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NAAM: ETAPPENORGANISATION DER KRIEGSMARINE

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In het O.D. "Etappenorganisation der Kriegsmarine" werd de naam van DIJCKERHOFF aangetroffen met de volgende aantekening:

"Berichterstatter, 1935, Rotterdam.
"Connected with the Etappenorganisation,
"but not under oath and not concerned
"with secret material. Address: (1935),
"Somerenweg 52, Rotterdam".

Naar aanleiding hiervan is DIJCKERHOFF in de Cellenbarakken te Scheveningen opnieuw ondervraagd. Hoewel hij onder eenige pres-
sie werd gezet en hem te kennen werd gegeven dat de zoonseer door
hem verlangde terugkeer naar zijn familie in Duitschland nog lang
zou kunnen uitblijven, indien hij niet naar genoegen antwoordde,
verklaarde D. niets af te weten van de Etappenorganisation der
Kriegsmarine. Wel gaf hij toe ongeveer in 1935 bezoek te hebben ge-
had van een hem met name onbekenden Duitscher, die hem had verzocht
tot een Duitschen Inlichtingenorganisatie toe te treden. DIJCKER-
HOFF zou daar niet op zijn ingegaan.

Het is de indruk van ondervrager, dat DIJCKERHOFF hierom-
trent waarheid spreekt en zich er inderdaad niet van bewust is ge-
weest, dat hij te boek stond als B.E. (Berichterstatter). Deze in-
druk wordt versterkt door de aantekening: "not under oath and
not concerned with secret material".

Bovendien zijn de tot dusver (Maart 1947) beschikbare in-
lichtingen omtrent de eveneens in de "Etappenorganisation der
Kriegsmarine" genoemde BAKKER niet ongunstig. BAKKER staat even-
eens aangeduid als "B.E."

De conclusie kan worden getrokken, dat de personen, aange-
duid als B.E. (Berichterstatter) niet noodzakelijkerwijze allen
behoefden te weten, dat zij als zoodanig werden beschouwd.

De personen, aangeduid als Vm (BE) = (V-Mann Berichterstat-
ter) of L (BE) = (Leiter Berichterstatter) waren hiermede vermoede-
lijk wel op de hoogte.

26.3.1947.
G/L

1 copie P.D. Dijkerhoff
1 copie O.D. 89

ETAPPENORGANISATION DER KRIEGSMARINE
(Marine Sonderdienst)

Volgno.

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I Etappendienst 1914-1918.

The organisation of the Etappendienst was begun some years before the first World War by the "Admiralstab der Marine" (service instructions were issued in 1911 under the title "Vorschrift für die Verpflichtung von Berichterstattern und Vertrauensmännern sowie das Zusammenarbeiten mit denselben (Vorschrift A)") and it was to function in war time as a supply organisation for German warships in foreign waters with the additional duties to collect and transmit - to other Etappen, to the warships and to the Admiralstab der Marine in Germany - intelligence of importance to the conduct of the war and, as opportunity offered, to interfere with and mislead the enemy Intelligence Service and organise sabotage. Agents were German business men in neutral ports whose duty it was to purchase the supplies, particularly fuel, and arrange their delivery to the warships at secret rendez-vous on the high seas. An appreciation of the work of the Etappenorganisation in the first World War was included in volumes 1 and 2 of "Kreuzerkrieg", written by Raeder and published by the Admiralstab. And in October 1933 "La Revue Maritime" published an article on the same subject by J. Docroche.

II German Naval espionage and counter-espionage organisations up to 1930.

The following brief account of the German Naval espionage and counter-espionage organisations between the two wars is included here to show the background against which the Etappendienst was reconstructed for the second World War.

In 1927 the Marineleitung and the Heeresleitung each controlled its own Intelligence section. That of the Marineleitung was divided thus:

- (a) the "militärischer Erkundungsdienst", und. A II k
- (b) the "Weltnachrichtendienst", under A II n
- (c) the "Spionageabwehr", und. A II m.

(a) The "militärischer Erkundungsdienst" (E.-Dienst) was a secret espionage organisation employing secret agents, "Helfer" or "Agenten" (who either worked in an honorary capacity - "etwa aus sportlichen Neigungen", or for money), to collect Intelligence about foreign Navies and transmit it to the German stations, in peace time to A II k of the Marineleitung, and in war time to Kriegserkundungsstellen - "E.-Stellen" - to be established inside Germany or in neutral countries as close as possible to the theatre of war.

(b) The peace time functions of the "Weltnachrichtendienst" (N.-Dienst) were to collect all political and economic information and that concerning 'racial psychology', together with such military information as could be obtained without active espionage. This organisation was also to be used for propaganda purposes; influence of the Press abroad, etc. The agents were to be described as "Vertrauenspersonen der Reichsmarine" and to be chosen from the German colonies in foreign countries.

The "Weltnachrichtendienst" in war time was to be expanded, but its agents were to continue to avoid all activity against the

law of the countries in which they operated. Certain of the agents living near the theatre of war would, in addition, of suitable and agreeable, be required to establish "Kriegsnachrichtenstellen" - "N.-Stellen" - for the collection of Intelligence from the "Welt-nachrichtendienst" agents and to control despatch, observation and interrogation services.

Other "Weltnachrichtendienst" agents, particularly those overseas, would be required to serve the "Kriegsberichterstatter- under Vertrauensmännerdienst". This service, as its name then implied, was only to become operative in time of war. Its functions were to be the supply of German warships in foreign waters with material and information and to support the trade war outside European waters. The agents were to be known as "Kriegsberichterstatter" and "Kriegsvertrauensmänner" and were to give their reports to "Etappenstationen" which would pass them on to the Services.

(It was intended for the successful operations of both the "militärischer Erkundungsdienst" and the "Weltnachrichtendienst" that the representatives of the German Foreign Office abroad should, where necessary, co-operate especially in providing cover in neutral territory during war time and in forwarding correspondence).

(c) The "Spionageabwehrdienst" (G.-Dienst) was to combat the enemy's espionage.

- i) By co-operation with the general measures taken by the civil authorities after consultation with the military (frontier controls, postal and telegraphic surveillance, etc.)
- ii) By "Gegenminen".
- iii) By investigation of those enemy organisations in and outside Germany opposed to the German Intelligence.
- iv) By participation in the military aspect of treason and espionage trials.
- v) By misleading and sabotaging foreign espionage.

This service would operate in peace and war time. It was for consideration whether, on the outbreak of a war, special "Spionageabwehrstellen" - "G.-Stellen" - should be established on neutral territory.

Agents of the "Spionageabwehrdienst" would be named "Abwehragenten" and would be paid or unpaid, permanent or occasional agents.

On 1.4.1928 the "Spionage-Abwehr arbeitenden Stellen" of the Marineleitung were absorbed into the "Abwehrgruppe" of the Heeresleitung to form the "Abwehr-Abteilung" of the Reichswehrministerium. The Navy's counter - espionage section (The "Spionageabwehrdienst" referred to above) was taken into Gruppe III of the Abwehr-Abteilung, but its espionage services were controlled separately by Gruppe V (or Gruppe Marine), with Referat V(a) for the "geheimer Meldedienst" (presumably a new name for the "militärischer Erkundungsdienst") and Referat V(b) controlling the "Weltnachrichtendienst". See: Appendix IV - The organisation of the section controlling the Etappendienst in relation to the German Intelligence Service.

By August 1930 the Weltnachrichtendienst had been dissolved. A report of September 1931 refers to its failure; to the large expense disproportionate to its results and to conflict with the Foreign Office.

III Reconstruction of the Etappendienst.

A - Aims.

Korvetten Kapitän FRISIUS was charged with the organisation of the Etappendienst on a new foundation with special consideration to reduced costs, elimination of the possibility of conflict with other Government departments and, above all, to its military aims. These last were outlined in August 1930 as:

- (1) support of German cruisers in foreign waters at the outbreak of war in their journeys home.
- (2) support of the direction of economic warfare and of the cruisers prevented by the war from returning home.
- (3) construction of a reporting service (= Meldedienst) which would ensure the supply of
 - a) all information of importance to the disposal of Germany's Forces;
 - b) information on merchant shipping to assist in the destruction of the enemy's shipping traffic and the surveillance of neutral shipping.

And in a lecture given by Leiter Gruppe IV to the Marineakademie on 16.2.38 the functions of the Etappendienst were summarised thus;

- (1) to enable cruisers stationed abroad, auxiliary cruisers and auxiliary vessels to obtain supplies and provisions from neutral countries as soon as the delivery of supplies from Germany ceases,
- (2) to collect information of military, political and economic importance and to transmit it to the Seekriegsleitung and to the German warships and merchant vessels in the area,
- (3) to support Germany's economic warfare and to interfere with the enemy's obtaining of supplies, so far as this is possible by influence on the authorities, firms and Press concerned.

Whereas the Abwehr (in view of the importance of the Intelligence side of the work) was made responsible for the development of the organisation and for the recruiting, training, communications etc. of the agents, the Marineleitung - later the OKM - was responsible for giving military instructions and naturally continued to be actively concerned in the policy of the Etappendienst and in its agents. It put at the service of the organisation during the years before the war the captains and other officers (very often the Navigation Officer) of the cruisers for the recruiting of agents abroad and liaison with them, and - while the Etappenorganisation was still run from the Abwehr-Abteilung - the use of the Reichsmarinedienststellen in German ports where there was no Abwehrstelle, for liaison work etc.

B - Expansion.

In 1934 a four year plan was drawn up for the expansion of the Etappenorganisation to full strength by the end of 1938. The Abteilung Abwehr budgeted for an expenditure of 20.000 Reichsmarks for tours of inspection of England, Scandinavia, Central America and North Africa. It was decided that yearly reports on the progress of the organisation should be submitted to the head of the Abteilung. The training of agents was to be undertaken seriously. Special attention was to be directed towards the building up of Etappe England, which was proving a very difficult task.

In May 1935 a special agreement was signed between the Auswärtiges Amt and CANARIS, as head of the Abwehr-Abteilung, concerning the assistance to be given to the Etappenorganisation by

diplomatic representatives abroad; this included regulations governing the safekeeping of agents' secret equipment and the handing over of this equipment on the outbreak of war and the recruiting of new agents for the Etappenorganisation by diplomatic representatives abroad.

C - Organisation.

By the end of 1938 the Etappenorganisation was considered to have been built up to its full strength. It was divided territorially into three main Etappen: Nah-Etappe, Fern-Etappe, Übersee-Etappe, which were subdivided into Gross-Etappen, comprising several Unter-Etappen. There were also Einzel Etappen (single Etappen) covering smaller territorial divisions:

	(<u>Gross-Etappen</u>		
	{	Finland1)	Finland
			3)	Lithuania
			2)	Estonia
			4)	Latvia
<u>Nah-Etappe</u>	{	Scandinavia1)	Norway
			2)	Sweden
	{	England1)	England
			2)	Holland
	(<u>Einzel-Etappen</u>		
	{	Belgium		
	{	Denmark		
)	<u>Gross-Etappen</u>		
	{	Spain1)	Spain
			2)	Spanish possessions
				Spanish Morocco
			3)	Portugal
			4)	Azores
<u>Fern-Etappe</u>	{	Italy1)	Italy
			2)	Italian North-Africa
	(<u>Einzel-Etappen</u>		
	{	Greece		Portuguese West Africa
	{	Black Sea and Asia Minor		Gulf of Guinea
	{	Persian Gulf		S.W. Africa
	{	Eastern Mediterranean		Portuguese Est Africa
	{	West Africa		British East Africa
	(<u>Gross-Etappen</u>		
	{	North America1)	North America (West Coast)
			2)	" " (East ")
	{	South America1)	Brazil
			2)	La Plata
			3)	South America (West coast)
<u>Übersee-Etappe</u>	{	East Asia1)	Japan
			2)	Manchukuo
	(<u>Einzel-Etappen</u>		
	{	Greater Antilles		
	{	Mexico		
	{	Panama (Central America and Lesser Antilles		
	{	Netherlands East Indies +)		

+) (China (including Honkong and Philippines)

In addition there were independent Etappen stations at Colombo, Madras, Calcutta, Bangkok, Sydney and Wellington.

Etappe England was dissolved in March 1939, and the rest of Nah-Etappe in July 1939 (although cover addresses, and the agents responsible for correspondence addressed to them, in the countries concerned were retained).

The Eastern Mediterranean Etappe was dissolved in Juni 1939, and on the outbreak of war the stations in all British and French possessions were also closed.

The work of preparing an organisation in Spain was left to a certain extent in abeyance during the Spanish Civil War, but from the summer of 1939 plans were pressed forward for an Etappe in Spain which should primarily be concerned with the naval supply operations.

In September 1939 it was decided to set up an Etappenorganisation in Russia and by the end of 1939 a base was established on land near Mormansk, made available to Germany by Russia. This Etappe was finally closed down in 1940 when Germany had acquired bases in the north of Norway.

The Etappe in the Netherlands East Indies ceased after the occupation of Holland.

In the spring of 1941 Etappe Bordeaux was established under cover of the Kriegsmarinedienststelle (KMD) there for the supervision of the "Versorgungsschiffe" who used this port as their home base.

IV. Agents.

A - Categories of Agents.

The agents of the organisation were mainly reliable German business men and shipping agents established in ports all over the world. Etappen orders stressed that Germans should be well-established in business and respected by the authorities of the country; they should also have a sound knowledge of the political conditions of the country. They were recruited and given their instructions either by officers of the German warships on their calls at foreign ports, by the Naval Attachés responsible for the Etappen or by the Headquarters Referenten who visited the areas under their control; and contact with them was maintained in the same way and during the agents' visits to Germany. Agents already working for the organisation were also encouraged to recommend potential new agents and to communicate with Headquarters directly, giving all particulars with regard to business connections, reliability, etc.; Abw.Abt. then communicated with the potential agent.

Each Grossetappe was headed by a "Militärischer Leiter" - Mil. Ltr. (military leader) who was the Naval Attaché of the nearest German Embassy or Legation. Each Etappe had at its head a "Leiter Berichterstatter" - L (BE) (head Intelligence agent) who was responsible for the agents in his territory and whose duty it was to keep in constant touch with Headquarters and with his agents. A L (BE) at the head of an Unter-Etappe was subordinate to the Mil. Ltr., Headquarters. An agent was either a "Berichterstatter" - BE (reporter of intelligence) or a "Versorgungsmann (Berichterstatter)" - VM (BE) (Supply man and intelligence agent) according to the purpose of the Etappe in which he was stationed. In rare cases Germans who had taken the nationality of the country in which they lived, were

employed as Vm (BE). In some cases "Reichsdeutsche" were recruited as "Hilfsberichterstatter" (assistant reporters) and in certain cases non-Germans were employed in this capacity. By the end of 1938 there were some two hundred agents employed by the organisation abroad. In January 1940 an order was issued to the effect that the Etappen-V-Leute were considered as members of the Kriegsmarine and, as such, subject to service regulations and exempted from military service in the Reich; a Vm (BE) was equivalent to a Kaptlt. and a L (BE) equivalent to Korv. Kpt.

B - Agents' Equipment.

The agents' "Geheim Ausrüstung" (secret equipment) was held in peace time in special safes at the nearest Embassy or Legation, by the Mil.Ltr. or in the nearest German consulate (provided the consul was a career, and not an honorary, consul) and was only to be handed out when the issue of a "Spannungsbefehl" from Berlin (or the outbreak of a war) gave the signal for the Etappendienst to begin operations. The material was divided into:

- a) Grundausrüstung (basic equipment), and
- b) Zusatzausrüstung (additional equipment).

(a) consisted of:

- 1) Vorschrift A, "Anleitung für das Zusammenarbeiten mit den Vertrauenleuten der Etappenorganisation" (Guide for collaboration with agents of the Etappenorganisation. See Appendix II for translation).
 - 2) The Etappenvorschrift (Etappen Regulations).
 - 3) The Wörterbuch für Scheintelegramme (W.f.S.) (Dictionary for Sham Telegrams) 1930 and 1936 editions, with code instructions; the Vertrauensmännerschlüssel (Agents' code) and the Schlüssel H (Code H).
In November 1939 a new code, in the form of an addition to the V.S. known as the "Versorgungs-männerschlüssel-zusatz", was issued.
The W.f.S. was used for communication between one agent and another, between agents and Headquarters and between warships' commanders and agents. The V.S. was a simpler form of code, which could also be used in connection with ordinary commercial codes and could be carried in the agents' head. In general this was used for less secret types of communication. The Code H was to be used for secret traffic between warships and merchant ships, and between the L (BE) and merchant ships. W.f.S. 1936 and the V.S. were 'blown' in 1941 (when the agent in Cadiz lost his copies).
 - 4) The agent's "Verpflichtungsverhandlung" or "Sondervereinbarung" - the paper signed by an agent when formally engaged.
 - 5) The agent's "Dienstausweis" (service-pass) if issued.
 - 6) "Kennung der Kriegsschiffe (Schattenrisse)" (silhouettes for recognition of warships)
 - 7) Weyer's "Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten" (Pocketbook of warships)
 - 8) the International Signal Book (Part II, Wireless Traffic) for the L (BE)
 - 9) Hapag-Lloyd Code
 - 10) Bentley Code
- } Commercial codes

The papers number above 7 - 10 (and apparently the W.F.S. 1930 edition, which was used in peace time) might be held by the agent. The agents were to revise their knowledge by examination of this "Grundausrüstung" at the place where it was held, at least once a year.

(b) consisted of:

- 1) List A - a list of cover names and addresses used by the OKW, to which agents communicated.
- 2) List B - a list of the names, cover names, numbers and addresses of agents. The copies of List B for use by the agents themselves contained only the names in the area concerned. A complete version was held by the Mil.Ltr's.
- 3) List C - a list of cover names of German warships, each having two different cover names which could be used alternately.

The "Zusatzausrüstung" might not be opened before the issue of a "Spannungsbefehl" or the outbreak of a war. (Amendments to the lists were sent sealed and were only to be opened with the original material at the given signal).

The German Navy commands and ships were also issued with the "Grundausrüstung" (with the exception of the papers numbered 4 - 7 above and, from August 1939, with the addition of a map "British Empire Shipping 1937"), but with the "Zusatzausrüstung" only on the outbreak of a war or before sailing to foreign waters.

In Juni 1939 - owing to the increasing political tension - orders were issued that all the material containing names of agents (the "Verpflichtungsverhandlungen" and "Sondervereinbarungen", the Lists A, B and C, and the Service passes) should be burned. In addition the "Etappenvorschrift" and the "Kennung der Kriegsschiffe" were withdrawn; as was the W.F.S. 1936 from the territories especially endangered, primarily the British colonies. (Agents were to be instructed to commit coding methods to memory and to make notes of cover names, addresses etc. in such a way that they should divulge nothing if read by an unauthorised person). List C was no longer to be used. The original equipment was however left with the Mil.Ltr's of the Grossetappen.

C - Payment of Agents.

With some exceptions, V-Leute were only to be paid a regular salary (L(BE) were to receive RM 500 a month, and Vm(BE) RM 300 a month) during service in war time. The money for these payments was, at least originally, distinguished from the "Versorgungsgelder" (see IX below) and referred to as "Betriebsfonds" or "Kriegsbetriebsfonds". It was planned that funds to cover three months' salaries and expenses should be sent to the Etappen before the war and held with the "Geheimmaterial" (The secret equipment). In May 1936 Abw. IV asked for RM 250.000 in 'Devisen' for these funds, but owing to the shortage of 'Devisen' it was apparently not possible to despatch the full amounts before war broke out. The money was normally sent (the first were despatched at the beginning of 1936) through the Auswärtiges Amt in the form of a cheque on an English bank and the recipient (the German diplomatic or consular representative) was instructed to cash the cheque and hold the money in bank notes or gold, bearing in mind that they must be exchanged for up-to-date issues should the notes become invalid.

In November 1939 it was noted that as the salaries for V-Leute could not be sent to the Etappen in 'Devisen', a "Sperrkonto" (blocked account) had been arranged in Germany for the V-Leute. But in certain cases - in which an agent whose presence in a particular place was essential for military reasons but who, unless he received the Etappen salary, might be forced to leave his post for personal business reasons - payment would have to be made in "Devisen". Although there is no specific reference to the arrangement, money for current expenses must presumably in the war have been drawn from the "Kriegsmaterialfonds".

D - Agents' peace time duties.

It was the duty of the Etappen-V.Leute in peace time to prepare for their work in a war. They were to gain such knowledge of the methods and channels of communication, and if possible pre-knowledge of controls likely to be imposed, that on the outbreak of a war there should be nothing to prevent their effective operations. They were also to maintain good relations with local authorities, especially port and customs officials and make contacts from whom they could obtain intelligence information and with whom they might thus expect to be able to do business connected with their work as "Versorgungsmänner". Information of outstanding importance was to be reported even in peace time; and the agents were to watch for the existence of organisations like that of the Etappendienst, run by other countries in their territory.

V. Policy in regard to the countries in which, and against which, the Etappendienst operated.

The Etappendienst was to operate in neutral and friendly countries only because of its dual purpose of supplying German warships, which obviously could not be carried out from enemy territory; and the collection of Intelligence, which was to be Intelligence about the enemy, not about the country in which the agent was resident; the agent was not to operate against his "Gastland". This policy conforms with the general conception of the organisation whose agents were to be respectable men on good terms with the local authorities (NSDAP members serving the Auslands-Organisation of the Party in an official capacity were considered by the Abwehr automatically to be suspected by the local authorities, and were therefore not employed - although there were exceptions - in the Etappendienst) and business houses; and was to ensure their continued liberty in time of war when they were to begin active operations for the Etappendienst.

In the early 1930's, when the reconstruction and development of the Etappendienst was being planned, Germany's potential enemies were France and Poland, and the development of the organisation centred round the trade routes of these countries (including, for instance, the Swedish railways).

Naval espionage against the country in which an agent was resident or operating was conducted by the "geheimer Meldedienst" under the control of the old Referat V(a) of the Abwehr-Abteilung, which subsequently became Abw. I M, which also ran the naval espionage in and against France and Poland, the "enemy" countries. Belgium, too, was for some time included with France in territory in which only V(a) could operate (the first moves to find personnel for Etappe Belgien were made in November 1935).

It was debated for some time whether Etappen should be established in Russia and Italy. In regard to Italy for instance,

it was first considered that as, owing to the political circumstances no Intelligence was being conducted there (Referat V (a) had no organisation in Italy 1935), no Etappen agent or station should be installed - but that it might be possible to obtain the Intelligence required through more official channels, but it was finally decided (by October 1935) that, since the activities of the Etappendienst were not directed against Italy herself, there could be no objection to placing personnel there.

This general policy in regard to the territory in which, and against which, the Etappendienst was to operate explains the dissolution of Etappe England after March 1939, when England was recognised as the future enemy should there be a war. The remaining territory of the Nah Etappe (Belgium, Holland, Denmark, with the exception of Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania) was handed over to Abwehr-Abteilung I on 1.7.39 to avoid duplication of work and for reasons of personnel; Nah Etappe in the frontier states on the North Sea and the Baltic was constructed for Intelligence purposes only (the supply work of course being unnecessary owing to its proximity to Germany) and when, for instance, K.O. Holland and K.O. Belgium were planned in the spring and summer 1938, it was laid down that the officers in charge of the Abwehr I work in those countries should be kept fully informed of the Etappen-V.Leute employed there and of their activities. This arrangement must have proved unsatisfactory and have led to the decision to transfer the organisations to Abwehrabteilung I. On the other hand, where the naval supply work was to be the primary purpose of an Etappe (as in Spain from the summer of 1939) Abwehrabteilung I and Ausland IV operated in the same territory, the Intelligence activities of the Etappen-V-Leute being restricted to the collection of information directly affecting their supply work.

The captured documents disclose certain exceptions to the general policy that an agent should not operate against his "Gastland." For instance in January 1936 Referat V(b) asked the Marineleitung for a questionnaire to be given to an agent who was to be in Southampton for some time and in a position to obtain information about the production of a British firm there. Although V (b) noted against the reply that some of the questions could not be answered by an Etappen agent, the intention was to collect Intelligence in England about British naval matters. And, on broader lines, the kind of Intelligence to be collected (and which was to supplement that obtained by the "geheimer Meldedienst"), such as information about preparations for mobilisation, would in countries like the U.S.A. presumably chiefly concern the American, including the United States, and therefore involve the agent in activities directed against his "Gastland". Notes for a lecture drafted in October 1936 explain that a BE was not to work against the country in which he was resident, but that he was to keep the Reichsministerium informed of all important events in that country without engaging in espionage.

VI. Etappendienst operations before 1939.

Although the Etappendienst was only to become fully operative when Germany entered a state of war, the documents show evidence of the Etappendienst having been in action

(a) during the Spanish civil war, when Na-Etappe and Etappenstation Istanbul were instructed to report ships sailing from Russia, Baltic and North Sea ports to "Red-Spain" or France. In his lecture to the Marineakademie in February 1938 Leiter IV stated that the BE-Dienst had functioned excellently; in many cases ships, whose mo-

vements had thus been plotted were, two or three days later, captured or sunk by the "White Spanish" Forces.

(b) in February 1938 the Etappenstation Port Said was operating and reporting to Germany all transports destined for the Sino-Japanese theatre of war.

(c) during the 'Munich Crisis' in September 1938. The "Spannungsbefehl" was despatched on 28.9.38 to all but a few places, and the "Entspannungsbefehl" on 30.9.38, but certain stations began reporting as early as the 17th September in all eighteen reports were received by courier, airmail, telegraph, wireless, etc., the majority informing Berlin of the whereabouts of British warships and merchants ships. The reports from L (BE) Athens on the political situation in Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece were especially commended. A full report was made of this "dress rehearsal" and suggestions for improvements followed naturally from the experiences of the "Spannungszeit".

VII. Commercial Cover.

Perhaps the most interesting point disclosed by the captured files of the Etappendienst is the evidence of very close co-operation between the naval section of the Abwehr and German business houses, including of course the big shipping lines. Contact with the firms in Hamburg and Bremen was first entrusted to the Reichsmarine-dienststellen there. By September 1931 RMD Bremen had succeeded in convincing the General Director of Norddeutscher Lloyd of the importance of the Etappendienst and in enlisting his co-operation. RMD Hamburg considered at this time, that he had less prospect of success in his area. But the Abwehr pursued the matter and by 1934 the Referenten of Abw. V(b) in Berlin and the Abwehrstellen in the ports were making an increasing number of personal contacts in business houses, so that finally Referat V(b) had contacts in such firms as the Deutsches Kohlen Depot GmbH (Dekade) of Hamburg and others with branches or representatives abroad, who

- 1) recommended suitable Germans and other German firms in and outside Germany for the Etappendienst;
- 2) assisted the Etappendienst in finding suitable commercial employment for its agents abroad; or transferred to the company's branches outside Germany employees who were considered by the Abwehr to be especially suitable for the Etappendienst;
- 3) put their business addresses - postal and telegraphic - at the Abwehr's disposal as cover addresses for the Etappendienst;
- 4) allowed the use of their business notepaper and envelopes by the Abwehr for correspondence sent to agents abroad;
- 5) allowed the use of their teleprinter communications with branches in countries, such as Holland, on Germany's frontiers;
- 6) provided cover for the journeys of Abwehr officers of Referat V (b) - later Gruppe IV - abroad;
- 7) allowed the use of their banking accounts to cover the transfer of funds to the Etappendienst agents abroad; or allowed the use of the company's money abroad for Etappendienst purposes, (in August 1936 Referat V(b) came to an agreement with Herr Kaufmann, representing the director of the Financial Department of Hapag, that the L (Be) in Batavia should "im Spannungsfalle" not transmit freight money paid to him for Hapag to Germany, but should collect it and use from it in case of need for the Etappendienst supply work. And this method of maintaining the organisation's funds abroad was extended during the war.)

- 8) covered the Navy in commercial transactions leading to the control of oil supplies and tankers.

The contacts in the shipping lines also advised the Abwehr of sailings and recommended reliable ships' captains for liaison with agents and courier work, etc.

It should, however, be pointed out that the contact was generally an official or director of the company concerned, in a sufficiently high position to be able to give the co-operation described above, but that the collaboration with the Abwehr was kept very secret inside the firm. For instance the agreement concerning the use of a company's address by the Etappendienst was to be known to, at the most, two members of the firm. The wording of the address to be used ensured the direction of the mail - or telegram - to the contact and he was personally responsible for its transmission to the Abwehr. (During the war the German censorship offices intercepted correspondence to the cover addresses and forwarded it direct to Abt. Ausland).

VIII. Security and Communications.

The cover provided by these business contacts and the safe-keeping of the highly compromising secret material in the German Embassies and Consulates together went a long way towards ensuring the security of the organisation in the years before the war - but Leiter IV's lecture in February 1938 indicates that the Abwehr was fully aware of the possibility of foreign knowledge of its existence as a result of the references to the Etappenorganisation in books published after the 1914-18 war.

The references to three incidents which occurred before the war show the importance attached to the maintenance of the Etappendienst as a secret organisation, the anxiety caused when part of it was endangered or exposed and the almost ruthless measures taken to excise and replace that part;

1) Early in 1937 the steamer "Goslar" was broken into in Philadelphia (It was thought by aman from the shore out for money and valuables) and papers from the Captain's cabin were stolen. These included a letter in transit to the Auswärtiges Amt which must have mentioned the L(BE) New Orleans, HARZOG, for HARZOG was removed from this position in the Etappendienst on Chef-Abwehr's orders.

2) The "Sondervereinbarung" of L(BE) San Francisco, Robert BLATT, entrusted to Captain Vagt of the NDL steamer "Elbe" was lost in July 1937. This was serious because the "Sondervereinbarungen" (special agreement signed by agents) showed the full lay-out of the organisation in an agent's Etappe. Therefore it was decided that Grossetappe North America must be reconstructed, and BLATT himself was of course removed. In neither of these cases did the investigations prove the loss of the paper to anyone who might have exploited them.

3) In the autumn 1938 Horst von PFLUCK-HARTTUNG, the Mil.Ltr. and L (BE) Denmark was arrested with other agents. Cover addresses were compromised and the whole organisation there capsized. (Etappe Denmark was never in fact rebuilt owing to the dissolution of Nah-Etappe in July 1939).

The successful functioning of the service in war time depended on the security of its communications. This was planned, and practised before the war. Etappen headed by a Mil.Ltr. in the person of the German Naval Attaché communicated through Auswärtiges Amt channels. Etappen under L(BE) corresponded by post or telegraph and this method was made secure by the development of cover

names for the agents and for the Abwehr; by the use of the business cover addresses (chosen because the Abwehr, in about 1935, found by examining the post in a mail train that only 15 % was private correspondence and the remainder almost entirely business communications, so that the latter was much more secure from surveillance), and agents were instructed in open letters to their cover addresses to word the texts in a language suitable to correspondence directed to that kind of business; and by the use of secret variations on the trade codes and of agents' codes (during the early years of the war - the documents captured contain papers dated up to the end of 1941 - the codes were subjected to periodic examination by experts to test their continued effectiveness and such alterations as necessary were ordered). The difficulties encountered in setting up a widespread wireless communication network seem to have prevented the completion of the original plans in this respect and to have forced the Abwehr to concentrate on those places where postal and telegraphic communication was likely to be interrupted by the outbreak of a war, and it was stressed early in the war that, as long as other means of communication were still available, W/T transmitters should be used as little as possible in order to avoid detection. By the end of 1938 the organisation had 7 wireless stations of its own in the following places:

Panama, Horta, Sta Cruz de Tenerife, Las Palmas, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Istanbul

and was planning to set up others in:

Mexico, Cristobal, Valparaise, New York, Buenos Aires, Rio, London, Madrid, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Rome, Port Said, Walvis Bay, Monrovia, Burban, Mombasa, Batavia, Shanghai, Tokyo.

But in March 1939 it was decided to abandon the plan to instal transmitters in the Nah-Etappe, During the early years of the war additional sets were sent out, for instance to Japan, to Spain and to the merchant ships sailing as "Versorgungsschiffe". The two receiving stations in Germany with which the Etappen wireless service communicated were: M.N.O. MITTE and M.N.O. NEUMUNSTER. The transmission station was Küstenfunkstelle NORDDEICH. Some of the agents' transmitters which were installed abroad before the war, such as that at Horta, were specially built by Siemens into radiograms, model "Telefunkensuperschrank 654 WSK 'Bayreuth'"; others were of small enough design to be concealed in a room.

IX. Etappendienst as a Naval supply service.

The Naval supply work of the Etappendienst (or the Marine-Sonderdienst as it was also called from June 1939) is only described briefly in this note, but it was in fact a very important function of the organisation, requiring careful preparation before and during the war, and the available documents show that it was fulfilled with some considerable success up to the end of 1941.

The preparations made before the war, which are not however shown in detail in the files captured, seem to have hinged, in so far as they were made by the Abwehr and later Abt. Ausland (In this work the German Naval High Command must essentially have been concerned in directing what supplies were to be made available and where and when they would be required), on the recruitment of Vm(BE), their provision with funds for purchasing supplies - the "Versorgungsgelder" - and a consideration of possible means of purchasing the supplies and obtaining shipping for their delivery which, in view of the change from coal to oil for warships' fuel was clearly to be very much more difficult than the same work

had been during the years 1914-1918, particularly when it was recognised from political developments that oil in the Western Hemisphere would be in the control of companies, such as Standard Oil and Shell, unlikely to sell to Germany.

The money for the Naval supply work, the "Versorgungsgelder", or, as the funds were later known, the "Kriegsmaterialfonds", was not to be sent out to the Etappen before a time when war was clearly imminent. In May 1935 the Reichsbank promised to supply RM 10.000.000.- in 'Devisen' when the money should be required and the original intention was that the proposed sums should be secretly transferred through the 'Bank für Internationale Zahlungen' and accounts had to show a normal business large enough to render this transaction inconspicuous) to the Etappen-V-Leuten. But when war with England had to be regarded as "within the bounds of possibility" which, it was believed, would make such transfers impossible, new arrangements were made. And in September 1938 the funds were despatched in the form of gold, notes (chiefly dollar notes) and credits direct through the Deutsche Überseebank, the Deutsche Süd-Amerikanische Bank and Hapag to Central and South America; through the Japanese Military Attaché to Tokyo; through N.V. Cultuur & Handels Mij. Lemangke (the agent REMPPIS in Holland) to Batavia; by steamers to Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Lourenco Marques; and by air to Lisbon. And when Etappe Spanien had been built up in the summer 1939 the money for Madrid was taken by courier.

The documents contain some notes on various schemes suggested for concealing Germany as the buyer of fuel oil and for obtaining the use of tank installations by indirect purchase of a partnership or interest in foreign oil independent of the big oil concerns. It was apparently decided to rely primarily on German merchant shipping for transport of the oil in view of the difficulties expected in chartering oil tankers. Although in September 1938, by means of a very complicated use of intermediaries, the German Navy had at its disposal oil carried by Norwegian tankers chartered by a Swedish firm. And in September 1938 too the German captains of the tankers of the Warried Tanker shipping company (a company working under German management but with American capital, whose ships were run by the company but received cargoes and sailing orders from Standard Oil), sailing under the Panama flag, were enlisted and provided with a special code so that they might be given sailing orders from Germany to bring in their cargoes or make them available for supplies to German cruisers.

The secrecy of the supply work from neutral countries had not only to be very strictly maintained for military reasons but it was, of course, necessitated by legal considerations connected with, for instance, the American neutrality law of 1935 and the Hague Convention in regard to the sale of supplies to belligerent powers and the use by belligerents of neutral bases.

The Etappen eventually concerned in the supply work were; Japan and China; Central and South Americas; Spain, Portugal and the Canary Islands; Bordeaux, from May 1941 after OKM/SKL had ordered that Bordeaux should be the home port for the equipment of the supply ships; Dutch East Indies, at the beginning of the war only; Murmansk, which was built up from October 1939 and operated with Russian consent until September 1940 when it was dissolved owing to the German acquisition of bases in the North of Norway; Italy. The files contain some evidence of assistance received from the governments of Japan, Spain, Russia and Italy. The political situation was kept constantly under review to watch for the

- 1) possibility of sailing permits being refused by neutral countries, a danger which became acute in Peru and Brazil in January 1941 when the neutrality conference was held,
- 2) possibility of German money being frozen. Money was transferred from gold into currency, and from one Etappe to another, etc. as appeared advisable,
- 3) for periods when protection of a friendly neutral from British representations made suspension of the supply work desirable, as in Japan in 1941,
- 4) for British action endangering the operations of the Etappen - dienst (such as the institution of the air line to Bathurst via the Canary Islands in December 1940) which called for German representations to a neutral country.

On the outbreak of war the German merchant ships lying in foreign ports were requisitioned and subordinated to Abt. Ausland IV as "Versorgungsschiffe". They were equipped for their new work by the Etappen-V-Leuten as well as local resources and secrecy permitted and - although they naturally did not, in equipment and crew, attain the standard of the Naval supply ships, the "Trossschiffe der Marine", based on Germany - sufficiently to enable them to fulfil their tasks in sailing from the neutral ports to the rendezvous on the high seas where the operation of transferring supplies (fuel oil and provisions) to the German warships and, later, of taking from the warships prisoners of war, survivors, etc., was carried out; or, as particularly in the case of Spain, in fuelling German submarines which secretly visited the ports by night for this purpose. The V-Schiffe, although subordinated to Abt. Ausland IV and sailing in their service of the German Navy, retained the outward appearance of merchant ships and sailed under whatever flag gave them best cover in the waters in question. Captains had orders at all costs to avoid seizure by the enemy and had often to scuttle ship. As an additional safeguard, two logbooks were kept, one false and one showing the true record of a journey.

OKM informed Abt. Ausl. IV of requirements and apparently Ausl. IV communicated with the Etappen (through the channels organised, via the Auswärtiges Amt, by cable or by wireless) and the Etappen then proceeded to make the necessary local arrangements to equip the ships for the operations.

So successful was the organisation in arranging the sailing of the V-Schiffe from neutral and friendly ports that in September 1940 the Etappenorganisation was entrusted with the arrangements for the sailing of the blockade-runners, under the RVM (the Reichsverkehrsministerium), the movement orders issuing - as for the V-Schiffe - from the OKM/SKL.

X. Luft-Etappendienst.

In October 1936 a suggestion was put forward by the Leiter Gruppe VI (air section) in the Abwehr Abteilung that a 'Luft-Etappendienst' should be constructed to supply the needs of the Air Force in a war, in the countries expected to be neutral, (Vm-Dienst, Luft); and establish a 'Luftbefragungsdienst' (this was in fact already covered in 1935 by the Marine-Etappendienst) to collect intelligence for the Luftwaffe (BE-Dienst, Luft) - the division of work between Gruppe VI's Nachrichtendienst and the Luft-Etappendienst to be the same as the division between Gruppe V and

Gruppe IV, in that the latter employed only "Reichsdeutsche" and was excluded from the "Feindländer" (at this time France and Russia). He suggested that Lufthansa employees should primarily be engaged as V-Leute. Various meetings were held to discuss this matter and general agreement was given by CANARIS. But from a minute of 24.2.38 to Gruppe VI, in which Gruppe IV asked how the matter stood, it would appear that the plan was not put into effect.

XI. Etappendienst as an Intelligence Service.

It is not absolutely clear from the captured documents to what extent the Etappendienst was in fact used during the war for the collection of Intelligence. It seems that the original intention that it should be a world wide Intelligence organisation was modified by the extension of Abwehrabteilung I's activities - especially in the territory of the Nah-Etappe and in Spain and Portugal immediately before the war - and by the necessity to close down all Etappen stations in British and French possessions when war broke out. The Intelligence work, for instance, of agents in the Nah-Etappe was to have included the running of a "Schiffs- und Luftbefragungsdienst" and the employment of subsidiary agents, "Befrager", for this purpose. The Berichterstatter were to consider suitable employees of companies connected with shipping and air lines and sea and air ports for this work and to maintain inconspicuous and casual contact with them before the war. The "Befrager" were to be instructed - it was left to the discretion of the BE to what extent this should be done before the outbreak of a war in their work but were not to be given insight into the organisation, its purpose, or its contacts. The reports received from these subsidiary agents were to be sent in to the L(BE) of the Etappe and forwarded to Germany with an assessment of their accuracy, reliability etc. But on the dissolution of Etappe England and Nah-Etappe in the spring and summer of 1939 the agents of the Nah-Etappe were taken over by Abw. Abt. I for use in the "Schiffsbefragungsdienst Ausland" of Abt. IM (and it is thought that the list of these agents, which is contained in the documents, must include names of the proposed "Befrager" since the paper concludes with the note that where there had as yet been no connection between Ausl IX and the V-Mann, the Abwehrstellen might approach the V-Leute without further ado. The list also includes, in regard to Belgium, names of some individuals earlier regarded as unsuitable as Etappen V-Leute). There is no direct indication that the Vm (BE), primarily concerned in the Naval supply work, were also to have established a "Befragungsdienst" in their areas; but the papers covering the years from the outbreak of war to the end of 1941 do show that a constant flow of Intelligence reports was received from the BE-Dienst of the Etappen still in existence. Where the content of the reports is mentioned it can be seen that they generally gave information about allied shipping movements, information which may well have been derived from a "Schiffsbefragungsdienst". Special mention is, however made of a report dated 6.7.40 from L(BE) Shanghai describing Japan's growing interest in the Dutch and French colonies in S.E. Asia, but it seems probable that the Intelligence activities of the Vm (BE) were chiefly concerned with the collection of information about shipping and such other information as might affect the operations of the V-Schiffe, as was laid down for the agents of Etappe Spain to prevent duplication of the work of Abwehr-Abteilung I.

personen verbonden aan de "Etappenorganisation der Kriegsmarine"
van zwaar van belang van Nederland en Koloniën.

APPENDIX I

- ✓ - ANKER, Karl - Vm (BE), Willemstad, Curacao, 1937.
Address: C/o Edwards, Henriquez & Co.
- ✓ - BAKKER, Pieter Jakobus
Vice-consul BE, Y'muiden, Holland, 1936.
- ✓ NK BALSTER Vm (BE), Rotterdam 1938.
Representative of Nederlandsche Agentur en
Bevrachtingsonderneming, Rotterdam, 1936.
Address: Netherlands Shipping Agents, Rot-
terdam, Wilhelmskade 12.
Former Stahlhelmführer
- NK BARONSKY, G. Vm (BE) Rotterdam, 1936.
NDL shipping inspector.
Address: C/o Muller & Co., Rotterdam.
Known as "German Intelligence agent".
- ✓ - BARTHMAN, Kpt. Lt. Vm (BE), Rotterdam, 1936.
Address: Rotterdam, Oostzeedijk 104b
Hapag Inspector.
- ✓ - BLOHM, Ernst
(Cover name Charley MORIAN) L/BE II, Batavia, in 1935.
Address: C/o Wm. H. Muller & Co., N.V.
Kali Besar West Nr. 4, Batavia.
Might be identical with Walter Ernst BLOHM,
German agent in Athens 1941.
- ✓ - BODENSTEDT, Karl
(cover name: Charley MORIAN) L (BE) Batavia 1935-40.
Received salary of RM 500 monthly as L(BE)I,
Batavia, 1939.
Address: 1939 - c/o W.H. Muller & Co., N.V.,
Kali Besar West No. 4, Batavia.
General Manager of W.H. Muller & Co. Dis-
missed with the rest of the German staff
when the Dutch took over this company. Re-
leased from the Etappenorganisation when
Holland was invaded by the Germans.
- ✓ - DYCKERHOFF, Dr. Oscar
(cover name GELDER) BE, 1935, Rotterdam. Connected with the Etap-
penorganisation, but not under oath and
not concerned with secret material.
Address: (1935), Somerenweg 52, Rotterdam.
A Dr. Dyckerhoff is listed as Vice-President
of the Deutsche Handelskammer for Holland,
Heerengracht 520, Amsterdam.
Member of the NSDAP. Leader of the Nazi Par-
ty and German Colony of Holland.
- ✓ - FENGLER, Max
Korvetten Kpt. A.D.
(cover name "HEIN") BE, Haarlem, Holland, 1935. Lufthansa re-
presentative in Shiphol. Lived in Haarlem
(1936). Leader of NSDAP, Holland.
- ✓ P. 4302 - HARDT, Herbert
Engelbert Etappen agent, Holland 1939.
Was in Germany at the outbreak of war.
Identical with Direktor Herbert Engelbert
HARDT, agent of I.W. AST Netherlands who
visited Spain in February 1943.

P. 4299 behind
 HASHAGEN, H.D.
 (cover name
 SAMUEL)

Etappen agent Soerabaja 1935.
 Address: 1935 - Bergawanstraat 43,
 Soerabaja.

✓ - HOCHST, Theo
P. 4299

Director of Engelsch Hollandsche Bank en
 Handelsmij, The Hague.
 Private Address: Rijstag 29
 The Hague.

Initiated in the Etappen in January 1937,
 but not an agent. Born Dusseldorf 13.6.94.
 Engelsch Hollandsche Bank and Handelsmij
 known to be under German control. HOCHST
 was leader of Nazi movement in The Hague.

✓ - KROLLE

Vm, Rotterdam
 Dutch. N.D.L. representative with Muller &
 Co.

✓ - MAHNKE, Walter
 (cover name:
 Ludwig THOMSEN)

Vm (BE) Curacao 1939, with monthly salary
 of Rm 300.

Address: c/o Fritz Fuhrop & Co.
 Apartado 639,
 Barranquilla.

Dismissed in February 1940.

✓ - MATHIESEN, Walter

Vm (BE), Curacao.
 Dismissed February 1940.

✓ - MOSEDER, Adolf Paul
 (cover name:
 Paul HORN)

BE Deli, Sumatra 1939 with salary of RM. 1300
 monthly.

Address: (1937) c/o Harrison, Crossfields
 Ltd., Deli, Sumatra.
 (1939) O.K. Tandjong Kassan Est.
 Post Tebing, Tinggi/N.E.I.

Released from service when Holland was in-
 vaded by Germany.

✓ - MULLER, Friedrich
Behind, name (1939/19378520)

Vm (BE), Curaçao 1935.

✓ - PETERS, W.
 (cover name: Samuel)

Vm (BE) Soerabaja with monthly salary in
 1939 of RM. 300.

Address: c/o Wm. H. Muller & Co., N.V.
 Kembang Djepoen
 Soerabaja.

Released from service when Holland was in-
 vaded by Germans.

✓ - REMPIS, Friedrich
 (cover name:
 VERMEULEN)
P. 4303 behind

Connected with the Etappenorganisation in
 1935, but not sworn in and not concerned with
 secret material. A former naval officer, he
 was engaged in 1939 in naval espionage in
 Rotterdam under Korv. Kapt. von BESTHORN and
 was known to the Dutch as an Abwehr agent.
 Address: Den Haag
 Duinweg 25, or
 N.V. Sunda Comp.,
 Rotterdam.
 P.O. Box 1189

SCHLOSSER

Connected with the Etappenorganisation 1935,
 but not under oath or concerned with secret
 material.
 Inspector of Levant Linie in Rotterdam.

SCHNEEWIND, Paul
(cover name:
Jan DIERCKSEN)

BE Padang, 1939, with monthly salary of RM. 300. German Consul, Padang. Was released from service when Holland was invaded by Germany. In July 1941 the Dutch East Indies authorities requested safe conduct for him through the Pacific and he was due to leave for Japan on 11.7.41.

SIPPELL, W.V.

Connected with the Etappenorganisation at The Hague in 1935, but not sworn in or concerned with secret material. Possibly identical with Rittmeister Dr. SIPPEL in A.G. Ausland Abt. II A August 1942.

✓ - VIEPHAUS, E.F.W. ✓
(cover name:
Edgar KUNITZ)

BE Batavia 1935-39 with salary of RM 300 monthly. Released from service when Holland was invaded by Germany.

GUIDE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE V-MEN OF THE
ETAPPENORGANISATION

(Instructions A)

Dated Berlin 6.6.36
Issued by the Supreme Commander
of the Kriegsmarine - RAEDER.

Chapter I - General

1. The following are equipped with this document:-

O.K.M.	Battleships
B.d.A.	Panzerschiffe
B.d.P.	Heavy cruisers
F.d.T.	Cruisers
F.d.U.	Marineattachés
Flottenkommando.	

and other staff afloat, ships and boats, only when they have received Etappen equipment for voyages in foreign waters.

2. This document 'A' contains an introduction into the nature and methods of the Etappenorganisation. It is designed to supply Commanders abroad with an introduction into the methods of collaboration with the Etappe and to give them an insight into the military effectiveness of the Etappe.

3. The Commander will only be able to extract from the Etappe the maximum efficiency in time of war if he has intimate knowledge of the directions laid down for such work, combined with a comprehensive and intelligent understanding of the whole BE (Berichterstat-ter)- and Vm (Versorgungsmann)-Service.

Chapter II - Fundamentals of the Etappen Service

(1) Organisation

A. Characteristics

5. The Etappenorganisation is based on reliable Reichsdeutsche living abroad who are in a commercial and independent position and who show particular aptitude for the Etappen Service. They should also be men whose professional position gives them cover for the carrying out of the diverse duties of this Service.

6. The organisation covers the whole world, with particular regard for the countries likely to remain neutral in the event of war.

7. The Etappenorganisation will be called into action in the event of war or on special orders at a time of crisis. In time of peace, it will be carefully cherished and kept strictly secret.

Only those immediately connected with the work of the Etappen Service shall have any knowledge of it.

8. All V-men of the Etappe are equipped with secret material (instructions, lists of addresses, cypher keys, etc.) In time of peace this equipment will be kept in a special steel cupboard, on extraterritorial premises belonging to the local representative of the German Foreign Office. Occasional inspection of these documents may only be made by the V-man within the premises of the Embassy, Legation, etc.

In wartime the material will be handed out to the V-man in so far as his activities necessitate his having it.

The equipment of warships in foreign waters consists of:

- a) Instructions A.
- b) E.V. (Etappenvorschrift)
- c) Cypher keys
- d) List A.
- e) List B. (General List B)

9. The chiefs of the diplomatic missions are generally informed about the Organisation and the V-men operating in their area. They are expected to support the activities of the V-men, in accordance with the agreements made with the Auswärtiges Amt (See Appendix III).

10. As far as concerns the behaviour of V-men in war and peace, the following fundamental rule applies:

Strictest secrecy and the greatest restraint in time of peace,
Greatest activity and the relentless prosecution of their duties in time of war.

B. Duties

- 11. a) Collection and assessment of military, political and economic information of importance, and its transmission to Germany, or else to the nearest German warship or merchant vessel.
- b) Supplying all German warships in foreign waters with fuel, supplies and food.
- c) Hindering the enemy supply and information services by influencing local authorities, firms and the Press.
- d) Supporting German war economy in so far as this can be carried out without endangering tasks a) and b).

C. Personnel of the Etappe

12. All persons recruited for and employed by the Etappenorganisation, i.e. all BE, Vm(BE) and L(BE), will be referred to hereafter under the collective title of Vertrauensleute of the Etappe.

13. Berichterstatter (reporters) - BE.

The reporters supply the BE Service of the Etappe and are merely a means of collecting and transmitting information. They will be placed in the larger ports, centres of communications, and places of political importance, even if these are not on the coast; and through their occupation (merchant shipping representative, export merchant, pilot, etc.) they will be in a position to obtain a clear picture of marine traffic and commerce in their locality.

The most important of them are equipped with disguised short-wave transmitters.

14. Versorgungsmänner (supply men) - Vm (BE)

These are primarily engaged in the supply service of the Etappe but are required simultaneously to be responsible for the BE service in their territory.

They are located at ports which serve them as supply bases, and will generally be the chief representative of the German shipping agencies or the owners or representatives of foreign branches of large German firms.

15. Etappenleiter (Head of the Etappe) - L(BE)

A number of BE and Vm (BE) are placed in each Etappe under the control of an L(BE) who will be responsible for the running of the Etappe in time of war.

In countries where it is anticipated that there may be heavy demands on the Etappe, there will be special military chiefs (Mil. Ltr.), generally the Naval Attaches. For each Mil. Ltr. the R.K.M. will supply special instructions concerning the creation, organization and conduct of the Etappe.

Similarly a Sondervereinbarung (Special Agreement) is made with all V-men in the Etappe. This Agreement lays down all their names, cover names, contacts, as well as their local duties; and these Special Agreements are, in peacetime, lodged with secret equipment in extra-territorial premises.

16. Every commander in foreign waters is, in time of war, and so far as military duties demand, permitted to recruit new V-men and to supplant those who are not equal to their task with fresh agents. Naval Attaches, who are responsible for the military control of an Etappe, have the same competence. The names of newly recruited V-men, together with their cover names and cover addresses, as well as the names of any dismissed V-men, are to be sent to the R.K.M. as soon as possible.

(2) Estimation of the efficiency of the Etappe

A. General

17. In estimating the military efficiency of the Etappe with particular regard to the amount of reliable work it can carry out, a special criterion must be used.

Each commander who in time of war applies to the Etappe for assistance, must be clearly cognizant of the nature of the organization, its inevitable deficiencies and the great difficulties with which the V-men have to cope in foreign countries; failing this, he may set his expectations of the organization too high, and will therefore be inclined, at the slightest failure, to draw false conclusions as to the total effectiveness of the Etappe.

18. It is therefore advisable to make allowances in advance for delays and even failures in carrying out his requests, and he should arrange his requirements accordingly (i.e. by applying to two sources simultaneously and obtaining confirmation of results independently etc.).

D. The BE Service.

19. The V-man of the Etappe are faced with a many-sided and complicated problem in the carrying out of their duties, which require of them good WT knowledge, a profound knowledge of local conditions, and exact information about the many possibilities for the transmission of information.

The BE Service demands from its BE men a high degree of skill and ingenuity and often the whole time service of the individual.

(There follow various paragraphs outlining the means of communication and how these are to be used skilfully - V-men are recommended to use the organisation of Amateur Radio Broadcasters, to which many German amateurs abroad belong; also five paragraphs covering the duties of "Supply Men"- fuel, money, etc.)

65. The Etappe is an organisation which has been built up in peacetime, with care and close attention to details, for the purpose of assisting the Fatherland's war potentials in time of war. The duties of the Etappe imply a high degree of responsibility. On the successful work and support of the Etappe depends not least the safety of ships and crews.