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## C O N T E N T S

Page

### P O L I T I C S

- Ideological Preparations for the 24th Congress 1
- Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia and Africa 7
- China emerges from Upheaval 14
- Relations between the biggest powers 17
- Some Political Aspects of the 14th SED-CC Plenum 21
- Strengthening Security and Developing Peaceful  
Co-Operation in Europe 29

### E C O N O M I C S

- The Soviet Union and the Six 33
- "Socialist Property" is fair game for all 39
- Co-Ordinated Research by Comecon Countries 45
- The Science of Managing Socialist Society 46
- Too much good life in the GDR 51
- "Gastarbeiter" exchange 52
- Practical Problems of Integration within Comecon 54
- Nationalisation Moves Gain Momentum 57

### C U L T U R E

- The Crisis of Soviet Social Sciences 60
- Generation Gap Among Bulgarian Scientists 63
- Party Concern Over Scientists 65
- The KGB and Soviet Dissent 70
- Aleksandrov's Attack on Soviet Writers 74
- Important Source of Information 79
- Teachers Conflict With Long-Haired Pupils 85
- Bolshoi Tour of USA Cancelled 87
- Measures To Improve The State of Soccer 87

## POLITICS

### IDEOLOGICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE 24TH CONGRESS

Summary: An increasing volume of propaganda and a growing number of speeches from the USSR are concerned with laying down ideological guidelines for the preparations for the 24th Party Congress. The same "centralist" approach as at the 23rd Congress is being followed, with condemnation of both "right" and "left" deviations (mainly meaning Yugoslavia and China). On the domestic front it is the "rightists" who appear to be the main danger for their activities among scientists (at the Lebedev Physics Institute), artists (e.g., the Taganka Theater in Moscow) and literary circles (both Sinyavsky and Daniel have been attacked by name, while Solzhenitsyn is more cautiously criticized). The main difference between today and the months before the 23rd Congress seems to be that then the writers were the chief worry for the Party at home whereas now it is the scientists -- men enjoying greater respect among the public, and men whose work is more essential to the Party.

Now that the 24th Congress of the CPSU is little more than three months away, the Soviet media are beginning to carry an increasing volume of material designed to lay down the main ideological principles for the first half of the seventies.

The build-up began in August with a massive article in Pravda (1) adopting the centralist stance favored by Brezhnev at the time of the 23rd Congress in 1966. Pravda then warned against "leftists who strive to replace the party by a political organization of petty bourgeois adventurism and nationalism intended to serve as the tool of a military and bureaucratic regime" -- a fairly transparent reference to Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.

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(1) 11 August 1970, by V. Afanasyev, pp. 2-3.

On the other hand it also condemned "rightists" who "advocate removing the party from power and from the leadership of society; like open anti-communists they do this under the flag of 'liberalization' and defense of democracy against an illusory party dictatorship".

The target of this thrust seems to have been the "liberals" in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and in the USSR itself, for Pravda went on to say that:

Demands for the creation of several parties, even including opposition parties, can be heard in anti-communist and revisionist circles. A plurality of parties -- 'political pluralism' -- is presented here almost as the only guarantee of democracy.

In September Partiinaya Zhizn (2) pointed to the dangers of expanding party membership too fast, clearly preferring an easily controllable "cadre" party to a large amorphous mass of unruly new recruits. It criticized the Crimean Oblast Party Committee for allowing the influx of new members to go up by 50%, and noted that other local organizations in European Russia, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Dagestan had accepted between 30 and 40% more new members in the first half of 1970 than in the same period of 1969.

In October announcements began to be made of the date of the Republican Congresses which always precede the Congress of the CPSU. For example the 24th Congress of the Georgian Party is to meet on 27 January, (3) the 24th Congress of the Ukrainian Party on 24 February, (4) etc.

Late in October the internal opposition which the regime is encountering among intellectuals and scientists was spotlighted by a strong attack in Partiinaya Zhizn (5) on the slackness of the

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(2) No. 17, 1970.

(3) Radio Moscow, 27 October 1970.

(4) Radyanska Ukraina, 24 October 1970.

(5) No. 21, 1970.

party organization at the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow.

Since Academicians Andrei D. Sakharov and Igor Y. Tamm are both associates of the Institute and have both been extremely active in the campaign for civil rights for some years past, it seems almost certain that the Party journal was aiming at them and perhaps at the head of the Institute, Dmitry V. Skobeltsyn. In this case the local party leaders were told to "instill among scientists an irreconcilable attitude to the ideological conceptions of anti-communism and revisionism" but their task is greatly complicated by the fact that neither Skobeltsyn nor Sakharov nor Tamm are members of the Party.

The Party's problem in trying to discipline its leading physicists is intractable enough, but its perennial difficulties with the writers, artists and musicians have this year been greatly aggravated by the award of the Nobel Prize to Solzhenitsyn. The Stockholm decision has been used by Party officials to blame the West for creating a "mood of opposition" in the USSR, and therefore to associate the dissident scientists, writers and artists with Western inspiration and support.

In November overt attacks on the writers began, when a Secretary of the Byelorussian Party, S.A. Pilotovich, accused some Byelorussian artists and scientists of being "apolitical" and of "ideological wavering". (6) This took place at an ideological plenum of the Byelorussian Central Committee, suggesting strongly that Pyotr Masherov, the Party's leader, wishes to stake out for himself a position as a "hardliner" before the Congress convenes next year.

Pilotovich paid an unintentional tribute to Western radio stations when he said that "the intelligentsia is one of the objects of ideological diversion by bourgeois propaganda" and then added:

It is not accidental that anti-communist centers in the West vigorously defend those who try to defame the idea of socialism, our Soviet reality, and publish in millions of copies the smuggled works of Sinyavsky and Daniel and other renegades. The awarding of the Nobel Prize to Solzhenitsyn also had clearly provocative goals.

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(6) Sovietskaya Byerlorussiya, 18 November 1970.

After this broadside at the tree writers, one of whom (Sinyavsky) is still in prison almost five years after his trial Pilotovich went on to criticize both members of the Republic's Institute of Literature and its Institute for History for "mistaken views". One begins to wonder whom the Beylorussian Party can trust -- certainly not a proportion of its scientists, artists, writers, historians, literary critics and not even some of its Komsomol members and students, to judge by Pravda's report on the plenum. (7)

Shortly before the speech by Pilotovich, three Soviet scientists, all of whom have been active in the civil rights movement, threw a major spanner into the Party's works by announcing the formation of a Human Rights Committee. (8) to the Western press in Moscow. The founders are A. D. Sakharov, V. N. Chalidze and A. N. Tverdokhlebov. The clear implication of this move is that neither the Party nor the Constitution, as applied by the Government, are able to ensure human rights for Soviet citizens, and that therefore a non-Party organization had to be floated to do the job.

Such a suggestion is certain to be regarded by the Kremlin as a major challenge, and compounding the offense, the three scientists made an unprecedented condition of participation -- that only those who "are not members of a political party" may join the new Committee, thereby excluding all the 14 million members of the CPSU.

The authorities seem likely to claim eventually that the Committee's membership rule contravenes Article 126 of the Stalin Constitution, which lays down that the CP is "the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state". But as yet no such move has been made by officialdom, and what seems to be the first overt response to the Human Rights Committee came only a week later. Pravda (9) then published a lead editorial which included a sharp reminder that the work of the Party Committee of the Lebedev Physics

(7) 19 November 1970.

(8) New York Times, 16 November 1970.

(9) 23 November 1970.

Institute in propagating Marxism-Leninism and in instilling an irreconcilable attitude among scientists towards anti-communism and revisionism has been "unsystematic".

This editorial is basically a summary of the line taken by Afanasiev in August. It lays down that there can be no compromise and no neutrality in ideological questions, citing as its inspiration the CC Plenum of April 1968 which prepared the ground for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is symptomatic of the relative disinterest shown until now by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in ideological matters that there has been no ideological plenum for two-and-a-half years past.

Pravda asserts flatly that "there is no social base for the dissemination of bourgeois views in the USSR". Yet the truth is that at no time since the twenties has there been anything like such a widespread opposition to the Party's policies, an opposition which has been voluminously documented every two months for years past by the Chronicle of Current Events. Such a broad and far-reaching movement must have some kind of social basis in practice, and Pravda seems to be right in assuming that the greatest challenge to the Party comes from scientists and intellectuals.

However, the editorial does not forget the danger from outside the country, and even accuses the "right and left revisionists who distort the essence of revolutionary theory" of being accomplices of imperialist propaganda. In this formulation it is noteworthy that the "rightists" come first, whereas in Afanasiev's article the pride of place was given to the "leftists".

Whether this change of sequence is due to the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations at the state level, which has now led to the exchange of ambassadors en poste, or whether it is simply the result of a realization in the Kremlin that whereas Maoism has little support in the USSR, "socialism with a human face" has a substantial following, it is still too early to say. But the latter interpretation seems more plausible.

Moreover it is partly supported by the fact that Pravda goes out of its way to denounce "private ownership survivals", a form of ideological backsliding which was supposed to have been liquidated years ago and which has seldom been mentioned in the Soviet context in recent times.

In their preparatory work for the 24th Congress, the local party organizations are told by Pravda that they must not permit

"even a shadow of liberalism" in defining their ideological positions. This type of unyielding defensiveness also seems to be patently concerned with the danger from the "right revisionists", who are the only major group likely to be putting forward liberal heresies.

According to Pravda, the liberal threat is all too visible in the Moscow theaters and studios, which were strongly criticized at the recent Plenum of the Moscow City Committee of the Party. This is a perennial problem in Moscow, and it always emerges for "rectification" at every CPSU Congress with unflinching regularity. The New York Times (10) reports that all plays by Mr. Arthur Miller have been banned, both from the stage and from TV, apparently in reprisal for his book published in 1969 which made some severe criticisms of Soviet cultural policy. In addition, Konstantin Sergeyev has had to resign from the directorship of the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad as a result of the defection of Natalya Makarova, and the Taganka Theater in Moscow has been warned about its too unorthodox repertoire (11) (which includes Brecht, Molière and Gorky). These authors may not sound heretical to outsiders, but the stumbling block for Pravda is that "attempts have been made to distort the ideological and artistic meaning of the classics by new interpretations".

The Pravda editorial ends by expressing concern for Soviet youth. Both their morals and their ideology are under attack from bourgeois and alien influences, it seems, and much more work will be needed by the Komsomol if these dangers are to be averted. Thinking of the recent complaint in a letter to the press by a Kiev schoolteacher who could not take his teen-age son to the cinema because all the local film theaters were showing love films, one can understand the problem without having any confidence that Pravda, the Komsomol or the 24th Congress will be able to solve it. The socialist realism of the old Stalinist pattern is no longer saleable even in Kiev, and probably still less in Moscow and Leningrad. This state of affairs also explains the constant search of the Taganka for new approaches to old plays, since the management is well aware that too many new plays in a season would never be permitted.

In conclusion, the ideological preparations for the Congress are taking place along fairly predictable "centralist" lines, but a significant shift as compared with the months before the 23rd Congress has taken place. Then the main danger to the Party

(10) 24 November 1970.

(11) Pravda, 13 November 1970.

line at home seemed to come from the writers, who were duly punished when both Tvardovsky and Kochetov were demoted from their respective posts in the Central Committee. Today the main problem for the Party seems to be the scientists, and a group of determined and respected nuclear physicists may be an even more difficult "organizational" opponent than was the small band of liberal writers assembled around Novy Mir and Yunost in 1966.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

### SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN ASIA AND AFRICA

by Stefan C. Stolte

Summary: The recent partial normalization of diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China may temporarily ease tension along their common border in the Far East but can hardly lead to any general rapprochement. Moscow and Peking are competing fiercely for economic and political influence in the developing countries of Asia and Africa, and it is likely that the Sino-Soviet confrontation will focus on this theater.

Over the past few months diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China have been to some extent resumed. In mid-August, L. F. Ilichev, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Peking to head his government's delegation at the Sino-Soviet negotiations in place of V. V. Kuznetsov, who is said to have fallen ill (Izvestia, August 16, 1970). A month later came the official announcement that V. S. Tolstikov had been appointed to the vacant post of Soviet Ambassador to China (ibid., September 17, 1970) and almost simultaneously TASS reported the conclusion of an agreement in Khabarovsk between the USSR and China on trade across their common border in the Far East (ibid., September 19, 1970)

These steps will probably mean a lessening, at least temporarily, of the dangerous tension along the straggling Sino-Soviet border, but are hardly likely to unfreeze the deep-seated hostility between Moscow and Peking. A reduction of tension in the Far East may simply shift the struggle to Asia and Africa, where the two leading communist powers are trying to

expand their economic and political influence.

The Soviet Union and China are also vying for markets in various parts of the world, although so far China's total trade turnover approximates only to that of such countries as Sweden and Australia. Two-thirds of Soviet foreign trade is in the form of barter with the countries of the socialist bloc, while since 1960 China has been increasingly entering into trade relations with non-communist countries. Whereas in 1960 the Soviet Union exported goods to the value of 1,400 million dollars to non-communist countries and China only to the value of 600 million dollars, by 1967 the respective figures had risen to 3,300 million and 2,000 million dollars (Aussenhandel der europäischen Ostblockländer 1956-1968, No. 6, Brussels, 1969, p. 6; Aussenhandel der Volksrepublik China 1958-1968, Brussels, 1969, p. 6). Apart from significantly closing the gap between itself and the Soviet Union in trade with non-communist countries, over the past ten years Peking has succeeded in making up considerable leeway on Moscow in trade with Japan, the foremost economic power in Asia, and, as the following table (compiled from data contained in the above publications and the Budapest newspaper Vilaggazdaszag, March 5 and May 12, 1970) shows, recorded a higher trade turnover with Japan in 1965 and 1967 than did the Soviet Union. The figure (in million of dollars) are:

	1960	1965	1967	1968	1969
Japan's exports to the USSR	62	177	166	185	269
Japan's imports from the USSR	76	185	353	391	462
Total trade turnover between Japan and the USSR	138	362	519	576	731
Japan's exports to Communist China	3	245	288	326	390
Japan's imports from Communist China	19	225	270	224	230
Total trade turnover between Japan and Communist China	22	470	558	550	620

Japanese economists expect their country's trade with both China and the Soviet Union to continue to increase, possibly soon reaching an annual level of 1,000 million dollars in each case. Nor is there any reason to regard these forecasts as unduly

optimistic: in the first six months of this year Japanese exports to China amounted to 307 million dollars and, although imports from China are below this figure, total trade between the two countries is expected to top 700 million dollars by the end of the year (Vilaggazdaszag, July 7, 1970). The Soviet Union still has a substantial lead in trade with the developing countries, however, with 2,800 million dollars in 1969 (*ibid.*, July 17, 1970) as against Japanese estimates of some 1,200 million dollars for China (*ibid.*, March 24, 1970).

China also lags far behind the Soviet Union in economic and technical aid to the developing countries. Figures recently published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung (August 29-30, 1970), for example, reveal that of the total sum of 9,238 million dollars allocated to these countries by the communist states between 1954 and 1968, 59.8 per cent came from the Soviet Union, 12.2 per cent from Czechoslovakia and only 9.6 per cent from China. Nevertheless, China's contribution amounted to almost 900 million dollars and was used exclusively to further Peking's political aims, primarily in Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Republic of Yemen and South Yemen and in Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia, Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea.

The largest project in China's foreign-aid program is the construction of a 1,000-mile railroad in Africa linking the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam with the Republic of Zambia. 5,000 Chinese workers and technicians are engaged on this project, which will cost from 250-300 million dollars and for which Peking has extended interest-free credit to be repaid over a period of 25 years apparently hoping for a similar propaganda effect among the developing countries as that achieved by the Soviet Union with the construction of the Aswan dam in Egypt.

Chinese aid in Asia is concentrated primarily on road construction, which (as in the case of Nepal or West Pakistan) could later prove to be of great strategic importance. After the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, Peking cut off the supply of aid to Cambodia, but in August this year the Chinese Government signed an agreement with the pro-Sihanouk government in exile promising "free" military support (Peking Rundschau, September 1, 1970, p. 15). China also supplies aid, mainly war materials, to North Vietnam, but here must compete with the mounting assistance being rendered to Hanoi by the Soviet Union: from 1964 to 1969 So

Soviet economic and military aid to North Vietnam increased fourfold, and in June this year new agreements were signed on additional Soviet consignments during 1970 (Vneshnyaya torgovlya, No. 9, 1970, p. 8).

Soviet economic, political and cultural influence continues to grow in India, and in 1969 the Soviet bloc countries took one-fifth of all India's exports (Vilaggazdaszag, July 11, 1970). In recent years Iran has also become an important target: a long-term agreement signed between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1967 has boosted mutual trade almost fourfold over the past three years, and the Soviet Union has now become the leading customer for Iranian goods. Business is also flourishing between the Soviet Caucasian and Turmen border republics and Iranian firms (Vneshnyaya torgovlya, No. 2, 1970, pp. 20-21). An important feature of Moscow's economic and political offensive in this part of the world is the construction of a 700-mile pipeline for conveying natural gas from deposits in southern Iran to the Soviet Union in repayment for Soviet credits (*ibid.*, No. 9, 1970, pp. 15-16).

Until the overthrow of President Sukarno in 1965, Indonesia was also a field of economic rivalry between Moscow and Peking. After a long pause, brought about by the change of regime in Djakarta, contacts have recently again been resumed between the Soviet Union and Indonesia, and in August 1970 an agreement was signed in Moscow on the conditions for the liquidation of some 800 million dollars of credit debts incurred by Sukarno's government (Izvestia, August 27, 1970). Moscow also expressed readiness to complete a steel-smelting plant, construction of which was interrupted in 1965, and of an artificial fertilizer plant and an atomic power station, and to construct factories for the processing of bauxite and zinc (Vilaggazdaszag, September 16, 1970).

Soviet and Chinese attempts to increase their influence in the developing countries through the medium of trade are, however, frequently negated by the strong competition they face from the western industrial powers and Japan. This largely limits Sino-Soviet rivalry in the establishment of bridgeheads to the ideological and political field, where each side claims to be the sole legitimate heir of Marx and Lenin and rightful leader of the world communist movement.

The key issue in the ideological quarrel between Moscow and

Peking is the revolutionary role of Asia and the developing countries and the means by which the world revolution is to be accomplished. The Chinese communists insist that Asia, led by China, will play the central role in this revolution, basing their arguments on Mao Tse-tung's thesis of the "creation of revolutionary strongholds in the village and the encirclement of the town by the village" (the "town" being Europe and North America and the "village" the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America). For years Peking has harped on the theme that:

imperialism is still not vanquished, the anti-imperialist struggle of the Asian peoples is still not finished. Asia was and remains the storm center of the anti-imperialist struggle..... The struggle between the above two opposing forces and the path and development of Asia are decisively influencing not only the fate of the Asian people but also the fate of the whole world. (Peking Rundschau, March 8, 1966, p. 15)

The Chinese communists insist on the inevitability of wars, including nuclear war, and this is the second major bone of contention in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The Soviet leaders believe that world socialism is now strong enough to attain its ends through the class struggle under the conditions of "peaceful coexistence", a conviction recently reiterated in the theoretical journal of the communist parties of the Soviet bloc:

The development of the Afro-Asian countries involves the preservation and interaction of different economic forms for a long time to come, including forms of state capitalism, small-scale capitalism, and in some cases even developed private capitalism. The interaction of these forms, together with the retention of the political leadership by progressive circles and the strengthening of the role of the proletariat and its party can, in certain circumstances, constitute the basis for the transition to a socialist outlook. However, the preservation of capitalist forms in the economy of such countries inevitably presupposes a class

struggle by the proletariat for the aims and principles of socialism. (Problemy mira i sotsializma, No. 7, 1970, p.87)

Moscow opposes this assessment of the situation in Africa and Asia to Mao Tse-tung's theory of the inevitability of further wars. Earlier this year the official organ of the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda, stated:

The Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China "legalized" Mao Tse-tung's thesis, which boils down to the assertion that war is inevitable and even desirable. "As far as the question of world war is concerned", declared Mao, "there are only two possibilities: either war will give rise to revolution or revolution will avert war". Explaining the meaning of this formula, first Lin Piao at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China and then the Chinese press insisted, and continue to insist, on linking revolution with war. The newspaper Tse-fang jibao, for example, wrote that revolution "must unfailingly lead to war". According to these principles it is not only impossible to avoid war but it is even necessary to strive towards it. (May 18, 1970)

The Soviet leaders are prepared to actively support local liberation wars against "imperialism" as in the case of their military aid to North Vietnam, but they strongly condemn attempts to provoke a "people's war" in the Maoist sense, fearing that this would discredit their own theoretical position and remove these liberation forces from the Soviet sphere of influence. Pravda maintains that:

in Asia the Chinese leaders have tried for years and are still trying to undermine the progressive regimes by provoking interstate conflicts in order to isolate the peoples engaged in the national liberation struggle from their real allies -- the countries of the socialist commonwealth and of the international communist and workers' movement. (Ibid)

Indeed, in some countries Maoist-inspired partisans are fighting against government troops who are equipped with weapons supplied by the Soviet Union, and in their mutual abuse, both Peking and Moscow accuse each other of striving for mastery in Asia and even for world hegemony. "The actions of the Peking leaders", says Pravda, "make it impossible to doubt that they are trying to exploit the peoples' heroic struggle for freedom in their global intrigues and are guided by Great Khan visions of becoming the new emperors of a 'Greater China', to which, if not the whole world, then at least Asia would be subject" (ibid.)

In its ideological and political confrontation with China the Soviet Union has latterly suffered two quite serious reverses: in Indo-China and in the Middle East. With the opening of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, Soviet influence in North Vietnam and South East Asia began to grow at China's expense, because the talks appeared to justify Moscow's less bellicose approach and cast doubt upon Mao Tse-tung's thesis of world-wide revolutionary war. After the fall of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970, however, the initiative again began to pass to the Chinese. A pro-Sihanouk government, not recognized by Moscow, was soon formed in Peking and in April 1970, at a conference of representatives from Indo-China, a "United Front of the Peoples of Indo-China" was set up under Chinese patronage (Peking Rundschau, special edition, May 12, 1970). A statement issued by this organization proclaimed its chief purpose to be the promotion of the liberation struggle of the three component nations (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) of Indo-China (Novoye vremya, No. 18, 1970, p. 2).

Almost simultaneously, Moscow began to lose ground to Peking among the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Radical groups such as the "National Front for the Liberation of Palestine", led by George Khabash, had for a long time been fired with Maoist ideas, but now other more influential organizations began to line up behind Peking, and in March 1970 an official delegation from the "Organization for the Liberation of Palestine", in which various groups of Arab guerrillas are united, traveled to the Chinese capital for political talks. A statement by the head of the delegation, Yasir Arafat, published in Peking announced: "We, the Arab popular masses, revolutionaries and fighters, shall never forget the magnificent effort by the great Chinese people in supporting the people of our

country in their unyielding struggle and revolution" (Peking Rundschau, April 7, 1970). Political instability among the leaders of the Arab world, caused by the sudden death of President Nasser, could bring to the fore more radical personalities and groups inclined to take their lead from Peking rather than Moscow.

It is impossible at the present time to plot with certainty the future course of the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in the developing countries, but on past evidence swings of the pendulum in favor of one side or the other cannot be ruled out.

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### CHINA EMERGES FROM UPHEAVAL

China's more active foreign policy, her moves to rebuild the Communist Party and restore higher education, and official references to her Fourth Five-Year Plan and to a forthcoming session of the National People's Congress, all confirm that the cultural revolution has finally ended. Unless the Peking leadership again feels obliged to plunge the people into a period of ideological puritanism at the cost of practical advances, the 1970s could see the growth in the Chinese economy which was on the horizon in 1966. The restoration of law and order at the beginning of 1969 allowed for some recovery in both industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, all concessions to pragmatism continue to be clothed in Maoist phraseology and political objectives remain in the forefront.

While no details of the Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) have been released, its outlines reflect current slogans, of which "self-reliance" is one of the most prominent. The pattern since the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 has been one of "walking on two legs" through the construction of a centrally-controlled modern industrial base (which also serves defence needs), together with development of a strong locally-oriented economy able to solve problems without aid and guidance from Peking - a trend which may have contributed to recent mergers of some Ministries and the simplification of central administration. In addition, it is evidently hoped that local industry will increase China's ability to withstand outside attack and relieve her hard-pressed transport system.

Self-reliance also seems to be of importance to the Chinese leaders at a national level, though the xenophobic excesses of the cultural revolution have been moderated. Peking is anxious to acquire foreign expertise and to borrow ideas from abroad, but unwilling to import complete foreign plants, as in the 1950s, or to become involved in co-operative projects with foreign governments - remembering no doubt the damage caused by Moscow's withdrawal of assistance in 1960 and the freezing of its aid projects that were vital to Chinese industrialization plans. But while she continues to rely on imports of Australian and Canadian wheat, China is now able to export considerable quantities of foodstuffs, including rice. Improved farming will probably enable food production at least to keep pace with the increase in population, particularly if restrictions on private plots continue to be relaxed. Chinese experts are now apparently developing their own miracle rice, wheat and other crop strains, as well as using imported ones, and the 1970 autumn harvest is expected to be good.

Agriculture will clearly remain a primary concern well into the 1970s, since peasants and farmers still form 85 per cent of the population. Local industry is constantly urged to "support agriculture" and to supply adequate fertilisers and machinery; troops are regularly drafted to help with the harvest and irrigation works, and intellectuals are sent to the rural areas as an auxiliary labour force as well as propagators of the correct political line. An article issued on November 5 by the Ministry of Commerce mass criticism group showed the extent of official concern to maintain morale and goodwill in the rural community. The needs and desires of the peasants must be a prime guide to the type of goods produced, it said, for as Mao had warned: "If Socialism does not occupy the rural front, capitalism assuredly will".

### Need to export

The article also quoted Mao for the reminder that only the peasants could supply foodstuffs and raw materials in abundance and "absorb manufactured goods in great quantities". In addition, agriculture remains important as a source of both direct and indirect State revenue. The government derives large funds from the profits of enterprises using agricultural raw materials, as well as from direct taxes on agriculture and from reselling grain

procured from the farmers. But China must export more to increase imports and win foreign currency, and she seems particularly anxious to exploit the demand abroad for food and light industrial products. In Heilungkiang Province, special Mao-study classes have been held to encourage peasants to deliver more grain to the State, and party committees have organized "mass criticism" to encourage the defaulters.

However, many peasants seem unwilling to make extra efforts for what they consider inadequate rewards. Throughout 1970, the authorities denounced "conservative" tendencies among the farmers and their refusal to try new methods or to boost output. In the provinces efforts are being made to alter the peasant outlook by a flood of propaganda and by the example of party officials sent down to work on the farms.

Drives to combat absenteeism, wastage and pilfering in industry suggest that industrial workers, too, are often unco-operative. A commentary in the journal, *Red Flag*, in October (No. 10, 1970) revealed that mistakes had been made in siting many local industries; several had been closed down soon after opening. Some had apparently failed through a lack of raw materials; others were found to be duplicating the job of other plants in the same area. Nevertheless, local industries geared to producing consumer goods and helping agriculture will no doubt continue to have a place alongside the giant State-run industries during the 1970s. The biggest uncertainty surrounds the question of how far political factors will continue to disrupt production and distribution in the future. Mao's slogan of "politics in command" remains prominent and the article on "Socialist commerce" mocked at those who preached the law of supply and demand in order to maintain a balance in the economy, telling them that balance was only relative whereas imbalance was "constant and absolute". Gluts or shortages were only a reflection of "the law of contradictions", the article said.

Political considerations will clearly continue to influence the pattern of China's growing foreign trade as well. Despite the Sino-Soviet trade agreement concluded in Peking on November 22 and the pact on local exchanges signed in Khabarovsk in September, there is unlikely to be any spectacular growth of trade with the Soviet Union (which fell to its lowest level in 1969). Conversely, trade is developing fast with Rumania and Yugoslavia, both of which are interested in trading outside the Soviet

bloc. Peking's hostility to the Japanese Government, however, is no bar to trade exchanges with Japan which will probably remain its major trading partner in the 1970s. Japan's proximity and ability to supply steel and fertilisers, as well as manufactured goods essential to China, seem to explain the 77 per cent increase in Chinese purchases in the first six months of 1970, reported in November by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). China's determination to find markets in the non-Communist States, despite a lack of suitable goods for export, is reflected in the fact that nearly 80 per cent of her trade is now with this group.

### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BIGGEST POWERS

by Dr Brezanic

Whatever happens in relations between the big powers, and especially the biggest ones, logically catches the attention of the rest of the world. For those relations, good or bad, reflect tangibly on broader international trends. The general estimate is that the role of the superpowers in international events is rising steadily, thanks above all to the concentration of tremendous military and economic power in their hands, and the fact that the agreements they reach are widespread in their repercussions. The world rejoices when the big powers undertake action directed toward relaxation, and shudders when they try to outdo each other on a cold war basis or go about striking coldly businesslike agreements designed to facilitate their encroachment on the interests of others. The world community supports those efforts of the big powers directed toward conducting business within the domain of their responsibility as important world factors. At the same time, that section of the world community that consists of small and medium-sized countries regards with mistrust all attempts by the great to monopolize solution of unsettled world problems. We are now in a situation where the great majority of the world's countries must take into account both aspects of the role of the superpowers, that is, constructive negotiation and solution of problems, not through monopoly by a small group but rather through equal participation by the international community at large.

This autumn brought a certain cooling off in the relations

between the USA and USSR. This could be concluded from the way the Soviet press dealt with US policies, from the sharper tone used in criticizing President Nixon's policies, from mutual accusations in connection with developments in the Middle East crisis, from President Nixon's visits to a number of European countries, and from two affairs - one involving American generals who landed on Soviet territory and the other the alleged construction of a Soviet submarine base on Cuba. All this has evoked disagreeable recollections of the cold war period. A more clamorous tone and acid vocabulary characterized references to Berlin, "American imperialism", "Soviet penetration", the "crisis of confidence" over installation of missiles in the Suez Canal zone, and so on. Under these circumstances, no sensation was caused by Kosygin's absence from the 25th anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, which only served to confirm the deteriorated atmosphere in relations between the USA and USSR. Also, the Nixon-Kosygin meeting was postponed to better times.

It is interesting to note that this temporary deterioration of the Moscow-Washington climate occurred after the cease-fire in the Middle East, after the agreement signed in Moscow on August 12 between Chancellor Brandt and Premier Kosygin on non-recourse to force and the inviolability of present European boundaries, and following the successful termination of the second round of talks between the two superpowers for strategic arms limitation in Vienna.

These three events, each by itself and all together, represent a new quality, including also the Middle East, regardless of all the changes in the crisis in that area since the very first day when the guns of the Arabs and Israelis fell silent along the canal. The USSR and USA have participated most directly in all three events. Certainly, Chancellor Brandt, in negotiating with Moscow, kept strict account of the overall strategy of the leading NATO power. It would therefore have been normal to expect further improvement and not deterioration in Moscow-Washington relations.

Certain other things have happened which the two powers have had to take into consideration.

The People's Republic of China is appearing on the world scene in a manner that is a source of growing concern to the USA and USSR although naturally not those two countries alone. Both

powers, each to the limits of its possibilities, are endeavouring to regulate their relations with the People's Republic of China, so as to reduce negative aspects as far as possible. The regulation of these relations, even at the lowest level, can but wield influence over the mutual relations and behaviour of the USA and USSR, but naturally has more bearing for the power that negotiates more with China and expects more from it.

In Europe, things have changed in a manner that offers encouragement, but not to everyone. Western Europe, in the broadest geopolitical sense, is making a growing bid to play a more independent role between the two giants. With each passing day, independent policy, as the alternative to narrow bloc and superpower policies, is asserting itself in growing degree. This positive trend found expression in preparations for the convocation of a European co-operation and security conference, and in the lack of confidence that the big powers could, within their small circle, solve the problems of the continent of Europe.

After the Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Lusaka, the moral and political force of non-alignment has experienced fresh affirmation and achieved new international prestige, which must be recognized and respected even by those powers that have been prophesying its downfall, ignoring it or offering resistance to its activities. But perceiving reality and publicly admitting the success achieved at Lusaka is one thing. The other side of the coin is the internal assessment that this growing power, which demands equality, independence and democracy in international relations, should not be permitted to flex its muscles and develop further, for it could jeopardize monopoly positions and privileges, and undermine suppression and hegemony. Those who felt themselves endangered by the fruits of increased activity by the non-aligned countries considered it necessary to oppose it this autumn in all possible quarters; in the United Nations, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Europe, Latin America and elsewhere.

The situation of the big powers has become more complicated. The world has never been divided strictly into two parts and today it is less than ever so. Many autonomous and independent factors have appeared, strong and influential factors which must not only be taken into account but also recognized as partners in the solution of this planet's problems. This means that the superpowers must change the rules of the game, from simple to

more complex ones. Today not even their allies support the leading powers in the blocs on all questions; they have their own specific attitudes, lay greater stress on their own national interests, and so on. It is this process of emancipation, this fundamental feature of our times, that causes the big powers the greatest worry, all the greater to the extent that they are unwilling to renounce their present positions.

The somewhat aggravated relations between the superpowers are partially the result of deliberate policies and to a lesser extent the product of spontaneity. This minor relapse into cold war competition was directed in large measure toward the spread of independent policy in all its forms and in all areas and it is this policy that is supposed to pay the bill for the deterioration.

During the 25th UN anniversary celebrations, the USA and USSR held talks on all important matters of interest to them. The USSR denied that it was constructing a submarine base in Cuba and for the moment the affair has receded; on Berlin, a more constructive talk between the four powers has continued and less emphasis is being placed on Berlin as a precondition for ratification of the Moscow Treaty; the American generals have been released, the cease-fire has been prolonged in the Middle East, the Bonn-Warsaw talks have terminated successfully, and talks between the two powers in Helsinki are proceeding normally and in a businesslike manner, offering encouragement in terms of results. Things have calmed down and the atmosphere is again the good old one. Another thing bears mentioning: US President Nixon, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly, thought it necessary to accentuate the role and responsibilities of the two superpowers for the preservation of world peace and security, while relegating the United Nations to the background. This open invitation from the UN tribune to the other superpower to act with it in deciding the fate of the world met with considerable dissatisfaction in the world organization, as it was justifiably conceived as degrading to the UN and treating it as an institution for the solution of third-rate problems while raising the two superpowers, without the People's Republic of China and other countries both great and small, to the position of some sort of world super-rulers.

These tendencies and aspirations are not new but they were expressed gruffly, in the least suitable place at the worst possible time, when the great majority of UN members was ex-

erting special efforts to revalorize the role of the most democratic world forum which should enjoy priority in the solution of all world problems. However, the Soviet Union is striving for recognition of Moscow's right to talk directly with its principal partner, without any intermediaries, about "everything". It was therefore natural for the Soviet press to welcome the substance of President Nixon's offer. The American President's statement went a long way toward contributing to the continuation of the superpower dialogue on all questions that have already been tabled.

Difficulties and crises in relations between the superpowers are normal manifestations regardless of whether they are "planned" or "spontaneous" difficulties; they are part of the game. Regardless of areas of agreement, mutual understanding and respect for each other's vital interests, the contradictions between the two giants are so numerous and serious that similar crises will continue to be a regular phenomenon owing to their ceaseless struggle for influence along all fronts. Other countries, especially independent ones, who have not entrusted their future and fate to either of the big powers or to both of them at the same time, will be able to bear up under the negative repercussions of occasional deterioration between the superpowers if they continue strengthening along the lines laid down by the Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Lusaka and by pursuing a policy of greater independence and equitable co-operation such as is asserting itself in greater measure in Europe.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

#### SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE 14TH SED-CC PLENUM

Summary: This paper describes some of the political highlights of the recent 14th SED-CC Plenum. It discusses the significance of the results of the exchange of Party documents and of the changes in the SED's Politburo attempts to document the Party's increasing sensitivity to any East-West German rapprochement.

After a period of six months, the Central Committee of the SED convened for a three-day session from 9 to 11 December 1970. According to the official communique, (1) the meeting

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(1) Neues Deutschland, 12 December 1970

passed a resolution on the 2 December gathering of the "Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact", discussed the draft economic plan for 1971, voted for some changes in the Politburo, and heard the speeches of Politburo members Paul Verner and Erich Honecker. While the main speeches dealt largely with economic questions, the Plenum also contained some interesting political material, especially with reference to the GDR's relationship to the Federal Republic.

#### Cadre Questions

In his speech on the exchange of Party cards, (2) Erich Honecker gave some statistical data on the present SED Party membership. Honecker reported that, following personal interviews with 99.6 percent of the present membership (the 4 percent who have not been interviewed were reported absent due to vacation, sick leave or prolonged sojourns abroad), new Party document would be handed out in January to 1,893,594 members and candidates. According to Honecker, 8,706 members and candidates, i.e. .46 percent, were expelled from the Party because of their ".....unstable, inactive relationship to the Party over a prolonged period of time".

The expulsion of less than 9,000 persons from a party comprising nearly 1.9 million members and candidates cannot be considered a political purge. By comparison, the 1951 Party card exchange resulted in the suspension of 150,696 members and candidates and the last Party card exchange in 1961 claimed 13,029 members and candidates as "victims". Some of the 13,000 expellees of 1961 had at the time been accused of "anti-Party" activities. During the exchange, no such indictment was expressed. The justification which Honecker advanced for the expulsions tends to emphasize rather the passivity of some Party elements and their disinterest in Party affairs. The announced results of the exchange also seem to confirm the fact that the SED does not fear any centers of resistance or deviationism among its rank and file in contrast, for example, to the Czechoslovak Party where, during the January to September

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(2) *ibid.*

1970 exchange, nearly 327,000 members were expelled or deleted from a total membership of approximately 1.5 million.  
(3)

According to the official communique, the Plenum also elected Hermann Axen a full member of the Politburo and Werner Lamberz to the position of candidate Politburo member; Axen, formerly a candidate member of the Politburo, is moving into the position previously held by Paul Fröhlich who died last September, while Lamberz, formerly Central Committee Secretary, is replacing Axen in his previous position. Both Axen and Lamberz, born in 1916 and in 1929 respectively are members of the generation which some day may replace the present Ulbricht leadership. They are both sons of Weimar Republic KPD functionaries. Axen's father was killed in a Nazi concentration camp and Lamberz' father was transferred from a camp to the famous penal battalion 999 from whence he defected to the Red Army. The fate of their fathers as well as the development in the GDR have been major influences in the lives of these functionaries. They are considered ideological hard-liners, particularly averse to any opening to the West. Hermann Axen has had long experience as editor-in-chief of Neues Deutschland. Since February 1966 he has been the Central Committee Secretary responsible for relations between communist parties. In this capacity, he has probably learned to move skillfully on the international communist stage. Lamberz moved into the Secretariat only during the last Party Congress (April 1967). He is said to be considered as an eventual replacement for Albert Norden, (4) now 66 years-old, who is currently the agit-prop secretary in the SED leadership.

The promotion of these two SED officials would not seem to alter the ideological orientation of the East German Politburo since the late Paul Fröhlich was also a hard-liner. If, as reported, a hard line group in the SED Politburo associated with Erich Honecker exists, Axen's and Lamberz's advancements might possibly strengthen that faction. In any case, their

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(3) See also Radio Free Europe Research 0724 "Exchange of Party Cards in the GDR", 8 September 1970 by Dorothy Miller.

(4) Reported, for example, in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16 December 1970

ascendency in the Party hierarchy does not indicate the advent of a more reasonable political line by the SED.

The release of Dr. Erwin Kramer, the Minister of Traffic, a few days after the CC-Plenum, (5) and his replacement by his deputy Otto Arndt, does not appear to have any political significance. Kramer was released at his own request, on grounds of old age (he is 68) and ill health.

#### The Main Enemy: "Social Democratism"

In none of the recent plenary CC meetings has the SED shown such an acute sensitivity to the "danger of imperialist subversion" as during the December session. All of the major speakers of the Plenum stressed the necessity to guard against "ideological subversion" and the impossibility of any "ideological coexistence". They also warned against "social democratism" as the most subtle, hence most dangerous, form of imperialist propaganda. The regime's dread of ideological penetration was reflected in such extreme demands as that of the economic expert Günter Mittag, who requested strict "economic delineation" (between East and West Germany) and in the absurd contention by Premier Willi Stoph, who maintained that the musical heritage of Beethoven belonged almost exclusively to the "socialist German national culture", and not to "imperialist Bonn" because of the ideological-cultural cleavage between the two states. (6) The following are some characteristic quotations from major Plenum statements characteristic of GDR apprehension:

They (our comrades) have understood that the government of the FRG, despite a certain realistic attitude which should be evaluated positively, still primarily intends to shake up the social and economic foundations of the GDR with its formulation of the so-called "unity of the nation" and with the "special inner-German" character of relations between the GDR and the FRG. The slogan of "inner-German special relations" is nothing but a modified expression of revanchism since in the last analysis,

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(5) Neues Deutschland, 15 December 1970 reporting on a session of the GDR People's Chamber.

(6) Neues Deutschland, 17 December 1970.

it aims at subjugating the GDR to the imperialist FRG by means which are different than those which in the past have been unsuccessful.....

The realization that between the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG, an objective process of delineation and not of rapprochement is taking place, is of great fundamental significance for our policy as well as for the ideological work of our Party.....

The difference between conservative forces which are in the service of monopoly capitalism and social democratism is that both factions are acting in support of the same imperialist aims, but with different tactics and with different methods. (7)

We must not grant any leeway to the enemy. The enemy has not given up his strategic aims. Neither have the rightist leaders of social democracy. Its recently passed program to fight against communism shows in which direction they are running. (8)

(It has been clarified) that the essence of West German imperialism, its irreconcilable hostility towards socialism, has not changed with the advent of the Brandt-Scheel government.....

In view of the enemy's intention to subvert and to subdue the GDR and other fraternal countries by means of open or hidden anti-communism, revanchism or social democratism, our citizens' increasing insight into the dialectics of peaceful coexistence and of socialism's military strength gains additional importance. (9)

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(7) Politburo member Erich Honecker, Neues Deutschland, 12 December 1970

(8) First Secretary of the Rostock District Harry Tisch, Neues Deutschland, 12 December 1970

(9) Central Committee member Admiral Waldemar Verner, Neues Deutschland, 13 December 1970

Bonn has learned, meanwhile, that the power of the Workers' and Peasants' state cannot be disturbed either by the use of the Bundeswehr or by counter-revolutionary putches and other attempts at "liberation". Today's social democratism views its specific task as presenting anti-communism in a more refined and subtle way. It does not preach the elimination, but the improvement, the "democratization" of socialism.... We know the counterrevolutionary meaning of the song about improved and liberalized socialism....

The class enemy in Europe is counting particularly on social democratism. He hopes that bourgeois ideology, in social democratic wrapping, with its nationalism posing as "inner German", with its "refined" anti-communism, with its "peaceful" psychological warfare against us, might be more difficult to identify than the gross cries of revanchism by Messrs. Strauss, Kiesinger and Barzel..... Under these circumstances, we must have complete understanding within the Party and in the minds of our citizens about the role and the function of West German Social Democracy during the current phase of the dispute between socialism and imperialism. (10)

West German imperialism is a strong, shrewd enemy which by all means and methods carries out the class struggle against the GDR.... In our policy and in our tactics, we must and will continue to distinguish between our state policy to attain peaceful coexistence by means of negotiations and agreements on the one hand, and simultaneous basic rejection of any form of ideological coexistence on the other hand. It would be a dangerous mistake on our part not to recognize the intention of our adversary to carry on a psychological war against

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(10) Politburo member Friedrich Ebert, Neues Deutschland, 13 December 1970

the SED and the GDR. (11)

Under our present circumstance, the development of ideological work means above all to fight more actively and efficiently against the ideological influences of the imperialist class enemy in West Germany, and to carry on an unceasing struggle against social democratism and against all illusions connected therewith in the heads of our people. This is necessary also in view of the intensified anti-communist campaign which emanates also from leading political forces in the FRG. All recent offers of so-called "all German ideas and practices", which include the demand for further common scientific publications, common scientific-technological study groups, etc., are part of imperialist global strategy. All the talk by West German entrepreneurs "of helping out" the GDR, to assist us "generously" with the development of science and technology and to carry on economic cooperation "free of ideology" -- all this cannot really hide the true aim of the imperialists. All experiences show that class struggle is carried out with particular violence, especially in the realm of economic development.

In the sector of economy as well, there cannot exist any all-German or inner-German relations, but only such relations as are customary between two states with equal international rights and with different social orders.

Between these two entirely opposed social systems, there is an increasing political and ideological delineation, but at the same time (there is) also an equally important economic delineation. (12)

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(11) Central Committee member Franz Dahlem, Neues Deutschland, 14 December 1970

(12) Politburo member and economic expert Günter Mittag, Neues Deutschland, 14 December 1970

These passages from various speeches should demonstrate that the spectre of social democratism haunted the 14th SED CC session. One might ask why these vigorous East German attacks should occur at this particular time.

This was the first SED plenum since the signing of the West German treaties with Moscow and Warsaw. Thus it is the first opportunity of the SED to express collectively its own position on the events of the past six months. The regime has, of course, paid lip service to the merits of the East-West treaties as contributions to European détente, but this very détente frightens East German leaders because they fear an ideological confrontation with West Germany. Whereas other East European leaders are willing to admit the more "positive aspects of the Brandt-Scheel government", the East German regime appears to be more unhappy with the present West German government than with the staunchest "cold warriors". While the former allegedly "revanchist" West German policy provided a distinct and logical target for communist attacks, social democracy (or its pejorative designation "social democratism") is more dangerous to the regime because it is "more refined, more subtle". In other words, the regime has misgivings that the East German population and sections of bureaucracy are vulnerable to social democratic thought. Thus, in the present period of budding West German-East European détente, East Germany is an unwilling participant. The regime may, therefore, have decided that an offensive is the best form of defense. Basically, the strong pleas for complete "delineation" between the FRG and the GDR (politically, ideologically, culturally and even economically) testify to an inherent insecurity and are probably calculated to convince the GDR population that no matter how détente with West Germany progresses things will remain the same inside the GDR.

Two additional incidental points of interest: the most violent attack against social democracy was launched by Friedrich Ebert, son of the first social democratic president of Germany, and himself a long-time social democrat. Also, the closing remarks, which Walter Ulbricht was reported in the plenum communique to have delivered, have not as yet been published.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING PEACEFUL  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

The following is the text of the statement of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states on questions of strengthening security and developing peaceful co-operation in Europe, which was signed in Berlin on December 2 by Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria), Gustav Husak and Lubomir Strougal (Czechoslovakia), Walter Ulbricht and Willi Stoph (German Democratic Republic), Janos Kadar and Jenő Fock (Hungary), Wladyslaw Gomulka and Jozef Cyrankiewicz (Poland), Nicolae Ceausescu and Ilie Verdet (Romania), and Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin (USSR).

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, represented at the meeting of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty memberstates in Berlin, have studied the situation that is taking shape in Europe. The meeting notes with satisfaction that the efforts made by socialist countries are effectively enhancing the improvement of the situation on the continent of Europe and the practical implementation of the principles of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. It was pointed out that tendencies towards a détente and extensive good-neighbourly co-operation had been gaining ground recently in relations among European states.

The states represented at the meeting welcome this progress in European affairs, which accords with the interests of all the countries of Europe, large and small, and with the safeguarding of lasting peace throughout the world. They will continue to facilitate the extension and deepening of mutually beneficial relations with other European states which are for their part, prepared to pursue a policy of easing international tension. Once again, emphasis was laid on the necessity for strict observance, in relations among all states, of the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

Those taking part in the meeting emphasised the great international significance of the conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany and the initialling of the treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Recognition of the existing situation in Europe which took shape as a result of the Second World War and postwar development and the inviolability of the present frontiers of the European states, observance of the principle of settling disputes exclusively through peaceful means, not resorting to the use or threat of force -- all this is of tremendous significance for the fate of peace in Europe and for a peaceful future for the European peoples. The entry into force of these treaties will accord with the vital interests of all states and peoples.

Those taking part in the meeting were unanimous in expressing solidarity with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic. The entire course of development in Europe shows that the edifice of lasting peace in this area cannot be built without the participation of the German Democratic Republic. The establishment of relations on an equal footing between the German Democratic Republic and other states which have not yet established such relations, including relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, based on the generally accepted standards of international law, and the acceptance of the GDR into the United Nations and other international organizations as a fully-fledged member are vital demands of the times and would be a substantial contribution to the cause of European and international security.

The states represented at the meeting fully support the just demand of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that the Federal Republic of Germany should recognise the Munich Agreement as invalid from the outset, with all the resulting consequences. The Federal Republic of Germany's clear and final dissociation of itself from that d i k t a t, which embodied the Hitlerite policy of plunder, would facilitate an improvement in the situation in Europe and the development of the relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with socialist countries.

It was noted at the conference that the preconditions were taking shape for the settlement of other problems existing in Europe and the hope was expressed in this connection that the present talks on West Berlin would end in a mutually acceptable

agreement being reached, meeting the interests of the easing of tension in the centre of Europe, and also the needs of the population of West Berlin and the lawful interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic.

Those taking part in the meeting expressed their conviction that the calling of an all-European conference on questions of security and co-operation would be a new and major stage along the road of strengthening peace in Europe.

Adequate preconditions for the holding of such a conference have now been created as a result of the preparatory work already done. The agenda is known in general outline; the participants in the conference have been determined and a broad basis has been laid for mutual understanding and for ensuring positive results from the conference. At the present time, together with bilateral contacts, the holding of multi-lateral consultations with the participation of all the interested states is needed in order to reach agreement on all the questions connected with the convocation of the conference. Many European states have come out in favour of this.

Those taking part in the meeting welcomed with satisfaction the new initiative of the Finnish government on the holding of preparatory meetings of all interested states in Helsinki on questions connected with the calling of the all-European conference. The states represented at the meeting declare their readiness to take part in meetings of this kind that are intended to facilitate the practical preparation of the all-European conference.

There are no reasons whatsoever for delaying the convocation of the conference or for putting forward any preliminary terms. The movement for security and co-operation on the continent of Europe is acquiring an increasingly broad and mass character. The socialist states attending the meeting are fully resolved to do everything in their power to put into effect the will of the European peoples for peace.

Those taking part in the meeting note that the opponents of a relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence in Europe have not ceased their dangerous activity. In this connection, attention was drawn to the increased activity of aggressive NATO circles, to provocative actions on the part of revenge-seeking and militaristic forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and to the ceaseless attempts from outside to retard the development of

favourable processes on the continent of Europe. Firm confidence was expressed that the peace forces of Europe were capable of overcoming the obstacles erected by the enemies of peace and of accomplishing, through joint efforts, the task of safeguarding firm and lasting peace in that part of the world.

Those taking part in the meeting reaffirmed the position on European security and on the relaxation of tension and disarmament set out in the Bucharest Declaration of July 5, 1966.

They expressed the determination of the parties and governments of their countries to continue taking concerted joint actions in the international arena for the sake of safeguarding reliable security in Europe and throughout the world. With these objects in view, each of them will continue to pursue an active policy of peace, the relaxation of tension and broad international co-operation.

(Soviet News)

## E C O N O M I C S

### THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SIX

Moscow and its allies are anxious to develop bilateral links with the EEC members, though they still attack the Community as a whole.

The Soviet attitude to the European Economic Community (EEC) is complex - while opposing the Community on the grounds that it is a closed economic system which impedes the flow of East-West trade, the Russians are also aware that in the decade since it was set up the Soviet bloc's trade with the Six has grown much faster than with the seven countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). They know that an enlarged Community with higher growth rates, reflected in external trade, would ultimately boost trade with Eastern Europe, too, though it might create shortterm difficulties for the Soviet bloc's agricultural exports. Soviet hostility has also betrayed fears that the success of the EEC may prove a strong attraction to the East European countries with their urgent need for advanced technology, while reducing Moscow's influence in Western Europe and its opportunities for splitting tactics as integration proceeds in the political and military as well as economic fields. Moreover, there is a risk of the States belonging to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) being left out in the cold after January, 1973, when the EEC Commission will conduct a common commercial policy on behalf of its members, and bilateral trade agreements between them and those outside which do not recognise the Community will be banned.

But though the Soviet bloc's future relations with EEC must be a major preoccupation of the Soviet leaders, the subject hardly featured in their recent series of high-level talks with the three principal members of the Community, Italy, France and Federal Germany, as well as with Britain. Nevertheless, President Pompidou, during his visit to Moscow in October, and the Italian leaders, during Mr. Gromyko's visit to Rome in November, left no doubt as to their interest in the enlargement of the EEC. Shortly after his visits to Moscow in connexion with the Soviet-West German treaty on the renunciation of force, Herr Scheel, the Foreign Minister, told the European Parliament in Strasbourg on September 16 that the treaty amounted to a step

towards Moscow's acceptance of the existence of the Community and might even promote its expansion.

Britain's commitment to entry on the right terms and the general willingness of the EEC members to see an enlargement of the Community have clearly reduced Moscow's scope for sowing distrust between the Six and the four applicants for membership (Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) by playing on nationalist fears. Indeed, the past six months have already brought a modification in Soviet policy - from outright opposition to the Community to a more oblique approach aimed at securing available benefits while still condemning the concept of economic "blocs".

#### Western markets

Several Communist countries - including the USSR - are now manoeuvring to set up a durable framework for future trade ties. At the end of President Pompidou's visit to Moscow, the communiqué noted that a long-term trade agreement for 1970-74 had been concluded in May, 1969, and the Russians are now proceeding with talks on a five-year trade agreement with Federal Germany, which were authorised by the EEC Council of Ministers on November 9. Even at the height of Moscow's propaganda attacks on the EEC, exchanges were in fact increasing rapidly - though trade with the West remains of marginal importance to the Soviet economy. It is more important for the East Europeans, who are anxious to sell more to the West to obtain machinery and technical know-how, or, like Poland and Yugoslavia, because they are concerned with securing markets for their foodstuffs. By recognising the Community, Yugoslavia has been able to negotiate on better terms; at the beginning of June the President of the EEC's Executive Commission, Jean Rey, went to Belgrade for talks with Yugoslav officials on implementing the trade agreement between Yugoslavia and the EEC signed a month earlier. According to the Belgrade newspaper, *B o r b a*, some problems remained but the agreement had smoothed the way to "normal" trade which was developing "dynamically" - nearly 36 per cent of Yugoslavia's exports in the first four months of 1970 had gone to the Six.

The Soviet Union's inconsistent approach to the Common Market is reflected in its attitudes to those who are already

members and those seeking to join - showing that growing acceptance of the EEC in practice does not preclude continuing hostility to the Community's enlargement. Thus while France's and Italy's membership is passed over in silence, considerable Soviet pressure is still directed towards preventing the accession of new members or, in the case of the European neutrals, dissuading them from seeking special arrangements. Predictably, Soviet sources ignored the discussions in Brussels on November 10 between the EEC Council of Ministers and delegations from Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, as well as the neutral's agreement to hold exploratory talks in the near future on free trade and customs union ties with the EEC, which would leave their governments in control of all commercial and foreign policies. But on the same day as the Brussels meeting, the Soviet government newspaper, *I z v e s t i a*, claimed in a report from Stockholm that "certain circles" in Sweden were preparing to sacrifice their country's neutrality and independent foreign policy for the "doubtful advantage" of participation in the Common Market. The party newspaper, *P r a v d a*, stated last June that EEC membership would be irreconcilable with neutrality.

Similarly, *P r a v d a* on October 26 revived warnings to Austria against seeking an association, mainly on the grounds that the Rome Treaty contains political objectives incompatible with Austria's neutrality as defined in the 1955 State Treaty, and that such a relationship would be a political rather than an economic matter. Moscow's other main argument against Austria joining remains the old one that Federal Germany, said to be the most influential member of the Community, will thereby intensify her penetration of the Austrian economy. The independent Vienna newspaper, *D e r K u r i e r*, carried a report from Paris on June 13, shortly after Mr. Gromyko's visit there, complaining that the Soviet Embassy had approached the French Foreign Ministry in an attempt to prevent an interim agreement between Austria and the EEC.

*P r a v d a* on June 3 also suggested that the Norwegians and Danes campaigning for entry into the Community were those most interested in advancing the political cohesion of Europe on the basis of common membership of NATO. Towards all these countries, as towards Britain, the bogey of West German domination of the EEC remains one of Moscow's favourite propaganda themes.

When the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers issued a call in October, 1969, for a European Security Conference, the extension of commercial, scientific and technical relations between Eastern and Western Europe was put forward as one of the main items for discussion. But the proposal remained vague, suggesting that Moscow was playing for time without having any alternative to offer to Western integration. A similar lack of real content was evident in other Western Communist proposals. Giorgio Amendola, a member of the Italian Communist Party Directorate, speaking to the European Parliament in March, 1969, launched two schemes, neither of which seemed to have any chance of getting off the ground. The first envisaged a European economic conference, convened within a United Nations framework with the participation of the Communist States, the second a European unity conference, to be attended by trade unionists, religious associations and other "popular forces" - a formula clearly designed to appeal to the Italian electorate. Recently the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has produced its own brain-child - an all-European trade union conference on social and economic problems. But though the Secretary-General claimed at WFTU's General Council meeting in Moscow on October 13 that important consultations on the subject had taken place between several national trade union centres in Europe, none of the non-Communist trade unions has as yet shown any interest in the project.

#### More constructive

From the East European leaders' point of view, one advantage of proposing East-West economic co-operation as a topic at the European security conference is that it enables them to adopt a slightly more constructive pose. Now only East Germany's propaganda, which centres on the alleged threat presented by the West German "monopolies", expresses the same hostility to the EEC as in the early days, though most of Moscow's allies have echoed its warnings to Britain and the neutrals against joining.

One of the most striking breaks in East European opposition to the Community came from Poland last June, when the journal, *Rynki Zagraniczne* (Foreign Markets), sponsored a discussion on problems arising from the latest developments in

West European integration. Reporting the meeting on July 9, the magazine quoted Dr Dlugosz, an official in the Foreign Trade Ministry, as saying that as Western economic integration could not be turned back, "it is necessary to start thinking about finding a reasonable *modus vivendi*".

Dr Rolow, editor of *Rynki Zagraniczne*, underlined the necessity of exchanging views on West European integration because of two facts - the end of the EEC's transitional period and the negotiations on the entry of new members. Changes in the Community would be of great importance to Poland and the other Communist countries, he said, and it was therefore planned to continue this kind of discussion and to delve more fully into the problems involved. For Dr Dlugosz, the main question was that of finding an adequate form of relationship with the Community and "taking advantage of all possibilities to secure maximal gains for ourselves".

An article two months later in the weekly journal, *Perspektywy*, also suggested that Poland has a real interest in coming to terms with the EEC. The article drew a gloomy picture of the Community's alleged efforts to retard or prevent the development of CMEA and to maintain an "unequal" trade balance with the East, but it acknowledged that the Six are genuinely concerned to develop exchanges with the Communist States. Echoing speakers at the earlier symposium, it conceded that the process of EEC integration was "irreversible" and that the Communist States, like other outsiders, must therefore "adapt to the maximum to the new structural agreements" to lessen any ill-effects, using such methods as greater rationalisation of domestic production and closer integration within CMEA so as to present a more effective counter to the EEC. While such a pragmatic approach is still rare in Eastern Europe, the Hungarians, too, are beginning to show a tendency to think in terms of increased contacts between the economic groupings of the "two Europes".

#### Italian moves

The attitude of the Communist Parties of the six EEC member States is also not entirely negative, and Moscow itself may now see an advantage in their flexibility. Already in 1962, the Italian Communist leaders reportedly told the Moscow meeting of 81

Communist Parties that the EEC had brought much prosperity to Western Europe, but the turning point did not come until mid-1965 when the position of the French Communists had moved far enough towards that of the Italians to enable the PCF Politburo to urge the participation of the Communist-dominated trade union confederation, CGT, in the work of the EEC institutions. The parallel Italian confederation, the CGIL, had already asserted its claim in 1962 and in 1965 eventually persuaded the CGT to set up a joint office in Brussels. Its report on European economic trends during 1969, issued in January, 1970, concluded that it was more important than ever for the trade unions within the Community to define and co-ordinate their activities in support of the workers' demands.

Another important step aimed at increasing Communist penetration of the EEC bodies was taken in March, 1969, when seven members of the PCI took their seats for the first time in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Their leader, Giorgio Amendola, was outspoken about the party's attitude to Europe. He made it clear that the Communists wished to see a radical overhaul of the whole concept of European integration, including possible changes in the Treaty of Rome, to free the EEC from its "cold war origins" and its ties with military blocs, notably NATO, and to re-form it on a more popular base. In keeping with the PCI's general campaign for loosening Europe's ties with the United States, an enlargement of the Community to include the East European States has been urged in Communist speeches in the Italian parliamentary debates on EEC policies. An important Communist objective is the drastic revision of the Community's agricultural policies, on the grounds that they are causing major damage to Italy's farmers and to the economy as a whole. There are also hints of support for Britain's entry into the Community insofar as it might widen trade union representation in the EEC organisations.

The Communist Parties of Britain and the other EFTA countries are still proclaiming their disapproval of the Community, though they too must be planning how to adapt their tactics if their governments move towards closer co-operation with it. In a speech on November 5, shortly before Swedish representatives went to Brussels for preliminary contacts with EEC officials, the Chairman of the Swedish Communist Party, C.H. Hermansson, attacked the idea of a customs union with the EEC since it might

impede trade with the Communist States and the developing world; but afterwards he modified this to a grudging concession that a trade agreement (though not a full customs union) with the Community might be useful. The Communists of Britain, Denmark, Norway, Austria and Switzerland, on the other hand, have remained rigid in their hostility.

### "SOCIALIST PROPERTY" IS FAIR GAME FOR ALL

by Yuri A. Pismenny

Summary: The rise in non-professional crime in the Soviet Union and the popular tendency to regard the misappropriation of "socialist property" as legitimate compensation for low wages and the chronic shortage of many essential goods in the shops are disconcerting the authorities. A number of measures designed to curb theft in industry and widespread graft have been introduced but can hardly solve the basic dilemma confronting Party and Government - how to remold citizens and inculcate communist morality.

The Soviet authorities are alarmed at the steady rise in crime and the growing frequency of cases of theft of "socialist property" (i. e., state and co-operative property), and of bribery and corruption -- offences upon which the press has recently been focusing attention.

A few examples will suffice to convey an impression of the extent to which misappropriation of state property is rife in Soviet industry. At the Gorky motor works a band of thieves smuggled out spare parts piece by piece until they had enough to assemble three "Volga" automobiles, which they then sold privately, and at the Volga Steamship Line another group of workers were found to have stolen more than 10,000 rubles. But they were put in the shade by employees of the Navashinsky Rayon Consumer's Union (Gorky Oblast), whom the police discovered to have caused the state a loss of 129,000 rubles over the past three years in 22 separate cases of theft. These are all relatively recent examples taken from an article in Sovetskaya Rossiya (September 30, 1970) by I. Levin, head of the board for internal

affairs of the Gorky Oblast Executive Committee. A check of the Soviet press, however, reveals an almost unbroken sequence of reports of cases of theft and embezzlement of state property.

Many of the thieves displayed considerable ingenuity in their efforts to avoid detection. One journalist, describing the scene at the end of the working day at a Moscow tobacco factory as the workers flock out through the checkpoint, reports that the watchmen extracted dozens of packs of cigarettes from bags and other, less obvious places, and that one woman had even hidden some of the stolen goods under an elaborate hairdo. This apparently routine scene was observed not in some remote provincial town but at the Moscow "Dukat" factory, the leading tobacco works in the Soviet Union (Komsomolskaya pravda, March 15, 1970).

Few organizations are immune from the virus of theft and embezzlement -- not even the USSR Academy of Sciences. The same journalist reports that a signal was received from the Soviet seismographic station on the island of Kerguelen in the Indian Ocean complaining that important scientific research was being interrupted by the lack of special magnetic tape promised by the Academy's Institute of Earth Physics. At the subsequent inquiry the deputy director of the institute explained with some embarrassment that this "vexing discrepancy" had occurred because an institute employee helped himself to five kilometers of tape intended for Kerguelen. He had taken this special tape home and cut it into five pieces for his private tape recorder (*ibid.*).

This irresponsible approach towards state property on the part of adults is frequently copied by children. A teacher in the Moldavian town of Orgeyev, for example, complained to the editors of the newspaper Izvestia that pupils secretly open cupboards in the school laboratories and steal whatever takes their fancy, usually from a desire to "help" their parents. On one occasion she caught a youngster busily unscrewing a door-handle from a school cupboard. When questioned he replied: "I wanted to take it to Dad... He might find some use for it. He's always bringing different things home" (August 11, 1970).

Pilfering from factories and shops is the most popular but by no means the only form of theft of "public property". Many bus drivers, for example, diligently collect fares from the passengers but omit to issue tickets and pocket the money themselves. An interesting variant reported in the same issue of

Izvestia concerned a certain Nepomnyashchy, captain of a fishing boat, who tried to sell five tons of sturgeon which he had caught illegally in the Sea of Azov (in defiance of the fishery protection regulations) to a restaurant in the town of Berdyansk (*ibid.*).

By no means all Soviet citizens are devoid of a sense of responsibility towards state property, but stealing is practiced on a vast scale and is endemic in all branches of the economy and at all social levels. The question arises, why should Soviet citizens display such indifference to the rights and wrongs of the theft of state property, which under Soviet conditions of total nationalization is, in theory at least, collectively owned by all the people? One explanation, and the simplest, is provided by the case of Citizen Pokrovsky. Desperately in need of a new carburetor for his car and knowing that the shops had been out of stock for two years, he was forced to ask the drivers at a transport depot to "procure" one for him. Pokrovsky obviously had pangs of conscience and writes that he was thoroughly ashamed at his age and in his position to have to loiter near the transport depot until somebody threw the stolen carburetor over the fence. He managed to overcome his scruples and accept it, however, because otherwise he would have been unable to take his family on vacation (*ibid.*).

The fact that many articles are in short supply in the Soviet Union and cannot be obtained through the normal channels is a powerful inducement to steal to many otherwise honest citizens, irrespective of their income level (cars are extremely expensive in the Soviet Union and only the higher income groups can afford them). The author of the article in which Pokrovsky's letter is quoted admits to the importance of this factor and writes: "... it would be dishonest not to mention the reproachful tone... running through the majority of the letters: you all get steamed up about the moral aspect but you don't answer the question of what can be done if... circumstances compel one to resort to the services of a petty thief" (*ibid.*).

Another reason for the prevalence of theft in industry is indicated by the deputy chairman of the USSR Committee for Public Control, V.I. Zaluzhny, who after looking through letters to the editors of one newspaper pointed out that a number of readers claimed that low wages are the main cause of dishonesty. Although he considered this argument to be basically false, he conceded that "productive forces in the USSR are still

not sufficiently developed... to satisfy... the needs of all members of society" and that this is the reason for "wage inequality" (Komsomolskaya pravda, March 24, 1970). Low pay and major discrepancies in wage scales (Party members frequently get the best jobs) are, however, undoubtedly one of the main reasons why workers in the lower-income brackets are tempted to supplement their wages by pilfering.

The biggest obstacle faced by the authorities in their drive to curtail offences against state property is the ambiguous moral attitude of many Soviet citizens. From the voluminous correspondence on this issue -- in Izvestia of August 11, 1970, the editors stated that they had received more than 300 letters -- it is clear that although some people consider that a person who helps himself to something which does not belong to him is guilty of stealing it many others do not see it in this light, and do not agree with the old Russian adage, "Take and keep mum, and its a thief you are". They are "puzzled that... a petty pilferer should be put on the same level as a pickpocket" (*ibid.*). Clearly there is a double standard of morality -- one for personal property and the other for public property -- which one commentator defines as follows:

To steal a couple of pounds of potatoes from a neighbor is stealing, but to take two dozen electric irons from the factory is almost regarded as proof of the vaunted "ability to survive". This sort of "plunderer" is not above trying to rationalize his conduct with the argument that our state is rich and its collective property belongs to the people. In this way he identifies himself with both the people and society which, of course, substantially raises him in his own eyes. (Komsomolskaya pravda, March 15, 1970)

This argument is not devoid of a certain logic, and it is pointed out that Lenin's promises that land, grain, factories, tools, transport, etc., would henceforth belong to all the people are interpreted too literally by some workers. Party ideologists constantly repeat this slogan, however, and should not be surprised if some people take their words at face value and help themselves to "their own" property. The equivocal attitude towards private property and "public" property, therefore, is due

neither to remnants of a pre-Soviet mentality that have not yet been fully eradicated nor to sheer greed, as Levin maintains in his above-quoted article, but to the realization that stealing from a neighbor causes him hardship and deprives him of something he has worked for, while stealing from the factory will not cause anybody distress.

The persistence of this attitude makes it all the more difficult for the authorities to control theft of state property. Workers cover up for one another and groups of employees stand surety for colleagues who have been exposed; their chiefs, including Party officials, write them glowing references for the police which "would even be suitable as a recommendation for an award" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, September 30, 1970).

Bribery is another social evil in the Soviet Union which is encountered in all walks of life. Early this year, Pravda reported the case of an engineer in Kazakhstan who wanted to dispatch some household effects by rail and who was nonplussed when told at the goods station that they could not be sent because nobody had been "greased". He refused to pay a bribe, and although he complained three times to the station-master, the goods were not sent until the next day. Even then the porters demanded an extra tip, although the loading charge had already been paid (January 16, 1970).

In addition to these cruder forms of extortion, more subtle and refined methods of blackmail are employed which recall Tsarist Russia in the early nineteenth century. After receiving permission, including the necessary allocation of funds, to build an apartment block for its employees, one prominent institute ran into unexpected difficulties at the Construction Bank, where its representatives were told that the money would be forthcoming only if the institute put a dozen apartments at its disposal when the building was finished. But this was only the first hurdle: the plant supplying the steel refused to deliver unless it also received several apartments in the new building (*ibid.*). All this occurred in Moscow, and is an example of how many people in the Soviet Union tread the narrow dividing line between actual crime and what might be considered merely an "irregularity". It is very difficult to take judicial measures against these semi-illegal operations because pressure is applied in a subtle way and "requests" are phrased in evasive language which makes it difficult for the prosecutor's office to produce clear evidence of

fraud or blackmail.

Bribery and corruption have apparently assumed such proportions that the government has been forced to adopt stern measures. After examining the effects of the Supreme Soviet's decree of July 31, 1962 on the legal steps to be taken in cases of bribery, a plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court, chaired by A. F. Gorkin, empowered the courts to impose additional penalties (confiscation of property, removal from the register of certain professions, etc.) (Izvestia, July 10, 1970). It is questionable if these harsher penalties will have the desired effect, however, because the nature of the Soviet system tends to encourage bribery and corruption just as much as it does the theft of "socialist property". In free-enterprise economies the customer has a choice of alternatives, and if one bank is uncooperative he can approach another, while in the Soviet Union state monopoly usually puts the customer at the mercy of a single organization which can dictate its own terms.

None of the widespread offences discussed above involves genuine professional criminals, and it is this fact which endangers the fabric of Soviet society and prompts the above-mentioned Zaluzhny to warn that petty theft on such a mass scale threatens to "undermine our foundation -- socialist property" (ibid., March 24, 1970). In September 1969 the Party Central Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers therefore decided to set up a Union Republican Ministry of Justice "for the purpose of raising the level . . . of guidance of institutions of justice". The decree announcing this also laid great emphasis on protection of socialist property and correct upbringing of youth. At the suggestion of the Party Central Committee the Supreme Soviet appointed V. I. Terebilov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, to head this Ministry. Perhaps as a result of a Party directive, information in the Soviet press concerning negative aspects of Soviet life is now becoming less frequent and Party chief Brezhnev has already alleged that the "enemies of the Soviet Union are trying to exploit Soviet self-criticism in order to malign the socialist system" (Pravda, June 13, 1970).

(Institute for the Study of the USSR, München)

## CO-ORDINATED RESEARCH BY COMECON COUNTRIES

### Pooling of scientific and technical potentials

Seven hundred important lines of scientific and technical research have been carried out under the co-ordinated programme of Comecon, a Tass correspondent was told by Vsevolod Konyushko, member of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology.

An extensive exchange of experience and results of research and joint work has taken place on a number of problems.

### Physics of solids

"For example", he said, "joint studies in the field of the physics of solids have considerably expanded and deepened our knowledge of this branch of science.

"important results have also been obtained in the theory of automated control systems".

The main form of contacts in the first stage consisted of the exchange of sets of technical documentation, samples of products and materials and descriptions of technological processes.

Research under joint working plans increased with the growth of the economies and scientific potential and with the development of scientific and technical co-operation, he said.

There are now nearly 600 Soviet research and design institutes and more than 700 organisations in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as Yugoslavia, working under such plans.

After the 23rd session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the main emphasis was put on the joint development of current scientific and technological problems and on concentrating efforts and material means for their solution.

Eighteen key problems have been selected, which are of importance for the development of many branches of industry, science and technology.

These include the creation of such new materials as semi-conductors, especially pure metals, plastics and synthetic resins; the design of new devices and high-precision measuring equipment; problems of economic management on the basis of the utilisation of computers; the development of new methods of protecting metals from corrosion; and means and ways of making efficient use of natural resources.

Scientific and technical potentials are being pooled and new forms of co-operation introduced. Thus, a treaty has been signed on setting up an international team of scientists at the Institute of Management Problems in Moscow.

A programme of co-operation in the field of protecting metals from corrosion has been agreed. Stress is put on a clear-cut division of labour between the research organisation of the fraternal countries.

Thus the theory of corrosion processes will be taken up by the Soviet Physico-Chemical Research Institute, while the Precision Mechanics Institute of Poland will develop methods for the temporary protection of metal articles, and the State Research Institute of Metal Protection in Czechoslovakia will develop methods of making organic coatings.

In all, more than 40 research institutes in different countries will take part in the programme of co-operation in combating corrosion.

Research programmes of similar scope have been prepared for co-operation in the field of nature conservancy, the comprehensive utilisation of raw materials, the creation of new chemical and biological means of plant protection and other problems.

(Soviet News)

#### THE SCIENCE OF MANAGING SOCIALIST SOCIETY

In recent years, concern about a scientific approach to Party activity has increased in Rumania. At the Ninth Congress of the RCP (July 1965), at its National Conference (December 1967), and at its 10th Congress (August 1969) efforts were made to make the foundations of Party management more scientific. In a speech on the occasion of Lenin's centennial (April 1970), Ceausescu emphasized that "today, leading a socialist society has become a science of decisive significance in the allround progress of that society. Therefore it is imperative for us to engage in thorough research on the developments of social life in terms of dialectical and historical materialism". As early as January 1969 the specialized press published a study dealing with "the Marxist theory of the scientific and technical revolution" (Contemporanul Nos. 1 and 2/1969).

In its September and October 1970 issues, the magazine Lupta de Clasa published a report, entitled "The Object and Basic Concepts of the Science of Managing a Socialist Society", prepared by members of the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy of Social and Political Sciences. The magazine also published an exchange of views which took place on the basis of this paper, which had been organized by the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences and the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy.

The report contains the following main points:

a. The need to introduce scientific management procedures.

Present day conditions, which are undergoing continuous change (the contemporary historical process, the technical-scientific revolution, the requirements generated by new conditions in Rumania, etc.) call for constant adaptation of the management of society, at all levels, to reasonable, scientific bases, in order to achieve a multilateral development of socialist society and of Communism.

b. Marxism-Leninism - the theoretical basis of the science of management; the contribution of other sciences.

The methods by which social life should be regulated, and the substance and sphere of such regulation, depend on social relations and on the way in which these are manifested in a given country. The Weltanschauung of the working class, dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism represent the theoretical and ideological basis of this science. "Party construction", which involves the activity of Party organs and organizations and their relations to state agencies, the masses, and the social organizations of the working people, plays a decisive role in this. On the other hand, sociology and its various branches, social psychology, the disciplines dealing with managing economic activity (such as planning, the theory of enterprise management, marketing, etc.) also make a contribution to the formation of this science. The theory of systems, cybernetics (which suggests new ideas for the ruling processes at the social level), and research on operations also play a significant role. The main system among these methods is mathematical (the theory of strategic games, the theory of programming, etc.). Utilization of sociological and socio-political investigation of mathematical logic, is a basic requirement in scientific management.

Three major elements should be taken into account in working out the socialist theory of management: (1) the Party, whose function is to work out general policy in accordance with the interests of the working class and working people; (2) the socialist state, which fulfills well-known domestic and foreign functions; (3) Marxist-Leninist theory, which is the prevailing ideology in society.

c. Problems the science of management can settle.

Scientific management can deal with and suggest theoretical and practical solutions for such problems as the achievement of spontaneity and awareness in the development of the socialist society; subjectivity in management and its objective limits; the factors involved in the evolution of democratic centralism; the relation between management, supervision, and the participation of the masses in social action; the necessity-possibility-reality relationship; the relation between the present and the future; detecting the appearance of various trends in the social life (political and moral attitudes, cultural aspirations, penetration of the new generations into the social picture; the relation between internal and external conditions in social development; the correlation of internal options to external determinations, or to the need to influence external conditions, etc.).

d. Policy and the art of policy.

Ruling requires both scientific and extra-scientific elements (intuition). That is why management is not only a science but also an art.

e. Socialism and democracy.

In a socialist society, management can be exercised only within a democratic framework. Democracy is inseparable from social management. The methods of combining management and democracy to which the Party has given the stamp of originality are particularly interesting. In the eyes of the Party, the strengthening of socialist democracy testifies to the fact that the act of ruling is invested with a scientific character.

Lupta de Clasa also published abridged texts of the speeches made by 17 participants in the exchange of opinions organized in connection with the report on the management of society.

The main ideas expressed on this occasion were the following:  
a. The importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and of the ruling of society by the Party.

Paul Radovan, deputy editor-in-chief of Lupta de Clasa, em-

phasized that the Party represents the vital center of management, and therefore the Party should be the main concern of managerial science. At the same time, this science should reveal the factors which help to increase the leading role of the Party. Marin Voiculescu, doctor of economics and associate professor, said that the science of social management could exist only under conditions of socialism, because socialism gradually turns the management of society into a science.

b. The need to overcome old and new clichés.

Stefan Voicu, editor-in-chief of Lupta de Clasa and Vice-Chairman of the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, said that in defining the problems connected with the science of social management it is necessary to organize free debate, which is not tied to either old or new clichés.

c. Opposition between Marxism-Leninism and the science of managing socialist society.

Constantin Moisuc, associate professor at the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy, emphasized that the report had tried to establish that there was "almost opposition" between the theory of management and Marxist-Leninist theory. He claimed that the science of management could very well exist among the social sciences, since it is based on the general theory of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, Moisuc said, this science was also based on other sciences, which had prepared the way for its appearance.

d. Scientific and non-scientific elements in political management.

Valter Roman, university professor and chairman of the section of political sciences at the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, emphasized that none of the social sciences dealt with the problem of management as such. Practicing scientific management is an objective requirement, but it does not follow that such management becomes ipso facto a science. This point should be clarified in order to reduce to the minimum the possibility of misunderstanding. Stefan Voicu said that the existence of a scientific Party policy does not mean that therefore there is a ready-made science of management. Remus Radulet, academician and vice-chairman of the Ruman Academy, took a stand against researchers who are wont to exaggerate their role in social life by claiming that "they carry out research" on any sector of activity.

e. The need for real, scientific information.

Constantin Vlad, associate professor and vice-chairman of the

Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, considered that a "rigorous" knowledge of social life, based on the "highest possible" amount of scientifically checked information, was essential to the future science of social management.

f. Changing present methods and forms of management.

The appearance of the science of management is viewed as a means of strengthening the leading role of the Party (Paul Radovan, Marin Voiculescu. Valter Roman, however, thought that the existence of modern cybernetical techniques calls for systematic changes in the forms and methods of managerial activity. Within the managerial hierarchy, planning should be preceded by diagnosis and prognosis. In the economic matters, the trend is to emphasize the place occupied by the economic processes at the expense of the extra-economic and administrative ones.

g. Politics versus social reality.

Cristea Ionescu Tira, associate professor, suggested that scientific management of socialist society should bring creative thinking into harmony with the existing economic "possibilities". Remus Radulet also considered that, in order to avoid committing the sin of "carrying out research" on all sectors of activity, the science of management should not contemplate dealing with all human problems.

h. The spontaneous side of management: institutionalization and noninstitutionalization.

Olivia Clatici, college lecturer, dealt with the political evolution which is achieved through spontaneous management. She also mentioned a discrepancy between the institutionalization and noninstitutionalization of political life.

i. Politics and the art of politics.

A number of speakers (referring indirectly to Ceausescu's activity) stated that politics is not only a science but also an art which requires individual abilities, talent, mental insight, and courage (Constantin Vlad). Without disagreeing with this, others claimed that the notion of art as science is now a conflicting one, which may result in the acceptance of empiricism and spontaneity (Constantin Moisuc).

(Radio Free Europe Research)

TOO MUCH GOOD LIFE IN THE GDR

According to estimates by the Director of the Institute for Nutrition at Potsdam, Professor Dr Hellmut Hänel, East Germany is spending an average 600 million marks per year as a result of over-eating by the population. In an interview with the East Berlin youth weekly Forum (8 November 1970), Professor Hänel said of these 600 million, 200 million marks are spent by the state for such social services as hospital costs, medical compensation and medication while the remaining 400 million marks are lost to the state because of reduced national income from decreased production.

According to the nutrition expert, "moral appeals and stimuli" are no longer sufficient to guide people towards a healthy way of life and to induce them to become "the healthy, slender individuals" which used to characterize "socialist men and a disciplined society". On the contrary, Hänel complained, "to eat a lot has become the symbol of wealth, and to eat a lot, generally means eating well and to much fat". People refuse, for example, to eat margarine, known popularly as "monkey fat", which they had to consume during "the bad times when no butter was available".

During the 14th SED-CC Plenum, Premier Willi Stoph also discussed the high consumption of butter in the GDR, maintaining that the yearly 14.5 kilograms per capita is the highest in the world. He then said:

We must note that on the one hand the consumption of butter is increasing and that on the other hand funds for social insurance, including subsidies by the state for health cures, among which (are included) reducing cures, have to be made available in increasing amounts. (Neues Deutschland, 11 December 1970)

To remedy this situation which, of course, is also familiar in the West, Professor Hänel has some rather novel, if unappealing suggestions. In his opinion, one possibility is raising the prices of rich and fatty foods. The Professor explained to the youth journal that material incentives have to be employed if citizens live unreasonably and eventually, through their own fault, cost the state money. Another suggestion by Professor Hänel will be received with even less enthusiasm by East German citizens: he proposed some kind of "obesity tax" whereby people

who are overweight through their own negligence should be penalized by receiving fewer social benefits. In any case, it is an original thought from the East German nutrition expert.

### "GASTARBEITER" EXCHANGE

The Ministry of Labor recently disclosed some information on existing agreements with other "socialist" countries concerning the exchange of manpower (see Nepszava, 8 December 1970). The information given to the press proudly refers to the fact that "Hungary has been a participant in the manpower co-operation (arrangements) between the socialist countries since the very beginning". It appears from the text, however, that the well-known agreement of May, 1967, between Hungary and the GDR actually constituted the start of such co-operation agreements. In the past three years, some 15,000 young Hungarian workers have learned new skills in the GDR and have been employed at 180 enterprises. At present, 12,000 young Hungarians are working in various cities in the GDR and it is expected that, in 1971, about 4,600 new workers will be assigned to East Germany. Originally, the 1967 agreement was concluded for five years, but it has already been extended for a further three; that is, until 1975. It foresees that an additional 20,000 young people will work in the electrical and machinery industries of the GDR.

The Ministry of Labor revealed some more details on manpower co-operation agreements existing with Czechoslovakia. As is already known, Hungary sent some work brigades to Cierna nad Tisou in September, 1969, to help with the transshipment of Soviet goods to Czechoslovak freight cars. These work brigades were composed of 200 workers living in Borsod, Nograd and Szabolcs Counties. The agreement was limited to one year and thus the 200 workers have already returned to their original working places. It appears, however that, since then, another 60 workers were again sent to Cierna nad Tisou for the same transshipment work.

Co-operation in the labor field between the neighboring towns of Komarom and Komarno is proceeding well. Two hundred women of Czechoslovak nationality work in the Komarom Flax Mills and fill vacancies which the factory could not staff with Hungarian women and girls. In connection with the solution of the manpower problem in Komarom, the Hungarian Ministry of

Labor has announced that the co-operation now being developed between Komarom and Komarno is a prelude to an expansion of local border contacts between the two countries (see Nepszabadsag, 14 August 1970). This plan is going into effect through a new agreement which was signed in Budapest between Hungary and Czechoslovakia for manpower exchange in the small border traffic. The agreement authorizes the local populations of the Hungarian areas of Rajka, Győr, Komarom, Salgotarjan, Satoraljaujhely and Somoskőjfalu, and of the Czechoslovak areas surrounding the cities of Bratislava, Medvedov, Komarno, Lucenec, Cierna nad Tisou, and Filekovo to apply for work for an undetermined period in the enterprises of the neighboring areas of the other state. The applicants must ask permission from their local councils and the local councils also provide for assignments to the enterprises.

The Ministry of Labor also disclosed that similar labor exchange talks will begin this week between Hungary and Yugoslavia in Szeged. If the talks are successfully concluded, Yugoslav workers may come to Szeged and neighboring areas in order to work in factories suffering from a serious labor shortage.

It is interesting to note that the idea of work in foreign countries greatly interests young Hungarians. Of course, the main interest is directed toward the Western countries, not so much toward other Communist countries. A striking concrete example of this was supplied by a Radio Budapest broadcast on 10 November 1970, when in a round-table program for young people, a young technician asked those taking part why more opportunity is not given to young people to learn to know other countries. The questioner said that he himself would have liked to spend six months in a Scandinavian country and to cover expenses by working.

The answer to this question was given by Pal Ipper, a Radio Budapest commentator and its former correspondent in New York, who bluntly stated that the world is divided into two parts at present and that such plans have come up against not only currency obstacles, but also political and military ones. Hungary is a member of the Warsaw Pact and it is simply inconceivable for young men of military age to apply en masse for work in Western Europe. Exceptions are possible, but a general solution which would permit the mass migration of young people is

impossible. No clearer answer could have been given, and in view of the importance of the person who gave it, it seems that future labor co-operation will remain limited to the "socialist" countries only.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

### PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION WITHIN COMECON

International economic co-operation, with especial reference to economic integration within Comecon, was one of the important items on the agenda of Hungary's recent 10th Party Congress. CC secretary Rezso Nyers devoted his report entirely to the question of international economic relations

The part of his report dealing with possible methods of effecting integration among the Comecon countries deserves attention. There are, he said, three such methods:

- 1) Economic policy consultations among the countries (the exchange of information on trends and degrees of economic development in the member countries, and the co-ordination of economic targets);
- 2) Co-ordination of national economic plans;
- 3) The role and use of economic regulators during the process of integration.

During the past few years considerable progress has been made in the application of the first two of these but not, according to Nyers, with the third. He said:

There are still some very important matters on the list of unsettled questions. The future role of the extensive system of economic regulators requires further clarification. This includes the function of prices, credit, currency systems and trading methods, and the possibility of currency convertibility.

Nyers asked: "Is it possible to have an efficiently functioning system of international production co-operation when the principles underlying economic calculation, estimates of profitability, and the role of money are different in the economies and foreign trade arrangements of the member countries"?

By raising this question, he indicated that, according to the views of Hungarian economic experts, effective integration and co-operation cannot be imagined without some clarification of the role of economic regulators. He did not say this in so many words, but he did say that these questions "are of such importance that a simple yes-or-no answer seems inappropriate at present".

Prior to the Party Congress, the same problem was discussed at the three-day (November 17-19) conference of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences attended by economic delegations from the Comecon countries. The most discussed subject was the use of economic regulators, especially the role of prices and money. The differing views that emerged were clearly indicated by the summing up provided by the Director of the National Office of Price Determination, Bela Csikos-Nagy, on the last day of the conference:

In view of the remarks made in the course of the discussion, we certainly cannot conclude that there are no differences of opinion among the delegations concerning the role of prices. It is by no means true that progress was made on all the questions discussed - e.g. how to make the function of money more effective, or in defining the conditions of an internal price mechanism which would be adequate to the generally accepted targets of integration. Only the Polish and Hungarian delegations were actively concerned with this question. Problems of foreign trade, domestic prices, and foreign currency were inadequately discussed both in speeches and lectures (Vilaggazdasag, 20 November 1970).

Unfortunately - with the exception of Vilaggazdasag, 18-20 November 1970 - the Hungarian press published only summary and incomplete reports on this extremely interesting conference. We cannot draw final conclusions - even from these reports - concerning the differences of opinion which existed among the delegations. Further, the conference was of a scientific nature and it is not quite clear whether the opinions expressed were only the personal views of those attending the conference or how far these opinions could be considered official standpoints. It is certain, however, that only the Hungarian and Polish delegations shared the same progressive views about the role of prices and

money relations in integration. Vilaggazdasag gave a detailed account of the remarks of Professor Soldaczuk (Poland) on this problem:

The development of co-operation is considerably hampered by the fact that there is no possibility of calculating objectively the effectiveness of the mutual division of labor among the members of Comecon. The system of bilateral trade agreements does not guarantee the adequate co-ordination of economic development plans and trends, and does not encourage the expansion of trade. The Comecon countries should work out a new, more flexible system of interstate economic agreements - based on the principle of comprehensiveness - which would assist the introduction in practice of a multilateral system of settling accounts. Comecon integration should be open and world market prices should play a considerable role in price calculation.

The Bulgarian, East German and Soviet delegates expressed a more conservative view (Vilaggazdasag did not record any Rumanian or Czech contributions to the conference and it is quite possible that these countries were not in fact represented).

The Bulgarian economist V. Ivanova, for example, said that: "prices cannot be a basic guiding factor in the specialization of production". According to Professor Grebig (GDR): "By the co-ordination of national economic plans, and by the central co-ordination of economic policies, the socialist countries take into account the fact that the international socialization of labor postulates a form of goods-money exchange between the socialist countries". In the opinion of Yurii Samrai (USSR): "Goods exchange is determined primarily by demand and not by prices".

There is obviously no identity of views between the member countries of Comecon concerning methods of implementing economic co-operation and, as Rezso Nyers aptly remarked at the congress: "We must be aware of the fact that we will be occupied by the theory as well as the practical problems of socialist economic integration for a long time to come".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

### NATIONALISATION MOVES GAIN MOMENTUM

Zambia, Nigeria and Kenya are taking similar steps towards the Africanisation of their economies.

Nationalisation of important sectors of the economy has been announced in three African states - Zambia, Nigeria and Kenya. The moves in Zambia, which are nearest to implementation and the most sweeping, virtually complete the programme aimed at bringing about a Zambian economic "revolution", first outlined in President Kaunda's Mulungushi Declaration on April 19, 1968.

Speaking at the close of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) National Council meeting at Mulungushi on November 10, President Kaunda announced that the State is to acquire a 51 per cent interest in all private banks, fully take over all building societies, and make the Zambian National Insurance Company the sole insurance agent. These moves follow the State take-over in April 1968, of 28 foreign-run industrial and commercial enterprises which had been working in monopoly or near-monopoly conditions, and the government's acquisition last January of 51 per cent of Zambia's two major copper mining companies, the Anglo-American Corporation and the Roan Selection Trust, together with the reversion of all Zambia's mineral rights to the State.

The State-owned industries are now controlled by the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) which negotiated compensation terms based on the book value of the shares. The take-over of the mining companies was also negotiated by INDECO, but on April 1, a new subsidiary to control the mines was set up under the Chairmanship of President Kaunda - the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). The new portfolio of national financial investment is to be administered by another new State subsidiary - the Financial Development Corporation (FINDECO).

In announcing the take-over of the banks, President Kaunda made it clear that this was only part of a scheme to improve the banking system in Zambia. At present, all five existing banks are concentrated in urban areas, with few branches in the rural areas where their services are necessary. An attempt to remedy this situation had been made when the Zambian National

Commercial Bank was established, in particular to cope with the needs of farmers seeking loans and credit, but development had been slow. President Kaunda therefore announced that it had been decided to direct the merger of Barclays Bank with the National Commercial Bank, and to set up a new bank, Barclays Bank of Zambia, in which the State would have a 51 per cent share and Barclays Bank DCO 49 per cent. A second national bank would emerge through the Standard Bank selling the State 51 per cent of its shares. The two new banking institutions would absorb the remaining two smaller banks, National and Grindlays Bank and the Commercial Bank, while the Merchant Bank would also be subject to a 51 per cent State take-over and operation within the new State banking system.

The closing-down of a number of foreign insurance companies will not be completed until the end of 1971, but companies will not be able to make out new policies after the end of this year. The companies will hand over to the existing State insurance company. This move is intended to save foreign exchange, an important consideration since the fall in the price of copper, Zambia's main foreign exchange earner.

#### Trading reforms

The President also announced other measures to complete the Mulungushi programme of reforms. He claimed that a really efficient Zambian business nucleus in the trading field had already been built up since April, 1968, and announced that from the beginning of 1972 retail and wholesale trading would be done by Zambian businessmen, State companies and co-operatives. The Minister of Trade subsequently defined those categories of trade which would remain open to expatriate terms upon due application. The President also announced a further list of categories of trading which would be reserved to Zambian or State companies, and added that transport and building firms should also be entirely Zambian-controlled from the beginning of 1972. President Kaunda said he was confident that these measures would give further impetus to Zambian enterprise, but that there were plenty of opportunities for expatriates in industry and agriculture, if they would move from distribution to production. However, some foreign-owned companies still enjoyed a monopoly position and had so far failed to offer the government

a controlling interest; he called on them to contact INDECO and offer 51 per cent of their shares. The companies mentioned included Lever Brothers, the National Milling Company, Duncan Gilbey and Matheson Ltd., and BAT-Rothmans. The President also announced the revocation of the trading licences of a number of other companies, whose operations, he said, had not been found to be in the national interest.

While the Zambian economic revolution is thus almost completed, the first signs of similar moves have been noted in Kenya. On November 17, the Chairman of the Transport Licensing Board, Mr. J.K. Gatuguta, said that any transport company which did not plan to offer at least 51 per cent of its shares to the government would not be licensed next year.

In Nigeria, Major-General Yakubu Gowon, the Head of State, launched the Second National Development Plan on November 12, and announced that "to correct the extremely low level of Nigerian control and ownership of industrial investments" the government will hold at least 55 per cent of the equities in each of the "strategic" industries reserved for public sector control - the iron and steel complex, petro-chemical industries and petroleum products. No details have yet been given of how the Nigerian Government plans to do this, but General Gowon stressed that foreign investment and technical and managerial know-how would continue to be welcomed. Other large and medium-scale industries, such as plantations, food and forest industries, building materials and construction industries will be run as mixed ventures in which government and private indigenous participation which envisages a total investment of nearly 35 per cent of their equity. The plan, which envisages a total investment of nearly £ 2,000,000 from the public and private sectors, covers the period 1970-74. Its main priorities are post-war national reconstruction and developments in industry, transport, agriculture, education and health.

## CULTURE

### THE CRISIS OF SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCES

Summary: Presently a lively discussion is taking place in the Soviet Union among professors of political economy on the question of what should be done to improve university-level research and teaching in Soviet social sciences. As has happened in the course of a similar discussion in the Soviet Ukraine in which physicists and other natural scientists participated professors of economics have described in agonizing detail the poor conditions in their field. They have complained especially about the lack of progress in basic research. Others have mentioned the necessity of overcoming a lack of information in this field.

The journal of the Ministry for Higher and Middle School Education in the USSR, Ekonomicheskie nauki, published last year a letter to the editor from Professor G. Kharachasyan in which he described the miserable conditions in the social sciences at Soviet universities, especially in the field of political economy. (1) This letter was to find a ringing echo. In the more recent issues of the same journal, several letters to the editor from university professors have been published on the same topic. A discussion has begun of the various suggestions for improving research and teaching, especially in the field of political economy.

A review of the major aspects of this discussion is interesting for many reasons, and it contributes to an understanding of the problems which this scientific field is facing in the Soviet Union.

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(1) G. Kharachashjan, "Uluchshit' organizaciju nauchnich issledovaniy," Ekonomicheskie nauki, No. 11, 1969, pp. 125 et. seq.

In contrast to the natural scientists, the social scientists are themselves very much caught up in the concepts and institutions of the Soviet system. For this reason, a large role is played in the discussion by such questions as : what new apparatuses should be created in order to introduce progress into the field; how should they be organized and directed; should they be created at the Ministry for Higher and Middle School Education on the basis of the institutions which already exist, etc. Generally, those involved in the discussion agree that scientific soviets should be formed on a basis similar to institutions of higher learning and that they should be responsible, above all, for the direction of research. Other suggestions advance the idea of constituting these soviets on a territorial basis and of giving them a different form than that of the universities.

These discussions on the form which the new apparatus should assume are marked by one important characteristic which should not be overlooked. Up until now, it has been the practice that the chairman of the department of political economy (as well as in other social sciences) was empowered to make all decisions concerning admissions, dissertations and research grants. As the ties between the social sciences and the Party are very close it was possible for the department chairman to play such a role. Everything he did was based on directives, policy notes and other regulations handed down by the party, that is, by the Academy for Social Sciences at the CC of the CPSU with which all chair holders in social sciences are directly connected.

These statements indicate that the discussion about the directing apparatuses for social sciences in fact reflect the crisis and the failures of the organizational system responsible in the first instance.

However, in the context of these discussions references were also made to the problem of the identity of the social scientist as an individual. Professor A. Bychkov, a doctor of economic sciences, and the docents M. Evseev and K. Mogil'nickaya (all three from Tomsk) said the following in their letter:

In organizing the scientific research of the universities, it would be incorrect to proceed only from (the standpoint of) centralism. In scientific endeavor as nowhere else, personal

interest in the topic and enthusiasm for it play an enormous role. (2)

As Kharachashyan, who actually got the discussion going, already reported, more than one-half of the professors for social sciences have neither a scientific title nor degree. The level of research in the social science departments is very low. Some topics are researched in duplicate or triplicate while others are ignored completely, and repetitions often occur in the distribution of topics for dissertations and research grants.

The candidates of economic sciences S. Lemenev and V. Semenko, both from the Ural Polytechnical Institute, note that basic research in political economy is limited to very few works. They also point out that very few of the university teachers have the proper educational foundation upon which to base their teaching. Many of the political economy instructors have no specialized training and make no efforts to acquire the same, while they do not participate in research at all. Thus, the improvement in the qualification level of the personnel at the pedagogical institutes is of utmost importance, and the universities in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev should concentrate on this problem. (3)

The candidate of economic sciences and docent I. Salun says that the following minimum requirements must be met in order to achieve a real improvement in research work in the area of the social sciences, and of political economy especially:

a) up-to-date and complete information for the scientists about the problems in their area of research. . . . . Unfortunately, most of the instructors in the political economy departments of the universities not only don't inform themselves, but they cannot even receive the material they must have from the Central Statistical Agency of the USSR and the responsible authorities.

b) the necessity to assure that the professors

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(2) Ibid., No. 8, 1970, p. 126.

(3) Ibid., No. 9, 1970, p. 124.

engaged in research receive a minimum material compensation.

c) sufficient financing of scientific research and publication of the results of scientific activity. (4)

Salun, as did the other participants in the discussion, stresses that there is a lack of "creative discussion", both of present-day scientific topics as well as of the results of the various research projects: "Unfortunately, there are very rarely any creative discussions; only a small portion of the scientists is invited to participate in them, and the results of these discussions are rarely published, and (even then) in a truncated and degraded form.

This discussion confirms the conclusion that interested and able professors have gone on record publicly in order to rid their fields of deficiencies. It need but be recalled that the Party, in numerous resolutions, has dealt specifically with the unsatisfactory state of the social sciences, but apparently (as these discussions would indicate) with little success as far as the professors of economics are concerned. This is much more than simply a mood or current within a limited specialized field for it is precisely the social sciences which suffer from the highest degree of partinost, and are therefore extremely sterile, orthodox and dogmatic.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

#### GENERATION GAP AMONG BULGARIAN SCIENTISTS

In its November 22 issue the Sofia daily Otechestven Front published a very long article, entitled "Young and Old in Science" by Professor Kiril Vassilev (b. 1918). Vassilev is a deputy director of the BCP CC Institute for the History of the BCP, where he serves under the directorship of David Elazar (b. 1920). The unusual length of the article and the arguments it contains give food for speculation that relationships between young and old representatives of the intelligentsia are not as smooth as officialdom tries to make out and that there is a widening "generation gap" between scientists representing various age

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(4) Op. Cit., p. 127

groups.

Vassilev said that he would discuss the impact of age on the effectiveness of scientific work, adding that frequently there have been cases of dissatisfaction with the performance of young and old scientists. The former are usually accused of lack of experience and of being easily carried away - ergo, they should not be given independent work. The latter, he believes, suffer from underestimation of their ability: the view is sometimes expressed that the older scientists no longer have any creative capacity, that they should be pensioned off earlier, and that nothing in the way of scientific achievement can be expected from them.

The author admitted the "objective truth" of the assertion that with the advance of age, the scientists begin to think in a "more stereotyped and dogmatic way", adding that the thought of aging people becomes conservative and routine as a result of exhaustion and arteriosclerosis. In order to present a balanced picture, which he has tried to do throughout the article, Vassilev stressed that despite these general trends, dogmatism was not the product of physiological conditions alone. "Concrete facts show", he continued, "that today there are not a few youthful dogmatists, whose thought is in a conservative groove, while at the same time there are 'old men' who are antidogmatists and passionately defend the new truth".

Vassilev then attempted a lengthy analysis of the creative work of several internationally known scientists and reached the conclusion that the so-called "middle age" of the scientist is most fruitful from an intellectual point of view. This age group, he said, comprises people whose ages range between 30 and 50. In assessing the assets and the disadvantages of young and old scientists, Vassilev tried to be as balanced as possible, apparently in the fear of antagonizing people, but he could not hide a slightly more critical attitude toward dogmatically minded older scientists. Summing up, he said that the young scientist, as a rule, "is able to crush dogma of any kind more easily than an older scientist, and displays great creative boldness". On the other hand, scientists who are above the 50-55 age group, and especially those in their late sixties, find the creation of new theoretical systems more difficult, while their thoughts are usually more conventional, more traditional and more conservative. "Historical facts show", added Vassilev, "that advanced age does not sufficiently stimulate

epoch-making thinking".

In conclusion, he appealed to scientific collectives and institutes not to deprive themselves of "the wisdom and experience of older cadres and the boldness and creative daring of youth". This concluding remark, as well as the whole article, is an indication of the existence of undercurrents among the most advanced part of Bulgaria's intelligentsia and of a "generation gap" between the dogmatically-minded intellectuals in all spheres of political and social life (whose protagonist is Politburo member Todor Pavlov), and young or middle-aged intellectuals who are not ideologically discredited by political involvement in the pre-1956 era and are therefore, not expected to make compromises with their consciences. Vassilev's ideas and arguments, as well as his concluding remarks, are apparently intended to reach a compromise and ensure a "co-operation", but the possibility of such "co-operation" is questionable as long as the intellectual and ideological spheres are dominated by stubborn representatives of the older generation.

Vassilev's article may also be interpreted in a broader sense. The impact of age can be a factor not only in the creative work of scientists, but also in the performance of anyone involved in any sort of social activity, political life included. Although it may be mere coincidence that the article has appeared during the preparations for the 10th Party Congress, scheduled for April 1971, it provides food for thought among those concerned with the composition of future Party and state ruling bodies - the latter of which include a number of executive officials of ripe years, to put it mildly. It is not out of the question that the theme of "co-operation" will be played once again by the Party, while official reactions to Vassilev's article (if any) may reveal something of the intentions of the current Party leadership as far as its most vulnerable "old-timers" are concerned.

#### PARTY CONCERN OVER SCIENTISTS

Summary: Activities and trends of opinion among the Soviet scientific elite are worrying the authorities.

Because of the high degree of specialisation needed to understand their work, scientists might seem to be a less easy target for ideological surveillance than writers and artists - but in the

Soviet Union, as in other Communist countries, they have had their share of persecution and interference. Stalin's excursion into the field of genetics during the Michurin-Lysenko controversy and his brush with the economist Evgeny Varga were two cases where the issues had clear political connotations. To a régime committed to revolutionary change, Lysenko's rejection of the classical chromosome theory in favour of heredity determined by environment was as convenient as Varga's over-objective evaluation of the strength of the capitalist system was inexpedient. Again, when Khrushchev tried to solve the agricultural problem by turning the Virgin Lands into granaries, Lysenko provided academic support for this over-ambitious scheme. Since the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in 1966, Soviet scientists have been increasingly involved in the struggle against neo-Stalinism as part of the general movement for civil liberties, rather than as a reaction against specific interference in their own research.

When interrogated by the secretary in charge of ideology of the Leningrad city party committee, R.I. Pimenov (the mathematician arrested last July), stated that his involvement in social and political issues sprang from the feeling of insecurity and fears for personal safety that scientists had been feeling increasingly since the end of 1966. The samizdat (underground) publication Chronicle of Current Events (No. 15, August 31, 1970), quoted Pimenov as saying that without "confidence in the morrow" it was impossible to have "narrow specialists occupied solely with their science and not at all interested in social issues". The régime would of course like scientists to be committed, but to political causes of its own choosing.

A commentary on the career of the rocket expert, Werner von Braun, in the September issue of Novy Mir (a journal still occasionally lively though much less polemical since the resignation of its editor, Tvardovsky) attacked the concept of science for science's sake and praised scientists who "consider themselves responsible for everything which happens on earth". Novy Mir quoted the names of some German experts who had either openly defied Hitler's régime or quietly sabotaged it. It also mentioned Einstein, Oppenheimer and others as men of science who had dissociated themselves from evil in their countries. In dwelling on the difficulties of scientists under a totalitarian system, the commentary was clearly hitting at

targets nearer home. It held up as examples scientists who have "raised their voices more than once, cautioning the politicians... against lawlessness".

#### Confined to asylum

The case of Dr Pimenov, who until his arrest worked in the Leningrad branch of the Steklov mathematical institute, typifies the kind of problem facing the authorities. According to the Chronicle, he was interned in a psychiatric hospital in 1949 after his resignation from the Communist youth league, but obtained his release the following year on condition that he would withdraw his resignation from the Komsomol. Subsequently he was expelled both from the Komsomol and the university, and then reinstated. In March, 1957, Pimenov was arrested again, together with B. V. Vail and others, and in August he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment on charges of "anti-Soviet" activities, the most important of which seems to have been his protest at the use of Soviet tanks to crush the 1956 Hungarian uprisings. At the beginning of 1957 the sentences of all the defendants were increased at the instigation of the Leningrad Procurator's Office, but in 1963 Pimenov was conditionally released. He embarked on a successful academic career, crowned in 1969 by a Doctor's degree. Last April, however, the flats of both Pimenov and Vail (released from prison in September, 1965) were searched. Among material confiscated was the widely circulated essay on Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom by the Soviet nuclear scientist and Academician, Andrei Sakharov, a message from the writer Andrei Sinyavsky, an open letter from the wife of another dissident, Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko, the "2,000 Words" manifesto of the Czechoslovak writers demanding political change, and an appeal to world opinion by Pavel Litvinov, now in exile for demonstrating against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Pimenov and Vail's trial was reported to have taken place in mid-October in Kaluga (a town south-west of Moscow where the writer Yuli Daniel has settled since his release in September) in the presence of several eminent Soviet scientists, including Sakharov, who demanded access to the proceedings in a letter to the Kaluga Regional Court.

Already in 1966 Sakharov, "father of the Soviet H-bomb", had protested against the introduction into the RSFSR Criminal

Code of article 190/1, under which Pimenov was tried, as endangering the exercise of civil liberties guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. Earlier this year the intervention of Sakharov and other scientists was instrumental in the release of their colleague, Dr Jaurès Medvedev, from a mental hospital in Kaluga. The fact that the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, M. Keldysh, was associated with the protest against Medvedev's detention, and his distinguished sister intervened successfully on an earlier occasion on behalf of the poet and mathematician Esenin-Volpin, a determined supporter of the human rights movement, encouraged hopes that Pimenov, too, would be released. But both he and Vail were sentenced to five years' exile.

In mid-November came the unofficial news that Sakharov and two other scientists, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Vasily Chalidze, had formed a non-political "creative association" devoted to developing the concept and practice of human rights in the Soviet Union "in accordance with the laws of the State". Like the letter recently sent to the Soviet Press by the famous cellist, Mstislav Rostropovich, who deplored the attacks on the Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenytsin and the general lack of artistic freedom under the Soviet system, the scientists' protest activities are placing the authorities in a quandary. It is relatively easy to proceed against little-known intellectuals and civil rights agitators, but quite a different matter when the voices of dissent belong to figures of such prominence.

#### Official reaction

The authorities are showing signs of unease at the restive mood of the scientific community. Last August the RSFSR newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossia, revealed that Akadengorodok, the scientific centre at Novosibirsk, long publicised as one of the régime's show-pieces, had been nurturing avant-garde discussion groups and literary clubs where nefarious "bourgeois" ideas were propagated. On October 13 Pravda followed this up with an attack on the organiser of a club, Mikhail Makarenko, a 45-year-old scientist with an interest in art, confirming earlier clandestine reports that he had been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for "speculation" and other undesirable activities, of which the article gave no clear idea. Moskovskaya Pravda

reported on November 12 that a Moscow city party committee session, mainly devoted to criticism of Lyubimov's Taganka Theatre, had also concerned itself with the ideological instability of scientists. A Moscow district party secretary was quoted as having referred to the "political short-sightedness" displayed by some "representatives of the scientific and technological intelligentsia", said to be unable to withstand bourgeois influences or to judge current phenomena from a class standpoint.

The recent investigation of the Lebedev Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences and of its party committee was the subject of a resolution reported in October in the journal Party Life (No. 21, 1970). The Institute's members, which include many eminent scientists such as Academicians Tamm and Sakharov, were accused of tolerating the "unscientific and idealistic concepts of bourgeois scientists". It urged them to study Marxist-Leninist theory and apply it to their professional and public activities, so as to foster an "irreconcilable attitude to the ideological concepts of anti-Communism and revisionism" - presumably a reference to the ideas of convergence and "Socialism with a human face" known to attract many Soviet scientists. Senior scientists were criticised, too, for having no links with junior staff associations and for paying little attention to the guidance of the young. Every young scientist, the resolution said, should be imbued with "the best features of the Soviet intelligentsia: ideological conviction, Soviet patriotism, love of labour and high moral qualities".

The scientific work being done at the Institute was also criticised. The resolution deplored that some scientists were engaged in trivial projects of no long-term significance and suggested that they should concentrate on fundamental research and development of newer branches of physics with an eye to their practical use. The régime's dilemma here, as in other fields, is how to concede enough freedom to enable the scientists to carry on their research and produce the required results, while preventing them from using that freedom to question Marxist-Leninist philosophy and method and the whole basis of Soviet society.

The list of candidates for membership and corresponding membership of the USSR Academy of Sciences, published in Izvestia on November 4, included some names of particular political interest. The nomination of Dzherman Gvishiani,

Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, proposed for corresponding membership in the Department of Philosophy and Law, seemed to be due as much to his ability (demonstrated in his recently published doctoral thesis on Organisation and Management) as to the fact that he is Kosygin's son-in-law. The inclusion in the list of five dissident mathematicians who signed the 1968 protest letter about the incarceration of Esenin-Volpin in a mental home (among them S.P. Novikov, nephew of Keldysh) brought some reassurance that for the time being the party is reluctant to antagonise public opinion in general, and the Soviet scientific community in particular, by wholesale reprisals. But the ideological campaign is being stepped up in preparation for the 24th Communist Party Congress next March. Pravda of November 23 carried a front-page leader which cited the resolution on the work of the Lebedev Institute and again exhorted scientists and youth to show "absolute intolerance" of bourgeois ideology and morality.

#### THE KGB AND SOVIET DISSENT

Summary: Because of the nature of, and world-wide publicity given to, Soviet liberal dissent, the KGB appears to be tempering its traditional methods with efforts to influence public opinion.

The Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in an open letter to the Swedish Academy on November 17, 1970, explaining why he would not go to Stockholm personally to receive his Nobel Prize for Literature, spoke of "the hostile attitude towards my prize shown in the national (Soviet) Press..... the baiting of my books, the dismissals from jobs and the expulsion from institutes for reading them...." This official attitude, which compelled him to believe that if he made the journey he would be barred from returning home, throws light of the way in which the Soviet authorities, and particularly the secret police (KGB), are adapting their methods to cope with persistent intellectual dissent.

In his letter to the 1967 Writers' Congress (1) Solzhenitsyn

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(1) Quoted in In Quest of Justice, Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today, ed. A. Brumberg, Pall Mall Press, London, 1970

revealed that numerous manuscripts had been taken from him; selected passages were extracted and circulated to an "unidentified select circle" with the aim of blackening his character. (The KGB subsequently made some of these manuscripts available abroad, presumably to identify Solzhenitsyn with the "anti-Soviet" cause and thus prepare the way for a trial). The writer also gave details of the slanders deliberately spread about him:

"It is being said that I served time as a criminal or surrendered to the enemy (I was never a prisoner of war), that I 'betrayed' my country and 'served the Germans'. That is the interpretation now being put on the 11 years I spent in the camps and in exile for having criticised Stalin".

Clearly the KGB now feels it has to go to the trouble of influencing such domestic and foreign public opinion about the heterodox intellectuals and of concocting evidence for the courts - even to the point of getting KGB psychiatrists to certify defendants. As an official once said to Andrei Amalrik (currently serving a three-year sentence): "The Committee (i. e. the KGB) is not what it was. In the old days you would have disappeared for 20 years. ...."

The KGB's new-found concern for the form of law and legal proceedings is paralleled by the growing awareness among Soviet intellectuals that the provisions of the law can be exploited to some extent. Exponents of the "civil rights" movement insist on their rights under the law and Constitution. Defendants in political trials have followed Sinyavsky and Daniel in their pioneering pleas of "Not Guilty". Defence counsel sometimes put up an excellent defence of their clients, even though some lose their jobs as a result. On at least one recent occasion the courts have refused to try a political case (that of Levitin-Krasnov) for wellgrounded legal reasons.

The role of the KGB has also been influenced by changing policies within the Soviet leadership itself. In 1969, one of the best-known young dissenters, Yuri Galanskov, analysed the KGB's response to the de-Stalinisation ushered in by the 1956 Party Congress. In an appeal to Western Communist Parties, smuggled out of the camp where he was serving seven years' hard labour, he noted that it had become evident that allowing

the KGB to have too much influence in internal affairs "leads to..... the KGB's degeneration". Its authority, therefore, "dropped noticeably and the KGB itself was significantly weakened". He continued:

"For this reason, in the years which followed, the KGB strove to boost the danger of cases with political motives.... in the eyes of the authorities in order to scare them and to raise its own authority and significance in matters concerning security and political stability. This is perfectly understandable. As a result, the possibility of redundancies among the KGB's staff diminished and it became possible to depend on an increase in funds from the State...."

This device may explain the authorities' over-reaction to the case of Sinyavsky and Daniel, who in 1966 were sentenced to seven and five years' hard labour respectively amid shocked world opinion that extended even to many foreign Communist Parties.

#### Protest movement grows

As such over-reaction has in turn led to an upsurge in dissent. Whereas, for example, in his White Book on the Sinyavsky-Daniel case, Alexander Ginsburg was able to include less than 200 signatories of letters protesting either against the trial or an incident arising from it (the sacking from his job of a defence witness), by 1968, when Ginsburg himself and his colleagues were put on trial, the number of people known to have protested in writing had increased to 700. Although many of these signatories suffered as a result, the pattern of protest against KGB repression remains.

One important new feature of the protest movement is the growing involvement of highly respected figures from the cultural and scientific "establishment" - men such as Sakharov, "father of the Soviet H-bomb", and the cellist Rostropovich, both of whom have publicly demonstrated their aversion to neo-Stalinist practices. A Soviet scientist, Dr R. Pimenov, whose trial and sentencing to five years' exile in October, 1970, sparked off further protest, told a Leningrad ideological official before his trial that scientists had lost their feeling of personal safety since

about the end of 1966. (2) He said that their fear had forced them to seek the social reasons which gave rise to it: "a threat to personal safety impels one to study politics".

A record of this conversation was included in a samizdat ("self-published") compilation circulating within in the Soviet Union, the Chronicle of Current Events, whose first issue came out in April, 1968, and subsequent ones at the end of every second month. In general, the rise in samizdat output and the increasingly detailed and analytical nature of many of the documents testify to the increasing independence of thought and political maturity of dissenting intellectuals.

#### "Psychiatric" treatment

The KGB has striven to intimidate or incarcerate the more active members of the loosely-defined "democratic movement". Closed political trials are held - or avoided by simply sending the defendant to "special-type" psychiatric hospitals for an indefinite period. Conditions in these, as in prisons and labour camps are grim. Injections and other brutalities are inflicted on inmates of the asylums, where political dissenters often find themselves confined side by side with the genuinely insane.

The KGB also infiltrates dissident circles by means of informers and agents provocateurs. The trial of Ginsburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolsky and the typist Lashkova in January, 1968, provided an insight into its methods. Dobrovolsky, who had undergone spells both in a labour camp and in psychiatric hospitals in the past, turned State evidence and was rewarded with a mild sentence. The principal prosecution witness was a mysterious Venezuelan called Brocks-Sokolov. As A. Yakobson, a Moscow translator, wrote in a detailed exposé of the KGB-

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(2) The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel was held in February of that year; in September, additions were made to the Russian Federation's Criminal Code, which serves as a model for legislation throughout the USSR, providing penalties of up to three years' hard labour for "the dissemination of conscious fabrications discrediting the Soviet State and social order" and "the organisation of or participation in group activities which violate the public order".

inspired accounts of the case which appeared in the Soviet Press, the intention was to suggest that Brocks-Sokolov and the four defendants belonged to the same foreign espionage organisation. But Yakobson asked: "The question is: how can spying equipment belonging to Brocks, who came to our country in December, 1967, convict people who were in prison under investigation from January, 1967, to January 1968?..." Although the KGB's handling of this case was inept, the presence of the foreigner probably did serve to smear the defendants in the eyes of some Soviet citizens.

### ALEKSANDROV'S ATTACK ON SOVIET WRITERS

Summary: Yesterday Pravda published a long attack by I. Aleksandrov on Tarsis, Kuznetsov, Bukovsky and Solzhenitsyn. The latter is evidently the main target. The language used is reminiscent of Semichastny's denunciation of Boris Pasternak, when the latter was awarded the Nobel Prize. It is also the most violent outburst against Soviet writers since the campaign directed at Sinyavsky and Daniel before their trial in 1966. Then too preparations for a Party Congress were under way. This paper suggests that the main fear underlying Aleksandrov's article is of the Human Rights Committee, on which scientists and writers, including Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, are now joined in an unprecedented organizational alliance excluding Communist Party members.

Pravda yesterday published a long article, by I. Aleksandrov, which is probably the most sweeping condemnation of the dissident Soviet writers since well before the 23rd Party Congress (in 1966), at the time when Sinyavsky and Daniel were being "worked over" before trial.

It is signed by I. Aleksandrov, a name believed in the West to be the nom de plume of a high Party or Agitprop official who became notorious in 1968 for his threatening articles on the dangers of "reformism" and "right revisionists" in Czechoslovakia.

The most significant aspect of its is its indiscriminate denunciation of a whole group of prominent but widely differing literary personalities, starting with Valery Tarsis but including Anatoly Kuznetsov, Andrei Amalrik and Vladimir Bukovsky, while concentrating mainly on Solzhenitsyn.

The evident fear which Aleksandrov displays of Solzhenitsyn's influence and renown in the light of the award of the Nobel Prize is shown by the fact that here he uses language worthy only of V. Semichastny's fulminations against Boris Pasternak, on a similar occasion during the Khrushchev regime. This terminology is unprecedented in the past year or two, when the Party was careful not to direct personal insults against Solzhenitsyn.

Yet now Aleksandrov describes him as a "spiritual internal emigre, alien and hostile to the whole life of the Soviet people", and says that: "expelled from the Writers Union and condemned by the Soviet public for his behavior, Solzhenitsyn has fallen into a dirty refuse pit". (1)

As if this were not enough, Aleksandrov goes on to include the Nobel Prize winner among what he calls a "pitiful handful of renegades, begging for whisky and cigarettes in exchange for dirty inventions".

The same technique of vulgar abuse is also applied to Amalrik, the author of "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?", who is described as a "half-educated slanderer". (2)

Another member of the literary opposition is the novelist, Anatoly Kuznetsov, whom Aleksandrov describes as "marked by a pathological hatred of the Soviet people". Pravda readers are also told that Valery Tarsis is "not a writer but a candidate for a mental hospital", a fate which in fact he probably avoided by emigrating to Britain in 1966. Since Kuznetsov also has lived in Britain since 1969, it seems almost certain that part of Aleksandrov's purpose is to blacken Solzhenitsyn's reputation by linking him with emigres or, as in the case of Amalrik, with a political prisoner.

Why should so much fury suddenly be unleashed against Solzhenitsyn, now that the publicity concerning the Nobel Prize

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(1) Pravda, 17 December 1970.

(2) Amalrik was recently sentenced to 3 years in a "strict regime" prison camp (Sunday Times, 22 November 1970).

has begun to die down? Surely the answer must lie in Solzhenitsyn's courageous decision to associate himself, as a corresponding member, with Andrei Sakharov's unique Human Rights Committee - the only known organization in the USSR from which Communist Party members are excluded by the standing rules.

Sakharov' Committee, which was formed by a group of three scientists, has only held one known meeting since its formation. On that occasion it significantly expanded its activity by granting corresponding membership not only to Solzhenitsyn but also to two other members of the cultural opposition, Aleksandr Galich, a singer, and Yesenin Volpin, the famous poet and mathematician who has a longer record of dissident political activity for civil rights than any of the other scientists and intellectuals on the Committee.

It is probably this alliance between scientists and artists, in an apparently illegal organization devoted to human rights, which is most worrying the Aleksandrov's in the Kremlin and in Pravda. The literary opposition can be, and frequently is, jailed, beaten up, exiled, or banished. But it is much harder for the Party to treat its top scientists in the same way, and so far the treatment of Yesenin Volpin and Sakharov, to give only two examples, has been far milder than the punishments meted out to men such as Amalrik or Sinyavsky.

Another aspect of Aleksandrov's article which requires comment is its xenophobia. Tarsis and Kuznetsov are easy targets in this respect, living as they do in Britain. But of Amalrik, Aleksandrov writes:

He decided to earn his living in the offices of certain Western publications. Almost every day he visited foreign correspondents, bringing dirty rumors and gossip from which reliable reports were later written.

Since Amalrik has been sent to prison already, this type of smear technique is presumably intended to blacken Solzhenitsyn by association. But it is also meant to discredit the Western press and radio stations, as is evident from the fact that Aleksandrov singles out "Time", "The Washington Post", and the "New York Times" for special criticism.

His sensitivity concerning Vladimir Bukovsky, the poet, can scarcely be due to the articles about him in the Washington Post,

since virtually no Pravda readers, apart from Aleksandrov, are allowed to see the newspaper. But Bukovsky has spent six years in prison, asylum or labor camps, (3) and became internationally known when he sent a letter to the Greek Communist composer, Mikis Theodorakis, asking him to visit Soviet prison camps and psychiatric hospitals. (4) As a result of a BBC television program, in which Bukovsky described the various forms of physical torture used in Soviet mental hospitals, (5) his name became widely known in the USSR as well, when the transcript of the program was broadcast to Russia by Western stations. The impact of the broadcasts in the USSR must have been considerable for Aleksandrov now to mention Bukovsky in an article primarily designed as a condemnation of Solzhenitsyn.

Perhaps the only encouraging feature of Aleksandrov's 2,500 words is that, for the first time, Solzhenitsyn's books, The First Circle and The Cancer Ward are given wide publicity in the Soviet press. Since neither story has been printed in the USSR, this is tantamount to an admission that many of the dissident intellectuals are by now known to have read samizdat copies - otherwise Aleksandrov would surely have refrained from giving free publicity to two works which are seen as being so dangerous to Soviet society.

There is, possibly, another explanation for Aleksandrov's outburst against the West and against Soviet writers who sympathize with Western ideals of human rights, personal liberty, and freedom to travel. The last installment of "Khrushchev Remembers" has been published in the West. It contains Khrushchev's most pertinent question: "Why should we build a good life and then keep our borders bolted with seven locks?"

There are many Soviet intellectuals and probably a number of Party officials who feel the same about contacts with the West, and it may well be the case that the evidence of a former First Secretary of the CC, CPSU, wanting to "unbolt" the borders was

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(3) New York Sunday News, 17 May 1970.

(4) AP, 5 June 1970.

(5) Reuter, 29 August 1970.

felt to be so dangerous as to require a counter-offensive. There must also be many prominent Soviet officials who felt that the borders should be "unbolted" just long enough to allow Solzhenitsyn both to accept his prize in Stockholm and to return to his own country.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the greatest anti-Stalinist prose writer, Solzhenitsyn, and the best-known anti-Stalinist poet, Yevgeni Yevtushenko, should have been criticized in the Soviet press on the same day. Yevtushenko's hard-hitting poem, "Stalin's Heirs", was also passed for publication by Khrushchev, like Solzhenitsyn's One Day..... And on December 17 Literary Gazette published yet another in its long series of attacks on Yevtushenko, saying his work is "hasty and sometimes superficial".

This time the speaker was Vasily Federov, a poet, who took exception to Yevtushenko's poem "Kazan University" at a meeting of the Writers Union of the RSFSR. (6) Federov's impression of the poem is that it portrays Lenin as having only joined the revolutionary movement to revenge his executed elder brother. It does, and he did.

As Mr. Peter Reddaway has put it:

For reasons clear to the psychologist, Sasha's execution in 1887 transformed Lenin from an apolitical schoolboy into a radical to be reckoned with. (7)

For Federov to claim that Yevtushenko is mistaken on this issue proves only that Federov is better as a party poet than as a student of Lenin. But there may be another reason for an attack on Yevtushenko at this time. It is known that he is one of the more prominent writers in a group (including Aleksandr Tvardovsky, Aleksandr Shteyn and Aleksei Garbuzov, a playwright) who protested to the Writers Union in November 1969, against

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(6) Reuter, 17 December 1970

(7) Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader, by L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway, Pall Mall Press, London 1967, p. 40

Solzhenitsyn's expulsion. (8) It is therefore at least possible that Yevtushenko, who is known to favor "unbolting the borders", has also recently protested against the official treatment of Solzhenitsyn in the award of the Nobel Prize.

One thing is certain: the Aleksandrov handling of the Solzhenitsyn case, with its echoes of Semichastny labelling Boris Pasternak "a pig", and Federov's discovery of deviation even in the devotional "Kazan University", seem to bear out fully what Solzhenitsyn wrote in The First Circle:

After all, the writer is the teacher of the people; surely that's what we've always understood? And a great writer -- forgive me, perhaps I should not say this, I'll lower my voice -- a great writer is, so to speak, a second government. That's why no regime anywhere has ever loved its great writers, only its minor ones. (9)

(Radio Free Europe Research)

#### IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION

by S. Kulakov

Soviet newspapers and magazines have long since gained a wide readership abroad, as shown by the steady increase in the number of subscribers and buyers. The All-Union Association Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the sole exporter of Soviet periodicals and books, supplies Soviet newspapers and journals to more than 100 countries.

The annual catalogues of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga offer the foreign reader about 1,300 newspapers, magazines and journals which cover every aspect of life in the USSR, and the Soviet peoples' economic and cultural achievements. These periodicals offer readers a good opportunity to keep abreast of the country's home and foreign policy and promote the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding between the USSR and other countries.

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(8) UPI, 28 November 1969.

(9) Harper and Row, N. Y. 1968, p. 358.

Pravda, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is the leading Soviet newspaper. Founded in 1912 by Lenin, this newspaper provides extensive news about current events in the USSR and abroad and carries articles on topical home and international problems. It publishes materials issued by Party Congresses and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, speeches by leaders of the Party and the state and outstanding figures of the Communist and working class movement.

Izvestia tells readers about the day-to-day work of the Soviet citizen, his successes scored in building a new life and the scientific and technological progress made in the Land of Soviets. This newspaper is published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and, therefore, provides a regular account of the activities of the Soviet Government and local government bodies. Izvestia prints official reports, news of major events throughout the world and comments of political observers.

Nedelya, the weekly supplement to Izvestia, is highly popular. Its many contributors present the main events of the week in an interesting way. It also carries many topical photographs.

Komsomolskaya Pravda, organ of the Central Committee of the Lenin Young Communist League of the Soviet Union, concentrates on the life of Soviet youth. It features polemical articles, reports of debates on moral and ethical issues, articles and stories about the life of young people in the USSR and abroad - all of which makes it popular not only among young people but other age groups as well.

Developments in the trade-union movement in the USSR are covered by Trud. It gives wide coverage to all new undertakings initiated by the Soviet working class and intelligentsia.

Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life) deals with problems of the Soviet villages, the life and work of the people engaged in agriculture.

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a military and political newspaper, is published by the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. It covers the wide range of activities engaged in by the Soviet Armed Forces and prints official reports and information bulletins.

The weekly Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta treats major questions of Soviet industry and agriculture. Attention is focussed on the economic reform, the operation of enterprises under the new

conditions, the use of economic instruments for increasing output and improving quality. This weekly raises important problems of national economic planning and management.

Many newspapers are aimed at specialists from specific fields such as culture, science, art, literature, and also at sports enthusiasts. These are Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Socialist Industry), Meditsinskaya Gazeta (Medical Gazette), Uchitelskaya Gazeta (Teachers' Gazette), Sovetskaya Kultura (Soviet Culture), Vodny Transport (Water Transport), Stroitel'naya Gazeta (Builders' Gazette) Sovetsky Sport (Soviet Sports), Futbol'khokkey (Football-Hockey), and others.

The weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta is one of the most popular Soviet newspapers. In addition to articles and essays by literary scholars and critics about the latest works of Soviet writers, playwrights and poets, it has discussion pages, and carries skits and humour and satire columns. It also publishes short stories, essays, excerpts from new novels and plays.

The Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad issues the newspaper Golos Rodiny (Voice of Motherland), which brings a wide range of information to those who for various reasons and at different times left the USSR but take an interest in its life. Its materials show how the traditions of Russian culture are cherished and the splendid natural beauties of the different parts of the country are preserved. Among its contributors are leading Soviet scientists, artists, cultural leaders and also foreign readers.

The magazine Otchisna (Homeland) is a literary illustrated supplement to Golos Rodiny (the Voice of the Motherland). It is sent to every subscriber of the latter newspaper. The magazine publishes literary works of different genres, photo stories about the life and work of Soviet people, and stories about the achievements of Soviet science, culture and technology.

A number of Republican Committees for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad issue newspapers in the respective languages in which they describe the life of their people, their culture and achievements in building communism. The newspaper Aireniki Dzain is published in Armenian, Golos Radzimy in Byelorussian, Dzimtenes Balsas in Lettish, Gimtasis Krashtas in Lithuanian, and Vesti's Ukrainy in Ukrainian.

A lot of newspapers are published in all the Union Republics, reflecting problems of the economy and culture and the life of

their people. The leading among them are: Sovetskaya Rossiya in the Russian Federation, Radvanska Ukraina in the Ukraine, Zvyazda in Byelorussia, Sovet Uzbekistoni in Uzbekistan, Sotsialistik Kazakhstan in Kazakhstan, Kommunist in Azerbaidjan, Cinia in Latvia, Tiesa in Lithuania.

Moscow News, published in English, French, Spanish and Arabic brings foreign readers extensive information about the life of the Soviet people, the main materials published in the Soviet press, TASS and Novosti Press Agency news releases and official documents on the home and foreign policy of the USSR.

Neues Leben issued in German in Moscow describes the life in the country and major international events.

Magazines and journals cover an exceptionally wide range, Kommunist, Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), Voprosy Ekonomiki (Problems of Economics), Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History), Voprosy Istorii KPSS (Problems of the CPSU History), Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya (World Economy and International Relations), and many other socio-political journals in the Russian language provide a detailed scientific analysis of various problems of economics, history, philosophy and international relations.

Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR (Papers from the USSR) Academy of Sciences), Atomnaya Energiya (Atomic Energy), Gornyy Zhurnal (Mining Journal), Stal (Steel), Elektrichestvo (Electricity) and other Soviet scientific and technical journals are widely known in many countries. They present material on the latest experimental and theoretical research being carried out in the most diverse branches of science and technology and material on the economic development of the USSR.

Selskokhozyaistvennaya Biologiya (Agrobiology), Tekhnika v Selskom Khozyaistve (Technology for Agriculture), Sovetskaya Meditsina (Soviet Medicine), Khirurgiya (Surgery) and other journals provide information about the development of agriculture, medicine, and the health services in the Soviet Union.

Questions of education are taken up in the journals Narodnoye Obrazovaniye (National Education), Sovetskaya Pedagogika (Soviet Pedagogics), Vestnik Vysshey Shkoly (Higher School Herald)

Novy Mir (New World), Okt'yabr (October), Moskva (Moscow), Zvezda (Star), Znamya (The Banner), Neva, Nash Sovremennik (Our Contemporary), Druzhiba Narodov (Friendship of the Peoples) and other literary journals publish new works of Soviet writers,

playwrights, poets and critics.

The weekly Ogonyok (Little Light) one of the most popular magazines, prints stories, poems, features, coloured photographs and reproductions of paintings by well-known Russian and Soviet artists.

Teatr (Theatre), Muzykalnaya Zhizn (Musical Life), Arkhitektura (Architecture), Dekorativnoye Iskusstvo SSSR (Decorative Art in the USSR) and other magazines and journals specialise in problems of art.

There are many magazines for young readers of different ages: Smena, Yunost (Youth), Tekhnika-Molodyozhi (Technology for Youth), Yuny Naturalist (The Young Naturalist) Yuny Tekhnik (The Young Technician), Murzilka, Vesyoliye Kartinki (Merry Pictures). All of them are attractively illustrated.

Krugozor (Panorama) socio-political literary and art monthly, in addition to articles, carries records.

Foreign readers who do not know Russian can learn about life in the Soviet Union from magazines, published in the USSR in foreign languages.

Soviet Union is a richly illustrated monthly published in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Hindi and twelve other languages. It offers a wide coverage of life in the Soviet Union, from economics and science to art and everyday life. Sports, medicine, social activities, space flights, cybernetics, education and the cinema - this list of subjects could be greatly extended.

Soviet woman, an illustrated monthly, presents a picture of the rich and varied life of Soviet women, how they bring up their children, work and fight for happiness and peace. It carries cooking and needlework hints, fashion news, and readily answers readers' questions. It is issued in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Hindi, Japanese and other languages.

The weekly New Times (issued in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Czech and Polish) is a reliable source of information on major aspects of international affairs. The magazine consistently champions world peace, business-like co-operation and peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems and the broad development of cultural ties among nations.

The monthly International Affairs covers questions of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy, problems of international relations, the foreign policy of other countries, international economic ties, the history of Soviet foreign policy and international relations.

The journal is issued in Russian, English and French. Its contributors are eminent Soviet scientists, journalists, experts specialising in problems of international relations and also foreign statesmen, leading public figures and journalists.

The monthly Foreign Trade is issued in Russian, English, Spanish, German and French. Its range of subjects includes: the theory and practice of economic relations of the USSR with foreign countries, trade and political measures of the Soviet Union, problems of development of trade and other forms of economic co-operation with foreign states, the international division of labour, general problems of international trade and economic co-operation, activities of international economic organisations, international liquidity and payments relations, monetary problems, the situation of the capitalist economy and world commodity markets. The journal regularly publishes statistics pertaining to Soviet foreign and international trade. Its supplement, Annual Statistical Survey of the Foreign Trade of the USSR, is published in Russian.

The monthly Soviet Literature, issued in English, Spanish, German and Polish, prints translations of new novels, stories and poems by well-known Soviet authors and also critical surveys.

The monthly Oeuvres et opinions in French acquaints readers with the works of Soviet writers, poets and artists. Much attention is paid to discussions of topical questions connected with artistic creation of literature and arts.

The illustrated monthly Culture and Life is published for a wide reading public in Russian, English, French, Spanish and German. It offers interesting articles about the various Union Republics, the life and work of Soviet people and the international cultural relations of the USSR. The monthly also contains special material for students of the Russian language.

Soviet Film, issued in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and Arabic, has won great popularity abroad with its articles on Soviet cinematography, pen portraits of Soviet film actors and actresses, directors and cameramen. It also prints reports on the work of Soviet film studios.

The Novosti Press Agency Publishing House issues Sputnik magazine, the first Soviet digest of the most interesting material selected from the Soviet Press on an extremely wide range of subjects. Issued in Russian, English, French and German, it is highly popular throughout the world.

Russky Yazyk za Rubezhom (The Russian Language Abroad) is a quarterly in Russian issued by the Russian Language Scientific Methodical Centre at the Moscow State University. It publishes articles by highly competent teachers well-known Soviet and foreign linguists and psychologists, and also articles by Soviet writers, literary scholars and journalists. It is designed for teachers, students, and all those who wish to improve their knowledge of the Russian language, Soviet life and culture.

Subscriptions for Soviet periodicals may be placed with organisations, firms and agencies, in different countries. Many newspapers and magazines are sold at news-stands and in book shops. The foreign reader has ample opportunities to receive information about the first country, where socialism triumphed, direct from the Soviet press.

(Foreign Trade, Moscow)

#### TEACHERS CONFLICT WITH LONG-HAIRED PUPILS

Summary: In the mid- 1950's, the depth of ladies' décolletages and the wild colors in men's ties were serious ideological problems in the Soviet Union. Today there are new problems in the same area, among which the most serious are the length of men's hair and mini-skirts on feminine comrades. A pedagogical journal recently devoted a lengthy discussion to the problem of long-haired students.

Uchitelskaya Gazeta recently reported on the tensions which exist in Soviet schools because of the male students' insistence on wearing long hair. (1) It appears that the problem has become somewhat serious in several schools: lochmatia, who are those not wearing the normal, standard Party-approved haircut, are not allowed in the classrooms in many cases. The editorial board had received letters from teachers indicating just how great the scandal is. Some of the pupils who are not prepared to submit

(1) Uchitelskaya Gazeta, 12 November 1970.

to pedagogical authority insist on letting their hair grow. Why? Because, in a word, it's the fashion.

Uchitelskaya Gazeta published a few short notes on the source of the youths' idea of just what is, at the moment, a fashionable coiffeur. One of the youths had said: "We saw a program from Zoppot on TV". And that is a veritable "last word" for the Soviet youths, since Zoppot (Poland) is the scene of periodic jazz festivals. The Soviet teachers were outraged:

And why do you orient yourself to the style of the Zoppot festival and not, for example, to that of the Tchaikovsky Competition? There were other hair styles there.

Such dialogues hardly need further commentary. They obviously indicate the narrow-mindedness of the Soviet teachers, as well as their helplessness and their arch-conservative attitudes.

Uchitelskaya Gazeta looks for a formula with which to solve this conflict in the schools. The first thesis is: one should make the youths aware of the fact that Soviet hair styles are internationally accepted and, that at the last hairstyling competition in Paris, Soviet stylists won several prizes; one should also explain to the youths that Soviet styles are in no way conservative but do in fact adopt the good points which come from Western styles. The teachers are indirectly criticized of being too harsh on the youths who have an obvious will to be "modern". In addition, the pedagogical journal calls upon Soviet barbers to familiarize themselves with modern hair styles.

The journal reports on one Moscow school to which the principal invited a master hair stylist to come and "re-style" his pupils in a modern, but attractive, manner. One of the lochmatia took the risk and submitted to such an "operation" during school time. The journal proudly reported that, as a result, all the lochmatia wanted the same new style.

As for the criteria which a truly Soviet hair style should fulfill, Uchitelskaya Gazeta says it should be modern, take individual characteristics into consideration, and be appropriate to the age and place. The journal published examples of recommended hair styles, all of which were neat, orderly and short. The border line for the length of male students' hair was drawn at about two inches.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

### BOLSHOI TOUR OF USA CANCELLED

The United States Ambassador in Moscow was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on December 11 and given a representation about various provocations perpetrated by Zionist extremists against Soviet institutions in the United States, as well as against Soviet artistic groups sent to the United States in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement on cultural exchanges.

All this not only created obstacles to the carrying out by Soviet institutions in the USA of their official functions and threatened to disrupt measures within the sphere of cultural exchanges, but also endangered the personal safety of Soviet citizens, he was told.

It was emphasised that, as the continued provocations by Zionist thugs showed, in spite of repeated protests from the Soviet side the American authorities were not taking the necessary measures to stop these criminal actions, thereby encouraging them in practice.

In this connection, the United States Ambassador was informed that the conditions resulting from this attitude on the American side made the organisations of the guest tour of the United States by the ballet and opera companies of the Moscow Bolshoi Theatre, previously planned for 1971, impossible.

(Soviet News)

### MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE STATE OF SOCCER

The debacle of the Bulgarian association football team at the World Cup Championship in Mexico produced, along with popular disappointment, an immediate reaction from Party and sports authorities. This initial reaction included, among other things, a general discussion of soccer affairs and the firing of several officials who were concerned with association football. The Bureau of the Sports Union also promised that a detailed analysis of the state of soccer would be made at a special plenum of the Central Council of the Sports Union to be held in August. For undisclosed reasons, this plenum did not take place until November 19 and 20.

According to the press, the session heard an analysis of the reasons for the poor performance in Mexico and the general state

of soccer in Bulgaria. The technical leadership of the national team was blamed for having failed to train the players adequately, for bad team selection, and for not making suitable tactical moves during the decisive games in Leon. The report emphasized the fact that these shortcomings were to be traced back to deficiencies in the training and performance of the individual clubs, which is in turn related to the poor training and qualification of coaches.

The report placed special emphasis on "shortcomings" in political-educational work among players, who were accused of failures of moral stability, of inadequate concern for civic duty and national dignity, and of lack of political training.

After a heated discussion, in which a national cross section of sports officials took part, the plenum adopted a decision which incorporated measures aimed at improving the state of soccer. Some of these, however, are typical of the general administrative way of trying to solve problems in Bulgaria. Thus the decision spelled out a sort of a "minimum program" for the Bulgarian national team - the Olympic team is to qualify for the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the national one is to perform "with dignity" in the current European Championship and the next World Cup Championship in 1974. (Only a week prior to the session the national team gave an extremely poor show in Sofia against Norway - 1:1 - in a game which counts toward the European Championship).

The decision also mentioned the working out of a program for the construction of a large number of soccer fields (each club participating in the First National Soccer League should have at least five fields at its disposal). Construction is supposed to be completed by the end of 1971, something which seems highly unrealistic ( the League is composed of 16 clubs).

In addition, the Sports Union will work out new regulations to provide material incentives for players. Both the report and those participating in the discussion made it clear that the current "tariff" of material factors has played a major, but in some ways "damaging", role in the training and performance of players. This should be corrected by introducing more balance between material and moral factors. In this way, the plenum openly admitted the "professionalism" of Bulgarian association football - a feature of Western sports that is so frequently criticized by the regime press.