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POLITICS

THE PLACE AND ROLE OF SMALL COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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The small and medium-sized countries have always had a special significance for the character of international relations during a given period of history. Viewed in the formal sense as independent, legal state units with an objectively small strength and limited possibilities of influencing the general course of international politics, they have been considered as a category of second-rate states. In view of the interests of the great powers, their strength and scope for influencing other states in a direct or indirect manner, it has often been claimed that the task of the small and medium-sized countries is fairly limited and primarily reduced to seeking to preserve their own security and achieve optimal arrangements concerning their presence on the world market. This was intended not only to underscore the existence of different categories of states but to point up a classification pattern showing essential distinctions between the category of the great powers and that of the small and medium-sized countries in rights as well as duties. This, in itself, should prevent the expansion of the circle of truly equitable international subjects entitled to cooperate on a footing of equality in all spheres of international life.

The contradictions between the large and the small states thus became an integral part of international relations and one of the main obstacles to the development of qualitatively new relations - those between formally equal members of the international community. The oligarchic attitude of the great powers towards the smaller states and their endeavours to emphasize their privileged rights were apparent in the achievements of the Vienna Congress and even in such universally conceived international organizations as the League of Nations and the United

Nations. This kind of attitude towards international problems has characterized the dynamic process of intermingling, clashing and overlapping of national interests. For a long time it seemed that the system of unequal relations between the large and the small states had become a constant of international life. Given this pattern of international relations, in which the interests of the large states and particularly of the largest and most powerful ones were automatically raised above the interests of the small and medium-sized countries, the latter became mere objects whose important and often crucial problems the great powers were free to resolve through arrangements between them.

Although lacking the physical strength to become vital factors of international relations, the group of small and medium-sized countries comprising a large number of sovereign states is nevertheless an ever-present element in the dynamics of international relations. Owing to their strategic position and natural resources and because of the involvement of the great powers, the small countries are often the scene of a clash of interests between the great powers and occasionally of an open confrontation between them.

The largest group of states in the present set-up of the international community are those whose population averages three million and whose economies are for the most part underdeveloped, a fact which further complicates the question of their incorporation into the currents of international life.

Recognizing the necessity of a definition of the place and role of the small countries in contemporary international relations, the Nobel Institute in Oslo recently organized a symposium¹ which brought together some twenty university professors concerned with the study of international relations from all parts of the world. This Institute, which has concerned itself with questions of peace since 1904 and awards the Nobel Prize for Peace every year, considered it appropriate that it should join the efforts for a theoretical analysis of the political development of small countries and of their place in contemporary international relations. This could also have been an attempt to elucidate from different angles and in the present changed circumstances some essential characteristics of the prevailing type of international relations in which the small countries are following an independent course of activity or one forces upon them by pressure.

¹ The symposium was held from September 13 to 16, 1970

The participants in the symposium approached a scientific analysis of the various problems related to the very notion of a small country guided by their different ideas about the place and character of the small countries, their classification and value. Discussing the small countries from differing positions and bearing in mind their own national experience, the participants tried to point out some fundamental features which might have a wider significance and at the same time provide the basic characteristic of the present course of development of international relations and of the place belonging to the small countries.

The nature of the problems raised at the symposium and the conflicting opinions expressed indicated two different ways of reflecting on the role of the small countries and the prospects of their activity. Some of the papers read and part of the discussion advocated the view that the small countries lacked possibilities for a major, global engagement in international relations and that their political strength was limited by both their own possibilities and the strength of the great powers. In view of this their national interests should be conceived in a realistic way and with prime consideration for certain aims of an exclusively regional character. In giving the strength of the great powers an absolute value the advocates of this view left no doubts about the possibility or rather impossibility of a major engagement of the small countries.

The military-political blocs and particularly NATO were claimed by some to provide an optimal framework for joint activity by the small countries and moreover for their collective influence on the policy of the leading power within the bloc. Deciding common problems of security and foreign policy on a footing of equality was said to provide for the active engagement of the small countries and for adequate representation of their national interests in the general strategy of the blocs. It is in the light of these premises which were claimed to offer the best framework for a small country's potential activity that the foreign policy of some of NATO member-countries was analysed.

Special attention was attracted by the opinion that at their present stage of development and in view of their specific position and narrow interests, the small countries should above all else offer their citizens maximum freedom which would make them fundamentally different from the great powers and would enable them to prove in practice the advantages of their own democratic development. Unencumbered by global interests and

prestige, the small countries could attain through their own internal achievements the highest degree of humane development of a state organization.

But although the different views, which for a number of years have ascribed to the small states the role of mere objects in the theory and practice of international relations in regard to which the great powers are free to act as they please, were repeated this time again, the earnest and liberal scientific atmosphere which prevailed at the symposium made it possible also to voice ideas other than these.

Emphasizing the fact that the small countries today constituted the majority of members of the international community and that in view of their strength the category of medium-sized countries could also be included into this group, several participants insisted in their papers on the need that all international subjects be treated as equals, i.e., that such an atmosphere be promoted which would provide for the gradual evolution of the system of international relations.

The small countries are today bound to each other by various links; some are members of one or the other military-political alliance and others are neutral or non-aligned in terms of their foreign-policy affiliations, but they are all vitally interested in view of their objective position in the maintenance of peace and security - and not only within the limited frameworks of a given region. Even if they were to unite the small states would still be unable to act as a more or less organized factor and directly influence to any noticeable extent the policy of the great powers by their physical strength. However, the group of small countries is showing a growing keenness in being able to voice their own opinions on the many problems which transcend regional limits and constitute the substance of world trends.

Viewed in this context the military-political blocs can hardly be considered as instruments which could help the small countries increase their influence on the policy of the leading power. The intertwining of bloc ties regularly means far more for the leader of the bloc than for any of the small member countries of the alliance which surely has very little influence on the shaping or channeling of a great power's policy. True, since their emergence the blocs have considerably altered the methods of their functioning; under the influence of increasingly manifest democratic and independent tendencies the small and medium-

sized members of the coalitions have begun to demand a greater say in the passing of important political decisions. However, the bloc organization, which also has a political-economic background, is preventing the establishment of such internal relationships as would enable its members to pursue an independent national policy. Apart from this bloc affiliations have a negative influence on the development of contacts with other states thus preventing or at least retarding progressive trends in international relations in general.

The increasingly marked tendency toward understanding between the great powers, despite the occasional setbacks, shows on the other hand that the interests of the smaller members of the coalition are not being treated on an equal footing with the interests of the big even in the latest phase of international development. This fact and past experience in international relations make it reasonable to fear that the interests of the small and medium-sized countries might well be disregarded in the various solutions resulting from an understanding satisfying big state interests.

The tendencies in the foreign policies of some traditionally neutral European countries have been assessed as positive and encouraging. Through their increasing engagement in international affairs these countries are showing by their own example that provided they behave and act freely and independently the small countries too may become a significant factor in international development. At the same time, through their intensified activity the non-aligned countries have demonstrated that their concept of international relations is still the only alternative to bloc solutions on the widest plane and that by accepting and pursuing a policy of non-alignment the small and medium-sized countries may find long-term and optimal prospects for their foreign-policy activity.

Upholding the same foreign-policy concept and prepared to cooperate actively and work together for a different course of international development, the small and medium-sized countries which pursue a non-aligned policy have far greater possibilities of satisfying their own foreign-policy interests and of helping to solve broader problems too. They cannot extort any solutions through their physical strength but their concerted action can prove a significant element contributing to the democratic development of a new system of international relations based on the

free activity of all countries on a footing of equality irrespective of their size, strength or internal system.

These aims should also be served by the United Nations by becoming a place where the small countries could coordinate their political activities. Deeply interested in the preservation of world peace and security and in the democratic development of international relations, which automatically presupposes the settlement of the problems of economic development of the small and medium-sized countries, these states which represent the largest group of members of the world organization should fight for and ensure the increased authority of the UNO, respect for its Charter and a more effective solution of the accumulated problems. Joint activity in the UNO would help to emphasize the identity of interests of the small and medium-sized countries and indicate the best ways of intensifying their mutual cooperation, irrespective of their foreign-policy predilections.

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REVOLUTIONS - ASIAN AND AMERICAN

by Robert A. Scalapino

Excerpts from address by Professor Robert A. Scalapino, of University of California at Berkeley, before the Comstock Club in Sacramento, published by Department of International Affairs, AFL - CIO.

The historian of the 25th century, looking back on our times, will declare the late 20th century to have been one of the major revolutionary eras of human history. He will compare (and contrast) it with such ages as those of the Roman, Mogul and Mongol Empires, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. And in almost all respects, he will find our revolution more rapid, more pervasive, and more profound than those of earlier periods.

The United States, moreover, stands in the forefront of this revolution. To understand our times, it is essential to begin with a simple, yet fundamental fact: we are the truly revolutionary society of the modern world. In what other society have changes over the past three or four decades so profoundly affected the life

of the ordinary citizen - his standard of living, his mobility, his means of perceiving events, hence his values, his life style, his relations to his family, his church, his community and his world? And it should be emphasized that we are talking about the ordinary citizen - the "common man". For most of the world, particularly the so-called "emerging world", change at this point tends to affect primarily the elite. The common man still lives and thinks in a traditional fashion, whatever the new ideologies and institutions surrounding him.

It is one of the supreme ironies that some of our contemporary American "revolutionaries" fail to recognize a revolution even when they are in the midst of one. They persist in applying words like "stagnant" and "reactionary" to a society that has been undergoing more rapid change in recent decades than any society in the long course of human development, change that dwarfs that presently taking place in the so-called "revolutionary world".

Nothing illustrates so dramatically the tyranny of deeply implanted myths, and the havoc which they can wreak upon reality as the fact that even among political moderates, the thesis is widely accepted that ours is an age pitting "the dynamic, progressive, emerging world" against "the static, conservative, established societies", now epitomized by the United States.

Out of Focus

When both information and interpretation are presented on a massive scale to a literate citizenry with strong, consistent, built-in biases in favor of sensationalism, that citizenry cannot avoid being grossly misinformed, while believing it is informed. No greater danger confronts our society than this, since at both "elitist" and "common man" levels, our images of the world are stronger than at any time in the past, but they are also seriously out of focus.

When their rhetoric has been set aside, a considerable body of American "revolutionaries" today are revealed as "counter-revolutionaries" whose basic objective is to fight against all that goes under the label of "modernization". They are, in the most basic sense, our new primitives. To appreciate this fact, one

must look at revolutionary movements elsewhere, movements flying other banners. Then the real character of our times can be more clearly understood. This is not merely a revolutionary era, but an age of multiple revolutions or movements dedicated to radically different objectives.

Asia, containing more than one-half of the world's population, is an example of a vast, heterogeneous area where revolution, whatever its ideological symbols, is firmly dedicated to modernity. The dominant themes in Asia today are those of progress, nationalism, industrialization and democracy, even though these themes may be variously defined. Asia seeks the same broad goals sought by Western avant garde for more than a century, and some exploration of these goals is warranted.

No concept is more revolutionary to a traditional society than the concept of progress itself. Historically, Asia was dedicated to a cyclical theory of life. Existence was represented by a wheel, a painful wheel. Once man got on that wheel, he continued in a ceaseless progression, returning again and again over the same course. Ultimate bliss, indeed, was represented by the capacity to get off that wheel and enter a state of non-motion. In Buddhist terms, Nirvana was a state of non-action, non-thought, even non-being. Thus, while Asia had a theory of movement, it had no theory of progress. Concepts of development, therefore whether clothed in the liberal or Marxian vernacular, have represented a radical innovation, and one that now strongly grips the Asian elite.

Triumph of Nationalism

The notion of the nation-state, and the willingness to give prior allegiance to the state and its symbols are also dramatic new concepts for people whose central loyalties were previously given to the family, the clan or the smallest ethnic unit. Nationalism is still largely an elitist concept in Asia, but it nevertheless is the most powerful single "ideology" on the Asian political horizon. The call for belief in, and sacrifice on behalf of, the Fatherland cuts across all ideologies and political systems in this part of the world. It is as strong in Communist as in non-Communist societies. Indeed, the triumph of nationalism over classical Marxism in such states as China and North Korea pre-

sents serious problems. It is by no means clear that the type of chauvinism, xenophobia and emotionalism that accompanied nationalism in the West and led repeatedly to war can be avoided in Asia during the decades that lie ahead.

Under nationalist banners, the new stress is upon the wealth and power of the state. Almost automatically, this places the emphasis squarely upon industrialization. The "modernizers" of Asia, almost without exception, now demand a one-generation industrial revolution. After World War II, industrialization was so avidly sought that in many countries, agricultural investment was frequently neglected, to the detriment of the people. Whatever the mistakes, however, industrialization remains a top priority in the Asian revolutionary movement, still regarded as the only means of alleviating mass poverty, creating state power, and closing the urban-rural gap.

Finally, there is the cultivation of the term "democracy". In the late 20th century, "democracy" is a word used in many different ways but among Asian revolutionaries, it is almost universally accepted as an essential symbol. To the authoritarians, it is a necessary cover to legitimize absolute power. To the tacticians of revolution, it is a means of mobilizing the masses on an unprecedented scale. To all activists, it still has a deep emotional appeal. Once the common man has been discovered by those who would hold power, he cannot be ignored. This may well mean that in fact, he has less chance for true freedom than before, but in any case, the effort to politicize him will be relentless. And it will be labelled "democracy".

These are the central forces that drive the Asian revolution today, and that are likely to continue to drive it for the foreseeable future. What extraordinary differences are represented by the so-called "revolutionary movement" in contemporary America. Let me make it clear immediately that I shall not be talking here about all American dissidents. My remarks are directed essentially at a certain portion of the white, upper-middle class radicals, most of them young, small in total numbers, but having an extraordinary influence today, especially in our colleges and universities.

A significant number of these "revolutionaries" are anti-progress. They are contemptuous of the concept of development, fiercely opposed to a work ethic, and not embarrassed to be considered primitivists. Their penchant for communes, their interest in Zen Buddhism or classic Hindu philosophy bespeak in various ways that alienation against modernity which is the hallmark of these children of affluence. When the United States eliminated poverty as a class phenomenon (poverty exists today as an ethnic or regional problem, but not a class problem), the character of American politics, including the nature of dissidence in this country, was fundamentally affected.

It is essential for our "revolutionaries" to be anti-nationalist, whatever their other values. Anti-nationalism, indeed, is indispensable to the movement, not merely in a political sense, but in the most profound psychological sense as well. We have heard much about the arrogance of power but, in point of fact, never in our history have Americans of power been less arrogant, more insecure, more questioning of their values and those of their society. The most powerful arrogance today is among the powerless, and it is the arrogance of guilt. "Of course the United States is always wrong. Our leaders are both knaves and fools. It is inconceivable that any action of government or the broader "establishment" could have a vestige of sanity or morality connected with it".

Contrary to some periods, the anti-nationalism of today does not lead to internationalism. On the contrary, its primary thrust is toward withdrawal and the small, closed community. Nothing is more natural than that our revolutionaries should be at heart isolationists. In the abstract, to be sure, they love mankind - and especially those other little revolutionaries like the Vietcong and Castro - who are defying big modern states. At root, however, they are so ambivalent toward the concept of organization, and so preoccupied with problems that are uniquely personal, that the visions which motivated an earlier generation such as those of "one world" can have little appeal. "Do your own thing" is the current motto, and no meaningful internationalism has ever been built upon

anarchist foundations.

As might be expected, the new American "revolutionary" is also anti-industrialist. Industrialization is blamed not merely for despoiling nature, but also for despoiling man. Forgotten is the grinding poverty of the pre-industrial era. Forsaken is the Hobbesian injunction that life in a state of nature is invariably brutish, mean and short. Once again, that state of nature is being widely idealized. Avarice, impersonalism, hypocrisy - above all, hypocrisy - are all identified as concomitants of the industrial revolution.

Bigness is, ipso facto, bad, and since bigness is regarded as the heart of the modernization process at this point, especially in the industrial sector, it must be smashed. And while one may withdraw to the rural commune, it is also possible to create a retreat within the hostile urban environment, establishing a protected enclave that defies all that is organized, regular, and "efficient". In this fashion, life style itself becomes a weapon of sabotage, an act of defiance.

Of the great goals of the 19th century, only democracy remains as a desiderata to our contemporary revolutionaries. Or does it? Once again, we have been forced to realize how fragile are democratic institutions, how difficult is the maintenance of freedom. In the final analysis, modern democracy depends upon both a strict observance of procedures and the presence of a set of widely shared common values. For the modern American "revolutionary", procedures are of scant importance. In retrospect, it is clear that the techniques pioneered in the South by civil rights exponents, utilizing non-violence and operating with a maximum of moral validity, served as the bridgehead to subsequent movements, operating throughout the United States, espousing a variety of issues, using techniques both violent and non-violent, but in any case, justifying the means by heralding the absolute morality of the objectives sought.

In this, of course, there is a precise parallel with all authoritarian movements, past and present. It is upon this basis that both Communism and Fascism have been justified. And now we are hearing from our revolutionaries old, familiar words: "Kill the pigs. Burn the books. Don't let

racist and reactionaries speak". All of this, and much more, is uttered in the name of liberation, truth and morality. It is this fierce insistence upon a moral monopoly that marks this, as other groups of revolutionaries who would impose their values upon everyone. Thus, the fact that there are legitimate grievances today is no excuse for attacking the very institutions of democracy, any more than the numerous grievances of the German in 1933 legitimizes Nazism.

Thus, compromise, that indispensable requirement of any working democratic system, becomes immoral. Pragmatism, an essential of the democratic creed, is termed "liberal garbage". And even more importantly, knowledge itself becomes enormously distrusted as likely to lead to corruption. The motto is "Feel, don't think". One can presumably trust one's emotions to maintain purity, but not one's brain.

It is thus not merely democratic procedures that have come under assault at the hands of the new primitivists, but also the intellectual processes that have long accompanied an open society. And nowhere is this issue more clearly joined than within the intellectual community itself. The frontlines today are our universities and colleges. Anti-intellectualism, propagated tirelessly by our new primitives, is now rife in every major intellectual center of this nation. Science and technology are now regarded as instruments of the devil.

It has been customary to assume that the primary perils to democracy derive from backwardness and inequities, from those stubborn obstacles, social and economic, that thwart modernization. However, we have now been made painfully aware of the fact that democracy can also be endangered as a result of progress and affluence. When progress takes place at a dizzying pace, as it has in the United States for many decades, the human capacity for adjustment can be strained to the breaking point. In the most basic sense, the United States has accomplished those revolutionary goals for which much of Asia (and other parts of the world) are now striving.

Our current "revolutionary" movement, indeed, is a reaction against our successes. We are now confronted with self-styled "radicals" who are opposed to modernization, and who, in both techniques and beliefs, are anti-rational and anti-democratic.

Their primary locus is the university. Their major source of support is the mass media. Their most precious weapon is the appeal to those insecurities that are inevitable as a result of extraordinarily rapid change - the slippage that has occurred in familial, religious and community relations, together with the deep psychological strain involved in living with the complex, unsolved (insoluble) problems of a shrinking world. Thus, "the movement" becomes a form of "copping out" - to use the new vernacular, a way of avoiding the far more difficult problem of learning how to live with complexity and change.

As befits the most revolutionary nation in the world, the United States continues to stand on the frontiers of human development. That we are forced to fight again the battle for democracy - and against new high priests of reaction, however they may label themselves - is merely a reflection of the extraordinary times through which we are living, an age of multiple revolutions of which ours is the most advanced, the most exciting and the most profound.

FOR A GLOBAL VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

Lidova Armada (No. 20, September 1970), the Czechoslovak Army Main Political Administration fortnightly, published an article headlined "Education in Hatred of the Enemy" which leaves no doubt about the ideological line to be followed in the Czechoslovak armed forces. According to the author, Lieutenant Colonel Josef Sedlar, the words "fight", "hostility", "hatred of the enemy", have in Communist terminology a "just, humane content". Relying heavily on Lenin, he contends that hatred of the enemy, like socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, is a "higher moral-political sentiment". This sentiment, Sedlar argues, does not come to a young man automatically; it must be induced and guided. Education in hatred of the enemy is an "integral part of education in socialist patriotic internationalism". An understanding of this point is especially important, since

draftees are recruited from sections of the population whose ideas about the military-political aspects of socialism and capitalism are "far from reality".

Sedlar deplors the fact that attempts at peaceful coexistence are often understood by adolescents in a "romantic" way. They dream of a world without frontiers, overlook the class content of internationalism, and incline toward pacifism. Sedlar emphasized that there is only one way to global peace, i. e., "by following the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence. . . . with the revolutionary long-term aims of liquidating the imperialist system by means of qualitative, revolutionary social changes, and of ensuring the victory of socialism and Communism throughout the entire world". Sedlar soberly concedes that those who are alive today will "perhaps" not see the final stages of this process, but that does not deter him from underscoring that "hatred of the imperialistic social system" ought to become the focal point in the ideological education of the soldier.

Rarely has this classical Communist view been asserted so bluntly by the Czechoslovak public media in recent times. The authorities are evidently alarmed by the degree to which the army was affected by the reformist ideas of 1968. That the army, being an authoritarian institution, should now react most strongly and try to swing the pendulum to its furthest dogmatic extreme, is not surprising. Apparently in order to support the army's educational efforts, the importance of pre-military training at schools has been re-emphasized recently.

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YUGOSLAVS OPPOSE SOVIET DOMINATION OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST CONFERENCE

by Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: At the recent meeting of 45 communist and workers' parties in Budapest, the Yugoslav representative insisted that no country or party should be allowed to assume a commanding position at any future anti-imperialist conference. In addition the Yugoslavs demanded that China, as well as all progressive forces in the world, including "progressive Catholics", must also be permitted to take part in such a conference, regardless of their differences with communist

parties. The conference must be based on the full equality of all participants, the Yugoslavs insisted.

Any anti-imperialist conference in the future must not be dominated by the Soviet Union and must necessarily include China. This view was maintained by Drago Kunc, a top Yugoslav Party functionary, at the recent meeting of 45 communist and workers' parties which discussed "some current questions of the struggle against imperialism". The meeting took place in Budapest during 28-30 September of this year and the communique was published on 2 October. It made clear the desire of the participating communist and workers' parties "to strengthen the unity of communist and other anti-imperialist organizations and forces".¹

The full text of Drago Kunc's speech, recently published in a Yugoslav Party weekly,² stressed the following five points concerning the Yugoslav attitude toward an anti-imperialist world conference:

1. No country or party must be permitted to occupy a monopolistic position at any anti-imperialist conference. In this connection Kunc said:

It is necessary to free ourselves from the harmful tendencies of avant-gardism, monopolism and sectarianism -- activities which unfortunately occur rather frequently. We believe that in the struggle against imperialistic policies there must not be commanders and subordinates, but that members of the communist, workers', liberation and socialist parties and movements should act on a basis of equality; we should include all other progressive forces such as progressive Catholics and other religious movements and groups, regardless of ideological differences and the political views they hold on other questions.

2. One should not try to suppress the fact that differences exist among members of the anti-imperialist front concerning peaceful coexistence, "technological neocolonialism", inequality between developed and underdeveloped countries, the independence and sovereignty of individual countries, and attitudes toward

1. Komunist, Belgrade, 8 October 1970

2. Ibid.

non-alignment.

3. No intervention, whether "ideological, political or economic", should be allowed; moreover, the struggle against such intervention is also the struggle against imperialism; therefore cooperation among anti-imperialist forces must be based on "respect for the right of all parties and movements to make their decisions freely and carry out their activities in complete independence, without any outside interference and pressure".

4. Kunc further emphasized the Yugoslavs' regret over the lack of "representatives of anti-imperialist forces other than Communists" at the Budapest conference. He even warned:

If the preparations (for a world anti-imperialist conference) were to continue within this narrow framework, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia would be compelled to reappraise its further participation in the work.

5. Finally, the Yugoslav delegate said that "the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic should be included" among those who will be involved in preparing for the anti-imperialist conference.

The convocation of an anti-imperialist world conference has for some time been favored by the Yugoslav Communists. It was first discussed in 1967 and again in the first half of 1968, in the course of opposing Moscow's advocacy of convoking a communist world conference. In Yugoslavia's opinion, all "progressive forces" throughout the world should have been invited to take part in a conference to discuss the struggle against imperialism. In 1967 and 1968 the Yugoslavs defended their proposal for a broadly-based anti-imperialist conference by claiming that such a conference would make it impossible for the Chinese to attract African and Asian nations to their extremist ideas; this year, however, they insist that the Chinese must be invited, obviously to counterbalance the Russians -- whose monopolistic tendencies the Yugoslavs fear.

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CONFIDENT MOOD IN CHINA

The tone of this year's national Day celebrations pointed to an awareness of the tasks ahead, though Mao's Thought continues to be cited as the remedy for all China's problems.

While publicity for the 21st anniversary of the Communist assumption of power in China (October 1) urged the population to prepare for a session of the National People's Congress - theoretically the country's highest policy-making body - with "new victories" on the political and economic fronts, there is still no indication of when the meeting will take place. And despite the emphasis on the need to consolidate at home, the leadership remains unwilling to release details of its policies in the coming period, including the fourth Five-Year Plan due to begin in 1971, or to issue any reliable statistics. Making the first authoritative references to this plan, both Lin Piao, the Defence Minister and Mao's heir apparent, and Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, stressed in their National Day speeches the importance of fulfilling current plans and laying a firm foundation for the next one. But their recipe for success was a familiar mixture of hard practical work and more ideological militancy, even though these forces often pull in different directions. The joint People's Daily, Red Flag, Liberation Army Daily editorial on September 30 also highlighted China's economic and social tasks, placing slightly less emphasis than last year on the need for war-preparedness - though the militia was prominent in the Peking parade and had recently received a great deal of attention in the Press.

Militancy was again to the fore in the international aspects of Peking's publicity. Mao's pronouncement of last May that "revolution is the main trend in the world today" was given prominence, while Lin Piao reiterated the leadership's hopes of strengthening unity with all "genuine" Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations - suggesting that new efforts may be under way to stimulate the formation of more anti-Soviet groups. There were the usual pledges to support the Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian and Palestinian struggles against "US imperialism". But though China's hostility to "revisionism" was reaffirmed, the Soviet "threat" to China was not mentioned - as it had been in 1969 and even in Army Day speeches last August.

China's interest in re-entering the diplomatic arena and extending her influence abroad was not apparent at the celebrations. Prince Sihanouk, now the honoured guest at almost all major Peking functions, was the only prominent foreign visitor on the rostrum, and apart from friendship delegations from Tanzania and Pakistan, who seem to have attended on their own initiative, the foreign representatives were either journalists, members of visiting economic delegations (from Albania, North Vietnam and North Korea) or members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation mission in Peking and the Burmese and Indonesian Communist Parties - all resident in Peking.

Unity stressed

In listing the names of the top Chinese leaders standing alongside Mao for the National Day parade, New China News Agency followed the usual practice of naming the Politburo in stroke order (equivalent to alphabetical order), but for the first time the members of the five-man Standing Committee of the Politburo were included within the general list. On this occasion Mao and Lin, usually referred to as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party, were described as Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander of "the whole nation and the whole army" - presumably to underline their status at the head of a united country at a time when China has no active Head of State or Foreign Minister.

Only two members of the Politburo were absent from the Peking celebrations - Chen Po-ta, a leading figure in the cultural revolution group, and Hsieh Fu-chih, a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Security. The absence of Chen, who has not been seen in public since August, has no obvious explanation, but it is possible that Hsieh (last seen in March) has fallen into disgrace. Among the Central Committee members attending the rally, a notable absentee was the Commander of the Peking Garrison and Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Wen Yu-cheng. The ranks of government and party officials contained many new names, whereas the army group, though larger than last year, remained similar in composition. Some senior military officers reappeared this year as members of civilian departments - apparently reflecting a new stage in the normalisation of the central administration. The re-emergence of several Vice-Ministers, absent

from view since 1967 or earlier, seemed to confirm a trend towards the rehabilitation of some victims of the cultural revolution.

Meanwhile, the rebuilding of the party apparatus appears to be proceeding very slowly, particularly at the provincial level, although the latest session of the Central Committee was clearly intended to demonstrate the party's paramountcy. Nothing was revealed of the meeting - the first since April, 1969 - until September 9 when a communiqué noted that it had met from August 23 to September 6, approved the State Council's report on a national planning conference and the 1970 Plan, and instructed the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to prepare for an NPC session "at an appropriate time". Mao Tse-tung was said to have presided and in addition to Lin Piao, 155 of the 170 Central Committee members were reported to have been present, but little further information was released. The treatment of internal themes in the communiqué was on familiar lines, though there were allusions to the "new successes and new experiences" constantly being gained in China and to recent progress in industrial production and capital construction.

Revolutionary emphasis

Subsequent Press and radio commentaries on economic topics have maintained the confident tone, suggesting that the policies laid down at last April's Ninth Congress will form the basis for the new Five-Year Plan. However, the continuing emphasis on Mao-study and the invocation of his thoughts as the answer to every kind of problem indicates that it is still considered necessary to set even mildly pragmatic policies within a framework of revolutionary phrases. Much time seems to be taken up with political work conferences devoted to "creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's philosophical writing", which must seriously interfere with work, though they are less disruptive than the upheavals of the cultural revolution. A broadcast by K i a n g s i R a d i o (October 19) complained that some party and revolutionary committees, including their leading members, still worked "according to experience" and held that it was of "little significance" whether they studied Mao's writings or not. Another provincial broadcast (K i r i n R a d i o, October 15) stressed the need to use Mao's thought and adopt "proletarian

politics" in order to carry out the grain procurement programme effectively.

Kirin Province had reaped a good harvest in 1970, the broadcast said, but new efforts must be made to strike at "counter-revolutionaries" and to combat all tendencies towards capitalism if the State was to receive its proper grain deliveries. In more practical terms, it reiterated that the interests of the State and the collective as well as those of the individual must be taken into account in determining the distribution of grain and that there should be a continuing campaign against waste, corruption and theft in the countryside. The revival of official appeals - common at the end of 1969 - for peasants to supply more grain to the State rather than keep it for their own consumption suggests that many prefer to use up their surplus instead of selling it to less advantage. Moreover, the Central Committee communiqué's references to the need to intensify the campaign against counter-revolutionaries and economic criminals showed that the apparent absence of serious trouble during the summer did not mean the ending of all problems in the countryside and that more investigations and trials might be held after the autumn harvest.

So far it appears that China has had a good harvest and that the economy is making a recovery. An NCNA report on September 22 said that there had been a budget surplus in the first eight months of the year, but gave no figures. When the six-monthly Canton Fair opened three weeks later, a spokesman said that China was anxious to develop her trade relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Foreign businessmen reported that a wider range of goods was on show than at the Spring Fair, but Japanese sources complained that a number of Japanese firms had been excluded because of China's recent ban on those which trade with Taiwan (Formosa) or co-operate with certain US firms.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

by Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: President Nixon's recent visit to Yugoslavia (30 September - 2 October) has been viewed as a great success by the country's press. It has strengthened Yugoslavia's position in the face of threats to the sovereignty of small socialist countries from the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition, President Nixon indicated that while supporting the spirit of independence of individual Yugoslav nationalities, America remains a staunch friend of Yugoslavia as an integral federalist state.

Both publicly in the press as well as in private talks, Yugoslav officials have indicated their satisfaction with President Nixon's recent 42-hour visit to Yugoslavia. International events such as the Middle East crisis and the Vietnam war played less important roles in the talks than did the feeling of security generated by the American President. This reassurance takes on greater significance since Yugoslav leaders are confronted with the Brezhnev Doctrine, which is designed to legalize Soviet interference in the internal affairs of individual socialist countries when Moscow believes that the system is threatened from any side. The fact that President Tito preferred to stay and entertain President Nixon rather than attend the funeral of his close friend Nasser in Cairo demonstrated the importance he attributed to the meeting with the American President.

President Nixon's words at the 1 October dinner in Belgrade have especially encouraged Yugoslav leaders in their efforts to follow an independent road and a policy of nonalignment. The following section of President Nixon's toast was repeated in many Yugoslav comments and articles:

..... We do not accept doctrines by which one power purposes to abridge the right of other countries to shape their own destinies and to pursue their own

legitimate interests. Every nation, large or small, has the duty to maintain its own security, but none has the right to do so by infringing the security of others.

You can be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The pursuit of total security by one nation can only lead to the insecurity of others, and therefore it will not bring order and peace. ¹

In Yugoslavia the last sentence of this excerpt is already being referred to as "the Nixon Doctrine". For this reason a radio commentator called the President's trip to Yugoslavia "sensational". ² The visit coincided with the inauguration of a new phase in Yugoslavia's domestic policies which involves Tito's succession. Tito, concerned about the fate of his country after he leaves the political scene, realizes that the worse which might occur would be a new fratricidal struggle among the individual nationalities. Moscow has, in the past, attempted to benefit from the quarrels among the nationalities. If the Western powers, especially the Americans, were to try to do the same, a new civil war in Yugoslavia might possibly erupt. It now appears that the American President has convinced his Yugoslav hosts that the United States of America has no intention whatsoever of "dividing" Yugoslavia into sphere of influence.

"Croatia Will Always Live"

Very few people noted the end of the short speech made by President Nixon in Croatia's capital of Zagreb on 2 October. In answer to a welcoming speech by Jakov Blazevic, the President of the Croatian National Assembly, President Nixon extolled "the spirit of Croatia, which has never been destroyed or

1 USIS, official text, 1 October 1970

2 Marko Vojkovic over Radio Belgrade on 5 October 1970, 19:30 hours.

enslaved" and then concluded: "Croatia will always live. Yugoslavia will always live. Long live Croatia. Long live Yugoslavia." 3

His words were understood by Yugoslavs to mean that America supports the Croatian struggle for greater independence but only within the context of Yugoslavia. This, for instance, contradicts the plans of some Croatian extremists to destroy Yugoslavia as an integral federalist state, even by allying themselves with the Soviet Union. Such activities have been carefully observed by Yugoslav leaders, who in some cases have even been inclined to overestimate the importance of such activities.

A major Belgrade weekly praised President Nixon not only as a "realistic" but also as a "tolerant" politician. His words concerning friends and fiends are being compared with those of the African leader, Julius Nyerere, who is claimed to have stated recently: "We cannot allow even our friends to decide who our enemies are". Said the Belgrade weekly:

These formulations by Nixon and Nyerere are very topical in the sphere of contemporary international life. They discredit the unfortunately very frequent division of countries into friends and fiends; they (i. e., the words of Nixon and Nyerere) oppose any hegemony and pressures whose chief aim has been to force individual countries (especially small ones) to conduct their foreign policy in a specific direction. 4

If one does not forget that Yugoslavia is a Communist country and that its policy of nonalignment has been directed both against the Soviet and American big-power politics, putting President Nixon on an equal footing with Julius Nyerere is, on the part of Yugoslavia, rather unusual. The American President's visit to Yugoslavia has been a source of encouragement for a small country that has been attempting for more than 20 years to retain its independent road to socialism and whose politicians have not concealed their desire to draw closer to Western Europe, without abandoning their spirit of independence and nonalignment.

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3 Politika, Belgrade, 3 October 1970

4 Ekonomaska politika, Belgrade, 5 October 1970

THE SOVIET NAVY

Russia was historically a land power. During World War II the Soviet Navy was weak; its role was limited to coastal defence and operations in support of the Army. But within the past two decades the USSR has become the second maritime power in the world, ranking only after the United States. This achievement is the result of a rapid and balanced growth, both in quantity and quality of the Soviet Union's Naval Forces, its merchant marine, its oceanographic survey fleet and its fishing fleet.

The purpose of this naval power was stated clearly by Admiral Kasatanov, first Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy when he said: "The Central Committee has precisely defined the place of the Navy in the defence of the country, and has shown the way for the building of a modern ocean-going nuclear rocket fleet which is capable of solving strategic tasks of an offensive character in modern warfare".

In order to adapt itself to its strategic role the Soviet Navy has steadily expanded its activities and improved its capabilities. Some noteworthy features are:

- The Soviet submarine fleet (about 350 vessels) is the largest in the world; a growing number of these submarines are nuclear powered and nuclear armed. Each year approximately twelve new submarines are constructed of which several are fitted with Polaris type ballistic missiles.
- The Soviet Union graduates over 1000 marine design engineers and naval architects each year which is substantially more than any other country in the world.
- The Soviet oceanographic research fleet is larger than all other oceanographic fleets put together.
- The Soviet fishing fleet - also the largest in the world - has up to date equipment such as the most recent fish factory ships carrying fourteen 50-ton vessels, which could be replaced by landing craft for amphibious operations.

- The Soviet merchant fleet comprises a greater percentage of modern ships than the merchant fleets of the West. Among them are about 80 large-hatch ships which could easily be adapted for military transport. Merchant marine tankers have been seen refuelling Soviet fleet units in the Mediterranean.

But these technical features are not the only evidence that the Soviet Navy is conditioning itself to its new role. Eight years ago the Soviet "Naval Infantry" (Marine Corps) was reconstituted; its importance has been emphasized by its participation in May Day Parades and numerous exercises. This shows Soviet interest in developing all forms of maritime capability including landing operations.

Today Soviet vessels are deployed as a matter of course over a considerable part of the globe's surface, including the NATO area, e.g. off Norway, in the North Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic sea and the Mediterranean. More recently they appeared in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean, areas from which they were previously absent. Combined with increased Soviet military supplies to Egypt, Algeria, Libya and other Mediterranean countries, these developments have created a new situation for the Atlantic Alliance.

As Admiral Kasatanov has pointed out: "Naval visits promote the development and strengthening of friendly relations between the Soviet people and the people of foreign countries. They also strengthen the authority and influence of our Homeland in the international arena". The importance attached by the Kremlin to the role of the Soviet Navy as an instrument for political influence and pressure is further illustrated by the growing number of official calls to ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian and the Caribbean since 1964.

The increased Soviet maritime power enables the USSR to achieve an important tactical presence wherever required by its interests. In addition, it provides the Kremlin with psychological support to its diplomacy, and new options for intervention or pressure in crisis areas all over the world.

E C O N O M I C S

SOVIET RETHINKING ON THE U.S. ECONOMY

Summary: At a recent conference in Moscow held to discuss the problems of capitalist economies, some refreshing rethinking was heard. One of the speakers, V. Lan, told the conference that there had not been a major economic crisis in the USA for 33 years, and that the recent fall on the N. Y. stock exchange could not be regarded as heralding a major setback in production.

He pointed out that the recovery from the slump of 1937 was not due to defence orders but to governmental civilian anti-crisis measures. He ended by noting that the US national debt is now smaller in relation to national wealth and income than in the past, implying clearly that the recuperative ability of the US economy has increased. Other speakers in the debate warned that because of the growth of the service trades in the West, labor released from industry would be absorbed in them without any major social upheaval.

In July 1970 the Soviet Institute of World Economics and International Relations held a conference in Moscow to discuss the economic problems of the capitalist countries. Most of the reports delivered were along the usual orthodox lines ("crisis impending") but an unusually refreshing note was struck during the debate by an economist named V. Lan.¹

Whereas the official spokesmen had made much of the fact that never before, until 1968-1970, had the value of securities on the New York stock exchange fallen by as much as 300 billion dollars, Lan replied by pointing out that in 1929 the value of all the shares quoted was less than \$ 100 billion.

¹ Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdana Rodnye Otrosheniya, October 1970 pp. 93-105.

Consequently the significance of the fall had to be judged in relative, not absolute, terms, i. e., as a percentage. Between December 1968 and May 1970, the value of shares fell by a third, whereas in 1966 it had fallen by a quarter in only eight months, and in 1962 by 27 per cent in only six months. Lan pointed out that neither in 1966 nor in 1962 was the fall followed by a crisis in production. "Consequently", he said, "it is impossible to assert that the recent fall in the valued shares necessarily presages an economic crisis".

He went on to say that there had been no crisis similar to the pre-war one in the USA for a third of a century. It was true that accepted Soviet thinking considers crises to have occurred in 1948, 1953 and 1957, but Lan noted that none of them had led to a fall in production as serious as that in 1927, let alone 1924. "Moreover", he went on, "we never previously regarded 1927 or even 1924 as an economic crisis".

After neatly disposing of the theory that a slump on the stock exchange must mean a crisis in the economy, Lan then moved into a frontal attack on the hoary idea that the U. S. economy is geared to war preparations. He started out with a little lecture: in 1937 the USA had experienced the worst crisis in its history.

Whereas in the first year of the 1929-1933 crisis, the index of industrial output fell by 20-22 per cent, in 10 months of 1937 the same index fell by 35 per cent. "And suddenly the crisis ended", Lan said. "Most people have explained this by referring to the pre-war upswing. But in the USA there was none. The first military orders for U. S. industry were received only at the end of 1939, after the beginning of World War II and after the review of the Neutrality Act".

Lan asked his audience rhetorically what really happened and then went on to tell them.

Taking account of the lessons of the 1929-1933 crisis, Roosevelt took strong action to curb and, if possible, to reduce the growing unemployment. During the crisis the businessmen were not able to provide work for the labor force which was expedient in capitalist terms, i. e., which would bring added value, or profit. If the provision of work of any kind for the unemployed could be regarded as a national or state task connected

with the preservation of capitalism, then it was, of course, possible to find work, all the more so in a country such as the USA.

However, the decision was only open to the government.....

..... Under Roosevelt the state debt became the source of finance for anticrisis measures. As a result of the 1937 crisis, the state debt was increased by three billion dollars, and later the debt was increased by incomparably larger sums for anticrisis measures.

Lan explains that these anticrisis efforts were regarded by U. S. leaders as part of the "struggle to preserve capitalism", and that today, as never before, "if the fall in output and growth of unemployment should assume threatening proportions, Washington would agree to an increase in inflation and an aggravation of other problems in order to avoid the growth of private difficulties into a major economic crisis".

After warning his audience in this way of the effectiveness of Keynesian methods in the USA and of the US Government's readiness to use them, Lan observed that the sources of finance for anti-crisis measures are not yet exhausted. He found it difficult to predict the limits to the expansion of the state debt, but he warned his listeners that as long as the rate of inflation does not move from the present creep to a gallop, the limit would depend closely on the dimensions of national wealth and income.

Since the end of the Second World War, the US national debt had risen by 100 billion dollars. But Lan ended his speech by pointing out that in relative terms, i. e., as a proportion of the national wealth and income, the debt had not only not increased; it had fallen substantially.

The published account of Lan's speech ends at this point. He certainly left no doubt in the minds of his audience that the US is now in a better position to cope with a recession than at any time since the war, and he made it perfectly clear that anticrisis measures do not necessarily depend on military expenditure. He not only told the assembled Soviet economists that there had been no such thing as an economic crisis in the USA for a third of a century, but he also left them with the

strong impression that they would be unwise to expect one in the foreseeable future.

Mileikovsky's Speech

If what Lan had to say was distinctly revisionist in economic terms, a later contributor to the debate, A. Mileikovsky, made some interesting political innovations. Attacking the standard Soviet view that a high rate of economic growth is essential if serious social upheaval is to be avoided, Mileikovsky pointed to Britain, which had refuted to theory ever since the war. "Despite the slow growth", he observed, "there has not yet been mass unemployment in Britain of a type which would threaten the economic or political system.

This is not only the result of the skill of the British ruling class in social manoeuvres on the basis of the alteration in power of Labour and Conservatives. It is also the result of structural changes in the economy, governed by an increase in the relative weight of the non-productive sphere which absorbs labor squeezed out of the field of production.

After disposing in this way of the old Stalinist belief in ever-increasing unemployment in the West, Mileikovsky went on to warn his audience that a similar process is likely to continue throughout the Seventies in the USA and West Europe. It would be accompanied by the growth of consumer goods output, the expansion of "so-called" social investments (even revisionist Soviet economists seem to find it hard to swallow the concept of capitalist states investing in society), and an attempt to restrain inflation without increasing unemployment.

A short speech made by Ya. Vasilchuk also took up and expanded upon Mileikovsky's theory of the declining importance of the production sector. He said that in the mid-Sixties U. S. expenditure on the "expanded reproduction of the complex labor force", taking into account the health and educational spheres alone, had been double the cost of gross investments in material values.

"This relationship, which differs sharply from the position in the first decades of the 20th Century cannot but lessen the

influence on the economy of cyclical fluctuations in gross investment".

In closing the conference, A. Anikin, speaking for the establishment, would not go further than to say that there is a possibility that the present "slump" in the U. S. economy (which to outsiders looks more like a recession) might grow into a deeper economic crisis. But he, too, warned that the U. S. Government would use every means in its power to avert any such development. The nearest he would come to the usual neo-Stalinist predictions of capitalist collapse was to say that "the contradictions of state-monopoly regulation have been sharply aggravated in the recent past and continue to grow worse".

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SOVIET MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES COME UNDER SCRUTINY

by Yuri A. Pismenny

Summary: For several years now a lively exchange of opinions on management problems, prompted by the new and more exacting demands which the technological revolution is imposing on those who make the wheels of industry turn, has been conducted in the Soviet press. Economists and sociologists are not short of ideas, some practical, others harebrained, but their freedom of action is still curtailed by the built-in rigidity of the Soviet economic and political system.

The latest contribution to Soviet economic thought is a scheme, a full description of which appeared in Literaturnaya gazeta on September 2, 1970. It is a new method of appointing managerial staff, devised by two sociologists from the Lvov branch of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, V. Yakushev and V. Yakhontov, which entails the periodic transfer of the worst managers at all levels to the bottom of the ladder and an equivalent number of talented ones to the top. This regular and obligatory shake-up, say the authors of the scheme, will have the same salutary effect as the pulsation of a living organism.

The disadvantages of such a scheme are obvious: regular and obligatory "pulsating" could adversely affect work rhythm, and if applied indiscriminately, it might produce the opposite of the desired result. Also, gains from this regular infusion of new blood could be largely offset by the disruption which would

ensue until those promoted or demoted had found their feet in their new position. The scheme also contains an element of intimidation, since although the inventors ask that it should not be regarded as a system of administrative sanctions, they write: "This is the crux of the matter: every organizer will know that if he turns out to be among the worst ten per cent demotion is inevitable. On the other hand, if he joins the 'top ten', new horizons open up before him" (*ibid.*).

This efficiency system is the latest suggestion to be tossed into the lively discussion on management which has been in progress in the Soviet Union for several years. The secretary of the Ternopol Oblast Party Committee, M. Danik, whose position obliged him to comment on the proposal put forward by Yakushev and Yakhontov, tactfully referred to it as "interesting but controversial", while the *Literaturnaya gazeta* editors thought it "unusual and debatable" (*ibid.*). But the very fact that it was published in this leading newspaper, even if only on the page known as the "Discussion Forum", is an indication of how far the dispute about the need for a drastic reorganisation has gone in the Soviet Union. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, which since last August has been devoting an increasing amount of space to the problem of management, declares:

The construction of the material and technical basis of communism, the scientific and technological revolution and the economic reform impose new and more exacting demands on the level and technique of economic management.

Modern management requires persons with special professional training - industrial administrators.
(March 12, 1969, p. 10)

It is clear that the intense interest in new management techniques has been generated by the technological revolution and the economic reform which it forced upon the Soviet leaders; the direct connection between the reform and the emergence of management problems is confirmed by the majority of participants in the debate. For example, F.P. Golovchenko, First Secretary of the Kiev Oblast Party Committee, wrote:

It is typical that this useful activity (for changing management methods - Yu.P.) was really developed

in the factory when we switched to the new economic system. It was the reform that compelled more serious interest to be taken in the scientific organisation of labor and more thoughtful and penetrating educational work to be undertaken among staff. (*Ibid.*, November 26, 1969, p. 11)

Here Golovchenko highlights the two main themes in the discussion on management - reorganisation of the system (i. e., the "scientific organisation of labor") and reorganisation of the individual (by "thoughtful educational work"), and one full page of *Literaturnaya gazeta*'s "Discussion Forum", headed "Management: Man or System?", expatiates on this issue, apparently because in an earlier issue (No. 2, 1970) a certain V. Zakharyev, writing from Michurinsk, asserted it was not the individual as such that counted in achieving a satisfactory management system. He was supported by an economist, G. Vyatkin, who commented:

The success or failure of management depends not so much on the personal qualities of the person in charge as on the system of management as a whole.....

Shortcomings in industrial management are usually viewed as resulting from ignorance or sluggishness on the part of administrators. The influence of other factors, for example defects in the actual system, are unfortunately frequently ignored..... People tend to say that enterprises do not work uniformly. That is correct. Obviously, the more capable the director..... the easier it is to surmount difficulties (including defects in the system). (*Ibid.*, August 12, 1970, p. 11)

Here Vyatkin repeats in a milder form what Zakharyev said quite bluntly - that managerial talent and outstanding ability are frequently indispensable simply in order to neutralize organisational faults.

Another economist, E. Rasskazov, takes the opposite view:

V. Zakharyev is absolutely wrong and his error must be exposed..... Marx held a different opinion on this score..... V.I. Lenin

also upheld the role of leadership in production. . . .
To some degree a manager will imprint his personality on any decision. (Ibid.)

Rasskazov apparently believes that the ability to overcome defects in the system is the mark of the outstanding manager and that, in the final analysis, everything depends on personal qualities.

It is noteworthy that although both these economists are skeptical of the present system they come to diametrically opposite conclusions: Vyatkin looks forward to its radical alteration, writing that frequently "the irrational behavior of managers is due in the first instance to the existing system", while Rasskazov discounts the idea of change and places his faith in strength of personality and leadership.

Professor V.I. Tereshchenko, a Kiev economist, tried to reconcile these conflicting approaches by arbitrating on the issue "which holds the key - the individual or the system?" Tereshchenko is described by Literaturnaya gazeta as a "prominent specialist on management problems", and frequent mention is made of his book Organizatsiya i upravlenie (Organization and Management, Moscow, 1965). In the newspaper (August 13, 1970) his article was headed "The Closer to Extremes, the Further from the Truth", and the professor indeed chose a middle way, stating that "in the conditions of our socialist economy the foreign jungles of management theory, the various pros and cons of this or that solution of the question 'man or system', to a considerable extent lose their practical importance". After explaining that this was an approach to economic management which has always been typical of the "bourgeois West" as an expression of the conflict between the human personality and capitalism, Tereshchenko continued: "It seems to me that we are incorrect in opposing man and the system. I see no theoretical justification for the dispute itself. . . . Man and the system are a single and indivisible whole". Clearly he is well aware that it is risky to draw a distinction between the individual and the system in the Soviet Union.

How, then, do leading Soviet experts envisage the ideal way of managing the economy? The deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan), V. Lisitsyn, has quite a lot to say on the subject. In an article in Literaturnaya gazeta he wrote:

Nowadays, the title "manager" signifies a new

profession. Consequently, it is necessary to train people professionally for leading positions. But if it is necessary to give the executives special and systematic training, a network of new educational institutions is required. It takes too long to wait until a manager has acquired everything by experience. The "universities of life" are rather exacting in their demands on their charges and on society. In the preliminary training of the organizers of production one should not rely on the individual branches of the economy but, in the main, on the university, because in the "art and science of management" the universal content common to all branches predominates. It is worth acquainting students of specific disciplines a little better with the management problem they will encounter at work. It is clear, however, that the fundamental training of executives must be carried out after they have completed their higher education. Candidates selected for special schools of management must be specialists with higher education with production experience, or those who have either graduated or are on the point of doing so. The management schools must develop as the links of the whole system. At their head must be placed an academy which trains the highest cadres, provides teaching staff and is in charge of scientific work in the field of management theory. For the formation of regular teaching staff in the schools of management and in order to attract academics to regular work on the theory and practice of management it would be beneficial to introduce the academic titles of "candidate and doctor of management and organization of production". (March 12, 1969)

In another article headed "Are Special Schools Necessary?" (ibid., November 5, 1969, p. 10), Lisitsyn called for the formation of a special state committee "to co-ordinate the activity of ministries and departments in teaching leading executives in the economy the science of management".

The new scheme outlined by Lisitsyn looks quite impressive and Tereshchenko found it "pleasing" (*ibid.*, August 19, 1970, p. 10). To many people in the Soviet Union it probably appears quite revolutionary, although it has long been a familiar feature of the economic landscape in the West. The projected schools of management are the business schools which have existed for many years in the United States and a number of West European countries, and the "industrial administrators" they hope to turn out are the equivalent of Western specialists in management. Lisitsyn admits that in recent years Soviet specialists have "carefully familiarized themselves with the training of industrial administrators in numerous business schools abroad" and he himself "visited such schools in America, Britain, West Germany, Japan and a number of other countries" (*ibid.*, March 12, 1969, p. 10).

Alongside Lisitsyn's article appeared another by G. Popov, head of the Laboratory of Management at Moscow State University, and one by an economist, Professor S. Kamenitser. Both authors write with scarcely-concealed admiration for the latest management training methods they have seen abroad (the former at a seminar in Geneva on training administrators, and the latter at the London and Manchester business schools) (*ibid.*). Ye. Shuykin, head of personnel and training at the USSR Ministry of the Automobile Industry, and other experts also write about these two latter Western schools.

Ideas borrowed from the West naturally have to be supplied with a suitable Soviet ideological underpinning. In Kommunist, for example, in an article headed "Contemporary Bourgeois Theories of Management", we read: "State-monopoly capitalism is, in Lenin's words, the most complete material preparation for socialism. The organizational experience of running large-scale production which has been accumulated under capitalism must also be critically adopted by the new society" (No. 12, August 1970, p. 123). In spite of all the evidence to the contrary, all participants in the Soviet management controversy staunchly maintain that new methods of economic management now being planned have nothing in common with the capitalist system. A major difference, says Tereshchenko is that the Soviet Union regards "social efficiency" as being no less important than purely economic efficiency, because "human happiness, the welfare of our society, are not measured in rubles"

(Literaturnaya gazeta, August 12, 1970, p. 11). This leads into the second main theme of the management debate - remolding the individual, that is to say, the executive, to fit him to cope with the demands of modern industry.

This second theme, referred to as "socio-psychological" as opposed to "administrative-organizational", together with the question of human relationships and the psychological climate in industry, was the subject of special commentary in Literaturnaya gazeta (November 26, 1969, p. 11) under the heading "Man and the Economy - the Executive and his Subordinate". The example taken was an experiment by the Kiev "Stroydormash" factory in the Ukraine, which appears to have become one of the centers of Soviet economic thought. This factory opened a special school for managers and issued a booklet entitled "Suggestions to the Executive on Behavior and Mutual Relations with Staff", and an "Order No. 75" on the application of these suggestions. The project was worked out with the assistance of various experts, including members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, but although the "Suggestions" contain some useful hints, they also include others so self-evident that they should scarcely require mention. It does not need a philosopher or an academician to point out that "every person has a sense of his own worth" or that "one should not chatter on the telephone during working hours" (*ibid.*).

Why has such a sudden interest in human relationships and the psychological climate in industry arisen in the Soviet Union? Tereshchenko affirms that great attention is paid to this subject in the West because "a contented cow yields more milk", whereas in the Soviet Union the reason is concern for "human happiness" (*ibid.*, August 12, 1970). V. Kudin, a doctor of philosophy, comes closer to the mark when he says of the initiative shown by the "Stroydormash" factory: "Not without reason do specialists in psycho-physiology stress that in a bad atmosphere labor productivity is lowered from 10 to as much as 18 per cent" (*ibid.*, November 26, 1969, p. 11). In other words, harmonious relations between management and workers are urgently needed in order to bring the Soviet economy up to the required level.

This debate on reorganization of management has thrown into relief the backwardness of Soviet management techniques, and although economists and sociologists are not short of ideas and are willing to learn from the West, the general inflexibility of the

Soviet system imposes definite limits. The debate continues, but the gap between discussion and action is considerable.

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OFFICIAL PLEAS IN DEFENCE OF THE SOVIET CONSUMERS' INTEREST

by Harry Trend

Summary: The championing of the consumer interest by the two major Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestiia is a welcome sign. The equating of consumer and production goods in importance points to a possible reduction of shortages of consumer goods. However, some of the suggested solutions still follow old patterns which place heavy emphasis on the manipulation of plan indices as a control method.

Editorials in the official Party newspaper Pravda and the official government organ Izvestiia have come to the defense of the much-neglected consumer interest in the Soviet Union.

A series of critical articles was addressed to the continuing neglect of the wants of the Soviet consumer and was responsible for stimulating the official party and governmental pleas.¹

Examples were paraded to illustrate the annoying chronic shortages of various consumer commodities. The lack of small enamelled ironware was ascribed to a "race for tonnage", which has resulted in the concentration of production on heavy pots and pans.² The blame for various disproportions - the production of enough cameras but not enough photographic paper, the supply of numerous television sets and high frequency cables but not enough voltage regulators, the production of tape recorders but a neglect of recording tapes - was laid on the doorsteps of the

1 E.g., Ya. Orlov, "A Duty, Not 'Extra Trouble'", Pravda 30 June 1970, p. 2 and S. Sarukhanov (Russian Republic Deputy Minister of Trade), "But Why Are They Not on Sale?" (Pravda, 7 August 1970, p. 7).

2 (Editorial): "More Goods for the People", Izvestiia, 12 August 1970, p. 1.

USSR State Planning Committee and other planning agencies who are said to be responsible for the lack of coordination between "the production of technically complex goods and their requisite accessories".³ The lack of drinking glasses which can be washed in hot water is blamed on the USSR Ministry of the Building Materials Industry and its Minister Comrade Breshnanov.⁴ The trade organizations complain that they are receiving 40,000,000 fewer items of glassware than had been ordered.⁵ The lack of some 20,000,000 knives and forks is blamed on the USSR Ministry of Light Industry for not even starting the construction of new production facilities which were to have been put into operation in 1970. Continuing shortages of "blankets, drawing pads, pencils and other widely assorted consumer goods" is ascribed to the fact that "certain republics and ministries", finding such production "burdensome", "have tried to rid themselves of the production of consumer goods".

Some shortages have continued for extended periods of time. In the case of oilskin tablecloths, a product manufactured by light industry and chemical industry, attention was drawn to the supply problem at the beginning of the current five-year plan but yet at the conclusion of the five-year plan the shortage persists. The editorial in Izvestiia observed that the "statistics" on gross production of these branches look good, but will this comfort the customer who cannot find oilcloth?"

The Deputy Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, A. Likhoradov, quickly responded to the criticism levied at his ministry for not producing the proper assortment of enamelled ironware. Noting the production of more than 3,500,000 enamelled pots, pans and dishes, or 2,000,000 more than in the corresponding period last year, he then admitted the facts presented in the August 7 Pravda article "to be true".⁶ The Deputy Minister observed

3 Sarukhanov, op. cit.

4 Izvestiia editorial.

5 (Editorial): "Goods for People", Pravda, 15 September 1970 p. 1

6 (Unsigned), "Not By Ton But By Individual Article", Pravda, 7 September 1970, p. 2

that the plan for 1971 calls for an increase in the production of teapots and metal cups "bringing their share of total enamelware output to 12 percent and six percent, respectively". But such assurances have been heard before with little effect.

The Izvestia editorial argued that "today there are no secondary branches or secondary goods whose production can be neglected". It then added:

It is time that all industrial workers realize that the customer who wants to purchase a one-kopek box of matches is entitled to as much attention from the socialist state as a plant wishing to acquire a 1,000,000-ruble rolling mill.

To those who suggest solutions through "sheer administrative action" the editorial replied that such action "will lose more than (it) will gain". Further, it was argued by the government's official newspaper, economic reform prevents such actions. The editorial then observed that "managers account for themselves before the people not only through statistical reports, but also the goods on shelves; and, moreover, this kind of accounting should be the main one".

The Pravda editorial, which blamed the Union Ministry of Trade and its local bodies for not displaying "the necessary efficiency in making use of stocks of goods, and at times (of being) insufficiently aware of market conditions", could only point to the existence of "unutilized resources for the production of items needed by the public" which should be tapped. After pointing out that "every republic, territory and province can organize the manufacture of many articles made from local raw materials" the writer of the editorial admitted that "there are difficulties in meeting problems connected with the production of many items". Without explaining how those most directly involved were to overcome these difficulties the Pravda editorial confidently concluded that "we must overcome these difficulties consistently and without fail".

The Deputy Minister of Trade for the Russian Republic wanted to impose as a "main index" a requirement placing emphasis on the "quantity of items produced" rather than "tonnage". For him the plan indices were primarily at fault. In support of the new index he also favored an exemption from the turnover tax for "all new cultural and everyday items and household goods"

during the first year of mass production. In this way enterprise profits would increase and act as a stimulative.

He also supported an expansion of production capacities for consumer goods. But in answer to those who advocated the production of "'trifles' at specialized enterprises" he was quick to admit that expanded production would be less expensive and of high quality but added that "the building of such enterprises would require great capital investments" and would entail large transport costs and other costs due to the need to ship the items long-distances from a few specialized plants.

The last word about consumer goods shortages in the Soviet Union has not been heard because the current economic reform still relies too heavily on the loading of plans with indices rather than permitting a greater and more direct influence of the consumer through the market. Nevertheless the increased sensitivity of the two most influential daily newspapers in the Soviet Union and the heightened severity of the district criticism of specific ministries is a much welcomed sign.

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CULTURE

CLASS DISTINCTION IN SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATION

by Sergey S. Voronitsyn

Summary: Only a relatively small proportion of young people leaving Soviet secondary schools are able to go on to higher education and, with the introduction of universal secondary education, this percentage is being further reduced. Furthermore, in the annual scramble for the scarce university places the children of industrial and agricultural workers are at a disadvantage compared with those of more influential and affluent parents, who are in a better position to manipulate the system.

At the beginning of the new academic year Literaturnaya gazeta published a lengthy article by A. V. Darinsky, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, dealing with the growing discrepancy between the number of young people finishing secondary school and the number who have the opportunity to receive higher education. According to Darinsky, some two and a quarter million pupils are released each year by the secondary day schools and a further 700-800,000 complete their secondary education at evening classes or through correspondence courses, an annual total of about three million, for whom no more than 500,000 university places for full-time study are available:

This means that only 2 out of 9 final-year pupils of the day schools and only 1 of 6 of all those completing secondary school can be accepted into the day departments of the higher educational institutes. Yet this figure still does not include the more than 900,000 finishing the technical schools, many of whom also want to receive higher education, nor those who for some reason did not enter university in the preceding years. In short, the absolute majority of final-year pupils, even from the day schools, cannot count on a place at a higher educational institute, either

on day, evening or correspondence courses. (Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 35, 1970, p. 12)

Here Darinsky does not even mention the fact that a considerable number of university places are reserved for people demobilized from the army and navy, people sent to study by various factories and organizations and also would-be students who have spent more than two years working in industry, which further limits the chances of secondary school pupils.

The first signs of a large gap between the numbers of those completing secondary education and the number of university places available began to appear in the mid-1950s, when the secondary schools started to pour out large contingents of young people whose education had been retarded by the war and the post-war chaos. In 1951, for example, there were 245,200 free places for 339,900 secondary school leavers, but by 1954 the ratio had altered dramatically to 276,200 free places for 1,013,600 school leavers (S. L. Senyavsky, Rost rabochego klassa SSSR, 1956-1965 (The Growth of the Working Class of the USSR, 1956-1965), Moscow, 1966, p. 60). This disproportion grew during the following years because, although the number of secondary school leavers rose steadily, the number of university places gradually decreased, until in 1958 no less than 1,573,000 secondary school leavers were chasing 215,500 places (ibid.).

The present situation is that the number of places available for fulltime day study at higher educational institutions has doubled over 1951 but over the same period the number of final-year pupils at the secondary schools has risen seven and a half times, and there is little hope of future improvement. The Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the USSR, V. P. Yelyutin, has actually confirmed that the present ratio will be maintained for the next few years (Ogonyok, No. 11, 1970, p. 7), and, due to the introduction of universal secondary education in the USSR, the number of pupils at secondary schools is bound to rise. Literaturnanay gazeta writes:

As the decision of the Twenty-third Party Congress on universal secondary education for youth is put into practice the disparity between the output of the secondary schools and the intake of the higher educational institutions will grow and, consequently,

the chances of entry into an institute will diminish further. In the next few years, practically 9 out of every 10 secondary school leavers will have to start to work immediately after finishing the tenth class. (No. 35, 1970, p. 12)

This abnormal development will clearly bring social problems in its wake. There is certain to be widespread disillusionment among the vast majority of young people who fail to secure a university place and who will thus be forced to accept unskilled jobs. The majority of those leaving the general secondary schools have no specialized training and must begin their working lives at the bottom of the ladder. Opinion polls conducted for several years in many parts of the Soviet Union reveal that most secondary school leavers are interested in professions which require high qualifications and which can only be reached via higher educational institutions. Surveys conducted in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast show that the most attractive professions for young people are those of physicist, radio engineer, medical researcher, geologist, mathematician, chemist, etc., while the least desirable occupations are those of turner, milling machine operator, store clerk, bookkeeper, agricultural worker, etc., (Sotsialnye problemy truda i proizvodstva (The Social Problems of Labor and Production), Moscow, 1969, p. 48). The reasons are obvious: great emphasis is placed on science and technology in the USSR and, in addition to prestige, members of the technical intelligentsia enjoy considerable material benefits. Furthermore, the acquisition of high professional qualifications is a guarantee of social advancement for the children of industrial and collective farm workers, while for the children of the intelligentsia it ensures that they will be able to retain the privileges which they already enjoy by virtue of their parents' social position.

It is not surprising that many secondary school leavers who fail to get to a higher educational institution and must start work regard this as the end of all their personal plans and hopes. They are frequently disinterested in their job, as the following extract from a letter of complaint addressed by a Leningrad factory director to the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences indicates:

If the secondary school leaver has not passed the

university entrance examination he goes into a factory, but he regards this as a temporary solution, as a failure in life, makes no effort and shows no interest in the work and at the earliest opportunity tries to leave the factory. (Izvestiia, September 9, 1970)

This mass of discontented young people is growing year by year. Aware of the grave social and economic implications of the problem, Soviet specialists recommend the introduction of theoretical and practical work in applied technical subjects in the general secondary schools. In Khrushchev's day, however, the attempt to give senior pupils on-the-job training in factories failed dismally. The overall educational level of these pupils fell but their desire to secure a higher education remained undiminished; if they failed and had to take a job it was usually not the one they had studied at school.

The educational authorities are now trying to interest school-children in the less attractive trades. V. M. Khvostov, President of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, explains:

We still require a system of active measures which aim to stimulate the inclination and interest of pupils and will foster an attitude to their personal future which corresponds to the real needs and opportunities of our society. In the main, this system must be worked out by pedagogical science in collaboration with psychologists and other specialists. (Ibid.)

Judging by the response in the Soviet press, attempts to dissuade parents from sending their children to university also misfired. Pravda describes a typical reaction:

You ask a parent: "But why must it be the university?" He is offended and begins to get hot under the collar: "All my life I've stood at a bench turning handles. I was in the trenches, see, from the Volga to Berlin.... It's going to be different for my lad". "The University means a profession for life", says the parent, "and I'm going to send my son to university". (June 23, 1970)

At the core of the educational problem in the Soviet Union lies the influence of social origin on a young person's whole future career. The children of the more privileged social groups have a far better chance of realizing their ambitions than their less fortunate classmates. This inequality begins in the nursery schools and reaches its peak at the time of university entrance. A sociologist, V. N. Shubkin, pointed to the complexity of the problem several years ago:

Now, for example, the social composition of secondary school leavers and first-year students differs sharply from the social composition of children in the first class. Whereas the children of workers and peasants predominate in the first class, in the first-year courses at university the children of the intelligentsia and white-collar workers are in the majority. This is a very complex problem and it cannot be solved in one or two years. But if we want to solve it, then we have no right to ignore these facts. (Kolichestvennye metody v sotsiologii (Quantitative Methods in Sociology), Moscow, 1966, p. 15)

There is an automatic process of social selection after completion of the eighth or ninth class when many of the children from poorer families leave school to start work, either because their wages are needed to supplement the family income or because the ten-year school is too far away from their homes. A survey among pupils in the eighth classes of schools in Nizhny Tagil revealed that 54.6 per cent of the boys and 78.3 per cent of the girls from professional families as opposed to 27.7 per cent of the boys and 47.6 per cent of the girls from workers' families were going on to the ninth class (Molodyozh, yeyo interesy, stremleniya, idealy (Youth, Its Interests, Aspirations and Ideals), Moscow, 1969, p. 230). More recently, this sifting has occurred mainly in the ninth and tenth classes, because in order to fulfil the plan for the transition to universal secondary education the school administration tries to persuade pupils of the eighth class to go on to the ninth class. It is only natural, however, that having got this far the majority of pupils, irrespective of family background, want to carry on with their education. Thus, in Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk Oblast 93

per cent of the children of parents in the urban professional class, 76 per cent of children of the rural professional class, 83 per cent of working class children and 76 per cent of agricultural workers' children expressed the desire for further study at higher educational institutions (V. Shlyapentokh, Sotsiologiya dlya vsekh (Sociology for All), Moscow, 1970, p. 118). Similar figures were recorded among final-year secondary school pupils in Leningrad, Ufa, Sverdlovsk and other parts of the Soviet Union.

Even at this stage the cards are still heavily stacked in favor of the children of wealthier and more influential parents. Although in theory all are equal in the competitive university entrance examinations and the sole criterion is knowledge and intelligence, success often depends on a number of social prerequisites that are largely the prerogative of specific social groups which, apart from other advantages, are more adept at manipulating the system. The results of the entrance examinations prove that the best chances are possessed by the children of wealthier parents of higher social and cultural standing, and particularly of those living in the larger towns.

As a rule, the standard of tuition in urban schools is higher than that in their rural equivalents, which in itself is a built-in advantage for certain sections of the population. This disparity has been admitted by I. G. Petrovsky, rector of Moscow State University:

Entry into Moscow University is not easy, especially for young people from rural areas. This is not because village children are less able. Talented people are born in equal measure both in the capital and in the remote villages. We well appreciate that in the country schools the standard of instruction is lower. Moreover, in the towns many children frequently receive additional private coaching. (Komsomolskaya pravda, July 10, 1969)

Private coaching is becoming increasingly popular, but it is obviously only within the reach of the children of more affluent parents. The value of this extra tuition is beyond doubt: among the first-year students at Moscow University's faculty of mechanics and mathematics in 1969 no less than 85 per cent had received additional coaching prior to the entrance examination. This trend prompted the following comment from

Komsomolskaya pravda:

With the approach of summer many university teachers display feverish activity. Each one rushes to rent an apartment, which must have a telephone and be close to a Metro station, displays his printed cards in the busiest places and tries to outdo his rivals with impressive-sounding titles (frequently meaningless). During this rush to prepare for the entrance examinations some even give up their summer holidays, and in some cases they band together and form "associations". They have evolved a differential scale of payments for their services: the average fee is 5 rubles an hour, but the children of well-to-do parents pay more. (August 28, 1969)

For appropriate remuneration some of these part-time private tutors, making use of their connections within the university, are prepared to guarantee success in the entrance examinations: "Some fathers and mothers will go to any lengths to obtain a 'guarantee' that their son or daughter will be accepted. Countless meetings and 'confidential' negotiations take place behind the closed doors of secluded houses" (*ibid.*).

The official position and social status of parents and relatives also plays a large, and frequently decisive role in university entrance. Influential friends and acquaintances are marshaled and no holds are barred:

They literally lay siege to the examination and enrollment committees and take them by storm. If this assault is repulsed the telephone calls begin. At first the fathers and mothers, the grandfathers and grandmothers telephone, then the "influential", the "responsible" and the Party officials are brought to bear. They request that "particular attention" be paid to a certain candidate who did not get top marks in the school-leaving examination or that his "case be reconsidered" (Molodoy kommunist, 1968, No. 5, p. 55).

These and many other legal, semi-legal and illegal tricks result in a social imbalance among students accepted by the

higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union. In Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast, for example, 73 per cent of the children of the intelligentsia and only 50 per cent of workers' and 35 per cent of agricultural workers' children secure places for full-time study at the universities and technical colleges (Sotsialnye problemy truda i proizvodstva, op cit., pp. 56-57). At the beginning of 1966 at Rostov University 57.7 per cent of the students were the sons and daughters of white-collar workers, 38 per cent belonged to manual workers' families and only 4.3 per cent came from the collective farms (Vestnik vysshey shkoly, 1967, No. 8, p. 59), and in 1969 at the higher educational institutions of Sverdlovsk Oblast the figures were 52, 44.3 and 3.5 per cent respectively (Pravda, June 21, 1969). Throughout the entire Soviet Union the percentage of representatives of the professional classes attending day courses at higher educational institutions rose from 41.1 in 1965 to 45 in 1968, while that of people with a collective-farm background dropped from 19.5 to 16 per cent of the total number of students (Sovetskaya intelligentsiya (The Soviet Intelligentsia), Moscow, 1968, p. 406; Moskovsky komsomolets July 31, 1969). Yet collective-farm workers and their families comprise around 25 per cent of the total Soviet population and the intelligentsia little more than 20 per cent.

In late 1969, by decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, special departments were established at many higher educational institutions to prepare "advanced" workers, collective farmers and demobilized soldiers for direct entry without entrance examinations. But because candidates are selected primarily on the basis of Party and Komsomol recommendations this scheme can hardly redress social bias in higher education. On the contrary, it is more likely to strengthen the representation of ideologically orthodox youth among students and young specialists. Komsomolskaya pravda writes about this method of selection:

Last year at many higher educational institutions the preparatory departments were filled up with inexcusable casualness; nobody took an interest in the knowledge and ability of the applicants. The results soon showed. In some higher educational institutions more than half the students had difficulty

in coping with the program of study. (August 16, 1970)

Party leaders and the educational authorities are aware of the social problems connected with higher education but are trapped in a vicious circle. They have no effective means of reducing the mass craving for higher education among youth and at the same time, fearing an overproduction of (possibly unruly) intellectuals, they are loath to expand the university intake.

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NEW STATUTES FOR THE GENERAL MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN THE USSR

Summary: The new statutes for the general middle schools in the USSR were published in September of this year. The first comments on the new statutes have referred to them as the result of years of experience in the Soviet school system. The following short analysis of the document attempts to indicate the changes and developments apparent in this field.

In the middle of September, all of the Soviet Union's pedagogical newspapers published the new statutes of the general middle schools (ustav srednei obshcheobrasovatelnoi skoly).¹ This "basic document" for the school was approved on 8 September 1970 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1959, in conjunction with the 1958 school reform, a law "On the strengthening of the ties of the school to daily life and the further development of the system of peoples education in the Soviet Union" had already been approved. At the same time, that law became the basis for the middle school statutes. In the meantime the school reform which Khrushchev pushed through in 1958 has been altered in several important aspects. The statutes were thus obsolete and no longer applied to the new situation in the Soviet school system. A team of pedagogues

¹ Uchitelskaia gazeta 15 September 1970

scientists and representatives of the organs for the supervision of peoples' education worked for some time on a draft statute for the general middle school. This draft was discussed in various committees, as well as in the columns of the pedagogical newspapers and journals. The approval of this draft statute by the Ministerial Council of the USSR is an important event in the life of the Soviet schools. Numerous confusions were done away with, and the goals of Soviet political education as well as the organization of didactic and pedagogical work in the middle schools were newly formulated.

The statutes are divided into six parts: general rules, the basic organization of teaching and training activities; pupils; teachers, class leaders, and trainers; school direction; basic teaching materials, finances and financial reports.

The length of school attendance is set at 10 years. According to the local conditions which apply in each case, basic schools with grades 1 to 3 (or 4), schools with eight grades and middle schools with grades 1-10 (or 11) will be set up. Children will be accepted in the first grade if they have reached the age of seven years by the first of September, or within that month. The school year begins on 1 September and ends (including exams) for grades 1-7 on 30 May, for grade 8 on 10 June, and for grades 9-10 (11) on 25 June. The school year is divided into quarters running from 1 September to 4 November, 10 November to 29 December, 11 January to 23 March and 1 April to the end of the school year. School vacations take place on 5-9 November, 30 December to 10 January, 24-31 March and during the summer months. In rural areas, the spring vacation can be postponed.

The size of individual classes may not be more than 40 pupils in grades 1-8 and not more than 35 in the 9th, 10th and 11th grades.

Each class hour is in fact 45 minutes long, separated by 10-minute pauses and a 30-minute recess after the second hour, or two 20-minute pauses.

The Novelties

The first innovation in the new statutes is a technical change in the grading system. The five-number system has been replaced by verbal descriptions of achievement: 5 = excellent, 4 = good, 3 = average, 2 = poor, and 1 = very bad. Grades for deportment

have also been introduced. Pupils who have received bad grades in department at the end of the year will not be allowed to take the final exams; they will only receive confirmation of the fact that they attended school that year. In the event that a pupil is not admitted to the final exams on the basis of his department grade, he can apply to take them for the next three years, and only then if he can provide a positive letter of recommendation from his place of employment. Pravda found this measure especially important in the improvement of school discipline.²

A further change is provided by the measures to relieve pressure on the pupils, such as a limit to the number of required course hours per week and to the amount of time to be spent on homework. Homework can now only be assigned if consideration is taken of the amount of time it will take to complete it: in grade 1, up to one hour; in grade 2, up to 1-1/2 hours; in grades 3 and 4, two hours; in grades 5 and 6, 2-1/2 hours; in grade 7, three hours, in grades 8-10 (11), four hours.

In addition, the amount of time which can be spent on "collective undertakings" such as excursions, drills, etc. has been set down. The new statutes forbid the releasing of pupils from school for the purpose of fulfilling social tasks or for the purpose of their participation in sporting events or similar activities. The nature and length of excursions and trips will be determined by the school principal.

Authoritarian School Principles Anchored

The teacher plays the main role in the Soviet school. "He fulfills an honorable and responsible state task, the teaching and communist educating of the young generation". The duties of the teacher are set down precisely in the statutes. The class leader is named by the principal. The direction of the school is the task of the principal, who is appointed by the Ministry of Peoples Education in the Union Republics or a similar authority at another level. The principals of eight-grade and basic schools are appointed by the Sections for Peoples Education in the raions or city soviets. According to the statutes, provision has also been made for the position of a deputy principal for teaching and educational activities. In the middle schools which teach production, there is also the post of a deputy principal

² Pravda, 21 September 1970

for production education. In addition, the position of military director has also been newly introduced. He is responsible for the basic military training of the pupils. The director of the pioneer organization is appointed, with the approval of the responsible Komsomol committee, by the Section for Peoples Education in the responsible raion or city soviet. Finally, the position of assistant principal for economic questions is provided for.

In the statutes mention is made of student self-government, but that means little more than that the pupils are allowed to strive to improve the quality of learning and to strengthen the "conscious discipline of the pupils". Even the upper-grade pupils have no influence whatsoever on the pedagogical and didactic work in their schools. Thus, the new statutes set down the principles which the Stalinist era introduced into the Soviet school system and which were so different from the principles which applied in the 1920s and 1930s. In those years, the problem of student self-government was discussed at length in the Soviet Union and the attempt was made to solve it differently than in the capitalist states. In a reference work of the time, the following information is given on this problem:

There the children elect a leader, to help the school in the struggle against breaches in discipline, which is set down by the pedagogues. The structure of school life is set up by the adults. The children learn about student self-government by fulfilling the responsibilities which the bourgeois state has imposed upon its citizens.³

In fact, that seems a concise description of today's state of affairs in the Soviet schools

The Schools and Nationalities Policies

Provision has been made by the new statutes to include a suggestion which Khrushchev made to be incorporated in the 1958

³ Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1930, p. 610.

school reform. According to this suggestion, the obligatory teaching of the national and the Russian languages in the Republics, as it had existed since the creation of the Soviet Union, was done away with. Up until 1958, non-Russian children had been guaranteed an education in their mother tongue, and they learned Russian as well. Likewise, the Russians living in the Union Republics had to learn the respective national languages. Khrushchev, however, left it up to the parents to decide in what language their children should be instructed. From a purely formal point of view this sounds like democratic progress, but in fact it was a chauvinist manipulation by means of which the school system in the non-Russian Federation, were to be Russified. Under the influence of propaganda, the parents "decided" that their children could only get ahead if they spoke Russian; that only this language would open to them the doors to the cultural treasures and to an understanding of modern technology, as it is referred to in propaganda jargon. At the same time, the parents in the national republics have the right to have their children instructed in another "of the languages of the people of the Soviet Union" in addition to Russian. This is not, however, carried out through a reorganization of the teaching schedule, but simply by the authorities' lengthening the number of years spent in school to eleven.

The pedagogues in the non-Russian union and autonomous republics had at one time suggested another solution; a compromise between changing the teaching schedule and improving the quality of teaching during the 10-grade schools.

The 1958 school reform had negative results on the use of nationalities' languages in the Union Republics. One good documentation of this problem has been presented by the old Canadian Communist, John Kolasky.⁴ In spite of all this, however, the switch to Russian as the language of instruction in the Union Republics has not been carried out. In the Soviet Ukraine, for example, the schools still demand that the pupils learn two languages, Russian and Ukrainian. The fact that the new statutes cling to the 1958 chauvinistic suggestions, in spite of resistance from the national intelligentsia in the Union Republics, throws a revealing light on the "proletarian internationalism" of Brezhnev and Company.

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⁴ Kolasky, John, Education in Soviet-Ukraine, Toronto, 1968 and Two Years in Soviet Ukraine, Toronto, 1970

NEW STAGE IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AMONG COMECON COUNTRIES

The following article, by Oleg Chukanov, abridged here, was published in a recent issue of Communist, the theoretical journal of the CPSU central committee.

As the international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969 pointed out, the large-scale advance of the scientific and technological revolution is among the main fields of the epoch-making competition between socialism and capitalism.

The scientific and technological revolution is creating new possibilities for demonstrating the advantages of the socialist mode of production over the capitalist mode.

Moreover, it is only with the large-scale utilisation of the achievements of scientific progress that the new system can build the highly developed material and technological foundation required to make a decisive stride in the transition from socialism to communism.

The Comecon countries have entered a period when successes in their further economic and political developments are very closely connected with the solution of the problem of attaining the technically highest possible level of production and, on this basis, a higher level of labour productivity than under capitalism.

Automation

It is noteworthy that the present stage of the scientific and technological revolution is characterised by the large-scale introduction of automated machine systems in the most important branches and stages of production.

The consistent implementation of socialist industrialisation the rapid rate of economic development and the growing co-operation and mutual assistance between them have enabled the socialist countries to expand their industrial potential several times over.

The rapid industrialisation of most socialist countries was based on the building up of productive capacity in the leading branches of heavy industry and, first and foremost, in the power, chemical and machine building industries.

For instance, the growth output of the machine building industry increased in 1969, as compared with 1950, in Bulgaria

by 32 times, in Czechoslovakia by 9 times, in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary by 7 times, in Poland by 24 times, in Rumania by 25 times and in the Soviet Union by 15 times.

Of great importance to ensuring a fast rate of scientific and technological progress is the improvement of the social production structure and the priority growth of the sectors which, in turn, create the material foundation for the development of science and technology.

The effect of the present scientific and technological revolution on social production in the Comecon countries manifests itself in the increasing development of power engineering, especially atomic power engineering, machine building and, first and foremost, of electronics and electronic computer facilities, the chemical industry, topgrade metallurgy, etc.

The Comecon countries now have a mighty industrial potential which is more than double that of the Common Market countries and approaches the potential of the USA for the overall indicator.

For instance, in 1969, the generation of electric power in the Comecon countries reached 920,000 million kilowatt-hours, the production of steel came to about 150 million tons, of oil to 342 million tons and of cement to about 130 million tons.

Powerful basis

In comparison, we may point out that the Common Market countries that year produced 535,000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 107 million tons of steel, 104 million tons of cement and 139 million tons of oil.

The countries of the socialist community have become a major industrial area of the world. Their share in world industrial output increased in the past 20 years from 18 to over 32 per cent, and today these countries account for about a third of the gross output of the world's machine building industry.

The Comecon countries, therefore, have created a powerful production basis which enables them to tackle the solution of the more complex problems advanced by the present scientific and technological revolution.

The dynamic development of the world socialist system is resulting in improvements in the structure of the foreign economic relations of the fraternal countries. Co-operation in this sphere

of science and technology acquires an immeasurably great importance, and an ever greater significance is attached to it in the system of the international socialist division of labour.

Scientific, technical and production co-operation is becoming a decisive factor in socialist economic integration and, ultimately, determines the scope and lines of the development of exchange of goods and services within the framework of the whole socialist community.

The current scientific and technological revolution and the utilisation of its results in the socialist countries is unthinkable in practice without close and wide-ranging international co-operation.

The Comecon countries have now built up a great scientific and technical potential, have gained a great deal of experience in carrying out complex research and can boast of major achievements in the most important spheres of science and technology.

This helps large-scale co-operation and division of labour among them in the sphere of science and technology and enables them to make more rational use of their actual and potential resources and to save time and money in solving their common problems in stepping up scientific and technological progress.

More than a million scientific workers - about a third of all the research personnel in the world - are working in the Comecon countries where a ramified network of research and designing institutions and a powerful experimental base have been created and allocations for research are steadily growing.

Today, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, spend on research more than 3 per cent and other European Comecon countries from 1.3 to 2.5 per cent of their national income, and they are planning to increase this proportion substantially in the coming years.

Meanwhile, the great range, rapid development and complexity of the problems involved in the scientific and technological revolution demand today, as never before, an immense concentration of research personnel and of material and finance resources.

Experience

No state today is capable in practice of conducting research throughout the entire sphere of science and technology without

co-operation with other countries.

The socialist countries have already gained a great deal of experience in their scientific and technical relations, which have been developing successfully ever since the establishment of the socialist community.

For instance, utilising the technical results produced in the USSR, Bulgarian industry succeeded in starting within a short time the output of ferrous and non-ferrous metals and a wide range of machines and equipment, including power equipment, and in mastering a number of complex chemical processes.

In the same way, Hungarian industry organised the output of ball-bearings, introduced chillcasting processes and mastered the production of top-grade steels. Hungarian specialists are taking extensive advantage of Soviet experience gained in designing and building enterprises for the coal, light and food industries.

Polish industry has introduced the Soviet-designed process of using natural gas in blast-furnace practices, which has substantially cut the consumption of coke. Making extensive use of the Soviet Union's experience the Polish comrades have organised the output of a number of new machines, metal-working machinetools, electric motors, and other equipment.

Drawing on Soviet process documentation and on the technical assistance of our specialists, Czechoslovakia started the output of bearings for the automobile industry.

In turn, the rapid scientific and technological advance in the socialist countries gives the Soviet Union the possibility of utilising these countries' achievements in order to solve important problems in some sectors of its national economy.

Positive results have been obtained by the application of Polish practice to the production of steel-aluminium trolley wires. Soviet metallurgists have introduced silicon production processes developed in the GDR; this has enabled the creation, within a short time and omitting the stage of laboratory research and equipment modelling, of a high vacuum furnace of a new design, thus saving considerable funds. There are many other examples of this kind.

The need for a collective solution by the socialist countries of new scientific and technological problems, along with the exchange of research results, gave rise to other forms of co-operation.

This applies, first and foremost, to the multilateral and bi-

lateral co-ordination of research, to co-operation among allied research organisations and to direct links among ministries and administrations, expressed both in the pooling of progressive production and technical experience and in the co-ordination and joint carrying out of work in the sphere of science and technology, as well as in setting up joint research organisations and groups.

To benefit of all

The socialist countries' fruitful co-operation in the sphere of science and technology is to the benefit of all its participants. It enables unwarranted parallelism in research to be avoided, time and money to be saved in solving the research problems common to these countries and the levels of their technical development to be raised and brought closer.

Scientific and technical co-operation is now entering a qualitatively new stage. The centre of gravity is increasingly shifting from the sphere of the exchange of research results and technical achievements to the sphere of joint efforts and the concentration of personnel and funds to the solution of new and vitally important problems.

Because science is increasingly becoming a direct productive force, it is also becoming a factor which determines to a great extent the development lines and economic efficiency of economic sectors.

It has been calculated that every rouble invested by the USSR into fundamental and applied research and design and process developments results in an increase in the national income of 1.45 roubles, while the efficiency of investments in science and the utilisation of its achievements in the sphere of production is on the whole four times higher than the efficiency of conventional capital investments.

From the very outset of its existence, the Soviet state showed convincingly the possibility and necessity of long-term prognostication and planning of the development of the economy, science and technology and their vital force and great organisational capacity.

Today, forecasts in the sphere of science and technology are becoming an important sphere, into which investments are very profitable.

International research centres are beginning to play an ever

greater role. Socialist countries already have a great deal of experience in organising such centres. For instance, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute has been successfully functioning since March 1959. Comecon's Institute for Standardisation, founded in 1963, is working and developing scientific and technical facilities which will enable the technical level and quality of goods to be raised by introducing standards in line with world level.

Another very important aspect of scientific and technical co-operation among the socialist countries today is the increasingly organic co-ordination involving the various forms of production co-operation and, in the first place, production specialisation and co-operation and the creation of an integral complex of economic links, starting with research and designing jobs and going on to the production and sale of finished goods.

The development of such links acquires a special practical significance with reference to the priority development of the most promising branches of modern production: the creation of automatic machine systems, new computation facilities, programme-control systems for metal-cutting machines and a complex of instruments, automation facilities and equipment for research.

An investigation into these questions and the preparation of appropriate proposals and scientific recommendations will be among the primary problems to be dealt with by the new International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System, to be set up within the framework of Comecon.

The rapid introduction of the latest scientific and technological discoveries into production will be promoted by the organisation of joint crediting, through the International Investment Bank, of the paramount national economic projects, among them the construction of national and joint industrial enterprises equipped with the latest facilities and ensuring the output of the top-grade goods which the fraternal countries need, with the most economic methods.

As the scientific and technological revolution advances, the raising of the scientific, cultural and technical level of the members of society acquires particular importance.

It is on this that our successes in the sphere of technico-economic and social progress will increasingly depend now.

The interconnection and interdependence of technological progress, the development of science the training of scientific

and technical personnel and the raising of the cultural and technical level of all working people are a logical process, the acceleration of which greatly depends on the work of the secondary schools and of higher education.

The present scientific and technological revolution makes high demands on all personnel, but it is economists and the engineering and technical personnel who have, first and foremost, to meet these demands.

Today, when science is advancing so quickly and when ever new spheres of special knowledge are appearing, the partial and sometimes complete retraining of research personnel, due to the need to solve the problems which constantly arise, is becoming almost inevitable.

Today, both the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries have started extensive work to implement the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Comecon sessions.

For instance, the 24th session agreed unanimously that the stage reached in co-ordinating the national economic development plans would enable the respective countries to complete the co-ordination of their 1871-75 economic plans within the time set.

These five-year plans attach major importance to the intensification of scientific and technical co-operation in its new forms.

Managerial problems

The problems of controlling social development processes acquire a particular importance and urgency at the present stage of communist construction. This raises the problem of improving managerial forms.

The solution of managerial problems is unthinkable without the utilisation of the latest methods developed by the natural sciences and technology, especially mathematics, and without automation and electronic computation facilities.

The scientific and technological revolution enables an approach to be made in a fundamentally new way to the problems of organising and managing economic activities. It dictates the necessity of building up a nation-wide automated control system in the very near future.

In the course of their scientific and technical co-operation, the socialist countries are directing their efforts to the solution of these problems which are at the junction of scientific and tech-

nological progress and advance in the sphere of management.

The mobilisation of the socialist countries' efforts and resources for the collective solution of problems of the scientific and technological revolution on the Leninist principles of internationalism and the all-out consolidation of co-operation in the sphere of science and technology is in harmony with the vital interests of each and every socialist country and of world socialism as a whole.

THE PARTY HITS BACK AT SOVIET SCIENTISTS

Summary: The discussion which has been raging, above all in the Ukraine, on the status of Soviet scientists, and especially physicists, has caused considerable uproar, even at the Party leadership's top echelons. The latter have now resorted to the traditional method of dealing with such cases.

There was a "thorough analysis" of the activity of the Party Committee of the P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR which served as an exemplary basis for a resolution dealing with the "problem" in general. The following report deals with this case, an extremely important one for Soviet science.

The Central Committee of the CPSU has published a resolution "On the Work of the Party Committee of the P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR".¹ In order to understand this resolution properly, one must recall the broad discussion which has been carried on among Ukrainian scientists in recent times. This discussion focused on the following topics: basic research in the Soviet Union, especially in the field of physics, is poorly developed and there are no centers for such research as in the USA and other Western countries; exaggerated pragmatism and utilitarianism have led to a lack of prestige for basic research and the theoretical sciences among the young people, which has made the recruiting of students for this field difficult; it is imperative that the

¹ Partinaya Zhizn, No. 21, November 1970, p. 3 et seq.

scientific cadres be rejuvenated at that the system by which academic degrees are earned be changed; it should be made easier to maintain contact with Western colleagues and to order foreign journals and books; and the entire "communication system" in the scientific sector must be brought up to date.

The problems which were debated are of obvious importance for the future of the Soviet system. It can be assumed that there were, in addition to the participating scientists, influential forces in the Party leadership which supported the airing of such questions in public discussion. It was not insignificant that one of the most important contributors to the discussion was the son of P. Yu. Shelest (a Politburo member of the CC of the CPSU and the First Secretary of the Ukrainian CC), namely the doctor of physical sciences Vitaliy Shelest. The resolution which the Central Committee has now published is designed to show that the Party leadership not only understands some of these demands, but is also in a position to change conditions within the natural sciences.

The CC chose the P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow in order to create a precedent and to work out applicable directives in the context of a concrete example. First it is established that the Institute carries out creative research work and that most of the scientists participate in Party life, and other such generalizations. The main message which the Party leadership wishes to convey is mentioned in an opaqualy-worded passage:

The Central Committee of the CPSU has obliged the Party Committee of the Physics Institute at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to do away with the deficiencies mentioned. The work of the Party organization should be directed at a further increase in the responsibility of the Communists and all associates at the Institute for a high scientific level of the research projects and for speeding up scientific-technical progress. The efforts of the Institute's collective should concentrate on developing basic research in the most important of new fields in physics which are still in the process of emerging in this country. The raising of productivity of scientific projects should be achieved, as should the utilization of the achieved results in practice and the forms of directing the collective's activities

should be constantly perfected. 2

The demand for a rejuvenation of the cadres is solved in the Solomonic manner, by demanding "a proper combination of scholars of the elder generations with the scientific youth". However, the accent is placed on the youth, as the resolution demands more prompt promotion of talented young scientists into positions of leadership.

It thus becomes very clear just what the Party has undertaken in order to maneuver out of an uncomfortable situation, while at the same time divesting itself of any responsibility for the faults found in the system. Translated into somewhat more direct language, the resolution admits that of course there are problems. Basic research is ignored and younger scientists have had little opportunity for advancement, but that is the responsibility of the leading institute at the Academy of Sciences, the Physics Institute, and especially of its Party organization.

In its resolution, the Central Committee recommended to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR that it expound more clearly the direction to be taken by scientific research and the perspectives for development at the Institute.

There is ample indication, however, that many figures in the Party leadership are anything but content with the manner in which the problems were presented in the "great debate". Thus, the accent was placed on the necessity to perfect political and educational work among the scientists. The task of the Party organization will be to:

Propagate systematically among the scientists the Marxist-Leninist consciousness of political socio-economic and philosophical problems of the present, as well as to develop a conformity in the development of science (and) an intransigent position on the ideological conceptions of anti-communism and revisionism.

While this may sound like Party "jargon", the scientists understand this language well. The resolution represents a warning, and at the same time a chastisement. Such demands

2 Partinaya Zhizhn, No. 21, November 1970, p. 9

as those for freer communication with scientists in all countries, for the right to subscribe to scientific publications in foreign countries, etc. can be interpreted as heretical designs. Thus, the Central Committee's resolution concerns not only the status of basic research in physics, but at the same time the openness and frankness with which the young scientists express their concerns. It would appear that the theoretical scientists and basic research scholars in the Soviet Union have launched an effective offensive.

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SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany, headed by the Minister of Education and Science, Dr. Hans Leussink, has had talks in the Soviet Union on problems concerning the further development of scientific and technological relations between the two countries. The delegation left Moscow for home on September 29.

A joint communiqué issued at the end of their visit stresses the existence of a mutual interest in expanding and deepening scientific and technological co-operation, especially in the fields of education, scientific and technological work, physics, chemistry, biology, biochemistry, medical science, electrical engineering and construction. It points out that good opportunities exist for doing this.

During the talks it was agreed that Soviet and West German experts would meet in the very near future in order to decide on subjects for co-operation and to work out specific plans.

An agreement was signed on scientific co-operation between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the German Research Association, which represents the West German universities, higher educational establishments and academies.

The communiqué says that the delegation was given a cordial welcome and that the talks were held in a spirit of sincerity and mutual understanding.

Dr. Leussink invited Vladimir Kirillin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology to visit the Federal Republic

of Germany at the head of a Soviet delegation so as to continue the negotiations which had been started so successfully and to study the work of scientific and research organisations. This invitation has been accepted.

Co-operation in many fields of scientific research, exchanges of scientists and direct scientific contacts between individual institutes and laboratories of the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany are envisaged in the agreement signed in Moscow on September 28.

This agreement on scientific co-operation between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the German Research Association has been signed in conformity with the treaty concluded in Moscow on August 12.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, Academician Jan Pieve, chief learned secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, expressed the hope that the agreement would contribute towards the expansion of scientific contacts, to the progress of science and to better mutual understanding.

He pointed out that quite active scientific contacts had been taking place between the USSR Academy of Sciences and scientific institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. The USSR Academy of Sciences was annually playing host to nearly 400 scientists from West Germany.

Professor Julius Speer, president of the German Research Association, who signed the agreement, said that it would strengthen relations between the scientists of the two countries.

On September 29 Dr. Leussink was received in the Kremlin by Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

They had an exchange of views on the prospects and possibilities for developing scientific and technical contacts between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Vladimir Kirillin took part in the conversation. Professor Adolf Butenandt, president of the Max Planck Society, and Herr Berthold Beitz, who heads the Krupp concern, were also present.

The West German delegation had meetings and talks in Moscow in the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Novosibirsk), at the Institute of High Energy Physics (Serpuukhov) and in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. The delegation also visited Leningrad.

Speaking at a press conference held in Moscow on September 28, immediately after his final meeting with the West German delegation headed by Professor Leussink, Vladimir Kirillin said

that the treaty signed by the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany had created a good foundation for the development of bilateral scientific, technical, trade and economic co-operation.

Vladimir Kirillin emphasised that good prospects existed for scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries.

Summing up for journalists the communiqué that had been agreed upon by the two sides, Vladimir Kirillin said that in the course of their talks they had discussed a wide range of questions concerning spheres for scientific and technical co-operation and its organisation and development.

The two sides, he continued, had agreed that it would be desirable to have co-operation in technological spheres which directly influenced the development of production (electrical engineering, chemistry and machine building).

It was planned to broaden and intensify the exchange of scientific and technical information and to arrange exchanges of scientists for long visits.

Nikolai Patolichev, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade, received Herr Beitz on September 22 and had a discussion with him.

Speaking at a press conference after this return to Bonn, Dr. Leussink said that the talks in Moscow had taken place in a businesslike and cordial atmosphere.

He added that the excellent way in which the delegation's tour of the USSR had been organised had contributed to the success of his delegation's visit.

Referring to outstanding Soviet achievements in various spheres of science and technology, Dr. Leussink said that much could be learned from the USSR.

"Co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, especially in science and technology, meets the interests of both our states", he declared.

On September 26 Alexei Kosygin received Professor Karl Schiller, the West German Minister of Economics, and had a talk with him about the possibilities for developing economic relations between the two countries.

Professor Schiller was visiting the USSR at the invitation of Nikolai Patolichev, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade.

Questions concerning the development of commercial and economic relations between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany had been discussed in Moscow on the previous day

in the course of a meeting between Nikolai Patolichev and Professor Schiller.

Definite progress has been made recently in trade and economic relations between the two countries, reports Tass.

An agreement was signed recently on deliveries of over 52,000 million cubic metres of Soviet natural gas to West Germany over a period of 20 years, beginning in October 1973. The Federal Republic of Germany will deliver to the USSR 1,200,000 tons of large-diameter pipes and other equipment for the gas industry.

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YUGOSLAV WRITER EXTOLS SOLZHENITSYN

Summary: Sveto Maslesa, a well-known Yugoslav literary critic, recently published an article in the Sarajevo fortnightly Odjek 1 titled "Solzhenitsyn: Unity of Literature and Life". In the first part of his article Maslesa describes how the Soviet writer Alexander Tvardovsky "discovered" Solzhenitsyn, who eventually became a symbol in the struggle against Stalinism. Lately, however, Solzhenitsyn has become a writer ideologically proscribed and because of this, the decision to award him this year's Nobel Prize for Literature has been condemned in Moscow as an anti-Soviet move. Maslesa said that it was impossible to separate Solzhenitsyn's literary opus from his life. The following is the full translation of the second part of Maslesa's article:

..... If in this moment one finds it necessary to think of and write about Solzhenitsyn, this is not only because such a noted institution as the Nobel Committee has entered a political game. More essential reasons are in question: faith in man and in his capability to resist all pressures, external and internal,

1 Odjek, Sarajevo, No. 21-22, November 1970, p. 7

to resist all monstrous methods designed to humiliate human beings. Solzhenitsyn is a bright spot, a beacon which we have impatiently waited to see in all parts of our world.

Debility of Ideological Verdict

The censorship which made impossible the publication of Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago and of Solzhenitsyn's books, the political-literary verdicts passed by official quarters, the whole political atmosphere created around these two literary names, all this has created the prerequisites necessary for hero worship and martyrdom. The books by Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn have perhaps become the most popular books in the Soviet Union exactly because of the determined and effective "Samizdat", the illegal publication of writings by means of mimeographed printing which gives every book the aura of politically-banned literature. There is no better and more effective advertisement in our time through which the reader's curiosity is attracted.

One of the consequences of such behavior of some cultural officials in the Soviet Union is that the books which have been put on the ideological index - and which have reached their readers in an unnatural way - are never accepted as ordinary literature but to a great extent as an expression and affirmation of a different ideological and political credo. In this way the literature is turned into an object used and misused for the most variable political-ideological concepts. It is therefore correct to claim that the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Bunin (in 1933), Pasternak (in 1958) and Solzhenitsyn was to a great extent inspired by ideological reasons; however, it is also correct to claim that every literature - regardless of what it really contains - after political condemnations, becomes the object of ideological calculations.

People who are acquainted with the Soviet literary situation know very well that Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago and the latest works by A. Solzhenitsyn attracted great interest not only in the Soviet Union but also outside its borders - long before the Nobel Prize was awarded to them; ideological interest appeared the moment their books were politically condemned.

Had the publication of Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago and Solzhenitsyn's latest books been permitted to appear in a normal way, i. e., had they reached their readers via the Soviet

publishing and literary institutions, less political elements would certainly have been included in the debates over their books. It is a well-known fact that Doctor Zhivago is not the culmination of Pasternak's literary creativeness, as some people have believed. Any normal literary evaluation of this book would place it behind some other authors. In such a case Doctor Zhivago would have become chiefly an object of literary rather than of political appraisals.

Solzhenitsyn's latest books surely have marked defects of which something was already written. However, these purely literary defects are, at this moment, completely hidden because the ideological-political aspects have outweighed the defects. The aura surrounding Solzhenitsyn resulting from the political condemnation levelled against him has hidden from a great number of Soviet and foreign readers the literary weaknesses in his books. Where political passions prevail, coupled with a rather rough ideological struggle, no realistic literary appraisal is possible.

Precisely because of this, it is somewhat ridiculous when the Russian Writers' Association, especially some of its members, are doing their utmost to prove Solzhenitsyn's novels worthless by proclaiming ideological verdicts. Of course, in this way they achieve a completely opposite effect: they turn the readers' attention from the purely literary to the political-ideological field.

Strength of Human Dignity

To a great extent Solzhenitsyn's destiny seems to symbolize the destiny of all courageous literary spirits who in history came into a direct conflict with the limitation of people's freedom to express freely their own views and their own vision of the world. One should now say that Solzhenitsyn's vision of the world has been very dark; this is a vision which levels great accusations. However, neither has his own destiny, which is an inseparable part of Soviet society, been easy. The historical-political conditions have in the course of the past century placed an extremely huge burden on the shoulders of the Russian and, generally speaking, the Soviet people. They have really "paid" their contribution to history, perhaps much more so than other people. It is not our duty here to explain the reasons for such a bad fate. However, what we have to say under present circum-

stances is that Solzhenitsyn's prose, more than any other literary work in the world, has convincingly demonstrated how difficult the destiny of the Russian and Soviet people has been and what superhuman efforts have been imposed upon them by our historical times.

Precisely because of Solzhenitsyn we now have a greater understanding of the efforts made not only by present-day Soviet writers, but by the Soviet people in general. Even those Soviet officials who accuse Solzhenitsyn would surely agree with us that the road traveled by Soviet society since October 1917 has been very hard and very strenuous, that great successes have been accompanied by great human, personal tragedies. The world must also be told about these aspects. It is our deep conviction that in so doing nobody smears the great strength of the Soviet people, but rather extols it in a human way. We need today, perhaps more than in any other time, a human picture of history, a picture which would present us with history from a human angle.

Solzhenitsyn has done more than could be expected from a mortal man: he has offered his own life as the last pawn to his human faith. Thus, his personal tragedy has become a part of his literary vision. This is the point at which his literature and his life have joined hands. This is why we have asserted that one cannot discuss Solzhenitsyn's books only as a literary phenomenon. His literary work, born as a child of his personal tragedy, is nothing but a manner of the author's engagement in a concrete social and ideological situation. Solzhenitsyn is today the awakened and unwavering conscience of Soviet citizens and of all free literary creators. This is why his appearance deserves the recognition of the whole world. In the contemporary world, in which the free and independent mind is being successfully stifled, a world in which human conscience - by means of increasingly effective techniques - is being eliminated in the most monstrous way, in such a world Solzhenitsyn must be given a special place. He really had the moral and human strength to say his "NO" where many other people remained silent, where many poets, these bearers of Prometheus' fire, did not dare to speak.

Solzhenitsyn belongs to a society which, quite naturally, is being shaken by many contradictions. Within the framework of that society, he decided to state his views and implement them. Solzhenitsyn has even turned his literary work into action. It

is our duty to greet and support such an artist, such a man, regardless of the part of the world from which his voice is being heard.

The freedom of the human mind is being stifled today in various forms. Solzhenitsyn has rioted against one of these forms. We view the recognition which he received recently as a recognition of his rebellion. We greet such a recognition because we would also have done so if it would have been given to a "rebel" from any other part of our world.

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HELP IN TRAINING SPECIALISTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Soviet assistance to developing countries in the training of their own specialists with higher and secondary qualifications takes a variety of forms, Nikolai Sofinsky, USSR Deputy Minister of Higher Education, said in a recent article in *C o m m u n i s t*.

These forms, he says, include tuition at higher educational establishments and specialised secondary schools in the USSR, the services of Soviet teachers at educational establishments abroad, the construction and assembly of equipment for higher and secondary specialised educational establishments and the provision of textbooks and methodical literature.

The organised enrolment of students from Asian and African countries at Soviet higher and secondary specialised educational establishments started in 1956 and of students from Latin American countries in 1957.

Lumumba University

In 1957, there were only 134 students from Asian, African and Latin American countries at Soviet higher educational establishments and specialised secondary schools, and over 12,500 in the 1969-70 academic year, he points out.

Students from abroad now study at some 300 universities, institutes and technical colleges in the USSR.

A special place in this assistance to the developing countries is occupied by the Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow, which was established in 1960.

In recent years the university has trained 2,908 young specialists, including 724 for Latin America, 590 for Africa, 433 for the Arab East and 598 for South and South-East Asia.

More than 200 postgraduate students have also taken further qualifications.

Over 3,200 students from 85 countries, as well as post-graduate students, are attending the Lumumba University this academic year.

"Students from the liberated countries are provided, free of charge, with scholarships, accommodation, free education and medical attendance in the Soviet Union, which pays for the education and maintenance of students, postgraduates and trainees", Nikolai Sofinsky says.

He also says that 14 higher educational establishments and four technical colleges have been built and fitted with equipment in India, Burma, Guinea, Afghanistan, Mali, Ethiopia, Algeria, Tunisia and other developing countries.

In all, institutes and technical colleges built with Soviet assistance provide 19,000 students with training in 52 fields of education.

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