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RUSSIA AND CHINA


A GUIDE TO THE
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

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INTRODUCTION

The Sino-Soviet Conflict, the expression used to describe the differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, today connotes far more than the mere identification of differences of opinion on an interstate level. The main reason for this is the fact that the two sides involved in this conflict are the two most important Communist states at present, which, in spite of all the differences in the declared aim of their aggressive foreign and social policies, are in agreement in bringing about a socialist world-system.

This fundamental agreement in their foreign policy objectives has led, in spite of — or because of — the disagreements which have arisen, to an increase in Communist activities in the international sphere, conditional on the attempts by both sides to exert their influence in the world-political arena. The objects of this competition have been and still are, first and foremost, the Communist Parties throughout the world and the states of the development countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In addition to this, both states are, of course, also anxious to gain a foothold in the highly industrialised states of the Western world, or to strengthen the influence they already have. These efforts to obtain as much influence as possible, to win over the largest possible numbers of party-liners for what each side regards as the "only correct" interpretation of the original Marxism-Leninism, are being made with all political means available.

This struggle on "all fronts" of the political sphere has also resulted in an exacerbation of the relations between the governments of China and the Soviet Union, which (in the Far East and Central Asia) have almost 7000 kilometres of common frontier.

As the relations between these two countries were anything but good in history and as the Soviet Government, continuing to some extent the Czarist policy even in the latest political development of China (1917 to 1949), has pursued a China-policy which had as its final aim the suppression of China, the relationship of the newly founded People's Republic to the Soviet Union was strained from the very beginning.

In considering the historical and political development of the two states up to 1949, when the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, the politically interested observer can see that the Sino-Soviet Conflict at its present stage is not only expressed in the political-military relations between the two states. On the contrary: the Sino-Soviet dispute has become an extremely complex factor in international politics which has to be taken into account in dealing with all the existing problems of international (in some cases national) significance.

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It cannot be the aim of this essay to give a comprehensive explanation of all the facets of the relationship between Russia and China — this article intends to give only a brief survey of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, its development and its present state, and to try to answer the most important questions which are raised by following up this disagreement.

These questions are:

- What is the real nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute?
- To what extent are historical questions of importance?
- Is an agreement, a reconciliation, conceivable, or is there an acute danger of a "red fraternal war"?
- In particular: what conclusions can the West draw from the Sino-Soviet dispute?

In order to be able to answer these questions in the limited space available the essay has been divided up as follows:

Chapter I: Account of the political development of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China from 1917/1911 until the beginning of 1971, and — parallel to this development — the course of mutual relations — first between the Republic (1911—1949), then of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Union.

Chapter II: Account of the conflict itself under the heads:

- Development of the conflict,
- Frontier question,
- Ideological divergences.

In a concluding summary the most important results of the preceding inquiry, the significance of this conflict for China, the Soviet Union and the West are pointed out.

The appendix contains a survey of the orientation of the Communist Parties of the world and chronological tables about China, Russia and the Sino-Soviet dispute.

A disadvantage of this method is that it is not always possible to avoid some overlapping, so that, for example, the frontier question is mentioned in both the historical-political development and in the account of the Sino-Soviet relationship and not only in the section entitled "Frontier Question". It seems, however, that in order to give a clear account this overlapping is the lesser evil.

U. G. F.

I. CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION 1911/17 to 1971

1. The Political Development of China From The 1911 Revolution to 1971

a) The Republic of China (1911—1949)

Divided by the systematic policies of the Western maritime powers and of Russia into "spheres of interest", deprived of its ability to take political action by revolts in its interior, China was politically powerless and economically disrupted at the beginning of the 20th century. Officially ruled over by the infant emperor Pu Yi, it was only a matter of time before China would collapse completely. Attempts at reform introduced at the turn of the century came too late: revolutionary movements under the leadership of the Chinese expatriate, Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) increased, and when in 1911 they were joined by separatist provincial governors, this led to the downfall of the monarchy. In the ensuing confusion Sun Yat-sen and his party proved too weak to form a government. As the real power was in the hands of Marshal Yuan Shi-kai, who was in charge of the military and political organisation of north China, Sun Yat-sen concluded an agreement with him that united China and made Yuan President of the new "Republic of China". The following parliamentary elections were won by the Kuomintang (the 'Nationalist People's Party'), which, however, was shortly afterwards declared illegal by Yuan Shi-kai and banned, as Yuan Shi-kai himself was aiming to become emperor. He was prevented from doing so by the Kuomintang and the military.

After Yuan's death (1916) China became the scene of clashes between leaders of the regional military groups, accompanied by the increasing weakness of the central government. China entered the First World War on the Allied side, but found that its interests (the regaining of the German possessions) were not respected in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, as these had been promised to Japan beforehand. A student demonstration against this Treaty led, to the formation of the "Movement of 5th May 1919", which developed into a revolt against China's Confucian past and a break with the literary tradition.

After Sun Yat-sen had tried in vain to establish a government in Canton, the Soviet Union promised him its support after concluding an agreement with the Communist International (Comintern) in 1923. Thereupon Soviet political advisers under Borodin reorganised the Kuomintang and soon began to play a leading part in Chinese domestic politics. A distinction must be made, however, between these Soviet advisers

who were active in the Kuomintang officially for Chiang Kai-shek, and the advisers in the Communist Party of China who, officially delegated by the Comintern, were therefore Communist agents working against the Chiang Kai-shek Government. In 1921 the Communist Party of China was founded under the leadership of the Comintern. It was instructed by Moscow to support officially the policies of Sun Yat-sen's party, and its members were told to join the Kuomintang individually, without giving up the CP and the Comintern. There they began to set up workers' and peasants' organisations and took part in the northern campaign against the "warlords". China became a typical example of Lenin's strategy of exploiting nationalism and the tensions among the peasantry caused by the Asian colonial countries for the victory of Communism.

After Sun Yat-sen's death (1925) the Soviet advisers in the Communist Party tried to accelerate the seizure of power by the Communists. Their plans were foiled by General Chiang Kai-shek, who had himself been trained in the Soviet Union and was now playing a leading role in the military. First in Canton and then on the northern campaign (1926/27) Chiang thwarted the attempts of the Soviet Union through the Communist Party of China to extend its sphere of influence. After taking Shanghai in 1927 Chiang almost completely destroyed the Communist organisation there and thus dealt the Communist Party of China a heavy blow. After divisions had come about in the Kuomintang, its left wing finally broke with the Soviet Union and the Communists as well.

In 1927 Chiang Kai-shek set up a Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanking under his leadership which, after the capture of Peking (1928) and the annexation of Manchuria, ruled formally over the whole of China.

The Government of Chiang Kai-shek was very successful in its social and economic policies in solving the tremendous problems with which the young republic was confronted, until Japan attacked the Chinese mainland (1937). Of great significance during this development was the consolidation of the national armed forces (with the aid of German military advisers), while in the field of school education, especially in the country, great efforts were still necessary.

In international politics, too, the recognition accorded to Chiang Kai-shek's Government grew. It was also successful in regaining some of the sovereign rights lost in the "unequal treaties" of the 19th century – above all rights to control import duties. In 1920 Germany and in 1924 the Soviet Union gave up their extraterritorial rights, while the United States, Great Britain and France did not renounce them until 20 years later, in 1943. The weaknesses of the Nationalist Government lay above all in the incomplete control it exercised over large areas of the hinterland and in stressing urban development on Western patterns.

This led to a neglect of agricultural problems, which were later to be of decisive importance in the conflict with the Communists.

The Communists for their part, after the 1927 defeat, radically changed their course and adopted as their aims the agrarian revolution, the establishment of rural Soviets and guerrilla warfare. This strategy had already been applied by Mao Tse-tung in Hunan in 1927, but at that time he had found himself in opposition to the Communist line and had had to sustain his movement without the backing of the Communist Party. These tactics were successfully applied by the Communist Party of China in Kiangsi Province from 1927 to 1934, but by means of a blockade the Nationalist Government forced the Communists to give up the bases they had set up there. The remnants of the Communist troops set out on the legendary "long march" across west China in 1935 to reach Shensi Province and they established their new capital in Yen-an. Shortly after this Mao Tse-tung assumed the leadership of the Chinese Communists.

The reversal of the Soviet Union's strategy in World War II to form a "United Front" against Germany and Japan also had its impact in the Far East and led in China to a "United Front" of the Communists with the Nationalists against Japan. The threat from Japan induced the Nationalist Government to end the civil war in order to offer joint resistance against Japan.

In July 1937 Japan renewed its attack against north China and in the course of the war, which lasted until 1945, was able to conquer the towns and transport routes of north China, so that the Chinese Government was forced to withdraw to Chungking (Szechwan). The initial military cooperation of Nationalists and Communists was, however, not to last. The clearer it became that Japan, weakened by the Pacific War against the USA, would not be in a position to conquer the whole of China, the more both "coalition partners" tried to secure for themselves favourable starting positions for when the Japanese occupation should come to an end. The Communists had a certain advantage in that they made use of the Japanese occupation to expand their domination over large areas of north China with the help of guerrilla organisations. When Japan capitulated in 1945, there arose in China the grotesque situation whereby the soldiers of the Nationalist Government had to be flown in American aircraft to accept the capitulation of Japanese bases which the Japanese had been defending against the Chinese Communists until surrender. In January and February 1946, although the Nationalist Government and the Communists made military and political agreements to avoid a civil war. The Communists however, equipped by the Soviet Union with confiscated Japanese war material, did not abide by these agreements and attacked in Manchuria. The losses of the best

troops of the Nationalist Government and their equipment suffered in this fighting turned out to be decisive in the civil war that was breaking out. Demoralisation of the troops and strategic mistakes together with the failure to carry out internal reforms mentioned previously led to the final defeat of the troops of the Nationalist Government following the bloody Battle of Sutchai.

In December 1949 Chiang Kai-shek withdrew with some of his loyal supporters to the Island of Taiwan, still recognised by the USA and the United Nations as the legal Government of China.

By 1st October Mao Tse-tung had proclaimed the "People's Republic of China" and with astounding rapidity had begun to rebuild the war-torn country. This outcome of the Chinese civil war came as a surprise to all observers, including the Soviet Union, as Stalin had believed in Chiang Kai-shek's victory to the end.

b) The Political Development of The People's Republic of China From 1949 to 1970

Whereas the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists during the civil war in China was marked for long periods by Soviet opposition to Mao Tse-tung's policies, there was a fundamental change after the Communist Party of China had seized power. The Soviet Union was the first state to accord recognition to the Chinese People's Republic. Soon began negotiations between the two states and in February 1950 resulted in the conclusion of an alliance and friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and China. On the domestic front, between 1950 and 1953, the Communists began to annihilate the leading social groups in a series of persecution campaigns and to replace them with their own leadership. Altogether over 10 million people fell victim to these purges. Industry and finance were nationalised, most of the proprietors being taken over together with their concerns, and, by payments of interest on their expropriated capital, being forced to cooperate.

In 1953 a constitution was passed and a first five year plan was worked out, which, following the Soviet pattern, laid the emphasis on building up heavy industry. The Soviet Union generally bore a considerable share of the economic development: between 1954 and 1959 it supplied more than 300 industrial plants and made over 10,000 experts available.

In 1956 agricultural difficulties contributed to Mao's decision to collectivise the whole of the agricultural system within one year. The attempt in 1957 to give controlled expression to the internal dissatisfaction by the "Hundred Flowers Movement" resulted in anti-Communist demonstrations and renewed purges.

The young state also pursued an active foreign policy. In November 1950 China intervened in the Korean War and supported Ho Chi Minh in the struggle against France in Indochina after the ceasefire (1953). At the end of 1950 Tibet was occupied and in 1951 annexed as an Autonomous Region of the People's Republic; repeated revolts were quelled. At China's urging the Soviet Union gave up its privileges in Manchuria in 1952, and in 1955/56 it returned the bases of Port Arthur and Dairen to China.

In 1954 a "Five Point Agreement" on peaceful coexistence was concluded between China and India and was accepted by the Bandung Conference in 1955.

At the Communist World Conference in Moscow in 1956 Mao Tse-tung signed the declaration on peaceful coexistence, but the attempt by the Chinese Communists to be recognised as partners of the Soviet Union in the leadership of the Communist World Movement remained ignored by Khrushchev.

The intention of attacking the Soviet Union's leading position in world Communism was one of Mao's motives when he proclaimed in 1958 the "Great Leap Forward", thus wanting to shorten the way from socialism to communism and to overtake the Soviet Union. This policy failed, however, and put China years back in its economic development. Only in 1962 was the 1958 level reached again. China began to turn away from this policy in December 1958 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, at which Mao Tse-tung gave up the position of President of the Republic, but retained Chairman of the Party. Liu Shao-chi became President; his decrees during 1960/61 deprived the commune system of its content and gave agricultural development precedence over industrialisation. At the meeting of the Central Committee in the summer of 1959 Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai attacked Mao Tse-tung's policies and position, but suffered a defeat, and together with many other leading members of the military fell a victim to a purge. Lin Piao, the new Minister of Defence, became the closest comrade-in-arms of Mao Tse-tung, who was trying to regain complete control.

In spite of Mao Tse-tung's defeat in domestic policies, his political course, which had been aggressive since 1957, was still pursued externally. In August 1958 China shelled the Nationalist Chinese island of Quemoy, thus triggering off the Quemoy-Crisis. In 1959 the frontier conflict with India which had been smouldering for years resulted in the occupation of additional areas of Ladakh (Kashmir). Further Chinese territorial claims along the Himalayan border led to increased tension between India and China, and on October 20th of 1962 a major Chinese

offensive was launched in Kashmir and on the north-east frontier of India. After the Chinese troops had overrun the Indian defence posts, Great Britain and the USA offered India military aid, whereupon the Chinese proposed a ceasefire and withdrew to the Ladakh region.

Through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation the People's Republic of China supported left-wing revolutionary movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America and became the spokesman of an aggressive policy of "national liberation wars".

At the same time the conflict within China was coming to a head. By a pronounced personality cult Mao had been trying since the end of 1959 to strengthen, by ideological means, his position weakened on the domestic scene. His writings, which theoretically contain no significant innovations, were declared the expression of the "greatest knowledge of the epoch", and progress in every field was attributed to the influence of "Mao Tse-tung Thought". The National Liberation Army, which had been held up as an example to the country since the beginning of 1964, served at the same time to give Mao Tse-tung the necessary backing. At the end of 1964 officers began to be dispatched to political departments, ministries, administrative departments, transport, educational institutes and industry, ostensibly to "spread the spirit of the Liberation Army", but in fact with the aim of going military control in these institutions.

The explosion of the first Chinese atomic bomb in October 1964, which was followed by others, procured China's admission to the "Atomic Club" and gave the People's Republic the status of a nuclear world power.

In the autumn of 1965 the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was initiated, the aim of which was to bring about the permanent revolution from below with the help of the "Red Guards" (hung-wei-ping) in keeping with "Mao Tse-tung Thought." Schools and universities were closed, trade union and all other mass organisations were dissolved, the greatest purge in Communist China had begun. The Cultural Revolution reached its climax in 1966/67, when violent disagreements arose in China between oppositional groups. President Liu Shao-chi was branded the main enemy as the "Chinese Krushchev" and overthrown; his fate is unknown. In mid-1968, as new administrative organs were created (Revolutionary Committees), there began a gradual consolidation of the internal political situation in China, and in September 1968 the "Victory of the Cultural Revolution" was announced.

Chinese foreign policy did not remain unaffected by the events of the Cultural Revolution. In the period from 1965 to 1968 it was characterised by three main features:

- The staging of acts of violence towards other states (destruction of the British Embassy in Peking, the kidnapping of a Chinese member of the staff of the Embassy in the Netherlands, etc.);
- The recall of all Chinese ambassadors — except for the one in Cairo;
- A worsening in the relationship to the Soviet Union, both by stepping up the press campaign and by frontier incidents from March to August 1969.

The 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1969, at which Lin Piao was officially appointed to be Mao Tse-tung's successor and Soviet revisionism was explicitly condemned in the new Party Statutes, and the Communist World Conference in Moscow in June 1969, which demonstrated the disunity of the Communist World on the question of China, contributed their share towards exacerbating the tensions in the Communist camp. Kosygin's unexpected visit to Peking in September 1969 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet negotiations on the common frontier (which are still going on) and the renewed exchange of ambassadors in December 1970 together with other signs of a normalisation of relations between the two states, indicate a certain lessening of tension in relations between China and the Soviet Union, in spite of the continued polemics.

On the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1969 a relatively moderate China presented herself to the world. Chinese foreign policy, which almost completely stagnated in the years of the Cultural Revolution, was increasingly reactivated and at the end of 1970 resulted in new successes when China was recognised by Canada and Italy. Also after the troubled times of the Cultural Revolution it was possible for China to return to normal life in its domestic and economic policies at what seemed to the outside observer to be an amazingly rapid rate, so that at the beginning of 1971, despite the preceding period of unrest, the People's Republic of China presented itself as an internally united, economically and militarily powerful state, a state which with its actively aggressive foreign policy was not without its dangers for others, a state prepared to assume the leading role to which — in its own opinion — it is entitled in the Third World (and on the international scene?).

2. The Political Development of The Soviet Union up to 1971

The lack of understanding shown by the Czarist régime towards social and national problems, intensified by the moral and material strain caused by the defeats in the First World War, resulted in increased internal political opposition, ranging from mutiny and civil disturbances

to political revolution (March 1917). The Czar was forced to abdicate and hand over power to a "Provisional Government", which was no longer in a position to prevent the complete breakdown of Russia: in the "October Revolution" the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, toppled this government and seized power for themselves.

After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3. 3. 1918), which ended the war with the Central Powers, Moscow, being centrally situated, became the capital of the "Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic", which was proclaimed on 14. 3. 1918.

In the civil war from 1918–1921, which was fought with great cruelty, the Soviet power asserted itself through the "Red Army" against the "White" Russians and against the intervention of the big powers (Great Britain, France, USA and Japan), also making use of the world revolutionary Communist International. On 30. 12. 1922, through the alliance of the Russian Soviet Republic with the Ukrainian, of the White Russian Soviet Republic with the Caucasian Soviet Republic, the "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" – USSR – was founded.

In order to prevent an economic collapse, the "New Economic Policy" was introduced in 1921; this made concessions to the private sector of the economy and helped to consolidate the power of the Soviet Union and to procure for it international recognition: it was recognised by Turkey in 1921, Germany in 1922, Britain in 1924, France, Italy and Japan in 1925. The economic consolidation by means of the "New Economic Policy" and Stalin's victory over his opponents in the Party leadership created the necessary pre-requisites for the changes, later described as the "revolution from above", which introduced the economic and political system of Stalinism. Stalin's thesis of the realisations of "socialism in one country" was only possible if the Soviet Union, left entirely to itself, was in a position to close the economic gap between itself and the capitalist countries. So large-scale industrialisation had to turn the agricultural Russia into the industrial state Soviet Union. To achieve this end agriculture was collectivised by force, which led to the destruction of the well-to-do peasants who were rooted to the soil (Kulaks) and resulted in disorganisation and famine. The tremendous efforts and sacrifices which the first Five Year Plan called for were meant to make a new ideological tendency acceptable to the population, while the propagation of "Soviet patriotism" appealed to the sentiments of, especially, the Great-Russians for their native land and for tradition. To this end, from 1934, all schools and universities in the Soviet Union again began teaching a nationalistic view of history which furnished the Stalinist state with its ideological justification and which was intended to deprive the

nationalism of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union of its effectiveness.

The formally federal Stalinist constitution, showing evidence of a democratic spirit, remained the theory for the practice of the authoritarily ruled single-party state. As the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin, exercised an unrestricted, total and totalitarian power. It was based on a regime of terror which had removed all its potential opponents in the great "Purges" (1935–38) and replaced them with a new generation of functionaries submissive to Stalin. The liquidation of a large number of Red Army generals with Marshal Tukhachevsky at their head (1937) constituted a considerable weakening of Soviet military power. It was the Second World War which introduced an ideological relaxation brought about by the consideration paid to the Allies and which led to the inclusion of the moral-religious forces of the Russian Orthodox Church in the defence front.

Apart from the gradual establishment of diplomatic relations with individual states, the Soviet Union was still in an isolated political position in the world at the end of the 'twenties. It was the Litvinov Protocol, as part of the Kellogg Pact (9. 2. 1929), signed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Estonia, which broke through the hitherto fundamentally negative attitude of the Eastern and Central European states to any form of cooperation with the Soviet Union, which brought about a certain relaxation.

Soviet foreign policy was confronted by far more difficult problems in Eastern Asia, where the Soviet Union lost much of its influence for the time being in China through events inside China and was not able to offer resistance to Japan's actions in Manchuria. The conclusion of a series of non-aggression pacts was the beginning of the Soviets Union's entry into international politics, and this was accelerated by National Socialism coming to power in Germany. Under Roosevelt's presidency the USA accorded diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 and the "Little Entente" did likewise – and on 18. 9. 1934 the Soviet Union was admitted into League of Nations.

By forming "Popular Fronts" of all the anti-Fascist parties which the Communists propagated in the various countries, Moscow tried to counter Germany rising up under Hitler. The pacts of assistance with Czechoslovakia and France appeared to strengthen the alliance security of the Soviet Union, but when Germany "incorporated" Czechoslovakia (1938/39) these remained unaffactive. Since the Soviet engagement in the Spanish Civil War (1936–38) was also unsuccessful, the obvious thing for the Soviet Union to do, seeing the situation from its own power-political points of view, was to compensate for these failures by

joining forces with Germany and setting aside all the ideological differences.

Thus, on 23. 8. 1938 the Stalin-Hitler Pact was concluded; following this alliance with Germany the Soviet Union annexed east Poland in September 1939, the Baltic states (including Lithuania) and the Rumanian provinces (Bessarabia and North Bukovina) in June 1940.

Tensions soon arose, however, in the German-Soviet relations because of the Soviet demand with regard to Finland and Turkey, and Moscow now tried to secure itself against Germany by treaties. The aim of the neutrality agreement with Japan was to keep the Soviet Union's back open, but the intention of counteracting German supremacy in the Balkans by means of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty was unsuccessful, because immediately after this treaty had been concluded the German-Yugoslav campaign began, which was followed by the invasion of the Soviet Union itself. The German army groups succeeded in gaining considerable ground in the summer campaigns of 1941 to 1942 — German troops reached Moscow, the Volga and the Caucasus. The German defeat was foreshadowed by the catastrophe of Stalingrad (January 1943) following rapid initial successes, while the Soviet leadership, after recovering from the shock, developed a military and political determination which contributed considerably towards the Allied victory.

The gain in power achieved by the Soviet Union after the Second World War extended far beyond the demands made in 1940/41 and the "war gains" promised at the conferences of Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam. An instrument of this political influence was the Communist Parties of South-East Europe, which again resorted to the popular front tactics, gaining their support from the presence of Soviet troops in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania and setting up "People's Democracies" in these countries. The Governments of these countries were determined exclusively by Communists who were dependent on Moscow and who turned these young People's Democracies into satellite states of the Soviet Union. Running parallel to this was the development of the "Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany" into the "German Democratic Republic".

The Soviet Union acted ruthlessly in achieving its political and military ends and not even stop at both direct and indirect acts of aggression. This policy led to a hardening of the fronts in the so-called "cold war", the only disturbance in the solidity of the Soviet Communist Eastern Bloc being Stalin's break with Tito (1948).

The consequence in foreign policy of the unadulterated imperialism of Soviet policies after 1945 were the loss of the ideological attraction

(existing in some quarters) of Stalinism, especially in the highly developed states of the Western world. The domestic development of the Soviet Union from 1945 to Stalin's death (1953) was marked by a further intensification and at the same time dogmatic solidification of Stalin's dictatorship. The idea of "Soviet patriotism", imbued with concrete implications through war and subsequent victory, continued to be propagated intensively and, in its negative tendencies, was now aimed against the capitalist West in general. Hand in hand with this went a new wave of political ideologisation in the form of the struggle against "cosmopolitanism" and "objectivism". It was not possible to turn away from this course until after Stalin's death, and then only gradually.

The problem of succession was ostensibly solved by proclaiming the principle of a "collective leadership", but in reality a bitter struggle for power was taking place in the highest bodies of the Party, to which influential Party members (Malenkov and Beriya) fell victim and out of which, finally, Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the absolute ruler (1958).

Under Stalin's successors, the propagation of "peaceful coexistence" was accompanied by a change in foreign policy tactics which resulted in breaking down some of the fronts in the cold war. (Ceasefire in Korea and Indochina in 1953, state treaty with Austria in 1955, establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.) At the same time the reaction to the uprising in East Germany (1953) showed that the more conciliant attitude that had become evident did not signify a fundamental change, but only an alteration of methods in Soviet policies. Nevertheless the "New Course" was able to score some successes, even if on the other hand it did result in a certain lowering of the standing of the Soviet Union in the Communist world.

At the 20th Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev tried to eliminate the late excesses of Stalinism by proclaiming "de-Stalinisation" and calling for a return to Lenin. Thus some criticism of the Stalinist system was permitted, and this shook the authority of the Stalinist Governments in the satellite states, resulting in anti-Soviet revolutions in Poland and Hungary in October 1956. In Poland Gomulka's skilful leadership managed to keep the movement under control; in Hungary the armed revolt was quelled with the aid of Soviet troops. The Soviet reaction consisted of an almost undisguised return to Stalinism, which was supported by China and opposed by Yugoslavia. In 1958 Khrushchev also assumed the office of Prime Minister and was thus — having been First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1953 — the absolute ruler.

From the point of view of foreign politics the two years which followed were characterised by a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and

the United States. In September 1959 Khrushchev visited the USA and reciprocated by inviting President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union for the following year. The era of the "Spirit of Camp David" (the atmosphere of good-will which prevailed during the talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev) was ended, however, by the shooting down of an American U 2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. The summit conference due to be held on 16th May did not take place; the invitation to Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union was withdrawn. Nor did the talk between Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961 result in a fresh rapprochement.

American-Soviet tension reached its climax with the Cuba crisis in October 1962, when Khrushchev was forced to yield to Kennedy's tough line and pull the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. One consequence of this Soviet decision was a stepping up of the controversy between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which had been carried on publicly since 1960, after having been pursued for some years already as an internal Communist discussion in secret. The principal Chinese charge was that the Soviet Union was guilty of an ideological diversion (revisionism), and China criticised the policy of peaceful coexistence and the Soviet-American rapprochement this entailed in the sharpest terms, power-political interests of the People's Republic of China also being involved in these accusations.

On 14 October 1964 Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced by a leadership triumvirate composed of Brezhnev (First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Kosygin (Prime Minister) and Podgorny (President of State). The reasons given later for Khrushchev's overthrow were the expansion of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the failures in agriculture and the violation of the Bolshevik principle of "collective leadership". The new leadership turned away from the strongly centralised economic policies of Khrushchev and adopted a system which was more consumer-orientated. The 23rd Party Congress in March/April 1966 passed a new Five Year Plan which bears the features of so-called "Liberianism". The Party Congress also confirmed the general political line being pursued by Khrushchev's successors and turned the name of the Party Presidium back into the "Politburo".

In foreign policy Kosygin and Brezhnev also represent the policy of "peaceful coexistence", which, however, is regarded by the Soviets (contrary to Western interpretation of this term) as a weapon in the class struggle, since the Soviet Union has always emphatically rejected, and still does, coexistence in the ideological sphere. In the same way the Soviet Union also rejects the Western policy of détente, the "policy of bridge-building". It regards this policy of the West as an attack on its

own power-system, as an attempt to lead socialist states on to the path of capitalism. As in a case of this kind weapons are not used, the Soviet ideologists have coined the phrase "peaceful counterrevolution". Moscow's reaction to a development of this sort in its own orbit of power was effectively demonstrated by events in Czechoslovakia, which led from the military occupation in autumn 1968 to the complete elimination of any opposition and the filling of all important positions with politicians loyal to Moscow.

In spite of the increasing opposition within the Soviet bloc both against the Communist system and against Soviet hegemony (Soviet writers' trials, Czechoslovak crisis, Rumania's efforts to become independent, disturbances in Poland in December 1970) it has become possible for the Soviet Union to score certain successes in foreign policy. Apart from the great influence it has gained through the Middle East conflict in the Mediterranean (including the fact that its fleet has managed to penetrate into the Mediterranean itself), the recognition of the legality of Soviet war gains in Eastern Europe and the conclusion of treaties to this effect between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Poland on the other (August and December 1970) are of particularly great significance for the stabilisation of Soviet domination in this area.

On the whole, from 1945 to 1971 the Soviet Union managed to become the second strongest state in the world, which was made possible, above all, by the immense sacrifices of the Russian population. The Soviet Union was able to achieve considerable successes particularly in the technological field (Sputnik, landing a rocket on Venus, first man in space, automatic moon vehicle).

In foreign policy the Soviet Union sees itself involved in an ideological conflict which has resulted in a division of the World Communist Movement into Moscow's and Peking's spheres of influence and which will be dealt with in more detail below.

3. The Relations between China and the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1971

a) The Soviet Union and Nationalist China (1917-49)

Relations between the young Soviet state and the Republic of China, which was hardly any older, seemed very promising for China in the beginning. After Lenin had never ceased to condemn the China policy of the Czar, on 25 July 1919 Leo M. Karakhan, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared that the Soviet Union formally re-

nounced all rights and claims deriving from "unequal treaties". (Karakhan Declaration). This declaration, which was followed by a second one on 27 September 1920, impressed the people and Government of China very much, and the Republic saw itself after all confirmed in its rights and treated as an equal partner state. These declarations seemed to provide the basis for the two states to live side by side on friendly terms, but in the time that followed both the Soviet Union and China were confronted with numerous domestic and foreign policy difficulties, so that for the time being there was no strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations. Not until 1924 was a General Agreement signed between the two states, some of the provisions of which confirmed that Outer Mongolia belonged to China, established diplomatic relations and regulated the territorial question for the future.

That the Government of the Soviet Union, which had actually declared the struggle against imperialism and colonialism to be the most important principles of its foreign policy, wanted to have nothing to do with these principles in its China policy, very soon became clear, however, in spite of the Karakhan Declarations and the General Agreement. So the projected talks on the territorial questions never took place — instead the Soviet Union stepped up its attempts to infiltrate into Sinkiang, Tannu-Tuva and Outer Mongolia, being successful in the case of the last two territories, breaking away them from China.

In examining Sino-Soviet relations since the beginning of the 'twenties a distinction must be made between inter-state relations and the contacts of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, at first thought that Communism and the socialist system as well stood no chance in China and therefore supported the Chiang Kai-shek Government in their official foreign policy. On the other hand the Soviet Communists tried to determine the policies of the Communist Party of China with the help of the Comintern and to bring them into line with the official China policy of the Soviet Union. This also explains the development of relations between the two states in this period.

In July/August 1929 a war almost broke out between China and the Soviet Union on account of differences of opinion on rights relating to the Manchurian railway, but apart from this the interstate relations remained relatively untroubled in the years that followed, especially since from October 1929 the Soviet Union was concentrating its efforts on collectivisation and the industrialisation of its economy.

The Communist Party of China, however, ever since it was founded in 1921, had been under the direct control of the Comintern, which, with the aid of a large contingent of advisers, tried to exploit the civil war-like

unrest in China to strengthen the policies of the Chinese Communists. The fate of the Communist Party of China was thus both a function of the struggles for power in Moscow and of the conception of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union induced the leaders of the Communist Party of China to enter into a coalition with Chiang Kai-shek's Party, which made the Soviet Union at least partly responsible for the almost complete destruction of the organisational apparatus of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai by Chiang in spring 1927. After this catastrophe for the Chinese Communists, Moscow's interest in China waned and the Soviet advisers were recalled too. Stalin's support for Chiang Kai-shek and the subordination of the Communist Party of China to this course by the Communists became especially obvious in the "Sian-incident" in December 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was taken prisoner by his own troops, who demanded a united front with the Communists against Japan instead of fighting the Communists. The Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union called for Chiang Kai-shek's release, instead of using the chance they were offered — which would have been the more obvious move to make — and overthrowing the Government. Nevertheless Chiang Kai-shek ended his struggle against the Communists and concluded a second alliance with Mao Tse-tung, which was directed against Japan and which was in force from 1937 to 1941.

The true nature of Soviet policy towards China could very soon be clearly discerned in the conduct of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Japanese conflict. When Manchuria and Korea were occupied by Japan in 1931 the Soviet Union had remained markedly "neutral", and, in order to avoid difficulties with Japan, the Soviets had sold the East Chinese Railway — in other words, Chinese territory — to Japan. Only a few years later, in 1936, Soviet troops invaded Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia — allegedly to prevent Japan attacking these territories, which the Soviet Union included in its sphere of interest. By this invasion and the Sino-Soviet Treaty concluded on 21 July 1937 the Soviet Union faithfully continued the Czarist China policy. The alleged aim of this treaty was to protect China from Japanese attacks, but it provided the Soviet Union with certain privileges in the territories in question.

On the one hand, Stalin was backing the strength of Chiang Kai-shek, and neglected therefore the connections with the Communist Party of China. This was expressed in the massive economic and military aid for the Nationalist Government. At the same time, however, he was trying to exploit China's weakness, brought about by the Japanese threat, to pursue his interests in China. In doing so, however, difficulties with Japan should be avoided. This was to be seen when, after scattered fighting, the Soviet Union concluded with Japan a ceasefire treaty in

September 1939 and a neutrality treaty in April 1941, the consequence of which was that the Soviet Union recognised "Mandshukuo" and Soviet aid to China was stopped or reduced.

The Soviet entry into the war in Asia took place in 1945 at the request of the USA and Great Britain as assistance for the Allies in the struggle against Japan and brought the Soviet Union fresh gains in China. As compensation for its aid, the Soviet Union concluded a "Friendship Treaty" with China on 14 August 1945 with which China was practically forced to pay for the Soviet assistance. Chiang Kai-shek, who opposed this treaty, was forced by the USA to sign under threat of the withdrawal of military aid. This treaty had already been decided upon at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) — at which China was not represented — and provided that the east Chinese and south Manchurian railways should be placed under Soviet-Chinese administration. Except that the Soviets should be allowed to use the Chinese ports Dairen and Port Arthur as naval bases and China had to recognise the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state. In return the Soviet Union undertook not to interfere in China's internal affairs, to give military support to the Nationalist Government and to recognise China's sovereignty in Manchuria. Thus the Soviet Union had once acquired all the rights in China which it had lost in the war between Russia and Japan in 1904/1905.

If Stalin wanted to enjoy the benefits of the agreements with China he was bound to give more support than ever to the Nationalist Government — and not to the Communists under Mao. The Soviet Union reacted accordingly: even after the capitulation of Japan, when Soviet soldiers had already entered Manchuria and the conflicts between Communists and Nationalists were assuming the form of guerrilla warfare, Stalin continued to back Chiang Kai-shek and apparently reckoned on a victory. But there were two tracks to Stalin's policy. In spite of the repeated declarations that the Soviet Union recognised only one Government, the Nationalist Government, and was giving "no support whatsoever" to the Communists, there are indications of material support being given to the Communists by the Soviet Union. According to information available today this aid was intended as a "counter-effect" to American aid to the Nationalist Government.

The Chinese Communists for their part frequently stressed their sympathy for the Soviet Union, and when in June 1949 Mao Tse-tung announced the policy of "inclining to one side", he demanded — in vain — an alliance of the Communist Party of China with the Soviet Union.

A worsening of the Sino-Soviet interstate relations came about when on 20 May 1949 the Chinese Nationalist Government accused the Soviet

Union of violating the 1945 treaty and asserted that the Soviet Union had given the Communists in Manchuria substantial support. Chiang Kai-shek brought the matter up at the United Nations, of which Nationalist China is a member, and it was debated at the 230th session of the General Assembly in May 1949, and then the meeting adjourned. It was not until 25 November 1949 that the Nationalist Chinese resolution was dealt with by the General Assembly of the UNO — at a time therefore when China was already under Mao Tse-tung's rule. Accordingly these negotiations remained fruitless.

The conduct of the Soviet Union in the last phase of the Nationalist Government and in the first phase of the Communist Government can be regarded as typifying Soviet China policy from 1917 to 1949: the only ambassador who had followed Chiang Kai-shek as far as Canton was the Soviet one. On 2 October 1949, one day after its proclamation, the Soviet Union was the first state to accord diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

In summary the following can be said about Sino-Soviet relations in the period from 1917 to 1949:

1. The Soviet Union, in its treatment of the China question, proved itself to be a faithful successor of Czarist policies; it skilfully exploited the power struggles between Nationalists and Communists and the external threat to China from Japan to carry through its own interests in China.
2. During this time the Republic of China was weakened by threats from within and without to such an extent that it was forced to accept the external "assistance" — whether it was a question of the occupation of Sinkiang by Soviet troops or the pressure from the USA to sign the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945.
3. The victory of Mao Tse-tung over Chiang Kai-shek in September 1949 took all those involved by surprise: there is evidence that not only the Soviet Union but also the USA and Chiang Kai-shek did not expect the Communists would have a success of that kind. Only the Soviet Union, however, understood how to use the situation and to offer itself to the young People's Republic as a "fraternal socialist state" — aid which Mao was forced to accept for the simple reason that his land needed outside help, which nobody offered than the Soviet Union.

It can be concluded from this starting situation and a knowledge of the further development of Sino-Soviet relations that the causes and the background of the present tensions between the two Communist states lie, to a large extent, in the past — in the Sino-Soviet relations up to 1949.

b) The Soviet Union And The People's Republic of China (1949 to 1971)

If Stalin did not want to afford to do without the enormous growth in territory and people that China signified for the Communist camp, Mao Tse-tung was not able to reject the aid from the Soviet Union, especially in the economic sector — irrespective of what Mao Tse-tung may have thought of the attitude of the Soviet Communists to China in the years before.

In December 1949 Mao Tse-tung was already setting out for an eight week visit to Moscow at the head of a large delegation. The result of this trip was a treaty of friendship, alliance and assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union to run for 30 years. As a consequence of this treaty the Soviet Union had to abandon some of the positions it had gained in the 1945 treaty with regard to China, but here too the basic tenor lay in the assertion of Soviet interests towards China. Thus the Soviet Union recognised China's sovereignty over Sinkiang, but in return China was forced to recognise, once and for all, the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic. It also provided for the founding of several Sino-Soviet societies, a comprehensive aid programme in the economic, military and cultural sectors. As a result of this numerous Soviet military personnel, scientists, technicians, teachers and students came to China and took an active part in building up the devastated country, but on the other hand they also represented an effective "Fifth Gang" and provided the Soviet Union with an insight into all of China's affairs.

China's participation in the Korea War (1950 to 1953) was only made possible by Soviet supplies of weapons and materials. It has never been decided whether the Chinese were acting here on Soviet instructions or only with Soviet support; in any event, the Chinese operations considerably increased the prestige of the young People's Republic. Later, incidentally, the Soviet aid — according to Chinese information — had to be repaid by China in full.

An interesting light is thrown on Sino-Soviet relations at this time by the discussion about surrendering Port Arthur and Dairen, two ports occupied by the Soviet Union. On 15 February 1952 China officially "requested" the Soviet Union to leave its troops in these ports. Today it is known that as early as 1950 Mao Tse-tung was pressing for the return of the ports, but, for obvious reasons, could not disregard Soviet wishes. In other respects, too, the Soviet Union was by no means so altruistic as would at first appear. So it is thought to be proved that the Soviet aid to China up to Stalin's death (1953) was aimed at a complete domination

of China's economic life — without regard for the interests of the People's Republic.

Under Stalin's successors there was some slackening off in the Soviet grip on China. China had a chance to place its relations with the Soviet Union on a new footing and to come a good deal nearer to equality. China did not receive any real economic aid until after 1953, and the first visit by Soviet leaders to Peking, Khrushchev and Bulganin, did not take place until September/October 1954. On 8 February 1955 the People's Republic was then for the first time mentioned equal together with the Soviet Union as the "leaders of the socialist camp" — Mao's efforts to obtain equality were showing the first fruits: on 26 May 1955 Soviet troops withdrew from the occupied Chinese ports.

The next years of Sino-Soviet relations were characterised by Soviet policies turning away from China to some extent and concentrating on and supporting at the same time the other Asian development states: whereas since 1955 the Soviet Union had demanded compensation for its economic aid to China, in the same year it concluded economic treaties with India and intensified its relations to Afghanistan and Burma. Today the question must be asked to what extent these policies, possibly with a knowledge of the Chinese attitude, were intended to put an end to the influence of the People's Republic in this area.

The 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 presents a picture of Chinese and Russians agreeing on all matters and confirms the leading role of the Soviet Union in world Communism. Only a few days after the Party Congress criticism of Stalin was published in the Chinese press, and it agreed with the accusations made at the Party Congress. In April of the same year an agreement was concluded the Soviet Union and China which provided for an increase in Soviet aid, and the period which followed is marked by numerous demonstrations of Sino-Soviet solidarity and unity; for example:

- China expresses its agreement to the way in which the anti-Soviet unrest was dealt with in Hungary and Poland in 1956.
- In February 1957 Chou En-lai visits Moscow and then goes on to Warsaw and Budapest.
- In 1957 Mao Tse-tung comes to Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union and signs the so-called "Moscow Declaration of 1957".
- On 15 October in the same year a Sino-Soviet agreement was concluded on "the new technology for the national defence of China", the agreement on nuclear aid which was kept secret at first.

— In July/August 1958 Khrushchev visits Peking, and during the talks with the Chinese leaders consensus is also established on Yugoslav "revisionism".

Only shortly after this, however, the first signs of friction were already beginning to appear in relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China:

- Thus the Soviet support for the Chinese stand in the Quemoy crisis in 1958 appears to be quite slight.
- On 1 December 1958 Khrushchev describes the Chinese Communes as "old-fashioned".
- In February 1959, at the 21st Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there is the first mention of differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Assertions made by Yugoslavia are under discussion, at once rejected by both sides.
- In the Sino-Indian frontier conflict in September 1959 the Soviet Union adopts a markedly neutral stand and thus indirectly disapproves of China's conduct.
- On 1 December 1959 Khrushchev talks about "distortions of Marxism-Leninism", doubtless meaning the policies of the Chinese leaders.

It is on this last point, the question of interpreting Marxism-Leninism, that it finally comes to the first public dispute on ideological questions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China: the editorial in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of China, "Red Flag", on the occasion of Lenin's 90th birthday, entitled "Long Live Leninism", marks the beginning of the open quarrel between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on ideological matters.

In the course of this disagreement, which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter, the Soviet Union stopped all aid to China by 1960 and withdrew all the advisers, who also took with them the design plans for the projects on which they were working. Thus Khrushchev was trying to bring the Chinese, revolting against Soviet tutelage, to "reason" by force — however, without success.

The interstate relations of the two major powers were naturally seriously impaired by the differences which were expanding into the "Sino-Soviet Conflict". It seems to be of considerable importance in this connection that, in spite of all the quarrels on a political-ideological level, until well into the Cultural Revolution Chinese-Soviet agreements on trade and exchange of goods, on air transport and for other areas of cooperation were regularly concluded each year. Though the full extent

of these agreements is not known, simply the fact that they concluded at all proves that, in spite of all the polemics, both sides were interested in maintaining their relations to the other state to a certain degree. This is also borne out by the fact that the usual diplomatic practices (such as messages of greetings on the various occasions) were still continued, even in times when the most violent polemics were being exchanged, although perhaps not quite as cordially as in earlier years.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution resulted in a considerable strain on relations between the two states. The polemics were stepped up, were extended to cover all spheres of policies, and finally — following acts of violence and demonstrations in Peking and Moscow — the ambassadors of the two states were recalled in June 1966.

In the following period the ideological-political disagreement grew more intense and resulted in an extensive paralysation of diplomatic relations.

The first direct contact since four and a half years between top Chinese and Soviet statesmen took place on 11 September 1969, when Soviet Premier Kosygin paid an unexpected visit to Peking. This meeting proved that there did exist a willingness to come to an understanding on both sides, despite the spectacularly demonstrative border incidents from March to August in the same year.

As a concrete result of the talks in Peking, negotiations have been under way (also in Peking) since 20 October 1969 on the territorial questions between the Soviet Union and China, another agreement on trade and the exchange of goods has been concluded and — in December 1970 — China and the Soviet Union again exchanged ambassadors.

In summary it can be said on the development of Sino-Soviet relations from 1949 to 1971 that, after very close economic and political contacts in the beginning, in the course of which the Soviet Union tried to bring the Chinese economy under its control, a process of emancipation, based on ideology, set in in China and resulted in a rapid worsening in the relationship of the two states to one another.

II. THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

1. The Development of the Differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China

If Chinese information is taken as a basis, the discussion with the Soviet Union on ideological questions began as early as 1956 at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although it is true that the accusations which the Chinese claim to have made by 1956 correspond in their contents to the charges which China did not state publicly until 1961, on the other hand it must be remembered that the final communiqué of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was endorsed in its entirety by the Chinese delegation and that in the subsequent years there were no indications that serious differences existed between the two Communist states.

Only together with the present knowledge of the Sino-Soviet relationship is it possible to conclude from the various utterances (mentioned in the previous chapter) of politicians of both states from about 1957 which refer to possible differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and Communist China that there were already serious differences between the two countries from the mid-fifties; even though both sides were anxious to cover them up, particularly in 1957/58, and not to allow anything to reach the public about them.

In following the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict it is quite generally necessary to distinguish between differences in the ideological field and in the political field. Whereas — as pointed out — the first ideological differences can be dated to the year 1956, the differences of opinion with regard to the political activities of the two sides cannot be fixed in such a definite way. If Khrushchev criticised China's domestic and economic policies on various occasions, for China it was first and foremost Soviet-American relations which gave rise to extreme distrust. It cannot be stated for certain to what extent China's conduct was the result of a concrete fear (which is possibly rooted in history) of being taken advantage of by the two super powers or, however, of the political calculations of the USA and the Soviet Union playing one off against the other, but it is a fact that the relationship between the Soviet Union and America is, still today, the subject of very strong criticism on the part of China ("encirclement theory").

It was for this reason that the period of détente between the Soviet Union and the USA (from mid-1958 to 1960), the climax of which was Khrushchev's visit to the USA in September 1959, resulted in a worsening of Soviet-Chinese relations. Khrushchev returned to Moscow from

the USA via Peking, where he spoke to Mao Tse-tung himself, but in doing so he does not seem to have succeeded in dispelling all the doubts surrounding his policies.

Only a short time later, on 21 April 1960, an article appeared in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of China "Red Flag" (Hung-chi) entitled "Long Live Leninism", which indirectly criticised Soviet policies. Thus the ice of reserve was broken, and the open dispute on (for the time being) ideological differences between the two Communist states had begun. At first this discussion was carried on indirectly, in that China criticised the policies of the "Yugoslav revisionists" (and meant the Soviet Union), knowing full well that there had been a détente in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, while the Soviet Union for its part attacked the policies of Albania, to which China was allied.

It then became absolutely clear at the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961 that antagonism had developed from the differences: the Soviet Union stepped up its criticism of Stalin, as a counter-move the Chinese delegation demonstratively laid a wreath on Stalin's grave. After this Party Congress the polemics between the Soviet Union and China were, for a time, also still carried on indirectly, the Communist Parties of Italy (under Togliatti) and of France (under Thorez) also being brought in. Only in 1963 did China drop all considerateness and openly attack the "revisionist Khrushchev clique".

How great the antagonism had become between the two Communist states was shown in autumn 1962 during the Sino-Indian frontier conflict, in which China had counted on support from the Soviet Union. When Nehru rejected a Chinese offer of a ceasefire and instead asked the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union for help, whereupon Moscow actually did continue to supply India with military aid (which had begun previously), China saw itself in the weaker position and was forced to withdraw from India again. It had thus become abundantly evident that the Soviet Union had let down its "socialist fraternal state".

Relations between the two countries were worsened further by the Cuba crisis in the same year: Moscow, its hand forced by Kennedy's tough stand, proclaimed that its yielding to Kennedy's demands was a "victory for reason", to which Peking retorted that "it was downright nonsense to say that peace had been saved by the withdrawal of the (Soviet) missiles". Later Mao Tse-tung referred to the sending of Russian missiles to Cuba as an "adventure", their withdrawal as a "capitulation" before the imperialists.

At the Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany held in East Berlin in January 1963, the head of a Chinese delegation was shou-

ted down for the first time in public and prevented from continuing his speech.

At the same time Khrushchev suggested (on 16 January 1963) the possibility of direct talks between Chinese and Soviets to prepare a new Communist summit conference. The official invitation to this was sent to Peking on 11 February and was accepted by Mao Tse-tung on 9 March. Irrespective of this the quarrel on ideological and practical political questions continued unabated, China building up a whole doctrine against Khrushchev, which culminated in the "Proposal for the General Line of the International Movement", which was presented to the Soviet Union on 14 June and published at the same time. This letter contained 25 theses for a "general line", which revealed the opposing standpoints more clearly than ever before.

With this draft programme, China tried, by compromising Khrushchev, to mobilise revolutionary Communist or even non-Communist movements in the socialist camp and thus to force a change in Soviet policies, especially in view of the readiness to come to an understanding with the USA. These high expectations of the Chinese leaders were not fulfilled, however, because, even during the Sino-Soviet consultations which had opened in Moscow on 6 July, the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union — also meeting in Moscow — agreed on the conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty, which was to be signed on 25 July.

This agreement constituted an unequivocal negative reply of the Soviets to the Chinese leaders and at the same time a tactical defeat for the Chinese strategy. Beforehand the Soviets had drawn up an "Open Declaration" as a reply to the Chinese note of 14 June, and this was no less detailed than the Chinese note. Both notes were published in "Pravda" on 14 July.

On 20 July the Sino-Soviet talks were then broken off without any results having been achieved: all it said in the communiqué published by both sides was "that during these talks both sides had set forth their views and positions on a whole series of important questions of principle relating to the present changes in the world situation, the international Communist movement and Sino-Soviet relations". This says nothing but that the different opinions were "set forth" but could not be bridged. Officially the talks were adjourned, but they have still not been resumed. The Chinese criticism of the nuclear test ban treaty signed by Moscow was all the stronger for this, and Peking described it as "a great fraud which served to lead the peoples of the world by the nose".

The second major Chinese offensive against Khrushchev began on 6 September 1963 with the publication of the first out of nine replies to the "Open Letter" from the Soviet Union dated 14 June, the last of which

was distributed on 14 July 1964. In the first of these replies, which was entitled "The Origin And The Development of The Differences Between The Leadership of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union And Ourselves", China claimed for the first time that the beginning of the Sino-Soviet quarrel went back to 1956, the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, and furnished various pieces of evidence as proof, such as, for example, an enumeration of those points on which China was allegedly of a different opinion in 1956 and even before that in ideological questions of policy from the Soviet Union.

These Chinese polemics made the controversy between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China insurmountable, the Chinese version making "Khrushchev's revisionism" solely responsible for these differences.

The fall of the hated antagonist Khrushchev on 14 October 1964 indicated the possibility of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The fact that both sides were at first extremely reserved after the change of power seemed to point to a definite intention of the Soviet Union. Today it is known that the new Soviet leaders actually did attempt to reduce the tensions with China, but they were not successful. The explosion of China's first atomic bomb, on 16 October 1964, played an important part in this, since it gave China the possibility to face the Soviet Union no longer as a hopelessly inferior partner, but as a party which had assumed a certain position of strength.

In November 1964 Chou En-lai took part in the Soviet celebrations for the revolution in Moscow, but apparently this first direct contact between China and the new Soviet leaders did not produce any reconciliation of the opposing standpoints. Only two weeks later, on 21 November 1964, China spoke openly of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party "Red Flag".

In fact Khrushchev's successors changed Soviet tactics in the conflict with China rather than the matter itself. The open anti-Chinese polemics were replaced by a more delicate, more subtle influencing of the "fraternal parties", which set out the Soviet standpoint in positive terms, but made the Chinese position appear to be of secondary importance and put it in a bad light. The Chinese press denounced the policy of the "Soviet revisionists", accused it, among other, of betraying the cause of Communism and at the same levelled the charge that the Soviets as members of the white race were helping to exploit the coloured peoples among which China includes itself. The Soviet Union generally reacted coolly to these attacks and confined itself to occasional retorts.

Characteristic of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the time after Khrushchev's fall was the exchange of "secret letters" between the Central

Committees of the two Communist Parties. Secret is a misleading description in that this exchange of letters even reached foreign countries in the West through deliberate indiscretions.

The leading article in the Peking "People's Daily" of 11 November 1966 contained a lengthy bill of indictment setting out once again all the points of dispute between China and the Soviet Union in detail. This marked an abandonment of the practice of secrecy.

The Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy was primarily concerned with the attitude of the Soviet Union

- towards the USA
- in the Vietnam war
- towards the endeavours for disarmament, such as the nuclear test ban treaty and nuclear proliferation.

The criticism of the Soviet domestic policy concentrated on

- the economic organisation of the concerns and
- the agricultural policy, which in the opinion of the Chinese accelerated the return to capitalism in the countryside and the move towards private property.

In their conclusion the Chinese supported the "fusion of the genuine revolutionary forces" and demanded that the "true" Marxist-Leninists, that is the supporters of the Chinese, must become active in the political and the organisational spheres.

The Soviet reply to this indictment was published in "Pravda" on 27 November and was, on the whole, couched in defensive terms. The ideological attitude of the Chinese was dismissed as "ideological infantilism", the emphasis of the Soviet argumentation being placed on the necessity for a united socialist front against "capitalist imperialism", by which the Soviets played down the importance of the Chinese ideological attacks and directed attention to the "real" ideological opponent of Communism.

In a certain respect, this correspondence was a turning point in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Whereas up to then the differences between the two states had been argued in the ideological and journalistic sphere, now the signs of a possible military conflict were becoming more and more apparent. Subsequently both the Soviet Union and China quite often hinted at troop movements and clashes on the common frontier. The most interesting and, if correct, most significant thing to happen was the statement of the Defence Minister of the Mongolian

People's Republic to the effect that the Soviet Union had set up a missile base on Mongolian territory which, on account of its strategical geographical location, could only be directed against China. It was concluded from this report that the situation was tense on the Sino-Soviet border, which was confirmed by later reports of border incidents. The Soviet attitude at this time tended to be reserved and its polemical articles — measured against the aggressiveness of the Chinese — can be described as moderate.

In March 1966 another "secret letter" from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reached the "fraternal Parties" in the West in which the Soviet Union, "at the request of the fraternal Parties", provided information on the state of the ideological conflict between them and the Chinese. According to this self-representation, after Khrushchev's fall the Soviet Union "tried everything" to prevent any further escalation in Sino-Soviet relations. The "Chinese leaders", however, had intensified the political struggle against the Soviet Union, provoked (!) border incidents, refused to expand the economic, technical and cultural co-operation of both states and had even taken steps to cut it down further. The Soviets also maintained that the anti-Soviet course had become a main constituent of all the ideological work of the Communist Party of China, which was permanently urging upon the Chinese people that the Soviet Union was one of its main enemies. Moreover the Chinese were reproached for their attitude in the Vietnam war and finally it was stated that the sole aim of the "ideological and theoretical platform of the Chinese leaders was to camouflage their nationalistic big power policies" and was nothing but "militaristic big power chauvinism" which served to realise a "hegemonial dream". The Chinese leaders (according to the Soviet version) used an "ultra-revolutionary vocabulary" and were exploiting a "petty bourgeois pseudo-revolution" to help "chauvinism and the predominance of their line" to victory.

Thus the Soviet Union had, in the main, made the same accusations against China as the Chinese leaders had levelled against the Soviet Union. The main points in ideology were the mutual deviation from the line of "true" Communism, in foreign policy "neo-colonialism" on the one hand and "big power chauvinism" on the other as well as the policy towards the "revolutionary liberation movements". Respectively with regard to the mutual internal policies charges were made of anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese conduct. These mutual recriminations have remained up to the present the main components of the polemics of both sides.

China replied to the Soviet accusations in a detailed "open letter"; in which at the same time it refused the invitation to attend the 23rd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The events in connection with the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China also brought about a change in the Chinese attitude towards the Soviet Union: thus the struggle against "Soviet revisionism" was made the highest principle of China's domestic and foreign policy, anti-Soviet demonstrations and mass rallies were quite common in the China of the Cultural Revolution. They were accompanied by countless articles in all Chinese publications, which criticised the details of the Soviet Union's policies.

The Soviet reaction to these furious attacks could be described as moderate, apart from some counter-demonstrations in Moscow. It confined itself to fundamental replies to the accusations made against it and to regular reports on the "Events in China". On the whole the impression given was that the Soviet Union was making light of the quarrels with China and did not take for serious the furious neighbour. Here one feature of Soviet polemics against China became especially clear which had been crystallising since the fall of Khrushchev: Soviet criticism of the People's Republic had been shifting to an ever increasing extent to Mao Tse-tung and his "clique" and had been excluding both the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.

By concentrating these attacks on a very small circle of Chinese politicians, the "Mao clique", and excusing both the Communist Party of China itself and the Chinese people by saying they have been misled by the "Mao clique" the Soviet Union enables itself to appear as the defender of the "correct" policies of the Communist Party of China and the "true" interests of the Chinese people and thus retains for itself the chance of once again resuming friendly relations with China "after Mao". These tactics could also win over for the Soviet China policy possible Chinese opponents of Mao Tse-tung's policies.

Up to the end of the new revolutionary phase in China, the announcement of the "victory" of the "Great Proletarian Revolution" in September 1968, there were no essential changes in the Sino-Soviet dispute, even though the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 did give rise to violent attacks against the policy of the "Soviet neo-colonialists".

The mutual relationship of the two Communist states their differences having become an accepted phenomenon in international politics in the form of the "Sino-Soviet Conflict", underwent a significant change with the unexpected reports of armed clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border on 3 March 1969. Both states accused the other of aggression and military provocation, without it being possible to see which side was in fact responsible for these incidents. This fighting on the long common frontier, which went on into August (for details see Chapter II/2b),

introduced new features into the mutual relations and made appear a war at times possible between the two Communist states.

In April 1969 the 9th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China took place in Peking, at which a new Party statute was passed. This statute expressly condemns the Soviet policies and makes it its aim to fight against "modern revisionism, whose core is the Soviet revisionist renegade clique". A programme of that kind is unique in the history of the Communist Parties.

Despite these escalations in the ideological and military spheres, in June/July 1969 talks were held by the Sino-Soviet Commission for frontier navigation in Khabarovsk and were concluded with an agreement on navigation along the frontiers.

The unexpected visit by the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to Peking on 11 September 1969 underlined a turn in the relationship between the two states. Shortly after the talks between Kosygin and Chou En-lai, negotiations opened on 20 October in Peking on the common frontier, which were conducted in strict secrecy and are still going on to date, although it is impossible to notice any signs of concrete results.

The polemics from both sides were also intensified by the frontier incidents in 1969. If the reproaches relating to ideology were kept within the customary bounds, there were certain shifts of emphasis with regard to the reproaches relating to the policies of each of the other states. The Soviet Union stressed in its polemics above all the "speculative mass war psychosis", the "general militarisation" and "systematic creation of a war hysteria". China accused the Soviet Union of "nuclear blackmail" and "preparing for a war". The mutual attacks relating to foreign policy were based on the relationship to the USA that each country suspected in the other. While China regarded with extreme suspicion the Soviet-American contacts, especially the talks in Helsinki on arms limitations (SALT), and deduced from these a cooperation of the "US imperialists with the Soviet revisionists", the object of which was the destruction of China, the Soviet Union was suspicious of the American-Chinese ambassadorial talks in Warsaw and deduced from them, for its part, Chinese-American cooperation against the Soviet Union.

These polemics were carried on throughout 1970 by both sides and are still continuing today (March 1971). The main Chinese document of this time was the article entitled "Leninism or Social-Imperialism" which was published on 22 April 1970 to mark the centenary of Lenin's birth. The Soviet reply to this appeared on 18 May and bore the title "Pseudo-revolutionaries Unmasked" and was of a fundamental nature

too. The range of criticism on both sides covered practically all aspects of domestic and foreign policy and thus did not extend beyond the customary limits.

At the same time, however, there were increasing signs of a certain normalisation in the relations between the Soviet Union and China. The most important point to mention in this connection is the recent exchange of ambassadors. At the end of 1970 Vassilij Tolstikov, for the Soviet Union, and Liu Hsin-chuan, for China, took over the ambassadors' posts which had been vacant since June 1966, after this exchange of ambassadors had been announced long beforehand. In June 1970 the joint Commission for frontier navigation questions met for its 16th session, and in addition, in the course of the year, agreements were concluded on railway transport and reciprocal trade. Parallel to this China reactivated its diplomatic relations to the states of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.

It was the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty on 12 August and the disturbances in Poland in mid-December that first led to new and violent attacks by China against Soviet policies.

In view of the fact that the ideological-political quarrel between the Soviet Union and Communist China can be traced back over years, it is clear that the polemics of both sides cannot be the sole criterion for the state of this conflict. In summarising, it can be said at the conclusion of this short survey of the development of Sino-Soviet differences that the noticeable progress towards normalisation indicates that the political signs on both sides at the beginning of the 'seventies point towards a lessening of tension.

2. The Development of the Frontier Question between Russia and China from the Beginning up to 1971

a) The Frontier Question up to 1949

Up until the middle of the 17th century there was no common front-line between Russia and China. The first encounters of Chinese and Russian troops on the edge of the Chinese sphere of influence took place in the 'fifties of the 17th century in the Amur region in the north-east of China. The Russian Cossacks did not, however, allow themselves to be held up in their advance and so fighting broke out, continuing more or less sporadically until 1689. In this year, on 6 September, China concluded the first treaty with a foreign state in Nerchinsk after long

negotiations. This **Treaty of Nerchinsk** (Chinese: Ni-pu-chu), as it was called from then on, laid down the demarcation of the border and provided agreements for reciprocal trade between the two states. It confirmed that the whole of the Amur Region, Eastern Mongolia and Turkestan were territories of the Chinese Empire, and at the same time Russian settlers and soldiers were forbidden to navigate the Amur, and the settlements which had been established earlier on the banks of the river had to be destroyed. Apart from that Russia was ceded about 240,000 square kilometres of territory which had previously belonged to China's sphere of influence.

All in all this treaty is regarded as balanced, even though both sides later complained bitterly about its provisions. Mainly responsible for bringing about the treaty were two Jesuits working as advisers at the Chinese Imperial Court, F. Gerbillon and Th. Pereira, who also provided a Russian, a Chinese and a Latin version of the treaty, the latter being the only valid one. These different versions were necessary to enable the Chinese representatives to sign at all. In the Russian version the treaty appeared to be an agreement with an equal state, whereas in Chinese it was a treaty of the "Middle Kingdom" with a "bearer of tribute".

For almost forty years the neighbourly relations between China and Russia developed on the basis of this treaty, which laid down only a small (eastern) part of the common frontier. It was moreover not marked everywhere and thus allowed the Russians to make further gradual advances.

The **Treaty of Kyakhta** of 1 November 1727 and its supplementary agreements contained agreements on trade, travel and on provisions on establishing a Russian mission in Peking and recent frontier agreements. It laid down that the border ran from the Sayan Mountains west of the Amur as far as the river Argun. Russia was thus able to expand its territory by a further 100,000 square kilometres. The supplementary treaties of 1768, 1772, 1786 and 1797 made only minor changes to the frontier. They introduced a period which was marked by the attempt on both sides to influence the tribes in the border areas which up to then had been largely independent.

These treaties were also quite definitely in accord with the interests of both sides and did not depart from the spirit of the earlier treaty. On the basis of them there developed a peaceful period of coexistence lasting one hundred years along the common frontier. This was helped by the fact that Russia hardly interfered any more in internal Chinese rivalries.

There was no change in this state of affairs until the middle of the 19th century, when China was weakened by the threat from outside — the “opening of China” by force by the European world powers and the resultant Opium War (1839–42), and internal unrest — the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) — and was not in a position to stave off a further threat, from Russia in the north. Russia exploited this moment of China’s weakness to impose its own interests: disregarding the treaties that had been concluded Russian peasants and Cossacks under N. Muraviev, the Governor for East Siberia, systematically settled the territory north of the Amur and established garrisons. Taking advantage of China’s plight, Muraviev forced China to sign the **Treaty of Aigun** under threat of arms on 28 May 1858, which gave Russia the whole territory north of the Amur including its banks, an area of some 450,000 square kilometres. It was also agreed that the area east of the Ussuri should be placed under joint administration. In addition, only shortly after this, on 13 June 1858, in Tientsin a Sino-Russian friendship treaty was concluded which gave Russia the same advantageous position with regard to China as the European powers had in the meantime procured for themselves by force of arms. Although China at first refused to ratify the Treaty of Aigun, especially as Russia was claiming in addition the Island of Sakhalin for itself, China was no match for the political machinations of its opponent and was thus unable to prevent the ratification of this treaty and the additional cession of territory east of the Ussuri in the **Treaty of Peking** of 14 November 1860. To these cessions of territories amounting to some 300,000 square kilometres were added another roughly 800,000 square kilometres when the frontier was drawn up again between Mongolia and Kokand, giving Russia a large part of Chinese Turkestan. This frontier line was laid down in detail in the **Protocol of Chuguchak** of 7 October 1864.

In this way Russia, almost unnoticed by the West, had been able to increase the size of its territory considerably and secure herself a number of privileges. This was, however, not enough to “saturate” it — on the contrary: in the subsequent years the main emphasis of Russian expansion shifted to the Chinese province of Sinkiang and the Chinese Pamir Region, to Central Asia. In order to put an end to Russian influence there a Chinese plenipotentiary was sent to St. Petersburg in 1879. Unfortunately he was so duped by his negotiating partners that he signed the **Treaty of Levadia** on 15 September 1879, which provided for the cession of the whole of the Ili valley. Although China managed to annul this cession for all but a small part by means of the **Treaty of St. Petersburg** of 24 February 1881. In the time that followed it was continually losing smaller territories to Russia.

The treaties of Aigun, Peking and St. Petersburg, the Sino-Russian

friendship treaty and numerous other agreements with China had procured for Russia not only huge territorial gains but also a host of privileges in trade, traffic and transport, mineral exploration rights, the granting of concessions and extraterritorial rights in China, so that at the end of the 19th century Russia had become the real gainer in the “dividing up of China”.

The decades that followed up to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, which was preceded by the overthrow of the Manchu-Dynasty by the social revolutionary Sun Yat-sen in China in 1911, were marked by the insidious infiltration of Chinese territories by Russian agents, particularly in Central Asia, without any new treaties being concluded between Russia and China.

China was hoping for a change in the China policy from the new Soviet Government in Russia, and above all for a revision of the frontier treaties. This was particularly so after the declarations of the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Leo M. Karakhan, of 25 July 1919 and 27 September 1920. In them it said that the Soviet Union declared all treaties “concluded between the former Government of Russia and China to be null and void” and renounced “all annexations of Chinese territories . . .”.

Although Lenin himself had on several occasions spoken out against the “unequal treaties” with China, the negotiations between Chinese and Soviet representatives soon showed that the idea of the Soviet Union returning any territories was unthinkable. In the Sino-Soviet **Treaty of 31 May 1924**, the Soviet Union renounced only its extraterritorial rights and confirmed that Outer Mongolia belonged to China.

Under Stalin the main emphasis of the Soviet Far East policies lay in the enforced settling of Siberia and in a more intense settlement of Central Asia. In addition the Soviet Union tried to exert direct influence on the Sinkiang Province, which is rich in mineral deposits, and not until the ‘fifties did Mao Tse-tung finally succeed in repressing this influence.

An incisive change in the relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China was brought about by the **Friendship Treaty of 14 August 1945** between the two states, which was concluded through pressure from the USA and which contained above all territorial provisions. China was forced to consent to not only the use of the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dairen and to rights to the East Chinese and South Manchurian Railway but also to the recent cession of Sakhalin and the recognition of the independence of the “Mongolian People’s Republic”.

aa) Outer Mongolia

Although, after Nationalist China, the People's Republic of China had also recognised the independence of its former province by the conclusion of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Treaty of 1962, the relationship between the two states has been very tense in recent years. This is the reason for a brief account of the circumstances surrounding the separation of Mongolia from China.

Outer Mongolia — "outer", because, unlike Inner Mongolia, it was situated outside the "Great Wall" — used to stretch far beyond its present frontiers and was independent even after the decline of the Mongol Dynasty in the 14th century to the end of the 17th century, but it was always under the influence of China. In 1689 the Manchu conquered this territory, but allowed it to retain that independence which was a feature of the Chinese vassal-states. In the mid-19th century Russian influence in Mongolia increased considerably, and when the Manchu Government was overthrown in 1911, the Mongols rose up and declared their independence. In the Mongolian-Russian Treaty of 3 November 1912 Russia formally accepted the protection of Mongolia, against which China immediately protested violently and at the same time demanded that the earlier frontier treaties with Russia be annulled. Thereupon, in the joint Sino-Russian declaration of 3 November 1913, Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia was confirmed and was underlined by a new joint declaration between China, Russia and Mongolia dated 7 June 1915. In addition China was given the right to appoint the ruler of Mongolia, but neither Russia nor China was to be allowed to send in troops or settlers unless summoned.

After the 1917 Revolution in Russia Chinese troops marched into Mongolia, China stating that it had been called in by the Mongols. Two years later, on 22 November 1919, China declared the agreements of 1913 and 1915 null and void.

Although the Soviet Union, in August 1919, revoked all the treaties which impaired Mongolian independence but at the same time stepped up the ideological and political infiltration. On 5 September 1921 the Soviet Union concluded a secret agreement with the Communist Party of Mongolia (which had a total membership of 160) and shortly afterwards, at its request, it invaded Mongolia. The "Mongolian People's Republic" was proclaimed as an independent state, the Soviet Union received certain privileges and was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the newly founded People's Republic. China immediately protested sharply against the Soviet influence and referred to Chinese rights in this area. Thereupon in 1924 a "General Agreement" was con-

cluded between China and the Soviet Union in which it was confirmed that Outer Mongolia was autonomous and belonged to China, but nothing changed in the actual state of affairs, in the Soviet domination.

The Mongolian-Soviet military alliance of 4 March 1936 further consolidated military and political integration, and the international recognition of the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic came about at the Yalta Conference in 1945 with an endorsement of the **status quo** in Mongolia.

In the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1945 the Chinese Government finally had to recognise the independence of Mongolia, and although this was made dependent on a plebiscite, there was hardly any doubt as to the outcome. This referendum was held on 20 October 1945 and, as expected, confirmed the separation of Mongolia from China. The Chinese Government recognised this decision and established diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic on 13 February 1946.

In contrast to this, as late as 1936, after the conclusion of the Mongolian-Soviet military alliance, Mao Tse-tung had spoken of a re-incorporation of Outer Mongolia and thus openly declared his opposition to Soviet policy. After armed clashes had taken place between China and Outer Mongolia towards the end of the civil war period in China, the Chinese Government under Chiang Kai-shek also revoked the independence of this state.

Nevertheless the People's Republic of China had recognised the full independence of Mongolia and established diplomatic relations with it on 14 February 1950. The Friendship and Assistance Treaty of 31 March 1960 and the Frontier Treaty of 26 December 1962 seemed to cement the friendly relationship once and for all.

The hostile attitude which China has shown particularly since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution towards the Mongolian People's Republic, the maps it has published on which the Mongolian People's Republic is marked in as Chinese territory, indicate, however, a change in Chinese policies with regard to the relationship with its socialist neighbour.

The Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa has also once again disputed the recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic and claims its territory as "part of China".

ab) The Tannu-Tuva Region

The separation of the Tuva Region from China is yet another example of the consistent continuation of Czarist policies by the Soviet politicians. Tannu-Tuva covers an area of some 170,000 square kilometres and lies on the north-western frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic. Up to 1911 it was considered to be unequivocally Chinese territory, was administered by China and was also recognised by Russia as such in the treaties of 1727, 1864 and 1870.

In spite of this Tannu-Tuva, when the declaration of Outer Mongolia's independence was made in 1911, was occupied by Russian troops and declared a protectorate — protests against this had no effect.

Although from 1917 to 1921 was impossible for China, because of the turmoil caused by the Revolution in Russia, to build up a Chinese administration in this area. After the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic the Soviet Union also regained control of Tannu-Tuva in 1921. The declaration of Tuva's independence on 13 August 1921 and the proclamation of the "Aratski Republic" (Shepherds-Republic) made no changes to the existing circumstances. In spite of the many Soviet confirmations of Tuva's independence and its establishment once again in the Friendship Treaty of 22 July 1925 between Tuva and the Soviet Union, on 13 October 1944 Tuva was finally annexed by the Soviet Union, i. e. the Tuvian "wish", as the Soviets put it, to join the Soviet Union was fulfilled. This annexation remained secret until 17 August 1948 and was after represented as a decision of the people of Tuva, although at the time in question the Tuvians represented only a minority in their country on account of the Soviet settlement policy. Since 10 October 1961 Tuva has been part of the Soviet Union as the "Autonomous Socialist Republic of Tuva".

b) The Frontier Question Between The Soviet Union And The People's Republic of China (1949 to 1971)

In spite of the development of relations with the Soviet Union which was favourable for the People's Republic of China in the first years of its existence, it soon turned out that the Chinese politicians did not regard the frontier question as having been cleared up in their interest and they were not prepared either to let the matter drop.

What was most likely the first Chinese attempt to negotiate on the frontier question with the Soviet Union took place as early as October 1954. At that time Nikita Khrushchev, in his capacity as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, together with Nikolai Bul-

ganin, the Defence Minister, was visiting Peking on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, but, according to Mao Tse-tung, he refused even to discuss the frontier question with the Chinese politicians. Chou En-lai's efforts were likewise fruitless when he spoke about the Sino-Soviet border question in general with Khrushchev in January 1957. In his own words, Chou called on the Soviet Union to conclude fresh treaties to settle the frontiers not only with China but also with Japan, the Middle East and Eastern Bloc states and with Finland, but did not receive a "satisfactory" reply. These Chinese initiatives to settle the border question were, however, initially kept secret by both sides and were not made public until mid-1964 by an interview with Mao Tse-tung by a Japanese delegation.

The Chinese interest in not adversely affecting its relationship with the Soviet Union at this early stage by public demands with regard to the border question can also be seen in the suppression of statements by Chinese intellectuals during the Hundred Flowers' Movement who accused the Soviet Union of employing the same methods in its China policy as the "Czarist imperialists".

The first public disagreement on this issue resulted from the Cuba crisis in October 1962. The Soviet Union replied to China's reproaches for stepping down in its Cuba policy with attacks on China's policies towards Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, accusing the Chinese of an "inconsistent attitude". In its answer to this China threatened to present "the bill of the unequal treaties" when the time was "ripe" and mentioned for the first time in this connection the treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860) and Ili (i. e. St. Petersburg, 1881). The first unofficial accounts of the border incidents between Russia and China appeared only a little later, in September 1963, and in reply to a Chinese accusation on the matter the Soviets maintained that China had provoked a total of 5000 incidents in 1962. In answer to the Soviet proposal of November of the same year to negotiate on the disputed sections of the frontier China was only willing to enter into negotiations on the whole frontier as such, but not on individual sections. The talks which began in Peking in mid-February 1964 were broken off without results in September and not resumed.

In July 1964 Tse-tung gave a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party the above-mentioned interview in which he commented for the first time directly on the frontier question. Mao accused the Soviet Union of pursuing a policy of "territorial ambition" in Asia and Europe and stated that China was preparing to wage "its war . . . against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for another 25 years". In its reply the Soviet Union accused Mao Tse-tung of pursuing a new *Lebensraum* — policy and compared him to Hitler and Tojo. Thereafter the controversy

increased in intensity, reports of troop reinforcements and armed incidents were received, the Chinese frontier province of Sinkiang being mainly involved. Thereupon the Soviet Union published, in October 1964, the most detailed explanation of their view to date on the frontier question, which contains what is so far the only comment on the Chinese claims west of the Balkhash Lake and in which the legality of the Soviet possession is underlined.

In the initial period of the Cultural Revolution relatively little attention was paid to the frontier question; it was first brought up again in May 1966 by China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, when he accused the Soviet Union of having caused more than 5000 border incidents between July 1960 and 1965. In the concealed polemics of the next few years the Soviet Union placed the Chinese minorities policies in the foreground of its attacks, and in February and July 1967 the Soviet press reported on incidents on the frontier which had allegedly been brought about by Chinese Red Guards. During 1968 Russia and China accused each other of making military preparations on the border and of settling the border areas to an increased extent — without, however, any further incidents being reported.

The accounts of heavy fighting between Chinese and Soviet border troops in the Ussuri area on 3 March 1969 provided the whole complex of the Sino-Soviet conflict with new aspects. On the one hand, because through the "combat reports" published by both sides and the accusations of ideological differences, the dispute for territorial claims now became official. On the other hand, because through the military conflicts the danger of a larger clash, possibly even of a war between the two Communist states, seemed to be threatening. Following further clashes in different sections of the common border in March, May, June, July and August 1969 the development in the frontier area seemed to be coming to a head. Although the resumption of the talks of the Joint Sino-Soviet Commission for Frontier Navigation, broken off in 1964, in Khabarovsk on 18 June and the signing of a protocol on navigation in August indicated that the tension was being taken out of the situation, fresh border incidents on 13 August seemed after all to demonstrate the contrary.

The unexpected visit by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to Peking on 11 September, when he discussed Sino-Soviet relations with Chou En-lai, and the détente which could be observed after this proved the determination of both states to prevent any further escalation. The practical outcome of these talks was a stabilisation of the situation on the border,

the opening of frontier negotiations by Deputy Foreign Ministers in Peking on 20 October and the gradual normalisation of the inter-state relations, which found its expression in the conclusion of an agreement on joint railway traffic, reciprocal trade and finally in the renewed exchange of ambassadors in December 1970.

Of decisive importance in judging these turbulent events on the Sino-Soviet border is the question as to which of the two states built up the border incidents by means of propaganda in March 1969 of all times (according to statements which agree with one another and which were made by both sides clashes of this kind had taken place earlier as well) and what reasons it had for doing so. For if it was not a question of a "put-up job" between the Soviet Union and China, which can with certainty be ruled out, one of the two sides must have acted as an agent provocateur. That the side that was first accused immediately reacted and threw back the charges is not surprising. Even today there is no conclusive answer to these question; it is therefore only possible to point out probable motivations of the two states.

Possible Motives of the Soviet Union:

— The border incidents are closely connected with the planned Moscow World Conference of Communist Parties and are intended to furnish demonstrable proof of the aggressive character of the Chinese conception, which makes stronger integration in the Communist camp necessary. The events in the Far East also detract from the Soviet Union's stepping down in the question of the election of the West German President in Berlin.

— The "yellow peril" was artificially built up by the Soviet Union to make the necessity of an understanding with the USA plausible, internally, and to make the Western world ready to accept negotiations to this end, in its foreign policy.

— Certain military circles and advocates of a policy of strength are trying, by referring to the "Chinese threat", to widen their influence and thus hope to bring about in the Soviet public an atmosphere which favours their concept.

Possible Motives of the People's Republic of China:

— The border incidents are causally connected with the forthcoming Congress of the Communist Party of China and are intended to strengthen domestic integration following the disturbances of the Cultural Revolution.

– The threat from the “Soviet revisionists” is “devastating” proof of the correctness of Chinese propaganda. Louder calls for austerity and higher productivity help to make up for the economic losses which were caused by the Cultural Revolution.

– Possible opponents of Mao’s policies can be unmasked as “pro-Moscow revisionists” and supporters of “Soviet neo-imperialism” and rendered harmless.

It applies equally to both sides that through the aggression on the Ussuri they can demonstrate to the world, but to the Third World in particular, the “imperialist character” of the Soviet or Chinese policies – with the aim of the respective country ingratiating itself above all with those countries which in their turn are exposed to imperialist pressures.

These motives reveal a certain common interest of both states, since not only the People’s Republic of China but also the Soviet Union were able to take advantage of the border incidents for their political intentions and – as could be seen in the course of the quarrelling – the extension of the differences was not at least inopportune for both. This makes it even more difficult to answer the question as to which side was the true aggressor, and although there is much to be said in favour of the idea the Soviets provoked the border incidents, this cannot be stated with any degree of certainty, let alone proved.

Summary

The border incidents in 1969 and their evaluation for propaganda purposes in the press by both sides have demonstrated that the frontier question is a vital issue between both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The exchange of notes on the further question, couched in the strongest terms, brought out quite clearly the differing views on this problem. Whereas the Soviet Union bases its attitude on the idea that no illegality attaches to the present demarcation of the frontier, and that it is prepared, at the most, to enter into discussions on minor corrections to the frontier, the Chinese leaders are demanding the annulment of the old “unequal treaties”, i. e. on the basis of inequality, and the conclusion of a new, “equal” treaty to lay down the demarcation of the frontier. In this matter China did not, for the time being, make any concrete territorial claims on the Soviet Union – instead it offered to carry out the future frontier settlement on the basis of the status quo.

The fact that both states, in spite of the conflicting views, have already been negotiating in Peking on the frontier question for more than one year and that since then there has been an increase in normalisation in

Sino-Soviet relations proves that it is possible to accommodate the interests of both sides and that at least at present neither state is interested in further escalation. Apart from the fact that up to now the negotiations have remained (officially) unsuccessful, the frontier question as such is only one of the issues in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, and thus a settlement of this problem alone cannot at the same time constitute a settlement of the Sino-Soviet dispute altogether. On the other hand, the events in 1969 prove that it is possible for both sides, by exploiting the frontier question, to provoke military conflicts on any scale and at any time should one of the two states deem this desirable for reasons of domestic or foreign policy.

3. The Ideological Dispute Between The Soviet Union And The People’s Republic of China

The chronological development of the Sino-Soviet relationship described in the preceding section has made it clear how closely the discussion on ideological questions is connected with practical politics. Apart from the large complex of problems, it also became evident that the individual subjects of this dispute have changed in the course of the years. This development can be divided up chronologically into five phases, the first two of which (1956 to 1960) were carried through practically behind closed doors.

The main themes of the discussion in this connection were:

- from 1956 to 1958: the results of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;
- from 1958 to about 1960: Chinese domestic policies with the experiment of the People’s Communes and the “short way” to communism;
- from 1960 to about 1965: the fundamental discussion on Marxist-Leninist ideology and its “correct” interpretation took place;
- after 1965 the effects of this ideological controversy began to show themselves to an increasing extent, especially in foreign policy. The struggle for spheres of influence was beginning to expand;
- from 1965 to 1968 the correctness of Maoism and the events connected with the Chinese Cultural Revolution were in the foreground, while
- from 1969 the problems relating to “proletarian internationalism” and the “separate path to communism” were added to these as a result of the conduct of the Soviet Union in its foreign policy: intervention

in Czechoslovakia (August 1968) and the announcement of the so-called Brezhnev-Doctrine, Sino-Soviet border incidents (March to August 1969), Germany's Ostpolitik and Soviet European policy and the events in Poland in December 1970.

This attempt at division is, of course, not complete; its sole purpose is to make the ideological quarrel of the two Communist states a little more transparent and to make it possible to gain an overall view of the problem. For reasons of clarity no attempt will be made at this point to trace the ideological discussion between the Soviet Union and China on the basis of the various points at issue with reference to practical politics. In order to answer the decisive questions in this controversy considerations of that kind would be of only secondary importance.

These decisive questions are:

- What are the fundamental differences of opinion in the pragmatic sphere of politics and to what extent do the views held by one or the other side deviate from original Marxism-Leninism?
- Are the basic elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy being called into question because of the differences in the ideological field?

Out of these there arises the key question of whether the present ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union can be overcome and correspondingly entails a strengthening or weakening for world Communism as such.

Before these question can be dealt with in any detail, three fundamental statements have to be mentioned first for a general understanding:

1. The prolific writings of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, Marx, Engels and Lenin, allows each of the two sides involved to quote passages from the wide selection of these works which justify the respective standpoint and which are in keeping with the respective point of departure.

Generally speaking it can be said that Peking represents the more literal standpoint, placing the emphasis on the revolution by overthrowing the existing order by force, whereas Moscow prefers a flexible standpoint, emphasising the revolution in the sense of a transformation of the existing state of affairs by exploiting non-violent means.

From the different interpretations of the writings there arises the possibility

- for Peking to make accusations against the ideological opponent of "revisionism", "right-wing opportunism", "social democratism", "social imperialism" and

- for Moscow to attack the ideological opponent of "dogmatism", "left-wing opportunism", "Trotskyism", "chauvinism".

Both Peking and Moscow refer in doing so mainly to the writings of Lenin.

2. The decision on the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism lies, in the last analysis, with the ruling and non-ruling Communist Parties. This means that the rank and file of the Party members will take the decision on this "correctness". Although the two sides will try their best in whatever ideological conflict may follow to win over the rank and file of the Party members for themselves, it can be stated quite generally for the present conflict that man as such is psychopolitically homogeneous and desires peace, security and enjoyment (happiness). For this reason Moscow orthodoxy – apart from the fact that its military and economic potential as one of the two super powers is incomparably greater – is the exegetically stronger. Put in other words: the Moscow centre of world Communism has made a better selection of Lenin's texts and interpreted them more skilfully for a politically relevant period in the future with regard to the psychopolitical frame of mind of the masses in the world.

3. The basic starting position, conditional on reality, on which the chosen way must in the end always be dependent is decisive for the attitude of each of the opponents. Accordingly the

Soviet Union is a nuclear super power, whose leadership is committed both to public opinion in its own country and to world public opinion by reason of its status, which results from the objective development. All the exegetic endeavours of the Soviet Communist leadership are therefore partly determined by an approach which is determined by the disposition of the Soviet population and the effects of the psychological atmosphere of the nuclear age.

On the other hand the **People's Republic of China** is an Asian power, industrially backward in the long term, which – although in possession of nuclear weapons – cannot as yet be regarded as a "nuclear power" for the foreseeable future. The Chinese Communist leadership is committed only to a very limited extent either to its own public opinion or to world public opinion by reason of this status which results from the objective development.

It should also be added that the Soviet leadership takes into account the specific national sense of mission of Great Russia, whereas the Chinese leadership takes into consideration the psychological effects

and the atmosphere of the age of the so-called "awakening of the colonial peoples".

These differences in the exegetic fundamental starting positions run through the whole controversy, which, as is pointed out below, concerns only the pragmatic political sphere.

a) The Sino-Soviet Dispute And The Fundamental Elements of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy

In order to assess the Sino-Soviet controversy in the field of ideology it is of fundamental importance whether in this dispute in the sphere of pure "Weltanschauung" such distinctly dividing elements have come into effect or could still come into effect that it is possible to talk of a decisive weakening of the World Communism in this special field.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine is a monistic rationalistic system of philosophy, whose core or axis is constituted by the following timeless and fundamental philosophical elements:

- 1) Materialism, that is the recognition of only one fundamental principle of all that is, of "eternal" matter and its movement.
- 2) Dialectic, that is the recognition of only one fundamental ontological principle of all that happens, of movement in time and space by the effect of opposites on one another which are present in everything that is.
- 3) Determinism, that is the recognition of only one direction of development, which, recognisable through the fundamental principles of the doctrine and therefore controllable, is inherent in all that is.

As a study of the most important documents available shows, not one of these three timeless basic elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is at issue in the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy.

Instead, all the documents deal, among divergent exegetic points of view or — with different premises — with more or less the periphery of the philosophical system in which the methodological principle of Marxism-Leninism has its place — the principle of the agreement of theory and practice. As long as there are no indications that the controversy is prejudicial to the above-mentioned basic elements of the system it is possible neither to speak of an actual "break" in the pure philosophical sphere nor to assume that one of the sides is willing to doubt the general validity of Marxism-Leninism or even to depart from this regulating principle which determines practical actions.

In answer to the questions posed at the beginning it is therefore possible to state in summarising that the present Sino-Soviet controversy does not threaten the core of the Marxist-Leninist system. On the contrary even in the toughest stages of the quarrel both states regarded the teachings of Marxism-Leninism as an inviolable foundation.

b) The Main Complex of Subjects Surrounding the Sino-Soviet Controversy

After this fundamental observation which at the same time contains a limitation of the importance of this dispute the main points should now be set forth to which the controversy between the Soviet Union and China in the ideological field according to the available documents may be reduced in the pragmatic political sphere.

In order to investigate this complex of questions the most important documents of a fundamental character which have been published by both sides since the beginning of the ideological dispute have been used — from the "Moscow Declaration of 1957", which was signed by representatives of both states, up to the Chinese pamphlet "Leninism or Social Imperialism?", which was published on the occasion of the centenary of Lenin's birth on 22 April 1970 and the Soviet reply to it of 18 May 1970 entitled "Pseudorevolutionaries Unmasked". It can be generally stated that the detailed arguments and counter-arguments advanced in the documents referred to confirm the fundamental fact that, for all the divergences in the pragmatic political sphere, the controversy always begins from a basic ideological-philosophical conception.

These documents also revealed that the main subject complexes the exegetic interpretation of which has led to differences of opinion are the following in order of relevance for attaining the final goal of world Communism:

1. "Unity of the international Communist movement"
2. "Process of the world revolution"
3. "Peaceful coexistence" and the terms
4. "State", "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "Personality Cult" each together with its own complex of subjects.

The opposing positions can be represented in detail as follows:

- on 1. **"The unity of the International Communist movement"** with the related subjects:
"socialist camp", "proletarian internationalism",
"leadership in world Communism".

The question of the primacy in the leadership of world Communism is, of course, central to the quarrel in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, but it is not mentioned directly. It is concealed behind such terms as "equality of the fraternal Parties", "proletarian internationalism", the "socialist world system", the "world camp" and its "rôle in the present epoch". All these expressions are defined in the "Moscow Declaration of 1957" and the "Moscow Declaration of 1960" and require no further clarification.

On this point

The People's Republic of China

takes the view that the cause of the revolution of the whole of the international proletariat will in the end depend on the outcome of the revolutionary struggle in the territories of Africa and Latin America, where the greatest variety of contradictions are concentrated in the world today. Therefore: the unity of the liberation movement.

The Soviet Union

The content of the "epoch" is formed by

1. the "socialist world system",
2. the "revolutionary struggle of the working class" and
3. the "struggle of the oppressed peoples

Therefore: the trinity of the liberation movement.

Both exegetic standpoints are undeniably Leninist. It is evident here in what ways and by what means each of the two wishes to be in the lead in attaining the common goal. A compromise in this matter is by no means impossible.

on 2. "The process of the world revolution"

with the related subjects:

"transition from capitalism to socialism", "rôle of the workers' movement", "rôle of the oppressed peoples" and the "non-violent and violent way to socialism".

This complex of questions is the most important for the non-Communist world, since the question which is central to it is which methods are to be preferred to gain power. There is no doubt for either side that power must be gained in order to promote the change in the world inherent in the historical process (determinism!) and that the prerequisite for this is the "overthrow of the bourgeoisie". These postulates have been signed by both states and recognised as binding in the "Moscow Declaration of 1957" and the "Moscow Declaration of 1960".

The controversy revolves only around the question of "how" — whether the so-called "peaceful" or "non-violent" way is to be preferred to the "violent" way or vice versa.

On this point

The People's Republic of China

holds the view that it is not possible to make the "peaceful" way to the new strategic principle of the international Communist movement. If the revolutionary process joins in the "worship of parliamentarism" and legalism, thus limiting the struggle to the sphere approved by the bourgeoisie, that is tantamount to destroying the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore: the "one track approach".

The Soviet Union

holds the view that both the "peaceful" and the "non-peaceful" way involve an act of "revolutionary force" and that this "revolutionary force", according to the concrete historical circumstances, can assume both the character of political force (peaceful way) and the form of an armed clash (non-peaceful way). Therefore: the "two track approach".

Both standpoints are Leninist. In this case, however, a compromise seems more difficult: Moscow's arguments for the peaceful way, the possibility of following this way thanks to the growing power of the "socialist world system", thanks to the revolutionising of the consciousness of the masses, to the accumulation of experience in the class struggle and the incapability of the old order of society, which is becoming increasingly evident, to solve the urgent social problems connected with the scientific and technological revolution, betray the interest, concealed behind them, of an European Communist super power. The interest of the Soviet Union consists in gaining time to consolidate its social system and thus to ensure, above all, the survival of its own Communist hierarchy.

These arguments cannot be equally convincing for the Asian Communist power China, which is under the very strong pressure of time.

on 3. "Peaceful coexistence"

with the related subjects:

"the export of counter-revolution", "peaceful competition with capitalism" and "war and nuclear war"

Both the Soviet Union and China have recognised that the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence" of the two world systems (capitalism and socialism) is the "inviolable and unshakable foundation of the foreign policy of the socialist countries" and that this principle also extends to the "economic competition with the capitalist countries".

On this point

The People's Republic of China

holds the view that the limitation of the general line in foreign policy to peaceful coexistence prevents relations between the socialist states and the oppressed peoples and nations from being treated properly. The superiority of the socialist system and the successes in building up in the socialist states provides an example and incentive for the oppressed peoples and nations. The part played by peaceful competition between the socialist and imperialist states is exaggerated. It cannot replace the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples and nations.

The Soviet Union

holds the view that the "principle of peaceful coexistence" is an objective law in the development of international relations in the "transition from capitalism to socialism" and that coexistence is the "continuation of the class struggle by other means", but by no means the recognition of the social and political status quo, in which peaceful coexistence has to be imposed on the opponent in order to cut off the "export of the counter-revolution" and thus create favourable external combat conditions.

These two standpoints are also Leninist; here too a compromise is possible, although not easy to achieve, since Peking, as an Asian Communist power which is backward in many respects, cannot expect anything like the same success from "peaceful competition" with the capitalist countries for its leadership claim in revolutionising the masses of the "oppressed peoples and nations" as Moscow, which can also make "revolutionary" use of "peaceful coexistence". Peking is not in a position to impose peaceful coexistence on the capitalist states. Moscow can gain both by peaceful coexistence.

This complex of subjects also naturally covers the matter of war, especially nuclear and thermonuclear war, which both sides underline as the only alternative to peaceful coexistence — surprisingly and typically not contradicted by the non-Communist world! The — in some cases grotesque — utterances by Chinese Communists on this complex of subjects are only part of the frippery and accessories of the controversy that do not affect the core of the matter and are therefore unimportant.

With regard to non-nuclear conflicts, the differences of opinion (except for the discussion set out above on the "violent" or "non-violent" way) are all in all insignificant. There can be no doubt that, in the event of war, both sides could reach a compromise according to the situation. It should be added that the Marxist-Leninist thesis of "just" and "unjust" wars is not a subject of the controversy.

on 4. "State", "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "personality cult" with the related subjects: "withering away of the state", "the new constitution of the general people's state".

For the non-Communist world the controversy on the "state" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is of relatively little interest, since this disagreement has practically no significance in foreign policy. The importance of this controversy lies in the fact that the opposing views of the Soviet Union and China are based on the fact that only one side (Peking) can in this case claim the full authority of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. The reason for this is that the Party Programme announced at the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1961 proclaimed a new transitional form for the system of state and society only for the Soviet Union as the first socialist state in the world! This transitional form, which is in contradiction to the dictatorship of the proletariat as preached by Marx, is the "general people's state". This is a real and actual violation of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, since this transitional form is something completely new and cannot be discovered in any of the writings. Accordingly

The People's Republic of China

holds the view that in a Communist ruled state only that system of society and state can exist which serves the revolutionary process within this political system.

The Soviet Union

holds the view that in a Communist ruled state the system of society and the state can assume, before the state withers away, a form which takes into account the vital interests of the "whole" people.

The difference between the status of a major modern European power and the status of a (still) backward major Asian power comes out here in a particularly blatant way. Although it can be objectively stated that Moscow has unilaterally violated the principles of the teachings, a compromise is, under circumstances which have changed with time, conceivable, since neither side has departed from the idea that after the transition to the full communist system of society no "state" at all, in the traditional sense, should any longer exist at the end of the total development.

This disagreement on the complex of subjects relating to "personality cult" corresponds to the same situation, since not only the Soviet Union but also China have undertaken to observe the "Leninist norms of Party life" on the basis of "democratic centralism" and in doing so "not to tolerate personality cult", which hampers the "development-policies of creative thought".

On this point the People's Republic of China holds the view that the struggle against the personality cult constitutes a violation of Lenin's teaching, in itself complete, on the relations between the leadership, Party, class and masses and that the exploitation of this struggle undermines the contrast between the leader and the masses, and the Party leadership resting on democratic centralism.

The Soviet Union holds the view that the objectionable practice of the personality cult, by which the forces of socialism are tied down and all the successes of a nation are attributed to one single person, must be rejected, and that the new social order is in a position to overcome the shortcomings of the "old world" it has inherited.

Undoubtedly only the Moscow interpretation is Marxist-Leninist in the original sense. Nevertheless the personality cult problem-complex does not constitute a serious danger for a possible compromise, since it will lose its acute character in the course of time. It is quite conceivable that, when Mao Tse-tung abdicates from the political and historical stage, here too a compromise can be reached, or that this whole issue will gradually recede into the background.

c) Conclusions

It emerges from the investigation into the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that neither the philosophical-ideological nor the political-pragmatic view of the Sino-Soviet controversy permits a prognosis which is optimistic for the policies of the non-Communist world.

The endeavours of the Soviet and Chinese Communist hierarchies are and remain directed towards the common, unshakable goal: the changing of the world according to the postulates of the philosophical doctrine of Marxism-Leninism! By bringing in the Third World and — in the most recent phase of this conflict — the European states as well, the ideological controversy has undergone a tremendous expansion. Nevertheless, Peking has so far not succeeded in winning over the majority of the Communist Parties in the world for its interpretation of the doctrine. The dissident groups which support the Chinese stand do not therefore count sufficiently, and the relative independence of some Communist Parties (e.g. the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and Rumania) must not mislead one into overestimating the slogan of "poly-centrism" as a point of departure for our own policies (in the West). It remains to be stated that the idea of "changing the world" (world revo-

lution) under the Communist banner continues to be the driving force of Communists of all shades, and that to this end the conditions in the non-Communist world offer many, as yet unrecognised, points of attack, which in the long term make the penetration by Communism even though it does not possess "monolithic" character by all means possible, even probable.

It can therefore be concluded from the course and contents of the ideological controversy that:

- the actual core of Communist ideology is not affected;
- it is a matter of a quarrel over methods which is of a pragmatic-political nature, in which a compromise seems possible, so that
- an "irrevocable break" between Moscow and Peking does not seem possible, even in the future;
- the advantage in this conflict lies with Moscow;
- the Soviet Union and the form of Communism it represents constitutes for the time being, from the world political point of view, the actual danger for the West.

4) Summary: Present Trends in the Sino-Soviet Dispute

An attempt has been made to roughly trace the course and the development of the relations between Russia and China up to the present in order to set out the almost historical continuity of this conflict.

In view of this development it can be observed that the conflict situation between the two major Communist powers which we today describe with the term Sino-Soviet Dispute is not merely a consequence of differences of opinions on a certain political doctrine. The historical disputes set out above between the Imperial Empires cannot be said to be the "causes" of the present disputes, but they point out however, the continuity of the Russian and Soviet China-policy which undoubtedly exists. Thus the Russian as well as the Soviet policy towards its Asian neighbour was at all times determined by interests in political power aimed at gaining influence, oppression and annexation. This became especially clear in China's revolutionary period, when Stalin, having just come to power, eagerly exploited the struggles in China in order to consolidate the Soviet position in China. In doing so he did not even stop at sacrificing Chinese "comrades", nearly the whole Communist Party of China. Only the appearance of such a strong, shrewd and at least intellectually equal leader personality as Mao Tse-tung repre-

sented could prevent the complete downfall of Communism in China and even lead it to victory. It must be repeated here once more that right until the end Stalin was convinced of the victory of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung's opponent, and that nobody was more surprised by the outcome of the Chinese civil war than Stalin himself, the almighty leader of the Communist movement.

And precisely here, in this section of Sino-Soviet relations, lie the roots of the present, so far-reaching conflict. Mao Tse-tung, it can safely be assumed, forgot and forgave none of the humiliations and defeats which China was forced to put up with from the Soviet Union. When he led a delegation to Moscow in February 1950 as the head of state of the People's Republic of China, undoubtedly the moment had come for him which he had been wanting ever since the Soviet Union had condemned his report on the "Peasants' Movement in Hunan". It is true, China had no choice — ostracised by the USA and the West, it had only the 'socialist brother' on whom it could rely for support and so Mao Tse-tung was forced to accept humiliating conditions in return for Soviet economic and military aid. But for Mao Tse-tung that was not a question of prime importance — his strategy towards the Soviet Union was determined by the time which Mao thought he had (and did have): he could wait. Economically and politically weak, grateful for every help, China was not in a position to make demands. Stalin also held the reins of the leadership of world Communism too tightly in his hands anyway.

The growing consolidation of China and also the death of Stalin (1953) strengthened the Chinese position and resulted in the first demands of Chinese politicians addressed to the Soviet Union. Let us not forget: in October 1954 China made its first (as far as we know) demand for a settlement of the frontier question. In the next few years the Chinese position became increasingly stronger, China was able to enforce its sovereign rights: giving up of the bases Port Arthur and Dairen by the Soviets, ending of Soviet subversion and infiltration in the Chinese frontier territories finally Mao Tse-tung believed to notice an ideological deviation by the Soviet politicians from Marxism-Leninism.

The long, very complex and in part unfathomable development of this relationship, in which both sides, at times restricted in their freedom to act by internal and external difficulties, were made by force of circumstances to react in a way which did not conform to the ideology, does not allow us to answer definitively the question relating to the actual priority of ideology, to the frontier question or other components of this conflict. The examination of these two complexes of problems has shown, however, that, in spite of the bitter feuds waged by both sides in the course

of this controversy both on paper and on the battle field, the opposing points of view are not irreconcilable and that the differences as such are, as it were, peripheral, even though they are, by both sides, placed in the centre of the discussion. Ideologically a quarrel as to methods, with regard to the frontier question a quarrel about principles — not territory! — the character of the Sino-Soviet conflict is more and more acquiring the features of an emancipation process in which China, oppressed for many years, has first emphatically advanced its claim for equality. The traditional idea of China being the centre of the world — "Middle Kingdom" (that is the translation of the Chinese term for China: chung-kuo) certainly plays just as an important part as the national sense of mission of Great Russia.

The expansion of this conflict to an international scale is not altering the Chinese attitude in the conflict with the Soviet Union being related to, as it were, the psycho-political sphere of consciousness in the Chinese leaders' (i. e. Mao Tse-tung's) assessment of themselves. Thus both states, by advertising in very different ways for their point of view, are trying to prove the correctness of the "way" represented by each — both to themselves and to world public opinion.

a) The Significance of the Sino-Soviet Dispute for the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union

For both parties to this conflict the quarrel with the other became in the course of its development, from what was initially a purely theoretical discussion, an important factor in political life which influences every decision in domestic and foreign policies.

This applies in particular to the People's Republic of China, whose policies have been completely overshadowed by the dispute with the Soviet Union, especially since the beginning of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". This becomes evident above all through the centrally controlled Chinese propaganda, which deals not only with domestic but also with foreign policies. No matter whether it is a question of fighting internal opposition or putting through some act of foreign policy, the Soviet "deviation", the "treasonable policies of the revisionists" are connected with it, if they are not made its cause.

Countless documents covering all aspects of politics convey the impression that for the leaders of China the conflict with the Soviet Union became an instrument of Chinese policy — in modification of the real motives of this conflict.

Much the same applies to the Soviet Union. The difference here is that — apart from domestic political campaigns during the border conflict in 1969 — Soviet policies are determined more by a certain 'reserve', an endeavour to offer Chinese propaganda no points of attack — admittedly a not very successful undertaking. Actual Soviet China-policy is determined by an adherence to certain principles, a certain inflexibility with regard to Chinese demands. In this way the impression arose that the Soviet Union was representing rather the rôle of the more understanding partner which was confronting its furious neighbour in a level-headed way.

It applies more to the Soviet Union than to China that it used the conflict with China for the objectives of its foreign policy strategy. Once more this became clear during the border incidents in March 1969: how well the 'yellow peril' can be exploited to emphasise the necessity for integration in the Soviet Bloc and World Communism! And are there not serious deliberations by Western politicians who try to exploit the 'China factor' in the pursuit of Western strategy towards the Soviet Union?

That does not mean to say, however, that the Soviet Union uses this conflict, possibly in collusion with China!, exclusively to achieve its political and military goals. On the contrary — it was the Soviet Union which for a long time was trying not to allow the tensions with China to become a conflict. But is it not possible — and in accord with Soviet policy — that now that this conflict has broken out and appears for the time being (in any case until Mao Tse-tung steps down) to be insurmountable the Soviets are trying to make this conflict serve their policies? It is only intended here to point out a not unimportant connection between the Soviet China-policy and Soviet-policy towards the West — a closer examination of these questions cannot be undertaken at this point.

b) Prospects

Taking the Chinese sources of information as a basis, nearly 15 years have passed since the conflict broke out. If, however, the differences which Mao Tse-tung already had in the early years of the Communist Party of China are taken into consideration, this quarrel is already in its fifth decade. Mao Tse-tung has survived both Stalin and Khrushchev and has thus had — unlike his Soviet opposite numbers — experience from the early times of Communism in China and in the Soviet Union

too. This gives him the advantageous position of being able to present and exploit both the Chinese and Soviet policies of this period in keeping with his own political objectives. By eliminating all possible rivals in several purges, of which the Cultural Revolution can be regarded as the last, even today Mao Tse-tung is still the driving force behind Chinese policies in general and behind the attitude towards the Soviet Union in particular.

Inseparably bound up with this observation is, at the same time, the question as to the future development of Sino-Soviet-relations. The days of Mao Tse-tung are numbered — and what will come then? Will China fall apart after Mao steps down because of the quarrels of rival candidates for the succession, as many experts suspect? Or will a strong leader personality succeed in carrying on Mao Tse-tung's spiritual and political heritage? And, last but not least, what effects will this have on the Sino-Soviet relationship?

In view of the great lack of information on the Soviet and, in particular, the Chinese political systems, there are considerable difficulties in answering this question, and any prognoses on the matter have, at the best, the nature of well-founded conjectures.

It can, however, be assumed that Mao Tse-tung is aware of the problems of his succession, for it was certainly one of the aims of the Cultural Revolution he initiated to strengthen the ideological foundations for his successor, by consolidating the revolutionary consciousness through "Marxism-Leninism" and the thought of Mao Tse-tung", (Maoism), to such an extent that even a less outstanding personality than that represented by Mao Tse-tung today, can preserve the unity of the state by the aid of 'Maoism'. On account of this indoctrination campaign it also appears that there is no chance that any pro-Soviet forces which might possibly exist can seize power 'after Mao'. By officially appointing Lin Pao, the present Minister of Defence, to be Mao Tse-tung's successor, the leaders and people of China have been prepared in advance for Mao's stepping down from the political stage. Lin Piao himself, who is not regarded in the West as a strong leader personality, offers, in his function as the Supreme Commander of the Army, the best guarantee for being able to hold together the state even 'after Mao'. One recalls in this connection the dominating rôle of the army as a factor for order in the decisive phases of the Cultural Revolution!

There is every reason to believe that Mao Tse-tung's political calculations will take proper account of the Chinese conditions. But even though this is the most probable possibility for a future development, it is still only one of many.

As far as the future relationship to the Soviet Union 'after Mao' is concerned, it can be assumed that the differences will still remain in the future, although a certain normalisation — such as can be recognised today already — can be expected. On the other hand, a renewed fresh co-operation between the two states appears improbable. This eventuality is only conceivable in the event of pro-Soviet forces coming to power in Peking, which seems to be practically impossible. An intensification of the conflict or even a war between the two states appears to be equally improbable. Neither today nor in the future can a clash of this kind be in the interest of either of the two states — neither the ideological-philosophical nor the political-pragmatic controversies of both states provide any foundation for a war, which in any event would be a "total" war.

Thus the "Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China of 7th October 1969" seems to point out the future development: it comes out in favour of peaceful coexistence and at the same time stresses that "... irreconcilable differences of principle exist between the Soviet Union and China... The struggle between them on principles will continue for a long time to come..."

The Communist Parties of the World A Survey

State	Stand	Status	Approx. Membership
Albania	Chinese	ruling	66,000
Algeria	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	1000/unknown
Argentina	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	60,000/unknown
Australia	Soviet/Chin.	legal	5000/300
Austria	Soviet/Chin.	legal	32,000/unknown
Belgium	Soviet/Chin.	legal	12,000/insignificant
Bolivia	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	3000/1000
Brazil	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	17,000/1000
Bulgaria	Soviet	ruling	610,000
Burma	Chin./Trotskyst	illegal	3000/700
Cambodia	Chinese	illegal	100
Cameroon	Soviet	illegal	1000
Canada	Soviet	legal	3500
Ceylon	Soviet/Chin.	legal	2000/900
Chile	Soviet/Chin.	legal	45,000/1000
People's Republic of China		ruling	20,000,000
Colombia	neutral/Chin.	legal	9000/2000
Costa Rica	Soviet	illegal	600
Cuba	neutral	ruling	60,000
Cyprus	Soviet	legal	14,000
Czechoslovakia	Soviet	ruling	1,700,000
Denmark	Soviet/Chin.	ruling	8000/unknown
Dominican Republic	Chinese	illegal	splinter groups
Ecuador	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	1000/unknown
El Salvador	Soviet	illegal	300
Finland	Soviet/Chin.	legal	49,000/unknown
France	Soviet/Chin.	legal	300,000/1000
Germany — West	Soviet/Chin.	legal	12,000/1000
Germany — East	Soviet	ruling	1,800,000
Great Britain	Soviet/Chin.	legal	33,000/splinter groups
Greece	Soviet	illegal	26,000
Guadeloupe	Soviet/Chin.	legal	1500/unknown
Haiti	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	400/unknown
Honduras	Soviet	illegal	500
Hungary	Soviet	ruling	620,000
Iceland	Soviet	legal	1000

State	Stand	Status	Approx. Membership
India	Soviet/Chin.	legal	60,000/30,000
Indonesia	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	150,000/unknown
Iraq	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	2500/700
Iran	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	1200/unknown
Ireland	Soviet/Chin.	legal	150/insignificant
Israel	Soviet	legal	1600
Italy	Soviet/Chin.	legal	1,700,000/spl. grp.
Japan	neutral	legal	250,000
	Soviet/Chin.	legal	900/2000
Jordan	Soviet	illegal	1000
North Korea	neutral	ruling	1,700,000
Kuwait	Soviet	illegal	50
Laos	neutral/Chin.	legal	100/2000
Lebanon	Soviet/Chin.	(legal)	4000/400
Lesotho	Soviet	legal	300
Luxembourg	Soviet	legal	500
Madagascar	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	20,000/200
Malaysia	Chinese	illegal	2800
Martinique	Soviet	legal	1000
Mexico	Soviet/Chin.	legal	35,000/300
Mongolian	Soviet	ruling	48,000
People's Republic	Soviet	legal	1000
Morocco			
Nepal	splinter groups	illegal	8000
Netherlands	neutral/Chin.	legal	9,580/100
New Zealand	Chinese	legal	400
Nicaragua	Soviet	illegal	200
Nigeria	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	10,000/insignificant
Norway	neutral	legal	4000
Pakistan	splinter groups	illegal	350
Paraguay	Soviet	illegal	5000
Peru	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	2500/3500
Philippines	neutral	illegal	2000
Poland	Soviet	ruling	2,000,000
Portugal	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	2000/unknown
Puerto Rico	Soviet	illegal	2000
Reunion	neutral	legal	3500
Rumania	neutral	ruling	1,800,000
San Marino	Soviet/Chin.	legal	1100/insignificant
Senegal	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	insignificant
Singapore	Chinese	illegal	400

State	Stand	Status	Approx. Membership
Somalia	splinter groups	legal	unknown
South Africa	Soviet	illegal	1000
Soviet Union		ruling	13,500,000
Spain	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	5000/insignificant
Sudan	Soviet/Chin.	illegal	8000
Sweden	neutral/Chin.	legal	20,000/3000
Switzerland	Soviet/Chin.	legal	5000/insignificant
Syria	Soviet/Chin.	(legal)	4000
Thailand	Chinese	illegal	3000
Tunisia	Soviet	illegal	300
Turkey	Soviet	illegal	2000
United States			
of America	Soviet/Chin.	legal	13,000/1000
Uruguay	Soviet/Chin.	legal/illegal	19,000/1000
Venezuela	Soviet/Chin.	legal/illegal	10,000/unknown
North Vietnam	neutral		170,000
South Vietnam	Chinese	illegal	40,-60,000
Yugoslavia	neutral		1,100,000

Summary

There are Communist Parties in 92 states. In
 - 44 of them the Communist Party is legal, in
 - 39 illegal, and in
 - 13 the CP is the ruling party.

In 27 states the Communist Parties are **pro-Soviet**,
 in 6 states **pro-Chinese**,
 in 12 states **neutral**, while there
 are **split** Communist Parties in 47 states.

Note:

The above classification is not complete in that a number of very small Communist Parties have not been included. In addition, there is also
 - especially in the case of the pro-Chinese Communist Parties - a constant change brought about by dissolution and the founding of new groups.

Finally, the division, particularly in the case of the 'neutral' Communist Parties, is only a rough approximation, because the stand of the Communist Parties concerned are in some cases subject to considerable change.

Source: "The Communist Parties", International Documentation and Information Centre, The Hague, 1970

Chronological Table 1: China

Before Christ:

16th–11th centuries	Shang Dynasty
11th century–221	Chou Dynasty
551–479	Kung Fu-tse
479–381	Mo Ti
371–289	Meng-tzu
221–207	Chin Dynasty (first Empire in China)
206 B. C. to 8 A. D.	Earlier Han Dynasty

After Christ:

25– 220	Later Han Dynasty
221– 280	Three Kingdoms
265– 316	Western Chin Dynasty
317– 419	Eastern Chin Dynasty
589– 618	Sui Dynasty
618– 906	Tang Dynasty
701– 762	Li Tai-po
907– 960	Five Dynasties
960–1126	Northern Sung Dynasty
937–1125	Liao Dynasty (Kitan)
1115–1234	Chin Dynasty (Jurchen)
1127–1279	Southern Sung Dynasty
1260–1294	Kublai Khan
1280–1367	Yüan Dynasty (Mongols)
1268–1644	Ming Dynasty
1644–1911	Ching Dynasty (Manchu)
1839–1842	Opium War
1850–1864	Tai Ping Rebellion
1894–1895	China-Japanese War
1900	Boxer Uprising
1911	Overthrow of the Ching Dynasty, end of the Chinese Empire

The Republic of China

1912–1916	Government of Yuan Shih-kai
1918–1928	Period of civil war (warlords)
1919	“May 4th Movement”
1921	Founding of the Communist Party of China
1925	Death of Sun Yat-sen
1927	Chiang Kai-shek stamps out the Communists' position of power in Shanghai
1928	The Nationalist Chinese Revolutionary Army conquers Peking, beginning of the Kuomintang rule
1931	Invasion by Japanese forces in Manchuria and in Northern China (September)
1933	April: Japanese-Chinese truce (Tangko Agreement)
1934	October/November: beginning of the 12,000 km “Long March” by the Red Army
1937	7th July: incident on the Marco Polo Bridge, beginning of the Chino-Japanese War September: beginning of the coalition between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China
1945	14th August: signing of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Treaty Capitulation of Japan, end of the Second World War in Asia October: beginning of fresh fighting between the armed forces of the Communist Party and those of the Nationalist Government
1945–1947	American efforts to bring about a settlement between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang
1948	September/January 1949: Communist forces conquer the Manchurian North-east provinces and large areas of north China, including Peking
1949	1st October: proclamation of the People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China

1949	30th November: Communist forces conquer Chungking. The Nationalist Government moves to Taiwan.
1950	5th January: recognition of the Peking Government by eleven states (including India and Great Britain) 25th June: outbreak of the Korean War
1953	26th July: official end of the war in Korea
1955	January: beginning of massive Communist Chinese attacks against Nationalist Chinese off-shore islands in the Straits of Formosa 11th November: frontier conflict between China and India
1956	until July 1957: "Hundred Flowers Movement"
1958	29th August: "The Great Leap Forward" was proclaimed
1962	20th October: outbreak of major hostilities in the Chinese-Indian frontier territory in the Ladakh region
1964	16th October: explosion of the first Chinese atomic bomb
1965	Autumn: beginning of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"; all Chinese ambassadors recalled
1967	17th June: explosion of the first Chinese hydrogen bomb
1967/68	Climax of the Cultural Revolution, xenophobic outrages, apparently chaotic disturbances in the interior
1968	September: the "Great Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" proclaimed
1969	March to August: armed incidents on the Chinese-Soviet frontier April: 9th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China 20th October: Soviet-Chinese frontier negotiations open in Peking
1970	Gradual normalisation of Chinese foreign policy; reactivation of relations with Eastern Bloc states

Chronological Table 2: Russia/Soviet Union

9th century A. D.	Invasion of the Swedish Varangians The individual Varangian domains are joined together and the north (around Novgorod) is linked with the Dniepr region
907	Kiev Dynasty
988	Vladimir the Saint (978—1015) brings Russia into the community of Christian peoples
1019—1054	Yaroslav the Wise (son of Vladimir) reunites the country after division. He rules from Kiev.
1113—1125	Fraternal wars. Under Vladimir II last predominance of Kiev over the minor rulers
1169	Conquest and plundering of Kiev Kiev loses its status as the capital
1147	First mention of Moscow
1223	Battle between the Mongols and Russians on the Kalka, devastating defeat of the Russian princes
1241	Fall of Kiev. Victory of the Mongols (Jenghiz Khan) at Liegnitz and on the Theiss
1240—1245	Grand Duke Alexandr Nevsky defeat the Swedes, Lithuanians and Germans
1325—1341	Dukedom of Moscow under Ivan Kalita
1462—1505	Under Ivan III the Great an all-Russian state comes into being
1480	Liberation from the rule of the Mongols
1533—1584	Ivan IV the Terrible, the first Czar
1598—1605	Boris Godunov
1645—1676	Aleksey Mikhailovich, war with Poland and Sweden
1686	"Eternal Peace" with Poland
1689—1725	Czar Peter I the Great
1703	Founding of Petersburg
1721	Peter I accepts the title of "Emperor"
1730—1740	Anna Ivanovna
1741—1762	Czarina Elizabeth I Petrovna
1762—1796	Catherine II the Great, territorial gains in East Poland and on the Black Sea coast
1768—1774	Russo-Turkish War
1812—1815	Struggle against Napoleon, "Holy Alliance"
1825—1855	Czar Nicholas
1825	Decembrist Conspiracy in Petersburg

1853—1856	Crimean War between Russia and Turkey
1861	Emancipation of the Serfs
1877—1878	Russo-Turkish War, Peace of San Stefano
1894—1917	Czar Nicholas II
1904/05	Russo-Japanese War
1914	Outbreak of the First World War
1917	"October Revolution", overthrow of Czarism
1918	Peace of Brest-Litovsk, murder of the Czar at Ekaterinburg
1922	The Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo
1935—1937	Several major show trials against "Trotskyites" and high-ranking army officers
1935	World Congress of the Third International in Moscow
1939	German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact Beginning of the Second World War
1953	Death of Stalin
1957	October: launching of the first satellite (Sputnik)
1958	Khrushchev becomes Prime Minister
1959	Khrushchev in the USA, meeting with Eisenhower
1962	October: Cuba Crisis
1964	Fall of Khrushchev
1967	November: 50th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
1968	August: intervention by the troops of the Warsaw Pact states in Czechoslovakia
1969	March—August: armed incidents on the Chinese-Soviet frontier
1969	June: Communist World Conference in Moscow
1970	August: German-Soviet treaty renouncing the use of force signed in Moscow
1970	The Soviet Union lands the first automatic vehicle on the moon

Chronological Table 3: China — Russia

1689	6th September: Treaty of Nerchinsk ((Ni-pu-chu) frontier treaty)
1727	1st November: Treaty of Kiakhta, Frontier treaty, travel and trade agreements
1858	28th May: Treaty of Aigun Frontier treaty (territories east of the Ussuri, Sakhalin)
1864	7th October: Protocol of Chuguchak Frontier treaty (Turkestan, Kokand, etc.)
1879	15th September: Treaty of Levidia Frontier treaty (Ili Valley)
1881	24th February: Treaty of St. Petersburg frontier treaty (Ili Valley)
1912	3rd November: Treaty between Russia and Mongolia, autonomy of Mongolia confirmed by Russia
1913	5th November: Treaty between Russia and China, autonomy of Mongolia confirmed by China
1915	7th June: Treaty between Russia, Mongolia and China, autonomy of Mongolia confirmed
1919	25th July and 1920 27th September: Karakhan Declarations, the Soviet Union renounces all "incorporations of Chinese territory"
1924	31st May: Treaty between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China Soviet Union renounces extraterritorial rights in China, confirms that Mongolia belongs to China
1934	27th September: Treaty between the Soviet Union and Mongolia Agreement on mutual defence
1945	14th August: Treaty between the Soviet Union and China independence of Mongolia, <i>inter alia</i> , recognised
1946	5th January: Treaty between Mongolia and China independence of Mongolia confirmed
1950	14th February: Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China Treaty of friendship, alliance and assistance
1957	15th October: Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China Agreement on nuclear aid
1960	31st May: Treaty between the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of China Treaty of friendship and alliance

- 1960 April: beginning of the open discussion on ideological problems
- 1963 March: beginning of the open discussion on the frontier question
- 1964 February: frontier negotiations in Peking
- 1966 Autumn: reciprocal recall of ambassadors
- 1969 3rd March: official reports of border incidents; mutual recriminations, further incidents in May, June, July and August
18th June to 18th August: negotiations of the joint commission for navigation in Khabarovsk, agreement on resumption of navigation
11th September: Kosygin in Peking, talks with Chou En-lai
- 1970 December: ambassadors returned to Moscow and Peking