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This review is an effort to meet the growing need for information and documentation on the political, cultural, psychological and other aspects of East-West relations. It will indicate briefly views and facts which have been presented already in pamphlets, papers, articles etc.

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I D E O L O G Y

THE STERILITY OF OFFICIAL SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

by Yuri V. Marin

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 25-8-'70)

Summary: Forecasting the possible future development of communism is an increasingly popular pastime among young Soviet theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism, disillusioned by the failure of official ideology to keep abreast of scientific and technological progress. The Party lays the blame for these ideological speculations on Western "bourgeois" theories and non-doctrinaire Marxists, but only adds to the general confusion in Soviet philosophy with unconvincing attempts to restore confidence in its ideology.

Speculation about the future of communism is now more prevalent among Soviet intellectuals, especially young philosophers and sociologists, than at any other time in the history of the Soviet regime. The Party's reaction to ideological pluralism at home and in the world communist movement at large has been the predictable one: to cling to the old ideology with grim determination, at the same time bringing the full weight of its propaganda apparatus to bear on any manifestations of heterodoxy.

Official Soviet philosophy is regarded as hopelessly outdated, not only by the younger intelligentsia, who are attracted by the latest Western philosophical and sociological theories, but also by old-guard Soviet and foreign experts in "scientific communism". Moreover, the general uncertainty among ideologists is being aggravated by the labored efforts of Party theoreticians to shore up the edifice of Soviet Marxism-Leninism.

The official custodians of Party dogma are now on the defensive against their own increasingly free-thinking intelligentsia and the majority of foreign communist theoreticians. Molodoy kommunist, for example, recently warned the younger generation against seductive theories:

Revolutionary ideology is being replaced by the natural sciences, the socialist revolution by the scientific and technical revolution. As a result, various sociological

theories are being conjured up: "the single industrial society", "the stage of economic growth", "convergence". Theories upon which the concept of de-ideologization is based. (No. 5, 1970, p. 92)

The article, entitled "The Decline of Ideology or a 'New' Ideology?", continues:

Ideology has nothing in common with scientific knowledge -- this is one of the favorite arguments of the theoreticians of de-ideologization. On what does this argument rest? One West German ideologist explains: "Ideologies are closed systems, they do not stand up to any form of rational criticism and they recognize only the mistakes of others. Ideologies require faith, science is the driving force in knowledge". Therefore, he says, "ideology and science are, in their basic contents, irreconcilable opposites". (Ibid., p. 95)

Voprosy filosofii, in an editorial headed "Leninism and Urgent Tasks of the Struggle Against Anti-communism", tried unconvincingly to refute allegations that the Kremlin's brand of socialism has failed and that the Soviet Union, motivated by great-power chauvinism, is pursuing an imperialistic foreign policy of territorial aggrandizement (No. 2, 1970, p. 5).

And Kommunist, the Party Central Committee's theoretical organ, published M. Iovchuk's article "Lenin and the Contemporary Struggle of Ideas in Philosophy" in which the author points out that "the question of the prospects for Marxist-Leninist philosophy under the conditions of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution and the social changes linked with it is the subject of a critical ideological struggle" (No. 2, 1970, p. 56). Iovchuk fears that Western theoreticians such as I. Bochenski and P. Sorokin could be right in their forecasts that philosophers in the communist countries may reject the "Party approach" and that eventually there will be a "synthesis of what are now called the socialist and the bourgeois world views" (ibid., p. 58).

Many foreign Marxists now question the Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist philosophical theory. Iovchuk complains that "errant Marxists are advancing an incorrect version, according to which, during the ideological struggle of the 1920s to the 1940s, in the USSR and several other countries there was

a hiatus in the line of creative development of Marxist philosophy, that "dogmatic stagnation" occurred, a "sclerosis of social thought" (ibid., p. 49). He quotes the sociologist Herbert Marcuse as saying that Soviet Marxism ignores objective dialectic, subordinating it to the "interests of the ideological justification and defense of the regime, which according to dialectical logic must be regarded as a stage which can be supplanted by historical development" (ibid., p. 51).

The remark by Roger Garaudy (until recently chief ideologist of the French Communist Party) that "after Lenin's death... the bureaucratic deformation of socialism raged for more than 30 years" and now "is being transformed into a permanent feature of the Soviet regime" (ibid., p. 67) is also quoted.

Another critic of Kremlin ideology is Ernst Fischer, a Marxist of world repute who was recently expelled from the leadership of the Austrian Communist Party and of whom Molodoy kommunist writes:

According to Fischer, all communist ideology is "for the most part false". He tries to explain ideology as the awareness of the power, the interest, and the position of certain abstract "ruling" circles and opposes Marxist philosophy to it... he places this philosophy outside ideology. (No. 5, 1970, p. 96)

Fischer, basing his argument on statements by Marx and Engels, arrives at the conclusion that "in any ideology what is decisive is not the content of truth but the "proof of strength", and when the false awareness proves to be more effective, then knowledge is subordinated to it, puts on a show for its benefit, is concealed or is accused of being 'hostile propaganda' " (ibid.).

Not only communists such as Garaudy and Fischer, hounded by their own parties on Moscow's instructions, reject Soviet dogmatism. The Yugoslav philosopher, M. Filipovic, for example, maintains that there are "two Leninisms" and stresses that "so far dogmatism has reigned in Soviet philosophy" (Kommunist, No. 3, 1970, p. 74). And the communist Chinese Peking Rundschau, greeting the Lenin centenary, states:

The millions and millions of the Chinese people rapturously acclaim the glorious services rendered by the great Lenin in the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat. At the same time they indignantly

curse the scandalous crimes of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev clique for their betrayal of Leninism and the October Revolution. (No. 18, 1970, p. 27)

The Achilles heel of Soviet ideology is the doctrine of "scientific communism", the blueprint for the transition to communism in the Soviet Union and in other countries under communist rule. A leading article in Voprosy filosofii takes Soviet ideologists to task on this score:

Here the large body of experts specializing in the sphere of social knowledge known as scientific communism bear a great responsibility. These are the very problems from which our ideological enemies are especially trying to profit, and at the same time this is the very field of research which noticeably lags behind the vital requirements of the practical ideological struggle. (No. 2, 1970, p. 6-7)

In recent years the theories of the prominent Soviet economist and statistician, S. Strumilin (who in the early 1960s proposed the construction of towns organized on the lines of communes and the assumption of full responsibility for the upbringing of children by the state), have been fully discredited, as have many classical communist theses which only a decade ago were considered axiomatic. The fundamental Marxist contention that "being determines consciousness", for example, has now been called into question. After a transitional period when it was argued that consciousness frequently lags behind being, D. Kedrov, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stated that science had become the mainspring of scientific and technical progress and that many Soviet theoreticians believed the time is ripe to reassess basic Marxist principles. Everywhere, he said, voices can be heard asserting that "now it is not being that determines consciousness, but, on the contrary, consciousness that determines being" (ibid., No. 5, 1967, p. 17).

Soviet apologists of historical materialism also have their backs to the wall. Party theoretician F. Konstantinov concedes:

Objections frequently raised nowadays against historical materialism are: that it is abstract, not concrete; that it ignores, discounts the enormous diversity in the history of nations and tries to force all this diversity into the

the Procrustean bed of a far-fetched supra-historical scheme of successive social structures -- primitive society, slave-owning society, feudalism, capitalism, communism. The result of this abstract, supra-historical Marxist sociology (historical materialism) is, allegedly that its forecasts regarding the course and prospects of social development have not been fulfilled. (Ibid., No. 4, 1970, p. 18)

In an effort to restore faith in official Soviet ideology, the CPSU leaders arranged a conference in Moscow on "The increasing role of Leninism in the contemporary epoch and criticism of anti-communism", which was attended by Party theoreticians and secretaries of the central committees of the Union republics and foreign communist parties, and the editorial board of Kommunist also organized a large conference of philosophers on the theme "Communist Party-mindedness is the most important philosophical principle". These conferences apparently diagnosed the sickness, but were unable to prescribe suitable remedies. The Party press deplored the lack of coordination and purposefulness that prevents Soviet philosophers from coming to grips with the most urgent ideological questions (Voprosy filosofii, No. 2, 1970, p. 6), and regretted that "toothless polemic, a penchant for following certain ideas contradicting the Leninist principle of Party-mindedness, is usually found together with an uncritical attitude towards the views and ideas propagated in bourgeois and revisionist philosophical literature" (Kommunist, No. 3, 1970, p. 76).

The theoretical organ of the Party Central Committee continues:

The attempt by some scientists to widely popularize immature, poorly thought-out, hurriedly written works is irregular. The creative development of dialectical and historical materialism cannot be a sphere of activity where any sort of experimentation or "trial of strength" can be made available to the mass of readers. Quest for new approaches to the solution of vital philosophical problems must be carefully brought to maturity in the author's laboratory and be subjected to discussion by specialists; only that which meets the most exacting scientific requirements should be publish-

ed and disseminated. To attempt to "enrich" Marxist-Leninist theory with premature, unreasoned arguments is to abandon objective, scientific ground and in many cases leads to some form of concession to the ideas of our enemies. (Ibid., p. 77)

This is a clear warning to restive young Party theoreticians not to stray beyond the closely-defined limits of official Marxism-Leninism.

For years, faith in Lenin's prediction that European and world revolution were just around the corner and that communism would soon triumph over capitalism remained unshaken. But now the picture has changed. A few years ago, the CPSU leaders called into being a special committee at the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by the young historian, I. Bestuzhev, and charged with furnishing scientific proof of the inevitable world victory of communism. In 1967 the Soviet press was full of sensational reports that a new science of "futurology" was being created in the Soviet Union, but even then Bestuzhev pointed out that although technical progress was being accurately forecast, political and social predictions were frequently purely utopian (Literaturnaya gazeta, May 1, 1967).

Further experiments in futurology produced serious doubts about the possibility of communism ever being victorious on a world scale. The deputy rector of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, G. Glezerman, stated that "in the course of history there are various and even directly opposite possibilities" (Voprosy filosofii, No. 4, 1969, p. 19). A similar opinion was expressed by P. Fedoseyev, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in a more recent article:

Historical necessity is not fatal inevitability: it manifests itself at each historical "moment" in the struggle between various trends in the form of a law-governed opportunity of developing along this "historically necessary" path, but at each concrete point in history -- especially at its nodal points -- the possibility of another development is not excluded. (Ibid., No. 5, 1970, p. 15)

A. Rumyantsev, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, calls futurology a pseudo-science and insists that the only criteria for the future are Lenin's prophecies (Mirovaya

ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, No. 1, 1970, p. 125). But this confidence is not shared by S. Trapeznikov, a historian who confines himself to the vague promise that "objective laws will inevitably lead to the collapse of capitalism and the victory of communism, but when this will occur and with what means of struggle it will be achieved -- revolutionary or evolutionary, violent or peaceful -- it is impossible to determine exactly" (Voprosy filosofii, No. 4, 1970, p. 15).

The crisis in official Soviet philosophy is primarily the result of rapid scientific and technological progress, as the following extract from a leading article in Voprosy filosofii admits:

The peculiar feature of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution is that in a certain respect it is the pivotal point of a struggle which has developed between the two worlds, between two systems of different types -- the socialist and the capitalist. Under these conditions the scientific and technical revolution and its results and consequences are turning into a two-edged weapon. (No. 4, 1970, p. 7)

The journal's editors concede that the Soviet Union is slower than the capitalist West in exploiting the achievements of modern science and technology, particularly with regard to production efficiency and labor productivity (ibid., p. 9).

Assessing the possibilities for the further economic development of the capitalist system, the Party press recognizes its capacity for the

..... creation and rapid development of new branches (atomic energy, electronics, the production of calculating and business machines, missiles, petro-chemicals, instrument manufacture, the production of pure and special materials, plant for air and water purification, bio-chemistry, the production of fuels, etc.); the rapid rates of development of electric power, machine construction and chemistry enable the accelerated renewal and improvement of the technical base of all industry and the entire economy;... the rapid growth in the production of consumer durables, the sharp rise in the output of electric power for private and domestic use; .. the

relative reduction of the proportion of basic branches producing raw materials due to the sharp increase in finished output per capita of those employed in industry and agriculture. (Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, No. 5, 1970, p. 15)

This realistic appraisal of the achievements of the capitalist system, at one time unthinkable, is symptomatic of the dilemma of the Soviet leaders, who are embarrassed to find that capitalism, far from collapsing as forecast by Lenin, is going from strength to strength, while the Soviet Union is plagued by doubts about its ability to keep pace.

WANTED: A NEW ASIAN NATIONALISM

by Tarzie Vittachi

Summary: How to bring in a new nationalism in Asia, to redress the imbalance and the deficiencies of the old? It is a question about which the Singapore Foreign Minister, Mr Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, feels strongly and has expressed himself with stimulating candour. His views are here recorded by Tarzie Vittachi, Director of the Press Foundation of Asia.

The classical nationalism that brought political independence to Asia has spent its vitality. But the sense of nationhood is still the most exciting political force there is. It could be harnessed for new use, provided people are willing to refurbish it to suit present and future challenges. These are the views of Mr Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Foreign Minister of Singapore, who led a discussion here recently on the political requirements to "improve the quality of life" in the Asia of the seventies.

Here are his thoughts, blocked out by relevant pointers:

Does old-style nationalism work?

Rajaratnam: I see no prospect of Asian nationalism fading away in the foreseeable future. But it may be transformed through a process of renovation.

What are its defects?

Rajaratnam: The major defect of the old nationalism was that it was designed for a purpose which has now become largely irrelevant. The old nationalism was an anti-colonial nationalism. It had, therefore, to inculcate among its adherents and anti-

authority and anti-government attitude because at that time authority and government constituted imperialist power. It had to instil in the people an abiding contempt for government and all its works. The nationalist movement was organised not to sustain government but to bring it down.

Similarly the old nationalism was not organised to promote rapid economic development, assuming that the imperialist government had such high-minded intentions. The greater the economic discontent and heavier the burden of poverty, the easier for the anti-colonialists to mobilise popular support against the hated imperialist regime. So, in addition to creating an ungovernable society, anti-colonial nationalism was dedicated to creating a discontented society.

What renovation is possible?

One of the immediate concerns of the new nationalism should be to reorientate people's attitudes towards government and authority. There is a world of difference between wanting to get rid of bad governments and wanting to get rid of government as such. The new nationalism must re-introduce into Asian society a sense of social discipline and social responsibility. Without this the reinvigorating of Asian societies becomes well nigh impossible. More so in times of accelerating change and sweeping transformations. Without social discipline I cannot see how Asian societies can cope with change or initiate meaningful and orderly changes of their own. On the contrary, without social discipline change acts as a catalyst for permanent disintegration and permanent chaos.

In calling for discipline I am not advocating submission and conformity. The discipline should either be self-imposed or, if imposed by constituted authority, then it must be for purposes and goals understood and accepted by the majority of the people. Nor should the need for social discipline be converted into a shield to protect unpopular and inept governments. The new nationalism should therefore offer techniques and procedures for the peaceful displacement of inept governments. The ground rules for this are already there but unfortunately in many countries ruling and opposition parties, in their short-sightedness, have generally ignored them.

FAITH AND SPIRIT

In which direction should this "disciplined" society go?

Its central purpose should be the rapid modernisation of Asian

societies. More succinctly, the new nationalism should be a modernising nationalism.

The new nationalism must focus its attention on the transformation of the minds of Asians. Successful modernisation has a great deal to do with mental attitudes and values. A modernising mind must be a creative mind. In this sense the Pyramid-builders of ancient Egypt and the creators of Angkor Wat and Borodudur as well as the architects of the temples of India were modernisers. The societies which created these astonishing monuments were, in their time, modernising societies and if you probe deeply into them you will find that their modernising zeal had a great deal to do with mental attitudes and faith and spirit.

Why has Asia failed to modernise?

Much modernisation so far has taken the form of a thin veneer of technological marvels, labour-saving devices, conspicuous consumption and imported Western vices laid over archaic societies. I call this "Alley Oop modernisation". It is Stone Age man caricaturing 20th Century man. We are attracted more by the imported products of modernisation than by the spirit of modernisation. But if modernisation is to be successful it must come from within Asian societies. It must emanate from modernised Asian minds -- minds moved by the virtues of modernisation rather than by what they can rummage from its dustbins.

Many massive and well-intentioned economic projects never get off the ground despite the pumping in of vast sums of money and the advice of competent experts. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with their plans -- as straightforward economic propositions. Where they went wrong was in ignoring the non-material factors involved in modernisation.

What change of direction does the new nationalism need?

A modernising nationalism should be future-oriented. In proposing this I have practical considerations in mind. Modernisation demands that people acquire a new time perspective. The Asian mind is essentially tradition-orientated and post-independent nationalism, for a variety of reasons, has tended to reinforce traditionalism by reviving the archaic elements in Asian history.

There is yet another reason for advocating a future-orientated nationalism. Modernisation demands that people should want to

work and live not just for today but for tomorrow as well. This is because the nature of modern technology and modern economy requires long-term planning. It takes many years of planning, work and considerable outlay of capital to initiate and complete a project. This means that people must learn to postpone immediate gratification for long-term gains. They must learn to acquire a sense of responsibility towards the young generations as yet unborn. This is not a concept that will come easily to an Asia traditionally conditioned to venerate and show concern primarily, if not wholly, towards its ancestors. Ministering to the needs of future generations, therefore, goes against the grain of tradition. Yet 20th Century modernisation requires an acute sense of and concern for the future.

Will people become enthusiastic about this modernising nationalism?

Another necessary quality for the new nationalism is that it should be development-orientated. It is not enough merely to want development -- whether economic, social or cultural. The peoples of Asia must want it so badly that they would be prepared to pay the price genuine development demands. Though a great many Asians have put themselves forward as proponents of development, they have tended to be somewhat silent about the exertions, painful adjustments, discipline and sacrifices required for development. Some of them have even put forward and tried to implement plans for "development without tears".

The new nationalism should make good this defect. It should introduce honesty and frankness into discussions about development and modernisation. I do not think that such frankness would panic Asians into rejecting development. Once the people get over the initial shock of being confronted with the harsh facts, they will be as ready to undertake the hardships of development as once they were to undertake the hardships of anti-colonial struggles.

How will the new nationalism eradicate social injustice?

An essential goal of the new nationalism should be stress on a meritocratic society. It must espouse a society where reward, prestige and influence should go to the most able, the most energetic and to those who contribute actively and positively towards development and modernisation. In a meritocratic society an individual's position, power and influence should not be determined by considerations of race, religion, caste or tribal, family or cultural affiliations. Talents are scarce

commodity in any society, but more so in developing countries.
How long will this process take?

It may well be that the prophets of the new nationalism must initially be prepared to face the indifference and even the sullen hostility of their compatriots. After all, it took the prophets of the old nationalism over half a century to get popular support for their ideas. So the prophets of the new nationalism must be prepared for quite a while to walk alone; to endure the ordeal of being treated as heretics; to suffer bitter disappointments.

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LUKACS DEFENDED AGAINST CHARGES OF REVISIONISM

(Radio Free Europe Research, 8-9-'70)

The 1970/71 issue of the Hungarian review Magyar Filozofiai Szemle published an article "Marxist Philosophical Debate or Personal Slander?" signed by the initials F. F., which rejected an earlier attack on Gyorgy Lukacs by the Salzburg philosopher and Chairman of the Hegelian Society, Wilhelm Raymund Beyer.

Beyer, it was claimed, had attacked Lukacs's "great ontological experiment" in an article "Marxistische Ontologie -- eine idealistische Modeschoepfung" published in the November 1969 issue of the East German Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.

Beyer had rejected completely the validity of Lukacs's experiment, which he came to know about through hearing a lecture and reading a volume of his work. Beyer, it was argued, had denounced Lukacs on the basis of quotations selected at random, mere rumor, and arbitrary interpretation of his work; for this reason, it was impossible to engage in a genuine philosophical-ideological discussion with him -- all the more so since no consistent thinking can be found in his study. That Beyer's aim was not a rational discussion of the issues involved is shown by the following excerpt:

By denouncing this system of thought (the system of thought of Lukacs's ontology -- Magyar Filozofiai Szemle editor's note) as "revisionist", we expose its dangerous character, which is especially dangerous for the modern capitalist countries.

"F. F." then analyzed Beyer's "confusion of thought" -- for example, the completely wrong assertion that Lukacs's views are identical with Heidegger's ontological theories or with the thesis of the primary importance of the theory of knowledge -- and in this connection he attacked Lukacs sharply for "causing ontology to consume epistemology", though Lukacs's ontology in fact represents exactly the opposite standpoint.

Beyer's "confusion of thought disguised behind emotion" did not permit the possibility of a rational philosophical discussion or even raise the question whether it is possible (and if so, how) to work out a "uniform science of history" as a generalized theory of society. Beyer's aim was to denounce an alleged revisionism. It is generally known that Lukacs is extremely critical of the development of "socialism", beginning with the period which he calls the "era of the personality cult".

For Lukacs the criterion of criticism is the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP, and the principles of reform which it originated. He always appeals to the Communist movement and its organizational and theoretical resources and opportunities.

Beyer, it was argued calumniated Lukacs when he said that the latter wrote and made public statements with the applause and respect of bourgeois public opinion in view. A great life, which has sacrificed itself unselfishly for 50 years for the revolution, does not need any rehabilitation. Beyer had distorted completely Lukacs's attitude to religion and had tried to give the impression that Lukacs follows Nicolai Hartmann instead of Marx in his views on the satisfaction of religious needs, which implied that he believed that the church and capitalism are the allies of the Marxists in this field. Beyer even claimed that Lukacs had been invited to the founding meeting of the Catholic Paulus Society, and his article was full of vulgar slander dredged up at random and accompanied by quotations which insulted the intelligence of the reader; the text itself and the commentaries had nothing in common.

"F. F." supports his argument with various examples. Thus, for example, Beyer deduced from a sentence in Lukacs's lecture on ontology, that Lukacs was angry with certain "socialist" countries over what happened in Czechoslovakia; this was quite wrong. From another passage, Beyer concluded -- falsely -- that Lukacs doubted the existence of the West German Communist Party.

Beyer's article was more than just another anti-Lukacs pamphlet, for he argued that: "All attempts at the revival of Marxism mean *eo ipso* the revision of Marxism". It is true that the theoretically orthodox character of Marxist-Leninist thought -- in the name of which Beyer passes judgement -- is open to question. But the point about the article is that it dealt not with the question of whether one particular scholar's interpretation of Marxism was right or wrong, but with a question of principle in the development of Marxism.

Heated arguments take place among Hungarian Marxists on a number of ideological-philosophical questions, including Lukacs' ideas, but the appearance of articles such as Beyer's is considered undesirable by Lukacs's followers and opponents alike, because the social effect of such writing is to prevent the revival of Marxism. And the need for a continuous process of development in Marxism is axiomatic for all Marxists.

THE SOVIET OPPOSITION FORMULATES ITS IDEOLOGY

by Herman Achminov

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,
4-8-'70)

Summary: The extent to which thinking people in the Soviet Union appreciate the significance of the structural changes taking place in their society has been hitherto largely obscure. But the recent appearance of democratically-phrased appeals and manifestoes, including the famous Sakharov memorandum to the Soviet leaders, proves that the intelligentsia now has a strong awareness of its own identity and can be expected to challenge the ruling caste of Party bureaucrats.

Communism today is not the enigma of a hundred or even fifteen to twenty years ago. It is no longer a "specter" laying claim to the future, but a concrete social phenomenon with distinctive features of its own.

Contemporary communism is a viable doctrine, but for backward countries only. It has come to power unaided, i.e., without direct external intervention, only in economically underdeveloped countries (Russia in 1917, Albania, Yugoslavia, China,

North Vietnam and Cuba). In the economic history of such countries modern communism performs the same function as early capitalism in normally evolving societies: it guarantees the primary accumulation of capital and, during this period, enjoys the support of the decisive sections of society (but not the majority). Modern communism can thus be considered a substitute form of early capitalism.

Secondly, notwithstanding the assurances of Marx and his followers, modern communism is not the result of modern industrial development and the future does not belong to it. The reverse is true: modern industrial development is undermining communism's positions, witnessed by the fact that the highly-developed capitalist countries (the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, etc.) are immune to communism and communist governments in highly-developed countries (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, as opposed, for example, to Rumania) are running into serious difficulties. Thirdly, the transformation of a communist state into a highly-developed country is accompanied by specific and growing conflicts and contradictions, particularly that between the need to apply market principles to ensure economic growth and the ideological arguments for the retention of the overlarge planned sector which has resulted from the abolition of private property.

Fourthly, in the course of a communist revolution a "new class", an aristocracy of communist bureaucrats comes to the fore. Soon, however, this new privileged class is split into two hostile camps -- the party apparatus and a class of specialists (technical intelligentsia) destined to be the grave-diggers of the very communism that bred them.

The above conclusions have been arrived at in an atmosphere of free exchange of information and opinions, but until the recent appearance in the West of various documents, composed in the Soviet Union and testifying to the emergence of democratic thought and platforms there, the extent to which Soviet citizens are aware of the historical import of the changes now taking place in the structure of their society and the conclusions they themselves draw from them remained largely obscure. The most important of these documents are: "An Appeal by Soviet Scientists to the Party and Government Leaders of the USSR", signed by A. Sakharov, V. Turchin and R. Medvedev; A. Amalrik's treatise "Will the Soviet Union Continue to Exist until

1984?"; and the "Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union", put out by the "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic States". The first of these has been published in the West by the newspaper Russkaya mysl (Paris, April 30, 1970), the second by the Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam in 1969, and the third, a copy of the manuscript of which is in the possession of the author of this article (the page numbers after the excerpts quoted from this document refer to this manuscript), is also being prepared for publication by the Herzen Foundation.

The aims of the three documents may differ -- nuclear physicist A. Sakharov and his colleagues are attempting to convince Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny of the need for specific reforms, Amalrik's treatise is an illegal historico-philosophical composition, and the "Program of the Democratic Movement" is a call for a (non-violent) struggle for a better future for the USSR and the whole world -- but their authors all share a keen awareness of the new Soviet intelligentsia as a separate class. Sakharov and his friends, in their memorandum addressed to the top Soviet leaders, underline that the desire of the intelligentsia for free exchange of information and expression of opinions is legitimate and natural, but

..... the state suppresses this striving. This causes a rupture, mutual distrust, which renders fruitful co-operation between the Party and state stratum and the most active and valuable class in society, i.e. the intelligentsia, difficult. Under the conditions of a modern industrial society, where the role of the intelligentsia is growing, this gap cannot be described as other than suicidal.

Such outspokenness is to be admired and testifies to the awareness on the part of Sakharov and his colleagues of the importance of the scientific intelligentsia for Soviet society and the limitations of the bureaucracy.

The "Program of the Democratic Movement" shows this awareness, but is even more scathing in its attack on the Party bosses:

"His majesty the Party bureaucratic elite", holding all the reins of society in his hands, has become the new, sole class ruling and exploiting society. The new class

of exploiters has been formed not by economic but by political attributes, by virtue of that immense power which it possesses. The characteristic feature of this new elite is that it represents neither the people nor any other social class. It represents only itself, but that political arbitrariness which it perpetrates is invariably presented as the will of the working class, as the will of the people. (p. 44)

This is the first definition in the Soviet Union of the essentially parasitical nature of the Party apparatus. And about the intelligentsia:

The intelligentsia is now a numerically powerful but qualitatively inadequate social force. Its most thoughtful and active section, finding no broad support in its own class, is declared unreliable, surrounded by suspicion and spied upon and subjected to repressions. But there can be no doubt that, in step with social development, our intelligentsia will play a more important and worthy role. (p. 41)

Amalrik's treatise which in effect is a continuation and more accurate definition of the "Program's" ideas about the intelligentsia, makes no reference to the Party bureaucratic elite and its parasitical nature. This, and several other differences, suggest that Amalrik is not the author of the "Program" or at least not its sole author. He writes:

As I see it, in our country the gradual formation of a class, which can still be called a "class of specialists", is in progress. It is composed of those people who have secured, by the Soviet yardstick, a relatively high standard of living for themselves and their families. Apparently, this class is already beginning to be aware of its unity and to make itself felt. (pp. 14-15)

Unlike Sakharov and the authors of the "Program", who are in no doubt that the intelligentsia exists as a class conscious of its separate identity, Amalrik regards it as still being in the process of formation. He is also more critical of the intelligentsia, speaking of the "stamp of greyness and mediocrity" which the purges placed upon the "middle class", of its fatalism and its "bureaucratization" (pp. 15 and 17).

Basically, however, these three assessments of the Soviet intelligentsia do not contradict one another because they refer to different aspects of the same problem: Sakharov and his friends are spokesmen for those intellectuals who are already conscious of their mission, the authors of the "Program" are trying to arouse new layers of society, themselves having already reached the required degree of awareness, while Amalrik takes in the whole scene and rightly observes that the active champions of freedom are still few in number. Nonetheless, it seems that Amalrik somewhat underrates, in depth rather than in numbers, the extent to which the intelligentsia is conscious of itself as a distinct class. He mentions the "Democratic Movement" and sees three ideological trends in it -- "genuine Marxism-Leninism", "Christian ideology" and "a liberal ideology" (p. 8), but maintains that "all these ideologies are to a considerable degree amorphous. Nobody has formulated them sufficiently, fully and convincingly" (p. 9). About the constructive program of the "Democratic Movement" he writes: "Although the Democratic Movement is in the process of distillation and has not formulated for itself any distinct program, all its members have, in any event, one common aim in mind: law and order based on respect for the fundamental rights of man" (p. 10).

Sakharov and his fellow authors, however, have a concrete program, which begins by urging the Party leaders to admit the need for further democratization and announce how quickly and by what means it will be implemented and concludes with the demand for more public say in the work of state organs within the limits dictated by the national interests. Sandwiched between general requests are the following specific demands:

4. To stop jamming foreign radio broadcasts.....
6. An amnesty for political prisoners... Public supervision of prisons and psychiatric institutes....
12. The gradual introduction of the practice of allowing several candidates to stand for one post in elections to Party and Soviet organs at all levels....
13. Extension of the rights of Soviet organs.

The authors of the "Program of the Democratic Movement" demand the creation of a democratic state, "a Union of Democratic Republics governed by representatives of all parties

and of non-party, national, class or religious groups" and the "curtailment of the obligations of citizens regarding the state and the guarantee... of fundamental rights and liberties without any restrictions", particularly freedom from arbitrary arrest, interrogation and other acts of violence, freedom of conscience, speech and the press, free elections and the right to hold meetings and demonstrations (p. 20).

Particularly interesting is the economic program of the "Democratic Movement", and here Amalrik again shows himself to be more cautious than the authors of action programs, writing that even a liberal ideology, which "in the final analysis proposes the transition to a democratic society on Western lines", demands, however, the retention of the "principle of public and state ownership".

Sakharov's opinions on ownership are less clear, because the only appeals signed by him are addressed directly to the Soviet leaders and it would be naive for him to suggest to them that they tolerate private ownership. On this point he and his colleagues restricted themselves to the following proposals:

3. The wide organization of integrated production combines (firms) with a high level of independence in matters of production planning, technological progress, marketing and supplies and in financial and personnel matters. The extension of such rights to smaller units. Scientific determination, after careful research, of the forms and extent of state control.

If this proposal were put into practice, state ownership of the means of production would become a mere formality, because state interference would be tolerated only after having been proved not to be economically damaging.

Turning back to the "Program of the Democratic Movement", this is probably the first Soviet document which denies in principle the alleged supremacy of socialism over capitalism. It says: "We consider that capitalism embodies positive social values and is constantly cultivating them... and that the struggle against capitalism in any of its forms is criminal and purposeless" (p. 8), and then logically demands the introduction of private ownership in the form of joint-stock companies, private ownership of the means of production and the transition to a market economy (pp. 28-29).

Finally, a common feature of all three documents discussed here is fear for the country's future. Amalrik sees the danger of the moral decay of Soviet society and the outbreak of class warfare:

In what does it believe and by what is it guided, this nation without religion and without morality? It believes in its own national strength. . . . With such an outlook it is not difficult to understand what forms popular dissatisfaction will take and into which channels it will overflow if the regime survives. The horrors of the Russian revolutions of 1905-07 and 1917-20 will then appear as pastoral idylls. (p. 36)

Sakharov and his colleagues lay greatest stress upon the increasing gap between the USSR and the capitalist countries due to the inflexibility of the Soviet system:

What awaits our country if course is not set towards democracy? The lag behind the capitalist countries during the second industrial revolution. . . . increasing economic difficulties; worsening relationships between the Party and the Government apparatus and the intelligentsia; the danger of lurches to right and to left.

And, at the end of their memorandum:

A shift to the right, i. e., the victory of the trends towards harsh administration, the "tightening of the screws", will aggravate these problems to the extreme and will lead the country up a tragic blind alley. . . . In a few years, perhaps, it will already be too late.

The "Program" regards the increasing leeway which the Soviet Union has to make up as axiomatic: "The Union lags behind all advanced countries in production and per capita consumption. This gap has been increasing in recent years" (p. 23). The ideologists of the "Democratic Movement" hope to avoid the excesses feared by Amalrik and seek to change the existing system by evolutionary and non-revolutionary means, stating:

We, the democrats of the country, announce that we are filled with the firm resolution to struggle un-

swervingly for the proclaimed values: the freedom and welfare of the people, regardless of any difficulties and sacrifices.

We, the democrats of the country, appeal to all honest, thinking and courageous citizens of our society. . . . to take an active part in the peaceful, non-violent struggle for lofty democratic ideals. (35)

The authors of all three documents consider the nationality problems within the Soviet Union or the socialist bloc to be important for the future. Sakharov and his fellow scientists regard them as being largely dependent on the solution of general political and economic questions: "What awaits our country if course is not set towards democracy? the exacerbation of nationality problems, because in the national republics the movement for democracy, coming from below, will inevitably assume a national character".

The "Program" devotes a special section to the nationality question, which opens with the statement: "The Soviet Union is a forcible unification of peoples around a Great Russian nucleus" (p. 30), and concludes with the demand for national self-determination by means of a referendum under the supervision of the United Nations. Amalrik expects that, particularly in the event of a war with China, "nationalistic sentiments will be strengthened to the extreme among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, primarily in the Baltic States, in the Caucasus and the Ukraine, and then in Central Asia and the Volga region" (p. 62).

The documents quoted above represent a new development in anti-communist thought in the USSR. After Stalin's death, particularly after the process of de-Stalinization was introduced, numerous legal and illegal works exposing the past appeared and, according to Amalrik, it was this period of "cultural opposition" which produced the present movement. Amalrik underestimates the theoretical sophistication of the Democratic Movement probably because he was banished from Moscow in April 1969, while Sakharov's memorandum and the "Program of the Democratic Movement" relate to 1970. On the other hand, Amalrik is the only author who tries to place developments in a historical perspective, although not altogether successfully. He grasps instinctively rather than by systematic analysis that

communism has a social basis in backward countries only.

In the development of democratic thought in the Soviet Union there has been a change of emphasis from criticism of the past to the elaboration of concrete programs for the future. But there is still a lack of historico-philosophical concepts which could convince the propagators of the new ideas of the historical validity and inevitable victory of their cause. In other words, in the Soviet Union there exists a state of conscious dissatisfaction, but there is no revolutionary situation. But, if Sakharov and his friends are correct, as they appear to be, with their warning to Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders that if reforms are not carried through now it could be too late a few years hence, the position could deteriorate rapidly from the regime's point of view. Far from heeding these warnings, however, the Soviet leaders are clamping down and appear to be set on challenging fate.

POLITICS

TEXT OF TREATY BETWEEN USSR AND FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

(Soviet News, 18-8-'70)

The text of the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970, by Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko and by Herr Willy Brandt and Herr Walter Scheel, is given below:

The high contracting parties,

Seeking to promote the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world,

Convinced that peaceful co-operation between states on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is in accord with the aspirations of the peoples and the broad interests of international peace,

Noting that the concerted steps previously taken by them, in particular the conclusion on September 13, 1955, of the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, have created favourable conditions for new important steps directed towards the further development and strengthening of their mutual relations,

Desiring to express in contractual form their determination to improve and extend co-operation between them, including the sphere of economic relations, and also scientific, technical and cultural contacts, in the interests of both sides,

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany regard the maintenance of international peace and the achievement of the relaxation of tension as a major aim of their policies.

They express their desire to promote the normalisation of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations between all European states, and in so doing to proceed on the basis of the real situation existing in this area.

ARTICLE 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany shall be guided in their mutual relations, as well in questions of safeguarding European and international security, by the aims and principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations. In conformity with this, they will solve their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake, in accord with Article Two of the U. N. Charter, to refrain from the threat of force or the use of force in questions concerning security in Europe and international security, as well as in their mutual relations.

ARTICLE 3

In conformity with the aims and principles set out above, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany are at one in the recognition that peace in Europe can only be maintained if no one encroaches on the present-day frontiers.

They undertake scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe in their present frontiers;

They declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever against anyone, and will not advance such claims in the future;

They regard as inviolable now and in the future the frontiers of all states in Europe as they are on the day of the signing of this treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line, which forms the western frontier on the Polish People's Republic and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

ARTICLE 4

This Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany does not affect bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements previously concluded by them.

ARTICLE 5

This Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will be effected in Bonn.

Done in the city of Moscow on August 12, 1970, in two copies, each in the Russian and German languages, both texts being equally authentic.

THE SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY

Ljubomir Radovanovic

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, 5-9-'70)

Rarely has a brief bilateral international agreement aroused as extensive and as much comment as the Soviet-German treaty of August 12, 1970. This in itself is a sure sign of its extraordinary importance which surpasses the relations between the signatories. The treaty contains five articles only two of which are of essential significance for the two parties concerned and for European relations in general. One of these commits the signatories to settle any mutual dispute exclusively by peaceful methods and in agreement with the principles of the UN Charter and to refrain from either the threat or use of force; the other binds them to respect now and in the future the territorial status quo and the inviolability of the present frontiers in Europe and especially the German borders. The former expresses the reason of the Federal Republic of Germany for concluding the treaty and the latter that of the Soviet Union.

The meaning of these two provisions of the treaty - although this is not explicitly stated - is that the Soviet Union renounces any forcible action against the Federal Republic as a former enemy state - the UN Charter makes an exception in this case and allows for such action on the basis of and under the conditions of Articles 53 and 107 to which the Soviet Union had alluded in the past - and that, on the other hand, the Federal Republic accepts the territorial status quo and the present frontiers in Europe as inviolable thus indirectly expressing - although not yet with a full international impact - its recognition of the German Democratic Republic which it had long considered simply as an area under Soviet occupation. According to the interpretation of the Federal Republic's Government, contained in a letter which was deposited at the time of the signing of the treaty, the Federal Republic does not consider this treaty to be in contrast to its policy of advocating a kind of peace in Europe in which the German people will again achieve its unity through free self-determination. This is a unilateral statement made outside the text of the treaty but it is customarily considered that the other side allows such an interpretation.

Viewed as an event in bilateral relations, the Soviet German treaty eliminates the main obstacles to increased cooperation between the two parties concerned, especially in the economic field and to a lesser degree possibly in the sphere of political relations, too, although there is no mention of this in the introductory provisions which refer to the mutual desire to expand cooperation. However, in view of the significance and role which both partners have in European politics and bearing in mind their disposition in the course of the talks and at the signing of the treaty, one may reasonably anticipate an improvement in political cooperation too. The caution with which the desires to this effect are formulated is easy to understand if one considers the profound character of the misunderstanding and suspicion that persisted all through the post-war period. The only reserve one might have about the future of the treaty stems from a declaration on the German side that the Federal Republic's Government would wait for the results of the four-power talks on Berlin before ratifying the treaty. The German Government must indeed ascribe a singular significance to the Berlin talks to consider them a worthwhile reason for delaying the ratification of a document of such paramount importance to it, one on which it had insisted for so long and which it had concluded with such haste.

That is now possible to anticipate closer political contacts and consultations on international problems of universal concern is indicated by Article 1 of the Treaty which defines some general goals common to both sides such as, for instance, the preservation of international peace and relaxation of international tension, normalizing the situation in Europe and fostering peaceful relations between all European peoples while respecting the existing state of affairs on the European continent. Naturally, no agreement was reached on any specific system in Europe - indeed, an agreement of this sort is nowhere in sight at the moment - but it has been agreed that this system should be developed by peaceful means and with full respect for the present territorial and political status in Europe.

The actual formulation of the provisions of the treaty allows for a broader interpretation of the future prospects of Soviet-German cooperation. The signatories have both committed themselves to a peaceful settlement of disputes not only in "mutual relations" but also in "matters of ensuring European and international security". They have undertaken to refrain from the

threat of force or use of force in "all matters affecting European security or international security as well as in mutual relations".

We are unable to enter the question here as to what legal and political effect the assumed obligations to a peaceful attitude and renunciation of force in regard to third countries, too, may have in relations between the two parties to the treaty and in general international behaviour in view of the fact that it is a matter of a bilateral agreement and of two parties which also have other obligations to the military alliances of which they are members, yet from the political-legal point of view it is surely a question of a major obligation and of a novel development which could well inaugurate a new period in European relations. Thus, in view of the manner in which it is expected to affect future Soviet-German relations and the evolution of international relations in Europe, the treaty which - according to present estimates is the product of a generally useful compromise - must be assessed as a constructive move in post-war European politics.

A more detailed analysis, which the situation created by this treaty surely deserves, could yield far-reaching conclusions - although past experience necessitates the utmost caution in the drawing of conclusions about the future on the basis of the logic deriving from international treaties. Even so the fact remains that the Soviet-German treaty is the first political agreement reached between two countries which belong to two mutually antagonistic military alliances with a contradictory political and ideological foundations. The contractors have agreed that their treaty will not affect any of their earlier concluded agreements or arrangements. This is a customary formula. Still, one cannot tell from this agreed statement what would happen if in a concrete case the obligations deriving from this treaty were to find themselves at variance with commitments resulting from the other agreements - NATO or the Warsaw Pact for example?

We know that the Atlantic Treaty has very important military dispositions in the Federal Republic and that the bulk of its armed forces including German troops is stationed there. Bearing this in mind a logical question to ask is how will the Atlantic system be affected by the fact that that very same member of the alliance on whose territory its main disposition is situated has unreservedly renounced the use of force in

matters of international security against that side because of which the whole of this military system was actually set up? On the other hand the Warsaw Pact was formed as the Soviet Union's reply to the inclusion of the Federal Republic into the Atlantic Treaty because of the menace which the renewed militarization of the Federal Republic and its involvement in the Atlantic military bloc constituted for the security of the Soviet Union. The direct danger and the immediate motive which caused the Soviet Union to establish the Warsaw Pact thus came from Germany. The question is whether the Soviet-German treaty on the renunciation of force has also introduced some changes into the original conceptions of that policy of which the Warsaw Pact had been an instrument.

These questions cannot be answered yet nor can they be answered only by the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic but it may well be said that the Soviet-German treaty best illustrates the obsolescence of the assumptions of the Atlantic and Warsaw pacts and the logic of the current efforts to replace the present outmoded bloc system of security in Europe by another, more universal system which would not be founded on bloc divisions and on a balance of power and fear. In the case in point one power which organized one powerful military bloc and another power, which is considered as being one of the main supports of the military potential of the other bloc, have renounced the use of force in mutual relations and in international politics in which the two organizations of military power cannot be regarded otherwise but as instruments of power politics. The question is whether this situation has put them in a somewhat contradictory position or whether one really needs special methods of interpretation of diplomatic documents? We nevertheless believe that by its effect and later implications the Soviet-German treaty will be bound to bring about a change in relations between the Atlantic and Warsaw groupations.

According to a general estimate, the Moscow treaty, on whose future effect great hopes are pinned, is an expression of each side's realistic assessment of its interests. To see this realism merely in the present estimate of their mutual relations would be a narrow-minded view as once it has been adopted, a realistic attitude can also influence future outlooks and relations with third parties. Generally speaking it could be said that the Soviet-German treaty has made it possible to establish new relations

between the two parties concerned and laid new foundations for their European policy for which it is assumed that it will exercise a decisive influence on the policy of the other eastern European countries and which contains a new outlook - both of the Federal Republic on her international position in Europe and of the Soviet Union on the strategy and tactics of Soviet policy in Europe. There is no doubt that the normalization of Soviet-German relations through which a certain rapprochement of views on European politics is manifested, will free both sides from the pressure which was automatically exerted on them by their involvement in the pattern of East-West Relations. Moreover hopes have been aroused that the new state of Soviet-German relations will have a beneficial influence on general East-West relations instead of their pattern continuing to wield a negative influence on their mutual relations. However one cannot but wonder whether such a course of development would please all of the two partners' present allies?

It is impossible to predict all the effects which the treaty will have in Soviet-German relations and in European politics and how long they will last. The prospective and potential area of these effects is nevertheless very broad. For if the Moscow treaty represents a new way of the Federal Republic's opening to the East then it may also be said to constitute a new aspect of the Soviet Union's opening to the West. In a certain sense it may become an instrument of overcoming the barriers - such as the Berlin wall constitutes in the broader political meaning - and in the present constellation of mutual relations help create in the Soviet Union a greater sense of security in relation to the West and at the same time offer the Federal Republic greater scope for maneuvering - not to say for a greater degree of emancipation as well - in the realization of her own conceptions of European politics.

BRANDT'S BARGAINING NOT YET OVER

by David Rees

Summary: The 'real bargain' which has yet to be struck between Bonn and Moscow is over Berlin, writes David Rees in this article, which reviews the implications of the recently signed Soviet-West German Treaty. The

Treaty, Rees reminds us, has yet to be ratified by the West German Parliament; and it is too soon to endorse any of the sweeping labels that have been applied to it - including 'milestone' on the one hand and 'sell-out' on the other.

The Soviet Russian-West German Treaty, signed on August 12 by Chancellor Willy Brandt and Prime Minister Kosygin, may well be - as it has been described by Tass - "a milestone in Europe's post-war history". Its most important clause recognises "the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable", including the borders between East and West Germany, and the Oder-Neisse western border of Poland, first provisionally demarcated at the Potsdam conference 25 years ago.

The Treaty specifically does not affect existing commitments and Chancellor Brandt has already sent letters to the Western allies on this point. But in West Germany itself there is a good deal of unease. Franz-Joseph Strauss, leader of the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrat opposition in the Bundestag, has already described the Treaty as a sell-out to Moscow. His comment is interesting as it foreshadows the line of the opposition in Bonn when the Treaty comes up for ratification.

In Western Europe, however, the agreement has been understandably welcomed. It has been described as the end at last of World War II, and as the beginning of a new era in East-West relations which may well lead to the convening of the European Security Conference long canvassed by Moscow.

But it may be significant that Chancellor Brandt himself, as much of a realist now as when he was Mayor of West Berlin, has warned against over-interpretation of the Treaty. When asked about its "historic importance", he said: "Don't you have anything smaller?" - questioning the grandiose term.

Clearly, to take up the Tass description, the value of a milestone depends on its message and the destination of the traveller. How, therefore, does the Treaty correspond to some of the wider objectives of West Germany, of the allies to whom Bonn remains closely linked, and of Moscow?

New Mobility

In the first place, given West Germany's objectives of rationalising economic and political relations with Moscow, it certainly presents advantages. It means that Moscow will find

it harder (though not impossible) to revive the line of "West German revanchism" - a major theme in consolidating the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, and one explicitly used as some justification of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia two years ago.

Brandt has also mentioned further contractual agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Bonn now looks forward to obtaining Soviet recognition of the European Economic Community, hitherto regarded in Moscow as an adjunct of imperialism. Clearly the prospects for Soviet-West German trade are brighter than ever before. Dr Karl Schiller, Bonn's Economics Minister, is to visit Moscow later in the year.

Another advantage of the Treaty, as far as West Germany's wider objectives are concerned, is that peaceful German reunification is not specifically ruled out, as there is no formal de jure recognition of frontiers. Likewise, there is no recognition of East Germany, a point tenaciously fought for by Bonn's negotiators. Moreover, by invoking Article 2 of the United Nations Charter on general security matters, the Russians have tacitly dropped their claim to intervene in Germany under Articles 53 and 107, following the example of the Western allies in 1954 under the Paris agreements.

Legalistically, therefore, the Moscow Treaty is most important for Bonn, in that while West Germany made in effect a separate peace with the West in 1954, relations with Moscow were left in suspense despite the Adenauer treaty of 1955. Moscow now gives Bonn a new legitimacy, and hence a wider mobility on the world stage. What use Bonn will make of this is another matter, but politically this is the major achievement of Brandt's Ostpolitik.

True, this success of West German diplomacy has been paid for by a virtual de jure recognition of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. It is hard to cast one's mind back to the era of the Hallstein doctrine; all the same, it is impossible to discuss the Treaty without mentioning the intertwined objectives of the Western allies in Berlin. For Chancellor Brandt made it quite clear in Moscow that the entire edifice of the Treaty has no hope of ratification in the Bundestag (where he has a majority of only 12), unless there are concessions over the status of Berlin.

In Berlin itself, the four wartime allies are still responsible

for the city, and of course it is Berlin, rather than the zonal borders of Germany, that has been the real potential East-West flashpoint for over 20 years. Four-power talks on the status of the city have been in progress for some months, and are due to be resumed in September. There is the possibility that the Russians, having won concessions in Moscow, may not feel able to make concessions over Berlin, and thus the Moscow Treaty will prove abortive, with the whole East-West impasse in Germany remaining unchanged.

Wide Differences

It would be unrealistic to pretend that there are not substantial differences between the two positions over Berlin. The Russians suggest that West Berlin, in an abrogation of the wartime agreements, should become an independent state on East German territory, with financial and economic (but not constitutional) links with West Germany. The Western allies, on the other hand, want new arrangements made on Wall-crossing permits and the easing of communications generally between the two halves of the divided city.

They hope for guaranteed access-rights to Berlin from the West, and written confirmation by the East of West Berlin's present status and its quasi-constitutional links with Bonn. If the Russians hope to obtain recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe, then the Western allies have as their objective Russian recognition at least, of the status quo in West Berlin. This is the real bargain to be struck over the Moscow Treaty. Western demands for the reunification of Germany have now been consigned to the capacious garbage-can of history. For its part, Moscow must persuade the Ulbricht regime in East Germany to make some concessions to Bonn.

There remains the possibility that wider Soviet objectives may, in their turn, help to break the deadlock. The progress of the SALT talks in Vienna, now recessed until the autumn, is evidence that some advance is being made on the intractable subject of arms limitation. Super-power diplomacy in the Middle East reflects the dangers of conflict for both sides in another critical part of the world. And perhaps the Russians realise that if the Moscow Treaty proves abortive, then so will their long proposed plan for a European Security Conference, with its grand objective of reducing US influence in Western Europe.

Perhaps the most important factor of all in Moscow's move towards some sort of agreement over Berlin and Germany is the unresolved crisis with China, dragging out month after month as China's nuclear-missile capability relentlessly increases. A settlement on Moscow's western glacis could be imperative.

Yet ultimately the current bargaining over Berlin and Germany can only reflect the underlying strategic parity between East and West. It would be unrealistic to hope for dramatic concessions by either side. Exaggerated hopes can only lead, like summit diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s, to false expectations of security and consequent disillusion. Methodical preparation, step by step, like that which led to the Moscow Treaty, is the best hope of peace.

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BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK SEEN AS THREAT TO ANTI-COMMUNIST RESEARCH ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMANY

by George Embree

Summary: West German officials have denied that anti-communist research and propaganda institutions in West Germany - designed to combat, or at least offset, the formidable flow of propaganda from the East - have been placed in jeopardy as a result of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. Nevertheless, fears persist among some such research countries that they may face a rundown of activities, enforced by lack of funds and by the dwindling of official approval.

Is Prime Minister Willy Brandt's coalition government clamping down on anti-communist psychological warfare activities in West Germany in order to curry favour with the Russians for its Ostpolitik?

The Foreign Ministry here categorically denies there is any truth in this persistent rumour, which has been circulating since the present government took office last autumn. An official of the Ministry's press department says: "The continued presence in our country of anti-communist psychological organisations has never been a subject for discussion with the communists. In fact, they have never raised the issue officially. They know we have a free and open society in which everyone has the right to

express an opinion and that we would never be prepared to negotiate this".

Nevertheless, important changes are taking place, even though discovering the reasons behind them is like consulting the oracle at Delphi, because the "facts" are often subject to very emotional and politically partisan interpretations.

When Brandt's coalition took office it inherited, from the Christian Democratic governments of Adenauer, Erhard, and Kiesinger an administration which has been described by some critics as "dominated by 'Cold Warriors' ". Naturally, the new government wants its own men in the upper echelons of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Inner-German Questions, and the Chancellor's Office. This change-over has taken time and its shock waves are still being felt.

Egon Frank, the Social Democrat who took over the Ministry for Inner-German Questions, told the Frankfurter Rundschau on November 19, 1969: "In our house, there is no room for 'Cold Warriors' or people with a tepid heart. The Institute (for All-German Affairs) will no longer be a screen for anyone to hide behind, who wants to be critical but is not plucky enough to sign his criticism with his name. On the other hand, the Institute is operating now under government instructions, and the Government is thereby enabled to show clearly what sort of policy it has chosen for Germany".

One important official group whose primary task is countering at home the massive psychological warfare campaign directed against West Germany by the communist bloc, expects to be in a state of "suspended animation" until a new director is appointed... or the group is disbanded. Its staff refuses to speculate about its future.

Budgets Squeezed

Further, all anti-communist psychological warfare operations, whether private or official, face a financial crisis as the result of the squeeze applied in order to combat rapidly rising prices. For example, the well-known and highly respected Institute for the Study of the USSR (which is located in Munich) is closing at the end of the year. According to authoritative private German sources, this reflects cuts in US government research funds for East European programmes and has nothing to do with German domestic or foreign policy.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, two other American operations in Munich, have been "consolidating" and "retrenching" for purely budgetary reasons since early 1968. This hasn't, however, prevented Radio Free Europe from considerably expanding its Czech news department by hiring many of the progressive Czech newsmen who led their country's "Prague Spring" in 1968.

Serious budgetary problems have forced the Federal Republic's Press and Information Service to cut back invitations to journalists to visit Germany (including West Berlin). Its problems stem from the Brandt Government's decision to freeze as much of the budget as possible in an effort to cool a badly overheated economy without imposing highly unpopular taxes.

A typical example of the different interpretations which can be given to the disappearance or curtailment of long-established groups and publications in this field is the case of the magazine Ost-Probleme, which published translations of major articles from the communist bloc press.

It was founded over 20 years ago by the United States Information Service in Bonn and later became a private publication of the publishers Kiepenheuer & Witsch in Cologne, where it was sponsored by the German Society for Eastern Affairs. Nearly two years ago it ceased to appear as an independent publication and became part of the monthly Deutschland Archiv, which specialises in problems dealing with the two Germanies.

Private research analysts regard this as a rather natural development, yet German psychological warfare specialists are deeply concerned, because Deutschland Archiv has a much smaller circulation than Ost-Probleme used to have, and the volume of material being translated is also smaller.

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CONTINUED EAST GERMAN FEAR OF WEST GERMAN CONTACTS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 18-9-'70)

A few days after the closing of the Leipzig Fair where East German spokesmen had advocated an expansion of East German-West Berlin and East-West German trade, a remarkable article appeared in Neues Deutschland (9 September 1970) which seemed

to warn against the advice given at Leipzig. The article, which occupied a full page of the main SED paper, was unsigned, thereby giving the impression that it was an official document decreed by a major SED Party body. Innocently enough, its title was "The Certainty of Our Future -- Their Dilemma", and according to the subtitle the article contained information "about some motives behind imperialist propaganda against the economic policy of the GDR". Setting out to show the superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist one, the article soon came to more important remarks concerning the claims of "representatives of West German monopoly capitalism about the subservience of the GDR to the economic needs of the Soviet Union", and about the alleged attempts by "the ideologues of capitalism to disturb and defile economic cooperation between the GDR, the USSR, and the other Comecon countries". The authors of the document then wrote these surprising lines:

West German offers to "help" the GDR to develop its trade, to "generously support" the GDR also in the realm of sciences and technology, are pursuing this same end.

Such "polite offers" are an attempt to penetrate into the GDR by means of so-called scientific-technological contacts, and to weaken the position of our republic. They are therefore no less dangerous than open attacks against the GDR. No type of propaganda, no matter how refined, will ever induce the GDR to reduce or to weaken in any way its stable, effective and long-term cooperation and foreign trade relations with the Soviet Union in particular and with the other socialist states.

This regression to an ideology which characterized the more strained periods in East-West relations cannot but provoke one to ask why the GDR launched such an attack at this time. Not only is the Soviet Union seeking closer economic relations with the FRG, but even the GDR itself has made relatively conciliatory noises - at Leipzig, for example. Does the GDR wish to disturb the incipient improvement in Soviet-West German relations? Are these remarks addressed at least partially to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as a warning? Or are these attacks against the FRG being made solely for internal

consumption, in order to serve as a brake on over-enthusiastic functionaries who would like to further East-West trade and détente at a pace judged dangerous by the conservative part of the leadership? Most probably, there are elements of all these suggestions in a possible answer. One point, however, seems certain: ever since the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty, the GDR has perhaps paid lip-service to the agreement, but has not taken an unequivocally positive stand on it. The article under review would seem to support the thesis that East Germany has reservations.

THE WORLD AND ITS WEAPONS

Build-up continues, but balances change

Summary: Once a year the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) in London, publishes an assessment of the world's arms balance. The Military Balance 1970-71 finds that while the United States promises to increase its warhead lead over the Soviet Union, America's defence expenditure has gone down, Russia's up, and the Soviet Navy continues to develop.

The arms sums of the world add up to more than they did a year ago, despite the new political climate of the SALT (strategic arms limitation) and Middle East talks. This is the conclusion of the Institute for Strategic Studies in its new report on world weaponry.*

To take the big powers first, Russia now has 240 operational 20-25 megaton SS-9 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and Soviet land-based ICBMs now outnumber those of the United States by 246. Production of Russian nuclear submarines to carry ICBMs is at the rate of 5-10 a year. Russia has also tested a three-warhead system which may now be available.

The United States, however, has entered a new technical era with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), has started to deploy a three-warhead system, and is converting submarines to take a 10-warhead MIRV which is scheduled to become operational in January 1971. The United States thus promises to increase its warhead lead over the Soviet Union.

As far as can be calculated (and the ISS report contains an account of the ingenious methods of checking and counter-checking employed by them for estimating Russian defence expenditure in

* The Military Balance 1970-71, Institute for Strategic Studies, London

the absence of information from Soviet sources), Soviet spending on armed forces and defence goes slowly up. US expenditure has gone down some \$ 5,000 million, and is planned to fall still further.

The report has been extended, and includes an estimate of the balance between the Soviet Union and China. In spite of the launching of the Chinese satellite there is still no evidence of operational missiles, and China's ability to deliver nuclear weapons still appears to be limited to out-of-date and short-range aircraft. Soviet nuclear superiority over China is complete, and where conventional weapons and potentiality are concerned there is an impression of an immense advantage to Russia in all except manpower - there are probably about 150 million Chinese males of military age available for drafting.

There are more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than in 1969, but the number in Europe has not declined. A comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces shows marked imbalances. The Pact has some 11,000 more tanks and 2,000 more tactical aircraft than the Atlantic allies, all of Soviet origin. The West is superior at sea but Soviet fleets are now able to challenge at every level of military or politico-military action.

An examination of the confrontation in the Middle East shows that it is costing Israel annually one quarter of its Gross National Product and Egypt one fifth. The Egyptian army is shown to be bigger than a year ago and its air force better equipped than at the time of the 1967 June war. Soviet advisers in Egypt have increased from 4,000 to 10,000 in 12 months.

Political Factors

New sections of the ISS report include Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, and an account of the forces of external powers in Africa (France, Portugal and Spain). Each section is preceded by a summary of the defence treaties and agreements existing between states or collections of states. The report has a constantly growing readership (11,000 copies in over 60 countries last year) and is, as the ISS claims, an "essential reference book" for anyone interested in the problems of international security.

While the political element of defence is outside the terms of reference of the report, it is taken into account in the assessments, but not of course in the lists or tables. Therefore it is

necessary to bear it in mind: for instance, the low figures for Japan reflect the Japanese security treaty with the United States, and the high figures for Nigeria reflect the aftermath of the civil war. Similarly, it must be remembered that armed forces are used for internal security in many situations as disparate as those in Northern Ireland and China.

Special points of interest are: North Vietnam and North Korea continue among the countries devoting the highest proportion of resources to defence, as they have done for many years. Argentina and Brazil spent more last year on defence than many smaller European countries. Latin America and the Middle East (where Russian transfers to Arab countries and French sales to Libya have been notable) are a substantial market in the international arms trade. There are 19 current agreements in the aero-space, electronic and weapons fields, involving six European countries and in some cases the United States.

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THE KREMLIN SPREADS ITS WINGS

Soviet air power - its growth, its impact and its limitations

by Wing-Commander Asher Lee

Summary: The deployment of Soviet air and missile power is a major factor in the continuing Middle East crisis. In this article Wing-Commander Asher Lee, author of The Soviet Air Force, traces the growth of Soviet air power, and assesses its achievements in the fields of politics and commerce as well as defence.

The impact of Soviet air power has pushed out to new frontiers. The Soviet air force and aircraft industry are no longer merely instruments of national defence as they were in the Second World War. Far from exporting aircraft, the Kremlin then had to negotiate desperately to obtain planes from abroad. Soviet bargaining with Hitler's Germany produced only a few Heinkels for the Soviet Air Force. But after Germany attacked the USSR in June 1941, the United States sent to the USSR nearly 14,000 planes in the period 1941-45.

The great turning point in the story of Soviet air power was, in my view, the fantastic German air legacy which the USSR

inherited at the end of the war in Europe. The Kremlin authorities knew that the German aircraft, aero-engine and electronic industries had been moving eastwards into Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Prussia, Rumania and Hungary to reduce the effect of Anglo-American bombing. And so they set up a special commission under Malenkov to explore this situation. At the end of 1944, skilled Soviet engineers were attached to the advancing Red Army units. Their job was to exploit fully the German aeronautical and other booty which was about to fall in their hands.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the German radar, aircraft, aero-engine and missile legacy. There were hundreds of German jet engines which helped to speed up the introduction of the jet age in the Soviet Union. The booty included some ground-to-air guided missiles which were, so to speak, the grand-parents of the SAM guided weapons systems used in North Vietnam and Egypt. Then there were the samples of German V2 rockets, which helped to lay the foundation of the Soviet space programme - and, indeed, of the United States programme. German advanced machine tools and a corps of experienced German engineers also helped to modernise the Soviet aircraft industry at an accelerated speed.

In less than five years, that is by the late 1940s, the value of the German legacy became apparent. For the first time, the USSR became an important exporter of aircraft to communist countries in Europe. The Soviet MIG and YAK jet planes were powered by jet engines based on German designs. The long-term purpose of these exports was probably political rather than economic. It was hoped to standardise military aircraft and so make the potential members of the Warsaw Pact more dependent on the Kremlin. Albania imported Soviet military planes but left the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia too had Soviet military planes but has also bought British and French planes or engines and has remained independent and neutral. Rumania had Soviet military aircraft but Rumanian adherence to Soviet economic and political policies is patchy to say the least. Rumania has now begun both to buy and manufacture British passenger planes.

Aid to China

When in 1949 Mao Tse-tung became master of the Chinese mainland, it was the signal for a new Soviet aircraft impact in

Asia. That the Chinese air force was able to make such an impressive debut in the Korean War was due to rapid and massive Soviet air assistance both in mainland China and in North Korea. By 1951 hundreds of Soviet-built MIG 15 jets were being flown over North Korea by Peking's pilots, sometimes with Soviet flying instructors at their elbow. The United States Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, said at the time that "Communist China had blossomed overnight into one of the most powerful air forces in the world". Perhaps this was saying too much.

For just over 10 years, from 1949 to 1960, Soviet air help to Asian countries was concentrated on the Chinese Peoples' Republic. Under Soviet tutelage, Chinese technicians learned to make radar equipment, jet fighters and bombers and Chinese pilots learned to fly at supersonic speeds. The Sino-Soviet rupture came in 1960. Since then the jet aircraft products of Peking's aircraft industry have competed with Soviet aircraft in both North Korea and Pakistan. The Sino-Soviet competitive element in Asian air markets will surely increase in the 1970s.

Soviet air and missile exports have probably exercised their greatest political influence in the last 10 years or so in the Arab world, in Africa and also in Cuba. The exporting of Soviet military and civil planes to Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Morocco, the Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq has also had the economic effect of blighting part of the export prospects of the British and French aircraft industries in these countries.

Of course, the political influence of the Soviet aircraft and missile presence depends in part on the general policy of the Kremlin. Thus in the late 1950s and early 1960s the Soviet presence in Egypt was discreet. But in 1970 the number of Soviet pilots, missile technicians and ground-to-air guided weapons systems increased. Soviet participation in Egyptian air defence became more active and so there was an extra strain on the Israeli Air Force.

The increased Soviet aeronautical presence has been seen by some commentators as a factor in bringing about the recent ceasefire. It is too early to say what the final outcome will be. Perhaps the defensive Soviet missiles in Egypt, like the offensive long-range missiles which were due to be based in Cuba in 1961, will tell us something about the limitations of the shore-lines of Soviet foreign policy.

Aeroflot's Role

It will take some years to assess the political effect of Soviet training of pilots and aircrews from Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania and of the provision of Soviet military aircraft for these and other African countries. For the time being there is inevitably a new Soviet presence. But African national independence may limit Soviet penetration in the long term. Soviet air aid to Indonesia brought no important political benefits to the Kremlin; similar aid to India has not yet won palpable gains; and there is, in theory, no reason why African countries should not have their aircraft and retain their independence.

A final word about the international expansion of Aeroflot, the Soviet civil airline. In the post-war period it has developed its overseas routes considerably. Up to 1945, Aeroflot was mainly a domestic internal airline equipped with out-of-date planes. It now flies passengers and freight to some 60 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Now it uses modern jet planes like the Ilyushin 62 and the Tupolev 154. With the Tupolev 144, Aeroflot may be the first airline to fly passengers at speeds faster than sound. Aeroflot has the potential to win more custom from leading Western airlines.

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PEKING AND THE PALESTINE GUERILLA MOVEMENT

(Radio Free Europe Research, 1-9-'70)

Summary: During the past few weeks the Chinese Communists have given full propaganda support to the Palestine liberation movement's opposition to the Middle East ceasefire. The Chinese, in commentaries on the Middle East situation, have denounced what they call "a plot by two 'super-powers' to carve up the region into their spheres of influence". This paper cites some indications of continued Chinese military assistance to the various Arab guerilla groups. It concludes that the propaganda support given by Chinese media to the Palestine liberation movement is of potentially greater importance than the military aid provided thus far.

In quick reaction to an article appearing last Sunday in the London Sunday Telegraph, ¹ a spokesman for the Palestinian Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) declared the following:

I am authorized to deny the presence of Chinese advisers who give training to Palestinian guerillas in Jordan. However, there are some Chinese experts with the guerillas, but outside Jordan. ²

The admission that Chinese military experts actively assist in the training of Palestinian guerilla organizations, although unusual, is not as dramatic as it sounds. Chinese military help to the Palestinian liberation groups has been common knowledge, although the exact nature and the extent of that assistance remains a matter of speculation.

Indeed, the representatives of various liberation groups have declared on a number of occasions that the Chinese Communists were supplying them with various forms of assistance for many years. Thus, the former chief of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) liaison office was quoted by Hsinhua as saying that "from the very moment when the first shots of the Palestinian revolution were fired, China declared its firm support for the armed Palestinian revolution and started to back up this armed struggle both materially and morally". ³

The claim that China was the first communist power to support actively the Palestinian liberation cause was also reiterated by Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Al Fatah), during his trip to Peking earlier this year. "It is no secret", Arafat said, "that 'Al Fatah', the initiator of the Palestine Revolution, received aid first from Peking". ⁴

1. Sunday Telegraph, 30 August 1970
2. UPI from Amman (Jordan) quoting a spokesman of the PDFLP, 30 August 1970
3. NCNA, 8 July 1970, was quoting an interview given by the then chief of the PLO office in Peking to the Palestinian guerilla organ "Fateh".
4. Arafat's remarks at a banquet given in honour of the PNL M in Peking on 21 March 1970. (NCNA of the same date).

The aid, mainly in the form of small arms, comes from Peking both as a gift as well as a business deal. That "Al Fatah" has made payments for such weapons was acknowledged by Arafat at the beginning of this year in an interview given to the Egyptian paper Al Sayyad. The somewhat embarrassing admission came in answer to an accusation that "Al Fatah" was taking money from the right wing of the Arab countries. To this charge Arafat was quoted as replying: "Am I supposed to refuse Saudi money just because Saudi Arabia is rightist? I am using Saudi money to buy weapons from China. How do you describe this action, leftist or rightist?" 5

The first Chinese arms agreement with the Palestine liberation movement is believed to have been negotiated during a visit in Peking by the former chairman of the PLO, Ahmad Shuquayri, in March 1965. Following that visit a permanent liaison office of the PLO was set up in the Chinese capital, which has been in constant touch with the Chinese authorities and has been able to transmit periodic requests and communications. 6 The "Al Fatah" military delegation that visited both Peking and Hanoi last year is believed to have reached tentative agreement on additional Chinese arms supplies, mainly portable one-man rocket launchers. Some of the weapons reach the guerilla headquarters in several Near Eastern countries by air, through shipments conducted under the aegis of the Chinese diplomatic representations in various capitals. But the bulk is believed to come in Chinese ships calling at the ports of Latakia in Syria, Basra in Iraq and Aden in Southern Yemen. The Chinese military assistance is mainly limited to "rifles, grenades, mortars, explosives, anti-tank guns and automatic weapons up to medium machine guns". 7

Its inability to provide the militant Palestine guerillas with modern weapons is fully understood by the Chinese leadership,

5. As quoted by Dana Adams Schmidt writing from Beirut in the NYT, 10 February 1970.
6. For an analysis of the Shuquayri visit and the establishment of the PLO office in Peking see RFE Research report "Peking's Support to 'Palestine Liberation' ", 16 June 1965.
7. The Sunday Times (London) reporting from Beirut, 23 August 1970.

hence the interesting commentary coming on the second anniversary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, in which Peking promoted the idea that "men and not weapons are the decisive factor" in armed struggle. 8 The comment, clearly designed to sway the leaders of the Palestine guerilla movement from turning to Moscow for more military aid and thereby coming under Soviet political influence reminisced of earlier times when the " 'Assifa' guerillas started with only one machine gun and 30 hand grenades". However, Peking suggested, "by relying on the people's revolutionary will, the bravery of the guerilla fighters... and on flexible strategy and tactics, the Palestinian guerillas have grown from strength to strength and scored victory after victory".

Even more meaningful are the sentences which openly deride the significance of modern weaponry in guerilla warfare:

The Palestinian people have come to realize..... that the oppressed nations should rely on people's war to defeat the aggressors and should not make a fetish of aircraft, guns, tanks and guided missiles. To make a fetish of weapons and not to rely on the broad masses of the people, solely trying to counter modern weapons with modern weapons can only result in reverses.....

The appeal was unsuccessful in the sense that in spite of their periodic political differences with the Soviet Union, the Palestinian guerilla organizations have been eager to improve their arsenals with modern weapons. Thus, according to a journalistic report of January 1969 quoting "sources close to the Palestinian leadership", "Al Fatah" units had been equipped with some Soviet-type "Katusha" ground-to-ground rocket launchers obtained through Czechoslovakia. 9

The real problem of the Palestinian liberation forces, however, lies in the Soviet unwillingness to provide sufficient quantities of such weapons. Earlier this year during his visit to Moscow, Arafat was flatly told that the bulk of Soviet military

8. NCNA, 5 June 1969.
9. John K. Cooley from Beirut, The Christian Science Monitor, 25 January 1969.

aid slated for the Middle East would be given to "Arab states" as opposed to the liberation groups. The entire Arafat visit, during which the Arab guests received the smallest possible publicity from the Soviet press, underlined Soviet desire to avoid entanglements in inter-Arab politics and in particular the feuds between the Palestinian guerilla groups. 10 Following that visit, Arafat went to Peking where his reception sharply contrasted to the one he was accorded by his Soviet hosts. It was not surprising therefore that upon his return from Peking, the Palestinian leader expressed his feelings toward the two communist powers as follows: "Our relations with the Soviet Union are good. We have found a joint area for mutual understanding with them!". Talking about the PLO's relations with Peking, on the other hand, Arafat quoted Chou En-lai as saying: "China backs the guerillas unconditionally and to the very end". 11

Important as it may have been, the most important assistance China has thus far given to the Palestinian guerilla movement was not in the field of arms deliveries. The Chinese Communists have given unconditional support to all Palestinian demands, including the dissolution of Israel and the complete takeover of its territory by Palestine forces. At the same time the Chinese have opposed all movements toward a negotiated settlement no matter what quarters they came from. Finally, the Chinese have taken maximum advantage of the Soviet Union's verbal support of a negotiated settlement as well as Soviet differences with radical forces in the Middle East.

Lately, the Chinese news media have given broad coverage to opposition of the extremist guerilla forces concerning the Rogers proposal and the Middle East ceasefire. They carried all statements made by militant Palestine sources, mainly by the paper "Fateh", denouncing the ceasefire and calling for the continuation of hostilities with Israel. Moreover, the Chinese have given maximum publicity to statements by the same sources reflecting polemics with the Soviet Union on the problem of the Rogers plan.

The Chinese Communist line on the latest Middle East developments has been clear from the outset. In a number of official

10. Bernard Gwertzman in The New York Times, 21 February 1970

11. UPI from Cairo, 5 April 1970.

commentaries the Chinese news agency charged that the Rogers plan was nothing but a "Middle Eastern 'Munich' " designed to realize the "fond dream" of certain "super-powers" for carving up the Middle East into their spheres of influence at the expense of Palestinian interests.

The brunt of the criticism fell mostly on the United States and Secretary Rogers. Yet, the most important political message was conveyed in those parts of the commentaries which referred to the "manipulations" of the second "super-power", i. e. the Soviet Union. One of the comments warned:

..... certain people of another so-called super-power have made frequent behind-the-scenes contacts with US imperialism, cooking up schemes and engaging in other activities with ulterior motives. The pack of fellows have helped US imperialists in exerting pressure upon the Arab countries. They have instructed their propaganda machines to grind out counterrevolutionary opinion. Harping on the tune of US imperialism they even said that "time has come to. . . get down to serious efforts to bring about a political settlement". . . . 12

The Chinese arguments on the current Middle East situation also include certain political slogans coined recently by Mao in connection with the "struggle against US imperialism". Thus, a second commentary asserted that the "awakened Arab people" are resolutely opposed to the "political scheme under which the destiny of small countries will be decided upon by the big powers at the sacrifice of the interests of the small countries". 13

Moreover, the same report said in conclusion:

Today the destiny of the Middle East should be determined by the one hundred million Arab people, and not by the two "super-powers". The era of big powers deciding the destiny of the small countries has gone forever. This is a law of history. If one or two "super-powers" obstinately try to run counter to this

12. Hsinhua correspondent's report, 31 July 1970.

13. Hsinhua correspondent's report, 7 August 1970.

law, dream of turning the wheel of history back to the 1930's and duplicate the 'Munich' plot of the 1930's in the Middle East, they will certainly knock their heads against a brick wall. 14

These words are designed to please the most militant elements in the Middle East and encourage them further to reject any negotiated settlement which is approved by the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, China appears to have given no substantial military aid to the Arab guerillas in their continued fight against the ceasefire. Therefore the PLO's decision to dispatch one of its spokesmen to Peking could be an attempt to induce the Chinese Communists to back up their arguments with financial and material support. The PLO newspaper "Fateh" defined the trip of Palestine envoy Housni Younes as aimed at holding talks with foreign leaders on measures that must be taken "to answer the latest conspiracy within the world-wide confrontation to the American plan which seeks the liquidation (of the Palestine cause)". Housni Younes, who is former head of the Peking office of the PLO and is personally acquainted with most top Chinese leaders, is the natural choice for the job.

Yet in spite of any future military assistance to be offered to the Palestine guerillas, China's chances of becoming a major factor in the Middle East are extremely slim. However, its ability to undermine a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict by encouraging various extremist forces in the region should not be underestimated.

CHINA'S 'FRIENDSHIP' DRIVE IN EAST EUROPE

by Anthony Sylvester

Summary: In spite of the talks on the frontier dispute in Peking, Sino-Soviet rivalry has not diminished and China's objective still appears to be to thwart the Soviet Union's global plans and ambitions. After the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and in view of the bitter dislike of Russia in Eastern Europe, the area now clearly constitutes a fruitful ground for fresh Chinese overtures and activities. The recent appointment of Chinese ambassadors to Belgrade, Budapest and Warsaw illustrates Peking's new interest in Eastern Europe.

14. Ibid. A most authoritative expose of the "two super-powers" theory was given by Chou En-lai in an interview to French correspondents in Peking. (NCNA, 28 July 1970).

The choice of Belgrade as a channel for a Chinese diplomatic offensive in Eastern Europe may seem surprising in view of the hostility shown by Chinese leaders for the Yugoslav Government in the past. There has been no Chinese Ambassador in Yugoslavia since 1958, when Yugoslav "revisionism" began to be regarded as the root cause of all the troubles in the communist world. In the heat of the Cultural Revolution effigies of President Tito were burned in the streets of Peking and as late as January 1969 the Yugoslav leadership was described by the leading Chinese newspaper as the "Tito renegade clique".

But things began to change. In March 1969 a trade agreement was signed between the two countries and Peking and Belgrade agreed again to exchange ambassadors. For the first time a regular shipping service between Chinese and Yugoslav ports has now been opened.

When the Yugoslav Ambassador, Mr Bogdan Orescanin, took up his post in Peking earlier this year he was received by the Chinese Premier, Mr Chou En-lai, with whom he is said to have had "friendly" talks. The epithet "friendly" has since been used by Chinese mass media to describe any contacts with the Yugoslavs. Mr Tseng Tao, the new Ambassador, has now arrived in Belgrade, and his voluble "friendliness" has already been noted by the Yugoslav press. One of China's most experienced diplomats, he was for some years ambassador in another sensitive spot, Algiers.

Yugoslavia's climb in the table of China's discriminating favours may seem unusual, but it is really moderate compared to that of Rumania with which, as Peking leaders have put it, a "profound fraternal friendship" has now been established. Rumania is indeed the principal focus of China's attempts to create a kind of Little Entente in the Balkans, hostile to Moscow's ambitions. There is no doubt that the apparent reconciliation between Belgrade and Peking owes much to the good offices of Rumania, which has for many years regarded Yugoslavia as a trusted neighbour.

Rumania has by clever manoeuvring demonstrated a point of cardinal importance to East European nations: that it is possible to have normal relations with Peking, or for that matter with Bonn or Washington, without necessarily breaking with Moscow.

Rumania, a member of the Warsaw Pact alliance, has now made clear that its commitment to come to Russia's aid does not

apply in the case of conflict in the East, but only in the (most unlikely) case of aggression coming from the West. No such definite distinction was made in the recent agreement of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and Rumania, where the latter pledges to help the former in case of attack from whatever source. But when the Rumanian Minister of Defence, General Ion Ionitsa, later visited China he explained that Rumania's obligations extended only to the European theatre.

'Warmth' Creeps In

It is no coincidence that Budapest and Warsaw have also been honoured with Chinese ambassadors who took up their posts almost simultaneously with their colleague in Belgrade. Both the Hungarians and Poles have a long record of popular defiance of and hostility to Russia.

During the upheavals in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 China played a significant part. It did much to stop the Russians from using military force against the emergent new leader, Mr Wladislaw Gomulka. In the case of Hungary, China approved the initial phase of popular revolt, although it turned against it when it seemed to be directed not only against Russia but also against communism. It is worth speculating whether China in its present mood would have acted in the same way. It seems more likely that it would now support almost anybody or anything in Eastern Europe, provided it were hostile to Moscow.

During the recent floods in Hungary, China came to the assistance of the country with aid worth \$ 200,000. This was in contrast to the assistance worth 21 million dollars given at the same time to Rumania for similar reasons. But relations between Hungary and China have been steadily improving and a trade agreement has now been signed, increasing the exchanges by 27 per cent over the level of the past year.

The change of climate in China's relations with Hungary as well as Yugoslavia and Poland has been illustrated by a significant detail. When receptions were recently given in various East European capitals by Chinese legations in honour of the anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, those that took place in Belgrade, Budapest and Warsaw were described by Chinese mass media as "friendly". The reception in Bucharest was said to have been "warm and friendly". No adjectives were used in the case of receptions in Prague, Sofia and Moscow.

However, the Chinese also described the reception held in East Berlin as "friendly". This was not the only instance of an entirely new approach to Herr Ulbricht's regime. But in this case there has been no response at all to China's overtures so far. Yet, if relations between Moscow and Bonn go on improving, China can scarcely fail to prove attractive to the German Democratic Republic.

Albania, China's only unqualified ally and frequent mouthpiece, has roundly condemned the recent non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and West Germany as a "new imperialist-revisionist plot". Nonetheless, Albania as well as China has begun showing two faces: one of ideological orthodoxy and the other of diplomatic flexibility.

China and Albania are still involved in a unique relationship. When an Albanian guest, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, recently visited Peking, he was given a tumultuous reception amidst the beating of drums and gongs. A specially created "China-Albania Friendship" dance was being performed as crowds carried placards with the simple message: "We are Genuine Friends".

This is as close as anyone can get to the hearts of the Chinese Communist leaders. With China's invaluable help the Albanians have been able not only to survive since the break with Moscow in 1961, but also to defy and indeed hurl abuse at most of the rest of the world, including immediate neighbours. This too carries an important lesson for others in Eastern Europe.

Full Circle

But now Albania can be used as a ferret for China's wider courtships in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Already, relations with neighbouring Yugoslavia have markedly improved. In a memorable speech last May 28, Albania's leader, Mr Enver Hoxha, affirmed that the Albanian people "will stand with the Yugoslavs against aggression".

Trade and cultural relations between the two former irreconcilable enemies are now rapidly expanding. Kosovo, the Yugoslav province peopled mainly by an Albanian minority of some million, is becoming what looks like a bridge of reconciliation and co-operation. It was previously a bone of contention and a hotbed of friction, mutual recrimination and violent incidents.

Albanian textbooks and other literature are being imported into Yugoslavia and works published in Kosovo are reprinted across the border. Films are exchanged or jointly produced.

In a sense, history has turned full circle. At no time since 1945 have relations between the two Balkan neighbours been more cordial than now. But a generation ago the friendship and co-operation were developing under the aegis of Moscow and Soviet Bloc. That suspicion and fear of the Soviet Union should now be the major factor in bringing Yugoslavia and Albania closer to each other again is a measure of the mess Russia has made of its East European policies over the past 25 years - a situation which China will continue to exploit.

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CHINA'S PERSISTENT PROBLEMS

The persistence of factionalism in the provinces is probably one of the reasons for the Chinese leadership's unwillingness to call a new (and long overdue) meeting of China's parliamentary body, the National People's Congress, about which there has been speculation for some time. The leadership's attempts to rebuild the party structure - largely destroyed during the cultural revolution - apparently continue to be hampered by disagreements at all levels on who should form the core of the party and how many militants and former Red Guards should be admitted to its ranks. Meanwhile, although emphasis has been laid on the party's "vanguard" rôle, the army continues to exert a powerful hold throughout the country and in some cases keeps a balance between the factions. It also still dominates many of the revolutionary committees formed by representatives of the "masses" (Red Guards), the army and reliable officials, which remain the main administrative network.

Party reconstruction - the rebuilding of party committees after the purges of the cultural revolution - has been a prominent theme since the second half of 1969, with an acceleration of the campaign earlier this year and intensified Press and radio publicity since May. But while committees have been re-formed at low levels, in factories, offices and rural communes, there has been little progress at the county level (except in Hunan and Heilungkiang) and none at provincial level. In over a year less than 40 of the 2,000 county committees have been announced as

rebuilt in eleven of China's 29 provinces and cities. One reason is clearly the Maoists' edict that the party's "organisational consolidation" (reconstruction of the party machine) should not begin until its "ideological consolidation" (remoulding of the officials) has been virtually completed.

The latest directives have included a joint editorial in the People's Daily/Red Flag/Liberation Army Daily on June 30 to mark the party's 49th anniversary and an article in the party journal, Red Flag (No. 7, July 1970), broadcast on July 3. The editorial hinted at friction and disunity at the highest levels with its attacks on ideological shortcomings among leading party cadres. Those who tried to defend their own interests under the pretence of serving the people were not fit to "sit on a leading body, still less to head it", the editorial warned. But its advice on how good leaders should be chosen was on familiar Maoist lines - they must rely on the "wisdom of the masses", have the right approach to self-criticism and above all be loyal to "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought".

Correct Ideology Stressed

The Red Flag article, though ostensibly an appraisal of party rebuilding at Peking University, obviously had a country-wide application. Stress was again laid on party officials having the correct ideological attitudes, but while they were warned against any inclination towards revisionism, liberalism or "tailism" (falling in with popular opinion), Red Flag reiterated that cadres who had been discredited during the cultural revolution could be rehabilitated. Party members were given the rather confusing advice that they should do this by "struggling against" the cadres while "striving to unite" with them. Under the usual labels of "Left" and "Right" deviations, Red Flag castigated a variety of failings in the party ranks, extending from the leftist sin of wanting to prolong the revolutionary upheaval indefinitely (and thus condoning anarchy) to the rightist errors of seeking "inner-party peace" and an end of ideological reform altogether. But once again there was no clear advice on how to consolidate the Maoist revolution while maintaining its impetus or on how to keep a balance between long-term goals and immediate tasks.

Hints that some influential figures might have doubts about the efficacy or even correctness of Mao's theory appeared in an article published prominently in the People's Daily of July 24

under the signature Jen Chun - which means "trust the masses". To judge by its sweeping comments on Mao and his thoughts, the article must have been approved by someone at a high level. But while its historical account of the building of the party and past purges of Left and Right opportunists added little to the usual run of such articles, the defensiveness of some of its arguments and its concern to show that Mao had been both correct and consistent in all his ideas suggested considerable opposition to his views in some quarters. Indeed, opponents were told firmly that they must not "chop up Chairman Mao's thesis on party building and rest content with a smattering" - implying that as so often in the past officials and other public figures are merely going through the motions of participation in the leadership's latest political exercise.

MAKE-OR-BREAK YEAR AHEAD FOR 'LONER' THIEU

by Kenneth Mackenzie

Summary: 'A much underestimated figure' is Kenneth Mackenzie's verdict on President Thieu of South Vietnam. Mackenzie, of the London Economist, bases this assessment on a series of meetings with Thieu and his senior advisers in Saigon. In this article he presents a profile of Thieu as man, soldier and politician - and weighs his chances of winning the presidential election scheduled for next year.

Three years have elapsed since former General Nguyen Van Thieu was elected President of South Vietnam. Contrary to countless sombre prognostications, his regime has not collapsed like a pack of cards; indeed today it is more viable than those of several neighbouring countries - though that is not saying very much.

In many ways Thieu is an enigma. Lacking in charisma, a Buddhist turned Catholic on marriage, he seems to have no effective power basis, and yet to belong to the country as a whole. In some way he resembles the late President Diem (whose merits are now surreptitiously cited in bated breath, though nobody has the courage to say that Diem's regime gave the country a framework of unity and cohesion). Thieu is nevertheless at pains to dissociate himself from the venality and nepotism that undermined the regime of his predecessor. The bon mot in Saigon is

that Diem consulted his relatives; Thieu only consults himself.

The man is essentially what the Americans call a loner. It is hard to pinpoint at any given week his closest advisers. He has built up around him a miniature "White House" staff, sophisticated western-educated young men - who will startle itinerant journalists by asking questions like: "Sir, do you think the Tories will be able to cope with Ulster?" - but it is hard to say how far they sway his decisions.

Thieu was born in the village of Tri Thuy in the province of Ninh Thua, in the central part of South Vietnam. His father - who died last year at the age of 81 - was a farmer and fisherman. His mother, still alive, had to open a small business stand to help her promising son through high school.

One of Thieu's basic political assets is that he is essentially a son of the people; he can go back to his own folk at the weekend and be accepted as a humble Vietnamese who has risen to the top by ability. Some would say that he has been helped on the way by outside influences, but in this respect his record is much more honourable than that of most Asian politicians.

Very little is known in the Western world about Thieu's background. He has been widely characterised by the Left as a "puppet" of the Americans and as a "fascist stooge". In fact, Thieu joined the Vietminh-directed resistance movement in 1945 in its fight against the French attempts to re-establish colonial rule over Vietnam. Like many prominent figures in the present Saigon regime, he broke from the supposedly "popular" movement when he discovered it was being totally controlled by the communists.

Placed in an ambiguous position, with loyalty neither to the communists nor the French colonial regime, he joined the merchant marine. A soldier, the sea has always been his first love. His favourite pastime is fishing - and he likes to entertain foreign diplomats and other distinguished guests for fishing weekends.

Key Training Post

It was not until 1948 - then aged 25 - that Thieu joined the army. This meant fighting against the communists - and he has been fighting against them ever since.

In 1956, about two years after the Geneva agreements which partitioned Vietnam into two countries, one communist and the

other non-communist, Thieu was appointed head of the National Military Academy at Dalat. This was a key appointment, for in the course of the next four years he trained many of the officers who now hold important senior and middle-rank jobs in the South Vietnamese army.

In the tortuous and muddled events which followed the overthrow of Diem, Thieu - still a soldier rather than a politician - became commander of the strategically-placed IV Corps in the Mekong Delta, with the rank of Major-General. By 1965, when the political chaos in Saigon made a take-over by the army almost imperative, Thieu had sufficient standing among his fellow-officers to become chairman of the National Liberation Committee - or, in other words, Chief of State. In 1967, after the new constitution - which is a bastard amalgam of the French and American constitutions - was promulgated, Thieu was elected President. In fact, he obtained only about 38 per cent of the votes; but as there were 10 other candidates this was not a very low proportion.

In the past three years, Thieu has held on doggedly, despite many setbacks and a chorus of international derision. His relations with his Vice-President, former Air-Marshal Ky, have always been strained, yet miraculously a major crisis between the two has never erupted. It may come next year when the next presidential election is due. Nobody knows whether Ky will break away from the President to whom he has been standing in for three uneasy years. The Americans would obviously try to prevent a Thieu-Ky confrontation, but if Ky wants to stand for the presidency it is hard to see who can stop him. The odds are that at the polls Thieu would win.

A more serious contender might be General Minh (popularly known as "Big Minh") who is making noises which suggest he has his eye on the presidency. A much more charismatic figure than Thieu, Minh would capture a lot of votes, but few sophisticated political observers see in his lotus-eating, orchid-growing way of life the ingredients of an effective presidency. Thieu's supporters write Big Minh off as "Big Zero".

Thieu's greatest asset politically is that he has now placed his own men - many of them middle-rank officers whom he formerly commanded - in key posts in the administration. Most of the province and district chiefs are loyal to him. Their calibre varies enormously, but by and large they are more impressive

than their predecessors were a few years ago.

More important, the commanders of the four military regions (or Corps) do not present any great threat to Thieu. This is a far cry from the days of 1966-68, when the perennial topic of Saigon bar conversation was that one or other of the Corps Commanders was planning a coup.

On the debit side of the ledger, Thieu's critics can chalk up many points. He is repeatedly criticised for making decisions on his own - and for being too slow in making them.

He has probably under-estimated the strength of the student movement and of the unrest among the disabled war veterans, whose plight is now causing the Saigon government a major headache. He has become perhaps too contemptuous of the feckless, faction-ridden politicians of Saigon, who, in his judgement, are merely holding up the war effort. He has been dilatory in dealing with the gravely deteriorating economic situation - though at the moment obstructionist Senators who are trying to block, or bury, his drastic austerity programme, for political reasons, are as much to blame as he is. He is still far from being a great national father-figure.

On the Road

The next year will make or break him. With his eyes on the presidential election of 1970 he is trying to build, under the American aegis, a basis of grassroots support. Much of his working week is spent travelling around the country, talking to ordinary people and conferring with his provincial administrators. There are no cheering crowds when he arrives in places like Hue or Dalat, but he shrewdly contacts the people who count, and on the whole makes the right public utterances. Realistically, he perceives that Western-style democracy cannot be created in Vietnam overnight - nor even in a decade - but that if government can be brought into a meaningful relationship with the people, it will be viable. He has a long, uphill task ahead of him, but most fair-minded observers would say that he is working on the right lines. He himself claims that he has three guiding principles: first, to end the war on an honourable basis (which means preventing a communist take-over); second, to create the basis of a viable democratic system; and third, to give his people a better life - which, in brass tacks, means sorting out the economy. His many critics would snort with derision at

these high-sounding claims; nevertheless the man probably means what he says.

Perhaps the most significant index of Thieu's quiet accretion of power is the changing American assessment of him. Three years ago, the Americans in Saigon were backing Ky, the hawkish, flamboyant leader who was (and still is) determined to smite the communists hip and thigh. Gradually, during 1967, the American line switched; Washington concluded that the man most likely to give South Vietnam a sense of stability was Thieu. But the Americans have never found Thieu the pliable puppet of communist mythology; indeed, there have been many occasions in the past two years when senior American diplomats wished Thieu was a puppet.

Still far from the goals which he has set himself, Thieu may just have enough fixity of purpose to win through in the end. If he does, he will owe little to the Western press, which has persistently under-rated him. He will owe much to a gracious wife and happy family, to the solid core of senior and middle-rank officers who respect him, and to a coterie of loyal advisers and provincial officials. And also perhaps to his astrologer; for despite his earnest avowal of the Catholic faith, Nguyen Van Thieu's roots lie deep among the Vietnamese people, with all their superstition and their animism.

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A PARTY OF MANY VOICES

Italian Communists' ambiguous image

by Edward Ashcroft

Summary: Central to the continuing party political manoeuvres in Italy is the role of the Communist Party. The Party's position - a shifting and variable one - is here analysed by Edward Ashcroft, formerly head of the BBC's French service and a frequent visitor to Italy.

The Italian Communist Party has long been remarkable for its comparative freedom from Moscow's dictation and for the degree of independence of action and thought that it allowed its own intellectuals and regional organisations. It has also been

something of an exception among Italian political parties in that until recently it managed to give the electorate the impression that it spoke with one voice.

In a country which weak coalition governments and quarrelsome political parties have made the scene of constant industrial and social disorders, the impression of unity must have its attractions. At any event, in the last general elections, the Communists and their satellite party, the PSIUP (the Proletarian Unity Socialists), got 30 per cent of the national vote, making them the second largest party in the Italian Chamber with 200 out of the 630 Deputies.

At the more recent regional elections, however, the Communist vote declined a little, whilst the PSIUP lost votes heavily to the Italian Socialist Party. The Communist Party's unambiguous condemnation of Russia's action in Czechoslovakia and violence at home had gone down well with many of the non-Communist electorate but recently there have been signs that developments within the Party may be causing it to lose some of its hold on its supporters.

For the Italian Communist Party seems to have caught the disease, so prevalent among Italian political parties, of "corrente" (i. e. divergent trends inside political parties). The condemnations of Moscow and of violent revolutionary action at home which had given such a boost to the Party's image as a responsible national party had at the same time revealed that like the Christian Democrats it too had its right and left wings.

The "Stalinist" wing, headed by Giuseppe Amendola, opposed the leaders' condemnation of Moscow. The strong left "corrente", headed by Pietro Ingrao, which had been all for Dubcek and his attempts to give "socialism a human face", naturally supported the Central Committee's attitude on Czechoslovakia but ran into trouble with the leadership by advocating the need to resort to immediate revolutionary action as the students and workers had done in France in May 1968.

Heretic Hunting

The most passionate supporters of independent revolutionary action by small groups of Communists were the four promoters of the monthly, Il Manifesto, and it is these four members that the Communist leaders felt obliged to expel from the Party early this year. The expulsion of the Manifesto group was something of an exception, even for this party of exceptions. As well as

allowing its members to indulge in criticism of Moscow over the Russian attitude to such matters as China and internal cultural freedom, the Party has also permitted a good deal of freedom of discussion about its own policies and Italian party members have in recent years been spared the heretic hunting so usual in, say, the French Communist Party.

This is all part of the humanistic vein in Italian Communism of which its great leader, Togliatti, was well aware. Luigi Longo, the present Secretary General, and Enrico Berlinguer who, because of Longo's age and sickness is now Secretary General in all but name, continue the tradition of Togliatti. It was Signor Longo who described himself as a "constitutional revolutionary" and, despite the often reckless part they have played in fomenting trouble over the past two years, the Communist leaders firmly deny that they wish to create a "revolutionary situation" in Italy. Indeed, in their pre-election manifesto this year, they stressed the Party's respect for the family, its desire to reach an understanding with the Catholics on the subject of divorce and its firm intention of avoiding violence during the elections. Eschewing revolutionary action, the central bureau's constant political aim has been to break up a Centre-Left government which contains the Social Democrats and Republicans, reactionaries in the Party's view. The Communists would support, at least provisionally, a central government of Christian Democrats and Socialists. They obviously hope that such a government would split the Christian Democrats who have always been deeply divided among themselves on social questions. The left-wing Christian Democrats, together with the Italian Socialist Party, are in favour of co-operation with Communists at regional level, much to the displeasure of their Social Democrat allies and the right-wing of the Christian Democrat Party.

Communists, Socialists and left-wing Catholics have in fact long worked together in central-north Italy, in Emilia-Romagna, in Tuscany with its capital of Florence, and in Perugia, capital of Umbria. This is indicative not merely of the broad-minded approach of some of the governing parties but also of the measure of freedom which the Communist Central Committee allows its regional branches.

"Red Managers' " Success

An example, though not necessarily typical, of Communists in action at a regional level is provided by the prosperous city of Bologna, whose municipality has been in the hands of the communists for the past 20 years. The "Red Managers", who have undoubtedly made a success of their administration, have always allowed the Socialists a share in the city's government. Indeed it is largely thanks to the Socialists that they have installed a sort of grass-roots democracy in the city by giving extensive powers to freely elected District Councils. They have come to believe in and practise the principle of "participation" which certainly does not figure in orthodox communist doctrine. Is Bolognese Communism Italian Communism then? No, but it is a facet. If you examined the role of communists in local affairs in Calabria, or in Lombardy, or in the Val d'Aosta, you would get other samples of regional variations, not of a monolithic organism.

It is these regional variations and the existence of political differences which tend to make the central direction of the Party cautious and the definition of its national aims rather ambiguous. Signor Longo has spoken somewhat vaguely of creating a working class party of Catholics, Socialists and Communists and has never completely dismissed the idea of his party joining a coalition government.

But would the Communists ever be asked? Italy needs a strong progressive government to deal with the problems created by its rapid transformation from a basically agricultural society into a highly industrialised one. But will the Italians ever trust the Communists enough to give them a place in a democratic government? Their record in local government in such places as Bologna is good, and their speedy condemnation of Russia's intervention in Czechoslovakia was, perhaps intentionally, reassuring.

At the same time, criticism of Moscow's action has become noticeable milder of late and, on a recent visit to the Soviet capital, Berlinguer was at pains to point out that the Italian attitude over Czechoslovakia had helped the Party's fight against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). One of the few points the Communists have made clear with regard to their attitude towards joining a coalition government has been that Italy must leave NATO before they would do so. At a time when Soviet

strength is increasing rapidly in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, would the Italians be prepared to make the experiment of putting Communists in power? For the moment at least, the prospect seems doubtful.

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NASSER - THE MAN WHO RESPONDED TO PRESSURES

'Moderation' imposed by events rather than inspired by vision

by Professor Trefor Evans

Summary: Dr Trefor Evans, Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, was in close personal touch with Gamal Abdul Nasser during the all-important years when Nasser was establishing himself as a leader of the Arab world. Professor Evans here sums up his impressions of Nasser, as man and politician.

Over Nasser the politician, and the worth of his contribution to Egypt and the Arab world, vast questionmarks hang. But on the personal level his parting will be regretted by all who came to know and work with him. I was appointed Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Cairo in the summer of 1952 and actually arrived by ship in Alexandria as the royal yacht was leaving with the Egyptian King and his family aboard on their way into exile. It was of course soon realised that General Neguib, in whose name the coup d'état was made, had behind him a group of young officers, the leading light among whom was Gamal Abdul Nasser. A couple of months, however, were to pass before senior members of the British Embassy could meet him.

A dinner party was eventually arranged in the house of the Military Attaché and was attended not only by Nasser but also by Colonel Abdul Hakim Amer, Colonel Zacharia Mohieddin and Major Salah Salem. And a productive meeting it proved to be.

The Sudan was discussed, among other things, and it became clear that the new Egyptian government, unlike its predecessors, was prepared to reach a settlement on the basis of self-determination. The negotiations that followed led to the independence of the Sudan and the evacuation of British troops from Egypt. From the autumn of 1952 to the early summer of 1956, I was in regular personal contact with Nasser and his closest colleagues. My appreciation of the man, and of the situation in Egypt following his death, is therefore based on the knowledge I gained of him during these formative years of his political career, supplemented by subsequent experience of Arab socialist governments in Algeria, Syria and Iraq. Few tears were shed for King Farouk when he lost his throne in 1952 and the appearance of the young

military leaders was greeted with much sympathy and some hope. But after Nasser took over from Neguib in 1954, it was not long before he appeared to many, especially those diplomats who had had experience of pre-war Germany, as a "Hitler-type figure". And he has, of course, remained a controversial figure to the end.

In many quarters the genuineness of his "moderating role" particularly over Palestine, has been doubted. His acceptance of the November 1967 United Nations resolution and of the Rogers Plan and finally his mediation in the latest Jordan debacle have lent colour to the belief that Nasser was a moderate. And as far back as 1955 he joined the British and Americans in a search for a compromise solution of the Palestinian problem.

It must not, however, be forgotten that the Egyptian revolution was born of the divide in Palestine; that Nasser himself suffered personally from that humiliation; that Egyptian re-armament in the mid-1950s was a reaction to the acceptance of Israel; and that, when he failed to obtain arms from the West, Nasser was prepared to turn to the Soviet Bloc. How does one reconcile these influences and moves with subsequent periods when he showed "moderation"? Such changes have naturally prompted surprise, and the motives behind them need close examination.

The Exigencies

Of course men learn to accept the inevitable, to reconcile themselves to what cannot be changed. And age itself can have a moderating effect. But one thing is certain: for all his idealism - and there is, I think, no doubt that he was inspired by ideals for the good of his country and of its least favoured members, the fellahin - it was his own brand of political realism which determined his attitudes and actions. In other words, he responded to the exigencies of particular situations, rather than aspiring to transform situations by applying to them a statesman's vision and an idealist's concepts.

His attitudes since the Six-Day War of June 1967 must be seen in this context - of response to pressures. The need to recover Sinai and to regain control of the Suez Canal weighed heavily with him, as did the growing identity - or overlapping - of interests of the Soviet Union and USA; these factors, rather than any innate moderation, have been responsible for the "reasonable" aspects of his policy in the last two years. Con-

versely, if he suddenly found himself with the military capacity to restore "Palestine to the Palestinians", can there be any doubt that he would have used it?

Nevertheless, for all the constrictive nature of the forces which motivated his moderation, his recent attitude, despite the equivocations which accompanied it, can be seen as a contribution to the cause of peace - or at least as something which enhanced the prospects of a settlement. Even some partial arrangement or modus vivendi which would give time a chance to exercise its persuasive influence, would be welcome - and it is to be hoped that Nasser's successor or successors will follow a similar path and not seek to turn the clock back.

And the man? Engagingly modest and disarmingly frank in private discussion, he was at his best in limited company and far more effective than before a large audience. His reputation for oratory has probably been exaggerated. He had undoubted qualities of leadership, ability to inspire loyalty and great personal courage - I well remember how he carried on speaking when an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life at a public meeting in Alexandria. He had also a capacity for hard work, perseverance and, last but not least, political flair and administrative ability. He lived modestly, his honesty was unquestioned and he was a good Muslim.

The Dam Remains

His failures - as in Yemen, as in the union with Syria, as in the June War - have been notable. Yet he can claim the achievement of having freed his country from one foreign influence - it is still too soon to say whether he has permanently committed it to the influence of another. If Egypt is irretrievably lost to the West (and I doubt it), the fault is not entirely Nasser's. My own experience of him was that his word could be relied on in most matters, though not, unfortunately, on the greatest issues.

He used to say that the Russian threat to the Middle East was such that if the Suez base had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it. Yet it was he more than anybody else who opened up the area to the Russians. Many would argue that his straying from the path of co-operation with the West was at least partially due to the short-sightedness of Western leaders

and their refusal to furnish adequate military and financial aid; and this argument has force. Financial aid was indispensable for the building of the Aswan Dam and the execution of the Nile Waters Project which British advisers had strongly recommended over the years. In the end the Dam was built with Russian aid. It is Nasser's most enduring memorial.

Of the four Egyptian officers who were present at our dinner party in the autumn of 1952, only one survives. Salah Salem, (the Dancing Major) died of natural causes; Hakim Amer (Nasser's closest friend) apparently committed suicide; and now Nasser himself is no more. Only Zacharia Mohieddin is left. Former chief of military intelligence and Minister of the Interior, he is clearly in the running for the succession. Anwar es Sadat, half-Sudanese and married a half-English wife, is Vice President and is presumably well placed to influence events; he has at least never put a foot wrong. Then there is the former squadron leader, Ali Sabry, who made his way to the fore first as personal assistant and staff officer to Nasser. In spite of his aristocratic connections (Farouk's mother was of the family Sabry) he has long been a strong advocate of co-operation with the USSR and can presumably count on strong support from the Russians in any struggle for the leadership.

But the chances are that in the immediate future, the government will be carried on collectively by these members of the Old Guard, with perhaps a reversion to the original collegiate organisation which was a feature of the Revolutionary leadership in the months immediately after the 1952 coup. And one cannot of course exclude the possibility of new and younger figures emerging from the ranks of the Officer Corps of the Egyptian forces.

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E C O N O M I C S

REALISTIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL-EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION

by Yury Zhukov

(Soviet News, 11-8-'70)

Despite the fact that the Common Market is claimed to have the purpose of creating an economic and currency alliance which will enable Western Europe to stand up to the USA economically, the U. S. monopolies are increasingly taking over the industries and economies of the countries of Western Europe, Yuri Zhukov said in an article in P r a v d a on July 29.

In fact, he points out, in the race for profits many West European monopolies, far from resisting their rivals, are on the contrary helping them to infiltrate Western Europe.

Moreover, in their efforts to attract U. S. firms, with whose co-operation they hope to gain certain advantages, the Common Market countries are carrying on a struggle among themselves to provide the biggest subsidies for U. S. corporations by providing them with credits and relieving them of taxes and duties.

"In this way, 'Little Europe' is forging its own fetters", Yury Zhukov says.

"Yet there is a way out, which is being indicated by more farsighted West Europeans who are able to rise above the commotion of day-to-day speculation and look at the existing situation from the point of view of long-term interests.

Tangible advantage

"This means the concept of equal, all-European economic co-operation, which, far from being detrimental to 'Little Europe', would, on the contrary, be of tangible advantage to it.

"The long-term advantage could be as great as, if not far greater than, that now derived from the subordinate role within the framework of 'Atlantic co-operation' ", he says.

Yury Zhukov recalls that, a couple of years ago, he gave facts and figures in an article in P r a v d a (Soviet News No. 5431, April 2, 1968) showing how great were the mutually advantageous possibilities of such all-Europe co-operation.

Many West European economists had been sceptical at the

time, but the economic and commercial ties that had developed between capitalist and socialist countries in recent years had convincingly demonstrated that this scepticism was totally unfounded.

"States with diametrically opposed social systems have existed side by side on our old continent for over half a century.

"Everybody today sees that the capitalist powers are unable to 'roll socialism back'. This means that there is only one way out for them - co-existence.

"However, co-existence also opens the possibility of a 'merchant-like' approach, about which Lenin repeatedly wrote in 1922 in his instructions to the Soviet delegation leaving for the Genoa Conference", Yury Zhukov says.

"The experience of recent years", he goes on, "has particularly convincingly proved that the socialist and the capitalist countries can carry out far-reaching economic projects equally beneficial to both sides.

"It is being ever more clearly realised in Western Europe, in particular, that a considerable increase in trade and scientific and technical co-operation with the socialist countries would enable Common Market countries to reduce their dependence on their overseas patron to a considerable degree".

At the request of P r a v d a, he says, the USSR Central Statistical Board had made additional calculations which show that since the comparative figures for the economic possibilities of Europe as a whole and for the United States given two years ago, the balance in favour of the European countries continues to improve.

Comparative figures

Yury Zhukov gives the following examples:

From 1951 to 1968 inclusive, the national income of the United States rose by an annual average of 3,75 per cent, in the European capitalist countries it was 4,6 per cent, and in the European socialist countries it was 8,25 per cent.

"This means that during this period the national income in Europe as a whole increased on an average by 6,5 per cent, i. e. 70 per cent faster than in the United States".

The annual increase of U. S. industrial output averaged 4,5 per cent over the same years. In Europe, taken as a whole, the figure was 8,1 per cent, or nearly double.

The economic growth of the socialist countries substantially outpaced the similar indices of capitalist Europe.

Europe generates more electricity than the United States produces more steel (in 1968, it smelted 285.3 million tons of steel, more than double the U. S. figure), more grain (almost double), more meat (also almost double), etc.

The foreign trade of the United States in 1968 amounted to 67,300 million dollars, and the corresponding figure in Europe was almost four times: 260,800 million dollars.

"What we have here is not simply economic arithmetic, but political algebra too, and the calculation of the economic potential of the European countries itself does not mean that it may be regarded as a single whole.

"Here there cannot be any of the 'convergence' which is so readily discussed in the West today.

"The indisputable fact is that the economic strength of 'Big Europe' is considerably greater than the possibilities of 'Little Europe'. This strength is a wonderful basis for business-like co-operation on a continent-wide scale.

"It should be particularly stressed that economic co-operation on a general European basis would make a big contribution towards the independent solution of the problems of scientific and technical progress in Europe.

"It would enable West European countries, by co-operating on a mutually-advantageous basis with the socialist countries, to overcome their lag and, hence, their dangerous dependence on the United States", he says.

Becoming reality

"Is such a general European co-operation possible?" Yury Zhukov asks. "It is not only possible, but is already becoming a reality", he declares.

"The experience of the past few years has proved that the capitalist and the socialist countries of Europe are in a position to carry out major mutually-advantageous bilateral and multi-lateral business transactions.

"Everybody knows, for instance, about the agreements between the USSR and West European countries which are being successfully put into effect, on the building of a big motor car plant in Togliatti, the reconstruction of plants producing the Moskvich car, the laying of trans-European gas pipelines along which

Soviet gas will be fed to the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and other countries, and so on.

"Such deals arouse great interest among big West European firms and national associations of employers, and the Conseil National du Patronat Français, in particular. And this is only the beginning.

"It goes without saying that such a growth of co-operation on a general European basis does not exclude but, quite on the contrary, presupposes the development of economic relations between European countries and the United States on the same principles of mutual benefit and full equality.

"In the situation today an increasing number of people in the West European capitals are coming to understand that a real possibility exists to put an end to the supreme rule of the dollar.

"To achieve this, it is necessary to overcome the inertia of the 'Little Europe' policy, whose ideologists still cannot get rid of their fear of developing economic relations with the socialist countries".

COMECON ATTACKS THE EEC's 'UNFAIR' TRADING

(The Guardian, 4-9-'70)

The Comecon countries, with the exception of Rumania, have attacked the EEC, alleging trade discrimination against the Communist countries and the developing world. They are asking the United Nations Commission to assess the adverse impact on third countries of the EEC trade policies. This resolution is being discussed by the UNCTAD board in session here.

The resolution, similar to one debated and defeated at the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi two years ago, refers to "a number of measures taken recently by the EEC to increase discrimination in trade and negatively affect third countries especially the Socialist countries and the developing countries".

It says the common agricultural policy limits access into EEC markets of products from third countries, and it gives a warning about the EEC's preferential trade agreements, their association agreements, and even the negotiations for enlarging the Community.

Surprised

The EEC is surprised at the form of the attack, but has not commented on the substance of the complaints. An EEC spokes-

man has said that UNCTAD is not a proper forum for this kind of discussion.

Many of these complaints have already been expressed by the US and other countries, especially in GATT. This attack therefore puts the US into a dilemma: whether to join with Russia in attacking the EEC's trading policies in UNCTAD or to let the Comecon countries fight alone with the EEC.

The EEC is also embarrassed by the attack because it comes when the Community is hoping to improve trade relations with the Communist world, and Mr Rolf Dahrendorff, the EEC Commissioner for External Trade is planning a trip to Moscow.

This is part of an effort by the other EEC partners to join Bonn in seeking closer economic ties with Russia and the other Comecon countries. Russia has firmly disapproved of the EEC, but after the German-Soviet pact, the Community is hoping for a change of attitude. The resolution before UNCTAD is a warning that the battle is not yet decided.

Answer

The EEC's answer to all complaints is that the Community has made a major contribution to the expansion of world trade, that opportunities for trade with the EEC countries have improved, and that its agreements are outward-looking rather than protectionist.

In Canberra, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr de Koster, said today that Australia's mining industry could have a potential undreamt of today, if Britain enters the EEC. He said Australia would benefit from the Market's tariffs which were lower than those of the bigger nations.

SOVIET INDUSTRY FACES THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

(Radio Free Europe Research, 19-8-'70)

Summary: Two unusual articles in Problems of Economics draw attention to the magnitude of the technological gap between Soviet and Western industry. One provides the most comprehensive statistics yet published on the backwardness of Soviet steel and engineering, while the other describes the extremely rapid build-up of computers and nuclear power in the U. S. A. This paper supplies the latest comparable

figures for the equivalent Soviet sectors in order to round out the picture.

Two remarkably frank articles in the July issue of Problems of Economics¹ face up to the defects of Soviet industry when confronted by le défi Américain. It is still relatively rare for such comprehensive documentation on the backwardness of the Soviet steel and engineering industries to be published at all, even though Problems of Economics, with its monthly circulation of only 55,000 copies, is unlikely to be read by many who are not part of the Soviet Establishment.

The second of the two articles (for details see footnote one below) is the more openly critical, and it has important implications for investment policy in the steel industry. At the end of his long list of complaints against the inefficiency of Soviet "metal-eaters", I. Pashko, the author, states bluntly that because of the waste of metals and materials now in evidence he cannot agree with those who claim that the capital investments available to the steel industry are not sufficient to remedy the defects.

This clearly implies that the steel lobby has made a pitch for much higher investment allocations, and has been told to put its own house in order first.

Pashko's first point is that the USSR spends too much on raw materials investment. He reports that in 1967 the USSR ploughed 15 billion rubles, or 27% of all its investments, into raw materials, whereas the USA at the same time was investing only 12-14% in the same branches. He admits, defensively, that the USSR cannot import cheap raw materials from Latin America and Africa, unlike the USA, and that the climatic and geological conditions for the USSR are unfavorable. But even after taking these factors into account the Soviet Union is still spending too much on its raw materials investments.

Pashko points out that in 1965, if the Soviet engineering industry had not been using 25% more materials than foreign countries for the same output, the USSR could have saved 10

1 No. 7, 1970. ("Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in Scientific-Technological Progress", by V. Pavlyuchenko, pp. 23-32, and "Questions of Reducing the Material Requirements of Production", by I. Pashko, pp. 33-42.)

million tons of metal.

As examples he mentions the "Volga" and "Moskvich" automobile engines which weigh 2.13 kilograms and 3.13 kilograms respectively per horsepower, compared with 0.7 - 1.24 kilograms for American automobile engines of the same class. The weight of the "Volga" (GAZ-21 R engine) is 19.3 kilograms per horsepower, whereas Western cars in this class usually do not exceed 10 kilograms per h.p.

It seems that for tractors things are better, but still not good enough. The Ch. TZ-1, 000 mm tractor from the Chelyabinsk factory (108 h.p.) weighs 11,000 kilograms (102 kgs. per h.p.), compared with a weight of 10,115 kgs. (80.9 kgs. per h.p.) for the Allis-Chalmers 11 ES tractor of 125 h.p. The figures show a 20% advantage for the U.S. product.

The same 20% differential exists in trucks, where the 5-ton, 150 h.p. ZIL-130 truck from the Moscow Automobile Factory weighs 26.33 kgs. per h.p., while the Ford S-700 (170 h.p.), carrying a load of 6.2 tons, weighs a fifth less.

For diesel engines, the Soviet situation is apparently far worse. Pashko says that the Yavoslovl AZ-204 engine weighs 50% more than the comparable U.S. product. This figure alone abundantly explains why first Ford and now Daimler-Benz were invited to take a major part in the Kama River truck plant, which will probably be the largest in Europe, if not in the world, when it is completed in the mid-seventies.

In heavy engineering, the USSR is as badly placed as in the automobile industry. A 100-ton converter from the Zhdanov Heavy Engineering Plant weighs 626 tons, compared with 426 tons for the same sized converter from the Austrian company "Voest".

A certain machine-tool made by Davy United (Great Britain) weighs about 900 tons, compared with 2,200 tons for the equivalent Soviet product. A pipe-welding machine made by Elektrostal (USSR) weighs 2,750 tons, as against 1,600 tons for the same type from Friedrich Koks (W. Germany).

One of the worst Soviet performances is put up by a machine for cross-cutting aluminum strip which weighs 355 tons compared with about 125 tons for the comparable French or Japanese product.

Obsolescent Profile of the Steel Industry

Pashko's comments on the state of the Soviet steel industry are just as caustic as his views on engineering. He begins by noting that in 1966 the percentage of sheet steel in the output of rolled metal was only 36.5% compared with 61% in the U.S. He admits that much of the difference is accounted for by higher automobile and packaging production in the U.S., but says that this is not the full explanation.

Figures for 1965 show that the Soviet machine-tool, agricultural machinery and tractor industries used sheet steel for 29% of their rolled metal (cf. 45% in the U.S.), while for domestic consumer goods and instruments the figures were 48% (Soviet) and 88% (U.S.). In general and heavy engineering the discrepancy is not so striking, being 41% for the USSR and 50% for the U.S.A., but in the building industry it is much greater (15% for the USSR and 42% for the U.S.).

Pashko reports that the State Committee for Science and Technology has laid down targets for the minimum use of sheet steel in 1975 as being 45% of rolled metal output, rising to 50-55% by 1980.

The basic trouble with the steel industry, in Pashko's view, is that its performance indices are still measured in tons, with all the waste that that implies and with a similarly obsolete price structure which is also tonnage-oriented.

Pashko turns next to the excessively high proportion of cast-iron and steel castings used in engineering, which amounts to 40% in the USSR as against 17-20% in what he modestly calls the "technically developed countries". Soviet industry uses between 50% and 80% more castings for the same volume of production as other countries. And to obtain that volume of castings the USSR has to produce as much foundry iron as the U.S.A., Britain, West Germany, Japan and Italy taken together. Pashko makes it sound a remarkably inefficient process, since he says it involves the expenditure of 30% more coke and a reduction of 26% in the productivity of the furnaces.

He calculates that if the industry could use modern technology (replacing 2 million tons of castings in five years by 1-1.3 million tons of sheet steel), costs would be reduced by 280 million rubles a year and capital investment would be cut by 750 million rubles.

The structure of the steel industry is described by Pashko bluntly as "irrational". For a decade now it has turned out 4, 000, 000 tons more cast iron annually than rolled metal, consuming about 20, 000, 000 tons of iron ore, coke, refractories and other materials. But the corresponding industries in the free world produce about 9% more rolled metal each year than cast iron.

Because Soviet cast-iron is smelted in cupola furnaces it has a high sulphur content, and therefore it is weaker and the ingots are heavier than necessary.

The U. S. steel industry has about 3, 000 electric induction furnaces, and has halved the number of its cupola furnaces in the last decade. Yet in the USSR at present only 0. 5% of cast-iron is produced in induction furnaces, whereas the other "technically developed" countries are planning to raise their comparable figure to 40% by 1975.

Pashko therefore demands a program to build 1, 000 induction furnaces, with a capacity of 10, 000, 000 tons, in the "next few years" (presumably meaning 1971-75). They would save several billion rubles, he estimates.

By investing in capacity for 10, 000, 000 tons of pressed steel instead of castings the USSR could save about 3 billion rubles, which is roughly the cost of a large steel plant. Moreover, Pashko points out that the operating costs would be lower as well.

He caps the financial arguments with a punch-line which notes that labor productivity in the foundry shops of engineering plant is 12 times lower than in rolling shops of the steel plants.

Gosplan has calculated that for every 100 million tons of steel produced, the USSR gets 43, 000, 000 tons of engineering products whereas the U. S. A. obtains 55, 000, 000 tons (18% more). Losses, scrap and steel used for repairs exceed the U. S. figure by 8, 000, 000 tons. 29% of Soviet rolled metal is scrapped each year, and in the ball-bearings industry scrap runs as high as 57%.

Wastage on shavings is three or fourfold as high as in other countries, amounting to 3-4 million tons a year at a cost of 2-2. 5 billion rubles. This involves 20-24 million tons of raw materials and 4-5 billion rubles of avoidable and additional capital investment.

In view of all these statistics, Pashko seems to be justified in his view that investment in the industry is already large enough

to remedy the irrational structure problem by switching to the use of more rolled metal, non-ferrous metals (especially aluminum) and of induction furnaces.

He also seems to be telling the steel lobby indirectly that Brezhnev's expensive agricultural program means only a relatively slow rate of growth for investments in steel up to 1975. The "metal-eaters" will not like it, but at least it may compel them to produce better metal more efficiently than at present.

Computers

V. Pavlyuchenko's article on "Changes in Scientific-Technical Progress" is not nearly as frank as Pashko's, because he only mentions U. S. achievements, without comparing them with the Soviet performance. Here we can help him out. He shows that from 1965 to 1969 the number of computers in use in the U. S. A. more than doubled, from 25, 000 to 54, 000.²

In 1969 the best Western estimate of Soviet computers in operation was 5, 000,³ but their capacity is believed by Academician A. D. Sakharov to be "hundreds of times less" than for the U. S. machines.

Atomic Power

Pavlyuchenko also reminds his readers of the speed of the atomic power program in the U. S. A.: from an annual growth of 430 Megawatts in 1967 to 2, 750 MW in 1970, with an estimate of 12, 000 MW for 1975. By that time, he notes, atomic power should be providing about half of all new capacity. Since he says nothing of the Soviet nuclear power program, he might like to look at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1970), which gives the comparable figures for the number of nuclear power plants in operation in 1968.⁴

2. Fortune, August 1969, p. 89

3. Christian Science Monitor, 3 January 1970

4. E. Creutz, "Nuclear Power: Rise of an Industry", p. 78

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number (1968)</u>	<u>Number (1975)</u>
U.S.A.	42	88
U.K.	14	19
France	10	10
W. Germany	9	15
U.S.S.R.	6	13
Canada	3	5
Italy	3	5
Japan	3	15
Sweden	3	7
Belgium	1	3
Holland	1	2
Greenland	1	n.a.
Spain	1	4
Czechoslovakia	1	1

Figures for 1975 are from Archiv der Gegenwart, No. 39/1969.

The A. E. C. has predicted that by 1980 about 30% of U. S. electrical generating capacity will be nuclear (about 150, 000 Megawatts). So total U. S. capacity by then should exceed 450, 000 Megawatts.

If one looks ahead only as far as 1975, an article in The Economist has predicted a U. S. nuclear capacity of 70, 000 Megawatts, about 13, 000 for the U. K., 7, 000 for Japan, 6, 000 for Canada, 5, 000 for Sweden and 4, 000 for both West Germany and the USSR. ⁵

What Pavlyuchenko seems to have done, without saying so openly, is to stress to those of his Soviet readers who have access to the comparable figures for the USSR, the magnitude of the technological gap in these two important fields should the USSR continue on its present course. In effect he is pleading for much greater investment in computerization and in nuclear power generation. The companion article by Pashko may be aimed at providing some of the resources by restraining the appetite of the metal-eaters' lobby.

5. 21 June 1969

THE CAR -- YOUR FRIEND OR ENEMY?

(Radio Free Europe Research, 25-8-'70)

Summary: Traffic and pollution problems have suddenly become a matter of concern in the USSR. Though there are few passenger cars in the Soviet Union -- the truck still dominates the roads -- the number of accidents is comparatively high and is continually increasing. Pollution, due to exhaust fumes, is remarkably high. Lately, a number of conferences have dealt with these problems.

The media of the Republics of the Transcaucasian Union have sounded an alarm: the number of traffic accidents and fatalities as well as air pollution are on the increase in a region which is known as the "green lung" of the USSR. In June a republic-wide conference on road safety took place in Tbilisi. The presidium of this conference comprised all the local VIPs including the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR. The report on the conference gives a good idea of the complex traffic problems faced by the USSR. ¹ A second scientific-technical conference on road safety was held in June in Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian SSR. ² Reports on this conference provide further insight into the problems caused by increasing traffic.

In addition to these conferences, numerous articles dealing with traffic and pollution problems have been published in the Transcaucasian press. One of these articles entitled, "The Car -- Your Friend or Enemy?" ³ perhaps gives the best idea of the growing concern among the Soviet public.

Accidents Cause More Deaths Each Year Than Cancer or Heart Disease

The republic-wide conference in Tbilisi reported an increase in registered accidents and resultant fatalities. ⁴

1. Zarya Vostoka, 28 July 1970
2. Kommunist, Organ of the Armenian CP, 2 July 1970
3. Zarya Vostoka, 22 January 1970
4. Ibid., 28 July 1970

In 1968, 500 people died as a result of traffic accidents in Georgia, and 1,800 were seriously injured. In 1969, the number of fatalities increased to 697, while more than 35,000 persons were severely injured. These statistics show that accidents were responsible for more deaths than cancer or heart disease. It should be remembered that the percentage of accidents in the Transcaucasion region is well below the average Soviet accident rate, which in turn is lower than that of the Ukraine. It has recently been made public that in 1969, 16,000 people died in traffic accidents in the RSFSR, and 66,000 were seriously injured. 5 Considering the relatively small amount of traffic in this republic, and in the USSR as a whole, these figures are frighteningly high.

The reports of these conferences reveal the causes of the high accident rate. At the Tbilisi conference one of these reasons was discussed:

Neither highways nor urban streets conform to international standards. Such roads were built for horse-drawn wagons and are inadequate to today's traffic requirements. 6

Traffic control techniques are equally out of date. There are not enough traffic lights and/or signs. The Georgian Party paper writes:

We must face the fact that the important factor of road safety is not being sufficiently taken into account in the planning, construction and reconstruction of roads. It has been established that there are 25,000 traffic signs too few on our streets (i. e., in the Georgian SSR). Some 100 bridges do not meet legal requirements, and about 200 need immediate reconstruction. Many heavily used streets do not have the necessary traffic signs, roadside markings, railings, sidewalks and street lighting. One could name dozens of heavily used roads leading through district centers and other towns that do not meet

5. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Nr. 12/1970

6. Zarya Vostoka, 28 July 1970

the most elementary requirements of traffic safety. 7

Driver qualifications and education have also been neglected. The competent authorities do not take their responsibilities seriously enough. For example, the licensing authority in Sukhumi did not realize that it had issued a license to a person with only one eye; 12 drivers who received licenses from the Sukhumi authorities had been rejected by the army because of color blindness. 8 Despite heavy penalties, drunken driving is often a cause of traffic accidents. In 1969, Georgia revoked 4,000 licenses for this offense. 9 Another factor that often leads to accidents is insufficient traffic education, especially for children. All the articles lament the high percentage of children involved in accidents.

The Threat of Air Pollution

During the main traffic periods, air pollution in Yerevan is about 40 times the permitted norm, and even the average pollution is about 26 times the permitted norm. 10 During a roundtable discussion in Leningrad, it was noted that in that city the air contains 12 to 14 milligrams per cubic meter of poisonous matter, while the permitted norm is only three milligrams per cubic meter. 11 During the discussion, it was pointed out that Soviet car factories do not have to construct engines conforming to statutory limits on engine fume emission. Such "sanitary norms" do not exist, and engines are built which emit two to three times the proper level of fumes.

Road Construction -- Stepchild of the Planners

Even a major city like Leningrad is limping behind in essential road construction. The city desperately needs the

7. Ibid., 22 January 1970

8. Ibid., 28 July 1970

9. Ibid., 22 January 1970

10. Kommunist, op. cit.

11. Trud, 8 February 1970

completion of 150 traffic projects, but only one such project is built per year. More than 100 pedestrian underpasses are needed, but only a few exist today. ¹²

The reasons for this lack of road construction are numerous, and they are mostly connected with Soviet planning. While the funds allotted to housing construction are continuously being increased, money for road construction remains static. Here, as in so many other industrialized states, a change in the investment policies governing road construction is needed. An aggravating factor is that the planning agencies are failing to take the ever-increasing volume of traffic into account. Complaints were voiced at the republic-wide conference in Tbilisi that there are no long-term (10-20 year) plans for road construction. If one takes into account existing, far-reaching plans for satellite cities and towns, one can easily imagine the traffic problems which will face the Soviet Union in the future, especially once the long-awaited automotive explosion erupts with the help of capitalist car manufacturers.

12. Ibid.

CULTURE

THE SOVIET STATE AND CULTURE

(Soviet News, 22-9-'70)

Summary: An intergovernmental conference, sponsored by Unesco, was held in Venice from August 24 to September 2 to discuss cultural policies. At this conference the USSR Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva, gave a report which has been summarised as follows by the Novosti Press Agency. The conference was attended by about 400 delegates from 85 countries.

From the very first days of its existence the Soviet socialist state assumed full responsibility for the development of culture in the country. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, founder and leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, watched over the rise and development of socialist culture. Not only did he develop the theory and the programme of cultural development but he also personally directed the implementation of that programme.

One of the fundamental principles of Lenin's plan for cultural construction was the precept of continuity in the development of culture. A new socialist culture cannot emerge out of nothing. Its creation is impossible without firmly relying on the classical heritage, on the finest progressive traditions of art which have preserved to this very day their humanist essence.

Making works of art widely accessible to the people, the Soviet State nationalised all art galleries and museums, conservatoires, art schools, theaters, the film and photographic industries and all cultural treasures and monuments and proclaimed them the property of all the people through special government decrees which Lenin signed. The state made it illegal to take valuable works of art out of the country and issued decrees providing for their strict protection.

The Winter Palace in Petrograd, which had once belonged to the tsars, was turned into a museum and, soon after the Revolution, workers, sailors and Red Guards listened in its Heraldic Hall to a performance of Mozart's "Requiem", given in memory of the heroes who had laid down their lives in the Revolution. A state collection of very rare and valuable musical instruments was made, and it is precisely these instruments, including

Stradivarius and Guarnerius violins, that are played by young musicians of ours who have time and time again emerged as victors in international contests.

During the most difficult years of the blockade and foreign intervention, when there was a shortage of bread and fuel in the country, Lenin kept on reminding us that the people would not forgive us if we did not succeed in saving the treasures of classical culture for the future.

Nowadays, too, the Soviet government is doing its utmost to make the treasures of national and world culture the possession of the people.

Lenin said that a rise in the general cultural level would create a firm, healthy soil from which mighty, inexhaustible forces would arise, making for the development of the arts, science and technology. This became one of the most important principles in cultural development.

The Soviet government accomplished this task under inconceivably difficult conditions; a poor material foundation and a situation in which three-quarters of the population were illiterate. More than 40 peoples living in the border-lands of the Soviet Union did not even have their own written language.

But just remember this. As a result of implementing the state's cultural policy, some 20 years after the Revolution, at the end of the 'thirties' the Soviet Union had become a country where everyone was literate.

More than 60 per cent of the employed population in the USSR have a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Here is one significant example: prior to the Revolution there was not a single higher educational institution in what were then outskirts of the Russian Empire (now the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan), whereas now there are more than 90. Taken as a whole they have about half a million students.

Free Education

In our country education is provided in the native language of each nationality. And one of the chief gains of the socialist system is that all the main forms of education, from the lowest to the highest, are provided free of charge.

On the basis of the rapid advance in education, a new people's intelligentsia has been created and the cultural backwardness of the masses has been eradicated. Thus, the problem of bringing

the treasures of the world's spiritual culture to the working people has been solved.

What was fundamentally new in the country's cultural policy was that from the very first days of the Soviet state, it shouldered the organisational, material and financial burdens of developing culture and the arts.

We are justly proud of the fact that culture in the Soviet Union is developing entirely independent of anyone's financial advantage and independent of commercial considerations. It is inspired, as Lenin predicted, not by considerations of profits or careers, but by the idea of socialism and feeling for the masses.

Our theatres, orchestras, art institutes and conservatoires have no experience of humiliating dependence on wealthy patrons. Young musicians, actors and artists develop without feeling the pain of humiliation or the bitterness of going unrecognised. The state helps them in every way, supports them with commissions and bookings and provides them with the best teachers and with grants and accommodation.

The creation of a firm material foundation for the development of culture, its planning and financing and the training and advancement of the peoples in cultural pursuits have become a matter of concern for the state as a whole. Because of this, culture has truly become the culture of the entire people, accessible to hundreds of millions of persons. The allocations in our country's State Budget for financing the development of culture continue to increase year by year. The expenditures on social and cultural measures, taken as a whole, amount to about 40 per cent of the State Budget.

In the Soviet Union there are 534 professional theatres, including 37 opera and ballet theatres, and there are also about 400,000 libraries and more than a thousand state museums.

The state publishing houses annually put out more than 75,000 books. In 1969 the total print of these books amounted to 1,300 million copies, or about a quarter of the world's total output of books. Let me add that the state regulates the price of tickets for shows of all kinds, actually giving subsidies for every place in a theatre, concert hall or circus. The prices of tickets, books, periodicals and gramophone records in our country are the lowest in the world.

Quarter of world's books

A state policy of this kind is conducive to a constant growth in the number of people going to museums, cinemas and theatres. The number of visitors to museums, for instance, increased from 50 million in 1960 to 100 million in 1969. The Hermitage alone was visited by more than three million people last year.

The total attendance at productions on the stage, concerts and circus shows last year exceeded the 300 million mark. By the way, in spite of the rapidity with which television has developed in our country, attendances at theatres and cinemas in recent years have not dropped but have actually increased.

The problem of ensuring a steady growth of the network of cultural establishments cannot be solved without skilled personnel. In order to ensure that such personnel are trained, the Soviet state has created a whole system which includes 61 higher educational establishments and 430 specialised secondary schools providing free instruction. The state ensures that there is employment in their own speciality for all those who successfully complete their training at educational institutions in the cultural sphere.

Lenin's plan for cultural progress also determined the ideological and aesthetic principles in the development of creative art. Socialist multi-national art fulfils a new social function as regards content and aims, when compared with the art of preceding eras.

The art of socialist realism truthfully reflects, in different forms, the heroic deeds of the people in the creation of a new society; it brings to the people noble ideas of revolutionary humanism and internationalism, calls for an active struggle for peace and for friendship among the peoples, and imbues the people with a sense of patriotism and a high sense of civic responsibility.

Socialist art has become a very powerful means of ensuring the ideological and ethical education of millions of people.

One of the most important objective features and conditions of the development of artistic culture in our country is its multinational character. More than a hundred nations and nationalities are united in our country in a voluntary union of equal and sovereign republics based on the principles of internationalism and on a common socio-economic and cultural life.

From the very first days of the existence of the Soviet state the task of preserving and developing the national forms and progressive traditions of the culture of all peoples, and the eradication of the cultural backwardness resulting from the policy of tsarist Russia held a leading place in its cultural policy.

In the years of Soviet government, opera and ballet theatres have been established in all the Union republics and in a number of autonomous republics. Many peoples for the first time in their cultural history have acquired their own theatres and their own playwrights. Stage productions are given in 46 languages of the peoples of the USSR. The art of the cinema is developing in all the republics. Fiction and socio-political literature are published in 89 languages of Soviet nations.

A multinational artistic culture has successfully developed in the past decades as an integral whole, while preserving the inimitable features of national forms and the special characteristics of the art of the fraternal peoples. We are striving to draw the working people into the joyful process of artistic creation on an even broader scale, to teach them not only to understand and to make use of art, but also to take a direct part in the creation of aesthetic values. We are opening up new and boundless opportunities for the amateur art activities of the masses by reducing the working day, improving the material and living conditions of the workers and peasants and providing more free time for the satisfaction of their spiritual demands. This is vitally important for amateur choirs, amateur theatres and the art shows of amateur artists.

More than 12 million people in our country take part in amateur art activities. More than 80,000 drama groups and more than 300,000 choral, instrumental and dance groups from all the parts of the country participated in the USSR Amateur Art Festival held in honour of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet state.

The Soviet state gives the utmost support and guidance, in both moral and material terms, to the development of amateur art. It builds clubs and houses of culture and there are now about 140,000 of these. It trains people to lead amateur art groups and provides these groups with musical instruments, materials, equipment and other requirements and arranges for

them to receive help from professional companies and leading artists.

From its very inception the Soviet state developed international cultural ties by all ways and means, taking into account the role of those ties in promoting friendship, closer relations and mutual understanding among the peoples, and in securing the mutual enrichment of national cultures.

At the present time the USSR is maintaining cultural ties with more than 120 countries. Representatives of the cultural circles of all the nationalities in our country take part in this. More than 100,000 Soviet personalities prominent in the fields of culture and the arts have visited foreign countries in the past ten years.

The Soviet Union is making a worthy contribution to international cultural co-operation and is paying a great deal of attention to arranging international functions of various kinds. This year alone the conference of the International Society for Music Education has been successfully held in our country. The International Conference of Librarians (ILFA) will shortly be opening in Moscow and a meeting of the International Council of Museums is to be held there.

The holding in our country of major international gatherings such as the Tchaikovsky Musical Contest, the Moscow Film Festival, the classical ballet contest, the International Book Exhibition, the Tashkent film festival of Asian and African countries, etc., has become a good tradition.

The expansion of international cultural ties makes us confident that they will assist in the development of world culture as a whole and promote a further advance of national culture, closer ties, better mutual understanding and peace and friendship among the nations.

THE REVIVAL OF THE POSITIVE HERO

by Arkady G. Gaev

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,
15-9-'70)

Summary: Some five years ago, when the wooden socialist realist hero of fiction was threatened with extinction, the Party called for more "positive" characters in Soviet literature and drama. Effusive

praise of a recent play centered on a dedicated Party secretary indicates that the authorities still hope to revive an artificial and stilted genre, but in the changing social climate of the Soviet Union this will be an uphill struggle.

Afanasi Salynsky's new play "Mariya", which has apparently been enjoying a successful run this year in a Moscow theater, contains the following exchange between the two lovers, Mariya Odintsova, secretary of a rayon Party committee, and Bokarev, an archeologist:

"What good does it do you?" Bokarev questioned Mariya, "rushing round the rayon, lacerating your nerves at meetings, fighting with all sorts of demagogues, listening to insults?....."

"Dearest", retorted Mariya to her beloved, "why don't you give up your archeology?"

"What a comparison" said Bokarev ironically. "Archeology is a science, the great science of the past".

"And Party work is also a science", countered Odintsova, "the great science of the future".
(Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 23, 1970, p. 8)

This extract contains the play's real message: only the Communist Party, backed by cohorts of dedicated activists, holds the key to an assured and predictable future. Seen in this light, the author's choice of a Party functionary, a woman with an exalted conception of her duty towards society, as the central character of his play is not unusual. But why this sudden revival of the "positive" hero?

Roughly five years ago, Soviet critics were complaining that the positive (in the Party sense) literary and stage hero had vanished from the scene. In an article entitled "In Search of a Hero" the writer Fyodor Levin stated that "literature devoted to the theme of the worker has, in recent years, been unable to offer a hero who knows exactly what he should do and who can lead others. But it seems to me that here the reason lies not only in literature" (Literaturnaya Rossiya, April 23, 1965, p.10). The death of positive heroes was also lamented by fellow writer Ivan Kupriyanov:

The theater repertoire seldom contains plays which are on a heroic and heroically romantic plane and deal with contemporary life..... Latterly, drama has begun to show less interest in great and complex social processes, in people whom we are proud to call "right-wingers". (Izvestia, June 5, 1965)

This "crisis" (described in greater detail in "Analysis", No. 380, October 19, 1965) prompted Party leaders and critics to call for the introduction of positive heroes into contemporary literature. In his article "It is Time Indeed" (Literaturnaya Rossiya, August 20, 1965), leading critic Aleksandr Dymshits set the tone with his demand that the writer Vasili Aksenov cease to use "scrofulous" heroes in his works and switch to the portrayal of builders of communism.

The protests of the critics achieved little, however. The enthusiastic revolutionary romantic was outdated, and critically thinking champions of individual liberty had begun to people the pages of Soviet literature. The Party was forced to wield the big stick and decree the resurrection of the positive hero (see "Analysis", No. 426, October 25, 1966). In a typical article the late Yevgeni Popovkin, editor of Moskva, wrote:

Writers and artists must display all the beauty and heroism of the Soviet working class, portray the Korchagins and the Koshevs who are standing at the blast-furnaces and constructing power stations on the Angara and the Yenisei, create the figure of modern man, the ideologically convinced Party warrior. (Moskva, No. 5, 1966, p. 163)

Leading functionaries in the Soviet theater and cinema also took up arms against the "anti-hero". A. Romanov, chairman of the State Cinematography Committee, quoted the film version of Boris Balter's story Do svidaniya, malchiki (Good-bye, Boys), as an example of "ideological errors" in character portrayal, saying:

You would think that before us we have people who are close to our hearts, men who build and fight. But how are they portrayed in the film? They bear the seal of doom and pointless sacrifice. They are filled with melancholy and disappointment, and the authors

of the film constantly remind us that these boys are like this because they are surrounded by mercenary hypocrites and that their life is such that it is difficult to spot even one small ray of hope in it. (Kommunist, No. 11, 1966, p. 79)

But a true artist cannot write to a formula. He has an organic relationship with his characters, irrespective of whether they are positive or negative. They are taken from real life and then passed through the creative laboratory of the author's mind. Not without reason did the poet Mikhail Svetlov say: "I would rather fling myself under a train than throw the hero onto the tracks" (Moskva, No. 1, 1966, p. 223). This is the attitude of the genuine artist, but the writer who approaches his work as an artisan is usually only too eager to please his masters -- love at the workbench, love as a stimulus to production -- the clichés of Soviet socialist realism are all too familiar. At the behest of the Party a procession of stereotyped characters -- teachers, doctors, engineers, virgin land pioneers, or whoever was the hero of the moment -- have passed across the literary scene. War, understandably, produces its crop of soldier heroes who assume a rightful place in a country's literature, but it is difficult to excuse, say, the recent glamorization of geologists in Soviet literature, as, for example, in Gennadi Kalinkovsky's story Zakon stalnogo klyucha (The Law of the Steel Spanner) (Yunost, Nos. 1 and 2, 1970).

A current hero of Soviet fiction is the secret policeman or secret agent. Typical examples of this vogue are: Yulian Semyonov's novel Semnadtsat mgnoveniy vesny (Seventeen Moments of Spring), Moskva, Nos. 11 and 12, 1969; V polose otchuzhdeniya (Right of Way), Oktyabr, No. 2, 1969 by A. Bezuglov and Yu. Klarov; V. Kravchenko's Pod imenem Shmidkheny (Under the Name of Shmidtchen), Moskva, No. 1, 1970; and the story Taynik (The Hiding-place), Ogonyok, No. 4, 1970 by A. Zubov, L. Lerov and A. Sergeyev. Gratifying though it may be to the Soviet authorities to see these figures depicted in a positive light, they can hardly be held up as shining examples to the population at large. It is, indeed, difficult for the writer to find a character who typifies Soviet society. N. Melnikov circumvented this problem in his story Passazhirsky 83-y (Passenger Train No. 83), Novy mir, No. 10, 1969, by depicting an assortment of

travelers from Khabarovsk to Moscow, a device which enables him to present a cross section of Soviet society. Few of his characters are "positive", neither the young man who deserts his pregnant wife for hours on end to flirt with another female passenger, nor the old retired railwayman wearing an order for meritorious service whose schoolgirl granddaughter is traveling illegally on a child's ticket and who advises his fellow passengers on how to screw money out of one's own children as a provision against old age, nor the two geologists who hate each other like poison and have to be separated by the police after coming to blows.

Melnikov is equally unsentimental about members of the Soviet elite: a diplomat traveling in a reserved compartment is shown to be merely an obtuse bureaucrat, and his wife, fashionably clad in a foreign dress and wearing expensive rings on her fingers, is a petty-bourgeois philistine. In another compartment a high official on his way to a health resort with a young secretary has brought along one of his subordinates to cover up his escapade. During the journey the passengers celebrate the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War II by drinking themselves insensible.

This is the background against which Salynsky has created a heroine, Mariya Odintsova, endowed with all the virtues and qualities approved of by the Party and intended to serve as an example of a model Soviet citizen. There is nothing new about the author's orthodox stand, however. Afanasi Salynsky, as well as being a dramatist, is also a leading light in the Soviet writers' organization. It was he who, in his report on Soviet drama at the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers, made the following impassioned defense of the Party approach to literature:

Together with the Revolution a new literature was born, the literature of socialist realism, which has announced to the world the advent of a new man, a man with the morals and ethics of a communist, who in his ideals is the incarnation of the best features acquired by people in the centuries of struggle for social progress. . . . And with the Revolution a new theater was born -- the Soviet theater. Onto the stage of this theater strode people completely without precedent in the history of mankind, people with a

collectivist mentality, brothers and friends in arms. (Chetverty svezd pisateley SSSR. Stenografichesky otchet) (The Fourth Congress of the Writers of the USSR, Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1968, p. 34)

Salynsky has long been known as a member of the orthodox camp in Soviet letters. Some ten years ago he attacked A. Volodin's play Pyat vecherov (Five Evenings) in the Party press, saying:

In this example we encounter a "philosophy" which is also characteristic of other works on the same plane. It consists in the imputation that a man should be rated not by his deeds, not by his socially creative activity, but merely by the fact that he is simply a man. This degenerate, narrow, so to say weak-jointed conception of humanism is the cause of the ideological triviality of a number of works in our literature. (Pravda, April 13, 1960)

A review of Salynsky's "Mariya" explains what distinguishes the heroine from lesser mortals: "Above all, her tremendous conviction in the rightness of Leninist ideas, the ability to instill her conviction into the heart of every person" (Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 23, 1970, p. 8). And sure enough, under Mariya's influence the discouraged chairman of the executive committee, a former war hero, regains his spirit and is transformed into an active fighter for communism. Mariya also cares about the mass of the people, whom she feels will go astray without her (Party) guidance. She worries about every individual worker: "Today he will dutifully quarry marble, but tomorrow he will live according to the despicable motto: we count for nothing; all that matters to us is money and good fodder" (ibid.). The review of Salynsky's play, referring to the "science of the future", continues:

It is to this science that the play dedicates its enthusiasm, the enthusiasm of its heroine. The playwright has presented us with a new conflict, the conflict between people with a different understanding of the moral problems involved in the construction of a communist society. Unobtrusively and without being

didactic, he proclaims the lofty purpose of Party work.
(Ibid.)

The campaign for the revival of the "positive" hero in Soviet literature appears to be gaining strength. The extravagant praise of Salynsky's "Mariya" was followed by critic Viktor Pankov's article "The Day of the New Heroes" in Literaturnaya gazeta, in which the author optimistically concludes: "Yes, our literature rests on the new heroes of history, because this is the richest source of real, vital figures and the means of defining exact criteria in the evaluation of relations between the individual and society" (No. 24, 1970, p. 7). The Soviet authorities still cling to the old formulas and stilted heroes of socialist realist literature, but it is doubtful if their attempts to revive this flagging genre in the changing social climate of the Soviet Union will meet with more than temporary success.

ALEXANDER YESENIN-VOLPIN -- PROFILE OF A SOVIET DISSIDENT

(Radio Free Europe Research, 27-8-'70)

Summary: Alexander Yesenin-Volpin has recently become involved in a protest against the incarceration of General P. Grigorenko in an insane asylum. This paper discusses Volpin's background as an activist in the struggle for civil rights in the Soviet Union.

Two London newspapers yesterday carried excerpts from a letter dated 20 July of this year addressed to Alexander Solzhenitsyn protesting in particular the incarceration of Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko in an insane asylum and in general the frequent use of insane asylums by the Soviet authorities as punishment for participating in civil rights activities.¹ The author, 46-year old Alexander Sergeyevich Yesenin-Volpin, a poet, brilliant mathematician and a prominent figure in civil rights activities, has had first-hand experience in such matters.

Having inherited some of the literary talent and independence of thought from his father, the famous Russian peasant-poet

1. Peter Reddaway in the London Times, 26 August 1970 and David Floyd in the Daily Telegraph, 26 August 1970.

Sergei Yesenin, who committed suicide in 1925 because of his disillusionment with the Soviet system, Alexander was engaged in writing poetry in his early twenties, the contents of which were far removed from the official creed of "socialist realism". During the immediate postwar period of Stalin's rule when any deviation from the orthodox line was tantamount to heresy, he had the courage to write the following lines:

.....inasmuch as leaders will insist that their pronouncements should be heard;
Every locksmith, every soldier too,
Instructs me in morality:

In our society all men are free
And equal -- thus teaches Stalin.
In our society all men are loyal
To Communism -- thus teaches Stalin.

..... And when they thrust on me, as sacred law,
'The dream of all the ages', the dream
Requiring no vindication,

And add moreover, 'you must love',
Then, even if being sent to prison
Is no mere penalty, but spells my doom,

I answer back: 'I just can't stand that crap' 2

In 1949, mainly on the basis of the above and another poem, he was arrested, judged to be "irresponsible" and put into a psychiatric prison in Leningrad. In the autumn of the following year, he was transferred to a forced labor camp in Karaganda to serve a five-year sentence which, however, was cut short when he was freed during the amnesty following Stalin's death.³

Several weeks prior to his arrest, he successfully fulfilled the requirements for his Ph.D. -- a fact that throws doubt on the official verdict of "irresponsibility".

In 1959, he managed to smuggle a collection of his poetry and an essay to the West where it was published two years later,⁴ but for which he was again arrested and detained on the charge

2. A. S. Yesenin-Volpin, A Leaf of Spring, New York, 1961, p. 49.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. See Footnote 2 above.

of "mental instability", and his works denounced as "man-hating verses, a kind of raving of a mentally deranged person".⁵ Yet, this "mentally deranged person" was officially invited in mid-1959 by the organizing committee of "The Symposium on the Foundations of Mathematics: Infinitistic Method" to be held in Warsaw in early September and under the sponsorship of the Institute of Mathematics of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the International Mathematical Union, to present a paper as one of the official Soviet representatives. Despite official Soviet refusal to allow Yesenin-Volpin to attend, his paper was judged to be of such importance that it was read to the symposium in his absence.⁶

Although significant, his dissident literary activity was still more literary than political and the impact of his protest was limited due to lack of concerted support for a specific cause. This was altered by the arrest and trial first of the writers Yulii Daniel and Andrei Sinyavski in 1965-1966 and of Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov and others in 1967-1968, events which dashed the hopes of innumerable liberals that the thaw initiated during Khrushchev's rule would continue under the new regime. On 5 December 1965, almost two months after the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel and an official Soviet holiday commemorating the constitution, Yesenin-Volpin helped lead a procession of approximately 200 persons in Pushkin Square in Moscow demanding an open trial for the writers and carried a banner with the words "Respect Your Own Constitution"⁷ -- a slogan which has become very popular among civil rights activists who take Soviet officials to task for violating the laws they themselves have legislated.

More than one year later, he was one of approximately seven hundred persons who protested the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial for which he was again arrested and placed in a mental institution in February, 1968. By this time, however, his intellectual abilities in the field of mathematical logic and his normal mental condition had been recognized by his colleagues in the scientific

5. Reuter, 20 January 1963

6. Yesenin-Volpin, *Ibid.*, p. 17.

7. New York Times, 18 December 1965.

community. In March of that year, ninety-five leading scientists, including one full and six corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, as well as Liudmilla Keldysh, the sister of the president of the Academy, sent a letter to the legal and medical authorities requesting his immediate release.⁸ Thus, in one of the first such instances, the scientific elite became involved in the general concern for civil liberties guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution -- an involvement subsequently repeated in the Zhores Medvedev case and one that was a contributing factor in the release of both Yesenin-Volpin and Medvedev.⁹

In the last two years, Yesenin-Volpin has frequently been mentioned in the Chronicle of Current Events as the author of numerous documents discussing the legal aspects of civil rights protest. One of his most important contributions is entitled "A Juridical Booklet For Those Subject To Interrogation",¹⁰ which provides detailed information on the legal rights of Soviet citizens when confronted by the authorities -- a document typical of the nature of most dissent in the Soviet Union which is based upon the concept of respect for the rule of law. It is significant that Yesenin-Volpin was one of many supporters who signed the letter of May 1969 sent by the Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the U. S. S. R. to the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights protesting the illegality of Soviet political trials and the violations of Soviet law by Soviet authorities. His most recent letter as reported in the British press¹¹ is in complete conformity with his alienation from past and present forms of Soviet injustice. It is unfortunate that the views he expressed more than ten years ago still apply today:

Actually, only a morally and mentally defective person can fail to reach a stage of extreme indignation in the Soviet Union. If this were not so, the Communists would have no reason to seal up their borders. In no other way

8. Text in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), *In Quest of Justice*, London, 1970, pp. 173-176

9. See CAA paper No. 0627 "The Influence of Soviet Scientists on the Release of Zhores Medvedev", 18 June 1970

10. For a synopsis, see the *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 6, 28 February 1969

could they have dealt with their flock while using Stalinist methods. Now the methods have changed, but not radically. The main point is that even the relative freedom which we have gained (a level of freedom which would seem to a person from another country to be the most shameful slavery) was not won by our society itself, but was granted to it by the government, or, more accurately, by the Communist 'church', as a sort of cat-and-mouse game with the people, rather than for the sake of more civilized rule, and then only because Stalin's successors have lacked the imagination and courage to follow in the footsteps of their teacher. 11

POLITICIZATION OF EDUCATION

(Radio Free Europe Research, 3-9-'70)

The last school year in Czechoslovakia was marked by so-called consolidation and normalization. Regime activity in this sphere shortly before the beginning of this school year was focused on political-educational work. One of the actions which -- in regime terminology -- is designed to clarify the fundamental problems of Communist education of the young on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, took the form of a three-day conference on Communist education at "schools of the first and second cycle" -- that is, at elementary and secondary schools. The conference was convened by the Czech Ministry of Education and opened in Prague on August 24. (Ucitelski Noviny No. 31/32, 27 August 1970).

The main reports on the first day were delivered by Antonin Vanek, head of the department of education and science of the CPCSS CC Lands Bureau, and Jaromir Hrbek, Czech Minister of Education. Vanek declared that it was essential to apply the "only correct concept, which regards educational activity as an important Party task". Communist education cannot be dispensed without a knowledge of, and identification with, the ideology of the Party; furthermore it is the right and the duty of

11. Yesenin-Volpin, ibid., p. 5

the Party to demand from every teacher "a high degree of ideological influence in the spirit of Communist education", he said. Hrbek emphasized that the CPCSS and the government regarded the task of converting the younger generation into convinced supporters and active builders of socialism and Communism as an important one. He criticized the "burgeoning formalism and bureaucracy" in organizations and in methods of working with the young. A consistently militant and convincing struggle against every variant of revisionism and bourgeois ideology is of key importance in Communist education of the young, Hrbek declared and in conclusion he expressed the hope that "assistance from our comrades in the USSR and the other socialist countries" will help to overcome all shortcomings and difficulties, and make it possible to educate the younger generation in the Communist spirit.

On the final day of the conference the director of the Pedagogical Research Institute in Prague, Miroslav Cipro, expounded the principles, forms, and methods applied in the Communist education of youth. After this a resolution was adopted which criticized the "mistakes" of the years of 1968-1969; referred to the "consolidation process" in the field of education; condemned the incorrect viewpoints of the past, declaring that "the mistakes which were made in these years "must be correct"; and finally appealed to the public to support the efforts of the teachers to educate a generation loyal to Communism.

A two-day aktif of Party workers and educators in elementary and secondary schools in Bratislava on 25 and 26 August 1970 was a pendant to the Prague conference. At this meeting Slovak CPCC secretary Ludovit Pezlar spoke about the current political situation and the tasks of the Party in the field of education, and the aktif set itself the task of contributing to a substantial improvement in educating youth in the Communist spirit.

These two conferences underscore the importance the Party attributes to the politicization of education in the schools. Czech Minister of Education Hrbek, in a broadcast marking the start of the new school year (Radio Prague, 31 August 1970) made it clear that the regime is intent on achieving this aim, and also indicated that the Czech educational system would revert to that of a uniform "internally differentiated" school. This means abandoning the experiment with selective schools, particularly of the gymnasium type (classical education) which had made a

promising start in 1968 along traditional pre-Communist Czechoslovak lines.

The drive to politicize school education and to revert to a "united" school system is not new. It was the line adopted at the beginning of the 1950s, when education was in the hands of the educational "expert", Minister Zedenek Nejedly. The regime was subsequently compelled to change its educational policies several times, and essentially education remained a field in which experiment and change were frequent. This lack of stability, understandably enough has had disastrous consequences on the quality and amount of knowledge acquired by the younger generation. It is doubtful that Hrbek's program will improve this state of affairs.

It should be added that the politicization drive in education has had a result virtually opposite to that expected by the regime. It is precisely from among what was then the younger generation that the greatest exponents of the liberalization process of the past years emerged. The fate of Hrbek's attempt to Bolshevize the spirit of the young may well be no different.

TEENAGERS CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF PATRIOTISM

(Radio Free Europe Research , 1-9-'70)

The provincial Hungarian dailies Nepujzag (Heves), Csongrad Megyei Hirlap, and Delmagyarország in their August 2, 9, and 23 issues respectively carried an article entitled "Teenager Patriotism" by Ivan Bogardi.

The author said that all over the world, young people's tastes and conduct has become standardized. Japanese teenagers adopt the same hair styles as their Hungarian or Belgian counterparts; the "mini" is being replaced by the "maxi" alike in Florence and in Sao Paulo; and the same groups are idolized by teenagers of all countries. These facts have created the illusion that a sort of "teenager internationalism" has come into existence.

The young people cannot be blamed for this uniformity. Fashions have always existed: all that has changed is that today they spread more rapidly than in the past, thanks to radio and television. It is pointless to criticize the young for their efforts to establish a common personality and to demonstrate their interdependence. Except on rare occasions this is not linked with antisocial behavior. What is wrong, however, is that this feeling

of interdependence is confined to their own generation and does not extend to the rest of their environment -- the adults with whom their lives are linked, and their country, the fatherland in which they live.

The word "fatherland" is never on the lips of the youth of today unless they are reciting poetry in school. The reason for this is that the word has changed its meaning and is now misunderstood.

Bogardi then mentioned the importance of NEKOSZ, the National League of People's Colleges in educating Hungary's youth in patriotism. NEKOSZ gives the term a meaning which is valid in the world of today. Students of the People's Colleges approach the Hungarian situation from the point of view of the responsibilities it imposes on them, and at the same time they are given a sense of what the "socialist" world system means. Their task may have changed and lost the spectacular appeal of its early days, but its content and framework have remained constant: the "socialist fatherland".

After giving some examples of teenagers' lack of patriotism, Bogardi asked what was at the root of this deficiency. Its source is not, he said, "beat" or the international leveling of taste. Its primary cause is defective patriotic education. A sense of cohesion must be created, first in small communities and later in bigger groups. NEKOSZ and the workers' movement, for example, are basic cohesive forces of this kind, which give meaning to the life of individuals.

A sense of interdependence is restricted among the young people to their own teenager community. To remedy this situation, they must be given responsibility -- work which is useful to their country; and what they say must be listened to and discussed. Their occasional outbursts should be accepted calmly. The Communist Youth League must play a key role in this matter.

Finally, Bogardi said that although Hungary's standard of living is below that of the most developed capitalist countries, a yearning for the West is out of place. The country's social program includes, in addition to improved living standards, the creation of a morally and generally richer way of life. This should be put across to, and understood by, the younger generation.

Bogardi's article is characteristic of the changed atmosphere in which the regime is trying to come to an understanding with

the new generation. He stressed the significant role of NEKOSZ in the postwar Hungarian youth movement, which was discussed in a lively fashion in Jancso's film The Confrontation. Curiously enough, one of the papers which printed Bogardi's article, the Csongrad Megyei Hirlap, which is published in an area known for its orthodoxy, omitted the passages in praise of NEKOSZ.

SOCIALIST CRIMINOLOGY REGARDS CRIME AS SOCIAL PHENOMENON

General Fall in Crime Rate in Soviet Union

(Soviet News, 15-9-'70)

The development of a communist outlook and, in particular, of socialist legal and ethical consciousness, is taking place under the conditions of the very sharp struggle between the ideologies of socialism and capitalism, Dr Igor Karpets, a leading Soviet legal expert, observed recently in an article in *S o v i e t s k o y e G o s u d a r s t v o i P r a v o* ("Soviet State and Law").

The opponents of Marxism, he points out, are trying to undermine the scientific basis of jurisprudence under the pretext of defending the "neutral" character of the social sciences in general and of jurisprudence in particular.

Denying the class ideology implicit in a juridical general outlook, bourgeois scholars are anxious to demonstrate the absence of fundamental differences in the methodological and theoretical propositions of socialist and bourgeois juridical concepts.

Describing this as an attempt to confuse the issue, Dr Karpets says that what is involved is the ideological struggle around the materialist concept of crime, its causes, the personality of the criminal and other key problems of criminology.

To the question whether socialist criminology exists, Dr Karpets says that socialist criminology is Marxist criminology, based on the historical materialist approach to crime as a social phenomenon.

It is especially important to emphasise this now when bourgeois ideologists are propounding the idea of the plurality of socialism: "soft" "democratic", etc., which enables them to class various eclectic theories in the sphere of criminology as socialist.

Eclectic Mixture

In bourgeois criminology, the absence of a single method in the approach to social processes has resulted in a plurality of criminologies - biocriminology, clinical criminology, socio-criminology, etc. - as well as an eclectic mixture of biological and social factors in criminal research.

A well tried technique used by the critics of Soviet law has always been the misrepresentation of its institutes. Crude methods do not work today, however, and the issues are presented in a veiled form.

Bourgeois ideologists accept that criminology as a science does exist in the socialist countries - it is impossible to deny this - but claim that it is a direct successor to bourgeois criminology.

To support this, the bourgeois ideologists rely on a purely superficial resemblance between the problems under study, the terminology, the names of institutions, particular methods of research, etc., and ignore the new social content, the new quality of criminology based not on the idealist views of crime and social processes in general, but on dialectical materialist methodology.

In order to prove the non-existence of Marxist criminology, some bourgeois theorists use a "historical approach". While presenting the facts, apparently impartially, they emphasise what is of advantage to them in order to praise an alleged deviation from Marxism and level the charge of "dogmatism" against those who do not accept the bourgeois ideology.

As an example of this approach, Dr Karpets cites the statements made by the West German jurist H. Keizer who gladly accepts the criminological ideas which circulated in the Soviet Union in the '20s and '30s and which were essentially a rehash of the biological and bio-social concepts widespread in the West at that time.

However, as soon as Soviet criminology stepped firmly on to the soil of Marxist-Leninist methodology, this immediately provoked fierce attacks as well as attempts to question the very existence of Marxist criminology.

To deny the existence of Marxist criminology is not itself the purpose of the bourgeois ideologists; their target is more comprehensive.

They want to "inspire" those Soviet scholars, as well as

scholars of other socialist countries, who are either under the influence of old criminological ideas or display methodological instability.

Therefore, any deviation from Marxism-Leninism, any interest in biological or bio-social concepts, for example, is openly hailed, even if it has little real basis in fact.

This does not, however, occur as often as the bourgeois ideologists would like it to, and not on the scale which would suit them.

Soviet scholars know that methodologically wrong positions are used not only with the aim of introducing "frustration" in the ranks of the scholars of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on purely specific scientific problems and provoking them into "lively discussion", as H. Keizer puts it, but also for a direct ideological offensive against the Marxist-Leninist outlook and Marxist juridical theory, in particular on the problems of crime.

Dr Karpets goes on to criticise the advocates of the biological and bio-social concepts of criminology.

Views about the existence of a certain special, genetically programmed "nature", responsible not only for the health of the individual but also for his economic and social status are being now actively canvassed in the reactionary bourgeois press.

These ideas, traceable to the reactionary propositions of eugenics, lead ideologically and politically to the most reactionary conclusions in ideology and politics.

Many geneticists deny the innate nature of crime. In particular, Professor A. Pekhov, in the course of criticising the theory of single-egg twins and other similar ideas imported into criminology, notes that K. Timiryazev, in his time, realised that man's biological evolution had been left behind at the threshold of his history and had been replaced by social development and improvement. As for the problems which interest us, Professor Pekhov points out that no one has ever been able to prove that crime, prostitution, poverty and other dangerous social phenomena are inherited.

The historical-materialist approach to crime, its causes and the means of its elimination does not suit the bourgeois ideologists. They try to intimidate the Soviet criminologists with the difficulties involved in the scientific treatment and practical solution of the problem of crime.

Many bourgeois theorists consider the very problem of the elimination of crime to be insoluble. However, since the laws of development of socio-economic systems of exploitation and those of socialism are different, it is pointless and, indeed, useless to transfer the vices of development of these systems and, in particular, those inherent in capitalism, on to an entirely different formation: socialism.

Historically conditioned

Unfortunately, in juridical literature wrong interpretations occur of the problem which fail to understand that crime "has come" into socialism from the preceding socio-economic systems and that, in consequence, its presence in our society is historically conditioned at the present-day stage of development, since socialism cannot solve all problems and become an ideal society within a historically short period.

It should be recalled that the fact that crime is historically conditioned implies at the same time that it is transient, for crime is alien to the principles of socialism and communism.

Socialism and its social relations have for the first time in history provided actual premises for the formulation and gradual solution in practice of the problem of the elimination of crime in the life of a society in the course of transition to the higher stage of development.

At the same time, Dr Karpets observes, the advances made in the Soviet Union in combating crime should be demonstrated clearly.

These advances include a general fall in the crime rate, the practical elimination of professional crime, the disappearance of many dangerous crimes, the absence of gangsterism, the decrease in the number of serious crimes in relation to crime generally, and a number of other trends characteristic of socialism.

Any conscientious investigator will understand that this is no mean achievement in a comparatively young society; such advances have never been attained by any previous socio-economic system. This is what points to the economic, social and ideological superiority of socialism.

Some bourgeois scientists, Dr Karpets goes on, propose that the Soviet scientists should take up the positions of biologism;

then they would not have to argue that crime is not a product of the socialist public relations; others suggest the recognition of the theory of factors - this is a variety of the theory of convergence preached in jurisprudence.

The final aim of their efforts is the same; to try to push Soviet experts off the positions of Marxist methodology in criminology and, on a wider plane, to help to intensify the influence of bourgeois ideology.

It is highly important to detect and estimate properly the bourgeois ideologists' attempts to transplant their ideas into Soviet science, to know the techniques and methods of ideological penetration of alien ideas into Soviet science and, from this position, assess those discussions which are in progress abroad concerning the ways of development of Marxist juridical science in general and criminology in particular, in order to rebut thoroughly the encroachments of our ideological opponents; and from this position, consider our own mistakes and delusions.

Abstract

Passing on to the theory which is highly popular nowadays in the capitalist countries and which contends that the main cause of crime is scientific and technological progress, Dr Karpets observes that the scientific-technological revolution exercises a huge influence on the material, social and spiritual conditions of life, and on the historical destinies of human society.

However, neither the scientific-technological revolution, nor scientific technological progress exist outside time and space. They develop not *p e r s e*, but within the framework of a definite social system.

While under socialism the scientific-technological revolution is connected above all with the desire to raise living standards, as well as social relations, on the basis of new technology, under the conditions of bourgeois society, of social and class antagonisms and contradictions, the scientific - technological revolution aggravates these contradictions, alienates the individual and hence leads to the growth of various negative phenomena, and especially to crime.

Overwhelmed by the complexity of the problems which arise, bourgeois sociologists and lawyers believe that the development of science and technology threatens human person ality and

civilisation itself.

This is, to say the least, a paradox, since under present-day conditions it is impossible to conceive of civilisation without associating it with the development of science.

Referring to the theories of E. Fromm, E. Durkheim, D. Rigman, R. Murton and others, Dr Karpets says that the un-soundness of their theories is self-evident; the current problems of social development are considered by these authors in abstract outside their class and social content, outside political estimates and judgements, outside the sphere of ideology.

This leads to an abstract and fallacious scheme according to which the evils of "mass civilisation" are considered to follow from the development of all science, all technological development and progress, outside their class and social content.

Hence the abstract picture of the causes of conflicts, of violence, of crime, outside time and space. Hence in particular, the thesis that civilisation and the scientific-technological revolution harms the development of society and that the psychic consequences of progress as such - fatigue, fear, frustration - push the individual always and everywhere to violence and crime.

It is impermissible, however, to mix up the technological and social causes, especially when applied to crime.

Certainly it is not an excess of information or other processes connected with the scientific-technological revolution that cause the alienation of a potential criminal and the growth of crime; rather the primary cause is the nature of bourgeois social relations which have nothing in common with socialist social relations. Therefore, the causes of crime are not universal for all socio-economic systems nor for all time.

Another theory preached by bourgeois ideologists is the "non-motivation" of crime, the contention being that modern man lives in fear, in a world of war, violence and alienation. But surely modern people live in different societies. There is socialism and there is capitalism in the world. There are forces striving for war and there are forces curbing them.

There is capitalist society of which the primary law is cruelty, violence and evil, and there is socialist society, which asserts the ideas of friendship and fraternity, opposes evil and violence and rejects cruelty.

ANTI-RELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN RESUMED

Religious affairs in Slovakia re characterized today by stepped-up control on the part of the authorities and attacks in the Party press against the Uniate Church. This Catholic Church, which acknowledges the Pope as its primate, was recognized again in the Prague Spring of 1968. Under the first republic there were more than 550,000 Uniates in Czechoslovakia -- chiefly in eastern Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. After World War II and the annexation of the Carpathian Ukraine by the USSR, only a few Uniates remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia, mainly in the Presov region, and a few thousand in the Czech Lands. On Easter, 1950, the two bishops of this Church, Pavel Gojdic and Vasil Hopko, were arrested, and the Church was banned and subjected to administrative measures. Uniate priests were interned or resettled in the borderlands, where they were forced to do heavy manual work. Only a few who joined the Orthodox Church favored by the regime were exempted from these repressive measures.

The first phase in the rehabilitation of the Uniate Church began on 10 April 1968, when an action committee for the restoration of the Church was elected. The rehabilitation efforts bore fruit when the Czechoslovak government decided, on 13 June 1968, to accord recognition once again to this Church and to resolve the problems connected with the relationship between the Uniate and Orthodox Churches. Finally on 8 September 1968, the Uniate Church took over the administration of 180 parishes which had belonged to it before the war and which had been placed under the Orthodox Church in 1950; the latter was now left with only 100 parishes.

However, in the aftermath of the August 1968 events the Orthodox Church gradually launched a counteroffensive. The present situation is characterized in an article which was published in the Slovak CP Party daily Pravda (1 September 1970), reproduced in Rude Pravo, and broadcast over the Hvezda radio station. According to the author of this article, Daniel Andrejcik, extremist forces in the Uniate Church tried to take advantage of the social climate and to foment religious passions and ill will between Uniate and Orthodox believers. He also described the return of property by the Orthodox Church to the Uniates -- which was sanctioned by Law No. 70/1968 -- as a "forced take-over of property belonging to the Orthodox Church".

He listed a number of parishes in which, in an affray a few months ago, an "organized mob" broke into the homes of Orthodox priests, who were then forced to leave their parsonages. Criminal proceedings had to be instituted against 176 citizens. Andrejcik admitted that the underlying cause of the friction between the believers of these two Churches is political. He claimed that the laws are continually being violated, especially with regard to the construction of and repairs to Uniate Church buildings. "Construction firms start Church buildings without permission from the national committees, and suppliers sell materials for church buildings without first obtaining the necessary building licence". Andrejcik ended his article with an appeal to the authorities to put an end to these practices and to draw the proper conclusions from them.

The situation of another Catholic Church which was again recognized during the Prague Spring is also critical. This is the Old Catholic Church, whose see is at Varnsdorf; its Church bulletin is no longer published, and there is no more news about its activities.