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VERTROUWELIJK

Vooruitlopend op een rapport m.b.t. het in Amsterdam gehouden anti-NAVO-congres, dat ik U zeer binnenkort zal doen toekomen, heb ik de eer Uwe Excellentie hierbij een afschrift te zenden van het geruchtmakende artikel over NAVO-geheimen in het Deense blad Vietnam-solidariteit no. 7, zoals dat in Engelse vertaling op het anti-NAVO-congres beschikbaar is geweest.

Een exemplaar van dit rapport zond ik rechtstreeks aan de Ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken, van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Justitie en van Defensie.

HET HOOFD VAN DE DIENST

A. Kuipers

Drs. A. Kuipers.

VERTROUWELIJK

ON DENMARK'S SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE USA AND NATO

The starting point is Denmark's geographic position with the seaward approach and exit to the East sea. And Denmark is only a small link in an enormous war machine. This means that we (in the first instance, our military) as a link in this machine have few and relatively limited assignments. The division of labor is conducted by the USA through NATO. Our defence, as it is called, is mainly built up in order to safeguard the defensive assignments within this division of labor:

- we should block the seaward exit ("we = our defence).
- we should prevent overflights.
- we should prevent landings.

But first, this does not mean that NATO as such is defensive, and neither does it mean that our territory cannot serve other than defensive purposes. It is perfectly situated as a point of departure for offensive actions in the Eastern Sea. In the good old days of the cold war, NATOists spoke precisely about an extended arm into the Eastern Sea. These operations in the Eastern Sea do not need to have Danish participation because they originate from Danish Territory. Military installations which should serve "defence" other than Danish, are found around in the country. (Our naval ports and large airports, NATO-depots and commando bunkers, etc). And in a crisis situation, the right to self-determination slips out of Danish hands, and we are ordered - and forced by circumstances - to carry out our part of the work: To hold the back country. And our territory shall be used as a point of departure for operations, over which we have no influence.

this can be added that we also in other aspects are a sub-servient link in the war machine. Through the unitary command, BALTAP, we are linked to West Germany. But only a minimal amount of the German air- and land forces are attributed to this command, while a considerable part of the West German navy is.

This navy is not only built up defensively. Many and large landing crafts are calculated to sail deeply into the Eastern Sea in order to land troops on its south coast.

These operations are prepared through manouvers in the vicinity of the Eastern Sea. For instance, it was West German landing crafts which landed "Orange" troops during Green Express. Furthermore, Bonn currently has a large naval rearmament program. In this, comparatively large crafts are included, armed with rockets and with a very large

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conventional fire power. Three missile-carrying destroyers (Lütjens, Mölders and Rommel) are as good as completed. Four "fregats 70" are under construction. The above-mentioned are not suitable for defensive missions in the western Eastern Sea. But also, there are other ways than those outlined above, in which Denmark has importance for the USA - NATO.

Intelligence I

Because of our position, we also represent a very important link in that chain which collects all types of intelligence for the USA-NATO. (Only a small part of the intelligence information which is collected by the USA really originates from espionage). The Danish coast and inland is studded with electronic installations which are supervising the air- and ship traffic in and around Denmark. Further, the observations are sent through NATO channels to larger centers outside Denmark, and - depending upon the type - further to the top leadership of the USA. Suspicious "objects" release eventually a scrambling, which means the Danish fighters take off, identify "objects" with the aid of their tactical reconnaissance material and dismiss eventual violations of Danish air sovereignty. In the same way, the fleet sends ships out. These follow and observe eventually the movements of the potential enemy (like a "hound" as it is called in the navy). The observations are sent further to NATO and the USA.

A Side Remark

A part of this information comes back to the Danish public in the form of NATO propaganda: There has now been seen so and so many Russian "Trawlers", and therefore, we must have that and that equipment. Or: 400 Soviet war ships, including 60 submarines, 7500 Soviet Merchant ships and 7900 Soviet fishing boats during 1958 sailed through Danish waters (the van der Stoel report). And this information is always accompanied by a demand for increased rearmament. In this case, by designating additional English and American military personnel to the strategic reserve for Denmark, and as a consequence of this, they must, amongst other things, take part in yet more manouvers.

Intelligence II

The above mentioned Danish activities are of a tactical nature (the achievement of knowledge of the potential enemy's immediate target and

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and increased knowledge of his units). Tactical intelligence is of course a part of a strategic intelligence, but only a part of it. The tactical explanation ("intelligence") collects intelligence which should build up a complete picture of "Orange's" resources (on a broad level) and the entire battle power. On the basis of this information, the generals then arrange targets for eventual attacks. This collection of intelligence occurs in many ways. For good reasons, we cannot express ourselves concerning the Danish participation in agent and espionage operations. Though we remind ourselves of the policeman who was recently ostracised because he was not willing to use his camera industriously while on vacation in eastern Europe. Back to the more normal explanation. As far as it is known, the Danish defence does not command over very much material for strategic reconnaissance.

But because the Danish military does not command over strategic reconnaissance material, the Danish territory can well serve as a point of departure for strategic explanation. We have knowledge of one such example. And it will of course be denied from official sources, because the threshold between the offensive and defensive behavior is about to be transgressed with participation in strategic reconnaissance. And a defensive policy is actually changing the established policy of the Danish government! But, before our example, we must concern ourselves a little with

American Air Espionage

The Americans have, for many years, conducted espionage from airplanes, and to an increasing degree from satellites. It is this which the military calls "strategic air reconnaissance". The most notorious example is probably the downing of the U-2 aircraft over Soviet territory. The plane started from Peshawar, Pakistan, and should have flown across the Soviet Union to Bodø, Norway. The U-2 carried complicated equipment which gathered pictures and sound signals. These over flights began in the USA seriously in 1955 during the regime of Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers. They were discontinued over the Soviet Union in 1960 after the U-2 affair. But they were continued over other socialist countries. Today, they are replaced to a large extent by satellite supervision which the Soviet Union also makes use of.

But the USA - that is to say, the CIA and NSA through the strategic command of the Air Force - has just, since the end of the second world war, also committed other forms of air espionage. Among others, the

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so-called "Ferret-missions": American long distance planes (for example Boeing and Constallation) have patrolled the sea and land borders to the socialist countries. The flights are today known from the far east where the North Koreans recently shot one down. It is the task of these spy planes to disclose the enemy's radar system, and in its entirety present an "electronic map" over the countries in question. It happens among other things by plotting the impulses wich "the enemy's" radar warning sends out. But, as not all radar stations are functioning in peace time (especially not radar against low-flying fighters) the American spy planes pretended to attack often violated, by doing this, the air territory of the socialist countries. Thereby, the Americans were able to initiate the chain of warnings wich normally were not in function, and in this way were able to chart them.

Denmark and the American Spy Flights

Denmark has been involved in these flights. In the beginning of the 60's a Super Costallation landed now and then at Kastrup airport. It went by the NATO code name "Polar Bear". It was its mission to carry out the "Ferret missions" in the vicinity of the Eastern Sea - it flew along with - and over - the borders of the socialistic Eastern Sea countries from West Germany to the Finnish Bay and back again. And, it thus landed about once a week in Kastrup, where it stayed overnight. We know, at the present time, no other examples that the Southern Danish vicinity has served as a link in this form of strategic espionage. But neither do we know if, for example, the West German spy ship, "Oste" enters Danish harbors on its missions.

A Side Remark II

We - and supposedly also our readers - know quite well that the socialist countries have similar vessels, etc. But, it is the supporters of NATO wich give a lopsided picture of the military activity in the vicinity of the Eastern Sea. It is they, who discuss the activity of these countries, and present the activity of NATO as exclusively dictated by this. And in addition use the opportunity to demand yet more gadgets, and the psychological war against the population has received yet another tooth.

The Radio War


Denmark's participation in the above mentioned NATO explanation (aside from the secret activities of the police and defence) also consists of

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
a tactical explanation, and then of adding territory to other activities. But, on one point we are significantly more involved than we have mentioned above. It is the involvement with the so-called "radio war". Through tapping and bearings an "electronic map" of the "enemy" is drawn up. The radio and radar frequencies are determined by the distinguishing features of the individual sender and are noted (for later identification); the senders position and type is established, and the warning system plotted, codes are broken, etc. The results are partially increased information, partially opportunity for "jamming" the communication in a crisis situation. From the western side "the radio war" is led by the Americans - just as they lead all other intelligence activities (there should exist a NATO resolution on this, from December, 1956). The intelligence system appears as a sketch in this drawing:

USA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE



(From Julius Mader: Who is Who in the CIA)

The "radio war" is safeguarded, especially by the National Security Agency, whose headquarters are situated at Fort George Meade, Maryland, USA. Its activities will appear by a description of its individual departments. The placing of the NSA in the collective intelligence system appears in the following drawing:

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In the Production Department (PROD) one is occupied with the tapped intelligence, and communications cipher analysis. ADVA occupies itself with breaking the special diplomatic codes of the Soviet Union. In GENS the common codes of the Soviet Union are broken. In ACOM, the codes of the Asian socialist countries. In ALLO, it concerns the code systems of all of the states. MPRO is a data department. In the Research and Development Department (R/D), the cipher analytical research is undertaken. REMP, and RADE develop the radio and bearing equipment, and SRED develops the coding machinery. The security department (CONSEC) develops USA's own coding systems (the slightly dated ones are transferred to the allies, who sell them further to the underdeveloped countries, where they are practically unuseable. The personnel department (SEC) concerns itself with, among other things, NSA's own security. The production department has 2000 moveable and stationary listening stations.

Denmark and the Radio War

Both "Polar Bear" and "Oste" deliver intelligence information to the NSA. But, the Danish defence also does. Under the Defence's Intelligence Service a "sh-sh" department, called the Central Radio of Defence, is responsible to it. It has a line of listening and bearing stations around in Denmark. And some of the tapping, among other things, goes to the Americans, to Port George Meade. A geographical placement

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means that we can intercept signals which the Americans would otherwise have radar difficulties in obtaining. It means once again that our relevance to the Americans is larger, FCR's activity is still a connection to NATO and the Americans. Besides, one speculates over the large secrecy the entire project is surrounded with, because the main station Aflandshage, on south Amager, lies and is flown over daily scheduled by Soviet flights. And would it not be possible, once in a while, that there would be somebody who might possibly be able to read what happens on the antennae and the radar screens? The secretiveness is due mainly rather to the psychological warfare the military conducts both against the Danish population. But regarding this, more another time.

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