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Opmerkingen :

Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

GEHEIM

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Poland/USSR/Germany

VIEWS OF POLISH OFFICIALS ON THE BERLIN CRISIS

Ranking Polish officials hold the following views on the Berlin crisis:

a) They do not believe there will be a war over Berlin but hesitate to comment as to which side will or must back down; they do, however, describe KHRUSHCHEV's position.

b) There is no doubt KHRUSHCHEV will sign a peace treaty with East Germany and will turn over to the East Germans control of the access routes to West Berlin. KHRUSHCHEV wants to force the West to sit down and negotiate with the East Germans since his primary aim in the Berlin situation is to obtain de facto if not de jure recognition by the West of the East German Government. When the treaty is signed with East Germany the Soviets will withdraw; this will leave only the East Germans with whom the West can deal. The East Germans, however, will make no difficulties for the West as far as access to West Berlin is concerned.¹⁾ Simultaneously, KHRUSHCHEV will declare an end to the occupation of Germany although Soviet troops will remain in East Germany "at the invitation of the East German Government".

c) KHRUSHCHEV's second major purpose in heating up the Berlin situation is to attempt to forestall in some fashion the arming of West Germany with atomic weapons. The Soviet Union is very fearful of a politically and militarily strong West Germany and will use all devices at her command to prevent this development.²⁾

d) KHRUSHCHEV's third goal in the Berlin situation is to obtain Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as constituting Poland's western boundary. It is be-

lieved in the Soviet camp that many politicians in ADENAUER's own party are resigned to this fact and would accept a fait accompli which would permit them to disclaim political responsibility.

- Comments: 1) The implication here is that the Soviets will not allow the East Germans to provoke the West into using force to secure their access to West Berlin.
- 2) It is implied that this is one of the concessions KHRUSHCHEV hopes to obtain at the Berlin bargaining table.
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