricate situation in Laos has apparently prevented the Chinese Communists from appointing a new ambassador to the royal government, and the Chinese embassy in Vientiane is presently run by a charge d'affaires ad interim.

The only Western European country that recognizes China but has thus far failed to receive a ranking Chinese diplomatic representative is the Netherlands. It is not clear, however, if the present state of affairs is due to the Netherlands' continuing consular contacts with Taiwan, or to earlier diplomatic difficulties with the CPR which led to the expulsion of the Chinese charge d'affaires in 1966 and to the defection of the acting charge d'affaires three years later. Britain, which also maintains consular relations with Taiwan, has recently succeeded in improving its relations with Peking and a new permanent Chinese representative has been appointed to London. Lately some British journalistic sources have also mentioned the possibility that the two countries would, in the foreseeable future, raise their respective diplomatic representations to the ambassadorial level.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of diplomatic relations with the CPR, however, is the fact that commercial contacts between Peking and any given country are not necessarily dependent on the existence of formal diplomatic ties. Thus China's two most important trading partners in Asia and in Western Europe - namely Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany - maintain no diplomatic relations with the CPR. In spite of this, in 1970 China's total trade turnover with Japan rose to \$ 825 million, almost exactly 200 million dollars over that of the previous year. In 1969 Chinese trade with West Germany amounted to \$ 246 million. In the same year China's trade with France was less than 50 per cent of that amount (\$ 120 million), in spite of the latter's establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking in 1964.

Conclusions

Peking's diplomatic activity during the past two years has demonstrated a certain amount of flexibility in establishing relations with foreign countries. Its usual insistence on recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan has been lifted whenever the Chinese leadership considered it advantageous to establish relations with countries that showed themselves reluctant to give such recognition. Peking's failure to return its ambassadors to a small number of countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations reflects continued disapproval of present or past policies of the countries involved. On the whole, however, the Chinese leadership has apparently succeeded in breaking out of its self-imposed isolation and has lately demonstrated increasing interest in broadening of the CPR's international contacts in virtually every part of the world.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

IMPROVING SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Eisaku Sato, the Japanese Prime Minister in his policy speech at the opening session of the 65th Japanese Diet (parliament) on January 22, referred publicly for the first time to "the Government of the People's Republic of China". In the past,

official references have always been to "China" or the "Peking Government".

The reference was one example of the Japanese government's good faith in its attempts to improve relations with China. Over the last few months there have been numerous statements by government leaders on the necessity for an all-out effort to increase ties and lessen hostility between Japan and its Communist neighbour. In his New Year Press conference, Mr. Sato announced that he was ready to hold ambassadorial level talks with the Chinese on, among other subjects, the normalization of relations between the two countries. The establishment last December of a new organisation, the Federation of Dietmen for Promoting the restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China with a membership of over 340 representatives from all parties in both Houses of the Japanese parliament should act as a powerful and active pressure group in bringing this about.

Although the Chinese continue to criticise the policies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and to be very firm in their refusal to separate trade from politics in dealings with Japan, there are signs that they are open to advances for improvement in relations. During a visit to China by a Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) delegation in October 1970, the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai expressed readiness to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan when diplomatic relations had been restored.

A number of non-governmental agreements have recently been concluded between both countries. The Fishery Association of China and the Japan-China Fishery Association signed an agreement in Peking in December 1970 (New China News Agency, NCNA, December 31). An air cargo agreement was concluded at the beginning of January between Japanese travel agents and the China International Travel Service to allow for direct transportation of air freight between the two countries (Japan Times, January 7). Agreement has finally been reached on the settling of accounts between Japanese and Chinese trading concerns in either yen or yuan instead of in pounds sterling or francs as in the past (Le Monde, January 20).

The only officially recognised contact between China and Japan is through the Memorandum Trade Agreement. Trade between the two countries is roughly divided between "friendly

firms" and that which is carried on under the auspices of the Trade Agreement; the latter forms only a very small part of the total trade but it is vital for the semi-official link which it provides. Last year Japanese trading firms had expected to suffer considerably from the imposition of Chou En-lai's "four principles" governing the behaviour of firms trading with China, but now trade figures for 1970 are expected to be higher than ever. The Memorandum Trade talks (the agreement expired on December 31) for 1971 have not yet started, in the last three years re-negotiating the terms of the agreement has consistently been a difficult task and the 1970 agreement was signed only in April of that year after six weeks of hard bargaining and the inclusion by the Chinese of condemnatory statements against the Japanese government in the final communiqué. Japanese representatives, including Mr. Fujiyauna (former LDP foreign Minister and President of the newly formed Federation of Dietmen) have been invited to China to start talks in February. The length and outcome of the negotiations should be a guide to the way in which Sino-Japanese relations are likely to improve and develop.

DOUBLE STANDARDS ON NATIONALISM

Summary: West European Communists have been affronted by reaffirmations of the Brezhnev doctrine at a time when they are anxious to stress their national loyalties.

The West European Communist Parties underlined their image of independence by holding their latest gathering well outside the Soviet bloc - in London - and on a subject not in the forefront of Soviet propaganda: their attitude to multinational industries. Their original intention seems to have been to rally in opposition to the European Economic Community (EEC), just as a year ago they met in Moscow to discuss what was then regarded as the unifying topic of European security. But fewer European Communists are now ready to endorse a simplified view of the EEC; even the Soviet leaders, despite their hostile propaganda, appear to accept the need to reach some sort of accommodation with it and to develop trade with the member States. The theme of joint action against the big international

firms enabled the Western Communists to proclaim their devotion to national interests and solidarity with the workers against the international employers, and in particular against American "monopolists", without forcing them to adopt a unified line on the EEC.

Organised by the British Communist Party (CPGB), the London conference took place from January 11-13 and was attended by high-level representatives of 14 other Western Communist Parties, including those from both the EEC and European Free Trade Area countries, the Finnish party and several clandestine parties such as those of Greece and Spain. Except for the presence of a senior member of the Soviet Embassy in London and Pravda's foreign editor, Moscow was little in evidence, though Communist representatives from the neutral States such as Austria echoed Soviet Press warnings to their governments against joining the Community. Pravda, for instance, on January 6, referring to meetings in Brussels between EEC officials and those of Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, had claimed that their entry into the Common Market would worsen the European political climate by tying them to the "NATO military-political bloc".

The British party's Secretary-General, John Gollan, reiterated the CPGB's opposition to Britain's entry, mainly on the grounds that it would adversely affect the cost of living, domestic agriculture and Commonwealth trade. In emotive terms he warned that the British Parliament would be deprived of sovereign powers over a whole range of economic questions if Britain joined. Decisions would be taken by an "uncontrolled super-bureaucracy acting in the interests of the trusts", while the international firms were "bastions of neo-colonialism" which presented an ever-growing threat to the workers' bargaining power, trade union rights, job security and wages.

Wider goals

The need to concert political and trade union action within each country and across boundaries in defence of the "workers' rights" served as a rallying cry for most delegates, though several speakers acknowledged the difficulty of organising joint action between workers affiliated to trade union federations of differing hues. Despite the emphasis on Communism's alleged

respect for each country's sovereignty (reflected in a marked reticence about the role of the World Federation of Trade Unions in promoting industrial unrest in Western Europe and avoidance of allusions to "proletarian internationalism"), the Communist Parties evidently hope to take the lead in organising co-operation, first between those working in the national branches of the international firms and secondly between all workers and "democrats" in pursuit of wider related goals such as nationalisation of key sectors of the economy. These recommendations, echoed in the final communiqué of January 13, seem to have been inspired mainly by the delegates from countries belonging to the European Community rather than those still outside it.

Already some years ago, the parties in the six EEC countries abandoned their blanket condemnation of the trend towards greater Western economic integration and the formation of bigger international firms, admitting that these are permanent features of the modern world and urging on their followers a more realistic approach towards them. The Communists in France and Italy have recently concentrated on the labour problems allegedly raised by the growth of the international companies, presumably finding them a convenient platform for striking nationalist attitudes and justifying a role in the Brussels institutions. With municipal elections due in March, the French Communist Party (PCF) is particularly anxious to widen its appeal by proclaiming its independence from foreign ties. "Socialism means the full development of national potentialities, not their negation", a contributor to the PCF organ, *France Nouvelle*, wrote in November. And in a speech to the Senate on November 30, the veteran Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, said his party was resolutely opposed to any kind of "national nihilism" since the nation was a reality which was unlikely to disappear.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI), which is the only one in the Common Market group to send representatives to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, makes much of the need to safeguard Italy's sovereign rights within the EEC structure, at the same time insisting on the value of a strong unified European community as a bastion against the growing influence of the United States. Giorgio Amendola, a member of the PCI's Directorate and Political Bureau who led the Italian delegation to the conference in London, repeated proposals for

a strengthening of the European "bloc" to counter US infiltration and in particular the "export" of American inflation to Western Europe. Like the French Communists, he acknowledged that multinational industrial mergers were a development that could not be reversed, and urged a parallel increase in multinational trade union co-operation. The Norwegian delegate, however, argued that many trade unionists in Western Europe lacked militancy and called for co-operation above all between Communist activists in the different factories belonging to the international firms.

Working from within

A more far-reaching division - glossed over at the conference - is that between the parties of the six EEC countries and the other European Communists on the question of the Community's institutions. The PCI with two years' experience of participation in the European Parliament's discussions and a role in EEC trade union consultations through its influential position in the Italian trade union federation, the CGIL, stresses the importance of joining Communist institutions, even if only to change them radically from within. The French take a similar view, participating through the Communist-dominated trade union federation, the CGT, in discussions of EEC policies affecting workers' interests. Both have recently stated that they have no objections in principle to the development of supranational bodies - though in the longer term they clearly favour a loose confederation of European States rather than a federal Europe.

At the London conference Amendola, echoing Moscow's recent efforts to outflank the EEC by proposing more East-West co-operation of all kinds, urged the eventual formation of a much enlarged European Common Market, embracing the East as well as the West. According to the *Morning Star*, he voiced agreement with the CPGB in opposing Britain's entry into the Market, but said that the presence of the British working class might reduce the strength and influence of Federal Germany.

Czechoslovak resolution

For those of the West European Communists who objected to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, its worst

feature was the flagrant violation of her sovereignty, which belied their own assurances to home audiences that Moscow no longer imposes a rigid line on "fraternal" parties and States. Brezhnev's assertion that nationalism and sovereignty cannot be separated from their class content, and that it is the duty of all parties to come to the assistance of a country where Socialism is threatened, caused them similar embarrassment as an attempt to justify the invasion legally. The Czechoslovak régime's reiteration of the doctrine in its December party resolution on the "lessons" of the events surrounding the invasion came at a particularly awkward time for the European Communists, as it was published while they were still discussing relatively non-controversial topics.

Proclaiming that the invasion itself had been necessary because of the threat of counter-revolution, the Czechoslovak resolution had rejected any "abstract conception" of a Communist State's sovereignty in favour of a view of sovereignty reflecting the State's "class and internationalist character". The condemnation of the invasion issued by the party Presidium at that time was denounced as "non-class and anti-internationalist". The PCI, in its newspaper, *L'Unità*, quickly commented that Italian Communists could not remain silent about this aspect of Prague's case, since sovereignty was "an inalienable right" which even in a Communist State had nothing to do with its class and international character. Returning to the theme at the mass rally in Rome on January 24 to mark the PCI's 50th anniversary, Giancarlo Pajetta, an influential Politburo member, declared that national independence and sovereignty must be defended "in all circumstances" and that internationalism "does not exist if it is not founded on the full rights of the nation". The PCI, he pledged, would continue to follow an independent Italian road to Socialism.

Similarly, the French Communist organ, *L'Humanité*, restating the PCF's original condemnation of the intervention and its belief in the ability of the Czechoslovak working class to cope with the situation on its own, attacked the new document for redefining national sovereignty in a way incompatible with the principles proclaimed by the world Communist movement. It cited in particular the document issued by the 1969 world Communist conference in Moscow, which said relations between Communist States should be based on the principles of

proletarian internationalism, mutual support and respect for independence, equality, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Yet the French party was on shaky ground in appealing to this document, for like many of the compromises worked out at recent international Communist gatherings it can be interpreted by different parties in different ways. *L'Humanité* failed to mention that the Moscow statement had included a passage reiterating, in line with the Brezhnev doctrine, that the "defence of Socialism is an internationalist duty of Communists" and that Moscow still interprets proletarian internationalism as the subordination of national interests to its own view.

For the Yugoslavs, the question of the Soviet leaders' present attitude to "national roads to Socialism" (the principle on which the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement of 1955 was based) is vital. *Zagreb Radio's* commentator on January 15 voiced alarm at the implications of the repetition of the Brezhnev doctrine in the Czechoslovak document, which was extensively publicised by *Pravda*, seeing it as a possible precursor to a "repetition of the Czechoslovak affair" elsewhere.

REEMERGENCE OF THE "BOURGEOIS MILITARY LINE?"

Summary: Selected quotes from an interview given by French Defense Minister Michel Debre have been reprinted by Chinese media. The parts of the interview quoted include an elaboration of France's determination not to rely on foreign military strength and a repudiation of arguments against the creation of an indigenous French nuclear deterrent. This paper points out the obvious similarities between the thinking of the Maoist leadership in China and the arguments advanced by Debre and suggests that the purpose of the Maoists in reprinting the relevant excerpts was to counter possible opinions within China opposed to the Maoist military line.

Is a certain segment of the present Chinese leadership - primarily the military - flirting with the idea of renewing

military ties with the Soviet Union? Do some of the economic planners within the government in Peking feel that the budget set aside for creating a nuclear weapons arsenal is a waste in light of the awesome nuclear might of the US and the Soviet Union?

Although none of these questions can be definitely answered, the possible existence of such elements could be the factor that prompted Chinese media to carry an interesting selection of quotes from a recent interview given by French State Secretary for National Defense Michel Debre, who discussed just those issues - from the French point of view. (1)

The interview which appeared in the French weekly magazine L'Express (2) was an unusually long one (eight pages) outlining Debre's political philosophy on a large variety of issues. In contrast, the Chinese chose to quote the Minister's views on only three topics: on the problems of France's former military relationship with NATO, Soviet and American naval presence in the Mediterranean, and France's reliance on its own nuclear capability.

What Debre said on the first topic was basically this: France is not thinking of returning to the NATO military structure and considers "integration" a means of subjecting the defense of the country to the policies of a great power - be it the Soviet Union or the United States. "Integration" would mean, Debre was quoted as saying, that the defense of France would become

... an appendage of the policy of a very big power - American or Russian, at present American. The consequence: if the Americans consider it in their interests to defend France we shall be defended. But if they find that to defend France is not in their interest, we shall no longer be defended. This is a bet that seems inadmissible to me.

Debre's conclusion, as quoted by Hsinhua, was that "if the leaders of a country like France do not have command over our defense, I am not sure that our country can defend itself". (3)

(1) NCNA, 7 January 1971.

(2) L'Express (Paris), 4-10 January 1971, pp. 60-69.

(3) All quotes are given as translated by NCNA.

In this context the parallel between France and China is striking: It is conceivable that following the Cultural Revolution certain elements within the Army once more began to question the necessity of maintaining an intense ideological and political conflict with the Soviet Union. The same elements could have also pondered the possibility of restoring military ties with the Russians under the terms of the now defunct treaty of friendship and mutual security, mainly in view of the re-emergence of what they consider a Japanese military threat in the Far East. Debre's argument could then be applied to the military relationship between the Soviet Union and China: the conclusions drawn by Debre are the very conclusions drawn by representatives of the "Maoist line" in the Party in their own debate with representatives of the "bourgeois military line" prior to the Cultural Revolution. At that time the Maoist argument won out and China chose to repudiate any military (and political) cooperation with the Soviet Union and to rely on its own military resources.

The next issue dealt with by Debre - as quoted by NCNA - concerned the French view of the current situation in the Mediterranean region. Debre was quoted as saying that he felt that:

our security is tied to the situation of Europe and the situation of the Mediterranean. We should watch them (the Russians and the Americans) constantly and see that no threat develops in the Mediterranean.

According to the Hsinhua item, Debre went on saying that "today Russia and the United States are in rivalry with each other, and their navies are "the preferred instrument of a policy of both balance and hegemony". As far as France is concerned, he concluded: "in this region, what we seek is to ensure our security".

Once again the similarity is striking. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the thesis to China, all one has to do is to substitute "Europe" for "Asia" and "Mediterranean" for "Pacific": Accordingly, the Chinese feel that their security

is tied to the situation in Asia and the situation in the Pacific. We should watch them (the Russians

and the Americans) constantly . . . and see to it that no threat develops in the Pacific.

Debre's conclusions, when applied to China, speak for themselves: "in this region, what we seek is to ensure our security" Even if it was nothing but coincidence, the statement might well be written by a Chinese leader and applied to the relations between China and the Soviet Union.

The third section of the Hsinhua selection, this time a complete paragraph taken from the interview, refers to certain elements within the country who feel that in view of the tremendous nuclear advantage of the two superpowers, the investment made toward creating a nuclear force is superfluous. Basically, Debre expresses his conviction that it is a mistake to compare the French nuclear force with that of the Russians or Americans, and continues:

Such comparison leads to the following reasoning: Since you cannot reach the degree of power of the Americans and the Russians, what is the good of it? Let us do nothing. By such reasoning, the less strong should be disarmed before the more powerful, for the number of armored units and battalions leads to the same reasoning. Nevertheless, we see, somewhere in the world, medium ones, or even small ones, which resist and win.

It is no secret that reasoning similar to that cited by Debre was very evident within certain circles of the Chinese leadership before China developed its first hydrogen device. The divergence of opinion within the Chinese leadership became widely known during the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution when the Maoist forces attacked their "bourgeois" opponents on every conceivable issue including matters pertaining to national defense. Thus, in the summer of 1967 NCNA reported on a newsletter written by a correspondent of the central PLA organ "Liberation Army Daily" which claimed that the success of the first hydrogen bomb exploded in June that year "smashed the revisionist line on science pursued by a handful

of top party persons in authority taking the capitalist road". (4) The same article accused the "enemy" of having yielded to the "pressure of imperialism and revisionism" and

employed all possible means to restrict and abolish the research undertakings of national defense science.

It is also well known that the opposition's arguments against China's developing its own hydrogen bomb had been based on both military and economic considerations. Now, following the return of a certain degree of normalization in the economic field, it would not be surprising if some pragmatic elements within the government and the Army would once more begin to cautiously air their disagreements with the regime's efforts to develop an indigenous nuclear striking force which - in their view - could serve mainly as an irritant when compared to present Soviet nuclear striking capacity. The return of nationwide economic planning (the fourth five-year plan is believed to have gotten underway at the beginning of this year) could have further reinforced the opinions of those who argued against excessive military spending at the expense of overall industrial development.

The conspicuous selection of the excerpts from Debre's interview can hardly be accidental. In the quotes presented by NCNA, an internationally known Western political figure expresses views identical to the official Chinese point of view on the same issues. In this sense, the publication of the Debre statements in the Chinese media is an important contribution to a debate presumably underway in the Chinese capital. For the Western observer, it provides an indication of the existence in China of a divergence of views on matters of military strategy. As such, the NCNA item on Debre's views could be of more than passing importance.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

(4) NCNA. 18 June 1967.

CHINA ESTABLISHES HER PRIORITIES

China is showing a remarkable resilience in recovering from the administrative and economic disruption caused by the cultural revolution. Though the emphasis is now on "Socialist construction" it is still officially held that the revolutionary upheaval of 1966-69 cleared the decks for a new upsurge in production and scientific experiment by getting rid of an ossified bureaucracy and Liu Shao-chi's "reactionary" supporters. The party's reconstruction in Mao's image, which was at first conducted at a slow pace, accelerated towards the end of 1970 and reached a high point in mid-January with the formation of a municipal party committee in Shanghai, where the drive to smash the old party edifice had started. Almost simultaneously a local congress led to the setting up of the fifth provincial party committee (after Hunan, Kiangsi, Kiangsu and Kwangtung) in Liaoning and ten days later Anhwei Province followed suit. The description of the new party committees as a triple combination of old, middle-aged and young people contrasts with the formula used to indicate the composition of the revolutionary committees, i. e. a triple alliance of party cadres, representatives of the mass organisations and the army. A closer analysis, however, suggests a change of label rather than of content.

In the case of Liaoning, for instance, the chairman of the revolutionary committee, Chen Hsi-lien (a Politburo member) has become First Secretary of the new party committee of 81 full and 28 alternate members, and the continuing influence of the army is reflected in the fact that three of the five names listed for the 13-man standing committee are military men. In Shanghai the pattern is similar. The standing committee of 16 is headed by two Politburo members. Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, as First and Second Secretaries; Chang is also chairman of the local revolutionary committee and First Political Commissar of the Nanking Military Region, while Yao like the other four Secretaries of the new committee, is a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee. The newly formed Anhwei party committee also reflects the existing hierarchy in the corresponding revolutionary committee. It is headed by Li Teh-sheng, the province's military com-

mander who took over control of the administration in 1967 and the following year became head of the provincial revolutionary committee.

But though party reconstruction appears to amount in practice to conferring ideological respectability on the administrative structure that emerged from the cultural revolution upheaval, it still encounters difficulties in some regions. So far over 200 county party committees have been formed, but none have been reported in Szechwan, Kweichow, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and the city of Tientsin. The prolonged silence of the radio stations in the first three regions is, on past form, an unmistakable sign of trouble, while Tibet has always presented a special problem for the central leadership.

Economic tasks

Apart from its ideological significance, the aim of party building seems to be to smooth the path of economic progress which is occupying increasing space in Peking's internal propaganda. The customary New Year editorial underlined the importance of the new Five-Year Plan, to which Lin Piao and Chou En-lai had referred for the first time in their speeches for China's National Day on October 1. The successful end of the third Five-Year Plan was officially announced by New China News Agency on January 13, when it was reported that the fourth had been launched amid the "new high tide of China's Socialist revolution and reconstruction". This phrase is now used in preference to the talk of a "new Leap Forward", but the mood of enthusiasm and confidence in China's ability to pull herself up by her own efforts is reminiscent of the earlier period, as is the renewed emphasis on the development of local small industries and the zeal of the masses inspired to new achievements by Mao's Thought.

Good weather, a more extensive use of fertilizers and large-scale irrigation projects have undoubtedly contributed to the successful harvests which are engendering new optimism, though the vast percentage increases for agricultural and industrial production claimed for many provinces seem totally unrealistic. Nevertheless, policy differences as to the correct economic direction apparently persist, and the pragmatic theories ascribed to China's disgraced Head of State, Liu Shao-chi, are still con-

demned as a retreat from Mao's ideas. At the end of December the *Chekiang Daily* warned that the struggle against erroneous attitudes did not end with the victory of the Maoists in the cultural revolution and that vigilance against backsliding must be constantly maintained. Recording a new provincial record in coal output, the newspaper claimed that this had been the result of "a tough political battle". The Central Committee's Party School, whose re-entry into the arena of public debate reflects the reactivation of the party organs, has also taken up arms against excessive pragmatism. In an article in the *People's Daily* on December 29, the "mass criticism writing group" in the school attacked the economic philosophy of its former President, Yang Hsien-chen, rejecting as reactionary nonsense his theory that during the period of transition to Socialism the economy should incorporate both Socialist and capitalist features. But a mixed economy within a predominantly collective framework, at least in the rural communes, has been advocated in many recent articles and is to some extent endorsed in the new draft Constitution. Despite the militant words designed to justify Mao's 1958 policies, it is unlikely that the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward will be repeated.

RESISTANCE IN SOVIET CONCENTRATION CAMPS

by Paul Barton *

Soviet prison camps today are in many respects different from what they were in Stalin's time. The change which has taken place during the last 20 years or so is of course just as important as the indubitable continuity of the dreadful institution.

Unfortunately, too many students of this change tend to overlook one of the most basic differences - namely, the fact that the inmates are no longer that helpless crowd, resigned to slow death, which they used to be in the Thirties and the Forties when the camp system was at its height. The prisoners' resistance which spread through the concentration camps during the last years of Stalin's rule has survived, though with varying intensity

* Paul Barton is AFL-CIO representative in Europe

and in forms that keep changing, until this very day.

When this paramount fact is ignored, attention tends to be focused excessively on such changes as the considerable decrease in the number of political prisoners, the improved diet, the possibility of receiving visits by relatives, etc. So it then seems natural to jump to the conclusion that the development in the camps is an outstanding example of the liberalization of the Soviet regime.

But that is a typical case of that distortion against which the dissident Soviet historian Andrei Amalrik - who himself is now serving a three-year term in a concentration camp - so convincingly warns when, in his essay "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?", he emphasizes that many observers take for a reform what is in fact the decline and disintegration of the Soviet regime.

On the contrary, when the prisoners' resistance is duly taken into account, a great deal of the improvements introduced in the camps during the last two decades are seen to be concessions wrested from the authorities by their victims.

It was not after Stalin's death, but as early as 1948/1949, exactly at the time when the resistance was beginning to make itself felt in the camps, that the material situation of the prisoners started improving. Among the most important changes brought about at that time were the improvement of food and clothing, the separation of the political from the common law prisoners, the introduction of wages and the control of mortality.

At the same time however, in an obvious effort to break the nascent resistance, the rules of the regime imposed on political prisoners were made even harsher than before. But this did not help. Little by little, the resistance got organized and the process of change received a tremendous impetus from the mass strikes and uprisings that shook the entire camp system to its very foundations.

The best known among them are those that broke out in Karaganda in 1952, in Norilsk in 1953 and Vorkuta in 1953 and 1954, in Kingir in 1954, in Taishet in early 1955, in Khabarovsk in summer 1955 and in Vorkuta again in summer 1955 and once more in fall of the same year. The most important changes that were eventually to transform the camps from what they were

under Stalin to their present form were actually agreed upon during the bargaining the authorities undertook with the insurgents: the right to send a letter once a month and to receive a family visit once a year, the removal of the iron bars from the huts, no more locking of the huts for the night, the elimination of a registration number sewn on the prisoner's uniform, the eight-hour working day, the revision of the political prisoners' sentences, the liberation of minors, invalids and prisoners having served two-thirds of their sentences.

And some of the later revolts, like those in Vorkuta in 1954 and 1955, took place in order to force the authorities to implement the measures promised in the initial bargain.

What is more, several improvements introduced at the time of the prisoners' uprisings were cancelled a few years later, when the situation in the camps was no longer so explosive. This happened, for instance, with the rule that one day's work with the fulfilment of the output quota was to count for more than one day of imprisonment. The real concern of the authorities was thus demonstrated beyond any doubt: it was not to reform the inhuman institution, but merely to bring the resistance under control. The fact that this objective could be reached only by adopting far-reaching changes was no merit of the Kremlin.

At present, the resistance in the camps does not seem to be directed by strictly organized underground groups as in the early Fifties. It takes a wide variety of forms, which range from simple solidarity and support given by the mass of the prisoners to those among them who are weak or ill or whose physical strength has been undermined in the punishment cells, "special regime" camps or jails on the one hand to dangerously explosive mass demonstrations on the other.

One such demonstration, which took place on October 4, 1964, in a Mordvian camp for political prisoners, has been described by Anatoly Marchenko in "My Testimony" (pp. 298-301). It occurred when an inmate was shot by a guard while trying to climb the wooden palisade surrounding the camp. Having heard the shots, prisoners from all over the camp started converging to the spot.

The fugitive was evidently still alive, but the sentry would

not led the prisoners or the medical orderly go anywhere near the two rows of barbed wire between which he lay to give him first aid. So they all began to roar and howl, paying no attention to the bursts of tommy gun fire over their heads. It went on and on for at least an hour and a half, until the wounded man was taken to the guardhouse and a medical orderly called in.

Between these two extremes, there are individual and collective hunger strikes, individual petitions and complaints with which a great many prisoners keep flooding the authorities and, last but not least, relentless efforts to undermine the morale and self-confidence of the camp officers by involving them in perilous political arguments or just by holding them up to ridicule during the obligatory political instruction sessions or so-called cultural events.

As a rule, these actions yield no immediate results and those who undertake them are often severely punished. But they convey a constant threat of more serious trouble and thus constitute a very effective means of checking the lawlessness of the camp authorities.

No doubt, the intensity of the resistance is no longer the same as in the early Fifties. On the other hand, the police and the camp administration have to face some serious problems which did not exist then.

First of all, it is no longer true that in his resistance the political prisoner is isolated from the mass of common law convicts or that he even has to cope with their hostility. Numerous examples show unmistakably that the resistance has made a tremendous impact on all the inmates. It is today by no means exceptional to see common law prisoners help and protect the "politicals" persecuted by the camp administration. Such was, for instance, the experience of Yuli Daniel during his imprisonment in Mordvia.

It can thus be said that little by little the camp system had become a school of political opposition and resistance. And this is true in still another sense. While in the early Fifties the struggle was mainly directed and organized by men who, like the Ukrainian partisans, had fought the Soviet regime before their imprisonment, today it is with very few exceptions carried out by people who learned to fight only after they got into a camp.

Here again, Yuli Daniel's experience is extremely interesting. Before he was sentenced this man, who was to become a symbol of resistance, was merely a dissident writer so little interested in the political life of his country that until his arrival in the camp he believed that there were no political prisoners left.

Marchenko's life story is even more striking. Today a typical revolutionary who is likely to die for his convictions at the age of 32 or 33. Marchenko was a completely apolitical foreman at the building sites until he accidentally got into trouble when a fight broke out in a workers' hostel.

This fact that the concentration camps have become such schools of resistance and political opposition explains why the Soviet authorities have been increasingly reluctant to send genuine oppositionists there.

While Yuli Daniel was sentenced to a camp for secretly publishing a few literary works abroad, his wife Larissa, after organizing a street demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was merely exiled to a remote region. More typically, the great revolutionary, General Grigoriyenko, was shut up in a special lunatic asylum where the danger of communicating his ideas to the other inmates is even more remote. And the same is happening to many others who are considered too dangerous for imprisonment in the camps - to such an extent that the confinement of perfectly healthy people in special mental institutions has become an important instrument of what some consider as a liberalization of the Soviet penitentiary system.

ALLENDE'S GOVERNMENT IN ACTION

Luis Silva Santesteban
(Belgrade correspondent of the Peruvian daily *Expreso*)

Expectations raised in international public opinion by Salvador Allende's triumph at the head of the Popular Unity coalition have been amply justified by the bold political and economic measures that were taken by the new government in Chile in its first three months. The Chilean government has indeed undertaken a number of highly significant measures. Some of these measures will have

an immediate effect, whereas the wisdom of others will be seen in time to come.

Allende has personally taken care to clarify misunderstandings about the character of his government. In a speech he said: "We are not going to form a Marxist government, because it would not have any sense. We shall create a government of Popular Unity that would rely on the six organizations forming part of this bloc". In the ministerial cabinet, two portfolios went to Allende's Socialist Party, three to the Communist Party, and the others to the smaller parties within the Popular Unity coalition.

In the short term, the government has to face two immediate problems of the Chilean nation - inflation and unemployment. As is well known, inflation in Chile has become a chronic disease. The country has been suffering from monetary instability since 1930, and the efforts of some governments, especially of Eduardo Frei's Christian Democratic government to bring it under control proved vain. On the other hand, it was not possible to avoid unemployment, although industry, in comparison with most other Latin American countries, has recorded a considerable development.

The long-term tasks of the new Chilean government are no less difficult. To implement such aims as emancipation from foreign dependence, caused mainly by North American imperialism and internal domination by domestic oligarchy, big land-owner aristocracy and some national consortiums, it will be necessary to put in the greatest possible efforts, especially since these tasks have to be carried out within the framework of the valid constitutional system which is now in force.

The Home Front

The programme of the Popular Unity coalition provides for the nationalization of the copper industry, banks, insurance companies and all the domestic or foreign private enterprises upon which national development is closely dependent. Some important steps have already been made along the road which leads to the abolition of the power that used to be wielded by monopolist enterprises in national life. Congress has already been presented with the draft of a law on the nationalization of the big copper mines, in whose exploitation the American

companies Anaconda and Kennecott have played a key role. As a result of this measure, seventy million dollars will annually go into the state coffers. It should be recalled that with Peru, the Congo and Zambia, Chile is one of the four biggest producers of copper in the world. Bearing in mind that Christian Democrats and even some right-wing sections are agreeable to the nationalization of copper, everything seems to suggest that the draft law submitted by the executive will be adopted without much difficulty. A formula is at present also being sought for the nationalization of the Pacific Steel Company, the largest steel producer in Chile, in which the government holds 55 per cent of the shares. The Lota-Sonchwagen Company, which produced 50 per cent of the nation's coal, has already been nationalized. The most important textile mill, Caupolicán-Tome, previously owned by a Chilean consortium, has also been expropriated. The executive has presented another draft law to reduce the number of enterprises assembling motor cars to three, compelling them at the same time to use no less than 70 per cent of assembly parts of Latin American origin.

The government has also proposed a draft law which, if adopted, will considerably alter the structure of the banking system. Christian Democrats are in favour of a cooperativization of the banks, whereas the present government suggests nationalization of the system. There are at present 24 private banks, including five foreign banks, which continue business within the framework of their statutes and administrative traditions of the country, but under government control which is exercised by specially nominated administrators.

The corporation for the agrarian reform has increased its efforts and by now has taken over nearly 70 estates, including eight owned by the Society for the Exploitation of Tierra del Fuego, which is an enterprise of major significance for Chilean agriculture. It is interesting that the present minister of agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, was one of Fidel Castro's advisers in organizing and carrying out the early stages of the agrarian reform in Cuba.

As we know, Chonchol resigned from the Christian Democratic party during Frei's government, which he had charged with inconsistency in carrying out the agrarian reform.

With this series of measures, which in time is bound to be increased, Allende's government has started the liquidation of

the hegemony of the capitalist and feudal interests in Chilean society.

The government has also taken some immediate measures to increase the wages of some categories of workers by 66 per cent, to lower the prices of men's readymade clothing by 10 percent, abolish several dozen decrees on price rises which were inherited from the previous government, to allocate half a litre of milk per day for every child, to employ 5,000 unemployed in December and another 10,000 in January, and to launch a large-scale housing programme.

The problems which have sprung up along the road which the Chilean government has taken are quite understandable. The impatience of some sectors of workers and peasants was demonstrated in a series of strikes and takeovers of land and factories. Some categories of white-collar workers, such as municipal and university employees, have similarly shown impatience in their expectation of a number of measures relative to the system of remuneration to come into force. On the other hand the public prosecution has disclosed the subversive activity of a group of latifundistas aimed at creating an atmosphere of chaos and violence which would bring about the downfall of Allende's government. We should add to this an attempt at Allende's life which was revealed in Valparaíso.

It is interesting to consider the relationship between the members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (M.I.R.), which is in favour of an armed struggle, and the movement of Popular Unity and Allende's government. During the electoral process the former stopped their activity in order not to prevent the victory of Popular Unity. Later on they took up a wait-and-see attitude until quite recently, when they offered armed support against a rightist conspiracy. The government on the other hand, published a decree of pardon for all political prisoners and ordered an annulment of all trials against revolutionary activists. It is worth noting the reception which was given in Chile to Régis Debray after his liberation by the Bolivian government. According to the Times, Debray now works in the press bureau of the presidency of the republic.

Recently a convention of the Popular Unity coalition was held to draft the foundations for the organization of popular support for the present government and to prepare activity in the campaign for municipal elections which are to be held in March

this year. The character of the new government in Chile should lead to the establishment of new forms of mass participation in national affairs. The political institutions of liberal democracy, which have been operating in Chile for more than a century, are a narrow framework for the introduction of new social and economic measures intended by the Popular Unity government. There are 15,000 committees of Popular Unity, which have been continuing their work since the pre-electoral period, and they constitute the embryo of authority needed by Allende's government to carry out the difficult plan of action it has undertaken.

The municipal elections in March this year will give the Chilean people an opportunity to express their opinion of the new government five months after its assumption of power. This no doubt will be a significant political test.

The Foreign Front

Chile's experience, which is being closely watched about-turn. Chile has established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and North Korea, renewed relations with Cuba, and decided to maintain consular relations with East Germany. Like Peru, it has reaffirmed its territorial sovereignty over 200 nautical miles from its coast.

Chile has also supported the so-called Albanian Proposal for China's admission to the United Nations and for the expulsion of Nationalist China's delegate.

Concluding Thoughts

Chile's experience, which is being closely watched by various countries, is a fundamental factor in the struggle against imperialist rule in Latin America. It should be recalled that Peru is undergoing a stage of revolutionary nationalism and that Bolivia, after suppressing the recent attempt at a coup d'état, could go on deepening the processes which timidly started a year and a half ago. If consolidated, the anti-imperialist axis, Santiago-Lima-La Paz, would undoubtedly play a decisive role in the rest of Latin America.

Is it reasonable to refer to a "socialist Chile" as was done, for example, by the influential French *L e M o n d e* ?

At the present stage, the Chilean government is not building socialism, but is rather laying down the foundations for doing so in the future. The building of socialism presupposes a number of prerequisites whose implementation may require a longer or a shorter period. Today Chile is following the "non-capitalist road of development" - the historical and social stage in which an underdeveloped country, under the leadership of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces at the head of the state, tries to abolish external dependence and internal domination by the latifundiary aristocracy. It is only after these aims have been achieved that socialist planning of development can begin. Consequently, the nationalization of foreign enterprises and the agrarian reform are the prerequisites for the start of socialist construction. From this perspective, despite important specific features, the Chilean experience has much in common with the processes which are taking place in a number of African and Asian countries, such as Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Burma, etc.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

THE HUMAN COST OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

by Robert Conquest

Robert Conquest, the noted British scholar and author of "The Great Terror", the most definitive work on Stalin's purges of the Thirties, was asked by Senator Thomas J. Dodd, vice chairman of the U. S. Senate's Subcommittee on Internal Security, to prepare a study on the total human cost of Soviet Communism. In the resulting 35-page document, Conquest details the staggering total of at least 21,500,000 human beings who perished directly through the various acts of terror perpetrated by the Soviet regime since the Bolshevik revolution. In this thorough study, he traces the roots of Soviet terror, starting with Lenin's theoretical justification of it as early as 1905, and proceeding to the first post-revolutionary phase (1917-1924) which saw the start of systematic terror against

opponents of the dictatorship by the Cheka - the secret police - which under its various names has carried out this function for the Communist regime ever since; the crushing of the Kronstadt rebellion; the ruthless campaign against the peasantry in the early Thirties; the Stalin-Yezhov purges of the mid-Thirties, accompanied by mass arrests, executions and deaths in forced labor camps.

Conquest's computations, based on a monumental job of research, come up with the incredible summary of the human cost of Soviet Communism: Executed or died in prison or camps during the post-revolution period (1919-23) - 500,000; executed during the Stalin terror - 2,000,000; died in camps during the pre-Yezhov period of Stalin's rule (1930-36) - 3,500,000; died in forced labor camps during the Stalin-Yezhov terror - 12,000,000; died in the politically organized famine during the forced collectivization of the Thirties - 3,500,000. Following is the concluding section of Conquest's study.

After Stalin's death in 1953, a considerable relaxation took place and by 1957 it seems that the camp population had been cut to about a third. Certain of his more rigorous laws - including that on hostages - were repealed and a large rehabilitation of his victims among Communists, soldiers, and writers took place. On the other hand, the laws against opposition to the state remained draconic and the rehabilitations were notably incomplete. For example, none of these executed in the two first Moscow trials has ever been rehabilitated.

These changes mainly took place under the aegis of Nikita Khrushchev. His attempt, if not radically to reform the system, at least to repudiate the horrors of the past, petered out with his fall in 1964. The years since then have seen a progressive rehabilitation of Stalin himself, an increase in the prestige of the Secret Police, and the suppression - once again - of the more unpleasant facts of the Soviet past.

Indeed, there has been a progressive worsening of the situation. Nothing resembling the extremes of Stalinism has

reemerged. But many of the camp complexes are still flourishing. Estimates of the numbers inside vary from about half a million upwards. And the worst feature of the whole system - the inadequacy of the camp ration - has remained quite unaltered. The death rate is all the same much lower, largely because those receiving this inadequate fare are nevertheless no longer used to any great extent on truly back-breaking labor such as lumbering.

One method, not indeed new but becoming more frequent nowadays, is the detention of leading advocates of political reform in lunatic asylums run by the Secret Police, where they can be submitted to various "cures", often of a degrading and painful nature and always without medical justification.

But, while Lenin's and Stalin's terrors destroyed whole social classes, by the 1960's the activity of the ever powerful Secret Police was directed, and needed to be directed, not at the population at random, but only at those who genuinely showed some sort of resentment at or rejection of the system.

History, it has been said, is the propaganda of the victor. One of the difficulties of dealing with Communist history is that all of us, or most of us, have been influenced over a half a century by versions more concerned to present the official Soviet picture than to discover the truth. It is true that in the last two decades a formidable body of independent scholarship has investigated these matters; but in spite of its status and influence, it does not seem to have driven out at least the remnants of unfounded assumptions which entered into the Western liberal conscience over the earlier period.

Truth Concealed

For the true condition of the Soviet Union in these matters was long concealed from many in the West. Part of the concealment, of course, was due to the precautions of the Soviet authorities to ensure as wide a measure of secrecy as possible. But even then, much information became available, through refugees and others. The Russians, and their supporters throughout the world, simply denied the truth of these allegations.

It may seem incredible that a great amount of truth, and mutually confirmatory evidence, should be rejected by large number of men of good will in America and elsewhere. They

seem to have been deceived basically because they had accepted a picture of the world into which the true facts did not fit.

Some of them were, in one form or another, "socialists". They had been told that the Soviet Union was a "socialist" state. And at any rate, it clearly was not what they reprobated most, a "capitalist" state. And they were unaware of other possibilities. Under "socialism" they knew - indeed, it followed by definition - that serious injustices could not take place. Even those of them who willingly acquiesced in the execution of any number of "capitalists" or Fascists, could not credit that under socialism people would be falsely and publicly charged with Fascism. Nor was their imagination flexible enough even to consider the notion that a socialist state would, or could, conceal the existence of labor camps full of millions of starving prisoners. The most they could accept was that a very limited number of anti-social types were being redeemed by productive labor in prisons of unexampled humaneness.

However, it must not for a moment be suggested that all socialists took this view. There were many on the left - and even on the extreme left - to whom the facts were perfectly clear, and who refused to pretend otherwise. It was among moderate liberals, heavily penetrated and influenced indeed by men more devoted to the Soviet scheme, that the highest level of self-deception was reached.

An excuse often advanced for these Soviet actions is, in effect, that things were as bad, or worse, in the previous Tsarist period. It needs to be strongly emphasized that this is by no means the case. Up to 1905, the Tsarist regime was in the most literal sense an autocracy, and even after that date it was the most backward policy in Europe. Nevertheless it was progressing. And even more important it had never produced anything remotely comparable to the terror of the Communist regime.

For example, for the last half century of Tsarism, the only capital crimes were attempts on the life of the Emperor, his wife, and the heir to the throne, and certain offenses against quarantine laws. In the 1870's special courts were temporarily set up for terrorists. But over the whole period before 1902 the death sentences amounted to no more (for 39 assassinations, including that of Tsar Alexander II) than a few score. A confidential Tsarist document gives 48 executions, while a Soviet source (Small Soviet Encyclopedia, 1st ed.) gives 94, from

1866 to 1900.

Increasingly, political assassinations became widespread, causing about 1,400 deaths in 1906 and 3,000 in 1907. Large areas were put under special regulations and courtsmartial tried those accused of terrorism and rebellion. These courts only existed for a few months but over a thousand executions resulted. (Soviet sources give 1,139 executions in 1907, and 1,340 in 1908; while they also speak of 6,000 executions in the period 1908-12, and of 11,000 in the period "following the 1905-7 Revolution". The highest figure that can be arrived at from these sources is one of about 14,000).

The other crime of which Tsarism can be rightly accused, at least in a general sense, was the pogroms against the Jews - that is, members of the Jewish religion - which started in the latter part of the 19th century. (Ironically enough, these pogroms were also encouraged by the revolutionaries of that period - not on racial or religious grounds, but as a form of popular terrorism against "exploiters"). Tsarist officialdom at one level or another, was often involved in the incitement of these bloody riots. The number killed over the period may have been over a thousand.

Generally speaking, if we set a limit of 25,000 for all executions, pogrom murders and deaths in prison of the period from 1867 to 1917, we will be safe. The total maximum imprisoned (in 1912) was 183,949. It is absurd to compare these figures with those of the Soviet epoch, let alone justify the latter by them. Over the first-half century of Soviet rule, the executions were at least 50 times as numerous as over the last-half century of Tsarist rule, and the maximum number of prisoners at least 70 times as great.

From Tsar to Lenin

Moreover, in every other respect as well, the standards of humanitarianism had enormously worsened. In Tsarist times torture was the rarest and most scandalous exception: and the hostage system quite unknown. Lenin himself, the most intransigent enemy of the Tsarist regime, had suffered exile in a village where he was free to work, received letters, got an allowance, met his friends, hunted and so on. In the later

period, any friend of a friend of some maker of a minor joke about the government was locked in a camp and working himself to death on starvation rations, without hope of release.

Naturally this is by no means to deny that the Russian past is irrelevant. The country had, at any rate since the 13th century, been the scene of cycles of dreadful violence. The true creator of the unified and expansionist Russian state was Ivan the Terrible, who would massacre all the inhabitants of any of his own towns which showed signs of independence, as in Pskov and Novgorod. Ivan, who was openly admired - and rehabilitated - by Stalin, was also the founder of the first terror organization or secret police proper, the Oprichnina. His death was soon followed by the Time of Troubles, in which the armies of pretenders and of foreigners again ravaged the country and the permanent underground criminal element, nowadays known as *blatnyye*, with their own laws and customs, sprang up.

The restoration of the state by the Romanovs led to stagnation. No feudal system, properly speaking, arose. That is to say, there was no body of rights and duties linking the people, the privileged and the Crown. Under the Tsars - and particularly after the system became fully stabilized in the 18th century - there was an absence of even theoretical rights: everyone was, in principle, simply the servant of the autocrat. The "modernization" carried out by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great consisted of the rationalization of this system, and the establishment in Russia of the technical, the military and the administrative methods of the West, but nothing of its civic and political content. At the beginning of the 19th century most of the population were "serfs". (This word is to a great degree misleading. The usual Russian word "rob" means slave. And in fact the serf had in general fewer rights than the slaves of the Americas).

Russia was thus heavily and deeply brutalized, at the top by the irresponsibilities of absolute power and at the base by the absence of social responsibilities and rights.

In the 19th century, however, the beginnings of a great change began to show themselves. Western ideas came back with the officers who had defeated Napoleon, Tsar Alexander II emancipated the serfs in 1861, and through the century an educated middle class arose. In the years before the revolution the beginnings of a genuine civic life had begun to lay down roots -

though as yet comparatively shallow ones. Even in the political sphere the autocracy was substantially modified by the concessions made after the 1905 revolution. And an independent peasantry with a true feeling for the land had begun to emerge.

On the other hand, the older revolutionaries, who had accepted Western radical ideas at the end of the previous century, and had come to them without any ballast of political and civic experience, evolved into abstract fanaticisms. When the Bolshevik Revolution took place in 1917, it meant (from the humanitarian point of view) that a group of men who believed that all not sharing their views were representatives of irremediable evil, and who openly put forward the idea of terror as a political weapon, were in control of a country and state where a whole history of irresponsible and archaic brutality had as yet been only superficially eroded, and lay ready to burst forth.

Moreover, over the ensuing years, it was precisely the class in which the civilized virtues had genuinely taken root which was destroyed - not merely by literal means, but also through the emigration of millions of Russians in the wake of the Civil War. (Lenin to some extent saw this: while remarking that the culture of the Russian middle classes was "inconsiderable, wretched", he said that even so it was "in any case greater than that of our responsible Communists").

Retrogression

As yet, it is undeniable that all the vast expenditure of human life has not led to the juster or more humane society promised. If anything there has been, in these qualities at least, a retrogression.

In my book, "The Great Terror", I sought to estimate the overall cost in human lives of the Stalin-Yezhov terror. The figures were brought together in a paragraph which it might be appropriate to quote at this point:

"Taking the conservative figures of an average over the period 1936-50 inclusive, of an 8 million population of the camp, add a 10-percent death rate per annum, we get a total casualty figure of 12 million dead. To this, we must add a million for the executions of the period, certainly a low esti-

mate. Then there are the casualties of the pre-Yezhov era of Stalin's rule 1930-36. This includes as its main component the 3½ million who perished in the collectivization itself, plus the similar number sent to the camp where virtually all died in the following years: again, minimal estimates. Thus we get a figure of 20 million dead, which is almost certainly too low, and might require an increase of 50 percent or so, of the debit balance of the Stalin regime for 23 years".

To obtain the total number of human beings directly killed in the Soviet Union by the Communist authorities since the revolution, we would, as this study makes clear, have to add at least several million casualties to the figure for the Stalin-Yezhov period.

(The number we take as dying as a result of the revolution, though not actually at the hands of its agents, depends on the degree to which we blame the plagues and famines of the early period on the seizure of power by a minority group and the consequent collapse of authority; and how much we blame the 1921 famine on the food policies of "War Communism". But, even leaving them aside, the result is striking enough).

All the same, in concentrating on these figures, it would surely be wrong to forget the vast amount of unquantifiable human misery resulting from, indeed part of, this same process. The suffering of wives whose husbands disappeared, the children who were orphaned, cannot be counted. The spiritual cost of being forced to denounce one's own parents, the mental torment of lying in fear of unjust arrest and death night after night for months or years, is not subject to measurement.

E C O N O M I C S

THE ENGINEER IN THE SOVIET PLANT

Summary: In the Soviet Union lively discussions are presently being conducted on the role of the engineer in the plant. This discussion takes on more than local importance when it is recalled that the engineer in each Soviet plant is the person actually responsible for technical progress and that he is confronted with a number of insurmountable difficulties, from limited authority to poor incentives.

Sotsialisticheskaya industriya has recently become a platform for the discussion of the position and potential of the Soviet engineer in the plant. The first article on this topic was written by Professor A. Zvorykin, a doctor of economic sciences. (1) According to Dr. Zvorykin, sociological investigation has confirmed the existence of great deficiencies in the education and employment of engineers. For example, it has been proved that the engineers are most content when allowed to work independently. In second place of importance come the following three incentives: pay, organization of labor and working conditions. Apparently, poor pay is presently the "stickiest" problem. The engineers interpret it as an expression of the minimal recognition of their contribution to the plant's function. They have therefore become something of an avant garde in the struggle to change the premium system in the plants. Various suggestions have been made on this matter; the engineers in particular have demanded expanded authority for the directors who could then honor their achievements more justly when distributing premiums.

A second important point is apparently the fact that engineers must deal with matters which have little relation to their education and professional capacity. For example, Professor Zvorykin referred to the very slight difference in pay scale between engineers and the less qualified cadres as one of the

(1) Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 3 January 1971

major reasons for this practice. Certain non-engineering positions are being filled with engineers, who earn around 100 rubles per month, rather than with unskilled technicians, who earn between 60 and 70 rubles. Professor Zvorykin suggested that the openings which can only be filled by engineers be decreased, that these positions should only be filled with unqualified personnel, and that lower positions no longer be filled by overqualified personnel.

Another article, indicates however, just how difficult it is to avoid the improper use of engineers. (2) Two engineers from the Moscow furniture combine No. 1 describe the situation of the engineer in the wood-working industry. 70 engineers and technicians are trained annually in Moscow for this sector, yet there are only 20 positions open for such cadres. The result is that a portion of the wood-working engineers, after completing their studies, look for work in the mechanical engineering sector. The directors at the combine do not, however, want to employ overqualified engineers in less demanding positions, not because of the difference in pay, but because such production work can on the whole be performed by a less educated but experienced worker. The old-timers often are superior to the new graduates, who have had little opportunity to gain any practical experience.

The two engineers suggested that the possibility be opened up in their plant for graduate engineers to be assigned to middle cadre positions in production, so as to increase their knowledge and pursue a career in this area.

In the combine in question, 18 engineers presently work in the technologists' department, all doing essentially the same thing, for the same pay, and under the same conditions as the workers. Instead of dividing the labor in such a way that less qualified workers could perform the less specialized activities, the engineers still waste their time doing these jobs. Instead of working according to any particular plan, they are constantly sent from one place to another whenever trouble arises. They have demanded that engineers should no longer be used as "Girl Friday's" and that the work should be organized so the people who are responsible for dealing with specific problems are those who really do deal with them.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

(2) Ibid, 9 January 1971.

SOVIET POPULAR CAR INDUSTRY'S START

Summary: Even when the Soviet authorities surmount the difficulties that have plagued their popular car industry, and begin to satisfy home demand, they are likely to face the further problem of a neglected highways system

Soviet hopes that the expansion of its popular car industry under the eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70) would be well under way by the beginning of 1971 have not been realized. Although large sums have been spent on plant and Western machinery and expertise, inefficient planning and direction and a poor response by the labour force have delayed achievement of targets. Some 22,000 models of the five-year-old modified Fiat-124 (known as the Zhiguli, or VAZ-2101) were built in 1970, its first year of production; but prospects for the Russian citizen of obtaining a car, either new or second-hand, in the foreseeable future are poor. In 1971, according to the Chairman of Gosplan, N.K. Baibakov (Pravda, December 9), 160,000 Zhigulis will be built - under half the original target of 330,000.

The decision to increase substantially the output of popular cars was taken by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership to stimulate productivity throughout the economy by offering the public the chance to buy a modern car. The range and quality of other consumer goods in the Soviet Union are still so unsatisfactory that prospective ownership of them provides only a limited incentive beyond a certain point. In particular, the average flat can accommodate only so many durable goods.

It was realised also that the few Russian cars available - of which about 30 per cent, or 80,000 a year, went to the private home market, 25-30 per cent were exported and the rest reserved for official use - compared unfavourably with Western models.

Agreements were concluded with the French company, Renault, in connexion with modernising production of the Moskvich small car, and with other West European companies; but the chief agreement, worth about \$ 800 million, was with Fiat of Italy. Signed in 1966, it covered the building of a car assembly plant at Togliatti (formerly Stavropol) on the Volga and included the production rights in two Fiat models, factory

equipment and technological advice.

Construction on a partially prepared site began in January, 1967, and the principal installations at the Volga Motor Works (VAZ) were to have been completed by early 1969. The first phase was to have been operating fully in 1970, the second at the end of 1971 and the third by the end of 1972, by which time it was hoped that the production of 660,000 cars annually might be achieved.

Failures in central planning, however, soon created problems. The date set by Soviet officials for completion was unrealistic, and possibly because so many Ministries were involved - 30 to 40 have been mentioned - there were delays in the supply of materials such as cement, bricks and pre-cast ferro-concrete. Construction or modernisation of factories for the manufacture of these materials fell behind schedule - as did the building of workers' houses, because some of the house-builders were directed to work on the plant itself.

The labour force often proved unsatisfactory. Skilled workmen were scarce and little was achieved by recruiting untrained members of the Young Communist League (Komsomol), many of whom left as soon as they became proficient. The lack of labour discipline was noted by the party organ Pravda, on March 6, 1969, when it said that workers were arriving late and leaving early because public transport to the site was inadequate or non-existent. Sometimes they failed to return after lunch-breaks cranes were left idle for hours and lorries could not be unloaded.

Series of delays

When it became clear that the first phase could not be completed in 1969 hopes were pinned on beginning production in time for the Lenin Centenary celebrations (April 22, 1970). But on February 25, 1970, Pravda revealed that work was far behind schedule. The No. 1 Forging Shop was incomplete and no machinery had been installed. Production could not begin until June, Pravda reported.

It was finally August before the first models of the Zhiguli came off the assembly line, incorporating Italian-made components initially. More than half the components are to be made in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia under five-year agreements. Such agreements may be needed for the

entire decade unless the pace of building Soviet ancillary plants can be improved. Although it was still officially predicted that 30,000 cars would be produced by the end of 1970, this estimate in turn was reduced to 22,000. In early November the ten thousandth Zhiguli was reported to have left the production line (Soviet News, November 24). According to Baibakov, work on production facilities at Togliatti will be completed in 1971.

The slow development of the Soviet popular car industry is also demonstrated by the new Moskvich factory, equipped by Renault, which failed to achieve full production during 1970. It was planned to produce 280,000 Moskvich cars in 1970, but the total was 100,000. From 1971 an annual total of 350,000 was expected, but there is likely to be a shortfall of 100,000 in 1971 before the target is achieved in 1972. It is estimated that there will be a combined shortfall of 1.3 million Moskvich and Zhiguli cars over the period 1969-1975 as between original plans and actual output.

Inadequacy of targets

The seriousness of the failure is the greater in that, even if targets had been achieved, the number of popular cars could not do more than what consumer demand. The very small production of medium and larger cars is of lesser importance - the target for GAZ and ZIL cars together in 1975 is only 80,000. On the other hand an annual production by 1975 of about 1,000,000 popular cars (equivalent to the United States' production in 1916) would only extent car use to a further five per cent of the Soviet population each year, even on the unrealistic assumption that all were allocated to the private market and that there was no replacement demand. In 1970 only one person in 200 in the Soviet Union owned a car: in the US current registrations equal one in three of the population and in Britain one in six.

The Zhiguli is expected to cost the Russian buyer R. 5,500 (rather more than US \$6,000 at the official rate). In Italy the Fiat-124 has been selling for \$1,732. The Russians are not permitted to sell the Zhiguli in the West (though they will export it to East European countries), but they sell other models at low prices to gain hard currency. Within the Soviet Union

there is similar price differentiation; thus, a Volga sedan which cost foreigners in the Soviet Union \$1,450 would be sold to Russians at the equivalent of \$6,000.

Car prices in the Soviet Union have been rising steeply. The new GAZ-24 (an improved Volga) will cost Soviet buyers the equivalent of \$9,900 - an increase over its predecessor, the GAZ-21, of 60 per cent; but it will sell to foreigners at \$2,055. The prices of the ZAZ-966 and the Moskvich-412 have also been greatly increased. With an average wage in the State sector in 1970 of R. 1,464, the purchase of a Zhiguli will absorb three to four years' income. Moreover, a substantial deposit has to be put down for registration as a buyer.

Impassible roads

Despite their hopes for the car industry, the Soviet authorities have made few efforts to deal with increased traffic on their already inadequate highways. In the Soviet Union, which occupies one-sixth of the world's land surface, there are only 930,000 miles of roads, - about twice the French network. A large proportion of them are un-metalled and therefore impassable for much of the year.

The government newspaper, Izvestiya, on August 15, 1969, dealt with the traffic problems of Donetsk, an important industrial town which has no by-pass. Traffic for Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov had to pass through and traffic jams quickly built up. There was little provision for parking and the city authorities had not, at the time of the article, decided whether to build underground or multi-storey car-parks at some future date. Owners of private cars had nowhere to keep them (private garages are virtually unknown in the Soviet Union) and, when spare parts were needed, were forced to obtain them on the black market, sometimes at ten times the official price. The problem here was not the supply of parts but inefficient distribution. Perhaps the worst discovery, Izvestiya reported, was that Donetsk, with its 900,000 inhabitants, did not have one service station. Even in Moscow, with a population of 7 million, there are only some 13 garages where repairs can be undertaken and everywhere there is a shortage of mechanics.

On July 24, 1970, an article in Pravda, also discussed the

serious situation on the roads, stressing the need for safety devices (no car safety belts are made in the Soviet Union). It pointed to the shortages of road-signs, durable paint for road markings, traffic lights and filling stations.

It is clear that unless an unexpectedly high priority is given to road construction and improvement in the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan, yet to be announced, it is unlikely that, in five years' time, any startling transformation of the highways system will have been achieved. Moreover, it seems that even when, as in the case of the VAZ works at Togliatti, the Soviet régime wills the means, the inherent inefficiency of the system tends to frustrate speedy execution. Perception of the difficulties is evident in a recent commentary (Tass in English, December 26) which said that in five years possession of a personal car would be "quite normal"; but the main emphasis would still be on improving public transport.

THE PERENNIAL WHITE ELEPHANTS

Summary: In a perennial ritual, the Soviet press at the turn of the year once again has published alarming reports about the increasing number of warehouses filled with consumer goods which cannot be sold in retail or wholesale stores. The fact that Soviet economic organizations are stuck at the end of every year with a large quantity of "white elephants" is proof that the Soviet consumer is rebelling against inferior-quality goods. At the same time, the annual regularity of such reports indicates that little has been done to improve this situation.

Sovetskaya torgovlia recently carried an article about surplus goods stored in the Uzbek SSR. (1) On 1 October 1970 the goods amounted to a total of 68 million rubles. The total value of the surplus has been growing annually: in 1968 it

(1) Sovetskaya torgovlya, 12 January 1971.

amounted to 22.6 million rubles; in 1969 to double that; and in 1970 it took another jump of several million rubles. The article denies the claim that these are mostly warehouse goods in storage from retail stores. In the republic's "Mintorg" wholesale house alone, there are unsaleable wares amounting to 36 million rubles.

Officially, deficiencies on the retail level are considered responsible for this problem. For example, it is claimed that there are too few self-service stores in Tashkent, that the "service culture" is at a very low level and that the distribution of the stores in Tashkent does not comply with the population's needs and interests. In Uzbekistan there are said to have been a number of cases where the employees themselves decided to temporarily close the stores.

The real cause, however, lies deeper. The goods are of poor quality, while the consumers' tastes and expectations have improved considerably. The customer no longer buys whatever is available, but rather looks for and chooses what he really needs and likes. Sovetskaya torgovlia reports on the shocking results revealed in a survey on this problem. In 1970 the state quality inspector investigated 90% of the stores which were carrying industrial products and classified 72.6% of the inspected goods as "rejects"; 12% were returned to the production plants for improvement and 4.8% were reclassified as lower quality. Thirty-six surveys of 22 "Mintorg" warehouses produced the following results: 59.6% of the wares were "rejects", and more than 13% were sent back to the production plants.

It was announced that the republican office of the Gosbank in Tashkent would be involved in the campaign to eliminate such deficiencies and credits were recalled for goods worth 2.7 million rubles. This is a drastic measure. The question as to "who should pay for this?" is clear: the Ministry for Commerce of the Uzbek SSR. However, the Gosbank also has to answer "how should this be paid?" - the goods could not even be sold at lower prices.

The Wholesale Exhibition in Kiev - A Wholesale Failure

At the end of each year a wholesale exhibition for the clothing industry takes place in Kiev. Propaganda has also interested the public in the event because an interest in fashion is increasing

among the population and more Soviet citizens want to know what will be new in patterns, designs and colors. In December 1970, the exhibition was prepared with special care - 300 firms and wholesale plants participated, and 12,000 samples of ready-to-wear fabrics, furs and hats were presented. Two-thirds of these were new models. In spite of all the hopes and preparations, however, the event was not a success. Twenty light-industry plants found no buyers for their products which amounted to some 44 million rubles. These were not luxury goods, but rather necessities: men's shirts, men's, women's and children's coats, and children's general apparel. The retail stores did not want to purchase these wares because the customers were making demands which industry had not allowed for in their production of the goods. Therefore, the same men's shirts in the shops this year. Various types of coats, valued at 13 million rubles, were left untouched. Cotton products are very popular in the Ukraine, but the products shown at the exhibition resulted in a complete lack of success in this branch of the clothing industry. (2)

Sotzialisticheskaya industriya recently reported on the reasons for the growing amount of unsaleable goods. The situation is especially chaotic in the clothing industry, and the reference to the mechanism which is responsible for all of this is very interesting. The fate of a particular "creation" begins with its design by the clothing industry, without, however, any discussions with the textile industry. Not until the textile exhibitions take place do the two branches get together to talk and cooperate. This results in a problem which could be anticipated: the fabrics which are needed to make a certain garment may not be available. In the course of the two branches' attempts to coordinate, a long series of letters usually flies back and forth. The amazing thing about this situation is that, for example, in the textile and clothing industries, glavki from one and the same ministry are responsible. The poor director of the Odezhda factory in Zaporozhe thus makes the following demand:

The Ministry obviously must choose in advance of the artists and designers the fabrics which the clothing industry will use. It should not be forgotten

(2) Radyanska Ukraina, 22 December 1970.

that the coordination of the activities not only of the glavki but also of the cooperating ministries play the most important role today in the most important task - in the satisfaction of the purchasers' wishes. (3)

(Radio Free Europe Research)

HYPOCRISY OF SOVIET AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by David Brombart *

The Communist doctrine of economic aid to developing countries remains an integral part of the Soviet Union's overall ideology and political strategy. Under the guise of the struggle against imperialism and foreign domination, bilateral aid is, in reality, based solely on their need for trade expansion in the Third World.

Vassil Vassilev has prepared an enlightening study for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on policy in the Soviet Bloc on aid to developing countries. The president of OECD Centre of Development, André Philip, concluded his remarks in the foreword with the following statement:

"In actual fact, the aim of Russian trade policy seems to be to play the underdevelopment countries off against each other, buy certain raw materials from them cheaply, sell them capital equipment, and thus acquire a credit balance at their expense, which can then be used to buy from the West other equipment needed for the USSR's own economic development. Such a triangular trading pattern may not be devoid of interest, but it can hardly be presented in the light of disinterested, brotherly assistance to the "have not" countries. It is curious to note that the economic reasoning of the USSR administrations has more in common with private investors' calculations in the West than with the aid policy formulated by our own governments".

(3) Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 7 January 1971.

* David Brombart is assistant to the executive director of the African-American Labor Center.

Another current myth is that Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc aid is directed to "progressive" countries. This is clearly not the case, since Soviet Bloc aid extends to over 40 countries. Such aid is not based on the premise that it will establish mutually advantageous trade relations; its true purpose is to conquer foreign markets. Another significant factor is that Soviet military aid is being extended to 20 countries.

The majority of developing countries are coming to see through the Soviet pretense behind the political slogans; they are beginning to recognize them for the perfidious rhetoric they are. The Soviet Union's position vis-a-vis the UN proposal that member states devote 1% of their GNP to aid to developing countries was stated by its representative to the September 1970 meeting of the Economic and Financial Committee of the UN Economic and Social Council.

He said that the distinction should be drawn between the socialist countries, which had always defended the cause of the developing countries, and the capitalist countries which had grown rich in exploiting them.

It was the latter, and not the socialist countries which should therefore undertake the obligation to contribute 1 percent of their gross national product. At the same time, the socialist countries were prepared to increase their aid to developing countries in accordance with their traditional policy.

The Soviet delegate did not, and with good reason, elaborate on what, till now, has been the traditional policy of his country. That policy has been to contribute as little as possible, or not at all, as in the case of some of the UN voluntary programs. This has been true for the UN peace-keeping operations, for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and many others. For example, the Soviet Union ranks 14th among the 20 largest contributors of the UNDP, providing \$3,000,000 against the \$86,267,500 contributed by the United States for 1971. Eastern European Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, contributed \$5,993,178 (less than Norway), or less than 3% of total world contributions.

The following shows the 20 largest contributors to the UNDP

for 1971: United States (\$86,267,500); Sweden (\$23,000,000); Denmark (\$16,933,333); Canada (\$16,000,000); United Kingdom (\$14,400,000); Germany (Fed. Rep.) \$13,144,754; Netherlands (\$11,111,111); Norway (\$6,579,868); France (\$5,009,009); Japan (\$4,800,000); India (\$3,750,000); Switzerland (\$3,750,000); Italy (\$3,500,000); USSR (\$3,000,000); Finland (\$3,000,000); Belgium (\$2,800,000); Australia (\$2,000,000); Austria (\$1,600,000); Pakistan (\$1,067,000); Brazil (\$1,050,000).

Contributions by Eastern European Communist countries to the UNDP for 1971 are as follows: Albania, \$4,000; Bulgaria, \$80,000; Czechoslovakia, \$692,521; Hungary, \$100,000; Poland, \$552,000; Romania \$201,667; Mongolia, \$12,000; Yugoslavia, \$829,990; Byelorussian SSR, \$150,000, Ukrainian SSR, \$375,000; USSR \$3,000,000. Total \$5,993,178.

This is an illuminating example of what the Communists mean by assistance to developing countries.

In the United Nations itself, the United States is called on to meet 31.52% of the United Nations budget, while the Soviet Union meets only 14.18%. A review of various United Nations specialized agency assessment scales is also very instructive. This same proportion can be seen in Soviet Bloc contributions to the specialized agencies, with the exception of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Here, the Soviet Union has shown more candor, having elected to withhold membership from the organization. No better demonstration can be given to the developing countries that the Soviet Union is not concerned with improving agricultural methods and food production for the benefit of the world's many needy nations.

In October 1970, George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, spoke in the following terms at an African-American Labor Center luncheon in honor of the African ambassadors to the United Nations: "There is no democracy without a free labor movement, and there is no free labor movement where there is no democracy".

Labor Backs U. S. Aid

United States labor remains one of the stronger forces promoting U. S. aid to developing countries, both within and outside the United Nations. Its objective is to promote world peace, human freedom and social and economic reforms.

The facts are clear. Economic aid to developing countries from all the Communist countries, including the People's Republic of China, is 11 times smaller than aid programs from OECD countries, and only 1/5 as large as U. S. aid. Communist funds are almost always tied to certain conditions, have no grant component and consist largely of loans carrying a minimum of 4% interest with a redemption period of up to 12 years.

Even the very little aid of the Soviet Union to the developing nations is rooted in political motivation and one-sided trade policies and is thus one of the greatest dangers to the security, freedom and independence of developing nations throughout the world. Yet, developing countries cannot expect much more than demagogy from a country which, as an old French saying goes, must first clean its own house before telling others what to do.

(AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News)

ON THE EVE OF YUGOSLAV SELF-MANAGERS' CONGRESS

Summary: In May this year the Second Congress of Yugoslav Self-Managers will convene in Sarajevo. (The first congress met in June 1957). The chief purpose of the present Congress will be to pass legislation designed to increase workers' rights not only in the management of enterprises but throughout Yugoslav society. In the past 20 years the Yugoslav self-management system has produced many positive changes affecting the workers, although many deficiencies remain because of the monopolistic positions of the state and Party. The forthcoming constitutional changes are expected to remove

some of these deficiencies.

On 5-8 May 1971 the Second Self-Managers' Congress will be held in Sarajevo. More than 2,000 delegates will be present from all over Yugoslavia - 80 percent of them Party members. Almost 50% of the delegates are "immediate producers and foremen", while 65 percent are simultaneously members of self-managing agencies in individual enterprises. It was also reported that about 50 delegates will attend from abroad where they are presently employed. (1) There will be 117 reports, most of them already sent to the working collectives, with the main report to be read by Edvard Kardelj. The Second Self-Managers' Congress was originally scheduled to take place at the end of November 1970, but because of the forthcoming constitutional changes the Committee in charge of preparing the Self-Managers' Congress decided in July 1970 to postpone it until May 1971. In explaining the postponement, Edvard Kardelj said that the Self-Managers' Congress "must be a congress of decision-making rather than a congress of discussion". (2)

The First Self-Managers' Congress was held in Belgrade on 25-27 June 1957 on the seventh anniversary of the creation of the Yugoslav workers' councils. At that time not only Soviet but even Chinese delegates were present. The largest applause was given to Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, at the time Poland's TU chief who hailed Gomulka for having introduced the workers' council system which in 1957 "embraced about 70 to 80 percent of enterprises in Poland". Of Tito's speech at the First Self-Managers' Congress on 25 June 1957, Loga-Sowinski commented as follows: "We completely accept every word that Comrade Tito said in his speech before the Congress, stressing that every country should construct socialism in the way it can and under the given conditions". (3)

The workers' self-management system was introduced in

(1) Borba, Belgrade, 24 December 1970.

(2) Radio Belgrade, 10 July 1970, 1500 hours.

(3) Borba, 28 June 1957.

Yugoslavia in June 1950. On 27 June 1950 Tito proclaimed in the Yugoslav National Assembly the so-called Law of the Workers' Councils authorizing direct producers to manage factories by themselves. According to official statistical data in 1968 there were 8,446 enterprises in Yugoslavia's socialist sector, each with a workers' council. Of these 8,446 enterprises 1,819 have less than 30 workers, which means that all those employed are automatically members of the workers' councils. The remaining 6,627 enterprises employ more than 30 workers and elect members to the workers' councils from among themselves. In 1968 145,488 members were elected to the workers' councils from the above-mentioned 6,627 enterprises, while the 46,216 workers in 1,819 enterprises with less than 30 workers all automatically became members of their enterprises' workers' councils. (5)

Workers' Councils: Pro and Con

Generally speaking, there have been three views concerning the efficiency of the workers' council system. The first view is maintained by the Yugoslavs themselves. Naturally, they are completely in favor of the self-management system, even though critical remarks can be found daily in the Yugoslav press deploring the great discrepancies between hopes and fulfillments.

The second view is maintained in Western countries. On the one hand, the Yugoslav workers' self-management system is considered an excellent improvement in the enterprises' and workers' situation in a country ruled by a one-party dictatorship, especially when compared to other communist countries in Eastern Europe; on the other hand, however, when compared with the systems prevailing in the industrially-developed states of the West, the Yugoslav system is considered inefficient. The fact that almost one million Yugoslav workers have been compelled to leave their country and seek employment in the West is usually used as an argument against the Yugoslav system.

This argument is also being used in the communist states

(5) Statisticki kalendar Jugoslavije 1970 (Statistical Calendar of Yugoslavia 1970). the Federal Institute for Statistics, Belgrade 1970.

of Eastern Europe where state and Party leaders consider Yugoslavia's self-management system a "revisionist" institution - its chief goal being not only the withering away of the state but also the withering away of the Party.

The Yugoslavs, however, view their workers' councils system in a realistic manner. Twenty years after its introduction, the idealistic "glow" has disappeared, both among the workers and the Party. What the workers expected from the councils has been, of course, different from what the Party wanted them to be. The top Yugoslav ideologist, Dr. Dusan Bilandzic described the Yugoslav way of thinking as follows:

There are two basic reasons why the prevailing workers' self-management system must not be idealized. The first reason is of a general nature: It is impossible to construct in human society any system which would be without conflicts; the second reason shows that the self-management system is only a process of development, because of which it has been burdened with the phenomena characteristic of the old society. (6)

Bilandzic's statement should not be understood as a kind of resignation, as an admission that the self-management system cannot be achieved at all. It is rather an admission that the system had to be adapted (a) to the workers' desires and (b) to the prevailing economic situation. Tito's basic idea concerning the workers' councils system was best expressed 14 years ago on 1 May 1957, in an interview when he said that the workers' self-management system was aimed at "taking care of man". Said Tito: "Socialist society has to be built for man, for the welfare of man, and not for something abstract. If man is lost sight of, then the essence of socialism is lost sight of too. First of all socialism must mean better human relations. Humanism Humanism in the true sense of this word is essential in socialism. This should never be forgotten!". (7)

(6) Politika, Belgrade, 17 April 1970.

(7) Borba, 1 May 1957.

It is on this basis that the successes and failures of the Yugoslav self-management system should be observed. For the self-management system surely could not make a poor country rich, nor could it make every worker receive as much money as he would like to have. What the Yugoslav creators of the self-management system believe they have achieved is that the sovereignty of labor and workers' organizations stems from the inalienable rights of the working man and not from property rights or the will of the state. The Yugoslavs identify the former (property rights) with the private capitalistic system in the West; the latter (the monopoly of the state) is identified with the state capitalistic system in Eastern Europe.

The greatest difficulties confronting the Yugoslav system can be found in the fact that self-management has been developed in a society imbued with both systems mentioned above. Thus, it has become almost a daily phenomenon for the Yugoslavs to defend self-management as not being guilty of various failures in the country's political and economic structure. A recent Collection of Studies 1960-1970, published by the Zagreb Institute for Social Management, aggravates the situation created by the gap between Yugoslav theories and practice.

The authors of the book complain that self-management has been looked upon as a form of organization which has brought about about some minor changes - for instance "participation" - rather than as a full-fledged socio-economic system. Many people have interpreted self-management in various ways, while the state apparatus on all levels "stubbornly resists the real implementation of the self-management system". (8) The authors of the study concluded that the self-management system cannot be realized either in the Western type of parliamentary system or in the system prevailing in Eastern Europe. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the authors of the study are not satisfied. They claim, for instance, that "political power in the name of the working class has been maintained by 'substitutes' outside the working class" and that the self-management system has lately been lagging behind "because the structures of power-

(8) Borba, 3 February 1971.

holding outside self-managing structures have become strengthened". The authors also criticize Yugoslav national assemblies on all levels as not being "assemblies of labor" but rather "parliaments of the bourgeois type". (9)

Greater Rights for Workers

Even though all the above-mentioned problems are of great importance, for the workers the self-management system has less been the problem of rational production than the problem of how to improve their living conditions. Of course, without rational production one cannot expect greater profits and higher wages. The workers, however, have not always been ready to accept reasons given by the state and the Party in explaining why it has not been possible overnight to achieve living standards similar to those in the West. As do the authors of the study, the workers also view excessive power of the state and Party apparatus as one of the major obstacles to improving their condition.

Yet compared with the workers' situation of 20 or even 15 years ago, their present position is considerably better. Dr. Bilandzic admitted in another article (10) that in the first few years of the workers' self-management system, "the workers' councils had almost no rights whatsoever", but in time a complete change was evident. Yugoslavs are no longer willing to be merely an instrument and it has been precisely the self-management system which has enabled the workers to express themselves freely. True, these wishes have not always been realistic, but neither have the theories developed by the people in power. It has been necessary to find a reasonable compromise and approach self-management more rationally.

It is exactly the results of this compromise which enabled a leading Croat economic expert, Mme. Neda Krmpotic to state recently in connection with the December 1970 Polish riots that it was better to allow people to go abroad and work than to shoot them. (11) It is however, not the best solution to let people emigrate nor is it an acceptable solution to kill them for protesting against inaptitudes of Party and state leaders.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Radnicka klasa u socijalizmu (The Working Class in Socialism), a collection of articles by nine authors, "Nase teme", Zagreb, 1969, pp. 143-164.

(11) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 30 December 1970.

The Yugoslav leaders believe that the self-management system has been the way out from the impasse of the two above-mentioned extremes.

Generally speaking the self-management system has two functions. First, it has been envisaged as a socio-political instrument designed to enable direct producers to plan their destiny without pressure either from the Party or state apparatus. Second, the self-management system has been viewed as an organizational system aimed at boosting the efficiency of productivity in enterprises, thus helping economic development in general. So far, Tito and his colleagues have not been capable of successfully integrating these two aspects of the self-management system.

It will be one of the tasks of the Second Self-Managers' Congress in Sarajevo to let the workers provide the solutions to this problem. With constitutional changes under way, designed to give greater independence to the constituent republics and autonomous provinces and with the plan to turn national assemblies on all levels into a forum of "workers' parliaments", the self-management system has a chance to increase workers' rights and enable them successfully to resist both the Party and state monopoly.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

SOVIET-JAPANESE TRADE DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet-Japanese co-operation in trade has taken important steps forward with the recent signing of two agreements. Joint exploitation of resources in the Soviet Far East, which began in 1968 with a timber agreement, now includes an accord on the construction of a port at Urangel near Nakhodka: this was signed on December 18, 1970, and followed a day later by contracts for the construction work. The project had been under discussion since the first meeting in 1966 of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee. A civil aviation agreement, signed on January 21, provides for weekly cargo flights, and eventually passenger flights, between Niigata, on the island of Honshu, and Khabarovsk.

Tass, on January 5 reported that an agreement will be

concluded shortly between Japanese railways, Soviet organizations and a European container company to provide for a system of despatching container traffic from Japan to Europe via the Soviet Union. This will use the ports of Niigata and Nakhodka and then rail links across to the Western borders of the Soviet Union. At present freight is carried by sea. The use of rail containers, although taking approximately the same time, will reduce the cost by 20 percent.

Further agreement is expected soon on fishing rights in the sensitive area of the Kurile Islands. Talks opened in Moscow on January 11 between representatives of the Japanese and Soviet Fisheries Ministries to settle the question of safe fishing areas for small and medium-sized vessels between three and 12 miles from the Kurile Islands. Disputes have frequently arisen over this problem and many Japanese fishermen have been arrested in the area.

Although joint trading ventures continue to develop, there is still no official peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. Soviet attacks on the ruling Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and on various aspects of its foreign policy have been numerous and strongly worded over the last few months. The Russians frequently attack Japanese attitudes on defence and accuse them of increasing militarism.

In her attempts to reach agreement on the territorial problem of the Kurile Islands, Japan is consistently faced with Soviet intransigence. Even Hakomai and Shikotan, the most southerly of the disputed islands, which have been under Soviet administration since the end of the Second World War and whose return Japan has been promised, have not been the subject of any specific agreement. Only when there is some flexibility towards this problem will an overall improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations be feasible.

YUGOSLAV COMMENTS ON LIBERMAN'S SELF-CRITICISM

Summary: Professor Liberman's latest book on Economic Methods in Raising the Effect of Social Production, published recently in Moscow has produced lively interest among political commentators in Yugoslavia. The first

assessment of the book was made by Radio Zagreb's Moscow correspondent Boris Hrzic (1) who condemned sharply Liberman's criticism of his own economic theories. A few days later, the Belgrade daily Borba and the weekly NIN (2) also reviewed Liberman's book, expressing the opinion that the timing of the publication - on the eve of the 24th Party Congress - may indicate a reversal of Soviet economic policy. The following text is the full translation of the article by the Borba Moscow correspondent Aleksandar Novacic, published on 3 February 1971 under the title "Liberman's Self-Criticism".

"The author has made a series of mistakes. He pointed frankly, but with bias, at the role profit plays in stimulating production. For this reason, some foreign commentators attributed to the author the idea of restoring a 'capitalistic market enterprise'. Bourgeois commentators maintained and are still maintaining that profit is the only criterion (by which one can) measure the work of an enterprise. This is, however, pure nonsense".

With these words, Professor Yevsei Liberman began his latest book, Economic methods in Raising the Effect of Social Production. The book was published a few days ago, with a circulation of 9,000 copies.

The name of Professor Liberman is usually connected with Soviet economic reform. The famous Kharkov professor disturbed Soviet economic thought in 1962 by predicting economic reform. Three years later, the principles of economic reform were adopted by the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Union.

Since that time, Liberman has seldom appeared in public. He was, however, criticized and defended, his ideas were discussed, and partially incorporated into everyday life. Because of his critical position in regard to Soviet economic reality, Liberman was also given the epithet of an "oppositionist" which, in regard to the dominating economic and political thought, was fully justified.

(1) Radio Zagreb, 2 February 1971, 1930 hours.

(2) Borba, Belgrade, 3 February 1971, and NIN (Nedeljne informativne novine), Belgrade, 14 February 1971.

Eight years later

Now, eight years later, this epithet disturbs him, and he is trying to renounce it publicly. Why? Is there a question of modification in his mind - the renunciation of those ideas he defended before? Or was it the vacillating development of Soviet economic reform which has shaken his conviction that the economic laws of the market should also be valid for socialism. Liberman himself, did not give any answer to these questions.

Analyzing economic reform from 1966 up to the present, Liberman has made a serious effort to point out both sides - positive and negative. First of all, he said, profitability of production increased, economic stimulants for workers and for enterprises have been introduced: administrative interference with the economy has decreased and the system of central planning has improved.

However, in all these sectors Liberman has also discovered serious weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses are explained by the fact that reform is a new and very complex process. The other (weaknesses) are explained by the fact that there are many people thinking and acting in the old way.

In support of his thesis, Liberman writes that some responsible ministries are still planning with a high number of indicators, which practically means that they are interfering in everything, in this way violating decisions adopted during the reform. Moreover, they (the ministries) are constantly exerting pressure upon enterprises to force them to adopt high plan objectives.

In this latest fact Liberman sees the main weakness of the system: enterprises are intentionally planning artificially low targets in order to secure the premium given for plan fulfillment and surpassing the targets. For, in case of a failure to realize the plan objective even by one percent, an enterprise is deprived of its premium regardless of the real increase of production.

Further, profit still does not play the role it should in production - the greatest part of the profit (about 80 percent of it) - is taken away for the (state) budget. The remainder left for the enterprise's funds is insufficient to buy or build anything new. Another problem is that wages often surpass the productivity rate.

As a matter of fact, all depends upon profit, the law of value in socialism, plan-market relation and some other questions which were already answered in various ways by different countries. "The maximum profit realized by some enterprises or entire branches does not always conform to the optimal criterions of the national economy and social needs. It could be said that, within the framework of ten years' development, from the social point of view, every investment is profitable".

Liberman maintained before that all "which is useful for an enterprise should be useful for the State". The Kharkov professor now condemns "market socialism", which means that he has evaluated in an opposite direction.

Since central planning is a characteristic of socialist society, according to Liberman, market socialism is incompatible with it.

What is the difference between "market socialism" and "capitalistic private enterprise?" asks Professor Liberman. It could be said, continues Liberman, that according to some models of market socialism, enterprises do not belong to private owners but to society in the form of working collectives. But, regardless of all these (forms), the essential here is cooperative socialism and a similarity to anarcho-syndicalist ideas which were criticized by Lenin.

For, market orientation is the socialism of those which do not believe in the creative power of the working people. This is a reactionary phenomenon, concluded the Kharkov professor.

The latest book of economist Liberman appeared during the final preparations for the 24th Party Congress. His previous writings always preceded important political events. It seems that Professor Liberman always appears at the appropriate moment.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

HOUSING HARDSHIPS IN HUNGARY

Four generations in a one-room flat, six out of seven young couples without a home - these and other facts about housing conditions in Hungary are revealed in a survey carried out in November, 1970, in preparation for a new rent act which comes into force this year.

The trade union newspaper Népszava, (January 8) reported that in Hungary in 1962 three generations shared a flat in 13.2 per cent of families; although the final figures of the 1970 census were not yet available it was thought this percentage would be increased.

A mother who shared one room and kitchen with seven other people of four generations said to a Népszava reporter:

"Can one hope for a change in the method of housing allocations after the party congress? If not, we women should buy ourselves 'season tickets' for attendance at hospitals for nervous and women's diseases".

The same day, Magyar Nemzet, the newspaper of the People's Patriotic Front said Budapest was 110,000 housing units short. An emergency resolution had been passed to build 10,000 more units than envisaged under the fourth five-year plan period just begun.

The party newspaper Népszabadság (January 1) described the plight of six young couples forced to stay with their parents because they did not have homes of their own. The couples, two of whom had children, told of the friction and bitterness caused by sharing small flats with their parents. Although they worked hard to make extra money, their savings of between 13,000-45,000 forints (about £182 to £630 at the tourist exchange rate) were not enough for a deposit on a flat. In district 13 there were 900 applicants for KISZ flats (built with the help of the Communist Youth Federation KISZ), but until 1975 only 75 flats could be allocated. According to young factory workers, it was pointless to work overtime since the prices of KISZ flats had risen to the point where workers could not afford them. Népszabadság's reporter found these complaints corroborated by the fact that only 14 percent of tenants of new flats were young, while the percentage of working class tenants was even smaller.

Why young couples cannot move into modern flats allocated to them was disclosed in the KISZ weekly Magyar Ifjúság (November 27, 1970) which examined the case of a factory worker who had left his job because he had been offered a better one.

His resignation caused a stir because he had been a KISZ official, in many respects in a privileged position and had recently been offered a KISZ flat.

His wife said that at first they had lived in a damp room in Csepel, where she contracted TB and spent some time in hospital. When she recovered, the couple applied for a KISZ flat and last August one was allocated to them. Their joy was shortlived. The flat, consisting of one room, alcove, kitchen and bathroom, was too small to accommodate their furniture and the cost was more than they could afford. Although they had saved 10,000 forints (approximately £140), the deposit was five times as much. Moreover, they would have had to pay interest on a loan of 40,000 forints (about £560) plus a mortgage repayment of 560 forints a month - about £7.14, equal to a little over 25 per cent of the husband's monthly wages of 2,200 forints. His wife told how they had tried to earn extra money: in the evening after work they folded, tied and labelled scarves but could not make more than 900 forints (under £14) on 10,000 scarves.

The housing situation is also causing serious problems to the State. According to the economic weekly Figyelő (Observer), on December 2, 1970, during the third five year plan (1966-70), income from rents was less than 3,000 million forints (£42 million) while house maintenance exceeded 7,000 million forints (about £98 million)". The difference had to be made up by the state budget. Despite this subsidy, however, maintenance work was lagging:

"In 1961 the value of unrealised renovation operations was set at 7,500 million forints (about £104 million) and this sum had increased to 11,500 million forints (about £160 million) in 1970. As a result the condition of blocks of flats has deteriorated faster than natural wear and tear".

Rents will go up as from July 1, 1971, but since low rents have been an important element in Hungary of the standard of living, increases will be offset by State subsidy. According to Figyelő, however, rent increases will not be enough to cover the expenses of housing maintenance:

"The rent will include - also in future - a considerable social allowance and will not become in the literal sense of the word, an economic category. It will not contain amortization and profit, and even more important, will cover only part of the maintenance charges".

It appears that the housing situation will continue to be one of the most intractable problems for the Hungarian people and government.

CULTURE

ATHEISTIC PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION

The crusade against religion

"I lined the pupils up and ordered all those who considered themselves Baptists to come forward two paces. About 30 came forward. I asked them if they intended to go on praying, they all replied that they would. Then I ordered the teachers to give them all low marks for conduct".

This is how the headmaster of a Soviet village school described his favourite method of combating religion among the children. His method - not his motive - is criticized in an atheist manual for teachers and parents, recently published in Leningrad in an edition of 50,000 copies.

The manual, entitled "Children and religion", hints that the law should be invoked against parents who teach their children religion or allow them to learn it. It demands that all school-children be so indoctrinated with "scientific atheism" that they will stop their grandmothers from praying.

It best recommends a practice pioneered by Mr. Khrushchev - making atheist propaganda out of that fact that "no Soviet cosmonaut has found any god or angels in the sky".

The book is the work of Mr. I. I. Ogryzko, head of the Faculty of Scientific Atheism, Ethics and Aesthetics at the Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute. It is addressed to teachers, young pioneer leaders, students, teacher trainees, parents, kindergarten attendants, and officials of the Komsomol (the Communist Party youth organization) and of clubs".

Mr. Ogryzko states that in Leningrad 97 per cent of school-leavers are "completely free of religious views". But he admits that this is not typical of the country as a whole. Figures given elsewhere in the book say only about 40 per cent of school-leavers are "convinced atheists". One in four has a tolerant attitude towards religion, without actually being a believer, it is stated.

The book is aimed equally at the Orthodox Church and the various "sects" which survive in Russia - Baptists in particular. It documents the evil said to be done to the health, morals and education of children by religion. The teacher is told to act "like a doctor healing a sick person" when dealing with religious

children.

Ample evidence is cited to show that such tact is not always the norm. A schoolgirl had written in a letter: "They call me a sectarian. Because of this they have begun to hate me in the class. I have lost all inclination to study. Even some of the teachers talk to me roughly and threateningly. I am frightened to show myself to the people who hate me. So I do not like going to school. Where can I go except to the sect, where I hear words of comfort, affection and attention.

Most schoolchildren are already ignorant of religion, it is stated. A questionnaire on the meanings of words produced the following results: altar - someone who lives in the Altai region; Whitsun - a holiday when people sing and drink vodka; atheists - big birds that come in the spring.

Although the Soviet constitution "guarantees" freedom of religious belief, in practice a teenager may have to conceal his or her faith to avoid attention which may amount to persecution, and may even be deliberately failed in his or her examinations on grounds of religion.

For instance Oleg Rodionov, a Moscow schoolboy, gave excellent answers on materialist philosophy at his school-leaving examination. The examiner asked for his own opinion, and he replied: "I have said what was demanded of me. . . . I know the text book. I personally believe that invisible forces such as God, the soul, and so on, exist". The headmaster refused to give him a high mark or even a diploma.

Religion sometimes attracts people because of the beauty of its ceremonies. So the Soviet Union has artificially developed secular ceremonies as substitutes. Instead of christening a child, the parents can plant a tree, "wedding palaces" solemnize marriages without religious services. Instead of being confirmed, teenagers dress up in their best clothes and go to a ceremony to receive their "Soviet passport" (not a passport at all but a police identity document held compulsorily by all adults living in cities for control purposes, and not valid for foreign travel). Sometimes a policeman attends this ceremony to lecture them on observance of the law.

Soviet policy towards religion aims at freezing it in its most primitive form, so that it can be better attacked. Priests are considered somehow subversive if they try to modernize their faith and reconcile it with science. "Such purified religion,

calling Christ the first socialist, and welcoming the exploit of Gagarin (the first Soviet cosmonaut), is more dangerous than medieval Christianity, because it cunningly confuses the believer and more skilfully projects God into the modern age, and therefore may survive longer", the manual says.

Schools are advised to organize their own museums of atheism, to which the children should bring their parents. Each member of a young pioneer group has to write an essay on some aspect of harm caused by religion. A verse is composed: "When grannie goes to church to pray, grandchild ought to stay away".

Mr. Ogryzko says: "It is not just a question of what the family can do, but of a direct duty". He cites Soviet legislation: "Parents must educate their children in the spirit of the moral code of a builder of communism". Astonishingly enough, some Soviet schoolchildren manage to keep their faith or maintain a tolerant attitude towards religion in spite of all the propaganda, sanctions and penalties against those who profess it.

Mr. Ogryzko quotes the words of a girl approaching school-leaving age: "I am not a believer. But if in our country believers are not persecuted, since we are not concerned with a person's beliefs, then why do we consider it permissible to conduct anti-religious propaganda?" This is indeed the essence of the matter, in a society where propaganda is not simply persuasion, but the voice of authority and even of the law.

MODIFIED APPROACH TO THE HIPPY MOVEMENT

Although the hippy movement has been continuously condemned and disdained by the Hungarian mass media, its problems appear constantly to hold the attention of the public, for the movement has taken considerable root among Hungarian juveniles. In the past, the hippies were mostly denounced as poligans and hippy-ism was treated purely as a criminological problem. Now, recent discussions and articles on hippy-ism indicate that the approach to the movement has been remarkably modified toward more tolerance and understanding.

On 9 November 1970, Radio Budapest (Kossuth), in its "Studio 20" program, arranged a question period when its young listeners could query the moderator (Pal Ipper, editor) and the prominent guests (Bela Kopeczi, deputy secretary-general of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Pal Szucs, head of the

Communist Youth League department for international relations) by telephone on points pertaining to the subject "Youth in the Wide World".

One of the callers raised the question, what is the difference between hippies and hooligans.

The answer to the question began with self-criticism. We are all guilty, the moderator said, if such a question can be brought up at all and added that hippies have been confused with hooligans, that we are dealing here with two separate worlds, that of the hippies and that of the hooligans. The moderator then expressed his preference for the hippies and explained that real hippies are to be found even today in the US. Tens of thousands of these hippies are living in New York, Washington and Chicago. They have attacked the Pentagon and have faced the bayonets of the military police, flowers in hand. The real hippies are disappointed with their whole environment. Although their disappointment has been evoked by the Vietnam war, it actually reflects the whole inner contradictions of American society. The hippies do not have a systematic philosophy. Therefore, it is quite hopeless to think that they might revolutionize or improve society.

The identification of hooligans with hippies is due to the uncritical acceptance of American propaganda terminology, which opposes progressive movements in general and which, for instance, brands the Manson family as hippies, although they have nothing to do with hippy-ism.

As the years have passed, the originally beautiful, honest and pure ideas of hippy-ism degenerated, because hippy-ism in reality is not a movement. It became atomized into tens of thousands of groups, which have in common only their alienation and lack of political aim. Hippie-ism has slipped down the paths of LSD and marijuana and it has become compromised.

These points by the moderator were supplemented by Bela Kopecki, who stressed the difference between the beatnik movement and hippy-ism. At its start, the beatnik movement was motivated by greater belligerency and by political, philosophical and ideological elements. Now the hippies have become the representatives of a special brand of resignation and passive resistance. This situation is partly due to their own errors, and partly to the deliberate exploitation of the business world.

On 9 January 1971, Radio Budapest (Petofi) broadcast a round-table discussion on hippy-ism entitled "Hair, Long Hair" between a teacher (Dr. Mihaly Csulak), a psychologist (Dr. Zsuzsa Muranyi Kovacs), and a well-known writer (Mihaly Sukosd). During the discussion, the participants pointed out that it is unjust to regard the phenomenon of hippy-ism as criminal. At the present, hippy-ism in Hungary is basically not a legal or a criminal problem. In Hungary, the juvenile criminals, like the convicted members of the Big Tree gang are erroneously called hippies. It is a mistake to consider the hippy movement as a negative and injurious phenomenon because, then, we are forced to neglect such groups as those protesting against the Vietnam war or those exceptionally interesting groups which have established themselves within the international New Left. Although Western hippy-ism is judged in collective terms such out-re phenomena as the Manson family have nothing to do with the original aspects of the hippy movement.

While juveniles have always had their own trends of fashion, the Western juveniles of today are especially characterized by their yearning for sexual equality. This is something that adult societies have not been able to achieve so far, either in the West or in the East.

Apart from their basic biological differences, the functions of the males and females in a hippy commune are the same. Child raising, for example, becomes a communal task. This is a quite new phenomenon that demonstrates how far the values of adult society are denied by the particular way of life of the hippies. A compilation of selected hippy documents will be published in Hungary next year and it will be interesting to read in Hungarian how the work of both sexes is becoming identical.

Hungarian hippy-ism differs in a basic way from its Western counterpart. While West European and American hippy-ism came into being in a "superdeveloped" society in which specific problems turned the youthful masses against their parents and society, such problems plainly do not exist in Hungary, because Hungary has not yet reached that stage of development with its particular problems. Hungary has other troubles, and therefore, the value orientation and the views of Hungarian youth are quite different. Although some outward signs of hippy-ism, such as long hair, blue jeans, as well as some gestures of indifference,

revolution, or opposition are identical in the whole world, the Hungarian hippies will not evade social integration. They are not fed up with our politics or our society but with our "sanctimonious solutions" and with our "overorganization". If these juveniles are not given ample counterarguments to their views, they might easily drift into extremist groups. We have just commenced practical work to solve these problems. Unfortunately, this work does not encompass the most important strata of youth. Studies have been made about juvenile intellectuals, but not about young workers or about the vast group of young people who left the villages for the towns. Furthermore, the most insecure stratum of youth is represented by those juveniles who could not matriculate into higher educational institutes after finishing their secondary school education. These juveniles, who comprise 60 to 80 per cent of all young people with high school diplomas, are generally undecided about their future for a period of two or three years, after which they usually start to master a profession or undertake further study in correspondence or evening courses. In their unsettled situation, these juveniles are very exposed to influences which turn them against the institutions and conventions of society.

At the end of the round-table discussion, it was stressed that the problem of Hungarian hippy-ism is an extra-ordinarily complicated one which has to be thoroughly studied if a solution is to be found.

On 10 January 1971, Katolikus Szó, the weekly of the Catholic Committee of the National Peace Council, published an article by its editor-in-chief, Dr. Richard Horvarth, entitled "Our Country and Our Youth". One paragraph of the article explained that there are also hippies to be found among Hungarian youth, even a lot of decent ones. However, these hippies have one basic fault - selfishness. They care only about themselves and neglect the fate of others. Instead of living in reality, they create a world of dreams and escape into it. They reject the discipline of the mind and will, set falsity against falsity and are enslaved by their passions. They represent disintegrating lives; theirs is an unhappy fate.

On 6 February 1971, Magyar Hírlap also carried an article on hippy-ism, entitled "Hippies", by Gabor Fodor.

In this article, the author referred to the movie, Easy Rider (which will probably be presented in Hungary soon) and

used it to raise a number of pressing questions about American hippy-ism. These questions have to be raised, the author said, in spite of the fact that Hungary is not the proper ground for the subculture of the hippy world. This has been proved by some faint attempts at imitation, which culminated in the spring of 1968. Most of the domestic hippy efforts have turned out to be basically unviable.

The author went on to explain that an objective assessment of hippy-ism is made difficult by two factors: one is the extremity of hippy behaviour, which arouses aversion in many people, while the other is the sympathy aroused by the stand taken by the hippies during the Algerian war of independence, the Cuban revolution, and the Vietnam war. As a result of these different points of view, some people have blamed the hippies in connection with the Manson trial, while others protested vehemently against any coupling of the romanticism of nonviolent hippy-ism with the defendants of the Manson trial. In reality, hippy-ism has never proved itself as a homogeneous movement, because "pathlessness" can never be unified.

The author then quoted Dr. Ross Greek and Lewis Yablonsky, American sociologists, on the tragic faults of hippy-ism and described the various trends among American hippies. According to the English historian Arnold Toynbee, American hippy-ism is the fire light of a way of life. Therefore, the basic question is not what is good or what is wrong with American hippy-ism, but what is acceptable and not acceptable in American society itself. Hippie-ism can be eliminated only by profound changes in the whole way of life and morals, and in the practice of freedom and justice, concluded the author at the end of his article.

Summarizing all the points made above, it seems evident that the question of hippy-ism is now being handled in Hungary with greater flexibility than ever before.

This evaluation can be substantiated by reports on juvenile delinquents who are labeled hooligans or gang members, but not hippies. For instance, the report of one such trial appeared in the 26 January 1971 issue of Magyar Nemzet on a "happening" in Szentendre. The 10 defendants had performed a one hour show with strange, ideological and cultural extravagances before 100 to 200 onlookers without being branded hippies by the reporter.