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QUARTERLY SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE.

No. 10.

January - March, 1951.

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## SUMMARY

The Line (paragraphs 1 - 4). The Party Line was to mobilise all shades of public opinion in favour of a Five Power Peace Pact and against German rearmament and to exploit the fear of a falling standard of living for the organisation of industrial discontent.

Strength (paragraphs 5 - 13). The general trend of Party numerical strength was slightly downward and was most marked in the C.G.I.L. In France local tests of electoral strength shewed a state of comparative stability. The greatest successes in Western Germany were among the Ruhr miners. The CUCCHI MAGNANI defections in Italy did not produce a landslide.

International Organisation (paragraphs 14 - 31). In the sphere of International Organisation the chief events were the banishment of W.F.T.U., W.F.D.Y., W.I.D.F. and the World Peace Council from Paris. The first named is transferring its headquarters to Vienna. A European Workers' Committee and Secretariat for Liaison has been set up in Berlin with the object of devising means of preventing German rearmament.

National Organisation (paragraphs 32 - 54). Some results of the upheavals among Party officials responsible for organisation which were a feature of the closing months of 1950 can now be seen in the national organisations. The broad effect has been to increase the supervision of lower by higher party organs and put the Parties in a posture for a maximum effort to mobilise "the masses" for the peace campaign. At the same time greater care is to be taken of Party security. More information is now available to discredit reports of alleged Communist paramilitary formations in Italy.

Tactics (paragraphs 55 - 77). Tactics were governed largely by the attempt to mobilise a "united" public opinion, in conformity with the Party Line, to support signature campaigns in favour of peace and against German rearmament. Approaches were made and encouragement given to any shade of neutralist opinion, to enlarge the camp of neutralism and bring it eventually into the Communist camp. Potential unity of action in the industrial field was nourished wherever found but with few exceptions little progress was made towards a firmly rooted unity suitable for political exploitation.



I. GENERAL - THE PARTY LINE

1. The Cominform Journal.

1. STALIN's interview with a "Pravda" correspondent was published under banner headlines in N.8 (120) February, 23rd (English edition). It occupies a pivotal place among the Party directives of our period: from the Party point of view its significance lies in its reaffirmation of some parts of the existing "Line" and its suggestions for the future.

2. There was in the interview no specific mention of Germany or the campaign against the "remilitarisation" of Germany. One entire leading article had been devoted to this subject (No.2 (114) of January 12th) and it had reappeared in various guises in succeeding issues up to 16th February. In its place the STALIN interview brought to the fore "the proposal of the Soviet Union in the United Organisation for the immediate conclusion of a Peace Pact between the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States of America, China and France". This theme was taken up immediately by the first session of the World Peace Council (21st-26th February 1951) and by the leading article in the Journal for 2nd. March (No.9. 121). "The main, paramount task, set by the World Peace Council, is the organising of a mass movement for the conclusion of a Pact of Peace between the five Great Powers"..... "The matter is one of organising an international referendum on the widest scale in the history of mankind, the concrete aim of which is to secure that those Powers, bearing the main responsibility for preserving peace, sign a Pact of Peace open to all countries."

3. It is not possible to detect in subsequent issues of the Journal any Party directive arising from the most sinister item in the STALIN interview, that referring to U.N.O STALIN said: "The United Nations Organisation created as the bulwark for preserving peace, is being turned into an instrument of war, into a means for unleashing a new world war." Although the criticism was repeated by the World Peace Council and in the Journal for 2nd. March no specific instructions for Party action were given.

4. There remains the question of the campaign against the remilitarisation of Germany, avoided in the STALIN interview. While the responsibility for the "referendum" for a Pact of Peace has been committed to the World Peace Council on a world wide scale the conduct of the German campaign is to be in the hands



of a special "apparatus" drawn from Trade Unions, is European in scope, and envisages various forms of "direct action". The Journal No.13 (125) of 30th March 1951 contains a front page report on the "European Workers' Conference against remilitarisation of Germany" held in Berlin on March 23rd-25th. There was but one item on the agenda "Unity of action of the working people and Trade Unions of European countries against remilitarisation of Germany". Delegates are reported to have spoken of "the heroic struggle waged by the workers against production and transportation of armaments." The appeal issued by the conference called upon the working people of Europe to "make use of all forms of struggle suitable under present conditions." It was at this conference that another dictum from the STALIN interview made an appropriate appearance: "Peace will be preserved and consolidated if the peoples will take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands and defend it to the end." In the neighbouring leading article of the same issue, entitled "Struggle of Working People in Capitalist Countries against War Preparations, Militarisation of Economy and Impoverishment", there is a sentence in heavy black type: "A powerful strike wave is sweeping all the capitalist countries; mightily militant actions and demonstrations of the working people are taking place."

(Note:- LINETSKY, speaking on Moscow Home Service 11th April 1951, said:

"Mass strikes have become a daily event in the U.S.A. as well as in Western European countries. In the rear of the warmongers a large social conflict is taking place ..... The characteristic of the growing class conflict in capitalist countries is the drawing into the struggle against the lowering of the standard of living of great masses of the population, and that in the progress of this struggle the fighting unity of the working class is constantly growing and becoming stronger. Never in the history of the international working class movement has the unity of the working class had such decisive significance as at present.").

## II. STRENGTH.

### 1. France.

5. A recruiting drive to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the P.C.F. is claimed by the Party to have brought in 20,000 new members. (Nothing is said about those who have failed to renew their membership.)



6. Elections of various kinds (particularly in the municipalities) have produced results from which it appears that the P.C.F., is on the whole, maintaining its electoral strength. In some municipalities, notably at Poissy and Ivry, important gains were registered. In others, notably Macon and Douarnenez there were losses. Fernand DUPUY, analysing the results of recent weeks in "France Nouvelle" of 31st March concluded that they shewed "une tendance tres nette a la polarisation sur l'extreme reaction: les partis de ladite troisieme force perdent des voix aux benefice du R.P.F."

7. According to the Bulletin d'Information de l'Union des Syndicats C.G.T. de la Region parisienne of 30th January the circulation of the Communist and affiliated press was as follows:-

Humanite	225,286
Liberation	130,769
Ce Soir	178,877
La Vie Ouvriere	94,135
? → Le Peuple	2,272
Syndical journals	c 300,000

### 2. Western Germany

8. Party membership in Hamburg at the end of 1950 was reported to be 11,309 compared with 12,533 in July 1950. In an election held at KASSEL in March 1951 to fill a vacancy in the Federal German Parliament, the K.P.D. polled less than 5% of the total votes cast, a drop of about 50% since the 1949 election.

9. The K.P.D. appears to have been more successful in retaining support amongst the Ruhr miners. Complete statistics are not available but it is estimated that the K.P.D. polled about 25% of the votes cast in the elections to Miners Works Councils held in October 1950, compared with 27.14% in 1949. K.P.D. delegates to the W.German Miners' T.U. Congress held in November 1950 numbered 128 out of a total of 539 (23.74%).

### 3. Italy

10. A recent estimate by an official source puts the following of CUCCHI and MAGNANI at about 2,000. This cannot of course be taken as necessarily equivalent to the total of defections from the P.C.I. on this issue, since



others may have defected without actually joining the rebels. Nevertheless this estimate discounts some current reports of a fundamental split in P.C.I. membership.

11. The most serious loss in strength appears to be occurring in the C.G.I.L. This communist controlled trade union organisation has been declining for some time past but an official source reports that  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million C.G.I.L. cards have not been renewed this year and the total membership is now 3 million.

12. The low state of P.C.I. morale is also causing the Party directorate a good deal of anxiety. There is a school of opinion within the Party leadership which attributes the reigning apathy to the continued treatment of the P.C.I. as a mass party which yet has no real chance of gaining power.

#### 4. The Netherlands.

13. The strength of the C.P.N. remains at about 35,000.

### III. ORGANISATION

#### 1. International.

14. Considerable changes are taking place in this field, involving among other things a distinct enhancement of the importance of Berlin as an international centre. The proscription of the headquarters of the W.F.T.U., W.F.D.Y., W.I.D.F. and World Peace Council in Paris necessarily involves those organisations in a search for suitable premises elsewhere. They will presumably not wish to bury themselves deeply within the Soviet Orbit and thus diminish their contacts with the free world. Berlin and, to a lesser degree, Vienna offer the advantages of safety and access. These are considerations which apply with especial force to W.F.T.U. which, despite its Far Eastern and Latin American Liaison Bureaux, has up to the present had a strong bias towards European affairs.

#### (a) The Removal of W.F.T.U. Headquarters from Paris.

15. On 26th January, the World Federation of Trade Unions, together with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Womens' International Democratic Federation, were declared illegal in France. All three organisations had their headquarters in Paris and under the terms of the declaration they were given one month to wind up their affairs and liquidate their property.



The usual stream of protest telegrams was sent to the French Government and to the United Nations by all Trade Union Federations affiliated to W.F.T.U.

16. The Executive Bureau had arranged a meeting in April, but as a result of their expulsion from France, they cancelled this and called an emergency meeting in WARSAW on 19th-20th February. The main purpose of this meeting was to arrange the transfer of the Headquarters to a new location. Little is known of the proceedings, except that a Manifesto was issued to the workers of the world to defend the W.F.T.U. against "the latest attack by the imperialist warmongers". The final communique issued by the meeting stated that many trade union centres had offered to accommodate the W.F.T.U., but that the final decision had been remitted to the Secretariat.

17. The stage reached in the actual closing down of W.F.T.U. Headquarters is unknown. The editor of the W.F.T.U. Fortnightly Review dated 25th February 1951 was printed in Belgium, whereas previous editions were published in Paris. The subsequent issue was, however, printed in Paris, thus giving rise to the belief that at least the Publications Department is (April 1951) still functioning there. One report stated that all equipment of the Paris H.Q. was due to arrive in Brussels in early March, but there is no confirmation of this information. It seems fairly certain, however, that the Economic and Social Department will move to GENEVA where it will be controlled by Georges FISCHER.

18. The W.F.T.U. has maintained effective secrecy about its future location; it is clear that the newly formed European Workers' Organisation, with its Secretariat in Berlin, will serve as a cover for W.F.T.U. activities.

(Note. Since this was written it has become known that the H.Q. of the W.F.T.U. is to be established at 3, Seilerstatte, Vienna I, Austria.)

(b) The European Workers' Conference and Liaison Committee.

19. It will be recalled that on 15th June 1950 the C.G.T. and the F.D.G.B. signed a joint declaration of collaboration (see Survey No.8). In the following months agreements were concluded between various industrial groups of the two organisations: in August railway, metal and textile workers and miners; in September dockers; in November postal workers. The last named met again on 26th January.

20. On 1st December 1950 SAILLANT, speaking at the W.F.T.U. Executive Meeting in Bucharest said:



"We must consider the idea of a great international assembly of trade union workers representatives from all European countries - we must not allow Europe to be split in two."

21. On the "initiative" of the metal workers of Hagen-Haspe (Ruhr) a preparatory committee of French and German workers met in Berlin and issued on 23rd February 1951 an appeal to European workers to hold a European Workers' Conference in Berlin 23rd-25th March against the Remilitarisation of Germany. The appeal was signed by:

Rene SIX	Miner. Montigny en Goelle (Pas de Calais)
Andre BOUDIN.	Hotchkiss Works, St. Denis.
Andre LOZE	Bordeaux docker.
Fritz THRUN	Metal worker Hagen Haspe
Walter JARREEK	Miner Bismark pit, Gelsenkerchen
BAETKE	Hamburg docker
Paul WOITEL	Miner. Karl Leibknecht pit, Oelssnitz
Kurt HANISCH	Worker in Berlin Camp factory.
Vera AHLE	Worker at Reisa steel works.

22. Preparations in France for the Conference although professedly the responsibility of factories themselves were in fact entirely in the hands of the C.G.T. The C.G.T. almost certainly nominated the 146 French delegates.

23. Full information about the proceedings of the Conference is lacking but the published accounts are enough to expose its general trend. According to the Credentials Commission's report there were 898 delegates, from U.S.S.R., Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, W. and E. Germany, Berlin, Trieste, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Austria, Italy, Great Britain. Rene SIX was elected president of the conference.

24. On the first day the Conference was addressed by August KONIECZNY of Essen who is reported as saying:-

"It is now of paramount importance to develop a broad peace campaign in which all German workers - Social Democrats, Communists, Christians and non-party - must join together. In many cases where strikes have been successfully carried out in Western Germany, the value of this united force has been patent."

25. On the second day of the Conference Karl MUELLER said that the concrete tasks now facing the W. German delegates were to fight the Adenauer Government's plans "with all the trade union methods at their disposal", to unmask concealed arms production in W.Germany, to "prevent the compulsory export of basic materials so that they may become available for the production of consumer goods", to press for the establishment of plebiscite committees in all factories, towns and villages and to organize powerful demonstrations on 1st. May.



26. A Manifesto was issued by the Conference calling upon the working people of Germany to "rise in a united front against the rearmament of your country" and upon the working people of Europe to "make use of all forms of struggle suitable under present conditions: holding of meetings, collection of signatures, appeals to governments, formation of united action committees etc. both on a national and international scale."

27. The Conference decided to set up a European Workers' Committee and a Secretariat in Berlin for Liaison. The Secretariat "will organise actions against Germany's remilitarisation in accordance with the decisions of the European Workers' Conference." The Committee, according to published accounts is composed as follows:

Dragay KODZHEYKOV, Bulgaria; F. MOELLER, Denmark;  
Edouard BRISSELT, Belgium; Heinrich HUPER, Austria;  
Karel DOUTNAC, Czechoslovakia; Nicolae MANOLACHE, Rumania;  
Fr. BOZSEKI, Hungary; Stefan REDKOWSKI, Poland;  
Amino PIZZORNO, Italy; Alexander VDOVIN, U.S.S.R.;  
Elfriede SCHMIDT, East Germany; Kurt HANISCH, Berlin;  
Walter JARREECK (representing German Jewish workers);  
Hermann BAETKE, Fritz THRUN, Western Germany; Jose MOIX, Spain;  
W. TILBURG, Holland; Andre BOUDIN, Jeanne POSEZ, Jean LENOIR,  
and LAFFOND, France.

28. The new organisation crowns many months of effort to secure closer collaboration between French and German workers. Clearly it will also serve as a form of European Bureau for the W.F.T.U.

(c) Organisational Developments in the World Peace Council.

29. A separate note is being issued describing certain changes in the structure of the W.P.C. designed to bring it into closer conformity with established Communist organisational principles. It is interesting to notice that the "Combattants de la Paix", the French branch of the W.P.C., is also undergoing reorganisation for the purpose of strengthening Communist control.

30. The counterbalancing in Communist propaganda of the virtues of W.P.C. against the sins of U.N.O. seem designed to leave the impression that the former may at some time be set up as the rival of the latter as an international political organisation.

(d) The Cominform Journal in France.

31. In January 1951, the Cominform journal was banned in France. An almost exact reproduction of it in French, "Paix et Democratie", then appeared

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the date of its first issue being one day later than the date of the publication of the official decree which banned the Cominform Journal. "Paix et Democratie", which describes itself as "Hebdomadaire d'Informations Politiques", has been published regularly since January on the same dates as the Cominform Journal. The only difference between the contents of the two papers has been the omission by "Paix et Democratie" of two paragraphs on conferences of readers of the Cominform Journal in satellite countries.

## II. National

### (a) France.

32. In pursuance of the directives issued at the XIIth Congress, a very great effort has been made to enforce the principle of supervision by the central direction over lower Party organs. In closing the Central Committee meeting at St. Denis on 14th-15th February Jacques DUCLOS congratulated the Committee on a discussion "bonne, pres de la vie et empreinte d'esprit de responsabilite. Cela tient sans doute aux nouvelles methodes de travail des membres du Comite Central, plus etroitement en contact avec les Federations et ayant, de ce fait, une meilleure comprehension des difficultes des organisations de base ....."

33. The demands of mass action for peace and the need to counter anti-communist campaigns have entailed developments on the propaganda side of the Party organisation. The Central Propaganda Section, of which nothing has been heard from some considerable time, has been revived and placed under the control of Roger GARAUDY. At the same time an attempt is being made to create a veritable "army of propagandists" at all Party levels. "France Nouvelle" has begun to issue pamphlets for the use of members. The first five are:- "Rearmement allemand"; "La vie chere et les salaires"; "Problemes paysans"; "La guerre au Viet-Nam"; "Plan Marshall".

34. Demonstrations against the presence of General EISENHOWER in Paris were staged (largely on the instigation of the C.G.T.) on 24th January after an appeal to Parisians had been issued on 21st. January. In the event the demonstration disappointed the P.C.F.'s hopes and the organisation was severely criticised by Raymond GUYOT and Jacques DUCLOS. The gravamen of this criticism was that the demonstrators were not organised into disciplined groups



before converging on the Champs -lysees and hence were easily dispersed by the police. "Spontaneity" having proved unsatisfactory a new method was employed on 15th February in a demonstration against the visit of a German officer to Paris. This time, organised under militant leaders before leaving the factories etc. the demonstrators were able, despite strong concentrations of police, to occupy the boulevards for two hours and paralyse traffic in the centre of the city.

35. At the beginning of March one Raul PRONNIER, P.C.F. member, was arrested and charged with sabotage and murder. Denying the second charge under interrogation he admitted the first and said he was a member of a sabotage "shock group" of the P.C.F. He confessed to the juge d'instruction however, that he was in touch with an important member of the right wing R.P.F. to whom he was passing information. He was thereupon labelled as a "Mouchard" by the P.C.F. The P.C.F. Federation of the Pas de Calais and the man's Party Section had apparently been shown his Party dossier before the scandal broke but had taken no action. For this negligence they were castigated by Auguste LECOEUR, who went on to say that the cadres situation in every Federation and Section would have to be examined and party vigilance sharpened.

36. Some reorganisation has occurred in the C.G.T. Leon MAUVAIS, former Organisation Secretary of the P.C.F. has become one of the Secretaries of the Federation Nationale de l'Eclairage et des Forces motrices. This position is obviously of great importance for "direct action". At the same time Auguste LECOEUR, MAUVAIS' successor as Organisation Secretary of the P.C.F., has been finding time to supervise as President the organisation of the chief Miner's Section of the C.G.T., the Federation Regionale du Sous-sol du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais. A new department has been set up in the headquarters of the C.G.T., the section de la Prud'homie. "Commissions juridiques are to be formed in the Federations and Unions Departmentales of the C.G.T. with the object of providing workers with legal advice on trade disputes, social security, housing etc. The Federation nationale des Syndicats de Police et d'outre Mer (C.G.T) reminded members in March that the 36th Congress of the Federation had adopted the principle of forming police "sections syndicales" and that nothing had been done in this direction. Comrades were adjured to take the matter in hand "en se reunissant par compagnie, poste de police, commissariat ou Service, pour



mettre sur pied leur section syndicale."

37. The organisation of the "Combattants de la Paix" has not escaped the general shake-up. Georges TERNET, a veteran militant trained in Moscow and a specialist in the administration of Communist commercial concerns, appeared at the Conseil national des Combattants de la Paix as the general administrator of the organisation.

(b). Belgium.

38. In order to protect Party members in Government service from purges, all trace of their membership is being removed in Party records. They will receive their instructions verbally, in future, and not in writing.

(c). West Germany.

39. The 18th Session of the KPD Central Committee (Parteivorstand), which was reported in the Communist Press to have been held in DUSSELDORF but which in fact took place in BERLIN on 9th February, decided on a thorough reorganisation of the Party leadership. Four members of the KPD Secretariat, including Fritz SPEHLING, Deputy Chairman and responsible for organisation were relieved of office. Other changes included the replacement of seven Land Chairmen and a corresponding reshuffle amongst the Land Secretariats. A number of the officials who have been relieved had been in the West during the Nazi regime, and some have admitted association with Noel FIELD, the alleged American agent whose name featured prominently in the SED purge of August 1950.

40. The result of this reorganisation has been to strengthen the hand of those elements whose obedience to SED and Soviet instructions is beyond doubt. Otto KLOCK, who appears to be the acting leader of the KPD in W. Germany while Max REIMANN remains in BERLIN, was an instructor at the Central Antifa school for German POWs in the U.S.S.R. and so was Walter POTH, newly promoted to the Secretariat. These changes were described at the Party Congress as measures to strengthen the striking power and purity of the KPD.

41. The Party Congress took place at WEIMAR (Soviet Zone) early in March. Preparations had been made to hold it in MUNICH and the change of location does not seem to have been made known to KPD officials till shortly before



the event. This is the first KPD Congress to have been held in the Soviet Zone, but it is still being referred to on occasion as the Congress of MUNICH. Walter WLBRIGHT, SED Secretary General, told the Congress that one of the major tasks of the KPD was to improve the work of the leading Party organs, from the Central Committee down to the lower organisations. He also demanded a more vigorous promotion of young cadres, extended mass work and stricter control over the daily activities of the Party.

42. The KPD Theses, published in connection with the Party Congress, included the statement that "measures must be considered for altering the methods and tactics of the work of democratic organisations in the event of their dissolution or suppression". No information is available on any plans which may have been made in this connection.

43. The subordination of the KPD to the SED, on which we have commented previously, has now reached the point where it can be said that all important meetings of the KPD leaders are held in BERLIN with SED representatives present. The KPD Central Committee in the Federal Republic has thus been reduced to the status of a co-ordinating committee to direct activities in Western Germany.

44. The Party has continued its efforts to ensure stricter control over lower formations, with particular emphasis on increasing the efficiency of factory and industrial groups. Instructions have been given that factory groups are to be formed in all enterprises where there are three or more KPD members. Central Committee instructors are attached to selected factory groups and are also responsible for making tours of inspection in the Länder. The F.D.G.B. has contributed more than 50 instructors to work in W.Germany and the SED also plays its part, having provided for example 78 instructors in October 1950 to assist in the KPD election campaign in HESSE, BAVARIA and WURTEMBERG-HOHENZOLLERN.

45. Speeches at the KPD Party Congress and the published Theses contained much criticism of opportunism and sectarianism. Party members were adjured to put themselves the question "why has the influence of our Party on the masses not been increased, in spite of the correct policy of the Party?" and to find the answer in the Party's failure to overcome opportunism and sectarianism and to counteract the disruptive activities of foreign agents. Warnings



against these errors have been repeated by the SED in broadcasts and the Press. Otto WINZER, of the SED Central Committee, writing in the Cominform Journal of 16th February 1951, referred to the resolute struggle which the KPD was waging against opportunism and sectarianism and declared that in the present situation only hopeless sectarians and agents of the warmongers could claim that united action with the SPD was impossible in W. Germany or W. Berlin. Karl SCHIRDEWAN, SED Central Committee, declared in a broadcast on 5th February that there were still many examples of backwardness and stubborn sectarianism and Party executives made the mistake of doing nothing about these shortcomings. Refusal to establish comradely relations with the Social Democrats indicated failure to understand that the working class must be united if the struggle against re-militarisation were to succeed.

46. There is evidence that the KPD Control Commission has been and still is engaged on a thorough scrutiny of the records of Party members who spent any part of their exile during 1933-45 in the West. Particular attention is paid to any such members who are on record as having been guilty of deviation during their exile.

(d) Italy

47. (A short note on the CUCCHI-MAGNANI defections is given as an Appendix to this Survey.)

48. Reorganisation of the P.C.I. in the same general direction as the P.C.F. was foreshadowed in Survey No.9. The Seventh Congress of the P.C.I. which sums up this trend did not take place until early April and we have only press reports so far of the proceedings. According to these reports the chief conclusions of the Organisation Sub-Committee were that

- (1) The P.C.I. must concentrate on developing its mass organisations, especially factory and town Peace Committees.
- (2) Entrance into the Party itself will be made more selectively. The most desirable recruits were those from the Young Communist federations, the applicants to produce a testimonial from their group leaders.
- (3) The provincial federations are to become financially independent.
- (4) The maximum size of Party cells is to be twenty.
- (5) The powers of the Central Control Commission are to be extended to cover all party schools and supervision of the implementation of Party directives



49. The intention of these directives is clearly to reduce the unwieldy "mass" structure of the Party itself to a more orthodox order and by the same act to render the Party more effective in the leadership and control of "non-Party" mass organisations.

"Paramilitary" Organisation and Arms.

50. Information worthy of respect has been received during this quarter which puts the question of armed rebellion by the P.C.I. into better perspective. This information virtually confirms the view expressed in earlier Surveys that the P.C.I. has no formally organised paramilitary apparatus. It appears that on two occasions only since the end of the Second World War have instructions been passed from the Directorate to Federations to be prepared to use arms. The first was in the Spring of 1946 when the Party was to have resorted to arms should the Monarchists attempt an armed coup. The second was before 18th April 1948 when it was considered possible that a victory for the extreme left in the elections would be annulled by the Government who would then attempt to rule by force. In both cases the instructions were that all active members should be prepared to report to their local party headquarters armed and ready for action should the need arise. There was no military plan of action.

51. Meanwhile the Italian authorities have continued to discover arms caches. The evidence is that none of these arms was hidden later than 1946 and that they are all Italian, Allied or German weapons. They had been moved from place to place, regreased and re-wrapped, often in newspapers dated 1948 and 1949. All the persons known to have been connected with the hiding of arms are either communists or fellow travellers. The original intention of the P.C.I. was that active party members should hide weapons for their own use. The workers in many of the large factories of the North, however, especially ex-partisans, formed factory dumps with the general idea of converting the buildings into fortresses if necessary. The distribution of the various caches appears to have been haphazard and bears no resemblance to planned distribution by a military force. The P.C.I. does not appear to be much embarrassed by the discovery of the dumps and in some cases it would appear that they



were not sorry to see the arms removed from the reach of undisciplined hotheads.

(e). Trieste

52. The Third Congress of the pro-Cominform Communist Party of Trieste was held from 9th to 11th February and was attended by delegates from the P.C.I.

53. Vittorio VIDALI, the Secretary-General, reviewed the international situation and stressed the importance of loyalty to Russian leadership as the best form of patriotism. He dwelt at some length on German rearmament and called for strong support of the campaign against it and for the World Peace movement in general. The Party's policy on the Trieste problem was unchanged.

54. Domestically, the Party was said to have been improved by recent reorganisation but it was still affected by absenteeism from meetings. A point of interest was a statement by Alessandro DESTRADI, Organisational Secretary, that many of the Party cadres had been trained by the P.C.I.

IV TACTICS

55. The primary aim of recent reorganisation, both national and international, within the West European Communist movement has clearly been to bring party control and leadership of the Peace Campaign to the highest state of efficiency possible. 1951, in the Party's words, is a crucial year for peace. DUCLOS, speaking to the Central Committee of the P.C.F., in February said: "L'annee 1951 sera une annee cruciale pour le maintien de la Paix. Mais les mois du printemps prochain doivent etre decisive pour remporter la victoire contre le rearmement allemand et gagner la bataille des signatures."

56. The campaign as a whole rests upon the co-ordination of two contributory campaigns. The open one, for the collection of signatures for a Five Power Peace Pact, is largely under the auspices of the World Peace Council. This began immediately after the STALIN interview. The other, not specifically mentioned by STALIN, is the campaign to prevent the rearmament of Germany (and incidentally of all other W. European states) by industrial action. Unity at the base is the necessary prerequisite for action and exploitation to the full of any fall in the standard of life which can be attributed to Western rearmament the means. A propaganda campaign against German rearmament is also fitted into the general scheme, being of special importance in France and Germany.



(i) France.

57. Although in fact closely related as parts of the Peace campaign, agitation against German rearmament and agitation for higher wages were kept fairly distinct from one another, "unity of action" however, being the watch word in both.

58. The "consultation nationale" against German rearmament, sponsored and controlled by the P.C.F. through the Combattants de la Paix was described throughout the period as the essence of the peace campaign. The campaign for a Five Power Pact did not attain equal importance even after the STALIN interview and the meeting of the World Peace Council. During January in particular the Politburo of the P.C.F. and the Administrative Commission of the C.G.T. urged upon French workers the necessity of collaboration with German workers as a necessary part of the resistance to German rearmament. The Conseil national de la Paix met on 18th March and were told by their President Yves FARGE that since 25th December 1950 when the appeal for signatures was launched 6 millions had been obtained and that this result was far better than that obtained in a comparable period for the Stockholm Appeal.

59. The P.C.F. paid a good deal of attention to the "neutralist movement". The attitude of the Party towards neutralism is best summed up in the words of its own leaders.

"Les communistes ne sont pas neutralistes: ils sont parti integrante du camp de la paix ....."

"..... il est a peine besoin de dire que s'il se trouvait par exemple, des neutralistes qui, sous pretexte de tenir la 'balance egale' preconisaient la denociation du pacte Atlantique, d'un cote, et la denonciation du traite france-sovietique de l'autre cote, les defenseurs vigilants de la paix ne sauraient approuver une telle position pour des raisons bien simples".

(Jacques DUCLOS. France Nouvelle 31.1.51).

"Les neutralistes en effet laissent entendre avec precaution, mais ils laissent entendre tout de meme que les Francais ne se battront pas pour TRUMAN, avec les nazis revanchards pour allies, contre l'Union Sovietique."

(Laurent CASANOVA. Humanite 2.1.51).



"Le Pacte Atlantique est maintenant attaque de l'interieure, meme dans les milieux sur lesquels il s'appuyait."

(Cahiers Internationaux. January 1951).

"Les communistes doivent avoir le souci d'aider les neutralistes honnetes a faire un second pas en avant en s'efforcant de leur faire comprendre que pour empecher la guerre, il faut lutter en commun avec tous les partisans de la paix, y compris les communistes."

(Waldeck ROCHET. Cahiers du Communism February 1951).

60. It is apparently the mission of the Union Progressiste to lure the neutralists into the "Peace Camp". A public meeting under the presidency of Paul RIVET, a director of the Union, was held on 1st March on the subject of "Le neutralisme aux service de la paix". The meeting was attended by Gilles MARTINET, Pierre COT, Charles d'ARAGON, Claude BOURDET, Jacques NANTET, Maurice LACROIX and "3000 Parisians".

61. In the sphere of industrial and other forms of direct action there is evidence of considerable caution. It was estimated in Survey No.9 that in France as elsewhere the closing months of 1950 were devoted to efforts to promote "unity of action" and that in pursuit of that aim the Party was prepared to exercise considerable restraint. During the first three months of 1951 the P.C.F. and the C.G.T. were carefully probing such foundations of unity as they had been able to lay down but were apparently not ready to subject them to the weight of a full test.

62. On 3rd-4th March the Conseil national de la Federation des Metaux de la C.G.T. met and called for action on "revendications". This action did not eventuate since a Government instruction to the employers went some way to meet the demands.

63. On 7th March bakery workers on the instructions of their Comite d'unite d'action decided to strike for 48 hours. The strike was by no means complete.

64. The Paris transport strikes called on the basis of unity of action achieved a much greater success. After preliminary negotiations the Unions of the R.A.T.P. met on 12th March and decided to take action to secure the "revendications" demanded. The strike was launched on 16th March, and completely stopped the Metro and bus services. On 17th March the C.G.T. called for



solidarity with the strikers. This was followed by a strike of taxi drivers on 19th March and on the same day suburban railwaymen struck. The power station supplying the Saint Lazare and Montparnasse stations closed down. The strike then extended to gas and electricity workers and on 22nd March Force Ouvriere decided to call a 48 hour general strike on the railways. These strikes are quoted here as shewing that within limitations the principle of "unity of action" has some reality, at least for wage questions. Whether it would stand the strain of political action is quite another matter and must clearly depend in part on the success or otherwise of the P.C.F. campaign against German rearmament.

(2) Western Germany.

65. Following the Federal Governments' refusal to negotiate on the terms proposed by the German Democratic Republic, the KPD in January abandoned its temporary tolerance of Dr. ADENAUER and launched a campaign demanding his removal. On 29th January REIMANN addressed an open letter to the SPD Executive calling for joint discussion of measures to preserve peace and stressing that no improvement was possible in W.German conditions without the removal of the Federal Chancellor. A "Central Committee for Unity of Action" had already been established at a meeting in ESSEN on 21st January 1951.

Although the KPD claim that the Committee itself is composed mainly of Social Democrats, the Communist analysis of attendance at the meeting shows that out of a total of some 350 persons present, only 49 belonged to the SPD while 191 were non-party and 77 KPD. The KPD Central Committee subsequently criticised the organisers for their failure to obtain a higher proportion of SPD.

66. The Cominform Journal of 12th January 1951 declared that the struggle against re-arming Germany was now one of the basic tasks of the Peace struggle. On 28th January the first W. German Congress against re-militarisation was held in Essen, having been convened by the North Rhine Westphalia Peace Committee. An appeal was launched for a plebiscite against re-militarisation and a letter addressed to ADENAUER asking "are you against the re-militarisation of Germany and in favour of a peace treaty in 1951?"

67. Heinz WILLMANN, Secretary-General of the German Peace Committee, said at a meeting of the Committee in Berlin on 10th March that before starting to



collect signatures in support of the WPC appeal for a Five Power Pact an enlightenment campaign should be carried out in the German Democratic Republic. At the same time preparation should be made in W. Germany for a plebiscite against re-militarisation and for the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1951. The collection of signatures for the WPC appeal should not begin till the plebiscite had ended. The KPD Secretariat discussed plans for this plebiscite during March and intends to establish a central committee of well-known persons in connection with it. A proposal to start the plebiscite on 15th April was later abandoned and it has since been postponed to a date as yet unknown. The formation of an all-German Constituent Council and the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1951 are the other main points of the KPD's programme.

68. The KPD made serious but abortive attempts to exploit the situation arising from the dispute on "Mitbestimmungsrecht" in the mining and metal industries. The Central Committee instructed that every effort was to be made to provoke an immediate strike, in contrast to the DGB plans which envisaged termination of contract. Communists were to link the issue with that of re-militarisation and to demand the obstruction of all forms of armament production. A general appeal to the workers was to be launched from the first factory or pit where the Communists succeeded in establishing a fighting committee with a common programme on the basis of unity of action. The Chairman of the KPD in North Rhine Westphalia optimistically said that the situation was developing towards a political mass strike. The agreement on this issue between the Federal Government and the DGB and the consequent abandonment of DGB plans for stoppage of work was denounced by SED and KPD as treachery by the Union leaders. The SED had previously broadcast numerous declarations of solidarity with the W. German workers and still continued to urge them to fight for a real share in management, if necessary by striking.

69. The Industrial Section of the KPD Central Committee drew up a plan of work for December 1950, giving instructions on how to put across the Prague proposals. This directive stated that resistance to the consequences of the war policy was finding vigorous expression in the ever growing wage struggles of the workers in W. Germany, and declared that efforts must be made to exploit all existing grievances linking them wherever possible with political issues.



Reports from Central Committee instructors attached to three local Communist strongholds show that in one area efforts were temporarily concentrated on the coal shortage, in the second on re-militarisation and in the third on the question of working extra shifts. Communist leaders are at great pains to analyse in detail all Party activities in the industrial field and to endeavour to overcome errors in technique, especially with regard to the establishment of unity of action.

70. Communist agitation in the Ruhr mines is claimed by the KPD to be partly responsible for the comparatively poor results achieved in the effort to increase coal production by working Sunday shifts. Communist propaganda has labelled them "armament shifts" (Panzerschichten), has condemned the compulsory export of German coal at a time when there is a shortage of domestic coal in Germany itself, and has emphasised the absurdity of working extra shifts to produce coal for foreign consumers and armament makers. The KPD has made a great effort to exploit this opportunity of merging economic and political issues but there are varying opinions within the Party on the degree of success which can be ascribed to Communist efforts. Agitation has also been continued for a cost of living bonus and the FDJ has been instructed to stir up discontent amongst the miners over such questions as low wages, bad living conditions in miners' hostels and the high cost of living.

71. Two articles by SED officials in the Cominform Journal have indicated that the SED/KPD will do its utmost to exploit economic grievances of this kind and represent them as the inevitable results of Western re-armament. Otto WINZER, of the SED Central Committee, has laid down that the switching of the W. German economy to a war footing will result in a very severe and painful crisis. Not content with future disaster, the Communists have unsuccessfully attempted to prove that armaments are already being made on a large scale in W. Germany and are distorting the country's economy. Facts make this line unconvincing in W. Germany, where local Communist leaders prefer to associate the fight for peace with the struggle for decreases in taxation and the cost of living. There is in fact little indication that even a fairly serious decline in the standard of living would result in any marked increase of support for the KPD as such.



3. Italy.

72. The peace campaign in Italy was pursued on broadly similar lines to the campaign in France, but encountered greater difficulties. The Party's efforts simultaneously to tighten its own discipline and to improve its mass activities with a view to leading public opinion to a passive acceptance of Soviet policy, even of Soviet invasion, have been left very late. The simultaneous increase of dictatorship within the Party and overtly "unpatriotic" action without have deeply disturbed the ex-partisan elements and certainly precipitated the CUCCHI MAGNANI defections which, although not catastrophic for the cohesion of the Party have been damaging for its propaganda. TOGLIATTI's policy of attempting to keep Italy weak so that revolution may be "brought in by the bayonets of the Red Army" has had, from the P.C.I. point of view, a highly undesirable airing in recent weeks.

73. The prospects for "unity of action" even in the economic sphere for the present, were bleak. The united front of the Trade Union organisations so carefully nursed by the P.C.I. from September 1950 broke up in January 1951 firstly as a result of disagreement between the C.G.I.L. and the non-Communist unions on the issue of universal disarmament and finally as the result of agreement with the industrialists on the operation of a sliding scale for the cost of living bonus. The C.G.I.L.'s loss of influence makes it less and less likely that organised labour can be used decisively by the Communists in mass actions in support of the peace campaign.

74. The intellectual refinements of "neutralism" do not seem to appeal to many Italians. TOGLIATTI made a strong effort to rally potential neutralists in a speech made on his return from Moscow in which he promised to withdraw opposition to any Government which would withdraw from the Atlantic Pact. But the only sizeable group of true neutralists to which the Party can turn are the Christian pacifists. German rearmament is a less profitable propaganda line in Italy than in France.

75. Lastly such demonstrators as the P.C.I. have been able to call upon have shown a growing respect for the police. Neither in numbers nor in resolution were those turned out to "oppose" General EISENHOWER equal to the task.



76. In view of these facts the P.C.I.'s campaign had a rather mechanical appearance during the period under review. LONGO explained how the economic grievances could be politically linked with the effects of rearmament. The Partisans of Peace endeavoured to stage their greatest mass demonstration in defence of Peace against General EISENHOWER, without success. The C.G.I.L. continued to refer to its Economic Plan. After the defections of CUCCHI and MAGNANI in February the Partisans of Peace endeavoured to shew that only peace is patriotic. On 27th January the National Peace Council advised 100,000 reservists to organise themselves for protest against the delivery of "pink cards" issued by the Ministry of Defence. Members of the Communist Women's Union returning from the W.I.D.F. meeting in Berlin in February launched the campaign against German rearmament. The Italo Soviet Friendship Association assisted by the youth organisation gave great publicity to the STALIN interview. The pattern is familiar.

4. Belgium and the Netherlands.

77. In neither country were there developments of importance.



APPENDIX.

A Note on the Defection of Aldo CUCCHI and Valdo MAGNANI  
from the P.C.I.

1. During January 1951 the Italian Ministry of Defence sent postcards to a hundred thousand reservists informing them of the places where they should report on mobilization. This purely routine measure was immediately seized on by the P.C.I. as the first step towards war, and recipients were encouraged to disregard the cards.
2. While the P.C.I. campaign was in full swing Aldo CUCCHI and Valdo MAGNANI, P.C.I. Deputies and very prominent members of the Communist dominated Artisan Organisation A.N.P.I., handed in their resignations to the Bologna Federation of the Party.
3. The two men made no secret of their defection, the reason for which was at once linked by the Press, well acquainted with their records in the Resistance, with the P.C.I. campaign.
4. The first statements made by CUCCHI and MAGNANI showed in fact that this had been the decisive factor which had led them to their break with the Party, and it provided the main theme in their subsequently published Manifesto.
5. The Manifesto opened with a Preface by MAGNANI, saying that the method he had chosen for making known his views had been severely criticised on the grounds that he should have gradually retired from public life without voicing his disagreement with the Party line. Since, however, the Party's Statutes admitted the application of democratic principles only when the Party's policy was discussed in Congress, he decided to put his point of view at the Reggio Emilia Provincial Congress on January 19th. After submitting his motion, which he subsequently withdrew, he realised that any free discussion of its terms was impossible in the prevailing atmosphere.
6. The Motion, published in full in the Manifesto, proposed five resolutions, of which the first four would certainly have met with no opposition.



These resolutions were as follows:

- a) attacks on Italy's adherence to the Atlantic Pact.
- b) an expression of sympathy with those bereaved during the anti-Eisenhower demonstrations.
- c) a declaration opposing any act of aggression on the part of Italy and
- d) the reaffirmation of national regeneration by the P.C.I. within the international solidarity of the working classes.

The fifth resolution read, however, as follows:

The Congress declares that, although convinced that the principles of their doctrine will never lead to aggression by the U.S.S.R., it is in favour of the defence of the national territory against armed forces, from whatever quarter they might come, which, without Italy having been previously attacked, might cross her frontiers and invade the country, since it recognises that the democratic revolution of the working class is based on both the solidarity of Socialist forces in the world and on the strength, the capacity, and development of the working class, which alone is capable at this moment in history of achieving national unity.

7. On January 25th both men sent in and issued for publication their letters of resignation from the Party.

8. MAGNANI, after confirming his hostility to the foreign policy of the Government, declared himself in favour of defence of the national territory from aggression, no matter whence it came.

9. CUCCHI stated that he, having heard of the rejection of MAGNANI's motion without any democratic discussion, admitted that he shared his colleague's views. The Party Directive, he said, admitted no freedom or democratic thinking within the Party, had no confidence in the working class, was lacking in national spirit and placed its trust in foreign bayonets for the achievement of social transformation.

10. On January 29th the P.C.I. published its excommunication bill, which stated that every opportunity had been given to the two traitors to discuss their perplexities with comrades at H.Q. Their refusal to do so confirmed previous suspicions and showed that they were determined on treason.



11. On February 10th A.N.P.I. passed a resolution branding them as traitors to the ideals of the Resistance. CUCCHI was the holder of the association's gold medal for valour and MAGNANI of a bronze medal. The Chamber of Deputies had in the meantime refused to accept their resignations, all parties with the exception of the P.C.I. and Nenni Socialists (P.C.I.) taking the view that their mandates were from the electors and not from their Party.

12. The widest effect was undoubtedly felt in the ranks of the A.N.P.I. from which organisation there were at once many individual secessions, and the three other Partisan associations, which had previously seceded from A.N.P.I., demanded that the latter be no longer classified as a chartered body engaged in welfare activities, since it now defended the interests of a political party and not those of the Resistance. At the beginning of March SILONE claimed that 10,000 members of the P.C.I. and P.S.I. had resigned. (Dept. Note: But see paragraph 10 of this Survey).

13. On 10th February CUCCHI and MAGNANI, who had returned to Rome and discussed their future plans with their older counterpart, Ignazio SILONE, and some of the latter's Left Wing Socialist friends, gave an interview to a news agency.

14. Questioned regarding their political intentions, the two men said that they did not believe that the future of the Italian working class movement could be solved by the creation of National-Communist, Titoist or Trotskyist groups. They would, however, encourage contacts and discussions with like-thinking workers, who felt they were no longer well represented by any Party. To this end an "Action Committee for unity and independence of the Italian workers' movement" would be created.

15. In the early days of February Valdo CUCCHI, in conversation with prominent Left Wing leaders of the P.S.U., expressed himself in the following terms:

"His main aim was, in conjunction with Valdo MAGNANI, to form an independent workers' movement in Italy which would neither approve of Italy's subservience to American imperialism nor rely for support on the petite bourgeoisie at home. Both CUCCHI and MAGNANI were determined not



to be subservient to anyone. They had broken with the P.C.I. not because it had not done all it should or could have done towards securing the economic and political emancipation of the working class, but because it was tied, materially and politically, to the Cominform and was unable ever to adopt a stand corresponding to the best interests of the working class. The emancipation of that class depended on the success or failure of the general policy of the U.S.S.R.

16. In elaboration of his intention to gain adherents for the movement, CUCCHI declared himself opposed to any attempt to include the orthodox members of the pro-Government Socialist P.S.L.I. nor did he see any hope of collaboration with the Republicans, whose interests were tied to those of U.S.A. There might, on the other hand, be a possibility of co-operation with the Left Wing section of the C.D.U.

17. The Left Wing Liberals, representing the elite of the intellectuals, were more important than their number indicated, and their critical attitude towards U.S. policy would lead them inevitably towards a progressive movement. They might in certain circumstances become the core of a Movement of Proletarian Unity.

18. Any idea that CUCCHI's intention to win adherents from the political parties of the Centre suggesting his own gravitation towards them can be discounted in view of remarks made by him in a subsequent conversation with similar individuals at the end of February. He and MAGNANI, he said, were and would remain Communists. Their attitude towards the class struggle was, in fact, more revolutionary than that of TOGLIATTI, since they were not compelled to adapt it to the requirements of anyone else.



A

The following comes from a regular and well placed source in the Gorizia area:-

ITALY

Political/Communism

Defections of MAGNANI and CUCCHI

1. The defections of the On. MAGNANI and CUCCHI from the P.C.I. created a great stir among some of the older members of the party, though almost none at all among the rank and file.
2. On 2nd February, POLETTO, Secretary of the GORIZIA Federation of the P.C.I., summoned all the activists in GORIZIO to Federation Headquarters and gave them the following instructions:-
  - a) A full report on the defections must be made by a competent comrade to every cell at the earliest moment possible.
  - b) MAGNANI and CUCCHI must be described as traitors who succeeded in infiltrating into the party as American and Titoist secret service agents with the object of splitting the party and sowing dissension.
  - c) They should be compared with RAJK and KOSTOV.
  - d) Provoke a full discussion on Titoism.
  - e) Show how the U.S.S.R. can never become an aggressor state. This must be done very convincingly. Discuss the matter from the politico-economic point of view, and show how a capitalist state is obliged to follow the path of war, and a socialist state the path of peace.
  - f) Emphasise the vital necessity of "revolutionary vigilance" in detecting deviationists and Titoists in the party, and act ruthlessly against them.
  - g) During the debate on Titoism, ensure that everyone takes part so that it may be possible to find out where deviationist tendencies lie. Note those that seem to waver. Try and bring them back to the party line. If they do not respond, arrange for their expulsion from the party.



The following report comes from a Trustworthy Source in Damascus.

SYRIA

COMMUNISM

Activities of Syrian  
Partisans of Peace.

1. On 23rd January a deputation from the Syrian Peace Partisans Organisation called on Rushdi KEKHIA, the President of the Assembly, Zeki KHATIB, Acting Premier, and Farhan JANDALI, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and requested that SYRIA should not co-operate with the Western Powers but adopt a policy of neutrality. Fallak TARAZI, who led the deputation made a speech in which she stated that the Syrian people wanted Peace, and any leanings which the Syrian Government might have towards the West would be interpreted as support for the "warmongering" policy of the Western Powers and would be disowned by the majority of the population. Moreover such a policy would expose the country to the risk of becoming a battlefield in a World War instigated by the imperialist designs of the Anglo-Saxon powers.
2. KEKHIA and JANDALI refused to make any statement on the Government's plans and the acting Premier Zeki KHATIB merely stated that the Government would take what action it thought fit to adopt the policy best suited to the country's interests.
3. The deputation was composed of the following:  
Fallak TARAZI  
Said TAHSIN (father-in-law of Walid MAJED, the Head of Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  
Ihsan JABRI (official in the Ministry of Public Works.)  
Abdul Jabbar Abu SHAMAT (official in Ministry of Agriculture)  
Dr. Mustafa AMEN (a well known Communist Lawyer).



F

The attached information is dated the first half of February and comes from various sources who are believed to have been reporting factually:-

FAR EAST

A Chinese source, from whom previous reports have been received, reported that Canton headquarters have been instructed to prepare to convert Kwangtung into a base for guerrilla activities should the Nationalists stage a successful attack on the mainland. The Province will be divided into five sections, each with its guerrilla leader, and guerrilla units will be established in each hsien city.

A Chinese Nationalist source reported that the Nationalists consider that they could exploit guerrilla and bandit activity, because both of these are anti-communist. They stated that the principal guerrilla areas are in Chekiang and Fukien, and that contact is maintained with them via the Kingmen islands.

Several sources in Burma have reported that the Communists have been making widespread efforts to persuade the various groups of insurgents to cooperate against the Rangoon Government. There are signs that in these activities the Communists have been successful in some districts, and that the insurgents in these localities have combined to attack government forces.

There are some Chinese Nationalist troops in Kengtung in S.E. Burma. They fled there from Yunnan in 1950 and both Burmese and Siamese authorities are vexed at their presence there, and anxious as to their intentions. So far these Chinese have behaved fairly well. There are said to be some Nationalist remnants in the hilly territory on the south and west Yunnan borders. Some think that all these Nationalist groups may try to unite in South Yunnan.

A Burmese source reported that friendly relations exist between the representatives in Rangoon of the Chinese People's Government and of the Viet Minh.