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1. Van Sardine ontvingen wij bijgaand overzicht No. 5 (Juli-September 1949) om te behouden.
2. De aandacht moge gevestigd worden op pag. 18, waarin mededelingen voorkomen, die ūwerzijds aan Sardine verstrekt werden en die reeds als van "considerable value" aangemerkt werden.

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COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE
A QUARTERLY SURVEY

No.5 JULY - SEPTEMBER 1949

Part I. GENERAL

1. Information received since the publication of Review No.4 somewhat modifies the conclusion reached therein that 1949 is witnessing the opening of a new phase in the development of Communist policy in Western Europe. It is true that developments have occurred in the international communist Trade Union field and that there are some signs of a return to the policy of working-class unity in the political field. But Trade Union developments have been slower than expected and the new political line is at present hazy. A blight of indecision seems to have fallen upon the Western Parties while they wrestle with the internal Party problems resulting from the Yugoslav crisis. It is clear that "Titoism" is considered by the leaders of the movement to threaten all European Parties and the Western leaders are endeavouring to conform to the requirements of orthodoxy without any very clear view of the extent of the measures they are to take. A solution of the Yugoslav crisis is a prerequisite for effective co-ordinated communist action.

2. It is not surprising therefore to find the pattern which events of the past year has taken - a series of purges and trials in the Peoples Democracies themselves and a constant re-iteration to the communist world of the lessons to be learned from these trials. The dangers of the heresy of deviationism has been the unending theme of communist propaganda and the execution of RASK resembles that of the famous Admiral Byng in that its purpose is manifestly "pour encourager les autres". This Russian preoccupation with the problem of national communism appears to have been at the expense of effort in other directions, and in Western Europe in particular it is difficult to discern any clear co-ordinated policy. It is perhaps true to say that communism has been on the defensive and the only theme on which

there has been general agreement among Western European parties has been that of unity with the other left-wing parties. In Italy, France and Germany in particular there have been appeals to the Social Democrats for collaboration and the policy has been given official approval in the Cominform Journal of 21st October 1949 which clearly states that the task of communist parties in capitalist countries is to create working class unity first for the establishment of a government of democratic unity and subsequently for the conquest of power by the working class. It is interesting to note that this article recognises the defeat of communism by the 'third force' and mentions in particular the setbacks in both Italy and France. The article further recognises the need for tactical compromise with Catholics and non-communist democrats.

3. This declaration of future policy as expounded in the Cominform Journal is probably best viewed as a defensive one. The decline in communist fortunes may be seen by the U.S.S.R. not as an advance on the part of social democracy but rather of the right wing in Western Europe. Indeed, the Cominform Journal itself speaks of the success of the 'third force'. It is quite possible that what is feared is a repetition of the events of the 1930s when the communist parties, especially in Germany, failed to realise that their quarrels with other left-wing parties left the way open for the development of the Fascist parties. It is clear, for example, that in Germany one of the fears of the KPD is that its attacks on the SPD may weaken the left-wing as a whole and permit the right-wing to capitalise on left-wing internal struggles. It is noteworthy that REIMANN, Chairman of the KPD, has drawn a parallel between the new Bundestag and the Bruening-Papen regime of 1932. Again in his speech of August 28th 1949, REIMANN, obviously thinking of the events of 1930-33, states: "It is one of the fundamental lessons from the history of the German workers' movement that a divided working class could

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not be victorious and was not in a position to ensure the role of leading the masses". It is for these reasons that a policy of Aktionseinheit "against the growing danger of reaction" is now being urged by the KPD.

4. The declaration of Maurice THOREZ, Chairman of the French Party, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the P.C.F. on 7th October 1949 urging a policy of unity of action, for a government of democratic union, is best viewed perhaps in this light, as is the offer made by TOGLIATTI in July 49 to join in the government of the country.

5. Apart from this broad declaration of policy by the French and Italian parties supported by the Cominform Journal article quoted above, the communist parties of Western Europe have been engaged in the protracted process of self-criticism and reorganisation. The procedure adopted during the past few months is worthy of attention: on 15th June 49, an anonymous article appeared in the Cominform Journal on the "Ideological work of Communist Parties", stressing the need for intensifying ideological work at the present stage of development in the class struggle. Stating that the struggle is now decisive, the article goes on to say that communist parties "must treasure like the apple of their eye the purity of Marxist-Leninist world outlook: they must not cede to the class enemy one single brick from the majestic and monolithic edifice of Marxism-Leninism: they must irreconcilably combat all theoretical distortion..." This article seems to have called the tune for since then a succession of articles have appeared in the Journal from the Polish, German, Italian, Hungarian, Albanian, Rumanian and Czechoslovakian parties explaining the steps they are taking to improve the ideological work within their parties. A notable omission so far is the French Party. *not the Dutch?*

6. These repeated warnings from east of the Curtain on the need for tighter discipline and improved ideology have had their effects on the communist parties of Western Europe. These effects have concerned chiefly the organisation and strength of these parties and the question is therefore more fully analysed in Part II of this Review.

PART II. ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH

7. The decline in communist influence in Western Europe over the past year noted in Review No.4 has been emphasised over the past few months. During that time, elections have been held in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Norway and in each case the communist cause has suffered severely. In Belgium, 22 seats were lost in Parliament, in Germany the percentage of votes obtained by the KPD was nearly half of that obtained in the elections of 1947, in Austria the KPO vote was a mere 5% of the total, while in Norway a drop of nearly 60,000 votes meant in fact that the Communist Party ceased to be represented in the Storting. The cases quoted here are those where elections have given an opportunity for assessing the strength of the communist cause: there is, in addition, abundant evidence of growing apathy and indifference among the rank and file of the parties, in spite of repeated exhortations by the leaders to harder and more intense Party work.

independent.

8. This decline has not been without its effects: the drop in membership is aggravating the financial position of the Parties which in turn makes necessary some organisational adjustments in the interests of economy. A report quoting a leading KPD functionary states that the current KPD reorganisation is not confined to Germany alone, but has general application throughout Western Europe. This reorganisation, according to this source, is being carried out on instructions "from higher authority". This report is still without confirmation, but it may well prove to be true, as it certainly is the case that other Western European Parties are also undergoing organisational changes at the moment. If, as is alleged, the instructions come from above, it is to be expected that they will reflect the major concern of the Russians at the moment over ideology and control of communist parties. This is, in fact, borne out by what information is at present available on the subject. The aims envisaged in the reorganisation appear to be the following:

In Netherlands by means of worden geboden.

- (a) An intensification of the membership verification of 1948, aiming at removing

from office functionaries as well as ordinary members who cannot be entirely trusted.

Hier enkele recente uitwijkingen van vorderingen, dat het op de praktijk aan te wijzen is om de 2e plaats

- (b) An improvement in the ideology of functionaries and of the rank and file by more intensive training and schooling.
- (c) The introduction into leading positions of younger militant functionaries.
- (d) A closer control of lower units by a smaller governing body.

9. That such objectives would be consistent with Russian desires at the present stage of development there can be little doubt. Whether, however, precise instructions have been issued on (d) above is less clear, and on the present evidence it would seem probable that a certain latitude has been granted to national parties, who are being allowed to give effect to the principle in accordance with local conditions. It is to be noted too that the French Party does not seem to have begun any reorganisation though one reliable report forecasts that changes will be announced at the 12th Congress of the P.C.F. now due to take place in April 1950, mentioning in particular the introduction of new and young blood into the Central Committee itself.

*Hieraan ook aan-
aankt saluut in 1948
C.P.H. congres
Febr. '50.*

10. From the communist point of view the situation is a difficult one; over the past year the emphasis from the Russian side has been on the dangers of deviationism and the necessity for complete subservience to the U.S.S.R. herself. The need to keep hammering these points home is all the greater so long as the problem of Yugoslavia remains unsolved. In the eyes of the rank and file of Western European communist parties, and to a certain extent, of the functionaries themselves of these parties, the failures of communism in Western Europe over the past two years are due to a large extent to the insistence of the Party leadership on this very question of subservience to the U.S.S.R. Reports from many quarters make it clear that while the leaders blame the minor functionaries and rank and file for the lack of success, the rank and file counter-argue that too much prominence has been given in official policy to the leading role of Russia and not enough to the interests of

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is in a position to do too much damage. This seems to have been the case, for example, in the disgrace of FURBOTN in Norway. East of the Iron Curtain, the purge is proceeding vigorously and there the organisation and strength of the communist parties is being strictly controlled on the model of the Russian party itself.

13. An interesting development in this connection has occurred in Eastern Germany which can now be considered to belong to the Eastern bloc of parties: there, internal Party elections are in progress and are to be completed by December 1949. Commenting on these elections, Walter ULBRICHT, Chairman of the Secretariat of the SED, in an article in the Cominform Journal of 23 September 49, after making the now trite statement that the elections will provide an opportunity for self-criticism, goes on to announce that a system of probation is to be introduced before members are admitted to the SED. He also declares that Party membership is to be limited to militant activists only. This is, of course, a completely new development in the SED and is a far cry from the Massenpartei of 1946. The Party is no longer to be either "Socialist" or to reflect KPD/SPD 'unity', but will be purely communist, and organised on the lines of the VKP(b) itself. This change coincides of course with the setting up of the Eastern German State, in which the SED will have the same role to play as the communist parties in the popular democracies of Eastern Europe.

*Hein (prog) hat Stalin
plant: We mogen
mit verlaengeren, das
alle p.g. mit de W.
of Vorwissen op 2 p
Licht leucht.*

14. Such radical changes in organisation are not possible in Western Europe, even though as stated above, the tendency there is now towards the development of cadre parties. As has been stated, however, there is far from any unanimity among Western European communist leaders on the point, and this seems to indicate that no precise instructions can have been issued. It is interesting to note for example that SECCHIA, in the course of the meeting of the Central Committee of the P.C.I. in Rome on 25/29 July 49 claimed that the membership of the Party had not declined and indeed urged that recruitment should be steadily pursued. SECCHIA did, in fact, discuss this very problem of the cadre party as opposed to mass party and

attempted to show that there was no real contradiction involved. His explanation was that in the Popular Democracies purges and limitations in membership were necessary because the party was identified with the government. In Italy on the other hand the enemies of the P.C.I. were continually attempting to lure members away from the Party and it was very necessary for the P.C.I. to maintain its political influence "We must keep our numbers; at the same time we must strengthen the Party ideologically....naturally unsuitable elements must be got rid of as the battle against erroneous ideas cannot be dropped merely in order to gain more members.....the need to increase our membership must never distract our attention from the constant need for qualitative improvement". It cannot be said that SECCHIA here has solved the problem, but it is certain that he has laid his finger on it. If the P.C.I. (and presumably the P.C.F.) is to maintain its numerical strength in order to remain a political force, it is not clear how it is to reconcile the drive for new members with the need for strengthening the ideology and discipline of the Party. If SECCHIA here is pronouncing official policy, the return to cadre parties is not envisaged. But SECCHIA does not seem to speak with the same voice as his fellow European communists. In Belgium, Germany and Norway, for example, the declared policies can only result in smaller parties, however tortuous the reasoning of the leaders to prove that they need not.

15. In Belgium the process of self-criticism has been going on apace and has indeed reached a stage threatening a split in the Party leadership. The reasons for past failures advanced by the lower reaches of the Party stress the disadvantages arising out of the party line emphasising the predominant role of Russia. The internal situation in Belgium they argue has been neglected in favour of international affairs in which Russia had been given far too much prominence. This complaint which has widespread application in Western Europe is, of course, the difficult one to which we have already referred.

The Belgian Party also protests that the original purge of 1948, later modified to a 'membership verification', was too uneven, and involved disciplinary action against comrades out of keeping with the gravity of the offences committed.

16. The P.C.B. also stresses another feature which is common to most Western European parties - the fact that the Party leaders are too old, the average age being about 40 years as against an average of 25 years in the 1930s. This is in fact true of most parties in Western Europe, and the same complaint has been heard elsewhere, notably in Germany and France. The current decline also involves important questions of finance and in the case of the P.C.B. the loss of 22 seats in the Belgian parliament has also meant a loss to the Party revenue of 1,800,000 francs per year, a sum which represents the salaries of 37 paid functionaries.

17. In other words, this situation in Belgium, which can be taken to be symptomatic of that of most West European parties, brings out quite clearly the effects of the difficult period through which communism is going - loss of membership, loss of parliamentary representation, a growing sense of discouragement among the rank and file, a drop in party revenue - all of which in turn has demanded an effort at stricter control, reorganisation and economies. To say nothing of the problem to which we have already referred - how to translate into action the Russian demand for obedience when a large number of communists consider that it was that demand which weakened communism in the course of 1948-49.

*Ih gylor fuit, dno
dit uon uat letoft
de CPN - just is*

18. The reorganisation of the P.C.B. has two main features:-

(a) A reduction in the number of federations from 29 to 16 which reduces the number of paid functionaries from 48 to 22, side by side with a reduction at Party Headquarters from 52 to 26. Salaries too are to be reduced.

(b) The introduction of a new unit called the

Secteur interposed between the Federation and the Section, controlled by a Comité de Secteur together with one member of the Federal Committee.

While the creation of these Secteurs is obviously in keeping with the economy drive it is very probable that they are meant at the same time to exercise a tighter control of lesser units than was hitherto possible. This theory is largely borne out by organisational developments in Germany and Italy. 19. The KPD during the past year has gone through a difficult time, its difficulties being made none the less acute by the attempt of the U.S.S.R. to gain control of Berlin. This policy was generally unpopular throughout Western Germany. The organisational separation of the KPD from the SED in January 49 was the first serious effort to give the KPD the opportunity of developing a policy in keeping with the situation in Western Germany. That policy, however, was perforce a short term one in view of the imminence of the elections of August 49 and in this way the organisation and policy of the KPD have the appearance of improvisation. The election policy of the KPD was a broad one, based on the National Front. The need to make a special effort in the Bundestag elections has forced the KPD to postpone the solution to a series of internal difficulties which have been pressing for a long time. These internal difficulties can be attributed to four main causes, and again the similarity to the Belgian situation is striking:

- (a) The aversion among a large part of the rank and file to the subservience to Russia: this influence has been specially marked in Germany where Russian policy in Berlin, Eastern Germany, and on the question of the Oder-Neisse line has been far from popular with the German population as a whole.
- (b) The reluctance of many true communists to accept the non-revolutionary aspect of the

National Front policy.

The effects of the purge and Mitgliederkontrolle of 1948 which were carried out badly, unevenly and in many cases unjustly.

The resentment among a large number of members to the intensification of the principle of 'democratic centralism'.

20. The election results showed clearly the ineffectiveness of the KPD as a political party in Western Germany and with a new phase opening before them, the KPD once again is in the throes of self-criticism and is attempting to put its house in order. As elsewhere, the efforts are aimed at reorganisation, an 'innerparteiliche Festigung' and an attempt to rid the Party of dangerous elements.

21. REIMANN, Chairman of the KPD, in a statement issued on 28 April 49 analysing the lessons of the election defeat, categorically stated that "the reorganisation of the Party must extend from top to bottom. The younger elements must be given responsible jobs...nominal Nazi party members may be accepted....." REIMANN in the same statement speaks of the need to cleanse the Party of hostile elements which could be done only if the Party were "ideologically clear-sighted and determined". Once again the confusion of thought and policy is as apparent here as it is in SECCHIA's statement mentioned above. Whether REIMANN is advocating a small party of tried and trusted communists or whether by his reference to the willingness to accept ex-Nazis he desires a Massenpartei, is far from clear. The internal dissension within the KPD has been particularly acute and a recent report states that the Parteivorstand is likely to request individual members to sign a "declaration of allegiance" to the Party line. Such a move could only be in keeping with a cadre party conception. But it is not easy to visualise ex-Nazis forming part of a cadre party.

22. As far as the reorganisation of the KPD is concerned, the important feature is the introduction of the new 'Kleine

Sekretariate', which bear a marked resemblance to the Secteurs which have been set up in Belgium. These new secretariats, which replace the former Stadtteilverstaende, consist of four members only - the Polleiter, the Orgleiter, Kassenleiter and Leiter fuer Schulung und Werbung. The avowed purpose of this new unit is to ensure closer supervision of the activities of lower party executives and at the same time to rid the Party of excessive bureaucracy. As in the case of Belgium, the creation of the new secretariats will also effect financial economies.

23. The introduction of a new unit named the 'Sector' is also seen in Italy. Pietro VERGANI, of the Central Committee of the P.C.I., discussing questions of organisation and leadership in the Cominform Journal of 15th August 49, recognises the lack of leadership on the part of federations in the work of the party. VERGANI then states that it was found necessary to decentralise the leadership of the Federations by the introduction in about June 49 of 'Sectors'. That decentralisation was in effect not the real purpose of this change in organisation is clearly shown by his statement that the function of the Sectors is to "increase the vigilance against ideological deviation and hostile provocations", a function which corresponds almost exactly to that of the secretariats in Germany. It is also striking that the Sector consists of four men and one woman and it is difficult not to assume that these functionaries represent the same departments as those quoted in the German Secretariats above.

*Unit de
order-district*

24. The reorganisation of the Swedish Party which took place during the first half of 1949 likewise shows the creation of a new party sub-division between the district organisation and the basic organisation. In this case the new unit is named the "Krets". Nothing is known of the composition of the "Krets" but again the reason given for the reorganisation is reported to be the "attainment of better contact with the lowest order of members".

25. There is, therefore, good reason to believe the German report that this reorganisation is common to all Western European Parties.

26. It is stated in para.12 above that a most undesirable consequence of the present trends in Western Europe in the eyes of the U.S.S.R. would be if any Western European communist leaders

were to declare in favour of national communism and take with them either the party as a whole or cause a split in the Party on the question. In the case of three parties the dispute has involved party leaders. In Norway, the position of FURBOTN, the Secretary of the Norwegian Communist Party, has been somewhat puzzling for more than a year, though it is known that he represented a group opposed to one led by LOVLIEN. The significance of the points under dispute between them is now made clear, in that following the defeat suffered by the Norwegian Party in the elections of October, 1949, FURBOTN has been expelled from the Party branded as a Trotskyist, while six of his supporters have been relieved of their Party functions.

27. In Belgium, the decision to reduce the number of Federations led Xavier RELECOM, the Political Secretary of the Brussels Federation to criticise the Party leadership, mentioning in particular that the P.C.B. would have to modify its attitude of complete subservience to the U.S.S.R. As a result, RELECOM and other leaders of the same Federation have been accused of deviationism and RELECOM himself has been relieved of his position as Political Secretary. The dispute in the P.C.B. has not yet been finally settled and it is certain that the question will be raised again at the next National Congress of the P.C.B, which is due to take place shortly.

28. The question of national communism has also been raised in Spain. There, there are, in effect, three separate parties, the Spanish Party (P.C.E.), the Catalan Party (P.S.U.C.), and the Basque Party (Partido Comunista de Euzkadi). The question of their fusion into one single Spanish Party was under discussion in early 1945, but the discussion raised at the same time the question of the independence of the P.S.U.C. from the P.C.E. The dispute in this case centres round the attitude of the P.S.U.C., the Secretary-General of which,

Juan COMORERA, is reported to have refused to agree to the fusion. The reason for the refusal is brought out in the August 24th issue of LLUITA, organ of the P.S.U.C., in which an article criticises national communism, stating that the influence of bourgeois nationalism was present within the P.S.U.C. and arguing that the P.S.U.C. must form an organic whole with the P.C.E. There is no evidence to show that COMORERA has asked for more than a retention of the status quo, but in view of the present state of affairs in Western Europe, it is clear that the P.C.E. has argued that such an attitude is contrary to the conception of democratic centralism, and if persisted in, would lead to the heresy of bourgeois nationalism.

The Militaerkommission of the K.P.O.

29. An interesting development has taken place in Austria where the KPO, in spite of the heavy reverse it has suffered in the recent elections, is apparently taking steps in one direction at least to deal with the situation which will arise after the signing of the Peace Treaty. It is reported that the ZK has discussed the question of the future Federal Army and has proposed the setting up of a Militaerkommission which would deal with matters affecting that army. The KPO, with the avowed intention of preventing the Federal Army from becoming a weapon which could be used against the Soviet Union, has decided to begin now choosing suitable Vertrauensmaenner whose task it will be to offer themselves as recruits for the Federal Army, concentrating as far as possible on the administrative and intelligence branches. While this plan is still in its early stages and indeed cannot yet have been put into effect, it is a noteworthy development as it is one of the few occasions which have come to light where a communist party has set itself a well-defined intelligence task. There is no indication, however, that the KPO in this enterprise is acting on instructions from above and indeed the report, though considered perfectly

reliable, may not represent anything more than wishful thinking on the part of the KPO. One point which arises is that the suggestion as made indicates that no department already existed within the KPO to whom such tasks would automatically fall.

Part III. TACTICS

Developments in the W.F.T.U.

30. The last Review stated that a new phase was opening in communist activity in Western Europe conditioned by the failure of the communist effort to gain political control of France and Italy, and evidenced by the developments in the W.F.T.U. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that while future W.F.T.U. activity through the new Trade Departments will probably be directed towards the disruption of the economy of Western Europe and the Americas, the creation of this new organisation was imposed on the Russians by their failure to prevent the W.F.T.U. split of early 1949. The W.F.T.U. Milan Congress of June/July 49, therefore, marks the beginning of a new effort, and not the culminating point of previous activity. This is important, as there is a danger in assuming that June/July 49 heralded an organisation which was ready for offensive action. Indeed, there is little evidence to show that the Trade Departments are in anything more than the preliminary stages of organisation. It is unlikely that concrete results, in the shape of centrally-co-ordinated strike action, could be apparent so soon. It would be unwise, therefore, to assume that those strikes which have taken place since July 49 were either instigated or controlled by the W.F.T.U., even though in the case of both the London Dock strike of July 49 and the Finnish strikes of August 49 a W.F.T.U. personality paid a visit to the scene of operations.

31. The Finnish strikes of July/August 49, for example, occurred shortly after the Milan Congress of June/July 49 and thereby give an initial impression of cause and effect. There is no hard evidence to support this theory. There is, in fact, some evidence that the Finnish Communist Party received a promise of Russian support for strike action early this year and proceeded with the plan despite the subsequent withdrawal

of the Russian promise of help owing to the over-riding priority of the TITO problem.

32. This is quite plausible, as in the first place it is evident that the Yugoslav question has been given priority by the Russians over the past months. The intensification of the cold war against that country with the threat of some form of intervention clearly indicates Russian pre-occupation with a problem which to them is fundamental. Secondly the strike effort was not sustained enough to make it successful and indeed so far from weakening the position of the government, the F.C.P. itself suffered a severe blow by the split in the Finnish Trade Unions resulting from the expulsion of the seven communist controlled unions.

33. One further point of interest arises from the Finnish affair. Rene ARRACHARD, a Vice-President of the Building-workers and Woodworkers Trade Unions International (Trade Department of the W.F.T.U.), travelled to Finland in early September to "study the situation". His visit was primarily concerned to prevent the threatened split in the Finnish Unions but, according to the "Times" of 5th September 1949 he publicly advocated continuance of the strikes and thus identified himself with the Communist Unions. His intervention was unsuccessful and indeed his pronouncements while in the country, so far from preserving unity, prompted the Delegate Meeting of the Trade Unions to discuss whether or not it should remain affiliated to the W.F.T.U.

34. One case has come to light, however, where the Seamen and Dockers Trade Department has intervened in a strike in a more positive way. The new Seamen and Dockers Trade Unions International (Trade Department of the W.F.T.U.) held its constituent conference at Marseilles between 15th-18th July 1949. This was during the strike of the Canadian Seamen's Union which spread to the London docks. The London

strikers sent an invitation to the newly-founded Trade Department asking it to send delegates to study the situation in the London strike. These delegates, including J.F. BLANKENZEE of the A.N.B.Z. (General Netherlands Seafarers Union), were deported from the U.K. within 24 hours of their arrival. On his return to Amsterdam, BLANKENZEE issued an appeal to the crews of foreign ships in Dutch ports asking for strike action in protest against the arrival in Amsterdam of the Canadian ship SS 'Laurention Lake'. BLANKENZEE then entered into correspondence with the crew of the 'Laurention Lake' itself urging them to stop work. His approach was unsuccessful, but the text of BLANKENZEE's last letter to the crew on the subject is of interest. This letter put forward two possibilities;

- (a) That the crew should strike, in which case the A.N.B.Z. would guarantee the payment of their wages.
- or (b) The crew refuse to strike in which case they be blackballed and the Trade Department would submit their names to all Dockers and Seamen's Unions throughout the world.

35. This case reveals several important points: firstly, that neither the Canadian strike nor the London strike can be attributed to the W.F.T.U., though it is clear that a belated effort was made to exploit the situation. Secondly, the affair shows that the financing of the proposed Amsterdam strike was to be undertaken by the A.N.B.Z., presumably through the influence of BLANKENZEE; and thirdly, that a form of blackmail pressure was brought to bear on the crew of the ship in question, using the new Seamen and Dockers Trade Union International as the means.

36. One can likewise deduce from this case what we have already implied above - that the new Trade Departments are at the moment in the throes of organising themselves and that as

a result, co-ordinated offensive action on their part is unlikely to show itself for some time. This is also borne out by a reliable report which states categorically that a policy of "world revolution" or even civil strife timed to break out simultaneously in a number of countries is not feasible at the present stage of development. The same report states, however, that the present W.F.T.U. policy is to exploit any strike anywhere as it arises in order to convince public opinion that economic recovery under Marshall Aid is impossible. The BLANKENZEE incident mentioned above supports this theory.

37. The actual organisational developments in the W.F.T.U. since the Milan Congress of July 49 can be briefly summarised. Apart from the flood of propaganda which marked that Congress, the points of real importance have been centred round two factors - the organisational structure of the W.F.T.U. itself and the setting up of the new Trade Departments. As far as the organisational structure is concerned, the salient feature is that, with the secession of those Trade Union organisations of the Western Powers which hampered Russian plans, measures have been taken to ensure that the constituent members no longer have the power to go against the wishes of the controlling central body. In other words one finds the introduction into the W.F.T.U. of the principle of "democratic centralism", where the centralism is much more marked than any element of democracy. The creation of the new Trade Departments is of more immediate interest. Reference should be made in this context of the decision to set up an International Solidarity Fund "to support the working class in the struggle for its vital interests". The part which this fund will play in financing future strike action is obvious and while full propaganda play will be made of the contributions donated to the fund and of the advances made from the fund to strikers, there is little doubt that Russia will

use the fund for financing strike action when it suits her purpose to do so, though the part she will play will remain concealed.