

van ~~81-200~~ tot

MINUTENBLAD

DOSSIER No. OD 43 deel ~~III~~ NAAM: Rusland (Toestanden)

*L.v.m. vermindering deel I gelicht - gezege deede
stukken. Minuutblad deel II in PD Nobis. F.J. (2-2-60)
deel II stukken vanaf 49 in dit OD gezege. PD 5642
Overige stukken s.v.m. vermindering gelicht A.C.D./werkgr. San.
13-4-59*

- 2 Voor zover van de geagendeerde stukken (in dit OD geborgen) het schutblad aanwezig was dit bijgevoegd.

jan. '68.
A.C.D.
Werkgr. San.


RAPPORT VAN KB

AAN HC

No.: 5749

Betr.: INENTING IN RUSLAND.

Typ.D.



Schoutblad in ruusland

Uit goede bron werd begin Mei 1952 vernomen, dat in Rusland op grote schaal verplicht wordt ingeënt tegen pest en cholera.

KB, 31 Juli 1952 ✓

VRIJ VOOR ACTIE

CVV.I./vM.

2+1.

Co. 140345.

(3 Juni 1952)

NOTA.

AAN : K.E.B. (L).
VAN : H.C. (CVV.I).

CX. No. : 140345.

Betr.: Post tussen Rusland en Nederland.

Copie van CO

5 JUNI 1952

UITGEBODEN

In antwoord op Uw Nota van 27 Mei 1952, ongenummerd deel ik U mede dat er inderdaad briefwisseling bestaat tussen hier te lande verblijvende privé personen en personen in Rusland.

Het betreft hier correspondentie tussen in Nederland verblijvende personen van Russische origine en hun familie in Rusland.

Een schatting over de omvang is niet te geven, maar wel kan gezegd worden, dat zij niet omvangrijk is.

Op 12.6.52 ^{doorgegeven} ~~in~~ ^{aan} ~~gevraagd~~ ^{aan} ~~gappelleerd~~

Sandine

H.C.

bij nr. CEH/52/259
KEB. 18.6.52 par. 1/4

NOTA.

CVU

VAN : KEB
AAN: HC

Ond.: Post tussen Rusland en Nederland.



Schutblad is vervuld

Sardine vraagt ons of ons iets bekend is omtrent het postverkeer tussen Rusland en Nederland. Is er met name enige briefwisseling tussen privé-personen in Rusland en in Nederland en omgekeerd?. En zo ja, is een schatting te geven van de hoeveelheid?

27 Mei 1952.
L.

RAPPORT VAN KB


AAN HB

No.: 5037

Betr.: "PRAWDA"

Typ. E:

br



Rechtblad is permissief

Bekend is geworden, dat in Wageningen 8 exemplaren van de krant "PRAWDA", gedrukt in de Russische taal, bij intellectuelen worden bezorgd. Verder is nog bekend geworden, dat ongeveer 1000 van dergelijke kranten in Nederland worden verspreid.

KB, 14 Mei 1952

GEEN ACTIE zonder overleg met K.B.

CO 132350

1393

SPECIALE INSTRUCTIES AAN ACD
(slechts bij definitieve opborging invullen)

ONAFGEDRAN

43

[Handwritten signature]

Afd./Sect. *[Handwritten]* Dat. *6-8-52* Par. *8*

Rechtsopvolgens aan: *met notaar ACD/1*

- KA*
- Kew*
- Kto*
- KB*
- Kc*
- KO*
- KA*

6/100

Interne aanwijzingen ACD 17

Verantw voor *[Handwritten]* H.ACD, namens dese

Adm afdoening *[Handwritten]* Dat: *4/3/52*

ACD/ Dat. Par.

Afd Sectie BEHANDELING Afz/Par Dat.

<i>KA</i>		<i>gereg. aan Ple. H. ACD, m.b. aan de brenyer afd.</i>	<i>Red Ks</i>	<i>4/5</i>
		<i>met versl. event. commentaar for de</i>		
		<i>voeging t.o.t. retour KA.</i>		

<i>Kew</i>		<i>[Handwritten]</i>	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	<i>[Handwritten]</i>
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09-27
6.1.
29 FEB 1952
ACD/132350

RAPPORT

VAN: KA-RA

AAN: H-BVD - H-KEW - H-KB - HB - HC- KO.

No. A 1747

ONDERWERP: De Sowjet Unie volgens vroegere
Sowjet burgers.

1. Bijgaand rapport van CLIPPER ontvangen om te behouden.

1 Bijlage.

29-2-'52.

THE SOVIET UNION AS REPORTED BY FORMER
SOVIET CITIZENS

Report No. 1

1. Personal History and Characteristics of Source

Fear, anxiety and much experience in threading his way through the maze of Soviet bureaucracy seem to have left unmistakable marks on this source's personality. Characteristic of his background is the fact that he lived in the USSR under documents falsified to make him appear five years older than he actually was. He was thus enabled to obtain admission to a higher educational institution and launch himself upon a professional career, but he was also forced to resort to reticence and evasion in order to conceal this falsification.

The source described his childhood in considerable detail. His father, a graduate of a gymnasium in St. Petersburg, and a construction engineer, had owned considerable property in the town of ***, in which the source was born. The father escaped liquidation or exile by leaving his home and concealing his past. In fact, he was so cautious that the source himself never learned the full story of his father's life. Both of the source's parents were apparently persons of well-developed cultural interests. From them he received some instruction in French and German and acquired habits of study which enabled him to enter school at the unusually early age, for a Soviet child, of six and to finish the 10-year school in 9 years.

On the other hand, because of the difficult conditions under which the family lived and because of the "frightful severity" of his father, the source developed a highly introverted personality. He stated that he had never had any friends with whom he felt he could share all his thoughts and feelings. When he reached the age of 14, his father arranged through a friend who was on the faculty of the *** Institute to have him accepted as a student there. His documents were fixed to make him appear five years older than he actually was. His father's social class was listed as that of peasant, to conceal his "bourgeois" origin. While he was a student at this institute he was almost expelled when it was learned that his father was not actually of peasant origin, but because of his good academic record and because members of the institute's faculty came to his defense, he succeeded in graduating. According to the source, the years 1934-1938 when he was a student in *** were among the most difficult in his life. He, however, was better off than some of his poorer fellow students who lived in a half-starved condition in dormitories often unheated, sleeping on beds which sometimes lacked blankets. Many of the students were forced to leave the institute during these years.

Graduates of the institute were offered a choice of at most three job opportunities. In some cases, the range of choice was narrower. They were given money for transportation to the place of possible work. Some individuals who accepted the transportation allowance but did not use it for the appropriate purpose, were turned over to the courts. The source obtained his first work in a dairy farm near ***. Although only 19 years of age, he soon had a very important position, because almost the entire veterinary staff were dismissed as "enemies of the people," leaving him the senior veterinary.

The source's military career began in May 1939 when he was drafted into the Soviet Army as a veterinary. After a brief period of general military training he resumed his veterinary career, at first as a master sergeant and later as an officer and rose during the war to his present rank of Major, which he attained in 1945. According to his account, the turning point in his life occurred on a 2,000 kilometer march from the Elbe to Vitebsk in May and June 1945.

During this march he carried further observations regarding life outside the Soviet Union which he had already begun to make during the war and he met a Polish girl with whom he apparently maintained an acquaintance from that time forward and whom he states he would like to marry. At this time he began to think about attempting to escape from the USSR.

The Major's account of his life since the Spring of 1945 was on the whole sufficiently clear, and he appeared to be willing to answer all questions regarding it. **** His observation and data resulting from this experience are set forth in subsequent sections of this report. He states that in 1945 and 1946 he began to think of obtaining a position which would enable him to go abroad and thus facilitate leaving the USSR. However, while he was in *** he thought seriously of entering the Veterinary Institute in that city as a graduate student, with a view to beginning a career as a research worker or professor. This idea appealed to him, he said, because such work is relatively free of politics. People in purely technical or scientific institutes, he said, are deeply immersed in their special work and are not bothered as much as the personnel of administrative agencies by the Party. This is particularly true of such a field as veterinary work. He also contemplated entering a foreign language institute but had to abandon this aspiration because his documents showed him as older than he actually was and too old to enter such an institute.

*see
ch. 900*

The source succeeded in December 1947 in getting an assignment to Germany. He persuaded his superior to secure this assignment for him by pointing out that he was on very bad terms with his wife and that, in view of the fact that at this time families of officers were not permitted to accompany them to the Soviet Zone, he would be able to get away from her. Throughout the post-war period, the source was contemplating marrying his Polish friend. **To do this he would have had to divorce his wife. He says that he even for a time thought of attempting to take her back to the Soviet Union, but decided this could result only in disaster both for her and for him. If he had attempted to conceal the fact that she was a foreigner, he and she might have been sent to concentration camps. Finally they decided that he should defect, and she was to follow him in September 1949. He was vague as to how her escape was to be effected. He said that they had decided that he was to accept his future wife's religion, and for this reason had, when he first came into the custody of the Americans, given his own religion as Roman Catholic.

2. Motives and Conditions of Defection

The source attributes his decision to break with the Soviet Union very largely to the personal reasons indicated in the preceding section. However, when asked whether he took this step solely on the basis of the influence of one person, he strongly denied this. He said that his wartime and post-war observations of Soviet and non-Soviet life had initiated in his mind a train of thought which had been carried to its culmination as a result of meeting his future wife.

This "clarification" of his thinking had recalled long dormant impressions of childhood and had revived the influence of his father's anti-Soviet attitudes. The source stated frankly that despite the many facts in his family background and childhood predisposing him to a negative attitude toward the Soviet system, the influence of Soviet schools, Soviet propaganda and his own relatively successful career had made him a staunch Soviet patriot by this time of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war.

He himself appears to find it difficult to reconstruct clearly the process by which he became favorably disposed to the Soviet regime. **** He probably derived considerable satisfaction from his rather rapid rise to positions of considerable administrative and professional responsibility at an early age. This impression is indirectly confirmed by his statement that he enjoyed his work. However, he also pointed out **** that because of his nonproletarian origin he would never have been able to achieve a "political" career. At any rate, he made no attempt to deny or conceal his prewar and wartime attitude toward "Soviet patriotism."

In December 1943, he became a member of the Communist Party. When asked to explain why he had joined the Party, he advanced several reasons. At this time great pressure was exerted on Army officers to join the party and entrance requirements were greatly relaxed. Party membership afforded a small but real measure of protection. Moreover, he had joined the party, in his own rather picturesque terms, "to get a little warmer place on the stove." He stated that his main motivation during the war was not a desire to advance the interests of the Party, but to defend the Russian people against the extermination policy of the Germans.

In 1944 he entered Poland with his army unit. From this time on he learned that what he had been taught in the Soviet schools about conditions of life outside Russia, and also about the history of the Communist Party, was false. He made friends with Polish people, partly because he did not permit his subordinates to engage in acts of violence and robbery which were very common among the Soviet troops. Germany also exerted considerable influence on his thinking. He was impressed by the efficiency of the Germans, particularly by the lack of duplication in German as compared to Soviet administration. He emphasized, however, that Poland had exerted much more influence on him than Germany. When he had first entered German territory, the Germans were so afraid of the Russians that it was very difficult to establish any personal contacts with them. He felt that there were "common slavic interests" between Poles and Russians which made it easier for these peoples to establish friendly personal relations than for either to get along with Germans. Later, when he had worked in Germany, he got along well with his German subordinates. ****

The conditions under which the source and his colleagues worked in Germany made it very difficult to escape. As commanding officer of a military unit, and in effect director of a considerable economic enterprise, he had had a relatively considerable measure of personal freedom but he had been under constant surveillance. He was fortunate in one respect. The Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of his unit***, to whom he referred throughout as the "zampolit" and who was his "official spy" was a chronic alcoholic, in his cups from morning to night, and not very efficient. He sometimes succeeded in escaping the attention of the zampolit by asserting his authority as commander. For example, he would sometimes leave the zampolit behind when he went on trips in the automobile assigned to him. The zampolit frequently called on him, and under pretext of having a drink together, tried to ascertain his views and moods. The source was also fortunate in having his own apartment ****. He assumed that he was under the observation of his German cook, maid, chauffeur and doorman, but he said that he was sure they had never compromised him with the Soviet authorities. He had always been extremely careful to do or say nothing that might arouse suspicion. Occasionally, however, he would go to a German restaurant in civilian clothes, in violation of regulations. He had disclosed his plans for escaping

to no one but his father and his Polish friend. Once in a very general way he had discussed with his brother the possibility of defecting. He felt certain that, given favorable circumstances, his brother would also defect.

A more fearsome figure than the zampolit, from whom it was even more necessary for the source to conceal his thoughts and plans, was *** an MGB officer of the counterespionage service **** This officer came to visit the source and his colleagues and subordinates about twice a week. Among other things, he always talked to the German doorman of the house in which the source lived. He also was in the habit of talking at length with two of the source's subordinates. **** The source suspected that these and other individuals were part of the MGB officer's espionage network. He admitted that he was afraid of this officer, who he said was a man of little culture or ability.

The source stated that his final decision to *** defect resulted from learning via the Voice of America broadcasts that the U. S. did not return Soviet refugees to the Soviet authorities. The Kasenkina case played a large part in encouraging him in this belief. While he was on leave, he sent a postcard from Moscow to his headquarters saying that his lame arm for which he was undergoing treatment had become worse and he probably would be unable to return on schedule. He did this to disarm any suspicion which might result from his failure to return on time.

Because he did not defect direct from his place of work, but while returning from leave, he has no information regarding the consequences of his defection to his colleagues or superiors. He did, however, furnish the following information regarding other cases of defection and resulting measures. A civilian employee **** had fled after receiving an order to return to the USSR. This man was under suspicion because he had been a repatriate and was therefore considered politically unreliable. Following his flight, which occurred in the summer of 1948, the zampolit, who had subsequently been replaced by *** and the MGB officer, had questioned him severely but he had pointed out that he was new in his job and that political affairs were mainly their business and not his. The MGB officer and the zampolit had driven all around the area, particularly in that part of it bordering on the American Zone, for about two weeks. They had interrogated a great many Germans, but had not succeeded in establishing any connection between the defector and any of the Germans. Another case of defection about which he knew was that of a veterinary who had fled when his acquaintance with a German woman had been discovered. The source had no details concerning this case except that the woman in question was a postal worker, and was assigned by the MGB officer the task of checking all letters received in this man's unit in the hope of obtaining some clues. Finally, he had heard that an adjutant of a Soviet general **** had fled. He did not know this man's name, but he had heard that he was engaged in journalism somewhere in Germany or elsewhere in Western Europe.

The source stated that at a time which he did not remember he and the zampolit had received a secret order to supply information regarding the defection of any subordinate to the following agencies:

To the immediately superior officer ****

To the Chief of counterintelligence and the local chief of the MGB.

To all military commands.

Questioned regarding his plans, attitudes and expectations in connection with his flight, the source emphasized that great personal danger was involved in such a venture. He said that he had not expected to be turned back to the Soviets by the Americans but that when he came into the custody of the Americans fears and doubts assailed him. At first he attempted to conceal his identity by fantastic stories of his past life and profession. He called himself a "political engineer" and attributed other false identities to himself. He stated that he had been particularly alarmed to find himself in "barracks." It seems clear that a measure of anxiety and confusion, mingled with increasing concern regarding his future, persists in the source's outlook. He told the author of this report that he would like to emigrate either to the U. S. or Canada and obtain work as a veterinary on a farm. He said that he realized that because of his very slight knowledge of English he would have to start in a very modest position. If he could not go to Canada or the U. S., he would like to remain in Europe or in a country of "European cultural level." He asked several times whether it would be possible to settle in France, stating that he had a great desire to see that country, about whose culture and history his mother had told him a great deal. He asked that his statements regarding his aspirations be transmitted to "higher authorities." He expressed a desire to receive works in Russian on veterinary therapeutics and surgery.

In presenting these requests, and in general throughout the interviews, the source's manner was one of almost embarrassing politeness tinged with obvious anxiety. After the first day of conversations, he felt much more at ease than in the beginning but from time to time moods of fear and supplication overtook him. For example, at one point he addressed the interviewer and a colleague as "Messrs. Investigators," a term applied in Soviet terminology to police officials. Again and again he affirmed his willingness to "do anything" to serve the U. S. and the struggle against Bolshevism. He agreed to prepare in his spare time a short article refuting the theory, with which he had become acquainted in reading an emigre Russian publication and which he resented greatly, that Bolshevism was a natural outgrowth of the Russian character.

3. Employment Experience and Observations based thereon

For the most part, the source's answers to question regarding the structure and functions of organizations with which he had been connected were substantial and factual, but not very analytical. ****

In his last assignment in the Soviet army in Germany, the source received a monthly salary of 2,310 rubles plus 1800 marks. He had the right to draw an additional 500 marks a month if he desired. 20% of his ruble salary was deducted and deposited to his credit in the USSR. **** He had a cook, maid, and chauffeur. He said there were no rigid rules for disposition of such perquisites of office but that in general they corresponded to rank. There were some colonels who had less and some captains who had as many such privileges as he. According to the major, he was actually fulfilling the functions of a colonel, and should have had a colonel's rank. Had he remained in Soviet service he would soon have become a colonel.

The enterprise functioned effectively. He had brought it up to first place among such enterprises in the Soviet Zone. One recognition of his success had been the award to him on May Day 1949 of a Leica camera. He said that he had enjoyed his work on the enterprise, since it was of a kind in which one can see tangible results of one's efforts. He seemed to be particularly proud of his success in stimulating good performance by his

subordinates, both Russians and Germans. The Germans he thought worked somewhat better than the Russians, since it was not so necessary to encourage and persuade Germans to work hard as was necessary in the case of the Russians. However, he pointed out that some of his Russian subordinates had lost their maximum work capacity since they had been in German captivity as forced laborers and many had become undisciplined or even drunkards as a result of this experience. He himself had had to send back to the USSR some lazy and incompetent civilian employees.

In general, the source enjoyed excellent friendly relations with both his superiors and his subordinates. He pointed out that there is a close professional solidarity among the officers of the Veterinary Service. A similar professional spirit prevails among medical officers, he said. Relations with political officers, however, were marked by "covert unfriendliness." This attitude was widespread among all nonpolitical officers. During the war, they had openly called the political officers "sluggards" (darmoedy). A similar feeling, reinforced by fear, characterized the relationship between army officers and personnel of the counterespionage service.

The source furnished the following assorted information regarding organization, function and work methods of the enterprise where he was last employed. Much of what he had to say dealt with the surprising degree of secrecy maintained in the work of the enterprise, which he emphasized did not do any work which should have been considered secret. Figures regarding milk and meat procurements, for example, were regarded as secret. The source laughed in reporting this fact, and added that everything is secret in the USSR and that this situation had prevailed throughout his entire army service. One of his most important subordinates, a Junior Lieutenant who had a title corresponding roughly to "Top Secret Officer" in the U. S. Army (Zaveduyushchi Deloproizvodstvom). This officer had attended courses for training in this work in the Intendant's school in Leningrad. His duties were the custody of secret material received either by the source or his zampolit. He was the only person who was at any given time familiar with the entire flow of correspondence between the enterprise and higher or lower rank organizations. He had been cleared by the MGB for this work. He himself, however, was not, according to the source, an MGB officer. The source also stated that there was no Secret Section in his enterprise.

The source had a secretary, the wife of one of his assistants, who received a salary of 500 rubles and 500 marks a month. Her job was classified as that of a bookkeeper. She would have received a smaller salary had she been classified as a stenographer.

Conditions of work were somewhat difficult. There was a great shortage of office supplies and equipment. His whole headquarters had only one typewriter. Most clerical work was done in longhand. The accounts were kept in German by the chief bookkeeper. Most of the brigades kept their accounts in longhand. The source said that he might have been able to procure additional office equipment, but that the amount of red tape involved in doing so was very discouraging. Sometimes he had paid for necessary supplies out of his own pocket. The enterprise had no calculating machines, and arithmetical work was done on the abacus.

The source said that when he took over in the enterprise the accounts were in chaotic condition but that by dint of much effort he had succeeded putting

them in reasonably good order. Among the reforms he had introduced was making the brigades accountable directly to him, rather than indirectly through the sections. In the spring of 1948 a "revision" of the accounts had taken place and many officers had had to pay fines. *** His own chief assistant had had to pay a fine of 5,000 rubles. When surprise was expressed at the size of this fine, the source said that such occurrences were very common and that he did not know any officers who had not had to pay some sort of fines resulting from discrepancies in their accounts. The above inspection had been carried out by Revizors of the staff of the *** Army. No inspection by the Ministry of State Control had taken place in 1948 or 1949, although one was expected.

The source stated that in Soviet civilian institutions the "American" double entry system of bookkeeping is used, but that army institutions such as the one with which he had been connected used a "simple" system of bookkeeping.

The source described the application of the Soviet planning system to his enterprise as follows. Such enterprises, which he described as "subsidiary enterprises," (Podsobnye Khozyaistva) had been established by Marshal Zhukov to supplement the rations of the Soviet forces in Germany. In 1947 they had been incorporated into the general economic plan of the Soviet Army Group in Germany. These enterprises received their economic plans from the Agricultural Section of the Army Group (Gruppa Voisk) in Berlin. His own enterprise received its plan through the Intendant of the Army, ****. The plan for the year 1949 had been received about the end of January. Prior to receipt of the plan, he himself had drawn up a preliminary plan. One of his duties was to bring the plan targets to the attention of each brigade and to supervise fulfillment of the plan throughout the entire organization. Each brigade reported to him monthly regarding its degree of fulfillment of the plan for each category such as milk, increase of stock, meat production, etc. He arranged periodic conferences of the heads of sections, the "brigadiers," the veterinaries and other responsible subordinates. He in turn was responsible to the Intendant of the **** Army.

Because his service had been primarily military, the source knew very little about the Ministry of Agriculture. He had worked for the Ministry of State Farms for about a year before entering Army service. He had learned a good deal about living conditions on collective farms while working in the Military Commissariat in ***. These he unhesitatingly characterized as extremely bad. Only the Chairmen of the Collective Farms lived decently. But regarding the internal operation of the Collective Farms or their relationship to the Ministry of Agriculture, he knew little. He did shed some light on the tie-up among the Veterinary Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture of Belorussia, the *** Oblast Military Commissariat, the system of Soviets, and the Party organization. These were all tied together in a complicated fashion characteristic of the Soviet system of double and triple subordination. Each Rayon had a Chief Veterinary, subordinate to the Chief Veterinary Administration of the Oblast. The Veterinary Administration, while subordinate with regard to professional matters to the Ministry of Agriculture, was "administratively" subordinate to the Agricultural Section of the Oblast Soviet. The Oblast Soviet, and ultimately the Council of Ministers, of Belorussia, was in charge of allocation of cadres, correspondence, custody of documents, etc., but the Veterinary Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture issued directives regarding Veterinary techniques, etc. There was a good deal of overlapping in the activities of the various organizations concerned with veterinary and livestock work.

In his work in ***, in which he had dealt not only with the heads of the Military Commissariat for the *** Oblast but with Agricultural and Veterinary officials on the Rayon level, he had found that the offices, respectively, of the Agricultural Ministry and of the Agricultural Departments of the Soviets, whether on the Rayon or Oblast level, often had entirely different sets of figures regarding the same facts.

In connection with these observations, the source said that a tremendous amount of puffing up of figures occurs throughout the Soviet administration insofar as he was familiar with it. This tendency to exaggerate increases at each administrative level because of the effort exerted at each level to prove fulfillment of overfulfilment of economic plans.

4. Information on Soviet Army

The source furnished the following miscellaneous information of political or sociological interest on the Soviet Army. Asked if Army officers regarded their service as a career, he replied in the affirmative, stating that at present all officers are considered to be "cadre" officers. Although there is a regular system of terms of service and of advancement from rank to rank, it is not strictly observed. He gave figures indicating the normal period of service in ranks from Junior Lieutenant to Colonel. Beginning with the first of these ranks, the terms increase from 2 years to 4 in the rank of captain and five each in the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. Promotions depend upon recommendations both by Commanding Officers and by political officers. After 25 years of service, officers should be retired with almost full pay, but this rule is widely neglected in practice. Many demobilized officers, even of ranks as high as colonel, fall into a very difficult position because they usually lack a profession and sometimes have to take jobs as workers or petty administrators. Indefiniteness of tenure prevails in the case of army civilian employees. They are employed normally for definite terms of service, but in fact are often retained for longer periods and they cannot leave their jobs as long as the authorities have need of them. At present, the official term of service in the Soviet Zone of Germany, both for military and civilian personnel, is two years but this also is quite indefinite.

Regarding educational qualifications of Soviet army officers, the source said that only the veterinary and medical officers must have special training. This is also true to a considerable degree of engineering officers; but the latter can rise very high without attending a special engineering school. As for line officers, many with ranks as high as colonel have had no more than 4 or 5 years of schooling. The general cultural and educational level of Soviet officers is rather low, according to the source.

He stressed the extreme difficulty of entering any of the higher educational institutions of the army, particularly the Frunze Academy in Moscow. There is an elaborate system of recommendations culminating in special examinations given by the academies.

He outlined the organization of the *** Oblast Military Commissariat, indicating its various sections, such as those for mobilization, training, supply, administration, secret section, etc.

Regarding relations between officers and enlisted men, he said that the gulf between the two groups, already considerable when he began his military

service over ten years ago, had increased during and especially since the war. In general the social life of the officers and enlisted men was completely separate. Their ways of spending leisure time differed greatly. For example, officers danced but soldiers did not. Their recreational facilities were separate and so was their political training. Officers' pay was of course vastly different from that of enlisted men, the latter receiving in the Soviet Zone about 40 rubles a month, and less, he thought, inside the USSR itself. One of the most conspicuous indications of officers' superior privileges was the fact that they usually received a month's annual leave and were allowed 15 days' travel time in addition, while personnel of the rank of sergeant or below did not receive any leave. One reason for this was that if enlisted men saw the conditions under which their parents and friends were living at home they would return with greatly impaired morale. Usually they were not permitted to go home even to attend funerals of their parents.

The situation in the Zone with regard to the presence of families of personnel serving there was very unclear. A number of contradictory measures had been taken. The Soviet Command was in a very difficult situation. There were disadvantages from its point of view in permitting the families of officers and other personnel to come to Germany and be subjected to its influence, but bachelors very often became involved with German women and this was also highly undesirable. To his knowledge, all Soviet line officers in Germany were now taking their meals in communal dining rooms and were living 3 or 4 in a small room. This and other measures were intended to isolate them from the local population.

A curious detail disclosed by the Major in reply to a question regarding postwar changes in the oath taken by the Soviet Army was that he himself had never been required to take the oath. Somehow it had been overlooked. He did not know of any changes in the oath in recent years.

5. Information about Party and Political Institutions

The Party organization in the enterprise in which the source last worked was directed and supervised by the zampolit. At Party meetings the zampolit attempted to create the impression that he was merely a rank and file Party member but it was clear that he was in charge of all political activity in the enterprise, including the work of the Party organization. However, the work which he directly supervised was conducted separately from the activity of the Party organization. The zampolit's work included observing and reporting on the political characteristics and reliability of all personnel, the conducting of political exercises which lasted all day every Saturday, the obtaining of publications, and other functions. The zampolit was subordinated to the Political Section of the Rear of the *** Army. This section in turn was directed by an office attached to the staff of the Soviet troops in Germany, which is controlled by the Political Administration of the Soviet army located in Moscow. The Political work in Germany among the Soviet troops in Germany is divided into two main sections (otdely), one for line troops and one for troops of the rear.

The zampolit regularly received directives from his superiors, which were sometimes discussed and sometimes merely read at Party meetings. Sometimes the zampolit delivered reports at Party meetings. Neither at Party meetings nor at the regular political exercises did the Zampolit play the leading role

which a man in his position should have exercised. His lack of leadership reflected his personal incapacity as well as the fact that the members of the Party organization and of the entire staff of the enterprise were professionally and politically well educated. This particular zampolit may have retained his position despite his personal deficiencies largely because the enterprise was politically a backwater. The source emphasized, however, that the zampolit was at least outwardly an ardent Communist and was possessed of considerable shrewdness. He knew all the twists and turns of the Party line. The zampolit was fond of saying that one should not forget that while he was drinking he was pondering the political characteristics of all of his colleagues.

The zampolit was appointed by the Army political administration. He in turn in effect appointed the secretary of the Party organization of the enterprise. With the aid of the latter, he had regular and frequent reports prepared on the political characteristics of Party members. The zampolit was the only paid Party or Political worker in the enterprise. His salary was somewhat less than that of the source. The "active group" (aktiv) of the Party organization consisted of the Party secretary and two "deputies" (zamestiteli). The source said that the Party secretary was also sometimes called the Partorg. The Party secretary was the source's deputy for veterinary affairs in the enterprise. The Party organization referred to herein was directed by a Party Bureau of the staff of the forces of the rear. It was also under the indirect supervision of a Party Commission attached to the political section of the *** Army. The zampolit transmitted his reports regarding the work of the Party organization and other work within his competence by "secret post" staffed by special couriers and soldiers who rode in American jeeps. The handling of these communications within the enterprise fell within the province of the Top Secret Officer referred to earlier in this report. The latter had a special room with barred windows and was equipped with a special stamp which he affixed to letters sealed with sealing wax and sewed with special thread.

The source described the conduct of meetings in the enterprise Party organization, dwelling particularly on a typical meeting in April 1949 at which he himself had been the principal rapporteur. Party meetings were held in the "recreation room" or in his or other executives' offices. They began with the reading of the Agenda by the Secretary, or in his absence by one of his deputies. Then followed the main report. The person reporting had been asked by the secretary and the zampolit to present the report and he had no right to refuse. The source's report mentioned above dealt with the fulfilment of the enterprise's plan for milk, meat and other procurements, etc. One part of it consisted of an appraisal of the work of the members of the Party organization in carrying out the plan. It was obligatory to conclude such a report with reference to the "advance guard role" of the Party. These consisted mainly of "pretty political phrases."

The main report was followed by questions. Usually the persons submitting them asked for clarification of this or that section of the report. This usually involved a good deal of "scolding." This was an example of Soviet "self-criticism." The source emphasized that one could only criticize those of rank lower than himself. Moreover, one only criticized persons within his own area of competence. Thus for example, even the zampolit never criticized the source's work as Director of the enterprise. It was superfluous to point out that none of the criticism was ever of a political character. If anyone had ever criticized the Party line he would be imprisoned "immediately." After the question and "discussion" which included criticism of comrades of lower

or equal rank, the rapporteur had the right to make concluding remarks. The meeting was then concluded by a "resolution" (the source used the terms resolyutsiya and reshenie). This was usually written by the Party secretary and presented for the "consideration" of the Party organization. It was of course adopted unanimously. Party meetings usually lasted from one to five hours and were generally held in the evening, although sometimes after lunch.

All but one officer of the enterprise were Party members. There was one Komsomol. Two of the civilian employees belonged to the Party organization.

Among the themes, both of Party meetings and of political exercises, were the "international situation" in which accusations of American "war mongering" were prominent, discussions of the political education of the Soviet forces in Germany which emphasized the dangers emanating from the "alien" influences by which they were surrounded, and discussions of Soviet culture and Soviet patriotism which emphasized the decadence of Western culture.

The source said that the pattern of political work and Party activity observed by him when he was employed in 1946 - 1947 in the *** Military Commissariat did not differ essentially from that described above. **** The whole party scene in *** was dominated by *** the first secretary of the Oblast Party Committee, who according to the source was the "greatest dictator" of the Oblast. Asked whether this man was a more important person than the Head of the MGB, the source said that he was more important in economic, political and "general Party" questions, but he believed that the head of the MGB did not report to him and outranked him in matters concerning the removal of "dangerous people." He emphasized that he had no factual information to support this personal opinion. In general, he felt that neither the Party workers nor the police workers reported to one another and that each had his own claim of command and that both groups spied on one another.

One of the activities of the *** Party organization was political indoctrination and a measure of supervision of the work of the personnel of the Oblast Military Commissariat. On one occasion a stormy incident occurred when a representative of the *** Party Committee specializing in military affairs criticized the staff of the Military Commissariat at a conference. One officer present became very angry and criticized the Party official for interfering in matters about which he was not informed. He pointed out that the latter was not a military man and warned him not to threaten Soviet officers. The incident created a scandal but neither the officer nor the Party worker, a typical Party professional dressed in the "Party uniform," or, as the source said, the "Stalin or Mealenkov uniform," were punished.

The source's general comment concerning the Soviet political system emphasized its extra-ordinarily dictatorial character. Stalin himself was an "autocratic dictator." Muscovites, who were better informed than the people of any other part of Russia regarding political affairs, were accustomed to speaking of "Stalin's court." The source stated, incidentally, that the people of Moscow obtained considerable information regarding goings on in the higher spheres from observations of the movements of individuals and from rumors. The concentrated character of the Soviet political system made it possible for the government to act very quickly and effectively to achieve high priority objectives. Stalin or one of his assistants had merely to sit down at the telephone and give an order. On the other hand, in all matters concerning popular welfare or the rights of individuals, the system worked with frightful

slowness and inefficiency. In this connection, he quoted the old Russian expression "God is in Heaven, and the Czar is far away."

He did not think that the Soviet leaders or rank and file Party members took seriously the ideals of Communism. The morale of the Party organizations to which he had belonged had been poor. Most Party members, like himself, joined the Party for purely selfish and mainly material reasons. The Party was simply part of the apparatus of dictatorial rule. It was fantastic to talk of the achievement of Communism in the USSR when such developments as the growth of privilege among army officers were leading in the opposite direction. Party members never spoke of the achievement of Communism in their ordinary spontaneous conversation. They echoed the Party line like robots. For the professional Party workers, party directives were very important, but they were "orders" (prikazy).

All this did not mean that the top Soviet leaders were completely lacking in confidence in their program. The one part of their ideology which they really believed was the assurance that they were destined to rule the world. The glowing promises of Communism served them as an instrument to facilitate achievement of this objective and justify the hardships experienced by the Soviet people.

The source considered that a purge had been taking place in the Party since shortly after the end of the war. In support of this opinion he referred to the disappearance of various important figures such as Zhdanov and Voznesenski. He suspected that Zhdanov had been done away with. He recalled that while he was working in ***, a "mass of people" had disappeared. Asked why no Party congress had taken place since the end of the war, he said that this indicated to him that there was some sort of "ailment" in top Party circles. Asked whether he had ever heard any criticism of failure to hold a congress, he replied in the negative. Ordinary rank and file Communists would not dare raise such a question, he said. Anyway, the role of the congress no longer had any great significance. The "top" (golovka) did not attribute much significance to Party congresses. Asked why the Party's finances were not mentioned in the state budget, he said that the state budget was only a "screen" and that the party actually had at its disposal all the financial resources of the country.

The source thought that Molotov had lost favor, at least to some degree, as indicated by the fact that he did not give the November 6 speech this year. It would be "excessive" to remove Molotov hastily, but it might be done gradually.

The work of the Party organizations interfered considerably with the functioning of both civilian and military administration in the USSR. This situation had become worse since the end of the war. To a certain extent, highly qualified personnel such as engineers were able to evade Party control because of the ignorance of Party workers regarding their special fields.

The source furnished the following information regarding the election for The Supreme Soviet of the USSR in which he had voted in *** in 1946. The campaign was featured in its earlier stages by obligatory study, at least for Party members, of the election statutes. ***, the First Secretary of the Oblast Party Committee, was nominated to run for Deputy. Consideration of his candidacy, as far as the source was concerned, began at a general meeting of officers and men of his military unit. ***The First Secretary came to this

meeting, accompanied by the zampolit of the unit, who introduced him. In addition to *** the First Secretary, several picked soldiers and officers delivered speeches prepared for them by the zampolit.

On election day the zampolit saw to it that no one was absent from the polls. The zampolit and the officers in command of the unit voted first, and stood watching the others as they voted. Voting began at 6 o'clock in the morning and proceeded very rapidly. Only a very few individuals availed themselves of their privilege of crossing out the name of the single candidate. After the election, some Red Army men were arrested. The source said that it was his opinion that they had been arrested because they had failed to vote for *** the First Secretary. The official version of the affair was that these individuals were war criminals. He said that "among the people" there were rumors that the counterespionage organs had ways of telling who had crossed the candidate's name off the ballot.

Asked if the office of deputy conferred prestige, the source said that the "people" were afraid of deputies, just as they were afraid of everyone else in official positions. The common people were in the habit of keeping quiet in the presence of deputies and other officials. But of course a Party secretary or an MGB officer would have little respect for a deputy unless he were an important Party member.

Asked if there were any general system of examinations or other ways of determining qualifications for government positions, the source stated that no such general system existed. The picture was a very confused one, for there were special courses in various fields of activity, such as the Army or the secret police, but in many cases people rose to high positions without special professional qualifications.

The source told the following which he had heard from an eyewitness, illustrating the use of deception as an instrument of Soviet politics. He said that it was typical.

The incident probably took place in 1948. Molotov and diplomats of Soviet satellite countries were on a train passing through the town of Orsha. While the train stopped in the station, prices in the station buffet were drastically lowered. When the train left the station they returned to their former high level. According to the source, his informant noted that the population was not allowed to enter the buffet and therefore did not know that this stratagem had been resorted to. The source says that his friend, however, who was present at the time, was kidded by acquaintances because he had been lucky enough to be present when he could buy something at a reasonable price.

6. Information on Police System

In addition to material incorporated in other sections of this report, the source furnished the following information and opinions regarding the Soviet system of controls, and in particular the role therein of the political police. He professed ignorance about details of the organization of the MGB and MVD and several times stated that he and most Soviet people were unaware of the precise meaning of these initials and of the relationship between these two main branches of the police system. He even seemed to be afraid to discuss the police system, although this impression may be a purely subjective

one arising in the interviewer's mind because of the source's generally apprehensive manner. He felt that the police system, the most extreme form of the whole Soviet system of regimentation and controls, was the worst and most hated feature of Soviet life. All elements of Soviet society, down to the level of ordinary workers and peasants, lived in constant fear of the police. They also hated the police personnel. He illustrated the latter feeling by quoting what he declared was a common saying among Soviet people that "you are not a man but a police man" (militционер). While he himself had never been subjected to police interrogation, he knew many people who had been. One of his uncles had spent some 10 years in exile in Siberia and his life had been shortened as a result. People who had been called in for questioning by the political police were forbidden to speak of their experiences. Police investigation produced an indescribable effect on its victims. These were extremely numerous, although he did not feel that he was in a position to estimate their numbers. He did say that he felt that they were even more numerous than is commonly supposed outside the Soviet Union. One recent and large category of these people was Soviet repatriates, the majority of whom, in his opinion, were sent to concentration camps.

He emphasized the extreme care with which all responsible officials of the police administration, even at a low level, were selected. Of course they were trusted Party members and they had to be of appropriate class origin. He had heard from one of his friends, *** one of whose acquaintances was a member of either the MVD or MGB, that the latter had been investigated for two years before being accepted into a special police school. He was not supposed to disclose to anyone the fact that he was studying in this school. The source did not know the name or location of the school.

The source pointed out several times that MVD and MGB personnel had their own chain of command and did not report to the administrative, military or even Party personnel with whom they worked and to whom in some cases they were normally subordinated. For example, a captain of the MVD or MGB attached to the staff of a general would not report to or be subject to the orders of the general. The attitudes taken by army generals toward the police personnel attached to them varied. If they were men of independent character and felt that there was no political blot on their record, they at least kept the police personnel at a distance socially. On the other hand, there were cases in which generals permitted mere captains of the police administration to associate with them on a basis of equality, and even to sit next to them at official functions.

7. Biographic

The source stated that he had no significant biographic information regarding top ranking Soviet personnel. ****

He had heard a rumor that Marshal Zhukov had been sent to the Urals after serving in Odessa. According to this rumor, Zhukov had been under close political surveillance since his transfer from Germany. He did not believe that Zhukov had been made head of the Odessa Military District to alarm the Turks, but regarded this appointment as a demotion.

Asked what was the opinion of the Soviet people about Stalin, he said that Russians often said that if Stalin were not a Georgian but a Russian he would not treat his people so harshly.

8. Social Groups and Social Relations

Asked if there were a "ruling class" in the Soviet Union the source replied in the negative. There was a ruling "caste" but not a class. Soviet society was, of course, divided into various distinct and sharply differentiated strata which did not correspond entirely to the official categories. Social origin was an important factor in one's career. In this connection, the source reiterated a statement made earlier in the interrogation to the effect that because of his own family background, he could not have achieved a political career. It was an advantage in the Soviet Union to be of working class origin. However, the influence of social origin on individual careers was gradually diminishing. Since the war, the most important factor governing the official appraisal of an individual's political reliability had been his experience during the conflict. Persons who had been war prisoners or who had lived under German occupation or worked as forced laborers for the Germans, were highly suspected. They were still gradually being weeded out of positions of responsibility and were still in danger of arrest and exile. Social origin had less weight than this factor, but was nevertheless very important. Application blanks for employment included questions concerning both of the above points.

There was a sharp struggle for success in Soviet society. Opportunity for advancement was certainly not equal. The political factors mentioned above played a large part in determining individual opportunities. Moreover, children of high ranking Party and government officials were in a privileged position. The "collegiate principle" (kollegialnost) determined social relations among officials and their children and was influential in respect to employment opportunities. In general, family incomes corresponded to official position and children whose parents had adequate incomes had a great advantage in obtaining a good education over those whose parents were unable to supplement the meagre scholarships which most Soviet students in high educational institutions received. He himself had had an advantage over his fellow students in the veterinary institute in *** because his father had been able to help him financially. While he had not lived well, and in fact had been so badly off that he had thought of leaving school, he was much better off than most of his comrades. He at least had a room in a private house, and had not had to live in the miserable institute dormitory.

The greatest division in Soviet society was that between the small ruling group and the vast mass of the population. Members of the ruling caste did not live on a "European" standard but they were reasonably well off. The majority of the population lived in poverty and filth. This was particularly true of the peasants. He felt that the difference between town and country life was far greater in the Soviet Union than in Poland and infinitely greater than in Germany. Most villages lacked electricity or other conveniences, even including public baths. Insects were extremely numerous in the peasant cottages. Because of their poverty, which they attributed to the collective farm system, the peasants were the most anti-Soviet element of the population. It was extremely difficult, in fact, almost impossible, for peasants or their children to legally leave the collective farms on their own initiative.

He himself had occasionally visited collective farms while working in the *** Oblast Military Commissariat, and he had been ashamed to eat his reasonably adequate rations in the presence of half-starved peasants. The latter sometimes openly told him "you are living on our necks." They also sometimes told him that they had been better off under German occupation than they were after the restoration of Soviet authority.

The life of professional people and intellectuals was rendered very difficult by regimentation and Party supervision. Most of them also suffered from the general poverty prevailing in the USSR. A few had large incomes, but there were no "ruble millionaires."

Asked what constituted success in the Soviet Union, the source said that success and prestige were closely associated with fear. Officials liked to have their subordinates and the public fear them.

9. Regional and National Differences and Problems

Local differences among the Slavic elements of the Soviet population were gradually disappearing. The source said that he could tell from what Oblast a person came by his speech, but that gradually speech and other differences, particularly among the great Russians, were disappearing because of the mobility of the population and because of the standardizing influence of mass communications media. There were many Soviet people, like himself, who moved about in government service and who were gradually losing their feeling of being rooted in any local community.

The above observation did not on the whole apply to the non-Slavic nationalities. The great Russians looked upon all the other nationalities, particularly those of Asiatic origin, with a mild feeling of superiority. On their side, the non-Russians, especially the Central Asians, were hostile to the Russians. Relations even between Ukrainians or Belorussians and Great Russians were not very friendly. The source mentioned at one point in the interrogation that in 1946, while he was serving in ***, he had tried to secure admission for his sister to the Pedagogical Institute of that City. His sister had come to *** but had decided not to enter the Institute because she would have to study the Belorussian language which she considered a mere "village Russian." While the source did not draw any conclusions from this fact, it would appear to substantiate his general statements regarding the attitude taken by great Russians toward all other Soviet nationalities.

The source himself had known Georgians, Tatars, Uzbeks and other non-Russians and said that he had no prejudice against them. The Central Asians had been very poor soldiers during the war. They usually spoke Russian very badly and they were so hostile to the Russians and to the Soviet regime that they often deserted to the Germans. He said that the Soviet government itself was to blame for this situation because it had treated these peoples badly. Central Asians who were formed into military units by the Germans had fought far better than while they were in the Soviet army. The appearance and discipline of Uzbeks and Turkmens improved so much in German service that they were almost unrecognizable. The Germans had given them good uniforms and food, particularly meat, without which they would not fight. One reason they had fought better for the Germans than for the Russians was that they realized the grim fate awaiting them if they fell into Soviet hands. Central Asian deserters captured by the Soviet Army were usually shot immediately. He had seen a great many of these troops during the Soviet encirclement of the Germans near Bobruisk.

He confirmed the story that the disloyalty of the Volga Germans to the Soviet regime was ascertained by dropping NKVD paratroopers among them disguised as German troops. The only information that he had regarding the disposition of the Volga Germans was that many of them had been assigned to jobs

as wood cutters, some of them in the Gorki Oblast. He had obtained this information from *** a resident of that Oblast.

There was a great deal of anti-semitism in the USSR. The source said that he himself was not anti-semitic and that he had had many close Jewish friends among the workers of the *** theater. However, he felt that Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, especially peasants, were very unfriendly to the Jews. He had seen many "scandals" between Jews and non-Jews at the markets around ***. These sometimes arose when Jews demanded to be allowed to go to the head of queues in return for offering extra money. He thought that much of the hostility to Jewish people resulted from the fact that the masses felt that Jews lived better than non-Jews and tended to get the best jobs. When the Soviet regime was overthrown, there would probably be mass persecution of Jews. This would occur in the period of chaos (bezvlastie) between the overthrow of the Soviet regime and the establishment of a firm new order. There will not, however, be any such persecution as took place in Nazi Germany. Jews who are respected by the people for their professional achievements as artists, scientists, or physicians will not be persecuted.

Many Ukrainians are hostile to the Russians because they associate the hated Communist regime with the Russians. This attitude arises in part because of the fact that most key Party and police personnel in the Ukraine are Russians or other non-Ukrainians. Asked whether he thought the Ukrainians should be given statehood, the source said that he felt that this was too difficult a question for him to answer but that each people should be allowed to organize its life as it wished and at the same time should live in friendship with its neighbors.

The Soviet government in conscripting for Army service pursued a deliberate policy of mingling various nationalities. During the war, the policy had, during the period after the first great Soviet defeats, been somewhat modified. Platoons, and sometimes even companies, consisting in whole or in large part of Asiatic troops had been rushed to fill the gaps at the front. These troops were almost always commanded by Russians or Ukrainians. Asked why larger units or even whole armies of non-Russians were not raised, he said that it would have been extremely dangerous for the Soviet government to have pursued such a policy, for these troops would have rebelled against the Soviet Command.

As noted earlier, the source expressed deep indignation against the theory that Communism is a specifically Russian phenomenon. He observed that France had almost become a Communist country following World War II. He said that insofar as Communism had appealed to the Russians, it was because of their poverty and lack of education at the time of the revolution of 1917. He said that the defects in the Russian character which are sometimes attributed to innate qualities of the Russian people were largely the product of the Communist régime which had corrupted them.

10. Religion and the Church

The concessions made to religious believers during the war were motivated by the Kremlin's desire to increase national unity at a time when the fate of the Soviet regime was at stake. Early in 1943 after the battle of Stalingrad, the *** Division in which the source was then serving spent some time resting and recuperating near the town of ***. A church had been opened in this town and many officers, including the source, went to this church. Many local people

also attended services there and brought their children. Commanding officers during the war overlooked the fact that members of their units were attending church.

There was one church in ***, also opened during the war, but in this case by the Germans. The source had gone to this church several times, but in civilian clothes, since it was a serious offense for an officer and Party member to attend church. As far as he knew, the *** church was still open, and there had been no persecution of religious believers in that area. The priest of this church was a young and goodlooking man. The source said that one of his girlfriends in *** had jokingly remarked that it would be easy to fall in love with him. The source made it clear that he intended, by citing this remark, to indicate that this priest was probably not a genuine priest at all but a government agent. He said that it was perfectly clear that the orthodox church was an organ of the Soviet state. The fact that Marxism-Leninism was studied at the Theological Academy in Zagorsk was in itself sufficient proof of this.

Old people in the Soviet Union, although they realized that the church was dominated by the government, were grateful to be allowed to go to church. As for the younger people, the source did not think that most of them were interested in religion, although he was not very clear in his mind regarding this point.

A bit of miscellaneous information which he furnished was that there was a considerable number of people of Polish descent around *** who considered themselves to be Catholics although with respect to language and in most other ways they had been pretty thoroughly Russianized.

11. Education, Culture, and Social Welfare

The cultural and spiritual level of the USSR was low, in the source's opinion. The good features of Soviet culture had been taken over from pre-Soviet Russia. The Kremlin had done everything it could to create a new Soviet culture but it had been forced to fall back on the heritage of the past. Without the latter, the Soviet theater and many other features of Soviet cultural life would be a complete failure. The retention of literary and other classics was one of the few evidences that the people's will exerted some influence over government policy. The unpopularity of Soviet plays and films was indirectly indicated not only by the demand for pre-revolutionary classics but by the extraordinary popularity of foreign productions. He had seen and enjoyed some American films, including two in which Deanna Durbin starred. In 1946, a German musical film entitled "Girl of My Dreams" was shown for a few days in ***. It attracted great crowds but was soon withdrawn by order of the Oblast Committee of the Party. This film was later shown for a time in Moscow and Leningrad. **** According to the source, the Belorussian newspapers took the position that it was permissible to show this film to the people of Moscow but not to those of Belorussia, who had been subjected to the disintegrating influence of contact with the Germans.

The source said that it was true that the Soviet regime had provided education for a great many people and had done a good deal to disseminate culture to the masses. But he said that there was no point in teaching people to read and study if they were only going to be spiritually enslaved. He felt that the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia was far superior in the quality of its education and above all in refinement of feelings to its Soviet counterpart. He saw little hope for the future of Soviet culture or science and considered that

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the growing regimentation in the USSR would lead to cultural "regression." In fact, this process had already begun. The Soviet regime had not produced a single outstanding name in literature, music or other cultural fields. This was because people were not allowed to create but had to act according to government orders.

Asked what was meant by the expression "Soviet man," he replied ironically that Soviet man must be crude, uneducated, and so stupid that he believes Soviet propaganda. It was the aim of the post-war cultural purges to produce Soviet man. The Politburo wanted people to think automatically as they thought themselves.

Despite the evil effects of the Soviet system, the Russian people still retained a love of its national culture. The Russians read more than Germans did and had more imagination. He said that the Germans were a more "practical" people than the Russians.

The worst effect of the Soviet system had been to destroy respect for the value of the individual human personality. So-called "Communist morality" had produced a coarse, harsh, type of individual who could justify anything in the name of Communism. Respect for women and for old people had been destroyed. The frightful behavior of Soviet troops abroad, even in countries which had been allied with Russia during the war, reflected the moral disintegration caused by "Communist morality." A less important but symptomatic indication of the low cultural and moral level of the Soviet people was the fact that young people almost never gave up their seats in trains or buses to women or old people. If they did, their comrades made fun of them. He criticized the Soviet government for continuing the Czarist regime's practice of making large profits by the sale of vodka. This, together with the more important fact that people lived under constant strain and fear, led to mass drunkenness. The Russians had always drunk too much, but he doubted if drinking had ever been as much of a problem as it is in the USSR at present. One often saw people lying drunk in gutters.

Moral standards in all spheres of conduct had suffered of course as a result of the war. He felt that they were lower among the Germans, however, than among the Russians. The efforts made by the Communist Party to strengthen family life were determined by such purely practical considerations as a desire to increase the population, and had no idealistic motivation. The source said that people found ways of evading the stricter divorce laws introduced in 1944 and subsequently. One way of getting a divorce was to lose one's passport, get a new one and change the name entered in the passport.

Corruption of officials, obtaining government positions or favors through "pull" (blat) and a nihilistic attitude toward law were widespread. The Soviet people felt that law was like a telegraph pole. It was something that you could not go through but you could go around it.

A person could get away with almost any sort of conduct as long as he was considered politically reliable and loyal.

He did not think that the health, recreation or social welfare program of the Soviet government offered much to compensate for the hardships and evils of Soviet life. The health of the Soviet people, like its character was deteriorating because of the conditions under which it lived. He felt that he had

been able to observe a steady deterioration in the health and physique of army recruits even during his own military service. Diseases such as tuberculosis and venereal disease were very widespread. Before the war, there had been very little of the latter in the USSR. The government's efforts to increase the birthrate were not succeeding. He based this observation on the fact that so many of his acquaintances had no children. The effects of concentration camps must also be considered in this connection. It was not true that free medical care was available to the majority of the Soviet people. Peasants even had to pay for veterinary service rendered to their "private" livestock.

The sanitary conditions under which most Soviet people lived were very bad. For example, most of the milk consumed in the Soviet Union was not pasteurized although dairy products used in government institutions were pasteurized.

The state of mental health was as bad as that of physical health. Psychiatric hospitals were overflowing. He knew of one mental hospital in the town of Korov and one in Gorki. There were many suicides among Soviet personnel in Germany. One civilian employee of his enterprise had hanged himself ***. He knew of three suicides in 1949 in the Venereal Disease hospital in ***.

Recreational facilities were grossly inadequate. Regulations providing for vacations were more a formality than a reality. Most people were too poor to take vacation trips. Large categories of the population, such as sergeants and enlisted men in the army did not even have the right to vacations. Repatriates serving in Germany received no vacations.

12. Attitudes toward the Soviet System

The majority of Soviet people are discontented to the point of hatred of the Soviet system. It will take from 10 to 20 years for the Soviet regime to regain the control of the people's minds, which it had achieved before the war. It would be difficult or impossible to "reeducate" those who had seen the non-Soviet world or even had lived under German occupation. The most potent source of discontent was the contacts with Western influence resulting from the war. The post-war ideological measures were designed in large part to overcome these influences.

Another important factor in creating discontent was memory of pre-revolutionary life passed down by parents to their children. The source himself was convinced that the Russian people had lived better before the revolution although he considered that the Czarist regime with its secret police and terror was an evil one.

Neither contact with the outside world nor memories of a previous regime would be significant influences if it were not for the basic evil of Soviet life, namely the virtual slavery under which Soviet people lived. The dominant feature of Soviet life was fear of making a political mistake. Its consequences were worse than those of committing real crime. For this reason, the people sympathized with political prisoners and regarded them as innocent. Such sayings as "one cannot escape prison" were common among Soviet people. According to one "anecdote" a Soviet person said, "I am waiting for a streetcar." His friend replied, "You know there is no streetcar in this town." "Yes, there is," was the answer, "one that goes to Siberia."

In order to survive in the Soviet Union, one had to become cunning and sly and above all one had to keep one's thoughts to oneself. This ingrown existence was hateful, especially to Soviet intellectuals. The source thought that all classes of people, particularly peasants, hated the system. Each major social or occupational group had both general and specific grievances. Poverty and fear of the Party and police affected most of the population. The peasants hated the collective farms, army officers hated the political officers, enlisted men resented officers' privileges, factory workers were bitter about the speed-up to which they were subjected. Most rank and file Communists shared these negative attitudes.

Asked in what ways discontent was expressed, the source replied as follows: the Soviet people have become very adept in double talk, although even the cleverest and most cautious remarks often lead to disaster. But one evidence of discontent was the great number of political jokes which circulated in the USSR. People did not usually trust one another, but there were some exceptions to this rule. Parents and children generally spoke freely to one another and so did some professional workers, such as his own veterinary colleagues, although to a lesser extent. It was dangerous for a man to discuss his business with his wife, since she might report him to the police if they quarreled. Sometimes persons traveling on trains expressed their feelings and opinions to fellow travelers whom they knew they would probably not see again.

Anecdotes and conversations were not the only ways in which discontent manifested itself. There was widespread "passive sabotage." He thought that the population of *** had passively resisted most government measures during the period of his residence there. Workers did not respond according to him to the thesis that the factories belonged to the people. They were in the habit of saying that the jails and concentration camps also belonged to them.

Asked whether discontent would increase or diminish with the passage of time, the source expressed the opinion that it would increase. However, he considered it possible that the government might be able to mold the minds of the children now growing up, upon whom no outside influences were permitted to operate.

13. Soviet Propaganda and Political Education

The source considered that all forms of Soviet propaganda were powerless in the face of the truth. This fact explained the susceptibility of the Soviet people to external influences when they came in contact with them. He felt that Nazi propaganda had been much more successful among the Germans than Communist propaganda was among the Russians. This was because Hitler's ideology corresponded to a program from which the German people derived benefit, though at the expense of other peoples. In contrast, Soviet propaganda attempted to justify a system and a way of life obviously detrimental to the interests of the Soviet people.

Of course, it would be a mistake to underestimate the effect of Soviet propaganda. Its great strength lay in the fact that it had almost no competition. There was an old Russian saying that if you called a person a fool, he would be angry the first two or three times but eventually he would begin to believe that he really was a fool if he were told so often enough. The methods

of propaganda and political training in the USSR were destined to saturate the public mind with the ideas deemed suitable by the government. Of course, all this repetition and drilling had its disadvantages. It was frightfully dull. People tried to escape dull and painful reality by reading fiction, particularly the Russian classics. He himself had lost all interest in the Soviet press and other forms of propaganda after the war. The only part of the newspapers that interested him at all was that containing foreign news. He could see no sense in reading whole pages of telegrams congratulating Stalin when everybody knew that the majority of the people were going hungry.

Before the war, he had read the press very carefully, because in order to achieve any sort of career in the USSR, it was necessary to keep up with Party directives and other information which could be obtained from the Soviet press.

He did not think that one could learn very much about public opinion in the USSR from the press, but one could learn a good deal about the problems bothering the Soviet leaders at any given time. The more furor was raised in the press about a problem, the more the government was worried about it. If conditions in any sphere were satisfactory, propaganda might either ignore it or boast about successes achieved. The more the Soviet press depreciated life abroad, the surer one could be that conditions were not good at home. Soviet people were very skilled in reading between the lines. His father had taught him that one must read not what is written in the papers but "what is meant."

The publications which the source and his comrades had read *** were the following: Pravda, Izvestiya, Sovetskaya Armiya, Sovetskoe Slovo (an organ of the civil administration in the Soviet Zone), a paper published by the *** Army, the title of which he did not remember, and some others including Krokodil.

14. Attitudes toward Foreign Affairs

As indicated earlier, the source considered the aim of Soviet foreign policy to be a Communist world dominated by Moscow. All Soviet policy was subordinated to this overall aim. The source's comment about basic foreign policy questions was rather sketchy. Although he was interested in foreign relations, he knew relatively little about them and in answer to many questions in this field, he replied that he had no information or opinion. He was more interested in Poland than in any other foreign country, except the U. S. He felt that the Poles, although they hated Communism, were not unfriendly to the Russian people. The appointment of Rokossovsky must have been a bitter pill for the Poles. He considered that its purpose was to speed up the Sovietization of Poland. In case of war the Poles would certainly not be reliable allies of the Soviets, and would in fact do everything possible to sabotage the Soviet war effort. It would be impossible to break the spirit of the Poles. In 1945; they had regarded the Soviet troops as liberators but now they had seen with their own eyes what Communism really was like.

Soviet policy in Germany was intended to bring about the creation of a state modeled on the present Soviet satellites. The Kremlin would certainly not give up its political or even its physical control of Germany, though as a political trick it might try to create the impression that it was withdrawing from Germany. Rokossovsky's appointment might have been intended as part of the preparation for such a maneuver.

Asked what he thought of the situation in China, he said that the success of the Communists there was a great threat to Asia, but in this connection, as in connection with other foreign policy questions, he stressed that Communism everywhere would collapse when it had been "liquidated" in the Soviet Union. He had never talked to anyone or heard any discussion among his friends about the Chinese situation.

Regarding Tito, he felt that his defection from the Soviet camp was very important because it shattered the illusion of a united Communist front. He said that he did not favor any "compromises" with any Communists, including Tito, but it was expedient to help him to resist the Kremlin. He thought there were very many Russian Communists who sympathized with Tito. Tito's program was "Communism without collective farms."

Asked how Soviet people reacted to resistance to Soviet expansion, he expressed the opinion that intelligent Soviet people realized that such measures as the Marshall Plan were defensive and did not represent an attempt to dominate foreign countries. Some Soviet intellectuals, however, expressed the opinion that American and Soviet policy were equally bad. This misconception could be easily corrected if the truth could be made available to these people. As for the masses, they were indifferent to political affairs.

15. War and Peace

The Kremlin knew that the U. S. was not aggressive, and so did many Soviet people. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's whole policy line was directed toward war preparations. The people of the USSR did not approve of the Kremlin's war-like policy, since they hated and feared war more than anything else. The army knew that the enemy in another war would be a country technically even more advanced than Germany. Soviet propaganda, beginning shortly after the end of the war, had attempted to arouse hostility toward the U. S. The first stage of this operation, particularly as it was carried out by the army political workers, was the attempt to prove that the Soviet Union won the war single handed. Later the agitators and the press began to accuse America of aggressive intentions toward the USSR.

He thought that Soviet morale would be very low in the event of war with America. He based this opinion in part on his observations at the front during World War II. In the early months of the war, the morale of the Red Army had been very low. Mass surrenders had taken place but the barbarous and inhuman policy of the Germans had united the Soviet people and elevated the morale of the army. At first, there was no hatred of the Germans and there was even a tendency to believe their propaganda leaflets. He did not think that the hatred aroused by German atrocities had been extended by the Soviet people to foreigners in general. The Soviet people knew the difference between national socialism and American democracy.

Of course, if the Americans used atomic bombs or in other ways inflicted suffering on large masses of civilians, there might be very hostile reactions. Hatred which might be aroused by American use of the atomic bomb would, of course, also be accompanied by fear. He had heard that people in Russia were talking of the necessity, in the event of war, of leaving the big cities. During the war, he had condemned Vlasov for allying himself with the Germans but since he had defected, his opinion of Vlasov had become more favorable. He now felt that it was too bad that some such general as Zhukov had not been able to "continue the war" after the defeat of Germany and bring about the destruction of Communism.

Asked what indications there would be of Soviet intentions to start a war, he said that new equipment would be supplied to the troops in Germany. At present, most of the equipment in use in Germany is old. Propaganda would be intensified against the prospective enemy. Certain key factories would change over to war production. The Oblast and Rayon Military Commissariats would work out mobilization plans. The Soviets would probably stage incidents which would make it appear that the U. S., or whatever nation they were about to attack, was the aggressor. For example, MVD agents might kill some Russian diplomats or representatives abroad and these acts would be blamed on the U. S. If the U. S. broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviets would probably take no decisive action.

In the event of war with the U. S., Soviet propaganda would probably allege that the USSR was fighting for the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia from American "imperialism."

16. Information regarding the U. S.

Before the war, the source had known relatively little about America. He had read Ilf and Petrov's famous book "One Story America." Though this book had satirized American life and culture, it was easy to see from it that America was a "grandiose" country. During the war, he had realized the vast importance of American aid. For example, almost all of the meat which he and his comrades in the army consumed during the war was American. They had also received great quantities of powdered eggs, juices, vitamins, and many other products. The army could not have been fed without American products. Without U. S. aid, the Soviet Union would certainly not have won the war and perhaps could not have survived. He had come to this conclusion despite the fact that the political workers in the army had almost ignored the role of America in the war. This was significant, because it was a departure from the normal practice, which was for oral agitation to embellish and embroider material given in the press. After the Teheran conference, for example, the political workers read the communique published in the newspapers but made no comment and did not attempt to play up the significance of this step in the development of the coalition.

The source had never met or talked to an American before his defection. While he was in *** some Americans eating in a restaurant had been pointed out to him and he had wanted to talk to them but the waiter had warned him that a police agent was present, and he had not done so.

17. America and Other Foreign Propaganda

The majority of Soviet army officers in Germany listened to the Voice of America. He always listened to the Voice except while he was traveling. Most people who listened did so because they wanted to hear the truth. Some of the listeners, however, were political workers and police officials who listened to obtain information needed for their work. It was easy to get Voice broadcasts in the Soviet Zone but the jamming was effective in Poland and almost drowned out the Voice in his father's town.*** His father listened to short wave broadcasts in German but no one in the neighborhood knew that he did this. He found that the Poles listened to the Voice Polish broadcasts but liked the BBC better.

Asked whether the Voice or the BBC were more effective, he said that the Voice was because of its 24-hour schedule.

He thought the Voice was doing a good job but that it should do even more than it already was to expose the activities of the secret police and other black features of the Soviet system. It should also do everything possible to acquaint the Soviet people with the tricks and deception utilized by the Soviet government in both its domestic and its foreign policy. The Russian people were ignorant of much that its own government was doing. All the fraudulent and barbarous tactics and practices of the Soviet rulers must be exposed to the whole world and in particular to the Russian people. Good propaganda was more valuable to the cause of peace and democracy than armaments, necessary though the latter were.

He had never seen the magazine Amerika while in the Soviet Union or in Germany. All that he had heard about it was that Americans distributed it by leaving copies in streetcars and on trains but that Russians threw them away. He had seen copies of Amerika since his defection and he thought that its illustrations were "unsurpassed." He had a very favorable impression of it but he doubted if the secret police permitted it to reach the people. He had never heard any mention of it in conversation with his fellow officers. He had never seen a copy of the Britanski Soyuznik (British Ally). He thought the secret police sent agents to buy copies of these publications so that they would not reach the people, but permitted them to be displayed so that foreigners would think they were freely distributed.

Asked to suggest ways in which the present American information program could be supplemented, the source said that we should organize a "Russian press" which should prepare various publications including a newspaper in the Russian language which would not be a strictly official organ.


18. Political Aspirations and Predictions

The source's statements regarding the possible future organization of Russia were characterized by more emotional fervor than clarity or comprehensiveness of thought. In a general sense, they were definite enough. "After the revolution" there should be an elected government guaranteeing all basic freedoms. There must be several political parties, which would include a peasant party and a workers' party. There should not, however, be a socialist party. The Soviet people hated the very word socialism. There is danger of a new form of dictatorship in Russia for the Russians unfortunately do have a certain tendency toward dictatorship. The collective farms must be abolished and private property and private enterprise restored. The "criminal world" of Bolshevism and all its evil heritage must be destroyed. This must not be done by terrorist means. The source did not indicate how this objective could be achieved. Regarding international organization and international relations, the source expressed the opinion that the ultimate goal must be the establishment of an international society in which there will be no possibility of war and in which even armies will cease to exist. The first step in this direction might be the establishment of a real U. N. organization. The present U. N. does not function properly and there can be no real international organization as long as Bolshevism exists. The war danger will be ever present as long as Russia is dominated by the present type of regime.

Asked whether he thought there was any foreseeable possibility of a change of regime in Russia, the source said that the only hope he saw at present was that some cataclysmic event might take place in connection with Stalin's death.

RAPPORT van ACD voor B.-

6.15
09.27



Betr: Centrale Comité van de Comm.Partij in de U.S.S.R.-

Betrouwbare, niet nader te controleren bron meldt bij
bericht ACD/108976/116 A-14

Schutblad in over

zie bijgaande fotocopie.

NB: Bij gebruik van deze informatie buiten de dienst moet
de telegrafische herkomst worden verzwegen.

ACD, 109013, 10-5-51

1 bijlage.

ACD/1

H. B. van

ZEER
GEHEIM

116.

A-14 CHATAIGNEAU, MOSKOU zond op 26.4.'51 het volgende bericht
aan het MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN, PARIJS.

act 1951/3
D 105
(La session?) du COMITE CENTRAL du PARTI COMMUNISTE de l'UNION à l'occasion du premier mai comporte, selon l'usage, une série de salutations à l'adresse des peuples étrangers (en particulier?) des classes laborieuses des pays, suivie d'appel aux différentes catégories de travailleurs soviétiques énumérées suivant un ordre traditionnel.

L'appel publié ce matin par la presse prescrit avec celui de l'année dernière les principales différences suivantes:

Premièrement: Alors qu'en 1950 le COMITE CENTRAL du PARTI COMMUNISTE saluait "les pays des Démocraties Populaires", il s'adresse cette année "aux travailleurs des pays des Démocraties Populaires".

Deuxièmement: Il salue les "forces démocratiques d'ALLEMAGNE qui combattent pour les intérêts vitaux du peuple allemand, pour une ALLEMAGNE unifiée, indépendante, démocratique et pacifique" et non plus comme en 1950 "l'ALLEMAGNE unifiée, indépendante, démocratique, pacifique".

Troisièmement: Le peuple coréen fait cette année l'objet d'une motion séparée.

Quatrièmement: Un paragraphe spécial concerne les PARTISANS DE LA PAIX qui sont exhortés à déjouer "les plans criminels d'agression militaires des millionnaires et --aires américains, anglais, français et autres. *réaction nos 200*

Cinquièmement: Un paragraphe spécial célèbre la politique étrangère soviétique "la politique de paix et de sécurité, d'égalité et d'amitié entre les peuples".

La longue liste d'appel et de salutations à l'usage interne offre, elle aussi, quelques modifications par comparaison à celle de 1950.

C'est ainsi que les travailleurs de l'industrie, de la pêche (activité récemment promue), les géurgentogues(?), font aujourd'hui l'objet de motion spéciale.

Enfin à l'appel habituel aux *paysans?* et à la recommandation "d'observer pieusement le statut des KHOLKOZE, loi fondamentale de la vie KHOLKOZE" s'ajoute cette année celle "d'utiliser intégralement les avantages de la grande propriétaire collective".

123797/96/95(1018/19/30)

In Algemene Dienst,
Plein 1813 No. 4
's-GRAVENHAGE
No. : 82986

11 Mei 1950

UITGEBOEKT

Uw No. :

Betr. : Verklaring van een uit
Rusland teruggekeerde
krijgsgevangene.

Hiermede heb ik de eer U, in vouwe
dezes, een fotocopie te doen toekomen
van een verklaring, afgelegd door een
uit Rusland teruggekeerde krijgsgevan-
gene, naar de inhoud waarvan ik U kort-
heidshalve moge verwijzen.

K.A.
CUM

Bijlagen: een

Aan de Heer Regeringscommissaris
in Algemene Dienst,
Plein 1813 No. 4
's-GRAVENHAGE

OP KAART
ACD/ AC
DAT: 14.6.50
PAR: *W*

5/107
3 APR. 1950
ACD/02906

B.
D.A./1-067/W.559

Transmis, pour votre information, la note
ci-jointe, relatant des renseignements fournis, par
un ex-prisonnier de guerre en U.R.S.S.

Le 22 mars 1950.

N O T E.

Le nommé KIRSCHVINK, Hans-Josef, de nationalité belge, né à Hauset, le 18 janvier 1923, y domicilié Hagbenden, n° 12, est rentré le 25 décembre 1949, venant de Russie où il a été détenu comme prisonnier de guerre.

KIRSCHVINK a été enrôlé de force dans la Wehrmacht, le 13 avril 1942 et fait prisonnier par les Russes en Tchécoslovaquie, le 14 mai 1945.

La famille KIRSCHVINK était pro-belge avant la guerre et elle l'est restée. Le père est premier échevin à Hauset.

Ci-dessous, divers renseignements fournis par KIRSCHVINK concernant son séjour en U.R.S.S.

Camps où il a séjourné :

De juin 1945 à fin 1946, à ARSCHA (dans l'Oural).
De fin 1946 à juin 1947, à Tchernikovo (Oural).
De juin à octobre 1947 (Odessa).
De octobre 1947 à février 1949, dans le bassin du Donetz, camp de Krasnilouch, Schaecht Karl-Marx et Krimatoss.
De février 1949 à mai 1949, à Melitopol (Ukraine).
De mai à novembre 1949, à Sébastopol.
En novembre, retour à Méliopol où il a été libéré.

Renseignements politiques :

Dans tous les camps où KIRSCHVINK est passé, les prisonniers étaient forcés d'assister à des cours de propagande politique. Ces cours se tenaient après le travail et au moins deux fois par semaine. Ils duraient plusieurs heures.

Jusqu'en 1946, il n'y a été question que de politique en général, basée uniquement sur la propagande marxiste.

A partir de fin 1946, la propagande était nettement dirigée contre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et les pays d'Europe occidentale.

Jusqu'en 1946, cette propagande portait assez bien ses fruits, parmi les prisonniers allemands qui ignoraient le sort des populations de l'Allemagne occupée. A dater de 1947, quand une correspondance fut établie, les prisonniers comprirent que la propagande était outrageusement exagérée et, ayant plus de contacts avec la population, ils remarquèrent que le régime était loin de répondre aux images qu'en faisaient les autorités.

Le 13 avril 1942, enrôlé de force dans la Wehrmacht.

Le 14 mai 1945, fait prisonnier par les Russes.

Le 25 décembre 1949, retour de Russie où il a été détenu comme prisonnier de guerre.

En général, on peut dire que très peu de prisonniers sont acquis aux théories communistes. Beaucoup ont paru suivre les cours sans répugnance pour avoir la paix et ne pas subir de mauvais traitements.

A Arscha, il y avait 3.000 prisonniers et à Tchornikovo, 2.500. Pour cette région de l'Oural, il pouvait y en avoir, en tout, en 1946, 16.000.

En 1946, KIRSCHVINK se trouvait avec deux autres Belges, des environs de Malmédy. Dès que les Russes constatèrent que ces trois prisonniers étaient de nationalité belge, ils furent séparés. KIRSCHVINK est resté sur place. Le deuxième a été envoyé à Ufa (70 Kms à l'Ouest d'Arscha). Le troisième est resté à Arscha, mais dans un autre camp.

En 1947, KIRSCHVINK et son compagnon resté à Arscha, ont été renvoyés à Odessa pour être rapatriés. A Odessa on a refusé de les rapatrier :

1. parce qu'ils avaient refusé d'adhérer au Comité de Front Deutschland (pro-communiste),
2. parce qu'ils étaient encore relativement en bonne santé et jugés aptes au travail,
3. parce qu'ils avaient essayé d'entrer en relation avec l'équipage d'un navire belge qui se trouvait à Odessa. Dénoncés aux Russes par d'autres prisonniers avant d'avoir pu établir ces relations, ils ont été désignés pour être réexpédiés dans un camp de travail.

Ils ont été envoyés dans le bassin du Donetz et, depuis lors, KIRSCHVINK n'a plus entendu parler des deux autres Belges et il ignore leur sort actuel.

A Krasnilouch, KIRSCHVINK se trouvait dans un camp de 900 prisonniers. La propagande communiste était encore beaucoup plus forte que dans les camps de l'Oural. Il fallait se rendre aux réunions trois fois par semaine sous peine de ne rien obtenir à manger. Cette propagande donnait des résultats nettement insignifiants. A partir de 1947, les prisonniers étaient fixés sur la propagande russe qui était accompagnée de mauvais traitements.

A 150 Kms au Sud de Krasnilouch, 3.000 prisonniers travaillaient dans les mines de charbon de Schacht Karl-Marx. Le nom russe de la localité n'est pas connu de KIRSCHVINK. La propagande était exactement pareille qu'à Krasnilouch.

A Krimatos, localité située sur la limite du bassin du Donetz, à 40 Kms de Stalino, travaillaient 1.200 prisonniers.

A Méritopoli, seulement 500. Mais c'était un centre très important de propagande.

Celle-ci était moindre à Sébastopol où 1.800 prisonniers travaillaient sans arrêt à la reconstruction.

Partout, la propagande était contrôlée directement par la N.K.V.D. Des officiers russes, qui appartenaient à ce service, remettaient les textes des cours à des interprètes allemands communistes (généralement prisonniers de guerre eux-mêmes) et membres de Antifa. Antifa est une école spéciale, que ne fréquentaient généralement que les prisonniers connus comme communistes convaincus.

Partout, dans les camps, grand ou petits, il y avait des mouchards parmi les prisonniers qui signalaient aux Russes ceux qui n'allaient au cours de propagande qu'à contre-cœur.

La propagande communiste était continue. Des affiches anti-américaines étaient placardées dans les camps. En 1949, les Russes ont raconté, lors des cours, que le parti communiste belge avait obtenu 90 % des suffrages aux dernières élections.

A Krimatos, trente prisonniers allemands fréquentaient une école Antifa proprement dite, en même temps que 12 officiers soviétiques. Tous ces Allemands étaient des volontaires. Il existait des écoles semblables à Moscou et à Stalino. A Krakasch (près de Krasnilouch), 1.200 hommes suivaient des cours spéciaux. Il s'agissait d'anciens SS ou de membres du Adolf Hitler: Leibstandarte.

A Odessa, une centaine de SS flamands, tous engagés pour l'armée allemande avant 1942, fréquentaient également une école de propagande. Ils s'étaient présentés volontairement, soit pour racheter leurs méfaits, soit pour éviter d'être remis aux autorités belges.

A Odessa se trouvait un SS hollandais celui-ci était homme de confiance pour les Hollandais prisonniers. Il était communiste avoué, très bien noté des officiers russes auxquels il servait de mouchard.

A Odessa, pendant les cours, les Russes invitaient les prisonniers, qui seraient bientôt libérés à se livrer dans leur pays à la propagande communiste, à troubler les réunions ou manifestations anti-communistes, promettant leur appui en cas de conflit éventuel. La propagande devait surtout se faire chez les jeunes, de 13 à 16 ans, pour former, plus tard, une élite communiste dans ces pays. Les prisonniers belges étaient également invités à lutter contre le retour du Roi. Il fallait également expliquer aux populations de l'Ouest que le régime communiste ferait de leur pays un Eden; que ce régime serait différent de celui appliqué à la Russie en raison de la différence de race, mentalité, etc.

A la Pentecôte 1947, les prisonniers de guerre avaient organisé, selon leurs moyens, une sorte de fête religieuse. Les Russes ont déclaré qu'ils constataient que leur propagande avait été vaine. Ils garantissaient que les prisonniers ne seraient pas renvoyés dans leur pays avant 1949.

Renseignements industriels :

Les prisonniers ne sont pas capables, selon KIRSCHVINK, d'en fournir beaucoup étant donné qu'ils étaient tenus à l'écart des industries intéressantes. Ceux qui fournissent de grandes précisions exagèrent ou mentent. La population russe elle-même connaît très peu les ressources de leur pays.

A Arscha (Oural), KIRSCHVINK travaillait dans la forêt, à trier des arbres coupés.

Dans cette localité, 30.000 Russes travaillaient dans des hauts-fourneaux. Aucun prisonnier n'était admis dans les industries d'Arscha. Il arrivait des trains amenant des vieux fers ou aciers. Il repartait du matériel en wagon hermétique. Il devait s'agir de pièces détachées pour blindage de chars. Au début de 1946, il y a eu une terrible explosion. Personne n'en a parlé.

A Tohernikovo, l'intéressé travaillait dans une tuilerie. Il existait également une fabrique de caisses. Ces caisses, de formats divers, étaient expédiées vides à Arscha.

Pendant son séjour dans l'Oural, il a entendu dire qu'il existait des industries très importantes à Scheloupinsk (Oural).

A Odessa, il a travaillé à la construction d'une nouvelle fabrique appelée Krekin, qui devait servir à épurer de l'huile. Celle-ci était expédiée au port par un canal souterrain établi à 2,50 mètres de profondeur. Cette immense fabrique, d'un rayon de 2,5 Kms était reliée au port par un canal de 3 Kms. Elle a été terminée en juillet et aussitôt, tous les prisonniers ont été déplacés.

A Krasnilouch, il a été inapte au travail, pesant encore 46 kilogs. Il existait trois mines de charbon. Aucune industrie.

A Schacht Karl-Marx, pas d'industrie. Seulement des mines.

A Krimatos, industries diverses très importantes s'étendant sur 9 Kms. Les prisonniers n'étaient admis que dans les quatre premiers kilomètres et y travaillaient dans des fonderies, aciéries, fabriques des chars, matériel pour navires de guerre. Dans la zone interdite aux prisonniers, se trouvaient 4 hauts-fourneaux et 7 gros bâtiments, dont les prisonniers n'ont jamais su à quoi ils servaient. 75.000 hommes étaient occupés dans ces industries qui marchaient jour et nuit, par poses de 8 heures.

A Mélitopol, KIRSCHVINK travaillait à construire un autostrade Moscou-Sébastopol, large de 7 mètres et asphalté. N'étant jamais allé dans la localité, il ignore s'il existe d'autres industries.

A Sébastopol, KIRSCHVINK a travaillé dans une fabrique d'asphalte. Il n'a vu aucune industrie. La ville était en-

tièrement détruite. Les casernes avaient été reconstruites, ainsi qu'une toute nouvelle caserne contenant 2.000 soldats. Garnison militaire extrêmement nombreuse.

Toute la population est occupée à la reconstruction de la ville et de la forteresse. Celle-ci possède un souterrain long de 1.6 Kms dans lequel passent deux voies de chemin de fer. Le passage est évidemment interdit à tout prisonnier.

Renseignements divers :

Les prisonniers ont toujours été mal soignés et jusqu'en 1947, mal traités. A dater de 1947, le traitement fut amélioré.

Les soldats russes disaient que si une nouvelle guerre avait lieu, ils ne feraient plus de prisonniers qu'ils devaient ensuite nourrir. Selon d'autres, les prisonniers séjournant encore en Russie seraient tués, en cas de nouveau conflit.

Le peuple russe est entièrement dominé par la police du régime. Le communisme doit être en régression. Le peuple pense qu'une nouvelle guerre le libérera des dirigeants communistes. Les ouvriers demandaient aux prisonniers comment les Américains traitent les prisonniers. En cas de guerre, de nombreux Russes seraient défaitistes. Les ouvriers s'intéressaient au sort des pays "occupés" par les Américains.

Le contrôle policier est beaucoup trop fort que pour permettre une révolte.

Le Russe ne cache pas sa crainte extrême de la puissance aérienne américaine.

Les prisonniers qui signaient un engagement de ne plus jamais porter les armes contre l'U.R.S.S. obtenaient des rations de vivres supplémentaires.

Ceux qui n'aimaient pas assister aux cours de propagande étaient interrogés sur leur passé, sur celui de leurs parents et de leurs grand-parents. Ces interrogatoires étaient parfois très durs et duraient de 4 à 5 heures, sans mauvais traitements corporels. Mais quand un prisonnier ne pouvait préciser où son grand-père était né ou décédé, il était suspecté.

En principe, les prisonniers ont pu écrire à partir de 1947 une fois par mois, mais 9 lettres sur 10 disparaissaient.

Les Russes prétendent officiellement qu'il reste 890.000 prisonniers de guerre en U.R.S.S. Il doit en rester environ 80.000 de plus, dans des camps qui ne sont pas mentionnés dans les statistiques. Les prisonniers appellent ces camps "Schweigenlager" (camps du silence). Il existe un camp semblable à Méliopol. Dans ces camps, un fonctionnaire du N.K.V. D. surveille 100 prisonniers. Le contrôle est extrêmement sévère. - Les Belges encore en captivité se trouvent à Kiev.

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Van: KA=RA
No.: E. 508

Hierbij doen wij U een rapport geheten RUSSIAN ASIA - A CENTRALISED EMPIRE
toekomen, hetwelk wij van Sardine ontvingen.

28.3.1950.

RUSSIAN ASIA:

A Centralised Empire

This paper traces the development of Russia's highly-centralised empire in Central Asia.

1. Historically, Moscow's hegemony dates from the years of confusion and conquest following the collapse of the Tsarist Empire.

2. Politically, it is exercised by infiltration and by the Communist Party system of "democratic centralism." Constitutionally, it is based upon the powers of the Central Government in relation to these territories, and, in particular, upon the notorious Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

3. Ideologically, it is consolidated by rigidly-imposed controls (especially in the sphere of education) which perpetuate the subservience and cultural enslavement of the people.

February, 1950.

I.—CONQUEST

After the collapse of the Tsarist Empire, Soviet control was not immediately fastened upon the colonial peoples of Central Asia. Efforts to secure their allegiance were made, partly by force, partly by promises of independence; but, as the Kremlin's grip tightened, real self-government was gradually eliminated.

Under the Tsarist régime those colonial areas comprised Russian Turkestan, which was divided into three parts:

One of these, the Fergana Oblast (formerly the Khanate of Kokanda) was administered by the Governor-General of Turkestan. Another, the Transcaspian Oblast (Turkmenia) was divided in 1898 into five districts, each of which was a component of the Russian Imperial system of administration, although the whole was under the Governor-General's authority. The remainder consisted of two vassal States of the Central Russian Government—the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva.

Moslems' Plans

In March, 1917, Kerensky's Provisional Government issued a liberal decree regarding the religious beliefs and national aspirations of all Russian citizens. Encouraged by this, the Moslems of Turkestan made plans to organise the Fergana-Turkmenia region, demanding autonomy within a Russian federation, as well as social and educational emancipation.

When the Bolsheviks came to power they regarded the Moslems as useful allies. Dissembling their Marxist contempt for Islam, they made a direct bid for Moslem support in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics. A categorical promise was made in the Lenin-Stalin proclamation of 7th December, 1917:

"Your beliefs and customs, your national culture and institutions are hereafter free and inviolable. Lend your support to the Revolution."

Abroad, a new policy was announced of Bolshevik patronage of the "enslaved Moslems of the Orient"—one of the earliest examples of what is now a recurrent propaganda attack on the "imperialism" of the Western Powers.

Massacre

Already, in November, 1917, the Fourth Regional Moslem Congress had elected a Pro-

visional Government and had proclaimed the autonomy of Turkestan. But, before the Constituent Assembly could meet, local Bolshevik forces attacked the new régime. Thousands of its supporters were massacred, their land scorched and their homesteads burned. During 1918-19 this reign of terror reduced the Moslems to poverty and hunger.

Moscow then decided upon a show of toleration. A commission went to Tashkent, dismissed a number of officials, and otherwise discouraged direct action against Moslem communities.

Further developments of the appeasement policy followed. In January, 1918, came the creation of a Commissariat (Ministry) for Moslem Affairs. Consisting of two Tartars and a Bashkir, it was attached to Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities. In 1920 private property and freedom of worship were recognised in the non-Socialistic "People's Soviet Republics" of Bokhara and Khiva.

In the meantime, however, the Bolsheviks' designs had become evident, for their hostility to Islamic independence was crystallising and the Civil War had spread to the Moslem areas. The fate of the Bashkirs was typical of Moscow's double-dealing.

Bashkir Resistance

At first they enjoyed Bolshevik indulgence. Their new Government, formed in 1918, was recognised in March, 1919, on the conclusion of their treaty with the Moscow régime. From Lenin's standpoint, the object of the treaty was sheer expediency—to ensure Bashkir neutrality during the Bolshevik campaign against Admiral Kolchak's White Army. In this it succeeded.

Kolchak was defeated at the end of 1919. The result was an abrupt *volte face*. Ignoring the Bashkir Government, the Red Army promptly installed a Soviet régime and crushed the consequent uprising.

The Bashkir Government fled to Central Asia and tried to continue the resistance. A second rising was suppressed in 1921. Together with the Volga famine, these struggles reduced the Bashkir population to 713,693 in 1926, as compared with 1,321,363 according to the census of 1897.

Crisis in Daghestan

Meanwhile, the Moslems of Daghestan, encouraged by the Lenin-Stalin proclamation, had risen against another White Army—that of General Denikin. As a result, their country was occupied by the Red Army, whose many excesses provoked an insurrection, in October, 1920, headed by Nasmuddin Gotsinky, the Imam of the Moslems of North Caucasia.

So successful was this insurrection that Stalin himself was sent to Daghestan. By guile and duplicity he overcame the people's opposition to Soviet "autonomy" (the new substitute for independence) and brought about a pacification.

To a "Congress of the Peoples of Daghestan," convoked on 13th November, he proclaimed the "autonomy" of Daghestan, which in 1921 duly became an "autonomous republic of the Russian Federation."

Stalin's Promises

"Daghestan," declared Stalin, "should be governed in accordance with its customs, its traditions, its own way of life The Soviet Government considers the Shari'ah to have equal validity with the customary laws of the other peoples of Russia." (In the light of Moscow's treatment of those other peoples, this declaration cannot be described as literally false.)

Similarly, in Turkestan, the continued resistance of the national "Basmachi" was overcome by Soviet propaganda based upon Stalin's promises to Daghestan. For the moment, the Red Army's intolerance of Islam was greatly modified; and, gradually, more and more nationalists were successfully wooed by Moscow.

Reassured by Stalin's benign reference to the Shari'ah, some Moslem leaders (notably the Mufti of Ufa) made a move towards conciliation.

It was hardly surprising that Moscow repulsed them. The *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* of 1935 stated that only "counter-revolutionary" theories would attempt to reconcile the doctrines of Communism with the principles of Islam.

Moslem leaders who tried to do so were regarded by Bolshevik officials as *ipso facto* engaged in a counter-revolution or about to start one.

Change of Tactics

It was clear that the Moslem masses, by virtue of their numbers and their adherence to Islam, constituted a grave weakness in the Soviet system. Thus, with the end of the Civil War, the tactics of toleration were discarded. The Bolsheviks were resolved to secure a much firmer grip on Central Asia, perfecting their control of every phase of life, and preventing the emergence of regional autonomy.

Typical of the softening-up process was the attack on Islam by the League of the Godless—founded in 1925 and later to achieve notoriety under its new name, the League of Militant Atheists. Agitation was directed at first against the mullah, whose culture was ridiculed. Then lands surrounding the mosques were seized, and burlesques of worship were organised by agitators whose object was to deride the feasts and customs of the Moslems.

Already, in 1924, the teaching of religion in schools had been banned, and it was forbidden to give religious instruction to groups of more than three children.

At the same time, Moscow did its utmost to disrupt the Islamic brotherhood, which transcends political and racial boundaries. It became more and more dangerous for the Moslems of the Soviet Union to communicate with Islamic bodies abroad; and although the Soviet Mufti did attend the All-Moslem Congress at Mecca in 1926, this was quite exceptional. Five years later, meeting at Jerusalem, the Congress directed international attention to the manner in which Soviet Russia's Moslem population was being isolated and persecuted.

Disruption

Internally, a policy of political disruption was also applied. The first All-Union Constitution, adopted in 1924, drew largely artificial frontiers which split the compact mass of the Moslem peoples in Turkestan.

The new territorial divisions destroyed the ancient vassal States, the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva, whilst setting up the republics of Turkestan and Uzbekistan, the autonomous republics of Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, and autonomous provinces such as Kara-Kalpak. In addition, the Bashkirs and Tartars were separated, forming two autonomous republics.

According to Mustafa Chokayev, former President of the Turkestan National Council, the

formation of these Central Asian republics was not designed to provide autonomy. The object, he held, was just the reverse—to prevent the national unification of the Turki people of Russian Turkestan.

II.—CONSTITUTION

Having reduced these units to the status of "Union Republics"—or, in some cases, to a position even more subordinate—the Kremlin is able to-day to cite constitutional authority for its rigidly-centralised control of all vital matters.

But the powers of the Government and those of the Communist Party are, in the U.S.S.R., virtually inseparable. Before surveying the constitutional structure, therefore, it will be as well to examine the political framework, which makes its own distinctive contribution to centralisation and Sovietisation.

Infiltration

The electoral system in Russian Central Asia conveys a superficial impression of democratic control. But, as in other parts of the Soviet Union, each constituency is presented with a single candidate, and therefore no choice can be exercised. Many of the representatives thus "elected" to the Central Assemblies are of Russian origin.

The various republics are Sovietised by the infiltration of non-indigenous elements—especially Russians—to control the Party machine, the Supreme Soviets and the Ministries. How this is accomplished, behind a façade of "national" control, is revealed in detail in the Annex to this paper: "Russian Party and Government Officials in Soviet Central Asia."

Russians Paramount

The following table shows that the practice is of long standing. In column I it gives the percentage of Russians in the relevant Communist Parties in 1927. In column II it gives the percentage of Russians in the populations of the Central Asian republics, according to the 1926 census:

	I	II
Tartar A.S.S.R. ...	63.4	43
Kazakhstan ...	59	20
Kirghizia ...	52.8	12
Turkmenistan ...	41	8

Except for the Tartar A.S.S.R., where Russian strength in the Party is more than adequate, these figures are out of all proportion.

A Centralised Party

The Russian dominance is powerfully reinforced by the constitution of the Communist Party itself. This is framed in such a manner that the branches of the central (All-Union) Party have no self-sufficiency—not even in local affairs, and least of all in the cultural field.

The Communist Party is organised on the principle of what is falsely described as "democratic centralism," which entails the entire subservience of the lower to the higher organs.

Thus the Communist Parties of the Soviet republics are subordinate to the All-Union body, and are bound to obey unconditionally the dictates of the central organisation in Moscow. The Centralised Party is the political counterpart of the Centralised Empire. It is, moreover, acknowledged to be the "central nucleus" of all governmental organs and of all administration. Among the colonised peoples of Russian Asia, therefore, there can be no group or national "deviation" from the Moscow dogma.

Reserved Powers

Turning from the political framework to the constitutional structure, one encounters in an even more rabid form the same obsession with centralisation.

Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. defines in the most sweeping terms the powers which are reserved to the Central Government.

It is a formidable list, running to 24 sub-sections and including practically all the functions of government. In effect, it guarantees the powers of the Kremlin Imperium in pseudo-autonomous territories such as those of Russian Asia. The list includes such matters as:—

Diplomatic relations; war and peace; enforcement of the Central Constitution; alteration of the frontiers of the constituent republics; organisation of defence and direction of armed forces; all foreign trade; all State security and secret police.

Vital Functions

Moreover, Article 14 embraces such vital functions as:

Economic planning; far-reaching rights of taxation; control of important banks, industries

and agricultural concerns; transport and communications; credit and currency; mineral deposits, forests and waters; education and public health; labour legislation; judicial procedure, criminal and civil codes; citizenship and amnesties.

Thus the Union Republics are forbidden to have their own currencies, their own stamps, their own taxes, their own armies. They may not even decide for themselves their laws or negotiate their own frontiers. The Central Government can and does forbid foreigners to visit certain of the republics at all.

Text in Full

This overwhelming retention of power at the centre, with all its consequences for the Union Republics, can be fully appreciated only if Article 14 is examined in detail. Following is the full text, as amended by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 25th February, 1947:

"The jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R., as represented by its higher organs of State power and organs of State administration, embraces:

"(a) Representation of the U.S.S.R. in international relations; conclusion, ratification and denunciation of treaties of the U.S.S.R. with other States; establishment of general procedure governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign States.

"(b) Questions of war and peace.

"(c) Admission of new republics into the U.S.S.R.

"(d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

"(e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics.

"(f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions within Union Republics.

"(g) Organisation of the defence of the U.S.S.R.; direction of all the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.; determination of directing principles governing the organisation of the military formations of the Union Republics.

"(h) Foreign trade on the basis of State monopoly.

"(i) Safeguarding the security of the State.

"(j) Determination of the national economic plans of the U.S.S.R.

"(k) Approval of the consolidated State budget of the U.S.S.R. and of the report on its fulfilment; determination of taxes and revenues which go to Union, Republican and local budgets.

"(l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural institutions and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance.

"(m) Administration of transport and communications.

"(n) Direction of the monetary and credit system.

"(o) Organisation of State insurance.

"(p) Contracting and granting of loans.

"(q) Determination of the basic principles of land tenure and of the use of mineral wealth, forests and waters.

"(r) Determination of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health.

"(s) Organisation of a uniform system of national economic statistics.

"(t) Determination of the principles of labour legislation.

"(u) Legislation concerning the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes.

"(v) Legislation concerning Union citizenship; legislation concerning rights of foreigners.

"(w) Determination of the principles of legislation concerning marriage and the family.

"(x) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty."

(English translation published by the official Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.)

Sub-colonial Status

The total effect of Article 14 is to relegate the Union Republics to a status which may be fairly described as "sub-colonial." Even on paper, the republics have less independence than, for example, the British colonies.

The powers retained by Britain are, by established theory and practice, used with the minimum of dictation. Wherever possible, the method is joint action, in which the fullest account is taken of local tradition and opinion.

Witness the negotiations carried on from 1945 to 1948 to provide a workable constitution in Malaya; and those with Ceylon, which led (in February, 1948) to fully responsible government under a constitution directly derived from the Ceylon Ministers' own plan of 1944.

In colonial policy the Western democratic emphasis is always on the growth of local authority. But the Communist, resolved to prevent any deviation from the universal, inflexible plan, feels impelled continually to buttress the centralised power of the Kremlin.

Behind the Façade

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. contains a number of articles designed to construct for the Union Republics a façade of independence. In each case, however, these apparent concessions are either cancelled out in practice or nullified by overriding provisions.

Article 18 (a), for example, declares: "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign States and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them."

This right has never been exercised. In fact Article 18 (a) is an amendment, adopted in 1944, to achieve the entry of certain Union Republics into the United Nations and thus to swell the number of satellite votes.

On Soviet insistence, the Ukraine and Belorussia were admitted, but neither has attempted to assert its "independence" in diplomacy. Their voting has been of the rubber-stamp variety.

In any event, Article 18 (a) is subject to the proviso of Article 14 (a), which lays it down that the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. covers the "establishment of general procedure governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign States."

No Secession

Article 17 declares: "To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R."

No record exists of even discussion of such a matter since the Constitution was promulgated. On the contrary, it is well known that writers and artists who dare to reveal signs of local patriotism are branded as "bourgeois nationalists."

It is not merely that they are forbidden to mention secession. If they even hint at the independence of any aspect of their national culture, they are pursued by vigilant Party critics and must then recant or take the consequences.

Finally, as if to remove any possible doubt there are two safeguarding articles which give to the U.S.S.R. overriding legislative power:

Article 19: "The laws of the U.S.S.R. have the same force within the territory of every Union Republic."

Article 20: "In the event of divergence between a law of a Union Republic and a law of the Union [i.e., of the U.S.S.R.], the Union law prevails."

These provisions are in themselves sufficient to refute the claim that the Union Republics are in any sense sovereign and independent. They set the final seal upon Article 14 as the charter of a Centralised Empire.

III.—EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as already pointed out, all elements of local autonomy are subordinated to the despotic power of the Party. Thus the Communist Parties of the national minorities are mere instruments or agents of Kremlin authority. In the Union Republics their main use is to complete the subjugation of thought and culture to the centralised pattern.

As early as 4th November, 1921, the pattern was outlined when the Communist Party issued a circular entitled, "Liaison between the Party organisations and organs of the people's education." This declared:

"The task of the people's education is essentially a matter for the Party, both in the training of qualified workers and in the development of Communist ideas among the masses and the rising generation."

During the past 20 years there have been many decrees aimed at centralising education throughout the U.S.S.R. Three of the most important deal with the standardisation of schools and text-books, the first being issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the other two by that body and by the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

All these decrees are included in "Directives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Decrees of the Soviet Government on the People's Education, 1917-1947," vol. I (Moscow, 1947).

Uniform Schools

The Party decree or directive of 5th September, 1931, *instructs the Commissariats (Ministries) of Education of the Union Republics* "to institute forthwith a scientific Marxist processing" of each syllabus. So much for the independence of the republics. It is further decreed that "the exact scope of systematic knowledge" is to be "strictly defined as regards the native language, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography, and history, so that teaching should be based upon the revised syllabus as from 1st January, 1931."

As for schools, the preamble of the joint decree of 16th May, 1934, reads as follows:

"To ensure the efficient functioning of schools, to establish throughout the U.S.S.R. uniform types of schools for general education—the primary school, the secondary school of seven forms and the secondary school of ten forms."

Standard Text-books

By a joint decree, issued in 1935, the standardisation of text-books was rigidly enforced, and it was again made clear that the Union Republics must bow to the will of the Party:

"The directive of the Central Committee [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] concerning the introduction of standard text-books has been systematically violated by yearly revisions of certain text-books.

Particularly unsatisfactory is the position regarding the publication of translated text-books and those in non-Russian languages in Union Republics, Autonomous Republics and Regions. . . . The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decree as follows:

"To condemn the practice of the People's Commissariats of Education in the R.S.F.S.R. and elsewhere in violating the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning the standard text-books; to establish that all Commissariats of Education in the Union Republics should sanction each text-book; to forbid Commissariats of Education to make any changes whatsoever in the revised standard text-books or to replace the existing text-books by new ones without the permission of the Council

of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Universities

University education and advanced training, technical and non-technical, were centralised by the joint decree of 21st May, 1936, whereby all "institutions of higher education" came under the jurisdiction of the All-Union Committee of Higher Education, attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

This committee was later promoted to the status of Ministry of Higher Education. In the Union Republics there are corresponding Ministries, but these are primarily responsible to the Central Ministry in Moscow.

The duties of the Committee of Higher Education were to scrutinise the estimates for the financing of institutions of higher education, to decide upon the number and type of such institutions, to ratify the standard type of syllabus, and to confirm staff appointments, including those of professors.

These decrees (and many others of a similar nature) relegate the "national" Ministries of Education to the position of local administrative units, and place the "national" Academies of Science under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government.

Proletarian Content

For the centralised control of culture the Soviet machinery is complicated but not less thorough. Its basic principle was enunciated by Stalin in May, 1925:

"Proletarian in content and national in form—such is the universal human culture towards which Socialism is marching. Proletarian culture does not cancel national culture, but lends it content. National culture, on the other hand, does not cancel proletarian culture, but lends it form.

"The demand for national culture was a bourgeois demand as long as the bourgeoisie was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded under the ægis of the bourgeois system. The demand for national culture became a proletarian demand when the proletariat came to power and the consolidation of nations began under the ægis of the Soviet Government."

Party Directives

It is the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow that gives "national" cultures their "proletarian content," which embraces religion, literature, science and the arts. On 26th August, 1946, for example, the Central Committee dealt with ideological deviations in the Soviet theatres:

"In view of the extremely limited repertory of the theatres of the Union Republics, Autonomous Republics and Regions, and the keenness of local dramatists for themes dealing with the distant past, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union instructs the Committee of Arts to take the necessary measures for translating the best works of Soviet drama into the languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to include them in the repertory of the theatres of the republics."

Such directives are usually followed by widely-publicised meetings and conferences of Soviet cultural societies, which are instructed to discuss the new "Party line" and to carry out the necessary purges. The most important of these societies are the Council of Arts, the Union of Soviet Writers, the Union of Music Composers, the Academy of Science, and the Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge.

National Form

The counterparts of these societies in the Union Republics, in conjunction with the local Communist Parties, then carry out the directives, adding the local slant which is held to impart a "national form."

For instance, on 14th August, 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party considered ideological deviations in literature and issued its ukase. In January, 1947, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan duly fell into line by issuing a decree on the "grave political errors in the work of the Institute of Language and Literature, attached to the Academy of Science of the Kazakh S.S.R." Kazakh writers were accused of an anti-Marxist approach to literature, of bourgeois-nationalist tendencies, and of submitting to "the decadent influence of the reactionary culture of the East."

These two decrees were considered in 1948, this time in Moscow, by the Plenary Session of the Union of Soviet Writers of the U.S.S.R.

Kazakh writers were again told to show "the positive influence of Russian and Soviet culture," and they were warned against "pan-Turkism," "pan-Iranism," "pan-Arabism," and the "counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet trend of pan-Islamism."

For more than three years, then, Kremlin propaganda has been striving to substitute "proletarian content" for "national content" in the literatures of Kazakhstan and other Union Republics. As stated by I. Omarov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, in May, 1949:

"After the historic decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on ideological questions and the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan . . . a decisive turn has been taken towards contemporary themes."

De-nationalisation

The procedure is identical for all aspects of national culture. Thus the instructions of the Moscow Central Committee, issued on 11th February, 1948, on the ideological errors of Soviet music composers, were followed by similar directives by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia on "the work of the Union of Soviet Georgian Music Composers."

On 28th December, 1948, *Pravda* carried a leading article on the "bourgeois interpretation" of the culture of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. This was well publicised by a session of the Union of Soviet Georgian writers, dealing with the "bourgeois interpretation of Georgian culture."

The centralisation or de-nationalisation of the Asiatic peoples' cultures is based upon three principles:

- Acceptance of a Russian pattern;
- Rejection of Eastern influences (particularly those of Turkey, Iran, the Arabs and Islam); and
- Elimination of any "reactionary content."

Many different methods of domination are employed. Full use is made of the Union Republics' branches of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. During discussions of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist view of history and literature, art and science, local "heresies" are exposed and the All-Union objectives are defined.

From the Central Government are sent commissions of inspection to find out whether plays and films are laying sufficient emphasis upon "Soviet themes." For instance, in April, 1949, one such commission went from the Ministry of Cinematography to Georgia, where it eliminated 17 Georgian scenarios and suspended the production of three films.

Language Question

Finally, the Russian language, which is obligatory in all national schools and essential for entrance to universities in the U.S.S.R., is designed to supersede the native scripts and languages, thus undermining the last bastion of national identity.

In the Central Asian republics the Arabic alphabet predominated until 1922; but it was found to be unsuitable for the large-scale production of books and newspapers. As in Turkey, it gave place to the Latin alphabet.

This "movement" started in Azerbaijan, where Latin characters were used in elementary schools as early as 1924. During the next three years Latinisation, fostered by specially created societies, made rapid progress among the Moslem peoples of the North Caucasus and Central Asia.

At the same time, adaptations of the Latin alphabet were introduced among the Kalmyks and Buryat-Mongols, who had previously used the Mongolian alphabet; among the Eastern Jews, instead of Hebrew; and among Chinese citizens of the Soviet Union, instead of Chinese ideographs. The Latinised systems used by the Turko-Tartar population were unified in 1927 at the "First Plenum of Committees for the New Turki Alphabet."

Russian Prevails

All this proved to be so much wasted effort; for, in the late 'thirties, it was decided to "review the question of Latinisation."

According to the *Soviet Encyclopædia*, "all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. felt a strong urge to study the Russian language and to read Lenin and Stalin, as well as the classics of Russian literature, in the original language. In all the schools of the republics the Russian language is taught from the second form. The peoples of the U.S.S.R. desired to master the progressive Russian culture and science."

In an article written in 1937, the *Encyclopædia* observes that "many peoples are now switching to an alphabet based on the Russian," particularly those "who live in close proximity to the Russian population." Regarding the Kabardines (a North Caucasian Moslem people), the *Encyclopædia* states that "although the Latin alphabet played a positive rôle there in the struggle against Arabism, it seemed more expedient in future to adopt the Russian alphabet."

The change-over to Russian characters gradually spread to the Central Asian republics, with their increasing subordination to Moscow. By 1939, throughout the Moslem regions of the U.S.S.R., the Russian had become the only legal alphabet.

Cultural Enslavement

Kremlin propaganda makes great play with the increase of literacy among citizens of the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of national autonomy, however, this increase is of little value.

On the contrary, official recognition of but one language and one ideology serves merely to rivet the shackles more and more firmly and to perpetuate the power of the Centralised Empire.

The result, as we have seen, is the rigid control of nationalist sentiment in the Union Republics and the eradication of native custom, tradition and belief among citizens who, so far from enjoying any measure of independence, are in fact culturally enslaved.

ANNEX

RUSSIAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

(6th February, 1950)

1. Party Officials

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of each republic has five secretaries, two of whom are always Russians. The post of second secretary is invariably held by a Russian, who is the power behind the national figure-head—i.e., the first secretary. This rule sometimes breaks down, as in Kirghizia, where even the first secretary is a Russian.

The Russian Party secretaries in Central Asia are:

Kazakhstan: S. I. Kruglov and S. Y. Yakovlev.

Kirghizia: N. S. Bogolyubov and B. P. Yakovlev.

Tajikistan: K. G. Kulkov and M. S. Shilkin.

Uzbekistan: N. A. Lomakin (probably replaced by another Russian, Lopatov) and R. E. Melnikov.

In each Central Committee there are various departments which ensure that Party directives are carried out in the political, cultural and economic fields. These departments are either headed by Russians or have at least two Russian deputies. Examples are:

KAZAKHSTAN: M. Chernetzov, head of the Planning, Financial and Trade Department; **KIRGHIZIA:** A. Vorobiev, head of the Agricultural Department; **TAJIKISTAN:** Yurin, sector head of Cultural Institutions of the Agitation and Propaganda Department; **UZBEKISTAN:** Efimov, head of the Machine-building Department.

The same pattern exists in the provinces. The regional party committees (*obkoms*) and the town party committees (*gorkoms*) are either headed by Russians or have at least two Russian deputies.

In Kirghizia the first Party secretary, Bogolyubov, admitted at the end of 1949 that only 45.6 per cent. of the leading Party workers in the Republic were Kirghiz and other local nationals, the rest being Russians.

2. Government Officials

Here, also, to preserve appearances, there are national figureheads and Russian deputies.

The Russian deputy-chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet include Sadikov (Uzbekistan), Dvornikov and Petrov (Tajikistan), Popkov (Kirghizia), and Lukyanetz (Kazakhstan).

Among the Russian deputy-chairmen of the Council of Ministers are Mazaev and Saiko (Tajikistan), Kabanov (Uzbekistan), and Iskakov (Kirghizia).

Ministries in most cases are headed by local nationals with at least two Russian deputies. Typical is the composition of the Ministry of the Food Industry in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek Minister is Mukumbaev; the Russian Deputy-ministers are Galushkin and Konovalov. A Russian, Lavrov, heads the Ministry of Health in Tajikistan.

Most of the leading positions in the sphere of security and justice are held by Russians. Examples are Dmitri Vishnevsky, Minister of State Security (MGB) in Tajikistan; and Ivan Dolgih, Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) in Kazakhstan.

All procurators are Russians: Rumiantzev (Kazakhstan), Romanov (Kirghizia), Zhogin (Tajikistan), Sadovnikov (Uzbekistan).

In Kirghizia, again according to Bogolyubov, the percentage of local nationals having prominent positions in industry is only 17.8, in planning, finance and trade 27, and in agriculture 28.

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19 MEI 1950

Nieuwe deportaties uit de Baltische landen

Russen voeren de Litauers, de Letlanders en Estlanders in groten getale naar SIBERIË

(Van onze correspondent)

BERLIJN, Mei. — De laatste tijd staan in de wereldpers behalve talrijke spionageprocessen in de landen, die onder de Sowjet-Russische invloedssfeer staan, ook weer artikelen over deportaties uit de Baltische landen. Volgens een door een gedelegeerde van de Baltische landen bij de UNO ingediend protest zijn sedert de oorlog tot begin 1949: 900.000 mensen naar Siberië en andere Aziatische gebieden van de Sowjet-Unie gedeporteerd. De grote mogelijkheden en de UNO worden erop attent gemaakt, dat de deportaties in de laatste tijd zijn toegenomen en hele groepen van de bevolking treffen.

De deportaties uit de bezette gebieden gebeuren volgens een bepaald systeem. De „landverhuizers” worden zonder waarschuwing tijdens onverhoedse acties opgepakt en in gesloten goederenwagens naar de nieuwe gebieden getransporteerd. Deze acties geschieden bij het aanbreken van de dag. De afwikkeling duurt niet langer dan twee uur. Het gewicht van de mee te nemen bagage mag niet hoger zijn dan 100 kg. Alle daadwerkelijke en eventuele tegenstanders van de Sowjet-Unie worden opgepakt. Daartoe behoren leden van alle politieke partijen (behalve van de communistische partij), landeigenaren, huiseigenaren, kooplieden, officieren, alle personen die een briefwisseling met het buitenland onderhouden en zelfs postzegelverzamelaars.

In 1920 begonnen de Russen door gedwongen verhuizingen onherbergzame Siberische gebieden te bevolken. Met de uitbreiding van de Sowjet-Russische invloedssfeer in andere naties heeft zich de gedwongen emigratie ook tot deze landen uitgebreid. De eerste massa-deportaties van vreedende volken begonnen in 1939 in Polen na de bezetting van het Oost-Poolse gebied door de Sowjet-Unie. Daarna volgden de Baltten, Bessarabiërs, Roemenen en Oekraïners uit Galicië, evenals Duitsers, die de nationaliteit van deze landen bezaten. Volgens Poolse bronnen werden in de jaren 1939/40 1.1 miljoen Polen, van wie 230.000 krijgsgevangenen en 250.000 politieke delinquenten naar de binnenlanden van de Sowjet-Unie gebracht. Het aantal doden uit deze transporten wordt na twee jaren geschat op 270.000.

De verplaatsing van de bevolking uit de

Baltische landen in de laatste tien jaren geeft het volgende beeld; vóór de bezetting door de Sowjet-Unie telde Litauen 3.024 miljoen inwoners, Letland 1.994 miljoen en Estland 1.134 miljoen. Na de intocht van de Sowjet-Russische troepen in Juni 1940 werden op grond van het Duits-Sowjet-Russische verdrag allereerst de Baltten-Duitsers uitgewezen en wel uit Litauen 54.000, uit Letland 50.000 en uit Estland 17.000. Daarna volgde de uitwijzing van 100.000 Polen uit het gebied van Wilna, die voor een deel naar Polen en voor een deel naar de Sowjet-Unie gevoerd werden.

Onmiddellijk na de officiële annexatie van de drie Baltische staten door de Sowjet-Unie werden uit Litauen 35.000, uit Letland 34.000 en uit Estland 62.000 „fascistisch georiënteerde” personen en tsaristische emigranten naar de binnenlanden van de Sowjet-Unie overgeplaatst. Volgens de aangetroffen lijsten van de NKVD (geheime staatspolitie) waren een miljoen mensen, onder wie 700.000 Litauers voorbestemd voor het transport; deze verplaatsing ging echter door het uitbreken van de oorlog tussen Duitsland en Rusland niet door. Tijdens de Duitse bezetting werden uit dit gebied 293.000 Joden en daarvan alleen uit Litauen 200.000 weggevoerd. Het grootste gedeelte werd gedood. Bij het vertrek van de Duitse troepen vluchtten 150.000 Litauers, 60.000 Letten en 50.000 Estlanders naar het Westen. Nog gedurende de oorlog werden in de jaren 1944/45, nadat de Sowjet-Russische troepen deze gebieden waren binnengetrokken, 121.000 Litauers, 85.000 Letten en 105.000 Estlanders naar de binnenlanden van de Sowjet-Unie overgeplaatst.

Aan het einde van de oorlog bedroeg de achtergebleven bevolking in Litauen 2.25 miljoen, in Letland 1.64 miljoen en in Estland 0.85 miljoen.

Met de her oprichting van het Sowjet-Russische bestuur in de drie landen begon een groot opgezette kolonisatie van Russen uit de binnenlanden van de Sowjet-Unie, zodat het oorspronkelijke bevolkingscijfer aan het eind van 1949 weer bereikt was.

Volgens het bij de UNO ingediende memorandum zijn na de oorlog in Litauen 771.000, in Letland 344.000 en in Estland 300.000 Russen zich gaan vestigen.


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ONDERWERP: Deportaties in Letland.



Bijgaand rapport inzake deportaties in Letland werd dzz. ontvangen om te behouden.

14.2.1950

SOVIET UNION (LATVIA)

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/MILITARY

Deportations from Soviet Latvia (Spring, 1949)

1. Time.

In Latvia, the deportations were carried out on March 25th, 26th and 27th, 1949. On a reduced scale, they went on during the following week and the first days of April, since the NKVD agents tried hard to discover persons who were not found in their homes the first time. The action followed the well-known pattern: in the afternoon of March 24th, lorries assembled at pre-arranged points. At night, i.e. between 00.00 and 02.00 hours on March 25th, task units and guides set out in the lorries to work. The action in Estonia may have commenced a few days earlier (on or around March 21st); at any rate the people in Riga were forewarned and very excited in advance,

2. Scope.

The total number of the deportees is not known: only high-ranking MVD officials dispose of exact figures. One informant calculates from the means of conveyance used that the total number was around 45,000 to 50,000 which would mean that the March deportations exceeded approximately three times those of June 13th and 14th, 1941; on the other hand another informant basing his figure on impressions of people living in Riga at the time, says the total was much smaller than in 1941. Information available with respect to individual cities and localities is also conflicting. According to the first informant, 7,000 persons were deported from Riga. (Relatively this figure is not high - 1.4 per cent of the estimated total population of the city, now over 500,000; however, Riga has the largest percentage of recently immigrated Russians and the shrinking Latvian population has been recently "purged"). The second informant states that only a few score of people were deported from Riga itself in March 1949! The victims were taken by lorry to the railway station of OGRE (30 kilometres east of Riga), where they were placed in freight cars with grated windows.

Sixty freight cars crowded with deportees (hence about 2,000-2,500 persons) were dispatched from VENTSPILS (WINDAU), though not all of them were residents of VENTSPILS (15,670 inhabitants in 1935); some were from the surrounding countryside.

From SKRUNDA (SCHRUNDEN - a rural commune of 4,900 inhabitants in the KULDIGA district, 40 truck-loads of men, women and children, some of whom were picked up in the adjacent areas.

In the ZEMGALE (SEMGALLEN) province, the greatest losses in the rural districts struck the areas of BAUSKA (BAUSKEN) and AUCE (AUTZEN, a small town in the JELGAVA district, 3,300 inhabitants).

In KURZEME (COURLAND), the principal points of assembly were reportedly DUNDAGA (DONDANGEN), the coastal district of northern KURZEME, and the STENDE railway station (the Talsi (TALSEN) area).

In VIDZEME (LIVONIA) province, the severest losses were suffered by the communes of LAUDONA (2,800 inhabitants) and KALSNAVA (KALZENAU), both in the MADONA district; the GAUJIENA commune in the VALKA (WALK) district (2,400 inhabitants) and the CESIS (WENDEN) area. There is practically no information on LATGALE (LETTGALLEN).

3. The reason for deportation was chiefly political unreliability. Any person who has given cause for suspicion, or deliberately or unwillingly given the impression of unreliability, is considered a class enemy. Chances of "correction" are slim. Certain categories of inhabitants (e.g. former governmental or communal officials of medium and higher grades) according to their former position or social status (e.g. owners of urban real estate, and farmers who previously owned more than 10 hectares), are almost automatically included among the class enemies, who, in the Communist view, must be annihilated sooner or later, but who must, before their death, be used as far as possible as manpower in the labour camps.

4. Composition of Deportees.

This time deportation affected chiefly the following categories of inhabitants:-

a) Farmers who had tried to avoid joining kolkhozes as well as persons who had opposed, however slightly, the establishment of kolkhozes or displayed their dissatisfaction with the kolkhozes, even if they were now kolkhoz members; in this respect, the Bolsheviks did not differentiate between former farmers and their hired labour;

b) Persons who had been made prisoners by the Bolsheviks during the war, but had been released subsequently (e.g. former legionaries or persons drafted by the Nazis in a compulsory manner for fortification work);

c) Other politically unreliable persons, e.g. former members of the Home Guards or the police, if not previously deported; former governmental and communal officials; former owners of urban real estate; persons suspected of giving assistance to the partisans (persons who are convicted of such assistance are deported without delay) and others.

If a family included one member of these categories, the whole family was deported.

The deportees belonged to various age groups, but the majority were between 15 and 70 years of age. A small number of young people managed to escape and have joined the partisans in the forests.

All social groups are represented among the deportees, beginning with workers and ending with former entrepreneurs.

In order of importance, the deportation affected the following categories:-

- a) Farmers and farm-hands.
- b) The professions, state and communal officials.
- c) Former soldiers and policemen.
- d) Former entrepreneurs and owners of real estate.
- e) Youth of school age.

It is known that this deportation also affected Latvians who had been repatriated from Germany since the war. It is true that persons repatriated from Western Germany or other territories outside the Bolshevik control are only deported immediately to the Soviet Union in exceptional cases, for hard labour; usually they are allowed to live in Latvia for six months or a year; they are used for propaganda, and then the following deportation wave engulfs them. Only a very few who have succeeded in gaining Bolshevik benevolence through their activities in Germany or after return to the home country, are permitted to stay in Latvia for any length of time. Many of the men who were

repatriated in 1946 and 1947 have been sent to the correctionary military units in Narva.

5. Manner in which the deportations are carried out.

Broadly speaking, the deportation was carried out more humanely than in 1941. In each farm or flat where a prospective deportee lived, 8-10 armed MVD men entered and ordered the deportees to prepare for departure within half an hour (or in some cases within an hour). The deportees were loaded in lorries, taken to the assembly places at railway stations, and entrained in freight cars with barred windows, guarded by specially reinforced guards. The transportation of the deportees to the Soviet Union was exclusively by rail. Neither age nor sickness was considered a valid reason for exemption. Janis KRAULIS, a market gardener, aged 82, was deported from VENTSPILS during 1949. The aged people or the sick who were unable to walk were thrown into the lorries and freight cars as inanimate objects.

Likewise there are known cases where parents have been deported from their homes in the morning, and a small daughter, returning from school in the afternoon found the place empty and did not know what had happened to her father and mother (in the GAUJIENA commune, VALKA district). In the same place about 200 grammar school pupils were deported leaving the school practically deserted.

When the deportees were entrained, husbands were sometimes separated from their wives and children from their parents, since the way to Golgotha was not the same for all.

The gathering of the hapless victims took place, as a rule, at night, when they were asleep and had to be awakened. Since only 30 minutes were allowed for preparations, most of the deportees were carried away with what they had on them. Cases are however also known where some families have been able to take with them larger amounts of belongings (e.g. clothing and underwear) and the MVD men did not prohibit it; but during the first stage of the travel, all belongings except the clothes which the deportees had on them, were taken away in many cases.

6. Destination and living conditions.

This time the deportees were forced by the Bolsheviks to sign a statement that they went voluntarily, to take work in the Soviet Union. It would require a great deal of naivete to believe that the Bolsheviks would release any surviving victims two years later!

The following case shows the Bolshevik conception of liberation. A family - father, mother and daughter - were deported to Siberia in 1941. Both parents died in Siberia, and the daughter, still at a tender age, was thereafter allowed to return to Latvia. But the return was granted on the condition that the child should not use public transport. This meant that the child had to come home on foot from Siberia after losing both parents. It is difficult to imagine more refined cynicism and disregard of human rights.

So far we have no precise information on the destination of deportees. The MVD guard soldiers in the trains used to say that this time the Latvians would be taken to the OMSK area. The trains were as a rule routed along the SMOLENSK-KUIBISHEV railway line. Word has been received that the Latvians have been deported to:-

- a) Islands in the Pacific Ocean between the Soviet Union and the United States,
- b) The area between SVERDLOVSK and CHELIABINSK in the Urals, and
- c) to KRASNOYARSK and elsewhere in Siberia.

The heads of families, i.e. deported men, were sent, with few exceptions, to hard labour camps. The regime in these camps is inhuman and they are guarded very rigidly; barbed wire fences, watch towers with floodlights, and patrols of MVD men with bloodhounds. Few men can endure the regime of these camps with 14-16 daily hours of work and absolutely inadequate food, for more than 2-3 years. Most of them die during this time.

Women and young people were usually placed in individual factories or kolkhozes, under Cheka supervision. Earnings are so low that in the long run it is not possible to buy sufficient food, not to speak of clothing. They all live under unhygienic conditions, and mortality is high. Local inhabitants consist chiefly of previously deported Russians who are very poor. Theft and robbery is wide-spread.

There is no information on children who have been separated from their mothers.

A number of letters have been received in Latvia from the deportees. For the time being it is difficult to say whether the deportees will be allowed to correspond regularly.

Who directed and carried out the deportations?

The action was directed by a MVD general, specially sent from Moscow, and "Prime Minister" Vilis Lacis. Special MVD militia units from the Leningrad, Moscow and other Soviet Union areas had been placed at their disposal. Assistance was also given by the local MVD men and party officials.

The registration of the deportees was commenced as early as 1946. The necessary information was supplied by Bolshevik agents, including, unfortunately, also Latvian and German prisoners of war. A law student Hans FOGEL (to judge from the name, not a Latvian; possibly a German) has reportedly been very dangerous in this respect. He had all the features needed by a real agent. Others who should be mentioned in this connection are Lieutenant WEINBERG (a non-Latvian) who accompanied one of the trains of deportees to Siberia, and a Russian Captain CIMBAL. Captain CIMBAL is said to hold a position which corresponds to general's rank, and his direct task is to fight the resistance movement and the partisans.

8. Deportations continue.

No wholesale deportations have been reported since March/April 1949, but several deportations on a minor scale are known to us.

In the SALASPILS area (in the RIGA district) about 30% of the Latvians at a kolkhoz were arrested on Easter night, driven to the SALASPILS railway station and sent in the direction of DAUGAVPILS (DUNABERG) in freight cars with barred windows and guarded by MVD agents.

In August and September the MVD troops carried a major action against the Latvian partisans in the SAUKA forest (the JAKOBSTADT district in ZEMGALE). As a result, the entire population, irrespective of their racial origin, has been deported from the two communes of SAUKA and NERETA. In RIGA, during working hours, about 100 workers and technicians from a factory were detained and taken to Soviet Russia.

The fight of the Latvian people against the oppressors goes on. In the rural districts, armed actions are only carried out by the partisans in exceptional cases, since the MVD units retaliate by deporting the inhabitants of the surrounding areas. Sabotage is fairly frequent in the cities and other densely populated areas. Thus, in Riga, in the "Forest Park", the villa of a Russian colonel was dynamited, and in SIGULDA (SEGEWOLD), an explosion also occurred in the Authors' Palace which reportedly was accommodating an agents' school. At the latter place, arrests and deportations followed the explosion.

9. The number of Russians in Soviet Latvia.

During the second Bolshevick occupation of Latvia, the loss of permanent inhabitants through deportation, casualties in partisan warfare, etc. already reaches some 300,000 persons. In the place of the deportees who constitute about 90% of these losses - the Bolsheviks import, more or less systematically large numbers of Russians from other republics of the Soviet Union. During the first years of the occupation Russian workers from industry and transport services were chiefly imported. As wholesale collectivization of farms commenced, many Russians and other nationalities (e.g. Mongolians) were also brought to the kolkhozes. The present number of Russians who have arrived from other republics of the Soviet Union can be estimated as follows:-

Working people and their families:-

1. Industry	160,000 persons
2. Commerce and transportation	80,000 "
3. Agriculture	180,000 "
4. State and communal agencies	20,000 "
5. Army and MVD troops	<u>200,000 "</u>

Total:- 640,000 persons.

The number of Russians (including Mongolians and similar races) who have come to Latvia from the Soviet Union now amounts to one third of the total number of inhabitants. The figures given above must be considered rough estimates only.

RAPPORT

Van: KA-R.A.

Aan: H A C D

No. E/385/387

ONDERWERP: Deportations and Collectivisation in
ESTONIA and LITHUANIA

Economic and Political Situation in ESTONIA.

ag. 2/2

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S O V I E T U N I O N

ESTONIA

Political/Economic

Deportations and Collectivisation in Estonia. (1949).

A. Deportations

1. In Estonia there was a big wave of deportations in March and April 1949. Information on its extent is conflicting; source estimates the total as 20,000 persons deported from the whole of Estonia. VILJANDIMAA County, where there were formerly many rich farmers, suffered particularly. Source believes there are now very few Estonians left there at all. At any rate, there are now so many Russians in the County that a Russian School has been opened there; and many farms are said to be standing uninhabited in this region.
2. Deportees are mainly selected from the agricultural population. Both political attitude and class background count: farmers who refuse to join collective farms, dubbed "kulaks" have been the main target.
3. Deportees are mainly men; source has heard of many women left behind when their husbands were deported. Old people and children are not normally deported.
4. Deportees have been mainly peasants. There are few landowners left to deport, by now; and the same is largely true of the intelligentsia. Industrial workers are only deported in exceptional cases, when required to work on special tasks in Russia.
5. Whole families, including children, are not normally deported only the father.
6. If the father is deported, the mother is allowed to work, and to keep the children.
7. If she is taken too, but not the children, relatives or neighbours take care of the children; failing this, they are sent to a local Russian kindergarten.
8. a) Deportations are all by rail, apart from local collection. Distances are too great to use road transport; source has never heard of a single case of road transport of deportees.
b) Deportees can take what food and clothes they can carry.
c) There are many stories of deportees travelling for days on end without water, but no proof of deliberate brutality.
9. Deportees are allowed to write to relatives, even to relatives in Western countries, after deportation.
10. All Estonian deportees are sent East of Moscow; some of them to Siberia, but mostly to the Urals. Many are known to be in KIROV area.
11. Most deportees are kept on compulsory labour, but a number are settled on the land, in Kolkhozes, in Russia.

12. Their living conditions are hard, but clearly do not aim at extermination. The main purpose is that deportees should work, and they are fed, clothed and housed well enough to preserve health and working ability. Source's brother, for instance, had been a burgmaster under the German occupation of Estonia; he expected to be shot as such, but instead was deported, and set to work on a kolkhoz.

B. Collectivisation

13. Deportations broke the back of any active resistance in Estonia and those remaining in the country must at least appear to conform to the situation. As for passive resistance, at any rate 22% of the peasantry remain un-collectivised.

14. Ca'canny or wasteful methods are almost the only weapons of the passive resistance to collectivisation.

15. Deportation is one means of enforcing collectivisation. Otherwise the normal methods of pressure are high taxes, and no allocation of seed or agricultural machinery. Under these circumstances, there is little need for physical violence, and source knows of no proven cases.

16. Kolhoz hands are paid mainly in kind, the rest in roubles. If they fail to perform the minimum norm of working days each year, they get no pay at all. Their real incomes depend on the efficiency of the farm.

17. Kolkhov hands do have small plots of their own; they are allowed to sell any unconsumed produce from it, but this is not likely to be much.

C. Living Conditions

18. There is usually food enough on the farms. Clothing depends on the success of the year's production at each farm; for the farm receives for distribution amongst its members a quota of cloth corresponding to its own production. Housing space on farms is not too bad on the whole, as deportations have left many homes empty.

19. As for social measures, schools are strongly encouraged and assisted, because of their political influence. Health measures in rural areas have also been stimulated, but there is a scarcity of trained doctors, nurses, etc. Pensions depend on the work done by the subject, and on his political record; stakhanovites do best in this regard, industrial workers next best. "Kulaks" and intellectuals normally get no pensions.

SOVIET UNION (LITHUANIA)

Political/Economic

Deportations and Collectivisation in Lithuania,

1949

A. DEPORTATION

1. Extent

The following figures take no account of the constant flow of deportations from prisons in Lithuania, but deal only with the five major mass deportations. Naturally, no official statistics have been published; perhaps they have never been compiled. However, it may be taken as fairly certain that 150,000 Lithuanians were deported in 1941 (during the first Soviet occupation), in the September 1945 and February 1946 waves jointly. There was a fourth large wave of deportations in December 1947, for which no figure is available. It is also reported that 100,000 persons were deported from Lithuania in May 1948, and 60,000 in March and April 1949. The two latter figures may exaggerate, as they come from South Lithuania, which suffered worst; but allowing for the December 1947 wave, a round total of 300,000 deportees all told seems probable.

In May 1948, 4,500 Lithuanians are said to have been deported from the three small south-west countries of ALYTUS, VAVENA and LAZDIJAI alone.

2. Selection

Motives for deportation are in the main the following:-

- a) Suspect membership of any resistance movement.
- b) Family relationship to any partisan.
- c) Proved family relationship to any "Displaced Person" who has not returned home.
- d) Regular correspondence with persons abroad.
- e) Opposition to collectivisation.

3. When any Lithuanian has been selected for deportation, his whole family goes with him: wife, children and even parents, especially if they are living with him. In this way no distinction is made between age groups or the sexes; but in practice two-thirds of those deported are women, children or old people.

4. Peasants have been the main sufferers; firstly, many were deported because they were suspected of helping partisans; now the latest wave of deportations has affected persons proved or suspected of resisting collectivisation.

5. Persons selected for deportations are usually fetched from their homes by MVD troops, and driven, often in their own carts, to barbed-wire enclosures in the nearest town. Here they have to wait a day or so, without any shelter, until the collection is completed and all have signed a declaration of "voluntary removal" to the USSR (usually for 10 years). They are then conveyed by bus or lorry to the nearest railway station, and thence by goods train to Russia.

6. No information is available about the food given to deportees on the train. The amount they can bring themselves depends on the benevolence of the MVD men in charge of the move; sometimes they tell deportees to bring all they can, sometimes only what they can carry on their persons. "Decapitalisation" often takes place at the collection point; this means that Russians or Lithuanian "annihilators" confiscate deportees' personal possessions.

7. Brutality in the form of insults, pushes and blows, seems to occur frequently; but this again depends on the MVD man's frame of mind. In general, anyone trying to escape is shot down, and no allowance is made for weakness or illness. Any physical resistance leads to arrest and imprisonment. The following concrete cases of brutality have been reported:-

a) In the town of ALYTUS, during the May 1948 wave of deportations, an old teacher named GAVELIS who had heart disease, was fetched by the Russians, and fainted as he was climbing into the lorry. He was hurled into the lorry and driven off.

b) In the same wave, an old man named KRILAVICIUS, who had long been ill and bed-ridden, was nevertheless deported from the town of JEZNAS.

c) In February 1946, Mrs. BUJANAUSKIS of BALBIERISKIS village in PRIENAI County, with four small children, and Mrs. VITKAUSKAS of LEIPALINGIS market-town, with three small children were deported; although the temperature was 20° below zero, they were not allowed to wrap their children in warm clothes for the journey, because the Russians were in a hurry.

8. Deportees are subsequently allowed to write letters to their homes, and even to Western countries.

9. The areas in Russia to which Lithuanians have been deported in large numbers are:- VARKUTA (on the Arctic Ocean), ALTAI, the KRASNOYARSK area, KAZAKHSTAN and the DONBAS.

10. Lithuanians deported via a prison and a trial, are sent to punitive labour camps. On the other hand persons deported during one of the mass waves, without crime or sentence, are usually permitted to live freely in the area of their exile - but without the right to move from there. There they are sent to work in coal-mines (as in the DONBAS, and at VARKUTA), in the forests (as in the KRASNOYARSK area) or on kolkhozes (as reported from KRASNOYARSK, ALTAI and kazakhstan). The hardest and most inhuman living conditions are in the mines and forests: and it is here that the more dangerous elements, and Lithuanians who refuse to sign the declaration of "voluntary removal", are placed.

11. On arrival, deportees normally have to build their own barracks, as there is no accommodation for them. Everyone over the age of fifteen has to take part in the work. Their work is sometimes as much as 20 km. from their camps (especially in the Siberian forest camps, but also at kolkhozes); and deportees then have to cover this distance twice a day on foot.

A man who fulfils his norm of work receives 200 to 300 roubles a month and a normal ration of food, which consists mainly of a 1-kg. loaf of bread a day. The norm is based on the ability of a strong and healthy man; if it is not fulfilled, the pay and the ration are reduced. Those who are ill or otherwise unfit for work, get neither pay nor rations. Sanitation is as good as non-existent. Administration is done by Russians, usually men who have been sentenced and deported for criminal offences.

One Lithuanian woman wrote from a deportation camp that "she had become rich" because she had sown 150 potatoes; another wrote that she would be the happiest woman in the world if she had any underclothes to put on.

B. COLLECTIVISATION

12. It was one of the main purposes of the partisan movement to prevent the collectivisation of Lithuania. Early in 1947, the Russians began to establish single kolkhozes, sometimes by sending Russian settlers to take over farms belonging to Lithuanians who had fled abroad. Lithuanian peasants were also encouraged to form kolkhozes voluntarily, for which they obtained considerable tax relief.

13. The partisans opposed collectivisation bitterly. They would shoot down Russian settlers who did not obey partisan orders to flee back to Russia. Lithuanian kolkhoz hands were given orders that they would be regarded as traitors if they did not leave their kolkhozes. As a result, very few kolkhozes, only such as were near to a Russian garrison or well-policed town could survive.

14. During 1948 and the beginning of 1949, the Russians under-took comprehensive "cleaning-up" operations against the partisans. The partisan movement was reduced to a fraction of its former strength; with it, the chief obstacle to collectivisation was removed.

15. At the 4th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party in October 1948 it was decided to carry out intensive propaganda in favour of collectivisation among peasants. Countless propagandists, including members of the Supreme Council, travelled the roads to get the peasants to decide in favour of collective farms. The radio and the press published the names of peasants who spoke against collectivisation at these meetings, and branded them "kulaks". The mass deportations of March and April 1949 followed behind this propaganda campaign, and there is no doubt that the Lithuanians deported at this time were mainly opponents of collectivisation.

16. It is known that at the gathering of the Supreme Council of the USSR in March 1949, delegates from the various republics had to report on the state of collective farming in their own territories. The Lithuanian delegates brought poor figures; it seems likely that those in charge in Lithuania received a reprimand, since the effort to collectivise was all-out from then onwards. With the partisan movement dispersed, peasant resisters deported and the rest of the peasantry terrorised, the way was free for the introduction of kolkhozes.

17. According to official figures published, 5,454 kolkhozes have already been established, employing over 200,000 peasants, or 52% of the total. JURBASKAS County is said to be 100% collectivised, JONISKIS Country 93%, SIAULIAI 93% and ZARASAI 75%. The partisans are still trying to stop collectivisation, even threatening to kill peasants who give way to the authorities; but it seems unlikely that they can prevent complete collectivisation in the long run.

18. Passive resistance by the peasants in the form of denying produce is out of the question; it would only injure the peasants themselves, for it is always the State that decides how much each kolkhoz must deliver.

19. There is no uniform system of pay on kolkhozes. For instance, at LIUDVINAVAS Kolkhoz each hand gets 5 kg. of bread grain plus 6 roubles a day, while at AUSRA Kolkhoz in KEDAINIAI County each hand gets $9\frac{1}{2}$ kg. of bread grain and 3 roubles; at the GEGUZES PIRMOJI Kolkhoz in RASEINIAI County hands get 7 roubles and nothing else, while at BERGALE Kolkhoz near RAUDONDVARIS each hand gets an advance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ kg. grain plus 4 roubles and a promise of 8 kg. grain later. At the LENINO KELIAS Kolkhoz in PASVALIS County hands are promised 10 kg. of grain a day plus various extra payments and an extra sugar ration. On 6th November 1949 the Minister of Agriculture promised each kolkhoz hand an average of 5 to 7 kg. of grain a day. Thus the form of men's pay clearly depends on the age and resources of the kolkhoz; in its early days only an advance of pay is issued; the remainder is paid out some time later, when the farm's production over the year can be assessed.

20. Each man on a kolkhoz does have a small piece of land which he can till privately in his spare time; he is free to sell any of its produce which he does not consume himself.

21. There is no shortage of food in Lithuania, but clothing is very scarce and of poor quality. The question of accommodation on kolkhozes is far from solved; special "building brigades" are erecting stables, byres, sties, etc. for kolkhozes, while old farms are used as dwelling-houses. As for social amenities, there has been no change since collectivisation began.

E S T O N I A

Economic & Political Situation

Agricultural and Dairy Farming

1.. When the Russians returned to Estonia in the autumn of 1944 the large farms and estates were divided up into small farms of 25 hectares, i.e. the entire area of each farm including pasture-land, fields, forests and meadows totalled 25 hectares. Those who had no land at all were forced to accept it. Those who did not wish to accept such farms were called up to the Party Executive Committee of the parish in question to give an explanation of their refusal. Anyone still refusing to accept land was declared to be a friend of the Germans and a saboteur, and was threatened with expulsion to Siberia. Those who during the period of Estonian independence or German occupation had been in some official post or owned farms of more than 40 hectares, had their entire property confiscated without any compensation; the men were sent to Siberia, the women, children and old people were turned out of their homes and the whole family branded as public enemies. Every farmer who could not pay his taxes to the State in money or goods was branded a kulak whatever the size of his farm.

2. Farmers paid their taxes in natural produce according to the area of their fields and in cash on the basis of the entire area of their property and their domestic animals and agricultural machinery. For example, a farm of 25 hectares had to surrender to the State 2,600 kilogrammes of grain, of which $\frac{2}{3}$ was rye or wheat, $\frac{1}{3}$ barley or oats, plus 4,000 kg. of potatoes. The State paid 10 kopecks per kilo of rye and wheat, 9 kopecks for oats and barley, and 5.5 kopecks for potatoes. 210 kg. of meat had to be surrendered of which $\frac{2}{3}$ had to be pork, for which was paid 70 kopecks a kilo. Up to 1947 milk had to be surrendered to the State according to the calculation on the basis of hectares. Subsequent to 1947 this changed over to the basis of number of cows owned. As from that date onwards planned development of cattle was introduced. On the hectare basis 90 litres of milk per year had to be surrendered irrespective of how many cows there were on the farm. This naturally caused considerable difficulties to those with few cows. Whereas earlier 350 litres of milk per year per cow had to be surrendered, private cattle owners now have to surrender 350 litres per year of a fixed fat content of 3.5%. Payment to the State for a farm of 25 hectares was 8-10,000 roubles - if the farm had no agricultural machines. If a farmer owned a tractor or thrashing machine the rate was between 10-14,000 roubles. Taxes and surrender quantities were 50% greater than 'kulaks' and 'public criminals'. Because of the immense burden of taxation many farmers got into debt, consequently their property was sold up and their families transported to Siberia, either to Forest work or labour camps. Such confiscated land usually remained uncultivated.

3. Nowadays every man on a farm must transport 100 fathoms of wood, every woman must fell 100 fathoms, and if there are any children over 16, they must fell 100 cubic meters of wood. All this is compulsory, and anyone who fails to carry out the programme is exiled to Russia. About 2 roubles per cubic meter is paid for chopped wood and 50 kopecks per cubic meter for transported wood. The work in question must be carried out between the period 1st October - 1st April.

4. It is not permitted to employ paid labour. Anyone found guilty of doing this is heavily fined and branded an employer of sweated labour. Furthermore his taxes and surrender quantities are increased.

5. Most agricultural work is done by women and children and elderly people, as a very large number of able-bodied men were sent to the mines in Siberia during the summer of 1945. Owing to the lack of labour large numbers of fields are uncultivated. As soon as the State observed the economic loss ensuing from this it began to carry out intense propaganda for the kolhozes. In 1947 on the insistence of the State a few kolhozes were founded, more from compulsion than voluntary. Despite the intensified propaganda the eyes of the people were open to the fact that life in the kolhozes was not like it was made out to be and everyone shunned them. The Party has demanded that all Estonian peasants must be members of kolhozes by the beginning of 1951, but it is difficult to see how this can be achieved. However, in its external propaganda the Estonian Communist Party maintains that the joining of kolhozes is voluntary and that the peasants see in them a happier future.

6. Disappointment and depression among the farming population became widespread and the Party then began to transport increasing numbers of people to U.S.S.R. During the night of 25th March 1949 cars and lorries manned by Russians drove into apparently every parish and town in Estonia and began the mass transportation of people to Siberia. It is estimated that there was an average of 5-7 large lorries per commune and 30-50 Russians of whom many belonged to the militia, N.K.V.D., etc. Furthermore, Soviet tanks drove through villages in several parts of the country.

7. Everyone whom the Party considered a danger to these plans was arrested and the main weight was on the more wealthy peasants, former civil servants and members of their families, 'kulaks' and 'enemies of the people'. Invalids, children, expectant mothers and all types were arrested, put in lorries and transported to railway stations from where they were sent in goods wagons to Russia. The next day when the news spread about this mass deportation, many farmers and peasants took to the woods or hid with friends, where they are still hiding out.

8. The Party's hands were now free. Immediately after the wave of arrests was finished peasants were rounded up on the basis of villages and forced to join kolhozes. It was then explained to them that it was impossible to have a Socialistic State with a Capitalistic agriculture. Documents were put in front of each person concerned and he was made to sign a promise to enter the kolhoz. If anyone refused to do so he was told the trains were still waiting at the station and that there was enough room for you too! At the same time other documents were signed by which the person surrendered all their property to the kolhozes.

9. Labour in the kolhoz is compulsory and absence from work without a good reason is punishable. All members of the family living in the kolhoz must work. For example, school-children of 12 years of age upward must spend 50 days of their holidays working. A working day in the kolhoz is 10 hours.

10. Each kolhoz family has $\frac{1}{2}$ hectare of garden where they grow root vegetables for their own needs. Out of this area they must surrender to the State 120 kg. of potatoes a year. Each family is allowed to keep 1 cow and 1 pig and from these 350 litres of milk per year and 50 kilos of pork must be surrendered to the State, plus 250 roubles in cash.

Education.

11. Education at the State schools lasts 7 years and is compulsory. The language of the schools is Estonian. From the second class onward 4 hours of Russian per week is taught. From the fourth class onward pupils are taught German or English. Many boys are steered into factory or railway schools and girls into economic schools. Life in the factory schools is hard. All pupils live in huts and wear uniforms. They spend more time working than studying and they are paid no wages for their work. In addition there is military training every day and the discipline of the schools is completely military. These factory schools are places where the youth of the country is prepared for war so that in case of mobilisation they could easily be called upon. Many pupils abscond from the schools and these are then rounded up by the militia and N.K.V.D. and sent to the Soviet Union.

12. Children of former civil servants are only allowed to attend State schools and are not permitted access to higher education. The situation is the same with children of 'kulaks', 'enemies of the people', tradesmen, etc. Whether or not the children may be allowed to attend a more advanced school is decided by the local Party organization in co-operation with the Young Communists, who have dossiers on all children, parents and relatives concerned.

13. In the State schools from the fourth class onwards the main emphasis is on the Constitution, the Stalin way of life and Party history. Such subjects continue throughout the entire education until the time the student leaves the university. Also from the fourth class onwards summer courses are held every year where the pupils revise all they have learnt up to then.

14. There are very few competent teachers and those from the period of Estonian independence are not allowed to teach. Since the beginning of 1949 all teachers, with exception of confirmed Communists, have been dismissed. Teachers in the State schools are usually those who have only passed through four classes of a State school themselves. It is sufficient if the teacher has been in the U.S.S.R. during the war and is a convinced Communist.

15. Estonian history and literature is distorted to conform to Communist ideas and these subjects are taught by teachers who have been in Russia or by actual Russians.

16. Even in the universities there are no teachers who are really competent. Instruction there is given mainly by temporary teachers from the State schools, with the exception of a few old professors who have been forced to recant publicly.

17. The salary of ordinary State schoolteachers is 700-800 roubles per month. In addition to their main teaching work teachers must play the part of Communist agitators in their spare time. Every spring and autumn teachers and pupils must participate in clearing ruins, etc. in their free time. Participation in this work is compulsory and every teacher and pupil must devote 70 hours to it in the spring and autumn. Any pupil not participating in the work is punished and parents warned.

18. Every year a large rebuilding loan is floated. It is announced in the press that subscriptions to this loan are voluntary, but in actual fact there is nothing voluntary about them. A sub-committee of the Party fixes the sum for which each person must subscribe to the State loan. In cases of people receiving monthly wages the subscription sometimes amounts to 3 months pay. Farmers subscribe from 25 to 1,000 roubles and private individuals between 100-500 roubles. Factory workers are forced to pay one or two months wages. In order to pep up this activity political organizations visit everybody and collect from all and sundry. If anyone refuses to subscribe to the loan he is threatened with a trip to Siberia or treatment at the hands of the N.K.V.D. In general most people are afraid to refuse, but simply continue to pay these 'voluntary' subscriptions. "nother way of punishing people who make trouble about subscribing to the State loan is by refusing to grant them permits to sell in the market or to mill flour at their mills.

Elections

19. Elections are not carried out as stipulated by the constitution and in no way do they correspond to what is written in the press. There are no real secret or popular elections; on the contrary, the people who participate are subject to terrorization and pressure. Apart from which many of the results are 'cooked'. It is just the same when local elections are going on. For example, the local Party puts up some suitable candidate for the provincial Party Bureau. The provincial Politburo then gives its approval to the candidate, calls in the local organizers and agitators and other officials and gives them instructions. The agitators then set out for the villages and factories and organize meetings. They then explain the 'activists' have put up the following people for election. Nobody dare say anything. Anyone withholding his vote without good and sufficient reason is guilty of an act against the State and is punished accordingly.

20. On election days the names of the Party's candidates are printed on a list and this list is given to the people passing in front of the ballot boxes. The voters are then ordered to drop the list into the box and in this way the voters have no choice but to obey orders. The polling offices are surrounded by a strong Soviet guard. Voting is compulsory and anyone abstaining is put under supervision of the N.K.V.D. and is subject to political interrogation. Unless he comes under this successfully he is deported. In cases of elderly or sick people officials are sent to collect their vote, and if a person has not put in an appearance by 12.0 a.m. on election day armed guards are sent to fetch him. Under these conditions it is no wonder that 99.98% of the electorate record their votes!

General

21. Private enterprise in all branches is forbidden beginning from cobblers, seamstresses, bakers, barbers, etc. All such

people are collected into "artells", while tradesmen are collected into co-operative or State training organizations. All type of work carried on at home is strictly forbidden and people found guilty of this are not only fined, but very often sent to camps in U.S.S.R. If anyone wishes to produce anything in his own home he must pay the State 2,000 roubles per year which is an impossible sum for anyone to pay.

22. One cannot speak of trade in the proper sense, as no goods are sold by manufacturers or "artells" to private dealers. In "artells" the wages of a worker are 250-300 roubles per month. All wages are paid on the piecework basis, even in kolhozes. The monthly income of a shop assistant is 200-250 roubles per month, while that of a factory worker varies between 60-80 roubles per week. From these wages are withheld trade union fees, subscriptions to State loans, etc.

23. There is a great shortage of sugar and it cannot be purchased freely, although on occasions one can get hold of $\frac{1}{2}$ kilo if one has time to spend a day or two in a queue. It is impossible to obtain any sugar in the country districts. 2 boxes of matches can be purchased at a time once a month but only when other goods are purchased at the same time.

24. Political literature is always sold when one purchases anything and the literature very often costs more than all the other goods put together. A certain amount of goods is in the shops but one has very little choice. In the summer one can buy blankets; in the winter raincoats and white tennis shoes. Everything is extremely expensive. An average mans suit costs 800-1,200 roubles. A pair of shoes 260 roubles, high boots 800 roubles, butter 40/50 roubles per kilo, black bread 2.60/3.80 per kilo, and white bread $\frac{5}{6}$ roubles per kilo.

25. In spite of all these great difficulties one could live in Estonia if it was not for the ever present fear of transportation to Siberia.

26. Ordinary men deported from Estonia are sent for 25 years to the mines in Siberia. On the other hand those who were civil servants during the period of independence are sent for the same period to the island of SAHALIN, KAMCHATKA or the coasts of AMUR to the coal and lead mines there. Many have written from there that living conditions are very bad and that usually people only hold out for 2-3 years. Formerly large numbers of deportees were sent to the KOM Oblast but lately, as far as is known, this practice has stopped. All those who have been sent to Siberia write asking for food parcels. They write in their letters that they live in mud huts and work in kolhozes 10-12 km away. They are paid for their work, if they are able to do any work, only 400 grammes of bread per day - nothing more.

27. Members of the Estonian Communist Party have announced at meetings that the Baltic States is to be emptied of Baltic nationals by 1951. It is not known who will come to replace them.

66. 531
89-27

NOTA Rapport

Van: KA.R.A.

Aan: ACD

No. E.321.

ONDERWERP: Regelingen in RUSLAND.



Van Sardine ontvingen wij bijgaand Internal Regulations
of the Soviet Union.
De inhoud van het materiaal mag onze dienst niet verlaten.

16-11-49.

PART I - DOCUMENTATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS.

19/8/49.

A : Internal Passports.

Regulations.

According to a recent defector source new internal passports issued since the war are stamped with the fingerprints of the holder. This is as yet unconfirmed by documentary evidence. It is worthy of note that the validity of existing passports of the 5-year type was still being extended in 1946.

Although the general format of internal passports is laid down in Moscow, passports in the sixteen republics will vary in detail. Those, for instance, issued in frontier zones will contain a special stamp, showing the holders to be inhabitants of a prohibited frontier zone. As such, holders will not be allowed to leave the zone without a special permit.

Renewals of passports and acceptances for work are entered on the pages of the internal passport headed 'special entries' (OSOBYE OMBETKI); auxiliary registrations on those headed PROPISEKI. They bear the stamp of the Passport department of the MILITSYa.

Enforcement of Regulations.

Checks on the observation of the passport law are made periodically. PRAVDA VOESTOKI of 24.6.49. reports one carried out 'recently' in Tashkent in a number of factories and organisations of the Ministry of Light Industry of the Uzbek S.S.R. As a result of the check it became obvious that, at a number of them, notes of taking on for work and dismissal have frequently not been made on passports and that citizens who had not registered in Tashkent or had no passports were accepted for work. For non-observation of the passport law fines were levied on directors of two boot and shoe factories and on the director of a cotton and rolled-felt factory respectively.

The need of such checks in Leningrad was emphasised by Lieut-General SHIKTOROV in the LENINGRADSKIYa PRAVDA of 21.7.49. Observance of the passport system was, he stated, of primary importance if a successful battle were to be waged against the doubtful elements in Leningrad and it was the duty of directors of enterprises and of house stewards to register new arrivals in good time, to check their documents carefully and to accept for work only those persons who were registered in Leningrad. The MILITSYa, he said, was frequently receiving applications for the registration of persons forbidden to live in Leningrad; the organs of the M.V.D. would, however, prosecute most strictly all who infringed the passport system and connived at infringements.

These reports lend colour to a rumour that wide scale police checks are at present being carried out in some areas of the Soviet Union, and is an indication both of the slackness of the attitude of factory administrations to passport legislation, and of the ease with which some Soviet citizens appear to carry on without identity documents.

The normal check, according to one defector source, consists in a cursory examination of the passport which must contain a permit of residence. Such examination may be followed by (a) questions regarding entries in passports as to place and date of birth etc, and (b) demand to see other documents such as work book (TRUDOVIYA KNIZHKA), or work pass. Inability to produce either passport or identity card means immediate arrest.

In case of loss, application for a new passport must be made at the MILITSIYA H.Q. where the original was issued; the MILITSIYA holds a counterfoil bearing a photograph of the person to whom each passport is issued; this serves as an identity check for the issue of a new one. A recent defector source states that a fine of 1000 roubles is exacted before a new one is issued. Temporary certificates of identity (VREMENNOE UDOSTOVERYENIE) valid for three months are issued pending enquiries.

Infringement of Regulations.

Sources tend to agree that, despite the penalties for infringement of the passport system, it is possible to buy passports in large cities with entries as desired.* Prices vary from 1,000 to 5,000 roubles. One defector goes so far as to say that the most likely source for such a purchase would be the police, though he could not quote any examples of this actually having happened.

(+ This has been definitely confirmed).

The case was recently reported in the press, of an employee of the Communications Office, Nakhichevan A.S.S.R. who plundered state property and disappeared in May 1948. He was later discovered to be living and working in Tashkent, having obtained a new passport.

B : Supplementary Documentation.

Certificates of Identity (UDOSTOVERYENIE LICHNOSTI)

Certificates of identity are issued to members of the armed forces, state or public services in place of the internal passport. They are also issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M.I.D.) to civilian personnel employed by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and contain the following data:

Name of issuing authority with date of issue;
Surname, name and patronymic of holder;
Number under which the document is registered in the organisation;
Holder's title and photograph;
Name and position of chief of the organisation or his deputy issuing the certificate. Signature of authorising official.
Period of validity;
Stamp of organisation/institution (covering part of the photograph);

This certificate of identity is surrendered when the holder leaves the organisation.

Temporary Identity Card (VREMENNOE UDOSTOVERYENIE).

Temporary identity cards are issued in cases of loss of passport by the Head of the local MILITSIYA and bearing both his signature, that of the Head of the Passport desk (NACHALNIK PASFORTNOGO STOLA) and the stamp of the issuing office.

PART II - DOCUMENTATION OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS.

Residence Permits (VID NA ZHITELSTVO).

Foreigners resident in the U.S.S.R. and in possession of a passport apply to OVIR (OTDEL VIZ I REGISTRTsII) of the M.V.D. (this department is to be found in most large towns). A residence permit (VID NA ZHITELSTVO DLYa INOSTRANTsEV) is then issued. The permit has to be renewed each year. On expiry of their passports, foreigners apply to their Embassy in the usual way.

The following instructions were promulgated via public boards in Moscow in August 1949:

1. The registration of Greek nationals in the U.S.S.R. takes place as follows: The Greek Embassy issues a Certificate of Nationality, in Russian for convenience sake. It bears the photograph of the person in question and is signed by the head of the Consular Section. It is valid for one year only.
2. Armed with his certificate, the Greek citizen has to present himself on 1st January (the authorities are not very insistent on the exact date) at OVIR. A residence permit is then issued.

PART III - RESIDENCE REGULATIONS.

Documentation.

- (i) On arrival at a new place of residence every citizen must register with the House Administration (DOMPRAVLENIE) of the block of flats or group of houses where he intends to live. This entails filling in a form (see below) issued by the Housing Directorate (ZHILISHCHNOE UPRAVLENIE) giving personal details, reason for leaving previous domicile, and length of stay there, name of referee or host, as the case may be. As documentary evidence the internal passport is required. The form is signed by both applicant and referee and forwarded to the head of the local MILITsIYa, together with the certificate of the house steward (UPRAVDOM) giving particulars of proposed place of residence, size, number of people housed there etc.

APPLICATION FOR RESIDENCE REGISTRATION.

Russian.

Domoupravlenie No..... zhiishohnce upravlenie

SERAVKA No..... Domoupravlenie No.....
Nachky " OED MILITsII G.Moskvy

Vydana gr..... Gr-na.....
Familiya, imya, otchestvo

Pribyvshemu iz.....
(postoyanno, vremennno)

Na zhitel'stvo v g.Moskvy
podavshemu zavaylenie o
propiske na.....
(ykasat'ch'ya)

ploshchad' i ee razmer
" 1949

Upravdom.....
(podpis')

Proshy propisat' menya.....
(postoyanno, vremennno)

Po adresu.....ul., dom no....kv.no...

Tsel' priedza.....
(ukazat' dlya chego, na kakoj strok)
otkuda pribyl.....

Ploshchad'dlya proshivaniya predostavlyast mne...
(ukazat' gorod, obl., rajon, selo)

(kto predostavlyast zhiiploshchad')

Pri etom prilagayu: 1. Paspport seri.....No.....
Kem i kogda Vydan

" 2.
1949 Podpis' zayavitelya...

"
podpis' predostavivshego zhiiploshchad'.....

SERAVKA DOMOUpravLENIYa
Zhiiploshchad' na Kotoruyu propisyvaetsya gr.....
Socetit iz.....kv.no., na etoj ploshchadi v
nastoyashchee vremya proshivaet.....chel.

Protiv propiski domoupravlenie
(vozrazhaet ili ne vozrazhaet)

Upravdom.....
(podpis)

" 1949

English.

House Administration No.....Housing Directorate.

Certificate No..... House Administration No....
Issued to:.....

To the CO. Dept. of MILITsII,
Moscow.

Arriving from..... I, Citizen.....
(Surname, name, patronymic)

(permanent, temporary)

For residence in the
town of Moscow making
a disposition of his
registration

(indicate where & size)

1949

Signature

apply for registration.....
(permanent, temporary)
at the address....street, house
no....flat no.....
object of journey.....
(reasons & length of stay)

where from.....
(town, province, district, vill-
age)

Domicile suggested by.....
(Signature of lessee)

For this I enclose

1. Passport series.....No.....
(when issued & by whom)

2. _____
1949.

Signature of applicant.....

Signature of whoever allocates
domicile.....

Certificate of House Administration
The domicile in which citizen
.....is registered consists of
.....flats, in this domicile at
the moment are resident.....
people.

For as against this registration.
.....

House steward.....1949.
(signature)

(Documentation, continued)

(ii) The newcomer, if his papers are in order and he has complied with the above regulations and been accepted by the Housing Directorate, is entitled to a certificate of residence (SPR.VK. S MEST. ZHITEL'STV.) which he will need when he wishes to change residence again. This certificate includes names, date and place of birth, nationality, address, where and in what capacity the holder works etc, and is signed by his referee or host, or possibly by the Director of his enterprise, if his living space be allocated by the latter. It also contains the record of passport number and term of its validity. On the reverse side of this certificate is a list of documents produced originally for issue of the passport.

(iii) An exit permit (VPISKA) issued by the MILITSIYA is required before the Soviet citizen may leave his town of residence for a period of more than two months. To obtain this he must fill in a departure form (LISTOK UBYTIYA) giving his personal particulars and those of his wife and children under 16, (or husband, as the case may be): his nationality, the address from whence he came, his present one and period of stay, his proposed future residence, his work and status, number of his passport, its validity and date and place of issue. In due course if his papers are in order and he has a certificate of release from work, the MILITSIYA stamps his passport with the exit endorsement. A counter-foil containing similar entries is detached for the Central Department for National Economic Accountancy of the State Planning Commission (TSUNICHU). No VPISKA is required by those going on holiday, to sanatoria, on courses, to meetings etc. where the period of time does not exceed two months and no entry is made by the TSUNICHU; the short-term traveller must however register out and in with the Housing Administration.

A report in the newspaper ZARIYA VOSTOKA of 14.11.48. reveals the existence of a black market in building houses. It was asserted that unauthorised houses have been erected in outlying districts. It would be of interest to know how this practice flourishes, as "black market" houses would presumably be immune from house registers.

Residence Restrictions.

Domiciliary control of the population is thus exercised by the MILITSIYA through its registration regulations enforced by the Housing Administration and through its internal passport regulations:

a) General Areas.

A refusal to register an individual means that he must leave the town or run the risk of being caught and sentenced to forced labour; the alternative is to go underground. Cases are frequently reported of citizens informing relatives anxious to come and live with them that there is no living space, and that the authorities are refusing registration (NE PROMISYVA.YuT). Non-registration means non-acceptance for work, though again cases are frequently reported in the provincial press of individuals living in town without registration (cf Part I, A). A certain degree of corruptibility of house stewards can also be allowed for, cf. SOVIETSKIJ MOLDAVIA of 25.4.49. which contained a description of the trial of a certain house steward for having allotted housing accommodation in Kishinev to unauthorised persons. Black market allocation of flats is also a frequent feature of court cases reported in the press.

There are indications moreover that the registration section of the MILITSIYA is not held in any great awe by the average Soviet citizen. The case was reported recently of a domestic worker in a foreign diplomat's household in Moscow who had not registered. This fact eventually came to light and she was instructed to return to her previous place of residence - she did not comply with the order and when this was discovered some time later she was forbidden to live within a radius of 100 kms. of Moscow. She returned to her home town and went to her local MILITSIYA, which while intimating that the Moscow department was acting outside the scope of its powers would not itself take action. The girl went back but this time was summarily advised that if she did not obey, the original limit of 100 kms would become 1000!

b) Frontier and Prohibited areas.

Residence regulations for frontier strips (POGRANICHNIYA POLOSA) were promulgated in November 1948 (of Part III, F. of our INTG/95626/4 of 5.5.49.) and as far as is known to date there has been no amendment.

Defector sources and Chancery reports confirm that prohibited zones (ZAPRETHNIYA ZONA) may be found anywhere inside the U.S.S.R., i.e., wherever there are factories or military installations, laboratories etc, of a secret or defence nature. They vary as to size from small encampments to large areas. Entry to and exit from these zones is forbidden to all not permanently resident or not having officially approved business within the zone. Persons entitled to enter the zone must have a permit (PROPUSK) issued by the MILITSIYA. According to a recent defector source permits issued to inhabitants bear the special stamp: ZHITEL' ZAPRETHNOJ ZONY: "Resident of the Prohibited Zone". The security of these zones as of the frontier strips is the responsibility of the M.V.D.

Application for a permit to visit/work in a frontier area or prohibited zone must be made initially by a resident of that area or zone on behalf of the intending visitor/worker (cf. our INTG/95626/4, Part III F). A summons (VYZOV) signed by the Chairman of the Town Executive Committee (GORISPOLKOM) or by the Director of an Enterprise/Institution, if work is involved, is then sent either telegraphically or by post to the permit office (BYURO PROPUSKOV) of the MILITSIYA in the place of residence of the intending visitor/worker. 8 - 15 days will elapse before the issue of the PROPUSK, though in the case of a journey on account of illness it may be less. This document, which bears a six figure number, e.g. 475869, has a limited term of validity dependent on reasons for visit and distance involved. Should the holder be unable to travel at the period specified, the PROPUSK becomes invalid and a new VYZOV must be despatched from the other end. Unless this VYZOV is correct in all its details:- full name of intending traveller, correct signature, etc - no PROPUSK will be issued and without a PROPUSK there will be no registration in the relevant area. Residents of frontier/prohibited areas who leave to take up work elsewhere must obtain a PROPUSK if they wish to return to their families on holiday.

Prohibited zones are not always clearly defined as such: a British diplomat walking in the outskirts of Tiflis in June 1949 was detained when walking past an encampment of tanks. The official in charge agreed that the absence of notices declaring the area prohibited was inconvenient and had even led to the detention of Soviet citizens.

PART IV - MOVEMENT CONTROL

4. : Travel Regulations and Conditions.

Travel by Train.

1. Tickets.

(a) Ticket offices. Station ticket offices must open 2 - 5 minutes before the departure of the train. There is an additional charge for fast (SKORYJ) courier (KUR'IRSKIJ) and express (EKSPRESS) trains. Seat reservations (PLATSKAJTE) can be obtained at the same time either for the final destination of the train or for the first junction.⁽¹⁾

(b) Allocation of Seats. The Railway Directorate has the right in case of need to open special booking offices for certain types of passengers, i.e., government servants, invalids etc.⁽¹⁾ This practice is confirmed by a British diplomat who observed at Tamsk railway station that the queue was formed in the following order:

Members of the Government
People going to health resorts
Service personnel
People travelling on special reservations (PO DIJONYAJ)
The rest.

The same source reports that a railway ticket is valueless unless its buyer also has a seat reservation. These cannot be obtained by private individuals travelling for private purposes, but are only issued when demanded in the name of some institution, whether the traveller is going on holiday or business. They are allocated, not in order of application but according to a complicated hierarchical table, with members of the Supreme Soviet being given first priority. It follows that no seat reservations can be guaranteed until the last moment, in case people with absolute priority should suddenly apply. It is impossible to imagine how such a system works in practice - indeed only the classic Russian patience and inefficiency could deal with it at all.

Tickets for non-reserved carriages (NEPLATSKAJTNYJ) must be stamped with the number of the carriage.⁽¹⁾

Travel tickets are issued to workers at their place of employment, according to a German ex-IPW (date of information: February 1949). To obtain them workers must have permission to be absent.

(c) Validity. The validity of tickets varies with the distance, i.e., a ticket for a journey of between 984 and 1250 kms is valid for four days, one of between 6041 and 6590 kms is valid for 15 days. The period of validity is always marked on the ticket. It can be extended only under special circumstances.

(1) Extract from OPITsLL'NYJ UGZL'TEL' P'ASS/ZHINSKIKH SOOBShCHENIJ 1948. TR.NSZHELDORIZD/T.

A passenger may break his journey at any intermediate place without forfeiting his ticket, provided the journey does not exceed the specified time. He must in this case take his ticket to the station office to have it stamped. He forfeits his seat reservation.

No one is admitted to the platform without either a travelling or a platform ticket, (1 rouble each). The latter gives the right to enter waiting rooms. (i)

(a) Collection. A deserter source states that in each carriage there are two ticket collectors who collect the tickets as the passengers enter the train and retain them in leather satchels. Tickets are returned when passengers leave the carriage.

It is impossible to pass from one carriage to the next because the connecting corridors are always kept locked. Keys for opening the doors between carriages are carried by the ticket collector. The key is in the form of a metal tube in which a triangular shaped hollow is cut. Source claims that it is possible to open the doors with a 762 mm T.T. pistol by pushing the barrel of the pistol over the knob; the three points of the triangle then catch in the rifling of the pistol barrel and it is possible to turn the knob and thus open the door. Source claims to have seen this done.

2. Luggage.

(a) Hand Luggage. Passengers are allowed to carry one piece of hand luggage not exceeding 16 kgs in weight. It must not contain firearms or inflammable substances. (i)

A deserter reports that luggage in excess of 16 kgs must be sent separately - it never travels on the same train.

(b) Left-luggage Offices. (КОМБЕЛ КИРМЕННИЯ КУЧНОВ КИДИ И БАГ.ЗНА)⁽¹⁾. The value of an article handed in at a left luggage office must be declared, a charge being made at the rate of 50 kopeks for every 100 roubles of the declared value. A ticket is issued in return for the package. Packages are not held for more than 5 days, the charge being increased for the last days. Regular rate is 1 rouble per package per day.

(c) Registered luggage⁽ⁱ⁾ Registered luggage must be handed in 10 minutes before the departure of the train, or 20 minutes if the value is declared. An extra charge is made for valued articles. Station officials may not limit the scale of value but have the right to examine the contents with the agreement of, and in the presence of the owner, if the scale of declared value excites doubt.

The allowance of registered luggage on each ticket is 50 kgs - each article must be labelled with a ticket 6 cm by 25 cm with the name of the owner, his address, place of departure, destination, and stamp of the station where registered. The passenger's ticket is also stamped "luggage" and a receipt issued.

ND: There is no stipulation concerning presentation of identity documents on leaving or collecting luggage.

Luggage not claimed within 30 days is sold. A deserter source reports that there are both slow and fast deliveries of luggage.

3. Illegal and Black Travel.

Sources continue to report that goods trains are still the best mode of illegal travel, with the qualification that these trains are exhaustively searched by the railway police in the larger stations and in the frontier areas.

Sources also report the continued possibility of travelling without tickets by bribing train guards. These reports are substantiated by press readings reports of court cases against corruptible guards. An article in the ZHIZNA VOSTOKA, dated November 1948 claims that on the Gori-Stalinir line the guards often lock the train doors to keep out excess passengers, even if they have tickets, but will let in anyone without a ticket who gives them a tip.

The same paper of 26.5.49, reports a court case against a railway guard sentenced to 3 years for accepting 25 roubles from each of 3 ticketless passengers.

4. Travel by River Boat.

Both regular and excursion trips are arranged along the Moscow canal. Tickets can be bought at the North River Station. An unspecified priority is observed in the allocation of tickets.

Every passenger may transport 16 kgs of luggage free, the company imposing an extra charge for each additional 10 kgs. Luggage can be handed in in advance to the left luggage office at the station which is open from 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. Porters are available to carry luggage from the steamer to the station at a fixed charge. (ii)

D : ROAD TRANSPORT.

Procedure for Registration.

(a) Cars/Lorries.

1. The vehicle to be licensed must first be technically examined by GOS.VTOINSPEKTsIYA, which then issues a Technical Passport for the vehicle in question. As the Technical Passport is a bulky document, GOS.VTOINSPEKTsIYA also issues a certificate (TALON) which proves that a Technical Passport has been duly issued. The TALON is kept by the driver of the vehicle.

2. Charge for registration is 25 roubles (15 to cover the expense of inspection, 10 for number plate). In districts where two plates are required, or in the case of lorries, it would seem likely that 10 roubles is paid for each plate. As far as is known, no annual car tax is imposed, nor are licences renewed, but vehicles must be examined by GOS.VTOINSPEKTsIYA periodically as and when laid down by them. Registration fees are paid into the bank.

(b) Motor Cycles.

Procedure for registering motor cycles is similar to the above, although the charge for inspection is only 10 roubles. Cost of number plates is not known.

(ii) Extract from PO KAMLU IENI MOSKVY SPETVOCHNIK - PUTEVODITEL' (IZDANIE GLAZNY "VECHERNIYA MOSKVA" 1949)

(c) Bicycles.

Application has to be made to any branch of the State or City bank. The applicant must have with him a SPRAVKA issued by his house steward (UPRAVDOM) to the effect that he is in possession of a bicycle. It must state whether it is a man's or woman's. On payment of 20 roubles the bank will issue a number plate and a receipt.

Bicycle registration must be renewed annually and the colour of the plates is changed each year.

Driving Licences.

Driving licences are issued by GOSAVTOINSPEKTSIYA, the "qualification commission" of which puts the applicant through a driving test. This consists of a medical examination, a technical examination on the workings of the engine, car maintenance, a verbal test on the rules of the road and finally a road test.

There are two types of licence:

- (i) professional:
- 1st class : very rare, amounts to possessing qualifications of an automobile engineer;
 - 2nd class : issued to those seeking employment as drivers;
 - 3rd class : " " " " " " " " " " " "
- Amateur : possessors of which cannot accept employment as drivers.

A fee of 15 roubles is charged for taking the examination but no charge is made for the licence. It is reported that both driving tests and inspections have recently become stricter.

Petrol.

Car owners are issued with petrol coupons which entitle them to buy petrol at about 3 roubles per gallon. It is legal to buy additional petrol at approximately 9 roubles a gallon.

Bra/F/W

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN
Directie Juridische en Administratieve Zaken

~~EXEMPLAAR~~

No. 39797.....

'S-GRAVENHAGE, de 25 April 1949.

Men wordt verzocht bij de aanhaling van
deze brief, dagtekening, nummer
en afdeling nauwkeurig te vermelden

ACD/60750

Blijkens bericht van ~~Harer~~ Majesteits
Ambassadeur te Moskou werd op 29 Maart jl.
het 11e Congres van de Sovjet Jeugd Organi-
satie (Komsomol) geopend.

Blijkens het verslag van de Secretaris
van het Centraal Comité van de Komsomol had
het Anti-Fascistisch Comité van Sovjet Jeugd
opgericht in 1941, contact met 200 jeugdorga-
nisaties in 70 landen. Van de Wereld Federa-
tie van Democratische Jeugd werd gezegd dat
haar werkzaamheden een bewijs waren van
kracht en een correcte politieke koers.

DE MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN,
Voor de Minister,
Het Hoofd der Directie,

Aan het Ministerie van
Algemene Zaken,
p/a Javastraat 68
te

'S-G R A V E N H A G E

Bur. C.V.D.
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