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ONDERWERP : Communisme in Italië, Duitsland (Russische zone), Duitsland, Triëst, Joegoslavië en het Verre Oosten.

U gelieve hierbij aan te treffen de copieën van 6 rapporten betreffende het communisme in Italië, Duitsland (Russische zone), Duitsland, Triëst, Joegoslavië en het Verre Oosten, die Sardine ons ter informatie en om te behouden deed toekomen.

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The following report comes from a reliable and well-placed source.

GERMANY (Russian Zone)

Hermann Axen on the current tasks of the SED/KPD

1. The Second Conference on Agitation held by the Central Committee (ZK) of the SED took place at the offices of Landesleitung Berlin of the SED on 19 February 1951 under the Chairmanship of Hermann Axen, the member of the Secretariat of the ZK responsible for agitation and for the peace movement. Amongst some three hundred functionaries who attended were representatives of Abteilung Agitation of the ZK, the Landesleitungen (including Hans Jonretzki, First Chairman of Landesleitung Berlin), the Praesidium of the National Council of the National Front, and of a few key factories. The Soviet Control Commission was represented by Major Bondor.
2. Axen began with a summary of the world situation, based on Stalin's recent interview ("Neues Deutschland" 17th February 1951), and stressed in particular the sharpening of the struggle for peace. He then went on to make the following points:-
  - (a) The need for the consistent execution of the directives arising out of the Prague Resolutions. The rapid rise in German political activity within the framework of internationalism. The need to achieve the aims set by Stalin (creation of a united, independent and democratic Germany) in the course of the current year.
  - (b) 1951 was a year of decision, which would see either the removal of the imperialists and Adenauer or the failure of the SED in its historical mission. By decision of the Cominform a number of important world demonstrations would therefore be staged in Germany, and especially in Berlin, during 1951.
  - (c) Apart from his military tasks Eisenhower was charged also with an important ideological mission: to confuse the masses, to distract their attention from imperialist war preparations, and to foster anti-Soviet agitation. It was expected that many instances of concrete provocation (such as Document "M") would be launched in the form of great campaigns by the West. The best way to frustrate such schemes was by the constant and tireless enlightenment of the broad masses of the people.
  - (d) The arguments which had to be brought before the people were as follows:-
    - (i) The responsibility of the whole of the German people towards the rest of the world. On Germany depended whether there would be war or peace. The German people had to learn a lesson from history (the Kaiser, Hitler, Adenauer). War served the interests of the milliardaires and meant death to the people (Stalin).
    - (ii) Peace would be maintained if the forces of peace of the German people were mobilised and activated. Suslov had pointed out that for the first time there was an organised world peace movement. In Western Germany such a movement was still in the initial stages; although there were strong latent forces, the organisation was lacking. The Congress of the World Council of Peace in Berlin (21 - 24 February 1951) would therefore be the starting point for a  
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great campaign of enlightenment in Germany. From all parts of Germany the Congress would be called upon to demand a peace treaty from the Western Allies.

- (iii) The German people had to be convinced that a people which fought for peace and independence was always victorious in the end. The analogy between Korea and Western Germany (Stalin's interview) had to be driven home to the population of Western Germany. The World Council of Peace would demand that the United Nations Organisation (UN) should carry out its proper functions and aims and not allow itself to become a tool of United States imperialism. Today the UN sanctioned United States aggression in Korea - tomorrow they would do the same in Germany. The German people would not have to be allowed to become an army for the imperialists. Constant and tireless enlightenment of the people would ensure that the imperialists would not receive the support of the masses and that the Bonn Government would be isolated.
- (iv) The Soviet Union's policy of peace within the framework of Communism should be stressed: peaceful reconstruction, the control of atomic energy, the law for the protection of peace. The fear of the Russians among the Western German population had to be dispelled, the campaign of enlightenment carried particularly to social-democratic circles, and the referendum on the subject of remilitarisation most actively propagated. Both in the DDR and in Western Germany the state of enlightenment of the people should be tested from time to time by the SED and the KPD.
- (e) Two strong arguments from the opposition were to be expected:-
  - (i) That Western Germany would be granted equal rights as a prelude to remilitarisation.
  - (ii) That the Western Allies would call for all-German elections.
- (f) The first argument was dangerous, especially in German ex-military circles. The counter-argument should be that although the imperialists would formally agree to Western Germany's having equal rights they would retain their absolute control over the country. Examples were Adenauer's recognition of German pre-war debts, and McCloy's announcement of an increase in occupation costs. The Western press was following the imperialists' warmongering line. The progressive papers in Western Germany were still weak and easy to eliminate. As attempts would no doubt be made to force the progressive forces into illegal activity, a change of tactics to individual agitation was necessary (e.g. through correspondence with, and visitors from, Western Germany). These methods had already shown the best results.
- (g) Counter-arguments to the second point should be based on Ulbricht's article in "Neues Deutschland" of 16th February 1951 ("Deutsche an einen Tisch"). The German accomplices of the imperialists should be unmasked and agitation among trades unionists and social democrats developed. The right-wing leaders of the SPD had to be unmasked, in particular Schumacher, who would be given a particularly important role to play in the programme of the imperialists as their chief mouthpiece

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to the masses of the working population.

- (h) Until now the argumentation directed towards Western Germany had been too general. The DDR had first to be mobilised in order to strengthen its own basis for the battle in Western Germany. In the near future a conference of State officials would be held, at which Ulbricht would criticise the work of the officials to date. The most energetic action had to be taken to counter the strong enemy influences which were making themselves felt among the agricultural population of the DDR. The work of agitation as a whole had deteriorated, partly owing to the volume of routine work and to a sense of achievement as a result of the successful elections in the DDR. One had now to go over to a systematic campaign. The ZK of the SED would play its part in raising the standard of agitation. After every full meeting of the ZK, one or two Kreis Secretaries or Secretaries of the Betriebsgruppen in key factories would be called in for discussions and instruction which they would then pass on to the masses. In factories and towns there would be a weekly conference of agitators and in the MAS (tractor pools) and VEGs (socialised estates) a fortnightly conference. Apart from that, there would constantly be short conferences of the agitators in all factories, villages and administrations. In this connection the Party press would act as a collective organiser and give guidance in the day-to-day as well as in the more long-term work of enlightenment among the masses.

3. Axon ended his speech as follows:-

"This briefly is our present situation. We must go into action immediately in order to carry out successfully in 1951 the historical international mission which we have been given."

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The following report comes from a well-placed source.

GERMANY

FDJ Preparations for the World Festival of Youth  
to be held in BERLIN from 5 to 19 Aug 51

1. In late Feb 51 a Conference of FDJ Gruppenleiter took place in HAMBURG-ALTONA. The principal speakers at the meeting were Friedrich DELIHEIM (FDJ Agitprop DÜSSELDORF) and Kurt ERLEBACH (KPD member of the HAMBURG Buergerschaft).

2. Speaking on the above subject DELIHEIM and ERLEBACH revealed the following points:-

- (a) Two million people would be mobilised for taking part in the demonstration in BERLIN. This figure would include 100,000 from Western GERMANY, of whom 10,000 would be from HAMBURG. This meant that each member of the FDJ HAMBURG would have to recruit eight outsiders for participation in the event.
- (b) Delegates from 85 countries would take part in the event.
- (c) Preparatory Conferences would be held between German, Dutch and French delegations.
- (d) An FDJ delegation would visit the SOVIET UNION for discussions.
- (e) In BERLIN on 5 Aug 51, 20,000 live "doves of peace" would be released. The main demonstration would take place on 12 Aug 51.
- (f) All FDJ members would be enrolled for participation on a special form.
- (g) A "Weltjugendwoche" would be inaugurated for 21-28 Mar 51. FDJ sponsored public meetings would be held in HAMBURG, HAMBURG-BERGE-DORF and HAMBURG-HARBURG.
- (h) No ideological conditions would be imposed regarding the attitude of participants in the Weltfestspiele. The main object was to get people to go to BERLIN in August.

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- (i) The Weltbund der demokratischen Jugend would bear the costs. Participants would only have to pay their fare to the Zonal boundary.
- (j) The FDJ publication "Das Junge Deutschland" would provide the best propaganda for the Weltfestspiele and each FDJ member must find three subscribers for the paper.
- (k) Weltfestspiele Committees were to be formed in HAMBURG at Stadtteil level. These committees must consist of complete outsiders.
- (l) A Landesausschuss for HAMBURG would be formed on 13 Mar 51 in the Elbschloss Brauerei. This committee must include prominent personalities. A cultural programme would be arranged for the occasion.
- (m) The great object of the Weltfestspiele was to provide a demonstration on a grand scale against the "imperialists".