

THE DEVIUS DALANG

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Eye-witness report by Bambang S. Widjanarko

Introduction by Dr. Antonie C. A. Dake

VERBATIM TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BAMBANG S.
WIDJANARKO ON THE OCTOBER 1965 PURGE OF
THE INDONESIAN GENERAL STAFF

Original Indonesian text with English translation.

Edited by

Drs. Rahadi S. Karni
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Modern Indonesia Dept.
Royal Institute of Linguistics
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'IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE DALANG'*)

*) Cornell Report on the coup of October 1, 1965, page 3, confidential version. Dalang is the puppeteer of the Indonesian wayang play.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

One of the riddles of contemporary history was the so-called "Untung" putsch that took place in Djakarta on October 1st, 1965.

It spelled the final decline of Indonesia's first president, Achmad Sukarno, and has been ascribed alternatively to communist plotting, CIA-intervention and naïve puritanisme of middle-rank officers. In all these interpretations facts have often been less relevant than prejudices but if one were to make a choice between them most facts seemed to point to the first interpretation. Especially after the trials of leaders of the once-powerful Indonesian Communist Party, the P.K.I., little doubt could have remained that the Indonesian Communists were heavily involved and compromised. Only stubborn ignorance or willful distortion of what are by now historical facts could lead to the opposite conclusion. Even so, this explanation has never satisfied those who had insight into the situation prevailing in Indonesia in those crucial years: 1964/65.

Then, a particularly strong Communist Party with a claimed membership of over 3,000,000 and enjoying the full support of the President, seemed inexorably on its way to power once Sukarno would have disappeared from the scene.

Moreover its highly capable and unified leadership under Dipa Nusantara Aidit was known for its cautious approach to domestic affairs, and it rather took its cue from Sukarno and local opportunities than from Marxist doctrine.

Its "Chinese" stance in the quarrel between Moscow and Peking - from late 1963 onwards - was

II

more than anything a verbal exercise and, moreover, related mainly to communist "foreign" policy: the area most "harmless" for radicalism. At home, however, the Indonesian Communists could in fact be classed as consistent revisionists. There is nothing, therefore, that would make it plausible that Aidit and his followers could have thought that action of their own against some members of the Indonesian General Staff (however anti-communist they all may have been) could be beneficial to the ultimate aim: a take-over in Indonesia after Sukarno. The clumsy attempt of October 1, 1965 witnessed by the world was beyond anything that could be expected of the P.K.I. leaders on their past record. Some - scholars not excluded - were even compelled to the conclusion that it could therefore never have been the PKI that had masterminded the coup.

While engaged in research for a study on the attitude of the PKI in the Sino-Soviet quarrel I felt the need to find an explanation for these facts which seemed so contradictory.* Many indications pointed to Sukarno himself as the key to the riddle. But it was only when in the course of my investigation I laid hands on one particular document that the picture began to make sense and that all the disparate pieces fell into place as they do at the turn of a kaleidoscope. It was this document: the interrogation of Sukarno aide Colonel Bambang Setyono Widjanarko by members of the Indonesian Security Commando Konkamtib, now published here, both in its original Indonesian version and translated into English. In it one finds fascinating material on the role Widjanarko's principal played on the October 1, 1965 affair according to "In the Spirit of the Red Banteng", Mouton Publishers, The Hague 1973.

III

to this witness.

The document strongly leads one to believe that Sukarno was the real force behind it all and what basically triggered the Indonesian upheaval of 1965 was a Sukarno-originated putsch of the Indonesian General Staff, by which he rid himself of officers not flexible enough to go the whole way with him: officers of whom the Indonesian president at that time was - or wanted to be - convinced that they were disloyal.

The publication of this document is designed to help clear up the confusion now reigning on that episode, that "ripple in the ocean of the revolution" as Sukarno called it, before he fell victim to it himself.

It gives an account of various situations and people as seen by one who was for many years close to President Sukarno as no-one else.

It treats - scattered over a number of days - of the major phases of the Sukarno side of the purge. The PKI part of it was clearly of no interest any longer at the time of the interrogations - October/November 1970, four months after Sukarno's death - while also Widjanarko apparently must have had almost no direct experience of it.

Classified according to subject matter one finds the following major questions discussed (with reference to corresponding pages of the English translation)

1. Discussion of "disloyal generals" on Bali in June 6, 1965, and the role of its governor, General Sjafiuddin (p.15,76,96)
2. The "disloyal generals" are identical to those murdered (p.19,50,163)

IV

3. Palace guard officer Untung receives the order to take action against the "disloyal generals" on August 4, 1965 (p.19,57,76,114)
4. Sukarno at various times in the second half on September 1965 meets his entourage and:
 - a. checks with his security chief, General Sutarto, the truth about the "disloyal generals" (p.200)
 - b. then on September 15 again orders against them, this time instructions being given to the palace guard, Commander Brig.Gen. Sabur and to Brig.Gen.Sunarjo (p.163)
 - c. repeats this on September 23 to Sabur after a new report, this time by General Murshid on the "disloyal generals" (p.105 168)
 - d. and again on September 27 and on September 29, urging "swift action" (p.171,178)
 - e. meeting meanwhile also with two close conspirators, Air Force Chief Marshall Dhani and Brig.Gen. Supardjo, both of whom were subsequently sentence to death (Dhani is still alive) (p.14,67,170)
5. On the eve of the purge of September 30, 1965 Sukarno receives a letter from Untung, which he orders be retrieved the next day when his chances to bring off the purge seemed to have passed (p.28.47.56,75,76,114)
6. The decision of Sukarno to go to Halim, headquarters of the "rebels" (p.5,8,59)
7. At Halim on October 1965 Sukarno receives word of the death of the Generals (p.60); does not show shock (p.64,66) or desire to

look for the victims (p.67); appears thoroughly familiar with the composition of the Revolutionary Council, the new Government proclaimed by the rebels to replace Sukarno's team (p.28,63,64,66,69,128,206) receives his fourth wife Dewi (p.30,80) and, seeing that he has lost the day retreats to safe and "neutral" Bogor, south of Djakarta (p.80.207)

8. Sukarno receives a warning by cable that the corpses of the Generals are about to be found near Halim, and tries - in vain - to erase all traces of the murder (p.25,74).
9. From that moment on - October 2, 1965 - Sukarno publicly claims to have been completely surprised by the purge (p.182), while shielding in his Bogor Palace for sometime Supardjo (p.33) and Dhani (p.185)
10. The nomination of General Pranoto as "caretaker" for the murdered Army Chief General Yani is frustrated by Suharto (p.21,27,47,68,69,77,78,197,208) which makes Sukarno "furious" (p.79)

For the rest details can be found that are less directly relevant to Sukarno's leading role in the purge of the Indonesian generals. The PKI figures in some of the answers (p.23,38,52,53,54,56,157,160) the Chinese connection is mentioned (p.20,81,160,189) as well as events in March 1966, when Sukarno seems to have considered withdrawing to East Java (p.11,117,123). Details are also given about the attitude and behaviour of a number of Sukarno's friends, e.g. Omar Dhani (p.183,184) and Sutjipto (123,124,126,129,134,175) and about the so-called Sukarno front that was to have protected the President from his new opponents surrounding Suharto

VI

2
(p.119,136,156,173). Finally Sukarno's kickbacks from various Indonesian and foreign commission funds are related; his yen for art sequestered from arrested Indonesians is described (p. 171) as well as his wife Dewi's help in selling these bijoux in Tokyo (p.182).

The editor, Mr. Rahadi S. Karni of Leyden University, gives his opinion on the authenticity of the Widjanarko Report in the following pages. The reader himself is left to judge the value of the report as an historical document.

Dr. A.C.A. Dake

Den Haag, April 1974

VII

Brief note on the authenticity of the "Widjanarko Report".

This Report of Interrogation by the Chief Interrogation Team of the Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order of Bambang Widjanarko, former Adjutant to President Sukarno, was put before me in the form of a typewritten copy of the original. This was not the copy reproduced here, retyped on an electric typewriter, but one clearly originating from Indonesia. This is the usual method of copying in Indonesia, where few Xerox or photographic copying machines are available, and this should not be a reason to suspect the authenticity of the contents of the Report. It means, however that such external factors as letterheads and signatures could not be checked, and that the authenticity of the Report should follow from internal factors, such as usage of language and internal cohesion, and knowledge of the way in which Indonesian military agencies conduct interrogations.

As to the language, it can be declared that the questions are put in the normal usage of legal or semi-legal Indonesian, and that the answers by the interrogated person, in the Indonesian context and in view of the background of Bambang Widjanarko, are as they could be expected to be: mostly to the point in military fashion, full of acronyms only understandable to Indonesians (and a few foreign experts), full of almost-synonyms coupled by a slash, all as is modern Indonesian usage among people of the interrogated person's background and education: a Colonel of the Marines whose general education comes to secondary school level, and who started his army career already

VIII

during the Japanese occupation.

As to the internal consistency of the report, this can also be checked by the reader who makes use of the English translation which is true to the spirit, be it, (for the sake of readability) not always completely to the letter of the Indonesian original as put before me. In general it can be said that these are the questions that an interrogator would put to a person who has spent six and a half years in close working relationship with the former Indonesian President and the Djakarta Palace entourage, and to which the interrogated person gives answers that make sense. If, however the interrogator asks questions about matters that Bambang Widjanarko has not himself witnessed, his answers are making less sense, and he starts theorizing a little (see e.g. Interrogation of 21 October 1970, question and answer 8). Sometimes in the answers slight lapses can be detected, but these are always details as e.g. when it is supposed that the Presidential plane Jet Star was ready to take the President from Halim airbase, where as in reality this plane was at the time in Sumatra with Subandrio's group, but it would be strange indeed if such lapses were not present, in view of the five years that passed between most events and the time of interrogation. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that sometimes the interrogated person does not know the answer to certain questions, and that he admits this. Important too is that if certain questions as e.g. the relationship between the former Indonesian President and the Communist Party are too suggestive, Bambang Widjanarko gives a modifying answer (see Interrogation of 21 October 1970 question and answer 6).

IX

All this underlines the internal consistency of this Report of Interrogation.

As to the way military agencies conduct interrogations, this can easily be checked from proceedings of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal, available in printed or typewritten form, of trials of persons suspected to have been involved in the coup attempt of 30 September 1965, in two of which viz. the trial of Pranoto and the trial of Supardjo, Bambang Widjanarko has been heard as a witness. The way in which questions are put, and answers are given there, tallies with the style of this Report of Interrogation. The authenticity of these trial proceedings has never seriously been doubted.

Finally from the use of certain expressions it is clear that the interrogated person in the post-coup years has been influenced by the political jargon and the political thoughts of what is known as the New Order. This would dispose him to testify in the way he did. But, as he himself states in the Interrogation of 4 November 1970, answer 117 b.1., many of the persons who were, like himself, for a long time in the vicinity of the former Indonesian President, had their minds thickly wrapped with reverence for the President. It seems, in the Indonesian context, logical that statements like those of Bambang Widjanarko, could only be made after the death of this revered personality in June 1970. This would explain the rather late conduction of the interrogation.

Rahadi S. Karni

Leiden, April 1974

Glossary

AL = Navy
ALRI = Indonesian Navy
ASKAPERS/MIL = Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy
AURI = Indonesian Air Force
BKR = People's Security Body
BRIMOB = Mobile Brigade
CPM = Military Police
CPR = Chinese People's Republic
G-30-S/PKI = 30 September Movement/Communist Party of Indonesia
GESTAPO = 30 September Movement
GESTOK = First of October Movement
KKO = Marine Corps
KODAM DJAYA = Military District Command, Greater Djakarta
KOSTRAD = Army Strategic Command
KOWILHAN = Regional Defence Command
KUTP-KKO = Marine Corps Officer's Refresher Course
NASAKOM = Nationalism, Religion and Communism
NRP = Military Registration Number
PANGDAM DJAYA = Commander of the Military District Greater Djakarta
PASKODARMA = Marine Command Troops
PETA = Indonesian Volunteer's Army during the Japanese Occupation
PKI = Indonesian Communist Party
PNI = Indonesian Nationalist Party
RC = People's Republic of China
RI = Indonesian Republic
RPKAD = Army Paratroop Regiment
SESKOAD = Army Staff and Command School
TAKARI = The year of self-reliance
TKR = People's Security Army

XI

TNI = Indonesian National Army
UND = United Nations Organization
USMC = United States Marine Corps

KOMANDO OPERASI PEMULIHAN
KEAMANAN DAN KETERTIBAN
TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT

PRO JUSTITIA

BERITA ATJARA PEMERIKSAAN.

Pada hari ini SAPTU tanggal 3 Oktober tahun 1900
tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat. LETKOL CPM - NRP 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI,

djabatan masing-masing: Anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA
PUSAT, telah melakukan pemeriksaan terhadap
seorang laki-laki jang mengaku bernama:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat Kolonel KKO, djabatan ASKAPERS/MIL (Asis-
ten Kepala PERSMIL A.L./Militer), umur/tanggal
lahir: 43 tahun/9 September 1927, tempat kelahi-
ran: Karanganyar - Kebumen, agama: Roma-Katholik
alamat/tempat tinggal: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Keba-
joran Baru Djakarta.

IA diperiksa sebagai SAKSI dalam perkara 2 G.30.
S/PKI.

Atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan jang kami adjukan
kepadanja, maka IA - jang diperiksa (BAMBANG
SETYONO WIDJANARKO) memberikan djawaban-djawaban
seperti tersebut dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

1. Apakah Sdr. bersedia didengar keterangannya pada hari ini?

1. Bersedia dengan segala senang hati.

2. Apakah Sdr. berada dalam keadaan sehat?

2. Sehat.

3. Tjoba djelaskan pengalaman Sdr. dibidang:

a. Pengalaman pendidikan,

b. Pengalaman pekerdjaan,

c. Pengalaman dalam partai/organisasi,

3. a. Pengalaman pendidikan:

- Umum: Sekolah Dasar.

Sekolah Menengah Pertama.

- Militer: -Latihan PETA - 1943.

-KUTP - KKO - 1952.

-Basic School USMC (USA) 1954.

-Adjudan Djenderal A.D. 1960.

-SESKOAD - 1968.

b. Pengalaman pekerdjaan:

- Tahun 1943 - PETA.

- Tahun 1945 - BKR/TKR/TNI (ALRI CA IV Tegal).

- KKO-ANGKATAN LAUT hingga sekarang.

c. Pengalaman dalam partai/organisasi:

- Tidak pernah masuk partai/organisasi.

4. Djelaskan hubungan keluarga saudara:

4. a. Ajah = meninggal dunia ± 1931.

Ibu = Nj.Karjosupadno, Djl. Stasiun No.7
Karanganjar Kebumen.

b. Saudara-saudara:

(1) Tuty Kartini, kakak (Pr).

- (2) Sutjipto, kakak (Lk).
- (3) Sumijati, kakak (Pr).
- (4) Sunarsih, adik (Pr).

c. I s t e r i: MAGDALENA PAAL.

d. Anak-anak:

- (1) Vincent, laki-laki,
- (2) Wanda, perempuan,
- (3) Joyce, perempuan,
- (4) Ingris, perempuan,
- (5) Stella, perempuan,
- (6) Michael Bharata, laki-laki,
- (7) Bambang Witjaksana, laki-laki,
- (8) Sinta Cisilia, perempuan,
- (9) Widiatmaka, laki-laki,

5. Apakah Saudara masih ingat tentang surat jang disampaikan kepada Bung KARNO jang berisi informasi bahwa pasukan RPKAD akan menjerang Istana dan akan mendatangi rumah 2 Menteri tertentu. Bila masih ingat berikan penjelasan.

a. Darimanakah surat tersebut asalnja?

b. Apakah isi dari surat tersebut?

c. Siapa sadjakah jang pada waktu itu mengetahui isi surat tersebut?

a.1 Pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 ± djam 18.30 Guest House Istana Djakarta berada beberapa pedjabat penting (Waperdan/Mentiri) jang atas perintah Bung KARNO harus tidur consignerang disitu. Kurang lebih pada saat/djam itu, Brigdjen SABUR, DAN MEN TJAKRABIRAWA membawa suatu informasi jang menerangkan bahwa pada pemusatan 2 pasukan Angkatan Darat diluar kota jang ber-

maksud untuk menjerbu Istana. Informasi ini disampaikan setjara lesan pada Bung KARNO dan pedjabat 2 lain.

2 ± djam 19.00 Kombes SUMIRAT (Adjudan Presiden) datang dengan membawa surat dan disampaikan kepada Bung KARNO.

Surat itu ternyata ditulis dalam bahasa Djawa. Oleh Bung KARNO surat tersebut diberikan kepada saja dengan perintah agar saja membatjanja dan menjalin kedalam bahasa Indonesia.

b. Isinja: - Surat ditudjukan kepada Bung KARNO.

- Memberitahukan/melaporkan bahwa ada pasukan Angkatan Darat, chususnja RPKAD, jang telah disiapkan untuk menjerbu Istana.

- Surat dikirim/ditanda tangani oleh Djenderal SUADI (Angkatan Darat).

c. Jang hadlir pada waktu itu adalah Bung KARNO, WAPERDAM LEIMENA, CHAERUL SALEH, Djenderal SABUR, Kolonel SAELAN, Kombes. SUMIRAT, AKBP MANGIL dan beberapa orang lagi jang saja tidak ingat.

6. Bagaimanakah penilaian Bung KARNO dan Brigdjen SABUR dan pendjabat-pendjabat lain jang ada pada waktu itu terhadap isi surat tersebut. Sebutkan pula tentang reaksi jang timbul sehubungan dengan adanja informasi tersebut.

6.1 Adanja informasi baik dari Djenderal SABUR setjara lesan maupun dari surat jang dibawa Kombes SUMIRAT (dari Djenderal SUADI), membawa penilaian jang serius oleh Bung

KARNO, Djenderal SABUR dan pedjabat-pedjabat lain.

Semuanja menanggapi bahwa info itu pasti benar dan akan terdjadi.

- 2 Berdasarkan anggapan/penilaian itu maka diputuskan bahwa Bung KARNO dan pedjabat2 itu harus segera meninggalkan Istana Djakarta dan keluar kota.

Setelah beberapa alternatif dibahas, achirnja diambil keputusan oleh DAN MEN TJAKRABIRAWA bahwa Bung KARNO beserta rombongan akan segera berangkat melalui darat liwat Kebajoran Blok P, Kemang, Tji-landak, Pasar Minggu, Depok - terus ke Bogor.

Dalam diskusi menanggapi benar - tidaknja informasi tersebut saja mengusulkan agar pimpinan Tjakrabirawa mengadakan pengecekan terlebih dahulu kepada PANGDAM DJAYA. Hal ini saja adjukan karena saja pertjaja bahwa fihak KODAM DJAYA pasti mengetahuinja.

Usul tersebut mendapat tanggapan jang negatip. Pak BANDRIO mengatakan bahwa pengecekan tersebut tidak perlu karena fihak KODAM DJAYA toch akan memberikan keterangan jang palsu.

Begitu pula Djenderal SABUR jang sudah pertjaja 100 persen atas informasi itu berpendapat bahwa KODAM DJAYA tidak perlu dihubungi.

Dalam diskusi ini, chususnja Pak BANDRIO sangat keras menentang untuk diadakan pengecekan ke PANGDAM DJAYA. Alasan berulang-ulang diadjukan bahwa info tadi datang dari fihak Angkatan Darat cq.

Perwira Tinggi Angkatan Darat jang benar2 dipertjaja, djuga bahwa PANGDAM DJAYA pasti akan menutupi adanja gerakan2 pasukan Angkatan Darat. Achirnja Bung KARNO memutuskan untuk tidak usah menghubungi KODAM DJAYA.

7. Mengapa info jang menjangkut persoalan pasukan Angkatan Darat (dalam hal ini RPKAD) tidak disampaikan kepada pimpinan Angkatan Darat untuk selandjutnja dipetjahkan persoalannja bersama-sama pimpinan Angkatan Darat?
7. Menurut saja bahwa info tentang pasukan Angkatan Darat (RPKAD) seperti itu tidak disampaikan pimpinan Angkatan Darat adalah karena:
- a. Pihak Istana (Presiden) dapat langsung berhubungan dengan PANGDAM V/DJAYA, karena KODAM DJAYA jang bertanggung-djawab atas keamanan Ibukota.
 - b. Situasi waktu itu (Maret 1966) adalah keruh sekali dimana Bung KARNO dan Tjakrabirawa tidak mempertjajai seluruh Angkatan Darat, baik RPKAD KODAM DJAYA, KOSTRAD maupun Staf A.D.
 - c. Sebab a dan b itulah jang menjebabkan adanja prejudice terhadap Angkatan Darat, sehingga persoalan adanja pasukan RPKAD tidak disampaikan kepada pimpinan Angkatan Darat. Keputusan ini diambil oleh Bung KARNO setelah mendapat saran2 dari pimpinan Tjakrabirawa (Brigdjen SABUR dan Kolonel SAELAN).

8. Berikan pendjelasan tentang usaha2 jang dilakukan oleh Bung KARNO dan Brigdjen SABUR dalam memperoleh bantuan kekuatan untuk menghadapi pasukan RPKAD jang akan menjerang Istana.

8.1 Setelah diambil keputusan bahwa Bung KARNO dan rombongan harus keluar dari Djakarta menudju Bogor dan route jang dilalui, maka DAN MEN TJAKRABIRAWA menjipakan segala sesuatunja. Diantaranja memerintahkan DAN JON KKO-AL (jang termasuk MEN TJAKRABIRAWA) untuk mengamankan route dan menghubungi KKO AL Tjilandak jang akan dilewatinja.

2 Dalam pemitjaraan2 di Guest House itu oleh Pak BANDRIO (chususnja) diterangkan bahwa untuk menghadapi situasi pada umumnya dan pasukan RPKAD jang akan menjerang Istana dapat mengandalkan pasukan2 KKO-AL dan BRIMOB serta AURI.

Pedjabat lain seperti Pak ACHMADI memperkuat keterangan tersebut.

Seingat saja jang hadir pada pemitjaraan itu adalah: Bung KARNO, Pak BANDRIO, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Pak LEIMENA, Pak ACHMADI, Pak HARTAWAN, Pak JUSUF M.D., Djenderal SABUR, Kolonel SAELAN, Kombes SUMIRAT dan saja sendiri.

3 Djenderal SABUR terus mendesak agar rombongan setcepat mungkin meninggalkan Istana.

9. SAKSI-2 Dr. LEIMENA dan Dr. SUBANDRIO dan Brigdjen SABUR telah memberikan keterangan kepada pemeriksa, bahwa Djenderal KKO HARTONO pada tanggal 10 Maret pada kira-kira djam

12.00 - 02.00 telah bertemu dengan Bung KARNO di Markas KKO di Tjilandak.

Bagaimanakah pendapat Saudara terhadap keterangan2 tersebut?

9. Seingat saja keterangan2 tersebut diatas adalah benar. Djenderal KKO HARTONO berada di Tjilandak sewaktu rombongan Bung KARNO tiba dan bertemu dengan Bung KARNO.

10 Berikan pendjelasan tentang pemitjaraan Bung KARNO dengan Djenderal KKO HARTONO di Tjilandak, tentang hal2 jang berhubungan dengan adanja berita bahwa pasukan RPKAD jang akan menjerang Istana?

10. Setelah rombongan Bung KARNO tiba di Tjilandak, Bung KARNO diantarkan keruang/kantor Komandan Kesatrian untuk beristirahat disitu. Dalam beristirahat ini terdjadi dialoog2 antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal HARTONO serta saja sendiri tentang situasi dewasa itu yakni adanja berita bahwa pasukan RPKAD akan menjerang Istana. Bung KARNO menanyakan apakah pasukan KKO sanggup menghadapi pasukan RPKAD kalau diperlukan, didjawab sanggup. Bung KARNO menanyakan apakah pasukan KKO tjukup kuat, didjawab tjukup kuat. Bung KARNO menanyakan apakah pasukan KKO dapat melindungi keamanan Présiden, didjawab sanggup melindungi. Pula dalam pemitjaraan itu dinjatakan bahwa KKO akan segera dapat inzetten pasukan bila diperlukan.

11 Berikan pendjelasan tentang adanja pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan para Panglima Ang-

katan untuk membitjarakan dokumen Gyllchrist dalam bulan Mei 1965.

11. Pada bulan Mei 1965 di Istana diadakan pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan Pak BANDRIO dan keempat Panglima Angkatan. Pertemuan tersebut terdjadi pagi hari. Pada saat itu saja tidak/belum mengetahui apa jang dibitjarakan, karena tidak ikut duduk ataupun berada dalam kamar pertemuan.

Beberapa minggu kemudian saja mendengar dari Brigdjen SABUR bahwa pertemuan tersebut membitjarakan adanja suatu document sangat penting jang dapat di ambil dari Kedutaan Inggris, sewaktu gedung kedutaan tersebut diserbu/dibakar oleh para demonstrant.

Dokumen inilah jang selandjutnja disebut dokument Gylchrist.

12 Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bilamana dan dimana Sdr. mendengar persoalan Dewan Djenderal.
- b. Apakah arti dari Dewan Djenderal jang telah Sdr. dengar pada waktu itu.
- c. Bagaimanakah tanggapan Bung KARNO terhadap Dewan Djenderal tersebut.

12a Saja mendengar adanja "DEWAN DJENDERAL" kurang lebih pada kwartal pertama 1965. Saja tidak ingat dengan pasti dari siapa berita Dewan Djenderal itu saja terima. Saja mendengarnya di Istana dimana banjak sekali pedjabat2 jang datang maupun bertugas disitu.

- b (1) Pertama sewaktu saja mendengar adanya Dewan Djenderal itu tidak begitu saja perhatikan karena hal yang demikian menurut pengertian saja adalah lumrah yakni bahwa perlu adanya suatu Dewan di Angkatan yang bertugas untuk mengurus kenaikan pangkat ataupun menjaga kehormatan Perwira.
- (2) Lama setelah itu (± pertengahan Juni 1965) saja mendengar bahwa adanya Dewan Djenderal di Angkatan Darat itu diberitakan bertudjuan anti Pemerintah cq. Bung KARNO.
- c Sepanjang pengetahuan dan penglihatan saja, Bung KARNO sangat dipengaruhi dan pertjaja akan adanya Dewan Djenderal itu, yang bertudjuan anti Bung KARNO. Dari beberapa kejadian dapat dilihat bahwa Bung KARNO marah² terhadap beberapa Djenderal Angkatan Darat dan sebaliknya sering menerima kunjungan beberapa Djenderal Angkatan Darat lain yang dipertjaja oleh Bung KARNO.

13 Berikan pendjelasan:

- a. Bilamana dan dimana saudara mengetahui/mendengar bahwa Bung KARNO telah marah² kepada beberapa orang Djenderal Angkatan Darat diantaranya Djenderal PARMAN, Djenderal SOETOJO karena dianggap tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO.
- b. Siapakah orang² lain yang pada saat tersebut juga mengetahui akan hal tersebut.

- c. Apakah tuduhan tidak loyal dari Bung KARNO terhadap Djenderal-Djenderal tersebut, disebabkan karena Djenderal-Djenderal tersebut diduga mendjadi anggauta Dewan Djenderal.

13a Waktu jang pasti (tgl) saja sudah lupa tetapi pada suata pagi hari (sebelum 1 Okt. 1965) di Istana Merdeka diruangan tengah saja melihat dan mendengar Bung KARNO marah² terhadap beberapa Djenderal Angkatan Darat, diantaranya Djenderal PARMAN dan Djenderal SOETOJO. Kemarahan tersebut disebabkan karena para Djenderal itu dianggap tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO.

b Seingat saja orang² lain jang mengetahui kedjadian itu adalah Para Adjudan jang hadlir, Pak DJAMIN, dan WAPERDAM SUBANDRIO, dan LEIMENA, dan Djenderal YANI jang mengantarkan para Djenderal tersebut.

c Tuduhan tidak loyal dari Bung KARNO itu memang disebabkan karena para Djenderal tersebut diduga mendjadi anggauta Dewan Djenderal.

14 Saksi DJAMIN, Saksi JUSUF MUDA DALAM dan HENNY telah memberikan pendjelasan kepada pemeriksa sebagai berikut:

- a. Pada tanggal 23 September 1965 djam 07.00 bertempat diserambi belakang Istana Djakarta Djenderal MURSID telah menghadap Bung KARNO dan memberikan laporan kepada Bung

KARNO bahwa Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat pimpinan Angkatan Darat masih tetap tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

- b Pada waktu itu Bung KARNO telah menjatakan akan bertindak kepada Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal tersebut. Kemudian Bung KARNO menanjakan kepada Djenderal SABUR tentang persiapan2 untuk melaksanakan tindakan tersebut.
- c Pada waktu itu Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan untuk memanggil Djenderal SUDIRGO, guna turut melaksanakan tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat tersebut.

Apakah keterangan dari saksi-saksi tersebut semuanya benar?

Bila benar, berikan pendjelasan:

- a Siapakah orang2/pendabat2 lain jang djuga hadir dalam tempat tersebut?
- b Bagaimanakah dialoog jang telah sdr. dengar antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal MURSID dan Djenderal SABUR?
- c Hal2 lain jang djuga dibitjarakan pada waktu itu?

14. Sepandjang ingatan saja, semua keterangan saksi2 tersebut benar.

a Orang2 lain jang pada waktu itu hadir adalah:

Pak BANDRIDO, Pak LEIMENA, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Brigdjen SUNARJO, Brigdjen SABUR, Pak DJAMIN, Laksamana OMAR DANI.

b Dialoog jang dapat saja dengar:

- (1) Bung KARNO kepada Djenderal MURSJID:
"Apakah jang kau laporkan itu benar?"
"Awat, kalau perlu saja adakan kon-
frontasi."
Djenderal MURSJID kepada Bung KARNO:
"Benar Pak".
- (2) Bung KARNO kepada Djenderal SABUR:
"Sabur, tindakan kepada mereka su-
paja dilaksanakan".
- (3) Laksamana OMAR DANI:
"AURI siap dibelakang Bapak".

c Seingat saja waktu itu djuga dibitjara-
kan/diperdebatkan tentang Departemen
Perdagangan, chususnja antara Pak BAN-
DRIO dan Pak CHAERUL SALEH, sehingga ter-
djadi pertjektjokan. Bung KARNO menga-
tasi persoalan tersebut dan memutuskan
agar djangan dibitjarakan lagi.

15. Saksi HENNY, Saksi DJAMIN, Saksi JUSUF MUDA
DALAM telah menerangkan kepada pemeriksa
bahwa Djenderal SUDIRGO telah beberapa kali
menghadap Bung KARNO untuk memberikan laporan
tentang hal2 jang ada hubungannya dengan Djen-
deral-Djenderal Angkatan Darat jang dikatakan
tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO dan termasuk
organisasi Djenderal-Djenderal jang dikatakan
akan mengadakan coup terhadap Pemerintah R.I.
Apakah benar keterangan2 dari saksi2 terse-
but. Bila benar berikan pendjelasan:
- a. Masih ingatkah sdr. tentang djalannya
pemitjaraan antara Djenderal SUDIRGO
dengan Bung KARNO.
 - b. Siapakah orang2 lain jang hadlir dalam

pertemuan tersebut.

15. Keterangan2 saksi2 tersebut adalah benar.

- a(1) Djalannja pembitjaraan setjara kalimat demi kalimat saja tidak ingat lagi, hanya garis besar dan intinja saja masih ingat, yakni: Bung KARNO menanjakan tentang hasil pengecheckan adanya Dewan Djenderal jang akan mengadakan coup, dijawab oleh Djenderal DIRGO bahwa itu memang benar, Selandjutnja Bung KARNO mengatakan bahwa ia memerintahkan Djenderal SABUR dan Djenderal SUNARJO untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap para Djenderal jang tidak loyal, serta memerintahkan agar Djenderal DIRGO + CPM membantupja.
- (2) Sebelum pertemuan tersebut (achir September 1965), Djenderal DIRGO pernah menghadap Bung KARNO dan diberitahu oleh Bung KARNO adanya laporan tentang Dewan Djenderal serta Djenderal DIRGO diperintahkan untuk mengecheck.

b Orang2 lain jang hadlir pada waktu itu ialah:

para WAPERDAM: SUBANDRIO, LEIMENA, Brigdjen SUNARJO, Brigdjen SABUR, Jusuf Muda Dalam, Mualif Nasution, Adjudan, Kolonel Saelan dan Djamin.

16. Berikan pendjelasan tentang adanya pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan Djenderal SABUR dan beberapa orang Djenderal lainnja pada tanggal 29 September 1965 di Istana Djakarta, untuk membitjarakan tindakan terhadap Dewan Djenderal/PATII2 Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal

terhadap Bung KARNO.

16. Seingat saja pertemuan tanggal 29 September 1965 tersebut adalah sebagai berikut:
- a. Jang hadlir Laksamana OMAR DANI, Djenderal MURSID, Djenderal SABUR, Djenderal SUNARJO, Jusuf Muda Dalam, MUALIF NASUTION, HENNY dan para Adjudan.
 - b. Jang dapat saja dengar pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SABUR: Bung KARNO menanjakan bagaimana tindakan terhadap Djenderal Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal jang didjawab oleh Djenderal SABUR bahwa semua sedang disiapkan dan akan melaksanakan setelah semua siap. Bung KARNO mengatakan supaja lekas dikerdjakan. Djenderal MURSID jang waktu ada mengatakan bahwa telah ada pasukan Angkatan Darat jang dapat dipakai sebagai tjadangan. Laksamana OMAR DANI mengatakan bahwa AURI siap dibelakang Bung KARNO.
 - c. Dalam kesempatan itu oleh Bung KARNO diperintahkan pada Kombes SUMIRAT agar memerintahkan Djenderal YANI dan beberapa pedjabat lain agar menghadap pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
 - d. Ketjuali dialog seperti tersebut diatas terdjadi pula suatu dialog antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal MURSJID jang isinja kurang lebih sebagai berikut: "Bung KARNO akan mengganti Djenderal YANI sebagai MEN/PANGAD dan menjerahkan pimpinan Angkatan Darat kepada Djenderal MURSJID". Djenderal MURSJID mendjawab: "sanggup

menerima".

17. Saksi HENNY dan Saksi DJAMIN telah menerangkan kepada pemeriksa bahwa pada tanggal 30 September 1965 kira2 djam 08.00 Djenderal SABUR telah menghadap Bung KARNO di Istana Djakarta, dengan membawa sebuah map, jang berisi surat2 pengangkatan Djenderal MURSID sebagai MEN/PANGAD guna ditanda tangani oleh Bung KARNO.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang kebenaran keterangan tersebut dan bagaimanakah pendapat sdr. terhadap keterangan2 tersebut.

17. Jang saja jakin dapat menerangkan adalah sebagai berikut:

Pada tanggal 30 September 1965 pagi, saja melihat Djenderal SABUR datang membawa suatu map dan diadjukan pada Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO menanda tangani surat jang ada didalam map tersebut. Selandjutnja Djenderal SABUR memberikan map itu pada Sekretaris Presiden, Pak DJAMIN.

Apaisi map dan surat didalamnja saja tidak mengetahui, sedangkan Djenderal SABUR dan DJAMIN tidak mengatakan apa2 terhadap saja.

18. Apakah sdr. masih ingat bahwa bertempat di Istana Tampaksiring telah terdjadi pembitja-raan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SJAFIUDIN jang mempersoalkan:

a. Adanja Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

b. Adanja groeperingen dikalangan perwira2 Angkatan Darat antara mereka jang loyal

terhadap Bung KARNO dan mereka jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

- c. Tentang tindakan2 jang perlu diambil terhadap Djenderal-Djenderal Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO tersebut.

Bilamana sdr. masih ingat, berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bila dan dimanakah pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SJAFIUDIN tersebut.
- b. Bagaimanakah djalannja pembitjaraan tersebut dan siapa2kah orang2 lain jang turut berbitjara pada waktu itu.
- c. Sebutkan pula orang2 lain jang turut hadir ditempat tersebut.

18. Saja masih ingat adanja suatu pembitjara antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SJAFIUDIN.

- a. Tempat - Istana Tampaksiring Bali.
Tgl. - 6 Djuni 1965 (HUT Bung KARNO).
- b. Jang hadir waktu itu dalam makan malam: Pak BANDRIDO, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Pak LEIMENA, JUSUF MUDA DALAM, Djenderal SJAFIUDIN, Pak SUTEDJA, Kepala Polisi Bali, Djaksa Tinggi Bali, Djenderal SABUR, Kombes SUMIRAT, AKBP MANGIL, Letkol SUPARTO dan saja sendiri.
- c. Pembitjaraan2 terdjadi kurang lebih sebagai berikut:
- Bung KARNO mengatakan bahwa para Djenderal2 hendaknja djangan hanja memikir-

kan taktik sadja, tetapi djuga mengerti strategi dunia, chususnja strategi politik Asia Tenggara. Pandangan adanja ba-haja dari Utara (RRT) adalah pandangan Nekolim, bahkan bagi kita harus menolak pandangan itu. Poros Djakarta - Peking merupakan pandangan strategis B.K. jang harus diikuti oleh para Djenderal.

- Djenderal SJAFIUDIN mengatakan bahwa adanja pandangan jang lain/tidak sama dikalangan pimpinan Angkatan Darat terhadap politik Bung KARNO itu menjebabkan kesulitan2 bagi para pelaksana di-bawah. Hal ini djuga menjebabkan tim-bulnja "groeperingen" dikalangan Ang-katan Darat, ada jang setia dan mengikuti politik Bung KARNO, ada pula jang tidak setia/tidak mengikutinja.
 - Menanggapi perkataan Djenderal SJAFIU-DIN tersebut, Bung KARNO mengatakan kalau benar demikian memang perlu adanja perobahan/perbaikan dikalangan pim-pinan Angkatan Darat. Bung KARNO djuga mengatakan supaja Djenderal SJAFIUDIN mengadakan pengetjekan terhadap benar/tidaknja berita tentang adanja Djende-ral-Djenderal jang tidak setia/tidak mengikuti politiknja itu.
 - Pak BANDRIDO menjarankan agar Djenderal YANI dipanggil sadja dan ditanja benar tidaknja tentang hal itu.
- d. Setelah pertemuan di Tampaksiring tersebut, saja ingat bahwa Djenderal SJAFIUDIN per-nah menghadap Bung KARNO di Istana Merdeka (waktu jang tepat tidak ingat lagi,

± Djuli-September 1965), dimana Djenderal SJAFIUDIN melaporkan bahwa atas hasil pengetjekannya memang benar adanya Perwira2/Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang tidak menjetudjuj/tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

Atas dasar laporan itu Bung KARNO menegas-kan perlunya segera diadakan perobahan/penggantian pimpinan Angkatan Darat. Sewaktu Djenderal SJAFIUDIN ditanja si-
pakah kiranya Djenderal Angkatan Darat jang pantas mendjadi M/PANGAD, disebut oleh Djenderal SJAFIUDIN nama Djenderal MURSJID.

19. Apakah sdr. masih ingat bahwa dalam bulan Djuli 1965 antara Bung KARNO dengan Chou-En-Lai telah mengadakan pembijtaraan di Sanghai. Bila sdr. masih ingat, berikan pendjelasan:

- a. Bila dan dimana pertemuan tersebut telah dilakukan?
- b. Siapakah jang hadlir dalam pertemuan tersebut.
- c. Apakah jang mendjadi pokok pembijtaraan antara Bung KARNO Chou-En-Lai tersebut?

19. Saja ingat bahwa pernah ada pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan Chou-En-Lai dalam bulan Djuli 1965.

- a. Pertemuan dalam permulaan Djuli 1965 (tanggal jang tepat saja lupa) di Sjanghai, ditempat/gedung dimana romboŋgan Bung KARNO tinggal.
- b. Seingat saja jang hadlir dalam pertemuan

tersebut adalah Bung KARNO, Pak KUSUMOWIDAGDO. CHOU-EN-LAI dan seorang translator Tjina.

- c. Saja tidak tahu apa jang dibitjarakan dalam kamar tertutup itu, hanja kemudian saja mendengar dari orang (mungkin pak KUSUMOWIDAGDO) bahwa pertemuan tadi menghasilkan:
- adanja proses Djakarta-Pnom Penh-Peking Pyongyang.
 - akan adanja bantuan sendjata dari RRT untuk merealisasi Angkatan ke 5 di Indonesia.
- d. Ketjuali pertemuan jang bersifat khusus tersebut (b) terdjadi pula suata pertemuan sebelumnya, dimana hadlir pedjabat2 Indonesia Bung KARNO, AIDIT, ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO, SJAFIUDIN SUHRI, KUSUMOWIDAGDO, dan dari fihak RRT hadlir: CHOU-EN-LAI dan beberapa pedjabat Tjina serta interpreter.

20. Sebutkan siapa2kah Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang oleh Bung KARNO dianggap tidak loyal dan dalam hal apakah para Djenderal Angkatan Darat tersebut tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO?

20. Seingat saja nama2 Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang pernah disebut oleh Bung KARNO sebagai tidak loyal adalah Djenderal PARMAN, djenderal SUTOJO, Djenderal NASUTION, Djenderal HARJONO. Mereka dianggap tidak loyal karena tidak mau mengikuti garis politik Bung KARNO cq. tidak mau kerdjasama dengan komunis.

21. Saksi SURATNI, dan Saksi SUKARTI serta Saksi AMANDA JACOBS telah mendjelaskan kepada pemeriksa, bahwa pada tanggal 4 Agustus 1965, bekas Letkol UNTUNG telah datang di Istana untuk bertemu dengan Bung KARNO. Berikan pendjelasan:

- a. Apakah keterangan dari saksi2 tersebut benar?
- b. Apakah kedatangan Letkol UNTUNG tersebut bersama-sama orang lain, dan siapakah orang tersebut.
- c. Apakah jang mendjadi pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Letkol UNTUNG?
- d. Siapakah orang2 lain jang mengetahui adanja pemitjaraan tersebut.

21.a. Keterangan2 dari Saksi2 tersebut adalah benar.

Bekas Letkol UNTUNG datang di Istana dan bertemu dengan Bung KARNO dikamar tidurnja pada tanggal 4 Agustus 1965.

- b. Seingat saja bekas Letkol UNTUNG datang tidak sendiri/bersama oreng lain, dia datang bersama Djenderal SABUR.
- c. Bekas Letkol UNTUNG ditanja Bung KARNO apakah IA sanggup diperintahkan mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 jang tidak loyal.
UNTUNG mendjawab sanggup.
- d. Saja tidak ingat siapa orang lain jang mengetahui adanja pemitjaraan itu, ketjuali Djenderal SABUR.

22. Berikan pendjelasan tentang hal2 jang berhubungan dengan adanja Team dokter2 dari RRT.

22. Setjara pasti saja tidak dapat menerangkan dengan djelas tentang Team Dokter RRT. Apa jang dapat saja djelaskan hanja sependjang jang saja lihat dan dengar.
- Adanja Team Dokter RRT tersebut adalah karena tawaran dari fihak RRT (CHEN YI atau CHOU-EN-LAI) untuk memperkuat team dokter Indonesia. Tawaran ini diterima oleh Bung KARN0.
 - Team Dokter Indonesia djuga menerima/ terpaksa menerima karena ingin melihat hasil pengobatan dengan tjara lain (acupuncture).
 - Kedua Team Dokter tersebut (Indonesia + RRT) diketuai/dikoordinir oleh Dr. SOEHARTO.
 - Setiap Team Dokter RRT memeriksa/ merawat Bung KARN0 pasti ada seorang dokter Indonesia jang mendampingi.
 - Ir. LAUW dan Dr. TAN jang termasuk dalam Team Dokter Indonesia, bertindak djuga sebagai penghubung dengan Team Dokter RRT.
23. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Apakah benar bahwa pada tanggal 30 September kira2 djam 22.00 - di Istora Senajan Bung KARN0 telah menerima surat dari Letkol UNTUNG.
 - b. Siapakah jang menjerahkan/menjampaikan surat dari LetKol UNTUNG tersebut kepada Bung KARN0?
 - c. Dimanakah Bung KARN0 telah membatja surat tersebut dan apakah isinja.
- 23.a. Pada tanggal 30 September 1965 ± djam

22.00 di Istora Senajan memang benar Bung KARNO menerima surat dari bekas Letkol. UNTUNG.

- b. Jang menjerahkan surat kepada Bung KARNO adalah saja sendiri dan saja menerimanja dari salah seorang DKP (Kawal Pribadi) nama SOGOL atau NITRI, jang mengatakan ada surat penting untuk Presiden.
- c. Bung KARNO menerima surat tersebut lalu dimasukkan dalam saku. Setelah itu Bung KARNO berdiri dan menudju keluar/ ke W.C. dengan diiringi oleh Kolonel SAELAN, AKBP. MANGIL, DKP dan saja sendiri.

Diberanda luar Bung KARNO mambatja surat tersebut dan setelah itu memasukkkan kembali kedalam sakunja. Mengenai isi surat tersebut saja tidak mengetahuinja.

24. Apakah sdr. masih ingat bahwa pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 telah mendapat perintah untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO untuk datang ke Halim. Bila sdr. masih ingat supaja sdr. djelaskan tentang:

- a. Siapakah jang memerintahkan sdr. untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO agar datang di Halim dan apakah sebab2nja.
- b. Dimanakah sdr. telah bertemu dengan Djenderal PRANOTO dan apakah jang telah sdr. sampaikan kepada Djenderal PRANOTO pada waktu itu.

24. Saja masih ingat kedjadian tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 itu:

- a. Jang memerintahkan saja untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO supaya segera menghadap Bung KARNO karena ditunjuk untuk memegang pimpinan Angkatan Darat, adalah Djenderal SABUR. Selandjutnja Djenderal SABUR memberi pendjelasan bahwa oleh Bung KARNO. Djenderal PRANOTO dianggap seorang Djenderal Angkatan Darat senior jang berpandangan maju/progressip.
- b. Saja tidak bertemu sama Djenderal PRANOTO sendiri, saja pergi ke KOSTRAD dan laporan kepada Djenderal SOEHARTO bahwa saja diperintahkan oleh Bung KARNO untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO (± djam 19.00). Djenderal SOEHARTO menanyakan pada saja "Dimana Bapak Sekarang berada?" Saja djawab "di Halim". Selandjutnja Djenderal SOEHARTO berkata pada saja:
- Sampaikan Bapak bahwa Djenderal PRANOTO tidak dapat menghadap.
 - Untuk sementara pimpinan Angkatan Darat dipegang oleh saja (Djenderal SOEHARTO); karena itu segala instruksi2 supaya disampaikan lewat saja.
 - Bambang, usahakan agar Bapak keluar keluar dari Halim".
- Setelah itu saja meninggalkan KOSTRAD kembali ke Halim menjampaikan laporan pada Bung KARNO (± djam 20.00).

25. Masih ingatkah sdr. bahwa Menteri NJOTO pernah datang di Istana Bogor dan bertemu dengan Bung KARNO.

Selanjutnja NJOTO lalu hadir pula dalam Sidang Kabinet paripurna di Bogor.

Bila sdr. masih dapat mengingat kembali akan hal tersebut berikan pendjelasan:

- a. Bilamana NJOTO telah bertemu dengan Bung KARNO di Istana Bogor dan siapakah jang telah menghadliri pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan NJOTO tersebut?
- b. Apakah benar bahwa NJOTO telah menjampaikan surat D.N. AIDIT kepada Bung KARNO dan bagaimanakah isi surat tersebut. Siapakah jang mengetahui isi surat tersebut dan turut membitjarakan bersama-sama Bung KARNO mengenai isi surat tersebut.
- c. Apakah sdr. masih ingat tentang statement PKI jang dibatjakan oleh NJOTO dalam Sidang Kabinet di Bogor dan bagaimanakah isi dari statement tersebut. Sebutkan pula apakah statement tersebut dibuat di Bogor bersama-sama Bung KARNO?

25. Saja ingat bahwa memang pernah NJOTO datang di Istana Bogor dan bertemu dengan Bung KARNO.

- a. Kedatangan NJOTO tersebut pada waktu sidang Kabinet (tanggal 6 Oktober 1965).

Sesaat sebelum sidang dimulai, NJOTO bertemu Bung KARNO dikamar kerdja Presiden. Hadlir djuga dalam kamar tersebut para WAPERDAM Pak BANDRIO, Pak LEIMENA, Menteri JUSUF MUDA DALAM dan Djenderal SABUR.

b. Saja tidak melihat/mengetahui sendiri apakah pada saat itu NJOTO memberikan surat pada Bung KARNO, tetapi pada hari2 kemudian saja mendengar dari Djenderal SABUR/Pak BANDRIDO bahwa memang benar dari NJOTO menjampaikan surat pada Bung KARNO.

Surat tersebut, seingat saja berisi sebagai berikut:

- (1) Penjelesaian G-30-S/PKI sepenuhnya ditangan Presiden/PANGTI.
- (2) Perlu adanya ketenangan, untuk itu semua fihak dilarang mengutuk Dewan Djenderal maupun G-30-S/PKI.
- (3) Semua alat2 revolusi supaja bekerdja seperti sebelum ada G.30-S/PKI.
- (4) Soal keamanan dibebankan pada AKRI dengan bantuan Front Nasional.
- (5) Semua alat revolusi supaja berkompetisi melaksanakan 5 Azimat Revolusi.
- (6) Dilarang saling tuduh-menuduh atau salah menyalahkan.

c. Mengenai statement PKI, seingat saja demikian:

- (1) Statement PKI tersebut berisi/menjatakan bahwa PKI tidak terlibat/tjampur-tangan dengan G-30-S-/PKI dan persoalan G-30-S/PKI adalah soal intern Angkatan Darat.
- (2) Statement tersebut dibatjakan oleh NJOTO pada sidang Kabinet tersebut (di Istana Bogor).
- (3) Saja tidak tahu apakah statement tersebut dibuat di Bogor bersama Bung KARNO.

d. Mengenai pengaruh surat AIDIT, jang disampaikan pada Bung KARNO oleh NJO-TO, sangat terlihat pada sikap Bung KARNO selandjutnja.

Hal2 jang djelas dapat saja terangkan:

- (1) Bung KARNO selalu bersikap melindungi PKI Bung KARNO tidak mau/ tidak pernah mau membubarkan PKI meskipun sudah banjak desakan-desakan dari masjarakat. Djuga saja sendiri jang pernah menerima pesan dari Djenderal SOEHARTO (waktu itu beliau masih dirumah lama Djl.Sabang dan berada sakit ditempat tidur), telah menjampaikan permohonan Djenderal SOEHARTO pada Bung KARNO agar dengan segera membubarkan PKI., telah mendengar/ melihat sikap tegas Bung KARNO untuk tidak mau membubarkan PKI.
- (2) Bung KARNO selalu menekankan agar ketenangan harus dikembalikan dahulu sebelum ada political-solution. Hal ini djelas senada dengan keinginan PKI.
- (3) Bung KARNO selalu menondjolkan bahwa PKI telah turut berdjasa dalam Revolusi Indonesia.

26. Apakah sdr. masih ingat bahwa Komandan Pangkalan Udara HALIM PERDANA KUSUMA, telah menjampaikan berita radiogram kepada Laksamana OMAR DANI.

Bila sdr. masih ingat, berikan pendjelasan:

a. Bilamana dan dimana radiogram tersebut disampaikan kepada Laksamana OMAR DANI dan apa isinja.

- b. Apakah radiogram tersebut diteruskan Bung KARNO.
 - c. Siapa2 sadjakah jang telah turut bersama-sama Bung KARNO dan Laksamana OMAR DANI mempersoalkan isi radiogram tersebut?
 - d. Kegiatan2 apakah jang telah dilakukan oleh pimpinan Men Tjakrabirawa sehubungan dengan adanya radiogram tersebut atas perintah Bung KARNO?
- 26.a. Saja tidak tahu pasti tentang radiogram tersebut jang dapat saja terangkan adalah sebagai berikut:
Pada tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 sore saja mendengar dari Kolonel KARDJONO (Adjudan) atau Djenderal SABUR bahwa ada informasi/berita dari Halim jang melaporkan bahwa didekat Halim ditemukan bekas2 jang kemungkinan besar menundukkan kearah djenazah.
Berita (radiogram) tersebut disampaikan kepada Laksamana OMAR DANI.
- b. Kepada Bung KARNO djuga dilaporkan berita (radiogram) tersebut. Saja tidak tahu pasti siapa jang menjampaiakannja.
 - c. Siapa2 sadja jang turut bersama-sama membitjarakan isi radiogram tersebut saja tidak tahu pasti. Pada sore hari itu ditempat Bung KARNO berada beberapa orang: Pak BANDRIDO, Pak LEIMENA, Laksamana OMAR DANI, Pak SABUR. Pada saat itu ditempat Bung KARNO ada kegiatan untuk mengambil suara Bung KARNO dengan tape-recorder untuk menjatakan bahwa Bung KARNO dalam keadaan

selamat.

d. Pada keesokan harinja, tanggal 3 Oktober 1965 saja mendengar berita2 dari Kolonel SAELAN tentang kegiatan2 Men Tjakrabirawa jang intinja sebagai berikut:

- (1) Atas dasar berita radiogram tersebut di atas, Bung KARNO memerintahkan kepada Men Tjakrabirawa. Kolonel SAELAN dengan satu Team, untuk menudju tempat dan mentjari djenazah2.
- (2) Karena hari sudah malam Team tersebut membawa alat penerangan (licht-agegraat).
- (3) Setelah Team tiba ditempat (Lobang-Buaja) dan baru akan memulai kegiatannya, datanglah pasukan RPKAD ditempat itu.
Dengan datangnya pasukan RPKAD tersebut maka tugas jang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada Kolonel SAELAN + Team untuk mengambil dan menjingkirkan djenazah mendjadi gagal.
- (4) Menjingkirkan djenazah tersebut jang dimaksud adalah menghilangkan bekas2.

27. Berikan pendjelasan djalannya pemitjaraan pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 dirumah Komodor SUSANTO mengenai pentjalonan/pengangkatan Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai MEN/PANGAD. Sebutkan pula tentang persetudjuan pimpinan G-30-S/PKI terhadap pengangkatan Djenderal PRANOTO tersebut.

- 27.a. Pentjalonan/pengangkatan Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai MEN/PANGAD dibitjarkan pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 dirumah Komodor SUSANTO, siang hari, Bung KARNO bersama pedjabat2: Pak LEIMENA, MEN/PANGAL, MEN/PANGAK, MEN/PANGAU, Djenderal SUTARDIO, Djenderal SUNARJO, Djenderal SABUR, mengadakan pemitjaraan diruangan tengah dengan pintu tertutup. Kami, Kolonel SAELAN, Kombes SUMIRAT, AKBP MANGIL, saja sendiri dan anggauta DKP berada diruang luar, tidak mengetahui atau mendengar djalannja pemitjaraan tersebut.
- b. Sore harinja, ± djam 17.00, Djenderal SABUR keluar dari ruangan tengah dan memerintahkan saja supaya memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO karena akan diangkat sebagai MEN/PANGAD.
- c. Beberapa hari kemudian baru saja ketahu bahwa selama adanja pemitjaraan tersebut diatas bekas Brigdjen SOEPARDJO telah keluar masuk ruangan tengah itu melalui pintu belakang dan turut dalam pemitjaraan. Adanja bekas Brigdjen SOEPARDJO ini dalam pemitjaraan dan djuga mendjadi penghubung dengan pimpinan G-30-S/PKI baru saja ketahu kemudian dari berita2 jang saja dengar dari Djenderal SABUR.
28. Tjoba sdr. djelaskan, tentang apa jang sdr. ketahu mengenai daftar anggauta Dewan Revolusi.
Apakah daftar tersebut sudah diketahu oleh Bung KARNO sebelum diumumkan, bagaimana

bentuknja dan siapa jang menanda daftar tersebut.

28.a. Saja mengetahui tentang adanja Dewan Revolusi tatkala mendengarkan siaran radio pada djam 14.00 tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 dikamar depan rumah Komodor SUSANTO.

b. Kurang lebih djam 14.30 sewaktu beberapa pedjabat (Pak LEIMENA, Laksamana MARTADINATA, Djenderal SUTARDIO, Djenderal SUNARJO) telah tiba, Bung KARNO memerintahkan Djenderal SABUR supaya menjerahkan suatu daftar kepada Pak LEIMENA.

Daftar tersebut adalah daftar anggota Dewan Revolusi.

Seingat saja bentuk daftar tersebut merupakan kertas jang distencil dan ditanda tangani oleh bekas Letkol UNTUNG, dan memang sudah ada ditangan Bung KARNO/Djenderal SABUR sebelum pengumuman radio.

29. Tahukah sdr. tentang kepentingannya didjemputnja/diambil badju PANGTI/ABRI oleh SOEPARTO dan SOGOL dirumah DEWI didjalan Gatot Subroto. Djika tahu, harap didjelaskan apa keperluannya dan siapa jang diperintahkan Bung KARNO untuk memeriksa saku2 badju tersebut dan apa pula keperluannya.

29. Kurang lebih djam 12.00 - 13.00 tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 saja melihat Letkol SUPARTO datang dengan membawa minuman dari Istana untuk Bung KARNO dan badju uniform PANGTI ABRI jang digantung didalam saku

plastik.

Setelah badju tersebut ditaruh didalam kamar, Bung KARNO memerintahkan saja untuk melihat apakah ada surat didalam kantong. Saja periksa kantong badju tersebut dan saja ambil sebuah surat jang ada didalamnja, lalu saja serahkan pada Bung KARNO tanpa saja batja. Bung KARNO menerima surat tersebut lalu merobek2nja.

Surat tersebut adalah surat jang diterima dan dibatja oleh Bung KARNO semalam di Istora (tgl. 30- September 1962 malam). dari bekas Letkol UNTUNG.

30. Tjoba saudara djelaskan tentang berangkatnja Bung KARNO dari HALIM ke Bogor dan asal mulanja sampai di Bogor.

- a. Siapa2 jang turut serta dengan Bung KARNO ke Bogor?
- b. Pembitjaraan apa sadja jang terdjadi didalam perdjalanan antara Halim dan Bogor?

30.a. Setiba saja di Halim (rumah Komodor SUSANTO) dari KOSTRAD ± djam 20.00, saja segera laporan pada Bung KARNO jang hadlir waktu itu semua pedjabat jang ada (diantaranja Pak LEIMENA). Saja laporkan pesan Djenderal SOEHARTO.
- Djenderal PRANOTO tidak menghadap.
- Untuk sementara pimpinan Angkatan Darat dipegang oleh Djenderal SOEHARTO, karenanja mohon semua instruksi2 disampaikan pada/lewat beliau.
Setelah itu saja menjarankan dan mengharap dengan sangat agar Bung KARNO mau meninggalkan Halim (saja tidak mengatakan bahwa ini pesan Djenderal SOEHAR-

TO kepada saja).

- b. Sedang mulainja laporan/pembitjaraan tadi berlangsung, datanglah bekas Brigdjen SOEPARDJO dari pintu belakang. Setelah dia memberi hormat pada Bung KARNO dan lain2 pedjabat jang hadir ia duduk disebelah saja karena ada kursi jang kosong.
- c. Saja laporkan pada Bung KARNO, jang didengar semua hadirin, tentang apa jang saja lihat didjalan antara Halim-KOSTRAD. Adanja gerakan-gerakan pasukan dari pihak KOSTRAD maupun gerakan (berkumpulnja) pasukan2 jang tadi pagi saja lihat disekitar Istana dan pada malam itu berada di Djakarta By Pass.
- d. Laksamana OMAR DANI jang djuga hadir mengatakan pada Bung KARNO bahwa kapal terbang sudah siap bila Bung KARNO menghendaki untuk pergi ke Madiun atau Djokja.
- e. Sedang tengah2nja pembitjaraan tadi datang Dewi jang diantar oleh Letkol SUPARTO. Semua berdiri. Bung KARNO menjambut Dewi. Dewi memberi salam pada semua jang hadir. Bung KARNO dan DEWI masuk kamar. Maka praktis pertemuan tadi bubar.
- f. Pada saat itu saja menarik Pak LEIMENA dan menerangkan pada beliau betapa seriusnja keadaan dan mengharap agar Pak LEIMENA mau mendesak pada Bung KARNO untuk meninggalkan Halim. Kepada Pak LEIMENA saja sampaikan bahwa saja menerima pesan dari Djenderal SOEHARTO agar

mengusahakan Bung KARNO keluar dari HALIM.

- g. Setelah bitjara dengan Pak LEIMENA dikamar luar saja menghubungi Kolonel SAELAN + AKBP MANGIL agar mereka menyiapkan kendaraan2 untuk keluar dari HALIM. Kepada mereka saja terangkan djuga situasinja dan achirnja kami putuskan untuk membawa Bung KARNO ke Bogor.
- h. Kurang lebih djam 22.50 pak LEIMENA keluar dan memberi tahukan bahwa Bung KARNO akan segera meninggalkan Halim. Setelah Bung KARNO keluar segera saja persilahkan duduk dikendaraan Princes. Pak LEIMENA duduk disebelah kirinja. Ditempat duduk depan 3 orang: Letkol SUPARTO sebagai sopir, duduk ditengah sdr. SUHARTO dari DKP, dan saja sendiri sebagai Adjudan.
Laksamana OMAR DANI jang mengantarkan Bung KARNO ke kendaraan melihat bahwa kendaraan sudah penuh terpaksa tak dapat ikut dalam kendaraan itu.
- i. Setelah semua duduk segera saja perintahkan untuk segera berangkat (djam 23.00). Kendaraan berdjalan menudju keluar Halim ke Djakarta By Pass. Setelah tiba di Djakarta By Pass belok kiri dan terus langsung menudju Bogor.
- j. Pada permulaan berangkat, sewaktu Bung KARNO melihat bahwa kita menudju/berada di Djakarta By Pass, Bung KARNO bertanja "Saja akan dibawa kemana". Pak LEIMENA jang duduk persis dibelakang saja menekan bahu saja sebagai tanda

agar saja mendjawabnja. Saja mendjawab "Saja mohon maaf Pak, kami akan memba-wa Bapak ke Bogor".

Bung KARNO bertanja: Kenapa ke Bogor?

Saja: Ada tiga hal alasan saja pak:

- (1) Halim tidak aman, menurut perhi-tungan saja, malam ini atau paling lambat besok pagi Halim pasti di-serang. Djadi Bapak harus keluar dari HALIM.
- (2) Dari apa jang saja dengar di KOS-TRAD saja ambil kesimpulan bahwa AURI harus ditjurigai. Karena itu Bapak djangan pergi dengan pesawat terbang.
- (3) Lebih aman melalui djalan darat dan Bapak kami bawa ke Bogor karena Bogor aman dan tidak djauh dari Djakarta. Dengan demikian Bapak dapat dengan tjepat menjelesaikan keruwetan jang sekarang timbul ini.

Pak LEIMENA: Ja Pak, Bogor aman dan tidak djauh dari Djakarta.

Bung KARNO : Betul, mBang, kita ini aman menudju Bogor?
(dalam perdjalan per-tanjaan ini sampai diut-japkan 3x).

Saja : Betul pak, saja mendjamin keamanan Bapak. (saja meng-akuai bahwa utjapan saja ini adalah suatu "omong besar" belaka, tetapi waktu itu perlu untuk me-nenangkan hati Bung KARNO).

k. Kurang lebih djam 24.00 rombongan sampai dengan selamat di Bogor. Sewaktu akan sampai dipintu gerbang Bung KARNO menanyakan pada saja: Bagaimana pendapatmu tentang gerakan-gerakan pasukan KOSTRAD?

Saja: Melihat adanya pasukan2 dikota dan mendengar pemitjaraan di KOSTRAD saja memperhitungkan bahwa Halim akan segera di serang".

Begitu sampai di halaman Istana saja berkata pada Bung KARNO: "Pak, tugas saja selesai membawa pengamanan Bapak".

l. Begitu sampai di Istana Bogor (paviljun) dan Bung KARNO masuk, saja segera tilpon ke KOSTRAD dan berbitjara dengan Djenderal SOEHARTO melaporkan bahwa Bung KARNO sudah di Bogor dan tugas sudah saja selesaikan. Begitu pula Djenderal SABUR sebagai DAN MEN TJA-KRABIRAWA berbitjara melaporkan pada Djenderal SUHARTO.

31. Berikan pendjelasan:

a. Bilamana dan untuk berapa lama bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO telah datang di Istana Bogor?

b. Pemitjaraan apakah jang telah dilakukan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO dengan BungKARNO?

31.a. Bekas Brigdjen SOEPARDJO telah berada di Istana Bogor antara tanggal 2-5 Oktober 1965, dalam rangka berlindung dari pengedjaran. Ia tinggal di paviljun kanan dekat Kebon Raya.

b. Saja tidak mengetahui tentang adanya dan isi pembittjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO ini.

32. Adakah keterangan lain jang hendak sdr. terangkan?

32.a. Sementara ini tidak ada keterangan2 lain jang perlu kami uraikan.

b. Saja selalu siap dan bersedia untuk memberi segala keterangan apa sadja jang saja ketahu untuk membantu mentjari kebenaran/keadilan.

33. Apakah semua keterangan sdr. benar dan berani angkat sumpah atas kebenarannya?

33. Semua keterangan saja adalah benar dan berani angkat sumpah atas hal itu.

34. Apakah sdr. merasa didikte, dipaksa dan ditekan dalam memberikan keterangan2 tersebut diatas?

34. Saja tidak merasa didikte, dipaksa atau ditekan, dalam memberikan keterangan2 tersebut diatas.

Setelah Berita Atjara Pemeriksaan ini dibatjakan kembali dalam bahasa jang dimengerti kepada jang diperiksa, maka ia jang diperiksa membuhuhi tanda tangannya seperti tertera dibawah ini, sebagai tanda-mengerti dan setudju terhadap isi daripada Berita Atjara Pemeriksaan ini,

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO - NRP.:582/p.-

Demikianlah Berita Atjara pemeriksaan ini dibuat dengan sesungguhnya dengan mengingat sumpah pada waktu menerima djabatan, dan kemudian ditutup pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di DJAKARTA.

Jang memeriksa:

S.SOEGIJARJO

LETKOL. CPM - NRP. 12688

AZWIR NAWIE

ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI

KOMANDO OPERASI PEMULIHAN
KEAMANAN DAN KETERTIBAN
TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT

UNTUK KEADILAN

BERITA ATJARA PEMERIKSAAN

- Pada hari ini, hari RABU tanggal dua puluh satu OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami :
1. S.SOEGIJARJO - Pangkat LETKOL CPM - NRP 12688.
 2. AZWIR NAWIE - Pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI

djabatan :

masing-masing anggota Team Pemeriksa pusat, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang saja belum kenal dan jang selandjutnja mengaku bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat : KOLONEL KKO, djabatan : ASKAPERS/MIL (ASSISTEN KEPALA PERSMIL AL/MIL), umur/tanggal lahir: 43 tahun/19 September 1927 tempat kelahiran : Karanganyar - Kebumen, agama : Roma Katholik, alamat/tempat tinggal : Djalan Widjaja 2/ IPI Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

Jan bersangkutan diperiksa sebagai SAKSI dalam perkara perkara G-30-S/PKI.

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanyaan jang diadjukan pemeriksa padanja, maka ia, jang diperiksa, memberikan pengakuan-pengakuan/keterangan 2 seprti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN :

DJAWABAN :

1. Apakah sdr. masih tetap pada keterangan sdr. yang diberikan dalam Berita Atjara Pemeriksaan tanggal 3 Oktober 1970 djam 10.00 yang lalu?
 1. Ja saja masih tetap pada keterangan 2 seperti yang diberikan dalam Berita Atjara Pemeriksaan tanggal 3 Oktober 1970 yang lalu.
2. Apakah sdr. dewasa ini berada dalam keadaan sehat walafiat?
 2. Dewasa ini saja berada dalam keadaan sehat walafiat
- 3 a. Sedjak kapan sdr. diangkat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI, - djelaskan asal mulanja sampai sdr. diangkat mendjadi Adjudan Presiden RI!
 - b. Apabila sdr. tidak lagi mendjabat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI dan djelaskan sebab2nja. Setelah sdr. tidak lagi mendjabat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI, djelaskan pula djabatan2 apa sadja yang pernah sdr. djabat.
- 3a. Saja diangkat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI berdasarkan perintah dan Surat Perintah PANGAL Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA pada bulan Desember 1960. Pada waktu itu telah ada seorang Perwira AL yang mendjadi Adjudan Presiden RI, yakni Kolonel SUSATYO MARDI (sekarang Laksamana Muda Laut, WAPANGKOWILHAN II), dan saja diangkat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI tersebut sebagai penggantinya, karena Kolonel SUSATYO MARDI ditarik kembali ke AL.

Dengan disertai Kolonel SUSATYO MARDI, saja laporan dan mulai dinas sebagai Adjudan pada tanggal 27 Desember 1960.

- b. Saja tidak lagi mendjabat sebagai Adjudan pada achir bulang Djuli 1967 (± tgl. 29) berdasarkan Surat Perintah dan penarikan dari MEN/PANGAL Laksamana MULJADI.

Sebagai pengganti saja telah ditunjuk seorang Perwira AL, Major GURITNO, jang meneruskan tugas sebagai Adjudan Bung KARNO.

Setelah saja tidak lagi mendjadi Adjudan Bung KARNO saja kembali ke AL dan diberikan tugas2:

- 1, Inspektur Djenderal KKO - AL - Agustus 1967 - Desember 1967.
2. Sekolah di SESKOAD - Djanuari 1968 - Juni 1968.
3. Inspektur Djenderal KKO-AL-Djuli 68 Mei 1969.
4. Panglima PASKOARMA I - Mei 1969 Maret 1970.
5. ASKAPERSMIL (MPAL) - April 1970 sampai sekarang.

4. Apakah sdr. selain mendjabat sebagai Adjudan Presiden RI ketika itu dan seterusnya dalam djabatan2 setelah itu di ALRI, ada mendjabat djabatan2 tidak resmi "rangka atau mendjadi salah satu anggauta Orpol atau Ormas?

Selama saja mendjadi Adjudan Presiden RI, maupun setelah itu dan sampai sekarang, saja tidak pernah masuk mendjadi anggauta ataupun mendjabat djabatan2 dalam satu Orpol atau Ormas. Jang pernah saja djabat adalah mendjadi "Ketua Panitia Pembangunan Geredja Roma Katholik Blok B Kebajoran Baru"

mulai tahun 1963 sampai selesainya geredja tersebut, Desember 1965.

5. Sedjak terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI apakah sdr. pernah didengar keterangannya tentang hal2 jang menjangkut peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, maupun menjangkut persoalan bekas Presiden SUKARNO dan Istana, ketjuali dalam pemeriksaan tanggal 3 Oktober 1970 dan pemeriksaan jang dilakukan pada hari ini 21 Oktober 1970?
 - a. Saja pernah didengar keterangan2nja tentang hal2 jang menjangkut peristiwa G-30-S/PKI pada tahun 1967 untuk memberikan kesaksian-kesaksian dalam perkara Djenderal PRANOTO dan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO.
 - b. Mengenai bekas Presiden SUKARNO dan Istana saja belum pernah didengar keterangannya, ketjuali dalam pemeriksaan jang dilakukan pada hari ini 21 Oktober 1970.
6. Kenyataan jang dapat dilihat dan dirasakan bahwa terutama dalam tahun 1965 kegiatan PKI sangat meningkat sehingga hampir disemua bidang kegiatan2 PKI sangat menondjol, harap sdr. djelaskan mengapa pada waktu itu bekas Presiden SOEKARNO sangat men-voortrekken PKI, sehingga boleh dikatakan program2 PKI dapat diterima begitu sadja oleh bekas Presiden SUKARNO.

Menurut saja hal tersebut disebabkan sebagai berikut:

1. Sedjarah Bung KARNÓ menunjukkan bahwa semendjak mudanja telah terus-menerus berdjjuang dan menderita melawan pendjadjahan cq. orang barat/kulit putih, dimana hal ini menjebabkan timbulnja rasa anti-pati pada diri Bung KARNÓ terhadap orang2 Barat. Dalam hal ini PKI dengan segala doktrin dan tjaranja menjetudjui dan mendorong Bung KARNÓ.

2. Semendjak zaman pendjadjahan (Belanda-Djepang) Bung KARNO selalu djadi pemimpin dan djadi Presiden R.I. 1945-1965. Hal ini menjebabkan timbulnja rasa kuasa dan rasa serba kuat, sehingga Bung KARNO merasa akan dapat menguasai semua golongan termasuk dapat menguasai PKI. Sedangkan sebenarnja PKI-lah jang dapat mempergunakan Bung KARNO.
3. Bung KARNO selalu memudji organisasi PKI sebagai organisasi jang baik - teratur - disiplin - militant. Sebaliknya Bung KARNO selalu mengetjam dan tidak puas terhadap organisasi ormas²/orpol lainnja. Untuk dapat mentjapai tjita² dan ambisinja, Bung KARNO memerdulukan organisasi² jang baik/militan. Karena itu Bung KARNO senang terhadap PKI.
4. Chususnja pada permulaan² tahun 1965 Bung KARNO menerima laporan² jang menentang politiknja cq Djenderal² Angkatan Darat. Pada saat itu PKI selalu menundjukkan loyalitas dan dukungannja terhadap Bung KARNO. Karena itu Bung KARNO djadi lebih rapat dan lebih mempertjajai PKI, jang menurut Bung KARNO dapat digunakan untuk melawan golongan jang menentang itu.
5. Berkali-kali Bung KARNO mengatakan bahwa ia seorang Marxist. Hal ini pasti menjebabkan dan sehaluan dengan PKI.
6. Achirnja, karena sifat² pribadi - tjara berfikir - tjita²/ambisi Bung KARNO dan adanja golongan jang menentangnja, terdjadilah pertemuan dan gerak sedjalan antara Bung KARNO dan PKI, jang menjebabkan Bung KARNO selalu voortrekken PKI dan menerima program 2 PKI.

- b. Keterangan2 saja tersebut diatas berdasarkan hal2 jang saja lihat/dengar/saksikan sendiri:
1. Bung KARNO sangat tidak senang terhadap diimportnja kebudayaan Barat, seperti melarang musik ngak-ngik-ngok, dan Bung KARNO sangat senang melihat PKI memupuk kesenian2 rakjat.
 2. Dalam beberapa pertemuan ketjil/tidak resmi Bung KARNO pernah menjatakan bahwa pemimpin 2 PKI masih muda2/kurang garam, sedangkan Bung KARNO sendiri sudah tjukup makan garam politik dan merasa pasti dapat menguasai PKI.
 3. Dalam pertemuan2 resmi/tidak resmi sering Bung KARNO memudji2 tentang kebaikan organisasi PKI, bahkan mengatakan PKI lah jang paling revolusioner, hal mana sangat diperlukan bagi negara jang sedang berrevolusi seperti Indonesia saat itu.
 4. Seringkali Bung KARNO mengatakan bahwa pemimpin2 ormas/orpol lainnja mlempe kurang revolusioner kurang militan dan sebagainya. Hal ini banjak didengar/diketahui oleh orang2/pedjabat2.
 5. Sebelum tanggal 17 Agustus tahun 1963/1964 / 1965, saja mendengar sendiri Bung KARNO berkata pada AIDIT/NJOTO agar PKI turut mengarahkan massa dan turut aktif mendjaga ketertiban/keamanan selama upatjara2 17 Agustus.
Disini djelas adanja kepertjajaan Bung KARNO jang dilimpahkan kepada PKI.

7. Harap sdr. djelaskan dalam hal2 apa sadja bekas Presiden SUKARNO, mem-voortrekken PKI, sehingga terdjadi persamaan djalan pikiran antara bekas Presiden SUKARNO dengan PKI seperti jang telah sdr. terangkan dalam djawaban nomer 6 diatas.

Hal2 jang dapat saja terangkan adanja persamaan djalan/pikiran Bung KARNO dengan PKI:

a. NASAKOM:

Adanja idee NASAKOM jang menurut Bung KARNO bermaksud untuk mempersatukan Bangsa, djelas sekali sangat menguntungkan PKI. Denganlihay dan tjepatnja PKI bergerak agar dimana-mana, dari atas sampai bawah, terdjadi NASAKOMISASI. Move dari PKI sangat disetudjui oleh Bung KARNO sehingga Bung KARNO menerima dan memerintahkan dilakukannja NASAKOMISASI disegala lapangan.

b. LANDREFORM:

Undang2 Landreform sangat menguntungkan PKI dan dipakai oleh PKI untuk politiknya. Dalam hal ini Bung KARNO selalu memihak pada PKI bila terdjadi clash2 dalam pelaksanaan landreform itu.

c. DEWAN DJENDERAL:

Issue adanja DEWAN DJENDERAL ber-kali2 dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO. Meskipun Bung KARNO djuga memerintahkan mengeceknja, tapi achirnja Bung KARNO lebih pertjaja pada orang2 jang melaporkan "bahwa Dewan Djenderal itu ada". Kebanyakan orang2 ini adalah orang2 jang sadar atau tidak sadar berorientasi ke-kiri/PKI.

d. Pidato2 Bung KARNO:

Beberapa dari pidato Bung KARNO jang bersifat kenegaraan berisikan thema/djiwa jang berasal dari nasehat tokoh2 PKI, umpama pidato TAVIP,

TAKARI dan pidato Bung KARNO pada ulang tahun 45 PKI. Pidato 17 Agustus 1965, djelas dibuat/ atau dipengaruhi oleh AIDIT dan NJOTO jang khusus dipanggil dari Peking sebelum tanggal 17 Agustus 1965 tersebut, untuk merumuskan pidato Bung KARNO itu.

e. Pada suatu sidang Kabinet di Istana Negara setelah terdjadinja G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO dengan lantang dan berulang-ulang mengatakan bahwa PKI telah tjukup banjak berdjasa dalam revolusi, bahwa PKI sebagai orpol tidak ber-salah, dan bahwa PKI tidak dapat dibubarkan.

Keterangan2 saja tersebut adalah benar2 saja lihat/dengar /ketahui sewaktu Bung KARNO mengadakan pertemuan2 resmi/tidak resmi atau sewaktu sidang Kabinet, dimana saja sendiri hadir.

8. Berdasarkan djawaban2 sdr. diatas tadi, dimana bekas Presiden SUKARNO selalu voortrekken PKI sehingga achirnja ketemu pada suatu titik persamaan pendapat/djalan pikiran antara Bung KARNO dengan PKI, djelaskan sedjak apabila Bung KARNO menjandarkan dirinja kepada PKI dan dikarenakan apa?

a. Bung KARNO makin kelihatan dekat dengan/menjandarkan dirinja kepada PKI menurut pengamatan saja adalah mulai tahun 1963.

Hal ini dapat dilihat dari makin menondjolnja pimpinan2/tokoh2 PKI duduk dalam Kabinet; seringnja diadakan pertemuan2 antara Bung KARNO dan tokoh2 PKI antara lain: AIDIT, NJOTO, Ir. SAKIRMAN dan LUKMAN, isi/djiwa dari pidato 17 Agustus 1963 (Genta Suara Revolusi) dan pidato2 lainnja selandjutnja jang berdjawa revolusioner Marxisme/Leninisme.

- b. Mengapa Bung KARNO sampai menjandarkan dirinja pada PKI dan Komunis umumnja dikarenakan:
1. Saat itu R.I. sedang berkonfrontasi untuk merebut Irian Barat. Negara2 Komunis dengan gigih memberi bantuan dan mendjandjikan akan terus memberikan bantuan pada Indonesia dan kepada Bung KARNO. Sebaliknya Negara Barat tidak mau memberi bantuan. Hal ini djelas telah menjakitkan hati Bung KARNO dan makin mendorong Bung KARNO kearah Komunis.
 2. Bung KARNO beberapa kali telah menjatakan dirinja djuga seorang Marxist, hal mana menjebabkan dekat/samanja djalan/fikiran antara Bung KARNO dan PKI. Pula menjebabkan adanja kepertjajaan dari negara2 Komunis kepada Bung KARNO.
 3. Bung KARNO seorang jang ambisius. Bung KARNO ingin diakui sebagai salah seorang tokoh/pemimpin dunia jang terpandang. Diantaranja ditjetuskan idee NEFO dimana Bung KARNO mendjadi pemimpin jang terutama. Idee ini chususnja dibantu oleh negara Komunis dan ditolak oleh negara2 Barat.
 4. Adanja pertemuan dan pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan pemimpin2 negara Komunis, chususnja RRT, saja kira telah menelorkan konsep atau strategi2 hubungan timbal balik dan mempererat kerdjasama kedua negara. Pertemuan di Sjanghai pada minggu pertama Juli 1965 antara Bung KARNO dan CHOU EN LAI lebih menguatkan lagi adanja persetujuan/perdjandjian antara 2 tokoh ini.
 5. Mengenai hasil pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan pemimpin2 negara Komunis jang dapat saja ingat:

a. Bung KARNO-KRUTJOF di Moscow.

Rusia menjanggupi untuk memberi bantuan dalam merebut Irian Barat berupa sendjata, kapal perang dan kapal terbang. Dalam perundingan ini saja ikut hadlir.

b. Bung KARNO-CHOU EN LAI di Sjanghai.

RRT menjanggupi untuk memberi bantuan dalam konfrontasi RI terhadap Malaysia. RRT menjanggupi untuk memberi 100.000 putjuk sendjata guna melengkapikan ke V, jang njatanja dikemudian hari sendjata2 ini dipergunakan oleh orang PKI dalam G-30-S/PKI.

Akibat dari perdjandjian inilah maka dikirim misi OMAR DANI ke RRT pada ± bulan September 1965.

Dalam rundingan ini saja tidak hadlir, tetapi dapat mendengar hasilnja setelah perundingan selesai.

9. Bagaimanakah pandangan PKI chususnja terhadap Angkatan Darat, sehingga achirnja ada issu tentang adanja Dewan Djenderal jang terdiri dari Pati2 Angkatan Darat jang tidak loyal/tidak menjenangi politik Bung KARNO, jang mana achirnja issue Dewan Djenderal itu sampai di Istana/Bung KARNO.

Apa jang saja ketahui dan dapat saja djelaskan adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. PKI ingin dan bermaksud menguasai rakjat dan pemerintah Indonesia. Dalam usaha mentjapai maksud ini PKI melihat bahwa penghalang utama adalah Angkatan Darat jang tidak mudah diterobosnja.

- b. Angkatan Darat, khususnya pemimpinnya, jelas sekali tidak menyetujui komunisme baik tjita² maupun tjara-tjaranja. Hal ini disebabkan banyak hal, antara lain:
- Perwira² AD sebagian besar adalah pejuang² mulai '45 jang bertjita-tjita luhur Indonesia Merdeka berdasarkan Pantjasila.
 - Pengalaman dalam revolusi fisik (45-49) telah membuktikan adanya pengchianatan PKI dengan peristiwa Madiun, dimana Angkatan Darat terutama jang menghanturkan PKI.
 - Doktrin² kemiliteran Angkatan Darat terutama berdasarkan doktrin kemiliteran negara Barat.
- c. Karena tiktik a dan tiktik b tersebut maka jelas sekali bahwa PKI sangat tidak senang terhadap AD. Karena itu dengan segala daya PKI mengusahakan agar pimpinan² Angkatan Darat dapat disingkirkan. Maka dibuatnja issue tentang adanya Dewan Djenderal jang menentang politik Bung KARNO, sehingga issue, tersebut benar² dapat termakan oleh Bung KARNO. Dalam melontarkan issue ini PKI telah pula dibantu oleh beberapa perwira AD jang dengan sadar atau tidak sadar telah melaporkan dan memperkuat issue buatan PKI itu. Achirnja Bung KARNO jang memang sudah dekat dengan PKI, ditambah lagi dengan laporan² oleh perwira² Angkatan Darat tersebut diatas, memerintahkan untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal Angkatan Darat jang dianggap menentangnja.

10. Sehubungan dengan dibunuhnja para Pati AD (alm. Djenderal YANI cs). dalam peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, apakah ada niat jang bersamaan antara Bung KARNO dengan PKI, langsung atau tidak langsung Bung KARNO telah terlibat atau melibatkan diri pada peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, sesudah maupun sebelumnja?

Menurut fakta2 jang telah terdjadi seperti telah saja djelaskan dalam uraian2 sebelumnja, djelas terdapat persamaan niat antara Bung KARNO dengan PKI didalam usaha menjingirkan Djenderal AD.

1. PKI memang telah njata tidak senang pada pemimpin2 AD sehingga dilontarkan issue adanja Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat jang menentang Bung KARNO. Tudjuan PKI ini adalah agar Djenderal2 tersebut ditingak oleh Bung KARNO.
2. Bung KARNO jang memang sudah dekat dengan PKI, menerima issue tersebut sehingga memerintahkan agar Djenderal2 AD tersebut diambil tindakan.

Djelas disini dasar apapun motipnja masing2 adanja persamaan niat antara Bung KARNO dan PKI.

- b. Setjara langsung atau tidak langsung Bung KARNO djuga terlibat dengan peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.
 1. Tanggal 30 September 1965 malam hari Bung KARNO telah menerima surat dari bekas LetKol UNTUNG.
 2. Tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi Bung KARNO berada di Halim dan menerima laporan2 dari bekas Brig djen SUPARDJO, tetapi sebaliknja tidak berusaha mendapatkan laporan dari fihak Angkatan Darat.

3. Bung KARNO tidak bertindak apa2 dengan adanja pengumuman pendemisioneran Kabinet oleh pimpinan G-30-S/PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
4. Bung KARNO tidak berusaha metjari berita tentang ditjuliknja/dibunuhnja Djenderal2 AD, setelah mendengar adanja peristiwa tersebut.
5. Bung KARNO telah menundjuk Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai care-taker pimpinan AD, padahal tjalon tersebut diadjukan/disetudju oleh G-30-S/PKI lewat Brigdjen SUPARDJO.
6. Bung KARNO selalu menjatakan bahwa peristiwa G-30-S/PKI adalah soal ketjil dalam revolusi, hal jang sama dengan pendapat/usaha PKI.
7. Bung KARNO tidak pernah mau mengutuk G-30-S/PKI.
8. Bung KARNO tidak pernah mau mengutuk dan membubarkan PKI, bahkan sebaliknja selalu voortrekken PKI.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnja dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka is, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari KAMIS tanggal 22 Oktober 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO.

Jang memeriksa:

1. S. SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM NRP;
12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS
BESAR POLISI.

Pada hari ini, hari KAMIS tanggal dua puluh dua Oktober tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S. SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM - NRP: 12688.
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI.

masing-masing adalah Anggauta Team Pemeriksa Pusat, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat: KOLONEL KKO, djabatana: ASKAPERS/MIL (ASS. KEPALA PERSMIL AL), umur/tanggal lahir: 43 tahun/19 September 1927, tempat kelahiran: Karanganyar - Kebumen, agama Roma Katholik, alamat/tempat tinggal: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadjukan padanja, ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2 / pengakuan2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAN:

DJAWABAN:

11. Apakah Pati2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARN0, sama dengan Pati2 AD jang tidak disenangi/disukai oleh PKI, djika sama harap didjelaskan tentang persamaan itu dan hubungannja antara PKI dan Bung KARN0 sehingga terdjadindja suatu pembunuhan terhadap para Pati tersebut:
 - a. Sepandjang pengetahuan saja, Pati2 AD jang dibunuh pada peristiwa G-30-S/PKI adalah Pati2 Ad jang dianggap tidak loyal oleh Bung KARN0 dan djuga Pati2 jang tidak disenangi/tidak disukai oleh PKI.

Tegasnja, memang ada persamaan:

1. Saja pernah melihat/mendengar (sesuai keterangan - keterangan saja pada pemeriksaan 3 Oktober 1970) adanja Pati2 AD jang ditegor dimarahi oleh Bung KARNO karena dianggap tidak loyal Pati2 tersebut adalah Djenderal YANI, Djenderal PARMAN, Djenderal SUTDJO, Djenderal HARJONO, dan Djenderal SUPARTO.
2. Saja kenal baik dengan Djenderal YANI den Djenderal PARMAN. Dari utjapan2 beliau2 ini dan sikap langkahnja saja mengetahui bahwa Pati2 ini memang anti komunis. Begitu pula para Pati2 AD lainnja, saja mendengar mempunjai sikap pendirian jang serupa.

PKI dapat mengetahui akan sikap/pendirian para PATI tersebut karenanja PKI makin tidak senang pada Pati2 ini jang djelas akan menghalang-halangi rentjana PKI Hal inilah terutama jang makin mendorong PKI untuk setjepatnja menjingkirkan Pati2 itu.

- b. Tentang hubungan antara PKI dan Bung KARNO sehingga terdjadinja pembunuhan terhadap Pati2 tersebut, jang djelas kedua fihak (PKI + BK) mempunjai satu kepentingan. Bung KARNO menghendaki disingkirkanja para Pati jang dianggap tidak loyal dan PKI menghendaki hilangnja para Pati tersebut jang anti komunis. Dalam penjingkiran/pembunuhan para Pati tersebut terdapat djuga adanja hubungan, yakni Bung KARNO mempertjajai bekas Letkol UNTUNG dan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO,

dimana orang2 ini djelas merupakan orang
PKI.

Fakta2 jang dapat saja terangkan:

- a. Beberapa kali saja mendengar/mengetahui bahwa Djenderal YANI dan Djenderal NASUTION memberi nasehat pada Bung KARNO djangan terlalu memberi angin pada PKI; agar Bung KARNO ingat pada peristiwa pengchianatan PKI di Madiun (1948).
- b. Djenderal YANI pernah mengutarakan kepada Bung KARNO, pada suatu pertemuan di Istana, adanja bahaja2 jang akan ditimbulkan oleh PKI mengingat makin besar/kuatnja PKI pada waktu itu (1965).
- c. Pada suatu sidang Koti di Istana, sewaktu Bung KARNO melontarkan idee Angkatan ke V telah ditolak oleh Djenderal YANI dan Panglima2 Angkatan lainnja.

12. Harap sdr. djelaskan tentang hubungan antara Bung KARNO dengan pemimpin2 PKI, siapa2 diantaranja jang senantiasa bergaul rapat dan selalu memberikan nasehat2 kepa Bung KARNO (sehingga nasehat2 itu selalu dituruti oleh Bung KARNO), baik sewaktu proloog, sewaktu terdjadinja kedjadian 1 Oktober 1965 dan setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

- a. Sebelum terdjadinja G-30-S/PKI tokoh2 PKI jang saja ketahui sering bertemu dengan Bung KARNO adalah NJOTO dan AIDIT. Disamping mereka datang di Istana sesuai dengan atjara2 formil (tertjatat dalam lembaran Staf Instruksi Adjudan Presiden),

kadang 2 djuga datang dengan medadak atas perintah/panggilan Bung KARNO sehingga tidak tertjantum dalam Staf Instruksi tersebut.

Saran2/nasehat2 dari tokoh2 PKI jang disampaikan dan diterima/diturut oleh Bung KARNO antara lain:

1. Agar dilaksanakan saran CHEN YI (RRT) terbentuknja Angkatan ke V. Hal ini terutama menurut PKI dapat dipakai untuk lebih mensukseskan djalannja revolusi dan dapat dipakai untuk mengimbangi kekuatan Angkatan Darat jang bersikap anti komunis.
 2. Agar Bung KARNO lebih gigih membrantas diimportnja kebudajaan/kesenian negara2 barat dan memupuk kesenian2 rakjat dimana LEKRA (PKI) telah lebih maju memelopori.
 3. Kejakinan Bung KARNO tentang memang adanja "our local Armu friends" seperti tertjantum dalam zogenaamd document Gilchrist dan disebutnja Dewan Djenderal jang tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO.
- b. Dalam peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, tanggal 1 Oktober 1965, saja tidak melihat/mengetahui adanja hubungan langsung antara Bung KARNO dan tokoh2 PKI, jang saja ketahui adalah bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO telah menghadap dan melaporkan pada Bung KARNO di Halim, dimana hubungan antara Bung KARNO dan tokoh2 PKI melalui bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO tersebut.
- c. Setelah tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
1. Selama Bung KARNO ada di Istana Bogor

telah pernah bertemu dengan NJOTO, tanggal 6 Oktober 1965, dimana NJOTO menjampaikan surat pada Bung KARNO dan saran2 lesan tentang penjelesaian peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

Dari surat dan saran tersebut itulah terdjadinja instruksi Bung KARNO:

- Penjelesaian G-30-S/PKI ditangan Presiden/Pangti.
- Harus ada ketenangan djangan meng-
utuk Dewan Djenderal maupun G-30-
S/PKI.
- Semua alat revolusi supaja bekerdja
seperti biasa.
- Keamanan dibebaskan pada Kepolisian
- Semua alat revolusi supaja berkom-
petisi melaksanakan 5 azimat revo-
lusi.
- Dilarang saling menuduh/menjalah-
kan.

2. Dalam sidang Kabinet di Istana Negara-
Djakarta Bung KARNO telah dengan te-
gas tidak mau mengutuk dan membubar-
kan PKI dan menondjol2kan djasa2
PKI.
3. NJOTO jang pada waktu itu masih Men-
teri Negara turut memberi saran/na-
sehat pada Bung KARNO agar dibentuk/
didirikan "Barisan SUKARNO" guna
meneruskan tegaknja kewibawaan Bung
KARNO jang berarti melindungi PKI
dan guna mengimbangi kekuatan Ang-
katan Darat + kekuatan masa lain
jang anti komunis/anti SOEKARNO"
itu. NJOTO djuga menjarankan atau
satidak tidaknja memperkuat pentja-

lonan Letkol SJAFIIE mendjadi Menteri Negara urusan keamanan jang nantinja diberi wewenang memimpin Barisan SUKARNO.

13. Apakah sewaktu sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, katakanlah setelah santernja issue mengenai adanja Dewan Djenderal jang dilontarkan oleh golongan PKI, pernah terdjadi perundingan2/ pemitjaraan2 antara Bung KARNO dengan pemimpin PKI atau orang lain jang berorientasi dengan PKI, untuk mengadakan tindakan2 atau penggantian terhadap pimpinan Angkatan Darat. Djika ada siapa2 orangnja dan apa jang dibitjarkan dan dimana tempatnja.
- a. Mengenai penggantian pimpinan Angkatan Darat jang saja tahu pasti adanja pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dengan beberapa perwira Angkatan Darat seperti Djenderal MURSID Djenderal SJAFIUDIN, Djenderal SU- DIRGO, Djenderal SABUR dan Djenderal SUNAR- JO, sesuai dengan keterangan2 jang saja berikan pada pemeriksaan tanggal 3 Oktober 1970.
 - b. Adanja issue Dewan Djenderal jang dilontarkan oleh PKI djelas terlihat adanja kepentingan PKI pada siapa2 Pati AD jang dapat/ pantas memimpin Angkatan Darat menurut pandangan PKI.
Pada bulan Agustus dan September 1965 tokoh PKI NJOTO dan AIDIT telah bertemu dan mengadakan pemitjaraan dengan Bung KARNO di Istana Djakarta. Dalam soal ini dapat dilihat djelas dengan dipanggilnja AIDIT dan NJOTO dari Luar Negeri pada achir Djuli 1965 dan chususnja NJOTO jang

lebih lambat dari AIDIT.

NJOTO segera dipanggil dan mengadakan pembitjaraan dengan Bung KARNO, dimana terlihat djelas akan pentingnja NJOTO bagi Bung KARNO.

Saja tidak hadlir pada pertemuan Bung KARNO - NJOTO ini dan tidak mengetahui apa jang dibitjarakan, tetapi dikemudian hari saja mengetahui bahwa Bung KARNO menjuruh NJOTO membuat pidato tanggal 17 Agustus 1965 dan kemungkinan besar djuga membittjarakan soal perwira2 AD dan penggantian pimpinan AD.

14. Sesuài djawaban sdr. dalam BAP tanggal 3 Oktober 1970 No. 23 dimana Bung KARNO menerima surat dari UNTUNG, bagaimanakah keadaan atau reaksi Bung KARNO pada saat setelah membuat surat tersebut diteras Istora Senajan tanggal 30 September 1965 malam itu?

Jang saja ingat, setelah membuat surat tersebut Bung KARNO kelihatan "tevreden" dan meng-angguk2kan kepala, tanpa berkata apa2. Surat dimasukkan kembali kedalam saku djasnja. Setelah itu Bung KARNO kembali lagi ketempat duduk/tempat upatjara.

Pada giliran Bung KARNO menjampaikan pidato sambutannja, kelihatan benar betapa semangat dan gembiranja. Isi dan tjara pidato sangat ber-api2, membakar semangat, Bung KARNO menjuruh Dr. LEIMENA maju ke mimbar dan menjandi lagu Maluku, jang mendapat sambutan meriah dari hadlirin.

Dalam perdjalanan pulang dari Istora ke Istana tidak ada hal2 jang menjolok. Setelah tiba di Istana (± djam 24.00) sajalaporan

pada Bung KARNO tentang atjara tamu2 jang besok paginja (10Oktober 1965) akan menghadap, jakni Djenderal YANI, Pak LEIMENA, J.M. DALAM, Djenderal HARTAWAN dan lain2 tamu jang tidak ingat lagi tetapi dapat dilihat dalam buku tamu Adjudan Presiden, Oktober 1965.

Bung KARNO jang menerima laporan saja itu hanja mengangguk dan berkata "ja baik!" Setelah itu saja mohon diri, mengutjapkan selamat malam/tidur, dan terus pulang kerumah, ± djam 24.00.

15. Apakah dapat sdr. perkirakan bahwa isi surat dari UNTUNG jang disampaikan kepada Bung KARNO tanggal 30 September 1965 malam itu berisikan pemberitahuan tentang akan dimulainja gerakan menindak para Djenderal jang tidak menjenangi politik Bung KARNO atau jang membangkang kepada Bung KARNO.

Dengan pengetahuan adanja Djenderal2 AD jang tidak disenangi Bung KARNO, adanja perintah kepada Djenderal SABUR supaja menindak Djenderal2 tersebut, adanja pemanggilan terhadap bekas Letkol UNTUNG oleh Bung KARNO pada tgl 4 Agustus 1965, adanja reaksi Bung KARNO jang kelihatan tevreden setelah menerima surat dari bekas Letkol UNTUNG itu, sekarang saja dapat memperkirakan bahwa isi surat tersebut adalah suatu pemberitahuan dari UNTUNG pada Bung KARNO tentang akan dimulainja gerakan menindak para Djenderal.

16. Sesuai djawaban sdr. nomer 14 bahwa setelah sdr. dan Bung KARNO tiba di Istana dari Istana tanggal 30 September 1965 ± djam 24.00 sdr. telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO

tentang tamu2 jang akan diterima besoknja tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Istana Merdeka (antara lain Djenderal YANI dll), apakah sebabnja Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi tidak langsung menudju ke Istana seperti biasanja?

Mengapa Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 65 dari rumahnja Dewi tidak langsung menudju ke Istana tetapi lalu belok menudju rumah HARJATI di Grogol, menurut saja adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan pada Djenderal SABUR dan UNTUNG (Men Tjakrabirawa) supaya menindak para Djenderal. Dalam fikiran Bung KARNO tentunja memastikan bahwa pasukan Men Tjakrabirawalah jang akan melakukan gerakan tersebut dan seperti biasanja djuga pasukan Men Tjakra-lah jang akan mendjaga Istana.
- b. Dalam perdjalananan dari rumah Dewi ke Istana pagi itu di Djalan Thamrin, DAN DKP MANGIL jang mengawal Bung KARNO menerima berita per radio dari Kolonel SAELAN bahwa Istana dikepung oleh pasukan2 jang tidak dikenal dan Bung KARNO supaya djangan ke Istana tetapi supaya kerumah HARJATI di Grogol. Adanja pasukan jang tidak dikenal itu, dan bukan pasukan Tjakrabirawa, menjebabkan diambilnja keputusan untuk tidak langsung ke Istana tetapi terus ke Grogol.

17. Djika demikian djawaban sdr. tersebut diatas, maka kepergian Bung KARNO ke Halim tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 bukan setjara kebetulan, djelaskan pengetahuan sdr. dalam hal ini, dan

apakah sewaktu Bung KARNO sudah berada di Halim diketahui pasukan mana jang mengepung Istana itu.

a. Bahwa kepergian Bung KARNO dari Grogol ke Halim itu bukan setjara kebetulan, menurut saja memang begitu.

1. Sebelum ada peristiwa G-30-S/PKI Bung KARNO selalu menilai bahwa AURI lah jang paling progressip-revolusioner menurut tjara Bung KARNO. OMAR DANI sebagai MEN/PANGAU selalu menundjukkan loyalitasnja pada Bung KARNO dan dalam pemitjaraan2 sebelum 1 Oktober 1965, OMAR DANI berkali-kali mengatakan akan persetudjuannja untuk menindak Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal pada Bung KARNO. OMAR DANI djuga menjatakan akan berdiri dibelakang Bung KARNO.

Karena itu Bung KARNO akan merasa lebih aman/tenang kalau berada di Halim.

2. Dari Grogol telah diadakan kontak dengan Halim dimana OMAR DANI mempersilahkan Bung KARNO ke Halim. Hal ini makin mejakinkan Bung KARNO untuk pergi ke Halim.

3. Bung KARNO tahu bahwa antara OMAR DANI dan tokoh2 PKI terdapat hubungan erat. Hal tersebut menjebabkan djuga diketahuinja oleh Bung KARNO bahwa di Halim (dimana OMAR DANI berada), tentuja terdapat djuga tokoh2 PKI.

Adanja kesamaan kehendak antara Bung KARNO dan PKI untuk menjingkirkan Djenderal2 AD lebih mendorong Bung KARNO untuk pergi ke Halim, dimana orang2 jang sefaham dengannja itu berada.

b. Setelah Bung KARNO berada di Halim diketahuinja bahwa pasukan jang mengepung Istana pada pagi itu adalah pasukan G-30-S/PKI. Hal tersebut berdasarkan laporan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO jang melaporkannja pada Bung KARNO.

18. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Isi laporan dari Brigdjen SUPARDJO jang disampaikan kepada Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Halim sebagai hasil pelaksanaan gerakan G-30-S/PKI.
- b. Pengetahuan Bung KARNO terhadap kedudukan Brigdjen SUPARDJO pada waktu itu dalam gerakan G-30-S/PKI.
- c. Bagaimanakah sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap laporan Brigdjen SUPARDJO tersebut.
- d. Siapa2 jang mendengar laporan tersebut dan bagaimana sikap/reaksi mereka?

Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi sewaktu bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO tiba di Halim dan melaporkan pada Bung KARNO (± djam), saja belum berada di situ. Saja tiba di Halim pada ± djam 11.30. Setelah saja tiba di Halim dan bertemu dengan rombongan Bung KARNO barulah saja mendengar tjeritera/keterangan tentang pertemuan Bung KARNO dan bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO itu. Jang memberi keterangan pada saja ini adalah Kolonel SAELAN, AKBP MANGIL dan SUPARTO.

- a. Bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO bahwa tugas jang dibebankan kepadanya untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD telah dilaksanakan. Djenderal jang telah berhasil diambil dari rumahnja adalah: 1. Djenderal YANI, 2.

2. Djenderal PARMAN, 3. Djenderal HARJONO, 4. Djenderal SUTOJO, 5. Djenderal SUPARTO, 6. Djenderal PANDJAITAN, sedangkan Djenderal NASUTION jang djuga didjadikan sasaran telah lolos.
- b. Bung KARNO menganggap dan memperlakukan bekas Brigjden SUPARDJO sebagai Komandan jang memimpin tindakan gerakan pembersihan dan rupanja telah mengetahui sebelumnja bahwa bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO itulah pelaksana utamanja.
- c. Sewaktu dan setelah menerima laporan dari bekas Brigdjen SUPARDJO, Bung KARNO kelihatan tevreden, sambil menepuk-nepuk bahu SUPARDJO ia berkata: "Je hebt goed gedaan. Kenapa NASUTION kok lolos".
- d. Jang turut menjaksikan dan mendengar laporan SUPARDJO itu adalah: OMAR DANI, Brigdjen SABUR, Kolonel SAELAN, AKBP MANGIL, Brigdjen SOENARJO, SUPARTO. Bagaimana reaksi mereka, saja tidak mengetahui.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnja dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh mambatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangananja dibawah ini. Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari DJUM'AT tanggal 23 Oktober 1970.

Jang diperiksa:

Jang memeriksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

KOLONEL KKO

1. S.SOEGIARJO

LETKOL CPM NRP +
12688

2. AZWIR NAWIE

ADJUN KOMISARIS
BESAR POLISI

Pada hari ini, hari DJUMAT tanggal DUA PULUH TIGA OKTOBER tahun 19.00 TUDJUH PULUH, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM - NRP: 12688.
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI

djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggota TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan lanjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat: KOLONEL KKO, djabatan: ASKAPERS/MIL (Assisten Kepala PERSMIL AL), umur/tanggal lahir: 43 tahun/19 September 1927, tempat kelahiran: Karanganyar - Kebumen, agama: Roma Katholik, alamat/tempat tinggal: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

Selanjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadjukan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan-pengakuan seperti tertera dibawah ini;

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

19. Bagaimanakah sikap dan reaksi Bung KARNO sewaktu adanya pengumuman2 tentang pendemisioneran Kabinet, pengumuman2 Gerakan 30 September/PKI dan pengumuman2 Dewan Revolusi, sewaktu tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 ketika Bung KARNO berada di Halim?
- 19.a. Sewaktu Bung KARNO mendengar pengumuman2 lewat radio tentang pendemisioneran Ka-

binet dan sebagainya jang disiarkan oleh G-30-S/PKI, saja melihat/mengetahui sendiri bahwa Bung KARNO bersikap tenang2 sadja, tidak terkedjut, dan tidak menunjukkan reaksi jang menolak/menentang pengumuman2 tersebut.

Dari sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO tersebut saja berpendapat bahwa Bung KARNO menje-tudjui pengumuman2 itu.

Para pedjabat jang waktu itu telah tiba dan berada diruangan dalam adalah:

OMAR DANI, Djenderal, SUTARDHIO, Djenderal SOENARJO dan Djenderal SABUR.

- b. Setelah itu, pedjabat2 jang dipanggil satu per satu mulai tiba di (Halim), seperti Laksamana MARTADINATA, Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO, Pak LEIMENA. Bung KARNO mengadakan pembitjaraan2 dengan pedjabat-pedjabat itu diruangan dalam. Saja sendiri bersama Adjudan lain dan pedjabat keamanan berada diruangan depan, sedangkan Djenderal SABUR turut berada diruang dalam.

Sore harinja saja mendengar bahwa dalam pembitjaraan-pembitjaraan Bung KARNO dengan para pedjabat itu keluar kata2 Bung KARNO antara lain:

- (1) "Kamu mengetahui tentang susunan Dewan Revolusi? Ini daftarnja".
Kalimat ini selalu ditudjukan kepada setiap pedjabat jang datang satu per satu tadi.
- (2) "Kedjadian seperti ini (G-30-S) adalah lumrah dalam suatu revolusi".
Kalimat ini dikatakan oleh Bung KARNO dalam mengutarakan pendapatnja tentang adanja G-30-S/PKI.

(3) "Het is alleen een rimpeltje in de oceaan".

Kalimat ini sebagai komentar Bung KARNO terhadap ditjulik/dibunuhnja Djenderal2 AD.

20. Apakah sikap Bung KARNO, jang telah menjetud-
jui, terhadap pengumuman Dewan Revolusi ter-
sebut jaitu mengenai adanja susunan Dewan
Revolusi dan pendemisioneran Kabinet Pemerin-
tah RI jang telah dinjatakan kepada SUPARDJO
pada waktu Bung KARNO menerima daftar susunan
Dewan Revolusi.

20. Bung KARNO telah menerima daftar susunan
Dewan Revolusi djauh sebelum ada pengu-
muman2 lewat radio, jang diterimanja dari
SUPARDJO pada pagi hari.
Dengan menerimanja daftar tersebut dan ti-
dak mengadakan penentangan/penolakan ter-
hadap daftar tersebut, ataupun tidak meng-
ambil tindakan terhadap SUPARDJO itu sen-
diri, djelas bahwa Bung KARNO sudah menje-
tudjui semua pengumuman2 lewat radio, se-
mendjak pagi harinja sewaktu menerima
laporan dari SUPARDJO. Sikap maupun kata2/
kalimat apa jang telah dikeluarkan oleh
Bung KARNO kepada SUPARDJO sewaktu Bung
KARNO menerima laporan/daftar setjara lang-
sung dari SUPARDJO saja tidak dapat den-
gan pasti menerangkan, karena pada saat
itu saja tidak ada disitu/belum tiba di
Halim.

21. Setelah para pedjabat, seperti Dr. J. LEIMENA,
PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, PANGAL Laksama-
na R.E. MARTADINATA, Djenderal SUTARDHIO,
Djenderal SOENARJO, Djenderal SABUR, dan lain2

jang pada waktu itu berada di Halim mengetahui adanya daftar susunan Dewan Revolusi dan pengumuman2 Dewan Revolusi antara lain pen- demisioneran Kabinet. Saran2 apakah jang telah di berikan oleh para pedjabat tersebut kepada Bung KARNO dalam menghadapi situasi pada saat itu (1 Oktober 1965) sehubungan dengan hal2 tersebut?

Berikan pula pendjelasan tentang sikap dan tanggapan Bung KARNO terhadap saran2 itu.

21.a. Ketjuali OMAR DANI, umumnja semua pedja- bat jang hadlir waktu itu telah menund- jukkan sikap jang sangat terkedjut ter- hadap adanya pengumuman2 jang dikeluar- kan oleh G-30-S/PKI. Mereka menundjukkan sikap jang tidak menjetudju pengumuman2 itu dan memberikan saran-saran pada Bung KARNO dalam menghadapi situasi saat itu.

(1) Pak LEIMENA, jang turut mengalami penembakan rumahnja, telah melaporkan kedjadian pentjulikan/pembunuhan Djende- ral2 dan menjarankan pada Bung KARNO agar sangat berhati-hati dalam menghadapi situasi dan djangan begitu sadja pertjaja pada laporan2 dari fihak G-30-S/PKI.

Seingat saja djuga pada siang hari itu pak LEIMENA telah menjarankan pada Bung KARNO agar meninggalkan Halim. Hal ini adalah atas desakan kami (SAELAN, MANGIL, saja sendiri) kepada Pak LEIMENA setelah kami mendengar siaran2 radio tersebut.

(2) Laksamana MARTADINATA jang sebelum pergi ke Halim telah menghubungi KOSTRAD terlebih dahulu, tela melaporkan pada Bung KARNO bahwa Djenderal SUHARTO telah mengambil oper pimpinan Angkatan Darat.

Beliau menjarankan pada Bung KARNO agar diadakan hubungan antara Bung KARNO dan KOSTRAD serta supaya Bung KARNO djuga mendengar laporan dari KOSTRAD.

(3) Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDDDIHARDJO menundjukkan sikap jang sangat berhati-hati dan saran jang diberikan pada Bung KARNO djuga amat hati2.

b. Bung KARNO jang menerima laporan2 dan saran-saran dari pada pedjabat tersebut telah menundjukkan sikap jang amat tjon-dong pada G-30-S/PKI.

(1) Bung KARNO tidak pernah menjalahkan /tindakan pentjulikan/pembunuhan Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat.

(2) Bung KARNO menundjukkan sikap jang menjetudjui semua pengumuman G-30-S/PKI jang dikeluarkan hari itu.

(3) Bung KARNO menolak saran untuk menghubungi KOSTRAD karena menganggap seluruh kekuatan di KOSTRAD dibelakang Dewan Djenderal.

(4) Bung KARNO tidak mau mendengar saran untuk meninggalkan Halim, karena berada di Halim itu ia merasa aman.

(5) Berkali-kali Bung KARNO mengatakan bahwa kedjadian seperti G-30-S/PKI itu adalah biasa sadja dalam suatu revolusi.

22. Didalam pelaporan ex Brigdjjen SUPARDJO kepada Bung KARNO (sesuai djawaban sdr. no. 18 punt (c), mengapa Bung KARNO telah memudji-mudji tindakan SUPARDJO dengan perkataan2 antara lain: "Je hebt goed gedaan" sambil menepuk-nepuk bahu SUPARDJO.

22.a. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, dengan melalui OMAR DANI, telah ada hubungan

antara Bung KARNO dan SUPARDJO. Pada tanggal 29 September 1965 SUPARDJO telah menghadap Bung KARNO bersama OMAR DANI dan menurut apa jang saja dengar kemudian SUPARDJO melaporkan pada Bung KARNO tentang Djenderal-Djenderal AD jang tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO dan kesiapannja SUPARDJO bersama pasukan-pasukan AD jang progressip untuk bergerak.

Adanja hubungan ini dan laporan2 dari SUPARDJO tersebut, B.K. mengetahui bahwa SUPARDJO telah turut membantu SABUR dan UNTUNG dalam mengadakan gerakan/tindakan pembersihan terhadap Djenderal AD..

- b. Dengan back-ground seperti tersebut diatas maka pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi sewaktu SUPARDJO laporan pada Bung KARNO tentang telah diambil/dibunuhnja Djenderal2 AD, maka Bung KARNO telah memudji SUPARDJO dan menjatakan kepuasannja. Keesokan harinja, 2 Oktober 1965 pagi Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan SUPARDJO dengan surat untuk menghentikan semua gerakan dan tidak boleh ada tembak-menembak.

23. Apakah sebabnja Bung KARNO tidak segera memerintahkan untuk mentjari para korban jang terdiri dari MEN/PANGAD Djenderal A.YANI dan Pati2lainnja dan Bung KARNO tidak pula memerintahkan untuk melakukan tindakan terhadap pelaku2nja, demikian pula Bung KARNO tidak bertindak selaku Kepala Negara, terhadap pendemisioneran Kabinet dan terhadap mereka jang mendalangi G-30-S/PKI itu?

23.a. Seperti saja terangkan terdahulu bahwa telah ada persamaan niat antara Bung

KARNO dan PKI untuk menjingkirkan Djenderal AD jang pada njatanja nama2 Djenderal2 tersebut adalah sama. Karena itu sewaktu Bung KARNO menerima laporan tentang ditjuluk/dibunuhnja Djenderal2 AD ia tidak segera memerintahkan untuk mentjuri para korban tersebut karena korban2 itu adalah Djenderal2 jang tidak ia senangi.

- b. Bahwa Bung KARNO tidak memerintahkan menindak terhadap para pelaku pentjulikan /pembunuhan itu adalah wadjar karena para pelaku itu memang orang2 jang ia perintahkan melalui UNTUNG dan SUPARDJO.
- c. Bung KARNO mengakui sendiri bahwa ia seorang marxist, djadi sedjalan dengan PKI. Disamping itu pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 berdasarkan laporan2 jang ia terima dari SUPARDJO, OMAR DANI, SABUR ia mengira bahwa G-30-S/PKI itu kuat dan menang. Karena itu, ia tidak mengambil tindakan apa2 atas pendemisioneran Kabinet oleh G-30-S/PKI.

24. Setelah sdr. kembali dari KOSTRAD untuk menemui Djenderal SUHARTO atas perintah Bung KARNO untuk memanggil antara lain Djenderal PRANOTO Pak HARTO telah berpesan kepada Bung KARNO lewat sdr. antara lain "bahwa pimpinan AD berada pada Pak HARTO" ditambah dengan saran MEN/PANGAL Laksamana alm. R.E.MARTADINATA (djawaban sdr. no. 21) mengapa Bung KARNO pada waktu itu tidak lantas berhubungan dengan Djenderal SUHARTO?

24.a. Dari semula, Bung KARNO telah mentjuri gai semua kekuatan AD adalah pro Dewan Djenderal dan anti Bung KARNO.

Berdasarkan laporan2 dari SUPARDJO pasukan2 AD dibawah KOSTRAD cq. dpb Djenderal SUHARTO itulah jang menentang G-30-S/PKI. Karena Bung KARNO lebih tjondong pada G-30-S/PKI maka Bung KARNO mulai pagi hari tidak mau berhubungan dengan KOSTRAD cq. Djenderal SUHARTO.

- b. Setelah saja laporan pada malam hari, 1 Oktober 1965, dan menjampaikan pesan Djenderal SUHARTO bahwa pimpinan Angkatan Darat untuk waktu itu diambil oper oleh Djenderal SUHARTO, Bung KARNO mendjadi marah. Rentjana Bung KARNO adalah menundjuk Djenderal PRANOTO jang djadi caretaker pimpinan AD.

Karena tidak setudju dengan Djenderal SUHARTO inilah maka djuga setelah itu/ malam itu Bung KARNO tidak mau berhubungan dengan Djenderal SUHARTO.

25. Berikan pendjelasan atau pengetahuan sdr., apakah Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Halim, telah mengetahui bahwa tokoh2 atau pimpinan PKI, pada waktu itu telah berada di Halim dan turut mengendalikan gerakan G-30-S PKI.

Bila benar demikian dengan djalan apa atau dari siapakah Bung KARNO mengetahui hal tersebut.

- 25.a. Menurut saja, Bung KARNO pasti sudah mengetahui adanja tokoh2 PKI berada di Halim sewaktu tanggal 1 Oktober 1965. Bung KARNO berada di KO-OPS ataupun dirumah Komodor SUSANTO di Halim. Adanja tokoh2 PKI tersebut dilaporkan oleh SUPARDJO jang pada hari itu berkali-kali menghadap/menghubungi Bung KARNO.

Djuga sewaktu siang hari tatkala dibit-jarkan pentjalonan care-taker pimpinan AD, SUPARDJO telah menghubungi tokoh2 PKI jang achirnja memberi tahukan Bung KARNO bahwa pimpinan G-30-S/PKI mentjalankan Djenderal PRANOTO.

- b. Pada keesokan harinja, 2 Oktober 1965 di Istana Bogor dengan positip kami baru mengetahui bahwa kemarinnja, tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 AIDIT berada di Halim dan AIDIT meninggalkan Halim dengan pesawat Dakota menudju Djokja pada tengah malam. Hal ini kami ketahui setelah Bung KARNO memanggil OMAR DANI dan ternyata tidak ada di Djakarta dan telah terbang dengan pesawat Hercules pada tengah malam itu djuga. Laporan2 tentang hal ini saja dengar dari Kolonel KARDJONO, Adjudan Presiden dari A.U.

26. Apakah Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 telah mempunyai kejakinan atau perhitungan bahwa Gerakan G-30-S/PKI akan berhasil/menang. Bila benar demikian atas dasar apakah Bung KARNO mempunyai kejakinan atau perhitungan tersebut?

26. Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi sampai siang/sore hari Bung KARNO mempunyai kejakinan/perhitungan bahwa G-30-S/PKI akan berhasil/menang.

Hal ini disebabkan:

- a. Bung KARNO telah mendapat laporan2 (sebelum 1 Oktober 1965) bahwa banjak Djenderal2 A.D. jang tetap loyal padanja;
Bung KARNO mendapat laporan dari SUPARDJO bahwa telah ada tjukup pasukan

jang akan mendukungnja.

Bung KARNO mendapat laporan dan djan-dji dukungan dari OMAR DANI bahwa se-luruh AURI berada dibelakangnja.

b. Bung KARNO mengetahui dengan pasti bahkan mengandalkan cq. kerdja sama dengan PKI, bahwa PKI dengan kekua-tan organisasi dan masanja akan men-dukungnja.

c. Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi Bung KARNO menerima laporan dari SUPARDJO bahwa tugas pentjulikan/pembunuhan Djenderal2 telah dikerdjakan dengan baik, jang menurut perhitungan Bung KARNO Angkatan Darat pasti akan lemah cq. kehilangan pimpinan.

Dari Djenderal SABUR Bung KARNO mene-rikan laporan bahwa memang benar pasu-kan2nja SUPARDJO, Jon 328, Jon 454, Jon 530, serta MEN/Tjakrabirawa sudah dapat menguasai kota dan instalasi2 penting, jang berarti seluruh Ibu ko-ta sudah ditangan G-30-S/PKI.

Di Halim baik menurut OMAR DANI maupun jang dilihat oleh Bung KARNO sendiri, seluruh AURI telah siap membantu G-30-S/PKI, antara lain: siapnja pesawat2 tempur dan siapnja pasukan2 P.G.T.

d. Dari semua jang tersebut diatas itu dengan ditambah dengan dasar keingi-nan/niat Bung KARNO sendiri untuk menjingsirkan Djenderal2 AD, maka Bung KARNO mempunjai kejakinan atas kemenangan G-30-S/PKI.

27. Apakah jang sdr. ketahui mengenai pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan WAPERDAM I Dr. SUBANDRIO, WAPERDAM II Dr. J. LEIMENA pada kira2 tanggal 26 September 1965 malam di Istana, di mana dalam pertemuan tersebut diadakan pemitjaraan mengenai pembagian daerah antara lain:

- Dr. J. LEIMENA di Djakarta,
- Dr. SUBANDRIO di Sumatera,
- Bung KARNO di Djateng atau Bali,

sehubungan dengan akan adanya tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 jang tidak loyaal kepada Bung KARNO.

27.a. Mengenai pertemuan dan pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Pak BANDRIO/Pak LEIMENA tersebut saja tidak mengetahui apa isi pemitjaraannya.

b. Jang djelas dapat saja ketahui adalah pada tanggal 28 September 1965 Dr. SUBANDRIO telah berangkat ke Sumatera dan kembali ke Djakarta tanggal 2 Oktober 1965.

Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 sewaktu saja ada di Halim dapat saja ketahui bahwa telah disiapkan pesawat terbang untuk Bung KARNO guna ke Djawa Tengah.

Keterangan ini pertama saja dengan dari Djenderal SABUR dan kemudian mendengar sendiri dari OMAR DANI bahwa pesawat kepresidenan Jet Star telah siap untuk membawa Bung KARNO.

28. Harap didjelaskan pengetahuan sdr. tentang tewasnja alm. Laksamana (L) R.E. MARTADINATA dalam suatu ketjelakaan pesawat Helikopter didaerah pegunungan Puntjak pada tanggal 6 Oktober 1966, apakah ketjelakaan ini dise-

babkan sabotage atau disengadja?

28. Jang dapat saja terangkan tentang ketjela-
kaan jang menimpa almarhum Laksamana (L)
R.E. MARTADINATA adalah dari apa jang
saja dengar dari kawan2 dikalangan AL dan
hasil penelitian team pemeriksa AL jang
chusus diadakan untuk pemeriksa ketjela-
kaan tersebut.

(1) Tanggal 6 Oktober 1966 siang/sore hari
Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA mengundang
tamu AL (dari Pakistan) dan Njonja
untuk di adjak minum teh di Puntjak.
Mereka berangkat dengan pesawat Heli-
copter AL dengan isi: Laksamana R.E.
MARTADINATA tamu, njonja tamu, dan
seorang pilot.

(2) Setelah selesai minum teh di Puntjak,
mereka kembali ke arah Djakarta. Waktu
itu Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA menge-
mudikan sendiri pesawat Heli tersebut.
Sewaktu melampaui Puntjak, ternjata
sebelah Utara Puntjak-Pass penuh kabut
tebal, dan helicopter terlandjur masuk
didalam kabut tersebut. Karena tidak
dapat melihat arah, pemandangan gelap,
Helicopter menebraksebuah puntjak/
bukit sehingga djatuh rusak terbakar.
Seluruh penumpang 4 orang, semuanya
tewas dalam ketjelakaan itu.

Sepandjang pengetahuan saja hingga sekarang
tidak terdapat petundjuk2 jang mengarah
bahwa ketjelakaan tersebut karena sabotase.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebe-
narnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan sete-
lah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh menbatja kem-
bali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa,

tetap pada keterangannya tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannya dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SABTU tanggal dua puluh empat OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S.SOEGIJARJO
LETKOL CPM-NRP:
12688.
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS
BESAR POL.

Pada hari ini, hari SA'BTU tanggal dua puluh empat OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM NRP: 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat: KOLONEL KKO, djabatan: ASKAPERSMIL (Assisten Kepala PERSMIL AL), umur/tanggal lahir: 43 tahun/19 September 1927, tempat kelahiran: Karanganyan- Kebumen, agama: Roma Katholik alamat/tempat tinggal: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Keba-joran Baru Djakarta.

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadju-kan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

29. Sehubungan dengan adanja perintah dari Bung KARNO kepada Kolonel SAELAN pada tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 sore di Istana Bogor untuk meng-hilangkan/menghapuskan djedjak djenazah para Pati AD jang dibunuh oleh G-30-S/PKI di Lubang Buaja, harap sdr. djelaskan:

- a. Siapakah jang mempunjai idee untuk tud-juan menghilangkan bekas2 djenazah terse-but?

b. Bagaimana sikap atau reaksi dari para pejabat2 jang ada di Istana Bogor waktu itu?

29.a. Mengingat:

- (1) Telah adanja kesamaan niat antara Bung KARNO dan PKI untuk menjingkirkan Djenderal2 Angkatan Darat, jang achirnja ternjata telah dibunuh;
- (2) Telah diketahuinja oleh Bung KARNO mulai tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam tentang kegagalan G-30-S/PKI;
- (3) Telah diterimanja laporan dari Komandan Halim atas ditemukannja tanda kearah mana djenazah2 itu berada jakni didekat Halim, jang berarti dekat sekali dengan tempat dimana Bung KARNO berada pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
- (4) Usaha PKI untuk membersihkan dirinja dari turut-tjampurnja dalam G-30-S/PKI demi kelandjutan hidup PKI itu sendiri, maka djelaslah bahwa idee untuk menghilangkan bekas2 djenazah tersebut adalah datang dari PKI jang disampaikan lewat SUPARDJO dan Djenderal SABUR kepada Bung KARNO. Hal ini telah saja dengar dari Djenderal SABUR, Bung KARNO sendiri jang djelas merasa terlibat dalam penjingkiran Djenderal2 AD tersebut, menerima dan menjetudjui idee itu dan achirnja memerintahkan Kolonel SAELAN untuk melaksanakan penjingkiran/menghilangkan bekas2 djenazah. Dengan tjara ini, kalau berhasil, akan dapat menutupi/menghilangkan segala bukti akan terlibat/tjampur tangan setjara langsung dari Bung KARNO dan PKI dalam G-30-S/PKI.

Jang djelas mengetahui soal penjingkaran/membuang bekas djenazah itu adalah OMAR DANI dan Djenderal SABUR.

Kedua pedjabat itu menjetudjui idee tersebut karena ke-dua2nja setjara langsung telah terlibat dalam perentjanaan dan pelaksanaan penjingkiran Djenderal AD atas perintah Bung KARNO.

Bagi OMAR DANI sendiri djuga akan merasa lebih tenang bila djenazah2 itu tidak diketemukan didekat daerah Halim.

30. Berkenaan dengan adanja surat dari UNTUNG kepada Bung KARNO tanggal 30 September 1965 malam di Istora Senajan, sebagaimana tersebut dalam djawaban sdr. pada BAP tanggal 30-10-1970 nomer 23, apakah kiranja dapat sdr. djelaskan bahwa isi surat UNTUNG tersebut, merupakan suatu pemberitahuan dari G-30-S/PKI kepada Bung KARNO tentang akan dimulainja gerakan menindak para Pati AD (MEN/PANGAD Djenderal A.YANI cs) jang tidak disenangi Bung KARNO?

30.a. Seperti pernah saja terangkan, pada saat itu (30 September 1965) maupun keesokan harinja (1 Oktober 1965), saja tidak mengetahui isi surat tersebut.

b. Djadi djauh dikemudian hari baru saja mengerti isi surat tersebut bahwa merupakan pemberitahuan dari UNTUNG kepada Bung KARNO tentang akan dimulainja gerakan penindakan terhadap Pati2 AD. Hal ini berdasarkan fakta2 jang saja ingat bahwa:

(1) adanja pati2 AD jang melaporkan pada Bung KARNO tentang Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal, dimana Pati2

- tersebut menjetudju pengambilan tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 itu.
- (2) adanja perintah Bung KARNO kepada UNTUNG pada tanggal 4 Agustus 1965 dimana UNTUNG ditugaskan pelaksanaan pengambilan tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD.
 - (3) adanja perintah Bung KARNO kepada Djenderal SABUR, Djenderal SUNARJO, Djenderal SUDIRGO pada tanggal 29 September 1965 untuk segera mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD.
 - (4) adanja sikap Bung KARNO pada malam hari di Istora tanggal 30 September 1965 jang sangat bersemangat dan gembira, mengutip Baghavad Gita.
 - (5) adanja sikap Bung KARNO jang merobek-robek/menghilangkan surat UNTUNG tersebut pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 siang di Halim setelah surat itu diambilnja dari dalam badju Pangti, dimana badju tersebut khusus diperintahkan kepada SUPARTO untuk mengambilnja dari kediaman Dewi.
31. Kepada sdr., oleh Djenderal SUHARTO pada tanggal Oktober 1965, telah disuruh beritahukan kepada Bung KARNO jang ketika itu berada di Halim, supaja Bung KARNO segera keluar dari Halim, karena Halim akan digempur oleh KOSTRAD, maka menurut sdr. kekuatan mana jang di Halim jang akan dihantjurkan itu?
31. Perlu saja djelaskan bahwa sewaktu saja menghadap Djenderal SUHARTO di KOSTRAD pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam hari Djenderal SUHARTO tidak memerintahkan

saja supaya memberitahukan Bung KARNO agar Bung KARNO segera meninggalkan Halim. Djuga Djenderal SUHARTO tidak mengatakan bahwa akan segera menggempur Halim. Kedjadian jang benar adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Sewaktu saja menghadap Djenderal SUHARTO dan melaporkan bahwa saja dipe-rintah Bung KARNO untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO, waktu itu Djenderal SUHARTO mengatakan kepada saja:
- (1) Untuk sementara pimpinan AD saja ambil oper. Segala instruksi2 dari Bapak (Bung KARNO) harap disampaikan lewat saja.
 - (2) Djenderal PRANOTO tidak dapat menghadap Bapak (Bung KARNO).
 - (3) Ditudjukan pada saja pribadi:
"Bambang, usahakan agar Bapak (Bung KARNO) segera keluar dari Halim.

Utjapan No. (1) dan (2) tersebut diatas itulah jang harus saja sampaikan pada Bung KARNO. Sedangkan jang No. (3) saja anggap perintah Djenderal SUHARTO kepada saja jang harus saja kerdjakan.

- b. (1) Sebelum saja tiba dihadapan Djenderal SUHARTO di KOSTRAD malam itu, saja telah melihat kesibukan2 pasukan2 (Infanteri, Kavaleri) disekitar KOSTRAD. Djuga saja melihat pasukan RPKAD jang sedang bergerak kearah Djl. Merdeka Selatan/Barat.
- Didalam Markas KOSTRAD saja melihat Djenderal NASUTION dan pati2 AD lain. Djuga saja melihat kedatangan Laksamana R.E.MARTADINATA menghadap Djenderal

SUHARTO.

Suasana sewaktu saja menghadap Djenderal SUHARTO itu (diruangan tengah KOSTRAD) adalah ramai, banjak perwira2 jang hadlir. Saja mendengar banjak pembitjaraan/diskusi antara mereka. Diantaranja saja dengan Djenderal NASUTION berkata: "Jang penting sekarang bagikita adalah segera mengembalikan keamanan.

Ini berarti tindakan militer.

Mengenai penjelesaian politik laat maar aan de oude Heer over.

(2) Sewaktu saja meninggalkan KOSTRAD dan kembali ke Halim melalui Djl. Prapatan, Senen, Tjempaka Putih, By Pass dan achirnja Halim, di Djl. Djakarta Bypass sebelah Selatan lapangan golf Rawamangun saja melihat dan melewati pasukan2 tentara jang berada didalam kendaraan truck. Waktu saja perhatikan pasukan itu adalah pasukan jang saja lihat pagi harinja disekitar Istana, dengan tanda halsdoek warna hidjau-kuning.

c. Dari semua jang saja lihat dan saja dengar tersebut:

- adanja kesiapan dan gerakan pasukan KOSTRAD;
- berkumpulnja pimpinan2 ABRI di KOSTRAD dan membitjarakan tentang tjara mengatasi situasi;
- utjapan Djenderal NASUTION (MENKO HANKAM) jang menghendaki agar segera diambil tindakan militer;
- utjapan Djenderal SUHARTO jang kelihatan marah terhadap statemen AURI

- jang dikeluarkan hari itu;
- adanya pasukan G-30-S/PKI jang telah mundur kearah Halim;
- berkumpulnja tokoh2 OMAR DANI dan SUPARDJO (jang pro G-30-S/PKI) di Halim;
- perintah Djenderal SUHARTO kepada saja agar berusaha membawa B.K. keluar dari Halim.

hal itu semua menjebabkan saja dapat menarik kesimpulan bahwa dalam waktu tak lama KOSTRAD pasti akan menjerang/mengempur Halim.

- d. Setelah saja tiba di Halim dan melaporkan pada Bung KARNO bahwa Djenderal SUHARTO mengambil oper pimpinan AD dan Djenderal PRANOTO tidak dapat menghadapi, saja terus meminta pada Bung KARNO agar mau segera meninggalkan Halim karena menurut saja Halim waktu itu akan segera diserang/digempur oleh KOSTRAD. Saja jelaskan pada Bung KARNO tentang kesiapan2/gerakan pasukan KOSTRAD dan telah mundurnja pasukan G-30-S/PKI.

Reaksi Bung KARNO atas pesan Djenderal SUHARTO tersebut adalah Bung KARNO menjadi marah2. Bung KARNO tidak setuju bahwa Djenderal SUHARTO mengambil oper pimpinan AD. Hal ini tentunya karena Bung KARNO telah menganggap bahwa semua kekuatan jang ada di KOSTRAD, termasuk Djenderal SUHARTO, adalah pro Dewan Djenderal, jang berarti tidak sefaham dengan Bung KARNO. Djuga Bung KARNO menjadi marah karena perintahnja (sebagai Presiden/Pangti) untuk memang-

gil Djenderal PRANOTO telah ditolak oleh Djenderal SUHARTO. Djelas kelihatan bahwa Bung KARNO merasa kesal/ke-tjewa akan kegagalan mengangkat Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai care-taker AD. Atas permintaan saja agar Bung KARNO meninggalkan Halim, terlihat sikap Bung KARNO jang akan menerima saran saja tadi setelah saja djelaskan tentang pasti akan berhasilnja KOSTRAD menjerang Halim.

Pada saat inilah OMAR DANI mengatakan pada Bung KARNO bahwa pesawat terbang telah siap untuk take off sewaktu2 untuk membawa Bung KARNO ke Jogja - atau Madiun.

Pada saat itu sebelum pertemuan/pembicaraan selesai dan diambil keputusan telah datang Dewi jang menjebabkan pertemuan praktis terhenti. Kesempatan ini saja gunakan untuk menarik Pak LEIMENA dan menerangkan betapa seriusnja keadaan, djuga bersama Saelan dan MANGIL kami siapkan kendaraan mobil untuk membawa Bung KARNO keluar dari Halim.

- e. Semendjak saat itu saja telah mengetahui bahwa semua kekuatan G-30-S/PKI jang berada di Halim akan dihantjurkan oleh KOSTRAD.

32. Apakah sebabnja pada tanggal 31 Oktober 1965 malam ± djam 23.00 Bung KARNO dibawa ke Bogor dan tidak kedaerah jang sudah dikuasai KOSTRAD pada waktu itu?

32. Bahwa Bung KARNO harus kami bawa ke Bogor

dan tidak kami bawa kedaerah jang sudah dikuasi KOSTRAD, karena:

- a. Perintah Djenderal SUHARTO kepada saja hanja berisi agar Bung KARNO di-bawa keluar dari Halim, tidak memerintahkan agar dibawa ke KOSTRAD.
- b. Saja mengetahui djelas bahwa Bung KARNO tidak senang pada Djenderal SUHARTO/KOSTRAD karena itu pada saat itu adalah tidak bidjaksana membawa Bung KARNO ke KOSTRAD.
- c. Bogor merupakan djuga kediaman resmi Bung KARNO. Bogor berada tidak djauh dari Djakarta dan hubungan Djakarta - Bogor adalah amat mudah.

33. Sehubungan dengan keterangan sdr. dalam menjawab pertanyaan pemeriksa nomer 21 maka para pedjabat setelah mengetahui adanja daftar susunan nama2 anggauta Dewan Revolusi, serta setelah mendengar siaran/pengumuman dari Dewan Revolusi tentang pendemisioneran Kabinet Pemerintah RI dan lain2, lalu mengadakan saran2 kepada Bung KARNO.

Tjoba berikan pendjelasan tentang saran jang diberikan oleh PANGAK (Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO) kepada Bung KARNO ketika itu (Tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Halim) dan bagaimana sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap saran tersebut.

33. Dari apa jang saja dengar dari KOMBES SUMIRAT atau AKBP MANGIL dikemudian hari dapat saja ketahui bahwa sewaktu pertemuan di Halim pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 siang/sore hari PANGAK Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO telah mengatakan:

- terkedjut/tidak mengetahui sebelumnya bahwa nama-nama tertjantum dalam daftar Dewan Revolusi.
- gerakan dan pengumuman G-30-S/PKI itu adalah suatu coup.
- menjerahkan pada Bung KARNO dan akan mentaati keputusan/perintah Bung KARNO. Atas perkataan dan pernyataan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO ini Bung KARNO merasa puas.

34. Apakah sdr. mengetahui bahwa Bung KARNO pernah mengirimkan sebuah misi ke RRT yang diketahui oleh Dr. SUBANDRIO dan anggota-anggotanya antara lain terdiri dari wakil2 dari keempat angkatan.

Bila sdr. mengetahui hal tersebut berikan penjelasan tentang

- a. Tujuan pengiriman misi tersebut.
- b. Hubungan antara pengiriman misi tersebut dengan:
 - (1) Pertemuan Cheng Yi - Bung KARNO
 - (2) Pertemuan CHOU EN LAY - BUNG KARNO, di Sjanghai.
- c. Pesan dan petunjuk2 apakah yang diberikan Bung KARNO kepada misi tersebut?
- d. Hasil daripada misi tersebut yang telah dilaporkan kepada Bung KARNO.
- e. Nama2 anggota misi tersebut.

34. Saja masih ingat bahwa Bung KARNO pernah mengirimkan sebuah misi ke RRT yang dipimpin oleh Dr. SUBANDRIO.

- a. Yang saja ketahu, tujuan pengiriman misi tersebut adalah:
 - (1) Lebih mempererat lagi hubungan Indonesia - RRT.
 - (2) Membitjarakan pelaksanaan bantuan

- sendjata dari RRT kepada Indonesia.
- (3) Mendesak pada RRT agar RRT benar2 memberikan bantuan jang konkrit bila sewaktu-waktu Indonesia diserang oleh musuh (chususnja Inggris) sehubungan dengan akan keluarnya Indonesia dari PBB dan adanya konfrontasi RI-Malaysia.
- b. Pengiriman misi tersebut mempunyai hubungan dengan adanya pertemuan2 sebelumnya antara tokoh2 RI dan RRT:
- (1) Sewaktu Chen Yi datang di Indonesia diantaranya telah menjodorkan konsep Angkatan ke V.
- (2) Sewaktu Bung KARNO datang di Sjanghai telah berbitjara dengan CHOU EN LAI dimana RRT telah menjanggupi untuk memberi sendjata 100.000 putjuk, chususnja untuk mempersendjatai Angkatan ke V. tersebut.
- c. Pesan dan petundjuk Bung KARNO jang dapat saja ingat adalah agar misi RI itu benar2 dapat mendjadjagi sikap RRT jang sesungguhnya akan kemauan dan kesanggupannya memberi bantuan konkrit pada RI, sebab hal ini penting sekali bagi penentuan sikap RI selanjutnja.
- d. Mengenai hasil misi tersebut jang telah dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO, seingat saja:
- RRT segera akan melaksanakan bantuan sendjata.
 - RRT menjanggupi untuk memberi bantuan pada RI bila RI diserang.
 - Bersama RI, RRT akan lebih aktif

lagi dalam penggalangan NEFOS.

- e. Nama2 anggota misi jang masih saja ingat Dr. SUBANDRIO, Djenderal MURSJID, Laksamana MULJONO HERLAMBAANG, dan lain2 jang saja tidak ingat.

35: Masih ingatkah sdr. bahwa Bung KARNO pernah mengerimkan sebuah misi jang dipimpin oleh bekas laksamana Udara OMAR DANI. Bila masih ingat, berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Tugas dan petundjuk2 Bung KARNO kepada misi tersebut.
- b. Hubungan antara misi tersebut dengan:
 - (1) Bantuan Sendjata RRT kepada Indonesia.
 - (2) Bantuan pesawat2 buah "MIG" dari Indonesia ke Pakistan.
- c. Hasil dari Misi tersebut.

35. Saja masih ingat bahwa Bung KARNO pernah mengirimkan sebuah misi jang dipimpin OMAR DANI ke RRT.

- a. Tugas misi tersebut adalah untuk melaksanakan pengambilan sendjata jang telah didjandjikan RRT.
- b. (1) Adanja misi tersebut jang merealisasi bantuan sendjata dari RRT kepada RI telah lebih memperdalam lagi pengaruh dan tjampur tangan RRT di Indonesia. Sendjata2 tersebut jang diperuntukkan untuk Angkatan ke V. berarti memperkuat/mempersendjatai orang2 kiri/kumunis di Indonesia.
(2) Misi tersebut djuga telah memberitahukan RRT bahwa Indonesia memberi bantuan 2 buah MIG pada Pakistan dimana RRT sangat berkepentingan dalam hal ini.

Pada saat itu, hubungan RI-RRT sangat

erat bahkan merupakan satu poros jang kompak dalam NEGOS. Dengan adanya bantuan 2 buah MIG tadi pada Pakistan pada hakekatnja adalah lebih menguntungkan RRT, karena:

- RRT membantu Pakistan karena terutama untuk menghadapi India jang djadi musuh RRT.
- Dengan bantuan Indonesia kepada Pakistan atas desakan RRT, menundjukkan lagi telah berhasilnja ekspansi politik RRT kenegara lain.
- Pakistan akan lebih tjondong/menjandarkan diri lagi kepada RRT.

Ketjujali tersebut diatas djelas sekali bahwa dengan adanya bantuan ke Pakistan itu telah lebih memperkuat kedudukan poros Djakarta-Peking-Pyong yang seperti dikehendaki oleh Bung KARN0 dan CHOU EN LAY.

- c. Missi OMAR DANI tersebut telah kembali dengan hasil membawa sendjata dari RRT.

36. Berikan pendjelasan tentang manfaat dari hasilmissi tersebut bagi persiapan/pelaksanaan gerakan G-30-S/PKI.

36.a. Missi2 tersebut telah membawa hasil:

- (1) sedjumlah besar sendjata.
- (2) makin berkembangnja faham komunisme.
- (3) memperlihatkan pada rakjat bahwa seakan-akan RRT itu adalah sahabat RI jang sedjati.

- b. PKI dalam usaha mentjapai tudjuannja dan menjebarkan adjaran2nja, terutama selalu berlandasan kekuatan buruh dan

tani, Kekuatan buruh dan tani inilah yang terutama telah digarap dan telah disiapkan oleh PKI.

- c. Dalam menanggapi idee Angkatan ke V. kekuatan buruh dan tani inilah yang akan dipakai sebagai intinja, dan dipersendjatai dengan sendjata2 hasil missi2 tersebut.
- d. Pada kenjataannya. sebelum Angkatan ke V. tersebut resmi didirikan, sebagian sendjata2 itu telah dibagikan kepada sebagian buruh tani tersebut dan kader2 PKI lainnya untuk turut melaksanakan G-30-S/PKI.
- e. Maka disini terlihat djelas bahwa ada hubungan langsung antara pengiriman missi2 beserta hasilnya dengan segala persiapan/pelaksanaan G-30-S/PKI.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh yang diperiksa maka ia - yang diperiksa -, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tands setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannya dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SENIN tanggal dua puluh enam Oktober tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

Jang memeriksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO.

1. S. SOEGIARGO
LETKOL CPM - NRP: 12688.

2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POL.

Pada hari ini, hari SENIN tanggal dua puluh enam Oktober tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S. SOEGIJARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI.

djabatan: masing-masing adalah Anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

pangkat : KOLONEL KKO, djabatan: ASKAPERSMIL AL (Assisten Kepala PERSMIL AL), umur/tanggal lahir: 43 tahun/19 September 1927, tempat kelahiran: Karanganyar - Kebumen, agama: Roma Katholik, alamat: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadjukan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan - pengakuan seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

37. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan kepada pemeriksa (periksa-djawaban terhadap pertanjaan nomer 35) bahwa missi OMAR DANI ke RRT kepada RI.
- Berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Bagaimana isi laporan dari OMAR DANI kepada Bung KARNO - tentang hasil missi OMAR DANI tersebut.
 - b. Bagaimanakah tjara2 pengangkutan sendjata tersebut telah dilakukan dan siapakah jang ditugaskan untuk mengatur/mengurus pengangkutan tersebut.

- c. Bilamana, dimana dan dengan tjara2 bagaimanakah sendjata2 tersebut telah di-bagi2kan kepada kader2 PKI/ anggauta2 pasukan2 G-30-S/PKI.
- a. Bagaimana isi sebenarnja dan laporan OMAR DANI kepada Bung KARNO setelah missi OMAR DANI tersebut kembali dari RRT, saja sendiri tidak tahu karena tidak hadir sewaktu OMAR DANI menjampaiakan laporannja itu. Apa jang saja dengar kemudian adalah bahwa OMAR DANI melaporkan pada Bung KARNO atas telah berhasilnja missi dalam pelaksanaan pengambilan sendjata2 bantuan dari RRT. Sendjata2 tersebut akan diangkut dengan pesawat Hercules dari AURI dan kapal laut jang kemudian hari saja ketahu nama kapal tersebut Gunung Kerintji jang sering dipakai sebagai Kapal Hadji.
- b. Seperti saja uraikan diatas, tjara2 pengangkutan sendjata tersebut adalah dengan:
- pesawat Hercules AURI
 - kapal laut Gunung Kerintji.
- Pengaturan/pengurusan pengangkutan ini dikerdjakan oleh KOTI/KOGAM.
- c. Dari apa jang saja dengar setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, sendjata2 bantuan dari RRT tersebut telah di-bagi2kan oleh AURI kepada kader2 PKI/anggauta G-30-S/PKI dengan melalui para pelatih AURI jang melatih anggauta2 PR/Gerwani di Lubang Buaja sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI dan membaggikannja langsung pada rakjat/pemuda2 PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam didekat Senajan.

38. Sdr. telah mendjelaskan kepada pemeriksa bahwa sendjata2 jang diterima oleh pemerintah RI dari RRT telah di-bagi2kan kepada:

- a. Anggauta2 PR/Gerwani di Lubang Buaja ter-djadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.
- b. Anggauta2 PR/Pemuda2 PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam di Senajan.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Apakah Bung KARNO djuga mengetahui adanja pembagian sendjata tersebut. Supaja didjelaskan pula tentang bilamana, dimana dan dengan tjara bagaimana Bung KARNO telah mengetahui hal tersebut.
- b. Sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO setelah mengetahui adanja pembagian sendjata2 tersebut.
- c. Siapakah diantara pedjabat2 pemerintah RI jang lain jang djuga mengetahui adanja pembagian sendjata tersebut.

38. Saja mengetahui bahwa sendjata2 jang diterima oleh pemerintah RI dari RRT telah dibagi-bagikan kepada anggauta PR/Gerwani dan pemuda2 PKI, adalah setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

- a. Mengenai pembagian sendjata di Senajan pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam, Bung KARNO mengetahuinja, karena pada waktu tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 di Bogor telah dilapori akan kedjadian tersebut oleh Djenderal SABUR.

Hadlir pada waktu Bung KARNO menerima laporan ini, seingat saja ialah:

Pak LEIMENA, Kolonel SAELAN, Kombes SUMIRAT, MANGIL dan saja sendiri.

Mengenai pembagian sendjata di Lobang Buaja sebelum 1 Oktober 1965, menurut saja Bung KARNO pasti mengetahuinja

djuga karena laporan2 dari OMAR DANI dan/atau SUPARDJO.

- b. Jang saja ketahuji tentang reaksi Bung KARNO atas pembagian sendjata tersebut adalah:
 - Bung KARNO tidak pernah menegor/menjalahkan atas terdjadinja pembagian itu.
 - Bung KARNO pernah mengatakan bahwa memang seharusnja tenaga2 revolusioner itu dipersendjatai.
- c. (1) Saja tidak tahu dengan pasti pedjabat2 RI siapa sadja lainnja jang telah mengetahuji tentang pembagian sendjata itu sebelum tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
(2) Mengenai pembagian sendjata di Senajan semua pedjabat jang ada di Bogor telah mengetahuinja pada tanggal 2 Oktober 1965.

39. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bagaimanakah tjaranja sdr. mengetahuji bahwa sebagian sendjata dari RRT telah diangkut dengan kapal "Gunung Kerintji".
- b. Dimanakah tempat penjimpanan sendjata dari RRT tersebut baik jang diangkut dengan pesawat udara maupun jang diangkut dengan kapal Gunung Kerintji tersebut.
- c. Siapakah jang mengurus atau jang bertanggung-djawab terhadap penjimpanan sendjata tersebut.

39.a. Saja mengetahuji bahwa sebagian sendjata dari RRT telah diangkut dengan kapal Gunung Kerintji adalah setelah kapal tersebut tiba kembali dan mendjadi pemitjaraan umum (k.l. achir Oktober 1965).

Saja tidak ingat jang pasti dari siapa saja mendengarnya, hanya saja menerima berita tentang datangnya senjata2 dengan kapal tersebut.

- b. Jang saja ketahui kemudian, beberapa waktu setelah terdijadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, adanya penjinpanan senjata dari RRT digudang AURI di Mampang (sekarang MBAU).

Saja tidak tahu pasti apakah digudang AURI di Mampang itu hanya disimpan senjata2 jang diangkut dengan Hercules dari RRT, atau djuga senjata2 jang diangkut dengan kapal Gunung Kerintji. Begitu pula saja tidak mengetahui akan adanya gudang/penjinpanan senjata ditempat lain.

- c. Saja tidak mengetahui siapa jang mengurus atau jang bertanggung-djawab terhadap penjinpanan senjata-senjanta tersebut.

40. Apakah sdr. mengetahui bahwa disamping dua buah pesawat MIG, pemerintah RI telah memberikan bantuan pula kepada pemerintah Pakistan jang berupa alat2 lain?

Bila mengetahui, berikan pendjelasan:

- a. Alat2 lain jang berupa apakah jang telah diberikan oleh Indonesia kepada Pakistan?
b. Bilamanakah bantuan RI kepada Pakistan tersebut direaliseer?
c. Siapakah jang mengurus/mengatur pelaksanaan bantuan tersebut?

40.a. Ketjuali MIG dari AURI, jang saja ketahui, pemerintah RI djuga memberikan bantuan alat lain kepada Pakistan jakni alat2 dari AURI , jang berupa:

- (1) kegiatan kapal perang,
- (2) artileri medan,
- (3) tank2 Rusia,

b. Nomer (1) tersebut diatas seingat saja belum pernah dilaksanakan.

Bantuan "tank2 Rusia" tersebut diatas telah direalisir sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI saja tidak tahu pasti tanggal berapa.

Bantuan "artileri medan" tidak saja ketahuhi pelaksanaannya.

c. Sepanjang jang saja ketahuhi semua pengaturan/pengurusan pelaksanaan bantuan ini dikerdjakan oleh KOTI.

Tjontoh dalam bantuan Tank:

KOTI memerintahkan ALRI untuk menjiapkan Tank2 sebanjak 1 (satu) eskadron.

ALRI menjiapkan alat2 tersebut dipelabuhan Tandjung Priok.

Pada waktu jang telah ditentukan datang kapal Pakistan dan mengangkut tank2 tersebut.

Bagaimana prosedur hubungan antara KOTI dan pemerintah Pakistan saja tidak mengetahuhi.

41. Apakah latar belakang politik dari bantuan pemerintah RI kepada pemerintah Pakistan tersebut?

41. Bantuan pemerintah RI kepada Pakistan tersebut, jang kalau dilihat dari djumlah/kwantitas sebenarnya hanya ketjil, lebih banjak menekankan pada keuntungan2 politik:

a. RRT jang bertetangga dengan Pakistan dan India, lebih banjak berkepentingan dalam pemberian bantuan RI tersebut, karena RRT bermusuhan dengan India.

Bantuan RI tersebut diberikan atas saran/desakan RRT, ini berarti bahwa Pakistan berterima kasih pada RRT.

- b. Bantuan RI tersebut berarti bantuan dari poros Djakarta-Peking, jang bermaksud lebih menarik Pakistan kedalam poros ini/NEFOS, jang akan dapat menjokong idee diadakannya CONEFO, jang menurut Bung KARNO sebagai tandingan PBB.
- c. Adanja bantuan tadi, diharapkan agar pertikaian Pakistan-India terus berlangsung dan/atau lebih hangat lagi. Kehangatan pertikaian ini, disamping pertikaian2 lain didunia, akan dapat menutupi/mengurangi perhatian dunia terhadap kegiatan persiapan PKI dan RRT dalam gerakan coup jang akan dilantjarkan (G-30-S/PKI).
- d. Setelah pelaksanaan coup (G-30-S/PKI), diharapkan adanja simpati dari Pakistan terhadap gerakan itu.

42. Apakah sdr. masih ingat tentang adanja misi dibawah pimpinan Dr. SUBANDRIO ke Negara2 di Afrika, setelah gagalnja konferensi A-A di Aldjazair?

Bilama sdr. masih dapat mengingat kembali akan hal tersebut, berikan pendjalasan mengenai:

- a. Apakah tugas dan petundjuk2 jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada misi tersebut?
- b. Siapa2kah anggauta2 dari misi tersebut?
- c. Negara2 mana sadjakah jang telah dikundjungi oleh misi tersebut?
- d. Apakah hasil dari pada misi Dr. SUBANDRIO tersebut?

42. Saja masih ingat bahwa memang benar adanja misi dibawah pimpinan Dr. SUBANDRIO jang dikirim ke-negara2 Afrika setelah gagalnja konferensi A-A di Aldjazair tahun 1965.
- a. Jang saja ketahu, misi tersebut diberi tugas oleh Bung KARNO untuk:
- (1) -mengkonsolidir pendapat2 negara2 Afrika, karena tidak djadinja konferensi A-A tersebut, dalam usaha bersama menghadapi imperialisme/kolonialisme dan chususnja dalam menggagalkan kekuatan NEFOS serta maksud tujuan mengadakan CONEFO.
 - (2) -mendjelaskan pada negara2 Afrika tentang "dokumen Gilchrist".

Kini saja mengetahui bahwa maksud pendjelasan "dokumen Gilchrist" tersebut adalah bertudjuan:

- sebagai bukti bahwa Inggris telah meng-subversi Indonesia dan tjampur tangan dalam soal intern Indonesia, sehingga didalam konfrontasi Indonesia, Malaysia, negara2 Afrika tersebut akan memihak Indonesia;
 - Tujuan kedua, adanja sebutan "Our local army friends dalam dokumen Gilchrist" tersebut, negara2 Afrika akan membenarkan tindakan Bung KARNO bila sewaktu-waktu diambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal Angkatan Darat.
- b. Saja tidak ingat nama2/siapa2 anggauta dari misi tersebut.
- c. Negara2 jang telah dikundjungi misi ada banjak, tetapi jang saja ingat hanja Chana,
- d. (1) Hasil misi jang berupa laporan Dr.SUBANDRIO kepada Bung KARNO

setelah kembali, saja tidak mengetahuinja, hanja tentang mengadakan CONEFO saja mendengar bahwa hal tersebut telah dilaporkan/dibitjarakan dengan Bung KARNO.

CONEFO jang akan diadakan dengan maksud menghimpun kekuatan NEGOS ditudjukan djuga untuk menandingi PBB, dimana waktu itu Indonesia akan keluar dari PBB. Dalam CONEFO ini sebenarnja peranan dan kepentingan RRT besar sekali, karena RRT tidak/belum dapat masuk PBB dan RRT akan dapat dengan luas mempengaruhi negara2 NEFOS tadi.

Idee untuk mengadakan CONEFO ini jang resminja keluar dari Indonesia cq. Bung KARNO, sebenarnja disponsori dan didukung penuh oleh RRT.

(2) Hasil njata dari missi tersebut jang dapat kita lihat adalah adanya sikap dan beberapa negara Afrika (seperti Chana) jang fanatik menjokong Bung KARNO setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, hal mana djelas adalah karena hasil kerdja missi tersebut.

43. Apakah sdr. masih ingat akan pidato Bung KARNO jang antara lain mengatakan bahwa Indonesia akan mampu membuat/meledakkan bom atomnja. Pidato tersebut diperkuat oleh pendjelasan Brigdjen HARTONO pada saat peluntjuran roket A. YANI diperisir Selatan pulau Djawa. Bila sdr. masih dapat mengingat kembali akan hal tersebut, tjoba berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Bilamana sdr. telah mendengar pidato2 tersebut dan bagaimana isi dari pidato tersebut?

- b. Apakah maksud/tudjuan pidato Bung KARNO tersebut?
 - c. Apakah antara Bung KARNO dan Brigdjen HARTONO pernah ada pembitjaraan2 tentang hal2 tersebut dan bagaimanakah isi dari pembitjaraan tersebut?
43. Saja masih dapat mengingat adanja utjapan Bung KARNO dalam salah satu pidatonja tentang akan mampunja Indonesia membuat/meledakkan bom atom.
- a. Saja tidak ingat lagi dengan pasti kapan (tanggal berapa) dan pada kesempatan apa Bung KARNO mengutjap kannja, tetapi kira2 dalam bulan Juli - September 1965.

Utjapan2 Bung KARNO tersebut terselip ditengah2 pidatonja jang pandjang. Isinja menerangkan akan kekuatan rakjat Indonesia, tidak genter menghadapi imperialisme/kapitalisme, dan bahwa dalam waktu jang dekat Indonesia akan mampu membuat/meledakkan bom atomnja sendiri.
 - b. Menurut saja, utjapan Bung KARNO jang demikian itu hanjalah suatu "bluft"/ omong besar belaka jang bertudjuan:

 - (1) Membesarkan semangat rakjat Indonesia, dalam rangka konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia.
 - (2) Untuk lebih menarik lagi negara2 lain dalam kalangan NEFOS agar mereka lebih pertjaja pada kekuatan Indonesia sehingga dapat diadakannja CONEFO (sebagai tandingan PBB).
 - c. (1) Saja tidak ingat/tidak tahu akan adanja pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Brigdjen HARTONO tentang "pembuatan/

peledakan bom atom" itu.

Djuga saja tidak tahu apa isi dari pembitjaraan tersebut, bila hal itu pernah terdjadi.

(2) Saja pernah mendengar dan membuatja di koran dalam tahun 1965 akan utjapan Brigdjen HARTONO jang menerangkan bahwa Indonesia memang benar mampu untuk membuat/meladakkan bom atom. Utjapan Brigdjen HARTONO tersebut adalah dalam rangka peluntjuran roket AD A. YANI.

44. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Sampai dimanakah pengaruh pidato Bung KARNO tentang bom atom tersebut terhadap luar negeri?
- b. Perundingan2 antara Indonesia-RRT, dalam rangka pembuatan/peladakkan bom atom di Indonesia tersebut.

44.a. Pengaruh pidato Bung KARNO tentang bom atom tersebut telah membawa pengaruh:

(1) Timbulnja rasa turut bangga dan rasa hormat dari negara2 jang ter-gabung dalam NEFOS, chususnja negara2 jang masih dalam taraf "developping-countries".

Negara2 ini makin pertjaja akan "ke-pemimpinan" Indonesia dalam barisan NEFOS itu.

Sebaliknja dari negara2 jang sudah/agak maju pernah terdengar rasa keraguan cq. kurang pertjaja. Hal ini pernah saja dengar sendiri pertanjaan dan ut-japan dari beberapa Dubes/Konsul negara sahabat di Djakarta.

(2) Dari negara besar, Amerika-Inggris-Australia, pernah termuat dalam

madjalah/surat kabar tentang pidato Bung KARNO itu. Menurut negara2 tersebut, setelah mengadakan penjelidikan, diterangkan bahwa Indonesia tidak mungkin mampu untuk meledakkan bom atomnja dalam tahun itu (1965). Keterangan mereka ini terutama didasarkan atas akan adanya skill dan peralatan di Indonesia.

- b. Tentang adanya perundingan2 antara RI-RRT dalam rangka pembuatan/peladakan bom atom, saja tidak/belum pernah mengetahuinja.

45. Berikan pendjelasan tentang adanya rentjana RRT dan Indonesia untuk membuka/mengadakan perhubungan/pelajaran laut antara Indonesia dan RRT dan bagaimanakah realisasi mengenai hal tersebut?

45.a. Saja mengetahui bahwa memang pernah ada usaha/rentjana untuk membuka hubungan laut antara Indonesia dan RRT. Untuk keperluan tersebut pernah dikirim suatu missi ke RRT untuk membitjarakan-
nja.

Missi ini kalau tidak salah dipimpin oleh Menteri PERLA, Djenderal ALI SADIKIN atau Laksamana JATIDJAN.

Missi berangkat sekitar kwartal ke II tahun 1965.

- b. Bagaimana hasil missi tersebut, saja tidak mengetahui. Djuga realisasi dari dibukannya hubungan laut antara Indonesia-RRT, saja tidak/belum pernah mendengar/tidak mengetahui.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah

dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa tetapi pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SELASA tanggal duapuluh tudjuh OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

Jang memeriksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WID-
JANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

1. S. SOEGIJARJO
LETKOL CPM - NRP:
12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI.

Pada hari ini, hari SELASA tanggal duapuluh tujuh OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S. SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM NRP:12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI

djabatannya: masing-masing adalah anggota TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadjukan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan/pengakuan 2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

46. Tahukah sdr. bahwa dalam bulan September 1965, pemerintah Indonesia telah mengirimi beberapa rombongan/missi ke RRT? Bilamana sdr. mengetahui akan hal tersebut, tjoba berikan pendjelasan tentang:
 - a. Matjam rombongan/missi apakah jang telah berangkat pergi ke RRT dan siapakah ketua dan anggauta2nja?
 - b. Tudjuan dan tugas dari missi tersebut?
 - c. Petundjuk2 dan instruksi jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada missi tersebut?
 - d. Hasil dari missi tersebut?

46. Saja ingat memang benar pada bulan September 1965 pemerintah Indonesia telah mengirimkan banjak missi ke RRT.

a. Matjam rombongan/missi2 tersebut adalah:

- (1) Missi MPRS dibawah pimpinan CHAERUL SALEH.
- (2) Missi Ekonomi dibawah pimpinan Menteri SURJADI.
- (3) Missi SESKAU dibawah pimpinan Komandan SES KAU (saja tidak ingat lagi namanja).
- (4) Missi LEMHANNAS dibawah pimpinan Gubernur LEMHANNAS (Djenderal WILUJO PUSPOJUDO),
- (5) Missi Kesenian dibawah pimpinan Ibu HIDAJAT.
- (6) Missi Wartawan (saja tidak ingat lagi dengan pasti siapa jang memimpin, kalau tidak salah DJAWOTO).

b. Tudjuan dan tugas missi2 tersebut, satu per satu saja tidak dapat mengetahui setjara tegas, hanja seingat saja dapat dibagi dalam 3 (tiga) kategorie:

- (1) Pembitjaraan antara pemerintah dan pemerintah (G.to.G), jakni missi Ekonomi, untuk memperlantjar import & eksport kedua negara (RI-RRT).
- (2) Dalam rangka Study Tour, jakni Missi SESKAU
- (3) Memenuhi undangan RRT untuk menghadiri hari

1 Oktober 1965 RRT, yakni
missi2 MPRS, LEMHANNAS,
Kesenian, Wartawan.

- c. Petundjuk2 atau instruksi2 jang telah diberikan Bung KARNO kepada missi2 tersebut. jang dapat saja ketahui adalah:
 - (1) Setiap missi harus berusaha lebih mempererat lagi hubungan RI-RRT.
 - (2) Setiap missi harus banjak melihat, mendengar, dan beladjar dari RRT, sehingga nantinja dapat berguna bagi Indonesia.
- d. Hasil2 apa jang dibawa/diperoleh missi tersebut saja tidak mengetahui.

47. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan bahwa dalam bulan September 1965 Bung KARNO telah mengirimkan missi MPRS ke RRT.

Berikan pendjelasan mengenai:

- a. Dalam rangka persoalan apakah missi tersebut telah dikirimkan ke RRT?
- b. Siapakah anggauta2 jang lain dari missi tersebut?
- c. Tugas serta petundjuk2 jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada Missi tersebut?
- d. Berapa lamakah missi tersebut berada di RRT.
- e. Hasil dari missi tersebut.

47. Missi MPRS jang dikirim ke RRT dalam bulan September 1965:

- a. Seingat saja missi tersebut dikirim dalam rangka memenuhi undangan pemerintah RRT untuk

- menghadiri perajaan 1 Oktober 1965 di Peking.
- b. Anggauta2 missi tersebut jang masih saja ingat adalah: CHAERUL SALEH, ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO, Djenderal MASHUDI; lain2nja jang saja tidak ingat lagi.
 - c. Petundjuk2 dan tugas khusus apa jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada missi tersebut saja tidak mengetahui, ketjuali apa jang telah saja sebut terdahulu.
 - d. Saja tidak ingat lagi dengan pasti berapa lama missi tersebut berada di RRT; kalau tidak salah rombongan berangkat dalam minggu achir September 1965 dan kembali di Djakarta tidak bersama-sama setelah 3 Oktober 1965.
 - e. Saja tidak mengetahui hasil apa jang dibawa/diperoleh missi tersebut.
48. Sesuai dengan keterangan sdr. jang telah diberikan kepada pemerikan, maka dalam bulan September 1965 dari Indonesia telah berangkat sebuah missi/rombongan LEMHANNAS ke RRT. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Bilamana dan terdiri dari siapa2kah missi LEMHANNAS tersebut telah pergi ke RRT.
 - b. Tujuan dari missi tersebut.
 - c. Tugas dan petundjuk2 apakah jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada missi tersebut.
 - d. Apakah benar bahwa Djenderal TNI/AD MURSID jang seharusnya turut serta dalam rombongan missi tersebut atas perintah dari Bung KARNO tidak dibenarkan

- turut, dalam rombongan tersebut.
- e. Apakah alasan2 Bung KARNO tidak membolehkan Djenderal MURSID pergi ke RRT pada waktu itu?
 - f. Apakah perintah Bung KARNO jang melarang Djenderal MURSID untuk pergi ke RRT ada hubungannja dengan rentjana Bung KARNO untuk bertindak kepada Djenderal2 AD, dan chususnja mengenai pergantian pimpinan AD dari tangan Djenderal A YANI.
48. Mengenai missi LEMHANNAS ke RRT:
- a. Missi tersebut berangkat ke RRT pada achir September 1965 (saja tidak ingat lagi tanggal berapa). Siapa2 sadja jang turut dalam missi tersebut saja tidak mengetahui nama2nja, tetapi missi dipimpin oleh Gubernur LEMHANNAS (Djenderal WILUJO POSPOJUDO) dan siswa dari ALRI (jang saja ingat) adalah Laksamana SUDOMO dan Djenderal KKO SUWADJI.
 - b. Seingat saja, tudjuan dari missi tersebut adalah untuk menghadliri perajaan 1 Oktober 1965 di Peking, sesuai undangan pemerintah RRT.
 - c. Tugas dan petundjuk2 chusus apa jang telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada missi tersebut saja tidak tahu, ketjuali jang telah saja terangkan terdahulu.
 - d. Memang benar bahwa Djenderal TNI/AD MURSID, jang seharusnya mengikuti rombongan LEMHANNAS, telah tidak turut berangkat bersama missi). Pada saat itu (keberang-

katan missi) saja tidak tahu bahwa tidak djadinja keberangkatan Djenderal MURSID tersebut adalah atas perintah Bung KARNO.

- e. Setelah saja mengetahui rentjana Bung KARNO untuk mengganti pimpinan AD dan setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI saja dapat mengerti/mengetahui bahwa ada hubungan antara tidak djadinja keberangkatan Djenderal MURSID tadi dengan kehendak Bung KARNO:
- (1) Sebelum peristiwa G.30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO telah mengatakan dan menundjukkan sikap akan ketidak puasnja terhadap Djenderal2 dan pimpinan AD jang dianggapnja tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO
 - (2) Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD tersebut.
 - (3) Bung KARNO telah menundjukkan sikap jang menjetudju ditundjuknja Djenderal MURSID sebagai pengganti pimpinan AD.

Dari fakta2 tersebut diatas itulah saja kini mengetahui bahwa Djenderal MURSID memang diperintahkan untuk tinggal di Djakarta dan/atau tidak dibenarkan untuk mengikuti rombongan LEMHANNAS ke RRT karena ada hubungannja dengan rentjana Bung KARNO untuk bertindak terhadap Djenderal2 AD dan pergantian pimpinan AD.

49. Apakah perintah Bung KARNO jang melarang Djenderal MURSID pergi ke RRT mengikuti rombongan missi LEMHANNAS tersebut, sebelumnja telah dibitjarakan terlebih dahulu oleh Bung KARNO dan pedjabat2 pemerintah jang lain.

Berikan pula pendjelasan apakah Bung KARNO telah memberitahukan kepada Djenderal YANI selaku pimpinan AD mengenai larangan tentang kepergian Djenderal MURSID ke RRT tersebut?

49. Seingat saja, Bung KARNO tidak pernah membitjarakan dengan pedjabat2 pemerintah jang lain tentang dilarangnja/ditundanja Djenderal MURSID mengikuti rombongan LEMHANNAS ke RRT.

Tentang pemberitahuan larangan tersebut kepada Djenderal YANI sebagai pimpinan AD, saja tidak tahu. Jang saja ketahui dengan pasti, Djenderal YANI memang dipanggil untuk menghadap Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.

50. Sdr. telah mendjelaskan bahwa dalam bulan September 1965, Bung KARNO telah mengirimkan missi Ekonomi ke RRT.

Berikan pendjelasan mengenai:

a. Siapa2kah anggauta dari missi tersebut?

b. Tugas dan petundjuk2 Bung KARNO jang diberikan kepada misi tersebut.

c. Tudjuan dan dalam rangka persoalan apakah missi tersebut dikirim ke RRT?

50. Mengenai missi ekonomi ke RRT dalam bulan September 1965:

a. Siapa2nama2dari anggauta missi ekonomi tersebut saja tidak tahu, hanja pimpi-

nan misi adalah Menteri SURJADI.

- b. Tugas dan petundjuk2 khusus apa yang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada misi ini saja tidak mengetahui, ketjuali apa yang telah saja terangkan terdahulu.
- c. Tujuan misi tersebut pada garis besarnya adalah dalam rangka lebih memperlantjar hubungan ekonomi RI-RRT. Persoalan2 yang telah dibitjarakan oleh misi tersebut yang dapat saja ketahui kemudian, adalah:

 - (1) Dalam rangka keluarnya Indonesia dari PBB, Indonesia akan lebih mengalihkan hubungan ekonomi dengan RRT untuk menghadapi kesulitan-kesulitan yang timbul akibat dari keluarnya dari PBB tersebut.
 - (2) Dalam rangka rentjana diadakannya CONEFO, Indonesia bermaksud lebih memperkuat hubungan ekonomi dengan RRT agar poros Djakarta - Peking benar2 kuat.
 - (3) Dalam persoalan Singapura pada waktu itu, RRT telah mendesak kepada Indonesia agar Indonesia menunggu "green light" dari RRT lebih dahulu sebelum mengakui Singapura (yang waktu itu telah menentukan sikap tidak masuk Malaysia). Sikap dari RRT itu dimaksudkan untuk memberi waktu pada RRT dalam membereskan persoalan2 bankingnya di Singapura, sebelum RI mengakui Singapura, tersebut.

51. Tjoba sdr. djelaskan tentang proses pengangkatan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO mendjadi MEN/PANGAK dalam bulan Mei 1965.

51. Setjara umum tentang proses pengangkatan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO sebagai MEN/PANGAK dapat saja terangkan sebagai berikut:

a. Pada awal tahun 1965 tersiar berita2 adanja perpetjahan2 dalam tubuh AKRI. Terdjadilkan beberapa golongan dalam Angkatan Kepolisian itu jang masing2 mempunjai tjalon/djago sendiri2 untuk kedudukan MEN/PANGAK. Segala kedjadian tersebut diketahui oleh Bung KARNO berdasarkan laporan2 jang diterimanya (dari Kombes SUMIRAT, Djenderal SABUR dan lain 2 pedjabat). Achirnja dari beberapa nama tjalon, Bung KARNO menetapkan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO jang akan diangkat sebagai MEN/PANGAK.

b. Sebelum resmi pengangkatan, Pak TJIPTO dipanggil menghadap Bung KARNO di Istana.

Disini terdjadi pemitjaraan2 dimana isinja:

- Pak TJIPTO mengatakan setia/taat pada Bung KARNO.
- Pak TJIPTO mengatakan setia/taat pada revolusi.
- Pak TJIPTO akan memimpin seluruh Kepolisian kearah tjita2 revolusi dengan berlandasan adjaran Bung KARNO.

Pada tanggal 17 Mei 1965, Djenderal Polisi TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dengan resmi dilantik sebagai MEN/PANGAK, menggantikan pedjabat jang lama.

52. Apa jang sdr. ketahui, mengenai hubungan Bung KARNO dengan ex. MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dekat sebelum G-30-S/PKI maupun setelahnja.

52. Mengenai hubungan antara MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dengan Bung KARNO, menurut apa jang saja ketahui:

a. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI:

Hubungan Pak TJIPTO dan Bung KARNO saja lihat biasa sadja, yakni adanja hubungan jang baik seperti para MEN/Panglima lain Angkatan.

- Dibandingkan dengan MEN/PANGAD, Djenderal YANI; hubungan Bung KARNO - YANI; ini lebih dekat, karena Bung KARNO melihat pada diri YANI seorang jang kuat (dengan AD-nja) dan tegas; disamping adanja hubungan pribadi Bung KARNO - YANI.
- Dibandingkan dengan MEN/PANGAL, Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA; hubungan Bung KARNO - MARTA ini kurang dekat, karena Bung KARNO melihat pada diri MARTA seorang dianggapnja kurang revolusioner.
- Dibandingkan dengan MEN/PANGAU, laksamana OMAR DANI; hubungan Bung KARNO - OMAR DANI lebih dekat, karena Bung KARNO melihat pada diri OMAR DANI ini seorang muda jang revolusioner dan menurut pada Bung KARNO.

Dekat sebelum G-30-S/PKI, memang Pak TJIPTO telah beberapa kali menghadap Bung KARNO, sama dengan MEN/Panglima lainnja.

b. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI:
Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI kelihatan hubungan Bung KARNO -Pak TJIPTO makin erat, melebihi sebelumnya. Dalam suasana waktu itu, achir 1965 s/d 1966 - djelas nampak sikap tegas Pak Tjip-to dalam membela Bung KARNO dimana sekap ini menjebabkan makin senangnja Bung KARNO pada Pak TJIPTO dan lebih mendekatkan hubungan antara dua tokoh itu.

53. Harap sdr. djelaskan pengetahuan sdr.:

- a. Apakah sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, ex. MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO pernah menghadiri pertemuan2 jang diadakan di Istana (dalam rangka Bung KARNO akan menindak Pati2 jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.
- b. Saran2 apakah jang pernah diberikan oleh SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO diwaktu berada di Halim pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 kepada Bung KARNO dan bagaimana sikap dan tindakan SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO pada waktu itu?
- c. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI (seperti djawaban sdr. diatas) "djelas tampak sikap tegas Pak TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dalam membela Bung KARNO", harap didjelaskan sikap tegas apa, sehingga makin senang dan dekatnja Bung KARNO dengan SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

53.a. Sepandjang jang saja ingat, dalam pertemuan2 dimana Bung KARNO mengatakakan akan menindak para Djenderal2 AD, MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Polisi SU-

TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO tidak pernah hadir.

Ketidak pernah hadliran Pak TJIPTO dalam pertemuan tersebut tidak menutup kemungkinan akan pengetahuan Pak TJIPTO terlebih dahulu sebelum tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 tentang penindakan itu. Hal ini dimungkinkan karena:

- (1) Oleh Bung KARNO sendiri pernah diberitahukan dalam bulan September 1965 pada Pak TJIPTO akan adanya DEWAN DJENDERAL.
- (2) Dalam utjapan2 Pak TJIPTO selalu memakai istilah GESTOK, bukan G-30-S-/PKI atau GESTAPU, sama dengan istilah jang dipakai oleh Bung KARNO.
- (3) Pernah saja dengar dari Pak MANGIL/DKP bahwa fihak Kepolisian cq. Pak TJIPTO berusaha untuk memindahkan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta ke daerah lain karena Pak TJIPTO menganggap bahwa keselamatan Bung KARNO di Djakarta tidak terdjamin.
- (4) Baik pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Halim, maupun setelah peristiwa G-30-S-/PKI, saja belum pernah mengetahui atau mendengar usul/saran Pak TJIPTO untuk menindak terhadap orang2 jang telah melakukan pembunuhan maupun saran pembuharan PKI, meskipun telah diketahuinja bahwa PKI terlibat dalam G-30-S-/PKI.

Dalam hal ini sangat menarik perhatiannya saja, karena dari pejabat lain Pak LEIMENA dan Pak SJAFIUDIN ZUHRI, saja ketahuhi pernah menjarankan saran2 tersebut pada Bung KARNO.

54. Pada tanggal 1-4 Sept. 1965 di Djakarta pada rapat Angkatan Kepolisian RI telah dilahirkan "Kebulatan Tekad AKRI".
Djelaskan pengetahuan sdr.:

- a. Apakah rapat tersebut diperintah/direstui oleh Bung KARNO?
- b. Untuk apa gunanya rapat tersebut diadakan?
- c. Bagaimana reaksi Bung KARNO setelah menerima laporan dari ex. MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO atas hasil2 rapat tersebut yang menelorkan "Kebulatan Tekad AKRI".
- d. Hubungannya rapat tersebut dengan rentjana Bung KARNO tentang akan ditindaknja para Pati AD jang tidak loyal pada Bung KARNO.

54. Mengenai rapat AKRI tanggal 1-4 September 1965:

- a. Seingat saja, adanya rapat tersebut bukan karena diperintahkan oleh Bung KARNO, tetapi telah mendapat restu dari Bung KARNO.
Sebelum adanya rapat, pimpinan AKRI Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO telah menghadap Bung KARNO pada tanggal 30 Agustus 1965, melaporkan akan adanya rapat tersebut dimana Bung KARNO telah merestuinja dan mendjandjikan untuk memberi amanatnya.

- b. Rapat AKRI tersebut diadakan untuk menggalang kekuatan AKRI sebagai kekuatan progressip revolusioner dan menentukan politik AKRI sesuai dan sedjalan dengan pidato Bung KARNO tanggal 17 Agustus 1965 (TAKARI) serta menurut garis kebidjaksanaan Bung KARNO. Pidato TAKARI tersebut adalah dikonsep dibuat oleh NJOTO dari PKI.
- c. Reaksi Bung KARNO setelah menerima laporan dari ex. MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO atas hasil2 rapat AKRI jang telah menelor-kan "Kebulatan Tekad AKRI" adalah sangat gembira dan menundjukkan sikap makin pertjajanja kepada AKRI sebagai suatu kekuatan jang berada dibelakangnja.
- d. Dari fakta2 jang membuktikan adanya kerdja sama Bung KARNO dan PKI, bahkan adanya persamaan niat antara Bung KARNO dan PKI dalam menindak Djenderal2 AD jang dianggapnja tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO; isi maupun kalimat2 dari Program Perdjuangan TAKARI jang merupakan Kebulatan Tekad AKRI sama dan senada dengan isi dan kalimat jang selalu dipakai oleh PKI; maka djelas bahwa ada hubungan antara rapat AKRI tersebut dengan rentjana Bung KARNO/ PKI untuk menindak terhadap Djenderal2 AD jang dianggap tidak loyal.

55. Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI apakah sdr. pengetahui adanya usaha2 dari golongan tertentu jang akan membawa/memjembunjukan Bung KARNO di luar kota Djakarta.

Bila sdr. mengetahui hal tersebut, tjoba berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Kapan, dimana dan dengan tjara bagaimana-
kah sdr. telah mengetahui hal tersebut.
- b. Alasan2 apakah jang menjebabkan mereka
akan menjbunjikan Bung KARNO dengan
membawanja keluar kota Djakarta?
- c. Tempat tudjuan dimana Bung KARNO akan
dibawa/disembunjikan?
- d. Siapa2kah jang termasuk mereka jang mem-
punjai rentjana untuk melaksanakan hal
tersebut?
- e. Apakah bekas MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Polisi
SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO djuga termasuk dalam
golongan jan akan melakukan gerakan ter-
sebut?

55. Mengenai adanja rentjana untuk membawa/
menjebunjikan Bung KARNO keluar dari
Djakarta:

- a. Pada pertengahan tahun 1966 saja men-
dengar issue2 akan adanja rentjana
membawa Bung KARNO kelain daerah ke-
luar dari Djakarta.
Achirnja saja mendengar dari AKBP
MANGIL Komandan Detasemen Kawal Pri-
badi, bahwa fihak kepolisian memang
sedang merentjanakan dan menjiapkan
hal itu.
- b. Alasan2 jang saja dengar tentang rent-
jana tindakan tersebut adalah:
 - (1) Di Djakarta dan Djawa Barat cq.
Bogor telah sepenuhnya dikuasai
orang2 jang anti Bung KARNO.
 - (2) Perdjuangan/revolusi menurut kon-
sep Bung KARNO tidak mungkin un-
tuk diteruskan selama Bung KARNO
masih tetap ditahan/dalam penga-

- wasan orang2 jang anti Bung KARNO.
- (3) Dilihat dari sudut keamanan Bung KARNO pribadi maupun perjuangannya Bung KARNO dibawa kedaerah lain jang lebih menguntungkan.
- c. Tempat tudjuan jang waktu itu direntjanakan adalah ke Djawa Timur atau Djawa Tengah.
 - d. Saja tidak tahu pasti siapa2 sadja jang turut merentjanakan dan akan turut melaksanakan tindakan tersebut.
 - e. Dan apa jang saja dengar dari fihak MANGIL/DKP, ex. MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO mengetahui akan rentjana tindakan ini.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannya dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari RABU tanggal dua puluh delapan OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa;

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S.SOEGIJARJO
LETKOL CPM - NRP 12688.
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUDAN KOMISARIS BESAR
POL.

Pada hari ini, hari RABU tanggal dua puluh delapan OKTOBER tahun 1900 TUDJUH PULUH, kami:

1. S. SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM-NRP 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

djabatatan: masing/masing adalah anggota TEAM PEMERIKSAPUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki/laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanyaan/pertanyaan jang diadjukan padanja, maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN;

DJAWABAN;

56. Apakah sdr. mengetahui, kira2 antara tanggal 26 dan 27 september 1965 UNTUNG adanja laporan kepada Bung KARNO jang mengatakan bahwa gerakan perwira2 madju sudah dapat dilakukan.

56.a. Saja tidak tahu ataupun tidak dapat mengingat kembali bahwa bekas Letkol UNTUNG pernah menghadap Bung KARNO sekitar tanggal 26 dan 27 September 1965. Begitu pula saja tidak tahu bahwa UNTUNG telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO jang menjatakan bahwa gerakan perwira2 madju sudah dapat dilakukan.

- b. Bahwa saja benar2 tidak mengetahui soal ini tidak berarti bahwa saja mengatakan "tidak mungkin". Kemungkinan UNTUNG melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO tersebut dapat sadja terdjadi sewaktu-waktu, baik di Bogor atau di Djakarta, karena sering kali Bung KARNO memanggil orang dengan mendadak, atau pun Bung KARNO mau menerima orang dengan mendadak tanpa harus melalui prosedur jang lazim berlaku.
- c. Jang tegas saja ketahu, UNTUNG pernah menghadap Bung KARNO pada tanggal 4 Agustus 1965 dimana UNTUNG menjatakan kesediaannya untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD jang dianggapnja tidak loyal, sesuai dengan keterangan jang pernah saja utarakan. Djuga saja tahu dan ingat bahwa UNTUNG pernah menjampaikan surat pada Bung KARNO pada tanggal 30 September 1965 malam di Istora, jang djauh dikemudian hari baru saja ketahu bahwa isi surat tersebut berisi laporan tentang hari/ tanggal permulaan gerakan. Dari kedua fakta tersebut diatas memanglah wadjar bila sebelum 30 September 1965 itu/mungkin sekitar tgl. 26-27 September 1965, UNTUNG telah melaporkan pada Bung KARNO jang menjatakan gerakan perwira madju sudah dapat dilakukan.

57. Pada tanggal 30 September 1965, Djenderal SABUR tidak ada di Djakarta, melainkan ada di Bandung, harap sdr. terangkan:

- a. Disamping tentang UNTUNG jang menerima perintah dari Bung KARNO untuk menindak

Pati AD jang membangkang terhadap Bung KARNO, Djenderal SABUR pun diperintah untuk hal jang sama oleh Bung KARNO, apakah sebabnja Djenderal SABUR sendiri pala waktu itu tidak berada di Djakarta.

b. Apakah sebabnja UNTUNG jang melakukan gerakan/tindakan terhadap para Pati AD untuk melaksanakan perintah Bung KARNO itu?

57.a. Disamping UNTUNG, memang benar bahwa Djenderal SABUR telah diperintahkan oleh Bung KARNO untuk menindak Djenderal AD jang dianggap tidak loyal. Bahkan dilihat dari organisatoris, SABUR lah sebagai DANMEN TJAKRABIRAWA orang pertama jang menerima perintah dan bertanggung djawab atas pelaksanaan perintah tersebut.

Mengapa juist padasaatnja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI itu terdjadi, atau tepatnja pada tanggal 30 September 1965 siang dan malam harinja, Djenderal SABUR tidak ada ditempat cq. Di Bandung, karena disebabkan:

(1) Sifat pribadi Djenderal SABUR jang selalu ingin menghindari saat2 kritis cq. pekerdjaan berat. Saja menerangkan hal ini berdasarkan pengalaman2 jang saja lihat/alami sendiri selama bertahun/tahun bekerdjasama sebagai Adjudan Presiden. Djenderal SABUR selalu ingin menarik hasil2 cq. nama baik dari sesuatu pekerdjaan, tetapi untuk melaksanakan pekerdjaan itu sendiri disuruhnja orang lain. Pengalaman saat kritis jang djelas dapat saja kemukakan adalah peristiwa:

- penembakan terhadap Bung KARNO sewaktu sembahjang Idul Adha di Istana Djakarta.
- pelemparan granat terhadap Bung KARNO di Makasar.
- peristiwa G-30-S/PKI sendiri dimana Djenderal SABUR pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 berada di Halim.

Dari peristiwa2 itu, dimana saja sendiri berada, dapat dilihat ke-lumpuhan Djenderal SABUR jang tidak berbuat apa-apa juist pada saat2 terpenting dimana tindakan seorang komandan dibutuhkan, chususnja tindakan untuk mengamankan Bung KARNO jang mendjadi tanggung/djawabnja.

- (2) Djenderal SABUR telah pergi ke Bandung itu djuga dapat diartikan sebagai usaha untuk menghindari diri bila nantinja ternjata bahwa gerakan jang dikerdjakan UNTUNG itu gagal. Dengan demikian dia dapat membersihkan diri kepada pimpinan AD.

b. Bahwa UNTUNG jang telah melakukan gerak/tindakan terhadap para Pati AD, karena:

- (1) Mendapat perintah dari Bung KARNO.
- (2) Setjara organisatoris militer mendapat perintah dari DAN MEN TJAKRABI-RAWA Djenderal SABUR.
- (3) Setjara organisatoris party, mendapat perintah dari PKI.

58. Sdr. telah menerangkan kepada pemeriksa bahwa sdr. pernah mendengar dari AKBP MANGIL tentang adanja rentjana fihak kepolisian untuk memindahkan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta kedaerah lain jaitu daerah Djawa Timur dan Djawa Tengah.

Karena kota Djakarta dianggap tidak aman bagi Bung KARNO dan tidak memungkinkan penerusan perjuangannya sesuai konsep Bung KARNO. Berikan penjelasan tentang:

- a. Bila dan dimanakah sdr. telah mendengar tentang adanya rencana pemindahan Bung KARNO dari kota Djakarta dari AKBP MANGIL dan siapakah orang2 yang lain yang mendengarnya?
 - b. Adakah sdr. telah mengetahui hal tersebut dari orang lain dan bagaimanakah caranya sdr. dapat mengetahui hal tersebut?
 - c. Dengan melalui/menggunakan organisasi manakah apakah rencana pemindahan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta tersebut akan dilakukan?
 - d. Siapakah orang2 yang duduk dalam organisasi tersebut.
Adakah Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO mengetahui akan adanya organisasi tersebut atau setajarnya langsung duduk dalam organisasi tersebut?
 - e. Bagaimanakah peranan selanjutnya dari Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dalam kegiatan2 melaksanakan pemindahan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta?
 - f. Bagaimanakah konkritnya rencana tersebut?
58. Mengenai rencana memindahkan Bung KARNO keluar dari Djakarta/Bogor:
- a. Seperti telah saja terangkan terlebih dahulu pada ± pertengahan tahun 1966 saja mendengar akan adanya usaha2 dari orang2 yang pro Bung KARNO untuk memindahkan Bung KARNO keluar dari Djakarta/Bogor ke daerah Djawa Timur.

Jang masih saja ingat, AKBP MANGIL/ Komandan DKP pernah mengatakan hal tersebut kepada saja dipaviljun Istana Bogor. Beberapa perwira dari DKP jang saja tidak ingat lagi namanja, turut mendengar pemitjaraan ini.

- b. Rentjana tersebut djuga saja dengar dari Kombes Pol.Drs.SIDHARTA SH, jang menggantikan Kombes SUMIRAT sebagai Adjudan Kombes SIDHARTA setjara sambil lalu sadja mengatakan kepada saja bahwa akan diusahakan oleh orang2 jang tjinta Bung KARNO untuk membawa Bung KARNO keluar dari Djakarta/Bogor ke Djawa Timur.
- c. Organisasi apa atau matjam apa jang digunakan untuk melaksanakan pemindahan Bung KARNO tersebut, saja tidak mengetahui cq. belum pernah mendengar nama organisasi itu.
Jang saja ketahuhi adalah adanja kelompok atau kelompok2 orang dari berbagai matjam seperti: Kepolisian/BRIMOB, AL/KKO, Kelompok Brawidjaja, Pemuda2 Marhaenis. Mereka ini semua Pak SIDHARTA, akan turut melaksanakan pemindahan Bung KARNO tersebut.
- d. Nama2 jang saja ketahuhi disebut turut aktip dalam usaha pemindahan itu, chus-usnja Djenderal BAMBANG SUPENO, Dari KOMBES SIDHARTA saja dengar bahwa Djenderal BAMBANG SUPENO bersama kelompok Brawidjaja telah djauh dalam usahanja.
Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO mengetahui semua rentjana pemindahan Bung KARNO ini dan djelas menjokong/

membantu dalam rentjana itu. Apakah beliau turut setjara langsung duduk dalam organisasi itu, saja tidak tahu/ tidak mendengarnya.

e. Peranan selandjutnja dari Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dalam kegiatan2 melaksanakan pemindahan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta:

(1) Apa jang saja dengar dari Kombes SIDHARTA bahwa Pak TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO telah memerintahkan Kepolisian DJATIM/PANGDAK untuk siap2 menerima kedatangannya Bung KARNO di DJATIM.

(2) Saja ketahui dari Pidato Pak TJIPTO di DJATIM jang menerangkan bahwa wadjarlah bila rakjat DJATIM membela/mendjadi benteng Bung KARNO.

f. Bagaimana konkritnja rentjana tersebut saja tidak tahu. Hanja garis besarnya dari apa jang saja dengar, Bung KARNO akan dibawa setjara diam2 dari Bogor (bukan dari Djakarta) dan akan dibawa setjara langsung ke DJATIM dalam incognito, jang dalam hal ini khususnja akan dikerdjakan oleh anggauta2 DKP.

59. Berikan pendjelasan apakah rentjana pemindahan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta, tidak termasuk salah satu tugas dari organisasi "Barisan SOEKARNO".

Selain itu djelaskan pula tentang tudjuan, tugas dan susunan "Barisan SOEKARNO" tersebut.

59.a. Jang saja ketahui tentang "Barisan SOEKARNO" adalah sebagai berikut:

- (1) Adanja kekuatan2 massa jang tumbuh setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI jang menolak dan mengetuk G-30-S/PKI itu jang seterusnya mengetjam pemerintah cq. policy Bung KARNO, maka Bung KARNO membentuk suatu kekuatan jang diberi nama "Barisan SOEKARNO". Tujuan semula mendukung mempertahankan, dan sebagai knuppel dari Bung KARNO dalam usaha meneruskan konsep/adjarannja. Djuga "Barisan SOEKARNO" chususnja dipakai untuk menghadapi massa/demonstran2 jang anti Bung KARNO tadi. Anggauta "Barisan SOEKARNO" ini adalah mereka jang setjara fanatik tanpa reserve mendukung Bung KARNO.
- (2) Setelah tertjetusnja idee "Barisan SOEKARNO" tersebut, dan mulai terdjadi/terasa adanja bentrokan2 antara dua kekuatan di Indonesia, para Panglima ABRI dengan serentak menjatakan bahwa semua Angkatan setjara keseluruhan adalah termasuk "Barisan SOEKARNO" dan menetap bahwa para Panglima Daerah Militer adalah Komandan "Barisan SOEKARNO" untuk tiap2 daerahnja. Dengan tindakan ini, maka "Barisan SOEKARNO" itu bukan lagi terdjadi dari orang2 jang fanatik tanpa reserve mendukung Bung KARNO, tetapi djuga terdiri dari semua golongan masjarakat. Dengan demikian maka terbaurlah tujuan utama dari "Barisan SOEKARNO" jang semula. Djuga dengan kedudukan para Pang-

lima Daerah sebagai Komandan "Barisan SOEKARNO" para Panglima itu dapat mengawasi dan mengendalikannya.

(3) Ditingkat pusat jang saja ketahu Bung KARNO mempertjajai pada Pak CHAERUL SALEH untuk mimpin "Barisan SOEKARNO", itu.

Baru kemudian saja tahu bahwa pelaksanaan pimpinan "Barisan SOEKARNO" itu didelegeer kepada Letkol SJAFIIE.

b. Dengan uraian saja seperti tersebut maka dapat saja terangkan bahwa orang2/ kelompok2 jang merentjanakan untuk membawa Bung KARNO keluar dari Djakarta/ Bogor adalah termasuk dalam "Barisan SOEKARNO" Nomer (1), yakni orang2 jang dengan fanatik tanpa reserve mendukung Bung KARNO.

60. Apakah Bung KARNO dalam mengambil langkah2 berhubung dengan adanya berita bahwa pasukan RPKAD pada tanggal 11 Maret 1966 (malam) akan menjerang Istana, telah pula mengerahkan "Barisan SOEKARNO" guna menghadapi kemungkinan2 serangan dari RPKAD tersebut.

60. Pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 malam, seperti pernah saja terangkan terlebih dahulu, di Guest House Istana Djakarta berada banjak pedjabat/Menteri2.

Diantarannya terdapat pula Menteri ACHMADI + ACHADI. Setelah diterimanya berita tentang adanya pasukan RPKAD/AD akan menjerbu Istana, terdjadilah banjak pembitjaraan2/dialog2.

Saja ingat akan adanya dialog antara Bung KARNO dengan ACHMADI/ACHADI,

jang isinja pada garis besarnya:
pertanyaan Bung KARNO kepada ACHMADI/
ACHADI tentang kekuatan pendukung Bung
KARNO dan akhirnya perintah Bung KARNO
kepada ACHMADI/ACHADI supaya menggerakkan
massa/kekuatan tersebut untuk melindungi
dan membela Bung KARNO.
Saja kira kekuatan daripada ACHMADI/ACHADI
inilah jang disebut "Barisan SOEKARNO".

61. Apakah peranan jang telah dilakukan oleh
Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dan
perwira2 Kepolisian jang lain dalam menghada-
pi kemungkinan2 serangan dari pasukan RPKAD
sebagaimana beritanya telah diterima oleh
Bung KARNO pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 malam.
61. Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa 10 Maret
1966 malam dimana Bung KARNO beserta rom-
bongan meninggalkan Istana menuju Bogor,
saja mendengar dari Kombes SUMIRAT sebagai
berikut:
- (1) Sewaktu Kombes SUMIRAT menjampaikan
surat kepada Bung KARNO pada tanggal
10 Maret 1966 malam tersebut, dia
djuga melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO
akan pesan2 MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Pol.
SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO jang isinja
berupa saran agar Bung KARNO mening-
galkan Djakarta dan bahwa Djenderal
Pol. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO segera akan
menjiapkan pasukan BRIMOB untuk melin-
dungi/membela Bung KARNO.
Djuga dipesankan bahwa Pak TJIPTO
pada malam itu akan berada ditengah
pasukannya.
 - (2) Dari keterangan Kombes SUMIRAT itulah
saja ketahui akan peranan aktif pak

TJIIPTO pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 malam.

62. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan kepada pemeriksa bahwa dalam bulan September 1965 Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan kepada Djenderal SABUR dan Letkol UNTUNG untuk bertindak terhadap beberapa orang Pati AD jaitu Djenderal NASUTION dll karena Pati2 AD tersebut dianggap tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO atau tidak setudju dengan garis politik Bung KARNO. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Dalam hal apakah Pati2 tersebut dianggap tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO atau garis politik Bung KARNO jang manakah jang menurut orang anggapan Bung KARNO tidak disetudju oleh Pati2 AD tersebut.
 - b. Bagaimanakah sikap dan pandangan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO terhadap garis politik Bung KARNO tersebut?
- 62.a. Para pati AD tersebut tidak menjetudju akan:
- b. garis politik Bung KARNO jang sangat tjenderung kepada komunisme dan chususnja politik poros Djakarta-Phompenh-Peking-Pyongyang.
 - c. Sikap dan pandangan Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO adalah sefaham dengan Bung KARNO jang berarti menjetudju garis politik Bung KARNO tersebut. Saja belum pernah mendengar utjapan "tindakannja jang menjatakan tidak menjetudju hal itu.
63. Apakah sdr. mengetahui tentang kepergian Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO ke Djawa Timur dalam bulan Djuni 1966, dimana ia telah

berpidato dengan menjebut-njebut antara lain: "Rakjat Djawa Timur supaja mendjadi benteng Soekarno". Bila Sdr. mengetahui hal tersebut, tjoba berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Apakah kepergian Djenderal SUTJIPTO JUDO-DIHARDJO tersebut termasuk dalam rangka persiapan memindahkan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta ke daerah DJATIM?
- b. Apakah Bung KARNO djuga mengetahui tudjuan kepergian Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDO-DIHARDJO tersebut?

63.a. Dari kegiatan2 Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO jang djelas menundjukan sikap setia pada Bung KARNO dan dari apa jang saja dengar bahwa Pak TJIPTO tersebut mengetahui dan menjekong usaha pemindahan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta/Bogor, djelaslah bahwa kepergian pak TJIPTO ke Djawa Timur tersebut adalah termasuk dalam persiapan usaha memindahkan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta/Bogor ke DJATIM.

- b. Bung KARNO mengetahui akan kepergian dan tudjuan Pak TJIPTO ke DJATIM, karena Pak TJIPTO sudah melaporkan diri pada Bung KARNO sebelum menudju ke DJATIM.

Prosedure seperti itu adalah lazim dimana setiap Menteri atau Panglima Angkatan melapor dulu pada Bung KARNO sebelum pergi meninggalkan Djakarta.

64. Vide djawaban sdr. nomer 53, bahwa oleh Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dalam bulan September 1965 pernah diberitakan tentang adanja "DEWAN DJENDERAL", apakah sdr. djuga mengetahui kalau SUTJIPTO

JUDODIHARDJO djuga memberitahukan Bung KARNO bahwa didalam tubuh kepolisian sendiripun ada Djenderal2 jang masuk dalam DEWAN DJENDERAL jang membangkang kepada Bung KARNO itu, kalau ada siapa2 Djenderal jang dilaporkan kepada Bung KARNO itu?

64. Setelah Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDO-DIHARDJO menghadap Bung KARNO dalam bulan September 1965 saja mendengar bahwa Pak TJIFTO itu djuga telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO bahwa djuga dalam tubuh Angkatan Kepolisian terdapat beberapa Djenderal2 jang tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO itu diantaranya: Djenderal Polisi K. SUROSO, Djenderal Pol. MUDJOKO, Djenderal Pol. MURDJAMAN, Djenderal Pol. SUTJIPTO DANUKUSUMO, lain2 nama saja tidak tahu/ingat lagi.

65. Sepengetahuan sdr. apakah memang benar adanya hubungan langsung antara KOMDAK VII/DJAYA dengan Istana, djika benar demikian apakah hal ini sudah sepengetahuan MEN/PANGAK SUTJIP-TO JUDODIHARDJO waktu itu dan apakah sebabnja hubungan langsung itu dapat dibenarkan.

65.a. Memang benar ada hubungan langsung antara KOMDAK VII/DJAYA dengan Istana. Beberapa kali saja mengetahui bahwa PANGDAK VII/DJAYA dipanggil/menghadap langsung Bung KARNO, tanpa melewati MEN/PANGAK.

Hal tersebut sebenarnja tidak benar menurut peraturan/prosedure.

Jang dapat langsung kepada Presiden waktu itu hanjalah Gubernur DCI DJAYA dan PANGDAM V/DJAYA sebagai PEPELRADA

ataupun Panglima Garnizoen.
Panglima Daerah AL (PANGDAMAR) ataupun
Panglima daerah AU (PANGKOWILU) tidak
mempunyai hubungan langsung dengan Istana.

- b. Adanja hubungan langsung antara KOMDAK/VII/DJAYA dengan Istana tersebut jelas diketahui oleh MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.
- c. Bahwa adanja hubungan langsung tersebut dapat terdjadi/dibenarkan, karena:
(1) Politik Bung KARNO waktu itu memang selalu berusaha untuk dapat langsung/mengendalikan Panglima2 Angkatan Daerah agar dapat dipakai sebagai alatnja.
(2) Khusus mengenai KOMDAK VII/DJAYA, Bung KARNO merasa puas karena tindakan2 pimpinan KOMDAK tersebut sedjalan dengan politiknya dan dari KOMDAK VII/DJAYA dapat diperoleh informasi2 jang sesuai dengan kehendak Bung KARNO.

66. Harap sdr. djelaskan tentang radiogram jang dibuat DIR INTELL MABAK a.n. MEN/PANGAK pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 (bukti dibatjakan):

- a. Apakah Bung KARNO mengetahui tentang radiogram tersebut, djika mengetahuinja, dari siapa, dimana, apahila.
- b. Bagaimana reaksi Bung KARNO ketika itu?
- c. Apakah ada instruksi2 jang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dan instruksi2 ada jang telah diberikan oleh MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO kepada kepolisian?

66. Mengenai radiogram Polisi tanggal Oktober 1965.

- a. Seingat saja, Bung KARNO mendapat laporan pada 2 Oktober 1965 di Bogor dari MEN/PANGAK Djenderal Pol. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO yang melaporkan bahwa Kepolisian telah mengirimkan radiogram tersebut kepada Kepolisian yang isi pokoknya adalah ketaatan atas seluruh Kepolisian kepada Bung KARNO.
- b. Bung KARNO sangat gembira mendengar laporan itu.
- c. Saja tidak mengetahui dengan selengkapnja apa isi instruksi Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO setelah laporan tersebut, tetapi dari apa yang saja dengar Bung KARNO menginstruksikan supaya MEN/PANGAK dan seluruh kepolisian supaya tetap setia/taat pada Bung KARNO.

67. Harap sdr. jelaskan pengetahuan sdr. bahwa pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 Kombes SUMIRAT ada menulis surat kepada AKBP ANWAS TANU MIDJAJA di KODAM VII/DJAYA antara lain isinya supaya mentaati semua perintah dari Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Pangti ABRI Presiden SOEKARNO.

- a. Apakah Sdr. mengetahui kalau isi surat tersebut oleh Kombes SUMIRAT disampaikan kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO ketika berada di Halim tanggal 1 Oktober 1965?
- b. Apa maksud dari surat Kombes SUMIRAT kepada ANWAS TANUMIDJAJA tersebut?

67. Dari Kombes SUMIRAT saja pernah mendengar sesudah berada di Bogor, bahwa:

- a. Kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO telah dilaporkan oleh Kombes SUMIRAT tentang adanya dan isinja surat tersebut, sewaktu MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO tiba di Halim pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.
- b. Maksud dari surat tersebut adalah supaya fihak kepolisian benar2 hanja mentaati perintah2 Bung KARNO apapun djuga akan terdjadi dan/atau kalau akan ada perintah/instruksi dari fihak2 lain.

68. Sewaktu tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 di Halim, oleh Bung KARNO kepada setiap pedjabat jang ada di Halim (termasuk Djenderal SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO) diberikan daftar susunan Dewan Revolusi disamping dirinja (SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO) ditjantumkan sebagai anggauta Dewan Revolusi djuga bawahannja jaitu AKBP ANWAS TANUMIDJA ditjantumkan sebagai Wakil Ketua IV Dewan Revolusi, harap sdr. djelaskan sebagaimana reaksi Bung KARNO bersama2 dengan MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, terhadap ditjantumkanja nama ANWAS sebagai Wakil Ketua IV Dewan Revolusi.

68. Reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap pengangkatan ANWAS tersebut adalah tenang2 sadja. Tidak ada reaksi jang menundjukkan ketidak persetudjuannja bahwa seorang perwira bawahan di angka lebih tinggi dari atasannja.
Reaksi MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO sendiri atas pengangkatan ANWAS tersebut kelihatan agak ketjewa sedikit, bahwa ia sebagai atasannja ditjantumkan/berada di bawah ANWAS. Tetapi achirnja MEN/

PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO menjerahkan segalanya kepada keputusan Bung KARNO.

69. Dapatkah sdr. mendjelaskan, apa sebabnja MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 itu (setelah memenuhi panggilan Bung KARNO) tidak berusaha keluar dari Halim (seperti MEN/PANGAL Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA) umpama untuk dapat berhubungan dengan Djenderal SUHARTO dan lain sebagainya guna lebih mengetahui keadaan jang sebenarnya?

69. Bahwa MEN/PANGAK S. JUDODIHARDJO setelah di Halim pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 tidak berusaha untuk keluar dari Halim, disebabkan:

- (1) Ia telah mendapat laporan dari Kombes SUMIRAT tentang surat jang dikirim oleh Kombes SUMIRAT ke KOMDAK VII/DJAYA jang isinja supaya hanja taat kepada Bung KARNO dan mengenai situasi dikota maupun KOSTRAD sewaktu paginja Kombes SUMIRAT menghadap PANGDAM V/DJAYA di KOSTRAD. MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO pertjaja penuh akan laporan Kombes SUMIRAT ini.
- (2) MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO menganggap bahwa ia harus hanja taat pada Bung KARNO, tidak pada orang lain lagi. Karena Bung KARNO berada di Halim, maka ia sendiri djuga berada di Halim tidak perlu ke KOSTRAD.
- (3) Mendengar dari Bung KARNO dan/atau SUPARDJO, MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO djuga beranggapan bahwa KOSTRAD berada difihak Dewan Djenderal jang anti Bung KARNO.

70. Sewaktu Bung KARNO dan rombongan berangkat dari Halim tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam menudju Bogor, pada malam itu djuga MEN/PANGAK S. JUDODIHARDJO kembali ke Djakarta (tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 ± djam 01.30) apakah sdr. ketahu petundjuk2 apa jang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK S. JUDODIHARDJO ketika akan ke Djakarta kembali malam itu?

70. Setelah tiba di Bogor pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam ± djam 24.00 para pedjabat jang turut mengantarkan Bung KARNO dari Halim terus duduk2 dipaviljun Bung KARNO. Saja sendiri lalu pergi ke paviljun sebelah, kantor Adjudan, untuk menilpun dan laporan kepada Djenderal SUHARTO di KOSTRAD.

Dengan demikian, saja tidak mengetahui pemitjaraan2 Bung KARNO dan para pedjabat tersebut.

Djuga kalau ada instruksi/petundjuk Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK S. JUDODIHARDJO sebelum ia kembali ke Djakarta saja tidak mengetahui.

Jang saja ketahu ± 1½ djam kemudian, tanggal 2 Oktober 1965, djam 01.30.

MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO meninggalkan Istana Bogor kembali ke Djakarta.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnja dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudja ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini:

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari KAMIS tanggal dua puluh sembilan OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S. SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM - NRP:
12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POL.

Pada hari ini, hari KAMIS tanggal duapuluh sembilan OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM - NRP:12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki/laki jang bersama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadjukan padanja, maka ia - jang diperiksa memberikan keterangan²/pengakuan² seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

71. Mereka jang terlibat dalam G-30-S/PKI dari Kepolisian RI antara lain AKBP ANWAS TANUA-MIDJAJA (Wakil Ketua IV Dewan Revolusi) setelah diadakan pemeriksaan oleh MABAK, kemudian oleh MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO ada dilaporkan kepada Bung KARNO dan bagaimana reaksi dan tanggapan Bung KARNO atas pelaporan itu?

- 71.a. Sebelum - selama - dan sesudah diadakan pemeriksaan oleh DEPAK terhadap AKBP ANWAS, saja mengetahui bahwa Kombes SUMIRAT selalu melaporkan proses tersebut kepada Bung KARNO.
- b. Setelah ada putusan DEPAK jang menja-

takan bahwa AKBP ANWAS tidak bersalah (tidak tersangkut), hal ini djuga telah dilaporkan oleh MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO kepada Bung KARNO.

- c. Reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap laporan2 tersebut adalah menjetudjui semua kebidjaksanaan MEN/PANGAK jang telah ditempuh dan membenarkan putusan bahwa AKBP ANWAS tidak bersalah (tidak tersangkut).

72.a. Dalam bulan Maret 1966 (2 hari sebelum penahanan Menteri2 jang dilakukan pada tanggal 18 Maret 1966), menteri ACHMADI telah menjingkir dan pernah bermalam dirumah MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, harap sdr. djelaskan apa jang sdr. ketahui dalam hal ini.

- b. Djelaskan pula mengenai Ir. SURACHMAN hubungannya dengan Kepolisian jang sdr. ketahui ketika itu?

72.a. Mengenai pernah menjingkirnja Menteri ACHMADI dan bermalam dirumah MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, saja mendengar/mengetahui beberapa lama setelah kedjadian tersebut.

Seingat saja, Bung KARNO djuga mengetahui cq. mendapat laporan tentang hal tersebut setelah terdjadinja kedjadian itu, dengan melalui laporan jang disampaikan oleh Kombes SUMIRAT dan/atau MANGIL.

- b. Saja pernah mendengar dari Kombes SUMIRAT bahwa Bung KARNO telah menginstruksikan kepada Kepolisian agar pihak kepolisian Ir. SURACHMAN (tokoh PNI), karena pada saat itu sudah amatterasa bahwa keadaan keamanan Ir. SURACHMAN tersebut

di Djakarta tidak dapat didjamin lagi.

73.a. Setelah G-30-S/PKI, Orde Baru tumbuh, didalam proses tumbuhnja Orde Baru jang menentang PKI dan Orde Lama ketika itu tjoba terangkan pengetahuan sdr. apa jang pernah dibitjarakan/didjandjikan oleh MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO kepada Bung KARNO, atau sebaliknya.

b. Harap sdr. djelaskan pula pengetahuan sdr. bagaimana kegiatan2 MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dengan Istana (Bung KARNO) sewaktu akan dan sesudah lahirnja SUPERSEMAR?

73.a. Dalam situasi hangat pada waktu itu saja mengetahui bahwa MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO selalu dan tetap setia pada Bung KARNO, meskipun dengan deras telah terasa adanya desakan2 jang anti PKI dan anti Presiden SUKARNO waktu itu. MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO selalu mengatakan pada Bung KARNO bahwa ia akan tetap setia kepada Bung KARNO bahwa ia akan tetap setia kepada Bung KARNO dan adjaran2nja.

Apa jang pernah didjandjikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO saja tidak pernah mengetahuinja.

b. Ketjuali keterangan seperti tersebut diatas saja tidak tahu kegiatan2 lain dari MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO sebelum adanya SUPERSEMAR.

Setelah adanya SUPERSEMAR, apa jang saja ketahui adalah sikap MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO jang tetap biasa/baik dan setia kepada Bung KARNO.

- (1) Bung Karno selalu menerangkan kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO dan Panglima2 Angkatan jang lain akan isi dari SUPERSEMAR jang dititik beratkan kepada keharusan mendjaga keamanan pribadi Bung KARNO dan meneruskan/mengamankan adjaran2 Bung KARNO.
- (2) Dari pendjelasan2 Bung KARNO tersebut, MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO bersikap akan mendjalankan apa jang dikatakan Bung KARNO itu.
- (3) MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO selalu menjetadjui sikap Bung KARNO jang menundjukkan rasa tidak puas atau marah terhadap tindakan pemegang SUPERSEMAR (Djenderal SUHARTO) jang dianggapnja oleh Bung KARNO tidak betul umpama:
 - pembubaran PKI.
 - penahanan menteri2.
- (4) MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO menundjukkan sikap ketidak puasannja terhadap Djenderal SUHARTO jang tidak pernah berunding dengan Panglima2 Angkatan jg lain dalam melaksanakan SUPERSEMAR.

74. Sdr. telah memberi pendjelasan kepada pemeriksa bahwa:
- a. "Barisan SUKARNO" jang dibentuk atas dasar kehendak Bung KARNO adalah terdiri dari orang2 jang fanatik kepada Bung KARNO.
 - b. Dengan adanja pernjataan Panglima2 KODAM bahwa mereka djuga mendjabat sebagai Komandan Barisan SOEKARNO didaerahnja masing2, maka tudjuan dan tugas dari "Barisan SUKARNO" jg terdiri dari orang2 jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO mendjadi kabur.

Berikan sekali lagi pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Landasan/dasar dari pada pembentukan "Barisan SUKARNO" jang terdiri dari orang2 jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO.
 - b. Hubungan dengan "Barisan SUKARNO" tersebut punt a. dengan Panglima2 KODAM jang menja-takan dirinja sebagai Panglima/Komandan Ba-risan SUKARNO.
 - c. Tudjuan dari Barisan SUKARNO.
 - d. Proses pembentukan organisasi Barisan SU-KARNO jang terdiri dari orang2 jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO.
 - e. Tokoh2/pedjabat2 pemerintah RI ataupun to-koh2 organisasi jang mendukung terbentuknja organisasi Barisan SUKARNO jg terdiri dari orang jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO.
 - f. Kegiatan2 dalam rangka melaksanakan tugas, organisasi Barisan SUKARNO dan bagaimana-kah akibat2 jang timbul, jang dapat meng-ganggu/membahajakan keamanan negara dan masjarakat.
74. Dari fakta2 jang saja lihat/dengar/keta-hui kini saja dapat menerangkan tentang "Barisan SUKARNO" sebagai berikut:
- a. Landasan/dasar:
 - (1) Sikap Bung KARNO jang berlandaskan surat dari AIDIT (tanggal 6 Okto-ber 1965) jang menetapkan bahwa hanja Bung KARNOlah satu2nja jang berhak men-jelesaikan G-30-S/PKI.
Sikap Bung KARNO ini sebenarnja adalah maksud PKI, karena dengan adanja Bung KARNO dan kelandjutan PKI akan dapat dilindungi dan kelandjutan PKI akan dapat didjamin jang berarti PKI akan dapat meneruskan tjita2nja.

(2) Dengan mulai adanya kekuatan2 jang menentang PKI dan Bung KARNO pada waktu itu, Bung KARNO merasa terantjam kedudukannya. Karena itu harus dikerahkan kekuatan2 jang benar2 setia pada Bung KARNO.

b. Hubungannya dengan pernjataan para Panglima.

Gagasan Bung KARNO untuk menggalang kekuatan dan membentuk "Barisan SUKARNO" tersebut dilontarkan setjara resmi oleh Bung KARNO dalam kedudukannya sebagai Kepala Negara dan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi.

Diharapkan oleh Bung KARNO sikap menjtudjuji dan menjkong dari para Panglima ABRI, tanpa mentjampuri pelaksanaannya. Tetapi ternjata para Panglima dapat mengerti landasan jang terselubung tadi, sehingga setjara keseluruhan dinjatakannya bajwa seluruh ABRI masuk "Barisan SUKARNO" dengan para Panglima Daerah sebagai Komandan Barisan SUKARNO setempat. Dengan tindakan para Panglima tersebut maka maksud utama Bung KARNO dalam mendirikan Barisan SUKARNO itu mendjadi gagal karena:

- tudjuan barisan SUKARNO mendjadi kabur.
- seluruh kegiatan Barisan SUKARNO dapat diawasi dan di kendalikan oleh para Panglima Daerah.

Namun demikian, sebagian dari orang2 jang fanatik tanpa reserve terhadap Bung KARNO masih terus melaksanakan kegiatan2nja menurut landasan/maksud semula.

c. Tujuan:

Tujuan Barisan SUKARNO (menurut konsep Bung KARNO), adalah:

(1) Menghadapi segala kekuatan jang anti Bung KARNO jang akan mendongkel Bung KARNO, dengan segala tjara apapun.

(2) Mempertahankan Bung KARNO sebagai Kepala Negara dan mengamankan/melindunginja.

d. Proses pembentukan:

(1) Setelah dikeluarkannya gagasan Bung KARNO tersebut, telah ada tanggapan spontan dari orang2 jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO. Pada tingkat pusat, Dr. SUBANDRIO telah menjokong setjara aktif dalam bidang moril dan fasilitas. Pak CHAERUL SALEH telah ditunjuk/diserahi untuk memimpin pelaksanaan gagasan tersebut.

(2) Pak CHAERUL SALEH telah mengadakan rapat-rapat dirumahnya dengan tokoh2/menteri2 jang sehaluan dalam pelaksanaan realisasi "Barisan SUKARNO" itu. Achirnja Pak CHAERUL SALEH menundjuk Letkol SJAFIIE untuk memimpin dan meneruskan gagasan2/policy jang telah dirapatkan itu.

Pak CHAERUL SALEH telah melaporkan segala kegiatan2nja pada Bung KARNO.

(3) Letkol SJAFIIE jang dibebani tugas tersebut telah meneruskan usahnja dalam menghubungi orang2 jang sehaluan (fanatik pada Bung KARNO) dan achirnja menetapkan bahwa Djenderal BAMBANG SUPENO jang diserahi mengorganisir dan memimpin barisan itu.

Letkol SJAFIIE djuga telah meminta pada pemerintah keperluan budget jang diperlukan untuk usahanja itu.

(4) Djenderal BAMBANG SUPENO, jang djuga beberapa kali telah menghadap Bung KARNO, dengan aktip menghimpun orang2 jang fanatik kepada Bung KARNO dalam merealisir pembentukan organisasi itu, sehingga adanja kegiatan2 di Djakarta, Djawa Tengah, dan Djawa Timur.

e. Tokoh2 jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO dan turut aktif dalam usaha pembentukan/pelaksanaan Barisan SUKARNO.

(1) CHAERUL SALEH, Dr. SUBANDRIO, ACHMADI, ACHADI, TUMAKAKA, HANAFI, ANWAR SANUSI, Letkol SJAFIIE, BAMBANG SUPENO.

(2) Pemuda PNI ALI SURACHMAN: JON LUMINGKEWAS TIRANDA, PAKALA, SLAMET SUROJO.

Mereka ini pernah menghadap Bung KARNO dan menjatakan bahwa seluruh pemuda Marhaenis siap turut dalam Barisan SUKARNO.

(3) Polisi: AKBP Drs. UTORO, AKBP ANTON SUDJARWO, AKBP SUROSO, AKBP SIDHARTA.

(4) TOKOH2 jang mendukung: Djenderal Pol SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, Djenderal KKO HARTONO, Djenderal TNI SUADI.

f. Dalam pelaksanaan tugas, Barisan SUKARNO (jang fanatik terhadap Bung KARNO) ini telah melaksanakan kegiatan:

(1) mengadakan/bentrokan2 dengan kekuatan2/demonstrasi jang anti Bung KARNO, seperti di UI, Tandjung Priok, Djokja dan sebagainya.

(2) mengusahakan untuk membawa keluar Bung KARNO dari Djakarta.

- g. Dalam hubungan ini oleh Djenderal Polisi SUTJIPTO JUDDODIHARDJO, MEN/PANGAK, telah pula dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO tentang aktivitas kepolisian di DJATENG dibawah pimpinan Brigdjen SABUR dan DJATIM dibawah pimpinan Brigdjen SUMARSONO, dalam hal menjokong penuh pelaksanaan pembentukan organisasi dan pelaksanaan tugas Barisan SUKARNO.

75. Berikan pendjelasan tentang kegiatan dari BAMBANG SUPENO dalam hal2 jang berhubungan dengan "Barisan SUKARNO".

75.1. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, telah diketahui bahwa BAMBANG SUPENO adalah seorang Djenderal AD dan merupakan tokoh dalam rumpun Brawidjaja. Djuga diketahui bahwa BAMBANG SUPENO ini adalah seorang tokoh jang mempunyai rasaketjawa terhadap Angkatan Darat.

2. Oleh CHAERUL SALEH, tokoh BAMBANG SUPENO ini diadjukan kepada Bung KARNO sebagai seseorang jang dianggap mampu dan punja pengaruh untuk memimpin Barisan SUKARNO, Bung KARNO menjetudjuinja dan setelah itu beberapa kali telah memanggil BAMBANG SUPENO.
3. Sewaktu menghadap Bung KARNO, BAMBANG SUPENO, telah menjatakan kesediannya untuk diserahi tugas tersebut, berjandji untuk tetap setia dan membela Bung KARNO. Oleh Bung KARNO BAMBANG SUPENO telah diberikan restu dan diinstruksikan untuk benar2 melaksanakan tugasnja menurut konsep Bung KARNO.

4. Saja mendengar, setelah menghadap Bung KARNO itu BAMBANG SUPENO telah mengadakan rapat2 dirumahnja dalam kegiatan Barisan SUKARNO tersebut, Kalau saja tidak salah ingat, pada achir tahun 1966 atau awal 1967, BAMBANG SUPENO pernah melaporkan pada Bung KARNO di Istana Bogor atas segala hasil pekerdjaannja jang isinja melaporkan bahwa rakjat tetap berada dibelakang Bung KARNO dan kekuatan2 pendukung Bung KARNO tetap setia untuk membela Bung KARNO.
5. Djuga pernah saja dengar bahwa BAMBANG SUPENO telah melaporkan pada Bung KARNO tentang KODAM BRAWIDJAJA jang pokoknja berisi tokoh2 dan pasukan2 Brawidjaja berada dibelakang Bung KARNO.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari DJUM'AT tanggal 30 OKTOBER 1970.

Jang diperiksa:

Jang memeriksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO

1. S. SOEGIJARJO
KOLONEL CPM - NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUDAN KOMISARIS BESAR
POL.

Pada hari ini, hari DJUM'AT tanggal tiga puluh OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1-SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688

2-AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI.

djabat: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BANBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diajukan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

76. Sdr. telah memberikan pendjelasan/keterangan kepada pemeriksa bahwa John Luningkewas, Slamet Surojo, Pahala dan Tiranda merupakan tokoh2 jang telah aktif dalam usaha pembentukan "Barisan SUKARNO" serta pernah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk membitjarakan soal2 jang berhubungan-dengan "BARISAN SUKARNO". Berikan pendjelasan tentang:
- a. Bila dan dimana mereka telah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk membitjarakan tentang hal2 jang berhubungan dengan "BARISAN SUKARNO".
 - b. Siapa2kah jang pada waktu itu menghadap Bung KARNO.
 - c. Bagaimanakah isi pemitjaraan tersebut dan petundjuk jang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO?
 - d. Siapakah diantara para pedjabat pemerintah/istana hadlir/mengetahui adanja pertemuan tersebut?

- e. Bagaimanakah pelaksanaan dari hasil pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dengan mereka tersebut?
76. Mengenai menghadapnja pemuda2 PNI (ALI SURACHMAN) pada Bung KARNO, jang dapat saja terangkan adalah sebagai berikut:
- a. Seingat saja, mereka menghadap Bung KARNO pada bulan2 pertama (kwartal pertama) tahun 1966 di Istana Merdeka Djakarta, diterima antara djam 10.00 diruangan resmi menerima tamu.
 - b. Ketjuali mereka berempat (John Luningkewas, Slamet Surojo Pahala, Tiranda) djuga hadlir Pak ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO dan Ir. SURACHMAN.
 - c. Pada garis besarnja isi pembitjaraan:
 - (1) Pemuda2 PNI siap sepenuhnja dibelakang Bung KARNO untuk membelanja dan menghadapi mereka jang anti Bung KARNO.
 - (2) Setudju bahkan akan turut aktip mendjadi inti dalam-pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO.
 - (3) Pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO di Djawa Tengah akan di-sponsori oleh SLAMET SUROJO dan akan mendapat dukungan dari tokoh kepolisian Djawa Tengah dan chususnja dari pasukan2 BRIMOB dan KKO disitu.
Pembentukan barisan SUKARNO

di Djawa Timur segera akan dapat dilaksanakan dengan bantuan penuh dari fihak Kepolisian Djatim.

Pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO di Djakarta telah dapat dirintis dengan basis di Tandjung Priok dimana BADJA- (Banteng Djakarta) telah terbentuk.

- (4) Gerakan2 untuk mengimbangi kekuatan jg anti Bung KARNO akan dapat segera dimulai/ dilaksanakan.
 - (5) Mereka minta bantuan keuangan pada Bung KARNO untuk membiayai gerakan tersebut.
 - (6) Dinjatakan sekali lagi oleh pemuda2 PNI ini akan kesetiaan-ja kepada Bung KARNO dan mereka berdjandji akan melaksanakan dengan kejakinan pasti berhasil/menang.
 - (7) Bung KARNO menginstruksikan kepada mereka agar benar2 melakukan segala rentjana dan djandji itu, serta mendjandjikan akan memberikan bantuan keuangan.
- d. Seingat saja, pedjabat pemerintah/ Istana jang turut hadir/mengetahui akan pertemuan itu adalah: Pak CHAERUL SALEH, dan Djenderal SABUR.
- e. Jang dapat saja ketahui pelaksanaan dari hasil pemitjaraan tersebut adalah:

- (1) SLAMET SUROJO memang ke Djawa Tengah dan terasa adanya kegiatan2 jang pro Bung KARNO, seperti adanya bentrokan2 di Djokja.
- (2) Terbukti di Djawa Timur adanya gerakan jang membela Bung KARNO dengan chususnja dibawah pimpinan PANGDAK DJATIM.
- (3) Di Djakarta terdjadi bentrokan2 antara demonstran jang anti dengan pemuda2 PNI (ALI SURACHMAN).
- (4) Saja dengar dikemudian bahwa kepada pemuda2 PNI itu memang diberikan uang dari Bung KARNO.
- (5) Adanja rentjana/usaha untuk membawa ke luar Bung KARNO dari Djakarta karena dianggap Bung KARNO tidak aman di Djakarta berhubung makin kuatnja orang2 jang anti Bung KARNO.

77. Sdr. telah menerangkan kepada pemeriksa bahwa kedjadian2 jg berupa bentrokan fisik antara pemuda2 jang berdemonstrasi didjalan djalan untuk mengadjukan tuntutan "TRITURA" kepada pemerintah dengan pemuda2 jang pro Bung KARNO dan jang tergabung dalam organisasi "Barisan SUKARNO" adalah merupakan akibat dari telah terbentukaja organisasi "Barisan SUKARNO" setjara fisik. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bila, dimana kedjadian bentrokan fisik tersebut telah terdjadi?
- b. Bila, dimana dan dengan tjara bagaimana Bung KARNO telah mengetahui adanya

kedjadian2 tersebut.

- c. Bagaimana tanggapan/reaksi Bung KARNO setelah mengetahui hal tersebut?
- d. Bagaimana reaksi Brigdjen SABUR dan saran2 apakah jang diberikan Brigdjen SABUR kepada Bung KARNO?

77. Tanggal2 jang pasti saja tidak ingat lagi, tetapi saja masih

- a. ingat bahwa memang telah terdjadi bentrokan2 tersebut diatas maupun adanja kegiatan pro Bung KARNO.
 - (1) Sekitar permulaan tahun 1966, bentrokan terdjadi di UI Salemba antara para Mahasiswa dan kelompok pro Bung KARNO.
 - (2) Sekitar permulaan tahun 1966 telah bentrokan terdjadi bentrokan antara para demonstiran dan kelompok BADJA/pro Bung KARNO.
 - (3) Dalam tahun 1966 di Djokja, terdjadi bentrokan antara para mahasiswa/demonstiran dengan kelompok pro Bung KARNO.
 - (4) Dalam tahun 1967 terdjadi adanja Show of Force dari pemuda2 Marhaenis (pro Bung KARNO).
- b. Segala kedjadian tersebut diatas telah diketahui oleh Bung KARNO berdasarkan laporan2 jang ia terima. Pertama melalui Djenderal SABUR/ KOLONEL SAELAN dan kedua melalui Dr. SUBANDRIO/CHAERUL SALEH, di Djakarta. Chusus mengenai Show of Force pemuda Marhaenis di Djawa Tengah, seingat saja telah dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO di Istana Bogor dengan bukti2 photo

show of force tersebut. Saja pernah melihat photo2 tersebut.

- c. Setiap kali Bung KARNO menerima laporan tentang adanya bentrokan2/kegiatan tersebut diatas selalu menundukkan kepuasannya dan memudji kepada orang2/kekuatan jang membelanja.
- d. Seingat saja, Brigdjen SABUR selalu menundukkan reaksi jang senang serta bangga diwaktu menjampaikan laporan2 tersebut kepada Bung KARNO. Saran jang disampaikanja kepada Bung KARNO berisi seperlunja kekuatan2 pro Bung KARNO terus disokong cq dibina.

76. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bila dan dimanakah Djenderal SUADI telah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk membitjarakan soal2 jang berhubungan dengan "Barisan SUKARNO".
- b. Bagaimanakah djalannya pemitjaraan tersebut?
- c. Siapakah orang lain jang mengetahui adanya pemitjaraan/pertemuan tersebut.
- d. Apakah kegiatan2 jang dilakukan Djenderal SUADI jang berhubungan dengan Barisan SUKARNO tersebut.

Mengenai Djenderal SUADI dan hubungannya dengan "Barisan SUKARNO" saja benar2 tidak banjak megetahui:

- a. Djenderal SUADI memang benar telah beberapa kali menghadap Bung KARNO, tetapi saja tidak tahu kapankah dibitjarakan tentang "Barisan SUKARNO".
- b. Saja tidak mengetahui djalannya dan isi pemitjaraan itu.

- c. Saja tidak tahu siapa2 jang djuga mengetahui pertemuan/pembitjaraan itu.
- d. Kegiatan Djenderal SUADI dalam rangka Barisan SUKARNO saja tidak mengetahui, hanja saja ingat satu kedjadian dimana Djenderal SUADI telah mengirim surat/laporan pada Bung KARNO (tanggal 10 Maret 1966).
- e. Sebagai tambahan keterangan, saja memang mengetahui dari sikap dan utjapan-nya bahwa Djenderal SUADI termasuk pen-tjinta Bung KARNO, baik sebelum maupun sesudah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

79. Berikan pendjelasan mengenai hubungan antara Bung KARNO dengan Djenderal TNI SUADI, baik sebelum maupun sesudah terdjadinja peristiwa-G-30-S/PKI.

Jang saja ketehui tentang hubungan baik antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SUADI adalah sebagai berikut.

a. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO telah merestui/memberikan izin kepada Djenderal SUADI untuk melangsungkan perkawinan.

Dari apa jang saja dengar, sebenarnja izin kawin tersebut tidak disetudjui oleh pimpinan AD, tetapi Bung KARNO memakai haknja sebagai Presiden/Pangti tetap mengizinkan Karena kedjadian ini maka semendjak itu terlihatlah hubungan jang lebih akrab antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SUADI.

b. Pengangkatan Djenderal SUADI mendjadi Duta Besar diantarannya djuga disebabkan adanya hubungan baik ini.

c, Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI beberapa kalisaja ketahui Djenderal SUADI menghadap Bung KARNO di Djakarta maupun di Bogor dalam atjara tidak resmi, seperti waktu minum kopi, malam krontjong di Bogor, waktu makan/siang/malam, dan sebagainya.

80. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Peranan/kegiatan2 dari Djenderal KKO HARTONO dalam hal2 jang berhubungan dengan "Barisan SUKARNO".
- b. Bila dan dimana Djenderal KKO HARTONO telah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk membitjarkan hal tersebut dan bagaimanakah isi dari pemitjaraan tersebut.
- c. Siapakah orang lain jang mengetahui adanja pemitjaraan Bung KARNO dan Djenderal KKO HARTONO tersebut.

Sebelum saja mendjawab pertanjaan2 tersebut diatas, saja terangkan terlebih dahulu tentang Djenderal KKO HARTONO mengenai proses pengangkatannja sebagai Menteri.

Sewaktu Bung KARNO telah mengambil keputusan untuk mengganti Laksamana R.E. MARTADINATA sebagai Menteri/PANGAL, Bung KARNO pernah bermaksud untuk mengangkat Djenderal KKO HARTONO sebagai Menteri/PANGAL karena menurut alasannja tidak ada perwira Senior AL (dari lain Korps) jang pantas diangkatnja. Setelah saja menegaskan pada Bung KARNO bahwa tidak mungkin seorang KKO didjadikan PANGAL sebab djabatan tersebut harus dipegang oleh seorang Korps PELAUT, maka Bung KARNO memutuskan mengangkat Laksamana Melaut MOELJADI sebagai-

MEN/PANGAL dan Djenderal KKO HARTONO sebagai MEN/WAPANGAL.

a. Peranan Djenderal KKO HARTONO.

1. Dari sikap dan utjapan2nja jang dapat saja lihat/dengar/ketahui, Djenderal HARTONO memang menjetudju dan mendukung "Barisan SUKARNO".
2. Djenderal HARTONO telah menjetudju/merestui perwija2 KKO bawahannya jang pro/turut dalam Barisan SUKARNO.
3. Djenderal HARTONO telah mengeluarkan pernyataan:"Putih Bung KARNO - putih KKO, Hitam Bung KARNO Hitam KKO". Pernyataan ini membawa akibat jang luas.
4. Kegiatan/peranan2 lain setjara aktip dikerdjakan oleh Djenderal HARTONO, saja tidak mengetahui.

b. Djenderal HARTONO dalam tahun 1966 telah beberapa kali menghadapi Bung KARNO. Saja tidak pernah turut hadlir setjara langsung dalam pertemuan tersebut. Tetapi melihat:

1. Adanja penempatan2 pasukan di Djakarta pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 dan/ atau setelah itu;
2. Adanja penempatan pasukan KKO sebesar 2 Bataljon di Djokja dalam tahun 1966;
3. Sikap Djenderal HARTONO jang pro Bung KARNO dan tertudju dengan Barisan SUKARNO;
 - a. Maka pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal HARTONO tersebut kemungkinan besar membitjarakan pula soal Barisan SUKARNO.

- c. Saja tidak ingat/tidak mengetahui siapa2 orang lain lagi jang mengetahui tentang pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal HARTONO tersebut.
- d. Menurut saja, kegiatan Djenderal HARTONO dalam hubungan Barisan SUKARNO djuga melalui Dr. SUBANDRIO dan CHAERUL SALEH.

81. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Apakah penempatan pasukan KKO di tempat2 tertentu di Djakarta dan didaerah lain dan pameran kekuatan "Show of Force" dari pasukan KKO dimana2 dalam tahun 1966 ada hubungannja dengan tudjuan serta tugas2 dari organisasi "Barisan SUKARNO" atau setidaknya ada hubungannja dengan hasil pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal KKO HARTONO pada tanggal 10 Maret 1966 (malam).
- b. Apakah Djenderal HARTONO djuga mengetahui adanja rentjana untuk membawa/memindahkan Bung KARNO dari Djakarta. Bagaimanakah peranan Djenderal KKO HARTONO dalam hal tersebut.
 - a. Penempatan pasukan KKO didaerah2 lain pada/mulai tahun 1966 setjara resminja adalah tidak ada hubungannja dengan "Barisan SUKARNO". Penempatan2 waktu itu adalah berdasarkan policy pimpinan AL jang akan melebarkan penguasaan teritorial maritim (TERMAR). Waktu itu pimpinan AL merasa terdesak cq kurang punja pengaruh terhadap penguasaan teritorial bila dibandingkan dengan AD.

Sebab itu lalu ditempatkan pasukan2 KKO jang resminja berada dibawah panglima2 daerah maritim (Pangdamar2).

Adanja sikap dari Djenderal HARTONO, sebagai pimpinan KKO, maka anak/buah KKO dimana sadja ditempatkan, mengikuti sikap Djenderal HARTONO tersebut. Sikap jang begini ini berdjalan paralel dengan usaha Barisan SUKARNO, sehingga dapat dikatakan bahwa penempatan pasukan2 KKO tersebut adalah sedjalan dengan usaha Barisan SUKARNO. Menurut jang saja ketahui, penempatan pasukan2 KKO tersebut tidak/bukan hasil pembitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal HARTONO.

Mengenai pengiriman/penempatan pasukan2 KKO di Djokja, pada tahun 1966 setelah Supersemar memang dalam usaha untuk memperkuat kekuatan2 pro Bung KARNO cq. Barisan SUKARNO jang pada waktu itu sedang menghadapi demonstrasi2 anti Bung KARNO.

- b. Dari Djenderal HARTONO sendiri saja belum pernah mendengar tentang pengetahuannya akan usaha membawa/memindahkan Bung KARNO. Dari apa jang saja dengar bahwa ada kelompok/pasukan KKO jang turut dalam usaha tersebut dan melihat sikap Djenderal HARTONO pada waktu itu, saja kira Djenderal HARTONO mengetahuinja.

Tetapi peranan apa jang telah dilakukan, saja tidak tahu.

- 82. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan kepada pemeriksa bahwa Djenderal KKO HARTONO pernah mengeluarkan pernyataan "Putih Bung KARNO - putih KKO, Hitam Bung KARNO - Hitam KKO". Selandjutnja sdr. mendjelaskan bahwa per-

njataan tersebut mempunjai akibat lus.

Bikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Apakah arti dan maksud dari pernjataan Djenderal KKO HARTONO "Putih Bung KARNO - Putih KKO dan Hitam Bung KARNO - Hitam KKO".
- b. Akibat luas jang bagaimanakah jang bisa timbul dari adanja pernjataan tersebut.

Dari apa jang saja ketahui, saja dapat mene - rangkan sebagai berikut:

- a. Pada waktu Djenderal HARTONO mengutjapkan pernjataan "Putih Bung KARNO - Putih KKO, Hitam Bung KARNO - Hitam Bung KARNO - Hitam KKO", dimaksudkan untuk menjatakan bahwa dia dan KKO nja berada dibelakang Bung KARNO tanpa reserve, dan akan membela Bung KARNO jang pada waktu itu sebagai Presiden/Pangti. Hal ini disebabkan karena kesetiaan Djenderal HARTONO kepada Bung KARNO. Pada suatu rapat Staf di MB KKO dalam achir 1967 dan 1968 setelah Bung KARNO bukan Presiden lagi, Djenderal HARTONO pernah mengatakan bahwa policy KKO mulai saat itu tidak lagi membela Bung KARNO tetapi menjokong penuh Orde Baru.
- b. Adanja utjapan tersebut telah membawa akibat luas:

1. Kedalam:

akibat doktrin dan disiplin KKO jang terus menerus dibina/dipelihara, seluru - h anggota KKO dimanapun berada, selalu taat dan menurut pada pimpinannya cq Panglima KKO.

Adanja utjapan tersebut telah menjebabkan anak buah KKO terpengaruh dan ber - tindak menurut pendapatnja untuk

membela Bung KARNO.

adanya sikap demikian ini, maka di daerah2 sering adanya bentrokan2 yang tidak kita inginkan.

Untungnya dalam hal ini, pada eselon tengah masih cukup banyak perwira pimpinan KKO yang nuchter dan dapat mengendalikan anak buahnya, sehingga tidak terdjadi bentrokan besar/umum dengan kekuatan lain,

2. Keluar.

akibat utjapan Djenderal HARTONO tersebut telah banyak sekali mempengaruhi sikap "tanggapan pihak luar KKO."

Pihak yang pro Bung KARNO merasa mendapat angin dan dukungan dari KKO sehingga mereka merasa kuat atau dengan berani meneruskan usahanya.

Pihak yang anti Bung KARNO atau kekuatan Orde Baru sebaliknya mendjadi tidak senang pada KKO dan mengetjap seluruh KKO membela Bung KARNO cq anti Orde Baru. Karena sikap ini maka kekuatan yang ada di pihak Orde Baru selalu men-tjurigai KKO bahkan pernah terdjadi adanya usaha untuk menghadapi KKO dengan kekuatan bersendjata.

83. Berikan pendjelasan tentang peranan dari AKBP Drs. UTORO, AKBP ANTON SUDJARWO, AKBP SUTOTO, AKBP SIDHARTA dalam hal2 yang berhubungan dengan Barisan SUKARNO.

Djelaskan pula tentang bila dan dimana mereka telah menghadap Bung KANRO untuk membitjarakan persoalan Barisan SUKARNO tersebut serta/ bagaimanakah isi dari pembitjaraan tersebut.

Mengenai tokoh2 kepolisian tersebut diatas,

dengan sebenar2nja saja tidak banjak mengetahuinja.

1. Dalam tahun 1966 memang saja pernah mendengar dari Kobes SUMIRAT atau AKBP SIDHARTA atau AKBP MANGIL, jang menjebut/njebut nama2 tersebut sebagai tokoh2 kepolisian jang turut aktip dalam Barisan SUKARNO. Tapi kegiatan/peranan apa jang telah dilakukan oleh mereka ini, saja tidak mengetahui.
2. Saja tidak ingat/tidak mengetahui bahwa mereka pernah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk membitjarakan soal Barisan SUKARNO, djuga saja tidak tahu apa djalannja dan isi pemitjaraan itu.
3. Chusus mengenai AKBP SIDHARTA saja mengenalnja setelah ia mengganti Kombes SUMIRAT sebagai Adjudan.
Dari pemitjaraan antara saja dan AKBP SIDHARTA, sebagai collega Adjudan, kadang2 saja dapat menangkapnja bahwa AKBP SIDHARTA tersebut setia pada Bung KARNO. dan akan tetap membela Bung KARNO. Djuga sedikit banjak ia mengatakan usahanja dalam Barisan SUKARNO dalam menghimpun/membina orang2 jang pro Bung KARNO.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnja dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SAPTU tanggal 31 OKTOBER 1970.

Jang diperiksa;

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO.

Jang memeriksa;

1. S. SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI.

Pada hari ini, hari SAPTU tanggal tiga puluh satu OKTOBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadju-kan padanja maka ia jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan2 seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

84. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan bahwa Bung KARNO pada tanggal 6 Oktober 1965, telah menerima surat dari D.N. AIDIT.

Sedjalan dengan surat AIDIT kepada Bung KARNO tersebut, maka AIDIT di Solo pernah mengemu-kan kepada beberapa kader/tokoh PKI a.l.

MUNIR dan BONO sebagai berikut:

- (1) IA (AIDIT) telah mengirimkan surat kepada Bung KARNO.
- (2) Perdjuangan PKI (G-30-S/PKI) akan diteruskan dan untuk keperluan tersebut PKI menunggu Komando dari Bung KARNO.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang bentuk dan isi komando Bung KARNO jang dimaksudkan oleh AIDIT tersebut.

84. Setjara langsung dan konkrit saja tidak mengetahui Komando Bung KARNO apa/jang

mana jang sehubungan/dimaksudkan oleh AIDIT tersebut. Tapi dari fakta2 jang ada bahwa:

- (1) Bung KARNO tidak pernah mengutuk G-30-S/PKI.
- (2) Bung KARNO telah menerima surat dari AIDIT tersebut diatas.
- (3) Bung KARNO telah menginstruksikan:
 - supaja djangan gontok2an:
 - supaja djangan mengutuk G-30-S/PKI maupun Dewan Djenderal.
 - supaja terus melaksanakan pantja azi-mat revolusi.
 - segala penjelesaian tentang G-30-S/PKI hanja ditangan Bung KARNO sendiri.
- (4) Bung KARNO tidak pernah membubarkan PKI.
- (5) Bung KARNO sangat marah/tidak senang terhadap tuntutan2 "TRITURA" jang diajukan para demonstiran.

maka saja berpendapat bahwa komando Bung KARNO untuk mengadakan "Barisan SUKARNO" itu, adalah sesuai dengan apa jang diha-rapkan/dimaksudkan AIDIT tersebut. Dengan didirikannya "Barisan SUKARNO" (menurut konsep Bung KARNO) dimana inti -nja terdiri dari pemuda2PNI (A-SU) dan orang2 jang fanatik pro Bung KARNO dan njatannya djuga banjak kader2 PKI didalam -nja, maka dapat memberi kesempatan kepada PKI untuk masuk didalamnja, untuk mene-ruskan hidupnja PKI dan meneruskan tjita2 serta rentjana/rentjana PKI.

85. Berikan pendjelasan tentang hubungan antara kepentingan PKI dan kepentingan Bung KARNO terhadap adanja:

a. Gerakan G-30-S/PKI.

b. Pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO.

85. Hubungan antara Bung KARNO dan PKI:

a. Djadi sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI telah terlihat adanya keamanan politik antara Bung KARNO dan PKI.

1. Dalam ambisinja untuk menundjukkan bahwa ia termasuk pemimpin dunia jang terkemuka, Bung KARNO telah banjak mendapat tentangan dari negara2 Barat. Hal ini menjebabkan ketidak senangan Bung KARNO jang achirnja menjerang negara2 Barat tersebut.

2. Dalam meneruskan politiknya, chususnja politik keluar dari PBB dan maksud untuk mengadakan CONEFO sebagai tandingan PBB, Bung KARNO telah menetapkan politik poros Djakarta/Pnompenh-Peking-Pyongyang dimana politik ini memang djelas jang dikehendaki oleh RRT.

PKI jang pada waktu itu lebih pro Peking daripada pro Moscow mempunjai politik jang sama dengan politik Bung KARNO tersebut.

3. Di Sjanghai telah diadakan pembijaraan antara Bung KARNO dan COU EN LAY, dimana telah dihasilkan agreement: -Indonesia akan terus melaksanakan perjuangannja atas dasar Marxis-Leninisme dimana RRT dengan sepeenuhnja akan membantu.

-RRT akan memberikan bantuan sendjata guna realisasi pembentukan Angkatan ke-V.

Hal tersebut djelas telah menguntungkan cq. sesuai dengan kehendak PKI.

4. Bung KARNO tidak senang terhadap orang2 jang tidak menjetudjuj politiknja. Karena itu Bung KARNO djuga tidak senang terhadap Djenderal2 jang dilaporkan tidak loyal pada Bung KARNO dan tidak menjetudjuj politik Bung KARNO.

-kerdjasama dengan PKI.

-poros Djakarta Pnompenh-Peking-Pyongyang.

-keluar dari PBB cq mendirikan Conefo. Bung KARNO menghendaki disingkirkanja Djenderal2 jang dianggapnja tidak loyal tsb.

PKI jang mempunjai tjita2 dan rentjana sendiri berdasarkan adjarannja, djuga tidak senang terhadap Djenderal2 tsb. diatas karena Djenderal2 tsb, djelas menghalangi segala rentjana dan maksud PKI.

Maka djelaslah disini adanja kesamaan maksud dan niat antara Bung KARNO dan PKI untuk menjingkirkan/menghilangkan Djenderal2 tsb, sehingga terdjadilah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

b. Setelah ternjata usaha G-30-S/PKI itu gagal, baik Bung KARNO maupun PKI tetap tidak mau menjerah dan terus berusaha untuk melandjutkan maksud dan politiknja.

1. Dengan statemen2/instruksi2 Bung KARNO tentang G-30-S/PKI seperti jang saja terangkan terdahulu, dimaksudkan untuk meredakan situasi sehingga dapat dikonsolidir kekuatan jang pro Bung KARNO maupun PKI.

2. Dengan komando diadakannya Barisan Sukarno, dimaksudkan agar dapat digalang kekuatan pro Bung KARNO untuk menghadapi tekanan2 dari jang anti Bung KARNO, dan untuk melindungi PKI serta memberi ruang gerak bagi PKI.

86. Sdr. telah memberikan keterangan kepada pemerintah bahwa sendjata2 berasal dari bantuan RRT kepada Indonesia, sebagian telah dibagi-bagi kepada anggota2 PKI/Pemuda Rakjat/Pasukan G-30-S/PKI di Senajan pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam. Hal tersebut telah dilaporkan oleh Brigdjen SABUR kepada Bung KARNO di Istana Bogor.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Djenis sendjata apa dan berapakah djumlah sendjata jang telah dibagi/bagikan tsb.
- b. Untuk tudjuan apa dan apakah akibat jang bisa timbul dengan adanja pembagian sendjata tst.
- c. Bagaimanakah isi dari laporan Brigdjen SABUR tsb kepada Bung KARNO.
- d. Sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap adanja laporan dari Brigdjen SABUR tsb.

86. Saja mendengar pada tgl. 2 Oktober 1965 di Bogor kurang lebih djam 10.00 tentang pembagian sendjata tersebut disekitar Senajan jang dilaksanakan pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam.

Bung KARNO telah mengetahui kedjadian tersebut dari laporan jang disampaikan Djenderal SABUR.

- a. -Djenis sendjata jang dibai2kan itu adalah senapan2 buatan RRT (Tjung) dengan amunisinja.

-Berapa djumlah jang tepat dari sendjata jang dibagian itu tidak diketahui, tetapi meliputi ratusan putjuk.

-Pembagian tersebut telah dilaksanakan oleh AU.

- b. Pembagian sendjata tersebut dimaksudkan untuk mempersendjata orang2 jang pro G-30-S/PKI untuk mengadakan perlawanan terhadap kekuatan jang menumpas G-30-S-PKI cq. KOSTRAD.

Akibat dari adanja pembagian tersebut, telah terdjadi beberapa tembak-menembak disekitar Senajan dan Hotel Indonesia (tanggal 1-2 Oktober 1965) antara pasukan KOSTRAD dan orang2 jang dipersendjatai tersebut.

- c. Dari apa jang saja dengar, Brigdjen SABUR telah melaporkan pada Bung KARNO : AURI telah membagi-bagikan sendjata buatan RRT kepada pemuda2 progressip di Senajan. Telah terdjadi pula perlawanan2 para pemuda ini terhadap pasukan KOSTRAD.

- d. Adanja laporan dari Brigdjen SABUR tersebut Bung KARNO kelihatan puas dan membenarkan tindakan pembagian sendjata tersebut.

Demikianlah berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sesungguhnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangannya tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannya dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan

pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SENIN
tanggal dua November tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S. SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM - NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUDAN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI.

Pada hari ini, hari SENIN tanggal dua NOVEMBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUDAN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

Djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang dimajukan padanja maka ia jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan/pengakuan seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

87. Apakah benar bahwa kira2 tanggal 15 September 1965 kira2 djam 08.00 bertempat diserambi belakang Istana Djakarta telah diadakan pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan Dr. SUBANDRIO Brigdjen SUTARDHIO, Brigdjen SABUR, Brigdjen SUNARJO dan Brigdjen Pol. SUTARTO, untuk membitjarakan rentjana tindakan terhadap PATI2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO?
- a. Sampai dimanakah pengetahuan sdr. tentang adanja rentjana untuk bertindak terhadap Pati2 AD tersebut?
 - b. Bagaimanakah djalannja pemitjaraan tersebut. Sebutkan tentang perkataan2 mereka jang sdr. ketahu.
 - c. Siapa2kah jang sesungguhnya hadir dalam pertemuan tersebut?
 - d. Keputusan2 apakah jang telah diambil dalam pertemuan tersebut?

87.a. Pengetahuan saja tentang adanya rentjana untuk bertindak terhadap Pati2 AD, dapat saja uraikan sebagai berikut:

- (1) Seperti sudah saja terangkan terdahulu, Bung KARNO telah menerima laporan laporan sebelumnya, tentang adanya Djenderal2 AD jang dianggap tidak loyal terhadapnja. Djuga Bung KARNO pertjaja akan kebenaran "dokumen Gilchrist jang menjebut adanya "our local army friends".
- (2) Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan kepada banjak pedjabat untuk menge-check kebenaran informasi2 itu, tetapi selalu menerima djawaban jang membenarkan informasi2 itu.
- (3) Dari sikap dan utjapannja Bung KARNO sudah menundjukkan bahwa IA tidak senang terhadap Djenderal2 AD cq. pimpinan AD tersebut jang dianggapnja tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO itu.

Bung KARNO pernah mengatakan (tjontoh di Tampaksiring 6-6-1965) perlunja mengadakan reorganisasi/perubahan dalam pimpinan Angkatan Darat.

Bung KARNO pernah marah2 terhadap Djenderal2 AD (Djenderal PARMAN cs).

Dari semua jang saja lihat/ketahui tersebut diataslah saja sudah dapat merasakan bahwa Bung KARNO akan bertindak/punja rentjana untuk bertindak terhadap Pati2 AD sebelum adanya peristiwa 6-30-S/PKI.

Tetapi berdasarkan situasi pada dewasa itu

-menurut etika saja jang sebagai perwira AL tidak sebaiknya mentjampuri soal2

dari Angkatan lain,
-saja lihat para pedjabat tinggi dan
Pati2 AD telah membitjarakan/membahas
soal2 itu.

maka saja, jang merasa tidak kompeten,
tidak banjak menaruh perhatian terha-
dap soal2 tersebut diatas.

- b. Pada pertengahan (+ tgl. 15) September
1965 telah diadakan pertemuan seperti
tersebut diatas. Dari apa jang masih
dapat saja ingat, waktu terdjadi per-
tjakapan2 kurang lebih sebagai berikut:
(1) Bung KARNO menanjakan sekali lagi
tentang DEWAN DJENDERAL, atau Djenderal2
AD jang tidak loyal. Bung KARNO mene-
gaskan bahwa dari hasil laporan2 penge-
chekan jang ia terima, memang benar ada-
nja Dewan Djenderal itu.
(2) Saran2 disampaikan kepada Bung KAR-
NO kalau memang benar informasi tersebut
maka terhadap Dewan Djenderal itu harus
diambil tindakan.
(3) Bung KARNO menundjuk dan memerintah-
kan Djenderal SABUR dan Djenderal SUNAR-
JO untuk mengadakan persiapan2 guna
mengambil tindakan terhadap para Djende-
ral jang tidak loyal itu.

Dengan sebenarnja saja tidak ingat lagi
bagaimana pertjakapan itu berlangsung
kalimat demi kalimat.

- c. Seingat saja jang hadlir dalam pertemu-
an itu atau mengetahui adanja pertemuan
tersebut adalah: Dr. SUBANDRIO, Djende-
ral SUTARDHIO, Djenderal SUNARJO, Djen-
deral SABUR, Djenderal Pol. SUTARTO,
MUALIP NASUTION, Pak DJAMIN, Pak HAR-
DJOWARDOJO, Kombes SUMIRAT dan para pem-

bantu Adjudan.

- d. Keputusan apa setjara konkrit jang telah diambil dalam pertemuan tersebut saja tidak mengetahui, ketjuali seperti titik b (3) tersebut diatas jakni adanja perintah dari Bung KARNO kepada Djenderal SUNARJO dan Djenderal SABUR supaja mereka mengadakan persiapan untuk ambil tindakan terhadap para Djenderal AD tersebut.

88. Sdr. dalam mendjawab pertanjaan pemeriksa no. 14 dalam B.A.P. tanggal 3 Oktober 1970 telah memberikan pendjelasan antara lain sebagai berikut:

- a. Pada tanggal 23 September 1965 kira2 djam 07.00 bertempat diserambi belakang Istana Djakarta telah terdjadi pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dengan Djenderal MURSID, Djenderal SUNARJO, Djenderal SABUR, Laksamana Udara OMAR DANI, Dr. SUBANDRIO, Dr. LEIMENA, D. CHAERUL SALEH dan DJAMIN?
- b. Dalam pertemuan tersebut Djenderal MURSID telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO tentang persoalan Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.
- c. Dalam pertemuan tersebut Bung KARNO telah memerintahkan kepada Djenderal SABUR agar melaksanakan tindakan kepada Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO tersebut.
- d. Selain itu dalam pertemuan tersebut terdjadi pula hal2 sebagai berikut:
 - (1) Pernjataan Laksamana OMAR DANI jang memihak kepada Bung KARNO dalam persoalan Dewan Djenderal.
 - (2) Adanja pertentangan mulut antara Dr.

SUBANDRIO dan Dr. CHAERUL SALEH tentang hal2 jang berhubungan dengan DEPAEDATAM.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Siapa2kah jang sebenarnja hadlir dalam pertemuan tersebut. Adakah orang2 lain jang djuga mengetahui adanja pertemuan tersebut?
 - b. Apakah sebenarnja isi laporan dari Djenderal MURSJID jang diberikan kepada Bung KARNO tersebut dan bagaimana tanggapan/reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap laporan tersebut.
Sebutkan pula tentang dialoog antara Bung KARNO - Djenderal MURSJID pada waktu itu jang sdr. masih ingat.
 - c. Bagaimanakah dialoog antara Bung KARNO Djenderal SABUR pada waktu itu.
 - d. Apakah peranan jang telah dilakukan Djenderal SUNARJO pada waktu itu.
 - e. Bagaimanakah djalannja pertentangan mulut antara Dr. SUBANDRIO dan Dr. CHAERUL SALEH dan bagaimanakah sikap Bung KARNO terhadap hal tersebut.
 - f. Atas dasar apakah Bung KARNO pada waktu itu memanggil Djenderal SUDIRGO, apakah Djenderal SUDIRGO telah menghadap Bung KARNO untuk memenuhi panggilan tersebut dan apakah jang mereka bitjarakan?
- 88.a. Pada tanggal 23 September 1965 pagi memang benar telah ada pertemuan tersebut diatas.

Jang hadlir pada waktu itu ialah: Dr. SUBANDRIO, Dr. LEIMENA, CHAERUL SALEH, Djenderal SUNARJO, Djenderal MURSID, Laksamana OMAR DANI, Djenderal SABUR, Pak JAMIN, Pak MUALIF NASUTION, Kombes

SUMIRAT dan para pembantu Adjudan.

- b. Djenderal MURSID:
Djenderal Mursid melaporkan pada Bung KARN0: "Perintah Bung KARN0 kepada saja untuk mengecek kebenaran adanja Pati2 AD jang tidak loyal pada Bapak telah saja kerdjakan. Ternjata memang benar bahwa Djenderal2 jang Bapak sebutkan itu tidak menjetudjui politik Bapak dan tidak setia pada Bapak".
Bung KARN0: "Apakah jang kau laporkan itu benar? Awas kalau perlu saja adakan konfrontasi".
Djenderal MURSID: "Benar, Pak".
- c. Djenderal SABUR:
Bung KARN0 kepada Djenderal SABUR:
"Bur, bagaimana perintah saja untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 itu?".
Djenderal SABUR: "Persiapan untuk hal tersebut telah kami bitjarakan dengan Djenderal SUNARJO dan Djenderal DIRGO (DIRPOM)
Tapi untuk pelaksanaannya masih memerlukan persiapan jang lebih teliti lagi".
Bung KARN0: "Mana, DIRGO? Adjudan panggil Djenderal DIRGO! Bur, tindakan kepada mereka supaya lekas dilaksanakan!".
- d. Djenderal SUNARJO:
Saja tidak ingat lagi dengan pasti peranan apa jang telah dilakukan Djenderal SUNARJO pada waktu itu, hanja saja ingat bahwa Djenderal SUNARJO telah membenarkan/memperkuat pernyataan Djenderal SABUR.
- e. Pertentangan jang masih dapat saja ingat antara Dr. SUBANDRIO dan CHAERUL SALEH

adalah pembitjaraan disekitar djabatn DEPERDATAM. Dr. SUBANDRIO mengatakan agar Pak CHAERUL SALEH jang telah mendjabat WAPERDAM III agar melepaskan kedudukannja sebagai Menteri DEPERDATAM dan djabatn tersebut diserahkan pada orang lain.

Pak CHAERUL SALEH menentang pendapat/saran Dr. SUBANDRIO ini dan tetap menghendaki djabatn Menteri DEPERDATAM tersebut.

Achirnja Bung KARNO berkata:

"Sudahlah, tak usah diributkan lagi hal itu. Saja sudah menundjuk dan mempertjajai seseorang, kerdjakan itu. Biar CHAERUL SALEH tetap seperti sekarang. Djangan dibitjarakan lagi".

- f. Pada waktu berbitjara dengan Djenderal SABUR, Bung KARNO telah menanjikan Djenderal DIRGO dan telah memerintahkan Adjudan untuk memanggilnja. Djadi dasar pemanggilan tersebut adalah dalam rangka perintah Bung KARNO untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap para Djenderal AD. Pada saat itu, diperoleh keterangan bahwa Djenderal DIRGO tidak ada ditempat tetapi berada di Kalimantan. Setelah dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO lalu memerintahkan supaya dikirim tilgram untuk memanggil Djenderal DIRGO tersebut. ± tanggal 26 September 1965 Djenderal DIRGO telah tibadi Djakarta dan telah menghadap Bung KARNO.

Bung KARNO kepada Djenderal SUDIRGO:

"Bagaimana DIRGO, apakah telah kau check tentang Dewan Djenderal".

Djenderal DIRGO: "Sudah Pak, dan memang

benar adanya informasi itu".

Bung KARNO: "Baiklah. Saja telah memerintahkan pada SABUR dan SUNARJO supaya mengambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 itu.

Kamu supaya membantu. Saja pertjaja padamu dan pada CPM". Itulah semua jang dapat saja ingat mengenai pertemuan tersebut diatas.

89. Berikan pendjelasan tentang fasilitas2 jang diberikan Bung KARNO/Brigdjen SABUR kepada Djenderal SUDIRGO selaku DIRPOM agar POMAD dapat melaksanakan tugas2nja sesuai dengan jang dikehendaki Bung KARNO dalam rangka penindakan terhadap Pati2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

89. Apa jang saja ketahui waktu itu adalah memang benar sekitar pertengahan 1965 dari Tjakrabirawa telah banjak diberikan bantuan/fasilitas kepada Djenderal SUDIRGO dan POMAD. Jang dapat saja ketahui berupa: Kendaraan2 dan sendjata. Pernah pula saja dengar dari salah seorang Pa Staf Tjakrabirawa, bahwa dari Djenderal SABUR telah dapat diberikan bantuan keuangan dan perumahan kepada POMAD lewat Djenderal SUDIRGO.

Tetapi hal tersebut saja sendiri tidak mengetahui kebenarannya.

Pada waktu itu saja tidak mengetahui hubungannya antara pemberian fasilitas tersebut dan rentjana penindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD, karena dari apa jang saja dengar adalah perlunja bantuan tersebut dalam rangka mendjaga keamanan Presiden/Pangti.

90. Apakah sdr. pernah mengetahui bahwa Djenderal SUDIRGO pernah mengirimkan surat kepada Bung KARNO jang berisi laporan tentang adanja Dewan Djenderal dalam lingkungan AD.

Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bilamana dan dengan tjara bagaimanakah surat tersebut sampai kepada Bung KARNO.
- b. Apakah isi dari surat/laporan tersebut.
- c. Bagaimanakah sikap/tanggapan Bung KARNO terhadap surat/laporan tersebut?

90. Kurang lebih dalam bulan Agustus 1965 saja pernah mendengar utjapan Djenderal SABUR/atau SAELAN jang mengatakan tentang adanja surat dari Djenderal SUDIRGO kepada Bung KARNO.

- a. Surat dari Djenderal SUDIRGO kepada Bung KARNO tersebut telah disampaikan dalam bulan Djuli 1965 (saja tidak tahu tanggal berapa).
Surat tersebut disampaikan melalui Tjakrahirawa cq. Djenderal SABUR.
- b. Saja tidak tahu selengkapnja isi surat tersebut, hanja pada garis besarnja berisi laporan dari Djenderal SUDIRGO kepada Bung KARNO tentang kebenaran berita tentang Djenderal² dalam lingkungan AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO. Menurut Djenderal SABUR/atau Kolonel SAELAN, Djenderal SUDIRGO telah mengadakan pengecheckan terhadap berita itu.
- c. Bung KARNO jang telah menerima surat laporan tersebut menundjukkan kepuasan dan kepertjajaannja atas segala isi laporan itu.

91. Berikan pendjelasan tentang bilamana dan dimana Laksamana OMAR DANI bersama/sama Brigdjen SUPARDJO telah menghadap Bung KARNO serta bagaimanakah isi pemitjaraan mereka.

91.(1) Seingat saja, Laksamana OMAR DANI bersama ex Brigdjen SUPARDJO telah menghadap Bung KARNO pada tanggal 29 September 1965 ± djam 11.00 di Istana Merdeka Djakarta. Pada waktu itu resminja Laksamana OMAR DANI sebagai salah seorang Panglima KOPUR dalam Mandala itu.

(2) Pemitjaraan dalam pertemuan tersebut berkisar pada kesiap siagaan Djenderal SUPARDJO bersama pasukannya AD untuk melaksanakan penindakan terhadap Djenderal AD dan kesiapan Laksamana OMAR DANI bersama AURI untuk membantu pelaksanaan tersebut.

92. Sewaktu sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, oleh Brigdjen SUNARJO selaku Djaksa Agung Muda pada waktu itu sering sekali diadakan pemitjaraan terhadap barang2 milik Swasta antara lain kendaraan2, perhiasan2 mas (intan berlian), wang dll. Djelaskan pengetahuan sdr. terhadap soal ini dan barang2 jang disita itu oleh Brigdjen SUNARJO diserahkan kepada Bung KARNO dan oleh Bung KARNO dikemanakan barang2 sitaan tersebut?

92.a. Saja mengetahui memang benar bahwa sebelum terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI Djenderal SUNARJO sebagai Djaksa Agung Muda sering menjerahkan barang2 sitaan kepada Bung KARNO.

Menurut jang saja dengar dari Djenderal SUNARJO sendiri, barang2 tersebut ada-

lah dibeslah dari orang2 jang melanggar hukum.

Matjam barang jang telah dibeslah jang saja ketahu berupa: kendaraan, barang antik, perhiasan, dan uang asing.

Berapa djumlah barang2 tersebut, saja tidak tahu.

- b. Bung KARNO telah menerima barang2 sitaan itu dengan menanda tangani surat penjerahan.

Oleh Bung KARNO barang2 tersebut disimpan dimana, saja tidak tahu, hanja saja mendengar bahwa sebagian dari barang2 itu telah diberikan kepada HARTINI, DEWI dan ARIJATI.

- c. Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, saja pernah mendengar bahwa Letkol SUPARTO pembantu pribadi Bung KARNO pernah pula diperintahkan oleh Bung KARNO untuk membawa dan menjimpan barang2 tersebut.

- d. Chusus mengenai Djenderal SUNARJO, jang telah menjerahkan barang2 sitaan pada tanggal 27 September 1965 pagi hari kepada Bung KARNO, dapat saja tambahkan sebagai berikut:

Setelah Djenderal SUNARJO menemui Bung KARNO di kamarnya, ia telah berbitjara dengan Kolonel SAELAN diruang belakang Istana Merdeka:

"SAELAN, mana SABUR? Itu tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 sudah dapat dilakukan. Suruh SABUR segera menghadap Bapak supaya menerima perintah langsung dari Bapak".

Utjapan Djenderal SUNARJO itu dapat pula didengar oleh saja sendiri, Pak MUALIF NASUTION dan HENNY.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tandan setudju ia membubuhi tanda tangannja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari SELASA tanggal tiga NOVEMBER 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S. SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR
POLISI.

Pada hari ini, hari SELASA tanggal tiga NOPEMBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIJARJO - pangkat LETKOL CPM-NRP, 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI,

djabatan: masing-masing adalah anggauta TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki jang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO,
KOLONEL KKO

Selandjutnja atas segala pertanjaan jang diadju-kan padanja maka ia - jang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan2/pengakuan2 seperti tertera diba-wah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

93. Berikan pendjelasan tentang hal2 jang ada hubungannja dengan pembeajaan "Barisan SUKARNO" sebagai berikut:
- a. Berapakah djumlah "uang" jang disediakan dipergunakan untuk membiajai "Barisan SUKARNO".
 - b. Siapakah jang mengurus soal2 pembeajaan tersebut?
 - c. Darimanakah asal wang jang dipakai untuk hal tersebut?
 - d. Apakah wang2 jang berasal dari komisi2 djuga dipakai untuk keperluan "Barisan SUKARNO".

- 93.a. Dari keputusan Presiden jang pernah saja dengar dalam tahun 1966 dan dari pemitjaraan para menteri, saja mengetahui memang benar disediakan wang/beaja untuk membiajai "Barisan SUKARNO". Saja tidak tahu berapa besar djumlah wang tersebut jang disediakan. Djuga saja tidak tahu berapa djumlah uang jang telah dikeluarkan untuk itu.
- b. Seingat saja, pengurusan soal pembiajaan tersebut dibebankan kepada WAPERDAM III, CHAERUL SALEH.
- c. Wang tersebut diambil dari uang negara cq. Budget Pengeluaran uang harus dengan tanda tangan pemerintah dalam hubungan Dana Revolusi Bung KARNO atau dengan tanda tangan2 orang WAPERDAM.
- d. Bung KARNO telah banjak menerima uang2 komisi: setjara satu per satu dari mana dan berapa besar wang komisi tersebut, saja tidak tahu. Saja tahu bahwa Bung KARNO menerima uang tersebut dari beberapa pedjabat. Jang saja ketahu sendiri cq. saja alami sebagai berikut: Telah 5 kali (lima) kali saja pernah diperintahkan Bung KARNO keluar negeri untuk mengambil uang dan menjerahkan kepadanya:
- (1) Pada achir tahun 1963 (lupa tanggalnya) saja telah diperintah Bung KARNO untuk menjertai Nj.U.SULARSO (almarhum) ke Honkong. Nj.SULARTO tersebut jang mendjalankan bisnes sebagai perantara antara PERMINA dan suatu perusahaan Djepang, berhak menerima komisi jang pembajarannya dilakukan setjara bertahap. Pada achir tahun 1963 tersebut,

Nj. SULARTO menerima US \$ 125.000,-- Setelah Nj. SULARTO menerima uang tersebut, uang diserahkan kepada saja dan saja terbang kembali ke Djakarta. Seluruh uang tersebut saja serahkan kepada Bung KARNO. Berapa prosen Nj. SULARTO menerima dari Bung KARNO saja tidak tahu.

(2) Pada pertengahan tahun 1964, saja bersama Nj. SULARTO pergi lagi ke Hongkong untuk keperluan jang sama. Ini kali Nj. SULARTO menerima US \$ 75.000,-- Dengan prosedur jang sama uang tersebut saja serahkan kepada Bung KARNO.

(3) Pada achir tahun 1964, saja bersama Nj. SULARTO pergi ke Tokyo untuk keperluan jang sama. Ini kali diterimanya uang US \$ 38.000,--. Uang tersebut saja serahkan kepada Bung KARNO.

(4) Pada pertengahan 1965, saja bersama Nj. SULARTO ke Tokyo, untuk keperluan jang sama, Ini kali diterimanya uang US \$ 140.000,-- Uang tersebut saja serahkan kepada Bung KARNO.

(5) Pada awal 1965 saja diperintahkan Bung KARNO untuk pergi ke Zurich (Swiss) guna mengambil uang sebesar US \$ 50.000,-- dari suatu Bank. Uang ini adalah dari Menteri Perkebunan FRANS SEDA. Untuk mengambil uang tersebut saja diberi surat pengantar dari Menteri FRANS SEDA. Uang tersebut saja serahkan kepada Bung KARNO.

Itulah semuanya jang saja ketahui sendiri tentang uang2 komisi. Untuk apa semua wang2 tersebut dipergunakan oleh Bung KARNO, saja dengan sedjurnja tidak tahu.

Pernah saja dengar bahwa wang2 tersebut kebanyakan digunakan untuk isteri/kenalan wanitanya.

Begitu pula hasil dari barang/wang penjiwaan yang diserahkan oleh Djenderal SUNARJO, saja tidak tahu pasti telah digunakan untuk apa oleh Bung KARNO, ketjuali seperti pernah saja terangkan. Apakah wang2 tersebut djuga digunakan untuk membiajai "Barisan SUKARNO"? Saja tidak berani mendjawab dengan positip sebab kemungkinannya memang ada. Tetapi dari apa yang saja lihat bagaimana "borosnya BungKARNO" semendjak djauh2 sebelum G-30-S/PKI, saja kira wang2 komisi tersebut telah dipergunakan untuk keperluan pribadinja.

94. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, kira2 achir1965/awal 1966 (setelah ramai2nja ada demonstrasi) Bung KARNO telah memberi perintah kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO supaja "tegen de stroom in" dan kemudian oleh S. JUDODIHARDJO perintah Bung KARNO ini diteruskan kepada semua Panglima Kepolisian di Daerah. Harap sdr. djelaskan:

- a. Benarkah oleh Bung KARNO ada perintah tersebut kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDO, djika benar perintah2 apa yang telah diberikan itu dan apabila dan siapa2 orang lain yang mengetahui ada perintah itu?
- b. Apa yang dimaksud dengan "tegen de stroom in".
- c. Bagaimana hasil dari perintah Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, itu?

94. Saja memang pernah mendengar adanya perintah Bung KARNO dengan mempergunakan kalimat "tegen de stroom in" itu.
- a. Perintah tersebut telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO pada minggu terakhir tahun 1965 di Istana. Saja tidak ingat lagi siapa2 sadja jang telah mengetahui waktu perintah ini diberikan.
 - b. Jang dimaksud dengan kalimat "tegen de stroom in" itu adalah "supaja fihak kepolisian dengan sekuat tenaga menentang semua demonstrasi2 jang mengetjam G-30-S/PKI maupun mengetjam Bung KARNO".
 - c. Jang saja ketahu hasil perintah Bung KARNO tersebut kepada MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO itu adalah adanya instruksi2 dari MEN/PANGAK karena semua daerah kepolisian untuk melaksanakan instruksi Bung KARNO tersebut. Hal tersebut telah dilaporkan oleh MEN/PANGAK SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO kepada Bung KARNO.

95. Harap sdr. djelaskan, pengetahuan sdr. tentang hubungan jang akrab antara Bung KARNO dan Brigdjen SUNARJO (Djaksa Agung Muda ketika itu), dimana dalam persoalan penindakan terhadap para Pati AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO. SUNARJO sebagai salah seorang pendukung rentjana Bung KARNO menindak para Pati tersebut.

95. Sepandjang jang saja ketahu tentang hubungan Bung KARNO dengan djenderal SUNARJO, adalah sebagai berikut:
- a. Bung KARNO sangat senang dan pertjaja kepada Djenderal SUNARJO, terutama

atas sikap lahiriah Djenderal SUNARJO jang berbadan besar, kuat dan bersifat terus terang dan agressip. Bung KARNO pernah mengatakan bahwa type Djenderal SUNARJO itulah jang dia perlukan untuk pelindung.

- b. Djenderal SUNARJO sangat setia kepada Bung KARNO dan dari setiap sikap dan utjapannja terlihat djelas untuk selalu membela Bung KARNO.
- c. Bung KARNO pernah mempunjai seorang Sekretarisse jang sangat dipertjaja, bernama NORMA. Kemudian, NORMA ini menikah dengan Djenderal SUNARJO. Adanja pernikahan ini menjebabkan lebih eratnja lagi hubungan Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SUNARJO.
- d. Dalam kedudukannja sebagai Djaksa Agung Muda, saja melihat bahwa sering sekali Djenderal SUNARJO menjampaikan laporan2 kepada Bung KARNO atau menerima laporan/ instruksi2 dari Bung KARNO: meskipun saja sendiri tidak tahu isi laporan/ instruksi tersebut.
- e. Dalam hubungan penindakan terhadap Pati2 AD, semendjak semula saja melihat bahwa sering diadakan pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dengan Djenderal SUNARJO sebagai orang jang dipertjaja, baik sebagai Djaksa Agung Muda maupun sebagai perwira tinggi AD dari CPM.

96. Selain dari wang2 komisi jang telah sdr. terangkan jaitu sdr. sendiri telah mengalami 5 kali diperintahkan Bung KARNO untuk mengambil wang komisi diluar negeri, dapatkah sdr. mendjelaskan jang menurut sdr. dengar tentang adanja komisi2 lain untuk Bung KARNO.

Djika ada harap didjelaskan:

- a. Komisi2 dari apa sadjakah itu?
 - b. Siapa2 orangnja (selain sdr.) jang diper-tjaja/diperintahkan Bung KARNO untuk keperluan pengambilan komisi ini?
 - c. Perusahaan2 apa sadja jang pernah memberikan komisi ini dan dalam hal apa?
 - d. Pada Bank2 mana dan dimana biasanja wang komisi itu disimpan?
 - e. Selain dari uang2 komisi jang disimpan dalam Bank2 diluar negeri, kekajaan2 apa sadja jang dimiliki Bung KARNO diluar negeri dan di dalam negeri?
96. Apa jang pernah saja dengar tentang komisi2 adalah sebagai berikut:
- a.-Komisi minjak, antara PERMINA dan luar negeri.
 - Komisi kendaraan, antara GAYA MOTOR dan Djepang.
 - Komisi hasil kontrak Tjakrabirawa dengan Nio/Kenny Hongkong.
 - Komisi buku.
 - Komisi karet.
 - Komisi kapal terbang.
 - b. Saja tidak tahu dan tidak pernah menden-gar bahwa ada orang lain jang pernah diperintah untuk mengambil uang diluar negeri. Menurut apa jang saja dengar fihak2 jang membuat kontrak telah men-gambil/menerima uang komisinja langsung dari fihak kontraktor dan setelah itu baru menjerahkan sebagian kepada Bung KARNO.
Nama2 jang saja dengar ada hubungannja dengan soal kontrak cq. komisi adalah:
 - Djenderal IBNU SUTOWO, PERMINA.
 - CHAERUL SALEH.

- Ir. SUGIJO, Gaya Motor.
- Djenderal SABUR.
- Nio.
- Pak MULIF NASUTION.
- Pak DJAMIN.
- KARKAM.
- ASLAM.
- DASAAD.
- HASJIM NING.

- c. Saja tidak banjak mengetahui tentang seluk beluk keuangan Bung KARNO, djuga dalam menjebut perusahaan2 apa sadja jang pernah memberi komisi ini tidak banjak saja ketahui. Beberapa jang dapat saja ketahui adalah sebagai berikut:
- (1) Perusahaan minjak Amerika dan Djepang dengan PERMINA.
 - (2) Perusahaan galangan kapal Djepang dengan PERMINA.
 - (3) Perusahaan kapal terbang DOUGLAS Amerika dengan DASAAD.
 - (4) Perusahaan TOYOTA/MAZDA Djepang dengan DASAAD.
 - (5) Kontraktor Nio/Kenny di Hongkong dalam hubungan dengan Tjakrabirawa.
- d. Saja benar2 tidak mengetahui dimana Bung KARNO telah menjimpan uang2 komisi ini. Djuga saja tidak tahu pada Bank mana disimpannya. Dalam soal keuangan, orang2 jang sangat dipertjaja oleh Bung KARNO adalah Pak DJAMIN, Pak M.NASUTION, dan DEWI.
- e. Apa jang saja ketahui tentang kekajaan Bung KARNO ketjualian uang2 tersebut adalah:

- (1) Sebidang Tanah didjalan Tjiawi-Sukabumi.
- (2) Rumah di Batutulis - Bogor.
- (3) Rumah didjalan Gatotsubroto - Dkt.
- (4) Berpuluh kendaraan.
- (5) Lukisan2 jang memakai tanda "Milik Ir. SUKARNO".
- (6) Pernah saja dengar Bung KARNO membeli satu villa di Swiss dan satu villa di Manilla.
- (7) Hasil dari tjetakan2 buku didalam/ luar negeri (diantaranja diurus oleh CINDY ADAMS).

Selain dari tersebut diatas, saja tidak mengetahui lagi tentang kekajaan Bung KARNO.

97. Sesuai djawaban sdr. diatas, dimana sdr. telah 5 (lima) kali diperintah oleh Bung KARNO untuk mengambil wang komisi diluar negeri, harap sdr. djelaskan dari komisi2 apa sadjakah wang itu, dan bagaimana selandjutannja?

97. Wang2 komisi jang saja ambil dari luar negeri seperti saja terangkan diatas berasal dari2 (dua) sumber:
(1) Jang dari Hongkong dan Tokyo (4 kali) dengan djumlah semuanya US \$ 125.000,-- + \$ 75.000,-- + \$38.000,--- + \$ 140.000,- = US \$ 378.000,-- berasal dari kontrak pembuatan kapal antara PERMINA dan suatu perusahaan kapal Djepang di Tokyo (saja lupa nama perusahaan tersebut).
Nj.U.SULARTO bertindak sebagai perantara sehingga terlaksananja kontrak tersebut. Seluruh uang tersebut saja serahkan Bung KARNO.

(2) Jang dari Zurich (Swiss) sebanyak US \$ 50.000,-- saja terima dengan melalui Menteri Perkebunan FRANS SEDA, dari suatu Bank.

Kemungkinan besar uang tersebut berasal dari hasil pendjualan suatu perkebunan asing jang dinasionalisir. Seluruhnja uang tersebut saja serahkan Bung KARNO.

Mengenai kelanjutan uang tersebut setelah diterima Bung KARNO, saja tidak mengetahui, ketjuali apa jang pernah saja terangkan.

Apakah ada orang lain lagi jang djuga pernah diperintah Bung KARNO seperti saja untuk mengambil uang komisi, saja tidak tahu.

98. Seperti telah sdr. uraikan bahwa dari hasil sitaan jang dilakukan oleh Djenderal SUNARJO (kendaraan, perhiasan emas, intan, berlian, dll) semuanya itu diserahkan kepada Bung KARNO, dan oleh Bung KARNO dibagi-bagikan antara lain kepada isteri2nja HARJATI, HARTINI, DEWI, dll.

Harap djelaskan pengetahuan sdr.:

- a. Adanja toko di bosement Hotel Okura di Tokyo milik DEWI jang mendjual perhiasan2 asal sitaan tersebut.
- b. Pendjualan barang2 perak antik hasil dari sitaan tersebut pada toko Internasional Shop Djl.Nusantara Djakarta.
- c. Apakah sebagai barang itu disita, apakah itu kehendak Djenderal SUNARJO sadja atau perintah dari Bung KARNO, dan apa latar belakangnja?

98. Perlu saja djelaskan, sesuai dengan apa jang pernah saja terangkan, saja pernah mendengar bahwa Bung KARNO telah memberikan/membagi wang dan barang hasil sitaan tersebut kepada isteri2nja. Apakah semuanya atautkah hanja sebagian jang telah diberikan itu, saja tidak tahu.
- a. Saja memang pernah mendengar bahwa DEWI mempunjai sebuah toko di basement hotel Okura Tokyo. Kemungkinan besar adalah barang antik dan perhiasan, hasil sitaan tersebut telah diberikan oleh Bung KARNO kepada DEWI jang selanjutnja DEWI membawa/mendjual barang tersebut di Tokyo.
- b. Mengenai pendjualan barang2 perak antik hasil sitaan pada toko Internasional Shop di Djl. Nusantara Djakarta, saja tidak mengetahui sama sekali.
- c. Apakah sebab jang sebenarnja sehingga barang2 tersebut disita, saja tidak mengetahui. Dari apa jang saja lihat dan saja dengar waktu itu, kedjadiannya sebagai berikut:
- (1) Seseorang ditahan karena dianggap melanggar hukum. Setelah pemeriksaan dilakukan, Djenderal SUNARJO melaporkan pada Bung KARNO. Ketjuali laporan tentang kekajaan orang itu.
 - (2) Djenderal SUNARJO menjarankan dan mohon izin untuk melakukan penjitaan barang2 tersebut. Bung KARNO mengizinkan dan merestui tindakan itu.
 - (3) Barang2 disita dan diserahkan kepada Bung KARNO.

99. Bila dan dimanakah sdr. pertama kali mendengar bahwa Bung KARNO pernah mengatakan/mengeluarkan kata2 "absolute overrompeling" dalam menghadapi peristiwa G-30-S/PKI. Apakah arti dan maksud dari kata2 tersebut dilihat dari kegiatan2 Bung KARNO sebelum dan pada saat terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

99. Saja mendengar utjapan "absolute overrompeling" jang diutjapkan Bung KARNO pada tanggal 2 atau 3 Oktober 1965 di Bogor.

Maksud dari kata2 tersebut adalah untuk menundjukkan kepada masjarakat bahwa Bung KARNO tidak tahu-menahu sebelumnja tentang akan adanja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI (ini jang diharapkan oleh Bung KARNO). Tetapi arti kalimat tersebut sebenarnja adalah untuk menutupi Bung KARNO sendiri, dari ketjaman2 masjarakat, setelah Bung KARNO mengetahui tentang kegagalan G-30-S/PKI.

100. Pernahkah sdr. mengetahui tentang adanja perintah harian Laksamana Udara OMAR DANI se-bagai MEN/PANGAU jang berisi dukungan kepada G-30-S/PKI.

Selain itu berikan pendjelasan pula mengenai:

a. Adakah Bung KARNO djuga mengetahui adanja perintah harian MEN/PANGAU tersebut.

Bila Bung KARNO tahu akan hal tersebut djelaskan dimana dan kapan serta dengan tjara bagaimana Bung KARNO mengetahui hal tersebut.

b. Bagaimanakah sikap/reaksi Bung KARNO terhadap adanja perintah harian MEN/PANGAU tersebut?

c. Instruksi/petundjuk apakah jang telah diberikan Bung KARNO kepada Laksamana

OMAR DANI sehubungan dengan adanya perintah harian tersebut?

100. Saja mengetahui tentang adanya perintah harian Laksamana OMAR DANI sebagai MEN/PANGAU yang berisi dukungan kepada G-30-G/PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 malam ± djam 19.30 sewaktu saja menghadap Djenderal SUHARTO di KOSTRAD. Pada waktu itu saja mendengar Djenderal SUHARTO menjebutnja dengan memperlihatkan sikap marah². Setelah saja kembali ke Halim malam itu, 1 Oktober 1965 djam 21.00, saja mendengar dari Djenderal SABUR tentang perintah harian tersebut.

- a. Laksamana OMAR DANI telah melaporkan kepada Bung KARNO pada pagi harinja, 1 Oktober 1965, tentang dukungan AURI kepada G-30-S/PKI. Djuga dilaporkan pada Bung KARNO bahwa ia (Laksamana OMAR DANI) mengeluarkan perintah harian.
- b. Bung KARNO menjatakan setudju dan kepuasannja terhadap sikap Laksamana OMAR DANI itu.
- c. Saja tidak mengetahui instruksi Bung KARNO kepada Laksamana OMAR DANI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965. Setelah berada di Bogor, 2 Oktober 1965, dan diketahui tentang kegagalan G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO telah menginstruksikan pada Laksamana OMAR DANI supaya mentjambut perintah harian tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 itu, Maksudnja dalam hal ini adalah untuk menutupi

Laksamana OMAR DANI cq. AURI akan keterlibatannya dalam peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

101. Berikan pendjelasan tentang sebab dan tudjuan Bung KARNO mengirimkan Laksamana OMAR DANI keluar negeri untuk melaksanakan tugas/djabatan PANGKOPELATIF pada tanggal 19-10-1965.

101. Saja mengetahui memang benar bahwa Laksamana OMAR DANI pada tanggal 19 Oktober 1965 telah diperintahkan ke luar negeri oleh Bung KARNO sebagai KOPELATIF.

Saja tidak ingat lagi negara2 mana saja jang telah dikundjunginja. Tetapi saja mengetahui pula bahwa kepergian tadi itu sebenarnja hanja untuk usaha melindungi OMAR DANI.

1. Sikap dan tindakan OMAR DANI sebelum dan sewaktu terdjadinja G-30-S/PKI (1 Oktober 1965) telah membuktikan bahwa ia pro G-30-S/PKI.
2. OMAR DANI telah mengeluarkan Perintah Harian, 1 Oktober 1965 jang intinja menjokong G-30-S/PKI.
3. Setelah diketahuinja akan kegagalan G-30-S/PKI, pada tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 ia telah mentjabut perintah hariannya.
4. Semendjak tanggal 2 Oktober 1965 untuk berapa lama, OMAR DANI telah berindung di Istana Bogor karena adanya tindakan pembersihan oleh fihak KOSTRAD.

Dari fihak2 tersebut diatas itulah maka oleh BungKARNO telah diperintahkan kepada OMAR DANI agar ke luar negeri jang maksud sebenarnja adalah

untuk menjelematkan OMAR DANI itu dari tindakan pembersihan.

102. Berikan pendjelasan tentang:

- a. Bilamana, dimana Letkol SJAFIIE (menteri khusus bidang keamanan) telah menghadap Bung KARNO.
- b. Soal2 apakah jang telah dibitjarakan antara Letkol SJAFIIE dengan Bung KARNO.
- c. Siapakah orang2 lainnja jang turut hadlir dalam pertemuan tersebut.

102. Sebelum Letkol SJAFIIE diangkat mendjadi Menteri, saja ingat bahwa SJAFIIE tersebut pernah menghadap Bung KARNO dalam bulan Oktober 1965 dengan diantar Djenderal SABUR.

Setelah pertemuan tersebut saja mendengar supaja SJAFIIE mempergunakan pengaruhnja untuk menggalang anak buahnja guna kepentingan membela Bung KARNO. Setelah SJAFIIE diangkat mendjadi Menteri, saja tidak tahu/tidak ingat lagi kapan ia telah dibitjarakan antara Bung KARNO dan SJAFIIE, maupun siapa orang2 jang hadlir, saja benar2 tidak itu. Setjara umum saja mengetahui bahwa Menteri SJAFIIE tersebut telah dipertjajai oleh WAPERDAM CHAERUL SALEH untuk membina "Barisan SUKARNO". Dalam rangka inilah saja djuga mendengar bahwa SJAFIIE telah meminta/mengadjukan kebutuhan biaja jang tidak saja ketahu berapa djumlahnja.

Demikianlah Berita Atjara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnja dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kem-

bali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membubuhi tanda tanganja dibawah ini.

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari dan tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari RABU tanggal empat NOPEMBER tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh.

Jang diperiksa:

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Jang memeriksa:

1. S.SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POL.

Pada hari ini, hari RABU tanggal empat Nopember tahun 1900 tudjuh puluh, kami:

1. S.SOEGIJARJO - pangkat LETNAN KOLONEL CPM-NRP: 12688.

2. AZWIR NIWIE - pangkat ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POLISI.

djabatannya: masing-masing adalah anggota TEAM PEMERIKSA PUSAT, telah mengadakan pemeriksaan landjutan terhadap seorang laki-laki yang bernama:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO

Selanjutnya atas segala pertanyaan yang diajukan padanya, maka ia - yang diperiksa - memberikan keterangan/pengakuan seperti tertera dibawah ini:

PERTANJAAN:

DJAWABAN:

103. Berikan penjelasan tentang hubungan antara OEI TJOE TAT dengan Bung KARNO dan Dr. SUBANDRIO dalam ranyka G-30-S/PKI dan pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO.

Jang dapat saja terangkan mengenai diri OEI TJOE TAT hanyalah sebagai berikut:

a. OEI TJOE TAT diangkat menjadi Menteri dengan disponsori oleh PARTINDO, PKI

dan Dr. SUBANDRIO.

- b. Dalam kenjataannya terlihat benar dukungan yang erat antara Dr. SUBANDRIO dan OEI TJOE TAT. Bung KARNO juga amat mempertajam OEI TJOE TAT ini.
- c. Bidang2 kegiatan yang saja ketahui dibebankan dan dipertajamkan kepada OEI TJOE TAT oleh Bung KARNO dan Dr. SUBANDRIO, khususnya mengenai segala hal yang berhubungan dengan Tjina:

1. Hubungan dengan RRT:

Sepanjang yang dapat saja lihat dan dengar, Bung KARNO maupun Dr. SUBANDRIO selalu minta nasehat kepada OEI TJOE TAT. Begitu pula dalam pelaksanaan perundingan2 dengan pihak RRT, OEI TJOE TAT selalu diikuti sertakan.

Kemungkinan besar sekali bahwa OEI TJOE TAT juga mengetahui dan turut aktif dalam perentjanaan maupun pelaksanaan pemberian bantuan sendjata dari RRT kepada Indonesai sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI.

2. Konfrontasi dengan Malaysia:

Saja mengetahui bahwa oleh Bung KARNO maupun Dr. SUBANDRIO, OEI TJOE TAT dibebani tugas untuk menggalang bantuan simpati orang2 Tjina di Hongkong - Malaysia, dalam politik konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia dalam tahun 1965.

Karena tugas ini, saja melihat adanya kepertjajaan yang lebih besar yang diberikan oleh Bung KARNO/ Dr. SUBANDRIO kepada OEI TJOE TAT.

Pada pertengahan tahun 1965 saja pernah mengetahui bahwa Bung KARNO memberikan otorisasi sejumlah uang dalam dollar US kepada OEI TJOE TAT dalam rangka kegiatannya tersebut diatas.

3. Dalam Negeri:

Oleh Bung KARNO/Dr. SUBANDRIO, OEI TJOE TAT juga dipertajai untuk menjadi perantara/penasehat dalam soal-soal Tjina di Indonesia. Misalnja soal BA-PERKI; nasehat/peranan OEI TJOE TAT selalu kelihatan.

Djuga beberapa kali saja mendengar bahwa hubungan dengan Dubes RRT di Djakarta dikerdjakan lewat OEI TJOE TAT.

- d. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, menteri OEI TJOE TAT termasuk beberapa menteri lain jang turut berlindung pada Bung KARNO karena adanya demonstrasi dan sebagainya. Sebagai tokoh dari PARTINDO, OEI TJOE TAT turut dan kelihatan aktif dalam usaha membela Bung KARNO. Diantarannya usaha OEI TJOE TAT jang pernah saja dengar adalah menggerakkan pemuda2 turunan Tjina untuk membela Bung KARNO pada achir tahun 1965 atau awal 1966.

Kegiatan2 lain dari OEI TJOE TAT jang setjara langsung berhubungan dengan "Barisan SUKARNO" saja tidak mengetahui.

104. Berikan pendjelasan tentang hubungan Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO dengan Bung KARNO dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI dan pembentukan Barisan SUKARNO:

104. Hal2 jang dapat saja terangkan mengenai Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI memang saja melihat bahwa Djenderal Pol. SAWARNO sebagai PANGDAK VII/DJAYA telah beberapa kali di Istana cq. menghadap Bung KARNO. Kadang2 bersama ANWAS. Dari apa jang saja lihat, Bung KARNO senang dan pertjaja kepada Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO karena sikapnja jang korek dan loyal terhadap Bung KARNO. Menurut saja, Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO sebagai orang jang dipertjaja Bung KARNO pada waktu itu, djuga mengetahui tentang adanja kehendak/rentjana untuk menindak Djenderal2 AD. Hal ini dapat terdjadi dengan melalui Djenderal Polisi SUTARTO, Kombes SUMIRAT, atau ANWAS.
- b. Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 pagi, Djenderal Pol. SAWARNO, telah datang di Istana, sesuai rentjana tamu Bung KARNO. Setelah ternjata bahwa pagi itu Bung KARNO tidak datang di Istana maka Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO bersama tamu2 lain pergi meninggalkan Istana. Dari apa jang saja dengar/ketahui kemudian hari, pada pagi itu Kombes SUMIRAT telah mengirim surat ke KOMDAK VII/DJAYA jang isinja memerintahkan agar kepolisian hanja patuh/taat kepada perintah Bung KARNO. Djenderal Polisi SAWARNO siang hari itu, 1 Oktober 1965, telah pula datang ke KOSTRAD dan bertemu Djenderal SUHARTO. Dari Djenderal SUHARTO telah diberitahukan kepada Djenderal SAWARNO bahwa kedjadian hari itu (G-30-S/

PKI) adalah coup dan Djenderal SUHARTO akan menindak siapa sadja jang berdiri dibelakang G-30-S/PKI.

Djuga kepada Djenderal SAWARNO telah diberi pita putih untuk dipakai fi-hak kepolisian sebagai tanda "kawan". Setelah Djenderal Pol. SAWARNO kembali ke KOMDAK DJAYA ia tidak meneruskan/memerintahkan ke bawahannja tentang segala apa jang dikatakan Djenderal SUHARTO itu.

Djelas disini adanja pengaruh dari surat Kombes SUMIRAT pada pagi itu. Sore hari, 1 Oktober 1965, Djenderal SAWARNO telah mengeluarkan surat perintah penahanan terhadap sedjumlah Pati2 Kepolisian (jang dianggapnja tidak loyal kepada Bung KARN0) dengan tindasan surat perintah tersebut kepada "Dewan Revolusi".

- c. Djenderal SAWARNO mendengar dan mengetahui bahwa seorang perwira bawahannja, ANWAS, telah diangkat mendjadi Wakil Ketua IV Dewan Revolusi. Terhadap hal tersebut, Djenderal SAWARNO sebagai PANGDAK, tidak berbuat/ambil tindakan apa2, baik pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 maupun pada hari2 berikutnya setelah diketahui betul maksud/tudjuan G-30-S/PKI.
- d. Mengenai penggantian Djenderal Pol. SAWARNO sebagai PANGDAK VII/DJAYA pada bulan Nopember 1965, saja mendengar bahwa hal tersebut diusulkan oleh MEN/PANGAK dan disetujui Bung KARN0, karena pada saat itu kedudukan tersebut tidak dapat dipertahan-

kan lagi sebab adanja desakan2 dari fihak KOSTRAD.

105. Berikan pendjelasan tentang peranan/kegiatan2 Djenderal SUADI dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI dan "Barisan SUKARNO" serta sebutkan pula hubungan antara Djenderal SUADI dengan Bung KARNO dan Dr. SUBANDRIO dalam melaksanakan peranan tersebut.

105. Sebagai tambahan keterangan2 saja jang lampau, dapat saja tambahkan:

- a. Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI sampai dengan pengangkatannja mendjadi Dubes saja mengetahui bahwa ada hubungannja baik antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SUADI, seperti sudah pernah saja terangkan. Saja tidak pernah mendengar/mengetahui akan adanja laporan dari Djenderal SUADI kepada Bung KARNO tentang Pati2 AD Sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI; tetapi memang ada kemungkinan bahwa Bung KARNO menanjakannja dan SUADI memberi keterangan tentang hal tersebut, karena saja sendiri tahu bahwa SUADI sangat pro Bung KARNO. Sikap pro Bung KARNO ini kadang2 dju-ga disertai sikap/utjapan jang tidak menjetudjui akan policy pimpinan AD waktu itu.
- b. Setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, pada tanggal 23 Oktober 1965 Djenderal SUADI menghadap Bung KARNO. Sebagai seorang Dubes RI memang menurut norma diharuskan menghadap Presiden bila ia kembali/datang di Tanah Air.

Djuga waktu itu, pertemuan tersebut saja anggap sebagai pertemuan courtesy.

- c. Setelah pertemuan tersebut diatas ternjata Djenderal SUADI tidak segera kembali ke posnja (Etiopia), tetapi berada tjukup lama di tanah air dan telah beberapa kali lagi menghadap Bung KARNO (saja tidak ingat tanggal nja).

Pertemuan2 itu kadang2 disertai Dr. SUBANDRIO, kadang2 sendiri.

Pada saat itulah saja mendengar bahwa oleh Bung KARNO memang diperintahkan kepada SUADI supaja berada dulu di tanah air, djangan kembali dulu ke Etiopia, untuk membantu Bung KARNO dalam menghadapi situasi jang makin menekan Bung KARNO pada saat itu.

- d. Dalam kegiatan membantu Bung KARNO inilah terlihat kerdjasama antara Dr. SUBANDRIO - SUADI, disamping kedudukannya sebagai MENLU dan Dubes.

Dari Djenderal SABUR/atau Kolonel SAELAN saja mendengar bahwa SUADI terutama bergerak dalam tubuh Angkatan Derat dalam menggalang kekuatan2 jang pro Bung KARNO. Sampai dimana hasilnya, saja tidak mengetahui.

- e. Saja pernah mendengar pula bahwa Djenderal SUADI pernah mengajukan kebutuhan biaja/uang sebesar Rp. 50.000,-- (u.b.) untuk keperluan kegiatannya itu. Hal tersebut terdjadi di ± dalam bulan Pebruari 1966.

106. Berikan pendjelasan tentang hubungan Djenderal SUDIRGO dengan Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SABUR dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI.

106. Keterangan 2 jang dapat saja berikan tentang Djenderal SUDIRGO, adalah sebagai berikut:

a. Hubungan antara Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SUDIRGO sebagai DIRPOMAD, memang kelihatan lebih sering terdjadi pada pertengahan tahun 1965, chususnja melalui hubungan antara Djenderal DIRGO dengan Djenderal SABUR, DAN MEN TJAKRABIRAWA.

Laporan2 jang masuk pada Bung KARNO diantaranya djuga diterima dari Djenderal DIRGO.

b. Seingat saja paling lambat dalam bulan Agustus 1965 Bung KARNO pernah memberitahukan dan menanjikan kepada Djenderal SUDIRGO tentang informasi adanja Dewan Djenderal cq. Djenderal 2 AD jang tidak loyal kepada Bung KARNO.

Pada saat itu oleh Bung KARNO diperintahkan kepada Djenderal SUDIRGO supaja mengadakan pengecheckan.

c. Dari bulan Agustus s/d September, saja melihat adanja hubungan/pertemuan jang sering terdjadi antara DIRGO - SABUR, dimana saja pertjaja pasti djuga membitjarakan tentang informasi tersebut.

d. Kepada Djenderal DIRGO/POMAD telah diberikan bantuan2 fasilitas oleh Tjakrabirawa jang berupa kendaraan dan sendjata. Djuga saja pernah mendengar bahwa kepada Djenderal DIRGO

pernah pula diberikan bantuan biaya/ uang, jang saja tidak tahu berapa besar djumlahnja.

- e. Djenderal SABUR pernah mengatakan bahwa kepada Bung KARNO djuga telah dilaporkan bahwa segala rentjana dan persiapan untuk penindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal dibi-tjarakan bersama dengan Djenderal SUDIRGO.
- f. Pada pertemuan di Istana Djakarta tanggal 23 September 1965, diwaktu Bung KARNO menanjakan kepada SABUR bagaimana tentang perintah penindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD, Bung KARNO djuga menanjakan dimana Djenderal DIRGO. Achirnja Bung KARNO memerintahkan agar memanggil Djenderal DIRGO jang waktu itu ada di Kalimantan.
- g. Pada pertemuan tanggal 29 September 1965, sewaktu Djenderal DIRGO menghadap Bung KARNO sekali lagi Bung KARNO menanjakan kepada Djenderal DIRGO tentang informasi Dewan Djenderal, jang didjawab oleh Djenderal DIRGO, bahwa memang benar hal itu memang benar ada. Selandjutnja Bung KARNO memerintahkan kepada Djenderal DIRGO supaya membantu Djenderal SABUR dan Djenderal NARJO jang telah menerima perintah dari Bung KARNO untuk ambil tindakan terhadap Djenderal2 AD jang tidak loyal.
- h. Untuk selandjutnja, sewaktu dan setelah terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/ PKI, saja tidak mengetahui lagi akan

kegiatan2 Djenderal DIRGO. Memang benar saja lihat/ketahui bahwa setelah 1 Oktober 1965 tetap ada hubungan antara DITPOMAD dan Istana, khususnya antara Djenderal DIRGO dan Djenderal SABUR.

Djuga pada bulan Nopember 1965 Djenderal DIRGO pernah menghadap Bung KARNO.

Tetapi saja tidak mengetahui hal2 apa jang telah dibitjarakan.

107. Apakah jang telah sdr. ketahui tentang peranan/kegiatan Djenderal SJAFIUDIN dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI.

Berikan pula penjelasan mengenai hubungan antara Djenderal SJAFIUDIN dengan Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SABUR dalam melaksanakan peranan kegiatan2 tersebut.

107. Keterangan2 jang dapat saja berikan tentang Djenderal SJAFIUDIN, adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Selama/sepandjang jang saja ketahui tidak pernah terlihat adanja hubungan pribadi jang akrab antara Djenderal SJAFIUDIN dan Bung KARNO. Pertemuan2 antara SJAFIUDIN dan Bung KARNO hanja terdjadi pula Bung KARNO sebagai Presiden datang di Bali, dan SJAFIUDIN PANGAK UDAYANA menghadapinja. Pertemuan kedua di Istana Djakarta dimana SJAFIUDIN menghadap Bung KARNO.
- b. Pada tanggal 6 Djuni 1965 Bung KARNO datang di Tampaksiring Bali. Hari itu adalah hari Ulang Tahunnja.

Pada djamuan makan malam banjak pe-
djabat2 setempat hadlir, diantaranya
Djenderal SJAFIUDIN.

1. Dari sekian pembitjaraan2, Bung
KARNO telah mengatakan/menguraikan
tentang garis politiknya, khusus-
nja mengenai poros Djakarta-Peking.

2. Pada saat itulah Djenderal SJAFIU-
DIN mengatakan kepada Bung KARNO
bahwa dalam tubuh AD dan khusus-
nja pimpinan AD terdapat Djende-
ral2 jang tidak menjetudjui poli-
tik Bung KARNO tersebut.

Hal ini menjebabkan kebingungan
bagi para pelaksana cq. Komandan2
bawahan.

Para Komandan bawahan jang pernah
setia dan saat pada Bung KARNO dja-
di bingung/ragu2 karena mengetahui
bahwa pimpinan AD tidak setudju
dengan politik Bung KARNO tersebut.

3. Menanggapi utjapan Djenderal SJA-
FIUDIN itu Bung KARNO mengatakan
bahwa ia memang djuga telah mene-
rima laporan adanja Djenderal AD
jang tidak loyal itu.

Bung KARNO memerintahkan pada Djen-
deral SJAFIUDIN supaya mengadakan
pengecheckan jang lebih dalam lagi
dan supaya menjampaikan laporannya
di Djakarta.

c. Pada + tanggal 13 September 1965 Djen-
deral SJAFIUDIN telah menghadap Bung
KARNO di Istana Djakarta.

Saja mendengar bahwa IA melaporkan
kepada Bung KARNO bahwa telah menga-
dakan pengecheckan dan hasilnya memang
benar terdapat Djenderal2 AD jang tidak

loyal terhadap Bung KARNO.

- d. Saat terdjadinja G-30-S/PKI dan saat2 sesudahnja, saja tidak mengetahui/mendengar lagi tentang Djenderal SJA-FIUDIN.

108. Apakah jang telah Sdr. ketahu mengenai peranan Djenderal PRANOTO dalam G-30-S/PKI serta bagaimanakah hubungan Djenderal PRANOTO dengan Bung KARNO dalam melakukan peranannja tersebut.

108. Apa jang dapat saja terangkan mengenai Djenderal TNI PRANOTO, adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Djauh sebelum peristiwa G-30-S/PKI saja sering mendengar nama Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai seorang PATI AD jang sederhana, pengikut kebathinan, tidak ke-barat2an.

Mendjelang bulan Oktober 1965 (saja lupa tanggal dan bulannja) Djenderal PRANOTO telah menghadap Bung KARNO di Istana. Pembitjaraan berkisar kepada rentjana AD jang diketuai Djenderal PRANOTO untuk mengadakan suatu pawai besar dalam menjambut hari ABRI 5 Oktober 1965. Pawai tersebut digambarkan sebagai pawai sedjarah, dimulai dari zaman Mataram/Modjopahit sehingga kemerdekaan RI dengan pekaian dan perlengkapan se-authentik mungkin.

Idee tersebut diterima/disetudjui oleh Bung KARNO bahwa Bung KARNO menjanggupi untuk memberi bantuan sepenuhnya; diantaranja Bung KARNO menjanggupi membantu mendatangkan

"kereta kentjana" dari Djogja/Solo. Dari apa jang saja dengar, maksud pawai tersebut ditudjukan untuk lebih menggelorakan semangat perjuang-an anti nekolim, memupuk rasa bangga nasional.

- b. Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 (peristiwa G-30-S/PKI) waktu sore hari, saja diperintahkan oleh Djenderal SABUR jang atas nama Bung KARNO untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO guna menghadap Bung KARNO di Halim, karena ia akan diangkat oleh Bung KARNO mendjadi caretaker pimpinan AD. Mengenai penundjukan Djenderal PRANOTO ini saja menden-gar bahwa proses sebagai berikut:

1. Siang hari 1 Oktober 1965 telah diadakan pemitjaraan antara Bung KARNO dan pedjabat pedjabat jang hadlir di Halim waktu itu tentang siapa2 jang pantas diangkat sebagai ganti pimpinan AD. Beberapa nama Djenderal AD telah disebut2 dalam pemitjaraan itu. Ex. Brigdjen SUPARDJO jang turut hadlir dalam pertemuan tersebut telah turut pula berbitjara. Achirnja diputuskan nama Djenderal PRANOTO sebagai caretaker pimpinan AD. SUPARDJO segera keluar dari pertemuan itu dan menemui pimpinan G-30-S/PKI, jang waktu itu berada ditempat lain di Halim membitjarakan tentang pentjalonan Djenderal PRANOTO tersebut. Pimpinan G-30-S/PKI menjetudjuinja.

Setelah itu SUPARDJO datang lagi dan laporan pada Bung KARNO bahwa fihak G-30-S/PKI menjetudju pentjalonan Djenderal PRANOTO tersebut, karena Djenderal PRANOTO termasuk Pati AD jang berpandangan madju/ progressip revolusioner.

2. Setelah ada konfrontasi dari SUPARDJO itulah baru Bung KARNO memerintahkan untuk memanggil Djenderal PRANOTO.

c. Dengan perintah dari Bung KARNO tersebut saja pergi ke KOSTRAD menghadap Djenderal SUHARTO, tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 djam 19.00, dan menjampaikan hal tersebut. Saja tidak ketemu dan berbitjara sendiri dengan Djenderal PRANOTO. Seperti telah beberapa kali saja terangkan, pada malam itu Djenderal SUHARTO mengatakan kepada saja tiga hal:

1. Pimpinan AD berada ditangan Djenderal SUHARTO.

2. Djenderal PRANOTO tidak dapat menghadap Bung KARNO.

3. Saja harus mengusahakan agar Bung KARNO keluar dari Halim.

d. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI ± 3 Oktober 1965, Djenderal PRANOTO menghadap Bung KARNO di Bogor. Sebenarnya waktu itu pati2 Senior AD sudah menasehatkan pada Djenderal PRANOTO agar menolak keputusan Bung KARNO tentang pengangkatannja sebagai "care-taker pimpinan AD". Tetapi waktu Djenderal PRANOTO menghadap Bung KARNO di Bogor itu, saja

mengetahui, bahwa ia tidak mengatakan penolakan tersebut, dan hanya menjerahkan segalanya kepada putusan Bung KARNO. Djuga waktu itu Djenderal PRANOTO mengatakan bahwa tetap setia dan taat pada Bung KARNO dan akan terus berusaha untuk membela Bung KARNO.

- e. Setelah kedjadian tersebut saja tidak mengetahui lagi kegiatan2 Djenderal PRANOTO maupun hubungannya dengan Bung KARNO.

109. Apakah hubungan antara Djenderal Polisi SUTARTO dengan Bung KARNO dan Dr. SUBANDRIO serta Djenderal SABUR, dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI.

109. Mengenai Djenderal Pol. SUTARTO apa jang dapat jang saja terangkan adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Djenderal Polisi SUTARTO termasuk "orang Dekat" Bung KARNO; ia sangat dipertjaja oleh Bung KARNO dan disenanginja. Hal ini saja ketahu semendjak ± tahun 1961 sewaktu ia mendjadi Kepala Kepolisian di Bali. Setiap kundjungan Bung KARNO ke Bali waktu itu, selalu saja lihat adanya hubungan jang akrab, antara Bung KARNO dan SUTARTO. Hubungan jang baik ini saja lihat terus berdjalan setelah SUTARTO bertugas di MABAK. Disamping dinas, pada kesempatan2 lain seperti dalam kesenian, wajang dan sebagainya, SUTARTO selalu mendapat undangan. Djuga dalam perdjalanan ke luar negeri, SUTARTO telah beberapa kali turut

sebagai "advance group" jang bertugas menjiapkan tempat, security, dan sebagainya.

- b. Dalam bidang intel, saja melihat adanja hubungan jang rapat antara SUTARTO dengan Bung KARNO, dengan Dr. SUBANDRIO, dengan SABUR, ataupun dengan ketiga-tiganja. SUTARTO selalu memberikan informasi2 ataupun menerima informasi2, serta membahasnja bersama.
- c. Seingat saja dalam hal dokumen Gillchrist, SUTARTO pegang peranan penting sekali. Ia berkali-kali melaporkan dan membahas hal tersebut. Dari Djenderal SABUR saja mendengar bahwa SUTARTO-lah jang memberikan kejakinan kepada Bung KARNO bahwa dokumen tersebut benar2 asli/authentiek.
- d. Sehubungan dengan dokumen tersebut maka terlihat kegiatan2 jang menaik tentang penjelidikan dan informasi2 tentang Djenderal2 AD jang dianggap tidak loyal terhadap Bung KARNO. Saja mendengar bahwa SUBANDRIO/SUTARTO dengan BPI-nja jang terutama diberi tanggung-djawab oleh Bung KARNO untuk mentjari kebenaran tentang informasi Dewan Djenderal.
- e. Sekitar pertengahan September 1965 telah diadakan pertemuan antara Bung KARNO dan beberapa pedjabat, diantaranya SUBANDRIO dan SUTARTO. Dikemudian hari saja mendengar dari Djenderal SABUR bahwa pertemuan tersebut telah membahas lebih mendalam lagi tentang adanja Djenderal2 AD jang

tidak loyal dan persiapan2 untuk menindaknja.

Pada saat itulah SUTARTO sebagai Kepala Staf BPI telah memberikan kepastian tentang kebenaran adanya Dewan Djenderal cs. Djenderal2 jang tidak loyal, sehingga menghilangkan segala keraguan jang saat itu masih ada.

f. Ketjuali dengan Bung KARNO, saja mengetahui bahwa SUTARTO sering berhubungan dengan Djenderal SABUR sebagai DAN MEN TJAKRABIRAWA.

Djenderal SABUR menerima banjak informasi2 dari Djenderal SUTARTO dan sebaliknya Djenderal SUTARTO menerima pula banjak informasi dari SABUR jang chususnja mengenai policy pendirian Bung KARNO.

110. Berikan pendjelasan tentang kegiatan/peranan Djenderal SUTARDHIO dalam rangka G-30-S/PKI. Sebutkan pula hubungan djenderal SUTARDHIO dengan Bung KARNO dan Djenderal SABUR, dalam melakukan peranan/kegiatan2 tersebut.

110. Keterangan2 jang dapat saja berikan mengenai Djenderal SUTARDHIO adalah sebagai berikut:

a, Hubungan Bung KARNO - SUTARDHIO:

Bung KARNO sangat senang kepada Djenderal SUTARDHIO. Hal ini terutama karena SUTARDHIO sederhana, tjerdas, agar pendiam dan loyal. Rasa senang Bung KARNO terhadap SUTARDHIO ini mengandung djuga rasa rempek.

Sebelum diangkat mendjadi MEN/DJAKSA AGUNG SUTARDHIO sebagai perwira CPM sering sekali turut rombongan Bung

KARNO ke luar negeri, khususnya sebagai "advance group" yang mengurus soal tempat, security dan sebagainya, terutama bagi Bung KARNO sebagai Presiden. Dari pelaksanaan tugas inilah terutama terdjalin hubungan pribadi yang baik antara Bung KARNO-SUTARDHIO.

- b. Dari beberapa kejadian yang dapat saja lihat/ketahui, SUTARDHIO selalu bersikap tenang dan tidak emosional. Begitu pula segala pendapat saran atau nasehatnja kepada Bung KARNO selalu difikirkan dulu dan disampaikan dengan senang. Kadang2 saja lihat pula ketidak tjotokan antara SUTARDHIO dan Bung KARNO dimana SUTARDHIO tetap mempertahankan pendiriannja dengan korek dan sopan. Tetapi pada achirnja kelayakan SUTARDHIO kepada atasan akan mendjadi dasar decision apa yang diambilnja. Pada diri SUTARDHIO ini terlihat benar sikap dan djiwa pradjuritnja.
- c. Sebagai Djaksa Agung, SUTARDHIO sering menghadap Bung KARNO. Djuga pada 23 September 1965 pagi SUTARDHIO bersama pedjabat2 lain telah menghadap Bung KARNO. Pada kesempatan itu saja turut mendengar adanja perintah Bung KARNO kepada SABUR dan SUNARJO untuk mengam-bil tindakan terhadap Djenderal yang tidak loyal.
- d. Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 saja melihat/mengetahui bahwa SUTARDHIO bersama pedjabat lain berada di Halim bersama Bung KARNO. Saja sendiri tidak turut hadlir dalam pertemuan dan pembitjaræan para ped-

jabat itu, tetapi dikemudian hari saja mendengar beberapa hal dalam peristiwa tersebut.

(1) Sewaktu daftar anggota Dewan Revolusi disodorkan kepada SUTARDHIO, IA menundjukkan sikap terkedjut dan mengatakan bahwa tidak tahu apa2 tentang daftar tersebut. Ia menunggu dan menjerahkan keputusan kepada Bung KARNO.

(2) Sewaktu pemitjaraan mengenai caretaker pimpinan AD, SUTARDHIO telah menjarankan agar Bung KARNO mengadakan konsultasi dengan pihak AD. Tetapi achirnja ia tunduk djuga kepada keputusan Bung KARNO jang mengangakat Djenderal PRANOTO.

e. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI di Bogor saja tidak ingat akan adanja pertemuan antara Bung KARNO-SUTARDHIO dan mengenai pemitjaraan apa.

f. Hubungan SUTARDHIO-SABUR dalam hal dinas tidak terlihat rapat, karena segala soal rupanja ditackle oleh Djenderal SUNARJO.

Dari hubungan pribadi SUTARDHIO-SABUR saja dapat mengetahui, karena saja sering omong2 dengan SUTARDHIO, bahwa hubungannya itu tidak begitu baik karena SUTARDHIO tidak menjetudjuji beberapa tindakan pribadi SABUR.

g. Mengenai kegiatan SUTARDHIO dalam rangka Barisan SUKARNO, saja tidak mengetahui dan tidak pernah menden-garnja.

111. Apakah sdr. mengetahui tentang kegiatan/peranan Laksamana Laut MULJADI dalam rangka G-30-S/

PKI dan bagaimana hubungan antara Laksamana Laut MULJADI dengan Bung KARNO dalam melakukan peranannya tersebut?

111. Jang saja ketahuai tentang Laksamana MULJADI adalah sebagai berikut:

- a. Sebelum terdjadinja G-30-S/PKI pada awal tahun 1965 dalam tubuh ALRI terdjadi peristiwa GPPR (Gerakan Perwira Progressip Revolusioner) jang bertendens kiri.
Dalam peristiwa ini Laksamana MULJADI waktu itu DEPUTY I, dengan tegas bertindak terhadap GPPR itu.
- b. Sewaktu terdjadinja peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965, Laksamana MULJADI lah jang mendesak MEN/PANGAL untuk segera berhubungan dengan KOSTRAD cq. Djenderal SUHARTO. Selama MEN/PANGAL Laksamana MARTADINATA berada di Halim, sepanjang siang hari, Laksamana MULJADI terus berhubungan dengan KOSTRAD. Dari dokumen2 jang erat inilah maka dapat dikeluarkan statement bersama (AD, AL, POL) jang mengutuk G-30-S/PKI.
- c. Setelah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI dan Laksamana MULJADI mendjadi MEN/PANGAL terdapat hubungan langsung antara Bung KARNO/Presiden dan Laksamana MULJADI/MEN/PANGAL.
(1) Dari apa jang saja ketahuai, Laksamana MULJADI selalu menundjukkan sikap jang djudjur/terus terang tetapi selalu loyal terhadap atasan/pemerintah.
(2) Saja mengetahuai bahwa sebagai "kawan sedjawat" ada hubungan dan pertemuan2 antara Laksamana MULJADI/MEN/

PANGAL dan Djenderal SUHARTO MEN/
PANGAD.

Dari Laksamana MULJADI pernah saja
dengar bahwa Djenderal SUHARTO akan
tetap menghargai Bung KARNO, dengan
perkataan Pak HARTO "Djungjung duwur,
mendem djero".

(3) Menurut Laksamana MULJADI, pada
hari kemudian ternjata bahwa Pak
HARTO terlalu menjian njiakan Bung
KARNO. Mulai saat itulah terlihat
adanja perbedaan sikap antara kedua
tokoh itu, hal mana sikap Laksamana
MULJADI dianggap tidak sesuai dengan
keadaan zaman.

112. Dengan telah adanja/telah diketahuinja daftar
Dewan Revolusi jang ditanda tangani UNTUNG
pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965, di Halim, oleh
Bung KARNO sebelum dimumkan/disiarkan mela-
lui Radio, apakah ini tidak berarti bahwa
pengumuman Dewan Revolusi tersebut merupakan
hal jang telah diketahui dan direstui oleh
Bung KARNO dan adanja kerdjasama antara Bung
KARNO dengan gerakan G-30-S/PKI?

112. Bahwa ternjata telah ada suatu daftar
nama anggauta Dewan Revolusi pada Bung
KARNO sebelum disiarkannya melalui ra-
dio, hal itu menundjukkan bahwa paling
sedikit Bung KARNO telah mengetahuinja
terlebih dahulu jang berarti ada hubungan
antara pimpinan G-30-S/PKI dengan Bung
KARNO.

Bahwa susunan/daftar tersebut ternjata
disiarkan oleh radio berarti telah dires-
tui oleh Bung KARNO, jang berarti adanja
kerdjasama antara Bung KARNO dan G-30-S

PKI, seperti keterangan2 saja terdahulu.

113. Tahukah sdr. mengenai pengungsian putra-putri Bung KARNO (antara lain RACHMAWATI, SUKMAWATI, GURUH) dari Istana Merdeka pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 + djam 16.00 sore dari Halim ditinggalkan dengan Helikopter ke Bandung, djika tahu siapa jang memerintahkan pengungsian putera-puteri tersebut dan apa alasannja?

113. Saja mengetahui adanja peristiwa pengungsian putra-putri Bung KARNO pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 siang dari Istana ke Halim dan terus ke Bandung dengan Helikopter.

a. Jang memerintahkan pengungsian itu adalah Bung KARNO kepada AKBP, MANGIL dan DKP.

Selandjutnja MANGIL memerintahkan seorang anak buahnja ke Istana.

b. Apa alasannja dari pengungsian tersebut jang saja ketahui, karena pada waktu itu dirasakan "tidak amannja" keadaan kota Djakarta cq. Istana. Kemungkinan besar djuga telah dirasakannja oleh Bung KARNO akan tanda2 kegagalan G-30-S/PKI.

114. Dari semua pembitjaraan baik dalam pertemuan2 selama Bung KARNO dan lain2 pedjabat berada di Halim pada tanggal 1 Oktober djelas tidak pernah disinggung-singgung tentang pengambil alihan kekuasaan oleh G-30-S/PKI, harap sdr. djelaskan:

a. Apakah sebabnja oleh Bung KARNO hal tersebut ditambah dengan semua pengumuman2 G-30-S/PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 tidak pernah dibitjarakan atau dibahas selama di Halim.

b. Apakah sebabnja hanja persoalan care-taker PANGAD jang dibitjarakan dimana ex. Brig-djen SUPARDJO turut aktif dalam penentuan tersebut?

114.a. Sesuai dengan keterangan saja terlebih dahulu, ternyata adanja kesamaan niat antara Bung KARNO dan PKI dan djuga adanja kerdjasama antara Bung KARNO dan G-30-S/PKI. Karena itulah maka Bung KARNO tidak lagi membitjarakan segala hal jang telah diumumkan oleh G-30-S/PKI pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 itu.

b. Pada saat itu dirasakan oleh Bung KARNO bahwa satu2nja kekuatan jang akan menentangnja adalah dari Angkatan Darat. Karena itu ia memandang perlu untuk segera menundjuk seorang care-taker pimpinan AD, jang tentunja harus loyal pada Bung KARNO, agar dapat menguasai seluruh AD dan khususnja kekuatan di KOSTRAD pada waktu itu.

115. Dapatkah sdr. mendjelaskan tentang peranan dari Letkol ALI EBRAM (AS 1 MEN/TJAKRABIRAWA) dalam rangka gerakan G-30-S/PKI, dimana ALI EBRAM ini telah melakukan kegiatan operasional.

115. Saja melihat Letkol ALI EBRAM pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 adalah siang hari di Halim. Disitu saja mendengar bahwa pada pagi harinja Letkol ALI EBRAM djuga berada dirumah HARJATI di Grogol. Mengenai segala kegiatannja jang sebenarnya saja tidak mengetahui. Pada saat itu saja mengetahui bahwa ia dari Staf

I/Intell Tjakrabirawa djadi saja mengira tentunja Letkol ALI EBRAM mendjalankan tugas2 security.

116. Sesudah peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, Djenderal SABUR pernah memberikan briefing jang antara lain mengatakan bahwa Letkol ALI EBRAM tidak terlibat dalam peristiwa G-30-S/PKI, Harap sdr. djelaskan apa jang sdr. ketahui dalam utjapan Djenderal SABUR tersebut.

116. Saja memang pernah mendengar hal tersebut dari seorang anggota DKP, mungkin MANGIL, memang Djenderal SABUR pernah memberikan briefing pada anak buahnja di Markas Tjakrabirawa jang mengatakan bahwa Letkol ALI EBRAM tidak terlibat dalam G-30-S/PKI.
Kapan briefing tadi terdjadi, saja telah lupa, tetapi beberapa lama setelah tanggal 1 Oktober 1965.

117. Dilihat dari keterangan2 jang telah sdr. berikan, menundjukkan beberapa perbedaan keterangan dibandingkan dengan keterangan saksi2 lainnja. Sehubungan dengan beberapa perbedaan keterangan tersebut, apakah benar pernah dikeluarkan suatu instruksi kepada pembantu2 dekat Bung KARN0, untuk mengadakan suatu afspraak/kesepakatan dalam mendjawab beberapa masalah jang menjangkut kegiatan-kegiatan Bung KARN0 dalam hubungan G-30-S/PKI.

117.a. Dengan sebenarnja dan sedjudjur-djudjurnja dengan tulus ichlas dan dasar sumpah saja, saja menerangkan bahwa dari apa jang saja ketahui dan alami sendiri, tidak pernah ada suatu afspraak/kesepakatan antara pembantu2

dekat Bung KARNO untuk tidak membuka cq. tidak berterus terang dalam memberikan keterangan2 jang menjangkut Bung KARNO dan G-30-S/PKI.

- b. Bahwa ada atau banjak diantara pembantu2 Bung KARNO jang sampai sekarang tetap tutup mulut atau tidak mau bit-jara, menurut saja karena:
1. Pemudjaan terhadap manusia Bung KARNO jang mulai tahun '45 dan sebelumnja sampai sekarang, masih terlalu tebal meliputi djiwa mereka.
 2. Adanja rasa berhutang budi kepada Bung KARNO jang mereka anggap telah memperlakukan dengan baik terhadap mereka itu.
 3. Kurang pengertian mereka akan keharusan kita semua tunduk kepada hukum.

118. Apakah sdr. merasa ditekan, didikte dan dipaksa dalam memberi keterangan ini seluruhnja?

118. Tidak, saja tidak merasa ditekan, didikte, atau dipaksa dalam memberikan segala keterangan ini.

119. Adakah jang hendak sdr. terangkan lagi?

119. Tidak ada hal2 lain jang akan saja terangkan.

120. Apakah semua keterangan sdr. jang telah sdr. berikan itu benar djika benar apakah sdr. bersedia disumpah atas keberannja?

120. Ja, semua keterangan saja adalah benar dan saja berani angkat sumpah atas kebenaran itu.

Demikianlah Berita Atajara ini dibuat dengan sebenarnya dengan mengingat sumpah djabatan dan setelah dibatjakan kembali pada/disuruh membatja kembali oleh jang diperiksa maka ia, jang diperiksa, tetap pada keterangan2nja tersebut diatas dan sebagai tanda setudju ia membuhuhi tanda-tangannja dibawah ini,

Kemudian Berita Atjara ini ditutup untuk sementara pada hari tanggal tersebut diatas di Djakarta, dan pemeriksaan akan dilandjutkan pada hari dan tanggal jang akan ditentukan kemudian.

Jang diperiksa;

Jang memeriksa;

BAMBANG SETIJONO
WIDJANARKO
KOLONEL KKO.

1. S.SOEGIARJO
LETKOL CPM-NRP: 12688.
2. AZWIR NAWIE
ADJUN KOMISARIS BESAR POL.

OPERATION COMMANDO FOR THE
RESTORATION OF SECURITY & ORDER
CENTRAL INVESTIGATION TEAM

PRO JUSTITIA

REPORT OF INTERROGATION

This day, Saturday, 3 October 1970, we:

1. S. SOEGIJARJO - Lieut.Col.CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - Ass.Chief Commissioner of Police

both in the function of member of the Central Investigation Team, interrogated a man admitting he was:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO

having the rank of Colonel KKO, function: ASKA-PERS/MIL (Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy/Military brand), age/date of birth: 43 years/ 19 September 1927, place of birth: Karanganyar Kebumen, religion: Roman Catholic, address/place of residence: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

He was heard as a witness in matters relating to the G-30-S/PKI.

In reply to the questions we put to him he, the witness (BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO) gave the following replies:

Question:

1. Are you prepared to be interrogated on this day and make your statement?

Yes, by all means.

2. Are you in good condition?

Yes.

3. Will you please tell us about your experiences relating to:

- a. Training
- b. Service experience
- c. Party/organisation activities

a. Training

General: Elementary school

Secondary school (SMP)

Military: PETA training - 1943

KUTP - KKO - 1952

Basic School USMC (USA) 1954

Adjutant to a General of the Army 1960

SESKOAD - 1968

b. Service Experience:

- 1943 - PETA

- 1945 - BKR/TKR/TNI (ALRI CA IV Tegal)

KKO ANGKATAN LAUT up to the present

c. Experiences in party/organisation:

Never been in a party/organisation.

4. State your family relationships:

a. Father - died ± 1931

b. Mother - Mrs. Karjosupadno, Dj. Setasiun
No. 7. Karanganyar Kebumen.

c. Brothers and sisters:

1. Tuty Kartini, elder sister

2. Sutjipto " , " brother

3. Sumijati " , " sister

4. Sunarsih " , younger sister

d. Wife: Magdalena Paal

e. Children:

1. Vincent , boy
2. Wanda , girl
3. Joyce , girl
4. Ingris , girl
5. Stella , girl
6. Michael Bharata , boy
7. Bambang Witjaksana, boy
8. Sinta Cisilia , girl
9. Widiatmaka , boy

5. Do you recollect a letter handed over to Bung Karno containing information that the troops of the RPKAD intended to attack the palace and were going to visit the homes of certain Cabinet-ministers? If you recall this, please make a statement as to the following:
- a. where did the letter come from?
 - b. what was its contents?
 - c. who was at the time aware of the contents of the letter?
- a.1. On March 10, 1966, at about 18.30 hours, a number of leading officials (Deputy Prime Ministers/Ministers) were present in the Guest House of the Djakarta Palace who had either to sleep there or remain there on the orders of Bung KARNO. At about that time, Brig.Gen. SABUR, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa regiment, brought information that there was a concentration of Army forces on the outskirts of the town and that their intention was to attack the Palace. This information was communicated verbally to Bung KARNO and other officials.
2. At about 19.00 hours Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT (Adjutant to the President) arrived with a letter which was handed

over to Bung KARNO. This letter, it appeared, was written in Javanese.

Bung KARNO gave the letter to me and told me to read it and translate it into Indonesian.

- b. The contents: the letter was addressed to Bung KARNO.
 - It reported that troops of the Army, in particular the RPKAD, were at the ready to attack the Palace.
 - The letter was sent and signed by Gen. SUADI (Army).
- c. Present were: Bung KARNO, Deputy Premiers LEIMENA and CHAERUL SALEH, Gen. SABUR, Col. SAELAN, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT, Assistant Chief Commissioner of Police MANGIL and other persons whom I can no longer recollect.

6. How did Bung KARNO, Brig.Gen.SABUR and other officials who were present, react to the contents of the letter?

Please also make reference to the reaction to the information given.

6.1. The information given, both verbally by Gen.SABUR and in the letter itself, which Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT had brought (from Gen. SUADI) was taken seriously by Bung KARNO, Gen.SABUR and other officials. All believed that the information was correct and that the intentions therein reported would take place.

2. On the basis of the assessment of this information it was decided that Bung KARNO and the officials present should leave the Djakarta Palace immediately for a destination outside the city. After a number of alternatives had been considered

it was finally decided by the Commander of the Tjakrabirawa regiment that Bung KARNO and the party should leave immediately by land for Bogor via Kebajoran Blok P, Kemang, Tjilandak, Pasar Minggu, Depok. During the discussion on the accuracy of the information I proposed that the leadership of the Tjakrabirawa regiment should first of all check with the PANGDAM DJAYA. I proposed this because I was convinced that the KODAM DJAYA was fully informed.

This proposal was rejected.

Pak Bandrio said it was unnecessary to check because the KODAM DJAYA would give false information anyway.

Gen. SABUR, too, who completely believed the information, thought it unnecessary to contact the KODAM DJAYA.

During these discussions it was particularly Pak BANDRIO who strongly protested against checking with the PANGDAM DJAYA. It was repeatedly argued that the information had originated with the Army, or with Chief Officers of the Army, who were completely to be trusted.

It was also argued that the PANGDAM DJAYA would certainly camouflage any troop movements of the Army, Bung KARNO finally decided that it was unnecessary to get in touch with the KODAM DJAYA.

7. Why was not the information relating to this problem of the Army troops (in this case the RPKAD) conveyed to the leadership of the Army to achieve a solution of this problem in cooperation with the Army leadership?

7. In my opinion information of this kind concerning the troops of the Army (RPKAD) was not released to the Army for the following reasons:
 - a. The Palace (i.e. the President) was able to establish direct communications with the PANGDAM V/DJAYA because it was the KODAM DJAYA which was responsible for security in the capital.
 - b. The situation at the time (March 1966) was very disturbed, Bung KARNO and the Tjakrabirawa not trusting the whole army -- either RPKAD, KODAM DJAYA, KOSTRAD or the Army Staff.
 - c. The considerations given under a. and b. were the reasons why there was prejudice with respect to the Army, so that problems arising from the presence of troops of the RPKAD were not conveyed to the leadership of the Army. This decision was taken by Bung KARNO after hearing suggestions made by leadership of the Tjakrabirawa (Brig.Gen.SABUR and Col. SAELAN).
8. Please comment upon the activities of Bung KARNO and Brig.Gen. SABUR aimed at ensuring military support against the troops of the RPKAD which were going to attack the Palace.
 - 8.1. After the decision had been taken that Bung KARNO and his party should leave Djakarta in the direction of Bogor, and the route had been worked out, the Commander of the Tjakrabirawa regiment went to make his preparations. These included an order to the Batalion-commander of the

KKO-AL (belonging to the Tjakrabirawa regiment) to make security arrangements along the route and to contact the KKO-AL of Tjilandak, which the party would pass.

2. During the discussions in the Guest House Pak BANDRIO (in particular) explained that, in dealing with the situation generally, and with the RPKAD troops who were reported to be planning to attack the Palace, the troops of the KKO-AL, the BRIMOB as well as the AURI could be relied upon.

Other officials, including Pak ACHMADI, confirmed this.

As far as I can recollect those present at this discussions were:

Bung KARNO, Pak BANDRIO, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Pak ACHMADI, Pak HARTAWAN, Pak JUSUF M.D., Gen. SABUR, Col. SAELAN, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT and myself.

3. Gen. SABUR kept on insisting that the group should leave the Palace as soon as possible.

9. Witnesses Dr. LEIMENA and Dr. SUBANDRIO and Brig.Gen.SABUR told the investigators that MarineGen. HARTONO had a meeting with Bung KARNO on March 10th at approx. 12.00 - 02.00 hours in the KKO quarters in Tjilandak.

What is your view of those statements?

9. As far as I can remember these statements were correct. Marine Gen.HARTONO was in Tjilandak when Bung KARNO's group arrived and met Bung KARNO.

10. Give us some comment on the discussions between Bung KARNO and Marine Gen. HARTONO at Tjilandak, about matters relating to a report that the troops of the RPKAD were to attack the Palace.
10. After Bung KARNO's party had arrived at Tjilandak, Bung KARNO was taken to the office of the Commandant of the Officer's camp in order to rest there. During this rest period there were dialogues between Bung KARNO and Gen. HARTONO and myself about the situation which prevailed at that moment: namely, the report that troops of the RPKAD were to attack the Palace. Bung KARNO asked whether the troops of the KKO were prepared, if necessary, to resist the troops of the RPKAD. The answer was that they were prepared to do so. Bung KARNO asked whether the troops of the KKO were strong enough. The answer was that they were. Bung KARNO asked whether the troops of the KKO were able to ensure the security of the President. The answer was that they were prepared to ensure his security. During the discussions it was also stated that the troops of the KKO could be deployed immediately, if necessary.
11. Please give us a statement concerning the meeting between Bung KARNO and the Commanders of the Forces to discuss the Gyllchrist (sic!) document in May, 1965.
11. In May 1965 there was a meeting between Bung KARNO and Pak BANDRID and the four Commanders. The meeting was held in the

morning. At that moment, I was not yet aware of what was being discussed, because I was not present at the meeting.

A few weeks later I heard from Brig.Gen. SABUR that the existence of a very important document was discussed at that meeting, and that it could be fetched from the British Embassy when the embassy building was to be attacked/burned down by demonstrators. This was the document that henceforth was to be known as the Gylchrist (sic!) document.

12. Please give us a statement on:
- a. when and where did you become aware of the problems connected with the Council of Generals?
 - b. What was the significance of the Council of Generals about which you had heard?
 - c. What did Bung KARNO say about Council of Generals?

12.a. I first heard about the existence of the "Council of Generals" in the first quarter of 1965. I do not know for sure from whom I first heard about it. I heard it at the Palace, where many officials either called or were employed.

b. (1) When I first heard about the existence of this Council of Generals I did not pay so much attention to it, because, in my opinion, it was quite an ordinary matter, in other words, that a Committee in the Forces whose task it was to regulate promotions or to keep up the officers' honour, was necessary.

(2) Quite a time afterwards (about the

middle of June, 1965) I heard that the existence of this Council of Generals in the Army was being reported as having a purpose opposed to the Government, or to Bung KARNO.

c. As far as I know, and have witnessed, Bung KARNO was very much influenced by and believed there existed this Council of Generals that was opposed to Bung KARNO. From several incidents it could be seen that Bung KARNO was displeased with certain Army Generals and, in turn, often received visits from certain other Army Generals who were trusted by Bung KARNO.

13. Please explain:

- a. When and where did you first hear or know that Bung KARNO was displeased with some Army Generals, including Gen. PARMAN, and Gen. SOETOJO, because they were regarded as being not loyal to Bung KARNO.
- b. Who were the other persons who were also appraised of the situation at that moment?
- c. Was the accusation made by Bung KARNO against the generals to the effect that they were not loyal, caused by the suspicion that those Generals were members of the Council of Generals?

13.a. I have forgotten the exact date or time but one morning (before October 1, 1965) I both saw and heard in a hall of the Merdeka Palace that Bung KARNO was angry with some of the Army Generals, including Generals PARMAN and SOETOJO. His anger was caused by the fact that these Generals were not regarded as being loyal to Bung KARNO.

- b. As far as I know, the others who were appraised of this, were the adjudants present, Pak DJAMIN and Deputy Premiers SUBANDRIO and LEIMENA, and Gen. YANI, who accompanied the Generals.
- c. The accusation of Bung KARNO that they were not loyal, was in fact due to the suspicion that the Generals were members of the Council of Generals.

14. The witnesses, DJAMIN, YUSUF MUDA DALAM and HENNY, gave the following explanation to investigators:

- a. On September 23rd, 1965 at 07.00 hours Gen. MURSID reported to Bung KARNO in the rear gallery of Djakarta Palace that the Army Generals, the leadership of the Army, were still not loyal to Bung KARNO.
- b. At that stage Bung KARNO already said that he would act against the disloyal Army Generals. Bung KARNO then asked Gen. SABUR about preparations to be made for measures to be taken.
- c. Bung KARNO then ordered that Gen. SUDIRGO should be summoned to take part in the measures to be carried out against the Army Generals.

Are the statements by those witnesses true, without exception? if they were, please comment:

- a. Who were the other officials who were also present?
- b. What was the nature of the dialogue which you witnessed between Bung KARNO and Gen. MURSID and Gen. SABUR?
- c. Any other matters also discussed at that time?

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14. To my knowledge all the statements made by the witnesses are true.
 - a. Other persons present: Pak BANDRIO, Pak LEIMENA, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Brig. Gen. SUNARJO, Brig.Gen.SABUR, Pak DJAMIN and Air Marshal OMAR DANI.
 - b. The dialogue I was able to hear:
 - (1) Bung KARNO to Gen.MURSID "Is what you report true?" -- "Watch out, if necessary I shall arrange a confrontation."
Gen. MURSID to Bung KARNO: "Indeed, Pak."
 - (2) Bung KARNO to Gen. SABUR: "Sabur, the measures against them must be carried out".
 - (3) Marshal OMAR DANI: "The AURI is at the ready and is behind you Bapak."
 - c. As I recall it, the discussion also related to the Ministry of Trade, particularly between Pak BANDRIO and Pak CHAERUL SALEH, during which there was a difference of opinion. Bung KARNO intervened in the dispute and ruled at the time that it should no longer be discussed.
15. The witnesses HENNY, DJAMIN and YUSUF and MUDA and DALAM told investigators that Gen. SUDIRGO had called on Bung KARNO on several occasions to report to him on matters relating to the Army Generals who had been said to be disloyal to Bung KARNO and who belonged to the organisation of Generals who were planning a coup against the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

Are the statements made by those witnesses true? If so, please comment:

- a. Do you recall the tenor of the conversation between Gen. SUDIRGO and Bung KARNO?
- b. Who were the other persons who were present at this meeting?

15. The statements by the witnesses are correct,

a.1. I do not recall the tenor of the conversation sentence by sentence.

I recall only the main outlines and the gist: Bung KARNO asked for the outcome of the "checking out" of the existence of a Council of Generals whose aim was to carry out a coup; Gen. DIRGO answered that it was true.

Bung KARNO also said that he had given Generals SABUR and SUNARJO an order to take measures against the disloyal Generals and at the same time ordered that Gen. DIRGO and the CPM should give them their support.

2. Before the aforementioned meeting at the end of September, 1965 Gen. DIRGO had on occasion been to see Bung KARNO and was told by Bung KARNO about the existence of a report and Council of Generals and, at the same time, Gen. DIRGO was ordered to investigate the matter.

b. Other persons who were present at the time were: the Deputy Premiers SUBANDRIO, LEIMENA, Brig.Gen.SUNARJO, Brig. Gen. SABUR, YUSUF MUDA DALAM, MUALIF NASUTION, Adjutants Col. SAELAN and DJAMIN.

16. Please make a statement about an alleged be-
tween Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR and a number
of other Generals in the Djakarta Palace on
29 September, 1965 to discuss the measures
to be taken against the Council of Generals/
Chief Officers of the Army who were not loyal
to Bung KARNO.

16. As far as I recall the meeting of 29th
September 1965, it was like this:

a. Present were: Marshal OMAR DANI, Gen.

MURSID, Gen. SUNARJO, YUSUF MUDA DALAM,
MUALIF NASUTION, HENNY and the Adjutants.

b. What I was able to hear of the conversa-
tion between Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR:
Bung KARNO asked about the measures against
the Army Generals who were not loyal,
and Gen. SABUR replied that everything
was being prepared and would be carried
out when everything was ready.

Bung KARNO said that the preparations
had to be speedily carried out. Gen.
MURSID, who was then present, said that
there was already an Army unit which
could be kept in reserve. Marshal OMAR
DANI said that the AURI was at the ready
and would back Bung KARNO.

c. On that occasion Bung KARNO ordered
Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT to command
General YANI and some other officials to
appear before the President on October
1st, 1965.

d. Apart from the above conversation,
there was a further exchange between
Bung KARNO and General MURSID, on roughly
the following lines: "Bung KARNO wishes
to replace Gen. YANI as Minister/Commander

of the Army and to transfer to Gen. MURSID the command of the Army. Gen. MURSID replied: "I am ready to accept".

17. Witness HENNY and witness DJAMIN told investigators that, on September 30th, 1965, at about 08.00 hours, Gen. SABUR called on Bung KARNO at the Djakarta Palace with a file containing the letters of appointment of Gen. MURSID as Minister/Commander of the Army to be signed by Bung KARNO.
Please give your comments on these statements and your personal opinion about them.

17. I can state the following with conviction: On the morning of September 30th, 1965, I saw Gen. SABUR arrive with a file which he gave to Bung KARNO; Bung KARNO signed the letter in the file. Gen. SABUR then gave the letter to the Secretary of the President, Pak DJAMIN.
The contents of the file and the letter it contained were unknown to me, while Gen. SABUR and DJAMIN made no statement to me about them.

18. Do you recall that, in the Tampaksiring Palace talks were held between Bung KARNO and Gen. SJAFIUDIN on:
- a. the existence of Army Generals who were not loyal to Bung KARNO
 - b. the existence of groups in the Army at officer level which were loyal to Bung KARNO and groups which were disloyal to Bung KARNO?
 - c. the measures that had to be taken against the Army Generals which were not loyal to Bung KARNO?

If you do recall this, please comment on:

- a. when and where was the discussion between Bung KARNO and Gen. SJAFIUDIN?
- b. What was the tenor of the discussion and who were the other persons who took part in it?
- c. Please also mention any others who were present.

18. I do recall a discussion between Bung KARNO and Gen. SJAFIUDIN.

- a. Place - the Tampaksiring Palace, Bali
Date - June 6th, 1965 (Birthday of Bung KARNO)

b. The people then present at the dinner were:

Pak BANDRID, Pak CHAERUL SALEH, Pak LEI-MENA, JUSUF MUDA DALAM, Gen. SJAFIUDIN, Pak SUTEDJA, Head of Bali Police, the Public Prosecutor, Gen. SABUR, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT, Ass. Chief Commissioner of Police MANGIL, Lieut.-Col. SUPARTO and myself.

c. The discussions proceeded roughly as follows:

Bung KARNO said that the Generals should not think only about tactics but also try to understand world strategy, in particular the political strategy of South-East Asia. The theory that danger threatened from the North (People's Republic of China) was a neo-colonial imperialist concept and we ought to reject it. The Djakarta-Peking axis was Bung KARNO's strategic concept which had to be observed by the Generals.

General SJAFIUDIN said that the existence of other theories than Bung KARNO's policies prevailed in leading circles of the Army, and gave rise to difficulties in the lower ranks assigned the task of carrying them out. This fact was also the cause of the rising of "groups" in Army circles; for that matter, there were some who followed Bung KARNO's policies and some who didn't.

Bung KARNO, responding to Gen. SJAFIUDIN's remarks, said that if that were true, then changes or improvements were in fact necessary in the top echelons of the Army. Bung KARNO also said that Gen. SJAFIUDIN should sound out the accuracy of reports that there were Generals who either did not follow his policies or were disloyal to him.

Pak BANDRIO suggested that Gen. YANI should be summoned and questioned as to the accuracy of this matter.

d. After that meeting at Tampaksiring, I recall that Gen. SJAFIUDIN occasionally turned up at the Merdeka Palace to call on Bung KARNO (I don't exactly remember when, but I think it was round about July-September 1965) and that Gen. SJAFIUDIN reported to Bung KARNO on the results of his investigations, which showed that there were, in fact, Officers and Generals of the Army who either did not agree with his policies or were disloyal to him. On the basis of this report Bung KARNO stressed the necessity for speedy changes and replacements in the top echelons of

the Army. When Gen. SJAFIUDIN was asked which Army General was eligible to become Minister/Commander of the Army, Gen. SJA-FIUDIN mentioned the name of Gen. MURSID.

19. Do you recall that, in July 1965, Bung KARNO and CHOU EN LAI had a talk in Shanghai? If you do recall this, please make a statement on:
- a. when and where did that meeting take place?
 - b. who were present?
 - c. what was the chief matter in the discussion between Bung KARNO and CHOU EN LAI?
19. I recall that there was, in fact, a meeting between Bung KARNO and CHOU EN LAI in July, 1965.
- a. the meeting was early in July 1965 (the exact date escapes me) in Shanghai in the building where the Bung KARNO party was staying.
 - b. As far as I remember, present at this meeting were: Bung KARNO, Pak KUSOMOWIDAGDO, CHOU EN LAI and a Chinese interpreter.
 - c. I was not aware of the topic of the discussion behind the closed doors: later, I heard from somebody (possibly Pak KUSUMOWIDAGDO) that the result of the meeting was: - the formation of the Jakarta - Pnom Penh - Peking - Pyongyang axis.
That arms aid would be given by the People's Republic of China to establish a Fifth Force in Indonesia.
 - d. Apart from this a fore mentioned special meeting (b) there had previously

been a meeting attended by the Indonesian officials Bung KARNO, AIDIT, ALI SATROA-MIDJODJO, SJAFIUDIN, SUHRI, KUSUMOWIDAGDO, and from the side of the People's Republic of China, CHOU EN LAI, several Chinese officials and the interpreter.

20. Please name the generals who were not regarded as being loyal by Bung KARNO and say in what respect they were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

20. As far as I know the Army Generals who at one point or another were called disloyal by Bung KARNO were: Gen. PARMAN, Gen. SUTOJO, Gen. NASUTION, Gen. HARJONO. They were regarded as disloyal because they refused to follow the policies of Bung KARNO, or did not want to cooperate with the Communists.

21. The witnesses SURATNI, SUKARTI and AMANDA JACOBS told the investigators that, on August 4th, 1965, ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG called at the Palace for an audience of Bung KARNO. Please comment on:

- a. Are the statements by the witnesses correct?
- b. Was Lt.-Col. UNTUNG accompanied by others and if so, who were they?
- c. What was the topic of conversation between Bung KARNO and Lt.-Col. UNTUNG?
- d. What other persons were informed of the conversation?

21.a. The statements of the witnesses are correct. Ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG arrived in the bedroom of Bung KARNO in the Palace on August 4th, 1965.

b. As I recall it, ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG was

not alone. He was accompanied by Gen. SABUR. c. Bung KARNO asked Lt.-Col. UNTUNG if he was prepared to accept orders that measures should be taken against the Army Generals who were disloyal. UNTUNG replied that he was.

d. I no longer recall who the others were who were informed of this conversation, except Gen. SABUR.

22. Please give us some clear facts about the presence of a team of Chinese physicians of the People's Republic of China.

22. I can make no clear statement about the presence of a team of Chinese physicians of the People's Republic of China. All I can recount is what I myself saw and heard. The presence of a team of physicians of the P.R.C. was the result of an offer made by the P.R.C. (CHEN YI or CHOU EN LAI), to reinforce the Indonesian doctor's team. This offer was accepted by Bung KARNO. The Indonesian doctors' team also accepted the offer or was forced to accept it, because they were interested in seeing the results of the technique of acupuncture applied by the Chinese physicians. The teams of physicians (both the Indonesians and those of the Chinese People's Republic) were presided over and coordinated by Dr. SOEHARTO.

(There was always a member of the Indonesian physicians' team present when Bung KARNO received medical treatment from the physicians' team of the Chinese People's Republic.

Ingenieur LAUW and Dr. TAN, who also belonged to the Indonesian physicians' team acted as liaison the Indonesian and Chinese doctors.

23. Please comment on:

- a. Is it true that Bung KARN0, on September 30th, at 22.00 hrs, received a letter at the Senajan stadium from Lt.-Col. UNTUNG?
- b. Who delivered the letter?
- c. Where did Bung KARN0 read the letter and what was its contents?

23.a. On September 30th, 1965, at about 22.00 hrs, Bung KARN0 did in fact receive, at the Senajan stadium, a letter from ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG.

b. I myself handed over the letter to Bung KARN0 and I received the letter from one of the bodyguards, whose name was either SOGOL or NITRI, and he said that there was an important letter for the President.

c. Bung KARN0 received the letter and pocketed it. He then stood up and went outside to the toilet, followed by Col. SAELAN, Ass.ChiefCommissioner of Police MANGIL, the bodyguards and myself. In the outside gallery Bung KARN0 read the letter and returned it to his pocket. I knew nothing of the contents of the letter.

24. Do you recall that on Oct. 1st, 1965, that you were ordered to summon Gen. PRANOTO to Halim airbase. If you do, would you please explain:

a. who gave you this order to summon Gen.

PRANOTO to come to Halim airbase and what were the reasons?

b. Where did you meet Gen. PRANOTO and what did you hand over to him?

24. As I recall, the events of October 1st, 1965, were as follows:

a. Gen. SABUR gave me instructions to summon Gen. PRANOTO to appear before Bung KARNO immediately, because he had been assigned the responsibility for the Army. Gen. SABUR also explained that Gen. PRANOTO was regarded by Bung KARNO as a progressive senior General of the Army.

b. I did not meet Gen. PRANOTO, and therefore went to the KOSTRAD and reported to Gen. SOEHARTO that I had been instructed by Bung KARNO to summon Gen. PRANOTO.

(approx. 19.00 hrs). Gen. SOEHARTO asked me: Where is Bapak now? I replied: "At Halim" Gen. SUHARTO added:

- Tell Bapak that Gen. PRANOTO cannot come.

- For the time being I am head of the Army (Gen. SOEHARTO) and that is why, from now on, all instructions must go through me.

- BAMBANG, see to it that Bapak leaves Halim.

I then left the KOSTRAD and went back to Halim to report to Bung KARNO (approx. 20.00 hrs.).

25. Do you recall that Minister NJOTO visited the Bogor Palace and met Bung KARNO? Furthermore was NJOTO also present at the session of the Paripurna Cabinet in Bogor?

If you happen to recall that, please comment.

a. When did NJOTO meet Bung KARNO in the Bogor Palace and who were present at their meeting?

b. Is it true that NJOTO handed over the letter from D.N.AIDIT to Bung KARNNO and what was the contents of that letter? Who knew of the contents of the letter and discussed the contents of the letter and discussed the contents with Bung KARNNO?

c. Do you recall the statement of the PKI which was read out by NJOTO at the Cabinet meeting in Bogor and what was the substance of that statement? Please state, also, whether the Bogor statement was drafted in cooperation with Bung KARNNO?

25. I recall that NJOTO once went to the Bogor Palace and met Bung KARNNO.

a. NJOTO arrived during a Cabinet meeting (6 Oct. 1965). Just before the meeting began NJOTO met Bung KARNNO in the President's study. Also present in the room were: Deputy Premiers Pak BANDRIO and Pak LEIMENA, Minister YUSUF MUDA DALAM and Gen. SABUR.

b. I was unable to see and did not know whether NJOTO handed over a letter to Bung KARNNO at that moment. But I heard on from Gen. SABUR and Pak BANDRIO that it was in fact true that NJOTO delivered a letter to Bung KARNNO.

As far as I can remember the letter had the following contents:

1. The statement of G-30-S/PKI is entirely in the hands of the President Supreme Commander.

2. Law and order is essential. It is therefore forbidden to all parties concerned to condemn the Council of Generals or the G-30-S/PKI.

3. The whole apparatus of the revolution must function as it did before the existence of the G-30-S/PKI.
4. Security problems will be submitted to the Police with the support of the National Front.
5. The whole revolutionary apparatus must compete to win the Five Sacred Talisman of the Revolution.
6. It is forbidden to utter accusations or recriminations in respect of each other.

c. As far as the statement by the PKI is concerned, the following:

1. The PKI statement contains the declaration that the PKI was not involved in any way with the G-30-S/PKI and that the whole question of G-30-S/PKI was an internal affair of the Army.

2. That statement was read out by NJOTO at the Cabinet meeting at the Bogor Palace.

3. I do not know whether the statement was drafted at Bogor in consultation with Bung KARNQ.

d. As regards the letter from AIDIT, which was handed over to Bung KARNQ by NJOTO, its influence was immediately noticeable in the attitude of Bung KARNQ. I can give clear facts to illustrate this:

1. Bung KARNQ had always adopted a protective attitude towards the PKI.

Bung KARNQ always refused to liquidate the PKI, in spite of heavy pressure from the Society at large.

I equally had received a message from

Gen. SOEHARTO to have the PKI immediately disbanded and had passed on the request to Bung KARNO. (At that time Gen. SOEHARTO lay ill in his old house at Djalan Sabang). It was then that Bung KARNO's determination not to disband the PKI became clear to me.

2. Bung KARNO kept insisting that law and order must be restored first before a political solution could be found. This was clearly in accordance with the will of the PKI.

3. Bung KARNO kept stressing that the PKI had also had its glorious share in the Indonesian Revolution.

26. Do you recall that the Commander of the Halim Perdana Kusuma airbase handed over a radiogram to Air Marshal OMAR DANI? If so, please comment:
- when and where was aforementioned radiogram handed over to Marshal OMAR DANI and what was its contents?
 - Was the radiogram passed on to Bung KARNO?
 - Who were the persons who dealt with the contents of the radiogram together with Bung KARNO and Marshal OMAR DANI?
 - What were the activities of the leadership of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment on Bung KARNO's orders in connection with the aforementioned radiogram?

26.a. I cannot say anything with certainty about the radiogram but I can say the following:

On October 2nd, 1965 in the afternoon I heard from Col. KARDJONO (one of the Adjutants) or Gen. SABUR that a report had

been received from Halim Airbase that traces had been found near Halim which seemed to give strong indications of the presence of corpses. This information - the radiogram - was handed over to Marshal OMAR DANI.

b. Aforementioned radiogram was also passed on to Bung KARNO. I did not know for certain who passed it on.

c. Who else was involved in discussing the contents of the radiogram, I do not know for certain. On that afternoon there were a number of people with Bung KARNO. They were: Pak BANDRIO, Pak LEIMENA, Marshal OMAR DANI and Pak SABUR. At that moment there was activity around Bung KARNO in order to record Bung KARNO's voice on tape with the purpose of declaring that Bung KARNO was safe.

d. The next morning, the 3 October, 1965, I heard from Col. SAELAN a report of the activities of the Tjakrabirawa regiment the gist of which was:

1. On the basis of the abovementioned radiogram Bung KARNO gave orders to the Tjakrabirawa regiment, to Col. SAELAN with a team to go to the place and look for the corpses.
2. Because it was evening the team took lights with it.
3. When the team arrived at the place, (Lobang Buaja) and had just started the search, a unit of the RPKAD arrived on the scene. Owing to the arrival of the troops of the RPKAD the mission given to Col. SAELAN and his team by Bung KARNO to find and remove the corpses, failed.

4. The purpose of the removal of the corpses was to wipe out all traces.

27. Please explain the tenor of the discussions in the house of Commodore SUSANTO on October 1st, 1965 on the candidature or appointment of Gen. PRANOTO as Minister/Commander of the Army. Also refer to the approval of the leadership of the G-30-S/PKI with regard to this appointment of Gen. PRANOTO.

27.a. The candidature or appointment of Gen. PRANOTO as Minister/Chief of the Armed Forces was discussed on October 1st, 1965 in Commodore SUSANTO's House in the afternoon. Bung KARN0 and the officials: Pak LEIMENA, ¹the Minister/Commander of the Navy, ²the Minister/Commander of the Police, ³the Minister/Commander of the Air Force, Gen. SUTARDJO, Gen. SUNARJO, Gen. SABUR held the talks in the central gallery behind closed doors. We, Col. SAELAN, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT, Ass. Chief Commissioner of Police MANGIL, myself and members of the bodyguard were in the outside gallery and were unable to hear and did not know what was being discussed.

On that afternoon, at approx. 17.00 hrs, Gen. SABUR emerged from the central gallery and instructed me to summon Gen. PRANOTO because he was to be appointed Minister/Commander of the Army.

c. It was only a few days later that I learned that, during the aforementioned discussions ex-Brig. Gen. SOEPARDJO took part in the discussions by entering and leaving by the rear door in the central gallery.

I learned only later from Gen. SABUR of the presence of ex-Brig.Gen. SOE-PARDJO at the discussions and also of his function as liaison with the leadership of the G-30-S/PKI.

28. Will you say what you know about the list of members of the Revolutionary Council? Was Bung KARNO aware of the list before it was made public? What did it look like and who signed it?

28.a. I knew of the existence of the Revolutionary Council when I listened to a radio broadcast at 14.00 hrs on October 1st, 1965 in the front room of Commodore SUSANTO's house.

b. At approx. 14.30 hrs. when a number of officials arrived (Pak LEIMENA, Adm. MARTADINATA, Gen. SUTARDIO and Gen. SUNARJO), Bung KARNO instructed Gen. SABUR to hand over a list to Pak LEIMENA.

This list contained the names of the members of the Revolutionary Council.

c. As I remember it, the list was stenciled and was signed by ex-Lt.Col. UNTUNG and was, it is true, already in the hands of Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR before the radio announcement.

29. Did you appreciate the significance of the fact that the uniform of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the R.I. had to be collected by SUPARTO and SOGOL from DEWI's house at Djalan Gatot Subroto? If you did, will you then explain what was the purpose of it and who was ordered by Bung KARNO to search the pockets of the uniform?

29. At about 12.00 or 13.00 hrs. on October 1st, 1965 I saw Lt.Col.SUPARTO, carrying drinks from the palace for Bung KARN0, arrive with the uniform in a plastic bag. After the uniform had been put into the room, Bung KARN0 ordered me to see if there was a letter in one of the pockets. I searched the pockets of the aforesaid uniform and I took a letter that was in one of the pockets and gave it to Bung KARN0 without reading it. Bung KARN0 took the letter and tore it up. That was the letter that was handed over to Bung KARN0 and read by him the previous evening in the stadium (September 30th, in the evening) and sent by ex.Lt.Col.UNTUNG.

30. Will you describe the departure of Bung KARN0 from Halim to Bogor and explain the reasons to go to Bogor.

- a. Who accompanied Bung KARN0 to Bogor?
- b. What was the substance of the conversation during the journey from Halim to Bogor?

30.a. When I arrived at Halim (at Commodore SUSANTO's house) from the KOSTRAD at approx. 20.00 hrs. I reported immediately to Bung KARN0. Present were at the time a number of officials, including Pak LEIMENA. I conveyed the message of Gen. SOEHARTO - that Gen. PRANOTO was unable to come - that for the time being, the command of the Army was in the hands of Gen. SOEHARTO and for that reason it was requested that all instructions should be handed to him or should pass through him. I then requested, and greatly hoped, that

Bung KARNO would decide to leave Halim (I did not say that this was a message which Gen. SOEHARTO had given me).

b. While I was making my report and conducting the discussion ex.-Brig.-Gen. SOEPARDJO entered by the rear door. After he had greeted Bung KARNO and the other officials he sat down in the empty chair next to me.

c. I told Bung KARNO, while those present listened, about everything I had seen on the way between Halim and KOSTRAD: the movements of the KOSTRAD troops and the troop concentrations which I saw earlier in the morning in the neighbourhood of the palace and which, that evening, were located at the Djakarta Bypass.

d. Marshal OMAR DANI, who was also present said to Bung KARNO that a plane was ready if he wanted to go to Madiun or Djogja.

e. In the middle of the conversation DEWI arrived, accompanied by Lt.-Col. SOEPARTO. The company rose when Bung KARNO welcomed DEWI and she greeted all those present. Then Bung KARNO retired with DEWI to a room and the company broke up.

f. At that moment I took Pak LEIMENA aside and explained to him how serious the situation was and hoped that Pak LEIMENA would persuade Bung KARNO to leave Halim. But I did tell Pak LEIMENA that Gen. SUHARTO had given me the message to get Bung KARNO out of Halim.

g. After I had spoken to Pak LEIMENA in the front gallery I got in touch with Col.

SAELAN and Ass.Chief Commissioner MANGIL and told them they should get cars ready to leave Halim. I also explained the situation to them and we finally decided to take Bung KARNO to Bogor.

h. At approx 22.50 hrs. Pak LEIMENA came out and said that Bung KARNO would be leaving Halim immediately. When Bung KARNO came out I requested him quickly to get into the "Princess" car. Pak LEIMENA sat on his left. Three people sat in front: Lt.-Col.SUPARTO, as driver, in the middle SUHARSO of the bodyguard and myself as Adjutant.

Marshal OMAR DANI, who accompanied Bung KARNO to the car, saw that it was full and was therefore unable to join us.

i. When everyone was seated I ordered an immediate departure (approx. 23.00 hrs). The car drove from Halim in the direction of the Djakarta Bypass. After we had joined the Bypass we turned left and went straight to Bogor.

j. Shortly after we had departed, and when Bung KARNO saw that we moved to and in fact joined the Bypass Bung KARNO asked: "where are you taking me?" Pak LEIMENA who was sitting just behind me, pressed my shoulder to indicate that I should answer. I replied: "my apologies, Pak, but we are taking you to Bogor." Bung KARNO asked: "why to Bogor?" I answered: "I have three reasons, Pak: (1) Halim is not safe, and I figure that Halim will be attacked either tonight or at the latest tomorrow morning. Therefore, Bapak must leave Halim."
(2) "I drew the conclusion from what I

heard at the KOSTRAD that the AURI cannot be trusted, therefore Bapak should not go by air." (3) "It is safer to go by land and we are taking you, Bapak, to Bogor because Bogor is safe and not too far away from Djakarta. That will make it possible for Bapak to put a speedy end to the present confusion."

Pak LEIMENA: "Yes, Pak, Bogor is safe and not far away from Djakarta."

Bung KARNO: "Is it true, mBang, are we now safely on the way to Bogor?" On the journey he asked this question three times.

I: "yes, Pak, I guarantee your safety."

(I acknowledge that this was an exaggeration on my part, but it was necessary at the time to put Bung KARNO's mind at rest).

k. The party arrived safely in Bogor at

24.00 hrs. When we were nearly at the gateway Bung KARNO asked me: "what is your opinion about the troop movements of the KOSTRAD?"

I: "when I saw the troops in the city and when I heard the discussions in the KOSTRAD I concluded that an attack on Halim was imminent".

As we arrived in the garden of the palace I said to Bung KARNO: "Pak, my task of taking you to safety is completed."

1. When we arrive at the pavilion in the Bogor Palace and Bung KARNO went inside I immediately rang up the KOSTRAD and reported to Gen. SOEHARTO that Bung KARNO had meanwhile arrived in Bogor and that my task was completed. Gen. SABUR did the same, speaking as Commander of the Tjakrabirawa

regiment, and reporting to Gen. SOEHARTO.

31. Please explain: a. When did ex-Brig.-Gen. SOEPARDJO arrive at the Bogor Palace and how long did he stay? b. What discussions did ex-Brig.-Gen. SOEPARDJO have with Bung KARNO?

- 31.a. Ex-Brig.-Gen. SOEPARDJO was in the Bogor Palace between 2 and 5 October 1965 to hide from pursuit. He lived in the right hand pavilion, near the Botanical Gardens.
- b. I know nothing of the nature of the discussions between Bung KARNO and this Ex-Brig.-Gen. SOEPARDJO.

32. Have you any other statements to make?

32.a. At present I have nothing to add to what I have already said.

b. I am always ready and prepared to make any statement as to my knowledge in order to establish justice and truth.

33. Are all your statements according to truth, and are you prepared to take oath on them?

33. All my statements are true and I dare to take oath on them.

34. Do you have the feeling that, in making the above declarations, you have been dictated or have been put under pressure or in any other way forced?

34. I do not feel to have been dictated, put under pressure or forced in any other way

in making the above declarations.

After this Report of Investigation had been read to the interrogated person in question in a language which he understands, he placed his signature upon it as reproduced hereunder, as proof that he had understood and approved the contents of the Report of the Investigation.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETIONO WIDJANARKO

Col.KKO-NRP: 582/P.

HEREWITH, therefore, this Report of Investigation is compiled in all truth, and in accordance with the oath taken prior to accepting the function, done at Djakarta on the aforementioned day and date.

The interrogators:

S. SOEGIARJO

Lieut.-Col. CPM-NRP.
12688

AZWIR NAWIE

Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police

IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE

REPORT OF INTERROGATION

This day, Wednesday, 21 October, 1970, we:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - Lieut.-Col.CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - Ass.Chief Commissioner of Police

function:

both members of the Central Investigation Team, undertook an investigation of a man whom I do not yet know and who himself admits to be:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

rank: Col.KKO, function: ASKAPERS/MIL (Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy/Military brand) age/date of birth: 43 years/19 September 1927, place of birth: Karangjar - Kebumen: religion: Roman Catholic, address/place of residence: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

The person in question was interrogated as witness in matters relating to the G-30-S/PKI.

In reply to all the questions which were put to him by the interrogator he, the interrogated, made the following statements and confessions as indicated below:

1. Do you adhere to your statements, reproduced in the Report of Investigation of 3 October 1970 at 10.00 hrs?:

1. Yes, I adhere to the statements given in the Report of Investigation of 3 October 1970 last.
2. Are you completely healthy at this moment?
 2. At present I am healthy and well.
- 3.a. From what time were you appointed Adjutant of the President of the RI: tell us about the circumstances of your appointment as Adjutant of the President of the RI.
 - b. Since when were you no longer Adjutant of the President of the RI and explain why. After you were no longer Adjutant of the President of the RI what functions did you then occupy?
 - 3.a. I was appointed Adjutant of the President of the RI on the order and warrant of the Commander of the Navy Admiral R.E. MARTADINATA, in December 1960. At that time there was already an officer of the Navy who acted as Adjutant of the President of the RI: Col. SUSATYO MARDI (now Vice-Admiral, Deputy Commander of KDWILHAN II), and I was appointed Adjutant of the President of the RI as his replacement because Col. SUSATYO MARDI was transferred back to the Navy. Accompanied by Col. SUSATYO MARDI, I reported for duty and commenced my duty as Adjutant on 27 December, 1960.
 - b. I was no longer serving as Adjutant at the end of July 1967 (approx. 29th) on the grounds of an Order of retirement of the (Minister/Commander of the Navy) Admiral MULJADI.

My replacement was an officer of the Navy, Major GURITNO, who continued the duties of Adjutant of Bung KARNO.

After I had ceased to be Adjutant of Bung KARNO I returned to the Navy and was assigned the following tasks:

1. Inspector-General KKO-AL Aug. 1967 - Dec. 1967.
2. Training at the SESKODAD Jan. 1968 - June 1968.
3. Inspector-General KKO-AL July 1968 - May 1969.
4. Commander PASKOARMA I May 1969 - March 1970.
5. ASKAPERSMIL (MPAL) April 1970 - untill now.

4. In addition to your function as Adjutant of the President have you during that appointment, or thereafter, in your later functions in the Navy, also occupied any unofficial posts, or were you a member of any political organization or mass organization.

4. As long as I was Adjutant of the President of the RI or thereafter and up to the present day, I have never been a member of or held a position with any political organization or mass organization. I have at one time been Chairman of the Committee for Reconstruction of the Roman Catholic Church of Block B in Kebajoran Baru from 1963 until the church was completed in December 1965.

5. Since the emergence of the G-30-S/PKI affair did you at any time make statements concerning matters relating to the G-30-S/PKI affair or with respect to ex-President SUKARNO and the Palace, apart from the investigation of October 3, 1970 and the investigation being held this day, the 21st of October 1970?

5.a. I have before given statements, regarding events which related to the G-30-S/PKI affair, in 1967, as a witness in the trial of Gen.PRANOTO and ex.Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO.

b. No statements have been made by me about ex-President SUKARNO and the Palace apart from the investigation taking place today, 21 October, 1970.

6. Facts which were noticeable and could be supposed show that the activities of the PKI greatly increased in 1965, to the extent that these activities of the PKI overshadowed everything in all fields. Please tell us why ex-President SOEKARNO at that time greatly favoured the PKI, to the extent that one could say that the political ends of the PKI were completely accepted by ex-President SUKARNO?

6. In my view the reasons for this were:

- 1) 1. Bung KARNO's career shows that, ever since his youth, he had continually struggled against and suffered from colonialism:
- 2) that is to say, white people from the West, and Bung KARNO consequently developed a dislike of people from the West.
- 3) In this respect the PKI with all its doctrines and methods agreed with Bung KARNO

and pushed him.

2. Ever since the colonial period (the Dutch and the Japanese) Bung KARNO had always been the leader and later President of the RI from 1945 - 1965.

1
As a result he developed a feeling of power and strength to the extent that Bung KARNO felt that he could control all existing groups including the PKI, whereas, in reality it was the PKI that could use Bung KARNO.

3. Bung KARNO always praised the organization of the PKI as well-ordered disciplined and militant. Vice-versa, Bung KARNO repeatedly criticized and was dissatisfied with the organization of the other mass organizations or political parties. To achieve his ideals and ambitions Bung KARNO needed a proper militant organization and that is why he loved the PKI.

4. In particular, at the beginning of 1965, Bung KARNO received reports about the existence of groups who were opposed to his policies: in this case the Generals of the Army. At that time the PKI continually demonstrated its loyalty to and support for Bung KARNO. For that reason Bung KARNO grew continually more attached to the PKI and gave it increasing trust because it, in Bung KARNO's view, could be used to counter the recalcitrant groups.

5. On many occasions Bung KARNO declared that he was a Marxist. This was certainly music in the ears of the PKI and accorded with its political aims.

6. Finally, owing to Bung KARNO's personality, his way of thinking and his ideals

and ambitions, and owing to the existence of groups who were opposed to him, there was common ground between Bung KARNO and the PKI. This was the reason why Bung KARNO continually favoured the PKI and accepted its programme.

My above declarations were based on occurrences which I had either seen or heard or of which I myself was a witness.

a. Bung KARNO was not at all keen on the importation of Western culture. This was evident from the ban on "ngak-ngik-ngok" music. On the other hand, Bung KARNO was clearly delighted that the PKI stimulated national culture.

Viking
b. During some rather more intimate, unofficial, gatherings, Bung KARNO declared on occasion that the leaders of the PKI were still very young and immature, while Bung KARNO himself was a political veteran and felt that he could easily control the PKI.

c. Both on official and unofficial occasions Bung KARNO frequently praised the effectiveness of the organization of the PKI; he even said that the PKI was the most revolutionary of all and that this was necessary for a country like Indonesia, which was passing through a revolutionary period at that time.

d. Bung KARNO frequently said that the leaders of the other mass organizations and political parties were too weak, less revolutionary, less militant etc. This was often heard or known by citizens and officials.

e. In the period preceding the 17th August, in the years 1963/1964/1965 I myself heard Bung KARNO say to AIDIT and NJOTO that the PKI should join in directing the masses and actively safe guard law and order during the 17 August ceremonies.

It is clear from all this how much confidence Bung KARNO had in the PKI.

7. Will you explain in what respect ex-President SUKARNO favoured the PKI to the extent that the way of thinking between ex-President SUKARNO and PKI followed the same lines, as you have declared above in answer number 6.

7. I can explain the similar line of thought between Bung KARNO and the PKI from the following facts:

a. NASAKOM

The NASAKOM idea, which had as its aim, according to Bung KARNO, to unite the People, was clearly to the advantage of the PKI. The PKI moved speedily and cunningly so that, from top to bottom, the NASAKOMISASI became a fact.

This move by the PKI was welcomed by Bung KARNO, with the result that Bung KARNO accepted and even ordered NASAKOMISASI everywhere.

b. Land Reform

The Land Reform Act was very much to the advantage of the PKI and was exploited by the PKI for its own political ends.

In this particular case Bung KARNO always

utilized that

choose the side of the PKI if a clash arose about the implementation of land reform.

c. Dewan Djenderal

The whole issue relating to the existence of a Council of Generals had frequently been reported to Bung KARNO. Although Bung KARNO had on occasion given orders for the reports to be checked, he ultimately rather believed people who reported to him, that the Council of Generals actually existed. Most of these people were either consciously or unconsciously either left-wing or orientated towards the PKI.

d. Speeches by Bung KARNO

Some of Bung KARNO's speeches, which had a political character, originated in theme or spirit from leading figures of the PKI; for example the TAVIP and TAKARI speeches and the speech by Bung KARNO on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the PKI. The speech of 17 August 1965, was clearly drafted or inspired by AIDIT and NJOTO who had been specially recalled from Peking before 17 August, 1965 in order to draft Bung KARNO's speech.

e. During one of the sessions of the Cabinet at the State Palace after the G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO said in a loud voice, and with constant repetition, that the PKI had clearly earned its laurels in the revolution and that the PKI was not to be blamed as a political organization and could not be disbanded.

These declarations of mine are true, as I either saw or heard or knew them at both official and unofficial meetings organized by Bung KARNO or during Cabinet sessions at which I myself was present.

8. On the grounds of your above replies, saying that ex-President SUKARNO had continually favoured the PKI, so that there was eventually a correspondence of views and thinking between Bung KARNO and the PKI, will you please explain from what time Bung KARNO had relied on the PKI and for what reasons?

8. It had been clear to me since the beginning of 1963 that Bung KARNO was getting ever closer to the PKI and was relying more and more upon it.

This was noticeable because of the clear participation of leaders of the PKI in Cabinet sessions; frequent meetings between Bung KARNO and PKI personalities including AIDIT, NJOTO, Ingenieur SAKIRMAN and LUKMAN; the contents and tenor of the speech of 17 August 1963 (Genta Suara Revolusi = the Ringing of the Voice of the Revolution) and the other speeches which displayed a Marxist/Leninist revolutionary spirit.

a. The reason why Bung KARNO eventually came to rely upon the PKI and Communism in general was:

1. At that moment the RI was engaged in a confrontation trying to secure West Irian. The Communist countries gave firm support and promised continuing support to Indonesia and to Bung KARNO. Vice-versa, the Western

countries would give no support.

This latter fact clearly irritated Bung KARN0 and drove him more and more into the arms of Communism.

2. On several occasions Bung KARN0 had declared that he too was a Marxist, causing an increasing closeness or identification in the thinking of Bung KARN0 and the PKI. That was another reason why the Communist countries relied upon Bung KARN0.

3. Bung KARN0 was ambitious, he very much wanted to be recognized as a world figure and a world leader.

Among other things he created the NEFO idea which made Bung KARN0 the most important leader. This idea received support from the Communist countries but was rejected in the West.

4. The meetings and talks between Bung KARN0 and leaders of the Communist countries, in particular China, had, I think, produced a concept or strategy of close relationship and strengthened co-operation between the two countries. The meeting in Shanghai in the first week of July 1965 between Bung KARN0 and CHOU EN LAI still further strengthened agreement between them.

5. As regards the result of talks between Bung KARN0 and the leaders of the Communist countries, I can remember the following:

a. Bung KARN0 - KRUSCHOV in Moscow

The Soviet Union promised support in the struggle for West Irian in the form of arms, warships and aircraft. I was present at these talks.

Ugby ←

b. Bung KARNO - CHOU EN LAI in Shanghai

China promised support in the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia.

China promised to supply 100.000 arms to equip the FIFTH FORCE. These arms later appeared to have been used by PKI people in the G-30-S/PKI.

It was a result of this agreement that the OMAR DANI-mission was sent to China in September, 1965.

I was not present at these talks but was able to learn of their outcome after the talks were over.

9. What were the views of the PKI, in particular in relation to the Army, resulting eventually in an "issue" arising about the existence of a Council of Generals, which consisted of Chief Officers of the Army who were not loyal or did not support Bung KARNO's policies, which "issue" about the Council of Generals in the end reached the Palace and Bung KARNO.

9. About this I can declare the following, to my knowledge:

a. The aim of the PKI was to dominate the nation and government of Indonesia.

In its efforts to achieve this aim the PKI became aware that the main obstacle in its path was the Army which it was not easily able to break.

b. The Army, in particular its leadership, clearly did not agree with Communism, its ideals or its methods. This was due to a number of causes, including:

- Most of the officers of the Army were fighters from the 1945-period and had high ideals of an independent Indonesia based on the Pantjasila.

- Experience during the revolution (1945-1949) had proved the treachery of the PKI during the Madiun-affair, when it was mainly the Army which destroyed the PKI.

- The military doctrines of the Army were chiefly based on the military doctrines of Western countries.

c. In view of points (a) and (b) it was very clear that the PKI regarded the Army with great disfavour. For that reason the PKI made every effort to eliminate the leadership of the Army. The PKI therefore fabricated the "issue" of the existence of the Council of Generals and its anti-Bung KARNOD policy and this "issue" clearly was believed by Bung KARNOD.

In launching this "issue" the PKI was also supported by a number of Army officers who either consciously or unconsciously reported and strengthened the "issue" which was a fabrication of the PKI.

10. Finally, Bung KARNOD, who was already close to the PKI and had moreover the reports of the above Army officers, gave orders that measures be taken against the Army Generals who were regarded as opposing him.

10. Could it be said that there was an identity of aim between Bung KARNOD and the PKI in connection with the assassination of

the Commanders of the Army (the late Gen. YANI etc.) in the G-30-S/PKI affair? Was Bung KARNO either directly, or indirectly, involved or can one say he had involved himself in the G-30-S/PKI-affair, both before and after?

10. In the light of events there was, as I have stated in my previous evidence, clearly a common aim shared by Bung KARNO and the PKI in their efforts to eliminate the Generals of the Army.

a.1. It was clear that the Army leaders were in disfavour with the PKI and that the PKI therefore launched an "issue" about the existence of Army Generals who were opposed to Bung KARNO. The object of the PKI was that Bung KARNO should take action against these Generals.

2. Bung KARNO, who in fact was close to the PKI, accepted this "issue" and, to such an extent, that he actually gave orders that action should be taken against the Army Generals.

In any case it was clear that, whatever the motives of the various persons involved may have been, both Bung KARNO and the PKI shared common aims.

b. Bung KARNO was involved, either directly or indirectly in the G-30-S/PKI affair.

← M 1. On the night of 30 September, 1965, Bung KARNO received a letter from ex-Lt.Col. UNTUNG.

2. On the morning of 1 October, 1965, Bung KARNO was present at Halim airbase and

received reports from ex-Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO but did not bother to seek reports from the Army itself.

3. Bung KARNO took no measures against the announcement by leaders of the G-30-S/PKI on October 1st, 1965, that the Cabinet was demissionary.

4. Bung KARNO did not bother to obtain information about the abduction or murder of the Army Generals after the events had been reported to him. (The following sentence is handwritten in the text) On the contrary, he gave orders that all traces should be removed. Report of Investigation Procedure page 13 no 26)

5. Bung KARNO had always said that the whole G-30-S/PKI affair was insignificant in a revolution, which was the same attitude towards the affair adopted by the PKI.

6. Bung KARNO never wanted to condemn the G-30-S/PKI.

7. Bung KARNO never wanted to either to condemn or liquidate the PKI; on the contrary, he always favoured the PKI.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth, and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the text read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval.

This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded

with on Thursday, 22 October 1970.

The interrogated:

The interrogators:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

Col. KKO

1. S.SOEGIJARJO
Lt.-Col.CPM NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

This day, Thursday, October 22nd, 1970, we:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - Lieut.Col.CPM-NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - Ass.Chief Commissioner of Police

both being members of the Central Investigation Team, continued our interrogation of a man named:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

rank: Colonel KKO, functions: ASKAPERS/MIL (Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy/Military brand)
age/date of birth: 43 years/19 September 1927,
place of birth: Karanganyar Kebumen, religion:
Roman Catholic, address/place of residence:
Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

Furthermore, he - the investigated person - makes the following statements or confessions with regard to all questions put to him:

11. Were the Chief Officers of the Army, who were not loyal to Bung KARN0, the same as the Chief Officers of the Army which were in disfavour with the PKI; if they were, will you explain the similarity and the connection between the PKI and Bung KARN0, with reference to the murder of these Officers.

11.a. As far as I know the Chief Officers who were murdered in the G-30-S/PKI affair, were the same officers who were regarded by Bung KARN0 as being disloyal and they were also the officers who were in disfavour with the PKI. In other words: it is correct that there was a similarity.

1. I did see and hear (in accordance with my statements during the interrogation of 3 October, 1970) that there were Chief Officers of the Army with whom Bung KARNO was angry and whom he had admonished because he did not regard them as loyal. Those Chief Officers were: Gen. YANI, Gen. PARMAN, Gen. SUTOJO, Gen. HARJONO and Gen. SUPRAPTO.



Handwritten: 2. I knew Gen. YANI and Gen. PARMAN well. I knew from the utterances of these gentlemen and their attitude and actions that these officers were in fact anti-Communist. I also heard that the other Commanders of the Army took the same view. The PKI was aware of the attitude and views of these Chief Officers and because of this, the PKI was even more opposed to these Commanders, who would certainly have obstructed the plans of the PKI. It was this consideration, mainly, which was a reason for the PKI to eliminate these Commanders as soon as possible.


Handwritten: b. As regards the connection between the PKI and Bung KARNO with reference to the murder of the aforementioned Chief Officers, it was clear that both parties (the PKI and Bung KARNO) had a common interest.

Handwritten: Bung KARNO wished to remove the Commanders whom he did not regard as loyal and the PKI wished to eliminate these Commanders who were anti-Communist. This connection also existed with reference to the elimination or murder of the Commanders, that is, Bung KARNO trusted ex-Lt.-Col. UNTUNG and ex-Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO, although it was apparent that they belonged to the PKI.

Handwritten: ↓ Highest

I can explain the following:

- 
- a. On various occasions I either heard or knew that Gen. YANI and Gen. NASUTION had advised Bung KARNO not to give way too much to the PKI on the grounds that Bung KARNO should be mindful of the treachery of the PKI in Madiun (1948).
 - b. On one occasion Gen. YANI had explained to Bung KARNO during a meeting at the Palace that there were dangers which could be caused by the PKI, in view of the increasing strength of the PKI at that time (1965).
 - c. When Bung KARNO, during a meeting of the FORCE (Supreme Command) at the Palace put forward the idea of a Fifth Column, this was rejected by Gen. YANI and the Commanders of the other Armed Forces.
- 



12.. Will you comment on the relationship between Bung KARNO and the leaders of the PKI; which of them were in regular contact with Bung KARNO and continually advised him (so that such advice was continually followed by Bung KARNO) both during the prologue and during the events of 1 October, 1965 and after the G-30-S/PKI affair.

12.a. Before the G-30-S/PKI affair the leading personalities of the PKI whom, I know, met Bung KARNO regularly, were NJOTO and AIDIT.

In addition to visits to the Palace in accordance with the formal procedure (prescribed in the Staff Instructions for Presidential Adjutants) they sometimes appeared suddenly at the Palace because

they had been summoned by Bung KARNO. This was therefore not registered in the Staff Instructions. The suggestions and recommendations made by PKI leaders which were conveyed to Bung KARNO or adopted by him were, among others:

Gemenfirchi

1. The implementation of the suggestion by CHEN YI (CPR) about the formation of a Fifth Force. According to the PKI the object of this was to achieve more success with regard to the revolution and, at the same time to contain the strength of the Army, which was anti-Communist.
2. That Bung KARNO should increase his opposition to the importation of western culture and art and promote national culture in which cause the Institute for Peoples Culture (a Communist organization) was a pioneer.
3. Bung KARNO's conviction with regard to the existence of "our local Army friend" as mentioned in the so-called Gilchrist Document and reports of the existence of a Council of Generals which was not loyal to Bung KARNO.

N

b. During the G-30-S/PKI affair, 1 October, 1965, I did not know whether there was a direct contact between Bung KARNO and leading figures of the PKI. However, I did know that ex-Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO called on Bung KARNO and reported to him at Halim, so that a contact existed between Bung KARNO and PKI personalities through the mediation of ex-Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO.

c. After October 1, 1965.

1. While Bung KARNO was staying in the

Bogor Palace he met NJOTO on October 6, 1965. On that occasion NJOTO handed over a letter to Bung KARN0 and gave him verbal suggestions about the solution of the G-30-S/PKI affair.

The instructions of Bung KARN0 were based on that letter and suggestions:

- 1 - the solution of the G-30-S/PKI rests with the President/Supreme Commander
- there must be law and order and there should be no condemnation either of the Council of Generals or of the G-30-S/PKI.
- 1 - the whole revolutionary apparatus must function normally.
- Security shall be the responsibility of the Police.
- the whole revolutionary apparatus must achieve, in competition, the 5 Sacred Talismans of the Revolution.
- It is forbidden to accuse each other.

2. ~~During the meeting of the Cabinet at the Djakarta Palace Bung KARN0 insisted~~ that he was not prepared to accuse or disband the PKI and he constantly spoke in favour of the PKI.

3. NJOTO, who was then still Minister of State, also suggested to Bung KARN0 that a "Sukarno Front" should be formed in the interests of the continued authority of Bung KARN0, which implied the protection of the PKI and would serve us an equilibrium to the strength of the Army and other mass forces which were anti-Communist or anti Sukarno.

NJOTO also suggested, or at least supported, the candidature of Lt.-Col. SJAFIIE as Minister of State charged with security affairs who would later be authorized to take charge of the Sukarno Front.

13. Were there, before the events of G-30-S/PKI or, let us say, after the emergence of the "issue" on the existence of a Council of Generals, as launched by the PKI group, occasional talks between Bung KARNO and the leaders of the PKI, or others who were PKI-minded, regarding measures to be taken against or changes in the leadership of the Army. If that was the case, who were the persons concerned, what was discussed and where did it all take place?

13.a. As regards the changes in the leadership of the Army I knew for sure that there had been talks between Bung KARNO and some officers of the Army, such as Gen. MURSID, Gen. SJAFIUDIN, Gen SUDIRGO, Gen. SABUR and Gen. SUNARJO, in accordance with statements I made during the interrogation of October 3rd, 1970.

b. As to the question of the Council of Generals, which was launched by the PKI it was clear that it was important to the PKI which Chief Officers were able and suitable to lead the Army in terms of PKI thinking.

In August and September 1965, the leading personalities of the PKI, NJOTO and AIDIT held talks with Bung KARNO in the Djakarta Palace.

This was quite clear from the recall of AIDIT and NJOTO from abroad at the end of July 1965, especially in the case of NJOTO, who arrived later than AIDIT. NJOTO was summoned immediately and had a talk with Bung KARN0 from which it was clear how important NJOTO was to Bung KARN0. I was not present at this meeting between Bung KARN0 and NJOTO and I did not know what they discussed. However, I knew later that Bung KARN0 had asked NJOTO to draft the speech for August 17th, 1965, and it is also very propable that they discussed the question of the Army officers and the replacement of the leadership of the Army.

14. In accordance with your reply in the Interrogation Report of October 3rd, 1970, nr. 23, where Bung KARN0 is said to have received a letter from UNTUNG, what was the mood and the reaction of Bung KARN0 after he had read the letter on the terrace of the Senajan stadium on the evening of September 30th, 1965.?

14. As far as I can recollect Bung KARN0 looked satisfied after reading the letter and continually nodded, without saying anything. He then put the letter in his jacket pocket. He then returned to his seat at the celebration. When Bung KARN0 gave his welcome speech it was clear that he was enthusiastic and pleased. His speech was passionate, both as regards content and the manner of its delivery. Bung KARN0 invited Dr. LEIMENA to come to the rostrum and sing a Moluccan song, which was

given an enthusiastic reception by the audience. There were no incidents on the return journey from the stadium to the Palace.

Upon arrival at the Palace (approx. 24.00 hrs) I reported to Bung KARN0 the list of guests to be expected the next morning (1 October, 1965). These were: Gen. YANI, Pak LEIMENA, J.M. DALAM, Gen. HARTAWAN, and others whom I can no longer remember although they can be looked up in the guest book of the Adjutant of the President, October 1965.

Bung KARN0, upon receiving my report, simply nodded and said "allright". I then took my leave, said goodnight, and went home (approx. 24.00 hrs).

15. Did you then suspect that the contents of the letter of UNTUNG, which was handed over to Bung KARN0 on 30 September, 1965, on that evening, contained the information about measures to act against the Generals who were not in favour of Bung KARN0's policies or were actively opposed to them?

15. In the light of the knowledge I now have of the existence of the Generals of the Army, whom Bung KARN0 disliked; the order to Gen. SABUR to act against the Generals; the summoning of ex.Lt.-Col. UNTUNG by Bung KARN0 on August 4th, 1965, the reaction of Bung KARN0, who looked satisfied after receiving the letter from ex.Lt.-Col. UNTUNG, I can now believe that the contents of the letter was the announce-

ment to Bung KARNO that the campaign against the Generals had begun.

16. In accordance with your reply number 14, that you, after you and Bung KARNO arrived at the Palace from the stadium on September 30th, 1965, at approx 24.00 hrs, reported to Bung KARNO about the guests who were to be received at Merdeka Palace on the next morning, 1 October, 1965, (including Gen. YANI, etc) why was it that Bung KARNO, on 1 October, 1965 did not go directly to the Palace, as was his custom in the morning?

16. The reason why Bung KARNO, on 1 October, 1965, did not go directly to the Palace from DEWI's house, but made a detour to the house of HARJATI, in Grogol, was, in my view, because:
Bung KARNO had given orders to Gen. SABUR and UNTUNG (Tjakrabirawa regiment) to take action against the Generals.
Bung KARNO felt certain in his mind that it were the troops of the Tjakrabirawa regiment who would carry out the operation and as usual, it were the troops of Tjakrabirawa regiment who guarded the Palace.
On the way from DEWI's house to the Palace that morning the Commander of the body-guard MANGIL, who escorted Bung KARNO, on Djalan Tamrin, received a radio report from Col. SAELAN to the effect that the Palace was surrounded by unknown troops and that Bung KARNO should not go to the Palace but to the house of HARJATI in Grogol.

The presence of those unknown troops, and not the troops of the Tjakrabirawa, was the reason why it was decided not to go directly to the Palace but to Grogol.

17. In view of your above answer it can be concluded that the departure of Bung KARNO to Halim on 1 October, 1965, was not a coincidence: Will you please tell us more about this and was it known, after Bung KARNO arrived at Halim airbase what troops had surrounded the Palace?

17.a. In my opinion Bung KARNO's departure from Grogol to Halim was certainly not a coincidence.

(1) Before the events relating to G-30-S/ PKI took place Bung KARNO had always appreciated the Airforce as being most revolutionary and progressive à la Bung KARNO. OMAR DANI, as Minister/Commander of the Airforce continually displayed his loyalty to Bung KARNO and during the talks before 1 October, 1965, OMAR DANI had on many occasions showed that he agreed with the campaign against the Generals of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO. OMAR DANI also said that he backed Bung KARNO. Bung KARNO would therefore feel calmer and safer at Halim.

(2) From Grogol contact was made with Halim and OMAR DANI invited Bung KARNO to go to Halim. This persuaded Bung KARNO even more strongly to go to Halim.

(3) Bung KARNO was aware that there was close contact between OMAR DANI and leading personalities of the PKI.

Because of this, Bung KARNO also knew that leaders of the PKI would also be present at Halim, where OMAR DANI also was.

In view of the common wish, shared by Bung KARNO and the PKI to eliminate the Army generals, Bung KARNO felt an even greater urge to go to Halim where he would be among people of like mind.

b. When Bung KARNO was at Halim he knew that the troops which had surrounded the Palace that morning were the troops of the G-30-S/PKI, on the grounds of the reports of ex.-Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO who reported it to Bung KARNO.

18. Please explain:

- a. the contents of the report by ex.-Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO, which Bung KARNO received on 1 October, 1965, in Halim as a result of the execution of the measures G-30-S/PKI.
- b. The knowledge of Bung KARNO concerning the position of Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO at that time in the campaign G-30-S/PKI.
- c. What was the reaction of Bung KARNO to Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO's report?
- d. Who else had heard the report and what was their reaction?

18. On the morning of October 1, 1965, when ex.Brig-Gen.SUPARDJO arrived in Halim and reported to Bung KARNO, (hrs) I was not yet present. I arrived in Halim at about 11.30 hrs. After I arrived in Halim and had met the Bung KARNO group I heard for the first time the story of the meeting between Bung KARNO and ex.-Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO.

This was told to me by Col.SAELAN, ass. Chief Commissioner of Police MANGIL and SUPARTO.

a. Ex.-Brig.Gen.SUPARDJO had reported to Bung KARNO that the assignment which had been given to him to take measures against the Generals of the Army had been carried out.

The following Generals had been successfully taken from their houses:

1. Gen.YANI, 2. Gen. PARMAN, 3. Gen. HARJONO, 4. Gen. SUTOJO, 5. Gen. SUPRAPTO, 6. Gen. PANDJAITAN while Gen. NASUTION, who had also been marked down, had escaped.

b. Bung KARNO both regarded and treated ex-Brig.Gen.SUPARDJO as Commander in charge of the purge and he seemed to have foreknowledge that ex-Brig.-Gen.SUPARDJO was the leader of the action.

c. Both during and after receiving the reports from ex-Brig.-Gen. SUPARDJO, Bung KARNO looked very pleased and while he tapped him on the back he said to SUPARDJO: "You have done well. Why did NASUTION escape?"

d. Those who were witnesses to and heard the reports of SUPARDJO were: OMAR DANI, Brig.-Gen. SABUR, Col. SAELAN, Ass.Chief Commissioner MANGIL, Brig-Gen.SOENARJO, SUPARTO.

I do not know what their reaction was.

Done this day, etc.

This Report was then provisionally terminated on the abovementioned day and date in Djakarta and

the investigation will be continued on Friday,
23 October, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

Col. KKO-NRP: 582/P.

The interrogators:

S. SOEGIARJO

Lieut.-Col. CPM-NRP.
12688

AZWIR NAWIE

Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police

This day, Friday, October: 23rd, 1970, weetc.

19. What were Bung KARNO's reactions when it was made known that the Cabinet had been declared demissionary; that it was known that there was a 30 September/PKI movement and that there was a Dewan Revolusi (Revolutionary Council), on October 1st, 1965, when Bung KARNO was in Halim?

19.a. From my own personal observation I can say that, when Bung KARNO had heard the announcement on the radio that the Cabinet had been declared demissionary by the G-30-S/PKI, he was quite calm, was not shocked and did not appear to reject or oppose the announcement. I concluded from the attitude from Bung KARNO that he approved of the announcement.

The officials who then arrived and were in the inner gallery were: OMAR DANI, Gen. SUTHARDIO, Gen. SOENARJO and Gen. SABUR.

b. They were joined later by the officials who had individually been summoned to Halim; such as Admiral MARTADINATA, Police General SUTJIPTO, Pak LEIMENA, Bung KARNO talked to these officials in the inner gallery. As for myself, I was with the other adjutants and security officials in the front gallery, while Gen. SABUR was also in the inner gallery.

In the course of the afternoon I heard that, during discussions between Bung KARNO and those officials, Bung KARNO made the following pronouncements.

1. "Do you know the composition of the

Revolutionary Council? Here is the list". He put this question continuously to each official as he arrived.

2. "such an event (G-30-S) is normal in a Revolution." Bung KARNO made this comment as he explained his view of the G-30-S/PKI.

3. "It is only a ripple in the ocean."

This was his comment on the abduction/murder of the Generals of the Army.

20. In what respect was the attitude of Bung KARNO one of approval with respect to the composition of the Revolutionary Council and the fact that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia had been declared demissionary and what was the attitude, conveyed to SUPARDJO, when Bung KARNO received the list containing the composition of the Revolutionary Council?

20. Bung KARNO was in possession of the list giving the composition of the Revolutionary Council long before it was announced on the radio and received it from SUPARDJO in the morning.

It was clear that, by receiving the list and failing to oppose it or reject it or to take any measures against SUPARDJO, that Bung KARNO approved of all announcements made on the radio, as from that morning, when he received the report from SUPARDJO.

I cannot report to you with any certainty about the attitude toward or the statements made by Bung KARNO to SUPARDJO when Bung KARNO had received the list directly from SUPARDJO because, at that moment, I was not yet present in Halim.

21. What proposals did the officials such as Dr. LEIMENA, Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, Admiral R.E. MARTADINATA, Gen. SUTARDHIO, Gen. SOENARJO, Gen. SABUR and others, who were at that time in Halim, make to Bung KARNO in connection with the situation at that time (October 1, 1965) after they knew about the composition of the Revolutionary Council and the announcements of the Revolutionary Council, including the fact that the Cabinet was declared demissionary?

21.a. With the exception of OMAR DANI, all officials who were then present appeared to be most shocked by the declarations made by the G-30-S/PKI. Their attitude was one of rejection towards those announcements and they made proposals to Bung KARNO with regard to the situation which then existed.

1. Pak LEIMENA, who had had his house bombed, reported about the abduction and murder of the Generals and suggested to Bung KARNO that he should be extremely cautious in tackling the situation and should not be too credulous about reports emanating from the G-30-S/PKI. As I recall, Pak LEIMENA also proposed to Bung KARNO on that afternoon that he should leave Halim. This was the result of our pressure upon Pak LEIMENA, that is to say, pressure by SAELAN, MANGIL and myself, after hearing the radio broadcasts.

2. Adm. MARTADINATA, who had first contacted the KOSTRAD before going to Halim, had reported to Bung KARNO that Gen. SUHARTO had taken over the command of the Army.

He suggested to Bung KARNO that contact should be established between Bung KARNO and the KOSTRAD and also that Bung KARNO should pay attention to the reports of the KOSTRAD.

3. Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO adopted an extremely cautious attitude and the proposals he made to Bung KARNO were also extremely cautious.

b. Bung KARNO, on receiving the reports and proposals of these officials showed by his attitude that he was very favourably disposed towards G-30-S/PKI.

1. Bung KARNO had never condemned the abduction and murder of the Generals of the Army.

2. Bung KARNO made it apparent from his attitude that he approved of all the announcements made by the G-30-S/PKI on that day.

3. Bung KARNO rejected the proposal that he should take up contact with the KOSTRAD because he believed that all the KOSTRAD forces backed the Council of Generals.

4. Bung KARNO would not listen to a proposal that he should leave Halim because he felt safe there.

5. Bung KARNO repeatedly said that an event such as the G-30-S/PKI was perfectly normal in a revolution.

22. Can you explain why Bung KARNO, when ex-Brig. Gen. SUPARDJO reported to Bung KARNO (as you say in your reply to no. 18, point c) he praised SUPARDJO, saying: "you have done well"

the while patting him on the back?

22.a. Prior to the events of the G-30-S/PKI there was already contact between Bung KARNO and SUPARDJO through OMAR DANI.

On September 29th, 1965, SUPARDJO appeared before Bung KARNO together with OMAR DANI, and as I heard later, SUPARDJO reported to Bung KARNO about the Generals of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO and about the readiness of SUPARDJO and the progressive troops of the Army to go into action. As a result of this contact and the reports of SUPARDJO, Bung KARNO knew that SUPARDJO, SABUR and UNTUNG were co-operating in a purge of the Generals of the Army.

b. It was against this background on October 1st, 1965, when, in the morning, SUPARDJO reported to Bung KARNO about the murder of the Generals of the Army that Bung KARNO praised SUPARDJO and showed his satisfaction.

Next morning, October 2nd, 1965, Bung KARNO ordered SUPARDJO by letter to stop all action and ordered that there should be no more shooting.

23. Can you explain why Bung KARNO did not immediately order a search for the victims, consisting of Minister/Chief of the Army A.YANI and the other Chief officers and why Bung KARNO did not give orders to seize the guilty? Also, why did Bung KARNO not act, as Head of State, against the declaration that the Cabinet was demissionary and against the persons who were behind the G-30-S/PKI.

- 23.a. As I have said before, there was an agreement between Bung KARNO and the PKI to eliminate some Army Generals, and in fact, the names of these generals were identical. When Bung KARNO received the report about the abduction and murder of the Army Generals it was for this reason that he did not immediately issue orders for a search for the victims, because the victims were the Generals who were out of his favour.
- b. The fact that Bung KARNO did not order action to be taken against those guilty of the abduction and murder was quite natural, because those who had carried out those orders were the very same persons he had given instructions to via UNTUNG and SUPARDJO.
- c. Bung KARNO himself admitted he was a marxist, i.e. of the same conviction as the PKI. He thought, moreover, on October 1st, 1965, on the grounds of reports that he had received from SUPARDJO, OMAR DANI, and SABUR, that the G-30-S/PKI was strong and victorious. For these reasons he took no action at all against the G-30-S/PKI for declaring the Cabinet demissionary.
24. After you returned from the KOSTRAD to meet Gen. SUHARTO, as part of your assignments from Bung KARNO to summon Gen. PRANOTO, Pak HARTO had asked you as mediator to pass on a message to Bung KARNO "that the command of the Army lies with Pak HARTO", and also made a proposal from the Minister/Chief of the Navy, the late Adm. R.E. MARTADINATA, - your reply no. 21 - can you explain why Bung KARNO

did not immediately get in touch with Gen. SUHARTO?

- 24.a. From the beginning Bung KARNO had made clear his suspicion that all forces within the Army were pro-the Council of Generals and anti-Bung KARNO. To judge by the reports of SUPARDJO it was these very Army troops, under the command of the KOSTRAD, casu quo Gen. SUHARTO, which were fighting against the G-30-S/PKI. Because Bung KARNO was more inclined towards the G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO did not want that morning to contact the KOSTRAD or Gen. SUHARTO.
- b. When I reported on the evening of October 1st, 1965, and passed on the message of Gen. SUHARTO to the effect that the command of the Army had been assumed by Gen. SUHARTO, Bung KARNO was angry. Bung KARNO's plan had been to appoint Gen. PRANOTO as caretaker Commander of the Army. Because he disagreed with Gen. SUHARTO Bung KARNO refused on that evening to contact Gen. SUHARTO.

25. Can you explain, or did you know, that Bung KARNO, on October 1st, 1965, at Halim airbase, already knew that leading personalities and the command of the PKI were already at Halim and in control of the G-30-S/PKI action? If that was so, how did SUKARNO know that and from which persons?

- 25.a. As far as I can see, Bung KARNO must have known about the presence of PKI personalities at Halim on October 1st, 1965.

Bung KARNO was with the Operational Command or at the house of Commodore SUSANTO in Halim. SUPARDJO, who at that day frequently saw or contacted Bung KARNO reported about the presence of PKI representatives. In the afternoon as well, when the candidature of the caretaker of the Army command was discussed, SUPARDJO got into touch with PKI representatives, who finally informed Bung KARNO that the command of the G-30-S/PKI proposed Gen. PRANOTO as candidate.

b. Next morning, October 2nd, 1965, in Bogor Palace, we first knew for certain that, on the previous day, October 1st, 1965, AIDIT had been in Halim and that AIDIT left Halim at midnight on board a Dakota aircraft in the direction Jogja. We knew this after Bung KARNO had summoned OMAR DANI but it appeared that he was not in Djakarta and that he took off in a Hercules aircraft on that same night. I heard reports of this from Gen. KARJONO, Adjutant to the President from the Air Force.

26. Was it a fact that, on October 1st, 1965, Bung KARNO was either convinced, or had come to the conclusion, that G-30-S/PKI would be victorious? If this were the case, can you explain on what grounds Bung KARNO had this conviction?

26. Bung KARNO was between the morning and the afternoon of October 1st, 1965, convinced, or had come to the conclusion, that the G-30-S/PKI would be victorious.

The reasons were:

- a. Prior to October 1st, 1975, Bung KARNO received reports that many Generals of the Army were still loyal towards him. Bung KARNO received reports from SUPARDJO that there were sufficient military forces who would support him. Bung KARNO received a report and a promise from OMAR DANI that the whole of the AURI would back him.
- b. Bung KARNO was certain of and cooperated with the PKI, and trusted that the PKI would support him with its organization and its masses.
- c. On the morning of October 1st, 1965, Bung KARNO received a report from SUPARDJO that the task of abduction and murder of the Generals had been effectively carried out. According to Bung KARNO's calculations this would certainly weaken the Army or cause a loss of command. Gen. SABUR submitted a report to Bung KARNO to the effect that it was true that troops of SUPARDJO, Battalion 328, Battalion 454, Battalion 530, as well as the Tjakrabirawa regiment were already in control of the city and the main public services which, in fact, meant that the whole of the capital was in the hands of the G-30-S/PKI. According to OMAR DANI, and also according to what Bung KARNO himself had seen in Halim, the whole of the Air Force was ready to support the G-30-S/PKI this included military aircraft being at the ready and shock troops being on the alert.

d. It is clear from the above, and from the fact that Bung KARNO himself wished to eliminate the Army Generals, that Bung KARNO was convinced that the G-30-S/PKI would be victorious.

27. What do you know about the meeting between Bung KARNO and the First Deputy Prime Ministers Dr. SUBANDRIO and the Second Deputy Prime Minister Dr. LEIMENA on approx. September 26th, 1965, in the evening, at the Palace, where discussions were held about the division of territories i.a.:
Dr. J. LEIMENA in Djakarta
Dr. SUBANDRIO in Sumatra
Bung KARNO in Central Java or Bali,

foreknowledge
in connection with impending actions against the Generals who were not loyal?

27.a. I am ignorant of both that meeting and discussions between Bung KARNO and Pak BANDRIO and Pak LEIMENA.

b. What I do clearly remember was that, on September 28th, 1965, Dr. SUBANDRIO left for Sumatra and returned to Djakarta on October 2nd, 1965.

On October 1st, 1965 when I was in Halim, I knew that there was an aircraft standing ready to take Bung KARNO to Central Java. I first heard from Gen. SABUR and later from OMAR DANI, that the Presidential Aircraft, Jet Star, stood ready to take the President to his destination.

28. Will you tell us what you know about the death of Adm. R.E.MARTADINATA following a helicop-

ter accident in the mountains of Puntjak on October 6th, 1966. Was this an accident or the result of sabotage?

28. All I can tell you about the accident of the late Adm. (L)R.E.MARTADINATA is what I heard from friends in the Navy and from the results of an investigation team of the Navy which was specially set up for this accident.

1. On October 6th, 1966, in the afternoon, Adm.R.E.MARTADINATA invited a guest of the Navy (from Pakistan) and his wife to take tea in the Puntjak.

They left by Navy helicopter and the passengers were: Adm.R.E.MARTADINATA, the guest, the wife of the guest and a pilot.

2. After they had taken tea in Puntjak they returned to Djakarta. At that moment Adm.R.E.MARTADINATA himself was piloting the helicopter. When they had passed over the Puntjak it appeared there was a thick fog North of the Puntjak Pass and the helicopter penetrated too far into the fog. Because they could no longer make out in what direction they were going the helicopter hit a hilltop and crashed in flames. All four persons in the helicopter were killed in the accident. As far as I know, there have been no indications, so far, that this accident was caused by sabotage.

Done this day, etc.

Today, Saturday, October 24th, 1970, we.....etc.

29. Would you like to explain the following, in view of the orders given by Bung KARNO to Col. SAELAN on the afternoon of 2 October, 1965, in the Bogor Palace to either remove or wipe out all trace of the bodies of the Commanders of the Army who had been killed by the G-30-S/PKI at Lubang Buaja.

- a. Whose idea was it to remove all trace of the bodies?
- b. What was the reaction or attitude to this of the officials then present at Bogor Palace?

29.a. In view of:

1. The existing common intention of Bung KARNO and the PKI, to eliminate some Army Generals, who, as it ultimately turned out, were murdered.
2. Bung KARNO's awareness, as from the night of October 1st, 1965, of the failure of the G-30-S/PKI.
3. The reception of a report from the Commander at Halim about the discovery of certain traces indicating where the bodies were to be found, namely near Halim, which meant that it was close to the place where Bung KARNO was present on October 1st, 1965.
4. The efforts of the PKI to remove from themselves any suggestion of involvement in the G-30-S/PKI, in order to serve the interests of the continuation of the PKI itself - in view of all this it was

clear that the idea of removing all traces of the bodies originated from the PKI and was conveyed to Bung KARNO by SUPARDJO and Gen. SABUR. I heard this from Gen. SABUR. Bung KARNO himself, who clearly felt involved in the elimination of the Generals of the Army, accepted and approved the idea and finally gave Col. SAELAN orders to remove all traces of the bodies.

In this way, provided it had been successful, all proof could have been hidden or destroyed that Bung KARNO and the PKI were either involved or had been directly responsible for the G-30-S/PKI.

The ones who certainly knew about the removal of all traces of the bodies were OMAR DANI and Gen. SABUR. Both officials approved of the idea because both were directly involved in plotting and carrying out the elimination of the Army Generals on the orders of Bung KARNO.

OMAR DANI himself would also have felt a lot easier if the bodies were not found near Halim.

30. In connection with the letter from UNTUNG to Bung KARNO on September 30, 1965, in the evening at Senajan Stadium as recorded in your answer in the hearing of 30-10-'70, no. 23, could you perhaps confirm that the contents of the letter from UNTUNG was a statement of the G-30-S/PKI to Bung KARNO about the beginning of the action against those Commanders of the Army (Minister/Chief of the Army Gen. YANI, etc.) who were disapproved of by Bung KARNO.

30.a. As I have said before, I did not know at that moment (September 30, 1965) or on the next day (October 1, 1965, what the contents of that letter was.

b. It was not until considerable time afterwards, therefore, that I realized that the contents of the letter was a statement from UNTUNG to Bung KARNO about the plan to set the action against the Generals of the Army in motion. I based this on facts that I can still remember namely:

1. That there were Commanders of the Army who reported to Bung KARNO about disloyal Generals of the Army and that these officers agreed to take measures against these Generals.

2. There was an order from Bung KARNO to UNTUNG on August 4, 1965, in which UNTUNG was commissioned to carry out the measures against the Generals.

3. There was an order from Bung KARNO to Gen. SABUR, Gen. SUNARJO, Gen SUDIRGO on September 29, 1965, to take swift measures against the Generals of the Army.

4. The attitude of Bung KARNO on the evening of September 30, 1965, in the Stadium when he was most enthusiastic and gay (in handwriting in the next Ed.) even quoting the "Baghavat Gita"

5. Bung KARNO tore the letter to shreds on October 1, 1965, in Halim after he had removed the letter from his uniform, of Supreme Commander which SUPARTO had been ordered to fetch from Dewi's house.

31. You were given an order by Gen. SUHARTO on October 1, 1965, to inform Bung KARNO that he should leave Halim as soon as possible because Halim was to be attacked by the KOSTRAD. What in your opinion were the forces which were to be destroyed at Halim?

31. I should inform you that when I appeared before Gen. SUHARTO at the KOSTRAD on October 1, 1965, at night time, Gen. SUHARTO did not order me to inform Bung KARNO that he should leave Halim quickly; neither did Gen. SUHARTO say he would be attacking Halim as soon as possible.

The actual situation was as follows:

a. When I appeared before Gen. SUHARTO and reported to him that I had received orders from Bung KARNO to summon Gen. PRANOTO, Gen. SUHARTO replied:

1. I am assuming command of the Army for the time being. I request to pass on to me all instructions issued by Bapak (Bung KARNO).

2. Gen. PRANOTO cannot appear before Bapak (Bung KARNO).

3. Addressing me personally:

"Bambang, see to it that Bapak (Bung KARNO) leaves Halim quickly". The above statements under 1. and 2. I had to convey to Bung KARNO. I regarded 3. as an order by Gen. SUHARTO which it was my duty to carry out.

b.1. Before I went that evening to Gen. SUHARTO at the KOSTRAD I saw activity of troops (Infantry, Cavalry) in the neighbourhood of KOSTRAD. I also saw troops of the RP KAD start moving in the direction of Djalan Merdeka Selatan/Barat.

In the quarters of the KOSTRAD I saw Gen. NASUTION and other Commanders of the Army.

I also saw the arrival of Admiral R.E.MARTADINATA who called on Gen. SUHARTO.

When I called on Gen. SUHARTO (in the central hall of the KOSTRAD) there was a lot of activity going on; a lot of officers were present

and I heard a great deal of discussion among them. Among others things I heard Gen. NASUTION say:

"The important thing for us now, is to restore security as soon as possible. This means military action. As far as the political solution is concerned, leave that to the old man."

2. When I left the KOSTRAD and went back to Halim via Djalan Prapatan, Senen, Tjempaka Putih, the By Pass and finally Halim, I both saw and passed the Army troops in trucks while driving on the Djalan Djakarta By Pass to the South of Rawamangun golf course.

When I observed the troops more closely I saw that they were the same troops I had seen that morning near the Palace, wearing green and yellow scarfs.

c. From everything I had seen and heard, namely:

- the alert and troops movements of the KOSTRAD
- the meeting of the leaders of the Armed forces in the KOSTRAD during which gaining control of the situation was discussed
- the statement by Gen. NASUTION (Minister/Coordinator of Defence) who wanted immediate military action
- the statement by Gen. SUHARTO who appeared to be angry at the Air Force statement issued on that day
- the presence of troops of the G-30-S/PKI which were already withdrawing in the direction of Halim
- the meeting of such people as OMAR DANI and SUPARDJO (who were pro G-30-S/PKI) in Halim

- the orders Gen. SUHARTO gave to me to try and get Bung KARNO out of Halim

from all this I drew the conclusion that an attack on Halim by the KOSTRAD was imminent.

d. When I arrived at Halim and reported to

Bung KARNO that Gen. SUHARTO was taking over the command of the Army and that Gen. PRANOTO was unable to appear, I asked Bung KARNO immediately to leave Halim quickly because in my view Halim would soon be attacked and destroyed by the KOSTRAD. I explained to Bung KARNO about the preparations and troop movements of the KOSTRAD and the withdrawal of the troops of the G-30-S/PKI.

Bung KARNO was furious at Gen. SUHARTO's message. Bung KARNO disagreed with Gen. SUHARTO taking over the command of the Army. The reason for this, of course, was that Bung KARNO believed that all the Armed forces of the KOSTRAD including Gen. SUHARTO, were pro the Council of Generals, which implied that they did not share Bung KARNO's convictions. Bung KARNO was also furious because his order (as President and Supreme Commander) to summon Gen. PRANOTO had been rejected by Gen. SUHARTO.

It was very apparent that Bung KARNO was disappointed and worried about the failure of the appointment of Gen. PRANOTO as caretaker of the Army. As to my request that Bung KARNO should leave Halim, it was clear to me from Bung KARNO's attitude, after I had explained that the KOSTRAD would certainly succeed in attacking Halim, that he would accept my suggestion. OMAR DANI said at that moment to Bung KARNO that the aircraft was ready to

take off at any time to take Bung KARNO to Jogja or Madiun.

At that moment, before the discussion was over, and a decision taken, DEWI arrived, so that the discussion practically ceased. I took the opportunity to attract the attention of Pak LEIMENA and explain to him how serious the situation was and we, together with SAELAN and MANGIL, arranged for a car to be ready to take Bung KARNO out of Halim.

e. From that moment on I knew that all the forces of the G-30-S/PKI which were in Halim would be destroyed by the KOSTRAD.

32. Can you explain why, on October 31, 1965, (sic Ed.) at 23.00 hrs, Bung KARNO was taken to Bogor and not to an area already in the hands of the KOSTRAD?

32. The reasons why we had to take Bung KARNO to Bogor and not to an area already in the hands of the KOSTRAD were:

- a. that the order given to me by Gen. SUHARTO was simply that Bung KARNO should be taken away from Halim and not that he should be taken to the KOSTRAD.
- b. I knew for certain that Bung KARNO was most unhappy about Gen. SUHARTO and the KOSTRAD and it was unwise at that moment to take Bung KARNO to the KOSTRAD.
- c. Bogor was the official residence of Bung KARNO, it is not far from Djakarta and communications between Djakarta and Bogor were easy.

33. According to your statement, made in reply to

question no. 21 by the interrogator after the officials knew of the list of names of members of the Revolutionary Council and also after they had heard the broadcast and the announcements of the Revolutionary Council concerning the intention to declare the Cabinet demissionary, etc. they, the officials, made their proposals to Bung KARNO. Would you comment upon the suggestion made to Bung KARNO by the Chief of the Police, Police General SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, at that juncture (October 1st, 1965, at Halim) and what was Bung KARNO's attitude and reaction to that suggestion?

33. From what I heard later from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT or Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL I understood that during the meeting in Halim on the afternoon of October 1st, 1965 the Chief of Police, Police General SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO had said:

- that he was shocked to find and had not known beforehand, that his name was on the list of the Revolutionary Council
- that the action and the announcement by the G-30-S/PKI was a coup.
- that he left everything to Bung KARNO and would obey Bung KARNO's orders.

Bung KARNO was satisfied at these words and this statement by Police General SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

34. Did you know that Bung KARNO had on occasion sent a mission to the CPR under the Chairmanship of Dr. SUBANDRIO and whose members

i.a. comprised delegates of the four Armed Forces?

If you were aware of this please tell us about:

- a. The object of that mission,
- b. The connection between the mission and:
 1. the meeting between CHENG YI - Bung KARNO
 2. the meeting between CHOU EN LAY - Bung KARNO, in Shanghai
- c. What message and what instructions were given to the mission by Bung KARNO?
- d. The result of the mission, as reported to Bung KARNO
- e. The names of the members of the mission.

34. I remember that Bung KARNO once sent a mission to China headed by Dr. SUBANDRID.

- a. As far as I know the aims of the mission included:
 1. To strengthen the ties between Indonesia and China,
 2. To discuss details of the supply of arms by China to Indonesia,
 3. To urge upon China that it give genuine support in the event of Indonesia being attacked by its enemies (in particular England) in connection with the withdrawal of Indonesia from the UNO and the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia.
- b. The dispatch of this mission was connected with meetings previously held between leading figures of the Republic of Indonesia and the Chinese People's Republic:

1. When CHENG YI arrived in Indonesia one of his suggestions had been that of the Fifth Force.
2. When Bung KARNO went to Shanghai he had a talk with CHOU EN LAY during which China said it was prepared to supply 100,000 arms in order to arm that Fifth Force.
- c. What I can remember of the message and instructions given by Bung KARNO was that the mission of Indonesia had to sound out the real attitude of the CPR concerning their willingness to give material support to Indonesia, because this was most important for a further determination of Indonesia's attitude.
- d. As regards the results of the mission, as reported to Bung KARNO, they were, as far as I can remember:
 - China would rapidly provide arms aid
 - China was prepared to support Indonesia should Indonesia be attacked
 - Together with Indonesia, China would give still more active support in the arena of the New Emerging Forces.
- e. As I recall, the names of the members of the mission were:
Dr. SUBANDRIO, Gen. MURSJID, Admiral MULJONO HERLAMBAANG, and others I cannot now remember.

35. Do you remember that Bung KARNO once sent a mission headed by former Air Commodore OMAR DANI?

If you remember, please tell us about:

- a. the task and instructions given to that

mission by Bung KARNO,

- b. the connection between that mission and:
 - 1. Arms aid by China to Indonesia
 - 2. The support given to Pakistan by Indonesia in the form of two MIG aircraft
- c. the result of the mission.

35. I remember that Bung KARNO did once sent a mission to China headed by OMAR DANI.
- a. The task of the mission was to fetch the arms promised by China
 - b.1. this mission, which secured arms support for Indonesia from China further increased the influence of China in Indonesia and her interference there. The aforementioned arms, intended for the Fifth Force represented a strengthening and arming of left-wing groups and communists in Indonesia.
 - b.2. This mission also reported to China that Indonesia had given Pakistan two MIG's by way of support. China had much at stake in Pakistan. At that time ties between China and Indonesia were very close, they even formed a compact axis in the New Emerging Forces. In actual fact China derived more benefit from the support of two MIG's to Pakistan because:
 - China supported Pakistan chiefly against India which was an enemy of China
 - Owing to the support of Indonesia to Pakistan, under pressure from China, the success of the policy of expansion of China to other countries was again demonstrated.

- Pakistan in this way would lean even more on China.

Apart from the above it was very clear from this support to Pakistan that the position of the Djakarta-Peking-Pyong Yang axis was even further strengthened, which was the intention of Bung KARNO and CHOU EN LAY.

c. The mission headed by OMAR DANI resulted in their taking back the Chinese arms with them.

36. Tell us about the advantages of the results of that mission for the preparation and carrying out of the G-30-S/PKI-action.

36.a. The result of this mission was:

1. a large number of arms
 2. a further expansion of Communist thinking
 3. a demonstration to the nation that China, so to speak, was Indonesia's best friend.
- b. In its efforts to achieve its aims and spread its doctrine the PKI had chiefly relied upon the workers and farmers, who were organized and activated by the PKI more than anybody else.
- c. In considering the question of the Fifth Force; it was to be these very workers and farmers who were to form the core of the forces and would be armed with the weapons obtained as a result of the mission.
- d. As a matter of fact part of the arms had already been distributed to some of the workers and farmers and other cadres of the PKI for the carrying out of the G-30-S/PKI even before the Fifth Force was officially established.

e. It was clear from all this that there was a direct connection between the dispatch of the missions, their results and all preparations for and the carrying out of the G-30-S/PKI.

Done, this day.....etc.

Today, Monday, 26 October, 1970, weetc.

37. You have told us (see reply to question no. 35), that the OMAR DANI mission went to China with the purpose of securing arms aid from China for Indonesia.

Please tell us about the following:

- a. What did OMAR DANI report to Bung KARN0 on the results of the OMAR DANI mission?
- b. How were the arms to be carried; who was given the task of organizing the deliveries?
- c. When, where, and in what way were the arms distributed to the cadres of PKI members and to the troops of the G-30-S/PKI?

37.a. I was not personally aware of the actual contents of the report submitted to Bung KARN0 by OMAR DANI after the return of the OMAR DANI-mission from China because I was not present when OMAR DANI actually submitted his report.

However, I heard later that OMAR DANI had reported to Bung KARN0 on the success of his mission in obtaining arms aid from China. The plan was to transport the arms by a Hercules aircraft of the Air Force and by a vessel of which I heard next day it was to be the Guning Kerintji which was frequently used as a ship for pilgrims.

b. As stated above the transport of arms was carried out by:

- a Hercules aircraft of the Air Force
- the Guning Kerintji

The Supreme Operational Command and for the Crashing of Malaysia were responsible

for this transport.

c. As I heard after the events of G-30-S/PKI the arms from China were distributed by the Air Force to cadres of the PKI or members of the G-30-S/PKI, using the mediation of trainers of the Air Force who trained members of the Peoples Youth and the Movement of Indonesian Women (PKI Youth and women's organizations Ed.) in Lubang Buaja, before the G-30-S/PKI affair and also to PKI youth and cadres on the evening of October 1, 1965, near Senajan.

38. You have explained to the interlocutor that the arms which were received by the Republic of Indonesia from China were distributed to:
- a. Members of the People's Youth and the Movement of Indonesian Women at Lubang Buaja before the G-30-S/PKI affair.
 - b. Members of the People's Youth and young Men of the PKI, on October 1st, 1965, in the evening at Senajan.

Please tell us about the following:

- a. Was Bung KARN0 also informed about the distribution of these arms?

Please tell us when, where and in what way Bung KARN0 knew about this affair.

- b. The attitude or reaction of Bung KARN0 after he had been informed of this distribution of arms.
- c. What other government officials knew about the distribution of arms?

38. I only knew after the G-30-S/PKI affair that the arms from China received by the

Government of Indonesia had been distributed to members of the People's Youth and the movement of Indonesian Women and the PKI young men.

a. Bung KARNO was certainly aware of the distribution of arms in Senajan on October 1st, 1965 in the evening, because on October 2nd, 1965, in Bogor, General SABUR reported to him on this subject.

At that time the following were present: Bung KARNO, who received the report, and as far as I can remember: Pak LEIMENA, Col. SAELAN, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT, MANGIL and myself.

As far as I know Bung KARNO must certainly have known about the distribution of arms in Lubang Buaja before October 1st, 1965, by reports from OMAR DANI or SUPARDJO, or both.

b. I knew the following about the reaction of Bung KARNO to the distribution of arms:

- Bung KARNO has never condemned the distribution;
- Bung KARNO once said that actually such revolutionary forces should be armed.

c.(1) I do not know for sure which other officials of the Republic of Indonesia knew of the distribution of those arms before October 1st, 1965.

(2) All the officials who were in Bogor on October 2nd, 1965, knew, about the distribution of arms at Senajan.

39. Please tell us about:

- a. How did you learn that a Part of the arms from China were transported on board the Gunung Kerintji?
- b. Where were those arms from China stored, both those which were transported by the ship Gunung Kerintji?
- c. Who arranged or was responsible for the collection of those arms?

39.a. I knew that part of the arms from China had been transported by the Gunung Kerintji, after the ship returned and it became a general topic of conversation (approx. the end of October 1965)

I do not remember with any certainty from whom I heard this; I simply was informed about the arrival of the arms on this particular vessel.

b. I learned later, sometime after the events of the G-30-S/PKI, that arms from China were stored in the warehouse of the Air Force at Mampang (now Air Force Headquarters).

I do not know for sure whether the arms stored in the Air Force Warehouse in Mampang were only those arms that had been transported by the Hercules aircraft from China, or whether they also included the arms which had been transported by the Gunung Kerintji.

Neither do I know whether there were other places where the arms were stored.

c. I did not know who arranged for the arms to be stored or who was responsible for this.

40. Were you aware that, in addition to the two MIG aircrafts which the Indonesian Government had given to Pakistan, there were perhaps other supplies to that Government? If you were informed, please tell us about it.

- a. What other supplies did Indonesia give to Pakistan?
- b. When was the abovementioned aid given by Indonesia to Pakistan?
- c. Who organized that aid?

40.a. I knew that, apart from the MIG's belonging to Air Force, the Indonesian Government gave other supplies to support Pakistan, namely, Navy supplies, being:

1. the activities of a warship
2. field artillery
3. Russian tanks

b. Number 1. above was, as far as I remember, never carried out.

The support of the above "Russian tanks" was given before the events of G-30-S/PKI, although I do not know exactly on what date.

I do not know whether the support in the form of "field artillery" was never carried out.

c. As far as I know, all his support was organized by the Supreme Operational Command.

To give an example of tank support: the Supreme Operational Command ordered the Navy to ready one squadron of tanks. The Navy readied this material in the harbour of Tandjung Prior. Following prior arrangement, a Pakistan

ship arrived and transported these tanks. I do not know which mode of relations existed between the Supreme Operational Command and the Government of Pakistan.

41. What was the political background of the support given by Indonesia to Pakistan?
41. In terms of quantity the support given by Indonesia to Pakistan was on a small scale, the emphasis was rather on the political advantages.
- a. China, which had Pakistan and India as neighbours, was much interested in the support given by Indonesia, because China's relations with India were hostile. Indonesia's support to Pakistan was given at the suggestion or under pressure of China and this meant that Pakistan had to be grateful to China.
 - b. The support to Pakistan by Indonesia also represented support from the Jakarta-Peking axis, with the object of drawing Pakistan more into this New Emerging Forces axis so that support would be given to the idea of the Conference of the New Emerging Forces which according to Bung KARN0, was destined to be the counterpart of the UNO.
 - c. This support was expected to result in the conflict between Pakistan and India either being continued or becoming more violent. The violence of this conflict in addition to all the other conflicts in the world, was expected to distract the attention of the world from preparations by the PKI and China for the coup

G-30-S/PKI.

d. It was also hoped that Pakistan would display sympathy for the coup G-30-S/PKI.

42. Do you recall the Indonesian mission to the African countries, headed by Dr. SUBANDRIO, after the failure of the Asia Africa conference in Algiers?

If you do recall this, please tell us about:

- a. What was the task and instructions given to that mission by Bung KARNQ?
- b. Who were the members of that mission?
- c. Which countries were visited by the mission?
- d. What were the results of the SUBANDRIO-mission?

42. I can remember that there was in fact a mission headed by Dr. SUBANDRIO which was dispatched to the African countries after the failure of the Asia Africa conference in Algiers in 1965.

a. I knew at the time that the mission was given the following instructions by Bung KARNQ:

1. To consolidate the opinions of the African countries, because the Asia Africa conference had been cancelled, so that a common effort would be made to combat imperialism and colonialism and, in particular, to support the New Emerging Forces and the ideal of establishing a Conference of the New Emerging Forces.
2. To explain to the African countries the significance of the "Gilchrist" document".

Now I know what the object of the explanation of the "Gilchrist document" was, namely:

- to prove that Britain was engaged in subversive actions in Indonesia and intervened in the domestic affairs of Indonesia, so that the African countries would choose Indonesia's side in its confrontation with Malaysia.
- The second object was to get the African countries to justify Bung KARNO's actions, on the basis of the expression in the Gilchrist document "Our local army friends", if, at any time, action should be taken against the Army Generals.
- b. I do not remember the names of the members of the mission.
- c. Many countries were visited by the mission, but for my part I recall only Ghana.
- d.1. I am not aware of the result of the mission in the form of a report by Dr. SUBANDRIO to Bung KARNO, upon his return.

I only heard that the establishment of the Conference of the New Emerging Forces was reported to Bung KARNO and discussed with him.

The plan was to establish the Conference of the New Emerging Forces as a focal point for the New Emerging Forces and it was also intended to be a counterpart of the UNO, because Indonesia, at that time, was to withdraw from the UNO. The role played by China and its interest in the

Conference of the New Emerging Forces was very great because China was then not yet able to become a member of the UNO and would have a great deal of influence in countries of the New Emerging Forces. This idea of establishing a Conference of the New Emerging Forces came officially from Indonesia i.e. Bung KARNO and was actually powerfully supported by China.

2. The results of that mission was very evident from the attitude of some African countries (for example Ghana) which, after the G-30-S/PKI, gave fanatical support to Bung KARNO and this was clearly the result of the work of that mission.

43. Do you recall a speech by Bung KARNO, in which he said that Indonesia was able to manufacture its own atom bomb and have it explode? This speech was supported by a statement by Brig.Gen.HARTONO on the occasion of the launching of the A.YANI-rocket on the south coast of Java.

If you recall this would you please tell us about:

- a. When did you hear those speeches, and what was their content?
- b. What was the aim of Bung KARNO's speech?
- c. Had there been discussions on this between Bung KARNO and Brig.Gen.HARTONO and what was the substance of those talks?

43. I can remember that Bung KARNO once said in one of his speeches, that Indonesia

would be able to make and explode an atom bomb.

a. I do not know for sure when (on which date) and on what occasion this statement was made, but I think it must have been about July-September, 1965. This statement by Bung KARNNO was inserted into a long speech. This speech emphasized the strength of the Indonesian people, who were not afraid of imperialism and capitalism and that, in the near future, Indonesia would be capable of manufacturing and exploding its own atom bomb.

b. I believe this was only bluff on Bung KARNNO's part. It's object was:

1. To boost the morale of the Indonesian people and undermine morale in Malaysia within the framework of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation.

2. To attract even more attention from other countries belonging to the New Emerging Forces, so that they would have even more confidence in the strength of Indonesia, in order that the Conference of the New Emerging Forces should be established as a counterpart of the UNO.

c.1. I knew nothing about talks between Bung KARNNO and Brig.Gen.HARTONO concerning the manufacture of an atom bomb. I also knew nothing about the tenor of the discussions, if indeed they ever took place.

2. I did hear and read once in a newspaper about a statement by Brig-Gen. HARTONO, who said that Indonesia was in fact capable of making and exploding an atom bomb. That statement by Brig.Gen.

HARTONO was made in connection with the launching of the A.YANI-rocket of the Army.

44. Tell us about:

- a. What influence did Bung KARNO's speech on the atom bomb have abroad?
- b. The talks between Indonesia and China in connection with the manufacture and exploding of an atom bomb in Indonesia.

44.a. Bung KARNO's speech on the atom bomb had the following results:

1. Those countries which were united within the New Emerging Forces developed feelings of pride and respect. This applied particularly to those countries which were still in a development phase.

There was an even greater degree of confidence among these countries in the "leadership" of Indonesia on the New Emerging Forces front.

On the other hand, the advanced countries displayed uncertainty and disbelief. I myself heard this from various ambassadors and consuls representing friendly nations in Djakarta.

2. As to the great powers the United States Britain and Australia, Bung KARNO's speech got some publicity in newspapers and magazines. However, after an investigation, it was reported in those countries that Indonesia could not possibly explode an atom bomb in that year (1965). This analysis was based chiefly on Indonesia's skill and equipment.

b. I was not aware of any talks between Indonesia and China about either the manufacture or explosion of an atom bomb.

45. Please tell us about the existence of a plan of China and Indonesia to open sea communications between Indonesia and China and how it was to be achieved.

45.a. I do actually know about an attempt or a plan to establish sea communications between Indonesia and China. On one occasion a mission was sent to China to discuss the matter.

If I am not mistaken this mission was led by the Minister for Sea Communications, Gen. ALI SADIKIN or Adm. JATIDJAN.

The mission left round about the second quarter of 1965.

b. As to the results of the mission, I have no information; neither have I any knowledge or information about sea communications ever having been established between Indonesia and China.

Done this day,etc.

This day, Tuesday, October 27, 1970, we.....etc.

46. Did you know that, in September 1965, the Indonesian Government sent several missions to China?

If you knew about this would you please tell us about:

- a. What kind of missions had previously been sent to China; who were their leaders and who were their members?
- b. What were the purposes of those missions?
- c. What were the instructions given to those missions by Bung KARNANO?
- d. What were the results of those missions?

46. I recall that the Indonesian Government did in fact send many missions to China in September 1965.

a. Some examples of such missions were:

1. The mission of the Provisional People's Deliberative Council headed by CHAERUL SALEH
2. The economic mission headed by Minister SURJADI
3. The mission of the Air Force Staff and Command School headed by the Commander of the Air Force Staff and Command School (I do not recall his name).
4. The mission of the National Defence Institute, headed by the Governor of the National Defence Institute (Gen. WILUJO PUSPOJUDO).
5. The cultural mission headed by IBU HADAJAT.
6. The journalists' mission (I do not

remember with certainty who was in charge but, if I am not mistaken, it was DJAWOTO).

b. I am unable to say with any certainty what the aims and the tasks of those missions were individually. As far as I recall they were divided into three categories:

1. Talks from government to government: the economic mission, whose aim was to promote import and export between Indonesia and China.

2. Then there was the Air Force Staff and Command School mission, which was part of the Study Tour.

3. There were missions in response to an invitation by China to attend the celebration of October 1, 1965, in China. These were the missions of the Provisional People's Deleberative Council, the National Defence Institute, the cultural mission and the mission of journalists.

c. As to the instruction given to these missions by Bung KARNO I can tell you the following:

1. Each mission had as its object the strengthening of ties between Indonesia and China.

2. Each mission had to keep its eyes and ears open to learn what it could in China which could be of use to Indonesia at a later date.

d. I do not know what the results of these missions were.

47. You have stated that, in the month of September, 1965, Bung KARNO sent a mission to China

of the Provisional People's Deliberative Council.

Please tell us about the following:

- a. In connection with what problem was that mission sent to China?
- b. Who were the other members of that mission?
- c. What task was given to that mission by Bung KARNO?
- d. How long did that mission stay in China?
- e. What were the results of that mission?

47. As regards the Provisional People's Deliberative Council's mission which was sent to China in September, 1965:

- a. As I recall, the mission was sent in connection with the celebrations in Peking on October 1, 1965, at the invitation of China.

- b. I still remember that some of its members were:

CHAERUL SALEH, ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO, Gen. MASHUDI; I cannot remember who else.

- c. Apart from what I already told you I do not know what special instructions or tasks were given to the mission by Bung KARNO.

- d. I no longer know with any certainty how long this mission stayed in China. If I am not mistaken the mission left for China in the last week of September 1965 and its members returned to Djakarta individually, sometime after October 3, 1965.

- e. I do not know what the mission reported in the way of results.

48. According to your declaration made to the interrogator, a mission of the National Defence Institute left Indonesia for China in September 1965. Please tell us about the following:
- a. When did the mission of the National Defence Institute go to China and what were its members?
 - b. What was the object of the mission?
 - c. What instructions did Bung KARNO give to the mission?
 - d. Was it true that Army Gen. MURSID, who was originally due to leave with the mission, was not allowed by Bung KARNO to leave with it?
 - e. Why did Bung KARNO not allow Gen. MURSID to go to China at that time?
 - f. Was there any connection between this decision by Bung KARNO not to allow Gen. MURSID to go to China and Bung KARNO's plan to take action against the Generals of the Army and, in particular with the replacement of Gen. A.YANI's command of the Army.

48. With regard to the mission of the National Defence Institute to China:
- a. The mission left for China at the end of September, 1965 (I no longer remember the exact date).
I did not know the names of those who went with the mission.
However, the mission was headed by the Governor of the National Defence Institute (Gen. WILUJO PUSPOJUDO) and students of the Navy (I recall them) they were Adm. SUDOMO and Gen. of the Marines SUWADJI.
 - b. As far as I know, the object of that mission was to join in the celebrations in Peking of October 1, 1965 at the invi-

tation of the Government of China.

c. Apart from what I stated earlier I know nothing of any special instruction Bung KARNO gave to that mission.

d. It is indeed true that Army Gen. MURSID who was due to join the National Defence Institute's mission, did not in actual fact leave with the mission. At the time the mission left I did not know that Gen. MURSID did not join them on the orders of Bung KARNO.

e. After I learned about Bung KARNO's plan to replace the Army command and after the G-30-S/PKI it became clear to me that there was a connection between the fact that Gen. MURSID did not leave for Pe-king at the order of Bung KARNO:

1. Before G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO gave every indication, both in what he said and what he did, of his dissatisfaction with the Generals and the Army command, whom he did not regard as loyal to him.

2. Bung KARNO issued orders that measures should be taken against those Generals of the Army.

3. Bung KARNO, to judge by his attitude, approved the appointment of Gen. MURSID as a substitute commander of the Army.

I realize now, from the above facts, that Gen. MURSID did indeed receive orders to stay in Djakarta or was not allowed to follow the National Defence Institute's mission to China, and that it was in connection with the plan of Bung KARNO to act against the Generals of the Army and the changes in the Army command.

49. Were the instructions of Bung KARNO to Gen. MURSID to join the National Defence Institute's mission to China discussed previously by Bung KARNO and other officials? Please tell us whether Bung KARNO informed Gen. YANI, as Commander of the Army about the ban on Gen. MURSID's visit to China?

49. As I recall it, Bung KARNO never discussed with other Government officials forbidding or delaying Gen. MURSID to join the National Defence Institute's mission in China.

Whether Gen. YANI, as Commander of the Army had been informed of this I am unaware.

However, I did know that Gen. YANI was ordered to appear before Bung KARNO on October 1, 1965.

50. You have said that Bung KARNO dispatched an economic mission to China in the month of September, 1965.

Please tell us about:

- a. The members of the mission
- b. The tasks and instructions given to that mission by Bung KARNO
- c. The object of the mission, and in connection with what problems was it sent to China

50. I can tell you the following about the economic mission to China in September 1965.

- a. The persons or the names of the members of the economic mission were

unknown to me. All I knew was, that the mission was headed by Minister SURJADI.

b. I cannot add to what I have already said with regard to the tasks and special instructions which Bung KARNO gave to this mission.

c. The improvements of economic relations between Indonesia and China was ingeneral its goal. I can say, with respect to the problems discussed by the mission of which I learned later:

1. In view of Indonesia's withdrawal from the UNO, Indonesia would have to try to cushion the results economically by strengthening her economic ties with China.
2. Indonesia wanted to strengthen its economic ties with China as part of the plan to establish a Conference of the New Emerging Forces so that the Djakarta-Peking axis would become genuinely strong.
3. As to the Singapore question: China had urged Indonesia to wait for the "green light" from China before recognizing Singapore (which at that time adopted an attitude that it did not want to join Malaysia). The object of this attitude of China was that it would give China time to arrange its banking problems with Singapore before Indonesia recognized Singapore.

51. Please tell us about the appointment of Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO as Minister/Commander of the Police in May 1965.

51. Generally, I can explain the appointment of Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO as Minister/Commander of the Police as follows:
- a. At the beginning of 1965, there were rumours in circulation that there were differences of opinion among the Police Force.
It seemed that there were a number of groups within the Police Force, each of which had a candidate for the position of Minister/Commander of the Police. Bung KARNO was well aware of all the events on the grounds of the reports which he received from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT, Gen. SABUR and other officials. Finally, Bung KARNO decided to appoint from a number of candidates Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO as Minister/Commander of the Police.
 - b. Before his appointment became official Pak TJIPTO was received in audience by Bung KARNO in the Palace. There was then an exchange as follows:
 - Pak TJIPTO said he was loyal to Bung KARNO and would obey him.
 - Pak TJIPTO swore allegiance to the Revolution.
 - Pak TJIPTO promised to sway the whole of the Police in the direction of the ideals of the Revolution, using as a basis the doctrines of Bung KARNO.On May 17th, 1965, Police Gen. TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO was appointed Minister/Commander of the Police officially, in succession to his predecessor.

52. What do you know about the relationship between Bung KARNO and ex. Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, both before and after G-30-S/PKI?

52. As regards relations between Bung KARNO and Minister/Chief of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, according to what I know:

a. Prior to the events of G-30-S/PKI: Relations between Pak TJIPTO and Bung KARNO were as I saw, quite normal and there was a good relationship as already existed with the other Ministers/Commanders of the other forces.

If compared with the relations to the Minister/Commander of the Army, Gen. YANI the relationship between Bung KARNO and YANI was closer, as Bung KARNO saw in YANI a strong man (with his Army) and a resolute man; in addition there existed a personal relationship between Bung KARNO and YANI.

If compared to the relationship with the Minister/Commander of the Navy, Adm. R.E. MARTADINATA; the relations between Bung KARNO and MARTA were not very close, since Bung KARNO did not see in MARTA someone very revolutionary.

If compared to the relations with the Minister/Commander of the Air Force, Air-marshal OMAR DANI, the relationship between Bung KARNO and OMAR DANI was closer, as Bung KARNO saw in OMAR DANI a young revolutionary man, who stuck to Bung KARNO.

Just before G-30-S/PKI Pak TJIPTO visited Bung KARNO on a number of occasions to-

gether with the other Ministers/Commanders.

b. After the G-30-S/PKI:

After the G-30-S/PKI events it appeared relations between Pak TJIPTO and Bung KARNO were getting closer than before. In the atmosphere then prevailing, at the end of 1965 up to and including 1966 the firmness of Pak TJIPTO in defending Bung KARNO was clearly visible, which resulted in Bung KARNO being more sympathetic to Pak TJIPTO, so that both men became closer.

53. Will you please tell us about the following:

a. Prior to the events G-30-S/PKI was ex.

Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO present on occasion at the meetings held in the Palace (as part of the action is considered by Bung KARNO against the Commanders who were not loyal towards Bung KARNO?

b. What proposals did SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO make to Bung KARNO when they were in Halim on October 1st, 1965, and how did SUTJIPTO then behave?

c. As you have already said, after the events of G-30-S/PKI "the firmness of Pak TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO in defending Bung KARNO was clearly visible".

Would you please tell us what was the nature of the firmness you have described whereby Bung KARNO became more sympathetic and closer to SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO?

53.a. As far as I know the Minister/Commander

of the Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO was never present when Bung KARNO discussed actions against the Generals.

The fact that Pak TJIPTO was never present at those meetings does not preclude the possibility that Pak TJIPTO knew about the action to be undertaken before October 1, 1965.

This was possible, because:

1. Bung KARNO himself had, in the month of September 1965, informed Pak TJIPTO about the existence of a Council of Generals.
2. In his conversation Pak TJIPTO continually used the term GESTOK, the same term used by Bung KARNO, and not G-30-S/PKI or Gestapu.
3. I did once hear from Pak MANGIL of the Presidential bodyguard that efforts had been made by the Police - that is to say Pak TJIPTO - to remove Bung KARNO from Djakarta to another area, because Pak TJIPTO did not believe that Bung KARNO was safe in Djakarta.
4. I never heard of a suggestion or a proposal by Pak TJIPTO either on October 1st, 1965 in Halim, or after G-30-S/PKI, that measures should be taken against the persons who had committed the murders or that the PKI should be liquidated despite the fact that he knew that the PKI was involved in the G-30-S/PKI. I noticed this particularly because I knew from other officials, Pak LEIMENA and Pak SJAFIUFIN ZUHRI that they had on occasion made such suggestions to Bung KARNO.

54. On September 1-4, 1965, during a meeting of the Indonesian Police Force in Djakarta there was a declaration of the "Determined Will of the Police Force". Will you tell us what you know about this?
- a. Was that meeting held on the orders of and with the blessing of Bung KARNO?
 - b. What was the purpose of that meeting?
 - c. How did Bung KARNO react when he received a report from ex.Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO about the result of this meeting which produced the "Determined Will of the Police Force?"
 - d. What do you know about the connection between that meeting and Bung KARNO's plan to take measures against the Commanders of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO?

54.a.As to the meeting of the Police Force, from September 1-4, 1965:

As far as I know the meeting was not ordered by Bung KARNO but did have his blessing. Before the meeting took place the Commander of the Police Force, Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO called on Bung KARNO on August 30th, 1965, in order to report that the meeting would take place. Bung KARNO gave his blessing and promised to send a Presidential message.

b. The meeting of the Police Force was organized to unite the forces in the Police into a progressive and revolutionary force, and to turn the policy of the Police in accordance with the speech by Bung KARNO on August 17th, 1965 (TAKARI) and aimed

at pursuing Bung KARNO's policies. The TAKARI speech was drafted by NJOTO of the PKI.

c. Bung KARNO was delighted when he heard from ex.Minister/Commander of the Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, about the results of the Police Force meeting which has produced the "Determined Will of the Police Force".

It was apparent from his attitude that he had even greater confidence in the Police Force as being an organization which supported him.

d. It was apparent that there was a connection between the meeting of the Police Force and the plans of Bung KARNO and the PKI to take measures against Generals of the Army who were regarded as not loyal. This was clear from the facts, which showed that there was cooperation between Bung KARNO and the PKI, or even a common goal shared by Bung KARNO and the PKI, with respect to the Generals of the Army, who were regarded as disloyal to Bung KARNO. Also indicative of this were the contents and sentences of the TAKARI programme of Action in the "Determined Will of the Police Force", the same sentences which were also continually used by the PKI.

55. Were you aware, in connection with the G-30-S/PKI, that there was a movement in a certain group to take Bung KARNO out of Djakarta and hide him. If you know about this, give a clarification:

a. When, where and how did you know about

this affair?

- b. Why did they want to hide Bung KARNO by taking him away from Djakarta?
- c. Did you know where Bung KARNO was to be taken and kept in hiding?
- d. Who were the persons who devised the plan?
- e. Was ex.Minister/Commander of the Police, Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, among those who wanted to take Bung KARNO out of Djakarta?

55. As regards the existence of a plan to hide Bung KARNO by taking him out of Djakarta:
- a. About the middle of 1966, I heard about the "issue", that there was a plan to take Bung KARNO out of Djakarta to another place. Eventually I heard from Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL, Commander of the Bodyguard, that the Police had devised the plan and prepared for it.
 - b. The motives for this plan, I understood, were:
 1. Djakarta and West Java - in particular Bogor - were completely under the control of persons who were against Bung KARNO.
 2. The revolutionary struggle according to the concept of Bung KARNO was impossible to be continued, so long as Bung KARNO was hold in custody by anti-Bung KARNO elements.
 3. From a point of view of security of Bung KARNO personally and for Bung KARNO's struggle, it was considered safer to move him to an area which was more advantageous.
 - c. The planned destination was East Java or Central Java.

d. I do not know for certain who the persons were who had devised this plan and would carry it out.

e. According to what I heard from MANGIL of the Presidential Bodyguard, the Minister/Commander of the Police, Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, was informed of this plan.

Done this day,etc.

This day, Wednesday, October 28, 1970, we.....etc.

56. Did you know that, on or about 26-27 September, 1965, UNTUNG reported to Bung KARNO that the action to be undertaken by the progressive officers could be carried out?

56.a. I did not know, neither did I recollect that ex.Lt.Col.UNTUNG was received by Bung KARNO between 26 and 27 September 1965. I also am not aware that UNTUNG reported that the action of the progressive officers could be carried out.

b. That I did not in actual fact know anything about this affair does not mean that I regarded it as impossible. It was always possible that UNTUNG would report to Bung KARNO either in BOGOR or in Jakarta because Bung KARNO often summoned somebody suddenly or Bung KARNO would receive someone disregarding the standing procedure.

c. I did, however, know for certain that UNTUNG appeared before Bung KARNO on August 4, 1965 and declared that he was prepared to take measures against the Generals of the Army whom he did not regard as loyal, in accordance with the statement I have already made.

I also know and remember that UNTUNG handed over a letter to Bung KARNO on the evening of September 30 in the Stadium. I only knew much later that the contents of that letter were a report about the actual date on which the action was undertaken.

It was therefore logical, in view of the above facts, that UNTUNG had reported to Bung KARN0 before September 30, 1965 and possibly on or about 26-27 September, that the action of the progressive officers could be carried out.

57. On September 30, 1965 General SABUR was not in Djakarta, but in Bandung. Could you tell us:

- a. Whether, in addition to UNTUNG, who was ordered by Bung KARN0 to take action against the Commanders, who practised passive resistance against Bung KARN0, Gen. SABUR was also given orders in connection with the same affair by Bung KARN0? How was it that Gen. SABUR himself was at that time not in Djakarta?
- b. Why was it that UNTUNG had been selected to carry out the orders of Bung KARN0 with respect to the measures which were to be taken against the Commanders of the Army?

57.a. It was true that, in addition to UNTUNG, Gen SABUR received orders from Bung KARN0 to act against the Generals of the Army who were not regarded as loyal.

From the point of view of organization SABUR, as Commander of the Tjakrabirawa regiment, was the first person to be eligible to receive the orders and implement them.

The reason why Gen. SABUR was not present in Bandung at that very time when the G-30-S/PKI took place, or, to be more precise, on September 30, 1965 in the afternoon and in the evening, was:

1. The peccadilloes of Gen. SABUR, who was always out to avoid critical situations or difficult work.

I say this on the grounds of experience based on years of cooperation as the Adjutant of the President.

Gen. SABUR was always out to take the credit for certain activities, but he left the actual work to others.

As to experiences I had with regard to critical situations I can mention the following:

- shots aimed at Bung KARNO during prayers Idul Adha in the Djakarta Palace.
- a hand grenade thrown at Bung KARNO in Macassar.
- the G-30-S/PKI itself, when Gen. SABUR was in Halim on October 1, 1965.

I myself was able to observe the weakness of Gen. SABUR from the events of which I was myself a witness. Gen. SABUR did nothing at those very moments when action by a commander was necessary. This applies particularly to measures to ensure the safety of Bung KARNO, which was his special province.

2. The departure of Gen. SABUR to Bandung could also be regarded as a precautionary measure to protect himself if it should appear later that the UNTUNG action had failed. In this way he would have been able to clear himself with the Army command.

b. The reasons why UNTUNG carried out the action against the Chief Officers of the Army were:

1. He was ordered to do so by Bung KARNO
2. Military speaking, he was ordered to do so by the Commander of the Tjakrabi-rawa Regiment, Gen. SABUR.
3. From a party-political point of view he was given orders by the PKI.

58. You have told the interlocutors that you had heard from Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL of the police plan to transfer Bung KARNO from Djakarta to another area, for example East Java or Central Java. Djakarta was not regarded as safe for Bung KARNO and was not considered to provide opportunities for the continuation of the struggle as conceived by Bung KARNO.

Please make a statement about the following:

- a. When, and where, did you hear from Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL about the transfer of Bung KARNO from Djakarta and what other persons heard about it?
- b. Did you hear about this affair from other people and in what way did you hear about it?
- c. What organization was to be made use of in transporting Bung KARNO from Djakarta?
- d. What persons were involved in the organization of this?

Did Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO know about the existence of this organization or was he directly involved in the organization?

e. What was the further role of Police Gen.

SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO in the activities concerning the transfer of Bung KARNO from Djakarta?

f. Please give actual details of the plan.

58. As regards the plan for the transfer of Bung KARNO from the Djakarta/Bogor area:

a. As I stated earlier, I heard about the middle of 1966 that attempts had been devised by people who were pro-SUKARNO to have him transferred from the Djakarta/Bogor area to some place in Central Java or East Java.

I remember that Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL, Commander of the Bodyguard spoke to me once about this business, in the Pavilion of the Bogor Palace. A number of officers of the Bodyguard, whose names I no longer remember, also witnessed this conversation.

b. I also heard about this plan from Chief Commissioner Drs. SIDHARTA SH, who replaced Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT as Adjutant; Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA said casually to me that certain persons who were attached to Bung KARNO would try to transport Bung KARNO from the Djakarta/Bogor area to East Java.

c. What sort of organization was to be used for the transfer of Bung KARNO, I do not know and I have not heard the name mentioned of any such organization. I did, however, know that there were a number of groups: the Police and its Mobile Brigade, the Navy and its Marine Corps, a group from the Brawidjaja division, the Marhaenist Youth (Indonesian Nationalist Party Youth Organization Ed.) According to Pak SIDHARTA all these people were to cooperate in the transfer of Bung KARNO.

d. The chief name mentioned in connection with the transfer attempt was that of Gen. BAMBANG SUPENO. I heard from Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA that Gen. BAMBANG SUPENO and his Brawidjaja group were far advanced with their preparations. Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO knew about these plans to transfer Bung KARNO and was clearly in support of them. I am not aware whether he was in the organization itself.

e. As to the further activities of Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO in the plan to transfer Bung KARNO from Djakarta I can state the following:

1. I heard from Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA that Pak TJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO had ordered the East Java Police District Commander to prepare for the arrival of Bung KARNO in East Java.

2. I knew that Pak TJIPTO, in the course of his speech in East Java had said that it was perfectly clear that the people of East Java should defend Bung KARNO and would form a bulwark for him.

f. I did not know what the details of the plan were. Generally, I knew that Bung KARNO was to be quietly transported from Bogor (not Djakarta) and was to be taken directly to East Java, incognito, and that this was to be done directly by members of the Presidential Bodyguard.

59. Please tell us whether the plan to transfer Bung KARNO from Djakarta was not one of the tasks of the organization "SOEKARNO Front".

In addition, please tell us about the object, the task and the composition of the "SOEKARNO Front".

59.a. I knew the following about the "SOEKARNO Front":

1. Owing to pressure from the masses, a pressure which arose after the G-30-S/PKI, and which rejected the G-30-S/PKI and condemned it, and which further criticised the Government and the policy of Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO began to assemble forces bearing the name "SOEKARNO Front".

The original aim was to support Bung KARNO, to defend him and also act as a task force for Bung KARNO in his attempts to proceed with his doctrines. The "SOEKARNO Front" was also specially used to combat demonstrators who were against Bung KARNO. The members of this "SOEKARNO Front" consisted of persons who supported Bung KARNO fanatically and without reserve.

2. After the idea of the "SOEKARNO Front" had been launched and after clashes arose in Indonesia between the two forces, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, declared that all Armed Forces belonged to the "SOEKARNO Front" and they decided that the Commanders of the Military Districts were (local) Commanders of the "SOEKARNO Front" for every district. As a result the "SOEKARNO Front" consisted not only of fanatical persons, who supported Bung KARNO unconditionally but they also consisted of people from all levels of society. As a result the original aim of the "SOEKARNO Front", became blurred.

It was also possible for the local Commanders to maintain supervision over the "SOEKARNO Front" because they were its Commander too.

3. I knew that, on the highest level, Bung KARNO relied upon Pak CHAERUL SALEH to lead the "SOEKARNO Front".

It was only later that I knew that the leadership of the "SOEKARNO Front" had been delegated to Lt.Col. SJAFIIE.

b. From the above statements I can say that the persons or groups whose plan it was to transfer Bung KARNO outside Djakarta or Bogor, belonged to the "SOEKARNO Front" as clarified under no 1. They were persons who fanatically supported Bung KARNO, without reservation.

60. Did Bung KARNO, when he took measures in connection with the reports that troops of the RPKAD were to attack the Palace on the evening of March 11, 1966, mobilize the "SOEKARNO Front" to oppose such attacks by the RPKAD?

60. On the evening of March 10, 1966, as I have already stated, there were many officials and Ministers present in the guest house of the Djakarta Palace. Among them were the Ministers ACHMADI and ACHADI. After reports were received that troops of the RPKAD of the Army were to attack the Palace, there was a great deal of talk. I recollect a dialogue between Bung KARNO and ACHMADI and ACHADI, the main features of which were as follows:
-They related to the question by Bung

KARNO to ACHMADI and ACHADI about the strength of the supporters of Bung KARNO and, finally, the orders given by Bung KARNO to ACHMADI and ACHADI to persuade those forces to protect and defend Bung KARNO.

My belief is, that these forces of ACHMADI and ACHADI were known as the "SOEKARNO Front".

61. What was the role of Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO and of other officers of the Police in dealing with the possibility of an attack by troops of the RPKAD as reported to Bung KARNO on the evening of March 10, 1966?

61. After the events of the evening of March 10, 1966, when Bung KARNO and his party left the Palace for Bogor, I heard the following from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT:
1. When Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT handed over a letter to Bung KARNO on the evening of March 10, 1966, he also reported to Bung KARNO on a message from the Minister/Commander of the Police, Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

The contents of this message was a suggestion that Bung KARNO should leave Djakarta and that Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO should have available the troops of the Mobile Brigade to protect and defend Bung KARNO. Pak TJIPTO also reported that he would spend the night with his troops.

2. I knew from the statement by Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT that Pak TJIPTO played an active role on that night of March 10, 1966.

62. You have told the interlocutors that, in September 1965, Bung KARNO gave orders to Gen. SABUR and Lt.Col.UNTUNG to take action against a number of Chief Officers of the Army i.e. Gen. NASUTION etc., because those Chief Officers were not regarded as loyal to Bung KARNO or were not in agreement with the policies of Bung KARNO.

Please tell us about the following:

- a. In what respect were the Chief Officers of the Army not regarded as loyal to Bung KARNO, or what specific policy of Bung KARNO was not approved, according to Bung KARNO, by the Chief Officers?
- b. What was the attitude and the line of thought of Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO towards the policies of Bung KARNO?

62.a.The Chief Officers of the Army were in disagreement about:

the policy of Bung KARNO, because it leaned heavily towards Communism and, in particular, the policy of the Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Peking-Pyong Yang axis.

b.The attitude and views of Pol.Gen.SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO were the same as those of Bung KARNO. This implied that he approved of Bung KARNO's policies.

I never understood from what he said, or from his behaviour, that he did not agree with these policies.

63. Were you aware of the departure of Pol.Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO to East Java in June 1966 and that he held a speech there, during which he said: "The people of East Java must

be a bulwark for SUKARNO".

If you know about this, please tell us about the following:

- a. Was the departure of Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO part of the preparations to transfer Bung KARNO from Djakarta to East Java?
- b. Was Bung KARNO informed of the purpose of the departure of Pol.Gen.SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO?

- 63.a.It was clear from the activities of Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO(who had clearly proved his loyalty to Bung KARNO) and from what I heard about Pak TJIPTO knowing about the attempts to transfer Bung KARNO from Djakarta or Bogor, and supporting them, that the departure of Pak TJIPTO to East Java was part of the preparations for the transfer for Bung KARNO from the Djakarta/Bogor area to East Java.
- b.Bung KARNO knew about the departure of Pak TJIPTO and the purpose of his journey to East Java because Pak TJIPTO had reported to Bung KARNO before he left for East Java.
- It was customary for a Minister of Commander of the Armed Forces to report to Bung KARNO before leaving Djakarta.

64. In view of your reply to no. 53, namely that Bung KARNO, in September 1965, had told Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO about the "Council of Generals", did you also know whether SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO also informed Bung KARNO that within the Police organization there were Generals who belonged to the Council of Generals, who were opposed

to Bung KARNO? If so, who were the Generals who were reported to Bung KARNO?

64. After Pol.Gen.SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO had been received by Bung KARNO in September 1965, I heard that Bung KARNO had also been told by Pak TJIPTO that there were Generals in the Police force who were not loyal to Bung KARNO. These included: Pol.Gen.K. SUROSO, Pol.Gen.MUDJOKO, Pol.Gen.MURDJAMAN, Pol.Gen.SUTJIPTO DANUKOSUMO. There were other names, but I do not remember them.

65. To what extent did you know whether it was true that there was a direct connection between the District Police Command VII/Greater Djakarta and the Palace?

If that was true, was this with the knowledge of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, and why was that direct communication justified?

65.a. It is true that there was a direct communication between District Police Command VII/Greater Djakarta and the Palace. I knew, on several occasions, that the Djakarta District Commander of Police was summoned to Bung KARNO without consultation with the Minister/Commander of the Police. That actually was not according to the usual proceeding.

The only persons at that time who were allowed to go straight to the President were the Governor of the Autonomous District of the Capital/Greater Djakarta and the Commander of Military District V/Greater Djakarta as District Administrator and

Director of the Twofold People's Command or as Commander of the Garrison.

The District Commander of the Navy or the District Commander of the Air Force had no direct contact with the Palace.

b. The direct communication between District Police Command VII/Greater Djakarta and the Palace was clearly with the foreknowledge of the Minister/Commander of the Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

c. The direct communication was both possible and justified because:

1. At that time the policy of Bung KARNO was to achieve direct control over the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the Districts, so that they could be used as his instruments.

2. Bung KARNO was particularly pleased about the District Police Command VII/Greater Djakarta because the behaviour of its leadership ran parallel with his own policy and because from them information could be obtained which accorded with the wishes of Bung KARNO.

66. Will you please tell us about the radiogram compiled by the Director of Intelligence at Police Headquarters on behalf of the Minister/Commander of the Police on October 1, 1965 (the evidence is read out).

a. Did Bung KARNO know about that radiogram? If he knew about it from whom, where and when?

b. What was Bung KARNO's reaction at the time?

c. Were there instructions given by Bung KARNO to Minister/Commander of the Police

SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO and what instructions were given by Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO to the Police Force?

66. With regard to the radiogram from the Police on October 1, 1965:
- a. As far as I know, Bung KARNO received a report in Bogor, on October 2, 1965 from the Minister/Commander of the Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO saying that the Police had sent this radiogram to the Police Districts, the gist of which was that the whole of the Police apparatus was loyal to Bung KARNO.
 - b. Bung KARNO was delighted at the contents of the report,
 - c. I was not aware of the complete instructions given after that report by Bung KARNO to the Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO. However, I heard that Bung KARNO had given instructions to the Minister/Commander of the Police and to the Police Force as a whole, to remain loyal and obedient to Bung KARNO.

67. Will you tell us about reports that, on October 1, 1965, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT wrote a letter to Assistant Chief Commissioner of Police ANWAS TANU MIDJAJA from the Military District VII/Greater Djakarta (sic. should be Police District Command VII/Greater Djakarta Ed.) of which the contents i.a. were that all orders of the Great Leader of the Revolution/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, President SOEKARNO, should be obeyed.

- a. Did you know that that letter was handed over to the Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO by Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT when he was in Halim on October 1, 1965?
 - b. What purpose was served by the letter of Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT to this ANWAS TANUMIDJAJA?
67. From Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT I once heard, after we had been in Bogor, that:
- a. Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT had reported on the existence and contents of this letter to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, when Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO arrived at Halim on October 1, 1965.
 - b. The purpose of that letter was that, as far as the Police were concerned, only and exclusively the commands of Bung KARNO should be obeyed whatever might happen or what ever orders might be given from other quarters.
68. On October 1, 1965 in Halim, Bung KARNO gave to every official there (including Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO) a list of the membership of the Revolutionary Council, in which next to himself (SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO) as member of the Revolutionary Council also was included his subordinate Assistant Chief Commissioner ANWAS TANUMIDJAJA, as Deputy Chairman IV of the Revolutionary Council.
Could you tell us about the reaction of Bung KARNO and Minister/Commander of the Police

SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO with respect to the mention of the name of ANWAS as Deputy Chairman IV of the Revolutionary Council.

68. The reaction of Bung KARNO to that appointment was quite calm.

There was no indication that he did not agree to the appointment of a subordinate officer to a position higher than that of his superior.

Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO himself appeared to be rather disappointed about the appointment of this ANWAS because he as his superior was listed below ANWAS. Finally, however, Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO left everything to Bung KARNO.

69. Can you tell us why Minister Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, on October 1, 1965, (after he had complied with the summons by Bung KARNO) did not try to leave Halim (like Minister/Commander of the Navy, Adm.R.E. MARTADINATA) for example to get in touch with Gen.SUHARTO and others, in order to become more acquainted with the true state of affairs?

69. The reasons why Minister/Commander of the Police S.JUDODIHARDJO, after arrival in Halim, did not try to leave Halim were:

1. He had received the report from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT about the letter sent by Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT to Police District Command VII/Greater Jakarta the contents of which was that only Bung KARNO should be obeyed.

With regard to the situation in town and in the KOSTRAD, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT had already been in touch that morning with the Commander of Military District V/Greater Djakarta at the KOSTRAD.

Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO completely trusted the report of this Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT.

2. Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIP-TO JUDODIHARDJO believed that he should obey only Bung KARNO and no-one else. Because Bung KARNO was at Halim he himself should be at Halim and there was no need to go to the KOSTRAD.

3. Listening to Bung KARNO and/or SUPARDJO Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO himself believed that the KOSTRAD was on the side of the Council of Generals, which was anti Bung KARNO.

70. When Bung KARNO and his party left Halim for Bogor on October 1, 1965, Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO left the same night for Djakarta (October 2, 1965, approx. 01.30 hrs.).

Do you know what instructions Bung KARNO gave to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO when he was about to leave for Djakarta that night?

70. After we arrived in Bogor October 1, 1965 at night, at approx. 24.00 hrs., the officials who had accompanied Bung KARNO from Halim, went straight to Bung KARNO's Pavilion.

I myself went to the next Pavilion, the office of the Adjutant, in order to ring

up Gen. SUHARTO at the KOSTRAD and make my report.

For this reason I do not know of the conversation between Bung KARNO and those officials. Neither did I know what instructions, if any, Bung KARNO gave to Minister Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO before he went to Djakarta.

I was however aware, that about 1½ hours later, on October 2, 1965. at 01.30 hrs, Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO left Bogor Palace to return to Djakarta.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth, and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the text read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval.

This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Wednesday, 28 October 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
Col. KKO

The interrogators:

S.SOEGIJARJO
Lt.Col.CPM NRP: 12688

AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

This day, Thursday, October 29th, 1970, we:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - Lieut.Col.CPM-NRP: 12688,
2. AZWIR NAWIE - Ass.Chief Commissioner of Police

both in the function of member of the Central Investigation Team, interrogated a man admitting he was:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO

having the rank of Colonel KKO, function: ASKA-PERS/MIL (Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy/Military brand), age/date of birth: 43 years/ 19 September 1927, place of birth: Karanganyar Kebumen, religion: Roman Catholic, address/place of residence: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

He was heard as a witness in matters relating to the G-30-S/PKI.

In reply to the questions we put to him he, the witness (BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO) gave the following replies:

71. Those involved in the G-30-S/PKI who were members of the Indonesian Police, among others, Assistant Chief Commissioner ANWAS TANUMIDJAJA, (Deputy Chairman IV of the Revolutionary Council), after being interrogated by the Police Headquarters and later by Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, were reported to Bung KARNO. What was Bung KARNO's reaction to this report and what did he say?

71.a. Before, during and after the trial by the Department of Police of Assistant Chief

Commissioner ANWAS, I know, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT had been reporting regularly on the investigations to Bung KARNO.

b. After the conclusions of the Department of Police from which it was apparent that Assistant Chief Commissioner ANWAS was not guilty and not involved, this was also reported to Bung KARNO by Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

c. The reaction of Bung KARNO was that he agreed with the policy pursued by the Minister/Commander of the Police and approved of the conclusion that Assistant Chief Commissioner ANWAS was innocent and was not involved.

72.a. In March 1966, (2 days before the Ministers were arrested - this was on March 18, 1966) Minister ACHMADI fled and spent one night in the house of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO. Will you tell us what you know about this?

b. Please tell us what you know about Ir. SURACHMAN and his relations with the Police.

72.a. I only heard about the disappearance of Minister ACHMADI and night he stayed at the house of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO some considerable time after it had taken place.

As far as I can remember Bung KARNO must either have known about it or have received a report about it through the reports of Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT and/or MANGIL, after it took place.

b. I heard from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT

that Bung KARN0 had given instructions to the Police to place Ir SURACHMAN (a leading figure of the PNI) under protective arrest because it was very clear at that moment that the safety of Ir. SURACHMAN could no longer be guaranteed.

73.a. After the G-30-S/PKI the New Order was created. Can you tell us what agreement was reached between Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO and Bung KARN0 (or vice versa) during the development phase of the New Order, which was opposed to the PKI and the Old Order?

b. Could you also tell us about the activities of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO with regard to the Palace (Bung KARN0), both before and after the inception of the Mandate of March Eleventh. (1966, according to which SUKARN0 had to renounce his executive powers Ed.)

73.a. The situation at the time was very tense and I knew that Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO continued to be faithful to Bung KARN0 although it could be felt at the time that there were already very strong anti-PKI and anti-President SUKARN0 currents.

Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO had always told Bung KARN0 that he would continue to be faithful to Bung KARN0 and his doctrine.

I was not aware what Bung KARN0 might have promised to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO.

b. Apart from the above declarations I knew nothing about the further activities of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO before the inception of the Mandate of March Eleventh.

After the Mandate of March Eleventh I knew that the position of Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO was still sound and that he remained loyal to Bung KARNO.

1. Bung KARNO continually explained to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO and the other Commanders of the other Forces what the contents of the Mandate of March Eleventh was, in particular that its accent lay on the duty to protect the personal safety of Bung KARNO and to continue his doctrines and ensure their safety.

2. As a result of this exposition by Bung KARNO Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO took the attitude of carrying out everything that was said by Bung KARNO.

3. Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO always agreed to the attitude of Bung KARNO, who was both dissatisfied and furious about the measures of the supporter of the Mandate of March Eleventh (Gen. SUHARTO), which were regarded as incorrect by Bung KARNO, for example:

- the dissolution of the PKI
- the arrest of the Ministers

4. Minister Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO also expressed his displeasure with Gen. SUHARTO, who had never con-

sulted with the Commanders of the other Forces on the implementation of the Mandate of March Eleventh.

74. You have told the interlocutors the following:
- a. The "SUKARNO Front", which was formed at the wish of Bung KARNO, consisted of persons who were fanatically in favour of Bung KARNO.
 - b. Because of the declaration that the Commanders of the Military Districts also had the functions of Commanders of the SUKARNO Front in their own territories, the task and aims of the SUKARNO Front, which consisted of pro-Bung KARNO fanatics, had become vague. Please tell us again about the following:
 - a. The background of the formation of the SUKARNO Front, which consisted of persons fanatically attached to Bung KARNO.
 - b. The relationship between the aforementioned SUKARNO Front under point a. and the Commanders of the Military Districts, who declared that they themselves were Commanders of the SUKARNO Front.
 - c. The aims of the SUKARNO Front.
 - d. The way in which the organization SUKARNO Front, which consisted of persons who were fanatically attached to Bung KARNO, was formed.
 - e. Personalities or officials of the Government of Indonesia or of other organizations who supported the establishment of the SUKARNO Front which consisted of fanatical adherent to Bung KARNO.
 - f. The activities relating to the implementation of the tasks of the organization of the SUKARNO Front, and what were the implications of these activities which endangered the

security or could disrupt the State and society?

74. I can tell you the following with respect to the "SUKARNO Front" from the facts which I either saw, or heard, or knew:

a. Background:

1. The attitude of Bung KARNO himself, who relied upon a letter from AIDIT, dated October 6, 1965, which laid down that Bung KARNO was the only person who had the authority to resolve the G-30-S/PKI.

It was the aim of the PKI, in reality, to bring about this attitude of Bung KARNO, because, through Bung KARNO, the continued existence of the PKI could be guaranteed, and this in its turn meant that the PKI would be able to continue to pursue its ends.

2. As a result of the rise of certain forces, which at the time were opposed to the PKI and Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO felt that his position was threatened. For that reason all the forces which were genuinely faithful to Bung KARNO had to be mobilized to meet that threat.

b. As to the declaration of the Commanders: Bung KARNO's idea of uniting forces to support the SUKARNO Front was officially launched by Bung KARNO in his position of Head of State and Great Leader of the Revolution. Bung KARNO hoped for the approval and support of the Commanders of the Armed Forces without their interfering with the implementation.

However, the Commanders understood this

hidden motive and the result was that a joint statement was issued to the effect that the whole of the Armed Forces would join the SUKARNO Front with the District Commanders as Commanders of the local SUKARNO Front. Because of this action of the Commanders Bung KARNÓ's objectives in establishing the SUKARNO Front were not achieved because:

- the aims of the SUKARNO Front became vague
- all the activities of the SUKARNO Front could be directed and checked by the District Commanders

Nevertheless, some persons who were fanatical supporters of Bung KARNÓ, continued their activities in accordance with their original views and aims.

c. Aims:

The aims of the SUKARNO Front (according to Bung KARNÓ's own draft) were:

1. to combat in every possible way those forces which were opposed to Bung KARNÓ and aimed to overthrow him.
2. to retain Bung KARNÓ as Head of State, to protect him and ensure his safety.

d. Formation:

1. After Bung KARNÓ had given expression to his idea there was a spontaneous reaction among persons who were fanatical followers of Bung KARNÓ. At the top Dr. SUBANDRÍO actively supported the idea, both morally and by providing facilities.

Pak CHAERUL SALEH was given the assignment of implementing the idea.

2. Pak CHAERUL SALEH held meeting in his house with Ministers and other persons who were of a like mind in order to achieve

the idea of this SUKARNO Front. Finally, Pak CHAERUL SALEH appointed Lt.Col.SJAFIIE to lead and continue the ideas that had been discussed.

Pak CHAERUL SALEH reported all his activities to Bung KARNO.

3. Lt.Col.SJAFIIE, who had been assigned this task, had continued his activities by contacting persons of a like mind (fanatically pro Bung KARNO) and finally decided to entrust the organization and command over the Front to Gen. BAMBANG SUPENO. Lt.Col.SJAFIIE had also applied to the Government for a budget to finance his activities.

4. Gen.BAMBANG SUPENO, who on various occasions called on Bung KARNO, took an active part in assembling persons who were fanatical supporters of Bung KARNO, in order to achieve the formation of this organization. As a result, campaigns were conducted in Djakarta, Central Java and East Java.

e. Persons who were fanatical supporters of Bung KARNO and took an active part in the formation and implementation of the SUKARNO Front were:

1. CHAERUL SALEH, Dr. SUBANDRIO, ACHMADI, ACHADI, TUMAKAKA, HANAFAI, ANWAR SANUSI, Lt,Col.SJAFIIE, BAMBANG SUPENO.

2. The ALI-SURACHMAN PNI youth group, JOHN LUNINGKEWAS, TIRANDA, PAHALA, SLAMET SUROJO.

They visited Bung KARNO and declared that the whole of the Marhaenist Youth stood ready to join the SUKARNO Front.

3. Police:

Assistant Chief Commissioner Drs.UTORO,
Assistant Chief Commissioner ANTON SUDJARWO,,
Assistant Chief Commissioner SUROSO,
Assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA.

4. Persons who were in support:

Police Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, Ma-
rine Corps Gen. HARTONO, Army Gen. SUADI.

f. In carrying out its task, the SUKARNO
Front (which fanatically supported Bung
KARNO) carried out the following actions:

1. combating demonstrations or opposition
to Bung KARNO, as in the case of the
Universitas Indonesia Tandjong Priok, Jog-
ja etc.

2. Attempts to take away Bung KARNO from
Djakarta.

g. In this connection Gen SUTJIPTO JUDODI-
HARDJO, Minister/Commander of the Police
had also reported to Bung KARNO about police
activities in Central Java headed by Brig.
Gen. SABUR and in East Java headed by Brig.
Gen. SUMARSONO. This was done as part of the
unqualified support to Bung KARNO by means
of the organization and the implementation
of the tasks of the SUKARNO Front.

75. Tell us about the activities of BAMBANG SUPENDO
in connection with the SUKARNO Front.

75. 1. Before G-30-S/PKI BAMBANG SUPENDO was a
General of the Army and a leading figure
in the Brawidjaja group.

It was also known that BAMBANG SUPENDO was
disappointed in the Army.

2. This BAMBANG SUPENDO, was recommended by
CHAERUL SALEH to Bung KARNO as a person

who was capable and had sufficient influence to command the SUKARNO Front. Bung KARNO agreed to this and afterwards received BAMBANG SUPENO on a number of occasions.

3. When he met Bung KARNO, BAMBANG SUPENO declared that he was willing to assume his task and promised to remain faithful to Bung KARNO and protect him. Bung KARNO told BAMBANG SUPENO to go ahead, and instructed him to see to it that he carried out his task strictly according to the ideas of Bung KARNO.

4. I heard at one time that BAMBANG SUPENO, after he had seen Bung KARNO, held discussions at his house in connection with the activities of the SUKARNO Front. If I am not mistaken BAMBANG SUPENO, either at the end of 1966 or the beginning of 1967, reported on occasion to Bung KARNO in Bogor Palace on the results of his work. The gist of this was that the nation was still behind Bung KARNO and that the forces which supported him were still ready to defend him.

5. I also heard that BAMBANG SUPENO reported to Bung KARNO about the Military District Command Brawidjaja, the gist being that the leaders and the troops of Brawidjaja were behind Bung KARNO.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the next read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval. This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provi-

sionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Thursday, October 29, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
Col. KKO

The interrogators:

S. SOEGIARJO
Lt.Col.CPM NRP: 12688

AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police

This day, Friday, October 30th, 1970, we:

1. S.SOEGIARJO - Lieut.Col.CPM NRP: 12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE - Ass.Chief Commissioner of Police

both in the function of member of the Central Investigation Team, interrogated a man admitting he was:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO

having the rank of Colonel KKO, function: ASKA-PERS/MIL (Chief Assistant Military Personnel, Navy/Military brand), age/date of birth: 43 years/ 19 September 1927, place of birth: Karanganyar Kebumen, religion: Roman Catholic, address/place of residence: Djalan Widjaja 2/121 Kebajoran Baru Djakarta.

He was heard as a witness in matters relating to the G-30-S/PKI.

In reply to the question we put to him he, the witness. (BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO) gave the following replies:

76. You have told the interlocuters that JOHN LUNINGKEWAS, SLAMET SUROJO, PAHALA and TIRANDA were active in the formation of the "SUKARNO Front" and sometimes called on Bung KARNO for discussions relative to the "SUKARNO Front". Please tell us about:
- a. When and where did they meet Bung KARNO to discuss matters relating to the "SUKARNO Front".
 - b. Who was there?
 - c. What did they talk about and what instructions did Bung KARNO give?

- d. Which Government officials, or Palace officials knew about those meetings?
 - e. How were the results of those discussions with them carried out?
76. I can tell you the following about the meeting of the ALI-SURACHMAN PNI youth group and Bung KARNO:
- a. As I recall they called on Bung KARNO in the first months of 1966 in the Merdeka Palace in Djakarta and were received at about ten hours in the official visitors' hall.
 - b. In addition to the four youths (JOHN LUNINGKEWAS, SLAMET SUROJO, PAHALA and TIRANDA) also present were Pak ALI SASTRO-AMIDJOJO and Ir.SURACHMAN.
 - c. In broad outline the substance of the talks was:
 - 1. The PNI youths were completely ready to stand by Bung KARNO, to protect him and to fight those who were against him.
 - 2. They agreed to be the "SUKARNO Front's active core during its inception.
 - 3. The formation of the "SUKARNO Front" in Central Java was the responsibility of SLAMET SUROJO and was to have the support of certain persons drawn from the Central Java Police, in particular the troops of the Mobile Brigade and the Marines there.The formation of the "SUKARNO Front" in East Java would be directly carried out with the complete support of the Police in East Java.
- It would be possible to form a "SUKARNO Front" in Djakarta with a base in Tandjong

Priok, where the Banteng Djakarta (another pro SUKARNO organization Ed.) had already been formed.

4. Movements designed to counter anti-Bung KARNO forces could be directly carried out.
 5. They asked for funds for this from Bung KARNO in order to finance the movements.
 6. These young men of the PNI once more swore their loyalty and assured him that they would carry out his orders in the conviction that they would succeed and be victorious.
 7. For his part, Bung KARNO gave them instructions to carry out the plans and fulfil their promises and also promised to give them funds.
- d. As I recall, there were Government and Palace officials present at the time who knew about those meetings: Pak CHAERUL SALEH and GEN.SABUR.
- e. This is what I know about the implementation of what had been agreed upon as a result of the discussions:
1. SLAMET SUROSO did in fact go to Central Java and it was noticeable that there were pro Bung KARNO actions; for example clashes in Jogja.
 2. In East Java, it is proven, was a movement to defend Bung KARNO which in particular was headed by the East Java Police District Commander.
 3. In Djakarta there were clashes between demonstrators who were against Bung KARNO and youth of the ALI-SURACHMAN PNI group.

4. I heard later that Bung KARNO had in actual fact supplied money to these youth.
 5. The existence of a plan to get Bung KARNO out of Djakarta because it was thought that Bung KARNO was not safe in Djakarta in view of the fact that anti-Bung KARNO forces were growing in strength.
77. You have told the interlocutors that clashes between groups of youths demonstrating in the streets to draw the attention of the Government to the Three fold People's Demand (i.e. disbanding of the PKI, Communists out of the Cabinet and a decrease in foodprices Ed.) and youths who were pro Bung KARNO and belonged to the "SUKARNO Front" movement was a result of the implementation of the "SUKARNO Front". Please tell us:
- a. When and where did the clashes take place?
 - b. When, where and how did Bung KARNO know about those events?
 - c. What was Bung KARNO's reaction when he knew?
 - d. What was the reaction of Brig.Gen.SABUR and what advice did Brig.Gen.SABUR give to Bung KARNO?
- 77.a. I do not recall the exact date, but I do remember that the aforementioned clashes did in fact take place, as well as actions in favour of Bung KARNO.
1. At about the beginning of 1966 there were clashes at the UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA Salemba between students and the pro Bung KARNO group.
 2. At about the beginning of 1966 there

were clashes between demonstrators and the pro Bung KARNO Banteng Djakarta group.

3. In 1966 there were clashes in Jogja between student demonstrators and a pro Bung KARNO group.

4. In 1967 there was a so-called Show of Force by the Mahaenist youth (pro Bung KARNO).

b. Bung KARNO was aware of those events on the grounds of reports he received. Firstly through Gen. SABUR of Col. SAELAN and, secondly, through Dr. SUBANDRIO or CHAERUL SALEH, in Djakarta. I remember in particular that a report was made to Bung KARNO about the Snow of Force in Central Java by the Marhaenist youth.

This was in Bogor Palace and Bung KARNO was shown photographs of the incident. I have seen those photographs.

c. Each time that Bung KARNO received a report about the clashes and actions he expressed satisfaction and was full of praise for the people who were defending him.

d. As far as I can remember, Gen. SABUR was both satisfied and proud when he presented those reports to Bung KARNO. The advice he gave to Bung KARNO contained suggestions about how to give increasing support to and build up pro Bung KARNO forces.

78. Tell us about:

a. When and where did Gen. SUADI meet Bung KARNO for discussions connected with the "SUKARNO Front".

b. What was the course of those discussions?

- c. What other people knew about them?
- d. What were Gen. SUADI's activities in connection with the "SUKARNO Front"?

78. I do not know very much about Gen. SUADI's connections with the "SUKARNO Front".

- a. It is true that Gen. SUADI has on a number of occasions called upon Bung KARNNO, but I never knew when they talked about the "SUKARNO Front".
- b. I know nothing about the course of the talks, or their contents.
- c. Neither do I know who knew about the discussions.
- d. I know nothing at all about the activities of Gen. SUADI in connection with the "SUKARNO Front".

I can recall only one instance of Gen. SUADI submitting a report to Bung KARNNO (March 10th, 1966).

- e. I would like to add that I do in fact know from the attitude and statements of Gen. SUADI that he belonged to the devotees of Bung KARNNO both before and after the G-30-S/PKI.

79. Tell us about the relationship between Bung KARNNO and the Army Gen. SUADI, before as well as after the G-30-S/PKI affair.

79. I can tell you the following about the good relations between Bung KARNNO and Gen. SUADI:

- a. Before the G-30-S/PKI Bung KARNNO had given his personal blessing and permission for Gen. SUADI's wedding.

I had heard that that permission to marry had not been approved by the leaders of

the Army. However, Bung KARNO allowed his tights as President and Supreme Commander to prevail and maintained his approval. Through this incident the close relation between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUADI became even clearer than they already were.

b. One of the results of this good relationship was the appointment of Gen. SUADI to an Ambassadorial post.

c. After the G-30-S/PKI I knew that Gen. SUADI met Bung KARNO several times, both in Djakarta and in Bogor, on unofficial occasions - for example to drink coffee, at a Krontjong musical evening in Bogor, at lunch, etc.

80. Tell us about:

a. The role played and the activities of Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO in matters relating to the "SUKARNO Front".

b. When and where did Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO meet Bung KARNO to talk about these matters and what was the substance of those talks?

c. What other persons knew about these talks between Bung KARNO and Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO?

80. Before I answer these questions I would like to explain how Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO got to be appointed Minister.

When Bung KARNO decided to replace Adm. R.E.MARTADINATA as Minister/Commander of the Navy, Bung KARNO had played with the idea of appointing Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO as Minister/Commander of the Navy

because, in his view, there were no senior officers in the Navy (from other Corps) whom he found suitable.

After I stressed to Bung KARNO that it was impossible to nominate anybody from the Marine Corps as Commander of the Navy (because that post definitely had to be filled by somebody from the sailor's Corps), Bung KARNO decided to appoint Navy Adm. MOELJADI as Minister/Commander of the Navy and Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO as Minister/Deputy Commander of the Navy.

a. As to the part played by Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO:

1. To judge by his attitude and statements as I saw and heard them, Gen. HARTONO did in fact approve and support the "SU-KARNO Front".

2. Gen. HARTONO agreed and gave his blessing to officers of the Marine Corps who supported the "SUKARNO Front".

3. Gen. HARTONO once said: "If Bung KARNO is white, then the Marine Corps is white, if Bung KARNO is black, then the Marine Corps is black".

This statement had far-reaching consequences.

4. I am not aware of any other activities of Gen. HARTONO.

b. In 1966 Gen. HARTONO visited Bung KARNO on a number of occasions. I was never present at these meetings, but I did observe:

1. The deployment of troops in Djakarta either on or after March 10, 1966.

2. The deployment of troops in the Marine

Corps (two battalions) in Jogja in 1966.
3. Gen. HARTONO's support of both Bung KARNNO and the SUKARNO Front.

It is quite probable that the SUKARNO Front was a subject of discussion when Bung KARNNO met Gen. HARTONO.

c. I do not recall if any other persons were aware of these talks between Bung KARNNO and Gen. HARTONO.

d. As far as I can see, Gen. HARTONO's activities, insofar as they related to the SUKARNO Front, were channelled through Dr. SUBANDRIO and CHAERUL SALEH.

81. Please tell us:

a. Was the placement of troops of the Marine Corps at various points in Djakarta and other areas, and the demonstration "Show of Force" of Marine Corps troops everywhere in 1966, connected with the aims and objects of the "SUKARNO Front" organization, or were they at least a result of the talks between Bung KARNNO and Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO on the evening of March 10, 1966?

b. Did Gen. HARTONO know about the plan to take Bung KARNNO out of Djakarta? What was Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO's part in this?

81.a. The placement of troops of the Marine Corps in other areas at the beginning of 1966 had no official connection with the SUKARNO Front. These placements were based on the policy of the leaders of the Navy which was aimed at the extension of the Maritime sphere of influence. At that time the leaders of the Navy felt that they were pushed into the background

and, compared with the Army, had too little territorial power. That is why Marine Corps troops were moved that officially fell under the Commanders of the Maritime Districts. The subordinates of the Marine Corps, wherever they were stationed, followed the attitude of Gen. HARTONO as leader of the Marine Corps. This attitude ran parallel with the activities of the SUKARNO Front. We may therefore say that the movement of those troops was in accordance with the activities of the SUKARNO Front. As far as I know, the deployment of the Marine Corps troops was not the result of talks between Bung KARNO and Gen. HARTONO. As to the movement of Marine Corps Troops in Jogja after the Mandate of March Eleventh in 1966: these belonged in fact to actions to strengthen pro Bung KARNO elements, or the SUKARNO Front which, at that time, found itself confronted with anti Bung KARNO demonstrations.

b. I never heard from Gen. HARTONO himself about plans or attempts to transfer Bung KARNO. I heard that there were groups or troops within the Marine Corps who were involved and to judge by the attitude of Gen. HARTONO at the time, I think that Gen. HARTONO knew about this. But I do not know what part he played in this.

82. You have told the interlocutors that Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO had said "If Bung KARNO is white, then the Marine Corps is white; if Bung KARNO is black, then the Marine Corps is black".

You also said that this pronouncement had far reaching consequences.

Please explain to us:

a. What was the significance and what was the purpose of this statement by Marine Corps Gen. HARTONO "If Bung KARNO is white, then the Marine Corps is white, if Bung KARNO is black then the Marine Corps is black"

b. What were those far-reaching consequences which this statement could have?

82. I can tell you the following from my knowledge:

a. When Gen. HARTONO said "If Bung KARNO is white, then the Marine Corps is white; if Bung KARNO is black, then the Marine Corps is black", he meant that both he and his Marine Corps backed Bung KARNO unconditionally and would defend Bung KARNO, who at that time was President and Supreme Commander. This was because Gen. HARTONO was loyal to Bung KARNO. During a Staff meeting at the Marine Corps Headquarters at the end of 1967 and in 1968 when Bung KARNO was no longer President, Gen. HARTONO said that the policy of the Marine Corps from then on was no longer to defend Bung KARNO but to give full support to the New Order.

b. The statement had wide repercussions:

1. Internally

As a result of the doctrine and discipline of the Marine Corps which was constantly emphasized, all members of the Marine Corps, wherever they were, continued to be loyal and obedient to their leader, i.e. the Commander of the Marine

Corps. The result of that statement was that the subordinates of the Marine Corps were influenced and acted according to their convictions in defending Bung KARNO. Because of this attitude there were frequent clashes in various district which we regarded as undesirable.

Fortunately, there were still enough officers in the middle echolon of the Marine Corps command who were sensible and were able to control their subordinates and this prevent larger and more general clashes with other forces.

2. Externally

The statement by Gen. HARTONO had a great deal of influence as regards reaction from outside the Marine Corps. The pro Bung KARNO group felt they got good opportunity and support from the Marine Corps so that they felt strengthened in continuing their efforts.

The anti Bung KARNO groups, or the forces of the "New Order" were dissatisfied with the Marine Corps and labeled the whole of the Marine Corps as defenders of Bung KARNO or anti New Order.

Because of this attitude the forces of the New Order mistrusted the Marine Corps and there were even some attempts to use armed force against the Marine Corps.

83. Tell us about the part played in the SUKARNO Front by Assistant Chief Commissioner Drs. UTORO, Assistant Chief Commissioner ANTON SUDJARWO, Assistant Chief Commissioner SUTOTO, Assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA.

Please also tell us when and where they appeared before Bung KARNO to discuss the problems of the SUKARNO Front and what did they talk about?

83. Actually, I knew very little about these figures of the Police you mentioned.

1. It is true that, in 1966, I did hear Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT or assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA or Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL mention those names as leading figures in the Police who played an active part in the SUKARNO Front.

However, I was not aware of the nature of their activities.

2. I did not know and do not recall that they ever called on Bung KARNO to discuss the problems of the SUKARNO Front; if they were, I do not know what they talked about.

3. I can tell you only about Assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA, whom I got to know after he had replaced Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT as Adjutant: I was able to discern from some of the talks I had with Assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA, as a colleague Adjutant, that Assistant Chief Commissioner SIDHARTA was loyal to Bung KARNO and would always defend him.

He also referred to his work with the SUKARNO Front in uniting and training persons who were pro Bung KARNO.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was

compiled according to truth and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the text read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval. This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Friday, October 30th, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO
Col.KKO

The interrogators:

S.SOEGIJARJO
Lt.Col.CPM NRP: 12688

AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

This day, Saturday, October 31, 1970.we.....etc.

84. You have said that Bung KARNO received a letter from D.N. AIDIT on October 6, 1965. Parallel with that letter to Bung KARNO, AIDIT had raised points in Solo to a number of cadre members of the PKI, including MUNIR and BONO:

1. He (AIDIT) had written a letter to Bung KARNO.
 2. The struggle of the PKI (G-30-S/PKI) was to be continued and to that end the PKI had to await the orders of Bung KARNO.
- Please tell us about the form and contents of the instructions of Bung KARNO for AIDIT.

84. I did not know either directly or concretely what instructions there were from Bung KARNO for AIDIT. However, from concrete facts such as:

1. That Bung KARNO never condemned G-30-S/PKI.
2. That Bung KARNO had in fact received such a letter from AIDIT.
3. That Bung KARNO gave the following instructions:

- Not to be angry with each other,
- Not to condemn the G-30-S/PKI or the Council of Generals,
- To carry out the 5 Sacred Talisman of the Revolution,
- All G-30-S/PKI problems were to be solved only by Bung KARNO.

4. That Bung KARNO had never liquidated the PKI.
5. That Bung KARNO was very angry and dissatisfied about the Threefold People's Demand made by demonstrators.

I am led to believe that the orders of Bung KARNO to establish the SUKARNO FRONT were in accordance with the expectations of AIDIT. With the establishment of the SUKARNO FRONT (on the lines suggested by Bung KARNO), or the core of which consisted of PNI (ALI SURACHMAN) youth and of persons who were fanatically pro-Bung KARNO, among which there were also many cadres of the PKI, - it appeared that this was the opportunity for the PKI to infiltrate, in order to ensure the continuation of the PKI - its ideals and plans.

85. Please tell us about the connection between the interests of the PKI and those of Bung KARNO as embodied in:

- a. The G-30-S/PKI movement
- b. The formation of the SUKARNO FRONT

85. As to the connection between Bung KARNO and the PKI:

- a. Political peace between Bung KARNO and the PKI was already apparent prior to the events of the G-30-S/PKI.

1. Owing to his ambition to demonstrate that he was a great world leader Bung KARNO met with a great deal of opposition in Western countries. This annoyed Bung KARNO and finally resulted in his attacking Western countries.

2. In pursuing his policies, in particular

the policy of leaving the United Nations and establishing the Conference of the New Emerging Forces as a rival to the U.N., Bung KARNO worked to establish the Djakarta - Pnom Penh - Peking - Pyong Yang axis; a policy clearly desired by the Chinese People's Republic.

The PKI, which at that time was more pro-Peking than pro-Moscow, shared this policy with Bung KARNO.

3. There was a meeting in Shanghai between Bung KARNO and CHOU EN LAI.

The result was an agreement:

- Indonesia was to continue its struggle on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and in this would have the complete support of China.
- China would give support in the form of arms to establish the Fifth Force.

This was clearly an advantage, according with the wishes of the PKI.

4. Bung KARNO disapproved of people who did not like his policies.

That is the reason why Bung KARNO was displeased with the Generals who were reported to be disloyal to him and did not agree with his policies, in particular:

- cooperation with the PKI,
- the Djakarta-Pnom Penh-Peking-Pyongyang axis,
- withdrawal from the United Nations and the establishment of the Conference of the New Emerging Forces.

Bung KARNO wanted to eliminate the Generals whom he did not regard as loyal.

The PKI, which also had its own ideals and plans, based on its doctrines, were also

displeased with the Generals because they were so obviously an obstacle to the plans and intentions of the PKI.

From this, the accord in aims and purposes between Bung KARN0 and the PKI to eliminate the Generals was clearly apparent, the result being the events of G-30-S/PKI.

b. When it appeared that the effort of G-30-S/PKI had failed both Bung KARN0 and the PKI would not give up and continued to make every effort, despite everything, to achieve their goals and policies.

1. The statements and instructions of Bung KARN0 in relation to G-30-S/PKI, as I have said earlier, were aimed at restoring calm, so that the forces which were both pro-Bung KARN0 and pro-PKI could be consolidated.

2. The instructions to establish the SU-KARN0 FRONT was meant to unite those forces which were pro-Bung KARN0 to resist the pressure of the anti-Bung KARN0 forces and were also designed to protect the PKI and give it freedom of movement.

86. You told the Government that the arms which had been sent to Indonesia as aid by China had been partially distributed to members of the PKI, the People's Youth and the troops of the G-30-S/PKI in Senajan on the evening of October 1, 1965. A report had been made on this by Brig.Gen.SABUR to Bung KARN0 in the Bogor Palace.

Please tell us about:

a. What kind of arms and what quantity were distributed?

- b. What was the purpose of the distribution of the arms and what consequences were foreseen?
- c. What was the substance of the report to Bung KARNO by Brig.Gen.SABUR?
- d. What was the reaction of Bung KARNO to Brig.Gen.SABUR's report?

86. I first heard about the distribution of those arms (on October 1, 1965) on the evening of October 2, 1965, in Bogor, at about 10 o'clock.

Bung KARNO knew about these events from the report submitted to him by Gen. SABUR.

- a. - The type of arms distributed were rifles manufactured in China (Tjung) plus ammunition.
 - The exact quantity distributed was not known, but there must have been hundreds.
 - The distribution was carried out by the Air Force.

b. The object of the distribution of arms was to arm pro-G-30-S/PKI elements so that they could resist the forces whose aim was to destroy the G-30-S/PKI, i.e. the KOSTRAD.

The result of the arms distribution was that shooting broke out near Senajan and Hotel Indonesia (1-2 October 1965) between the troops of the KOSTRAD and the above mentioned armed persons.

c. I heard that Brig.Gen.SABUR had reported to Bung KARNO that the Air Force had distributed Chinese weapons to progressive youths at Senajan.

These youths also offered resistance to the troops of the KOSTRAD.
d. Bung KARNO was satisfied with Brig.Gen. SABUR's report and he justified the distribution of the arms.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the next read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval. This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Monday, November 2, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO
Col.KKO.

The interrogators:

S. SOEGIJARJO
Lt.Col.CPM NRP:12688

AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

This day, Monday, November 2nd, 1970, we.....etc.

87. Was it true that, on or around September 15, 1965, at about 08.00 hrs, in the rear gallery of Djakarta Palace, a meeting took place between Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO, Brig.Gen. SUTARDHIO, Brig.Gen.SABUR, Brig.Gen.SUNARJO and Police Brig.Gen.SUTARTO to discuss plans for measures against the Chief Officers of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO?

- a. What was your knowledge of the plan to act against the Chief Officers of the Army?
- b. How did the talks go? Please repeat what was said as far as you can remember.
- c. Who were actually present at that meeting?
- d. What decisions were taken at the meeting?

87.a. As regards my knowledge of plans to act against the Chief Officers of the Army, I can tell you the following:

1. As I said before, Bung KARNO had previously received reports about the Generals of the Army who were regarded as being disloyal to him.

Bung KARNO also believed in the accuracy of the "Gilchrist document", which referred to "our local army friends".

2. Bung KARNO had ordered many officials to check out the accuracy of that information and kept receiving confirmation of the information.

3. Both in his attitude and his statements Bung KARNO displayed dissatisfaction with the Generals of the Army, i.e. the command of the Army whom he regarded as being dis-

loyal to him. Bung KARNO had said on occasion (for example in Tampaksiring on 6-6-1965) that it was necessary to reorganize the Army command.

On another occasion Bung KARNO was extremely angry with the Generals of the Army (Gen.PARMAN etc.).

I concluded from everything I had seen or got to know about all this that Bung KARNO intended to take action against the Chief Officers of the Army prior to G-30-S/PKI.

The situation at that time was such that:

- according to ethics I myself as an officer of the Navy had better not meddle with the affairs of other Forces.
 - I observed that leading officials and Chief Officers of the Army were discussing and investigating these problems.
- So that I, regarding myself as not being competent, did not pay much attention to those problems.

b. About the middle of September, 1965, (approx. 15th) the above meeting was held.

As far as I remember the following is the gist of some of the discussions:

1. Bung KARNO again inquired about a Council of Generals, or about the Generals of the Army who were disloyal.

Bung KARNO said that the existence of a Council of Generals had been confirmed from reports which he had received.

2. It was proposed to Bung KARNO that, assuming the information was true, measures should be taken against this Council of Generals.

3. Bung KARNO ordered Gen.SABUR and Gen.

SUNARJO to prepare measures against those disloyal Generals.

I can no longer recall the actual course of the talks, sentence by sentence.

c. As far as I can remember, the following were either present at the meeting or knew about it:

Dr. SUBANDRIO, Gen. SUTARDHIO, Gen. SUNARJO, Gen. SABUR Police Gen. SUTARTO, MUALIP NATION, Pak DJAMIN, Pak HARDJO WARDOJO, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT and all the Adjutants.

d. I do not know precisely what decision was taken at that meeting, apart from the abovementioned point, b(3), namely, the orders given by Bung KARNO to Gen. SUNARJO and Gen. SABUR to prepare action against the Generals of the Army.

88. In your reply to question number 14 in the Interrogation Report of October 3, 1970 as by the interlocutors, you declared, among other things:

a. On September 23, 1965, at about 07.00 hrs. there was a meeting in the rear gallery of Djakarta Palace between Bung KARNO and: Gen. MURSID, Gen. SUNARJO, Gen. SABUR, Air Marshall OMAR DANI, Dr. SUBANDRIO, Dr. LEIMENA, Dr. CHAERUL SALEH and DJAMIN.

b. At that meeting Gen. MURSID reported to Bung KARNO about the problem of the Army Generals who were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

c. At that meeting Bung KARNO ordered Gen. SABUR to take measures against the Generals of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

d. Apart from this the following took place

during these meetings:

1. Marshall OMAR DANI made a statement taking Bung KARNO's side in the conflict with the Council of Generals.
2. There was a dispute between Dr. SUBANDRIO and Dr. CHAERUL SALEH about matters relating to the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining.

Please tell us about:

a. Who were actually present at that meeting? What other persons, if any, knew about that meeting?

b. What was the substance of the report made by Gen. MURSID to Bung KARNO and how did Bung KARNO react to it?

Please report on the dialogue between Bung KARNO and Gen. MURSID at that time; at least what you can remember of it.

c. What did Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR say to each other at the time?

d. What was the part played by Gen. SUNARJO?

e. What did Dr. SUBANDRIO and Dr. CHAERUL SALEH say during their dispute and how did Bung KARNO react to it?

f. Why did Bung KARNO summon Gen. SUDIRGO? Was Gen. SUDIRGO with Bung KARNO as a result of this summons and what did they talk about?

88.a. It is true that, on September 23, 1965, in the morning, this meeting took place.

Present were: Dr. SUBANDRIO, Dr. LEIMENA, CHAERUL SALEH, Gen. SUNARJO, Gen. MURSID, Marshall OMAR DANI, Gen. SABUR, Pak JAMIN, Pak MUALIF NASUTION, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT and all the Adjutants.

b. Gen. MURSID:

Gen. MURSID reported to Bung KARNO: "I have carried out Bung KARNO's orders to check out the truth about the Commanders of the Army who are not loyal to Bapak. It is in fact true that the Generals named by Bapak do not approve of Bapak's policies and are not loyal to him".

Bung KARNO: "Is what you are reporting true? I warn you, if necessary I will bring about a confrontation". Gen. MURSID: "It is true Pak".

c. Gen. SABUR:

Bung KARNO to Gen. SABUR:

"BUR, what about my orders to take measures against those Generals?".

Gen. SABUR: "We have discussed the preparations with Gen. SUNARJO and Gen. DIRGO (Director of Military Police). However, a more detailed preparation is necessary to carry out your orders".

Bung KARNO: "Where is DIRGO? Adjutant, call Gen. DIRGO!". "BUR, the measures against them must be quickly carried out!".

d. Gen. SUNARJO:

I am not quite sure what part was played at the time by Gen. SUNARJO. All I can remember is that Gen. SUNARJO confirmed the statement by Gen. SABUR.

e. The dispute that I recollect between Dr.

SUBANDRIO and CHAERUL SALEH related to the post at the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining. Dr. SUBANDRIO said that Pak CHAERUL SALEH, who already had the post of THIRD DEPUTY PREMIER, should give up his post as Minister of Basic Industry and Mining and should give it to someone else.

Pak CHAERUL SALEH was opposed to this suggestion by Dr. SUBANDRID and wanted to continue as Minister of Basic Industry and Mining.

Finally, Bung KARNO said:

"Enough of this, stop all this fuss. I have appointed and trusted somebody, carry that out. Leave CHAERUL SALEH as he is. Let us not talk about it any longer".

f. When he was talking to Gen. SABUR, Bung KARNO asked for Gen. DIRGO and ordered an Adjutant to call him. This summons was within the context of Bung KARNO's orders to take measures against the Generals of the Army. At that moment it was announced that Gen. DIRGO was not available, but in Kalimantan. After this had been reported to Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO ordered that a telegram be sent to Gen. DIRGO telling him to report.

On approx. September 26, 1965, Gen. DIRGO arrived in Djakarta and reported to Bung KARNO.

Bung KARNO to Gen. SUDIRGO:

"How is it DIRGO, have you already checked out the Council of Generals?"

Gen. DIRGO: "Yes Pak, and it is correct that there is such information".

Bung KARNO: "Good. I have ordered SABUR and SUNARJO to take measures against those Generals. You must give your support. I rely upon you and upon the Military Police Corps." That is all I can remember about the aforementioned meeting.

89. Please tell us about the facilities which Bung

KARNO and Brig.Gen. SABUR had provided for Gen. SUDIRGO as Director of Military Police, so that the Military Police Army could carry out its task in accordance with Bung KARNO's wishes in the context of the action against the Commanders of the Army, which were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

89. I knew, as a matter of fact, that about the middle of 1965, considerable facilities were given to Gen. SUDIRGO and the Military Police of the Army by the Tjakrabirawa Regiment. As far as I know they were vehicles and arms. I also heard from one of the Staff Officers of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, that Gen. SABUR would be able to provide money and accommodation by way of support to the Military Police of the Army through the mediation of Gen. SUDIRGO. However, I do not know whether that was true. At the time I did not know there was a connection between the facilities and the action to be taken against the Generals of the Army, for the simple reason that I was told that such support was necessary within the context of the protection of the security of the President and Supreme Commander.

90. Did you know at any time that Gen. SUDIRGO sent a letter to Bung KARNO reporting the existence of a Council of Generals in Army circles?

Please tell us about:

a. When and how did that letter reach Bung KARNO?

- b. What was its contents?
- c. What was Bung KARNO's reaction to it?

90. Round about August, 1965, I did hear from Gen. SABUR or from SAELAN that Gen. SUDIRGO had written a letter to Bung KARNO.

- a. The letter from Gen. SUDIRGO to Bung KARNO was handed over in July, 1965 (I do not know the exact date).

The letter was handed over via the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, that is, Gen. SABUR.

- b. I did not know the entire contents of the letter, but it seems that it gave in broad outline the report of Gen. SUDIRGO to Bung KARNO about the correctness of the report concerning Generals in the Army who were disloyal to Bung KARNO.

According to Gen. SABUR or Col. SAELAN, Gen. SUDIRGO had checked that report.

- c. Bung KARNO, in receiving the report, expressed his satisfaction with it and his confidence in its entire contents.

91. Please tell us about where and when Marshall OMAR DANI called on Bung KARNO, together with Brig.Gen. SUPARDJO and what they talked about.

91. 1. As I recall, Marshall OMAR DANI and ex-Brig.Gen. SUPARDJO called on Bung KARNO in the Merdeka Palace, Djakarta, at 11.00 hrs. on September 29, 1965. At the time Marshall OMAR DANI came in his official function as one of the Battle Commanders in the Mandala Command.

- 2. The discussion turned upon the readiness of Gen. SUPARDJO and his Army troops to act against the Generals of the Army

and the readiness of Marshall OMAR DANI and the Air Force to support such action.

92. Before the events of the G-30-S/PKI Brig.Gen. SUNARJO, as Deputy Attorney General, had very often seized private property, these included vehicles, gold adornments, jewels (diamonds and brilliants) money etc.

Will you tell us what you know about this and about the property seized by Brig.Gen. SUNARJO being handed over to Bung KARNO. Where did Bung KARNO put the property seized?

92.a. I know that, before the G-30-S/PKI, Gen. SUNARJO, as Deputy Attorney General, on frequent occasions handed over property that had been seized to Bung KARNO.

I heard from Gen. SUNARJO himself that the property seized had belonged to persons who had violated the law.

The kind of property seized, as far as I know, included such things as: vehicles, antiques, jewels and foreign currency. I do not know the extent of the property seized.

b. Bung KARNO took possession of that property by signing a receipt. Where Bung KARNO kept the property, I do not know, all I heard was that part of it was given to HARTINI, DEWI and ARIJATI.

c. After the G-30-S/PKI it came to my ears that Lt.Col.SUPARTO, a private assistant of Bung KARNO, had also received orders on occasion to take the property with him and look after it.

d. In particular, I can tell you the following about Gen. SUNARJO who, on the mor-

ning of September 27, 1965, had handed over to Bung KARNO goods that had been seized.

After Gen. SUNARJO had been with Bung KARNO in his room he spoke with Col.SAELAN in the rear gallery of Merdeka Palace:

"SAELAN, where is SABUR? The measures against the Generals can be carried out. Tell SABUR to come to Bapak immediately so that he can receive his orders directly from Bapak".

This statement by Gen. SUNARJO was heard by myself, Pak MUALIF NASUTION and HENNY.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the next read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval. This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Tuesday, November 3, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO
Col.KKO.

The interrogators:

S.SOEGIJARJO
Lt.Col.CPM NRP: 12688

AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

This day, Tuesday, November 3, 1970, we.....etc.

93. Please give us some information about transactions relating to the financing of the "SUKARNO Front", as follows:
- a. What amount of "money" was set aside or used to pay for the "SUKARNO Front"?
 - b. Who was in charge of the whole question of financing?
 - c. Where did the money for this purpose come from?
 - d. Were funds originating from the commissions also used for the "SUKARNO Front"?
- 93.a. I knew from a decision of the President, that I had heard of in 1966, and I also knew from conversations I had with Ministers, that it was a fact that money was set aside to finance the "SUKARNO Front". I did not know how big the amount was, neither do I know how much money was spent.
- b. As far as I can remember Third Deputy Premier CHAERUL SALEH was in charge of the financing.
 - c. The money was derived from state funds, that is to say, from the Expense Budget, this money requires the signature of the Government if it is for the Bung KARNO Revolutionary Fund or the signature of two Deputy Prime Ministers.
 - d. Bung KARNO received a lot of commission funds: I do not know individually from where and what amounts of Commissions. I knew that Bung KARNO did receive these funds from a number of officials.

As far as I knew personally from experience: on about 5 (five) occasions I was ordered by Bung KARNO to go abroad and take up money and then hand it over to him.

(1) About the end of 1963 (I have forgotten the exact date) I was ordered by Bung KARNO to accompany the late Mrs. U. SULARTO to Hong Kong.

This Mrs. SULARTO acted as a mediator for business between the PERMINA (State Oil Company Ed.) and a Japanese enterprise, and she was authorized to receive commission funds which were being paid out in instalments. At the end of 1963 Mrs. SULARTO received US \$ 125.000.

After Mrs. SULARTO had received the money she handed it over to me and I flew back to Djakarta. This money I handed over to Bung KARNO. I do not know what percentage Mrs. SULARTO received from Bung KARNO.

(2) About the middle of 1964, I again went to Hong Kong with Mrs. SULARTO for the same purpose. This time Mrs. SULARTO received US \$ 75.000 and I handed over the money to Bung KARNO in the same way.

(3) At the end of 1964 I went to Tokyo with Mrs. SULARTO for the same purpose. This time she received US \$ 38.000 and this money I also handed over to Bung KARNO.

(4) About the middle of 1965 I went to Tokyo, again with Mrs. SULARTO, for the same purpose. This time she received US \$ 140.000 and that money I also handed over to Bung KARNO.

(5) At the beginning of 1965, I was ordered by Bung KARNO to go to Zurich in Switzerland and to draw from a bank there an

amount of US \$ 50.000. This money belonged to the Minister of Agriculture, FRANS SEDA. In order to be able to draw the money I took with me an introductory letter from Minister FRANS SEDA. I handed over that money to Bung KARNO.

That is all that I personally know about the commission funds. Honestly I do not know what Bung KARNO did with the money, although I did hear on one occasion that it was spent mainly on his wives and women friends.

Neither do I know with any certainty what Bung KARNO did with the money acquired from the sale of property that had been seized and handed over by Gen. SUNARJO, apart from what I have already said.

You ask whether the funds were used, among other things, to finance the "SUKARNO Front"? I would not be astonished if the answer was positive, it is quite possible. However, since I saw long before G-30-S/PKI how wasteful Bung KARNO was, I think that the commission funds were being used for his own private purposes.

94. After the G-30-S/PKI and about the end of 1965, and the beginning of 1966 (after the demonstrations) Bung KARNO ordered Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO to "(row) against the stream". Subsequently this order of Bung KARNO was passed on by SUTJIPTO JUDO to all Commanders of Police in the Districts. Will you explain:

a. Is it true that Bung KARNO gave such an order to Minister/Commander of the Police

SUTJIPTO JUDO? If it is true, what order was given? When was it given and who were the other persons who knew about it?

- b. What was meant by "against the stream?"
- c. What was the result of Bung KARNO's order to Minister/Commander of Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDO?

94. It is true that I had heard about that order being given by Bung KARNO, he using the expression "against the stream".

- a. Bung KARNO gave that order to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO on the last week of 1965 at the Palace. I do not remember to whom the order was given or who knew of it.
- b. The meaning of "against the stream" was that the Police must counter with all its power all demonstrations which were directed against the G-30-S/PKI or against Bung KARNO.
- c. As to the results of Bung KARNO's orders to Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO I knew that the Minister/Commander of the Police had given instructions to all Police Districts to carry out Bung KARNO's orders. Minister/Commander of the Police SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO also reported this to Bung KARNO.

95. Will you tell us what you know about the close relation between Bung KARNO and Brig.Gen. SUNARJO (Deputy Attorney General at the time) whereby SUNARJO was one of the supporters of Bung KARNO's plan of action against the Chief Officers of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO?

95. As to relations between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUNARJO, I can tell you the following:

a. Bung KARNO was very satisfied with

Gen. SUNARJO and trusted him, chiefly because of his appearance: he was tall, strong, straight forward and aggressive. Bung KARNO once said that the protector he needed was of Gen. SUNARJO's type.

b. Gen. SUNARJO was most loyal to Bung KARNO and it was clear from his every reaction and utterance that he would always protect Bung KARNO.

c. Bung KARNO once had a secretary named NORMA whom he greatly trusted. Later, NORMA married Gen. SUNARJO. Through this marriage relations between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUNARJO became even closer.

d. I very often saw Gen. SUNARJO, in his position as Deputy Attorney General report to Bung KARNO or receive instructions from him, although I did not know the substance of either the reports or the instructions.

e. As to the action against the Generals of the Army: I saw from the beginning that there were frequently a conference between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUNARJO, the latter both in his capacity was a confidant and as Deputy Attorney General and as Chief Officer of the Army of the Military Police Corps.

96. Apart from the commission funds to which you have already referred and for which you went abroad (5 times) in order to withdraw money for Bung KARNO, did you ever hear of any

other commission funds which were for Bung KARNO? If so, please tell us:

- a. What sort of commissions were they?
- b. Who, apart from yourself, were entrusted with orders by Bung KARNO to collect those commission funds?
- c. Which enterprises offered such commissions and in connection with what?
- d. In which banks were the commission funds deposited?
- e. Apart from the commission funds deposited in foreign banks, what other sources of wealth did Bung KARNO possess, either at home or abroad?

96. I can tell you the following about the commissions:

a.-Oil commissions between PERMINA and other countries.

-Motor vehicle commissions between GAYA MOTOR Cy. and Japan.

-Commissions resulting from the contract between the Tjakrabirawa Regiment and NIOIKENNY in Hong Kong.

-Books commissions.

-Rubber commissions.

-Aircraft commissions.

b. I am not aware and I have never heard of other persons who were instructed to withdraw funds abroad. I did, however, hear that those who were connected with the conclusion of contracts received their commission funds directly from the Contractors themselves and only thereafter gave part of it to Bung KARNO.

The names I heard in connection with the

contracts or commissions were:

- Gen. IBNU SUTOWO, PERMINA
- CHAERUL SALEH
- Ir.SUGIJO, GAYA MOTOR Cy.
- GEN.SABUR
- NIO
- Pak MUALIF NASUTION
- Pak DJAMIN
- KARKAM
- ASLAM
- DASAAD
- HASJIM IVING

c. I did not know much about the financial circumstances of Bung KARNO neither do I know many enterprises who gave these commissions. Some that I knew of were:

1. Oil enterprises in the U.S. and Japan connected with PERMINA.
2. Japanese Shipyards connected with PERMINA.
3. The Douglas Aircraft enterprises of America with DASAAD.
4. The Toyota/Mazda enterprises of Japan, DASAAD.
5. The contractor NIO/KENNY of Hong Kong with the Tjakrabirawa Regiment.

d. Honestly I did not know where Bung KARNO kept these commission funds, neither did I know in which bank.

As far as financial affairs were concerned Pak DJAMIN, Pak.M.NASUTION and DEWI were the persons who were most trusted by Bung KARNO in this connection.

e. The further details of Bung KARNO's wealth of which I have knowledge are the following:

1. A piece of land on the road from Tjia-wi to Sukabumi
 2. A house in Batutulis, Bogor.
 3. A house on the Djl. Gatotsubroto, Dja-karta.
 4. Scores of cars
 5. Paintings with the mark "property of Ir. SUKARNO".
 6. I have also heard that Bung KARNO bought a villa in Switzerland and also one in Manilla.
 7. Royalties of books printed both at home and abroad (some of these managed by CINDY ADAMS)
- Apart from the above I know nothing else about Bung KARNO's wealth.

97. In connection with your above answer from which it appeared that you received orders on 5 (five) separate occasions from SUKARNO to withdraw commission funds abroad, could you tell us to what commissions those funds related and how matters were further arranged?

97. The commission funds which I withdraw abroad were, as I have stated above, from 2 (two) sources:

1. From Hong Kong and Tokyo (4 times), representing a total amount of US \$ 125.000 plus US \$ 75.000, plus US \$ 38.000 plus US \$ 140.000 = US \$ 378.000 was derived from a contract for the construction of a ship, the contract being concluded between PERMINA and a Japanese yard in Tokyo (I have forgotten the name of the firm).

Until the contract was carried out Mrs. S. SULARTO acted as mediator. I handed over all the money to Bung KARNO.

2. Through the Minister of Estates FRANS SEDA, I received from a bank in Zürich in Switzerland an amount of US \$ 50.000. It seems very likely that this money was from the receipts of a foreign estate which had been nationalized. I gave the whole amount to Bung KARNO. I do not know what happened to the money after it had been received by Bung KARNO, apart from what I have already stated. I do not know whether there were other persons who were sometimes ordered by Bung KARNO to withdraw commission funds, as I was.

98. As you have explained, the property seized by Gen. SUNARJO (cars, gold adornments, diamonds, brilliants etc.) were all handed over to Bung KARNO. These Bung KARNO distributed among his wife HARJATI, HARTINI and DEWI and others. Will you please tell us about the following:

- a. The existence of a shop in the basement of the Hotel OKURA, in Tokyo, the property of DEWI, who sold jewels which originated from the property which had been confiscated?
- b. The sale of antique silver objects, originating from confiscation, in a shop known as International Shop, Djl. Nusantara, Djakarta?
- c. Why were those goods confiscated? Was that simply the whim of Gen. SUNARJO or was it on the orders of Bung KARNO, and what was the background?

98. I should tell you, in further explanation of my earlier statements, that I had heard that Bung KARNO had distributed money and other property which had been confiscated among his wives. I do not know whether what he gave to them was everything or only part of it.
- a. It is true, I did hear that DEWI had a shop in the basement of the OKURA Hotel in Tokyo. It is quite possible that antiques and jewels which had been confiscated were given to DEWI by Bung KARNO and that DEWI took the property to Tokyo and sold it.
 - b. I know nothing about the sale in the International Shop, Dj1. Nusantara, Djakarta, of confiscated antique silverware.
 - c. I did not know why this property was confiscated. From what I saw and heard at the time it generally went as follows:
 - 1. Somebody was detained on suspicion of having violated the law. After an investigation, Gen. SUNARJO reported it to Bung KARNO and also submitted a list of the possessions of the persons in question.
 - 2. Gen. SUNARJO suggested, and asked permission to confiscate the goods. Bung KARNO gave his permission and the actions had his blessing.
 - 3. The goods were confiscated and handed over to Bung KARNO.
99. Where and when did you first hear that Bung KARNO used the expression "absolute surprise" in considering the events of G-30-S/PKI?

What was the meaning and purpose of those words, as seen from the point of view of the activities of Bung KARNO before and during the events of G-30-S/PKI?

99. I first heard the expression "absolute surprise" used by Bung KARNO in Bogor on October 2 or 3, 1965. The purpose of those words was to prove to the community that Bung KARNO knew nothing beforehand of the events of G-30-S/PKI (at least this is what Bung KARNO hoped.) But the real object of those words was to protect Bung KARNO himself from criticism by the community after Bung KARNO knew that G-30-S/PKI had failed.

100. Did you ever hear of the existence of an Order of the Day issued by Air Marshall OMAR DANI, as Minister/Commander of the Air Force, which implied support for the G-30-S/PKI?

In addition to commenting on this, would you please also tell us about:

a. Was Bung KARNO aware of that Order of the Day of the Minister/Commander of the Air Force.

If so, where and how and in which way did Bung KARNO know about it?

b. What was the reaction of Bung KARNO to the Order of the Day of the Minister/Commander of the Air Force?

c. What instructions did Bung KARNO give to Marshall OMAR DANI in connection with that Order of the Day?

100. I knew about the existence of an Order

of the Day issued by Marshall OMAR DANI as Minister/ Commander of the Air Force and that it implied support for the G-30-S/PKI, on October 1, 1965 in the evening at about 19.30 hrs, when I appeared before Gen. SUHARTO in the KOSTRAD. Gen. SUHARTO spoke about it and was extremely angry. I heard about the Order of the Day from Gen. SABUR, after I returned that evening to Halim, on October 1, 1965 at 21.00 hrs.

- a. On that morning, on October 1, 1965, Marshall OMAR DANI reported already to Bung KARNO regarding the support which the Air Force would give to G-30-S/PKI. He also reported to Bung KARNO that he (Marshall OMAR DANI) had issued an Order of the Day.
- b. Bung KARNO showed his approval and satisfaction at Marshall OMAR DANI's attitude.
- c. I had no knowledge of the instructions given by Bung KARNO to Marshall OMAR DANI on October 1, 1965. After arrival in Bogor on October 2, 1965, and knowing about the failure of G-30-S/PKI, Bung KARNO gave instructions to Marshall OMAR DANI to withdraw the Order of the Day of October 1, 1965. The object of this was to protect Marshall OMAR DANI or the Air Force from involvement in G-30-S/PKI.

101. Please tell us about the reasons and the object of Bung KARNO's decision to send Marshall OMAR DANI abroad in order to fulfil his task as Commander of the Aviation Industry Command

on 19.10.1965.

101. It is true that Marshall OMAR DANI was ordered by Bung KARNO on October 19, 1965 to go abroad in connection with the Aviation Industry Command.

I do not remember which countries were visited by him, but I do know that his departure was, in reality, simply an attempt to protect him.

1. The attitude and behaviour of OMAR

DANI, both before and during G-30-S/PKI (October 1, 1965) proved that he was pro-G-30-S/PKI.

2. OMAR DANI issued an Order of the Day on October 1, 1965, the gist of which was support for G-30-S/PKI.

3. After he knew about the failure of G.30-S/PKI, on October 2, 1965, he withdrew the Order of the Day.

4. From October 2, 1965 OMAR DANI sought temporary protection in Bogor Palace because purges were being carried out by the KOSTRAD.

Because of the above facts Bung KARNO ordered OMAR DANI to go abroad, with the actual purpose of protecting OMAR DANI from the purges.

102. Please tell us about the following:

a. When and where did Lt.Col.SJAFIIE (Minister Extraordinary in Charge of Security) go to see Bung KARNO?

b. What problems were discussed by Lt.Col. SJAFIIE and Bung KARNO?

c. What other persons were present during this interview?

102. Before Lt.Col. SJAFIIE was appointed Minister, I remember that SJAFIIE had been to see Bung KARNO in October, 1965 in the company of Gen. SABUR. I heard, after that meeting, that SJAFIIE had to use his influence with his subordinates to secure support and protection for Bung KARNO. After SJAFIIE became Minister I do not know and I do not remember if there was a conference between him and Bung KARNO or what other people were present, really I do not know. Officially, I knew that, at that time, Minister SJAFIIE was entrusted by Deputy Premier CHAERUL SALEH with the task of building up the "SUKARNO Front". In this connection I also heard that SJAFIIE had asked for funds, but I do not know to what amount.

Done this day, this Report of Interrogation was compiled according to truth and taken account of the official oath. The interrogated, after having had the next read to him or asked to read the text back signed it as evidence of his approval. This Report of Interrogation was, moreover, provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day at Djakarta and the investigation will be proceeded with on Wednesday, November 4, 1970.

The interrogated:

BAMBANG SETYONO WIDJANARKO
Col.KKO.

The interrogators:

S. SOEGJARJO

Lt.Col.CPM NRP: 12688

AZWIR NAWIE

Ass.Chief Commissioner of
Police.

This day, Wednesday, November 4, 1970, we.....etc.,

103. Please tell us about the relation between OEI TJOE TAT and Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO in the context of the G-30-S/PKI and the formation of the SUKARNO Front.

103. I can only state the following about OEI TJOE TAT:

a. OEI TJOE TAT was appointed Minister and was sponsored by the Partai Indonesia, the PKI and Dr. SUBANDRIO.

b. It was obvious there was a high degree of mutual support between Dr. SUBANDRIO and OEI TJOE TAT. Bung KARNO also had great confidence in OEI TJOE TAT.

c. The fields of activity which I knew had been entrusted to OEI TJOE TAT by Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO were, in particular, all those matters relating to China:

1. As to the relationship with China:

From what I saw and heard both Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO always asked for the advice of OEI TJOE TAT.

Also, OEI TJOE TAT was always involved in conferences with China. It was also quite possible that OEI TJOE TAT was informed and also actively participated in the drafting of plans for the execution of armed aid to Indonesia as a gift from China prior to G-30-S/PKI.

2. Confrontation with Malaysia:

I knew that OEI TJOE TAT had been charged with the responsibility both

by Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO to recruit support and sympathy from the Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in the confrontation policy of 1965 against Malaysia.

Because of this task I observed that the confidence which Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO had in OEI TJOE TAT grew continually. About the middle of 1965 I learned that Bung KARNO had authorized that a certain amount of money in US \$ should be transferred to OEI TJOE TAT in connection with these activities.

3. On the domestic front:

OEI TJOE TAT was also trusted as a mediator and adviser in CHINESE affairs in Indonesia by Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO. As an example I may mention the case of the Committee for Deliberation of Indonesian Citizenship (for Chinese resident in Indonesia Ed.)

In this affair the advice and the involvement of OEI TJOE TAT was constantly noticeable.

I also heard on several occasions that contacts between Indonesia and the Ambassador of China in Djakarta were carried out through OEI TJOE TAT.

d. After G-30-S/PKI I heard that Minister OEI TJOE TAT was among a number of other Ministers who sought protection with Bung KARNO in connection with the demonstrations etc.

As a leading figure with the Partai Indonesia, OEI TJOE TAT was active, in all efforts to protect Bung KARNO. In particular, as I once heard, OEI TJOE TAT made

special efforts to activate Indonesian Chinese youth in defending Bung KARNO. This was at the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966.

I do not know of any other activities of OEI TJOE TAT which were directly connected with the "SUKARNO Front".

104. Please tell us about the relation between Police Gen. SAWARNO and Bung KARNO in the context of the G-30-S/PKI and the formation of the SUKARNO Front.

104. As regards Police Gen. SAWARNO I can tell you the following:

- a. Before the G-30-S/PKI I did in fact see Police Gen. SAWARNO on several occasions at the Palace or with Bung KARNO in his function as Commander of Police District VII/Greater Djakarta. Sometimes I saw him with ANWAS. From what I saw it was evident that Bung KARNO was fond of Police Gen. SAWARNO and trusted him because of his correct and loyal approach to Bung KARNO. In my view, Police Gen. SAWARNO was aware, as a confidant of Bung KARNO, at that stage, of the plans to act against the Generals of the Army. This was possible through Police Gen. SUTARTO, Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT or ANWAS.
- b. In the morning of October 1, 1965, Police Gen. SAWARNO came to the Palace as arranged, according to the guest book of visitors of Bung KARNO. When it appeared that, on that particular morning,

Bung KARNO was not in the Palace, Police Gen. SAWARNO and other guests departed. I heard later that Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT had on that morning sent a letter to Police District Command VII/Greater Djakarta containing instructions to the police organization to be loyal and obedient only to Bung KARNO.

On that afternoon, October 1, 1965, Police Gen. SAWARNO also called at the KOSTRAD and met Gen. SUHARTO. Gen. SUHARTO told Gen. SAWARNO that the events of G-30-S/PKI represented a coup-d'état and that Gen. SUHARTO would act against anybody who supported the G-30-S/PKI.

Gen. SAWARNO was given white ribbons which had to be worn by the Police to show that the wearer was "a friend". When Police General SAWARNO returned to the Police District Command Greater Djakarta he did not convey to the lower ranks what had been told him by Gen. SUHARTO.

The influence of the letter of that morning from Chief Commissioner SUMIRAT was clearly noticeable in this.

In the afternoon of October 1, 1965, Gen. SAWARNO issued an order for the arrest of a number of Chief Officers of the Police (whom he did not regard as being loyal to Bung KARNO). He sent a copy of the order to the "Revolutionary Council".

c. Gen. SAWARNO knew that one of his subordinate officers, ANWAS, had been appointed Deputy Chairman IV of the Revolutionary Council.

As District Commander of Police Gen. SAWARNO did nothing, either on October 1, 1965, or on succeeding days, after the intentions of the G-30-S/PKI became clear.

d. As to the replacement of Police Gen.

SAWARNO as Commander of Police District VII/Greater Djakarta in November 1965, I heard that this was proposed by the Minister/Commander of the Police and approved by Bung KARNO, because, at that moment, that position was no longer defensible owing to pressure from the KOSTRAD.

105. Please tell us about the role and activities of Gen. SUADI in the context of the G-30-S/PKI and the "SUKARNO Front" and also tell us about the relations between Gen. SUADI and Bung KARNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO in the performance of that role.

105. I would like to add the following to my previous declaration:

a. Before the events of G-30-S/PKI and up to and including his appointment as Ambassador, I knew that there was a good relationship between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUADI, as I have stated.

I have never heard that there was a report from Gen. SUADI to Bung KARNO about the Chief Officers of the Army, before the events of G-30-S/PKI. However, there was a possibility that Bung KARNO inquired and that SUADI made a statement about this because I myself know that SUADI was very much pro-Bung KARNO.

This pro-Bung KARNO attitude was sometimes accompanied by a condemnation of the policies of the Commanders of the Army at that time.

b. After G-30-S/PKI, on October 23, 1965, Gen. SUADI called on Bung KARNO. As Indonesian Ambassador it was protocol that he should call on the President when he returned home. At the time I also regarded this meeting as a question of courtesy.

c. After this meeting it appeared that Gen. SUADI did not immediately return to his post (Ethiopia), but he remained for some considerable time in Indonesia and also called several times on Bung KARNO (I can no longer remember the exact dates).

At these meetings he was sometimes accompanied by Dr. SUBANDRIO and sometimes he was alone. At that stage, I heard that Bung KARNO had actually ordered Gen. SUADI to stay in Indonesia for the time being, and not to return immediately to Ethiopia, in order to support Bung KARNO in the crisis he was going through.

d. These activities in support of Bung KARNO can be seen as cooperation between Dr. SUBANDRIO and SUADI, quite apart from their positions as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador. I heard from Gen. SABUR of Col. SAELAN that SUADI was chiefly active in the Army, namely in activating pro-Bung KARNO forces. I do not know what result this produced.

e. I also heard that Gen. SUADI had submitted an application for an amount of RP. 50.000 new currency in respect of his activities.
This took place approx. in the month of February 1966.

106. Please tell us about the relations between Gen. SUDIRGO and Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR within the context of G-30-S/PKI.

106. I can state the following about Gen. SUDIRGO:

- a. Contacts between Bung KARNO and Gen. SUDIRGO, as Director of Military Police of the Army did in fact increase about the middle of 1965, particularly through contacts between Gen. DIRGO and Gen. SABUR, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment . The reports received by Bung KARNO also included those of Gen. SUDIRGO.
- b. As far as I remember, it was in August 1965, at the latest, that Bung KARNO informed Gen. SUDIRGO and asked him about the information received about the existence of the Council of Generals, that as, Generals of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO. It was then that Bung KARNO ordered Gen. SUDIRGO to check those reports.
- c. From August through September I saw an increase in contacts between DIRGO and SABUR and I was certain that they were discussing this information.
- d. The Tjakrabirawa Regiment supported Gen. DIRGO and the Military Police

of the Army through facilities in the form of vehicles and arms. I also heard that Gen. DIRGO received support in the form of funds, but I do not know the amount.

e. Gen. SABUR has also said that Bung KARNO had been told that all the plans and preparations for action against the disloyal Army Generals had been discussed with Gen. SUDIRGO.

f. On the Occasion of the meeting in Djakarta Palace on September 23, 1965, when Bung KARNO asked SABUR how things stood with regard to the orders to act against the Generals of the Army, Bung KARNO asked where Gen. DIRGO was. Finally, Bung KARNO issued orders that Gen. DIRGO, who was in Kalimantan at the time, should be summoned.

g. On the occasion of the meeting of September 29, 1965, when Gen. DIRGO appeared before Bung KARNO, Bung KARNO again asked Gen. DIRGO for information about the Council of Generals and Gen. DIRGO had answered that the information was correct and that it actually existed. Bung KARNO then ordered Gen. DIRGO to assist Gen. SABUR and Gen. NARJO who had received orders from Bung KARNO to take measures against the Army Generals who were disloyal.

h. I was further ignorant, both during and after the events of G-30-S/PKI of the activities of Gen. DIRGO. However, I did know, that after October 1, 1965, relations between the Directorate of Military Police of the Army

and the Palace continued to exist, particularly between Gen. DIRGO and Gen. SABUR.

Gen. DIRGO also occasionally appeared before Bung KARNO in November 1965, although I did not know what they spoke about.

107. What did you know about the activities of Gen. SJAFIUDIN in relation to the G-30-S/PKI? Tell us about relations between Gen. SJAFIUDIN and Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR and his role in those activities.

107. The statements I can make about Gen. SJAFIUDIN are the following:

a. As far as I know there was never a particularly close personal relationship between Gen. SJAFIUDIN and Bung KARNO.

The meeting between Gen. SJAFIUDIN and Bung KARNO only took place when Bung KARNO visited Bali as President and SJAFIUDIN as Commander of the Police District Udayana appeared before him. The second meeting was in the Djakarta Palace when SJAFIUDIN appeared before Bung KARNO.

b. On June 6, 1965, Bung KARNO arrived in Tampaksiring in Bali. That particular day was his birthday and, at the dinner, many local officials were present, including Gen. SJAFIUDIN.

1. During the many discussions Bung KARNO also gave an exposé about relations between Djakarta and Peking.

2. Gen. SJAFIUDIN then told Bung KARNO that, within the Army and particularly in the command of the Army, there were Generals who did not agree with Bung KARNO's policies.

This caused confusion among the lower commanders. These, who had once been loyal and obedient to Bung KARNO, were confused and filled with doubts because they knew that the Commanders of the Army did not approve of Bung KARNO's policies.

3. Reacting to Gen. SJAFIUDIN's remarks Bung KARNO said that he had received a report about certain Army Generals who were not loyal. Bung KARNO ordered Gen. SJAFIUDIN to make a thorough investigation and then report to Djakarta.

c. On September 13, 1965, Gen. SJAFIUDIN called on Bung KARNO in the Djakarta Palace.

I heard that he reported to Bung KARNO about what he had checked and the result was there were, in fact, Generals who were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

d. I heard nothing more about Gen. SJAFIUDIN either during or after the events of G-30-S/PKI.

108. Please tell us about the part played by Gen. PRANOTO in the G-30-S/PKI and also how the relationship was between Gen. PRANOTO and Bung KARNO during his activities.

108. I can tell you the following about Army Gen. PRANOTO.

- a. A long time before the events of G-30-S/PKI, I heard Gen. PRANOTO frequently mentioned as a modest Chief Officer of the Army, a follower of Javanese mysticism and that he was not western orientated. Before October, 1965 (I have forgotten the date and the month) Gen. PRANOTO visited Bung KARNO at the Palace. They talked about the plan of the Army, which was presided over by Gen. PRANOTO, namely, to organize a big parade in honour of the Armed Forces Day, October 5, 1965. That parade had been proposed as an historic procession, starting with the Mataram/Madjapahit period up to the independence of the Republic of Indonesia with the most authentic costume and decor. The idea was accepted and approved by Bung KARNO and he promised his full support. Among other things, Bung KARNO was prepared to use his influence to have the "Golden Coach" brought from Jogja/Solo. I heard that the purpose of the procession was to stimulate the anti-neocolonialist and imperialist fighting spirit and also feelings of National pride.
- b. In the afternoon of October 1, 1965 (the day of G-30-S/PKI) I was ordered by Gen. SABUR in the name of Bung KARNO, to summon Gen. Pranoto to meet Bung KARNO in Halim as he was appointed by Bung KARNO as caretaker Commander of the Army. As regards the selection of Gen. PRANOTO I heard the following:

1. On the afternoon of October 1, 1965 a conference took place between Bung KARNO and officials who were then in Halim, about persons who were suitable to be appointed as substitute Commanders of the Army.

Several names of Army Generals were mentioned during those talks. One of those to speak was ex-Brig.Gen.SUPARDJO. It was finally decided to appoint Gen. PRANOTO as caretaker Commander of the Army.

SUPARDJO hastely left the meeting to visit the Command of the G-30-S/PKI which at that time was elsewhere in Halim and discussed the candidature of Gen. PRANOTO. The Command of the G-30-S/PKI gave its approval. SUPARDJO then returned to Bung KARNO to report that the G-30-S/PKI approved the candidature because Gen. PRANOTO was one of the progressive revolutionary Chief Officers of the Army.

2. Only after SUPARDJO's confrontation Bung KARNO gave orders to summon Gen. PRANOTO.

c. I went to the KOSTRAD with these orders of Bung KARNO and appeared before Gen. SUHARTO on October 1, 1965, at 19.00 hrs and conveyed the orders to him. I did not meet, neither did I speak with Gen. PRANOTO himself. As I have repeatedly said, Gen. SUHARTO spoke about three matters on that evening:

1. The command of the Army is in the hands of Gen. SUHARTO.

2. Gen. PRANOTO cannot report to Bung KARNNO.
3. I should try and get Bung KARNNO out of Halim.
- d. After the events of G-30-S/PKI, on or about October 3, 1965, Gen. PRANOTO appeared before Bung KARNNO in Bogor. Actually, the Senior Officers of the Army had already advised Gen. PRANOTO to reject the decision of Bung KARNNO to appoint him as caretaker Commander of the Army. However, when Gen. PRANOTO appeared before Bung KARNNO in Bogor, I knew that he did not talk about rejection and left everything to Bung KARNNO. Gen. PRANOTO then also told Bung KARNNO that he remained loyal to him and would always protect Bung KARNNO.
- e. After these incidents I had no knowledge of the activities of Gen. PRANOTO or his relations with Bung KARNNO.

109. What were the relations between Police Gen. SUTARTO and Bung KARNNO and Dr. SUBANDRIO and Gen. SABUR, within the context of G-30-S/PKI?

109. I can tell you the following about Police Gen. SUTARTO:
- a. Police Gen. SUTARTO was one of those people who belonged to the "in-group" of Bung KARNNO: Bung KARNNO was very fond of him and trusted him. I had known this since 1961 when he was Head of Police in Bali. Every time Bung KARNNO visited Bali, I

was struck by the close understanding between Bung KARNO and SUTARTO. This understanding continued after SUTARTO was attached to the Army Headquarters.

In addition to his service obligations, SUTARTO also received invitations for other events, such as artistic events, wajang, etc.

SUTARTO was also on several occasions a member of the so-called "advance group" in connection with foreign visits, whose task it was to arrange for bookings, security, etc.

b. In the field of intelligence I was able to see the close relations between SUTARTO and Bung KARNO and SUBANDRIO and SABUR, or between the three of them. SUTARTO either gave or received information and they always studied it together.

c. As far as I remember SUTARTO played a very important part in the Gilchrist (sic) document affair. He made many reports about it and studied it. I heard from Gen. SABUR that it was SUTARTO who convinced Bung KARNO that the document was authentic.

d. In connection with that document there was increasing activity in checking and information about the Generals of the Army who were not loyal to Bung KARNO.

I heard that SUBANDRIO and SUTARTO with their Central Intelligence Service were mainly responsible to Bung KARNO in checking the accuracy of information

about the Council of Generals.

e. About the middle of September, 1965, there was a meeting between Bung KARNO and a number of officials, among whom SUBANDRIO and SUTARTO. I later heard from Gen. SABUR that that meeting had made a deeper investigation into the existence of disloyal Generals in the Army and preparations to take measures against them. It was at that moment that SUTARTO, as a Chief of Staff of the Central Intelligence Service, had given the assurance about the accuracy of reports about the Council of Generals or the disloyal Generals, so that all doubts that at that moment still existed were removed.

f. Apart from his relations with Bung KARNO I knew that SUTARTO was very often in contact with Gen. SABUR as Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment. Gen. SABUR received a great deal of information from Gen. SUTARTO and on the other hand Gen. SUTARTO also received a great deal of information from SABUR, particularly about Bung KARNO's course of action.

110. Tell us about the activities of Gen. SUTARDHIO in the context of the G-30-S/PKI. Please also tell us about relations between Gen. SUTARDHIO and Bung KARNO and Gen. SABUR those activities.

110. I can tell you the following about Gen. SUTARDHIO:

a. Relations between Bung KARNO and SUTARDHIO:

Bung KARNO was very favourably disposed towards Gen. SUTARDHIO. This was because SUTARDHIO was modest, intelligent on the quiet side and loyal.

The affection that Bung KARNO had for SUTARDHIO was mixed with a feeling of moving in unison. Before he was appointed Minister and Attorney General, SUTARDHIO, as an officer of the Military Police very often went abroad as a member of Bung KARNO's entourage, in particular as a member of the "advance group" to arrange security etc., especially for Bung KARNO as President. Chiefly as a result of these activities a good personal relationship developed between Bung KARNO and SUTARDHIO.

b. I concluded from a number of things which I observed and knew that SUTARDHIO was always calm and not emotional. All the recommendations he made to Bung KARNO were well thought out and calmly presented.

Sometimes there was a difference of opinion between SUTARDHIO and Bung KARNO, in which SUTARDHIO, though maintaining his point of view, remained correct and polite. But ultimately loyalty to his superior was the basis of his decision, The spirit of the soldier was evident in the attitude of SUTARDHIO.

c. In his capacity as Attorney General SUTARDHIO very often called upon Bung KARNO. SUTARDHIO was among the officials who called upon Bung KARNO on the morning

September 23, 1965. On that occasion I heard Bung KARNO order SABUR and SUNARJO to take measures against the Generals who disloyal.

d. On October 1, 1965, I observed that SUTARDHIO and other officials were together with Bung KARNO in Halim. I was not present myself at this meeting, and did not join in the discussions but the next day I heard the following about this meeting.

1. When the list of members of the Revolutionary Council was handed over to SUTARDHIO, he appeared alarmed and said that he knew nothing of the list. He simply waited and allowed Bung KARNO to decide.

2. During talks about the caretaker of the Army SUTARDHIO had proposed that Bung KARNO should consult with the Army. However, he finally bowed to Bung KARNO's decision to appoint Gen. PRANOTO.

e. I cannot remember, after G-30-S/PKI in Bogor, whether there was a meeting between Bung KARNO and SUTARDHIO and what they spoke about.

f. The service relationship between SUTARDHIO and SABUR was clearly not very close because it was apparent that all problems were dealt with by Gen. SUNARJO.

As to the personal relationship between SUTARDHIO and SABUR and I know about this because I often chatted to SUTARDHIO, this was not so favourable because SUTARDHIO did not approve of some of SABUR's personal actions.

g. I do not know about SUTARDHIO's activities in connection with the SUKARNO Front, and never heard anything about them.

111. Did you know anything about the activities and role of Adm. MULJADI in connection with the G-30-S/PKI, and what was the relationship between Adm. MULJADI and Bung KARN0 in this role.

111. I can tell you the following about Adm. MULJADI:

a. Before the G-30-S/PKI, at the beginning of 1965, there was the Movement of Progressive Revolutionary Officers in the Navy, which had left-wing tendencies. During this affair Adm. MULJADI, who was then First Deputy (Navy Commander Ed.) firmly acted against this Movement.

b. During the G-30-S/PKI it was Adm. MULJADI who, on October 1, 1965, pressed the Minister/Commander of the Navy to contact the KOSTRAD immediately i.e. Gen. SUHARTO.

When Minister/Commander of the Navy Adm. MARTADINATA was in Halim, Adm. MULJADI was in constant touch with the KOSTRAD all day. Thanks to these precise documents it was possible to issue a joint statement (Army, Navy, Police) condemning the G-30-S/PKI.

c. After the G-30-S/PKI and after Adm. MULJADI became Minister /Commander of the Navy there was direct communication between Bung KARN0, as President and Adm. MULJADI as Minister/Commander of the Navy.

1. From what I know Adm. MULJADI always displayed honesty and was always loyal to his superiors and the Government.
2. I know that there were contacts, as "colleagues" between Adm. MULJADI Minister/Commander of the Navy and Gen. SUHARTO, Minister/Commander of the Army. I once heard from Adm. MULJADI that Gen. SUHARTO would always respect Bung KARN0, in the words of Pak HARTO: "Raise it high, bury it deep".
3. According to Adm. MULJADI it appeared that Pak HARTO had later treated Bung KARN0 less respectfully. From that moment on there was a difference discernible between those two personalities the attitude of Adm. MULJADI being regarded as not suitable to the times.

112. If Bung KARN0's knew of the list of the Revolutionary Council, as signed by UNTUNG in Halim on October 1, 1965, before it was published or broadcast does this not mean that the announcement of the Revolutionary Council was approved of by Bung KARN0 and that he knew about it, and that there existed cooperation between Bung KARN0 and the G-30-S/PKI?

112. The fact that the list of members of the Revolutionary Council was in the possession of Bung KARN0 before it was broadcast on the radio, shows that, at the least, Bung KARN0 had been informed before-

hand and this in its turn means that there was contact between the command of the G-30-S/PKI and Bung KARNNO.

The fact that the radio had broadcast the list, mean that it had been approved by Bung KARNNO. This in its turn means that there was cooperation between Bung KARNNO and the G-30-S/PKI - as I have already stated.

113. Did you know about the evacuation of the children of Bung KARNNO (for example, RACHMAWATI, SUKMAWATI, GURUH) from the Merdeka Palace on October 1, 1965, at about 16.00 hrs, and that they were flown by helicopter from Halim to Bandung? If you know about this, who gave orders for the evacuation of those children and what was the reason?

113. I knew about the evacuation of Bung KARNNO's children from the Merdeka Palace to Halim and further to Bandung by helicopter on October 1, 1965, in the afternoon

- a. The evacuation was ordered by Bung KARNNO, who instructed Assistant Chief Commissioner MANGIL and the Presidential Bodyguard. MANGIL next issued an order to a subordinate to go to the Palace.
- b. As far as I know, the reason for the evacuation was the prevailing insecurity of the situation in Djakarta or in the Palace. It was also very possible that Bung KARNNO began to feel that G-30-S/PKI would fail.

114. The question of a takeover of power by the G-30-S/PKI was clearly never mentioned in all the discussions and meetings that took place while Bung KARNO and other officials were at Halim on October 1, 1965. Could you tell us:
- a. How was it that Bung KARNO never referred to this matter and that all announcements by the G-30-S/PKI on October 1, 1965, did not refer to it or discussed it during that period in Halim?
 - b. Why was only the question of a caretaker Commander of the Army discussed while ex. Brig. Gen. SUPARDJO took active part in the appointment?
114. a. As I said before, there was similarity in the intentions of Bung KARNO and there was cooperation between Bung KARNO and G-30-S/PKI. For that reason Bung KARNO no longer discussed matters which were already announced on October 1, 1965 by the G-30-S/PKI.
- b. At that moment Bung KARNO felt that the only force which could oppose him was Army. That is why he thought it was necessary to appoint a caretaker of the command of the Army, who definitely would be loyal to Bung KARNO, so that he would have the whole of the Army in his power, particularly the forces of the KOSTRAD, at that time.
115. Can you explain to us the part played by Lt.Col. ALI BRAM (first Assistant) of the

Tjakrabirawa Regiment in the context of the G-30-S/PKI, whereby ALI BRAM carried out operational activities?

115. I saw Lt.Col. ALI EBRAM on October 1, 1965, in the afternoon at Halim. I heard that , on that morning, Lt.Col. ALI EBRAM was also in the house of HARJATI in Grogol.

I knew nothing about his activities. At that moment I knew that he was a member of the First Staff (Intelligence) of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, so I naturally thought that Lt.Col. EBRAM had to carry out a security task.

116. After G-30-S/PKI, Gen. SABUR at one time gave a briefing during which he said that Lt. Col. ALI EBRAM was not involved in the G-30-S/PKI. Will you explain what you knew about that pronouncement by Gen. SABUR?

116. I did in fact hear from a member of the Presidential Bodyguard, possibly MANGIL, that Gen. SABUR had given an occasional briefing to his subordinates in the Quarters of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment during which he said that Lt.Col. ALI EBRAM was not involved in the G-30-S/PKI.

I forget when the briefing took place but it was a long time after October 1, 1965.

117. In view of the declarations you have made, there is some difference with statements made by other witnesses. Is it true, in the light of those differences, that an instruction was issued to close collaborators of Bung KARNO to make an agreement upon answers

to be given with regard to certain subjects relating to the activities of Bung KARNO in connection with G-30-S/PKI?

117.a. As honestly and straight forward as I can truthfully say, with due respect to my oath, I declare that, from what I knew and experienced myself, there was never at any time an agreement between close collaborators of Bung KARNO not to be completely frank and honest in making statements relating to Bung KARNO and the G-30-S/PKI.

b. The fact that some or many of the collaborators of Bung KARNO have so far maintained silence is, in my opinion due to the following facts:

1. Worship for Bung KARNO personally, which thickly wrapped their minds from 1945 and ever since to the present day.
2. The existence of a moral obligation to Bung KARNO whom they consider to have been always good to them.
3. Lack of understanding by them for the duty of all of us to obey the law-

118. Do you feel that you have in any way been subjected to pressure, dictated to, or forced to make the above declarations?

118. No, I do not feel I have been put under pressure, dictated to, or forced to make these statements.

119. Is there anything else you would like to say?

119. I have nothing else to say.

120. Can you say that all the statements you have made are true?

If they are true, are you prepared to swear by them?

120. Yes, all the statements I have made are true and I can swear by their truth.

Thus, was this Interrogation Report made according to truth, bearing in mind the official oath and after it had been read out and re-read by the interrogated person, this interrogated person stood by his aforementioned statement and, as proof of his agreement, his signature attached hereunder.

Furthermore, this report was provisionally concluded on the abovementioned day and date in Djakarta, and the Interrogation will be continued at a day and date further to be determined.

The Interrogated person:

BAMBANG SETIJONO WIDJANARKO
Colonel of the Marine Corps

The Interrogators:

1. S.SOEGIARJO
Lt.Col.of the Military
Police Reg.no.12688
2. AZWIR NAWIE
Ass.Chief Commissioner
of Police.

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