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C O M M U N I S M I N W E S T E R N E U R O P E

A Q U A R T E R L Y S U R V E Y

No: 4 A P R I L - J U N E 1 9 4 9

Part A. GENERAL

1. There has been very little of any outstanding interest in the communist world during the period under review, little that is which would indicate any positive and co-ordinated plan of action by communist parties in Western Europe.

The peace campaign which we noted in our last review does of course proceed apace, but in general the various parties seem to have been concentrating more on the process of self-criticism, examining previous failures and preparing for whatever action the future and Russian strategy may call on them to undertake.

2. This period of comparative quiet is not unexpected as it has been noted previously that when the battlefield of the cold war has been transferred to the conference table of the foreign ministers, the overt work of communist parties has as a rule been confined to the day-to-day tasks of platitudinous criticism of whatever the Western Powers have had to offer at the conference. The recent meeting of the foreign ministers in Paris has been no exception to this rule and indeed if anything the tendency has been more marked than previously. L'Humanité, in particular, practically ignored the conference while it was in session. Since the date of the first feelers for a conference put out by the Russians in the early Spring, there has been a gradual but noticeable slowing down in the tempo of communist agitation, apart from a peace campaign and a steady if normal abuse of the Western Powers for warmongering activities. It is safe to assume that as the Russians themselves had good reason to

attend the Paris conference in order to gain at least limited objectives in Germany, the question of a future communist "line" in Western Europe would depend on the outcome of the conference and how far the Russians had obtained what they set out to achieve.

3. If however the Paris conference (and together with it the lifting of the Berlin blockade) were the most important single political events of the last three months, it is necessary from the point of view of the study of communism in Western Europe to examine the events not in the context of the past quarter, but against the background of developments in Europe over the past year, and in a sense as a climax to the events of that year. Much has happened in the communist world since the creation of the Cominform in September 1947, and to attempt to analyse the affairs of any one party or group of parties, be that analysis confined to policy, to organisation, to strength or to tactics without consideration of the major events which the year 1948-49 gave birth to and the influence which these events have had, would be faulty analysis indeed.

4. It is no part of the purpose of these periodic reviews to attempt to discuss general Russian policy: they are confined to the study of communist method, tactics and strength. It is convenient at this stage, however, for the reasons outlined above to review the development of communism in Europe over the past year, and to do so it is necessary to make at least fleeting references to the question of Russian policy as a whole.

5. It is easy enough in retrospect to see that the main Russian effort in Western Europe, through the activities of national communist parties, was concentrated in three different countries - France, Italy and Germany. It was the intention in the first of these two countries to judge correctly the moment most opportune for taking advantage of the

comparatively favourable position which the last years of the war had bestowed on the P.C.F. and P.C.I., to estimate at what point a revolutionary situation had been reached which, with the communist parties exerting maximum pressure through the paralysing effect of strike action, would give these parties the chance of seizing power. The German situation was different: there after two years of effort to create under quadripartite agreement a central government for Germany under terms which would give the SED the necessary opportunities for achieving complete control of the whole of Germany, Russian policy at the end of 1947, following on the failure of the C.P.M. in London in Nov-Dec/47, was already modified and aimed at squeezing the Western Allies out of Berlin, as complete control of that city was a necessary preliminary to the transformation of the Russian Zone into a peoples' democracy on the new familiar pattern.

6. In the case of France and Italy the main effort was made in late 1947 and the strikes of that period represented the trial of strength between the communist parties and the respective governments. The efforts failed. In Germany the growing pressure on Berlin reached its climax in the winter of 1948 but the success of the airlift saw the beginning of the manoeuvres which led to the calling of the Paris conference of May/June 1949. But while in these three main efforts the Russians failed to achieve their objectives, one other event of major importance greatly jeopardised the readiness with which the Russians might otherwise have modified their policy in Europe to meet changing circumstances - the Jugoslav crisis of early 1948 leading to the expulsion from the Cominform of Jugoslavia in June 1948. The effects of that crisis in European communist affairs have been profound and the disciplinary action necessary as a result has complicated still further the situation faced by communist

parties in Western Europe who have throughout the year felt the full effect of three factors - the failure of general communist strategy in Western Europe, the public reaction to the failure of the communists on the one hand and to the show of strength of the Western Allies on the other, and last but far from least the disciplinary call to heel by the Russians as a result of the Yugoslav crisis. It is not too easy to impose stricter discipline on an army whose morale is affected by failure in battle.

7. It will be seen therefore that general communist post-war strategy in Europe as a whole had the following tasks:

- a) In Eastern Europe, to create the Popular Democracies and bring those countries very tightly into the Russian orbit, economically as well as politically.
- b) In Western Europe, to take advantage of the favourable position created by the war, and where communist parties were sufficiently strong, to create a revolutionary situation by which the communists could obtain effective control. This objective has not been attained and the very effort to attain their objective has led to the introduction by the Western Allies of ERP and the Atlantic Pact. The modified objective has subsequently been to take steps to wreck the Marshall Plan so that once again opportunities might arise for the creation of revolutionary situations arising out of adverse economic conditions.

8. The objectives in Eastern Europe have of course been comparatively easy to attain: in those countries where the communist party did not hold a majority the normal procedure

has been adopted of merging with the Social Democrats into parties variously styled as Popular Fronts, Fatherland Fronts, etc, with the communists ensuring themselves the key positions within the Government. This step having been achieved, it has been followed fairly quickly by trials of traitors, arrests of social democrats and by such actions as the coup in Czechoslovakia. Further Russian objectives have been subsequently achieved by using the communist parties in their new position of instruments of control within the country.

9. This happy state of affairs in Eastern Europe however received a nasty jolt with the Yugoslav crisis, where the instrument of control preferred to interpret its own desires rather than those of the USSR. This crisis was followed by strenuous and effective efforts on the part of the Russians to ensure that the other popular democracies did not, and indeed could not, fall out of step in the same way. The past year has thus seen many heads roll and the purge has been no respecter of rank or previous service - witness the fall of Gomulka, Rajk etc. This purge has been far reaching and effective and it is important to appreciate that where a party is in control, such purges do not necessarily weaken the position of that Party. On the contrary, they tend to strengthen it. The USSR herself is no mean exponent of the art of purge and has shown that from the steady succession of purges which she has gone through she could emerge stronger (in the sense of effective party control of the country) than a rather wishful thinking Western world had hoped.

10. But if the purge in Eastern Europe had been effective, it is equally certain that the necessity for it has much exercised the minds of the VKP (B). It is after all easier for the USSR to purge her own party and country after her own lights than it is for her to ensure that another party does likewise even in a Popular Democracy. It has also been

apparent that the Yugoslav crisis has been taken by the Russians to be a symptom of a malady not confined to Eastern Europe and from the point of view of Russian control and direction of national communist parties, it is evident that pointed reminders on the question of loyalty have been sent west of the iron curtain.

11. It is here however that a problem has arisen to which the USSR does not seem to have found an effective answer. In Western Europe the communist parties are far from being in control of the countries in which they operate, and as was pointed out in the first of these Reviews, even the largest of them are dependent on obtaining mass support if they are ever to achieve their revolutionary aims. Here, however, the communist parties are certainly not instruments of control and cannot be regarded as anything more than instruments of attack in Russian hands. They are still at the present stage somewhat delicate instruments of attack, and corrective measures efficaciously applied to instruments of control cannot easily be applied to the same degree to instruments of attack. In other words, the communist parties in Western Europe are in the last analysis strong or weak as political forces² only in direct ratio to their numerical strength and to the number of votes they obtain; and their popularity depends not only on the effectiveness of their propaganda but on the reaction also of public opinion to the general policy of the USSR throughout Europe. It is here that the dilemma has appeared. Public opinion has in fact been adversely affected in the communist sense by the intransigence of the USSR in world politics, by the Yugoslav crisis itself, by the Berlin affair and by the show of determination on the part of the Western Allies as evidenced in Western Union,

²N.B. Please note that this analysis is of the political effectiveness only of communist parties: it does not take into account any subversive activity.

the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. To counteract this loss of popularity communist parties in Western Europe are seeking to strengthen their attack by co-operating with other parties and organisations on a broad front. But the shadow of the Yugoslav crisis and the subsequent demand for increased Party discipline have forced the communist parties in Western Europe to pursue two policies at the same time - an internal one of a 'membership verification' (a milder form of the Eastern purge) at the same time as an external policy of increasing Party strength and co-operating with other parties and organisations. This dual role has perhaps been too much for at least the middle functionaries and certainly for a large number of the rank and file.

12. It has been said that East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet: in this case East meets West in Germany but an examination of the development of communism in that country since the end of the war shows that the unfortunate SED/KPD would have been much better off if the twain had now met in Berlin and if the SED had not become involved in both the Eastern and Western communist policies. It has been mentioned in paragraph 5 that the first objective of Russian policy in Germany was to create a central Government under Communist control. When this was abandoned in late 1947, steps were taken to create an Eastern German state on the lines of a popular democracy with the possession of Berlin as a necessary preliminary. Now by the spring of 1949 this plan too had been abandoned and present Russian strategy in Germany is a matter for present speculation. Meanwhile the SED/KPD has been used as an instrument of attack in Russian plans, and has suffered grievously as a result. In early 1948 the SED began to be groomed as the controlling Party in the envisaged Peoples Democracy of Eastern Germany.

and by the summer, side by side with purges in the administration, the creation of a new police force and pressure on the Allies to leave Berlin, the SED was undergoing a purge - in the belief that it was to become an instrument of control. The 'Partei Neuen Typus' was the theme of early and mid 1948. By the end of that year however the instrument of control had again to revert to its status of instrument of attack and the purge had to change its character accordingly. Now the SED is obliged to pursue a National Front policy, co-operating with the very parties whose continued existence six months previously was being counted in terms of months. The confusion in the ranks of the SED is widespread as a result: the lack of enthusiasm has now been publicly admitted by the SED itself. It is small wonder that the plebiscite of May 1949 showed the results it did, an interesting example of the popularity of the instrument of control being assessed in terms of public reaction. That a plebiscite organised in a country under Russian control and which phrased the question in such a way that in any case a 100% vote of 'Yes' could be expected, should in fact record a 35% vote in favour of 'No', is quite unexampled. All the more remarkable when the evidence clearly shows that this adverse vote did not reflect the full extent of public disapproval.

13. The KPD in Western Germany, meantime, has been very much the poor cousin of the SED in Berlin, and whatever opportunities it had between 1945 - 48 were effectively jeopardised by the SED leaders in Berlin who were out of touch with tactical requirements in Western Germany. By its organisational separation from the SED in January 1949 the KPD at last was given a much clearer task in the orbit of Western Europe: but the KPD has not benefited either from the trials of the SED outlined above or from the rejection of Germans to Russian policy in Berlin. The election of August 1949 in

Western Germany will no doubt give the KPD food for thought and most probably not a little indigestion as a result.

14. The Purges.

The development of the purges in Eastern Europe is an interesting one: the first signs of brewing trouble (this is seen of course only in retrospect) was the appointment in January 1948 of Pavel YUDIN, editor of "TRUD" as Editor in Chief of the Cominform Journal. By April of the same year rather significant and anonymous articles began to appear in the Journal criticising the tendency on the part of communist parties to ignore true Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This first obvious article appeared shortly after the first letter on 27th March 1948 from Stalin to Tito accusing the latter of deviationism. As the Stalin letters were sent simultaneously to the other Cominform parties with the exception of France and Italy, the significance of these articles appearing in the Cominform Journal could not have been lost on those parties. This is not surprising as Tito's defence of the role played by the Yugoslav party in its fight for the liberation of Yugoslavia from the Germans might well have found some support in France and Italy where too the communists had played no mean part in the resistance forces during the war. Already therefore the difference between East and West was not lost on the Russians, but this difference has not been one which has made their disciplinary steps any easier since the actual expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948.

15. The sequel to the Cominform crisis in the affairs of communist parties in Eastern Europe has been a straightforward one and has followed three different lines:- a) the actual purge itself involving the removal from office of leading communists whose orthodoxy was suspect; b) unequivocal reminders issued by the Russians in the press and by radio of the necessity of complete subservience to the USSR;

c) protestation of loyalty on the part of the Eastern European parties themselves. The first of these lines has seen the fall of Gomulka and Rajk, the purges of the Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian parties and the victory of the extreme left wing clique in the Polish party. The Russians for their part have put the position quite clearly in such statements as "the attitude towards the Soviet Union is now the test of devotion to the cause of proletarian internationalism.....", a phrase dutifully repeated by other communist leaders in both Eastern and Western Europe.

16. The Peoples Democracies have on their side kept up a steady stream of abuse of Tito, who, in Eastern eyes, has of course already graduated from a communist to the Trotskyite lackey and tool of Western dollar imperialism. More has been required of them, however, than this, and acknowledgment of the supreme role of the USSR has been a necessary complement to attacks on Yugoslavia. A striking and significant example of this is an article appearing in the Cominform Journal of 1st June 1948 written by GEORGHESCU, the secretary of the Rumanian party. The thesis of this article is to drive home the point that not only has the VEP(B) played, and is still playing, a leading role in the Communist struggle, but that even the Peoples Democracies have a long way to go before they can attain the same stage of socialism as that reached in the USSR. The article, while admitting that the Peoples Democracies would reach by "a diversity of forms" true socialism and that despite this diversity the forms would inevitably be one and the same thing - dictatorship of the proletariat - hastens to point out that any "attempt to exaggerate the importance of the specific features of each individual country represents an opportunist and nationalist tendency....." That of course is a mere further reprimand of Tito, but the article then goes much further: it immediately states that the Peoples Democracy is "a form of

the dictatorship of the proletariat", and after a very brief analysis reaches the conclusion that "today there are two different forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat: the Soviet form and the form of the Peoples Democracy. The Soviet form is the higher form of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The article then propounds the theory that the advance to the higher form of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be through the Peoples Councils, "the political foundation of the Peoples Democracy". But this development, it is stressed, needs the help and guidance of the USSR and the article harps on the theme "Devotion to the Soviet Union and a resolute struggle against any manifestation of anti-Sovietism.... the vast experience of Soviet construction is an inspiration to the communist and workers parties..... the Marxist Leninist party must constantly strengthen the Peoples Councils....." etc. The Peoples Democracies need be in no doubt where they stand in relation to the USSR.

17. The subsequent issue of the Cominform Journal, that of 15th June, echoes a little the theme of subservience to the USSR, but emphasises even more clearly than before the great importance of proper ideological training of party members. No less than seven articles, one of which has the ominous touch of anonymity, deal with this question and the anonymous article on the ideological work of communist parties makes a point of listing the current heresies - nationalism, cosmopolitanism, formalism, surrealism, obscurantism and medievalism. It is no easy thing to be a good communist these days.

18. In Western Europe, no full-scale purge has been attempted as no such purge could in essence be afforded by the Parties themselves. A 'membership verification' has been the order of the day, but there has been very good evidence that even this step has been differently interpreted

from one country to the other, and the success of the measure has been doubtful, especially when at the same time Parties have been alarmed at the fall in membership figures.

19. Nevertheless, with this phase drawing to its close, and with the immediate crisis of Berlin at least partly solved, one may presume that the communist parties having now completed their stocktaking, a new phase in Western Europe can be expected to open.

The peace-campaign

Part B. STRENGTH.

1. In view of the defeats which have been suffered by Communist parties in the various elections held in Western Europe during the past six months - the plebiscite in Germany in May 1949 and the more recent reverse suffered in Belgium spring readily to mind - it is almost certain that membership figures of Western European parties should reflect this decline in popularity. It is equally certain, unfortunately, that the Parties concerned will not release official figures that would make this tendency too apparent, as nothing tends to fail like failure, and such figures which are given will probably be based on mathematical juggling of the kind mentioned in our last Review under Italy. A further factor is of course the 'membership verification' mentioned in Part A which certainly had an adverse effect on membership figures.

FRANCE:

2. The outstanding event in France during the period under review was the national conference of the P.C.F. held at Montreuil on 9-10 April 1949. The conference, dealt with more fully in Part C., became at this juncture in P.C.F. affairs, and indeed in communist affairs in Western Europe, a period for self criticism and an examination of Party weaknesses. The general confession was that the Party had inadvertently isolated itself from the masses and though no figures were quoted it was clear that both membership and morale had suffered during the year preceding the conference.

3. In this connection we make reference to a series of articles appearing in the French press written by a certain Roger PIRQUET whose sound observations on P.C.F. affairs in general entitle him to be quoted in this context on the question not only of P.C.F. membership figures, but what these figures imply in actual practice. PIRQUET estimates an actual membership total of approximately 711,000, which

accords fairly well with our own estimate quoted in Review No.3 of "well below 300,000". It is, however, PIROUET's analysis of this figure which is of interest: he allots a total of 11,000 paid and active functionaries, representing the hard cadre of the Party: the remaining 700,000 represent the normal active membership, of whom about 70% are male. PIROUET points out however that this figure includes some 200,000 rural workers, difficult to mobilise and hardly dependable for any major tasks undertaken by the Party. In addition allowance is made for about 1½ million Trade Unionists, not necessarily members of the P.C.F. who can be exploited by the P.C.F., but only in major strike actions. These figures, PIROUET points out, give a force comprising about 4 or 5% of the total population of France, and obviously its effectiveness as a political force depends not on its quantity, but on the quality of its organisation and members, a quality which the National Conference of the P.C.F. referred to above has admitted to have suffered.

4. The decline in morale therefore continues, and this decline is likely to be represented in most phases of the Party's work: on the financial side for example, THORZ is reported to have given a personal reprimand to the ALLIER Federation for maladministration of Party affairs and in particular for a debit shown in its books amounting to 750,000 francs. The steps the Party intend to take are discussed under 'Tactics', but there is no sign yet of an upward swing in Party affairs.

ITALY:

5. Our last Review explained that by a mathematical calculation the integrity of which was clear to Togliatti alone, the latter claimed that the figure of 2,200,000 would be reached by the P.C.I. before the end of the first half of 1949. Our information is that at the beginning of

the campaign for the renewal of 1948 membership cards, the 88 Federations in Italy were issued with 1,800,000 blank cards, a figure based on estimated requirements submitted by the Federations themselves. By 1st March, 1,210,000 new cards had been paid for, 220,000 had been issued free to the unemployed and 370,000 remained unissued. This means that April, May and June will have to have been pretty busy months if Togliatti's optimistic mathematics are to be justified. A noteworthy feature is that the MILAN Federation reported that 50% of its middle-class members failed to renew their votes.

GERMANY:

6. No figures are available for SED/SPD membership for the period under review. As far as the SED is concerned, of course, actual membership figures have no real significance in view of the near-totalitarian regime which exists in the Eastern Zone of the country. One can only estimate the rise and fall in the popularity of the Party from other evidence. It is quite obvious that the struggle for the possession of Berlin, which, whatever official statements are issued, did not result in the USSR achieving her objectives, reacted very unfavourably on the Russians as far as their own popularity and that of the SED are concerned. SED affairs have reached a low ebb and the Party itself has been at pains to call its members publicly to order. Thus on 17th June the Berlin SED Executive issued a resolution criticising ideological weaknesses in the Party, accusing it of a "sectarian attitude" and reminding it that every form of national arrogance was in reality a disavowal of the leading role of the Soviet Union, a reminder hardly likely to whip up enthusiasm in view of the present temper of the German public. Likewise "Neues Deutschland" on 9th June published an article by Hermann ATERB stressing that the official criticism already

made in early May of the Thuringian branch of the Party for toleration of anti-Soviet tendencies extended to the Party throughout the Zone.

7. What all this adds up to was clearly shown in the elections for the Volkskongress in mid-May when the populace was asked to vote 'yes' or 'no' to a question which, SED and Russians apart, was one of those questions expecting the answer 'yes'. No less than 33% of the votes however gave the answer 'no', and even then it is to be remembered that these figures were doctored in order to soften what was an even greater blow to the Russians, and of course to the SED.

8. The position with the KPD in the Western Zones is better only because it has not behind it an occupying power constantly prodding to produce results in keeping with the authoritative position it holds. The KPD got off to an encouraging start at the beginning of the year with its organisational separation from the SED and reports received at that time showed that the Party while conscious of the renewed impetus that this change would give to its work was equally conscious of the difficulties with which it was faced - the unpopularity of Russian policy in Berlin, the vexed question of PWs still in the USSR and the Oder-Neisse line. Nevertheless it was evident that fresh prospects were opened up by the negotiations then proceeding over the Occupation Statute, which offered the KPD chances of exploitation. These negotiations which seemed interminable at one time suddenly reached agreement and the role of the unfortunate KPD is somewhat less clear than it was and there are few signs that the Party is making any progress. Elections are due in August, and it is extremely doubtful that the results of these elections will give the KPD any cause for enthusiasm. Meantime, in the field of activity where one might expect the party to be most effective, the Trade Unions, an analysis of

results over the past two years in Works Councils elections give the following figures:

Works Council Representation in Percentages

Year	KPD	SPD	Others and Independent	Region
1947	35	38	27	NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN
1948	15	50	35	
1949	16	50	34	
1947	18	51	31	HAMBURG
1948	12	60	28	
1949	11	61	28	
1947	17	65	18	NIEDERSACHSEN
1948	12	69	19	
1949	10	71	19	
1947	NOT KNOWN			SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
1948	12	59	29	
1949	9	51	40x	

x This figure probably includes 15 - 20% SPD candidates.

Here too, therefore, there is a marked decrease in Communist influence.

BELGIUM:

9. An analysis of membership figures of the P.C.B. shows in this country a steady decline in Party fortunes. The actual figures are as follows:

1945	104,000
1947	75,000
1948	63,000
Early 1949	45,000

This means, of course, a drop of more than 50% in the total Party membership, a remarkable drop. In Brussels itself, the

1945-6 membership of 12,000 had fallen by 1948 to just over 4,000, a drop in this instance of 60%. And even the 45,000 quoted above is hardly a true reflection of Communist enthusiasm in the country as of that number only 25,000 are regular subscribers to Party funds.

10. It is not surprising to find that these figures were borne out by the results of the general election held in Belgium in June 1949: where previously the P.C.B. held 23 seats in the Belgian Parliament, this total has now fallen to 12, which as a percentage is almost exactly equivalent to the drop in total Party membership.

11. It is hardly necessary to add that these figures speak for themselves as far as morale is concerned. Attendance at Section meetings is rarely above 10% of Party card holders, while demonstrations organised by the Party are equally poorly supported.

HOLLAND:

12. No hard and fast figures are available on actual membership figures for the period under review but the available evidence does not suggest that the trend noted in other Western European countries is without its parallel in Holland. Apathy and lack of interest are rife among the rank and file, and attendance at party meetings have been extremely poor. An indication of the declining support for the Party is shown in the sales of the Party newspaper 'DE WAARHEID', the circulation of which in 1945 was 400,000 per month and in 1949 is a mere 130,500 - a drop of 65%.

Part C. TACTICS

1. There are three principle developments in communist tactics discernible in Western European affairs in the period under review - the Peace Campaign, the efforts on the part of national parties to seek co-operation with other parties, classes and mass organisations, and to implement the decision made in January 1949 to set up International Trade Departments within the W.F.T.U.
2. Of the Peace Campaign, little need be said as far as Western Europe is concerned as the campaign has now become world-wide and the developments over the past three months have had a much wider significance than a mere European one. It is sufficient to say that the Peace Campaign has become, and will presumably continue to be, the main theme of communist propaganda, although it is an essential feature of the campaign that it should appear not as communist initiated or communist inspired, but as a spontaneous protest against the warring of the Western powers by the broad masses of the people. As has been previously stated the success or otherwise of this campaign can be measured properly in one way only - by assessing how far the campaign has been instrumental in weakening the resolution of the Western Powers in maintaining the Atlantic Pact, Western Union and the Marshall Plan. There are few signs yet of any material progress in that direction as a result of the Peace Campaign.
3. The second tactical move; the efforts to broaden the communist front, has had some more interesting manifestations. In practically all countries in Western Europe there have been declarations by communist leaders on this theme, each Party interpreting the line to suit the particular circumstances obtaining in its own country. The National Conference of the P.C.F. held at Montreuil on 9/10th April did not spare words on the point. "France Nouvelle",

summarising the findings of this conference in an article appearing on 7th May, defined seven essential points arising out of the conference. Referring to the recognition of former Party weaknesses, the article goes on to say that the isolation of the Party "souligne ce qui nous reste à faire pour réaliser le large rassemblement des masses qui est la base de notre politique". The article accuses the party of "sectarism", which it defines as follows: "Le sectarisme s'exprime tout particulièrement dans la faiblesse et parfois dans l'inexistence de notre lutte pour l'unité de l'action, notamment avec les travailleurs socialistes et catholiques". At the conference of the Central Committee of the P.C.F. held at Saint Ouen in late June, Jacques DUCLOS is reported to have called for a Government of Democratic Union, saying that "this union can be achieved tomorrow with people who are by no means close to us. We must aim to win the support of as many people as possible and not to allow them to unite in a bloc against us".

4. This same theme was developed by TOGLIATTI in an article published in the communist press on 27th May. TOGLIATTI stated that he recognised that the majority of the population was agreed on the need for a détente in Italy in the economic, political and social field and equally agreed on the need to bridge the abyss between the two hostile parts into which Italy was now divided. Such a détente, the article said, could be achieved by the isolation of reactionary groups and by rebuilding round the most progressive part of the population a solid governing majority - conditions which of course clearly imply the participation in the government of the country of the communists themselves.

5. In Italy too, a meeting of the Directorate of the P.C.I. held on 26th May issued a communique appealing to Party members to join forces "with all those, of whatever faith and whatever public opinion, who wish to defend the

law and the republican constitution."

6. As has been mentioned previously in these Reviews, this effort to broaden the communist front has aimed at the same time at attracting the support of the intellectuals, and this factor directly links up with the Peace Front itself.

7. In Germany the broadened front has very decided tactical objectives related to the situation in Germany itself. Here since the beginning of the year one has witnessed the development from the openly avowed declaration by PIECK in his significant article in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 30th December of a return to 'Blockpolitik' to the present campaign in all zones for a 'National Front' aimed at enlisting the support of Germans from all walks of life and of all political hues for a united Germany. This campaign, which if successful, would mean the abandonment of the Western German Government by the Western Allies, is almost certainly doomed to failure. It is being exploited by the KPD in the West in its present election campaign, but once the elections of August 1949 are over, the National Front in Germany if continued must be aiming at long-term objectives. As it noted however that this line in Germany has had the distinction of being prominently featured on the front page of the Cominform Journal for 1st June. This short article refers to an open letter of the SED Central Committee, but takes the trouble to quote one sentence only: "Nothing will prevent the communists from continuing to attempt to reach agreement with their Social Democratic brothers".

8. One other aspect of this general campaign in Western Europe is also worthy of mention: a clear distinction is made between the leaders of the Social Democrats and the rank and file. Attacks on the former are permissible and encouraged, but co-operation with the latter is simultaneously to be developed.

9. It is possible at this juncture to make nothing more than a short reference to what is probably the most significant development in communist tactics in Western Europe over the past few months. It was to be expected that when the T.U.C. and the C.I.O. took steps at the W.F.T.U. conference in Paris - which led to the breakaway of the Western block from that organisation, the Eastern block would not tarry in creating some T.U. organisation which would not be confined to the Eastern countries alone. This is obvious, as potentially the most effective weapon in communist hands is the strike weapon and any action initiated by the communists in this direction can best be achieved through an international organisation with units in the countries most inimical to Russian interests.

10. The decision to create international trade departments within the W.F.T.U. was followed early in April by a number of Provisional Organising Committees meetings in Paris, after which the dates of the Constituent Conferences of six of the sixteen trade departments envisaged, became known. The Conferences were scheduled to take place in Italy, France and Czechoslovakia, round about the date of the 2nd Congress of the W.F.T.U. in Milan, i.e. in June and July.

11. At this stage one can do nothing more than speculate on the purpose behind these new departments, but the speculations are on obvious lines. Part A has stated that as a political force in Western Europe Communism has deteriorated over the past year; that conclusion however valid it may be, must not however blind one to the potential strength of Communism as a subversive force. And as the chief object of Russian attack is the Marshall Plan and the opportunities it offers for economic rehabilitation, the best attack against it would probably be one directed against the industrial and economic strength of the countries benefiting by the Marshall Plan itself.