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26 SEP. 1950  
ACD/ 43620

Rapport:

Van: KA-RA

Aan: Hoofd B

No: E/775

Onderwerp: Quarterly Survey of Communism in Western Europe.

Van Sardine ontvingen wij bijgaand Survey (periode April-Juli 1950) om te behouden.

QUARTERLY SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE.

No. 8.

April - July, 1950.

August, 1950.

No. : 38.

I N D E X

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. STRENGTH
- III. ORGANISATION
- IV. TACTICS
- V. NOTE ON TITOISM IN WESTERN EUROPE  
(APRIL - JULY 1950).

QUARTERLY SURVEY OF COMMUNISM  
IN WESTERN EUROPE - NO: 8

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Survey is not the proper place in which to attempt to relate events in the West European Communist movement to the new international situation created by the North Korean invasion of South Korea. All that can be said is that during the period under review no significant change in the character of the West European Communist movement has taken place which can be traced unmistakably to events in the rest of the world since the Korean war began.

2. There are perhaps four main strands in the texture of Communist action in the past four months:-

(i) the commitment of the Party machine from top to bottom to the campaign for "the abolition of the atomic bomb". As far as Western Europe is concerned the outbreak of war in Korea resulted in even more peremptory demands for the prosecution of this campaign but did not immediately change its character. It is suggested that the following are possibly the chief objectives of the campaign:

(a) the presentation of the completed lists to U.N.O. in support of a Soviet move there.

(b) the intensification of the fear of war among the peoples of the Western world and the stimulation of a "general will" in favour of any solution of current international difficulties which seems to promise

support direct action against the rearmament of the Western world or to support any other line which the Communists may later adopt.

(ii) The elevation of the West German problems to the front rank and the broadening of the base of the Communist attack upon the Allied Zones. It is clear that preparations to this end were being made before the Korean war began. How or whether this move is related to Soviet grand strategy and what bearing it has on plans made before the Korean invasion cannot be argued here.

(iii) Indications that the French and Italian Communist dominated labour organisations are preparing the ground for a new strike campaign later this year. The assault on the economy of Western Europe is of course a long-continuing one.

(iv) The continued "toughening" of the Communist movement by reorganisation, indoctrination and incitement to "action". This too has been going on for a long time and cannot be directly related to the Korean war.

3. It is not yet known what, if any, secret directives were given to the leaders of the European Parties who attended the SED Congress in Berlin as fraternal delegates. Every European Party with the exception of Trieste was represented there by senior officials. One report has it that they were addressed in private session by SUSLOV who stressed that at the present stage the political struggle is of greater importance than the economic and recommended a general intensification of ideological training. The same report records a statement by DUCLOS on his return from Berlin to the effect that it had been considered desirable to assemble representatives of countries lately at war with Germany in order to shew the German masses that hostility towards them is now at an end.

4. There is no confirmation from secret sources of the press report that the European Parties were instructed at

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Berlin to abandon the technique of "mass sabotage" in favour of technical sabotage by specialist squads. After the Stockholm Peace Congress in March it seemed possible that the Communist Peace movement would divide into two channels; one the broad and open campaign for the collection of signatures for the Stockholm Appeal, the other a secret campaign of sabotage against the delivery of M.A.P. supplies. But, despite obscure references in some official pronouncements to the "separation" of the signature campaign from "other movements", directives in the Cominform journal and elsewhere have continued to stress that mass action against M.A.P. is closely related to the signature campaign. Although in the second half of the period "mass action" was in fact dwindling away, it was still being advocated. Nor has there been any reliable positive evidence of the creation of secret organisations by the West European Parties for sabotage operations.

*In 1948: so zou een Franse man in Utrecht bewezen hebben dat in Nederland niet voldoende sabotage werd verricht. Het onderzoek naar de identiteit van die man loopt nog. h.m.*

II. STRENGTH

France

5. The general decline of the PCF and its affiliates which has been noted in many of our previous Surveys appears to have been at least temporarily checked. The CGT indeed seems to have profited by the economic campaigns of the earlier part of the year and to show a distinct increase in numerical strength. Benoit FRACHON, Secretary General of the CGT, speaking to the Comité Confederal Nationale in April claimed a total membership of about 3 millions.

6. THOREZ gave the following statistics about PCF strength in the course of his speech to the 12th Party Congress in April.

Party cards issued:

1947	907,785
1948	798,459
1949	786,855

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but given. Prominent by  
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His conclusion was that "Après un recul sensible en 1948, nous constatons une consolidation de nos effectifs en 1949". There are no official figures as yet for 1950 but it is probable that they would show comparative stability. The results of several municipal elections held during May and June reveal a similar stability in the Communist vote. Recruiting for the Party is in progress. The fiftieth birthday of Maurice THOREZ was made the occasion of a special "promotion". No relaxation of Party control over the security of new entrants has occurred however.

#### Belgium

7. The PCB suffered a crushing election defeat at the beginning of June. Having had only 7 deputies and 3 senators the Party has lost all the advantages it acquired after September 1944. In the course of the election campaign general discontent was caused in the Party by the action of the LALMAND-DISPY group in eliminating certain militants and including their own supporters on the lists of candidates. This policy culminated in the defection of Fernand DEMANY and caused criticism of the Party leaders on the grounds of their undemocratic methods. So great was this discontent that the Political Bureau seems to have suspended the purge of all inactive elements from the Party which had been earlier decided upon.

8. An official estimate puts the effective strength of the Party at the present time at no more than 17,000.

#### Italy

9. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the PCI in Rome on 12-14 April SECCHIA announced the latest returns for the re-registration of Party members up to 31st March 1950: 2,098,668 members of the PCI, 433,390 in the Youth Federation; grand total 2,532,058. We have no information to disprove these figures and no recent indication of the percentage which is fully "active". Signs of "tiredness" and "disappointment"

were noted by some speakers at the meeting and there were repeated references to failure in the Trade Union membership campaign. On 23 April the CGIL opened its "Month of Membership Renewal and Press Diffusion", the target being to secure by 31 May 1950 the same number of registered members as on 31 December 1949 - a target originally set for 31 January 1950.

10. In addition to the annual campaign for membership renewal, the Party is also engaged in a recruiting campaign. The Rome Federation claims to have recruited 2,000 new members in May and over 800 in June. On the other hand TOGLIATTI speaking to the Turin Federation in May complained of a decline in the numbers and influence of Communist cells in the factories.

"This is a matter", he said, "that provides food for thought. I should understand this if your organisation had increased its cadres; I should say: the proletariat of Turin is still faithful to the old standpoint which is somewhat hostile to the idea of creating a mass party; but if this were so, you would have more leaders in the factories and a higher percentage of activists in your sections". Recruiting must be fostered not merely upon the economic and trade union plane but upon the ideological also.

11. In the course of his speech to the Central Committee of the PCI TOGLIATTI stressed the importance of the emergence of the PSI (NENNI Socialists) as a "great mass Party" with over 600,000 members, adding however "even if the registration of members may not in all cases have been carried out under the rigorous controls that are enforced in our Party".

#### Germany

12. The membership of the KPD in the Western Zones of Germany is now about 195,000. (Compare 350,000 in 1947).

13. At the North Rhine/Westphalia Landtag elections the Party suffered a reverse. It obtained 12 seats, all from the reserve list. (At the last election, in 1947, it obtained



28.) The total number of votes cast for the KPD was 336,000 (701,000 in 1947). The percentage of the total vote was 5.5 (14% in 1947). This disaster appears to have been taken into account at the 16th Tagung of the KPD at which the KPD leadership was trounced by the SED.

#### Holland

14. Although the CPN secured only 31 seats at the Provincial elections on 26 April 1950 the total of votes cast for the Party did not show a great decline since 1948. In 1948 the CPN received 382,001 votes; in 1950, 329,365.

### III. ORGANISATION

#### A. International

15. The most important event in this sphere which occurred during the period and one closely related to the tenor of the proceedings at the SED Congress in July was the meeting of representatives of the CGT and the FDGB (Free German Trade Unions of the Soviet Zone) on 14 and 15 June. The object of the meeting was announced as the realisation of "an effective collaboration between the French and German working classes to establish a solid and durable peace, to pursue the struggle against the renaissance of fascism and to defend the vital interests of the wage-earners". At the termination of the meeting an appeal was published containing the following, among other, decisions:-

(1) To reinforce in France and Germany the action of the workers to defend peace in conformity with the recent decisions of the Executive Committee of the WFTU. To pursue, to reinforce and to support, in the ports of France and Germany the struggle against the loading and unloading of war materials and for this purpose to establish close relations between the port workers of these two countries.

(ii) To resist, in France and Germany, the attempt to concentrate under the control of the American capitalists the coal and steel industries of France, Western Germany and other West European countries. To denounce the Schumann Plan.

(iii) To struggle in France and Germany for Trade Union unity both national and international within the WFTU.

(iv) To establish direct contact between the organisations, the militants, the factories of France and Germany and especially between those of Western Germany and France.

16. "In order to realise these common tasks the representatives of the CGT and of the FDGB undertake to establish close relations between the two organisations and to arrange for the exchange of experience and for consultation whenever necessary".

17. It remains to be seen how effective this "pincer movement" from East and West against the Trade Unions of Western Germany will be. It is remarkable that the CGT, already heavily burdened with international commitments for the WFTU and with national problems, should take on this additional task. There must be a limit to the capacities of even the most energetic French Communists!

18. Taken in conjunction with the great international gathering at the SED congress this move indicates that the prosecution of Communist policy in Western Germany is to be much more than formerly the responsibility of the European Communist movement as a whole.

## B. National

### France

#### (a) Party Reorganisation

19. Much of the discussion at the 12th Congress of the PCF was devoted to questions of organisation, especially the re-establishment of the factory cell as the basis of Party work.

20. It is interesting to note the comparative youthfulness of the delegates to this Congress. Of the 903 delegates 605 were below 35 years of age and the average age was 31.5 years. The majority therefore were from the new Party cadres formed since the Liberation.

21. At the end of the Congress Auguste LECOEUR was elected Secretary of the Party, specially charged with organisation. In a long speech he severely criticised the existing state of organisation and defined the tasks to be done.

22. Like many another commander LECOEUR began by demanding an instant reduction in the volume of paper-work done by Party officials. He said there were far too many letters and circulars issued by the Central Committee. On the average each Federation received one every other day. Comrades were urged to "user un peu plus de chaussures et un peu moins de fonds de culottes". After this soldierly admonition LECOEUR turned to the main subject of his discourse, the need for a great increase in Party work in the factories, which was at a deplorable level. "C'est un fait, depuis la Libération nous n'avons pas avancé mais au contraire reculé dans beaucoup d'endroits". He concluded that "l'amélioration de notre travail aux entreprises permettra de pousser activement au recrutement de jeunes ouvriers révolutionnaires, comme le prouve le resultat des usines Renault, où les cellules d'entreprises ont recruté pour la promotion STALINE 262 ouvriers, presque tous en-dessous de 25 ans".

23. The Congress passed a resolution calling upon federal and section committees to constitute cells in the thousands of factories possessing none. "L'activité des cellules d'entreprises sera orientée vers la lutte politique, en combattant les tendances économistes, et avec la perspective de résoudre les questions fondamentales posées au prolétariat en tout que classe dirigeant la lutte pour abolir le pouvoir du capital monopoliste et réorganiser la société sur une base socialiste".

(b) A "Secret Apparatus"?

24. Certain non-Communist journals, notably "Le Populaire", accused the PCF during May of organising an "illegal apparatus". LECOEUR, the new Secretary in charge of Organisation, considered it necessary to deny these charges (Humanité 31 May 1950) and to characterize the reports as police provocation. No reliable confirmation of the press allegations has been received.

25. There is a curious parallel with Italy in Party warnings about police provocation by the creation of bogus action groups and maquis. Leon MAUVAIS (who was alleged in the press to be head of the "Illegal apparatus") published an article in "Cahiers du Communisme" for May 1950 drawing the attention of militants to the infiltration of "mouchards et agents provocateurs" into the Party and accused the enemies of the Party of wishing to provoke "la constitution de groupes speciaux et de maquis". He quoted as an example Thonon, in the Haute-Savoie.

26. "Leurs objectifs sont clairs et doivent être vigoureusement et publiquement combattus. Ils voudraient non seulement entraîner des Savoyards dans des provocations qui justifieraient des mesures de repression, mais aussi et surtout, empêcher les travailleurs, tous les combattants de la paix, contre la bombe atomique, pour des actions politiques de masse contre la guerre". And then as if to accuse some Party members of having actually taken part in the formation of a maquis, he says "En général, ceux qui ont la nostalgie de la mitraillette - que, bien souvent, ils n'ont pas eu en moins quand il le fallait - tentent de faire croire qu'en 1944 le Parti a manqué le coche, qu'il devait faire la revolution etc."

... que "le contrôle des adhérents et des dirigeants,

27. This warning was supported by one from C. LUCIBELLO, national secretary of the Anciens FFI-FTP.

28. It is known that a census of former FFI-FTP members is being carried out. This may well be connected with a Party check on the bonafides of the members of the Association.

Italy

(a) The PCI as a "Mass" Party. Reorganisation envisaged.

29. The March issue of the monthly Communist review "Rinascita" carried an article about Party organisation written by Celso GHINI. He discussed the wide variations in the size and activity of Communist cells as between the North and South of Italy. In the North the average number of members per cell was 34, in Central Italy 44, in the South 60 and in the Islands 120. The writer concluded that the organisation of an adequate cell structure was urgent. This did not mean a purely mechanical subdivision of the membership into smaller units; it involved the creation of many more directing centres below the section level, the formation of more cadres and the grant of responsibility to a greater number of comrades. Five regions have been selected for intensive and immediate action on these lines - Abruzzi, Campania, Lucania, Sicily and Sardinia. This it is estimated will bring 5,200 Party members into positions of responsibility for the first time. The Party Statutes laid down that a cell might contain from 5 - 70 members. The writer concluded by saying that a rapid increase in the number of comrades capable of assuming directive posts was all the more important at this moment since the enemy clearly intended to concentrate his attacks on the Party's leaders.

30. (Dept. Note: This extremely interesting article puts into precise statistical terms the "mass" character of the Italian Party; it emphasises the loosely knit structure of

the Party as compared for example with the French Party where the largest cell contains 25 members and the average is smaller, or the SED where the basic group contains 10 members. The reorganisation envisaged in this article, having as its object a large increase in the percentage of "cadres" is clearly intended as a first step towards enabling the Party to "go underground" effectively if necessary. If the cell system is in fact as rudimentary as this article states it to be the leadership would have scant hope at present of controlling so large a mass in illegality with so few officials.

Reorganisation of this nature has been found necessary in other Parties, quite apart from questions of future "underground" existence, to ensure the adequate indoctrination of members).

(b) CGIL

31. "Tempo" of 24 April reports DI VITTORIO as saying that "a communist who tries to make his Trade Union subservient to the Communist Party is, in reality, acting against the interests of both the CP and the CGIL". This is either a gross example of "Economism" or, what is far more likely in view of DI VITTORIO's position in the WFTU, is intended by him for the eyes of non-Communist Trade Unionists who reject the CGIL because it is "subservient" to the PCI.

*Not seen but CPM. Reference in  
Militantism section.*

(c) PCI Activity against the Army.

32. Some information has now been received which shows that as in France and Holland the Communist Youth Federation of the PCI (FCGI) is much concerned with establishing contact with conscripts (See Review No.7).

33. The magazine Settimana Inccm published on 6 May an article by Vittorio ZINCOME drawing attention to the Centri Assistenza Recluti e Soldati (CARS) attached to each PCI Federation which are officially welfare organisations but unofficially stimulate the formation of secret cells in the army and the dissemination of defeatist literature.

(d) A Financial Scandal.

34. Police investigations of the use made by the Modena Chamber of Labour of 18.000,000 lire collected for the families of 6 men killed last January in the Modena riots revealed that the families in question had received an interim grant of 500,000 lire apiece while 5 millions had gone to the "National Solidarity Fund" in Rome and about 9 millions had been used to pay the administrative and publicity expenses of the public funeral of the victims. There is to be a court case which should prove of no little interest.

Germany

35. At the 16th Tagung (session) of the KPD which appears to have taken place at the offices of the SED in the Russian Zone of Berlin about 4-6 July it was concluded that the KPD has been guilty of fundamental errors. It is highly probable that Walter ULBRICHT, now Secretary General of the SED was present at the meeting and this, in conjunction with the secrecy surrounding the meeting and the location at which it was held makes it clear that the KPD was brought finally to book by the SED for its failures. It is reported that as the result of this meeting disciplinary action was to be taken against Hermann NUDING (responsible for the Peace Movement in W. Germany), Walter FISCH (responsible for press policy) and Hugo EHRLICH (editor of the Central KPD paper "Freies Volk"). The expulsion of NUDING from the KPD Secretariat was announced for the first time by Wilhelm PIECK at the 3rd Congress of the SED in Berlin. EHRLICH has been replaced as Editor of "Freies Volk". It is not yet known what action has been taken against FISCH.

36. At the SED Congress (20-24 July) Wilhelm PIECK analysed the West German situation and gave the KPD its directive (see para.39), thus emphasising the dominance of the SED over the KPD. The directive insofar as it concerned

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submitted to the  
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organisation contained little that was new but placed much weight on strengthening Mass Activities, not only in the Trade Unions and among the Social Democratic workers but also among the unorganised workers and youth. The KPD was also instructed to eradicate the enemy within and consolidate ideologically. PIECK made it clear that the SED must make every effort to strengthen relations with Western Germany by all available means, including exchange, visits and correspondence at all levels.

IV. TACTICS

A. General

37. Apart from the Peace Campaign, which is discussed separately, two developments in the sphere of tactics appear to be of special importance.

*Karl  
Laggenby ditto? 22 July 44*

38. The first is the unequivocal rebriefing of the KPD in the Western Zones of Germany.

39. The main lines of the KPD's future policy were laid down at the SED Congress. The KPD is to be guided by the general principle of encouraging "national resistance" by "going to the people", developing the National front and exploiting economic discontent more thoroughly. As recently in France and Italy, the Communists are adjured to disobey laws which have no juridical foundation. The major effort is to be made in the industrial sphere. The KPD is to address itself to "the masses" on an economic programme; it must be equipped to seize the opportunities which will be presented by the future resistance of the workers to price increases and attacks on wages.

40. The second consists in the attempts by the CGT in France and the CGIL in Italy to develop unity of action with non-Communist workers on purely economic issues. According to a report dated 10th August the Bureau of the CGT at its most recent meeting decided to reduce its minimum wage claim



*has not been  
all the same*

for all wage earners from 19,000 to 17,500 francs a month. This is partly to be explained by the fact that 19,000 francs is in any case too high but probably more fully explained by the fact that the non-Communist labour organisations FO and CGTC have accepted the figure of 17,500 as a basis for negotiation in the Paris region. The CGT by accepting the same figure has created an important condition for joint action. It seems likely that when the summer holidays are over and the Trade Union sections have recommenced normal activity the CGT will commence action on this basis. The Comité Confederal National de la CGT is to meet in September next and, allowing time for preparatory work in the sections, it would appear as if action could not begin until October or November. In Italy the directives of the PCI are to the effect that all trade union action must become part of the agitation for the CGIL "Labour Plan". It is admitted by the PCI which has approved it that this plan has nothing to do with Socialism but is merely aimed at bringing about maximum output and full employment. It is thus a device for securing wide support on the labour front for the CGIL. The CGIL is already threatening strikes this autumn if its dispute with the employers about the right of dismissal is not settled. Thus it would appear as if the CGIL is also preparing for economic action on a united front basis as soon as its preparatory work is concluded.

#### B. The Peace Campaign.

##### (1) Directives

41. Over the past four months the work of the West European Parties has been narrowed down in a manner unparalleled at any time since the end of the second world war, to the accomplishment of a single task - the organisation of mass support for the Appeal of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace launched at Stockholm in March 1950. The Parties have been driven, flattered, cajoled

and chidden in the international press, in speeches and conferences in season and out of season always to the same end. With a dreadful monotony, relieved only by occasional outbursts of frenzy the Cominform journal dings the lessons of Stockholm into what must be presumed to be the still sensitive ears of the Party in every issue published since 24 March.

42. It is clear that the Soviet Union, speaking with the voice of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace intended the Stockholm Congress to initiate a campaign which was to be in some sense of a new type. The Stockholm appeal contains the following passage:-

43. "We address ourselves to all social, religious groups and workers in culture, all honest people, who, irrespective of their views concerning the reasons for the strained international situation, are alarmed because of this and seriously desire to see peaceful relations restored between the peoples".

44. Jean LAFITTE, Secretary General of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace, in his report to the Stockholm Congress said "It is not a question of imposing such and such an ideology but of bringing our points of view and our methods to bear upon our common aim; PEACE". He went on to say that the movement must not be built upon the model of an organisation. It is and must be something much wider. In this respect he was astonished to see that the Association for Peace constituted in Japan figured as an organisation affiliated to the League for Democracy, as if the peace movement were of less account than the movement for liberty. Nor must the peace movement be thought of as an organisation for the co-ordination of existing democratic organisations as appeared to be the case in Belgium. Lastly the peace movement must not be conceived as a simple addition to existing organisations.

45. What seems to be envisaged in this is the stirring up of a vast emotional storm among the peoples of all countries against the Atomic Bomb. The Cominform Journal No.15(75) 14 April says "People who think that no amount of signatures can avert war and protect the peaceful population from destruction by atomic bombs are profoundly mistaken.... These signatures will express the firm will and determination of millions and millions of people - workers, peasants, intellectuals and other strata of the population - to defend peace". "... the imperialists fear most of all the will of the peoples, the direct and open action of the masses against the war preparations".

46. The second of the above quotations especially the phrase "the direct and open action of the masses" shews that however much the Soviet Union may wish the campaign for prohibition of the atomic bomb to be something "new" it has not abandoned the older hope of action "by the people" to interfere physically with the production and transport of arms. The same issue of the Cominform Journal says "This campaign (for signatures) is closely linked with all other forms of the struggle for peace: exposing the ideological preparation for a new war, struggle against unloading and transportation of U.S. war materials, struggle of the working people in the Marshallised countries against poverty and unemployment". (This conflicts with the general sense of LAFFITTE's address at Stockholm).

47. Other contradictions between the proceedings at Stockholm and the Cominform Journal can be found in abundance. For example, Ilya EHRENBURG said at Stockholm: "We do not wish to impose upon anyone the Soviet way of life - it is not

Soviet Union and the suitability of the Russian model for all peoples have become clear". Again EHRENBURG said: "The partisans of war try to represent our movement, which unites men of different countries, as a movement devoted to the defence of the Soviet Union". This slander the speaker deemed it his duty in the name of the Soviet delegation to deny. The Cominform Journal however seems to have placed itself firmly among the "partisans of war" by declaring on 30 June "It is impossible to advance the revolutionary movement without defending the U.S.S.R., without promoting its successes, without uniting all the democratic, peace loving forces around the Soviet Union". Finally, as if to negative everything said at Stockholm and elsewhere about rallying Catholics, Protestants, even industrialists, in defence of peace the Communists are reminded by the Journal on 7 April that "to belittle Socialist ideology in any way, to deviate from it in the slightest degree means strengthening bourgeois ideology "which is of course the ideology of coercion, oppression and exploitation".

48. There is not the slightest evidence in the Cominform Journal that the vast emotional campaign among all people of good will for the prohibition of the atomic weapon is to be allowed to affect the professional cohesion and loyalty of the Communists. They are to retain cool heads and not themselves to shift their ground by so much as a hairsbreadth.

(ii) Action

France

(a) General

49. From the moment of the issue of the Stockholm Appeal the leaders of the PCF began to organise, with characteristic energy and thoroughness, a campaign designed to bring the Appeal

the Central Committee of the Party in April, May and June. The entire session of 4 May was devoted to the question and in particular to a report by Etienne FAJON who stated categorically that everyone in the Party from the Central Committee to the remotest cell must be imbued with the idea that the campaign takes precedence over everything else. Throughout May the weekly communiques of the Bureau Confederal of the CGT repeated that the collection of signatures was in the forefront of CGT activities. In an article in "Servir la France" for June MONMOUSSEAU demanded that CGT delegates serving on the Comites d'Entreprise (Works Councils) should use the exceptional opportunities afforded by their position to collect 10 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal and to instal peace Committees in every enterprise.

50. House to house canvassing has been added to canvassing in places of work, at meetings and public festivals. Charles TILLOM told the Central Committee in June that the house to house canvass was producing better results than the "peace vote" of October 1949. The local peace committees are also expected to lead the "Partisans of Peace" in effective action "after the example of the dockers, seamen and railwaymen".

51. It is interesting to notice that in directives to militants of all kinds there is no sign of a "tongue-in-the-cheek" attitude towards the danger of war. It was by calling attention to the deteriorating international situation that CASANOVA sought to answer (Humanite 14-15 April) the question widely asked in the Party "Why are we pursuing this long-familiar line and how are we to interest our friends in the mere repetition of something we have done before?" The Party leadership is not apparently averse to allowing its own militants to be affected to some extent at least by the general atmosphere of anxiety which the Party is endeavouring to create among the people at large.

52. It is possible that a clue to one of the purposes which the list of signatures will be made to serve is contained in the text of an open letter from the Conseil National des Combattants de la Paix addressed to members of Parliament:

53. "Nous croyons le moment venu pour notre pays de tout mettre en oeuvre pour que les Nations Unies decident la mise hors la loi de la bombe atomique".

54. This suggests that the lists are to be presented in some way to U.N.O. when all possible signatures have been collected.

(b)Direct Action

55. Party directives made it perfectly clear that although the campaign for signatures was to be directed against all strata of society it was to reinforce, and not to replace, direct action against the importation, manufacture and distribution of war material. FAJON, in the report already quoted, said that the creation of peace committees would create a climate of solidarity for the actions of the dockers etc. Moral and material aid was to be given to the dockers, seamen and railwaymen in their concrete actions.

56. It might have been supposed that the initiation of the broad campaign for the prohibition of the atomic weapon designed to appeal to all classes would have been at least publicly separated from the direct action campaign against M.A.P., the latter becoming the sphere of secret and specialised sabotage operations. This however has not yet come to pass. Whatever preparations may have been made for specialist sabotage (and we know of none) no attempt was made in April and May to conceal acts of sabotage by mass action. "Mass sabotage" in the name of peace took place on several occasions in April and May such as that at Nantes on 11 May when a party of six assailed a munitions train delayed by signals and did sufficient damage to hold up the train for some hours or that at Nice when

a "commando" of 250 steel workers and railway employees tried to stop the departure of aviation stores from a railway station. The character of the Party's sabotage remained the same as that described in our Review No.7. It is true that during June there were no significant examples of "mass sabotage" but on the other hand there was much discussion in the Party press of the principles underlying such actions. Writing of the violent clashes between police and demonstrators which took place at Brest on 5 April Andre MARTY concluded that "La classe ouvrière en maintenant son unité, a fait la preuve de sa maturité, au cours de ces événements sanglants". There is in all this no suggestion of a general change in the character of the Party's activities.

57. In one respect however the scene has changed somewhat. Since the strike at the MICHELIN works ended (at the beginning of May) there has been a comparative lull in strike action. Andre LUNET, writing in "La Vie Ouvrière" No.292 (6-12 April 1950) reaffirmed that the battle for the 3,000 francs is inseparable from the struggle for peace but it is significant in view of all that has been said and written about the vice of "Economism" that during the period under review little effort has been made to use the strike for purely political ends. The experience of February, March and April was a discouraging one from the Party point of view. Moreover the re-organisation under Auguste LECOEUR of the Party's political machine in the factories is not yet complete.

58. For the past four months the greater part of the PCF machine has been committed to the great mass action for "peace". There is no sign that the invasion of Korea produced any change in the character of that action and it is difficult to see how any far reaching additions (such as general preparations for armed insurrection) could have been made to the tasks of an organisation already so fully extended.

Italy

(a) General

59. The Central Committee of the PCI met from 12-14 April and directed that the Party must devote the major part of its effort to the peace campaign. "L'Unita" of 28 April and 3 and 5 May carried articles entitled "After the Communist Party Central Committee Meeting" which enjoined that the struggle for peace must pass from the phase of mere propaganda to that of mass organisation and political action. By mid May the campaign for signatures to the Stockholm Appeal was in full swing. The whole Party machine and every available mass organisation was committed to it. "L'Unita" daily published statistics of signatures collected and on 16 July announced that the total had exceeded the 10 million mark. 15,000 Peace Committees were said to be in existence. Big poster battles raged on the walls of towns and vilages.

60. How seriously the collection of signatures has been taken in Italy is shown by the following extract from a speech by a Federation Secretary to the leaders of a PCI city organisation on 19 July:

61. "I cannot allow you to remain indifferent towards this campaign for signatures. With war at our gates, I am extremely worried about the fact that you are not aware of your responsibilities at this grave moment, and I consider you all thoroughly irresponsible and bereft of all conscience if you do not realise that our whole future depends on success in collecting these signatures! By means of these signatures you will mobilise the largest stratum of the population to our cause, and, tomorrow, in the event of an emergency you will be able to count on these masses."

62. An official of the same city organisation revealed in conversation that he believed the campaign for signatures to be in the nature of a census of all persons not in the PCI upon whom the Party could rely on the event of war.



63. The effect of the invasion of S.Korea upon Party activity was negligible. TOGLIATTI even allowed himself the luxury of a little deviation by writing in l'Unita on 2 July a gloomy article in which occurred the words "Here then is the third World War in action...." Apart however from demands for even greater efforts in the collection of signatures the PCI did not react noticeably to the Korean crisis.

(b) Direct Action

64. It was remarked in Review No.7 that the PCI seems to have made much less use in recent months of the Communist dominated CGIL as a political instrument in the peace offensive than the PCF has made of the CGT. The divorce between economic and political effort appears to have become even more marked recently. For the time being the CGIL appears to have gone off on its own in pursuit of a united front on the basis of its Labour Plan. By the autumn it will no doubt be once more pulling even with the PCI, but for the time being at least it would not seem to be putting its full weight into the peace campaign.

65. There is at all events no news of "mass sabotage" against armaments on the same scale as in France. Indeed the Unita articles say that the methods and forms of resistance to recrudescent Fascism must be such as to enlarge and not to restrict the progressive front. Party militants are warned to avoid violence, since this is the excuse that the Government wants for a campaign of repression. There were curious "warnings" in "L'Unita" on 13 June and 12 July against mysterious circulars and persons circulating in various regions of Italy urging espionage, violence and the formation of "action squads". This, said the paper, must be the work of police provocateurs or agents of a foreign power.

Western Germany

(a) General

66. During the last three months West German Communists have been adjured again and again, with unmistakable emphasis, to give first priority to the peace campaign. The Draft Resolution "concerning the present situation and the future tasks of the Party", submitted to the SED Congress at Berlin on 24 July, dealt in its first chapter with the importance (and relative failure hitherto) of the peace movement. PIECK's speech on the first day of the Congress (20 July) put the peace movement first among the three main issues (before the National Front and the strengthening of the DDR). The expulsion of Hermann NUDING from the KPD Western Zones Secretariat (though not from other posts or from the party) was announced without warning at the Congress and attributed, among other reasons, to "his denial of the possibility of organising a peace movement within the West German TU's." REIMANN got off with a caution, after very strong criticism of the shortcomings of the KPD by PIECK, GROTEWOHL and ACKERMANN; and the first point made in GROTEWOHL's criticism (on 21 July) was that "in Western Germany the peace movement had not yet gained the necessary impetus".

67. That this emphasis on the peace campaign was not intended solely for public consumption is corroborated by a report on internal KPD discussions in Bremen relating to the duty of dock-workers to refuse to handle war materials in West German ports. Willy KNIGGE (1st chairman of the Arbeitsgebietsleitung of the KPD in Bremen) is there reported as saying that "the fight for peace would have to take

*however, hidden  
if this is  
of course.*

... other party work, as the clock pointed

Harbour Workers, Seamen and Inland Watermen held in Bremen, conjointly with a Peace Conference, on 8/9 July. At the Harbour Workers Conference no less than at the Peace Conference strictly so-called, the principal and almost the only theme was the peace campaign; and the outcome was firstly the election of a Harbour workers' Peace Committee, secondly a resolution supporting the Stockholm appeal, thirdly a call to all harbour workers to "refuse to unload or transport war materials" and to form Peace Committees to work in conjunction with that at Bremen. A similar association of the struggle for peace, as first priority, with the duty of refusing to handle war materials and the creation of close relations between dockers in different ports for the purpose, is found in the "joint declaration of the CGT and the FDGB for the defence of peace", issued after the 17th meeting of the FDGB Executive in Berlin on 16 June. The FDGB admitted that it had much to learn from the CGT in this matter. In comparison with this evidently anxious emphasis on the peace movement, the campaign of the National Front, though by no means neglected, has had to take second place. It has been decisively separated from the peace campaign in public utterances, the two being presented as complementary but distinct, and one of the weaknesses of West German Communism has been attributed to an impolitic confusion between the two.

(b) Direct Action

68. The effects of the sharp reminder administered to the KPD, that the peace movement is to be treated with the utmost seriousness, have already become apparent. The collection of signatures, according to Communist propaganda, began to show marked improvement, despite "official persecution" in Western Germany. Miscellaneous progress reports were put out with the usual enthusiasm and vagueness. Moscow Radio attributed the improvement to "the aggression of the US imperialists".

against the Korean people", which seems to be the only suggestion that the Korean outbreak affected these events. It is obviously impossible to be sure whether the alleged improvement is real in this respect but apart from the collection of signatures there were verifiable signs of a stronger, though ill-conducted, drive towards direct action to frustrate the "Anglo-American warmongers". Direct action has taken the form of overt mass action.

69. Although there has been no slackening, but rather an intensification of the campaign to collect signatures for the Stockholm appeal, at the same time it has been increasingly emphasised, especially at the SED Congress in Berlin, that signatures by themselves are not enough. The particular type of mass action which has been most urged and, to a less extent, practised is the strike and specifically the refusal to handle western war material. A wide interpretation has been given to the phrase "war material", and dock workers in Bremen were privately instructed, when in doubt, to break open cases to find out exactly what was being handled. A strike of the kind required took place at Hamburg on 8 August, when a group of dockers, who were believed to be under Communist leadership, refused to unload two British ammunition ships, ostensibly because the port authorities had rejected their demand for danger money. There was an abortive plan by youths of the FDJ to sabotage trains carrying war materials from Bremerhaven in June. They were prevented by the Party from carrying out the attempt, on the grounds that it was incompetently organised and had been discovered.

70. The story of the FDJ youths' abortive plot is perhaps typical of Communist efforts at direct action at the moment; REIMANN's efforts to do better seem to have been concentrated very largely on the FDJ. He called on the FDJ to adopt a more militant attitude, to "emerge into the open and let themselves

be seen everywhere in their blue shirts", to demonstrate and start discussion groups and so on. The result has been an attempt to expand the FDJ organisation and the establishment of Land Committees of "Young Fighters for Peace". It is the intention to set up Committees of the latter organisation in schools, universities and factories. On the evidence available in the last three months the FDJ is not yet a serious menace, and the KPD has a long way to go before it can create such a menace in any quarter.

V. NOTE ON TITOISM IN WESTERN EUROPE (APRIL - JULY 1950).

The Yugoslav technique of organising sympathetic publicity, by encouraging visits to Yugoslavia by individuals and parties who are likely to report favourably on conditions there, was first employed in the late summer and autumn of 1949. During the quarter under review there has been a noticeable increase in the numbers of such friendly visitors, although no big fish, comparable with Claude BOURDET or Mr ZILLIACUS, have been landed. Italian ex-partisans, Yugoslav emigres, veterans of the Spanish civil war, Norwegian trade unionists, and youth brigades from almost every West European country have been welcomed in Belgrade. In Paris a Comité National d'Initiative was formed on 9.4.50, with the object of organising the despatch of youth brigades to Yugoslavia. This bureau, which produces a journal "La Brigade", claims to be quite independent of political parties, and states that its funds are furnished by subscriptions and the sale of "La Brigade". At one of its meetings it was claimed that 2,000 young men, many of them members of the PCF or the UJRF, would visit Yugoslavia during the summer. Its work has been supplemented by an offer made to French workers by the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation of cheap holidays at Yugoslav centres.

72. There is no lack of people willing to take advantage of the Yugoslav invitation to "see for themselves" at little

or no personal expense, and among them have certainly been a number of party members or ex-members. A party of Italian ex-partisans attended the May Day celebrations in Belgrade under the leadership of Carlo CUTOLO, a Communist who was political commissar of the "Italia" Division, and Mario MOJANA a Section Secretary of the PCI. In July another group of Italians visited Yugoslavia and its leader David DOMENICO, a member of the PCI executive in Viterbo province, publicly repudiated the policy of his party.

73. A better gauge of the effectiveness of Yugoslav propaganda may be the reactions of the party leaders in other countries. In Italy "Titoism" is recognised to have considerable influence among the ex-members of the resistance movement organised in the ANPI and although it is not generally a danger among the higher levels of provincial party organisations we know of at least one federation where radical purges have been ordered.

74. The PCF leadership does not appear to be in any danger of losing its control of a "monolithic" party, but it was compelled in May to put pressure on the Parti Socialiste Unitaire (PSU) to expel certain members of its executive who had visited Yugoslavia and reported favourably on the experiences. The PSU has always been regarded as a willing echo to the PCF and the chief offender in this case, Yves DELLAG, was not only a member of the PSU executive but had also been, until shortly before the incident, a member of the Bureau Confederal of the CGT. Another indication of continued vigilance was an article by COGNIOT in "Cahiers du Communisme" - subsequently followed by "L'Humanite" in which he referred to Titoist activities in a number of departments and urged upon the party press the need for a more intensive and less formal handling of the Yugoslav problem.

75. There is still no evidence that the Yugoslav government wishes to foster an international organisation of

Titoist groups, although Marshal TITO himself recently made a speech in which he recommended to foreign communists, dissatisfied with their leadership and policy, that they should form independent Marxist parties. The first slight sign of such a party may be the recent announcement by Felix MONTIEL and Jose de BARRIO, former members of the Spanish CP, that the Socialist Action Centres which they were forming were to serve as bases "for the Marxist party which they intended to set up". Further work in that direction is to be postponed until the return of a delegation which will visit Yugoslavia in September.

76. There have been strong indications that the Trotskyists are being tempted to hitch themselves to Tito's star. The Central Committee of the Fourth International held its 8th Plenum in Paris at the end of April and adopted a resolution to the effect that "there exists in Yugoslavia a workers' state and a regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat in which the Yugoslav communists are engaged in a struggle with bureaucratic deformations". This rather patronising approval of the Yugoslav ideological posture, is supplemented in "La Verite", the organ of the French Trotskyists, by much enthusiastic support of the youth brigade movement. We have also learnt that Trotskyists in Sweden have been divided over the Yugoslav issue, but that the anti-Tito group were rebuked for their attitude by the French section. There is no evidence that the Yugoslav CP has responded to these blandishments from their predecessors in opposition.

77. During May Moshe PIJADE made a brief visit to Paris and Brussels, and a Yugoslav official in Paris stated that his purpose was to inspect Yugoslav cultural organisations in France and Belgium. The Belgrade press made no reference to the trip but it was believed there that its motive was a private one, connected with the state of his wife's health. It is not likely that on so short a visit PIJADE could have

had time to effect any major change in the policy and methods of Yugoslav missions in Western Europe. He is nevertheless a leading theoretician of the Yugoslav CP and this contact with the West (his first in four years) may have had a significance that as yet escapes us.