

MINUTENBLAD

DOSSIER No. OD. 2117

NAAM: BEVEILIGING ALGEMEEN METHODIEK EN
DOCUMENTATIE

1. Aangelegd d.d. 10-7-52, in opdracht van Cst.
ACD 4A
2. Voor zover van de geagendeerde stukken (in dit OD geborgen) het schutblad aanwezig was dit bijgevoegd. aug. '70.

Speciale instructies aan A C D, (Slechts bij definitieve opberging in te vullen).

CO 106.811 } 1061 T
13.2.453 } 2117

~~ONAFGEDAAN~~

in aan te leggen op:
Beveiliging algemeen -
methodisch documentatie

Afd./Sect.: aach/cont. Dat.: 20-6-50 Par.: B

Interne aanwijzingen A C D.

A C D. 10 Dat.: 10/7/52 Par.: J (K)

20/6-50

Aantekeningen (Nummeren s.v.p.):

fil. H. KVD - H. KVD. t. b., daarom

mi. H.D. - ko. t. b.
acc
fil 13/4

kan m.v. waaraan tel. informatie bij van de hand
hoe Bin. data hier aan komt?

Res. ten pr en maand, dit verbaal ook?

Kunnen we via Clippie aan de film en het fotograf
bouwen procedure of het?

Don het niet nuttig zij indien een enkel van om
font culture relatie en copy geven van dit stuk?

H.D. n.a.v. notitie v. H. KVD.

krinnend. is onderhandt aan dit exemplaar gekomen
uit een open bron. Am. tijdschrift. Er is dus stellig ge
kenbaar tege om pr en maand een fotocopia te
doen. Aankomen waarmee bij het stuk niet kan.

nu e om dit verder aan particuliere
relaties te geven.

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Jaar via KARA. aan wo. op
KARA. aan Clipper het of vldr. 7 bedrukte
filmppje e pamflet kan vragen wanneer
wo. althans dit filmppje al niet heeft.

KA.

16/4

Levi PHD en bevestigings t.b.
doarna aan mij.

§ 20-4

Aan alle rechtso.

De verschillen met onze onderzoeksmethode zijn des interessant
PHD 1/5-51 B.

De/I	7/5		De/II
De/II	9/10K		De/I
De/III			De/II
De/IV	11/5 - Th		De/III
De/V	12/5		De/IV

I.2.b. vch aan KB II, met nu 2 heeft 199. De/II 70

Dit stuk is uit Nederlandse bron afkomstig (Buitenlandse
Zaken?). Is het nu te gaan waar het vandaan komt
en kunnen wij deze bron meerdere exemplaren voor ons
verkregen worden? K.O.Z. 30-5-51

4 in de gennogel K.O.Z. 31-5-51.

Levi stencil is volgens Tissot niet door BZ gemaakt. K.O.Z. 6/6/51

Fotocopie laismake over wo. K.O.Z. 17/10/51

Aan KARA,

ik kan aanschrijving van KA d.d. 16/4

doarna t.b. aan KB II

KB II 25-9-51 Gezien J.

KB II: 20/12/51 Gezien VH

MINISTERIE VAN BINNENLANDSE ZAKEN

BERICHT OP SCHRIJVEN VAN

NR. 3584 AFD. Kabinet

BETREFFENDE

's-Gravenhage, 4 April 1951.

1 bijl.

MEN GELIEVE BIJ HET ANTWOORD NAUWKEURIG
HET ONDERWERP, DE DAGTEKENING EN HET
NUMMER VAN DIT SCHRIJVEN TE VERMELDEN

4.3
29.53 - 06.31
9-4-51
ACD/1068111

Hierbij doe ik U ter kennisneming toe-
komen een Amerikaans artikel over beveiligings-
maatregelen in een der Amerikaanse bedrijven.

DE MINISTER ZONDER PORTEFEUILLE,
Voor de Minister,
DE SECRETARIS-GENERAAL,

Ulsen

NIET O.K.
ACD/44
DAT: 10/2/51
PAR: 1/1

Aan de Heer Hoofd van de B.V.D.

RAPPORT
VAN: KA-RA
AAN: KA
No. A 1750

ONDERWERP: "Security - It's Up to You".

4.3
2953-0631
5-3-52
132453

PA

Naar aanleiding van Uw aantekening d.d. 16-4-'51 op het
schutblad van Co. 106811 geeft CLIPPER ons hierbij te leen
een slide film getiteld: "Security - It's Up to You".

5-3-'52.

1 BIJLAGE.

UITGEBOEKT

NOTA

VAN: KA-RA

Op 16-1-'52 werd aan CLIPPER brief CAH/52/044 (106811)
geschreven, n.a.v. de aantekening van ACD/PA d.d. 10-1-'52
aan KA-RA.

18-1-'52 JK.

UITGEBOEKT

NOTA
VAN: KA-R.A.

Op 20-9-51 werd aan CLIPPER brief CAH/51/923(106811) geschreven, waarin hem om de film "Security-It's up to you" werd gevraagd naar aanleiding van de aantekening van KA. dd. 16-4-51 op schutblad CO. 106811. De gegevens voor de brief werden geput uit stuk 106811 dd. 9-4-51.

20-9-51, H

FOTO
No. 4405

SECURITY AND LOYALTY CONSIDERATIONS IN
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

*Med
beru*

(overgenomen uit "Personnel Problems Under Mobilization"
van "Personnel Series, Number 135").

x) Williard V. Merrihue
Manager, Employee and Community Relations, Apparatus Department,
General Electric Company.

The need for security today is but a matter of plain common sense. None of us can take security for granted. Obtaining security to the degree necessary is awfully hard work. Yet as members of management, we face an increasing responsibility for knowing the ins and outs of security.

Many of us have our security experience of World War II to provide us with the best possible starting point. I suspect that all of us, however, despite our experience or lack of it, will benefit from a review of security and loyalty considerations in personnel administration. Perhaps the subject can best be approached by some division of the problem. Accordingly, for the purposes of the discussion, I suggest the following sequence:

1. Organizing for security
2. Safeguarding the plant-both from within and without
3. The handling of subversives and the attendant clearance problems
4. Antidotes to complacency

The security organization.

The first step in obtaining security is to organize for it. This organization will vary from firm to firm according to traditional organizational patterns now in existence. In the Apparatus Department of General Electric, we place the responsibility clear up at the top echelon of management. We appointed an Apparatus Department Security Officer on the staff of and responsible directly to the General Manager of the Depart-

- ment -

x) The author.

Willard V. Merrihue, Manager of Employee, Labor and Community Relations for the Apparatus Department of General Electric Company, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with a degree in Chemical Engineering. He first joined General Electric as a copywriter and served successively as Assistant Manager of the Industrial Advertising Division, Manager of the Central Station Advertising Division, Assistant Manager of all Apparatus Advertising Divisions, and Manager of Advertising and Sales Promotion for the Apparatus Department. He was named to his present post in 1947.

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ment. This individual develops general security policies and coordinates security practices among Apparatus divisions. He is also responsible for developing the educational and training plans for security observance. In a smaller organization, the security officer might well report to the director of personnel or industrial relations.

The managers of our 16 operating divisions, such as Aircraft Gas Turbines, Aeronautic and Ordnance Systems, Steam Turbines, etc., have been given the responsibility for seeing to it that proper security safeguards are observed in the performance of classified work. A division security agent, responsible to the division manager, has been designated for each division having classified defense work. This agent develops and supervises detailed security measures and coordinates with the Apparatus Department security officer.

The work of these various security officers is made easier by a Department instruction on security measures. This instruction establishes responsibilities and general procedures so that government regulations may be complied with in the most effective manner. Quite detailed, the instruction serves as a valuable guide for the individuals assigned the security activity.

Thus, our security organization is quite simple, with a clear line of responsibility and the delegation of this important activity to a relatively small number of hand-picked individuals who can be counted on to do a conscientious and imaginative security job.

Security Routines.

The second step in obtaining security is to establish the routines necessary to provide safeguards for every possible contingency, both within and without the plant.

General Electric's program varies in this respect from plant to plant, depending upon the extent and the nature of defense projects. I shall cite as an example the Company's huge Schenectady Works. Here defense activities are of a nature that demands strictest security measures. Non-defense production is also carried on to such an extent and by so many people that many extra precautions are necessary.

Let's take a security tour of GE's Schenectady Works. First of all, before we can take this tour, visitors (as well as salesmen and GE employees from other plants) must register in the reception room at the Main Gate. You will be given a temporary pass upon being cleared and must wear this pass in plain sight during your entire stay. If you are an alien, you will require special clearance and will be accompanied by a GE employee at all times while you are in the plant.

This checking process is not confined exclusively to visitors. Each employee is provided with a photographic identification badge which must be worn in plain sight in order that he may enter the plant and which he wears while within the plant. As a

convenience to employees, a photo identification card to help establish identity is also issued. We have a new rule that if a man forgets his badge, he swaps his identification card for a temporary badge, which he turns in as he leaves the plant at night. All new employees are photographed the same day they are hired.

Now, as we walk around and see for ourselves the badges prominently displayed, we glance upward and see towers at strategic points. These lofty vantage points are manned by guards with a clear view of the surrounding areas. At night, powerful searchlights atop the towers are used to light the plant property.

Next, we see a Company guard checking an incoming truck. The driver is given a truck pass which is time-stamped when the truck enters and when it leaves the plant. It is also registered at certain points within the plant area. And now let's go inside a building and see what the casual visitor may see.

One of the first things we learn is that the casual visitor sees nothing if the work is of a classified nature. "Restricted Area" signs are conspicuously posted to protect areas containing classified projects. Only cleared employees are permitted to enter these areas. Even then, employee visitors to restricted areas must sign the security register in and out. And unless authorized by proper authority, an escort in constant attendance is required throughout the area.

It is interesting to note at this point that the Company's own photographers are subject to strict plant security regulations. Restricted Area guards demand and then examine carefully the photographer's credentials. News pictures and news stories require the approval of the Division Security Officer. In addition, the use of aerial photographs is generally prohibited.

The armed services assign resident security officers to plants where classified projects are being carried on. For example, one such project at the Schenectady Works is proceeding under the scrutiny of several members of the security personnel of the United States Navy. These armed forces security specialists help keep our operations train on the security track.

Suppose, now, that we are ready to leave the plant. As we turn in our temporary passes at the Plant Gate, we observe the employees leaving the plant. Guards at this gate and every gate carefully check all lunch boxes and packages. This practice assumes major security importance during a national emergency.

For us, the tour is over, but the security activity goes on into and through the hours of darkness.

Day and night, but particularly when darkness gives protection to those who would do us harm, the Plant Protection Headquarters provides the allimportant nerve center for coordinating

all communications and activities of the guards on their regular posts of duty or on patrol.

Inside, the security patrol carefully checks to see that all classified material is properly safeguarded. If material classified higher than "restricted" is found out in the open, the responsible person is asked to come to his office at once - regardless of the hour, of his pleas that he is in the middle of a bridge game at the club, or of the 20-mile drive he has to make to get to Schenectady. When he arrives, he reviews the classified materials and, finding them in order, he sees that they are properly locked up in the three-combination files or safes provided. This sort of calling-in has been known to happen to several individuals just slightly more than once. Then, needless to say, the necessity for it stops rather abruptly.

Outside, perimeter fences are lighted and patrolled at night. Here, guards in a prowler car make ceaseless rounds that go on throughout the night.

There are other precautions and safeguards that we did not happen to run across on our tour. But at every moment during the working day and night you may find security-minded and security-trained employees observing one or all of the following practices:

1. Storing secret and confidential material not in use in the most secure manner possible - in a three-combination safe, in an equally secure file cabinet, or in a secure room which is locked when not occupied.
2. Requesting and obtaining armed guards to maintain a continuous watch when the foregoing measures are not possible.
3. Locking desk drawers or file cabinets containing restricted material which demands a lesser degree of security than confidential or secret material.
4. Taking all necessary precautions in the shop when classified blueprints or drawings and even parts and assemblies are involved.
5. Making a daily inspection leaving to be sure that security is letter-perfect.
6. Forwarding secret and confidential material to other locations by using double envelopes, each addressed and marked in accordance with specific regulations.
7. Including a receipt in forwarding secret material, this to be signed by the recipient and returned to the sender.
8. Using registered mail or authorized courier to deliver secret and confidential materials.
9. Avoiding ^{the discussion} of classified information in telephone conversations and never using telegraph for sending any type of classified matter.
10. Destroying classified material in accordance with a detailed set of instructions that are to be followed without exception.
11. Challenging all unauthorized persons in areas that are restricted.

There are other measures, too. Even this incomplete listing, however, shows that there are a lot of specific and sometimes vexing precautions to be taken in safeguarding the plant. But

these measures are vitally necessary.

The handling of subversives.

And now to our next topic, the handling of known or suspected subversives already in the employ of the Company or discovered in the employment process; and the attendant problems raised by the necessity for clearance of employees by the various armed services.

This problem is charged with an explosive that can and frequently does go off in management's face. A disgruntled employee can lower the morale and the working efficiency of an entire unit. A slowdown or work stoppage may result from the way such an employee is handled, particularly if the union chooses to make trouble.

Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in the security practices of the various armed services-different security rules for handling classified material and different interpretations placed upon similar rules. For example, the Navy insists that each and every employee who is to work on Navy projects of any classified nature whatever-restricted on up-must be cleared in advance of his being hired for or transferred to these projects. On the other hand, the Army and the Air Forces insist only that an employee be a citizen if he is to work on restricted or confidential jobs for these two branches of the services.

Quite obviously, any unit or factory that handles classified projects for all three services is going to have a difficult time if it tries to set up to conform to their different rulings. The only logical way out is to adopt the practices of the most stringent service, in this case the Navy.

The result, however, is a penalty of a three to four week's delay between interview and clearance for those units dealing in classified work. Thus, the paradox of clearance is that it imposes on the most important operations in the plant a serious personnel hiring and absorption problem.

We believe that the services would benefit greatly if they were to eliminate inconsistencies in their security demands and thus provide a clear-cut, well-defined, easy-to-follow security procedure. I understand that this problem has been undergoing study for some time on the part of defense officials, and I am going on record here and now as favoring the setting up of a joint industry-services committee to speed the study of the whole security problem and to come up with recommendations that would clarify and codify the procedures all of us should follow in this important area.

Now, let's examine one of the most troublesome and complicated offshoots of the loyalty check - what shall we do when the clearance request backfires, and the person being checked is not cleared.

If the individual is not already an employee of the Company, he may be hired for non-classified work or he may be allowed to wander off to seek other employment. This is an employment office policy matter and should not ordinarily cause too much trouble. But when an operation is changed from non-classified to classified, with clearances necessary for everyone, or when prior clearances are declared invalid and new ones are called for, trouble may well be in the offing if the applicant has been hired.

Recently, the Congress passed, over the President's veto, the Internal Security Act of 1950. While our lawyers are still studying the text, you may be interested in a layman's brief summary of the law from an industry standpoint.

First, the law requires that all Communist action and Communist front organizations, together with the names of their officers, must register with the Attorney General within 30 days of enactment of the law. Furthermore, the names of all members of Communist action groups must also be registered. A significant section of the law provides that whenever the Attorney General shall have reason to believe that an organization which has not registered is in fact a Communist action or front organization, he shall file a petition with a Subversive Activities Control Board to order the organization to register. The act then provides for hearings before the Board to determine whether the organization should have registered.

The law established heavy penalties for failure to register - up to \$ 10,000 for each offense in the case of an organization, and up to \$ 10,000 and five years imprisonment for each offense in the case of an individual. Incidentally, each day of failure to register is considered a separate offense. In my opinion as a layman, that provision is the one that puts the teeth in the new law.

As far as industrial employment is concerned, no member of an organization registered under the law may seek, accept or hold employment in any defense facility designated by the Secretary of Defense. The penalties for violation of this section are similar to those concerning failure to register. While the law provides that no officer or employee of a defense facility may advise, counsel, or urge any person known to be a member of such organizations to violate this section, there is as far as we can see no requirement, stated as such, that employers shall remove such employees from the payroll. However, it would, I believe, be the duty and obligation of members of industry as good citizens to notify the proper authorities when they note such federal offense on the part of one of their employees.

As I see it, for the time being at least, and pending action on the part of these organizations to register and subsequent action on the part of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, there is nothing that industry can do but await developments. You may be sure, however, that we await these developments with keen interest. If aggressively administered, this law will enable vital industry to have removed from its

midst those subversives which to date we have been powerless to exclude from our plants.

Antidotes to complacency.

And this brings us to our last topic-antidotes to complacency, or the difficult job of maintaining security-mindedness.

Security in itself is at best a highly unspectacular and sometimes boring set of rules and procedures. But the overtones of these routine security measures are intensely dramatic and can be used to stimulate interest and awareness. We have developed some techniques and ideas that may be of interest.

One of the most useful of these tools is a slidefilm entitled "Security- It's Up to You". This film has been used with great success among all our people who work on classified projects. It is available in two versions, one for office workers and one for factory workers. We've had the best results with the film when the top manager of the unit addresses the group on the security problem, followed by either an armed services or FBI representative to lend emphasis to the manager's word. The FBI men who have talked to our groups have been particularly outstanding in what they say and how they say it.

After the showing of the film and a question-and-answer period, the members of the group are given a brief but effective leaflet called, "Are You Security-Minded?". Opening the leaflet, we find a self-rating quiz on six important security principles. And the back page points out that a single negative answer disqualifies you as being security perfect, since, as it says, "there are no half-measures with security".

After this initial contact with the realities of security, various promotional means are used to maintain a high level of interest. As in World War II, we find that posters do a good job from the standpoint of keeping the need for security continuously in the minds of all our employees. These posters are changed frequently to lend a dynamic element to their messages. And the use of two evil-looking, sneering characters called Sneak and Peek helps give this attention-giving device a continuity.

Just recently we undertook one of our most spectacular and effective programs. We asked each supervisor to call together his own group of employees in a conference room, to explain to them the great urgency for security, and to ask them to serve on an over-all employee vigilance committee. An article appeared in our Schenectady Works News headed, "Works Manager Appeals to Employees to Act as Voluntary Vigilance Committee". The lead paragraph says, "Lewis J. Male, Schenectady Works Manager, today issued an appeal to every employee to serve voluntarily on a Company-wide vigilance committee". The article then goes on to stress the fundamentals of security and to ask that each employee be watchful and report immediately to his supervisor questionable actions or suspicious individuals.

Other newsworthy stories about security are always cropping up as this one did recently at our Schenectady Plant: The antics of the alien raccoon who was running around the plant without a badge drew attention to security with a neat and light touch. This incident got quite a play in the local press and the Company's provisions for security were brought to community notice in a thoroughly palatable manner.

Another effective means of assuring attention to security is through the surprise visits of responsible Company security specialists to restricted areas. These visits keep our people on their security toes and help in the realization of our security objectives.

Finally, we have used other internal publications to educate our people. For example, we have printed a four-page leaflet (or its two-page spread counterpart in our Works newspapers) which presents an interesting story of security and what it means. This message was seen and read by a vast number of our employees.

For our management, we have used our Employee Relations News Letter. For example, we put out a special supplement on "How Communists Operate", a reprint from the U.S. News and World Report. All our members of management, approximately 15,000 in number, received this supplement and profited thereby.

Human nature being what it is, we find that our continuous training and constant supervision in security considerations fails to impress sufficiently a few well-meaning but forgetful or careless employees. As a result, we have had to take some stern disciplinary steps. The nature of the discipline varies with the nature and gravity of the offense, but no violation of security is overlooked. As evidence of how important we consider this discipline, our vice president recently had to write a sharp letter of reprimand to one of our top supervisors.

And now, what does all this add up to? Frankly, it adds up to action on the part of all of us. If we are among those charged with the responsibility for security, we must work tirelessly to obtain the most flawless security humanly possible. We must organize our task well and the security officer in charge of the security program must report to top levels in management. We must see that our plants and places of business are secure both within and without. We must work toward clarification of and consistency in security regulations. We must train our people thoroughly and promote security imaginatively. But, first, and most important of all, we must train ourselves so that we know security to the last period of the last sentence.

Question: Is your personnel department responsible for providing security and loyalty protection, or is there a separate operating organization set up for security activity?

Mr. Merrihue: We discussed that very thoroughly when we were setting up the security program, and we decided that in an

operation as large as ours, where we had so many defense projects, it would be better to design a distinctly separate set-up and then have it work very closely with Personnel.

Question: Has GE considered the propriety of canceling all visits by the public to its plants?

Mr. J.W. Logan: (Apparatus Department Security Officer, General Electric Company): Yes, we have - as a matter of fact - very recently. GE has a widely publicized visitors' program, popular particularly at the Schenectady Works, where the ordinary tourist is taken on a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ - or 3-hour visit of the plant. I personally went through that visit just two weeks ago to discover whether we should make recommendations to limit or stop those tours. In view of the ease with which they can be supervised, however, we feel they are still a good public relations activity and need not be discontinued at the present time.

Of course we intend keeping an eye on this part of the program, as the time may come when tours should be discontinued.

Question: Do you have a special form for all visitors to fill in?

Mr. Logan: Yes, and that is one of the problems of continuing these tours for casual visitors. One of the questions asked on the form is, "Are you a citizen of the United States?". Actually, the answer doesn't mean much. If you are not a citizen and want to get information from your tour that a non-citizen shouldn't have, you could say you were a citizen. We have no way of verifying your status. We would have to stop the tours if this became a real problem because we cannot subject our guests to an inquisition into their status.

Mr. Merrihue: The tours are so carefully supervised, however, that we anticipate no problem on this score. In fact, certain vendors might be said to present more a problem.

Question: What are some of the stigmata of a known subversive? Is the Hoover listing a pretty good index?

Mr. Merrihue: We are very seldom told why a man is not cleared - in fact, practically never.

Question: Why haven't you asked the FBI for a list of known Communists in your company?

Mr. Logan: The answer to that is quite simple. The FBI is not empowered to work with an industrial organization unless a case of sabotage is involved, or something of that sort. They are not authorized by law or by regulations within their own organization to furnish us with a list of Communists.

We have tried to secure such information, but I might point out that even if we had it, we have had up until now no way of removing known Communists from the plant on these grounds.

Question: Why can't you deal with subversives under past and current laws?

Mr. Logan: Prior to the recent enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950, there were no laws which govern the present situation except the Espionage Act. And under the terms of that law you must prove that the employee in question has violated the espionage law. But a subversive who behaves himself and does not have any specific act of subversion on his record cannot be dismissed under present law.

The security regulations of the armed services provide that if clearance is denied any employee, he cannot work on classified work.

That is as far as it goes. And it has been our problem that, where such men are not on classified work, they are still within the plant.

Chairman Bergen: Is it not true, Mr Logan, that a number of persons who are denied clearance by government are so barred, not because they are subversives but because they may like John Barleycorn too much, or their moral standards may be less desirable than those considered suitable for employees charged with important war work? /they may have a loose tongue,

Mr. Logan: That is correct. As a matter of fact, two very vexing and troublesome cases at the moment involve a question not of subversion but of morals.

Question: Have you considered fingerprinting the new employee at the time he is processed?

Mr. Logan: We do not fingerprint our employees.

Chairman Bergen: Why not?

Mr. Logan: It has been a policy of the General Electric Company not to interfere or inquire into the personal affairs of our employees so long as they do not interfere with performance of the job. As a matter of policy, therefore, we do not make an exhaustive background investigation, and fingerprinting is a part of such an investigation. Of course, under other circumstances, we may come to that.

Chairman Bergen: Didn't you do that in World War II?

Mr. Merrihue: Yes, in all our plants which were engaged in defense work. A routine was established whereby all employees in such plants were fingerprinted, and the prints were forwarded to the Department of Justice for review.

Mr. Logan: We now fingerprint any employee who is to work on Atomic Energy Commission projects, because that is required in the government's clearance procedure. But AEC procedure is not GE procedure, and I think properly so because it is a very specialized activity closely supervised by the FBI and the AEC, so that it pretty well takes care of itself.

Question: Can you give us more information on the actual clearance procedure?

Mr. Logan: Where we undertake classified work in any of our business operations, each employee who is to be involved in it at any point, or who is to have access to classified material, is asked to fill out what we call a personnel security questionnaire. This is merely a background history - where he has worked, where he has lived, and all that sort of thing. Then the Company places a request with the armed service for which the classified project is being undertaken for a clearance on this employee for "Confidential" or "Secret" or whatever the project classification may be.

On a project classified "Confidential-Navy", clearance takes two or three weeks. In the case of a "Secret" classification, it takes nine months to a year before clearance comes through. In the meantime, we cannot use the employee on such work.

Question: Has the union cooperated in security measures?

Mr. Merrihue: We have 45 unions at General Electric, but practically all of the measures I have described have been taken unilaterally by the Company up to now. So far, ^{however} you might say that we have ^{had} little union resistance, although any arbitrary rulings on the part of the government might be resisted - for example, removing a man whose work is satisfactory because of

lack of final clearance. We do face that problem. Actually, it is very difficult to predict the actions of the unions because under present laws we have not been able to remove a known subversive from the plant. We simply shift them from classified to non-classified work. And even that is looked upon with great suspicion by the union in many cases.

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