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ONDERWERP : Communisme in Italië, Duitsland (Russische zone), Duitsland, Triëst, Joegoslavië en het Verre Oosten.

U gelieve hierbij aan te treffen de copieën van 6 rapporten betreffende het communisme in Italië, Duitsland (Russische zone), Duitsland, Triëst, Joegoslavië en het Verre Oosten, die Sardine ons ter informatie en om te behouden deed toekomen.

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The following report comes from an established source with good contacts in military and official circles in Croatia.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav Military Defence plans and some of their Political and Economic Consequences

INTRODUCTION

1. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Yugoslav General Staff was faced with the problem of preparing a strategic plan for the defence of Yugoslavia against an armed invasion from the East, in particular from Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria.

2. This plan had to take into consideration four main factors; morale, manpower, material and terrain. This report proposes to describe how these factors have been treated in the development of the strategic pattern of the Yugoslav military defence plans over the last two years.

MORALE

3. With regard to the problem of how to create and maintain the discipline and spirit necessary for the successful execution of the plan, the CCCPJ and Yugoslav General Staff made the following decisions.

4. Convince the members of the CPJ of the justice of the CCCPJ case against the Cominform and the USSR. This necessitated proof by the CCCPJ that it, and not Stalin and the Cominform bureau, was following the path of true socialism. This the CC succeeded in doing through:-

(a) aggressive propoganda, in which all the reactionary, imperialist, and anti-Marxist features of USSR and Cominform policy were clearly revealed and contrasted with the progressive and democratic policy of the Yugoslav government;

(b) marxist legislation - such as, for example, the laws providing for the creation of Workers' Councils in the factories and the development of democratic centralism in the administration of the country - which aimed, perhaps a little too theoretically, at withering away the powers of the state, and which contrasted forcibly with the anti-marxist laws in the USSR which aimed at reinforcing the centralised burocratic powers of the state.

5. Convince the members of the CPJ that economic relations with the capitalist West were necessary, and that they did not, in any way, compromise the political and economic integrity of the Yugoslav socialist state. This the CC succeeded in doing by:-

(a) refusing to admit Western interference in the socialist control of Yugoslavia's economy, or in the administration of Western loans and the distribution of Western economic aid;

(b) refusing to enter into any political or military agreements with the West.

6. Convince the masses that it lay in their interests to support the CCCPJ against the Cominform and the USSR. This the CC succeeded in doing by:-

(a) persuading the masses that their choice lay between Russian and Yugoslav communist rule, that the latter was preferable, and that the West was not prepared to supply a democratic or liberal alternative;

(b) appealing to nationalist and patriotic sentiments against Russian imperialism and ruthlessness.

7. Destroy or neutralise all Cominformist sympathisers. How successful the CC has been in doing this may be judged by the following:-

(a) no Cominformists have succeeded in removing the CC from power;

(b) the number of persons arrested during the last 5 months as Cominformists has been negligible, (in Croatia 4);

(c) Tito, in his speech to party members of the Guards Division in Belgrade on 17th February 1951, felt so confident that the Cominformist danger in the country had passed that he ordered the party to be more "democratic", and urged party members not to hesitate to criticise the government provided they did not allow their views to influence them to such an extent that they refused to execute the decisions of the majority. The significance of Tito's speech lies in the fact that until recently party members were terrified of criticising the government. Now that the CC has satisfied itself that the internal Cominformist danger has passed, it can afford to be more liberal, and suffer criticism.

8. By and large, the CCCPJ may be said to have succeeded in creating the psychological conditions vitally needed for the successful development and execution of the defence programme. It is true that some orthodox marxist members of the CPJ still grumbled about Yugoslavia's trade and financial relations with the West, the modifications made in the 5 Year Plan, the vast sums allocated to the armament industries, the shortage of raw materials for industries unconnected with the defence programme. It is true that the masses still complained bitterly of the rise in the cost of living, and the shortage of food and consumer goods. But to all these critics, the CCCPJ had one very simple, ready and effective answer - the danger from the East. As the international political situation deteriorated and the rhythm of the defence programme increased, the cry of danger from the East grew shriller until, in December 1950, it reached its climax at the extraordinary meeting of the National Assembly during the debate on the military budget and the need to extend the 5 Year Plan by one year. A few weeks later, Tito realised that the price he had paid for this magic answer was to throw the whole country into a state of war hysteria, and so, on 17th February, he told a meeting of party members of the Guards Division that there was no immediate danger of war and that he did not consider it necessary to accept Western military aid and equipment.

MANPOWER

9. With regard to the problem of how best to use Yugoslavia's man power, the CCCPJ and the Yugoslav General Staff have formulated and implemented the following policy:-

(a) Maintenance of the maximum number of men under arms consistent with the manpower requirements of industry and agriculture.

(b) Employment of the Yugoslav army in the most efficient manner possible.

(c) Mobilisation of the civilian population.

10. All males up to the age of 27 are liable for military service. Recruits are called up every six months. Conscripts serve from 1 to 3 years. Those with higher school certificates serve 1 year with infantry units, those without higher school certificates serve 2 years

with infantry units, those drafted to armoured and other specialist units serve 3 years. University students may defer service until they are 31 years of age. (There are, at present, about 55,000 university students in Yugoslavia). High school students liable for conscription may also defer service: about 20,000 students fall under this category. Partisans with over 12 months war service are exonerated from military service. Persons who served for over 18 months with foreign or enemy armed forces during the war are only liable for 6 months military service.

11. So far the 1924-32 classes have been called up. Most definitely no secret mobilisation has taken place, although in the autumn of 1950 conscripts due for release were retained for an extra 2 months. No extensions of service have been ordered since then.

12. Although no mobilisation, secret or otherwise, has yet been ordered, the Yugoslav General Staff is proceeding swiftly with the task of perfecting its mobilisation plans. Most regular and reserve officers have already received sealed orders concerning what they should do when mobilisation is announced. At present the administrative organs of the state are carrying out a very secret census of all factories not engaged on vital defence work and where 30% or more of the men employed are fit for military service. The object of this census is to ensure that these men will be called up in the event of mobilisation and substituted by female labour. If substitution is impossible then the factories will be closed down.

13. Thanks to Red Army advisers, the influence of Red Army strategy, tactics and discipline was dominant in the Yugoslav army until 1948. In June of that year, the army suddenly found itself cut off from its main sources of military equipment and supply, and obliged to reverse its strategic plans and interests. Faced with a very serious shortage of heavy equipment and the prospect of fighting alone against preponderant enemy forces, the Yugoslav General Staff gradually modified the Russian inspired tactical and disciplinary training programmes of the army. How far modification has gone may be judged by Ivan Gosnjak's (deputy commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav army) address to the Yugoslav General staff and senior party functionaries at the Ministry of National Defence on 19th February 1951. He laid down the following directives:-

(a) all officers must pay much more attention to the strategy and tactics of partisan warfare and avoid accepting any rigid principles of strategy and tactics.

(b) Training in the army must be directed towards developing the personal initiative of every officer and man, so that, in the event of regular formations and units being broken up by the enemy, every officer and man can carry on the fight as a partisan.

(c) Closer and more friendly relations must be established between junior officers and soldiers. Relations should not be too intimate nor too distant. Every junior officer must take a much closer interest in the welfare of every single soldier under his command, and subordinate his personal interests to those of his men. Bearing in mind that discipline in partisan units, unlike that in the regular army, is not based on military law, it is only by gaining the genuine respect and affection of his men that the junior officer can retain the leadership and loyalty of his men when the fortunes of war oblige him to become a partisan.

14. Mobilisation of the civil population will be considered under three heads; preliminary military training, military training outside the army, and civil defence.

15. Preliminary military training (Predvojnicksa Obuka)

Already in 1948, preliminary military training was obligatory for all male and female university students and students of the 5th and higher forms of gymnasiums. Severe penalties are imposed on students who fail to present themselves. Instructors on the courses are invariably regular army officers from the ranks of Captain to Colonel. The courses cover theoretical and practical military training. Theoretical training includes garrison duties, organisation of the army, ballistics, description of weapons including the rifle, M/G, sub M/G, gun, mortar, etc., recognition of army ranks and badges, the rights and duties of officers and O.R.s and martial law. Practical training includes rifle training, issue of orders, route marches and parade drill.

16. Military training outside the army (VVO Vanarmijski Vojni Odgoj)

The fundamental object of VVO is to train the whole civil population, young and old, weak and strong, male and female, to become efficient partisans in the event of war. When VVO began early in 1950, it was not taken very seriously. In October 1950, however, the CCCPJ ordered all mass organisations to give VVO priority over all other activities. Under the aegis of the ex-partisans association ("Savez Boraca"), the Narodna Fronta (National Front), Youth organisations, Vojna Tehnika, Streljackske družine (Rifle Clubs), Sports associations, etc., mobilised their members through their street or block cell committees, and the Trade Unions mobilised their members through their factory committees.

17. Mobilised members were then organised on partisan military lines into sections, platoons, companies, Battalions, brigades and divisions. Command of most of these units was given to reserve officers or members of the "Savez Boraca", though command of the higher formations was entrusted to regular army officers.

18. VVO training includes theoretical instruction on partisan warfare and tactics, political instruction on the necessity and glory of partisan warfare, partisan route marches (generally on Sundays), tactical exercises, partisan reconnaissance, partisan attacks on towns, villages, fortified localities, factories, lines of communication, bridges, military installations, dumps, etc., signals - (laying of field telephone lines, use of W/T etc.), first aid, fording of rivers, river patrols, construction and erection of pontoon bridges, temporary bridges, boats, etc., and the erection and destruction of road and railway blocks.

19. As indicated above, VVO is conducted on partisan lines and is not carried out in conjunction with the regular armed forces, although occasionally aircraft and tank units may take part in large scale exercises. Arms employed on VVO are generally dummy wood rifles or old rifles without ammunition. VVO manoeuvres and exercises began in December 1950, and are still going on. Sometimes they are on a big scale and involve 3 or 4 brigades, civil defence units (PAZ), airforce, tank and engineer units, and sometimes they are on a small scale involving companies and battalions.

20. The population as a whole is taking VVO seriously, and, in view of the fact that civilians are not punished in any way if they do not take part in the VVO, the number of civilians who do take part is surprisingly high. At recent VVO exercises in the Zagreb area which took place on a Sunday, the weather was very bad and very cold. And yet of the 200 persons who voluntarily, really voluntarily, took part, only 75 were young men and women, the rest belonged to the fiercely anti-communist petty bourgeois class, clerks, civil servants, artisans etc. They marched cheerfully under the most awful conditions in the countryside round Zagreb, and waited patiently for 3 hours for their

turn to shoot at the rifle range and all of them, at the end, marched proudly through the streets of Zagreb in their civilian suits, military forage caps, with their rifles slung across their shoulders.

21. Civil defence

Civil defence includes, among other organisations, Red Cross, Fire services, Salvage units and PAZ (Pretu avionsko zastita = anti-aircraft defence). With the exception of the Red Cross, all these organisations are directly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.

22. PAZ was founded in 1949 but only began to take shape in 1950. PAZ centres have now been organised in all cities, towns, large villages, and industrial and mining centres; they maintain a small permanent staff of civil defence instructors, engineers, chemists and police officers, all carefully selected by UDB-a.

23. PAZ centres are responsible for organising air raid defences in their respective areas, and for training a corps of PAZ personnel which, in an emergency, could be instantly called up for permanent duty. Most persons selected for duty with PAZ are unfit for military service, though some young students are also sometimes recruited.

24. PAZ training is modern and based, for the most part, on German experience in World War II. It does not, however, cover atomic warfare. Theoretical PAZ training includes high explosive and sulphur bombs, incendiary and napalm air raids, as well as bacteriological and chemical warfare. Practical training is carried out in conjunction with the air force and covers air raid exercises. Such exercises have, during the last 3 months, taken place throughout Yugoslavia, especially in the Hungarian and Roumanian border areas. For those selected to join PAZ, training courses are compulsory, and failure to attend is severely punished.

25. One of the main problems confronting PAZ is the acute shortage of air raid shelters. Most of the shelters built during the war were demolished in 1945 and 1946, and, because of a shortage of building materials and labour, no new shelters are being built.

MATERIAL

26. With regard to the problem of how best to equip and supply the Yugoslav armed forces, the CCCPJ and the Yugoslav General Staff have based their policy on:-

- (a) No requests for help from the West.
- (b) Development of indigenous armament industries.

27. Help from the West

The reasons are essentially political. For internal political reasons the Yugoslav government could not and cannot afford to compromise its socialist integrity by entering into military agreements with the West providing for the supply of war material, since that might disrupt the unity of the CPJ and drive many members into the Cominform camp. For external political reasons, the Yugoslav government could not and cannot afford to compromise its armed neutrality by accepting Western war material and thereby providing the USSR and the Cominform with an excuse to attack her.

28. Obviously enough if, in spite of this, the USSR clearly showed signs of mounting an attack against Yugoslavia then the government would modify its policy and ask for western military equipment. But, for the present, the government does not think the situation quite so dangerous. Proof of this lies in Tito's speech to CPJ members of the Guards Division in Belgrade on 17th February,

when he asserted that there was no immediate danger of war. Two days later, Ivan Gosnjsk repeated Tito's views at the CP Croatia conference in Zagreb.

29. Development of indigenous armament industries.

Suddenly cut off in 1948 from its main source of military equipment and anxious not to accept western equipment, the Yugoslav government had obviously to develop its own armament industry if it intended to remain in power and protect the country against Russian and satellite aggression. Since 1948, development of the armament industry has been given priority over all other industries, and to this end the whole 5 Year Plan has been modified and subordinated. Because the 5 Year Plan had not been modified sufficiently and because the capital equipment requirements of the armament industries had been raised so high and those of the other industries insufficiently lowered, the Yugoslav government found itself obliged:-

(a) to export more and more food and raw materials in order to buy more and more capital equipment for more and more non productive armament factories,

(b) to reduce imports of capital equipment for industries unconnected with the defence programme, and reduce production in these industries.

(c) to ask for western credits. This has resulted in a reduction in the standard of living of the masses, and widespread economic discontent.

30. One of the benefits of developing the indigenous armament industry is that the Yugoslav General Staff now has a chance of standardising equipment and munitions. This report does not propose to discuss the quantity, quality and types of equipment now being produced in Yugoslavia. Suffice it to say that the Yugoslav armed forces are well endowed with light infantry weapons, that replacement of the extremely heterogeneous collection of guns with which the army is equipped is proceeding slowly, that a new tank, the Tito tank, is being produced at the rate of one tank per day, and that progress with the construction of new fighter aircraft is painfully slow.

TERRAIN

31. With regard to the problem of how best to defend Yugoslav territory, the CCCPJ and Yugoslav General Staff decided not to attempt any serious defence of the eastern plains, and to concentrate the main defence effort of the regular armed forces in the mountainous areas of southern SERBIA, MACEDONIA, MONTENEGRO, and western Yugoslavia behind a line running roughly along the south bank of the river Sava.

32. The reasons for this policy are clear - the Yugoslav army, inferior in numbers and equipment, would be destroyed if it attempted to oppose a determined Russian and satellite advance in the eastern plains by presenting a continuous front and operating in mass. On the other hand, it would be able to fight almost indefinitely if it:-

(a) dispersed in small, independent, mobile formations in the mountainous areas west of the Sava and avoided presenting the enemy with a large, slow moving target;

(b) maintained contact with the West on the Adriatic. Hence the vital necessity of occupying Albania and controlling the eastern entry of the Adriatic;

(c) succeeded in defending the heavy industries and lines of communications of Bosnia.

33. An indication of how the Yugoslav General Staff has arrived at this decision and how its conceptions of strategic defence have changed since 1949 may be obtained by comparing the Yugoslav army manoeuvres of 1949 and 1950. In 1949, Yugoslav army manoeuvres were conducted on the basis of large formations operating in consort over a limited area - witness the manoeuvres that were held at Mladenovac and Arandjelovac, south of Belgrade. In 1950, the manoeuvres were conducted on the basis of much smaller formations operating independently over large and widely separated areas - mainly in Bosnia and land west of the river Sava, though also in northern Serbia.

34. In accordance with the requirements of the strategic defence plan described above, the Yugoslav government decided:-

(a) to transfer, where and as quickly as possible, as many heavy industries, vital defence plants, munition, food and equipment dumps as possible, from East to West;

(b) to concentrate construction of new heavy industries, defence plants, iron and steel plants etc., in western Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia.

(c) to develop railway communications in Bosnia - viz, the Samac-Sarajevo railway, the Brcko-Banovici railway, and the Banja-Luka-Doboj railway that is about to be built.

(d) to develop Adriatic port facilities - e.g. the construction of the new port of Ploce.

(e) that partisan forces should be used to harass, attack and destroy the enemy in enemy occupied territory, particularly his lines of communications, rear headquarters, supply and munition dumps and other logistic facilities.