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IN AFRICA



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INTRODUCTION

At the opening of the present decade, a particular conjunction of circumstances seemed to make Africa a fertile ground for activity by the Communist powers and the world Communist movement.

During the previous decade, the imminence of independence had created opportunities for the Soviet Union and China to take up the postures of champions of a liberation that had to be wrested from reluctant colonial oppressors. In succeeding years, the Communist powers capitalized to the utmost on this assumed propaganda advantage.

Political independence meant that the new states were free to form their own international alignments. In the immediate post-independence climate of opinion in the new states, to break existing links with the West often seemed more urgent than to avoid commitments to the Communist bloc. Communist-sponsored causes and slogans - for peace, against imperialism - had an appeal which seemed not to be matched by anything from the West.

The international Communist movement had built up an impressive apparatus of contacts with individuals and organizations in the new states, and the agencies concerned counted on expanding their activities in the freedom which they expected to enjoy after the removal of colonial restraints.

In Communist eyes, the social and economic discontents of African populations offered scope for the propagation of Communist-type "solutions".

For most African countries, the present period is that of the aftermath of independence. For many of them, the independence moment already belongs to contemporary history. Circumstances which at independence seemed propitious for the Communists and the Communist powers do not necessarily obtain in the same measure today. Anti-colonialist postures of the Soviet Union and China have features which militate against full solidarity with the sentiments of African nationalists. Anti-Western reactions that followed independence have not always persisted. Non-alignment has often not been sufficiently anti-Western to meet Communist requirements; this has been a common Soviet complaint in recent years. Great breaches have been

made in the front of solidarity which was supposed to encompass non-Communist Africa and Asia and the Communist countries; this has been caused as much by dissensions between the Communist powers themselves as by disputes among the non-Communist countries. The international Communist movement has not enjoyed the freedom of activity in the new states which it promised itself on the eve of their independence. Finally, the economic and other remedies which Communist advisers have been able to prescribe for some African states have proved more pernicious than the ailments which they were supposed to cure. These developments, and the resulting loss of prestige and influence by the Communist powers, form the background to recent reverses for both Soviet and Chinese policies in Africa.

In this situation, of lessened African enthusiasms, lower Soviet and Chinese expectations and allayed Western anxieties, the general picture can be regarded by all concerned in a steadier perspective. But, just as on the eve of African independence there was a wide variety of Western views on Africa's chances vis-a-vis the Communists, so today there is a considerable diversity in Western opinion concerning the ensuing development and further fortunes of Soviet and Chinese policy and Communist activity in Africa. Some would regard the setbacks of the Communist powers as only incidental to their permanent longterm designs; others feel that the reverses must have affected the scope and substance of these designs themselves. At all events, the present is a fair moment not only for taking stock of what the Soviet Union, China and the Communist movement have so far achieved or failed to achieve in Africa, but also for assessing what the future promises for them.

It was to provide an opportunity to consider and discuss this trend of events, and its significance for the West, that the ninth Interdoc international meeting was devoted to the theme "East-West Confrontation in Africa". The conference which was held at Cambridge on 22nd and 23rd September, was attended by representatives of the various national organizations and groups associated with Interdoc, as well as by guests from Holland, Germany, the U.K., Italy, France, Denmark, Belgium and the United States.

Five principal papers were presented to the conference: RUSSIA, AFRICA AND THE WEST, by David L. Morison.

Mr. Morison is the author of The USSR and Africa, and analyses Soviet views and policy on Africa in the periodical Mizan, published by the Central Asian Research Centre in London.

Mr. Morison gives an account of certain directions in which Soviet thinking and policy on Africa have changed, and also of recent reverses for Soviet policy. He discusses what should be the Western reactions to these developments, and draws attention to certain indications of a recent "harder" trend in Soviet policy.

SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, by Dr. Roswitha Zastrov.

Dr. Zastrov is a specialist on relations between the Eastern bloc and the developing countries, and was for some years a regular contributor to Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungsländer, the quarterly review of the Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, published in Hanover.

Dr. Zastrov examines the political and economic aspects of Soviet policies towards developing countries. She describes Soviet economic and technical aid programmes, with particular reference to recent Soviet moves towards "production co-operation" with the developing countries. Soviet difficulties in adjusting Communist ideology to the ideals of the new states are also outlined.

THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, by Pieter Lessing.

Mr. Lessing is the author of Africa's Red Harvest. He has travelled widely in African countries, and has followed closely the development of their relations with the Communist states.

Mr. Lessing discusses what has happened to the African revolution in the years since independence, and what lessons are to be learnt from this by the parties chiefly concerned - Africa, Russia, China and the West.

NOTES ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS IN FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICA, by Professor Pierre Alexandre.

Professor Alexandre is an anthropologist and linguist,

with a wide experience of administration and scholarly research in Africa, and a considerable knowledge of the African student scene in Paris and elsewhere.

Professor Alexandre sees Communist activity in French-speaking Africa, and among French-speaking Africans abroad, as the continuation of a pre-independence process. He discusses the influence of Communism of the Moscow, Peking or other varieties on the present generation of African intellectuals, and students in particular.

THE BLACK AFRICAN, THE AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE ATTRACTION OF COMMUNISM, by A.G. Aukes.

Mr. A.G. Aukes is the Chairman of the Africa Institute at The Hague.

Mr. Aukes takes an independent line, and is clearly of opinion that the West has insufficient knowledge of the realities of life and conditions in Africa, and of the forces actuating African attitudes, to adapt a realistic judgement on present-day African developments. In his opinion, a greater degree of realism, and less dependence on out-of-date assumptions is necessary to form an accurate assessment of the forces at work in Africa, and the basic factors which influence African behaviour.

Each paper was followed by a discussion in which ideas ranged widely, but owing to the time factor insufficient attention could not be given to such important matters as the activities of front organisations or the cultural offensive of Communism. The papers and discussion conformed generally with the main objective of Interdoc, viz: an exchange of views and experience on the international level, in relation to the question of East-West confrontation.

Although the range of discussion covered the whole area of Black Africa, there was perhaps inadequate distinction between situations and conditions in the various countries which formed part of the former British and French imperial dominion in Africa. To cover all these matters would have taken much longer time than was available to the conference.

RUSSIA, AFRICA, AND THE WEST

by David L. Morison

It is a fortunate thing, for those who are engaged in exposing Communism, that Communism so often exposes itself. For instance, if one wants to show that "peaceful co-existence" really means nothing of the kind, there are hundreds of speeches and articles by leading Communists, Soviet or other, to the effect that class struggle is a part of peaceful coexistence, that support for revolutionary wars is a part of peaceful coexistence, and in fact, that peaceful coexistence covers pretty well every kind of hostile provocation, stopping short only at actual armed hostilities between the powers.

Similarly, if one wants to show that Soviet economic aid has an ideological purpose, Soviet statements can be found to the effect that it is a "lever" for winning the confidence of the governments that are being aided; that it will foster the development of the state, public or nationalized sectors in their economies; and that it will promote the emergence to positions of authority of the most "progressive" strata of the community. Or, for those who want to show that, according to the Soviet view, non-alignment really means alignment with the Soviet bloc, a whole Soviet literature on neutralism is available, of which this is the constant argument. And so on.

But is this the whole story? The examples quoted make it clear that documentation of Communist hypocrisy and Communist concentration on the ultimate aim of Communism, can very easily be done by selective quoting straight from the horse's mouth. In this way a picture of universal Communist hypocrisy, and universal Communist appetite for world domination can be built up. But will this picture be believed? And will it be accurate?

These two questions - between which there is an obvious connection - have often occurred to me while engaged in documenting the policies of Communist countries towards the new and non-Communist states. Like your Organisation, those of us who are engaged in the study of this subject, make

a point of the fact that our function is to document the policies of the Soviet Union and China towards the countries of Africa and Asia. I spoke earlier of "exposing" Communist policy. Obviously, anyone engaged in this work, if he has a normal healthy dislike for Communism, will have a special interest in revealing the Communist monster in its true colours. But, by concentrating on the monstrous aspects, one may easily over-draw the picture, and then one need not be surprised if one is not believed. If it is to be made credible, it has to be explained - and that calls for a careful examination of all the thinking and the moods of "the other side", so far as this is possible.

I propose in this paper to give an account of certain directions in which Soviet thinking and policy on Africa have changed. At the same time, I suggest that these changes have a bearing on certain old-established Western concepts about Soviet and Communist aims in Africa.

In some cases, one finds a new Soviet view which is at variance with an earlier one. In other cases, Soviet opinion has been expressed about a certain subject for the first time. Indeed, there is much of novelty in the whole process: in their articles and discussions about the developing countries Soviet observers of the African and Asian scene have recently come as near to "thinking aloud" as is possible in present Soviet conditions. Nor is it only a case of new views being expressed by the academic pundits. At the level of government policy there have been some striking new turns. And all the time, as it seems to me, these supposed spokesmen for Communism are only further exposing its bankruptcy as a model for the developing countries of Africa and Asia. This is not the sinister side of Communism; it is, in many respects, its absurd side, and at the same time, I would submit, its most vulnerable side. Here you can see the real hollowness and lack of assurance which lies beneath the organised superstructure.

Here, on the face of it, one is getting some distance away from the subject of Communist subversion and Communist ideological penetration. But this Communist weapon, being an ideological one, has to be countered by ideological means. If you can show that the Communists themselves do not even believe what is supposed to be their own creed, you will have gone far towards undermining the underminers.

SOVIET DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AFRICA

Six or more years ago, there was every indication that the Russians were impressed by what they considered to be Africa's revolutionary, anti-Western potential. They were even quite excited about it. Today, there is every indication that the Russians are quite disenchanted with most aspects of the African scene.

The Congo affair was the first big eye-opener for the Russians, and they now refer to it as such. At the outset of the first Congo rebellion in 1960, the Soviet Union saw it as an opportunity to rally African sentiment against the Western powers. But then the UN stepped in, and African energies were deflected from directly assailing the West into support for the aims of the international body. The wrath of the Soviet Union against the UN force, to which so many African countries contributed, was a measure of the extent to which it felt cheated by the "young peoples" and the "new states" on which it had placed such fervent hopes.

Still, these hopes died hard. The later rebellions in Eastern and Western Congo enjoyed much Soviet sympathy. But, by this time, there was the complication of Chinese support for them. The Russians now admit the extent of Chinese influence on these rebel movements. In retrospect, they see the rebels as wrong-headed:

"The uncontrolled efforts to "revolutionise" all the processes in Africa without any profound scientific analysis had their effect on the rebel movement in the Congo . . . The adventurism of the initiators of the "super-revolutionary war" produced a crop of light-headed performers . . . The tragic events in Stanleyville exposed the whole poverty of the adventurist theory of "certain victory" under any conditions transferred on to unprepared soil."

(N. Khokhlov, Literaturnaya Gazeta: 2.6.66)

The whole Congo business must have been a painful lesson for the Russians. What faith, in future, could they place in the old idea that a general surge of anti-Western ("anti-imperialist") militancy was only awaiting release, as soon as the opportunity offered? They must have had some seri-

ous second thoughts about the advantages of revolution in Africa.

In fact, the beginnings of Soviet rethinking on this subject can be fairly precisely dated. Three years ago, in September, 1963, a Soviet authority on nationalism in the African and Asian countries, Karen Brutents, sketched the outlines of the new policy. This made it quite clear that the Russians were not going to rival the Chinese in revolutionary militancy. On the contrary, they were digging their heels in on a more moderate line which, they calculated, would have more "intellectual" appeal. In Africa and Asia, said Brutents, there were "national progressive governments" which "had the respect of the masses"; to call for their overthrow by armed struggle would be fatal to the prospects for social progress in these countries. For Africa in particular, "social progress" has remained a key Soviet slogan. (Pravda, 17. 9. 63)

In the light of this, and of the great parting of the ways between Soviet and Chinese views on revolution in Africa and elsewhere, I do not see how one can still talk about the Russians and the Chinese as if they were playing the same game in Africa. The Chinese, for Africa, and for much of the rest of the world, are still the revolutionaries par excellence - perhaps even more so after the recent Party shake-up in Peking. As regards the Russians, on the other hand, there is much that is anti-revolutionary about their present attitude. If one tries to bring the two into one focus, one only blurs the picture, and does a disservice to the cause of anti-Communism, which requires above all things to be exact.

Another painful lesson which the Russians have learnt concerns the effectiveness of economic aid as a "lever", as they have called it. (And, in this connection, military and "cultural" aid can be bracketed with economic aid.) Guinea, in its first years of independence, looked like becoming a client state of the Soviet Union - such was the extent of Soviet influence on its government, coming in on the back of Soviet aid and technical advice. Yet, in December, 1961, Sekou Toure turned on his Soviet advisers because he could not tolerate the degree of interference they were permitting themselves in his country's affairs. Cordial relations have since been re-established; but this was a first salutary check to any hopes which the Russians might have had of Sovietizing selected, apparently promising, African countries.

Yet, just as some illusions about Africa's revolutionary potential still remained after the Congo debacle, so after the Guinean "incident" hopes were still cherished that "progressive" countries like Guinea, Mali and Ghana would justify the large commitment of Soviet material and political aid to them. In 1960, at a world Communist meeting in Moscow, Communist theory had been strained in order that "progressive African and other regimes and leaders could be granted the status of comrades - partly to encourage them, and partly to justify the Communist countries' exertions to aid them. This was the "national democracy" formula. Extraordinary ingenuity has since gone into trying to square the real state of affairs in these countries, and the political and ideological views of their leaders, with the Communist model for them. Their leaders were first promoted from being "national bourgeois" to become "national democrats", and then "revolutionary democrats", proletarians in all but name. According to quite a wide section of influential opinion in the Soviet Union, these African leaders and their regimes did not merit the attention that was lavished on them. But these views were rejected by those who were pushing the Soviet "forward" policy in Africa. Those who expressed reservations were attacked as "dogmatists" and isolationists.

Now, these Soviet isolationists must be regarding themselves as justified by this year's events in Ghana. Here a popular revolution, overthrowing a pro-Communist regime, has exposed to all the world the morass into which the affairs of a once prosperous African country can be drawn by a creeping near-Communism. For the Russians, it has shown that what they call the "progressive" development of a small country, strongly under their influence but remote from their borders, can suddenly be put into reverse.

But Soviet policy itself cannot be reversed so easily or so rapidly. The lessons of Ghana, when digested, will certainly result in further Soviet rethinking. In the meantime, the Russians are painfully trying to hold the line. At the Soviet Party Congress in April, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union would continue its support for African and Asian countries, as hitherto; in spite of everything, he might have added. But as regards setbacks in Africa - with Ghana obviously in mind - he promised no Soviet counter action. The matter called for "vigilance and more vigilance" by the Af-

frican peoples themselves, he insisted. This attitude of leaving African matters to the Africans is increasingly in evidence, at least in Soviet pronouncements.

Another sharp setback to Soviet hopes has occurred in Kenya. Here the Russians made a serious miscalculation. For a long time, Soviet authorities on the subject have been pointing out the ideological shortcomings of African socialism, as preached and practised in countries like Kenya, Tanganyika and Senegal. Why they should have thought that Kenyatta's brand of socialism could be turned in a Communist direction, and that they could achieve this through sending Soviet instructors to Kenya's ideological training school in Nairobi, I do not pretend to know. Presumably they were unduly impressed by the pro-Communist enthusiasms of Mr. Oginga Odinga and his ilk. In the event, Kenya sent home the Soviet instructors. Taking a new and harder look at Soviet aid, it rejected a consignment of Soviet arms as being out of date; and it found that some important provisions of the general Soviet economic aid agreement were quite unworkable - and said so. Latterly Moscow radio has been attacking the Kenya regime and claiming that Odinga's party - such as it is - represents the people of Kenya.

Another recent reverse for the Russians, in Algeria, has some interesting implications. Ben Bella was very pro-Soviet; desperately in need of aid for a languishing economy, he could not afford to be otherwise. But he had little sympathy for his own local Communists. The Russians, who felt that Ben Bella's government was quite as pliable as if it were actually a Communist one, acquiesced in the self-effacement of the Algerian Communist Party; the Party merged itself in Ben Bella's FLN, which itself now came to be recognised by the Russians as a "vanguard party". When Ben Bella was overthrown by Colonel Boumedienne, the "special relationship" which the Russians had relied on was abruptly broken off - and, as regards the old link via the Communists, the Russians had themselves burnt their bridges there.

This was particularly chastening for Moscow, because it was a blow to a new Communist tactic which has now been shaping for some time. This is for local Communists to cooperate with, and work their way into, approved nationalist governments, while deliberately effacing their own Party as a potential rival. Of course, this depends on the willingness

of the nationalists to play the game. In Africa, apart from Algeria, the tactic has been tried in the U.A.R. In Nigeria, it is significant that the (virtually Communist) Nigerian Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party expressed support for the new military government; it probably hoped for openings in it for some of its members. It raised no particular outcry about its own disbandment, along with other Nigerian parties.

But, apart from setbacks to Soviet policy in particular African countries there are certain general trends in Africa about which Soviet commentators are increasingly complaining. One of these is the failure of the African states to show a united front against the West - indeed, one might say, their failure to show any kind of unity at all. The Organisation of African Unity, on its establishment, was welcomed by the Russians, and by Khrushchev personally, as a framework for such a kind of united front. It is now evident to the Russians that it is nothing of the sort, and their comments on it have become increasingly bitter.

A similar decline, from initial enthusiasm to something near cynicism, was earlier apparent in the Soviet attitude to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation. In 1957 this was described by Soviet participants in its first conference as "a powerful movement of our time", "like a vast ocean which has overflowed over two great continents". But a Soviet journalist who attended the conference of the movement at Moshi, Tanganyika, in 1963 said that the conference was quite unrepresentative, and was simply passing resolutions that no one would carry out:

"Africa has today become a continent of independent states, and the general concept of "Africa" has been cast into political oblivion."
(Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn . No. 5, 1963)

In short, African states were going their own ways, regardless of any supposed framework for co-ordinating their policies. This independence is another Soviet complaint, which is voiced very sharply. As between East and West, African states profess to take a "third road". This the Russians cannot tolerate, despite their expressed support for non-alignment. They think (perhaps rightly) that the West is encouraging this genuinely detached attitude, and they bitterly resent this. They feel it is not playing the game.

In the internal policies of the African states, also, the Russians consider that a sinister "Westernisation" is taking place. In their view, a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" is taking shape - and they detect this scourge of society even in Guinea and Mali. They complain that this new class "makes common cause with Western capital".

There is here a real Soviet fear that the private enterprise pattern is gaining ground in Africa. The matter has been the subject of quite a controversy between Soviet experts on Africa - some saying that capitalist trends are dominant, and others that the "progressives" are leading the field.

For all these reasons, then, there is no particular optimism in the Soviet view of Africa at present.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET SUPPORT

Soviet isolationists who would like to see some degree of disengagement from Africa are not listened to at present. But, at the top level of policy, there have been clear signs that the Soviet Union does not want to become further involved in African issues.

In the past, Moscow has said much about its "internationalist duty" to aid the new states and the liberation movements of African and other countries. But in October last year - just when in Rhodesia things were moving forward to the unilateral declaration of independence and the resulting African turmoil that most people then forecast - Pravda came out with a very significant editorial. The gist of this was that the USSR's "internationalist duty" lay first and foremost in building up its own economy. The peoples of African and Asian countries must shoulder their own liberation tasks. Misguided actions in their support could easily do more harm than good - local conflicts could thereby become enlarged into international ones. (Pravda, 27. 10. '65)

To have come out with such a statement at such a time, the Russians must have decided that disappointing the Africans was a lesser evil than getting involved on their behalf. The urgent economic battle on the home front was more important. And here the question of Soviet economic aid came up. Pravda made a point of the fact that such aid involved

sacrifices for the Communist countries themselves. Nor is this the first such warning. The Soviet Union is no exception to the general awareness, among developed countries, of the burdens of economic aid.

For years, Soviet propaganda has denounced the disparity between the prices which developing countries receive for their raw material exports, and the prices they must pay for finished goods from the West. (Soviet prices of course are not mentioned.) The UN Trade and Development Conference of 1964 occasioned more Soviet tirades in this vein. But, when they came to consider in detail proposals for ironing out this disparity, Soviet economists were insistent that "the broad masses of the workers" must not have to pay more for imported goods. This argument was not only confined to learned periodicals: the Pravda article quoted above condemned the idea of "some kind of international levelling" which would "discredit socialism" - presumably, by placing unfair burdens on the workers of industrial countries like the Soviet Union.

So much for the "internationalist duty" of the Soviet Union. But, when all is said and done, what real mutual economic interests are there between the Soviet Union and African countries? Only a painful readjustment of marketing arrangements in the Soviet Union can make possible the absorption of imports from Africa on any large scale. Africa's essential trading partnership with the West is one of the facts of life that the Russians cannot wish away. Indeed, they have been showing more realism in this matter lately. For instance, an old Communist argument used to be that in the colonial period African countries were forced to specialise in single export crops - groundnuts, or cocoa, for instance - so as to make these countries "raw material appendages of the West". Now, the Soviet experts, while they call for crop diversification, are careful to insist that "there must be no abandonment of the specialised crops whose production has already been mastered".

COLLAPSE OF "THE SOVIET MODEL"

During the stage of African advance to independence, there was a great deal of loose thinking in the Soviet Union about the possibility of putting Soviet and Communist recipes into

practice in Africa. The situation is quite different today. Many of these recipes, whether political or economic, have had to be either abandoned or put into cold storage.

Briefly, in the political field, the idea of "proletarian leadership" of African states has now been exploded. In tropical Africa there are only the most rudimentary and impotent Communist Parties. Trade unions are often more interested in economic than political demands. Ruling elites, so far from professing a class creed, are against the idea of class struggle as a mobilizing idea. Hence the various Soviet moves, which I have mentioned, to adapt and modify the basic Communist recipe. In this field, it may be said that Africa has altered the Communist outlook more effectively than Communism has altered Africa.

In the economic field, the idea of a Soviet model for Africa has gradually disintegrated under the impact of criticisms and objections by Soviet experts themselves. First, after a long innings, the idea of primary concentration on heavy industry development was recognised as absurd. Then it was admitted that premature or sweeping nationalisation could be very harmful and could thus "discredit the idea of nationalisation itself". Then more attention began to be given to agricultural development; industrial development, it was pointed out, would only slowly absorb Africa's surplus manpower. These matters continue to be discussed and argued by the Soviet pundits - with occasional references to Soviet experience, it is true, but without any attempt to hold up "the Soviet model" as something to be followed in economic matters.

In any case, a certain self-consciousness seems to have overtaken the Russians in this matter. The fifth anniversary of the world Communist meeting of 1960, at which the "national democracy" model was presented to Africa and Asia, was marked by a Pravda editorial which nowhere even mentioned the "national democracy" idea. The idea of "imposing its recipes", said the paper, was "deeply alien" to the Soviet Communist Party. Perhaps they have learnt something.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

It may be said that all this takes one rather outside the field of Communist subversion and ideological penetration.

But surely it is relevant to the lines on which this instrument, which is above all a psychological and intellectual one, is to be countered. The best thing to do about Communism is to make all the facts about it known - and these include whatever one can ascertain about the thinking and intentions (including the general mental confusion) that lie behind the visible exertions of the Communists.

For example, on the subject of Soviet setbacks, the widest publicity should be given to the naivety and, often, blundering stupidity which produced them. Events in the Congo, Guinea, Kenya and elsewhere have shown how the Russians have repeatedly misjudged the situation, overestimated their own openings, and above all, not foreseen the probable African reactions.

Then there is the growing evidence that the Russians are getting tired of Africa and losing interest. The point here is that the Russians can afford this reaction. We cannot. The links between Africa and the West are logical, mutually beneficial and abiding. Those between Africa and Russia are probably none of these things. The U.S.S.R.'s moves away from involvement in African issues, and resistance to increasing material aid to African countries, need to be publicised. The game, which so many African governments indulge in, of "playing off" East against West, has gone on too long, and is an obstacle to relations of mutual respect between Western and African countries.

Finally, it should be made quite clear to all who are interested in "the Soviet model" for Africa that the Russians themselves do not believe in it.

So long as research and publication go hand in hand, the findings of the researcher can always refresh the arguments of the publicist. Just as there is "always something new out of Africa", so there is always something new in Communist policy towards it. For us in the West, any such new turn should be a matter of interest; for the Africans themselves, it must be a matter of concern.

Analysing Soviet policy is rather like a dog chasing a rabbit. At any given moment you are at the spot where it was, just before. Things have moved on since this paper was prepared. Is the shape of future Soviet policy now any more clear?

The Soviet inquest into recent setbacks gathered momen-

tum in the Soviet press during the summer, and is continuing. What emerges is a welter of rather confused voices. There is a search for reassurance. Soviet spokesmen assure the public that the tide of "the national liberation movement" is not ebbing. Others say that it is at any rate at a "new stage". Others seek to revise the time schedule for African countries' advance to socialism. A lot of advice and criticism is handed out to them, some of it contradictory. Newspaper articles on this subject are full of questions - how is one to explain? etc.

If one wanted to sum up the present trend of events in Africa in a few words, one could perhaps say that the energies and preoccupations of the African states are increasingly turning inwards. They have less energies to spare for general causes, including those anti-Western ploys which are so dear to the Soviet Union. Their own economic development, social improvement and national unity have come to be seen as more urgent than those international issues and aspirations which have sometimes seemed to link their interests with those of the Soviet Union.

This the Russians have now realized. In the view of Soviet Communists, revolution has once again become a matter for a selected élite. It is not to be entrusted to the "backward masses". A few years ago, the numerical strength of the "national liberation movement" was a matter for Soviet rejoicing: it was a vast accession of strength to the general front against imperialism. Now it is seen that the result of this broadening and spread of the revolutionary idea has been, in the end, to dilute it.

At the same time there has been hitherto a tendency for Soviet ideology itself to become diluted, in so far as the Russians have tried to reach a sort of ideological concordat with the nationalist ideologies. They now have the feeling that the African and Asian regimes which they chose to favour have been "calling the tune" themselves far too much. They want to revert to the position where Moscow calls the tune. This applies to relations with the African "candidates for socialism" - the U.A.R., Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and, they now add, Congo (Brazzaville) and (sometimes) Zanzibar.

I mentioned in my paper a new Soviet and Communist tactic. This is to try (by encouragement) to build up the ruling

parties of these states as "vanguard parties", on the Communist model, with local Communists adhering as and where possible. Recent Soviet setbacks - the minor one in Algeria and the major one in Ghana - have not resulted in any reversal of this tactic. Indeed, it is being pushed more vigorously. Existing mass parties, it is insisted, must make way for "tight", ideologically reliable parties on the Communist model. Moscow must be increasingly looked to for ideological, moral and material aid. These states have proclaimed socialism to be their goal: very well, the Russians now say to them, we accept that: we can scrap those second-best options of "national democracy", "non-capitalist development" and so on, which we invented because we thought you were too unready for the real socialist medicine; we accept your readiness for socialism, but in return you must accept our advice. You - that is, your party and government élites - must be ideologically reliable: that is, you must close your ranks around Moscow and international Communism, because only danger can come to your regimes through compromise with Western interests or conservative and moderate elements at home.

To judge by the latest indications, this seems to be the situation of Soviet policy at the moment. The Russians are still against further involvement in Africa; but they want to hold the positions that they have. The Soviet Union is indeed increasingly aware of the burdens of economic aid; but it seems to be now reassuring its limited circle of allies that, if they play the game, they can rely on it for support. It is still true that, in the economic field, the Russians are no longer holding up "the Soviet model" as something to be automatically copied, as regards the pattern of Soviet economic development. But recently, after keeping off the subject for a year or more, the Soviet pundits have begun once again to hold up the general line of advance to socialism in the Soviet Central Asian Republics as one that should be emulated by African and Asian states.

Those who try to forecast the future of Soviet policy like to make neat and tidy pronouncements, such as "there will be a return to isolationism" or "dogmatism will come back" or the like. But the future, when it becomes the present, is never as tidy as the forecasts were. It is perhaps true now to say that the "dogmatists", those who want to preserve the

purity of the revolutionary creed, are coming to the fore again. But this cannot mean that there is a desire to revert to the situation of 12 years ago, when African and Asian nationalisms were regarded as irredeemably bourgeois, and their leaders were outside the pale. Moscow is indeed now laying down a tougher line for them. But the gist of this is that they must link their fortunes more firmly with those of Moscow. And their party and state structures must increasingly approximate to the Soviet model.

What this would mean in practice would be the consolidation in different parts of Africa of a number of states on something like the Cuba pattern - clients of the Soviet Union, but perhaps not "client states" in the full sense of the word. But, most importantly, they would be averse to Chinese influence, because they had been "brought up" on Soviet-type socialism.

What will future Chinese tactics be? China's African policy, which has now suffered such setbacks, was in the hands of reputed "experts". These are now under a cloud, regarded as having been too clever by half. Strong, simple, straightforward methods are now the vogue in China today.

It has been suggested that the rampage of the "Red Guards" now in progress in China is intended, as a side-effect, to carry a lesson for non-Communist Asian and African peoples. They too could produce a revolutionary climate in their countries by such simple "do it yourself" methods. They need not be intellectuals - the right slogans, and above all the right enemies, and the thing would go like a bomb.

It would be quite logical for Sino-Soviet competition in the Third World to develop on these lines - the Russians working on the educated and intellectual Left wing, to create a hard Marxist and pro-Soviet core which will draw the country increasingly into the Soviet orbit; and the Chinese appealing with a few unsophisticated notions to the anti-establishment and often anti-intellectual disgruntled have-nots, to create a "revolution from below".

But the recent setbacks of both the Soviet Union and China have been not so much the failure of any particular tactics, as reverses for Soviet and Chinese influence as such. And it does not seem as if the Russians, at least, have any great hopes of being able to turn the tide again in their favour.

SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES by Dr. Roswitha Zastrow

DEFINITION AND LIMITS

The U. S. S. R. 's policies towards developing countries must be seen as part of the overall foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which is characterized by the strategy of "competitive coexistence". They are part and parcel of Soviet international economic relations. Soviet technical assistance, cultural and propaganda activities, and last but not least Communist Party policy. This Party policy holds together the "socialist brother countries", and supports the "international proletariat" and the emerging countries in their struggle to break away from colonialism and imperialism in order to become free and independent. It also continues to believe in a world-wide victory of Leninist socialism.

At the 23rd Soviet Communist Party Congress (29 March to 8 April 1966) two things were underlined: the importance of the Soviet Five Year-Plan for the developing policy of the Soviet Union, and support for national liberation movements all over the world. The Soviet leaders continue to hold to the "model" theory established under Khrushchev according to which the rapid development of the Soviet Union in the economic, cultural, military and social spheres is supposed to be a pattern for the developing countries, able to win the sympathy of the people for the "cause of Communism". The Congress approved the following measures with respect to developing countries: "Strengthening of foreign trade relations and increased economic co-operation. . . ; expanded trade. . . , especially by increasing the export of machinery and other industrial products needed for the establishment of the national economies, as well as a corresponding rise in imports of agricultural and industrial products and also of raw materials from those countries; technical assistance. . . in connection with the establishment of a national industry, promoting agriculture, creating scientific, technical and planning organizations as well as construction sites, developing modern communication and information media, geological research, and supporting the training of specialists and qualified workers". According to a Soviet commentator, the broad scope

of Soviet policy towards the young states in 1966 as in previous years covers not only "diplomatic relations, economic assistance and cultural exchange, but also, whenever necessary, military support, including the delivery of arms to "national liberation" fighters, and under special conditions a demonstration of readiness to give direct military assistance".

In order to determine the limitations of Soviet policies towards the developing countries, it is necessary to identify the impact and influence of the other Communist countries on the new states. The dissimilarity of activities on the part of the Soviet Union, the East European states, Yugoslavia and China is clearly to be seen in the case of tropical Africa. The looser the relations among the Eastern bloc states, the more strongly they have been able to represent their own interests in the third world. It is no longer only of importance how the Communist powers are influencing Africa, but also to what extent they have been forced to change their tactics and ideologies as a result of their rivalries.

According to the Izvestiya specialist on African affairs, Kudryavtsev, the principles of Soviet policies towards developing countries are fundamental to all international declarations which the Soviet Union brought forward and which concern the national liberation struggle of the peoples: for example the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples was initiated by the Soviet Union and adopted at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1960. Another example was the Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their independence and sovereignty, which was adopted by the 20th session of the U.N. General Assembly, again on the initiative of the Soviet Union. These declarations do not fail to influence the new states and world opinion. Moreover they can be played off against the Western powers in case of need. The Soviet Union's role as mediator in the conflict between India and Pakistan helped to strengthen the credibility of the U.S.S.R.'s claim of being a peace-loving nation. The Soviet Union further recommended itself to the emerging countries when it acted as one of the initiators of non-nuclear zones, of which Africa is one.

EVOLUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

Before 1954 when the Soviet Union began to grant development aid outside the bloc, Stalin's policy of economic isolation prevented any economic relations with countries outside the Eastern bloc. His policy towards the developing countries was limited to waging the traditional battle against colonialism. However, as the colonies achieved their independence, this policy changed to one of "peaceful co-existence", and only then were diplomatic, political and economic relations with the emerging countries possible. With the rapid progress made by the U.S.A. and Western European countries in their political and often military relations with the developing countries as a result of their economic assistance programmes, it was not possible for the Eastern bloc to stand idly by. For another thing, it was felt that increased foreign trade relations would be of considerable economic value at home.

It soon became necessary from time to time to adjust the political ideology of the Eastern bloc to the local conditions prevailing in the various developing countries in order to make it possible to cooperate with the "bourgeois" governments in these new states and, further, to make it possible for the local Communists to work together with the "national democratic" parties in those countries. Red China naturally refused to support these tactics; the Chinese define all non-revolutionary co-operation as revisionism. However, the Soviet tactic did have success. The number of developing countries with which the Soviet Union has normal diplomatic, economic and trade relations rose from 18 in 1955 to 29 in 1960, and now has reached 60.

The fact that the Kremlin has decided, if possible, to avoid a military conflict with the U.S.A. has had the effect of bringing about a reduction of tension between East and West, except for China, as well as placing less emphasis on ideologies. In addition, the power struggle between Moscow and Peking, which is fought out more and more in the developing countries, has forced the Soviet theoreticians and tacticians to greater elasticity in their ideology. At the same time the political and social development of the new states during the most recent period has shown trends which have impelled Soviet theoreticians to undertake revisions,

some of which have been basic. This concerns especially Moscow's approach to the different forms of socialism in the developing countries and the resulting tactics of the C. P. S. U. and the other Communist Parties and groups towards the one-party system in the developing countries.

It is not possible to adjust the realities of any given situation in a developing country to the Communist ideologies, and make up for such discrepancies by a reign of terror, as has been done in the U. S. S. R. If huge governmental capital investments were to lead to more or less permanent neglect of the consumer, the result in the African countries would certainly be an overthrow of the government. The immediate objective of increased productivity is not to be achieved through force but through information and training. Therefore the ideology must adapt itself to the modern industrial world rather than the reverse. It is a fact that the people in Communist countries, notably scientific and technical persons, are already orienting themselves much more strongly towards pragmatic objectives rather than to the postulate of world revolution - more of course in their actions than in their public statements. Science is fast becoming the basic foundation of Soviet policy on developing countries.

Alexander Dallin, in "Africa and the Communist World", has pointed out that African studies have received special attention in the U. S. S. R. since 1955, and that the objectives were the following: " (1) To understand Africa and provide Soviet policy-makers with information, intelligence and advice; (2) to train cadres of Soviet experts on Africa in the various relevant disciplines; (3) to equip Soviet technicians, journalists, scientists and others going to Africa with the requisite competence; (4) to impress Africans with the idea that the Soviet Union is the major country most concerned with Africa's past, culture and accomplishments, and is therefore presumably better able to understand them; (5) to establish contacts with other Africanists abroad; and (6) to apply its conclusions in the academic cold war between scholars in the East and West". The African Institute was founded in Moscow late in 1959.

The Russians have replaced the political catchwords of the early period with economic and social slogans. Since a conference of Soviet specialists on developing countries was held in Moscow in 1964 there has been a long series of dis-

cussions in Soviet periodicals. One series sponsored by economists lead to the interesting result of setting up within Communist political economy a new scientific division called "Political Economy of the Developing Countries".

Russian policy toward developing countries has grown more objective since Khrushchev's exit, and after the high expectations of the early period had been disappointed it has now entered a new phase of stocktaking. A few Soviet theoreticians are attempting to get away from the doctrinaire viewpoints and they tend to evaluate the individual developing countries somewhat more flexibly. One of these, V. D. Zotov, bases his judgment on the pragmatic political goals of the leading groups within each country. He divides the various socialist concepts into three basic groups: the socialist concepts of "revolutionary democracy", which serve as the ideological basis of non-capitalist development; the concepts of "national-type socialism", which are basically bourgeois; and pseudo-socialist concepts which are supported by reactionary groups. He criticizes "African socialism", which he includes in the second group, for its alleged traditional character and because it tends to defend in part the interests of the bourgeoisie. He includes Senghor's "Negro African, existentialist and lyrical socialism" in the third group.

The Soviet concept of "national democracy", a formula for the social and political structure of the developing countries, which was launched at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in 1960, is now in abeyance. It was not even mentioned in a leading editorial in Pravda marking the fifth anniversary of this conference. The Soviets now assert that they would never force their own recipe for the development of a revolution upon a developing country. This of course is said with one eye on China. The Soviets reiterate that even development along the non-capitalist path is the responsibility of the local population. And it is a fact that those countries which have adopted political programs of non-capitalist development - in Soviet eyes the more progressive countries - such as the U. A. R., Syria, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Burma, and others, have been accepted on their own conditions. Such conditions include, for example, taking into consideration religion, weakness of ideology, a mixed political economy which includes private ownership of the means of production (even though somewhat limited or

under government control) and finally acceptance over a period of years of the fact that local Communists had been imprisoned in some of the countries concerned. However, in several of these countries the Soviets won their point when the local Communists were freed and allowed to become active in the national single party, a procedure which Professor Löwenthal has called "licensed infiltration".

For the time being the Soviets have decided to keep the old pattern of the revolution in two phases which means that after the achievement of political independence there should follow "economic liberation from imperialism and monopolist capitalism" resulting in thorough-going economic and social changes towards socialism. However, they are beginning to analyse the political consequences in those developing countries which, having achieved their independence, continue to be dependent economically on the Western industrial states. They have detected a change in direction towards capitalism on the part of many of the new countries, especially in Africa, and they have publicly stated that they are worried that the developing countries could be completely swallowed up by capitalism. Some of the realistic Russian thinking goes so far as to advise these countries to take advantage of the offer of financial help from the capitalist countries, and indeed to request even more financial help, this to include even those nations which have chosen the path of socialism such as the U.A.R., Syria, Algeria, Burma, etc., with the underlying thought that a limited capitalist development should be permitted for the sake of strengthening their production processes.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The basis for Soviet economic assistance is a special programme for social and economic change in the developing countries. All foreign companies and capital are to be nationalized; an indemnity is to be paid only if it can be used for constructive purposes within the country and under the control of the government. All vital branches of the economy are to be taken over by the government, or at least are to be government-controlled. Small and medium-sized undertakings are to remain in private hands provided they are in the field

of crafts and trades and have no foreign business. The development of a national industry, especially one which provides the means of production, is given special support. The purpose of land reform is to bring about a more equitable distribution of landholding among the people, and, with the aid of co-operatives, to bring about a higher productivity in agriculture with the assistance of more modern farming techniques.

The increased economic power of the government is demanded in order to simplify planning and prevent "capitalist exploitation of the people". By adopting all of the points in this programme it should be possible for the young state to steer a course along the non-capitalist path. The local Communists are given the responsibility for publicizing the programme. An important condition of its implementation are close economic and political ties with the socialist camp.

Foreign trade is for the Soviet Union the most important form of economic co-operation with the developing countries. The loans made by the Eastern bloc nations are tied to specific purposes, and their repayment along with the interest is made possible by sending goods in return. The Soviets announced at the first UNTAD conference in Geneva that they would purchase double the amount of goods from the developing countries by 1970. They want to import not only more raw materials but also finished and partly finished goods. Under long-term contracts they will be willing to guarantee stable prices for certain products.

The volume of financial assistance by the Eastern bloc is not very great. It has reached about 10% of Western assistance. Between 1954 and 1963 the total amount promised by the Communist bloc was about 5 billion dollars. Since 1960 the amount has decreased. The share of the East European states was from 20% to 25%, and China 10%.

In general, Soviet financial help consists of credits with favorable repayment terms and annual interest rates from 2½% to 3%. Repayment is to be made within 10 to 15 years. Repayment often is made in local products. Chinese aid is quite different. Loans are interest-free, with repayment up to 50 years. Only about 30% of the financial help promised had been paid out by the bloc nations by the end of 1963, and up to that time Russia had not been placed in the position of having to carry the full burden. However, in recent years

the rate of using up the credits has increased, as more and more projects in the developing countries have moved out of the planning stage into the execution stage.

The largest portion of Soviet assistance is earmarked for specific projects. Only 5% is allotted for services in connection with technical assistance. About 70% of the financial assistance is used for industrial projects, medium and small ones, not only for showpieces like the Aswan dam. A substantial amount is used for the improvement of transport media such as road-building, harbors, airfields, bridges and railroads. Less than 3% is made available for special show-projects. The U.S.S.R. is primarily responsible for projects involving heavy industry, whereas the East European states have specialized in purely economic projects, particularly in the Near and Middle East where they are primarily engaged in building up consumer goods industries. The Soviet press has stated that the Soviet Union is engaged in building or planning some 600 industrial, agricultural and miscellaneous projects in the developing countries. In addition more than 100 schools, medical institutions and scientific centers are being constructed with Soviet aid. Soviet assistance is concentrated on specific areas. It is clear that the Russians have been giving priority to those countries which are opposed to military alliances with the West and which advocate "positive neutrality". But, in spite of this strategy, the expected Soviet political success has not materialized.

Recently the Soviets have been stressing that their economic assistance can be really effective only if the developing countries themselves make great efforts. Furthermore, the aid cannot be all-embracing. The objective is to take over "key assignments with the idea of creating a sound economic basis without limiting national independence".

To make its relatively insignificant accomplishments look better, Soviet policy has cleverly used Western assistance to its own advantage. The Soviets insist that because of their own liberal aid policies, the West has been forced to give more concessions in connection with loans made; Western terms of repayment has had to be eased; the interest rates have had to be lowered; repayment has had to be permitted in local currency or by means of the delivery of local products; and the West has even had to give loans for

the benefit of the state or public sector.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Most of the specialists sent out by the Soviet Union and the East European countries are assigned to financial aid projects. Practically all technical assistance is financed by loans rather than by grants. For that reason Soviet policy can be compared to the private technical aid of the Western countries rather than to the official aid programs of the West. For the most part the developing countries are required to repay the Soviet Union for the expense of Soviet specialists.

This particular kind of assistance was heavily concentrated on the following countries: India, Cuba, the U.A.R., Afghanistan, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen and Algeria. Roughly 10,000 specialists are employed in the developing countries. An exact number is not available. The largest projects involving Soviet technical assistance are the Aswan dam, where 1500 engineers are employed from time to time, the Bhilai steel works in India, and the building of a network of roads as well as airfields in Afghanistan.

The Soviet specialists endeavor above all to train local technical cadres. V.A. Sergeev speaks of 100,000 technicians and skilled workers being trained in the developing countries by Soviet experts. In addition, 10,000 students and graduates from the developing countries were matriculated at Soviet universities in 1965. The Soviet Union has also helped to set up scientific institutes and vocational training schools; 90 of these institutions have been established during the last three years.

In each bloc country there is an administrative agency for sending out experts to developing countries. In Moscow it is "Technoexport", in Warsaw "PolSERVICE", in Prague "Polytechna", in Belgrade the "Federal Department for International Technical Assistance" and in East Germany "Limex GmbH", which is responsible for licensing, patents and technical documentation as well as scientific and technical assistance. In every government department in the U.S.S.R. which has some kind of relationship with the developing countries

groups of experts are now being trained for service abroad.

A greater specialization in the training of Soviet experts and advisers has been taking place recently, particularly in the areas of planning, education and health, and research in the fields of geology, hydrology, mining and oil well drilling.

THE NEW FORM OF CO-OPERATION: PRODUCTION CO-OPERATION

The U. S. S. R. continues to look for new techniques of co-operation with the developing countries. In 1965 the Soviets first proposed "Production Co-operation" and ever since there have been lively discussions revolving around this proposal. Its objective is to organize several of the economic areas within the developing countries and gear them to meet the buying demands of the socialist world market. The production co-operation idea works as follows: economic and technical assistance is given to those developing countries which agree to set up organizations and factories in whose production the Soviets are particularly interested. In other words, the workers in the developing countries are supposed to play their part in helping to supply the Comecon countries with raw materials, industrial products and foodstuffs in order to help solve such problems as the shortage of labor in the Soviet Union and the lack of fuel and power in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets derive another important advantage in that as a result of this international division of labor it is more profitable to import certain goods of importance to the Soviet economy than to produce them in the U. S. S. R. , and the Soviets save manpower. Should this process known as "production co-operation" provide a stable and permanent source of imports, then the Soviets will establish it as a branch of their national economy.

This type of co-operation of course is also intended to be useful to the developing countries, to assist them in raising their national income and living standards and creating a "state sector", and to aid them with the promotion of industrial and agricultural production and the training of specialists. In Soviet eyes it is "the most effective means of eliminating the old colonial economic structure and replacing it with up to date industrialization". By encouraging the ex-

ports of the developing countries and bringing them into the system of the international socialist division of labor, it is hoped that they will be enticed away from the capitalist world markets and integrated into those of the Communist Countries. A further advantage to this plan is that it tends to create long-term economic relations between the two groups.

It remains to be seen just how this new plan will work out in the long run, inasmuch as only Poland, Rumania, and East Germany have done some experimenting in this direction. Apparently the concept of "production co-operation" is a combination of the old form of Soviet mixed companies and that of the method of production-sharing. The problem of ownership of these companies has not yet been touched. But in any event, this new concept would allow the Soviets to base their aid more easily on the needs of their own economy. It would also permit them to have more to say over a longer period of time in the decisive industrial sectors of the new states, and it would indeed permit them to influence the development of the entire economy. From the international viewpoint, this is an attempt on the part of the Soviets to build an "economic front of socialist states and developing countries".

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

Since 1960 the training assistance of the Soviets has been substantially increased, on the assumption that the new generation of scientists will be taking over the leading positions in the developing countries and hence will be able to exert far more influence than the almost non-existent working class. There are four main types of training assistance: (1) Young people from the developing countries may study at Soviet universities and technical schools. Special institutions for foreign students were founded for this purpose, such as the Patrice-Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow and the 17th November University in Prague. (2) Young engineers and other specialists are given practical experience by being sent to factories and research institutes in the bloc countries. (3) A similar type of training of engineers, specialists and technicians is carried out in the developing countries in factories built with Soviet aid. (4) Technological and

polytechnic institutes and trade schools are being built by the Soviets in the various young states.

During the 1963/64 academic year there were over 6.000 students from the developing countries in the U.S.S.R., 3.500 of whom were enrolled in the Lumumba University. Another 6.000 studied in the Mid-East European universities. The figures include 3.000 in Czechoslovakia during 1963/64, 1.200 in East Germany during 1962/63, 1.000 in Yugoslavia during 1964 and 850 in Poland during 1960/61. The number of students from developing countries enrolled in Eastern bloc institutions rose from 1.845 in 1959/60 to 12.000 in 1963/64. During the last year there were 10.000 in the U.S.S.R. alone.

There are no statistics available on the number of persons completing their practical training in production techniques, except for one figure of 15,000 engineers, technicians and specialists. This figure is cited as the number of persons trained in Soviet factories between 1956 and 1962.

THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST - WEST RELATIONS

by Pieter Lessing

INTRODUCTION

Through a fortunate accident of timing this conference is taking place at a moment when what for convenience can still be called the African revolution has arrived at cross-roads. Every revolution, of course, arrives at such a point; but something more, perhaps something unprecedented, has happened in the case of Africa. While the turmoil continues in individual countries, the African revolution as a continent-wide phenomenon has suddenly, within the past few months, ground to a temporary standstill.

It has in a sense lost its direction, and as a result a breathing space has set in during which many of those most deeply involved are taking a close, perhaps even a bewildered, look at what has happened before deciding what to do next. This is happening in Africa itself, and it is also happening in Moscow and Peking. It does not appear to be taking place to the same extent in London or Washington, which is unfortunate because the respite is unlikely to last long, and during its short duration many crucial decisions will have to be made.

It is not easy to point to any particular cause for the standstill. In part it is the result of miscalculation everywhere, not least of all in Africa itself, but certainly also in London, Washington, Moscow and Peking, and at the United Nations.

Much has gone wrong with the African revolution, and it is tempting to speculate whether nearly so much would have gone wrong if Africa had been left alone to work out its own destiny and solve its own problems - if Africa had not been turned into an important arena of the East-West confrontation. It is possible to believe that the African revolution would then have been a much more modest affair, with more limited targets, and with ambitions confined to matters pertinent to Africa's well-being.

The earlier African nationalist leaders certainly had only such limited aims. Few of them dreamed of a pan-African nationalism, a concept which until not long ago did not exist in Africa; or pitching either Africa or themselves into the

limelight of world affairs, or of trying to make Africa a major participant in the East-West conflict.

It was perhaps futile to hope that the world's second largest continent would be left in peace long enough to enable it to work out its own pattern of behaviour and existence before forcing upon it the mantle of an international giant. However that may be, it can be argued that what has gone wrong with the Africa of the past decade, or even less than a decade, is to a considerable extent due to outside involvement in Africa, to foreign ambitions for and in Africa, and to a political corruption of African leaders, a corruption of African nationalism itself, perpetrated by outside interests specifically concerned with the East-West conflict.

One result of imposing upon the African revolution a role for which it was not designed has been that it has failed in its most fundamental purpose. It has failed to achieve anything truly beneficial for four-fifths of the people concerned - the ordinary Africans, whether they be tribesmen or modest teachers, clerks, or trade unionists. I specifically mention trade unionists, because instead of working for their benefit, the African trade union movement has been corrupted into an international political instrument with little concern for the actual welfare of workers.

In order to consider the confrontation in Africa in its present phase, it is necessary to take a look at what has happened to the African revolution. And in the context of recent developments, that means considering what has gone wrong with it for each of the main participants; the participants being (1) Africa, (2) Russia, (3) China, and (4) the West. The order is not important, but it is convenient to take them in this sequence.

1. AFRICA

It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the historical background to the African struggle for independence. However, in many cases - I would say in most cases - a peculiarity of the struggle was the apathy of the ordinary people; that is, the great majority who had not been swept up in the liberation movement. It was peculiar because many, if not most, of them, if they took the trouble to think about it, would have found that they had real reason for grievance under colonial rule.

Nevertheless, their political leaders had to work very hard to stir them up. Often the liberation struggle consisted more of a battle, with intimidation and violence, to work up support among the people than it did in wresting independence from the European colonial power. But this aspect of the liberation struggle seldom reached the world headlines.

In attempting to work up enthusiasm and to forge a liberation movement - and usually at this stage there was already outside intervention from Moscow and, at the later stages, from Peking - the liberation leaders in the different countries had to make grandiose promises to their followers.

In the end they had usually succeeded in building up an impressive liberation movement by the eve of independence, but these movements were not political parties in the contemporary European sense. They were movements working towards only one goal: independence. Once independence was achieved the reason for their existence and for the unity they had brought disappeared. All that remained, in the view of the African masses, was to sit back and reap the fruit.

But there was remarkable little fruit to be reaped, and disintegration of the liberation movements, combined with a deep dissatisfaction with the meagre harvest, became a serious post-independence threat to each country in turn, with the added danger of unemployment and a collapse into tribal conflict. The pattern was established in Ghana in 1957, and it has repeated itself without exception in every African country after independence. The only difference is that some African leaders have been able to manage their people better than others. In most cases, however, the method of handling the discontented has been to establish a dictatorship, and to keep the erstwhile liberation movement artificially in being as a party and then making the country a one-party State.

Unfortunately this did nothing to solve the real problem: the grievances remained. Added to this, what benefits did flow from independence normally have gone disproportionately to those at the top. This applies particularly to the benefits flowing from economic aid. Corruption became increasingly a symptom of independence, with little or nothing of the rewards filtering down to the people, who, instead, often became steadily poorer and more under-privileged.

African politicians may not be any more corrupt than other species of politicians elsewhere; but in a new society the vigi-

lance and checks and counter-checks which constantly function in a more mature political society are absent, and the temptations and opportunities therefore greater.

In the circumstances it became increasingly necessary in Africa to find a scapegoat to blame for the failure of independence to benefit the people, and an enemy who allegedly threatened the independence. The scapegoat and enemy was, of course, readily available. He could be called by any of a number of names: imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism or racial-fascism and, in some cases, simply the white man.

The search for a scapegoat and an enemy more than anything else opened the way wide for Communist infiltration. Russia and China did not stand in danger of being blamed for the ills, which were all held to be a hangover of the colonial days, and, increasingly, the products of neo-colonialism and imperialism. Moscow and Peking would thus readily identify themselves with the fight against the "enemy", who was conveniently branded the enemy of national liberation.

Soon, with the help and encouragement of the Communist powers, the so-called enemy became the enemy of all Africa who could be defeated only by a collective, pan-African nationalism. Then followed the rivalry between the African nationalist leaders to outdo one another on the new pan-African front with evermore extravagant policies, for which they did not have to bear the consequences of failure. (My remarks do not apply to all African leaders, but to enough of them to justify the generalisation).

The creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 was a natural outcome. But, contrary to the general conception at the time, the creation of the Organisation of African Unity was a negative act, not something positive, because the pan-African unity, which was not unity, was itself something negative in the circumstances of its inception. It was something that had been artificially created to fight an imaginary enemy.

The rivalry between the African leaders, combined with traditional ethnic, regional and tribal divisions, had produced such deep antagonisms that the search for unifying factors had to be confined to totally negative manifestations, to what Africa could agree upon to be against; it could be imperialism,

against neo-colonialism, and so on, but it could not unite to tackle any of the great pressing problems of Africa. The continent's poverty increased year by year, the falling level of food production promised to land the continent with a famine of Indian proportions within 15 years, and the economic development programmes, in spite of unprecedented aid, mysteriously refused to produce miracles.

The search for an African image continued relentlessly. Why there should be such a thing as a collective African image when there is not a collective European, or American or Asian image was irrelevant. The search produced only one basic factor which all Africans vaguely shared: a dark complexion. (To call Africans black is wrong. In fact, very few, and mainly the Nilotic peoples, are black at all.)

This led to a black racialism which went far beyond the white racialism which the white man is now traditionally accused of. But in a world where words have ceased to have ordinary meanings, the new black racialism, with all its intolerance and often brutal manifestations, was given a different name. It was called anti-racialism.

Meanwhile, both Communist and Western subversion of the new Africa continued, and in the end few could really remember what the great African revolution was expected to achieve. Meaningless phrases, such as positive neutralism, non-alignment, and peace-loving freedom fighters (in countries long since independent), most of them coined in Moscow or Peking, continued to identify African nationalism with the so-called third force in the East-West struggle, a force wholly committed to help fight the alleged enemy of Africa - Western imperialism.

However, all this was taking place on a plane far removed from the real Africa, the Africa with which African nationalism was in fact rapidly losing touch. A spirit of disillusionment was overtaking the African masses. Their Utopia had become a nightmare, and their leaders had made the fundamental mistake of hopelessly underestimating their political perceptiveness. Ominous storm signals were beginning to flash. The African is a very patient man, but his patience can be exhausted, and this was rapidly happening.

The Organisation of African Unity offered no hope for the ordinary African. Many saw it merely as a prop for their respective political leaders, and few were surprised when,

as an organisation, it failed to meet its first real challenge.

This came with the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence. For once African nationalism or pan-Africanism had a real issue to face. African leaders readily described it as the greatest challenge Africa yet had to contend with, but all pretence of unity evaporated when the organisation's more militant members tried to get some collective response and action, and Africa was left more divided and more mutually hostile within itself than before.

Whether the Organisation of African Unity, which is at the moment in a state of virtual suspense, can be resuscitated is one of the matters which is at present occupying many minds in Africa, and elsewhere.

If the ordinary African felt disillusioned, he was nevertheless helpless to act, because he was disorganised. But within each country there was one organised group which had the capacity to act if it so wished - the Army. And finally in many cases the disillusion spread to the Army as well. At the end of last year and during the earlier part of this year several of the African armies did decide to act.

The series of coups that followed one another - in Congo (Leopoldville), the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Ghana, and, earlier, in Algeria - all had different immediate causes, but they were all revolts against those of Africa's new political leaders who had manipulated the African revolution for their own benefit, some of them virtually selling out their country to foreign interests in order to do so.

In a few African countries the process is still continuing, but the general effect of the series of coups has been to bring the African revolution to a temporary halt. The grand pan-African dream has for the moment vanished, with many of the militant political leaders totally discredited, while Africa is once more forced to look at basic issues. It is accepted that Army rule can be only a temporary relief, as the problems of the new Africa are too deep for such a simple remedy to suffice. Nowhere is the Army equipped to tackle the tribal, regional, and above all, the economic problems which have not only accumulated but have been aggravated during the years that the African revolution was mismanaged.

Nevertheless, in nearly all cases where the Army has -

taken over, there is now a greater readiness to face facts. Common sense can be as contagious as fanaticism and may therefore spread in Africa.

Russia and China are fully aware of these considerations, and are planning accordingly.

2. RUSSIA

There can be little doubt that, for Russia, Africa has proved a disappointment. There have been miscalculations and misjudgement, and some plain bad luck arising to some extent from China's determined move into Africa. The result has been a situation in Africa which Moscow has found itself incapable of managing. The result is that the Russians are also at this precise moment making an assessment of where they have gone wrong, and trying to decide where to go next in the light of their past experience.

Two things basically upset Soviet calculations. First, the African revolution gained a momentum of its own and started moving at a pace with which Moscow could not keep up, except by reckless, opportunistic actions, many of which have since backfired. When Moscow in a sense discovered Africa, a slow and far more bitter liberation struggle was anticipated, with a far more determined stand by the colonial powers.

A slowly unfolding revolution was foreseen, with which Russia could become gradually more identified, until its guidance was firmly in Soviet hands. Instead, the struggle was in most cases brief, and not nearly as bitter as is generally assumed, and in some cases - Tanganyika and the Congo are ready examples - not really a liberation struggle at all. The colonial powers were often only too ready to get out.

Consequently the Russian championship of the African revolution became to some extent superfluous, and Moscow's bid to lead or guide it was more often than not overtaken by events. In the circumstances the leadership which Moscow did try to offer, by practical means as well as by propaganda, was often artificial, sometimes purely opportunistic, and, as later events proved to Moscow, often unwanted.

Second, China's arrival on the African scene soon placed Russia on the defensive. The African revolution which Peking -

foresaw was something very different from the cosy, controlled revolution Moscow had expected. Indeed, the undisciplined revolution-for-revolution's-sake which China was trying to foster would bring Russia few practical advantages. Yet, Russia was faced with the immediate problem that she either had to acknowledge China as the greater revolutionary inspiration and abdicate her own revolutionary role in Africa, thus becoming a traitor in many African eyes, or she somehow had to compete with China for the allegiance of Africa's most extremist revolutionary elements.

Russia accordingly found herself in the uncomfortable position of trying to wage the African revolution on two fronts: one to get the West out and reduce Western influence to a minimum, and, two, to wrest the initiative from China and keep Chinese influence to a minimum. This was a feature of Russia's African offensive long before the open clash between Moscow and Peking. I saw evidence of this in various African countries as far back as 1960.

The Sino-Russian dispute increasingly began to force the pace for both of them in Africa, pushing both of them into reckless adventures. The recklessness mattered less to Peking than it did to Moscow, because for the Chinese the recklessness was by itself creating a situation which after all, was favourable for revolution, whereas for Moscow it was changing the nature of the revolution with which she was becoming so deeply involved.

But for Russia, who found it necessary also to attempt to appear respectable in moderate African eyes, it became increasingly difficult to compete with China, for whom respectability in revolutionary circumstances was a negative attribute. Soon she found herself outdone in the difficult art of trying to control a revolution which, meanwhile, had discovered an identity of its own. The rivalry with China having drawn her into the company of the extremists, she now found that her actual influence over the real African revolution was declining.

One Soviet bloc diplomat in Africa, in one of his franker moments, recently put it to me as follows: "The fanatical African revolutionaries have shown that they prefer the kind of leadership which Peking is offering, and now tend to turn their back on us. But we have frightened the more sober and

solid leaders of the African revolution, and by frightening them we have instilled in them a preference for association with the West. That means that China now has her firm adherents in Africa, and so has the West, leaving us with little to hold on to".

Not only was Moscow losing control of the fanatical elements, but the Russians were beginning to realise that the fanatical elements were slowly becoming unwanted in Africa and in danger of becoming a minority whose sole future contribution would be destructive. The real new Africa - the Africa which Russia so desperately needed to influence - had started a search for stability.

The African leaders in control in the different countries, having staged their own revolution, were mostly looking for stability within their own countries, and doubts began to grow about Moscow's ability, even if it so wished - and in many African minds there was doubt about the wish - to contribute to the stability.

To this should be added that in the eyes of too many African leaders a contribution to internal stability must consist mainly of generous economic aid, no matter whether the aid is wisely applied or not. In this respect Russia became painfully aware that she could make no more than a marginal contribution to the economic development of Africa, and could certainly not match Western development programmes. Even Mr. Khrushchev's many promises of aid remained largely unfulfilled.

The position which Russia had to face early this year was therefore that wherever there was in a sense a true revolutionary spirit left in Africa, the tendency was to look to Peking, and where that spirit did not exist the trend was to look towards neither Peking nor Moscow. Worse, even where Moscow had to some degree succeeded in ingratiating itself with the existing regimes, a series of coups were unseating those potential friends whom it had so carefully cultivated.

The pay-off for the past rashness was that Russia was now being held equally responsible for the Chinese excesses, and that she was being made to pay an equal price. This was unjust in Soviet eyes. In fact, it hurt, but there was little that Moscow could do about it. If the Russians have short political memories and tend to forget their own past extremist leader-

ship in Africa, they have overlooked the fact that Africans on the whole have excellent memories.

There was another predicament for Russia, and it remains unresolved. The real African revolution is moving towards the South. It now draws its inspiration from the idea of ending white rule in Rhodesia, South Africa and the two Portuguese territories, and for this particular struggle a peculiar bashfulness has overtaken Russia. The reason for it lies in Russia's own past rashness and in a successful anti-Russian manoeuvre by China.

The main rallying call for the overthrow of white rule in the Southern parts of Africa is so-called anti-racialism which, in practice and in the context of the African revolution, has become a relentless black racialism. In retrospect it was extremely short-sighted of the Russians not to have realised, in the days when they were leading the cry against white racialism and fostering black racialism, that the day might come when their white skins would become suspect in the eyes of black racists.

But, with the help and prodding of China, this is what is in danger of happening. I do not think it has already happened to a significant extent, although there have been instances of it, but the Chinese propaganda and teaching in this respect is now so intense that Russia has become exceptionally reluctant to continue to encourage the racial approach to Africa's affairs.

The Chinese theme, now driven home at every opportunity, is that, to twist a metaphor, the white man can never change his skin: once a white man always a white man, and always tainted with the sins of the white man, which consist primarily of an uncontrollable desire to oppress and exploit anybody not possessed of a white skin. The Chinese warning to the Africans in this respect is specific: do not trust the Russians. They are at heart imperialists and the enemy of black Africans because, in spite of what they say, they are white and their affinity is with the white man.

Russia has thus found that whereas she attempted during the past few years to divide the world, in African eyes, between the imperialists and the exploited, with the Communist world as the unfaltering champions of the exploited, China has divided the world, with greater success, between the

"have" nations, who are all white, and the "have-not" nations, none of whom is white. The mere fact that Russia is today one of the world's leading industrial nations is held up as proof of this: the Russians are rich because they are white, and they are rich because, being white, they are born oppressors. Their only interest in Africa, the theme continues, lies in seeking opportunities to exploit Africa.

Again, this is not yet the generally accepted idea in Africa, but Russia has shown herself to be extremely sensitive to the attack.

For the above two reasons she is for the moment taking a back seat in the drive to end white rule in Southern Africa, since that would be essentially a racial or colour conflict, intensifying the recent antagonisms. She is for the moment unsure of herself.

These are all very recent developments in which the series of coups have played a definite part, especially the loss of Nkrumah. They do not mean that Russia is thinking in terms of leaving Africa in peace for a spell: she dare not do so. A retreat would be disastrous for her, and not only in terms of the Peking-Moscow conflict.

Instead, she is at present trying to find a new approach to the African revolution. When it emerges, it is certain to be a more realistic approach than before, based this time on a far more profound knowledge of Africa, of the African character and of the inspiration of the Africans, and less dictated by short-term opportunistic considerations. It is also certain to be less hit-and-miss than before.

3. CHINA

Only two years have passed since Chou En-lai made his now famous remark in Mogadishu, that "the revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent". It is less than a year since he said much the same thing in Dar-es-Salaam. And it is not long since a Chinese Army directive predicted confidently that "if there were one or two among the independent countries which would affect a real nationalist revolution . . . a revolutionary wave would roll up the African continent".

The relatively short period that has elapsed since then has shown, certainly to the Chinese if to no one else, that Chou En-lai misunderstood the aspirations of Africa, and that Peking's ability to guide the African revolution along the road laid down by Mao Tse-tung had been seriously overestimated.

When Chou En-lai spoke in Mogadishu, and later in Dar-es-Salaam, he was speaking at the height of China's overt political influence in Africa. Since then numerous political setbacks in Africa have done much to reduce Peking's political influence to the clandestine, subversive and purely disruptive level, directed more towards the overthrow of existing regimes than towards guiding those regimes.

It is, of course, true that China's setbacks in Africa must be seen against the background of her even more serious reverses elsewhere, for instance in Indonesia and the Middle East, and her international problems and her preoccupation with Vietnam. Yet, so far as Africa is concerned, the turning point came in the Congo.

The Congo was for China the key to Africa. The statement "When we capture the Congo, we can proceed to capture the whole of Africa" has been attributed to Mao Tse-tung, and the recklessness and rashness of China's Congo adventure certainly support the claim that this was indeed Peking's view. The associated attempts to seize control of Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville) were essentially supplementary actions to China's involvement and direct participation in the Congo rebellion.

There have recently been reports of what has been described as "intensive" meetings in Peking to consider the serious foreign setbacks of the past year. It can be taken for granted that the problem of Africa is figuring largely in these discussions. The reports, incidentally, follow earlier reports that Chou En-lai had been severely criticised in Peking for having misread and misunderstood the situation in Africa.

The crucial issue concerning Africa which must now be decided in Peking is whether Chinese policy must remain hell-bent on revolution at any price, or whether there can be a relaxation in order once more to cultivate more friends among African regimes actually in power. In short, it must be decided whether, if only for a time, China must accept

the African revolution as an African revolution, or whether the all-out drive must continue to turn it into Mao Tse-tung's revolution.

I am not predicting that there will be such a clear-cut decision in Peking between the two approaches. There is little likelihood of China abandoning her existing subversive network, which now reaches into every corner of Africa and into every aspect of African affairs. And it would be as well to remember that what we regard as serious setbacks for China in Africa need not necessarily be seen in the same light in Peking.

If the Chinese aim is to spread unrest in Africa, and instability and retrogression, then Peking can be reasonably satisfied with its achievements so far, and the setbacks may be regarded as little more than the natural flow of ups-and-downs in the prevailing atmosphere of instability and insecurity.

There is no need for the Chinese leaders to assume that the military regimes, where they have seized power, or the civilian leaders who have started uttering warnings against China, are going to solve Africa's pressing problems and that the African revolution has therefore at last become staid. The Chinese may well see recent developments as no more than a temporary counter-revolutionary wave which will work itself out and which meanwhile constitutes a challenge to be met.

In these circumstances China's reverses need not be catastrophes for Peking. There will always be the prospect of another chance, when conditions once more deteriorate in individual African countries. Rather than come to terms with the new, more moderate and perhaps temporary regimes, China in any case has a vast, ubiquitous fifth-column in Africa, complete with its own military wing (within as well as independent of the various national armies), which is constantly available to stir the crucible. China will take care to prevent the mixture from settling.

Their considerations are certain to be weighed in the deliberations now taking place in Peking. Moreover, they will be considered against the background of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Chinese decisions will very likely be influenced by the further consideration that it is at present Soviet policy to attempt to come to terms with the new re-

gimes and to contribute to the stability of each in order to win the right of access to their counsels.

Whatever is decided in Peking will be based on a much more realistic appreciation of the African revolution than was the case before. The over-confident assumption that the African revolution can with little difficulty be equated with Mao Tse-tung's revolution is, for instance, likely to go, and so is the other earlier fallacy that, because the Chinese are not white and have recently had a major and successful revolution of their own, they need simply to offer leadership in order to be assured of a faithful African following.

They now have sufficient experience of Africa, and have suffered sufficient frustrations in Africa, not only to understand the African better but to realise that the African revolution is a very delicate and complicated adventure. The reverses suffered have given China cause to think, and out of that thinking may come not so much a change of policy but a far more dangerous subtleness and finesse in their approach to Africa. The brash arrogance may disappear, and with it the reckless rushing in on a hit-and-miss, trial-and-error basis.

In spite of the reverses, these tactics have served a purpose; they have unsettled the whole of Africa, they have won for China some fanatical supporters in Africa, they have created a corps of "true" African revolutionaries, and, finally, through them China has learnt more about Africa than any academic studies or pulled punches would have taught them. A breathing space has therefore been provided, and it may be of more than momentary duration, because of China's many other pressing problems.

Vietnam, Indonesia, and an internal struggle in China may well delay the resumption of a full offensive in Africa. For a time it is possible that Peking will confine itself to a holding operation, limiting offensive action only to areas and situations which promise easy success, but on the whole using the time to consolidate China's foothold in the pockets where she is in any case still reasonably firmly established, such as Zanzibar and Brazzaville, and within some of the liberation movements based on Dar-es-Salaam.

There are indications that during this period China will be particularly sensitive to loss of influence to Russia.

While the traditional antagonist, the West, can be safely neglected for a while, any advance of Soviet influence becomes an immediate challenge to Peking.

Basically, part of China's (and Russia's) struggle for Africa hinges on the question of how the fight against the alleged imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists must be conducted. If China can succeed in leading that fight, then she may predominate in Africa; if Russia predominates in leading that struggle, then China's stake in Africa must inevitably be drastically decreased. Thus, whereas the Western enemy can for a while be neglected, because he will not go away in the interim, the Russian threat to China's position cannot be ignored. Even South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia can be neglected, because they will remain there to be fought against another day. But once China gives way to Russia as the benefactor of African nationalism in its more fanatical form, she will genuinely be on the retreat in Africa. That, therefore, cannot be allowed to happen.

For the moment, the East-West confrontation in Africa has therefore reached an unusually interesting phase, with one of the main antagonists almost willing to ignore the Western giant and preferring, instead, to indulge in a faction fight with its nominal partner. How long this phase will last cannot be predicted, but the fact that it has set in would suggest that Africa has for China ceased to be a short-term operation and become a major, long-term and fundamental strategic campaign.

4. THE WEST

There is one notable contrast in the approach to Africa by respectively the two main Communist countries and the West. It is that both Russia and China are constantly learning from experience. They have made many mistakes, but in almost each case they have taken the lesson to heart and next time they have been wiser and have adapted their approach so far as their over-all African strategy can allow. In the reassessment now taking place in Moscow and Peking, we can be certain that the lessons learnt from their past

failures will have a considerable influence on the decisions reached.

The West seems to have been less ready to learn. In London and Washington and elsewhere there has been from the onset of the African revolution a peculiar confidence that we know all there is to be known about Africa, about the African character and about African aspirations.

By itself this has been unfortunate, but it is even worse than that, because in this case we cannot talk about "the West" collectively. For instance, supreme self-confidence in their respective assessments prevailed in Washington and London, and the two assessments have often varied considerably. In Paris there was yet a third assessment. And all three formed the basis of rival policies, with the result that the West has often been at hopeless loggerheads with itself in Africa.

To take Britain specifically, the idea persisted until very recently that developments in Africa can be dealt with as if in a vacuum, totally unrelated to the East-West world confrontation. There was remained an assumption that there was little to worry about, because few Africans would accept Communism. Although this is no longer the prevailing opinion, it was to some extent right; if left to themselves, the Africans would be unlikely to embrace the alien god of Communism. But the Africans were not being left to themselves, and in many respects their revolution was being conducted for them from places far removed from Africa.

Moreover, Moscow and Peking wasted little effort in trying to convert large numbers of Africans to the teachings of Marx and Lenin. The struggle for Africa became a struggle for a physical and political foothold in which ideologies played little part and in which even the Africans themselves did not really matter.

Those Africans who accepted Russian and Chinese friendship did so largely because the idea had been instilled in them that the West stood for imperialism, that imperialism was the enemy of Africa and African nationalism, and that the West had no other interest in Africa other than to exploit it for its own benefit. Conversely, China and Russia were seen as friends because they were the enemies of imperialism and therefore the potential defenders of African independence,

and not because they practised Communism. Our warning to Africans against the Communist danger was therefore futile and in some respects even dangerous.

As an aside, it is interesting to speculate how Africa would have evolved during the past 10 years if the transistor radio had never been invented. It is possible to argue that Japan, with no direct political interest in Africa, has made the biggest single impact on the development of the African revolution, because it has been Japan who has flooded Africa with cheap transistor radios, thereby giving the B.B.C., The Voice of America, Moscow radio, Peking radio, and the hundreds of local "Voice of Africa" radio stations direct access to the deepest jungle and the humblest of tribesmen.

But to return to the Africa revolution: The East-West confrontation had made it the most subverted revolution which has probably ever taken place. What we in the West fail to understand is that to the African nationalist all our anti-Communist stratagems and warnings, whether in the Congo or Tanzania, in Nigeria or Uganda, are subversive activities on a par with the Communist subversion against which we remonstrate. Moreover, our subversion of Africa, carried on separately from London and Washington, Paris and Bonn, Brussels and Rome, has often been undertaken without even the preliminary precaution of trying to understand what was taking place in Africa.

As a result we have helped neither Africa nor ourselves, and in the process we have discredited ourselves in African eyes - even in the eyes of those Africans who on balance remain pro-West in political and economic outlook. This is a tragedy, especially if it is considered how much goodwill we enjoyed in Africa at the beginning of the African revolution. That goodwill has not been destroyed by the so-called struggle for independence in the different countries. In most cases there was as much goodwill as ever when the independence was eventually achieved. The destruction came later. Sometimes it was unavoidable, as a scapegoat was needed when independence turned sour, but this was by no means always the case.

The fact that must now be faced is that there is at the moment a respite on all sides, in both the evolution of the African revolution and in the East-West struggle in Africa

which now forms the background to the African revolution. But once the respite ends new furies will have been let loose.

Unless we really try to understand the African revolution - as others are now trying to understand it - we shall be even more ill-equipped than before for the resumption of the bigger confrontation in Africa.

NOTES ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS IN FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA

by Professor P. Alexandre

The present notes deal essentially with the activities of the Communist powers in the states that have been formed from the former French colonies in Black Africa, but not including North Africa. The former Belgian colonies will be mentioned only incidentally, because my personal knowledge of this subject is limited.

The states born of the former French colonial empire differ from their neighbours in that they have been exposed much longer and much more intensively to the influence of Marxism, in the form of either orthodox Communism, or various "heresies" - from Trotskyism to Sartrean existentialism - which are connected with it, or rather have broken away from it. There is nothing surprising in this fact, when we realize the closeness of the cultural ties which resulted from French colonial policy, which tended to put the colonies on the same footing as the mother country, and which have largely remained after decolonization. As the Communist Party plays an important part in the politics of the French mother country, with which many African politicians were closely associated from 1945 to 1960, so Marxist thinking occupies an important position in the French system of cultural values, especially in university circles, and even the curriculum of secondary education - history and philosophy - includes at least a short introduction to Marxism as a compulsory item.

It should be noted here, that contrary to what has sometimes been asserted, these circumstances do not necessarily imply an automatic propagation, a kind of fatal infection with Marxism; there are also, if I may say so, cases of allergy, or of self-immunization, even among African leaders who are regarded as "progressive" and indeed "revolutionary".

This influence of French Marxism, Communist or not, grew especially after World War II, when on the one hand, elective political institutions became general in the colonies and, on the other hand, a great number of African students

came to our universities. This happened at a time when we had a three-party system - Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats - and the parties of the mother country tried to find support in the overseas territories. Communist Party activity was particularly efficient in this respect. Communist Study Groups (G.E.C.) led by colonial officials and expatriate trade unionists, played a prime role in organizing the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.), the most powerful inter-colonial party, and the African trade unions. However, the R.D.A. severed its affiliation with the French Communist Party in 1951 and during the following years the trade unions split away from the C.G.T., the French Confédération Générale du Travail. Except in the Cameroons, it was not before the independence of the countries concerned that some national parties, originating from the R.D.A., again showed an overt sympathy with the Soviet bloc and, later, with Communist China.

An explanation of these developments can be found in the history of the French Communist Party. The role it had played, or pretended to have played in the resistance movement had brought it - at a moment when its links with Moscow were either broken or precarious - a flow of devout members, many of whom, if not the majority, left it again between 1948 and 1956, as Moscow's hold became stronger. It is scarcely a simplification to say that after the war the general trend in the P.C.F. was to build a kind of "Union of French Socialist Republics" with its centre in Paris, rather than turn the French colonies into as many independent states. In fact, it was not until the very end of the Algerian war that the Communist Party openly declared itself in favour of the independence of that country. As regards the African colonies, it seemed better for them to follow the destiny of a mother country which, until 1948, appeared to be in a fair way to becoming a people's democracy itself. This kind of colonialism of the Communist Party continued until the break with the RDA in 1951: its chief concern was to ask the African parliamentarians to support its European policy, and it paid but little attention to African problems. This was the real reason why Mr. Houphouët-Boigny broke with the C.P. and began a fruitful co-operation with the French government. It should be emphasized that this break did not mean that he gave up the

idea of independence, as Chinese Communist propaganda will have it today; before 1951 there had never been any question of independence.

The first to include independence in its programme at that time was the Union of Cameroon Peoples (U.P.C.). But, from then on, it was not the French, but the Italian Communist Party and the special services of the Soviet bloc which supported its activities. In fact, it would appear, that during this period the U.S.S.R. probably alerted both by the break between P.C.F. and R.D.A. and the interest the United States had begun to show in Africa (Stettinius mission)- started to take an active interest in the problems of black African peoples, which until then it had left to the Communist Parties of the colonial powers.

For this relative indifference there were dogmatic and practical reasons: Soviet theorists seem to have been of the opinion that until then the African colonies had not yet reached the state of historical evolution where the socialist revolution, or even the revolution of the middle classes, which precedes it, became possible. As a matter of fact, even as late as 1956 members of the African Institute of the Academy of Science were still discussing the question as to whether the African Communities were still in the stage of slave-owning patriarchy or in that of feudalism. Specialists in African problems were very rare in the U.S.S.R., and they focused their attention primarily on such subjects as philology or ethnography (for instance, the studies of Ol'derogge in Leningrad) and the documentation they could draw on was old and second-hand only. The efforts made to make up for these arrears bore fruit only after destalinization, and it may indeed be said that the U.S.S.R. allowed itself to be largely overtaken by decolonization.

The most important exception was the Cameroons, where, especially through the intermediary of East Germany (presumably chosen because of its historical ties with the Cameroons) and of the Italian and Cuban Communist Parties, the U.S.S.R. experimented with organized subversion. In this, incidentally, it was assisted by certain Americans, too naive to recognize a Communist when they meet one, and by some British administrators, moved by a centuries-old conditioned reflex. Most probably the choice fell on the Cameroons by coincidence of circumstances. But it was none the less a

judicious choice, because of the strategic position of this country at the geographic hinge of West Africa. Almost the whole range of subversive techniques was employed between 1951/2 and 1964 (thus until four years after the independence): diplomatic support in the U.N.; support by radio propaganda, by the international Communist press, by the distribution of clandestine leaflets (sent by post from Cuba, or brought in on Italian ships); financing both in the country and abroad; sending lawyers to defend the active fighters for independence before the courts (and, as it seems, to give them instructions and money); sending arms and ammunition (mainly Czech); training of cadres, first in the training centres of the French Communist Party (Bobigny), and afterwards behind the Iron Curtain (in the satellite states rather than in the U.S.S.R.); preparing, transporting and financing cadres from abroad (the U.S.S.R. had no monopoly there; the British administration in Nigeria turned a blind eye to this for several years; later Egypt, Ghana and Guinea took over).

It should be noted that, contrary to what was to be the Chinese action in Congo, no Soviet instructors were sent to fill the leading posts in the underground forces. The few European advisers, were mainly or exclusively, French Communists, who were soon spotted and expelled, and, as indicated above, anti-Communist Americans. To my knowledge, which is not complete however, the few Soviet agents that were spotted confined themselves to informing Moscow of the course of the rebellion. From the local point of view the latter was entirely a Cameroon question, foreign influence being exerted from abroad, from a distance, either from Europe, or, later, from certain African states. Thus the Soviet Government, when it decided to establish closer relations with the Cameroon Government, could plausibly deny any intervention with the Cameroon internal affairs. (From then on the Soviets have indeed suspended their subversive activities; but they continue to train clandestine cadres and to keep them in reserve.)

I have enlarged on the Cameroon example because it came first and was among the most complete and most noteworthy cases. However, it differs quite considerably from the lines usually followed since the independence, in that - although unsuccessful - this was essentially a subversive action. Its

very failure, followed by that in Congo in 1960, probably explains why the Soviets, following the ideological trends of the new African states, prefer the less conspicuous methods of peaceful co-existence.

Actually, this appeal quite soon reaches its limits, for reasons of doctrine: a "socialist" African state can at most pass as a "national democracy". Since the fall of Khrushchev - who, in a welcoming speech to Sekou Touré, had for a moment seemed to admit the possibility of various ways leading to socialism - "African socialism" has been formally condemned by the Soviet theorists, who were probably afraid of being outflanked on the Left by their Chinese colleagues. However, rather than reverting to the semi-overt organization of subversion, the Soviets make as much use as possible of diplomatic and para-diplomatic methods, including technical assistance, and they like to contrast their attitude in this respect to that of the Chinese, whom they accuse in more or less discreet fashion of intervening in the internal affairs of African states. This is the normal game of peaceful co-existence and, as has been repeatedly stated by Soviet theorists, obviously, does not imply either ideological disarmament or giving up attempts to take advantage of the conflicts within capitalism and to support liberation movements of the proletariat so long as such movements are, objectively, developments of the historical process.

The ideological struggle therefore continues, in particular in the fields of propaganda and diplomacy. In the latter field the essential element is the struggle against neo-colonialism, which mainly consists in preferential assistance to states that are hostile to the West and, wherever possible, a more or less discreet support for the Left wings of the parties in power, whose objectively progressive nature is judged from their attitude in foreign policy rather than from the orthodoxy of their socialism. In the sphere of propaganda the classical methods such as radio broadcasts, literature, exhibitions, cultural centres, probably play a less important part than the activities among expatriate Africans.

A distinction should be made here between Africans, mostly students, living in Western countries, and those living behind the Iron Curtain. M. Houphouët-Boigny is supposed to have said that "Ivory Coast students come back from Paris as Communists and from Moscow as anti-Communists."

This is an amusing statement, not wholly unjustified, but it needs qualification. In fact, at the present time only a very small minority of the African students in France really adhere to orthodox Communism - for instance, by becoming members of the French Communist Party. On the other hand, the very vast majority of them, including the Catholics, express, in a vocabulary derived from Marxism, a violent opposition to the African governments now in power and to a neo-colonialist bogey often quite difficult to define. Organizations such as the Federation of Black African Students in France (FEANF), to mention only the most important among them, are not Communist, but contain cells set up by the Communists, or rather, by some Communists, for there is an appreciable Trotskyist influence and for some time the influence of China has been prevalent. Inversely, it seems that the same phenomenon of quasi-automatic opposition can be observed in the colonies of African students in the U.S.S.R., with the same Trotskyist, and especially Chinese, components, to which should be added a pro-Western, or perhaps, rather, a religious (Christian or Islamic) component. However this may be, in both cases the student returning to his country brings back a way of thinking that has been influenced by the atmosphere of the country where he studied. M. Houphouet-Boigny's statement is only true, as far as the anti-Communists are concerned, of students who have known both the U.S.S.R. and the Western world. Those who have only known the U.S.S.R. are permeated, if not by Marxism or Communism, at least by Sovietism. This is why the U.S.S.R. is trying more and more to recruit students directly in Africa, and no longer in Western Europe as it had done for a long time. It would seem, moreover, that it has almost entirely given up the idea of systematic Marxist indoctrination of all students staying in the U.S.S.R., and that it prefers henceforth to select certain likely candidates who are separated from their fellow students and sent to training centres outside the universities.

Another recent trend is to stiffen the conditions of entry into the Soviet universities: the time is past when all those who were ploughed at the Sorbonne or in London met again at Patrice Lumumba University. One gets the impression that the Soviets are trying to develop in Africa a real elite, formed by them in their country, without worrying too much

in the beginning about converting them systematically to Marxism.

This is probably a realistic approach which, in the long run, may yield better results than the insistent and clumsy proselytism of the 1950s. In fact, it may well be that, in the circumstances, the Soviets have a psychological advantage over the Western powers in that their culture is supported by a much more homogeneous, if not monolithic ideology and is thus capable of permeating, by some sort of osmosis, the African technologists trained in their countries. Singularly the African students I have met in Moscow, more than those studying in London and Paris, reminded me, of their compatriots at the American universities of the West and Middle West.

On the whole there is hardly any exaggeration in defining the Soviet attitude by the phrase "who is not against us is for us". What is relatively new is that this slogan applies less and less to the attitude of the African states towards the West than to their attitude towards China.

It was about 1959 that China made its entrance on the African scene. From the outset its propaganda has been directed at least as much against the Soviet Union as against the West, one of the main themes being, precisely that the Soviets were accessories to Western neo-colonialism.

The Chinese ideology has often been defined as Stalinist; but in fact an analysis of its theses shows it to be rather pre-Stalinist, if not Left wing deviationist: rejection not only of peaceful co-existence, but also of "revolution in one country"; absolute priority for violent revolutionary action, etc.

These themes are well known; what has received less emphasis is a tendency, implicit or explicit, to transpose the doctrine of class struggle to the level of nations, if not of races (the ideas are deliberately confused). This tendency differs fundamentally from the Soviet attitude, which has always tried to avoid racial arguments (for obvious reasons). As opposed to the U.S.S.R., depicted as revisionist and having become "bourgeois", China presents itself as "pure and hard", with, especially in the beginning (there seems to have been a change since 1964 or 1965), a much better defined attitude than that of the Soviets - "who is not for us is against" - which has resulted, for instance, in any co-operation with the West, and indeed any co-operation between races, being

put on a level with class treason. One of the first practical consequences is the greater effort in the field of subversion, either direct (Congo) or by the formation of cadres in China or in certain African countries.

It should be noted that the Chinese have not followed the same policy as the Soviets with respect to the formation of African cadres.

Having probably learned from the setbacks experienced by the Russians, they seem to have adhered to the following principles: recruitment direct in Africa at a much lower level of education - primary school rather than secondary school or university; isolation of the African trainees in small groups, so as to avoid the formation of important African colonies that might collectively resist indoctrination; emphasis purposely placed on the rigour and austerity of the Chinese revolution, China being represented as a kind of building site with very rough living conditions rather than as a "workers' paradise".

It is only very recently that fairly large groups of Africans have officially been sent to Chinese universities by their governments. It appears that, besides this official recruitment, even in such countries as Congo (B), Guinea or Mali, a clandestine - and illegal - recruitment is going on, of future fighters, who presumably are meant eventually to overthrow present governments, even if they are friendly with or indeed "allied" to China. For instance, it is almost certain that at Brazzaville the Chinese, imprudently asked by the government to teach the Revolutionary Youth Movement "scientific socialism", are indeed preparing to overthrow this government, which is already in part a prisoner of its own youth movement. This explains why the leaders in countries such as Mali or Guinea - who are definitely more competent and experienced than their colleagues in Brazzaville - appear to be trying to limit the contacts between the Chinese technical assistants and the population and avoid using the Chinese as ideological mentors.

In fact, contacts in Africa between Chinese and Africans have never been so cordial as European circles have stated or feared, although the Chinese missions have undoubtedly done their utmost to avoid, for instance, displaying a "colonialist" level of life (which has not been done by the Russians, Czechs and East Germans). On the one hand the Chinese ob-

viously lacked African experience, and on the other hand the leaders of Chinese missions can hardly like their subordinates mixing too much with a population that is not very reliable ideologically.

Perhaps there is also a certain incompatibility of culture, with its psychological consequences, just as was the case with the Westerners, but without the corrective influence of having lived together for a considerable number of years. However this may be, all reports agree in indicating a certain degree of disillusion and dissatisfaction on both sides: the Chinese miracle, from which some of the African leaders expected, around 1960, a rapid and painless development of their countries, has obviously not occurred. It is only correct to add that the Chinese had not positively promised it and had restricted themselves to criticizing systematically all that had been done before them or all that was done by others (which, incidentally, was a claim the African technologists trained outside China certainly did not like very much). Finally, one must note that even in Congo - Brazzaville, the Chinese did not succeed in gaining full control and in causing the Soviets and the Westerners to be thrown out. In fact, it would seem that they are in the way of giving up much of their position to the Cubans, who are the "latest fashion" in what is called revolutionary Africa.

Before Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Communist Party flooded French-speaking Africa with Soviet-inspired propaganda. The Castro-Communist phenomenon is quite different. It means that henceforth there is an effective Cuban presence in Africa. One reason of the Castrists' present success is that they are regarded as a third power between the Soviets and the Chinese (although the "Che" Guevara trend is generally thought to be more pro-Chinese). What is probably more important, however, is that in all respects the Cubans are nearer to the Africans and more at home in Africa: reports from Congo-Brazzaville (once again a privileged territory) state that Cuban military personnel and other instructors are getting on better with the population (and with the French technical aid personnel) and are more capable of coping with local conditions than are either the Chinese or the Soviets. It is also said that they are taken less seriously.

Lastly, Yugoslavs: there are relatively few of them in

Africa, but they can be count on a certain sympathy on account of their national independence of both the Soviets and the Chinese. Certain remnants of French culture, which formerly predominated among the Serbian intelligentsia, seem to facilitate their dealings with the French-speaking African leaders, but the weak economy of Yugoslavia does not permit her to compete with the Soviets or the Westerners in the field of assistance. It seems that countries such as Mali and Guinea have, at least in some periods, tried to find in Yugoslavia examples of a solution that might apply to their own problems.

What has been said so far concerns the activities of the Communist powers in Africa itself, whether they take place officially, by diplomacy, on a government level, where they may be friendly, sympathetic, neutral or hostile, or, more or less unofficially, on the level of the elites, or on that of the masses (especially China and Cuba). It should be emphasized here that all governments of French-speaking Africa, even the "scientific socialists" of Brazzaville, have so far succeeded in avoiding being tied to Moscow or to Peking's apron strings: there is no doubt that they are Africans first and foremost, and that they are not prepared to exceed certain limits in the sympathy they may feel towards the "socialist camp". From the orthodox Marxist point of view, the different varieties of African socialism are and will remain heresies: this is sufficiently clear from the use of the adjective "African" before the noun "socialism".

It would seem that in this respect the Soviets have seen through the situation better, or sooner, than the Chinese and that they have given up at a very early date any illusion as to the existence of a "favourable revolutionary situation" in Africa. In the main, the African leaders in power consider the revolution an accomplished fact, of which they are reaping the benefits and they certainly do not think of tolerating another. Even if they show a strong tendency towards the East, they really intend not to commit themselves, and this attitude will probably remain as it is, unless the situation changes fundamentally as a result either of what could be called palace intrigues, or of mass movements. In both cases this would imply an action upon people quite near to those in power (which seems to have been tried in Guinea and perhaps in Mali) or upon the masses (as attempted in Congo-Brazzaville). In both

cases such actions would have to be led by Africans, if only because any foreigner, white or yellow, is so conspicuous against the black background.

It is quite clear now why so much importance is attached to future African revolutionary leaders being indoctrinated abroad. Mention has been made above of the efforts made to this effect in the Communist countries: obviously, these efforts have been confined to a minority, which, though undoubtedly important, is small in number. Hence the interest in conducting a campaign among the many more Africans working or studying in the West. The primary aim of such a campaign is not to recruit among these people the leaders or the main cadres of future African people's democracies - more or less satellites of Moscow or Peking - but to predispose them more to working with the hard core, and to ready enlistment for work in favour of one of the Marxist blocs.

This type of conditioning is nowadays practised in France in a diffuse way rather than formally organized, and thus largely escapes control by the established Communist Party, especially since the outbreak of the conflict which has brought the latter into conflict with the French Federation of Communist Students. The influences at work are diverse and often conflict on what are sometimes important points:

- * dissident factions of the Communist Party, especially pro-Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Trotskyist;
- * non-Communist Marxists, for instance, certain existentialists and certain Christian progressives;
- * revolutionary groups with racial motivations, often pro-Chinese without being Marxists (for instance, the followers of the late Dr. Fanon);
- * "rebels without a cause", with nihilist tendencies, who lump together both the U.S.S.R. and the West in their refusal to accept social conformism, and who often harbour a romantic (and more or less masochistic) sympathy for an imaginary "Noble Savage".

We must not forget that in this climate the young Africans find themselves foreigners not only to the country where this climate is developing but also to their own original surround-

ings, having more or less lost all roots in the latter. Moreover, they are involved in a conflict of generations which brings them into conflict with the politicians - now in power in their countries - for reasons too often justified to a certain degree (lack of technical competence, corruption, etc.). This drives them, quite naturally, towards a revolutionary attitude, which itself is largely justified in many cases if one considers the social conditions prevailing in their countries, which they regard as the result of colonialism (or neo-colonialism). Now, the West in general, and France in particular, do not offer them an ideological answer to these problems, or rather they offer too many answers; Marxism while being but one among the rest, has like Christianity the advantage of being universal, or universalist ("catholic"). We need not be surprised, therefore, to find, for instance, in the Bulletin de l'Association des Etudiants Catholiques Africains articles which would not be out of place in the columns of the Quotidien du Peuple of Peking. It is not certain, however, that the revolutionary tendencies of these students are as strong as they appear to be - many of them adapt themselves to the establishment once they have returned to their countries - or that these tendencies will necessarily lead them, if one day they come to power, to become obedient followers of Peking or - less probably - of Moscow. It is far more likely that an African variety of socialism based on Marxism will appear. The first symptoms of it can already be observed in various states.

In conclusion, whatever may be the diplomatic or psychological successes achieved by Moscow or Peking in certain African states, we must not underestimate either the lasting effects of contact with European culture (which, it is true, may work both ways) or, especially, the increasingly pronounced desire of Africans to preserve both their national independence and their cultural and ideological originality. These two factors are developing side by side at an ever increasing rate.

THE BLACK AFRICAN, THE AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE ATTRACTION OF COMMUNISM

by A. G. Aukes

Let us begin by stating that the African we thought we knew and understood, does no longer exist. During the colonial period his role and his function were comparable to those of a supernumerary actor in a play in which the leading parts were played by the Europeans and the scenes and settings were European. As a super the African had been given a subordinate role. He pronounced his text and played his part the way he had been taught and ordered to by the European.

This play - if I may stick to this comparison for a while - has now come to an end in almost the whole of Africa and has been replaced by a new scene: that of independence. The African is now playing the main role. The lesser parts as well as the parts of the supers have, for the time being, been given to the Europeans, who are required to show the greatest possible adaptability.

The implications are obvious: the African wants to play his own game. He wants to get free from the old, imposed texts and from the old scenes and settings from the times of colonial rule, because these drive him back to his former state of mind, his former social attitude and particularly to his former dependence.

We do not yet know this new African. His actions and reactions in his new leading role are still strange to us; nor do we - or he himself, for that matter - know the texts he is going to pronounce. He will be extemporizing . . . There will be prompters . . .

Stripped of its fringes, Africa's potential is still nothing but a reflex of Western energy, Western thinking, Western sense of responsibility and efficiency. Colonialism has created in Africa a kind of dream-world, an unavoidable dream-world in which the real situation, and particularly the "power factors" are twisted and obscured.

It is only through colonial domination that Africa has acquired a certain potential, but the psychological, physical, climatic and economic factors that were at the bottom of tropical Africa's age-long inertia, have by no means disappeared. The colonial period has now come to a definite end. This does not mean, however, that the period of economic development

which has now begun has been stigmatized by African leaders as "colonialist". On the contrary, despite all political difficulties and lack of experience, an increase of the standard of living ranks as the first objective. We shall refer to this subject in more detail later.

It was not very surprising that, after the disappointing experience in Asian territories just after World War II, European colonial powers fell back on the African countries.

In fact, Africa was not discovered until during the late war, when other parts of the world were inaccessible to Western warfare owing to enemy action.

There was much to be said for falling back on Africa: there was a group of Europeans working all over Africa, who had to deal with a relatively passive native population, barely stirred by nationalistic ideologies and certainly not organized politically. The main currents of world thinking seemed to be passing Africa. Moreover, the presence of the European seemed more justified in Africa than anywhere else in the world. In this poorest of all continents, divided up into tribes and family groups, the European introduced modern political systems and structures. He also introduced an economic infrastructure, needed to exploit the, sometimes rich, resources.

In general the African proved a much more willing and tractable pupil than the Asian. Fairly diligent, passive and not a strong personality, he had no difficulty in adapting himself to Western schooling and Western customs. This explains why after the war a small black-African elite participated in life in the French capital: they went to college there, took part in debates and showed the "esprit" so dear to the French.

In the Assemblies of Ghana and Nigeria the Africans showed a remarkable adaptation to the manners and customs of Westminster: the native judges put on the wigs and gowns of their British colleagues and the European regarded all this as unmistakable proof of a profound understanding between the continents. Europe truly and unconditionally believed in its ability to lead the African territories step by step to a certain degree of autonomy, with long intervals of course, and definitely not until the Africans would have fully acquired the principles of freedom and equality of Western democracy.

This structure of beautiful thoughts and good intentions

has collapsed like a house of cards. Africa has ceased to be the "chasse gardée" of Europe.

Nationalism has got hold of Africa: it has made a formerly passive population conscious of new values, even if it does not really know the positive content of these values - supposing that the average African is at all capable of forming an idea of these values.

It should be stated here at once that we, ourselves, know as little of the factors determining African thinking as of African thinking itself.

In the colonial society the leading European group associated very little with the African - except, of course, missionaries and medical groups. There was little, if any, personal contact and, as said before, knowledge about the African world of thought was very limited indeed. As a matter of fact there was no incentive whatever to acquire it.

It all started quite simply. In the post-war years French and English political parties set out from the mother countries to the African coasts in order to fill their ranks with a handful of more or less educated negroes. In fact this was scarcely more than an embryo of a political life - and quite an artificial one, too, for it was completely detached from the apathetic masses. Moreover, this political life was linked up directly with the European mother countries, so that there was nothing typically African about it. Thus just a few Africans played a part as extension pieces of the policy of the European mother countries, dutifully observing the rules valid for Europe and arising from the European mind and culture. That was all, and it certainly did not mean very much in those days.

Until, all of a sudden, nationalism sprang up and fairly quickly took hold of the whole of black Africa. Nationalism did not everywhere take the same form: it varied according to developments in the region in question and, obviously, also according to the atmosphere that had been created by the colonialising power.

The development of nationalism was strongest in the French and British territories in West-Africa, where it managed to take root in the existing officially permitted political parties, in the trade unions and other organizations such as youth and sports associations.

Since then the ties with the political parties in the mother

countries have been almost completely severed. Most of the negro-politicians of those days have been brushed aside and a new generation has taken over. The new African leaders have come mainly from the trade unions: they are keener than the old school and are relying for their power and support on the masses.

But even if we regard these politicians as much more radical and exacting than their moderate predecessors, yet we shall be well-advised to watch the coming generation even now.

Most of these young people are still students. They are members of the youth organizations of the political parties and many of these young men are known to have extremist and Marxist views. They are the politicians of to-morrow and before long they will want to realize their ideas. These are the people the West will have to deal with in the near future and it should be borne in mind that, if need be, radical youth will not shrink from creating political and economic chaos if they are out to break what they regard as unduly close ties with the West.

The militant power of African nationalism striving at independence has surprised most observers of African affairs. And yet we must not let ourselves be tempted to attribute the achievements of the African independence movement to nothing but the power and impetus of Africa itself. If Africa had really had to depend entirely on its own force, and had to fight the governing powers, the growth towards independence would have proceeded much more slowly.

In general, in the young African states, society is still living largely in more or less closed communities, life is still "integrated", i. e. the various fields of human and social activities are experienced as being one whole.

In those countries one can scarcely distinguish between the religious, the economic and the cultural field, as we know them in the West. A certain social experience, such as the construction of a bridge, or a railway, is in this society felt to be a total phenomenon, i. e. something to be fitted into the whole picture of life. It is not something of a purely economic or technical nature - it should as well be classified as a religious and cultural one.

In these African societies the economic function, i. e. the struggle for life, forms part of the total world picture; it is,

therefore, a religious function. As long as society remains closed or "integrated", influences from outside must be taken up and fitted into the whole, the total of native life.

However, the penetration of Western influence has inevitably led to the original native social system being attacked down to the root of its existence. However primitive these old native institutions may appear to us, Westerners, it was they that gave the individual members of these societies the psychological and economic security without which life is not worth living.

Local economic conditions have been disturbed: the social organization disrupted and religious life - support amidst all the uncertainties of life - attacked. The security within the group, based on the traditional forms of production, on the old-established structure of society and on a belief in superhuman powers and values, no longer provides that firm hold in life in the big cities. Nor have a new form of religion or new values been found yet.

The young, vigorous men with a sense of enterprise move to the big cities and industrial centres, attracted as they are by economic gain and by what seem to be new values.

They leave a void in their native villages, both socially and economically, but in the big centres they form conglomerates of individuals without any social ties or common culture. Drifting away from their old faith they are working under new, unknown conditions. If these young men are then followed by their families, the village community will soon disintegrate. Thus a new phenomenon arises: the lonely family in which the wife is going to play an entirely different and new role and the children are growing up in a town quarter, no longer protected against outside influences. The support, the moral power provided by the tribe, has disappeared. Instead, there is now contact with members of other tribes who have also come to the towns, and this in turn promotes the loss of their own inherited manners and customs, with nothing positive to compensate for it.

When comparing the European with the African, we are struck by the great difference in attitude towards life: the European is a personality thinking and acting independently: he has an individual conscience. The African on the contrary does not yet have such personality, nor is he trying to get it. He feels safer when he forms part of the group, of the tribe.

He has a collective conscience. In other words: the basis of the difference between Europeans and Africans can best be illustrated by two dicta: The Aristotelian dictum "To be is to be an individual" represents the European point of view. The proverb of the jungle: "To belong is to be" expresses the African point of view. To the white man individualism is important; for him his own interests come first. To the African, however, the individual is important as far as he is related to the group: it is only the group and/or the town community that counts. This attitude is closely related to the necessity of protecting himself against unseen powers that rule the world and which he can keep at a distance only by the effort of the group as a whole.

The European individualist, on the other hand, opposes the unseen powers and forces; he tries to grasp and to control them. The European is out to conquer, the African's key-note is defence. The successes achieved by the European individualist in his efforts to control the forces of nature have led him ever further towards a purely materialistic self-realization. His standards and values are consumptive values in a material sense. These standards differ strongly from those prevailing in Africa, where they are governed by the necessity of protecting the group against the unseen spiritual forces. It is not difficult to imagine what will be the result of this difference in standards and values within a mixed community.

Events of the past few years illustrate the depth of the cleft between European and African attitudes towards life.

In between these two attitudes is Christianity, or, rather: the Christian way and view of life. Like the white man, Christianity believes in the importance of the individual. Its values are based on the need, the necessity for the individual to gain a victory. But this victory is essentially spiritual, not material: Christianity, the Church, recognizes, just as the African, that there will be no progress for the individual unless he succeeds in absorbing the power of the spirit and allows it to be active.

The contrasts between the European and the African are, so to say, the two ends of a bridge across which Christianity may use to bring about the actual meeting between the apparently opposing elements.

Without the protection of his old tribal surroundings the

African in the town feels uncertain and frustrated, and, naturally, this feeling is reflected in politics. But this climate of uneasiness, uncertainty, political unrest and nostalgia alone does not suffice to rally the masses in the service of nationalism. Organizations and leaders were needed.

For the displaced, disrooted part of his compatriots the political leader must perform the functions which - in the closed communities - used to be fulfilled by the tribal chief, the ancestors and the religious myths. But he must accomplish this task without having the possibilities that made it a reality in the closed African communities. He, the political leader, must lead his supporters under completely different conditions, for, although he is a symbol of revived certainties, of a new meaning of existence, of the total unity of life and the significance of life, his authority is no longer surrounded by the protective wall of the closed community.

As a symbol he is exposed to the rivalry, the competition of missionary activities, which also aim at giving life a new meaning, and to a thousand influences from the West, also from the Communist countries, which affect the African and seek to introduce new ethics and new views of life.

Is it surprising that under these conditions the leading politician becomes a dictator? For he cannot tolerate any rivals and he is constantly tempted to banish all external spiritual influences.

Nobody can blame the young African leaders for lacking the competence to take over control from the West. Such a phenomenon is quite beyond any blame. It is a natural thing sociologically, which makes nations get adrift, and the individual plays only a minor part in it.

Though they may have sensible ideas, individual Africans cannot resist the strong undercurrents. Nor can they withdraw from developments by taking, as it were, a higher stand and objectivating the situation. For this would typically be the attitude of the Western individualist who, by a rational process of objectivation, is himself able to dissociate himself from the problem and to map out the route to be followed.

This is a thing that cannot be learned at a Western university. It is a cultural acquirement resulting from generations of thinking and searching. It is a Western heritage which an individual from an entirely different culture cannot

acquire in Europe in a few years' time.

Thus, for the time being an African can do little more than assimilating the external results of Western thinking and Western science. And it is impossible for Africans, including the present leaders, to see their own problems and their own situation objectively, and to take measures accordingly. Irrational and emotional reactions to the acquired independence will dominate the situation and the leaders in Africa.

Western economic considerations, an open eye for what is to their own advantage, logical considerations as to the shortest and most efficient way of reaching greater prosperity, analyses of the African position in the world of today and a sober recognition of their own possibilities and impossibilities, are completely lacking for the time being.

And should these notions occur to some of their leaders who are more open to Western arguments and influences than the others, these leaders would immediately be faced with the absolute impossibility to realize their ideas. No single individual can do anything against a society that is dominated by primitive ties and loyalties.

It would seem as if African developing countries, by virtue of their political and social institutions, are predestined for systems that exhibit a great affinity to the Marxist one. However, most African leaders are averse to ideologies. They hold very pragmatic views as to the possibilities of economic development of their territories.

The new African countries are subject to economic, political and social tensions resulting from the inability of these countries to solve the multitude of economic and social problems themselves and by their own means.

They have no money, no knowledge, no trained executives, no governing experience, so they look to those who may support them technically, financially and materially. If they fail to get this help from the former mother countries, or other Western countries, they turn to the Eastern bloc. And here lie both the danger for the West and the chances for the East.

In this very first stage of "economic self-assertion", this attempt to survive as an independent state, the African does not seem to care from which side the aid comes: they accept the most advantageous offer. To the African leaders it is of

primary importance how soon assistance can be given, no matter which side it comes from. Along with independence, these leaders have promised their people a greater prosperity - and it is now up to them to fulfil these promises.

African leaders lack ideologies. We, Europeans, are inclined and used at once to look for the ideological backgrounds of any act so as to have some certainty as to the reasons for decisions. This alone makes politics without an ideology - as usually encountered in developing countries - at least inexplicable and, as a rule, rather suspicious.

Our political thinking is dominated by the East-West conflict, in which we know nothing but alternatives. Accordingly, we see the acts of the leaders of developing countries in that light and we cannot imagine that these leaders have other problems to contend with than we and that they are only interested in ours - the East-West problem - in order to "gather honey from all blooms", as someone has put it rather poetically. The African leaders live in quite another conflict situation than we with our East-West problem.

They belong to the poor nations who have to try their utmost to improve their standard of living and they consider the industrialized countries of the West, just as highly industrialized Russia, to be rich countries.

However, we are only too readily inclined to approach the problems of the young African states in a typically Western manner and we tend to forget that we are thus creating a Western image of these problems, based on the Western type of society. That is the type we are familiar with, and we take it for granted that consequently it prevails in other parts of the world as well. And we also tend to forget that these African leaders, inexperienced as they are, and supported by only a handful of equally inexperienced helpers, for fear of neocolonialism, and intent on demonstrating their independence of former Western rulers, are prone to actions that are not always in their own interest.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Although the theme of the colloque was East-West confrontation in Africa, in the discussion which followed presentation of the preceding five papers, speakers displayed a determination to seek clarification of essential points regarding the situation in Black Africa as an arena for contending East-West influence, rather than debate the pros and cons of the confrontation, its successes and failures.

In the course of the discussion, a number of points emerged on which there was some divergence of opinion. While there was general agreement on the complexity of the African scene, and the inadequacy of factual information regarding African attitudes towards both "East" and "West", some speakers drew attention to the confusion of thought which arose from over-simplification in assessing conditions in the African continent, and to the habit, frequently observed in western writing on Africa, of judging African affairs in western terms: e.g. to apply criteria which even in colonial times were of doubtful validity, and are now becoming even less applicable to the rapidly changing scene, particularly in tropical Africa.

A tendency to refer to Africa as though it were a single homogeneous country, and to speak of the "African mind" and "African viewpoint", and the common use of similar terms, is typical of much current journalism and political expression, which obscures the fact that there are three main African regions, viz: Northern Islamic Africa (part of the Mediterranean world), Black (tropical) Africa, and Southern Africa. These main regions can be subdivided in the northern and central regions into East and West, former French and British colonial areas, and the Islamic region; in the case of Southern Africa, into several regions, including the main sub-division of Southern Black Africa, existing colonial territories, and White-dominated Africa. Apart from their tribal and racial differences, all these areas have diversities, and are faced with problems which stem from their traditional and cultural past, no less than from the impact of western administrative systems, economies and imposed cultural and educational ideas during the colonial period. Added to all this, is their enmeshment in the East-West confrontation.

Basic characteristics and conditions are too often confused with ephemeral trends, largely derived from western contact, and which now seem likely to be modified or submerged by a return to African "normalcy". The Russians and Chinese have been led astray by misjudgement in this respect, no less than the "West".

This viewpoint was given expression in positive terms in Mr. Aukes' paper. In considering Mr. Aukes' view of our relations with Black Africa, the opinion was expressed that judgement of African affairs was inevitably coloured by our own past experience of Africa, our own interests, and by habits of thought that derived from western involvement in the economic exploitation of Africa's resources, and from responsibilities in the fields of administration, education and justice imposed on administered territories, mainly in the interests of the dominant powers or commercial interests.

This somewhat sweeping assessment of the situation was contested by several speakers, who considered that it ignored other influences and experience, such as missionary activity, much humanitarian action, medical and scientific work, and considerable European and American scientific and anthropological study, from which a wealth of knowledge of Africa existed. The Russians lack this experience, their knowledge being largely academic and theoretical. The Chinese knew even less and the lack of success in the main communist effort in Africa can be largely attributed to this fact.

According to one speaker, the absence of civilisation, both in cultural and technical terms, in Black Africa at the time of the early western impact, in contrast to India and South East Asia, facilitated the task of colonisation but prevented the development of any real integration of cultures. The gap was too wide. Until comparatively recently, Africans, mainly in urban areas, acquired a knowledge, only of the superficial aspects of western life; outside the towns (mainly coastal ports) the pattern of life for the majority of people was little affected. Education, which varied in quantity and quality in the colonial territories, had little regard for African needs and mainly aimed at producing clerks and artisans. Only in recent years (too late in the Congo and some other regions) was it extended to develop

the capabilities and widen the knowledge of Africans. Perhaps too much emphasis was placed on providing secondary education overseas. Those Africans who were enabled to attend schools and colleges abroad, often found themselves, on their return, to be out of touch with their own people.

The question is now being asked by Africans as well as by Europeans and Americans: can African needs be better met by extending further existing educational facilities in Africa, limiting overseas training to specialist studies, post graduate work, and research. Several speakers voiced the opinion that Africans should be encouraged to develop schools and colleges on lines suitable to their own requirements. The process of de-Africanisation of Africans attending colleges and universities in the western world came in for some discussion. A French view was that this development was most marked in France as an outcome of the system of education established in the former French colonies, and the curriculum of French education. Western educated Africans tend to become uprooted and *désorientés*, and on their return to their homelands, instead of contributing something to the development of their respective countries, too often seek safe government jobs or employment by foreign firms. Many of them have no desire to return home, and become the typical "professional Africans" of Paris, Brussels and other European and American cities.

Although some recent study had been made as to the results of African student training in Europe and America, there was still insufficient knowledge available on this subject. There are indications that the Russians are giving some thought to the subject as they are far from satisfied with the results of their own efforts or of the impact of their teaching and environment on students attending their educational institutions.

The most generally expressed view was that it was a matter for Africans to decide what forms of education and administrative and governmental structure they wished to have, and that the best service that could be given by the West in the interests of all concerned, was in the fields of technical and scientific training, particularly in medicine, agriculture, economics, commercial practice and technology. In the cultural sphere, Africans will take what suits them

from the west and will evolve their own forms; in government and administration they will undoubtedly continue to study both western and communist models, but will develop their own patterns which are likely to diverge from both western and eastern practice in the light of local conditions and through the influence of basic native habits of thought, expression and traditional behaviour. Some aspects of Marxist thinking will be applied, but as western influences have been brought to bear for a longer period, and the French and English languages are likely to remain as media for government, administration, higher education and communication with the outside world, it seems most probable that the West will be able to counterbalance effectively influences deriving from the communist worlds. Far more students from Black Africa attend schools and colleges in western Europe and America than in Russia and the East European countries, or are educated in local institutions whose curricula are in French or English. Africans who have attended courses in the Soviet Union are often unhappy in their experiences there, and only a minority can be regarded as having been converted, or perhaps one should say 'conditioned', to a communist way of thinking. Some Marxist influence is undoubtedly retained, but it is likely to be transformed by contact with local realities, and only the more fanatical young nationalists, or the disappointed or corrupted politicians seem likely to pursue a revolutionary path in accordance with the precepts of their teachers in Russia or China. In contrast with this somewhat optimistic viewpoint, one speaker warned that neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to adopt a passive attitude, leaving it to nature, as it were, to bring about a situation in their favour; if western influence was to be maintained, some hard thinking had to be done, and a reassessment of the position and of African needs, in a rapidly developing situation, would have to be made.

The relatively modest programmes of Black African nationalist leaders in colonial days have been thrown into confusion by the too sudden emergence of their communities into the family of nations, and above all, with the role, thrust upon them, as participants in the world wide "cold war", and its aftermath, "peaceful coexistence".

The temptation to play off East and West, proved too

great to be resisted in the early days of independence, but care is now being taken by the more responsible African leaders to avoid being enmeshed in the strings (real or imaginary) attached to outside help. The "cold war" provided many opportunities to embark on political crusades at the expense of more urgent domestic matters, and the complicated issues of Rhodesia, and Apartheid in South Africa provided themes for politicians to divert attention from more pressing local problems.

Both Mr. Morison and Mr. Lessing, in their papers, and in the subsequent discussion, spoke of the growing disillusionment of many Africans with the antics of their leaders and with African involvement in external affairs, and the side-tracking of local interests by politicians who have been seduced by the fleshpots associated with trade and commerce, or the bandwagon of pan-African slogans. Events in Ghana and Nigeria are clearly indicative of the popular demand being made of their leaders that local needs and interests be given primary attention. The euphoria of the first years of independence; the costume drama of the African role in the United Nations, and the talk about pan-Africa and Afro-Asian collaboration, as well as the clamour about neo-colonialism, are gradually giving place to a strong trend to concentrate on their own affairs, taking help as it comes from both East and West. Despite all the heroic talk about Rhodesia, the Black African countries now show signs of giving more attention to their own domestic problems than to the wider (and wilder) issues expounded by some political leaders.

Notwithstanding evidence of some Russian disillusionment with Africa, and the adverse effect on their activity in Africa occasioned by the Moscow-Peking split, there was every reason to suppose that Moscow would learn from its mistakes, and would take a second look at the task, and would adopt new tactics in pursuit of communist aims, with perhaps a longer range programme in view. From a study of the Soviet press, there was considerable evidence to support this conjecture. Despite Russian disillusionment with native African agents of Soviet policies in Black Africa and of the failure of African leaders to perform in accordance with the theories expounded by Soviet "experts" on Africa, attention is now being given to the new generation.

Articles in the Soviet press indicate a change of attitude towards the "downtrodden masses of Africa" and their capacity or willingness to adopt the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. In taking a longer view of the situation, Soviet policy now appears to lie in the direction of creating, or influencing, the growth of an elite of African leaders among the younger generation of educated Africans, and with this end in view, revolutionary propaganda is being soft-pedalled while more emphasis is being placed on technological and specialist training and on more subtle means of undermining western influences. There is now even an effort being made to "understand" African religion, especially the impact of Islam, and some attention is being given to African cultural patterns, and the special nature of African economy. The Chinese, with their single-minded emphasis on the revolution according to Mao, continue to pursue their line of attack against the imperialist world, but they too have come up against obstacles to their revolutionary plans, and are beginning to realise that their earlier tactics need reconsideration.

Revolutionary ideas, and opposition, as a matter of course, to established governments in the capitalist world, as inculcated in Marxist teaching, both in communist countries and in certain circles in Europe, are discovered by African students to be out of place when they return to their own countries to discover that anti-establishment ideas are unwelcome at home, and that the road to power and influence can be traversed with greater ease by climbing on to the government bandwagon or taking part in "capitalist" ventures which the politicians denounce as neo-colonialism while drawing the maximum benefit from capitalist commercial operations.

Some differences of opinion emerged during discussion on the role of Trades Unions, several speakers expressing the viewpoint that many of the Trades Union leaders, especially in East Africa, showed honesty of purpose and concentration on the legitimate role of Unions; other speakers contested this view and urged a less optimistic view of the situation in the Trades Union field, a recognition of the fact that most young Trades Union leaders, many of whom are trained in France and Belgium as well as in Britain and the USA and the Soviet Union, merely use their Unions

as stepping stones to politics. There was general agreement that communist propaganda, effected through young Trades Union leaders trained abroad, is likely to play an important part in domestic affairs in some, at least, of the Black African countries. It is recognized, however, that American and British, as well as German efforts in the direction of training young Africans in this field may offset the effects of communist influence.

The racial question, and in particular the Black versus White syndrome, now manifesting itself in America, and actively fostered by Chinese propaganda, was discussed at some length as a danger that might be given impetus from unhappy developments in Rhodesia, in Portuguese Africa and South Africa. Those speakers with wide experience of Africa were inclined to discount this as an inevitable development of political discords in Black Africa, and were of the opinion that with the extension of education, the continuation of material help on practical lines, and with a patient and forbearing western attitude to internal developments in Africa, this danger may be avoided. It was, however, recognized that some African politicians and nationalist leaders aim, or profess to aim, at "kicking the white man out of Africa". Most African leaders, however, realise that left to their own resources, the new African states have little chance of establishing themselves on a solid basis, and that a violent racialist programme would defeat its own ends. It behoves western countries therefore to play down racialism within their own borders as well as in their relations with Africa and Asia. The West should help the Africans along the road which is most in harmony with their needs, and which offers them the best possibilities for development, in contrast with a theoretically determined system which Communism offers.

In concluding the discussion and summarizing results of the meeting, the conclusions reached may be stated in the following terms:

1. The East-West confrontation in Black Africa has reached the cross roads, all parties pausing to consider the successes and failures of the past five or six years.
2. Communist infiltration and influence has undoubtedly produced some effect on the outcome of the so-called

African "revolution", but on the whole, the results for those promoting the communist effort have been far from commensurate with the energy expended. However, the relative singleness of the communist idea, gives it an advantage in contrast with the multiplicity of western viewpoints. However, it should be borne in mind that Communism is developing several faces, a fact which could weaken Communist prestige. Moreover the contrast between theory and practice must weaken its credibility.

3. The Russians are showing signs of some disillusionment with the African scene, but are studying their successes and failures and appear to be considering on what lines a further campaign shall take. Of special interest in this connection is the tri-continental conference held in Havana in January 1966 which affirmed a new political attitude on the part of the Kremlin towards Africa, and which indicates an intention to support the concept of a One-Party system, and to concentrate on the masses and Trades Unions rather than the top political leaders. They also aim at influencing students, youth organisations and women. Moscow also appears to be taking an interest in the growth of crypto-communist groups and organisations and encouraging their development.
4. The Chinese effort may have been even less effective, although in some places, notably in Dar-es-Salaam, in Guinea and in the area around Brazzaville, and in Congo, it should not be underestimated. There are signs that Chinese emphasis on racialism has not as yet had much effect on the situation. Chinese influence appears to be more noticeable in the field of ideology.
5. Western influence is still considerable, and thanks to the language factor, may be expected to maintain its strength, but many delegates to the conference expressed the opinion that a clearer assessment of the African situation is necessary, and that more emphasis should be placed on African needs and attitudes, and less on out-of-date western concepts of what is good for Africa and for Africans.
6. Many of the problems of Black Africa are of an economic nature for which no easy solution is possible. Popular

disappointment with the outcome of independence, on which the mass of simple Black Africans placed their hopes as a result of facile slogans and propaganda, can no longer be allayed by nationalist propaganda or public displays. The solutions of these problems depended on the efforts of African leaders and on such assistance as the outside world is willing to grant, to bridge over the difficult and critical period before some degree of stability can be attained. The main need is improvement in agricultural production. Soviet propaganda is exploiting popular disillusionment to further its own aims.

7. The growth of coastal towns and administrative centres and the development of large-scale agrarian and mining economies associated with overseas commercial enterprise in Africa, has destroyed many local crafts, and to some extent the pattern of life of a large section of the communities. It is essential that encouragement be given African countries to train and develop new skills in agriculture, marketing, artisan crafts, and transport, and to diversify, as far as is possible in so undeveloped an area, the economy. The development of an urban proletariat is an important aspect of this situation which can be exploited by propaganda for its own ends.
8. On the subject of tribalism, available information is inadequate and contradictory, and it is too early to foresee what part it will play in the development of society in the different African countries. There are indications that the Russians are giving a new look at tribal questions. The question of languages is important in this connection, as encouragement by the Russians of the use of the vernacular could cut the lines between the indiginous population and former metropolitan countries.
9. The term: "African revolution" is perhaps, a misnomer. It is commonly employed by African politicians to display the wider aims to which they give lip-service; also by the communist world, but mainly for home consumption. However, the various movements in Africa are fragmentary, and there has been no coordinated revolutionary process in the strict sense of the word. Even the communists have come to realise this fact.

10. In concluding the debate, the Chairman drew attention to the fact that it is not the role of Interdoc to seek to create or promote policy, but to enable discussion on important issues to be conducted in as objective and informative a manner as possible, thereby leading, by publication of the proceedings, to wider consideration of the points at issue and the problems with which the western world is faced in dealing with the growing pains of a whole continent.

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