



THE
INTERNATIONAL
STUDENT MOVEMENT

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

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PREFACE

In writing this study I have drawn upon publications issued in the course of the years by the international student organizations and which can be found in the files of many NUSes. Many articles and surveys written on this subject by past and present student-leaders and the reports they presented to their National Unions on the various congresses have also been taken into consideration. Where this material was incomplete or contradictory I have tried to get an accurate picture through personal talks with the office-bearers involved. Despite all endeavours to render as truthful an account as possible, I would be wrong to claim that I have been completely successful. The period 1945-'65 belongs to a still too immediate past for a totally objective analysis. Nevertheless I take full responsibility for conclusions and formulations except where the text indicates that others are speaking.

This study is not meant to be exhaustive either. I have tried only to depict those events which, to my mind, have had a decisive influence upon the development of the international student movement. Events that caused a great deal of stir in their time, but had no noticeable impact on the development, have been left out. The choice of subjects is, of course, my own responsibility.

Finally, I should like to acknowledge my debt to all who have helped me in gathering this material. In particular, I wish to thank the Netherlands Student Council (NSR) through which I first came into contact with the international student movement, thus enabling me to acquire, during a number of years, an unforgettable experience.

Oostloorn, January, 1966.

Gert van Maanen.

INTRODUCTION

"Let us always make clear our willingness to talk, if talk will help, and our readiness to fight, if fight we must. Let us resolve to be the masters, not the victims, of our history, controlling our own destiny without giving way to blind suspicion and emotion" (1)

These words spoken by President Kennedy a month before his death when addressing the students of the University of Maine may seem to the reader a strange beginning for a study on the international student movement. And yet they are characteristic of the mentality of many post-war students, at least of those active on the international student level. One may feel that international student meetings have always been marked by this atmosphere, that they have always been dynamic, inspired by the maxim: "we shall do better than the previous generation". Whether this is true or not, it is a fact that since World War II students have been more active than ever before and seem more aware of the possibilities and responsibilities inherent in their place in society.

There are many explanations for this increase in consciousness. First there is the fact that the university was becoming accessible to social groups which in the past reached the university in exceptional cases only. In several Western European countries the number of scholarship-holders has increased by tens of thousands. Moreover, the university itself has rapidly outgrown the ivory tower concept of the previous century and turned more and more towards society. Without abandoning its academic purpose, the university is becoming increasingly aware of being an essential element of society to whose needs it must be adapted. University and students no longer look upon society as the "world outside", an interesting phenomenon for study.

A second reason lies in the fact that we are living in the age of communication, with all its consequences. Public opinion today has a greater influence than ever before on

governments and political systems. Whether public opinion influences the press or vice-versa, both are a powerful weapon in the making or marring of policies. Experience goes to show that opposition in countries with freedom of expression is no longer useless. There are innumerable examples to prove that mobilization of public opinion can bring about a change of policy. And every success in this field emphasizes the possibilities of effective pressure.

Every day one can read in the press how students use these means to express their opinion for more or less praiseworthy causes, with or without result. In Greece they played a decisive role in the government crisis. Student demonstrations in South Korea forced Syngman Rhee to resign. Students in the United States are the nucleus of civil rights action groups. In Latin America students are in the vanguard of all parties. In Hungary they were the soul of the revolution. In Africa students are the great advocates of Pan-African unity. Students in Scandinavia are changing their governments' policy on South Africa. After the communist coup in Indonesia students took the lead in changing their country's policy. In America and Western Europe students are organizing teach-ins to discuss issues such as Vietnam and South Africa. And there are many more examples of students voicing their opinion in critical situations.

Why is it that amongst students there is a higher degree of political involvement than amongst the rest of the population? This question may seem somewhat rhetorical, but we should deal with it briefly. Although the answer varies for different parts of the world, there is one general feature which distinguishes the average student from the average non-student.

Various international student organizations define the student as "a young intellectual, seeking after truth". (2) This does not in the least imply that other groups are less concerned with the truth. This definition may be more meaningful in the negative: a student will not let himself be put off by an untruth, a half-truth or a partial truth. He is expected to continue seeking until he is convinced that an assertion is irrefutably correct. In every branch of studies

the search for law is an essential element of academic investigation. The truth admits of no compromise and probabilities are taken at their face value.

Such an uncompromising approach will be made not only to the academic problems facing the student but also to the social and political ones. There again he will continue to look for what he feels is absolutely accurate, without being put off by a compromise.

However, outside the student world there is no escape from compromise. Job, family, social status, friends and many other factors force the average citizen to accept compromise. There are things better left undone and opinions better unexpressed, because one does not want to risk the possible consequences for one-self or one's dependents. Political parties, however loyal to their principles during election campaigns, can only exert influence through compromise.

There is no such necessity for the student. At least not to the extent that it colours his whole life. He must keep his scholarship by obtaining reasonable results in his studies. Apart from that, he is as free as he wants to be. He sees how inevitable compromise becomes outside the university and realizes that he may contribute to the discussion, in order to avoid that the compromise differs too much from his own point of view. Unlike those involved in a certain conflict, he has nothing to lose. He has the choice between using his influence or remaining indifferent. Sometimes, however, issues are at stake that make him wonder whether he has the right to remain aloof. This was especially true during World War II. Students who previously concerned themselves with their studies only, arrived at the conclusion that they had to take notice of certain measures, even when these did not yet affect the university. Free of ties, they seized in many countries the opportunity of fighting the Hitler regime. Universities became the heart of resistance, especially during the first months of the war.

But under less critical circumstances also they realized that their position offered them special possibilities. And when aware of an opportunity to take action, one must accept the responsibility of taking or leaving it. The more serious

the problems facing a country, the larger the number of students who no longer wish to remain aloof.

Is it because they are meddlesome that students all over the world are taking position? Is it the attraction of uproar? Or is it a manifestation of responsible social commitment and a sense of sharing in the responsibility for developments?

It is not relevant, within the framework of this study, what percentage of the students makes this conscious choice. The percentage is low in a stable society because no group which feels neglected needs the expressed support of the student to achieve its goal. But, as I said earlier on, the more acute the problem, the larger the number of students who feel their responsibility.

Having advanced the thesis that uncompromising search for truth is one of the essential characteristics of a student, we must at once make certain limitations. Traces of this mentality may be found all over the world, but this attitude is not practicable everywhere. Many countries offer little scope for individual or collective stands on personal conviction. In another chapter we shall deal with this in greater detail. The consequences for the official student organizations of these countries are conformity (DDR), clandestinity (Spain) or confrontation with exceptional difficulties (South Africa). At international conferences such countries are represented either by blind followers, mandated delegates studying abroad or students who are genuinely representative, but who often must weigh their words in view of consequences on their return to their own country. The first group, in particular, has the tendency to raise points which are more of interest to the respective governments than to students. It is an established fact that these representatives would never have been accredited, had their government not known them to be completely loyal. Discussions with them lack all elements of dialogue, because their mandate permits no genuine dialogue – in which everyone is willing to change his opinion for a better one. Their opinion is conceived in government offices and they cannot deviate from it without risking their career. As we shall see later on, this is one

of the roots of the conflict in the international student movement.

When dealing hereafter with the developments of the international student movement, we shall restrict ourselves to relations among National Unions of Students and the two international organizations in which they have come together. Organizations based on academic disciplines, political convictions, religion and the like shall not be taken into consideration. Their development and problems are influenced by totally different factors.

The international student organizations have established different criteria on the basis of which a national student organization is to have the right to call itself a National Union of Students, but we shall go into these later. For the purpose of this study, a National Union of Students (abbreviated NUS) shall be a student organization acting as mouth-piece of the students in a certain country.

Practically every country which possesses an institute of higher education has such an NUS in which students unite to defend their interests. Since World War II and the gradual decolonization of Africa and Asia, the number of universities in the world has multiplied and scores of NUSes have been founded, died out and been refounded. Nothing is more natural than the need of these NUSes for international contact to exchange experience and request support for some of the tasks they are facing.

Thus, already after World War I, initiatives were taken to create an international student organization within which these NUSes could cooperate. Best known amongst them is the International Student Confederation (CIE) founded in 1919. This organization came to a sudden end when the Nazis invaded Brussels and destroyed its headquarters. The CIE was mainly active in the field of student welfare. It was not an organization providing great inspiration and leadership. (3) Its members, mainly from Europe and the British Commonwealth, preferred a loose structure with the emphasis on the Unions' autonomy. This made it impossible for the CIE to develop any real activity and, precisely in the second half of the thirties when coordination was needed

most, the CIE badly defaulted.

It was largely due to the CIE's structural weakness that the first international student organization to be founded after the war was strongly centralized. When, in a climate of post-war solidarity, the International Union of Students was created in 1946, a dynamic structure was accepted with barely any objection. That this structure offered abundant scope for abuse was not realized at the time. As we shall see further on, it did not take long before communists acquired a majority within the IUS secretariat and converted this organisation, created with such idealism, into one of the most important communist front organizations. As hopes of returning the IUS to its original course diminished, more NUSes left the organization with great disillusion. They gathered within the International Student Conference (ISC) which first met in Stockholm in 1950.

Since that time the IUS and ISC have gone through a great many evolutions, but they still dominate the international student movement. It is the purpose of this study to help those interested understand the complex situation that has arisen in the course of the years. It would be considerably easier if we had to deal with two straightforward student organizations. Since, however, one of these organizations is geared not towards the interests of students but towards those of world communism, it is necessary, for a proper understanding of developments, also to bear in mind the changes communism has undergone in its various manifestations. These changes are determining factors of the policy and strategy of the IUS. One could argue that it is wrong to premise that the IUS is a communist front organization. But, as we shall see later, the IUS has put itself completely in line with the front organizations a few years after its foundation. It is therefore necessary at the outset to devote a chapter to the purpose and function of front organizations in general in order to understand better the developments within the IUS. This chapter will be followed by a survey on the nature of NUSes in different parts of the world for a clearer picture of the components of the international student movement. The actual subject of this study will begin in chapter three.

I. COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

Since the very beginning communism has used so-called front organizations to draw certain groups within the communist sphere of influence and have them serve the objectives of communism. (4) As early as 1921, Lenin worked out a plan for the foundation of international organizations to be used as "transmission belts" by the communists. The term "front organization" is somewhat confusing because it immediately evokes associations with the terms "national front" and "popular front", commonly applied to mobilization of a population for national purposes. A better label might be that of "auxiliary organizations". However, the term front organization has become so renowned that we shall continue to use it in order to avoid misunderstandings.

The big force behind the front organizations was the German Willi Muenzenberg (5) who in 1921, in his capacity as president of the Communist Youth International, took the initiative of founding the International Workers Aid (IWA). Initially, this organization collected foodstuffs for areas in the Soviet Union suffering from starvation. Gradually Muenzenberg realized that such a noble institution lent itself perfectly to political activities. A few political departments were added to IWA and in the following years it began to work feverishly among the workers in Western countries. Material assistance became a secondary objective and priority was given to moral solidarity and political indoctrination. To this end, IWA set up among others a complete newspaper concern whose activities reached as far as Japan.

Encouraged by the success of this organization, the COMINTERN decided in 1926 to start working on a larger scale:

"The first part of our task is to build up, not only communist organizations, but other organizations as well, above all mass organizations sympathizing with our aims and able to aid us for specific purposes. We must create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller com-

mittees around the communist party, smaller organizations so to speak, actually working under the influence of the party, but not under its mechanical control." (6)

Thereupon Muenzenberg presented to the COMINTERN in 1928 a programme of action as a directive for, what he called, "the Innocents Clubs". It contained the following six points:

1. Arouse the interest of the "millions of apathetic and indifferent workers", uninterested in communist propaganda. They must be approached and attracted in different ways.
2. Build bridges for those who sympathize with communism but have not yet taken the final step of joining the communist party.
3. Expand the communist sphere of influence by means of mass organizations.
4. Create organizational links with those sympathizing with the Soviet Union and communism.
5. Use these sympathizing organizations to train a leadership and party officials and provide them with organizational experience.
6. Obstruct activities of similar non-communist organizations. (7)

The above programme could have been written today and is still a guide for the front organizations. But there was one severe handicap. Both the Communist Youth International and organizations such as the PROFINTERN (founded for the solidarity with oppressed workers) made no secret of their communist objective and, thus, frightened away many of the willing. During the war, when post-war tactics were elaborated, it was decided that front organizations should in future categorically deny all relationship with communism. Their activities were to remain unchanged but the facade was to be more generally acceptable. The Communist Youth International was dissolved and the leadership made preparations to set the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), to be founded immediately after the war, on its

proper course. (8)

In the years immediately following World War II, many of these "new-fashioned" front organizations were born. They had full opportunity because of the general longing for international cooperation and those who, like Stalin and Churchill, saw a cold war approaching, were silenced. Under the banner of international cooperation and struggle against fascism, three international organizations were created immediately after the war: the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). In the next years the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Teachers Unions (WFTU), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and a few others were added to the list.

In all these organizations communists from the very beginning occupied leading positions and laid down the policy. The various organizations enthusiastically endorsed generally acceptable and noble initiatives, but in their implementation the Executive did not adhere to the generally accepted interpretation but followed the Moscow line. By a process of false logic (we are against fascism; whoever is against us is, therefore, a fascist) they became a successful sounding-board for Soviet policy.

How did the communists obtain a majority in these organizations, one might ask. The main reason is that the organizations had been founded on their initiative and that the different national committees represented in these organizations were their creation. This had not been difficult since many organizations had to be built from scratch after the war. In the climate of general solidarity, few were aware of any danger. By the time the first congress was held, the communists had already secured key-positions in most delegations. Moreover, they had a planned strategy and the other members of the delegations found it extremely difficult to give, unprepared, an appropriate response to the disciplined action of the communist group. The non-communists disagreed amongst themselves on their line of action and those who still had their doubts

were told that their attitude was out of tune at such tremendously impressive events. At all constituent congresses the disciplined communist delegations thus successfully achieved control over the organizations with barely any opposition. A structure was designed so as to guarantee a minimum of control by the members, whereas the Executive was given almost full power to do what it felt necessary for a good cause.

What would have become of these organizations had the communists been in the minority? A clear answer can be found in the Soviet Union's attitude towards the United Nations. (9) Ever since the declaration of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Moscow, October, 1943 (10) up to the final foundation of the UN on 26th June, 1945 in San Francisco, the Soviet Union realized that the communists would be in a minority in the UN. In the opinion of the Soviets, this organization had to be directed mainly at the maintenance of peace. Though still convinced of the inevitability of war in accordance with Leninist principles, peace was a necessary pre-requisite for the post-war Soviet Union to recover and consolidate itself. Its attitude during the preliminary talks and during the first years of the UN's existence clearly proved that it regarded this international organization as a means and not as an end in itself: with a non-communist majority all activities in the social, medical, agrarian, educational and other field would be clearly non-communist and therefore anti-communist. This was a logical consequence of Stalin's two-camps theory. Consequently, there was no Soviet support for these activities of the UN, the right of veto was a *sine qua non*, and everyone, the Soviet Union repeatedly stressed, was free to leave the UN when he thought fit. All three points meant essential restrictions of the UN's possibilities, if not a clear manifestation of the Soviet concept of "international cooperation". The Soviet Union gave the clearest proof of its attitude when, at the height of the cold war, it isolated itself completely within the UN along with a small group of supporters and decided to found one of the most important front organizations:

the World Peace Council (WPC). This organization was first launched as a strong alternative to the UN. The General Assembly had hardly established that communist China was committing aggression in Korea when Peking reacted:

"The UN has completely disappointed the hopes placed upon it by the peoples of the world The World Peace Movement has won the confidence of the peoples throughout the world, who have lost faith in the UN." (11)

Only after the relaxation of the cold war and the introduction of the policy of peaceful coexistence did the Soviet Union change its attitude towards the UN and began to recognize the utility of the organization and its agencies.

Meanwhile it had become evident, however, that communism would support no form of international cooperation unless it was of immediate advantage, or rather, unless it was obviously more profitable to participate than to stand aside. This opportunistic attitude is well-known and must be taken into account. It is, however, blatantly contradictory to the idealistic purposes presented to non-communist participants at its congresses. But what is idealism "The idealist philosophy is an erroneous concept of the world. The one-sided and subjective attitude to this conception of the world leads gradually to the swamp of idealism where it is rooted by the interests of the ruling class, by the interests of slave-traders, feudal lords and bourgeoisie." (12)

All the front organizations made a glorious start and yet they were not always so successful in the first years of their existence. Since the leading officials were not free to deviate from the party line unless they were prepared to risk a purge at home, the front organizations were totally involved in all aspects of the cold war. The Marshall plan, conflicts with Yugoslavia, the Korean war, Hungary and many other issues on which International Communism took a stand, were successively taken up by the front organizations in strict obedience to the official Moscow line. This made it impossible for them to conceal their communist nature, especially when, after Khrushchev's visit to Tito in 1955, they had to do their utmost to make Yugoslavia re-join their ranks. Meanwhile, many of the initial supporters

of the "Innocents Clubs" had turned their back on these organizations and in practically all their fields of action new organizations were created in a desire to return to the non-partisan approach. In 1949 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was founded, followed in 1950 by the International Student Conference (ISC), the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), and in 1952 by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), etc. In line with the two-camps theory, these organizations were, from the very outset, accused by the front organizations of supporting imperialism, colonialism, war-mongering, in short all trends regularly denounced by communist propaganda. Their activities were identified with those of the worst elements in the world, as if universal principles were non-existent. Nevertheless, these organizations grew steadily and the front organizations' membership began to decline until it was almost limited to communists alone. Everyone will understand this was not the development they had in mind.

The thaw in the cold war which set in just before Stalin's death and was stimulated after 1955 came to the rescue of the front organizations. Encouragement of violent revolts and revolutions gave way to a strategy of peaceful coexistence. This policy was confirmed at the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956. Apart from de-stalinization this Congress brought other important changes in tactics, gratefully adopted by the front organizations as providing more room for flexibility. Nationalism in developing countries was recognized as a positive current, and "bourgeois revolutions" like in Indonesia, Burma and India were no longer dismissed as treason, capitulation and conspiracy. Communism, it was realized, was better served by positive neutrality than by opposition to non-communist-nationalist movements. In developing countries, in particular, the chance of a final communist success would be greater after a period of nationalism, which therefore should be stimulated in the short run.

A new interpretation of peaceful coexistence was, moreover, applied at the 20th Party Congress. It was felt that

victory without armed conflict was not impossible and the old breathing-time theory was thus consolidated as actual policy. (13) However, its description by the 1960 Moscow Declaration allows for no illusions:

"The line of peaceful coexistence is a line of mobilization of the masses, of the development of intensified action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence is far from being a rejection of the class war: it is one of the forms taken by the class struggle and its use helps to intensify the class struggle within the capitalist countries and the national liberation struggle in the colonies, while they in turn help to strengthen the communist peaceful coexistence campaign by helping towards communism without the need for war." (14)

And in regard to the front organizations it adds:

"While ensuring that communists retain the leadership at all times, greater use is to be made of the peace movements, the youth, student, trade-union and women's groups to exploit all possible sources of discontent, joining forces where possible with social democratic and labour groups for tactical ends." (14)

This line offered the front organizations new scope for expansion. It gave a broader definition of the ultimate goals, allowing for the recruitment of more support from outside the communist world. As said before, this did not imply that the front organizations became less dependent on communism. Communism itself showed a kinder, less harsh face. Vaster possibilities for cooperation with non-communist movements were created, as long as the purpose served the interests of communism. Emphasis was laid on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-neocolonialism, disarmament, peace, scientific advance and the progress of the university. Communism not only tried to win support for its own cause, it began to attach more importance to arousing dislike of the West. Muenzenberg's directives were still valid, only further specified and concentrated on the following points:

1. Promotion of world communism by means of propaganda, attacking and degrading the imperialist States and defending and idealizing the socialist bloc.
2. Winning over of non-communists by first inducing them to support certain highly praiseworthy goals, defined, however, in accordance with communist terminology and policy. The arouse of sympathy for certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy, followed by subtle indoctrination.
3. Indoctrination, especially in those countries where the communist party is banned.
4. Disintegration of rival organizations.
5. Propaganda for Soviet policy and long and short-term demands of the Soviet Union.
6. Cooperation with non-communist organizations, as long as and on the condition that it serves communist purposes.
7. Introduction of communist thought in the outside world.

This new policy has led over the last years to redoubled activities by the front organizations to increase their contacts in developing countries. Recognition of the positive values of nationalism has provided them with a good introduction and removed many restraints. Though aware of working with people following a very definite strategy, the developing countries were wise enough to accept the assistance offered, whatever the motives. However, they were also offered such- and far more important- assistance by the non-communist world. But here again front organizations intervened and used their position to isolate these Western countries where possible. The French author, Suzanne Labin, has made the following enumeration of assumptions proclaimed by front organizations in developing countries: (15)

1. Communists are the real friends of anti-imperialists.
2. The conflict is one between the Soviet Union and the USA and the rest of the world must, therefore, remain neutral.
3. Communist countries are arming themselves for fear

- of Western aggression. Make aggression by the West impossible through disarmament and the problem has ceased to exist.
4. Communist countries are afraid because they do not understand the West. The West must, therefore, take initiatives, removing all possible misunderstanding of its good will.
 5. The West is most distrustful and negative towards communists. That is why you (i. e. the third world) must make the West more open and constructive.
 6. A thousand million communists are living in the communist countries, a fact which must not be overlooked. The percentage of those who dislike communism can be ignored.
 7. Atomic danger today is greater than ever. The Soviet Union concentrates on this rather than on political successes.
 8. Communism owes its success to social injustice; no other party is concerned with this problem and that is why communism in Eastern Europe receives mass support.
 9. Communist aid to developing countries is disinterested and inspired by humanitarian motives, whereas Western assistance is neo-colonialist and aimed at retaining control over the country.

Constant insistence upon these sophisms makes it quite easy for the average "innocent" to discover the true nature of front organizations even today. Members, initially attracted by their fervent anti-imperialism, have often expressed their discontent at the partiality of the front organizations. In developing countries, especially, people tend to organize themselves along their own lines, having no contact with the front organizations except where this is useful or where, for neutrality's sake, such organizations should not be rebuffed. However, the front organizations are increasingly compelled to work with minority groupings so as to get some footing in certain countries. Moreover, since 1960 a new problem determines the future and image of the front or-

ganizations. The Sino-Soviet dispute first showed itself publicly at the 1960 congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, although WPC and IUS meetings had already given the outside world indications of a widening gap. (16) In Peking, China accused the Soviet Union openly of trying to isolate the Chinese and reach an agreement with the United States. The reply was the first public charge with fractionalism. Ever since the Chinese have done their utmost to turn the congresses of the front organizations into anti-Soviet manifestations. True, until now they have not achieved a majority, but their support is certainly growing among youth which is naturally more attracted by the harsh, uncompromising Chinese line than by the Soviet coexistence policy. In straight contradiction to the rules, the Chinese have argued again that Moscow has been keeping the front organization tied to its apron-string and have confronted the Russian delegations with the difficult task of denying this well-known but unadmitted fact. At recent congresses there was such tension between these two delegations that it threatened to destroy the purpose of the organizations. The non-communist participants were compelled to witness disputes on points of no concern to them and saw nothing constructive in serving as sounding-board for the big two. It is as yet impossible to foresee how this situation will develop. When the relations between both Parties will be severed, there is no doubt that the pro-Chinese group will refuse to let Moscow hamper its activities any longer and will withdraw from the front organizations. The result may be the establishment of pro-Chinese front organizations operating alongside or against the Soviet fronts.

II. THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (NUS)

Since National Unions of Students are, in principle, the components of the two international student organizations under study here, we must first take a brief look at the different forms in which the phenomenon of the NUS presents itself.

As said before, we understand by a National Union of Students the organization which gathers the students of a certain country and whose aim is to defend their interests nationally and internationally. It is easy to see that this definition may cover a wide range of organizations, each with its own interpretation of the word student, his interests and the way in which these can best be defended.

It is an established fact, moreover, that student organizations suffer in a high degree of discontinuity and that, as a result, each student organization is subject to a great many changes. Within a year a NUS may have ceased to exist because its officers have graduated, because they have not adequately briefed their successors, because financial resources are reduced or because university or government have made work impossible. Later another organization may turn up, win the support of the majority of the students and develop into a NUS that has nothing in common with the previous one.

This makes it difficult to give examples of specific NUSes since they may change radically within a few months. Still one can give a general survey provided it is restricted to the general features common to NUSes in a certain part of the world. For the character of a NUS is not determined merely by the opinion of its members and the personal qualities of its officers. There are also external factors, all of which influence, to a greater or lesser degree, the pattern of conduct of organizations in a certain country.

First there is the factor of national character. It will be clear to everyone that the Chilean national character differs essentially from that of the inhabitants of Norway and Thai-

land. In South America active participation by youth in national problems is regarded as normal, in Norway it may be considered meddlesome, while in Thailand it is definitely uncivil and incorrect for a younger person to disagree with his elders. Consequently, one can understand that when delegates of NUSes from these countries want to work together, they may have some difficulty in understanding each other's language and objectives.

The influence of the political structure of a country is as important. Between totalitarian dictatorship and true democracy lie a great many possible forms of government, each of which offers different opportunities to student organizations. Often in a dictatorship we find, side by side with the legal and conformist organization, an illegal one aiming at elimination of the totalitarian structure, an objective it regards as far more important than the promotion of student welfare. A democracy, on the contrary, offers so many opportunities for legal expression that illegal methods are unnecessary. Here, no one needs student support to change an unjust situation and students will, therefore, tend to devote themselves purely to specific student problems.

Intimately related to this is the degree to which political systems restrict freedom of action of the individual or his organizations. Whereas freedom of action of individuals, let alone organizations, is subject to fundamental limitations in countries such as Haiti and the DDR, individuals in most developing countries can express themselves freely. On the other hand, the Governments of these countries are often reluctant to grant absolute freedom of association which might increase confusion and hamper development. In Western countries, the individual enjoys complete freedom of action and restraints can only be exercised over organizations when they are regarded as immoral or subversive. But however favourable the political situation may be to the birth of independent organizations, a government may sometimes have to appeal to these organizations to consider the interest of the State which may be threatened by unchecked political activity. Hongkong students are requested not to be too provocative, while Finnish students are asked not to

take action against a communist youth festival held in Helsinki.

Closely related to these political difficulties are other problems facing a country and demanding the attention of the entire population. The Israeli, Palestinian, Indonesian, Indian, Cuban and South African NUSes, for instance, are strongly influenced by the key problems of their countries.

Finally, it is evident that the socio-economic background of those entering university influences their conduct as students.

It is, therefore, not surprising that NUSes in different parts of the world vary considerably in structure, purpose, outlook and methods. If, for the sake of clarity, classification is necessary, the geographical one is the least objectionable. In this way we can distinguish the following groups: NUSes from what are sometimes called the "old established countries"; NUSes from communist countries and NUSes from "newly emerging countries", to be subdivided into African, Asian and Latin American NUSes. I shall try to give a brief description of some general features in this order.

A. The old established countries.

The university in these countries (Western Europe, North America, Australasia) is an established institution, regarded by the average citizen as the place providing training for a position in society. Since World War II there has been a re-orientation towards the university's social task and purpose, but this discussion takes place more within the university than in society. In society the opinion still prevails that the university is the intellectual playground for tomorrow's elite. It is self-evident that this attitude has its effect on the students who enter the university from society and through them on the character of their NUSes. Originally founded as representative bodies for the defense of interests, they have gradually become since World War II the mouthpieces of the students, conducting an active policy. In increasing their activities,

the NUSes have since that time been strongly stimulated by the tremendous expansion of their field of action. State subsidy to the University increased and students from other more needy and vulnerable groups gained admission. The defense of their interests could not be left to State and university authorities alone. The NUSes realized that coordinated and guided action alone could improve the social condition of needy students. The need for student participation in the responsibility for the improvement of university education became increasingly apparent. The NUSes began to show interest not only in socio-economic problems, but also in democratization of education, teaching methods, examination systems, curricula, etc. In addition to the old services, they began to set up cooperatives, student travel bureaux, bookshops etc. Increase in international contacts led to a comparison of activities, a study of methods and an exchange of experience which added considerably to the efficiency of the NUSes. Thus, the NUSes grew into recognized representative organizations like those existing in other sectors of society.

And yet there is a noticeable difference among the various NUSes and it is striking how language helps to determine this difference.

The "Latin" NUSes (France, Italy, Wallonia, Quebec, etc.) regard syndicalism as the best method to achieve results in the shortest time. The term 'syndical' is somewhat misleading, because every organization which defends interests is a syndicate so that in a sense the other NUSes are equally syndical. It is more correct, therefore, to speak of Latin syndicalism and Anglo-Saxon syndicalism. The former starts from the principle that the student is a "young intellectual worker" who, like the non-intellectual worker, can best defend his interest by means of a pressure group. Through press campaigns, demonstrations and actions, this pressure group continuously draws attention to its demands and carries on with these activities until the authorities concerned comply.

Anglo-Saxon syndicalism places the stress on the student's responsibility side by side with, and not in opposi-

tion to, the other components of university education. The State (financier) as well as the university (means) and the student (object) have their own specific responsibilities for the improvement of university education and have, apart from their own duties, the right to remind the other partners of their tasks. The Anglo-Saxon NUSes therefore constantly strive to be accepted as partners whose special position gives them expert knowledge. For students are in touch every day with education and social provisions and know from personal experience what improvements are needed. Anglo-Saxon NUSes will resort to more demonstrative methods of voicing their demands to press and parliament only when they are rebuffed on questions in which they are concerned. In many countries their ready acceptance of a co-responsibility has won them direct participation in preparations and planning. Thus they try to influence the university situation in the long run, without giving up their independence.

The relationship between "Latin" NUSes and their universities and governments is often much more strained, with the result that the French NUS, for instance, has refused to sit on the national council of education and is trying to influence its recommendations from outside. One might ask which is the more effective method, but this is not the place to discuss the pros and cons of the two forms of syndicalism.

Finally, a few remarks about the political activities of these two groups. The "Latin" students are undeniably more politically involved than the Anglo-Saxons. Both groups base themselves on the student's social commitment, the one because of his solidarity as intellectual worker, the other because of his responsibility towards society. But, as we shall see later on, most Anglo-Saxon students do not want to risk a split in their Union by discussing political problems. In their opinion, the NUS is first an organization forwarding common interests which should refrain from taking sides in political conflicts unless it is absolutely clear that the overwhelming majority of the students share the same opinion. The "Latin" NUSes, on the contrary, set

such store by the student's political responsibility that they do not want to exclude it from their work. Officers are often elected for their political convictions and not just for their concept of specifically student interests.

B. The communist countries

It hardly needs explaining that universities in communist countries, despite their equally long-standing tradition, have changed in character since the introduction of communist government. They are still institutes of higher education, but freedom of research is no longer unlimited. It is bound by the rules of Marxism-Leninism. Whereas Western universities sometimes pay too little attention to the needs of society, the university in communist countries is adjusted to these needs. But this inevitably excludes any form of academic investigation regarded as not in the interest of society, or rather not acceptable to the marxist-leninist view of the interest of society. The best-known example of obstruction to the progress of science by this structure is that of the Soviet biologist Lysenko. For scores of years he retarded the progress of genetics, silencing his opponents as if they were the Galilei's of our time. Blind subservience of the university to society undoubtedly restricts its academic freedom, yet this does not at all imply that no great progress has been made, especially in fields not subject to strict doctrinal considerations.

The university's activities are subject to party doctrine, but those of youth and student organizations even much more so. Most communist NUSes are student sections of the national youth organization which is directly controlled by the party. The primary purpose of these NUSes is not to defend the interest of their members but to prepare them for socialist citizenship. The interests defended are primarily party interests for which the NUS must gain the necessary support amongst the students. (17) Whereas in the old established countries NUSes were founded to defend the student's interests to the State, in communist countries

the NUSes serve to bring the State, in this case the party, closer to the student. But even when subservience to the party is not stated explicitly in the constitution, the NUS's freedom of action remains limited. In accordance with the social pattern of communist countries, criticism must fall within the limits of the permissible and criticism which is also reproach is not permissible. It only leads to confusion, uncertainty and delay and this is not in the country's interest and is least expected from a NUS. Its main task is to promote certainty, steadfastness of purpose and a sense of responsibility among the students.

Another function of the NUSes and youth organizations is early discovery and subsequent training of tomorrow's party leadership. The value attached to this function by the party cannot be overestimated. It explains why the "Komsomolskaya Pravda", organ of the youth movement, is the third paper in importance in the Soviet Union. It also explains why the youth and student movement is often directed by older people who know the problems of youth from talks with their children.

A clear example of the relationship between State, party and NUS, is the career of the present high Soviet official, Alexander Shelepin, who when "a student", was secretary of the KOMSOMOL and Vice-President of the IUS and later, in his "youth", Vice-President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and head of the Soviet state security service at one and the same time!

In the light of the purpose of these NUSes, there is no cause for surprise or irritation at the fact that they are less flexible in their international contacts. Party interest is common interest and therefore student interest also. Contradiction between these interests is precluded by definition. These NUSes can therefore not be expected to try, independently of the party, to accommodate on fundamental issues. Communist NUS delegates may deviate from the doctrinal line only when sure of getting understanding and support from their superiors. During the Stalin era the leader of a delegation would risk all and everything, now

only his career. Consequently, stands on fundamental issues are rigid and uncompromising, unless compromise is clearly in the party's interest.

One of the consequences of this party-link is the reflection of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the communist student world. The Soviet and Chinese NUSes oppose one another and as the conflict grows in intensity, their attitude to one another become more irreconcilable. The NUS of Albania, follows in China's wake and together they ignore the Yugoslavs completely. The other communist NUSes take more or less the Soviet line, depending on the attitude of their governments. A striking example, in this respect, is that of the Rumanian Vice-President of the IUS who, after many years of loyal service in Prague, became the enfant terrible of the Soviets when he suddenly and with obvious delight began to play an independent role as his Government set out on a more independent course.

Yet we must not let ourselves be blinded by these facts since in the past few years these NUSes have taken many more initiatives of their own. Several NUSes, previously acting on party orders, now have a wider scope of activities and may independently take actions to which the party would probably not object. Thanks to liberalization in Eastern Europe, NUSes which used to be organizations for the students can now also be more of the students. It lies with the future whether this is the beginning of a new evolution or just a temporary change.

C. Africa (18)

European and African universities greatly differ in that the latter are generally young and new. True, in colonial times, institutions of higher education had been founded here and there, but it was more or less the rule for the few African students to enter a university in the colonizing country. Only after World War II, large-scale foundation of universities began and the countries themselves could provide for the education of their citizens.

Logically, these African countries have no place for a

university with an ivory tower concept and neither State nor university wish it to be otherwise. Since in the past only privileged or very persisting and energetic Africans had access to university education, graduates are few and demands on them all the heavier.

If any group has the right to call itself the elite of tomorrow, if not of tonight, it is the African students. More closely than anywhere else they follow the development of their country and continent and participate in it actively. The university community occupies a place more important than anywhere else and inter-action between university and society is, therefore, intense, too intense sometimes to the liking of many African governments.

The influence of student organizations on the evolution of African society dates back to far before World War II. Before long, African students at European universities began to organize themselves to discuss the role they would have to play on their return to their countries. Undoubtedly the most influential amongst them has been the West African Students Union (WASU), founded in London in 1926. Many present African leaders like Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Quaison Sackey have worked and received their first political training within WASU. In 1945 Paris followed London's example and the Federation of Students from Black Africa in France (FEANF) was founded, whose leaders have, meanwhile, attained leading positions in the governments of practically all French-speaking African countries. It is not surprising that these student organizations attached primary importance to the achievement of an independent Africa which was to take its place in the world on a basis of equality and mutual respect. To them the socio-economic problems with which the European NUSes concerned themselves, were of minor importance and deserved little attention. They were political organizations, and, drawing their membership from many African countries, laid the basis for Pan-Africanism. Now their role has been taken over by NUSes born on African soil and equally aware of their duty to serve national and

African interest first.

Though bound together by Pan-Africanism, these NUSes differ greatly amongst themselves. These differences are in the first place determined by the attitudes of their governments. Some African countries know a certain form of parliamentary democracy, some have a single-party system, and others an autocratic regime. Some governments are well-disposed towards the students and let them speak on many questions, while other governments are afraid of student organizations which are strong and which might turn against them. These are the factors which mainly determine whether NUSes cooperate with the political rulers, or are opposed to or controlled by them. Not infrequently does it happen that rival organizations are created by government intervention when the NUS's policy displeases the government and in these cases, much devotion, leadership and great financial means are needed to keep the NUS operational. The changing political climate in many African countries therefore regularly alters the image of the African NUSes.

Finally, there is a second difference among African NUSes which runs more or less parallel to the colonial language border. One can find in Africa more or less the same distinction as between Latin and Anglo-Saxon syndicalism. In the course of the years, many theories have been developed about the reasons for a difference in outlook between French- and English-speaking Africans, but these fall outside the framework of our study.

Generally speaking, the former are more dynamically political than the latter. The English-speaking NUSes are usually less radical and militant, more imbued with a fair-play mentality, while the French-speaking NUSes are more basically political. They want full priority for the political activities of the African students, sometimes at the expense of student welfare work. This assertion must, however, be handled with great care, since local situations vary so much that there are many exceptions to this rule.

D. ASIA

In comparing Asian and African NUSes we find remarkable differences that are mainly due to a difference in outlook. Few NUSes from non-communist Asia have been able to develop strong institutions, defending student interests and at the same time participating actively in the developments of society. The only NUS of importance as political factor is the Indonesian. But this NUS's history runs in many respects parallel to that of many African NUSes. Here again the basis for student activities was laid outside Indonesia in 1922 when the Perhimpunan Peladjar Indonesia was founded in the Netherlands. This organization rapidly grew into an organization similar to WASU in London and many of Indonesia's present leaders belonged to it. It was the students who brought pressure on Sukarno and Hatta on 17th August, 1945, to proclaim independence and they have been recognized as a functional group within society since. This explains why the emphasis of their work lies in the promotion of the Indonesian revolution and why they leave activities in the field of student welfare to other organizations.

But in other Asian countries the situation is totally different. The government leaders of most Asian States have left their student days far behind them. Seeing current developments in Latin America and Africa they do not wish for a strong student organization which might turn against them. They, therefore, do at least not encourage the creation of NUSes and in many Asian countries initiatives are nipped in the bud by repressive measures. It is seldom acknowledged in these countries that students can play a positive role in the functioning of the university or in national problems. Opposition parties may be willing to recognize the value of student organizations, but once in power, they soon follow the example of their predecessors and allow no critical organization. If they still manage to survive, these NUSes often have great difficulties to face. Usually, they disintegrate into small groups of fanatical opponents to the regime.

However, this situation is also due to the fact that the NUS is a new phenomenon in many Asian countries and that both students and governments are often little aware of the positive and creative possibilities of an NUS.

On the other hand, we must say that the situation has improved considerably over the last ten years. The number of countries is increasing where governments leave the student free to organize themselves and carry out activities. In these countries NUSes are often consulted on university matters and participate in community development projects. With the support of the international student movement these NUSes have grown in importance and set up a number of services which justify their existence. Generally these NUSes still concern themselves mainly with university matters and take political stands only when sure of their membership's support or when national interest is at stake. It is in the nature of the university and the students that these NUSes have in a short time developed into stable organizations which will grow in importance in the future. Until now the main handicap has been discontinuity of leadership, but of late attempts have been made to fill this gap by means of leadership training seminars.

E. LATIN AMERICA

Latin American universities are as old if not older than the average European university and so is the student movement. Long before the phenomenon of the NUS was born, Latin American students coordinated their activities and participated actively in the affairs of society. One of the reasons is that long before the war most Latin American students already came from a middle class background and therefore had stronger ties with society than students in Europe for instance. One of the consequences was that student emancipation in Latin America started early. Active participation by students in social problems was generally accepted and so was their political involvement. There has been no revolution in Latin America without a clash between the student branches of the tendencies at war.

Despite great differences, Latin American NUSes have much in common politically. All, without exception, concern themselves mainly with the future of Latin America and strive for radical reform, freeing Latin America from its economic and social difficulties. Obviously their aspirations bring them in sharp conflict with the great landowners and often with the army. Relations between government and students are friendly only in countries where the government is seriously working for speedy and effective reform. The other governments which fail or do not want to tackle the country's real problems with a strong hand, have in the course of time come to know the university as centre of opposition. As a result relations are usually strained. In addition to their political activities, the Latin American NUSes also work in the university field where they concentrate on democratization of education and organization of anti-illiteracy campaigns in rural districts.

Differences among the NUSes mainly arise from the fact that the Latin American student movement is generally organized along party-political lines. In their composition the Executive Committees often reflect the degree of strength of the different political tendencies in the universities. The NUS elections are closely followed by the national press because they often are a barometer of the popularity of the big parties. Roughly, there are three groups that operate in almost each country but which have contacts on continental level also. These are the christian democrats, the communists, philo-communists and left-wing radicals, and finally the left-wing democratic tendencies. Right-wing groups in the universities are negligible. Since Fidel Castro's victory over Batista the second group has gained considerably in influence in the universities, largely because, unlike the other groups, it attached importance to effective leadership training. Its willingness to perform the less appealing tasks has earned it a higher degree of influence in the universities. In recent years this advance has come to a standstill and christian democratic and left-wing democratic groups are regaining strength. This was influenced partly by the uneven development

of the Cuban example and partly by the division of the communist student movement into many splinter groups reflecting all shades of communist thought over the years.

Heated discussions and conflicts may suddenly change the character of an NUS and obscure the true picture of the Latin American student movement. But one thing never changes: the opposition of Latin American students to dictatorship and economic controls which restrict the continent's development.

III. ORIGIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS

On 17th November, 1939 German soldiers dispersed a student meeting in Prague, causing the death of nine students. A few months later German troops broke into the Secretariat of the International Student Confederation (CIE) in Brussels, destroyed its files and seized its property. In the occupied territories of Western Europe universities rising against fascism were closed and tens of thousands of students went into hiding or joined the resistance movement.

Few students succeeded in escaping to England or the United States. They met, formed small groups and agreed to commemorate henceforth 17th November as a symbol of student resistance.

In 1942 the International Students Council and the International Student Assembly were founded, in England and the United States respectively, for the promotion of mutual contact. But in the tense and confusing years that followed, these organizations proved insufficiently viable.

At last, in 1944, the struggle against Hitler began to look more promising and people could start thinking of what should happen after the war. The English NUS in London convened students from some countries to discuss the possibility of a new world-wide student organization. The need for immense university relief programmes would provide enough work for this organization and there was, it was felt, ample willingness to join hands after the war. The idea of reviving the pre-war CIE was rejected, however. By not taking a stand against fascism, even when fascist intentions had become clear to everyone, this organization had compromised itself hopelessly. And one thing was clear: the new organization would have to be anti-fascist.

On recommendation of this informal meeting, the English NUS contacted the various representative groups and NUSes that could be reached and called a meeting of Unions from thirteen of the United Nations (among whom USSR, USA, France, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) in March, 1945. (19)

The twenty-four delegates discussed for two days and unanimously expressed the desire for close cooperation. Some problems however did arise on account of the political differences. It was decided for the time being to recognize the existence of different political opinions, but that arbitration in this field did not pertain to an international student organization. Fruitful though these discussions may have been, the meeting was too little representative for final decisions. It therefore agreed to convene a larger meeting for the elaboration of the structure, working methods and purpose of the new organization.

Two months earlier however, invitations had been received from some International Preparatory Committee which proposed to convene a World Youth Congress in London in November, 1945 with a view to creating a World Federation of Democratic Youth. Consequently, the meeting decided to invite all the delegates of representative student organizations at this congress to prolong their stay by a few days and lay down together the basis for a world student organization. The meeting dissolved, having set up a preparatory committee of seven. It was composed of representatives from England, USA, USSR, China, Canada, France and Yugoslavia.

Two months after this meeting Prague was liberated by Soviet forces and a new Czech government was formed from amongst all political parties.

In July, 1945 the Czech student organization informed the English union of its plans to convene a vast international student congress on the occasion of the 17th November commemoration. With the support of the Western European student organizations it hoped to make this event successful.

This news was somewhat confusing but London decided that the Czech students deserved to be supported on account of their heroic role in the war. But since it was a pity not to profit from the presence of so many student organizations in London in November, 1945, a division of tasks was proposed to Prague. It was decided in common agreement that the practical problems such as structure, finance, constitution and membership of the new organization would be

studied informally in London and the results reported to the Prague congress. The Prague congress would mainly discuss the students' role during the war, and the London proposals would be the second item on its agenda. Finally, it would decide on a date for the constituent assembly. Both congresses therefore would be informal and pave the way for a constituent congress to be held at a later date. (20)

The World Youth Congress mentioned before was held in London from 1st to 9th November. According to planning, it decided to found the World Federation of Democratic Youth which from the very beginning proved to be dominated and controlled by communists. With mixed feelings about the outcome of this Congress, 150 students representatives from 38 countries met afterwards to discuss the future of the international student movement. Two items had been placed on the agenda: the future organization's constitution and discussion about the date, place and procedure of the constituent congress. (21) Contrary to the committee of seven's proposal, France and Belgium wanted to revive the old CIE. The overwhelming majority felt, however, that the CIE or any similar weak structure had seen their day. The natural reaction was a desire to create an organization with strongly centralized powers for the sake of greater response and efficiency. The conference decided to convene the constituent Congress in Paris the year after, and to establish a secretariat there.

A second controversial issue was the question of whether the new organization should be active politically. Whereas the Western European delegations urged for pure student activities, the Soviet delegation argued that all matters affecting society affected students also. It wanted to pave the way for unlimited scope of action. The problem was avoided and the ideas of the conference were put down in a vaguely-worded resolution.

However, a heated debate took place when the question of future cooperation with WFDY was raised. Since the Soviet proposal to embody cooperation in the statutes met with

strong opposition, no recommendation for or against was made. Finally, an International Preparatory Committee was elected, composed of the NUSes of the Soviet Union, the United States, England, Belgium, France, Denmark, China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, India, one from Latin America and one from the Commonwealth.

The following day a large number of participants left for the continent to arrive just in time in Prague after a harrowing journey across ravaged Europe. The city had been gaily decorated and a crowd of 200,000 people enthusiastically welcomed the first large international delegation to arrive in Prague after ten years. Deeply moved by the population's enthusiasm, 600 delegates from 52 countries set out for the Lucerna Hall where the 17th November commemoration was opened by the son of the Czech national hero, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk. (22)

After an impressive opening session a report was presented on the proposal of the London meeting. Despite the original agreement the communists, who proved to be in the majority, tried to make the congress a formal meeting taking final decisions. But the point was made successfully that too few representative unions were attending for this meeting to take such an important resolution. If it did, it might have a negative influence on the support that many unions not present might give to the organization otherwise.

Another attempt was made to create a constitutional tie with WFDY. But the majority in London now found itself to be in the minority. However, the Americans, Belgians, Dutch, French, Fins, Italians and some of the Czechs decided to take one line to prevent degeneration of the new organization into another political front. (23) Political involvement would create great conflicts within the respective Unions since their members belonged to different political tendencies. It would also jeopardize the new organization's future. Consequently, the congress resolved to abstain from making any recommendation, but many realized that this meant only respite.

The rest of the time was filled with vast demonstrative meetings and manifestations against fascism and practically

everyone went home feeling that prospects for a new world student organization looked promising.

Within the framework of this study, the IPC meeting is more important than the congress itself. Of the twelve countries elected at the London meeting, one, the United States, was absent since it had no representative National Union as yet. And so only eleven countries were present, but however broad the composition of this IPC may seem, it was not really so. Both the English and French NUSes were at the time dominated by communist students. Consequently, the delegations of these unions were almost completely in communist hands. There were also communists on the Belgian and Danish delegations, while the Indian representation was totally made up of members of the communist All Indian Student Federation. Czechoslovakia was represented by the communist Joseph Grohman, later President of the IUS. As a result, the communists had a majority within the IPC. The other delegates were of good will, but had little political experience. Their unions were apolitical and generally had experienced only one political confrontation, that of fascism. If this group was uneasy about the majority's conduct, the motives varied and opinions were divided. In a spirit of idealism decisions were taken which were to have far-reaching influence upon the future of the international student movement. With Grohman chairing the first session in his capacity of representative of the host country, the IPC decided to hold the constituent congress in Prague. Moreover, the Soviet delegate felt that the London decision to make Paris seat of the organization should be revised for the sake of courtesy, and proposed Prague as IUS headquarters. (The reason advanced at the next IPC meeting was: "the French found themselves unable to accept the task of organizing a Congress in 1946" (24)) Grohman was then elected IPC Secretary General and the English communist Madden took his place in the chair. In the months that followed the IPC prepared a draft constitution for the IUS, providing for a small Executive with vast powers. This Executive was to be composed of twelve members, but "the practical activities of the Executive are di-

rected by the President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary and a Treasurer". A Congress was to be held once every three years, while a Council, originating from the Congress and in which each member organization had one seat, would meet annually. Further this draft contained the clause that all member unions had to abide by the decisions of the IUS. This clause was to become the source of many difficulties.

In the time prior to the Congress, the IPC hastened to establish links with the three most important front organizations, WFTU, WFDW and WFDY and letters recommending their projects were circulated. In anticipation of the congress, the situations in Greece, Austria, Spain and Egypt were condemned. (25) The IPC report to the congress justified these steps with the following sentence:

"It has become apparent to us, that during this year students in many countries have come to regard our Committee as truly capable of representing their interests and speaking on their behalf". (26)

Finally, full preparations were made to ensure the success of the IUS constituent congress.

IV . THE FIRST WORLD STUDENT CONGRESS

After a year of intense preparations - seldom has an international student congress been prepared so thoroughly - the doors of the House of Music in Prague opened on Sunday morning 18th August, 1946 and more than 300 students from 38 countries were taken to their seats. The communist Prime-Minister of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, delivered an outspoken speech, calling upon the participants to work for peace and for the eradication of the last vestiges of fascism. Wildly applauded he declared that fascists and reactionaries had to be fought on all fronts. Then a Czech workers choir mounted the rostrum to give the first world performance of a passionate song, calling upon the youth of the world to take a firm stand against fascism, its manifestations in Spain, Greece and Egypt in particular. Long-standing ovations ! A cable from Marshall Tito was read and received an applause second only to that given to the delegation of Spanish refugees and the Soviet delegation. Thus, the first session turned into an impressive anti-fascist demonstration, casually coupled, however, to various related goals. A Canadian delegate wrote in her report:

"the Congress would have been most impressive, if it had not been for the almost uncontrolled cheering and its political implications, which left a number of us wondering what the turn of the events would be, or rather if the Congress could hope to avoid the trend, it had definitely started to take." (27)

To understand the reactions of the participants it might be useful to see who were present in the congress hall. The delegations could be divided into three groups, representing:

- a. National Unions of Students
- b. National Coordinating Committees, for countries where no representative NUS existed.

c. Student organizations from countries where no NUS or Committee existed.

The number of delegates depended on the number of students represented, with a maximum of 25 seats per country. The IPC had set up a special Credentials Committee composed of the United States, Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, India and the Soviet Union. The representatives of the latter four were sure to take the line of the IPC majority. The allocation of seats caused many difficulties, but finally the following results were achieved: (28). Two of the three groups from India withdrew. They regretted the fact that they had both been kept out of the IPC and the Credentials Committee in favour of the communist All Indian Student Federation, but when this federation was elected to the Executive before any decision on the credentials of the other Indian delegations had been reached, they withdrew their credentials. (The delegations in question were that of the All Indian Student Congress (80,000 members), affiliated to Nehru's Congress Party and that from the Islam part of India, now Pakistan).

Only four of the twenty Italian delegates took their seats. Although the NUS Executive had been elected democratically, the IPC considered the Union's structure less democratic. Consequently, only ten seats were allocated of which the four communists were to have one each. Only the communists accepted this arbitrary decision. The Austrian NUS with its compulsory membership was not regarded as fully representative and received only one seat. But three political student associations from Austria each obtained one seat and the marxist student organization two.

In this way the communists secured a considerable majority at the Congress. An American delegate carefully analyzed the voting within the various delegations and discovered that by the means outlined in Chapter I the communists had succeeded in introducing sufficient sympathizers into the delegations. They were distributed as follows (29): Soviet Union - 24; Poland - 15; Yugoslavia - 15; Rumania - 10; Bulgaria - 10; Mexico - 6; Hungary - 7; Czechoslovakia - 15;

Finland - 5; Egypt - 2; India - 6; Mongolia - 5; Iran - 1; Greece - 1; Albania - 2; Algeria - 1; England - 14 of the 20!; France - 12 of the 20!; Italy - 4; Spain - 8; USA - 2. Consequently, 21 delegations supplied 185 reliable seats out of a total 308. No wonder that the opening session and its many demonstrations had on the others the effect of a cold shower.

As we said before, the device of the congress was anti-fascism. It was manipulated in such a way that any initiative contradictory to the IPC's policy became either "foolish" or "fascist". Only occasionally did someone succeed in breaking through this wall and expressing his real intentions. Like George Orwell who in his book "1984" calls everything acceptable ideologically "goodthink" and all the rest not even "badthink" but "crimethink", anti-fascism was here identified with democracy and progress and anyone who, according to the IPC, obstructed the "progress" of the IUS was put on the level of reactionaries and fascists. Often a request was made to define fascism as a concept, but as the minutes show, this request was always put off and finally referred till after the discussion on struggle against fascism and then the Congress had no more time. (30)

A few weeks later, the American Bill Ellis, newly elected Vice-President of the IUS, wrote:

"If, as the war becomes history, there is still a steadfast refusal to define fascism more willingly, there is a danger which no one of us can overlook. In these terms mere opposition becomes fascist, and thus the anti-fascists may become the fascists..."(31)

The second slogan of the congress direction was "unity". "Unity for reconstruction; Unity for a better world; Unity for peace". Since the word was used in and out of season, the participants were made to feel even more that discussion of trivialities and shades of opinion was out of place. As a result many of them were willing to go a considerable way with the communists for the sake of unity. (32)

Discussion of the agenda led to the first serious conflict between the IPC and those who found themselves in the minority. The original agenda, sent to the participants four

months earlier and on the basis of which they had made their preparations, included subjects such as scholarships, relief, democratization of education, etc. But the 25 page document distributed among the participants on the eve of the Congress proposed to devote the first part of the congress to the struggle against fascism, the role of students in the struggle for peace, etc. (33) Thus, political and ideological differences were bound to break forth immediately, whereas practical student problems would only be raised at the end. The minority therefore proposed to leave the controversial issues till the end so as to give Congress all chances of beginning in a climate of effective cooperation, placing the emphasis on all that united the delegations. However, the Soviet delegation proposed to pass to the vote immediately and the agenda was thus retained in its new form without discussion. The congress resolved itself into commissions which began to study motions on fascism, peace and reconstruction.

After three days the participants returned to the plenary where the commissions' work was finished and a beginning was made with the debate on the constitution. The IPC had little difficulty in having Prague elected seat of the IUS: "the energy and organizing ability with which the Congress Secretariat has approached its work, has been an outstanding feature of the whole development of this Congress. It is because of this that we have confidence in recommending to you that the headquarters of our future organization should be situated in Prague". (34) Those who feared this might facilitate communist infiltration, thought they could hardly rebuff the host country and agreed. In future the IUS headquarters could only be moved by a two-third majority decision. Proposals concerning the structure were accepted without much discussion. The only change was to increase the Executive membership from 12 to 17. After a heated debate, the minority ensured that the Executive would no longer be called "governing body" so as to avoid the possibility of the Executive taking any political decisions on its own initiative in between Council meetings. Instead its mandate was laid down in the constitution as "to carry out

the policies of the IUS, and the decisions and projects of the Congress and the Council". Later it was to become apparent that this formulation made little difference for the Executive's majority. Henceforth the Executive took all political decisions it thought fit and at times regarded itself also as governing body.

The minority could achieve little result in the discussion on relations with WFDY, which according to the IPC had to be embodied in the constitution. Now that the atmosphere at the congress indicated that closer relations with WFDY would inevitably be established, all the minority could do was prevent such a clause from being laid down in the statutes. Instead, it was inserted in the by-laws. Were the tide ever to turn in the future, this decision could at least be revoked by a simple majority instead of one of two-thirds.

However, the main controversial issue in this debate was the clause on the relationship between the IUS and its member unions. It read as follows:

"Members of the IUS shall abide by the Constitution of the IUS, carry into practice the decisions of its Congress and other governing bodies and support organizations, pursuing general aims similar to those of the IUS".

In case of a conflict, the defaulting union could appeal to the Council.

If this passage were to be accepted, the minority argued, it would mean that NUSes would have to implement a decision of the IUS even if they had voted against. In other words, the Unions would forfeit their autonomy in every field where the IUS took a stand. It further implied that they would also have to support, on penalty of expulsion, organizations pursuing similar aims, which according to the IPC report would be WFDY, WFTU and WFDW. Were the minority unions to accept this clause, they would set their own membership against them. In any case the IUS would not profit from the result. In long discussions with the IPC, they made the point that it would be extremely undemocratic to force

possible future minorities not only to accept majority decisions but even to carry them into practice. To avoid the impression of wanting to render the IUS powerless, an amendment was worded as constructively as possible, namely that "subject to the approval by the national organization" be added. It left the passage equally dynamic, but recognized national autonomy. Confusion reigned in the hall during the vote. The amendment was rejected but several reliable delegations proved to have voted in favour. Immediately the leader of the Soviet delegation asked for a vote by roll-call. Poland and Finland fell back into line and the amendment was again rejected, now with a larger majority. (35) (160 - 71 with 13 abstentions) This determined the character of the IUS. In deathly silence the Dutch delegation made the following statement: (36)

"Every minute of this Congress we have been talking about democracy and the fight against fascism in all its forms, and you may depend on this: we in Holland know the meaning of democracy, and it is something quite different from the policy of domination that some groups have practised at this Congress towards the minorities. And let us not talk about the fight against fascism as long as we have in our midst delegates who do not dare to give their personal opinion for fear of getting into difficulties with their government at home.

The acts and decisions of the IPC have already furnished evidence of the completely one-sided political influence this body exerts. Although acting on the basis of majority decisions must be called a democratic procedure, it is not complete without the following: maintaining the rights and privileges of the minority. Dutch students, perhaps more than those of any other country, have always appreciated firm international contact. They have lived up to it and will live up to it in the future. But international contact and cooperation presuppose equal participation, not the predominance of certain groups. We want to live in friendship with

all of you. But we need another basis of cooperation than that which the constitution of the IUS now gives us. Therefore I have no choice but to declare that the Dutch Union of Students will not become a member of the IUS and consequently cannot accept its seats in the Council".

Though understanding the motives of the Dutch delegation, no other delegation wanted to go that far. On the contrary, they were disappointed by this decision which they regarded as premature and thought it was wrong to weaken the minority. They still believed in the need for a powerful international organization. Events during the congress had brought this group together and in common agreement they decided to go on and play as constructive a role as possible.

The last two days the Congress again resolved itself into commissions to discuss practical problems, the actual purpose of the invitation. After the tense days the commission work was something of an anti-climax. The only event worth mentioning is the election of the Executive. The IPC Secretary Joseph Grohman was elected President and the Englishman Thom Madden Secretary. The other members of the "small" Executive were the Chinese Au Sik Ling, the Frenchman Pierre Trouvat, the American Bill Ellis and the Russian Alexander Shelepin. The Belgian Meerts became secretary for finance. Of these seven three were communists and one a fellow-traveller. Of the other ten members of the large Executive five were communists so that they could count upon nine of the seventeen votes. For the organizers, the World Student Congress had been a success.

V. CONSOLIDATION OF THE IUS AS FRONT ORGANIZATION

The participants of the constituent congress returned home. Almost all delegations from the minority group reported to their Unions that, although the danger existed that the IUS become increasingly partisan, a powerful structure had been created within which students from all parts of the world could achieve understanding and cooperation. The idea of a United Nations on student level had an attraction which left little room for criticism. As a result, there was a desire to mobilize all forces and make this organization a viable one. The American Vice-President of the IUS, Bill Ellis, wrote with firm belief:

"The IUS must be a succes. In the light of the world situation, any organization which has the hope of developing understanding among peoples of the world, regardless how insignificant, must be fostered and encouraged. Therefore, all student organizations have a God-given responsibility to participate in this organization with the rest of the students of the world. It is partly through our participation that the IUS will be what we so desire - namely a truly representative and democratic organization. We must not fail!"

His views were shared by practically all participants from the minority group. Few wanted to believe they stood off-side already.

In the meantime the Executive began to apply itself to the tasks entrusted to it by 2½ million students. It started by founding a secretariat in Prague, composed of Grohman, Madden and those members of the Executive who were willing to move to Prague. Congress having decided to increase the number of Executive members from 12 to 17, the Secretariat was given powers "for the development of all policies in the absence of the Executive", (38) thus bringing this large body back to manageable proportions. Within a few weeks a staff of more than thirty had been

recruited to assist the Secretariat. Watching the spring parade of the Czech Communist Youth Movement, Ellis noticed that practically the entire staff was marching along. (39) Close contacts with WFDY were established and a joint delegation set out for Asia to prepare a Southeast Asian Youth Conference to be held in February 1948 in Calcutta. In vain Ellis tried to restrain the IUS in its cooperation with WFDY. In spite of his warnings that these joint projects would not meet with the approval of many student unions, the IUS decided not to be putt off. The Calcutta conference drew little attention at the time, but was later regarded as a Soviet pretext to bring European and Asian communists together for the preparation of uprisings in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia (Madiun). (40) (Remember that Burma and Indonesia did not owe their independence to communism. U Nu and Sukarno were, therefore, at the time still regarded as bourgeois and "the leaders of the betrayers clique". (41)) Meanwhile, however, the IUS had learnt that the International Student Service and World Student Relief - two organizations which were already active in the field of relief before the war and which later were to merge into World University Service (WUS) - were planning to organize a conference in Asia. In view of these organizations' tremendous popularity - since the war they had collected millions of dollars for university reconstruction in areas afflicted by the war - the IUS/WFDY Asian program would be pushed into the background. Therefore, it was decided to mandate the IUS member of the delegation to Asia to advise, where possible, against participation in the ISS/WSR conference on account of "fascist tendencies" within these organizations. Well-acquainted with relief work, Ellis could prevent this, but he could not stop the IUS from opening the attack upon ISS/WSR a few months later. In a long letter to the ISS/WSR conference in Aarhus in July 1947, the one year old IUS reproached the two other organizations for speaking on behalf of students in the field of relief work:

"This does not imply that we are unfriendly to the ISS: it remains only for certain representatives to cease

addressing the world on behalf of the students of their country. In many cases the students of that country deny this representation." (42)

This was said in reference to the fund-raising campaign in which ISS appealed to the population on behalf of the students and thanked it afterwards in their name for the assistance offered. Although the IUS spoke appreciatively of the large amounts collected, it wanted to make clear that "the credit for all this work must not be placed to the name of ISS, but to the students of the world". (43) Nevertheless, the IUS felt that ISS was not using to the full the possibilities of collecting funds, nor did it approve of the way in which the funds were used:

"the tremendous pressure of sectional organizations upon the students of certain countries to aid ex-enemy countries, for example Germany, when even more serious needs exist in other countries, for example China, Bengalen and Rumania. Again in this way the student is pressed to a certain political point of view and not encouraged to develop the widest interest in all world problems, and particularly in countries of which he may know very little". (43)

The IUS also demonstrated the absurdity of the ISS/WSR's plans for activities in the field of international education:

"To concentrate on the themes of international education for the privileged few University people who can participate, means the by-passing of the needs of the colonial countries. There should be no insistence upon international education, until there is a far greater development of national and popular culture in all countries. Otherwise the privileged few will tend to become even more isolated from the rest of their community. . . ." (44)

Let us compare this statement to the viewpoint of the participants in the first IUS Congress:

"The commission felt, that there was much to be gained by students undertaking part of the university course in a foreign university. It therefore recommends that students of all countries should serve at least three months of their degree course abroad". (45)

Nevertheless, the IUS introduced the entire document by the following sentences:

"The opinions put forward in this address are not those of a few individuals, but arise from the work of the IUS and its practical experience over one year. They are based upon the discussions of our inaugural congress last year, from the principles of which it is not possible for the IUS to depart unless it be so decided by Council or Congress". (46)

The document ended suggesting that relief work should in future be left to the IUS. Those who read this document were shocked. Bill Ellis did his utmost to convince the IUS that this attitude was unjust and offensive in all respects. He especially tried to make the IUS realize that relief work ought to be based on genuine and acute need and never on the political conviction of the needy, let alone on that of their government a few years ago. But the IUS leaders remained determined to destroy ISS/WSR and replace it by a relief organization of its own making. Though once more outvoted, Ellis continued to work loyally within the IUS in the belief that IUS must and was going to be a success. Unfortunately, he caught tuberculosis from a room mate in the summer of 1947 and was forced to withdraw to Davos, whence he continued to follow developments from a distance through the intermediary of his proxy Jim Smith.

In August 1947, one year after the Congress, representatives of almost all member organizations along with a few observers from non-member organizations met again in Prague for the first Council meeting.

Though less sensational than those of the first Congress,

the results of this council meeting may not be passed over in silence. For a start the Belgian and Swiss delegations announced that they could not join the IUS unless this organization abstain from taking stands on political and religious matters. Svetsov (leader of the Ukranian delegation, soul of the Soviet delegation and big man behind the scenes) dismissed these remarks with the words: "any attempt to be apolitical and neutral only leads to the adoption of a political policy, which is anti-democratic". (47) However, the Council noted the minority's apprehension and adopted, after long discussion and many amendments a "clarification" of the IUS's scope of activities, proposed by Australia:

"whenever the IUS or its Executive Committee establishes to its satisfaction, that conditions prevailing in any country limit the social, academic, cultural or material freedom of students, it shall consider itself obliged, as an international union, to act against such conditions and to call upon its constituents to support such acts. All political action of the IUS must confine itself to these principles". (48)

Although this clarification was to be interpreted by an Executive which had not proved very objective in the past, it was hoped that the Belgian and Swiss delegations would accept it as a compromise. That this clarification made no essential difference became apparent within two months after the Council, when the IUS spoke of the international students day (17th November) in a special leaflet:

"on the battlefields of Spain, Indonesia, Vietnam and Greece are being fought wars, which have been precipitated by the reactionary imperialists and fascists to reimpose their colonial and dictatorial rule over the people of these countries. Today the help of the students of these countries is to strengthen our fight for peace against the vile attempts of imperialists and fascists who want to drive humanity into another bloody war".

"In India communal riots by reactionary elements have

forced thousands of students to give up their studies". (this referred to Nehru's Congress Party)

Alarming, however, for the IUS was the defeat of the communist students in the 1946 elections of the Czech NUS and the removal of their leaders from the Executive. The NUS had left the communist controlled youth movement, became increasingly non-communist and had entered into conflict with the IUS direction. Grohman had been told that the NUS was strongly opposed to him and was considering nominating its new president for the IUS presidency. To prevent this from happening, the Soviet delegation proposed not to elect a new Executive since the present officials were excellent, but Ellis succeeded in convincing Grohman, Madden and Svetsov that they could not ignore the constitution without great difficulties. Strong internal pressure and the power of persuasion of the English and French delegations (still in communist hands) induced the Czechs to renounce to their plans. The Executive was re-elected almost in its entirety, with the exception of the Belgian Meerts, who, disagreeing with the turn the IUS was taking, resigned as treasurer. The Italian Berlinguer was elected in his place and entrusted with the task of consolidating the IUS finances. Although the IUS could make both ends meet with 4.5 million Czech crowns (\$ 85.000), two-fifths of this amount was contributed by the Soviet member organization and one-fifth by the Czech government. Only eight unions contributed the remaining sum so that the IUS was very vulnerable. It came as a surprise to no one when in November 1947 the IUS had a deficit of 700.000 crowns. What was difficult in Meerts's time, proved possible under the communist Berlinguer. Within a short time, the IUS had large funds at its disposal and NUS contributions now only formed a minute part of its revenue.

Although the IUS's political one-sidedness was apparent at the Council, practically all the minority delegations took Bill Ellis's advice and recommended to their Unions to continue participating, since the cause would probably be lost without their presence. For the Swiss, participation was no

longer compatible with their neutrality. The Belgians wanted better guarantees for an objective policy first, while the Austrian union no longer wished to tolerate the questioning of its representativity. Since every student in Austria is automatically a member of the NUS and has a right to vote, it was not acceptable to argue that the NUS was not democratic. On the other hand, the IUS did not want to reject the 150 members strong marxist Democratic Student Union.

For these three unions, the scales tipped to the negative, but the rest of the minority decided to continue the fight within the IUS. Their main reason was the frightening fall of the Iron Curtain right across Europe, making communication practically impossible. The IUS became one of the few remaining channels through which students on either side of the curtain could meet. A closing of this channel had to be prevented at all costs and the minority was willing to work for it, and agreed to many a compromise. Events of February 1948, however, brought an unexpected and dramatic turn.

VI. THE CZECH COUP D'ETAT

In order to understand developments in Czechoslovakia and the reaction of the IUS, we should briefly refer to the Prague events of February 1948.

After Czechoslovakia's liberation by Soviet troops in spring 1946, a new government was formed by the two governments in exile, set up by Jan Masaryk and Klement Gottwald in London and Moscow respectively. For the first time in history, communists and social-democrats sat together on a national coalition government, with 9 and 15 members respectively, while the communists held 38% of the seats in Parliament. But as time went by, tension between the two groups increased and in the summer of 1947 Czech students already reported that a crisis seemed inevitable.

On Friday 19th February, 1948 tension reached a climax and the non-communist members of the Gottwald cabinet handed in their resignation to President Benes in protest against communist agitation instigated by the Ministries of Home Affairs and Information. Benes refused to accept their resignation. The following day Gottwald demanded that Benes revoke his decision and that he himself be mandated to form a new government. Prague was in a state of commotion. Gottwald supporters demonstrated in the streets and, after the example of the 1917 soviets, action committees were formed which occupied government buildings throughout the country. On 23rd February 10,000 students marched to Hradcany Castle to express their loyalty to President Benes and demand maintenance of parliamentary democracy. Tension in Prague increased. Deeply moved, Benes surrendered on 25th February and silently signed Gottwald's mandate to form a new government. Once again thousands of students went to Hradcany Castle to induce the President to resume his initial stand. While a delegation was inside, the police warned the students that they were given three minutes to disperse. Then, with rifle butts, they drove the

students down through the narrow entrance. Suddenly, during the singing of the national anthem, shots were fired. The number of victims has not been confirmed and varies between one and nine. (49a)

In the night following the demonstration, communist action committees surrounded the building of the local and national student union as well as that of the IUS. The following day the Central Students Action Committee took over the local and national union. Professors and students, known as "reactionary elements, who do not have a positive attitude towards the new government" (50), were removed from the university. The reason given later was their "former collaboration with the Nazis". (50) Among them were at least one former soldier of the allied forces and one former inmate of a concentration camp. In all, 118 students were arrested. (51)

Jim Smith, eye-witness to most events, immediately suggested that the IUS Secretariat protest most strongly to the Czech government against the dispersion of the student demonstration, the arrest of students on account of their political beliefs, the dissolution of the National Union and the expulsion of professors and students from the university by the action committee. He proposed to ask for a fair trial of the detainees and to protest firmly against

"the principle of party-control over permission to study and permission to teach, being a complete violation of the basic principle of academic freedom, as I think it has to be understood by the IUS." (50)

The secretariat refused. It must, it said, bear in mind that this change in the political and social situation might have a beneficial influence on the people's welfare. It could not judge whether the students, in demonstrating, had acted in the interest of their people. However, if it proved to be a change for the better for all, this would also apply to the students. Consequently, the IUS secretariat could not protest against the change or the methods used. Moreover the secretariat had felt the undemocratic character of the Union

and its increasing corruption.

When after a long discussion his request to apply the IUS principles to this situation also received no support whatsoever, Smith handed in his resignation and informed Ellis of what had happened. Ellis phoned the secretariat from Davos and tried, in vain, to convince the IUS secretariat of its responsibility. Finally, the American, who had incessantly reminded the non-communist delegations of their God-given responsibility and devoted himself with heart and soul to the welfare of the student United Nations, handed in his resignation. No other document expresses more clearly the disillusion of the non-communist students, confronted with communist morality, of which Lenin had said: "the basis of communist morality is the struggle for the consolidation of communism." (52)

The letter in which Ellis tendered his resignation read as follows: (53)

"I, the American Vice-President of the IUS, resign my position in protest of your refusal to condemn the brutal and undemocratic treatment of Czech students by their government during the week of February 22, 1948. I refuse to be a partner to your bastardly non-action, your past omissions, or your future political machinations. By your non-action, you have betrayed the trust and principles of all freedom-loving students and proclaimed your allegiance to the Machiavellianism of the communist students. You have betrayed the very tradition of November 17, which was yours to cherish and defend. You are no longer worthy of that tradition.

November 17 so gripped the imagination of the students and peoples of the world because it was a dramatic revelation of these two facts. On this day, it was from the universities, professors and students, armed more powerfully than the Germans in their belief in democracy and truth, that came the first resistance against the spirit of Hitlerism. There came from the centers of learning, the most effective opposition to German

might, when all other forces were dispersed and helpless. The NAZI answer was: the execution of the student leaders of the National Union, the closing of the universities, and the imprisonment in the concentration camps of 2000 students and professors. Is it any wonder that the students of the world could bequeath to the IUS no greater treasure than November 17 as the symbol of their ideals ?

During the two years of the IUS existence, many of us have attempted to live and act according to this symbol, November 17. We have supported the rights of students and protested many incidents where such rights were violated. We protested the arrest of the Greek students in March 1947 by their government, the killing and arrest of Egyptian students in 1946 by the police force, and the suppression of student-rights and academic freedom by the Kuomintang government.

Today, we have before us a similar violation of students' democratic rights in Prague, Czechoslovakia. When Mr. Klement Gottwald addressed his followers in Wenceslas Square during the week of February 22, a demonstration of students began a march to Hradcany Palace to proclaim to President Benes their allegiance to the principles of Masaryk. This demonstration was fired on and clubbed with rifle butts by the police. Since then, students have been illegally arrested, student groups seized by action committees, the National Union dissolved, professors and students who were alleged reactionaries thrown out of the university, and faculty buildings violated.

For me, these actions assume a peculiar importance and similarity to November 17, 1939. Did not these actions take place in the same streets of Prague, in the same buildings, against the same students who were armed again only with their beliefs? Did not the police force represent a party which has seized the country

again by force and fraud? Did not the police justify the invasion of the university buildings by the same law as the Germans, promulgated by Von Neurath, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia during the occupation? Is there any difference between November 17 and these recent events?

These charges being true, Mr. Smith, the deputy in Prague to the American Vice-President felt compelled to submit five resolutions of protest to the IUS secretariat. You refused to take action.

The reason for this refusal is obvious. All the protests heretofore issued by the IUS had two common factors. In each case, the students were oppressed by the right-wing forces. However, in the case of the Czechs, the students were persecuted by a left-wing police force. The second common factor was the suppression of democratic rights.

For the American students the principle is the decisive factor, not the politics. Thus the fact that you have refused to support Mr. Smith's resolutions, which he was honor-bound to present, means that you have acted in the past only because principles and politics coincided. Today that is not possible. You have shown your colors.

This non-action of yours is no accident, for it is the last of a whole series of similar events. Since September it has been evident that the IUS was taking sides in the present world crisis. For instance, at the last Executive Committee meeting one report stated the fact, that the world was divided into camps, the democratic and the imperialist, and then that the IUS must be democratic. (54)

In addition, since the Congress of 1946 crisis, this issue of political tendencies of the IUS has lurked in the background. The issue- due to the present world situation - would have had to have been faced even-

tually. Today, however, your non-action leaves no hope of future discussions and settlements, for it is the worst example of a series of past omissions. For instance:

1. You have disapproved the nationalistic and fascist tendencies in textbooks, such as those still left in Germany, but you have never spoken against the periodic change of Russian history textbooks to conform to Russian foreign policy.
2. You have disapproved governmental interference in the field of education, especially restrictions on access to scientific information, but you have never spoken against the diatribes directed at Varga, Alexandroff and Shostakovitch by their government.
3. You have justified full cooperation with communistic WFDY by reason of the constitution, but you have never tried seriously to enlist all your support behind UNESCO as so stated in the constitution. (55)
4. You have protested the illegal treatment of Greek students by their government, but you have never objected to the forcible seizure of Greek students by the Markos forces.
5. You have protested the treatment of Spanish students by the Franco government, but you do not object to the same injustice against Czech students.
6. You have protested the treatment of Chinese students, but you have never objected to the seizure and disappearance of students in the Russian zones of Austria and Germany.
7. You have attacked Catholic students as reactionary, but you have never censured the tactics of com-

munist students.

8. You have attacked the imperialism of European countries in the Far East, but you have never spoken of Russian imperialism in Eastern Europe and in the same Far East.
9. You have attacked the US, France and Great Britain at every possible point, but you have at no time in your history dared to speak against Russia.
10. You have assiduously sought information and facts to discredit so-called reactionary groups, but you have never attempted to discover the truth of the many charges levelled against the left wing.
11. You have interpreted the Constitution to your own ends.
12. You have interpreted democracy not as a majority rule which respects the right of the minority and the individual, but as a dictatorship of the proletariat.

All this you have done and not done. The non-action in Prague is the final act.

For these reasons Mr. Smith and I, the Vice-President, resign. We can no longer remain true to the principles of American students if we support the IUS in its present unrepresentative and undemocratic course of action. Also I have requested all American student organizations to re-affirm their confidence in our present stand by immediate disaffiliation and the severance of all present and future relations with the IUS. Already the National Student Association has agreed with our position. All other student organizations will follow. American students are finished with the IUS. They condemn your former omissions and

your final betrayal.

Because so many other student groups believe in the same principles as American students, simple withdrawal of organizations in my country is not enough. It is necessary, that all freedom-loving student organizations proclaim their spiritual and moral unity with the actions of Czech students, and their opposition to the undemocratic forces which persecuted them, by no other act than disaffiliation of the IUS.

Therefore, I call on the National Unions of countries such as England, France, the Scandinavian countries, Cuba, South America, Canada, to show their disaffiliation from the IUS. By this action at least we can show our unity and faith in our principles.

Gentlemen, I regret that for us this is a parting of the ways. The responsibility for this separation lies with you, not with me.

I am William S. Ellis, Former IUS Vice-President."

In a report (56) to the NUSes the IUS gave an account of its visit to the Czech Ministry of Home Affairs. With regard to the student demonstration, the following conclusions had been reached:

"the police and the Ministry sincerely regret that the incident occurred (i. e. the firing at the demonstrators), and that the students were responsible."

The report added:

"in very few countries would governmental authorities have received an inquiring student group so kindly, and listened to all inquiries, giving explanations of the situation."

The IUS felt that any comparison with 17th November, 1939 was absurd and declared:

"In 1939 foreign domination of a fascist power came to Czechoslovakia, and the student demonstration of 1939 demonstrated the protest of the whole Czech people against this invasion, against the attack upon their national and civil rights. The student demonstration of February 25th, 1948 was made in opposition by some of the students of Prague to a social movement of the people of Czechoslovakia coming to power."

A few weeks later the IUS published a bulky report, explaining the absence of a formal protest. In broad outline it was an elaboration upon the answers given to Jim Smith. Further arguments were put forth for support to the action committees, which:

"were doing no more than applying those principles, which had already been adopted by the students themselves, but which had never been put into practice." "The previous undemocratic character of the Czech NUS was related to a situation existing in the country, and similarly, the new developments among the students are paralleled by new changes among the whole people. . . ." (57)

This closed the incident as far as the IUS was concerned; not for some National Unions, however. They now knew what to expect from the IUS. Some drew their conclusions. Others refused to resign themselves to the IUS's partiality and had sufficient idealism to continue.

VII. DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS

The IUS secretariat's attitude to the Czech crisis had led many NUSes to wonder whether it was not time for them to review their relations with the IUS. On the initiative of the Canadian and Belgian NUSes informal discussions took place in Brussels, where it became evident that Sweden and Ireland had decided to leave the IUS, while Denmark had suspended its membership. The other NUSes were clearly aware of the IUS's partisan nature, but felt that communist domination was not sufficient reason to withdraw. They did realize that their attitude would have to be far more militant. The English and French NUSes, in particular, appealed to the others to wait at least until the next Council meeting and express their grievances there. Were this to be of no avail, they could as yet discuss other methods of setting the IUS back on the right course.

The Council meeting was held in the summer of 1948 in Paris. Vain efforts were used to make the IUS change its mind about the Czech crisis. On the contrary, the IUS Executive itself took the offensive and accused the reactionary leaders of the Swiss, Dutch, Irish, Austrian and Italian NUSes of sowing division between the IUS and students in their respective countries. Minority groups in these countries were encouraged to form national committees to express their students' opinions at IUS meetings. Although New Zealand protested most strongly that admission of minority groups from countries where a representative NUS existed, would be in straight contradiction to the letter and spirit of the constitution, the policy was approved by the Council and from that time carried out resolutely. For, the secretariat declared, the IUS had to be loyal to its supporters in all countries of the world.

The main item on the agenda was the Executive report presented by Grohman. It proved a faithful reflection of Soviet foreign policy. Having depicted the living conditions of students in Western Europe in glaring colours, Grohman

remarked: (58)

"It is interesting to note that in practically all these countries I have mentioned, there is an economic plan, bearing the name of one of the foreign ministers in operation".

In its general resolution Council further commented upon the relationship between university and the Marshall plan:

"Evidence was given by some delegations that there has been a deterioration in the living conditions of the working people and students in certain countries, affected by the Marshall plan".

The IUS was therefore mandated to study closely the adverse influence of the Marshall plan on university life. In other parts of Europe, however, the situation appeared to be much more promising:

"In other European countries the student has found his opportunity in the work of reconstruction and is fulfilling the tasks allotted to him in the planned economies of the countries concerned".

The minority delegations strongly protested against these passages and argued that these remarks had nothing, but absolutely nothing to do with an assembly which was supposed to be dealing with student affairs. However, the Council's majority did not share this view and its spokesman, the Soviet delegate, declared that the Marshall plan constituted in fact an "act of enslavement for the peoples of Europe".

The Executive report made short work of Bill Ellis. He was branded as:

"one of the greatest enemies of the IUS, a disruptive factor in the international student movement. To read his letter of resignation and some of his recent articles is almost physically repulsive because they are in the same vein as the distorted reactionary press".

(59)

Some discussion by the minority was allowed however, because the IUS Executive wanted to have as many unanimous resolutions as possible. In order to enable this group to vote for a resolution despite its biased text, the Executive proposed the insertion in several resolutions of the passage "some delegations think. . . . etc." Having vaguely outlined the minority's views, pressure was brought on these delegations to accept the resolution as a whole. For example:

"Although we acknowledge that some Council members hold the opinion that the actions of the Executive secretariat in connection with the recent events in Czechoslovakia were incorrect and not impartial and would like to protest about this, the majority of the Council considers that the actions of the Executive secretariat were correct". (60)

This did, in fact, reflect the truth and so unanimous adoption of the resolution seemed no more than logical. In the end, the Council's support to the Executive was as good as unanimous, while only a few minor objections were included in the resolution.

In this way the IUS showed its awareness of the growing criticism and of the danger of a withdrawal by an increasing number of NUSes. But the IUS address to the students of the world remained unchanged:

"Students of the world: rally around the IUS and participate fully in its activities. . . . be confident that if the youth demand and fight for peace, no war-mongering schemes led by the Anglo-American monopolies can succeed".

It was evident that the IUS was firmly in the grips of the communists and that no hope was left for fulfilment of the ideal of the 1945 pioneers. Although their ideas still permeated through the IUS constitution, the interpretation was no longer idealistic, but ideological.

Within a year after this Council Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and France decided to leave the IUS. (The com-

munist Executive in France had been replaced in the meantime). As we know, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland and Austria had gone before them, while Norway, West Germany, Italy, Canada and the US had never joined the IUS. But developments within the IUS had not disillusioned the Western countries alone. In Latin America, the 1948 Pan-American Student Conference had decided to found a confederation of its own for cooperation among Latin American NUSes. The IUS's fear that this might affect its influence in Latin America, was not unjustified. The Council, therefore, called upon all Latin American Unions:

"to boycott any student conference in Latin America, which is designed to disrupt the international student movement, and to oppose the creation of a confederation of students of Latin America, intended to undermine the cooperation of Latin American student organizations with the IUS. The Council appeals to all student organizations and students in Latin America to participate actively in the work of the IUS, where their interests can best be served and their demands realized." (62)

It is interesting to note that among the founders of the Confederation was the 22-years old Chairman of the Havana Law Student Council, Fidel Castro. That their attempts failed was due to other reasons than the paternalistic approach of the IUS. (62a)

The year following this Council meetings the IUS applied itself to large-scale organization of activities. The leaflet "This is the IUS", distributed by the IUS in the course of 1949, gave a survey of the tremendous amount of work done by the secretariat. It organized many seminars, opened a sanatorium in Czechoslovakia, had international work brigades carry out projects throughout Eastern Europe, organized the second World Youth Festival in cooperation with WFDY, and sent delegations to Latin America and Southeast Asia. The tremendous funds needed for this programme caused no problems. The financial crisis of the previous year had been surmounted. "World Student News", the IUS

magazine which had not come out for a whole year for lack of funds, was once more distributed throughout the world in four languages and daily broadcasts by Radio Prague's student section kept the student world informed in several languages on the expansion of the IUS. At Council meetings everyone was satisfied that the IUS had been able to find funds and did not inquire after their sources. Anyway, the Executive's practice, adopted since the Paris Council, of circulating financial reports only shortly before their discussion left not much room for such inquiries.

But however many activities the IUS organized, every single event and every single leaflet was imbued with the political line the Executive wished to follow. The leaflet "This is the IUS" tells us how only 1% of the US national budget is applied to education and 51% to military or paramilitary purposes. (Ignoring the fact that education in the US is financed by each State separately, whereas military affairs fall under federal authority). Further, it maintained that school children in "Trizonia" (= West Germany) were again taught the Hitler salute, how 60 Indonesian students had been electrocuted by the Dutch, how Nehru's police illtreated students, and how living conditions in Eastern Europe were improving visibly. (63)

The next Council meeting took place in Sophia in September 1949. With the increasing withdrawal by unions from the IUS, the small communistic majority of the first Congress of 1946 had now become an overwhelming majority. This was partly due to the admission as full delegates of 15 splinter groups from non-communist countries, whether a representative NUS existed in the country concerned or not. In accordance with the Paris Council directives, the number of participating countries was thus raised from 22 to 37. An additional 34 NUSes and organizations attended as observers.

The first item on the agenda was again the discussion of the Executive report which offered its interpretation of the international political situation. It mentioned the recent withdrawals in passing, but did also devote a few paragraphs to the relationship between the IUS and so-called

apolitical student organizations. Although the latter were qualified as "an old trick of the reactionaries to stifle youth and student organizations and to make the youth docile and obedient", (64) the Executive firmly denied that such organizations could not feel at home within the IUS.

Whereas only four hours were devoted to practical activities for the coming year, the debate on the Executive report took $7\frac{1}{2}$ of the 11 days. During this debate one delegation after the other expressed its repudiation of the war-mongering authors of the Marshall plan and rejoiced in the progress of the socialist camp under the glorious leadership of the Soviet Union. Only the English and Canadians really tried to have a more objective discussion, but failed. After France, England had now also elected a new Executive which was not prepared to enter completely into the views of the IUS. On the other hand, the English showed clearly that they wanted no division in the student world and that they did not think of leaving the IUS. Their main purpose was to open up the IUS as much as possible and create in it a place for minority opinions. They proposed the creation of an IUS branch in London which, in cooperation with the English NUS, would be mainly in charge of East-West exchanges. Thus far the IUS had grossly neglected this field to which, according to the English Union, it should in fact give its foremost attention, because the isolation created by the cold war had to be broken. The Executive showed no interest, however, and the proposal did not stand a chance at the Council. The English NUS further felt that the IUS should not resign itself to the withdrawal of so many NUSes and made a second constructive proposal. It declared its intention of organizing a conference in London, to be sponsored by the IUS, where this organization could discuss with these NUSes about their objections and future cooperation. If this conference was satisfactory, a large number of NUSes might return at the second IUS congress in 1950. The proposal was made several times, but met with a very cool reception.

The most important factor of this Council, however, was the attitude of the IUS towards Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had

been expelled from the COMINFORM on 28th June, 1948 and since then Moscow had staged many an attempt to overthrow Tito. The official arguments were Yugoslavia's anti-Soviet attitude, its deviating line on agricultural policies, and the fact that Tito attached more importance to the development of the popular front than to absolute rule by the communist party. But the real reasons were deeper. Although a post-war Soviet-trained elite existed in all Eastern European countries, it had to compete with popular communist leaders who had been active in the local resistance movement during the war and wished to take a more national line. After Tito's example, they laid emphasis on the country's sovereignty and chose to take a road to communism adapted to local conditions. The creation of a Balkan tariff union was even suggested as a first step towards an Eastern European federation under the direction of Tito, Gomulka, Georghiu-Dej and Dimitrov, making the Soviet Union an equal partner instead of the big undisputed leader. This was a serious threat to Soviet leadership. In addition, Mao Tse-Tung in the Far East was successfully driving Chang Kai Chek's Kuomintang into a corner and creating a communist State with more inhabitants than the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe together.

Stalin felt that this imminent disintegration had to be called to a halt. He condemned diversity of political structure and ideological views and decided to use all means to create uniform Eastern European States where respect of the Soviet Union was even embodied in the constitution. With the assistance of a Moscow-trained elite he was successful everywhere, except in Yugoslavia where Tito saw no reason for giving the Soviet Union credit for his own achievements. Then, an attack was launched against Tito, not only to force Yugoslavia back into line, but especially to kill the illusions of nationalist tendencies in other Eastern European countries. Following its expulsion by the COMINTERN, Yugoslavia was to be isolated further by the front organizations. "World Student News" which had previously paid considerable attention to the activities

of the Students Committee of the Peoples Youth of Yugoslavia (SSPYY), suddenly passed over Yugoslavia in silence.

The second World Youth Festival held in Budapest on the eve of the Sophia Council meeting was the first event where IUS and WFDY were to be confronted with Yugoslavia's presence since its expulsion from the COMINFORM. Unfortunately, they had not yet finished collecting all the damning evidence conform to the official line, whereas, on the other hand, it was equally impossible for them not to take notice of the Yugoslavs' presence. But the Hungarian government's refusal to grant visas rescued the IUS from this untimely encounter.

In Bulgaria the situation was not so easy, however. In the first place, since the Yugoslavs sat on the IUS Executive Committee, they had to be invited; secondly, the Bulgarian government could not refuse to grant visas, since, by virtue of the Bled treaty, travellers needed exit-visas from their own country instead of entrance visas to the country of destination. Thus, the Yugoslav delegation arrived in Sophia on the eve of the Council meeting. Within a few hours, however, the Bulgarian police took them out of their hotel and guarded them finally across the border. (65)

The Scottish and English delegations requested the IUS Executive to use its influence with the Bulgarian government. The IUS refused alleging that the Yugoslavs had entered the country without the necessary documents and that this was their own fault. The English delegation proved, however, that the Yugoslavs' papers had been in order. The British documents, on the contrary, had proved to be insufficient on arrival, but this question had been solved efficiently at the customs by an IUS telephone call. Reluctantly the Executive decided to ask the Bulgarian Union to make inquiries. Towards the end of the Council meeting, the latter reported that the Yugoslavs had entered the country without the permission of the Bulgarian authorities, that they had tried to contact Tito agents and had undertaken hostile action against the Bulgarian government. These agents and spies had then been expelled.

At the plenary session the Executive refused to invite the Yugoslavs to send another delegation, alleging that it

did not want to give any encouragement to agents being smuggled into a country. A Scottish motion of protest was not taken into consideration and the question of Yugoslavia's absence was dismissed with the comment that the country had fallen into fascist hands and as such could lay no claim to special treatment by the IUS. (66)

No other IUS act showed more clearly how much the leading figures followed in the wake of the international communist movement and how the organization had degenerated into "the student section of the COMINFORM", as the English NUS President called it. In the next months fierce attacks were launched against Yugoslavia, ending in its expulsion from the IUS. This decision was taken at the Executive meeting in London in February 1950. Only one non-communist, the President of the English NUS, Jenkins, attended this meeting as voting member. Although the relationship with Yugoslavia had not been placed on the agenda, the IUS President, Grohman, used the opportunity to bring many serious accusations against the Yugoslav NUS (SSPYY). He ended off his statement saying that the IUS would sever relations with SSPYY and proposed to try and establish relations with democratic Yugoslav students. Jenkins pointed out to the meeting that the Executive had no power to take such a decision, which fell within the competence of the Council or Congress, and that in any case a SSPYY representative should be present when questions affecting his NUS were on the agenda. His proposal to invite an SSPYY representative to answer questions was strongly opposed and accepted only when Jenkins declared that it was a sine qua non for continued English attendance. English observers made a verbatim report of the interrogation that followed and it is shocking to read what tone the IUS used at the time against deserters from the communist camp. (67) On many counts SSPYY was accused of having obstructed the IUS or at least of not having given sufficient support. SSPYY was in particular reproached for having invited students from developing countries to come to Yugoslavia at the time of the World Youth Festival instead of letting them go to Budapest, where the Yugoslavs themselves

had not been admitted. Bucevic, the Yugoslav representative, referred to the memorandum presented to the IUS by SSPYY, which unequivocally expressed this union's constructive desire for cooperation. SSPYY had failed neither in its financial nor its moral support. He strongly protested against the charges of obstruction and regard the IUS Executive's conduct as a flagrantly contradictory to the IUS constitution. The memorandum was dismissed and Grohman summed up the interrogation saying that Bucevic had not succeeded in refuting the accusations. Bucevic then invited the IUS to come to Yugoslavia and observe the situation with its own eyes, but the Executive felt no need to do so.

The proposal to break off relations with SSPYY was accepted by all votes but one, that of Jenkins.

Some time after this Executive meeting, the IUS published a leaflet enumerating the reasons for the severance of relations. Having commented upon Bucevic's "confessions" in London, the IUS concluded:

"In all it amounts to a damning indictment of the leaders of the SSPYY, who are revealed as open agents of a regime of fascist oppression and terror, and as people who stop at no lie or slander to disrupt the unity of the international student movement and further their role as police agents and provocateurs." (68)

According to the IUS 3.900 students had been confined in concentration camps and many democratic professors had been replaced by former Nazi collaborators.

"The present policy and activities of the leaders of the SSPYY can only be understood against the background of post-war developments in Yugoslavia. The present rulers of Yugoslavia, disguising themselves as "democratic", "socialists", and "communists" attained power with the concealed purpose of depriving the Yugoslav people of their long-fought freedom. These traitors had long before entered the service of foreign intelligence organizations, and as their treacherous acts in the relation to the Greek democrats

make abundantly clear, they have now openly joined the instigators of war."

A few weeks after the Executive's decision, the English Union decided by 86 votes to 26 to suspend its membership of the IUS and stated its willingness to accept the invitation, rejected by the IUS, of sending a committee of inquiry to Yugoslavia. The IUS was invited to participate in the delegation, but it replied not to want to support "disruptive activities." In order to guarantee the representativity of the delegation, an executive member of the communist student movement in England was invited, but he withdrew at the last minute saying that no other communist member would be willing to take his place. The delegation visited all universities in Yugoslavia as well as many other places, institutions and people who could provide instructive information on the situation. On the basis of the IUS report, the delegation questioned a great variety of people who could be expected to know. It reached the conclusion that most of the IUS charges were completely groundless and that only some were partially true, but not to an extent which justified alarm. Arrests had taken place since the COMINFORM resolution, but 850 of the 1,000 detained students had meanwhile been released. The delegation was very surprised to learn that the IUS had based its opinion on statements of refugees, while at the time of the Czech crisis it had declared with such ardour that refugee information was unreliable. The IUS's lack of interest in making inquiries on the spot, brought the intentions of the IUS clearly to light. (70)

One should bear in mind that the English report was written by the same students who the year before had argued that the Czech crisis should not be a reason to leave the IUS, since they were not acquainted with the local situation. They had insisted on continued support to the IUS for the sake of international student cooperation. Even now they continued to work for this ideal and did not wish to abandon hope.

VIII. THE CLIMAX

As it had announced at the Sophia Council meeting, the English NUS was to take the initiative for a conference of NUSes who were alarmed about the development of the IUS. It was not the purpose of this meeting to discuss the foundation of a counter-organization, but to try and re-establish talks between the IUS and the minority unions. To this end, the 1949 autumn council of the English NUS decided by 100 votes against 18, in the presence of Grohman:

"that the Council approves the action of its Executive in proceeding with arrangements for holding an International Student Conference in London in December as a move towards re-establishing the representative character of the IUS."

Having already shown little interest in this conference at the 1949 Sophia Council meeting, the IUS Executive later decided not to sponsor this event and tried to convince the English of its futility. Once invitations had been sent out, however, the IUS went one step further and called upon all Unions to boycott this meeting:

"it is evident that this meeting contains the seed of disruption and a great potential danger for the unity of the world student movement."

The organizers, who strove for unity, were identified with the:

"enemies of student unity, who are at the same time enemies of world peace and international understanding."
(71)

The results of the conference proved the IUS wrong. The representatives of 17 NUSes met in London from 20th to 22nd December, 1949, i.e. before Yugoslavia's expulsion from the IUS. It was clear from the beginning that it was not the purpose of this meeting to create a new organization

as rival to the IUS; the idea was rejected expressedly. The IUS having refused to discuss with them, the participants had no other choice but to exchange ideas among themselves about the developments of the IUS and what position could best be adopted. Regarding objections to the IUS, feelings were unanimous on the following points: (72)

1. Overemphasis on political questions;
2. Partisan political analysis;
3. Inefficiency in practical activities;
4. Frequent partisan purposes of political activities;
5. Increasingly un-representative character;
6. Repeated breaches of the constitution;
7. Fundamental issues being settled outside the Council;
8. Uncompromising attitude to any opposition;
9. Neglect of the minorities.

Profound differences existed, however, as to what course of action should be taken. The English NUS was reproached with pursuing an unrealistic policy, since, for the sake of unity, it continually accepted to support activities on which the IUS received instructions from outside the student world. Only a few delegations supported the English proposal to return together and try, as a strong minority, to realize the original objectives of the IUS. The majority argued that, as they knew from experience, it made no difference whether they were a smaller or larger minority. They no longer wished to be indentified with the partisan policy of the IUS and preferred to attend the second World Student Congress as observers. Observers had full speaking rights and the right to move motions and, in that capacity, they could therefore also voice their opinion. Were this Congress to prove more susceptible to reason than the previous Council meetings, they could still apply for membership. But the IUS should first give evidence of its willingness to listen to other opinions on international political developments.

The meeting established in detail how constitution and proceedings should change for the IUS to be able to rally behind it the students from all parts of the world. It was decided in the meantime to intensify contact on practical

projects, this form of cooperation having proved impossible within the IUS. The Dutch delegation reported on a project worked out by some NUSes at a conference in Leiden, providing for the foundation of an "International Student Conference on Practical Activities" (ISCOPA). This conference would meet more or less regularly to exchange experience on practical problems affecting all NUSes. ISCOPA could not possibly be regarded as a rival organization of the IUS since it would lack all elements of a movement and aim, on the contrary, at unconditioned information and consultation. Though aware of ISCOPA's advantages, the meeting feared that the participating Unions' intentions might be misunderstood. They had, therefore, better wait for the second IUS congress and give the minority no definite form.

Meanwhile the IUS was preparing for the second World Student Congress which was to be the biggest event ever organized.

According to the constitution the Congress ought to have taken place the previous year, but then the Yugoslav problem was too acute, making the immediate organization of so vast a student meeting inopportune. The Executive had therefore preferred to hold a small Council meeting in 1949, justifying this decision by interpreting the constitutional clause on the organization of one Congress every three years as reading once in a period of three years. This gave respite until 1952! But Yugoslavia's position within the communist bloc had soon become clear and the international situation was already favourable for a Congress in 1950. Both "World Student News" and "News Service" were filled with accounts of preparations in Eastern Europe and of difficulties encountered by communist splinter groups in non-communist countries in preparing to represent the students of their country at Prague. Since the tone of these publications is sufficiently wellknown, quotations are unnecessary. But if any doubts still exist, one should read the leaflets "US Education in Crisis" and "21 Unforgettable Days in the Soviet Union" published by the IUS around that time. They show us

the difference between life in a country where war-mongers set the tone and a country ruled by peace lovers.

The other IUS publications were filled with news on the signature campaign for the 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal, one of the World Peace Council's first mass activities to rally public opinion behind the Soviet standpoint on nuclear armament. Initiated in spring 1950, this campaign was aimed not only at creating opposition to the use of the atom bomb. Let us remember that the Soviets tested their first bomb in September 1949, at a time when public opinion in the West had reduced fabrication of nuclear weapons to a minimum. After the Soviet test, Soviet leaders were afraid that popular fear of this weapon might be replaced by fear of its use by the Soviet Union. The West may start a large-scale production of bombs, thus increasing Soviet arrears. The front organizations, led by the World Peace Council, were brought into action to foster moral indignation against the weapon in which the West still had a lead. Conventional armament was, of course, conveniently overlooked. This would enable the Soviet Union to make up arrears, since opposition of public opinion would make use of this weapons practically impossible. Ignoring control and inspection, the basis of Western disarmament proposals, the Stockholm Peace Appeal opposed nuclear armament in itself.

Today it is suspected that this campaign was also organized because Moscow knew what was going to happen in June 1950. On 28th June the Korean war broke out, completely unexpectedly for the non-communist world. In the early morning North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and the weak South Korean army, taken by surprise, was unable to ward off the invasion. (American liberation forces had been withdrawn the previous year against the wish of the South Korean Parliament). Within four days the North Koreans had taken Seoul. The UN Security Council ordered a cease-fire and when North Korea continued its aggression, the first UN peace force was formed to stop the North Korean onslaught.

It is suspected now that Soviet policy in the Korean case was mainly determined by a desire for good relations with

Mao Tse Tung and that it had not expected this UN reaction at all. The Soviet Union's previous relations with Chang Kai Chek's Kuomintang regime were somewhat compromising and it therefore wanted to be more compliant to Mao than it might have been otherwise. Since in January 1950 the Soviet delegate had left the Security Council in protest against Formosa's presence and Red China's absence, the Soviet Union was not present when the Security Council decided to take action. However, the Soviet delegate returned when in August 1950 the Korean question threatened to become a world conflict.

Consequently, the second IUS Congress took place at a time when Soviet uneasiness about the UN was at its greatest, when the North Korean armies had driven the UN forces back into the extreme Southeast of South Korea and the World Peace Council was trying to neutralize the West's military lead.

Prior to the Congress, a Council meeting was held on 12th and 13th August, 1950. It discussed the secretariat's activities of the past year, established the proceedings for the congress and decided on admission of new members. 25 New organizations were proposed as full delegates. No information on their membership was available, but during the debate it became evident that only one of these organizations qualified as an NUS (Nigeria). The others were small action groups, whose members were sometimes students, but more often than not secondary school pupils. There was no clause in the constitution justifying the granting of full delegate status to organizations such as the Melbourne University International Cooperation Club or the Union of Pupils of Secondary Schools in Nazareth (Israel); even less so when they were to represent countries where an NUS did exist. Questions from the French and English remained unanswered. On proposal of Hungary and the Ukraine, the new members were accepted and the discussion closed.

In continuation the Council was to ratify the Executive's decision regarding the Yugoslav NUS. The non-communist

participants wanted to have the Yugoslavs invited to give their version of the story. Once again they pointed out that SSPYY could claim this right in accordance with the constitution. Asked whether he thought the constitution could be ignored on such an important matter, Grohman retorted that he was not going to let himself be questioned as if he had been brought before the Committee on Un-American Activities. By an overwhelming majority the Council decided not to admit the Yugoslav fascists. A Scottish motion of censure was refused a hearing, a South African proposal to send a delegation was ruled out of order and the Executive's decision was ratified with only 12 votes against.

The next day the Congress began, attended by more than 1,000 participants from 78 countries, representing, according to the Credentials Committee's report, a total of 5,919,585 students.

The hall decorated with flags and flowers became the scenery of the greatest show on earth. Grohman started off by reading the Executive report which talked in great detail of the IUS peace mission, the Stockholm Peace Appeal, the Marshall plan, the German question, Korea, etc.

"Two camps were formed after the last war - a camp of those fighting for peace and progress, which is supported by all honest and peace-loving people, and a camp of war-mongers and reactionaries, which is ruled by a small group of imperialists from Wall Street who in their mad hunt after profit and world rule try to drag the world into new, worse, bloodshed". (73)

An off-hand account by one of the observers gives us an impression of the atmosphere and mass suggestion: (74)

"Grohman's reading of a nine page reference to North Koreans broke up Congress. . . . clapping, then all rushed to the Koreans and lifted them on their shoulders, handing them bouquets of roses, chanting Ko-Re-A and the name of Kim I Sung, the President of North Korea. Demonstration reached climax on floor when Korean

delegation head upon podium received bouquets, arm-loads, from organizational and governmental representatives. Americans presented bouquets to Koreans. Entire delegation, carrying roses, carried on shoulders of students throughout the hall. . . amidst chanting and play of floodlights. Some Koreans in uniform. This aspect lasted ten and one half minute. Then a whole hall sang student resistance and fighting songs. Koreans shouted slogans, wild cheering and clapping unison replies from whole audience. Koreans back on shoulders, milling in circle in forefront of hall. . . Ko-Re-A becomes almost deafening . . . as Koreans passed my desk they shouted slogans of defiance at me. Entire presidium was standing throughout, including President UNEF, who clapped at first, then just stood. American delegation standing on tables or around tables clapping and joining in shouts and chants. After sixteen and one half minute chair requested delegates take their seats, but this entirely ignored . . . demonstration unabated. Each individual Korean carried by group of students through aisles between tables. Demonstration ended suddenly at twenty and one half minute . . . "

But not only the Koreans deserved this honour. Almost all speakers of minority groups from non-communist countries were carried on the shoulders and showered with flowers. It is not surprising that the unexperienced observers were deeply impressed. Few delegates could resist the temptation of joining in, or if they did, they were surrounded by the chanting and yelling crowd and stigmatized as reactionaries.

Under these conditions no real discussion was possible. True, there was absolute freedom of speech and everyone who wished to speak was given the floor. But the text had to be handed in the previous day for distribution. As a result a speaker who did not take the official line, was almost always immediately followed by a compatriot, contradicting his statement on every score and explaining that the former speaker did not represent true student opinion. Then

followed the notorious 15 minute demonstration and only the second statement was circulated. (No more than one of the many interventions by the English NUS was distributed on stencil). Jenkins, the English President, had the honour of a personal reply from the Soviet delegate, Shelepin. When, within the time granted to him, Jenkins had qualified the Executive report as totally unacceptable and made a desperate appeal to Congress to be impartial, especially where action for peace was concerned, Shelepin replied: (75)

"Yes, Mr. Jenkins, to our regret we must distress you. We educate the Soviet youth to love the Soviet army, and the children, the youth, the whole of our people love the Soviet army, which, headed during the war by Comrade Stalin, saved from fascist slavery the whole of the world, including your country Britain, Mr. Jenkins"

"Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Rust were trying to persuade us that they and other similar leaders of the British NUS expressed the opinion of the British students. This is a lie. It is not you who express the interest of British students. The opinion of the wide students masses is expressed by your compatriots who spoke after you and on behalf of the British students exposed and condemned you You, Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Rust, are traitors of your own people. You helped to get Britain transformed into the 49th State of America."

These remarks were followed by a thirty-minute demonstration during which the students lifted the entire Soviet delegation on their shoulders, chanting Sta-lin, Sta-lin, Sta-lin, Kom-so-mol, and Long-live-peace. Then a motion of censure was passed on Jenkins' intervention.

Apart from the official delegations, a number of guests were in the hall who were regularly given the floor to convey to the Congress the best wishes of their organization and to outline the heavy tasks of students in the struggle for peace. The IUS meaning of the word peace was most clearly defined by the Czech Minister of Education: (76)

"We do not want any kind of peace - we want a real peace, which means socialism and communism; when we cry peace, we must also cry: down with capitalism, long live socialism"

He was, of course, not an official IUS spokesman, but the Congress resolutions proved that the IUS held the same leninist views on peace. These alone made it possible to praise the North Korean armies which had penetrated deep into South Korea, as promoters of peace and brand the UN forces trying to defend a bridge-head as "agressors, headed by the American imperialists". Whether the crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces could be called an act of aggression, may be a point of dispute. But this happened two months later and could not possibly be foreseen at the time of the Congress.

The Congress approved an address to the UN expressing the participants' indignation at the fact that the UN let itself be used by the United States.

The proposals drafted six months earlier by the London meeting of minority unions were not discussed at the Congress. When the Danish representative tried to raise this issue, he was silenced by a slogan-shouting crowd directed by Grohman. Attacks on the non-communists participants subsided only after six days, when the Congress had been set on a definite course. Members of the Russian delegation then approached Jenkins behind the scenes and assured him that, although his words had been unwise, an agreement could be reached on the main issues of the Congress. They warranted that the Congress would ratify whatever agreement would be reached between him and the Soviet delegation. After consultation with the other non-communist delegations, Jenkins presented a programme of thirteen points to the Soviet delegation, which the minority regarded as fundamental. The most important were:

1. Impartial application of IUS principles;
2. Promotion of contact among students from the "two camps" should be given primary attention;

3. Political statements should be made only when in accordance with the 1947 clarification;
4. Recognition that not all UN fields of activities fell within the competence of the IUS also:
5. Minority groups from countries with a representative NUS should not be given voting rights;
6. The secretariat should not be a policy-making body;
7. The IUS should take action in a country only through the intermediary of the member organization;
8. Impartiality and right to reply in publications. (75)

Having taken note of this programme, the Soviet delegation abandoned its conciliatory attempts and the Congress continued, though on a somewhat more moderate line. On the last day the Scottish delegation officially submitted the 13 points to the Congress for its consideration, on behalf also of the Scandinavian Unions, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USA and South Africa. The Congress felt no need to discuss it and ignored the request. Thus, the unions concerned saw their attempt to set the IUS on the right course fail. It was not to be their last endeavour, but it did mark a turning-point in the relationship. Now that the IUS had blocked the way to the realization of cooperation without great difficulties and scissions within the Unions, they decided this should not prevent them from coordinating activities amongst themselves. They resolved to meet that same year in Stockholm to fill the gap created by the IUS.

But they still felt that no new organization should be created. This would only widen the gap between East and West which they so much hoped to bridge.

IX. THE BIRTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE

In October 1950, the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish NUSes jointly sent out invitations for an international student conference to be held in Stockholm in December. Invitations were sent only to the NUSes having participated in the London meeting of the previous year, but the organizers were open to suggestions for wider participation. They stated their intention, however, of limiting participation to those NUSes who had proved to have strong objections against the IUS. Other NUSes who were more or less satisfied with the IUS would not be invited so as not to incur the odium of enticing NUSes away from the IUS.

The invitation clearly stated that it was not the purpose of this meeting to create a platform for general political discussion of the world situation or to found a new organization. NUSes who thought of accepting the invitation were asked to bear in mind that its only purpose was:

"to bring about a discussion on those very practical problems of student cooperation, which are the immediate concern of the representative student organizations in different countries, and to outline a program of action of concrete benefit for students everywhere. (77)

The existing international student organizations were told they would also receive an invitation if they wanted. The IUS sent its Vice-President Berlinguer to Stockholm a week before the conference to see how the land lay, but showed no interest in participating.

The NUSes who accepted the invitation could be divided into four categories:

1. NUSes, members of the IUS: England, Scotland, Finland, South Africa.
2. NUSes who had left the IUS: Australia, France, Belgium, Austria, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden

and Denmark.

3. NUSes who had never joined the IUS for various reasons: Canada, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United States.
4. NUSes expelled from the IUS: Yugoslavia.

In all there were 21 representative NUSes with a total membership of approximately two million students. In order to prevent domination by big countries, the IUS voting system was abandoned and each Union was given one vote, regardless of the number of students it represented.

The main subject of debate in Stockholm was how to arrive at a form of practical cooperation without falling into the mistakes of the IUS and without creating a structure that could be regarded as rival to the IUS. The meeting realized that it was highly improbable that Eastern European NUSes would accept a form of cooperation outside the IUS. The immediate disadvantage of founding another organization would be an antithesis between communist and anti-communist, institutionalizing the split in the international student world. The rule to keep politics out of the discussions was broken only by the American representative who gave a passionate speech, saying that it was high time to call a halt to communist propaganda among students by means of a democratic organization. (78) This speech was felt to be very unfortunate. The IUS immediately used it to accuse the Stockholm conference of "disruptive activities". (79) But it never mentioned the motion of censure that had followed immediately and was carried unanimously by the other NUSes.

After long discussion on the different possibilities of cooperation, the conference adopted a New Zealand motion, providing that the conference was to meet annually as an autonomous platform for consultation. Possible joint projects were to be delegated to one of the NUSes who would report to the next conference. Thus there was no need for an Executive or Secretariat and it was clear that no one had the right to speak on behalf of the conference. This structure was inspired by the desire to avoid at all costs a

second confrontation with an organization that could not be kept in hand.

Thus, the various aspects of student welfare (relief, student health, travel, sport, exchange, supply of textbooks, international student identity card, refugees, etc.) were committed to the charge of the different NUSes who were to report on the possibility of coordinated action.

However, the participants were aware that students in other parts of the world were facing difficulties far greater than their own. A Students Mutual Assistance Programme (SMAP) was created to coordinate aid to students from developing countries on social, cultural and political level. Finally Canada and Scotland were mandated to make arrangements for the next ISC to be held in either country, if possible the following year.

The year 1950 marked a turning-point in the international student movement, although this could not be foreseen at the time. Those who in Stockholm decided to strengthen mutual cooperation on practical activities, had no intention of building a structure that was to compete with the IUS. On the contrary, they opposed this idea as the outcome of the ISC fully proved. Their main objective was to fill the gap in the field of cooperation until the IUS was willing to be truly universal and non-partisan. Sooner or later such a consolidation of the minority would have occurred anyway, also if the IUS had fallen into the hand of another political or religious group. Now it had taken so long mainly because the IUS usurpers were communists, i.e. one of the partners in the world conflict. Outside the student world this conflict was influenced by the cold war climate, but in student circles the possibility of a dialogue had to be preserved at all costs and contact should not be allowed to freeze. Until 1948, the IUS had still attempted to conceal its character. But during the Yugoslav and Korean issues, the IUS no longer tried to steer a middle course, not even in appearance. In the opinion of many minority unions, continued endeavours to bring the IUS to reason were so many concessions to international communism which, in these years, had shown its harshest

and most intolerant side. Those who insisted on a dialogue were reproached with naivety and at the same time rebuffed by the IUS. Again and again they were sent home empty-handed and it became increasingly difficult for them to persuade their members that one should try once more. One concession on the part of the IUS, however insignificant, would have enabled them to point to concrete results of their work and things might have developed differently. But again and again the IUS firmly closed the door to discussion precisely with those unions who defended the IUS outside the communist camp.

The Stockholm meeting had its favourable effect in that the IUS itself realized something was wrong with its development and decreasing representativity. True, the 1950 Congress credentials report showed a tremendous increase in membership, but this was mainly due to the affiliation, after the 1949 Chinese Revolution, of the All China Student Federation with its 1,200,000 students and pupils. But since 1948 the vast majority of new members had been drawn from small, non-representative groups, ready to follow blindly. The NUSes which the IUS wanted to have were withdrawing and the IUS was going to be left with fellow-travelling organizations only. The IUS Executive was faced with the difficult task of continuing to play its role of front organization, a very demanding one at the time, and simultaneously create a climate in which the non-communist student organizations would be prepared to return. We must realize that these two tasks were difficult to combine in a time when, throughout Eastern Europe, purges were taking place and one Titoist after another was falling victim to the secret police. Too compromising an attitude to non-communists was the next thing to Titoism and entailed personal risks for the IUS leaders.

The IUS Executive meeting in Berlin in January 1951 avoided the real points of dispute and tried to have recourse to general action for unity. Although heavy attacks were made on Stockholm "splitters of unity", the IUS for the first time recognized that there was place for more than one

opinion: (80)

"The Executive meeting of the IUS confirms that unity in the IUS does not imply agreement on a particular ideology or philosophy and that, in spite of differences of political, religious or philosophical viewpoint, unity can be built. Unity in the IUS means unity of action in favour of a program worked out in common and based upon the vital interests of students in all parts of the world, and primarily peace."

In cooperation with the unions from England, France, Scotland, South Africa, Syria, Burma and Brussels, a joint declaration (81) was drafted, stressing once more that differences among NUSes in structure and purpose did not preclude unity. The non-affiliated NUSes were called upon to participate in the IUS's activities for peace, national independence and democratization of education.

Although the Executive report's statements on international relations gave no indication of temperance (82) - it was a written document! - oral attacks on the minority unions and their governments were less fierce and frequent at this meeting. This trend was continued at the Council meeting in Warsaw, September 1951. (82a) Having been told only four months ago in an open letter that changing full membership into associate membership was useless and unnecessary, now in Warsaw the English Union had no difficulty in raising this question. An associate member would, in consultation with the IUS executive, determine his relationship to the IUS, which could mean a restriction of both rights and responsibilities. What it amounted to in general was that the English NUS would support the basic principles of the constitution, but have to abide by the IUS decisions only in as far as they agreed with its own constitution. It would retain the right to attend meetings and cooperate on practical projects. From other results of the Council it also appeared that the IUS wanted to seem susceptible to reason and restrained itself considerably in comparison with the past. Thus, the Council carried a South African motion calling for the

organization of a unity meeting:

"to discuss measures for strengthening cooperation between the IUS and student organizations non-members of the IUS and to clarify differences which may exist."
(83)

Here at last was the initiative proposed to the IUS already two years earlier and which had led to the London meeting where the IUS had refused to participate. Convinced of the importance of this meeting, the non-communist NUSes proposed a neutral preparatory committee, but unfortunately the IUS thought it beneath its dignity to accept. The old conflict flared up for a minute when the minority urged that the Yugoslavs be invited. This proved unacceptable to the IUS. Although most non-communist NUSes knew that the exclusion of Yugoslavia would be hard to defend to their members, they gave in but withdrew from the preparatory committee so as not to be responsible for invitations. However, they pledged full support to make this meeting successful. The Council, on its part, expressed its appreciation of the minority's flexibility in a supplement to the unity resolution.

Most NUSes reported that the IUS seemed to be taking a turn for the better, but the next year it became clear that this moderate tone of the IUS could not last long. Attacks on Yugoslavia continued unabated and information on Western countries was so tendentious and untrue that it was difficult to believe in the IUS's desire for a rapprochement. And when the IUS joined in the campaign of all front organizations against the presumed use of bacteriological weapons in Korea, many had had enough and the unity meeting was finally attended by no more than two non-members of the IUS.

X. THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

In the beginning of January 1952 the International Student Conference met for a second time, now in Edinburgh. It was to hear the reports of NUSes on the different activities delegated to them, but this did not take long. There was no reason for great satisfaction. Although some projects, such as the Students Mutual Assistance Programme, had had a very ambitious start, shortcomings in most other fields were great. The various NUSes had sent each other a large number of questionnaires, but response had been far from satisfactory and concrete cooperation had hardly made any progress. There were many explanations, but the main reason was lack of mutual contact in the period between the two ISCs. Most NUSes did not have the means to send delegates to conferences where only a few subjects would be discussed and they could afford even less to have officers keeping up a detailed correspondence with other NUSes on technical matters. Another handicap was the absence of general funds to assist the NUSes with their expenses. An unpleasant example was that some NUSes had been unable to come to Edinburgh for financial reasons (New Zealand, Egypt and others).

Thus the decentralized structure proved far from efficient and effective in many respects. How to overcome these difficulties became the main subject under discussion. The Swedish NUS suggested the foundation of a joint secretariat with coordinating capacities and which could assist the NUSes in the implementation of their delegated responsibilities. However, the South African delegation in particular feared that this secretariat may assume such an important role that it would amount in fact to the creation of a new organization, with all the dangers this entailed. But the conference was of the unanimous opinion that this was not the intention. Those in favour of a secretariat stated that they did not want to create the organic centre of a movement, but at the most a

joint post box with limited tasks. The secretariat would only be able to carry out specific activities, based on specific mandates of the ISC, while a Supervision Committee of five NUSes would ensure that the secretariat did not exceed its powers. It was therefore dependent completely on the ISC itself what the secretariat was to become. After long discussions, the participants decided to take this step.

As a result, the foundations were laid in Edinburgh for the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students which was to function under the name COSEC for the next twelve and a half years. Although in later years the power of COSEC were to exceed that of a post box with limited mandates, the principle remained unchanged:

"The Secretariat shall be the administrative agency to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the International Student Conference. It shall only administer tasks and projects, specifically allotted to it by the Conference. It shall have no policy-making functions whatsoever." (84)

After a brief discussion it was decided to situate the Secretariat in Leiden, the latter receiving one more vote than Paris. This decision was also to have its influence in later years. Preference was given to a quiet university town over a politically dynamic city of world importance. (85)

A second, but no less important decision of the 2nd ISC was the formulation of the so-called "Principles of Cooperation". Since the 1st ISC "World Student News" had attributed a number of activities and purposes to this conference which the participants felt to be untrue. (78) They therefore accepted the proposal of England and Yugoslavia to formulate the objectives clearly. Although the final text contained little which was new, it was designed to prevent erroneous interpretations: (86)

"Expressing the desire of the NUSes of different countries for mutual understanding and friendly cooperation, this Conference agrees on the following

principles as a basis for that cooperation:

1. It shall be a practical cooperation on student problems such as concerning university education, student needs, student cultural activities, student sport, student health, etc.
2. It shall be a cooperation on a voluntary basis and in the spirit of mutual respect and equality.
3. It shall be a cooperation that excludes all forms of discrimination, and is devoid of any kind of partisan policy.

The NUSes represented at this conference, in adhering to those principles, regret that events, for which they are not responsible, have prevented the full realization of a world student community. They declare their intention to work for such a community based on these principles and state their willingness to review their own arrangements in the event of changes in the international student situation and of indications that other National Unions are willing to enter in full cooperation. This Conference believes that by participating in a practical cooperation based on these principles, National Unions of Students can help to create friendship and understanding among students in all countries".

As the ISC developed, the Principles of Cooperation were continually adapted, but the basic ideas remained unchanged during the following twelve years. The determination not to create another organization, let alone to compete with the IUS, was clearly expressed. It is difficult to escape the impression that in creating this structure the Conference was thinking of the deficiencies of the IUS rather than of a concrete alternative. It could not yet be foreseen that this approach would change later. It was mainly the affiliation of NUSes from other continents which gave the ISC a completely new impetus. We must also remember that with the exception of Indonesia and Brazil, those present in Edinburgh came from "the old established countries". Their prime goals were

better living conditions for the students and the adaptation of the University to post-war developments. The Edinburgh participants could understand that students in many countries gave priority to the political problems of their countries, but they did not share this approach.

The IUS's negative reaction to the 2nd ISC was not surprising. Even before this conference was held, they had given it a great deal of attention and had dubbed it "the third well-intentioned step to hell". (87) (After London and Stockholm) As soon as rumours of the possible creation of a secretariat reached Prague, the idea was sharply attacked by the IUS and people were warned emphatically not to be deceived by the sponsors of the plan:

"Their good intentions are this time more concrete - they want to establish something, but this something is not, you see, an organization, but something rather ill-defined, an "instrumentality". (87)

This move would, according to the IUS, create a negative climate on the eve of the unity meeting:

"It is significant that the Yugoslav and Falangist Spanish organizations which, by unanimous agreement of delegates representing 6 million students, including those of Australia and Canada (both non-members of the IUS) were excluded from the unity meeting, will play an important role in Edinburgh". (87)

(Spain was not present in Edinburgh and remember how Australia and Canada had argued for admission of the Yugoslav NUS)

When the Edinburgh results were made public, the IUS redoubled its attacks on what it called a "Western student bloc": (88)

"It merely provided a playground for those student politicians whose major preoccupation is the application in the student field of policies to divide the world into antagonistic geographical blocs, and resulted in decisions which seriously jeopardized international student cooperation."

This attitude had already casted doubts on the IUS's willingness to establish a dialogue, but this impression was further strengthened by the way in which the IUS continued to spread tendentious information about the "disastrous" educational situation in the Western world where progress was limited by the great importance of armament. It was not until 1956 that Radio Warsaw was to admit that Eastern Europe was confronted with similar difficulties, an opinion ignored by the IUS. Attacks on Yugoslavia, the most controversial issue of the coming unity meeting, continued unabated. Thousands of students there still suffered from tuberculosis, and

"The cases of moral crimes and drunkenness among teachers have increased, the demoralization spreads... (89)

The IUS's ambivalence at this time did not make it any easier to detect the real intentions of the Executive, since other front organizations, in the field of trade-unions for example, were simultaneously making unity proposals. To what extent these proposals were genuine is impossible to say, because all front organizations had, as said before, once more been suddenly dragged into a campaign to arouse the indignation of the world at the "Bacteriological war in Korea". (90) The American UN forces were accused of dropping insects contaminated with typhus, plague, cholera, encephalitis, dysentery and smallpox from special planes over North Korea. Soon all front organizations were drawn into this campaign, which was directed by the World Federation of Democratic Women which circulated eye-witness accounts. The whole world was shocked by the reports and photographs, but after a year and a half the campaign was stopped suddenly and nothing was heard of it anymore. If these accusations were true, the world would still be speaking of it, as it still speaks of Auschwitz. But despite all the commissions sent out by the front organizations and returning with "evidence", it was all too clear that it was an attempt to portray UN action as nothing but an American conspiracy and to mobilize world opinion against it. At the Executive

meeting in Budapest in March 1952, the IUS placed great emphasis on this campaign and an extensive report by an international scientific commission was sent to the readers of "World Student News". But this was not the only attitude of the IUS which had an adverse effect on the unity meeting. At the Executive meeting the IUS concept of this meeting appeared to have changed essentially. It no longer wanted a practical conference for the discussion of differences of opinion, but a demonstrative meeting for world student unity. Many NUSes and other groups were invited to give their support to problems affecting students, but no list of invitations or concrete agenda were distributed. Most non-communist NUSes became convinced that there was no need to attend the unity meeting, since they were already sufficiently acquainted with the value of demonstrative meetings. As a result, only two of the NUSes for whom this meeting was originally intended, were present, namely Chile and Canada, and of the minority unions within the IUS only South Africa and Finland attended. Though a far wider participation had been announced, only 25 member organizations of the IUS attended the meetings and even "News Service" did not comment on the results. However, "World Student News" published a short article on the many practical suggestions made to achieve unity (91): e.g. The IUS sanatorium would be opened to students from non-member countries, publications would be exchanged and Hungary wanted to measure its strength on long-distance swimming with Canada, USA and South Africa. Only the "Statement of the Participants" had a direct bearing on the original object of the meeting, but it remained unmentioned in the IUS publications. Among other things it spoke about the various controversial issues, requested the IUS to devote more space in its publications to convictions other than its own and stated that the IUS would explain its attitude towards Yugoslavia in a detailed document. As to the rights of the minorities and respect for the constitution, the IUS claimed to be unaware of not having acted in accordance with "the letter and spirit of the constitution". Unfortunately, the important objections of the

minority, such as the famous thirteen points, were immediately excluded from the discussion in order to avoid what the IUS called "sterile political debate". As was to be expected, the Canadian delegation was disappointed in the progress made and felt that the unity meeting had not fulfilled its purpose. The questions under discussion could, it said, have been handled by correspondence, while the real differences of opinion remained undiscussed and the minority had the impression of being treated as the "skunks at the international garden party of world solidarity behind the IUS". (92) Nevertheless, they continued to recommend attendance at IUS meetings, since, for the time being at least, this was the only possible contact with Asian students.

The same issue of WSN in which the IUS reported on the unity meeting, mentioned that COSEC still failed to carry out practical activities. (93)

"There is no doubt that the poverty of practical results, which, however, served as the pretext of calling conferences of the Stockholm-Edinburgh type, will still better enlighten the students on the strictly political and divisionist character of these endeavours whose object is to split the international student movement, to prevent students who are not members of the IUS from working together with their colleagues in all parts of the world, organized within the IUS who can themselves present another kind of balance sheet of activities since these meetings."

As far as the lack of practical results is concerned, the IUS was right, for it was not until August 1952 that the secretariat began to function in Leiden. The old IUS accusations that COSEC would be the result of an American conspiracy, devised long in advance, can therefore be ignored.

The unity meeting was hardly mentioned at the Council meeting in Bukarest held immediately afterwards and attended by representatives from 43 countries as against 61 the previous year. The main subject of this meeting, the struggle for peace, was orientated towards the forthcoming meeting of the World Peace Council. But after the example of the

other front organizations, it adopted a milder tone than before. "Bacteriological crimes" in Korea were only mentioned in passing. Once again, it was said that documentation on the IUS/ Yugoslavia relationship would be prepared, but a proposal to study the situation on the spot was again rejected. It should also be added that Grohman was absent from Bukarest and that the Rumanian, Bernard Bereanu, was elected as his successor. Little is known about Grohman's absence, but it is suspected that he had maintained excessively close contact with Slansky, the Czech party secretary, who had been purged and executed in December 1951. Although the IUS owed him much, it now appeared ill at ease about the great influence he had enjoyed for years. Thus, an innocent South African motion of thanks was dismissed by the Executive with the words: "The IUS is not a thanksgiving body". (94)

Despite its moderate tone, the Council could hardly be called a great success. By its renewed refusal to discuss the thirteen points the IUS placed in jeopardy its last contacts with the minority group and gave extra stimulus to the development of the ISC.

The third International Student Conference, held in Copenhagen in January 1953, was important for various reasons and helped shape the future development of the ISC, mainly because of the thirty-five NUSes participating. Three came from Asia, two from Africa and eight from Latin America. Whereas at the time of the Edinburgh conference some interested NUSes had been unable to come for financial reasons, COSEC had raised funds for travel grants to Copenhagen, thus increasing participation considerably. For this end COSEC had received the following mandate from the Edinburgh conference:

"In so far as it will assist the operation of projects laid down by the conference, the secretariat may seek and use finance from such sources as may from time to time become available, provided that such monies are given in support of the principles of cooperation." (95)

On the basis of this mandate, several institutions had been approached and finally a private fund in New York, "the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs" had been found willing to give unconditional financial aid. The initial fear of the conference that the financial donors would have an influence over policy was quite understandable and it is not surprising that the exact nature of these contacts were studied in great detail. In view of the IUS's constant claim that the ISC would be a creation of the State Department, it was regarded as especially unfortunate that COSEC had drawn on American funds. On the other hand, the conference was aware that the only other source of support would be Western Europe and the difficulty here was the small size and number of possible sources. America, on the contrary, proved to have several foundations that were willing to give support and who at the same time realized that the ISC could function only if it remained completely autonomous. Whatever the motives of these funds might be, the participants had no objection to accepting their financial assistance as long as they did not wish to influence policy. But in the years that followed, the conference and the supervision committee continually ensured that the ISC's autonomy was not diminished. We shall examine this at greater length later.

The fact that more than a third of the ISC participants came from developing countries, had a fundamental influence on the course of the debate in Copenhagen. In particular, the Latin American delegates felt that their problems were essentially different from those confronting the founders of the ISC. They were faced with political oppression, party-political infiltration in the universities, restrictions of the autonomy of university and national unions, illiteracy and other problems which to them were far more important than student welfare, student travel, exchange, etc.

Fourteen of the twenty Latin American countries were at that time ruled by military dictatorships who interfered unscrupulously in all aspects of daily life. The Latin American students were aware of their political importance and

did not have that feeling of political outsiders, typical of students in so many Western European countries. In Chapter II we enlarged upon this outlook and its effect on many Latin American NUSes. It hardly needs to be said that this group expected quite different activities from the ISC than those stressed until then and that the different viewpoints were bound to come into conflict. They wanted a strong organization that could assist them in their problems. The European representatives understood these wishes and the underlying problems, but they were very reluctant to let the ISC be used as platform for discussion of such matters. They wanted at all costs to prevent the ISC from following the same course as the IUS, coming to regard itself as a kind of student United Nations which no longer realized the limitations of its own competence.

The Latin Americans, however, maintained that purely practical discussions would mean neglecting the real needs of the students in their countries. They wondered whether Western European students would have adopted the same approach at the time when their countries were occupied by Nazi forces. Would they really have had the patience to occupy themselves with student housing when their country was confronted with problems of basically different nature? The majority of the participants in Copenhagen felt, however, that everyone who had come to the ISC knew that it was a practical conference where political questions could not be discussed, and thus a great many delegations were disappointed in the development of the ISC. However understandable the motives of the majority may have been, their stand was untenable in an ISC that wished to embrace all parts of the world. The next ISC was to bring a definite change of course which, although taken with great hesitation, was to alter the character of the ISC within a few years.

Once it had been decided that the ISC in Copenhagen would remain essentially unchanged and that it would continue to see itself as a "framework for practical cooperation", the practical atmosphere returned.

Once again there was no reason for the delegates to be

extremely enthusiastic about the practical benefits of the ISC. The secretariat had been working for no more than six months, sufficient time to show its potential usefulness, but not long enough to produce many tangible results. The tasks allotted to the various NUSes as "delegated responsibilities", had generally progressed slowly. It was hoped, therefore, that the secretariat would soon be able to give more support to those NUSes who were facing problems. The principle of "delegated responsibility" was to be retained, however. COSEC's powers were only slightly increased in that it was authorized to seek cooperation with UNESCO.

Some objected to giving the secretariat the power to act on behalf of the ISC in this field, but the only alternative would be to entrust this task to an NUS. This would mean that contact with UNESCO would be dependent on the expert knowledge of officers of that NUS and their unknown successors and cooperation with UNESCO was thought too important to be handled in this way. Another factor was that UNESCO had just severed its relations with the IUS and no one wished to give the impression that the ISC was trying to replace or compete with the Prague organization. But it was felt that UNESCO's activities were primarily practical and that the NUSes participating in the ISC should definitely try and make their own contribution to its work. At the next UNESCO meeting COSEC's application for consultative status was granted.

Another important decision of the 3rd ISC was the first attempt to define the term "NUS". It was agreed that it should be an organization representing the majority of the students in a certain country and striving to defend their interests. The clause suggesting that the Executives of NUSes should be elected freely was the cause of long discussions, however. The supporters of this principle declared that this was the only guarantee that the delegates would represent student opinion. Were this principle to be abandoned, one could be confronted with government representatives in disguise, without any guarantee that these

individuals enjoyed the confidence of the students. Its opponents felt, however, that since it was a fact that in many countries the NUS was fully government-controlled, adoption of this clause would automatically exclude participation of these countries. This would apply in particular to the Eastern European unions whose respective Executives were not elected by free and secret ballot.

A later ISC was to decide to grant observer status with speaking rights to NUSes who did not meet the ISC definition, but in Copenhagen it was felt that a dangerous precedent would be created if a freely-elected Executive was not acknowledged as essential condition for a representative NUS. Moreover, the same clause had been added to the IUS constitution and one of the main objections against the IUS had been its arbitrary interpretation of this clause. It would be very strange to abandon this condition now. As a result, the clause was adopted by 16 votes against 10. (96) This principle had been adhered to ever since and every organization that could not prove that its Executive reflected student opinion, was categorically denied the right to vote.

XI. THE THAW SETS IN

Two months after the 3rd ISC the entire world situation was affected by an event whose repercussions were also felt in student circles. The future of the hitherto monolithic communist bloc was suddenly unsettled by Joseph Stalin's death on 5th March, 1953. Many books have been written and as many theories have been developed on its influence on the evolution of international communism. (97) In any case, there is no doubt that Stalin's successors had no reason to rejoice at the legacy he left behind. Since World War II and particularly since Yugoslavia's exclusion from the COMINFORM, the communist parties in Eastern Europe had gradually changed in character and degenerated into a privileged bureaucracy, executing the orders of one single man. The secret police had become increasingly powerful and people and party were ruthlessly purged of anyone whose opinions were not completely in agreement with the established line.

In the meantime, living conditions in the Soviet Union and in the other Eastern European countries had deteriorated rapidly. Collectivization of agriculture was not producing the expected results and there was the threat of heavy industry assuming a disproportionate role. The question arose of whether the Soviet economic pattern based on the needs of Soviet society in the first decades of this century, were applicable to the more advanced Eastern European States. Logically, discontent in Eastern Europe increased, but every sign of dissatisfaction was ruthlessly repressed. In September 1952 Stalin addressed his opponents for the last time by means of an article published in Pravda on the eve of the 19th party congress. This "last will" was followed by intensified activities of the secret police which culminated in the doctors' plot on account of which thousands were arrested.

But suddenly the mainstay of this system had disappeared,

leaving a vacuum. Eastern Europe was visibly relieved but remained just as uncertain about the future, since no one, not even Stalin's successors, knew what the future would bring. Partly to reassure themselves, the new leaders appealed to the people not to give way to panic and confusion but to have faith in the future. Stalin's "last will" receded into the background since there was no one with sufficient authority to enforce this viewpoint.

Today it is suspected that Beria, chief of the secret police, was planning to assume power, but within three months he had been imprisoned and half a year later he was executed as British agent! Gradually it became clear that the more moderate course Stalin had taken in his last years in the international field, might also be followed at the national level. But development was extremely slow and it was to take years before Khrushchev announced the rupture with Stalin at the 20th party congress in 1956.

Stalin's disappearance also meant that there would have to be a change in the relations with Eastern European countries. The latter were less inclined to accept from the new leaders all that they had accepted in the past from Stalin. Tito and Mao were now the oldest in seniority in the international communist movement and although the former was still out of favour, Moscow knew that he was held in high esteem by many in Eastern Europe. Was it wise and was the own position strong enough to continue taking the same line towards Tito?

With regard to relations with the outside world, Stalin had already said in his time that war was not inevitable and that some form of coexistence should be sought. Although many in the West distrusted their smile, there was little possibility at that time that the new leaders would once more create a war psychosis as in the late forties.

Events in the first six months after Stalin's death had a considerable influence upon the front organizations. While in the past their statements had often anticipated the official change of course by a few weeks, now they were faced with great uncertainty, since they knew little about the direction

in which Moscow was going to move. The 1953 March issue of "World Student News" published in grand style a list of condolences offered by the IUS and some NUSes to the Soviet people (98) - mentioning among others Stalin's heroic struggle against fascism as well as his vast contributions to science and culture ... Later, after Moscow's example, it became completely silent. The same issue of WSN published a detailed testimony by an American pilot of how he had dropped bacteriological bombs on Korea (99), but this subject also disappeared from later publications. Little attention was paid even to the Korean truce. Attacks on the non-communist world abated and emphasis was placed on unity and the tremendous interest which existed in participating in the 3rd World Student Congress at the end of August. But the IUS's uncertainty about which line to take was best expressed in its attitude towards Yugoslavia.

While during the first months Moscow abstained from commenting upon Tito, the IUS was repeatedly confronted with requests from the non-communist world to invite Yugoslavia to its Congress. It was faced with the choice of accepting the suggestion and consequently reconciliation with Yugoslavia, or inviting student organizations, large and small, from all parts of the world and excluding the Yugoslavs, which was - to say the least - an unfriendly act....

In expectation of the Soviet position, the IUS delayed its decision until two months before the congress, when it declared: (100)

"On this question of inviting the Yugoslav Student Organization to the Congress, the IUS is constitutionally bound by the decision of the second World Student Congress, which broke off relations with the leadership of this body. We have not received any information since the last Congress to contradict the very serious accusations made against the leadership there and you will appreciate furthermore that neither the Secretariat, nor the Executive, nor the Council have the power to override this previous decision of the highest governing body of the IUS."

But suddenly at a session of the Supreme Soviet on 8th August, 1953, Malenkov suggested the possibility of exchanging chargés d'affaires with Yugoslavia, the first statement since years which was not an attack but even a certain recognition. The IUS immediately caught the news (one of its Vice-Presidents, Alexander Shelepin, had been appointed member of the Supreme Soviet a year earlier...) and on the very same day the secretariat announced that "the Yugoslav Union of Students had been invited"! (101) How easy it turned out to be to override a decision of the highest governing body! The fact that, according to the constitution, the invitation ought to have been sent to the Yugoslavs at least five months before the Congress was ignored, but this was not the reason why the Yugoslavs did not go. The Yugoslav Executive had not had sufficient time (three weeks) to consult its members and felt it would be incorrect to accept on its own initiative an invitation from an organization whose conduct towards the Yugoslav students had been so offensive.

The IUS attitude towards the Yugoslavs at the Warsaw Congress was completely in keeping with what we have seen before. On the 8th August it could not be foreseen that Malenkov's suggestion would not be carried out immediately. It would take more than another year for Moscow to radically change its position and in the meantime the IUS was without directives. Consequently, the IUS was not very pleased with the invitation it had issued, nor with the proposal by the English NUS to revoke the decision to sever relations, taken by the second congress. Another proposal to retract the accusations of fascism was not allowed to be tabled either. (102)

This goes some way towards explaining the position in which the IUS found itself at the time of the third Congress. As usual, much care had gone into the preparations and according to reports in "World Student News" and "News Service", many non-members would also be present in Warsaw to emphasize the unity of the international student movement. This included Sweden, Ireland, Luxemburg, France, Italy, USA and Scotland but not a word was said about the conditions laid down by these NUSes nor about the fact that Scotland was only sending observers. (103) When finally more than 1.000 representatives of more than 200

organizations from 102 countries gathered in Warsaw, the IUS impressed the casual observer as the most universal organization one could imagine. However, the NUSes which formed the IUS's membership according to its constitution were only few in comparison with previous Congresses: 11 of the 21 NUSes present came from communist countries. The other were the NUSes from Bolivia, Burma, Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Japan, Nepal, Panama, Ivory Coast and Indonesia, of which the latter two withdrew after the Congress. In some cases, new representatives were accepted as full delegates from minority organizations in countries where a representative NUS existed. For example, Raúl Castro represented Cuba, as other local communists turned up to represent Australia, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Mexico. Finally, the NUSes of England, Scotland, Canada, Denmark, Israel and Chile were present as observers, while the other 170 observers represented local groups, sports organizations and student papers. (104)

Although in this way the number of participants almost equalled that of the second Congress in 1950, this meeting was much more moderate in tone. The demonstrations which had dominated the Prague Congress were absent, but for a few exceptions, and the Executive did its utmost to maintain a calm atmosphere.

Since the only outsiders allowed to address the Congress were the front organizations, this meant a great time saving in comparison to Prague, but one cannot say that the time gained was put to use. Although according to the constitution observers could only be given the floor at the request of the Congress, once again every organization and every participant had access to the rostrum. Practically all speakers fell in completely with the line of the Congress so that the series of interventions added little to the final results of the Congress. As usual, proceedings began with the reading of the Executive report, this time by Bernard Bereanu. It offered the by now well-known survey of the international situation, only this time more in relation to the problems directly affecting the students. The passages on peace-lovers and war-mongers had been kept to a minimum. But

since so many NUSes from outside the communist world were absent and demonstrations of protest by students in communist countries were very few, a large part of the report was devoted to activities of NUSes with whom the IUS maintained no relations. Thus it was a survey of student achievements in general rather than a report of IUS activities.

The Executive report was discussed for five days in the plenary session. The uniformity of comments was somehow contradictory to the claim that the world student parliament was assembling here.

The only outstanding factor of this Congress was that the IUS itself realized that it was far from representative. The proposal to create associate membership, was now accepted (105) and the Executive repeatedly pointed to the advantages of this status. In fact, six NUSes applied for this form of membership after the Congress, but five of them withdrew within a year. (106) year. (106)

Even the most fervent supporters of the IUS were little satisfied with the development of the Warsaw Congress. External circumstances forced the IUS to manoeuvre carefully so that a dynamic policy was impossible. The non-communist observers noted a greater willingness to accommodate but they had the impression that this stemmed from reasons of temporary convenience rather than from a real interest in a dialogue. Both at the Congress and afterwards it was evident that the unity the IUS sought was in fact uniformity. There was no willingness to consider the value of other viewpoints, which meant that the IUS as a world student organization had failed. If it wanted to regain its glory of 1946, it would have to seek a new and independent course.

The deadlock into which the IUS had forced itself was an important factor in the increasing interest in the ISC. The IUS Executive, therefore, decided to send a delegation to the next ISC which was to be held in Istanbul in January, 1954, to establish contacts "on the request of many NUSes". (107)

XII. THE ISC BECOMES A WORLD ORGANIZATION

In January 1954 the 4th International Student Conference met in Istanbul, Turkey and brought together more representative NUSes than any other previous student meeting. In order to make it clear that it wished to base itself on representative NUSes alone and not to give voting rights to minority organizations, the ISC once more devoted much of its time to the examination of credentials. Finally, it granted delegate status to 35 NUSes and gave at their request fraternal observer status to 5 NUSes, a status comparable to the associate membership which the IUS had just introduced. This procedure further stressed the fact that the ISC did not see itself as an organization, but as a periodically recurring conference which decided upon participation independently of the decisions of previous conferences, before embarking on its actual work. Of the 40 national student organizations who met the criteria of an NUS, 20 came from Europe, 5 from Asia, 2 from North America, 2 from Australasia and 7 from Latin America.

It was this broader representation which led to the most important decision of the Istanbul ISC. In Istanbul, it was clear, a solution had to be found for the differences of opinion which had already arisen among Latin American and European representatives in Copenhagen concerning the political role of the ISC. Whereas in Copenhagen opinions had been diametrically opposed, in Istanbul the various Western European representatives appeared to have accepted the fact that the ISC was involved in more problems than had been the intention originally. On proposal of the Scottish NUS, it was decided that a special commission should examine in how far political issues affecting students could be discussed at this conference. NUSes representing the most various viewpoints (108) were elected to this Commission and after five days of consultation asked the conference to add the following paragraph to the Principles of Cooperation:

"The Conference nevertheless recognizes, that because of varying economic, social and political circumstances in differing parts of the world, the content of student problems..... differs greatly, and recognizes further, therefore, that ISCs should be prepared to discuss the important and complex problems which confront students who are in less fortunate social, political and economic circumstances than the students who first formulated the principles of cooperation, subject to the following limitations:

1. That the problems raised shall concern students as such;
2. That in so far as any decision on these problems is political, it shall be of a non-partisan nature and the taking of such decisions shall be clearly independent of partisan political consideration; since this is a criterion difficult to apply,.... the decisions should be taken only when the results are likely to be morally and practically effective toward the solution;
3. That problems involving fundamental human rights... shall be considered only if accurate documentation is made available. (109)

This clearly made it possible for the ISC to concern itself with politics to a limited extent. After a long debate the proposal was adopted by 20 votes against 1, with 6 abstentions. The only objection came from the Dutch NUS which was afraid lest the Conference "became drowned in a political sea" and which had no mandate to vote for such a decision.(110) Those who abstained maintained that student problems could never be separated from the problems of society of which students form a part, and that therefore the "student as such" clause was incorrect as a principle. (111) It would take them six years to convince the ISC, but in the meantime the vast majority was more than satisfied with the agreement reached.

The commission had prepared some resolutions which were based on this new principle and carried without difficulties. For example:

"National Unions of Students should lend their moral support to the wishes of students in colonial areas to move as rapidly as possible toward the goal of national independence, which is the pre-requisite for full educational opportunity." (112)

Obviously, this laid the basis for many "student as such" resolutions which were to be adopted in later years. One can hardly escape the impression that the student as such clause served more as a loop-hole for the discussion of fundamental problems within the framework of this conference.

As the third condition for the making of political statements indicated, the ISC was aware that a political statement was of little value if the conference had not tried or been able to study the actual situation. In addition to the new principles of cooperation, it was therefore decided to set up a standing committee to inform the conference on the actual situation in various countries and especially to investigate whether the violations of fundamental human rights affected the university also. At the request of the conference, or of at least five NUSes, this commission was to inquire into:

"patterns of suppression of academic freedom, the distortion of free educational practices and other problems affecting freedom of access to the universities and equal educational opportunities." (113)

Five individual students who enjoyed the confidence of the conference were to be elected to this commission.

The Research and Information Commission (RIC) began on a small scale with three reports: South Africa, East Germany and Argentina. Since this ISC these reports have become the basis of the political activities of the conference and have helped considerably to inform delegates on situations confronting their fellow-students.

Although no unanimity had been reached on the important decisions, this conference went a long way towards bringing the different tendencies together. It was still felt that it should

not be an organization that could be regarded as a counterpart of the IUS, but in fact the ISC, willingly or unwillingly, had grown into an established institution within which a great variety of students could cooperate.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this was the first ISC at which an IUS delegation was present as an observer. Although its report, of which a summary was printed in "World Student News" (114), was negative, it was striking that the participating NUSes were in no way reproached. Since Istanbul the IUS publications were careful to distinguish between the ISC and COSEC and attacked the latter for disrupting unity in the international student movement. The secretariat was continually portrayed as an American creation, supported by American funds and trying to keep NUSes from cooperating within the IUS. The IUS publications never mentioned that it was in Istanbul, not in Washington that COSEC received its mandates, praise and criticism.

In the meantime the IUS itself was declining until it reached its lowest point at the 1954 Council meeting in the Moscow Lomonosov University. Although the credentials report spoke of a constant growth, a brief comparison with the credentials report of Warsaw 1953 clearly proves the contrary. Whereas in Warsaw 54 countries had been represented, this number had dropped to 46 in Moscow. 18 of the delegations had been sent by representative NUSes, six of which came from non-communist countries. The others could, as usual, be divided into minority groups claiming to be NUSes and local organizations. In Warsaw the IUS had claimed to represent more than six million students, in Moscow this figure had gone down to five million. The same report ascribed 1.5 million students to the Soviet Union and 3.5 million to China, where, according to the Chinese intervention, 30,000 graduated in 1953. The inaccuracy of these figures needs no comment.

As usual the delegates gave unanimous support to the Executive line and the only real controversial issues were raised by the observers. A Canadian request to give voting rights to representative NUSes only was once again rejected,

since, as the IUS Secretary General declared:

"we must not let legality hinder the work of the Council."
(115)

It was the coming-man Jiri Pelikan, who presented the Executive report this time, which continued the mild tone of Warsaw. One should remember that this was a written document and that the IUS carefully avoided taking a hard line in it at a time when relations in Eastern Europe were once more crystallizing. Once again student achievements throughout the world were enumerated at length, regardless of whether they had received IUS assistance. The report briefly commented upon the withdrawal of the Indonesian NUS, attributing it to the malevolent intentions of its President rather than to the Indonesian students themselves. (116) Particularly striking were those passages which reproached the Yugoslav NUS for rejecting the invitations to Warsaw in 1953 and Moscow in 1954. (117) The report made no mention of the open letter (118) sent by this Union to the IUS since it had arrived in Prague too late. (119) It demanded that the IUS first retract in a public statement its past defamation of Yugoslavia. Pelikan's comment that he as newcomer in the secretariat could not judge the past, was not accepted since the letter was addressed to the IUS and not to Mr. Pelikan. Moreover, he had been present at the 2nd Congress as head of the Czech delegation and had accepted at the 3rd Congress that the previous decisions concerning Yugoslavia had not been revoked. The Yugoslav NUS therefore reached the conclusion that its presence in Warsaw

"would only help to keep up the illusion, among those who still believe in slogans, behind which there are no deeds."

This letter from a communist NUS was a harsh blow and illustrated the IUS's difficult position from which it would only be able to free itself if it would determine its own policy instead of waiting for the official line.

The financial debate, however, was the most significant. Since the report was once again distributed shortly before

its discussion, the participants had no opportunity to study it. It was, therefore, proposed to reduce the number of questions to a minimum. The English and French representatives protested that it would be ridiculous first to vote on the report and then to be compelled to ask for clarifications in the corridors. Moreover, the English NUS had been promised six months earlier that its written questions would be discussed in detail at the Council meeting. It became evident during the debate that not only these NUSes found it impossible to comprehend the 31 pages of figures, but the secretary for finance himself could not find his way through the document and merely gave a few indirect replies. The situation became so painful that the Executive finally resorted to its old tactics of making strong personal attacks on the questioners and accused them of malevolent obstruction. Then the report was put to the vote and the discussion closed. On its return home, the Scottish delegation presented the final report to a professional accountant together with the report on the past year's activities. His conclusion was that the financial report was of no value. (119)

Finally the Moscow meeting discussed the potential of the associate membership category at great length. Interest had been less than expected and most of the NUSes had ceased to consider the IUS as an organization for concrete cooperation. It continued its policy of attacking the secretariat of the ISC and not the participating NUSes. (120) At the next Executive meeting in March 1955, the Executive realized that this had not helped to arouse more interest in associate membership.

It was, therefore, decided to extend an invitation to the ISC for a joint Conference of Cooperation to be held in 1956. (121) It was hoped that this proposal would be welcomed by the next ISC and it was decided to send a delegation to this conference. Thus, the IUS acknowledged for the first time since communist assumption of power that it was impossible to achieve world student unity within the framework of the IUS itself.

XIII. ISOLATION OF THE IUS

The quiet give-and-take atmosphere that had marked the 4th ISC was completely lacking when the 5th met in Birmingham in July, 1955. (122) This time 52 NUSes were present, 49 delegates and 3 fraternal observers. With the presence of 9 Asian, 6 African and 11 Latin American NUSes, the NUSes from the "old established countries" no longer had a majority. This time the scale was balanced by the representatives from the "new emerging countries". Naturally, this had its influence on the character of the ISC, on the political discussions and the conference's self-esteem. The secretariat's activities were no longer a subject of controversy at the conference, since for the first time there was reason to look back on the past year with satisfaction. COSEC was now functioning well and could prove to have stimulated and coordinated activities in many fields. As a result, the programme of delegated responsibilities, for instance, had been carried out effectively, considerably increasing the practical utility of the ISC. Travel, press and welfare seminars had enabled experts from the various NUSes to coordinate their activities and contact between them and COSEC had been strengthened by a vast travel programme. An international student delegation had visited a large number of African universities to see how African students could benefit from special ISC activities. The conference did have some criticism to make but was in general satisfied with the secretariat's work and decided to expand the ISC programme considerably. It was decided to publish a magazine in addition to the Information Bulletin to provide background information on many subjects of interest to NUSes and students. A delegation was to be sent to the Asian NUSes to continue the kind of work of the African team and the secretariat and the different NUSes were given a large number of specific mandates.

The ISC's financial position was less promising. Many NUSes had proved unable to pay their contribution so that

more funds would have to be sought. It was agreed that those NUSes unable to meet their financial responsibilities would make, in consultation with the Supervision Committee, at least a token contribution to strengthen the ISC's position in its search for funds. It was agreed that the secretariat should provide detailed information on the nature, methods and sponsors of the funds which were occasionally drawn on by the ISC in order to avoid misunderstandings.

The real controversy arose in connection with the ISC's political powers first outlined in Istanbul, 1954, albeit with certain limitations. This emerged most clearly from the debate on credentials when two organizations of questionable political reputation requested admission. The case of the Afrikaanse Studente Bond (ASB) was not difficult to solve, since the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was clearly representative. Although the NUSAS had been prevented from attending due to travel difficulties, the conference decided not to exclude it. The conference was indignant at the fact that one of the ASB principles was support for the government's apartheid-policy and that its constitution forbade membership of non-whites. The organization was sent home without status.

More complicated, however, was the case of the Spanish NUS, SEU, which, although gathering all Spanish students by means of compulsory membership, was extremely undemocratic and could not be regarded as representative of Spanish student opinion. The difficulty for most Western European NUSes was, however, that similar situations were to be found in many Eastern European countries. A negative decision on the Spanish case would thus also close the door to Eastern European NUSes. This viewpoint was strongly challenged by the Latin American NUSes. If the pro-fascist Spanish NUS were to be accepted as an equal partner, the Latin American delegates would no longer wish to participate in the ISC and would in fact withdraw. They felt that this NUS was so clearly undemocratic - even its President was appointed by Franco and not by the students - that it could never be accepted simply for the sake of the Eastern European NUSes. Moreover, these delegates felt that the

criteria of democratic structure and policy-making should also be applied to Eastern Europe. The uncompromising attitude adopted by the leaders of the Latin American student organization towards Eastern European NUSes provided a striking contrast with that of the Western NUSes who tried to keep the door open for a dialogue. Three days before its closure, the conference finally decided by a very narrow majority that "the status of SEU remain in a state of suspension" until a RIC team had reported on the actual degree of support this organization received from Spanish students.

The status to be granted to the IUS observers was a second controversial issue. At previous conferences discussion of the IUS's merits had been carefully avoided, but this time an IUS representative asked for the floor to give information on the proposed "Conference of Cooperation". Again the Latin Americans protested against the granting of any status to the IUS, arguing that like SEU this organization was an instrument of forces outside the student world. But the large majority of the conference regarded it as unrealistic not to acknowledge the IUS as an important tendency within the student world and one which deserved to be heard.

A heated discussion arose when the IUS proposal was tabled. The conference debated the pros and cons for a full day. It came to the conclusion that 18 of the 70 representative NUSes in the entire world participated in the IUS and 52 in the ISC. 12 of these 18 NUSes came from communist countries and however praiseworthy their financial sacrifices and work might be, they were 100 per cent committed to the viewpoints of their respective governments in their decisions. If these NUSes were interested in cooperating with the ISC, why would they not attend the next conference where they could meet NUSes of every tendency, from liberal to communist? If they were not prepared to do so, who was to participate in the Conference of Cooperation? Did the dozens of minority organizations who faithfully voted according to the wishes of the Executive and claiming to represent the students of their country, also count as IUS members?

These questions were put to the IUS representative, Harish Chandra from India. He admitted that the last question in particular might cause difficulties, since there were nine countries where one organization was a member of the IUS and the other participated in the ISC. In his opinion, these organizations would have to come to an understanding among themselves, otherwise the Conference of Cooperation would have to create a special status for their benefit. This implied that the Dutch NUS (25,000 members) would have to contact the Progressive Youth Organization (150 members) and that its status would depend on the agreement they would reach. If only one organization from a country was represented, as was for instance the case of Nepal, Thailand and Monaco in the IUS, there would be no problem since no one would feel neglected. He proved incapable of convincing the ISC with these arguments. The participants foresaw an endless debate on the participation rights in this conference. Even in deviating from the principle of exclusive participation by representative NUSes, this conference would be of no value when splinter groups could participate freely in the voting. On the basis of many arguments, the IUS proposal was rejected with one vote in favour, and the ISC adopted the following resolution:

"This conference expresses its belief that international student cooperation can best be achieved and furthered through the ISC, and believes that the widest possible participation in the conference is the practical way of achieving one world student community. It notes the absence of a number of NUSes from this and previous ISC's. It appeals to those organizations to attend the 6th ISC or to clarify the reasons why they do not participate in the ISC". (123)

To avoid difficulties concerning the credentials of communist NUSes, not fulfilling the criteria established by the ISC, the resolution continued:

"The conference recommends that on the basis of the replies received to the invitations to the 6th ISC, the

credentials committee reconsider the categories of representation which now exist." (123)

Needless to say that the IUS was not pleased with this reaction. Officially it still claimed to speak on behalf of the majority of the world student community and as such it regarded its proposal as a gesture of recognition towards the minority represented in the ISC.

But this was not the only set-back which the IUS had to face that year. The UNESCO General Assembly also proved to be of the opinion that the IUS was not a genuine student organization and rejected the IUS application for renewed consultative status. Finally World University Service (WUS) having offered a seat to an IUS representative for many years, decided not to comply with the IUS's conditions for accepting membership. Although the IUS still carried out a considerable number of activities, its international reputation had fallen practically to zero. It had no other choice, therefore, but to continue its attempts to hold a Conference of Cooperation. Contacts with the Swiss NUS Executive led to a Swiss proposal to convene such a conference (124), but the officers in question had acted without a mandate and were dismissed by their NUS. (125)

Under these conditions the IUS Council met in Sophia in September 1955 where the IUS reversed its policy completely. (126) Most characteristic of the climate in Sophia was the passage in the Executive report which reads:

"It is clear today and even our sternest critics will admit, that on the basis of our past experience and realistic approach to the problems of the student world, the IUS has considerably modified its programme and activities, to meet the interests of all students irrespective of their politics, religion, race or social origin."

Within four months after the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Tito, the IUS was able to inform its members that

"the decision of the IUS Executive to sever the relations with the Yugoslav NUS was incorrect."

Despite this remarkable reversal, no IUS member apart from the West African Students Union in London seemed to feel any need for clarifications. The Executive gave vague replies to questions from observers and spoke of an exchange of correspondence with the Yugoslav Union and the study of some relevant documents. No details were given concerning this correspondence or the nature of the documents. The Council did not feel the need to discuss the background of this change and the discussion ended with unanimous support for the Executive's policy, as did all questions of any importance. In a private talk with the Canadian observer, the Executive explained this unified reaction on the part of Council:

"Of course, people think for themselves in the IUS and vote as they think. Moreover it is obvious that different people think differently. However, the IUS has worked out a system by which differences can be ironed out before they reach the floor of the Assembly, proposals and counter-proposals are carefully studied and a compromise solution is found, which allows a unanimous vote on the floor." (127)

Still, this unanimity could evidently also be achieved without previous consultation, as was proved when the Scottish Union tabled two motions. The first dealt with IUS participation in the International Student Travel Conference, accepted by the Executive after adding the amendment that the possibilities of such participation should be studied. The Council approved it unanimously. The second motion calling for the promotion of free student travel between Eastern and Western Europe was rejected by the Executive with the unanimous agreement of the Council. To avoid a repetition of the financial discussion at the Moscow Council meeting of 1954, observers were not admitted to the financial debate, thus allowing it to develop smoothly.

It was precisely this quiet, not to say apathetic, atmosphere of the Council meeting which made it difficult to believe that this was the student event of the year. The deadlock in which the IUS found itself was not easy to break.

XIV. THE YEAR 1956

As we said earlier on, most of the IUS's difficulties in the years 1955/56 were largely due to the problems facing the new leaders of the Soviet Union. Profound differences of opinion existed within the collective leadership that had assumed power after Stalin's death. On the one hand, the hard-line communists rallied around Molotov, while those who wished to set a more moderate course were grouped around Malenkov. It took several years of careful manoeuvring between the two extremes before Khrushchev secured the leadership. But as long as it remained unknown who would emerge as winner of the race, uncertainty continued to exist about future policy. In 1955 the situation began to crystallize and Khrushchev and Bulganin made the surprising Canossa trip to Yugoslavia to admit that Stalin had erred in the past. This had its repercussions on the relationship with other Eastern European countries.

There Stalinists had remained in power and it is only natural that they were not very pleased with the approach to their former arch-enemy Tito, since it encouraged their domestic opponents. This opposition was quite significant and reacted increasingly against domination by the Soviet Union which had manifested itself ruthlessly in the form of Stalin and the secret police. But the Eastern European leaders themselves had been so closely involved in this ruthlessness, that it was not easy for them to argue for greater independence from the Soviet Union without risking their own position. While they were not too pleased with Moscow's new line, they still realized that they were too dependent on Moscow not to accept it. Consequently, one after the other, including Albania's Hoxha, they re-established relations with Tito.

But further encouragement was given to the opposition movements in Eastern Europe when, under the treaty of 15th May, 1955, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from

Austria and allowed a neutral policy to be conducted there. It had proved possible to achieve freedom from the Soviet yoke. The government leaders became increasingly aware that their position and the status quo could only be maintained by the presence of Soviet troops. They were, therefore, not reluctant to sign the Warsaw Pact on the day following the Austrian treaty. True, the basic motive for this Pact was the creation of a defense system against NATO (which West Germany had joined eleven days earlier), but it also enabled the Soviet Union to maintain its troops in Eastern Europe, now that its previous motive - maintenance of supply-lines with Austria - had disappeared. Clearly aware of this fact, Khrushchev sought new ways of making the Soviet Union once again the unquestionable leader of the international communist movement. He not only had to stabilize the situation in the Soviet Union itself, but was also compelled to give new assurance to Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe, which would appeal both to the leaders and to the people. To help achieve this, relations with Tito were to be normalized even further in order to remove any element of competition and to have Tito take his place as one of the leaders at Khrushchev's side. However sincere Khrushchev may have been when launching this attack upon Stalin in his secret address to the 20th Party Congress in February, 1956, it was a brilliant political move to shift the blame for all the Soviet Union and the CPSU was accused of onto the shoulders of one person. By absolving State and Party of all responsibility, he could present himself as the faithful Leninist, returning to the true ideas of communism. All negative aspects of Stalin's regime could be qualified as Stalinist excesses, while any qualities could be attributed to Lenin, regardless of whether they were compatible with Leninism or not (peaceful coexistence, for instance). Thus, he succeeded in creating the impression that he, and through him the CPSU, had something new to offer.

After the initiation of de-Stalinization, the COMINFORM, Stalin's political power apparatus, was dissolved in April 1956 and Khrushchev travelled once more to Belgrade to

demonstrate by a joint declaration with Tito that it was possible for a country to go its own way to communism.

But however conciliatory his attitude to Yugoslavia and however great his willingness to ascribe past mistakes to Stalin, the other Eastern European countries had to be brought back into line by all possible means. There the party's position was not so strong that it could permit itself the luxury of self-criticism after the Russian example without embarrassing the present leaders. It was, to say the least, doubtful whether new leaders would be well-disposed towards the Soviet Union. Stronger support was therefore given to the Stalinist leaders and increased activity of the secret police prevented the fermenting dissatisfaction from coming to the surface. This plan succeeded everywhere, except in Poland and Hungary.

Ten days after the Belgrade declaration, riots broke out in Poland which finally led to Gomulka's return to power. Although this decision had been preceded by an exceptionally strong conflict with Moscow, Gomulka, a proponent of a Polish road to communism, succeeded in convincing the Russian Leaders who had hastily set out for Warsaw, that his course was the only one that could keep Poland within the communist camp. Having assured them that there was no doubt of his loyalty to Moscow, they finally, but reluctantly, gave in.

Hopefully, this brief outline of tensions in Eastern Europe (128) will have given the readers an idea of the reason why the front organizations were taking such a wavering course at that time. Every Eastern European officer had to reckon with domestic changes and therefore weigh his words carefully. The only thing they were sure of was that they were to be more amiable to the West.

Realizing that front organizations would again have to be used to the full once Soviet supremacy had been re-established, the Soviet Union wanted to run no risk and the headquarters of the different front organizations were moved to the few reliable Eastern European countries, such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In 1956 the World Fed-

eration of Trade Unions left neutralized Austria and set up its offices in Prague. Within a year, the World Peace Council, which was having difficulties with the Austrian government, was to move to Prague also. The Women's International Democratic Federation had already left Paris for East Berlin in 1951 and the World Federation of Democratic Youth had moved from Paris to Budapest in the same year. During the Hungarian crisis, however, the latter also went to Prague, where, as we know, the IUS was already sited. Characteristic of all front organizations at that time was their lack of initiative.

Since the Council meeting in Sophia of September, 1955, the IUS Executive had continued to seek support for the Conference of Cooperation. The joint initiative with the Swiss having failed, the General Secretary contacted the French NUS which turned a ready ear, but for very different reasons. (129) In Istanbul and Birmingham the French NUS could not agree with the ISC's decision to open the door to political discussions and had left the assembly on both occasions. The French were convinced that the ISC had taken a course which would inevitably lead it away from its practical work, for which purpose France had helped to found the ISC originally. They now wanted to gather all members of the IUS and all NUSes participating in the ISC for the discussions of purely practical matters. This proposal suited the IUS not so much because it would be a practical conference, but because it would be a world student conference outside the framework of the expanding ISC, illustrating the fact that the ISC could not claim any more than the IUS to be able to gather all students of the world. The NUSes in the ISC, however, were less enthusiastic about the proposal. They had begun to realize how unrealistic a purely practical conference was and also preferred to wait for the reaction of the IUS members to the invitation to attend the next ISC. The COSEC Administrative Secretary, John Thompson, visited the Polish, Czech and Hungarian NUSes - he had not been given a visa for the Soviet Union and Rumania - who informed him that they had not yet taken

a final decision concerning participation. These NUSes had objections to the present structure and methods of the ISC, but they agreed with Thompson that this need not prevent their participation since every ISC decided independently of the previous conference on its structure and methods up to the next one. They promised to give him further information on their standpoint. (130)

In the meantime the IUS Executive met at the end of January, 1956 in Bukarest. Although this Executive meeting was almost completely devoted to preparations for the 4th World Student Congress, it also dealt with other matters and with unity in particular. After the example of the Soviet leaders, the IUS permitted a considerable degree of self-criticism, as demonstrated by a thesis on World Student Unity, which was to serve as a basis for discussions at the Congress: (131)

"Difficulties and mistakes led to the position where a number of organizations left the IUS, leading to the present division of the world student community. In seeking the explanation for this situation we have to bear in mind:

- the cold war atmosphere and its consequences in the student movement;
- the misuse and exaggeration of differences in opinion as to the tasks and scope of activities of an international student organization, leading to the splitting of the IUS as the one international organization; by such disruptive tactics serving non-student interests;
- the unwillingness of a number of student organizations, while members of the IUS, to officially recognize the constitutional stand of the IUS on colonialism. This led to the failure to apply this principle in practice or to support in deeds the just demands and actions of students of colonial and dependent countries, and to recognize them on the basis of equality;
- the past mistakes of the IUS when it failed, in a number of cases to recognize differences in the characteristics of the student movement and to act accordingly; the

lack of tolerance and understanding on the part of the IUS in the past in its relations with those student organizations which adopted other stands and the insufficient attention paid by it to the various aspects of student interests."

Starting from these views the IUS renewed its proposal for a Conference on Cooperation and asked all interested Unions to study its possibilities. Finally, the Congress would then make definite proposals.

After the usual publicity the Congress was held from 26th August to 2nd September, 1956 in the most appropriate place: Prague. It was attended by 650 students - 120 of whom were Czechs - coming from 38 countries. The number of representative NUSes was 15 (12 from communist countries, Japan, Ecuador and Sudan). Delegate status was also granted to 9 organizations of foreign students in Europe, while the other delegations represented noted minority or clandestine groups from all parts of the world. Finland, Israel and Tunisia were present as associate members. (132)

The most striking feature of this Congress was the open conflict between representatives from communist countries and the other delegates. Whereas the former group, to which belonged the majority of the Executive, were committed to the conciliatory attitude of their governments, the latter were convinced leftists who only had to account for their deeds to the members of their organizations (in as far as there was question of a real organization).

As was to be expected, the Executive report (133) concentrated on the problems of unity, and the secondary theme, the struggle against colonialism, was for the first time given priority over peace. Once again it was fully acknowledged that the IUS could not be regarded as a structure within which world student unity could be realized. The ISC was also unjustified and unrealistic in making such a claim. The report drew attention to the French proposal and announced that an IUS delegation would explain its advantages to the 6th ISC.

The one-sided and moderate tone of the Executive report vexed the uncommitted left wing. The Japanese delegation strongly attacked the absence of a firm declaration against American nuclear armament and accused the Executive of being obsessed by COSEC which dominated the entire report. The Japanese felt that student action for peace, against nuclear armament, against colonialism and for democratization of education was far more important than the search for cooperation with the reactionary NUSes grouped around COSEC.

Although the Executive endeavoured to calm the heated discussion, the left wing proved to feel little concern for the Executive's dilemma. They longed to go back to the days when the IUS spoke in strong and unequivocal terms. This conflict came to the surface a second time when the Executive once more tried to steer a middle course in regard to the proposal for the observation of a one-minute silence in honour of the Algerian dead. The Executive tried to prevent this motion from being tabled so as not to vex the apolitical observers from ISC circles, but quickly abandoned the attempt when the African representatives proved to disagree.

The Executive's proposals for modification of the IUS constitution in order to remove the objections of non-members were remarkable. Aware of the IUS's isolation and that this had to be remedied at all costs, it proposed seven changes, somewhat along the lines of the thirteen points proposed by the minority in 1950: (134)

1. Abolition of Council meetings, leaving Congress as the sovereign governing body;
2. Congress was to meet at least once every two years and to be called IUS instead of World Student Congress;
3. Abolition of the proportional voting system, granting one vote to each member organization regardless of its membership;
4. Member organizations were no longer to be bound by IUS decisions;

5. Membership was to be open to: NUSes, National Co-ordinating Committees in countries where no NUS existed, one or more student organizations from countries possessing neither an NUS nor a Committee and representative organizations of foreign students if gathering together the majority of the students of their nationality. All other student organizations were to receive consultative status;
6. Deletion of the clause on the "fight for the eradication of every vestige of fascist ideology", etc;
7. The abandonment of the purpose "to be the representative organization of democratic students of the whole world".

The latter two proposals had been approved in the commission, but in the plenary session they proved unacceptable to the uncommitted left wing. As a result, the original text of 1946 was maintained. The other proposals proved acceptable, thus marking the beginning of a new period in the development of the IUS. But for the fact that the ISC had no membership but only participants in a periodically recurring conference, the new IUS structure showed a striking resemblance to that of the ISC. Only the future would tell whether these decisions would bring an essential change in the character of the IUS as organization for the promotion of a specific ideological and political concept of the world. Observers at the Congress were still very sceptical and felt that the discussion and the direction of the Congress showed a change in methods, but not in the purpose of the organization. Three months later this question was to be clarified.

On 23rd October, 1956 the troubles that had been brewing for a long time in Hungary broke out in open revolt. (135) After the dismissal of the fanatical Stalinist Rakosi on 18th July, events followed one another rapidly. Internal pressure, exerted mainly by students and authors - the so-called Petöfi circles - gradually brought the "Hungarian Gomulka", Imre Nagy, back into favour until on 13th October he was

re-admitted to the Party. It was demanded that a new Party congress be called and that in the meantime Nagy be consulted on all current issues. After mass demonstrations the official authors' association endorsed this demand. After the example of the Petöfi circles, the students declared their independence from the communist youth organization and founded an independent Union which expressed many demands in the field of education and welfare.

On 23rd October the text of Gomulka's agreement with the Soviet leaders was publicized. On the same day the students decided to organize a silent demonstration of sympathy in front of the Polish Embassy. Permission was refused, but when tension in the city increased, the prohibition was withdrawn two hours later. More than ten thousand students assembled on one of the squares from which they set out for the city centre. When they reached the government buildings, the number of demonstrators had increased to more than a hundred-thousand. At the request of the crowd, Nagy appeared on the balcony and appealed for maintenance of order, but in vain. Some two hundred thousand people marched to the broadcasting station and assaulted it when a student delegation failed to re-appear. Suddenly the demonstration turned into a revolt which swept all over Hungary. The following day the Hungarian government proved incapable of checking the developments and called in the Soviet forces which were stationed in Hungary by virtue of the Warsaw Pact. This added fuel to the fire. Hoping to save what he could, Nagy was requested to assume the function of Prime Minister. He once again called upon the people to maintain order and announced that he would negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On 29th October he made it known that an agreement had been reached and that the Soviet troops would leave Hungary. The following day he announced the re-introduction of the plural party system and formed a coalition government, while declaring on 31st October that Hungary was leaving the Warsaw pact and would conduct a neutral policy. In a cable to Hammerskjöld he protested against the entrance of more Soviet troops and re-

quests went out to the four big powers to help Hungary defend its neutrality. On the same day, Mikojan arrived in Budapest to discuss the situation of Soviet forces and the communist Ministers, led by Kadar, withdrew from the Nagy government. On 3rd November, a Hungarian delegation, headed by Pal Maleter went to the army commander's headquarters to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops, but did not return. The next day Nagy announced on Radio Budapest that contrary to its promises, the Soviet Union had launched an air-attack against Budapest. On the same day Kadar declared that he had formed a counter-government and that he had requested the commander of Soviet troops to assist him in crushing the "sinister forces of reaction". Soviet troops began operations immediately throughout the country and after a bitter resistance the revolt was quelled on 11th November. In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of refugees, including more than six thousand students, had crossed the open Austrian border. On the surface at least, order in Eastern Europe had been restored for the time being.

There is no need for recalling the indignation aroused by these events in all parts of the world. But there had been no intervention because the powers to whom Nagy had appealed, were themselves involved in a conflict which reached its climax at the same time: that of the Suez canal. After the nationalization of this canal by Egypt on 26th July and subsequent strong diplomatic pressure on Egypt, British and French troops had entered the canal zone on 31st October to ensure that its supervision would be handed over to an international body. Fighting came to an end on 6th November with the negotiation of a truce by the UN and one month later the first international police force ever used in the history of the UN arrived in the zone. This Anglo-French intervention had also caused indignation, particularly among the countries of the Bandung conference.

NUSes from all parts of the world gave assistance to the Hungarian and Egyptian students. (136) In the case of Egypt it was mostly moral support since no universities had been

affected by the invasion, but in the case of the Hungarian students there was an urgent need for material aid. In dozens of countries students set up funds to provide for the most basic needs of their refugee fellow-students and part of the aid was sent straight to Hungary to relieve the most pressing needs. Fourteen NUSes, COSEC and WUS formed a Coordinating Committee in Vienna for joint assistance to the students. Within a few months all refugees had been granted scholarships and placed in European and American universities.

Meanwhile the IUS secretariat had issued the following statement: (138)

"University students have been facing great difficulties in the course of recent weeks... the secretariat of the IUS is deeply concerned with these happenings, in the course of which student lives were also lost... in accordance with our constitutional relations with our member organization in Hungary, we are contacting them to obtain further information."

Considerably easier was the Egyptian case. Here the facts were known so that an IUS protest was not long in coming: (138)

"The IUS secretariat voices strong protest against this foreign invasion and expresses its sympathy and solidarity with the Egyptian students", etc.

Though less sharp in tone than normal, this protest stood out in contrast to the brief comment on Hungary. It was not until December, 1956 that the IUS made a further statement on events in Hungary. "World Student News" and "News Service" printed an eye-witness account from an Executive member of the provisional Hungarian NUS: (139)

"What had happened or what was going to happen was not clear to the students themselves, and even in front of Parliament I heard student groups saying here and there that it would be better to shut some people up and not let

them shout fascist slogans. But at the time it only seemed stupid extremism and nobody took these people and their slogans seriously.

All the entrances of the building were closed and the demonstrators were not allowed to enter. And then, God knows from where, an organized group immediately took jemmies and broke through the main door. They poured into the yard, where security police on guard tried to keep them back with tear-gas shells. At that moment a shot was fired; the first shot which came from the demonstrators and killed the commander of the guard. The tragedy had begun. To protect their own lives, members of the guard returned the fire and soon a pitched battle had started. It turned out later that there had been an armed group amongst the demonstrators and when the fighting started, they had immediately gone on lorries to a nearby arsenal in order to get more arms."

"In the name of democracy armed fascist groups began persecuting members of the Communist Party and slaughtering them in a cruel way although in the majority of cases they were unarmed. And at the same time as the bloody terror was going on behind the back of the masses, people were being roused by the same elements who aimed at organizing a counter-attack on the Soviet troops who had come to restore order on the request of the government, which was in a fatal position due to the disorganization of the Hungarian armed forces."

"Their only aim was to get the people to pull chestnuts out of the fire for them: that is, they wanted to make Hungary a country of the landlords and the Catholic Church again. Their plan however failed. A tiny minority of students fled abroad but most of the other students well understood the big chances. They stand definitely for the system of peoples democracy. And this determination is a valuable contribution to the future of Hungary."

The IUS approach to the Hungarian crisis roused general and strong indignation. Again the IUS proved incapable of searching its own heart. It did not favourably influence the implementation of the proposals for cooperation.

XV. THE YEAR 1956 CONTINUED

About a week after the fourth World Student Congress in Prague and a month prior to the Hungarian revolution and the invasion of the Egyptian canal zone, the 6th ISC met in Ceylon in September 1956. (140) For the first time a world-wide conference of representative National Unions was taking place outside Europe and for the first time the representatives from Asia, Africa and Latin America were in the majority (30 of the 56 NUSes). Apart from the discussion on the usual programme of practical activities, it was mainly the heated discussion on political stands that marked the importance of this ISC.

First, however, a few brief comments on the relationship to the IUS which had come with a strong delegation headed by the new President, Jiri Pelikan. All communist NUSes from Eastern Europe and Asia had refused the invitation to attend. The reason they had given was that they were able to cooperate to their full satisfaction within the IUS, whereas "COSEC" was not completely free of partisan activities. COSEC was criticized on the grounds that it generally spoke about the IUS in aggressive terms. COSEC asked for concrete examples since it was unaware of partisan activities or attacks on the IUS. (In fact it had been COSEC's policy never to speak about the IUS in order to avoid an antithesis in the student world). There had been no reaction to this request, but again it was remarkable that the attack was directed at COSEC, regardless of the fact that it was the Conference which determined its policy and that the secretariat only implemented practical projects on the basis of explicit mandates. In Ceylon there was once again a long debate on the status of the IUS delegation, but despite Argentina's keen opposition, the IUS was granted observer status with 35 votes in favour and 15 against. (In Argentina the IUS had long supported a small Peronist

organization at the time when the NUS was making vigorous efforts to restore democracy.)

The ISC had many reservations however with regard to the IUS proposals for concrete cooperation. Just as the IUS distinguished clearly in its publications between COSEC and ISC, the ISC distinguished between the IUS machinery, the representative member unions within the IUS and its non-representative members. As far as the IUS machinery was concerned, the ISC felt no need for close cooperation, since it regarded it as an institution of party-political nature. Previous conferences had already objected to ISC relations with any organization of such a nature and this stand was again taken in Ceylon. With regard to the non-representative groups within the IUS, the ISC had no wish to cooperate since it wanted to work only with representative NUSes. But with the representative NUSes within the IUS, the ISC was willing to use any opportunity that might lead to better cooperation.

Though still of the opinion that it offered the best framework for independent and world-wide student cooperation, it reached the conclusion that it would be useless to wait for the communist NUSes to follow Yugoslavia's example and participate in the next ISC. But still the possibility for them to do so should remain open and the ISC, therefore, decided to invite them once again and further encourage their participation. It was also decided to call upon NUSes both within and without the ISC to organize, independently of the COSEC programme, informal meetings of ISC and IUS NUSes to discuss problems of closer cooperation. This meeting would differ from the proposed Conference of Cooperation in that it would be informal so that problems of representativity of voting participants need not be raised. No decisions could be taken, but it could show the different NUSes the most promising way to closer cooperation. This was regarded as a better approach than the Conference of Cooperation, since no guarantee had been given that it would not be attended by minority groups.

While in Istanbul and Birmingham it had been the Latin American NUSes who had forced a broadening of the conference's policy, the pressure in Ceylon came from the North African Unions. The direct cause of their dominating role was the situation in Algeria where after years of local unrest the war for independence had broken out on a large scale. The French NUS, in particular, was strongly opposed to admission of the Algerian student organization on completely equal terms. This organization did gather all Algerian students in Algeria, France, Tunisia and Morocco but not the white students in Algiers who were more numerous than the Algerian students. The debate on the Algerian organization's status introduced the political element of the Algerian fight for liberation early in the proceedings. At first it focussed on the question of whether children of French colonials studying in Algiers ought to be regarded as Algerians. If so, the French NUS represented more Algerians than the Algerian organization since these students in Algiers were members of the French NUS. If not, recognition of the Algerian NUS implied that the French in Algeria should be regarded as foreigners.

After long discussion those who wanted to interpret the Copenhagen definition of an NUS to the letter, were persuaded that the Algerian NUS was undeniably a representative organization of Algerian students, while the interests of the French students in Algiers were defended by the French NUS. Finally, the Algerians were admitted to the ISC by 36 votes against 5, with 7 abstentions.

But this was not the end of the discussion on Algeria. As in Istanbul and Birmingham, a special commission was set up to study the Bases of Cooperation. Since all NUSes were interested in this subject, each National Union sent a delegate to the commission. A large part of the time of the commission was taken up by the Algerian question. It was immediately agreed to mandate the Research and Information Commission (RIC) to make a study and present a factual report to the next ISC.

In the opinion of the Algerian NUS, this decision was no

reason to pass over the Algerian war for independence in silence and it proposed a resolution expressing the ISC's solidarity with the Algerian students. This met with strong opposition on the part of the French and some other Western European NUSes. They felt that the ISC resolutions derived their strength from the fact that they were based on a close study of facts and if the conference was to deviate from this principle, it would mean removing the very backbone of such resolutions. They argued how difficult it had been to convince their members that the ISC could no longer limit itself to practical matters. Until then, every European Executive had been able to submit to their members a vast documentation on the basis of which the political stand had been taken. They had been able to demonstrate that the ISC did not adopt a position rashly or on the basis of one-sided information. Breaking this rule and taking a stand on the basis of information provided by one of the parties involved, instead of by an independent ISC commission, would be creating a dangerous and unacceptable precedent. Moreover, whatever stand such a resolution took it would inevitably mean the acceptance of the objectivity of the information supplied by one party and would cast doubt on the objectivity of that supplied by the other. Secondary motives could thus obscure the actual judgement. They, therefore, opposed this procedure energetically.

On the other hand, the North African NUSes argued that no one could pretend not to be sufficiently informed on the Algerian problem. The facts were self-evident and the world press reported every day on the bloody developments. They felt that the struggle for independence had now reached a level where the Algerian students badly needed the moral and material support of the ISC. By sending them home empty-handed with the mere argument that the formal condition of a RIC report had first to be complied with, the ISC would discredit itself and even lay itself open to ridicule. The session was adjourned and when the meeting reconvened the American NUS proposed a compromise resolution which merely expressed solidarity with the Algerian students in their struggle against the suppression of their lawful

aspirations for independence. The Istanbul ISC had already acknowledged independence as a pre-requisite for the free development of a country and its education.

But the Western Unions were not to be convinced and they insisted on the need for a RIC report. They were defeated, however, in commission by 28 votes to 18. Determined to defend their concept of the ISC to the very end, they tabled an alternative motion on Algeria in the plenary session in which the ISC noted the information on the violation of the legitimate rights of the Algerian students and expressed solidarity with its victims pending a RIC report. This proposal was defeated by 25 to 23 votes and one abstention. Afterwards the American compromise resolution was adopted by 25 votes against 19 with 7 abstentions. Needless to say, the European NUSes, though encouraged by the strength of their support, were disappointed in the result of the vote. They feared that the means of controlling the ISC's political activities created in Istanbul were in jeopardy and they were determined to consolidate them where possible. On their behalf the NUS of New Zealand proposed the replacement of the words "which is" in the Istanbul clause "national independence, which is a pre-requisite for full education development" by "where it is". Thus they tried to express that bad educational provisions were not inherent in colonialism, as was proved for instance in Malta, the West Indies, etc. The ISC adopted this viewpoint with a very small majority, but now the others were deeply disillusioned by what they regarded a step backward.

Thus an antithesis grew within the Conference between what would later be called the "student responsibility" wing and the "student-as-such" wing (student responsibility: shared responsibility for society in all its aspects; student-as-such: NUSes must limit themselves to student problems).

This division had no repercussion on the practical programme. In Birmingham the work of the ISC had already been expanded considerably and all participants without exception supported the development of seminars, delegations, publications, exchanges, etc.

But the political discussions had left too great a mark on the conference to prevent most delegations from returning home disillusioned and dissatisfied.

In the months that followed the NUSes of both wings were to reflect upon their attitude towards the ISC and the usefulness of continued participation. It is striking to see how the result was positive without exception. Practically all NUSes who attended the ISC in Ceylon reached the conclusion that this diversity of opinion was the price to be paid for universality. However dangerous and irresponsible certain viewpoints might sound to those from a totally different society, no one could be blamed for trying to find support for his ideas within the ISC. If decisions were taken, defeating now the one party and then the other, the fact remained that only the framework of the ISC offered this opportunity for unrestricted debate. A distinction began to be made between the existence of the ISC and the ideas put forward. While efforts were being made to retain as much influence as possible on the latter, it was generally felt that one should not risk disintegration of the ISC through lack of tolerance. While the Ceylon Conference had been marked by tensions, the next ISC was to be known for its remarkable tolerance.

It was hardly surprising that the reaction of the IUS delegation was not favourable. IUS reports (141) repeatedly pointed out that the ISC was facing a profound crisis and sharply attacked the heated discussions on colonialism. Again much attention was paid to COSEC's financial dependence on the good will of American foundations. The IUS felt that the large number of practical mandates to COSEC meant centralization of power in the hands of a few who in the past had not proved to be impartial.

On the other hand, the IUS also noted positive tendencies. Although informal meetings between IUS and ISC NUSes would offer less scope for concrete results than a Conference of Cooperation, the initiative was of undeniable value. But the ISC's refusal to accept IUS proposals for concrete cooperation in common spheres of action, gave, in the opinion of the

IUS, little hope for the implementation of this initiative.

The previous chapter has already shown that it was not the outcome of this ISC which chilled relations between the NUSes of East and West, but rather the events in Hungary which took place a few weeks later. The Western Unions were deeply shocked but not surprised by the IUS's failure to react. Statements by Eastern European NUSes on Hungary deprived the Western European NUSes of any wish to cooperate. While fund raising campaigns were being organized everywhere, most Western European NUSes decided to suspend their exchange programmes with Eastern European NUSes until the latter had taken a clear stand.

Only Poland proved able to voice an independent opinion at that time. (142) On 6th November, 1956 the Polish NUS adopted a resolution:

"declaring full support for the Hungarian people, its heroic youth and its students who initiated the fight for sovereignty, the establishment of a socialist democracy and the rejuvenation of practical socialist thinking. We bow our heads before the tragedy of the Hungarian people, whose thousands of patriots shed their blood so that their just demands for full democratic freedom and national independence could be met... We believe that the Hungarian people are fully entitled to decide on their own future. That is why we think it intolerable and contrary to the spirit of international law for other countries to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary. We consider that the intervention of the Soviet army rendered the situation more complex and made more difficult the fair solution of the Hungarian problem by the forces of the popular front. Our people were lucky enough to achieve their aims and obtain positive results without any bloodshed. We promise faithfully to abide by the guidance given by the leaders of the party to remain calm, to be prudent as well as resolute. In these days of trial for the Hungarian people we promise to remain faithful to the ideals of socialist democracy and national independence. This is our way of showing soli-

parity with the Hungarian people."

The sincerity of this declaration made a deep impression in Western Europe. Henceforth, the Polish student union occupied a special place among the Eastern European NUSes because it had the courage to interpret the opinion of its members. (143) The other NUSes remained mouthpieces of their respective governments, i.e. communist parties. One after the other they regretted the unfortunate civil war in which the fascists had plunged the Hungarian people. The Rumanian NUS made the most aggressive impression. Having refuted strongly the rumours of student demonstrations in Bukarest, it declared: (144)

"The slanderers recruited from among the meanest fascist traitors chased away by our people, should know that the student youth together with the whole working people of our country will never allow a return to the regime of bourgeois and landlord exploitation. We do not allow slanderers against our people, who by efforts and sacrifices create even better studying and living conditions for us.

We know that the aim of Radio Free Europe is to incite the most reactionary elements, notorious fascists, to crimes and cruelties against the socialist peoples. This thing was evidently seen during the bloody events in Hungary, when this station was inciting to the most bestial crimes, to the enthronement of white terror. This radio station subsidized from the \$ 125 million given by the US Congress for provocative actions against the socialist states and supported by the revanchist militarists in Bonn, is gravely responsible for the thousands of people and children, tortured and killed in the most bestial way, as well as for the material and cultural damages caused to Hungary."

It needs no explaining that this and similar declarations invalidated the arguments of Western European supporters of East/West cooperation. Once again it was evident that the Eastern European student leaders acted as mouthpieces

of the party. Once again it was difficult to recognize them as representatives of the Eastern European students without indirectly attacking the latter. It was not until official Russian policy relaxed somewhat and the effects of liberalization began to make themselves felt in Eastern Europe that feelings calmed down and contacts were gradually resumed.

XVI. GROWING DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ISC

Events in Hungary had a marked but not irreparable repercussion on the image of the IUS in the third world. It was a known and accepted fact that the IUS was a communist front organization. The IUS itself was anxious to forget the November days of 1956 as soon as possible and the NUSes in developing countries were not eager to constantly remind the IUS of its failure. No doubt this was partially due to the fact that the IUS had attached such primary importance to the struggle against colonialism at its fourth Congress in August 1956. The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India in November 1955 had marked the official end of a period in which communism had taken a hostile attitude towards non-communist nationalist movements in the third world. This hostility had diminished over the years and it had been realized gradually that such tendencies might be communism's only vehicle of success in these countries. (145) Consequently, the national leaders of India, Indonesia and Burma, etc. at one time so abused, were now recognized as national heroes by Moscow. It was constantly stressed that communism was the true friend of all those who were fighting for national independence.

It needs no explaining that the front organizations played a very important role in this new line, and in particular WFDY and IUS since today's audience is tomorrow's leadership. For the IUS this opened up a field of activities in which energy and enthusiasm would achieve a great deal. In chapter II we outlined the main features of this policy. For the IUS it amounted to the following:

- a. a stronger emphasis on anti-colonialism
- b. drive a wedge between ISC and COSEC
- c. imply that "COSEC" is a student section of the US State Department
- d. declare that genuine anti-colonialists had no influence within the ISC

- e. create the impression, by identifying COSEC with the West, that true neutrality could only be served by affiliation both to "COSEC" and IUS.

An extra advantage for the IUS was that the Ceylon ISC had deprived the resolution on colonialism of its strength. In the opinion of the IUS, the ISC had clearly demonstrated that it still regarded the question of the right to national independence as a matter of dispute.

But when the 7th ISC met in September 1957 in Ibadan, Nigeria the Conference, with the exception of a small minority, clearly saw through these tactics. This minority advanced the objections repeatedly expressed by the IUS against the ISC: (146) The secretariat was partisan because it gave more attention to one political problem than to another. The secretariat was reproached for not having made official contact with the IUS secretariat. And finally, the secretariat was reproached to be 90 per cent dependent on American funds. These questions were discussed at great length since they disclosed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and working methods of the ISC.

First, it was incorrect to suppose that the secretariat had any power to issue political statements. COSEC had only circulated the opinions of NUSes at their request. If these opinions reflected only one side of the picture, it was the NUSes who should be blamed and there should be no hesitation to express one's own opinion by means of the COSEC distribution system. Second, the only contact COSEC could have with the IUS was to pass on the ISC's opinion on different subjects. It was the task of the individual NUSes or of the ISC to negotiate or reach compromises with the IUS secretariat. To convert the passive secretariat to an active executive the structure of the conference would have to be changed and this was a decision for the ISC. Third, the secretariat had an obligation to find funds for the ambitious activities planned by the Ceylon ISC. All NUSes had been asked to seek funds in their own countries. Only three NUSes had reported that they had discovered foundations willing to contribute to the work of the ISC in a way which was free from any political conditions. Should the secretariat have refused

this support because it came from too small number of countries?

After the discussion, the conference decided unanimously, the minority included, not to change the structure of the ISC. The present structure alone could reduce the danger of political domination by members of the secretariat to a minimum.

Few new opinions were advanced by this ISC concerning the relationship with the IUS. One of the reasons was that the IUS was represented by only one delegate, the Nigerian government having refused visa to the other four. This representative, a member of the Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France (FEANF) had been instructed by Prague to leave the hall after stating the IUS viewpoint and not to enter into discussions. (147) In his intervention he referred to the letter which the IUS has sent to the ISC participants in July, making further proposals for joint activities. He repeated the IUS view that the ISC could not be regarded as a movement capable of gathering all students in the world. He demonstrated that 50 of the 62 NUSes present represented together less students than those studying in China alone, so that it could safely be stated that half of the world student community was not represented in the ISC. Since it was clear that neither the IUS nor the ISC could achieve unity within its own framework, it was of the utmost importance to meet at a World Cooperation Conference to discuss this urgently needed unity. The criticisms of the IUS he had heard in the corridors were no longer applicable since the fourth Congress in 1956. The IUS had changed its constitution and acknowledged its errors. One should not try and pretend that the Hungarian crisis had been planned in IUS headquarters. These events had caused a split among IUS members and the secretariat had therefore not been able to act on behalf of these members. This was in contrast to the Egyptian invasion when indignation had been unanimous.

Unfortunately, the speaker badly weakened his intervention by stating, to the hilarity of the conference, that COSEC would not have acted much differently in the case of

American interference in Mexico...

His renewed proposals were discussed, but the conference did not share his opinion on the relationship between ISC and IUS. Informal meetings between IUS and ISC NUSes held in Yugoslavia and France had shown that insurmountable difficulties still existed with regard to participation of minority organizations in the World Cooperation Conference. There was no visible difference between the IUS proposals and those of the Conference of Cooperation and the ISC therefore saw no reason to change its position. This attitude was undoubtedly influenced by the promising prospects for Eastern European participation in the ISC (Poland). It was decided to send a delegation to Eastern Europe to clarify mistaken ideas about the ISC. Moreover, it was urged that the different NUSes strengthen their contacts and pursue discussions with the Eastern European sister organizations.

However passionate and dynamic the Ceylon Conference might have been, the ISC in Nigeria was the most harmonious conference ever to be organized. The participants adhered just as much to their principles, but were remarkably willing to give and take. The European NUSes had overcome their disappointment of Ceylon and were more open to and sympathetic with the problems of the third world. They were ready to support several resolutions on suppression of legitimate student rights, provided the cases in question were so significant that it was unnecessary to wait for a RIC report. Now that deterioration of the Algerian situation had opened the eyes of many NUSes, the Ceylon stand on colonialism was corrected. Unequivocal support was given both to the Algerians and to students from other colonial territories fighting for independence.

The other NUSes on their part accepted to formulate political resolutions as far as possible in accordance with the "student as such" clause, and most resolutions on colonialism, totalitarianism and dictatorship referred to their effect on the university. As we have seen before, this could sometimes lead to strange conclusions, giving the impression that solidarity was given to the victims of a flood only because

their books were warping in the water! But one could see a clear evolution in the ISC's political consciousness and those NUSes who felt that the ISC did not go far enough, knew that this would also change in course of time.

But the political evolution of the ISC was not to be as easy as participants in Nigeria thought. Upon leaving Ibadan, they had no reason to suspect that within eighteen months this conference of friendship and cooperation would change into a fanatical arena. This was not merely due to the fact that completely different people with a different concept of the conference's usefulness, were to attend the next ISC. The utility of the ISC was not questioned in the coming years, as proved by the constant expansion of the programme.

The mentality of a great many participants changed, and the ISC was seen through different eyes. In retrospect Nigeria was the end of a period of construction and consolidation with everyone's whole-hearted contribution. The NUSes regarded the ISC as a body of their own which offered hitherto unknown possibilities for cooperation and to which each contributed a part. But as the ISC began to carry out more activities through the intermediary of COSEC, the notion ISC/COSEC became more and more of an institution. Strongly stimulated by IUS publications constantly portraying COSEC as an American and partisan office, there was a growing feeling that the conference was turning into something which was not of their own creation. Certain reservations arose, strengthened by the fact that none of the groups within the ISC - Latin Americans, Anglo-Saxons, Southern Europeans, Arabs, Asians, French-speaking Africans, English-speaking Africans, etc. - felt that they were getting 100 per cent of what they wanted. Whereas formerly this had been regarded as a logical consequence of the search for international agreement, many now felt annoyed by compromise. The reasons are manifold.

First, there was the change in the world political situation, marked after 1956 by increasing relaxation between East and West. The balance of power had been redressed and East and West helped to replace the cold war by a climate of coexistence.

The launching of the first Sputnik had increased Soviet reputation considerably and as a result this policy of coexistence gradually no longer rested on fear but on self-confidence.

Meanwhile the process of decolonization in Africa and Asia was in full swing and the Afro-Asian countries grouped together to conduct an independent policy of non-alignment. (Bandung 1955)

On gaining independence almost all countries placed university education high on their list of priorities. Many National Unions who had participated actively in the struggle for independence, were now the home of the elite who closely analyzed their government's policy. Aware of the role they had to fulfil within their country, these NUSes, felt the need to strengthen regional contact.

Until now they had met occasionally at regional seminars, organized by the ISC, to discuss university and political problems. But they began to feel an increasing need for regional contact as a means of studying their common problems. They wished to discuss these among themselves and felt that neither ISC nor IUS offered the right framework for this purpose.

Ever since Stockholm the ISC had encouraged such regional conferences. Had not the ISC itself begun as a regional conference? After the reversal of the fourth Congress, the IUS had also become aware of the usefulness of such events and begun to support them. Thus within a year after the Bandung conference, a vast Afro-Asian student conference was held on the same site. (148) Financially supported by the Afro-Asian solidarity fund and ISC, the conference was attended by representatives from more than 25 Afro-Asian countries. Problems of credentials were avoided by agreeing to take unanimous decisions only. Although this resulted in very general declarations with little reference to concrete situations, the most important fact was the experience of getting together amongst themselves. But the interests of African and Asian students proved to be too far apart and consequently no second conference has been held to date. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (AASC) did organize some student mani-

festations, but these had nothing in common with the Bandung conference and were not representative of the continents concerned. (This AASC had originated from the Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension, organized by the World Peace Council on the eve of the Bandung conference to compensate for Soviet absence at the latter.

Later on, President Nasser was contacted and the Committee developed into a Soviet-Egyptian front, led by Asian communists and Egyptian left-wing nationalists. Now China has a dominant influence on this Committee which is decreasing in importance for the Soviet Union.) (149) In Africa the Bandung experience in regional contact led to the foundation of the Pan-African Student Conference which first met in 1958 in Kampala, Uganda. (150) In Latin America, two Latin American Student Conferences (LASC) had already been held by that time (1955 Montevideo, 1957 La Plata).

In as far as the results of these conferences are not related to the world student movement, they fall outside the framework of this study. But the fact that they were held did influence the development of ISC and IUS, since these two organizations were subjects of discussion. At the first LASC (151), held before the Prague Congress of 1956, the participants' indignation was roused by the IUS delegate's bold statement that the Argentinian delegate was a paid FBI agent and that the entire meeting had been financed by the US State Department. A motion of censure on his behaviour was carried unanimously. The IUS realized that this approach was little effective and published, in spite of everything, a positive report on the meeting. The second LASC (152) in 1957 received a better treatment, and was supported morally by the IUS and materially by the ISC. Since the IUS no longer claimed that it alone could best serve the interests of Latin American students, its assistance was welcomed as much as that of COSEC.

One of the results, however, was that the impression began to gain ground that there were two bureaux at the service of the student movement: COSEC and the IUS secretariat, the latter being communist and the former being run

by American money. East and West were thus obviously courting the favour of the third world. The logical consequence for the self-respecting NUSes from the third world was to adopt a position of non-alignment, with certain reservations towards both. It need not be said that these ideas were stimulated by the IUS and categorically denied by ISC/COSEC. Although the ISC resolutions were a clear proof of an impartial approach, the anti-Western statements were simply qualified as tactics of the State Department.

At the ISCs this accusation was hardly ever raised since it was clear to all that the conference took autonomous decisions based on principles established by the conference itself. Everyone had the opportunity of expressing his objections to these decisions and principles at the ISC. But although the conference elected its own Supervision Committee and gave mandates to a secretariat, controlled and chosen by this Committee, many NUSes relapsed after the ISC into the same antithetical way of thinking and COSEC was downgraded to a Western counterpart of the IUS secretariat. Since moreover no one was one hundred per cent satisfied with the course the ISC was taking, it was only natural to project this dissatisfaction on COSEC and the West that financed it.

More complex was the position of the Western NUSes who adhered to the student-as-such clause which the regional conferences had rejected outright. Their stand reflected the genuine opinion of the vast majority of their members who did not want their NUSes to exceed their field of competence and be accused of "political interference". The representatives of these NUSes were faced with the alternative of alienating either their members or the ISC. They felt they were fighting with their back against the wall. The NUSes from the third world, on the contrary, regarded the student-as-such clause as a manifestation of such a narrow-minded concept of society that they were little inclined to give in on this point unless the Western unions' support depended on it.

While in Nigeria participants had still felt that the ISC

could not exist without tolerance, the next conference was to be attended by some delegates who cared little whether the ISC continued to exist or not. Disintegration of the ISC on account of the student as such clause would, they felt, not be a loss, but perhaps even a gain. These delegations were determined to push the debate to extremes and raised the problem in a way so as to force the conference to discuss it. The presence of delegates of such mentality was due to the changes that had occurred in Latin America.

As we said in the previous chapter, it had been the Latin American delegates who had made the ISC politically conscious. Their first and foremost problem was the struggle against absolute dictatorship in most Latin American countries. However, it had also been these same NUSes who, in the first years of the ISC, had been most strongly opposed to the totalitarian ideas with which, in their opinion, the IUS identified itself. Their most important political aims were anti-dictatorship, anti-imperialism and anti-communism.

Since 1954 one Latin American dictatorship after another had been overthrown: in 1954 Guzman in Guatemala, in 1955 Peron in Argentina, in 1956 Somoza in Nicaragua, in 1957 Rajas in Colombia and in 1958 Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. This was what the Latin American student movement had lived for, but it was bitterly deceived. In most cases, the so-called anti-dictatorial parties, individuals or juntas who assumed power, proved totally deficient in dealing with the real problems of their countries, and in their concept of democracy. A second problem was that of the economic depression which had set in in the mid-fifties and which could only be ended by their most important market, the United States.

Failure in government of the originally left-wing opposition to the right-wing dictatorship strongly stimulated the extreme leftist groups which advocated a more radical policy. Identifying themselves with the freedom-fighters of Africa and Asia, they were convinced that only a radical revolution like that of Cuba in 1959, could solve their problems. In their opinion, Latin America was a proletarian continent

which could only be saved from disaster by radical Marxism-Leninism. This gave birth not to a Moscow-style communism, but to an indigenous Marxism-Leninism which later was to be known as Castroism.

It is a well-known fact that this movement rapidly achieved great influence in the universities. Prague fostered these developments and a large number of Latin Americans participated in the youth festivals. Promising participants (like Raúl Castro) were invited to IUS leadership training seminars where they were taught methods of exerting maximum influence. Profiting from dissension among christian democrats and left-wing democrats, they stood out because of their extreme dedication and often gained a disproportionate amount of influence in the NUSes. With little difficulty they obtained, as compensation for the many services rendered, places on delegations to international events and in some cases even offered to pay for the trip themselves, that is to say with the assistance of Prague. In this way they appeared on the official delegations to the various conferences.

It was these people who unexpectedly attended the 8th ISC as members of the Latin American delegations. They had not come to persuade but to cause the maximum amount of trouble for the ISC and, if possible, to destroy it.

XVII. FROM PEKING TO PERU

At the beginning of the previous chapter we explained the line which the IUS began to take after 1956, and also what would be its consequences for the development of the ISC.

As far as the IUS itself was concerned, this new policy marked a turning-point in its history. Whereas between 1953 and 1956 the IUS had been very reluctant to issue strongly worded statements as long as it was not clear which tendency would emerge supreme in Moscow, the IUS regained its self-confidence after Khrushchev's victory. The leaders had not been discouraged by the repercussions of the Hungarian events and their subsequent failure in Nigeria. They were convinced that in the long run things would go their way.

As a result, their tone towards the ISC NUSes from Western countries sharpened once more as living conditions in the West were painted in glaring colours and accounts of the happy life in the people's democracies regained their old glory.

Utmost attention was further paid to the problems of the third world and detailed accounts were produced contrasting the shocking conditions before independence and the tremendous progress afterwards.

When the fifth IUS Congress opened in Peking in September, 1958, there were few traces of internal weakness, so apparent in Prague two years earlier. The Executive report was written with the old fervour and had regained its self-confident tone. In Prague the Executive had tried to reduce harsh political statements to a minimum but now it once again set the tone of the discussion, declaring:

"the real division in the student movement internationally was not based so much on each union's international affiliations, but rather on its attitude toward the basic problems of our times. The latter are such things as peace, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the democratization of education, being the very principles on which

the IUS was founded." (153)

This line dominated the Congress from beginning to end. In Peking little or no attention was paid to the genuine student problems discussed in Prague. The debate on the Executive report lasted for five full days during which each delegate made his contribution to peace and anti-imperialism. Nor did the Peking Congress have any objections to demonstrations any longer. Although the number of participants had been reduced from 650 to approximately 250, ovations and cheering once again filled the conference hall. An audience of some 200 Chinese provided an appropriate sounding-board.

The final resolution book might create the impression of reflecting the opinion of an impressive list of participants from seventy countries, but as usual only IUS members had been able to vote and the observers had had no responsibility for the wording. Membership had increased by four NUSes and another four had applied for associate status. (155) Three NUSes, however, had decided to withdraw as associate members (156), thus leaving a total of 19 member NUSes and 5 NUSes participating as associate members.

In addition, NUS status was granted to four minority groups (157) as well as to nine overseas student organizations. (These are organizations of overseas students of one nationality or region. Since these organizations were not located in their own country, the ISC generally granted them a special status on the condition that they were representative). In accordance with IUS criteria, this brought membership to a total of 35 NUSes.

It is worth while mentioning that in Peking an observer of the Yugoslav NUS was present again for the first time. Though far from satisfied with the way in which the IUS had glossed over past offences, he felt his presence was necessary for the sake of the international student movement. However, his presence was not welcomed very enthusiastically. The Chinese representatives had been instructed to ignore the Yugoslavs completely. Whereas they ensured an appropriate ovation after every intervention, including those of the most committed ISC NUS, there was total silence after the Yugo-

slav speech. This attitude of the hosts made it difficult for the Eastern Europeans to take a friendly approach towards the Yugoslavs, but in private talks they expressed their happiness at the Yugoslavs' decision to return after nine years' absence, if only as an observer.

The welcome given to the Hungarian delegation was also remarkable. At the time of the revolution the Hungarian NUS had been dissolved and replaced by a new organization as soon as order was restored. The official Hungarian intervention made no mention of November 1956, but the Italian observer referred to it in connection with a resolution on imperialism. A brief heated discussion broke out. The Hungarian representative having disclosed the fascist plots, the other Eastern European NUSes took the floor and cut off further discussion by reproaching the Italians on the grounds that they were insufficiently interested in imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Clearly, however, many speakers had the same reservations as the observer NUSes concerning the Hungarian declarations.

Thus, after these few skirmishes, Hungary was not mentioned any further. But no opportunity was lost to attack imperialism where non-communists were responsible. The commissions which started after five days were dominated by the same subject. And yet, this congress differed from the previous ones. It had normally been the procedure that a motion was simply praised and then adopted unamended, but this time there were several real debates. We should bear in mind that there were now more shades of opinion within the communist bloc and resolutions had to be worded so as to be acceptable both to the Poles and to the Chinese. The non-communist participants regarded this discussion as an internal matter of the leading group within the IUS. To them it made little difference whether the final resolution attacked colonialism on a dogmatic or revisionist line. As long as the debate did not exceed these boundaries, they had no wish to see the IUS divided on such shades of opinion.

In Peking the IUS attitude towards the ISC also differed considerably from its approach in Prague. The conciliatory

tone had given way to outright rejection of the "imperialist instrument", COSEC, and the NUSes from imperialist countries. It did not preclude cooperation with these organizations, but its very willingness to cooperate should be seen already as a concession. Joint initiatives could only be taken in the field where the IUS felt each NUS had a responsibility: peace, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Several observers repeatedly pointed out that these questions fell outside their NUSes' sphere of influence and that therefore such proposals were better not made. Further, they made it clear that even if the majority of the ISC wished to include these questions on the agenda of the conference and in the COSEC programme, the IUS concept of peace, etc. would never be acceptable to the ISC. Resolutions and interventions proved that the IUS still glossed over the fact that the West did not have a monopoly of imperialism and other injustices, but that they were the phenomena of all expansionist systems. The IUS formulation of the resolution on nuclear armament was just one more illustration. This resolution praised the Soviet Union's noble gesture in stopping atom bomb tests and stated:

"Half a year ago the Soviet Union decided unilaterally to stop the tests of all atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. We all desired that the other countries possessing atomic weapons would immediately do the same. However, the Governments of the USA and Britain still continue nuclear tests against the will of all peoples." (158)

IUS publications denounced the attitude of the USA and Britain, but suddenly spoke no more of the splendid Soviet example when, ten days after the adoption of this resolution, the Soviet Union resumed its tests...

Its sharp attacks on COSEC and certain ISC NUSes did not mean that the IUS was losing interest in the ISC NUSes from the third world. In addition to the usual proposals for joint activities in the interest of peace, etc., the Congress carried an Uruguayan motion on the organization of a round table conference of national student organizations for the

discussion of principles and possibilities of mutual cooperation. (159)

The 8th ISC was held in La Cantuta, Peru in February 1959. In the previous chapters has been indicated that this ISC would not develop smoothly and in fact what was a peaceful assembly in Nigeria became in Peru something more akin to a game of rugby.

First, the climate in the universities of the host country was not particularly conducive to a stable conference. Batista, the hated dictator of Cuba, had been overthrown by Castro's revolutionary movements shortly before the conference, and the Cuban NUS had played a considerable role in it. Firmly supported by ISC and IUS the President of the Cuban NUS, Echeverria, had joined the fight against the Batista regime and was eventually shot in front of Batista's headquarters. (160) Many NUSes who had known him and who remembered his impassioned plea at the previous ISC for the restoration of Cuban democracy, were deeply moved by his death.

The victory of the anti-Batista movement caused a wave of enthusiasm throughout the Latin American student movement and radical tendencies rapidly gained influence. In Peru they had obtained a majority in three of the eight universities and had formed an opposition to the NUS which continued to represent the other five universities.

Both organizations now claimed the right to a seat in the ISC and to be host of this conference. The discovery of a bomb among the wires of the translation equipment just before the opening was sufficient proof of the hostile relations between these two organizations. Groups of radicals, armed with bicycle chains, marched around and through the building at the time of the debate on the status of the Peruvian NUS. The posting of military with machine-guns around the building did not exactly lead to a relaxed atmosphere in the hall.

The conference was attended by representatives of 66 NUSes, a new record. But one should remember that amongst them were for the first time representatives with a conscious anti-ISC mentality. In close contact with the IUS delegation,

they knew clearly what their task was. They repeatedly took the floor and stated their demands without thought of compromise, a move which forced the ISC to either reject or endorse their standpoints. Implying that those who did not support them automatically attacked them, they compelled NUSes, who would otherwise have been willing to compromise, to make a choice. Thus they succeeded in carrying along with them a group of some 20 NUSes. There is no doubt that this group was sincere in the positions it took. But they had themselves passed the point of no return when normally agreement would still have been possible. The conference became more of a sounding-board for opinions on different subjects than a joint search for a common policy. Dialogue turned into confrontation.

The main lines of attack were the student-as-such clause and relations with the IUS, or rather world student unity.

The first indications of what was to come emerged when COSEC was reproached for not having given a travel grant to FEANF, the organization of African students in France. (161) COSEC replied that in accordance with the resolutions of the Nigerian ISC, FEANF did not qualify as an NUS, having no base or membership in the country of origin, but operating from France as an organization of foreign students. The North Africans argued that FEANF was not to blame for the fact that no sufficient higher education existed in that part of Africa and that these unfortunate circumstances could not deprive it of the rights of an NUS. This opinion was not shared by the majority of the conference since recognition of FEANF as an NUS would imply that each group of foreign students of one nationality - Hungarian students in England, Libyan students in America, etc. - could form an NUS with the consequent rights to seats and travel grants. The proposal to recognize FEANF as an NUS and give it a travel grant was, therefore, rejected by 23 votes to 25 and 2 abstentions. At a later stage the conference decided however to grant similar groups fraternal observer status and guarantee them travel grants. It was decided unanimously to apply

this rule for the first time to FEANF's case and a travel grant was sent by cable. When after a few days the FEANF representative arrived, he expressed his gratitude to the ISC for its assistance and then declared that FEANF's anti-imperialist principles made cooperation with imperialist-controlled COSEC impossible. But he would use the opportunity to write a report on the ISC and COSEC for presentation to the IUS as a FEANF contribution to discussion about the ISC within the IUS... (162)

This discussion proved already that the legalist views of the West were bound to clash with the more politically oriented mentality of the third world. The one group wished to maintain adequate guarantees for a representative conference, the other wanted a conference which dealt with the problems they were facing. The debate on relations with the IUS and unity made this even more clear. (163) The Supervision Committee was criticized for not having accepted the invitation to attend the IUS Congress. SUPCOM based its decision on the resolutions of the ISC in Nigeria, but many NUSes argued that it had not had the interests of unity at heart. After a long debate on whether SUPCOM could give instructions to COSEC that differed from the ISC decisions, the conference decided by 32 votes to 17 with 5 abstentions that it had no right to do so. But this did not settle the future mandate to be given to COSEC concerning the IUS. The commission on the Bases of Cooperation discussed this question at great length in connection with the open letter of the IUS. (164) In this letter sent to all delegations on the eve of the conference, the IUS again made a plea for unity, based on the struggle for peace, the eradication of colonialism, for full national independence, for democratization of education and the improvement of study and living conditions of students. The IUS saw two possibilities: cooperation or continued division and on the basis of many arguments it opted for the former. Once again several proposals were made, varying in nature from the purely political to the joint organization of a cultural festival. The conference was asked to mandate COSEC, SUPCOM or a special commission to negotiate with the IUS.

During the debate opinions with regard to this letter varied. It is not necessary to repeat the standpoints here in full. Briefly, the student-as-such group wanted intensified cooperation with Eastern European NUSes, but did not in any way feel like contributing to the greater glory of the IUS machinery which it regarded as partisan and subservient to one particular ideology. The other group felt that this attitude had a negative effect on world student unity and they did not want to ignore the IUS purely and simply because it was partisan. There was no need for cooperation with the IUS in its entire programme, but only in those fields where communists and non-communists thought alike. COSEC should therefore make concrete proposals at the forthcoming IUS congress.

This met with firm opposition from the student-as-such group which maintained that the ISC and IUS were two dissimilar institutions: the one a body for deliberations and the other a movement. No one but the ISC itself could negotiate on behalf of the ISC. To give COSEC a mandate for negotiations was to them completely unacceptable, since they and previous ISCs regarded COSEC as a body that acted for them but not on their behalf. SUPCOM's sole function was to keep COSEC within the boundaries of its mandate, and this committee could not act on behalf of the ISC either. The ISC itself was evidence enough that NUSes with totally different backgrounds could together agree upon a policy and they saw no reason why the communist NUSes were unwilling to cooperate within an ISC which gathered no less than 46 more NUSes than the IUS. The way in which the Eastern European NUSes had refused to receive an international student delegation, agreed upon by the ISC in Nigeria, gave little reason to believe that they really wished to be informed about the ISC. (165) It was unacceptable and wrong in principle to support their partisan organization at the back and call of communism in return for this blunt rebuff.

It is only natural that this standpoint proved unacceptable to those who wanted to enhance the prestige of the IUS. But to their anger, they were defeated in commission by 20

votes to 28 with 5 abstentions. 23 NUSes in all left the hall and deliberated for four hours. Then they asked the Algerian President to negotiate on their behalf with those who had remained. This President, Ait Chalaal, was representative of those convinced supporters of unity who were not out to lead the ISC into an unsurmountable deadlock. The 23 NUSes, he said, would return on the condition that the conference agreed to the holding of a round table conference to which COSEC was to invite all known student organizations. For practical reasons, this conference should take place on the eve of the 9th ISC in 1960, but participation in the round table should not necessarily imply participation in the 9th ISC. Nor should this project be regarded as an activity within the framework of the International Student Conference. The commission adopted this proposal after detailed discussions on the usefulness and possibilities of this round table. As a result, the resolution not to enter into direct cooperation with the IUS was carried in plenary session with 10 votes against and 5 abstentions. In continuation, the RTC proposal was put to a vote and accepted with 7 votes against and 3 abstentions. (166)

This hard-won agreement completely disappeared, however, when the most important resolution, that on Scope of Cooperation, was tabled. The issue was whether the ISC should once again decide to limit its activities to problems affecting the student-as-such. The pros and cons on this question have been discussed earlier on. The issue was not easy to resolve because it was a confrontation of two completely different concepts of the relationship between student and society. In the eyes of the student-as-such group, the student was someone preparing for a position in which he could better serve society than if he had not studied. The other group saw the student as someone who because of his special position, had a heavy responsibility towards the society of which he forms a part.

The NUSes who supported the student-as-such view, realized that it would be easy to change their opinion for the sake of unity within the ISC, but that this stand would

not be understood, let alone approved, by their members. They argued that the ISC was a student conference where students went to discuss student interests. If thousands of issues were to be tabled which affect the student not as student but as citizen, the ISC would have a never-ending agenda:

"Why not instead have countries send their representatives to massive forums to discuss anything, which affects anyone in any role whatsoever? NUSes could easily send students to discuss any problem under the sun, but that was the very reason the ISC confined itself within limits, without taking up issues which affect students as they affect anyone else". (167)

The others maintained that with this concept the ISC could ignore any problem with which students in a certain country concerned themselves because of their responsibility towards society. This sense of responsibility was not a hobby or the product of meddlesomeness, but a task the student could not shirk.

A third group fully shared this opinion but also understood the difficulties the student-as-such NUSes would have with their membership, were they to change position. It argued that the ISC had proved in the past and also now to feel responsible for the world situation and that no one could state that the ISC had not fought strongly against imperialism and colonialism. This had proved possible, though by means of a strange device, within the limits of the student-as-such clause which, therefore, need not necessarily be abandoned. After a long discussion in the plenary, the student-as-such clause was maintained by 27 votes to 20 with 1 abstention. (168)

For a moment the problem arose again in connection with the resolution on peace and nuclear testing and it was difficult to argue that these questions fell within the boundaries of the student-as-such clause. Now the middle group leant towards the other side, declaring that these problems were such that the ISC could not ignore them. Consequently the resolution was carried by 35 votes against

16, with 8 abstentions. (169)

Examining the votes, it hardly need to be said that for many delegations this ISC was a disappointment, and no programme, however excellent, could change this feeling. The inspiring feeling generated by the world student parliament had given way to profound disillusionment with the other party's implacability. This ISC might bring back memories of the Ceylon arena, but it could not be followed by a paradise such as Nigeria. There had been no solution to the problems, no consensus and the participants left with the conviction that the next ISC would again be one where the majority would triumph.

XVIII. THE 1960 ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

During the months following the Peru ISC discussions among the various NUSes on world student unity were so intense that we must deal with this question at greater length. As we know, the question of a round table conference (RTC) of all student organizations in the world was first raised in Peking and in Peru the ISC had approved this idea. However, strangely enough the IUS had made no mention of this initiative in its open letter (170) to the participants in the Peru ISC, whereas previous open letters had repeatedly spoken of Conferences of Cooperation. In order to understand this change in the IUS's attitude towards the ISC, we should briefly recall how their relationship developed.

Having neglected the ISC completely at the time of its foundation and referring to it only in passing as "splitters of the student movement", the IUS had made, in the first years of the ISC's existence, a number of attempts to bring the dissident NUSes back into the IUS. In speaking of unity in those years, the IUS meant unity of structure, i. e. return to the IUS. But as the IUS's reputation diminished and the ISC grew in membership and importance, the IUS secretariat changed its policy. Realizing that the ISC could no longer be ignored as active organ of the international student movement, IUS representatives first attended its conference in Istanbul, in 1954. One year later, in Birmingham, the IUS was ready to admit that unity could not be realized within the IUS, but not within the ISC either, it said. It simultaneously abandoned the idea of organic unity, since fusion of the two structures into one new student organization did not appeal to it in the least. Leaving aside the question of whether the ISC NUSes would have been prepared to compromise on the principle of democratic structure for the sake of some Eastern European NUSes, acting as militant minority within a new superstructure was not a pleasant prospect for the IUS. In

accordance with the communist doctrine that an international organization should only be supported if taking the right line or if non-participation would entail too great disadvantages, the IUS decided to abandon the idea of fusion.

Dissolution of the IUS was contrary to the interests of the international communist movement and was, as such, out of the question. As soon as the ISC had surpassed the IUS in importance, the meaning of the word unity changed. Now the IUS understood it as cooperation between equal partners for the achievement of certain aims (unity of action). It proposed to fight against certain political injustices and for the realization of certain political ideals. "Students, unite! For peace and friendship, against imperialism and colonialism". It repeatedly pointed out that both ISC and IUS were concerned with developments in Algeria, Cuba, South Africa, etc. Joint action would therefore only be profitable. But in proposing to take joint action on political issues, the IUS knew that the students-as-such clause made it impossible for the ISC to accept. Although the final result was the same, ISC actions were based on a completely different principle. And the IUS knew that the ISC would not be prepared to abandon this standpoint for the total political involvement into which the IUS had gone. Knowing that the ISC would not accept, it could constantly force the ISC to justify its refusal. If these explanations were not satisfactory, it was easy to brand the ISC as an organization which regarded these problems as not sufficiently important for joint action with the IUS.

The IUS proposals for practical cooperation were different matter. Here the IUS was at first interested in ISC acceptance of these proposals which would be of tremendous political importance. It would confirm the impression that the student world also was divided into "two camps". Joint action by these "two camps" would place the IUS on a footing of equality, something it badly needed around 1956.

However, the ISC could not accept being branded as an organization from another camp and did not consider itself to be a Western counterpart

of the IUS. It was a structure which wished to respect every tendency among the NUSes and not a political movement for the promotion of a certain political and ideological concept. If the IUS was looking for partners, it had better contact the International Union of Socialist Youth (I.U.S.Y.), the World Liberal Student Organization or similar structures, but not this loose framework of NUSes, so essentially different from the IUS.

This did not mean that the ISC did not want to cooperate with communists; the contrary was true. But this cooperation should not be to the greater glory of a superorganization, subordinating all interests to that of communism. If communist NUSes could not be expected to join the ISC, cooperation should be established by means of bilateral contacts.

When, however, after 1956 the IUS began to recover lost ground, it no longer needed cooperation with the ISC for its prestige. International developments helped the NUSes in which the IUS was interested to find their way to Prague anyhow. But there was no reason why it should not continue to make proposals as long as the ISC's reaction remained negative.

In Ceylon (1956), however, the IUS made no attempt to raise the proposal for cooperation in the commission. In Nigeria (1957) the IUS was not interested enough in cooperation to let its representative stay at the conference. In Peru (1958) it attended with a strong delegation but to direct the delegations hostile to the ISC rather than to induce the ISC to accept cooperation. Officially, it sent open letters to each ISC, but accompanied by such a flow of criticism on the imperialist forces within COSEC and the ISC that there is reason to doubt whether the IUS really wanted to work with such a reactionary clique.

Anyway the ISC in Peru endorsed the proposal for the organization of a round table conference (RTC) moved by Uruguay in Peking. At last, after ten years, the moment would come when all national student organizations from all parts of the world would gather outside the framework of IUS and ISC.

It is difficult to ascertain today whether this ISC decision came as a surprise for the IUS. The RTC was not mentioned in the IUS report on the Peru Conference, which was published in "World Student News". (171)

In June 1959 the IUS secretariat sent an open letter (172) to all National Unions which had participated in Peru four months earlier. It strongly attacked COSEC and stated that the IUS would accept any proposal for the realization of unity provided it contributed to peace and struggle against imperialism, etc. However, not a word was said about the RTC.

Prague gave no sign of being aware of this proposal until the beginning of August. The World Youth Festival in Vienna discussed the idea of an RTC and reached the following conclusion: (173)

"In the opinion of the great majority of those present the proposal of the Uruguayan NUS, made at the 5th IUS Congress in Peking, to call a round table conference open to all national student organizations, seemed a good way of furthering international cooperation. ISC/COSEC's attempts to seize the initiative by calling such a gathering just prior to the next ISC would not promote cooperation and might on the contrary do it more harm. There was general agreement, that cooperation should be specific and should find its expressions through such forms of action as international festivals, student campaigns against French-West German atomic weapon testing in the Sahara, solidarity months with students fighting against colonialism, a week of solidarity with students of Latin America fighting against dictatorship, fortnightly campaigns for student unity and cooperation."

These words revealed for the first time that the IUS was not absolutely happy with the ISC's acceptance of the RTC proposal. It not even wished to regard the RTC as a "Campaign for student unity and cooperation", but returned to its proposals for political cooperation.

When the IUS organized a large international student

peace conference in Prague on the occasion of the 17th November commemorations, it once more glossed over the ISC's support to the Uruguayan proposal, and Pelikan declared:

"As you know the Peking Congress upheld the proposal of the Uruguayan NUS calling for the convocation of an RTC which would be open to all member organizations of the IUS as well as ISC/COSEC. We can state with pleasure that many organizations have supported this idea as shown especially by the resolution of the 3rd LASC recently concluded . . ." (174)

The ISC's support was not mentioned.

It was not until 23rd February, 1960 that the IUS Executive formulated its position towards the RTC. Unfortunately it was negative. In another open letter (175) to all NUSes it stated always to have been in favour of an RTC, provided it be organized outside the framework of ISC and IUS. An RTC as supported by the ISC resolution could not be fully independent since COSEC had been mandated to send invitations. For an RTC as the IUS envisaged, an International Preparatory Committee would have to be formed, composed of IUS members and NUSes participating in the ISC.

This statement caused much confusion among the various NUSes, first, because it added new elements to the Peking resolution (176) and second, because it read into the Peru resolution (177) an intention which this resolution explicitly denied. In Peru the ISC had expressly stated that the RTC could not be an ISC project and that participation could never be seen as participation in an ISC event. That COSEC had been asked to provide an opportunity for the RTC to be held on the eve of the 9th ISC, was a practical decision to cut down travel expenses. COSEC had been mandated to invite all national student organizations and that was all it was to do. Now the IUS suddenly maintained that these arrangements precluded a neutral RTC.

After the Polish NUS Congress in March 1960, the IUS position was further explained at a meeting of some 20 NUSes

who had attended the congress as observers. This meeting resulted in the creation of a commission of three NUSes (Poland, Italy, North Africa) which was to consult the IUS, COSEC and several NUSes on the holding of a neutral RTC. (178) Meanwhile the ISC Supervision Committee had decided in October to accept the invitation of the Swiss NUS to hold the 9th ISC in Switzerland. At the request of COSEC, the Swiss NUS had then agreed also to host the RTC in accordance with the Peru resolution.

In conformity with the same resolution, COSEC sent in mid-April invitations to all known student organizations, adding that any organization that had been omitted would automatically receive an invitation as soon as the organization concerned or another organization informed COSEC. The invitation further stated that the RTC itself would decide what subjects it wished to discuss. (179)

In order to prevent the RTC and the activities of the Commission of Three from overlapping, the Swiss contacted this Commission and emphasized that the RTC would be held completely outside the framework of the two international structures. It further proposed to make arrangements jointly so as to guarantee a maximum degree of success. Every national student organization, without exception, was to be invited and COSEC and IUS would be present as observers. When the RTC opened, the Swiss NUS and the Commission of Three would regard their task as completed and let the RTC itself decide how and about what it wished to discuss. (180)

Meanwhile the Commission of Three had consulted COSEC and IUS on the holding of a "neutral" RTC. In Leiden the Commission was told that COSEC had been mandated to support any initiative conform to the principles of the ISC resolution. COSEC wished to emphasize, however, that the RTC to be held in the summer in Switzerland was neutral in all respects and was a project outside the framework of the ISC. COSEC's only task in fulfilment of its mandate was to ensure that all who wanted could attend. (181)

The IUS also supported the idea of a neutral RTC, but suddenly added that participation should be open only to IUS

members and ISC participants. The IUS declared that the RTC's purpose should be to discuss the split in the international student movement. Only NUSes directly involved had the right to discuss their rapprochement. (182) This IUS concept of the RTC meant exclusion of several organizations from the deliberations; first, those organizations who for one reason or another had never attended ISC or IUS meetings, and second the organizations founded recently (e.g. the new Egyptian and Indian NUSes as well as the East African Students Convention).

In order to reconcile these different viewpoints the Commission of Three invited the Swiss NUS, IUS, COSEC and a representative of the ISC Supervision Committee to meet in Tunis in the beginning of May. As a result of these talks, the Swiss NUS made a new proposal (183) offering to make all arrangements up to the opening of the RTC, assisted by an International Preparatory Committee, representative of the different tendencies in the international student movement (Poland, Italy, North Africa, Soviet Union, USA, Venezuela and Indonesia). The RTC would be open to any organization who expressed the wish to attend. The Commission of Three then asked the Swiss NUS for clarification on three points which were not quite clear to it:

1. Was this RTC identical to the one mentioned in the Peru resolution?
2. Would the Swiss NUS organize the RTC for which COSEC had sent out invitations?
3. Who would be invited? (184)

The Swiss NUS replied that this was not the same RTC as the one for which COSEC had sent out invitations. It informed that COSEC considered itself relieved of its responsibility since it felt that the Swiss initiative was not in contradiction with the Peru resolution. As to invitations, it wanted to wait for the conference of European NUSes where the Swiss hoped to have final discussions with COSEC and the IUS on this matter. (184)

This European Meeting was held in the middle of May 1960 in Warsaw and was attended by 17 of the European

NUSes. To the surprise of many, Pelikan announced at this meeting that no IUS NUS would attend the RTC. This RTC was not neutral, he argued, because COSEC had sent the invitations. He did not mention the Swiss proposal for the creation of an IPC. (185)

Those who suspected that the IUS president had no power to decide on participation in the RTC on behalf of the IUS NUSes, were proved wrong. At the beginning of June, the IUS secretariat repeated its standpoint in an official statement (186), distributed to all NUSes.

It remained a mystery how this statement could be reconciled with the letter or spirit of the Peking resolution.

On 22nd June the Soviet NUS sent an open letter (187) announcing that it would be unable to participate in the RTC:

"By its activities after the ISC Conference in Peru, COSEC not only confirmed the partisan nature of resolution 14 adopted by the ISC, but also has done everything to accentuate the negative content of this wrong decision, to exploit it for frustrating international consultations on the ways and means of arranging a real RTC and to raise new obstacles to implementing the useful initiative of the NUS of Uruguay. It is impossible therefore to take in earnest the statement of COSEC in the letter of May 14th that the Conference, which will be held in Switzerland between August 17th and 19th is neutral of any preconceived policy and independent of any international structure. The purpose of such statements is to confuse the issue and mislead the students, to use their sincere strive for unity for unseemly ends. Now all see, know and call things by their names - the RTC in Switzerland is a COSEC conference, a product of one-sided political actions, is a partisan measure designed to divide and not to unite the student movement."

The Soviet NUS went on to say that it could only support an RTC prepared by an IPC, ignoring the Swiss proposal calling for such a committee.

On 1st July the Canadian NUS accepted the challenge and replied to the Soviet Union in an open letter (188), declaring that it was deeply shocked by this gross denial of the sincerity of the ISC resolution. By an overwhelming majority the ISC had adopted this resolution, guaranteeing a neutral and impartial RTC:

"Is a RTC, convened according to the formal desire of some 50 countries partisan? This RTC will be what its participants want it to be. They will be the sole authority to determine whatever regulations there should be with regard to representativity, agenda, etc. By your abstention you are refusing to use an instrument which has been put at your disposition to further world cooperation. It is very well for you to say off-hand that "the Conference cannot promote world unity", but after so many pious declarations in favour of unity you are refusing to use the first concrete proposal to be implemented in years. This can be your RTC as well as ours, or the French's, or everyone's. If you refuse to come, you must be prepared to accept responsibility for retarding world student unity."

Then the Canadian NUS dealt with the fact that absence of an IPC was used as a means to reject the RTC.

"A suggestion was made by a number of student organizations that a RTC should be organized by an IPC. This is indeed a valid suggestion. However it was felt by the students that a RTC could be convened sooner and with full guarantees of neutrality and independence, without necessarily taking these preliminary steps. This suggestion was proposed by the 3rd LASC and further discussed by a number of meetings, but it is only since the RTC is being organized and since the cooperation towards its success is mounting from all corners of the world, it is only since what was thought to be a dream is becoming a reality, that this suggestions has been made an essential policy matter, suddenly important enough to justify a boycott of the RTC. One

positive step has been taken towards world cooperation. It is by no means the perfect nor the ultimate step. It is simply the offering by Switzerland, on the initiative of some 50 NUSes, of a place for all to meet. You have rejected this opportunity. "

In continuation the Canadian NUS interpreted the feelings of many other NUSes, asking whether the Soviet NUS was sincere in its desire for unity.

The Swiss NUS further explained its intentions in a last open letter (189), but the IUS machinery was functioning already and one after another the communist NUSes announced they would not participate. (190)

Non-participation of one of the most important tendencies destroyed one of the essential purposes of the RTC. The NUSes who in Peru had insisted on resolution 14, now saw the IUS attributing it to the "cold war advocates" and began to have second thoughts about participating. Since only ISC NUSes would be present and the genuine atmosphere of an RTC was lacking, their presence would imply that they considered such a meeting to be useful all the same.

Thus 54 national student organizations, among whom were 49 NUSes, finally came to Basel to participate in an RTC which was no longer a real RTC. Comparing this figure with the participation in the 9th ISC in Klosters a few days later, one sees that 24 NUSes had decided not to participate (10 African, 4 Latin American, 5 European and 5 Asian unions).

At the very outset the conference concluded that only one subject could be discussed: how to ensure wider representation in the future. The Latin Americans supported the idea of an IPC which was representative of the main tendencies. But not all wanted to take this as the sole possibility, since the Swiss proposal for the creation of such an IPC had failed. The English NUS felt that it might perhaps be better if two NUSes, England and the Soviet Union, jointly tried to convene an RTC, thus avoiding the difficulties of forming a representative IPC.

After two days of discussion the RTC decided not to opt for any specific course. It merely called upon the ISC and

IUS secretariats to support any initiative which might result in a RTC outside the framework of the existing structures and which was open to all national student organizations. This recommendation was carried unanimously and the participants dispersed to meet the next day in Klosters. (191)

XIX. THE NINTH ISC

The day following the RTC in Basel the ninth International Student Conference assembled in Klosters. (192) Whatever the feelings of the different NUSes on their return from Peru, interest in the ISC continued to grow. The number of participating NUSes had increased to 73, 22 from the America's, 20 from Afro-Arab countries, 11 from Asia and Australasia and 20 from Europe. But the fact that participation had increased so much far from eased the work of the Conference. Several controversial issues had not been solved at the Peru conference and these same problems were now about to be raised again. But in contrast to the Peru Conference, every NUS had come prepared for this discussion. They had been able to consider at home how far they could go and what price they were ready to pay should they prove unable to get their views adopted.

Meanwhile the change in the political pattern of the ISC had continued. Encouraged by Castro's victory, the communist sympathizing student movement had spread through Latin America like a raging fire and gained control over approximately 50 per cent of the NUSes.

One can imagine that these NUSes were not interested in the ISC, since they had a natural leaning towards the IUS. Conscious of this fact, these NUSes were nevertheless present in Klosters; in the first place because their Unions still participated in the work of the ISC and because they could not from one day to another convince their members that the ISC was not important, but in the second place because the task they had begun in Peru stood a better chance of success in Klosters. The main problem which confronted the ISC in Klosters centred on the fact that it would be easy to foster disagreements which might lead either to a split or bitter disillusion. They therefore attended in a body but not with the ISC's welfare at heart.

In the meantime conflicts in Africa between French- and

English-speaking NUSes had grown worse. At the second Pan-African Student Conference the former had left the hall and relations had been strained ever since. The gap that had grown between the two groups ran more or less parallel to the tension among head of States, divided into the Casa-blanca and Monrovia group, with the difference that on the student level the division coincided almost 100 per cent with the language groupings. The English-speaking Africans attached primary importance to university matters although strongly active in politics also, whereas the French-speaking Africans generally regarded politics as the main reason of their existence and university activities as less important. (193) Anyway, the English-speaking NUSes felt at home in the ISC and were willing to work for compromises acceptable to the largest possible number of NUSes. They had confidence in the methods of the ISC and the way in which it arrived at decisions. The French group, on the contrary, was more attracted by the two camps theory offering scope for greater political activity. This theory allowed them to play the role of the neutral third force, keeping at a certain distance from the two international structures and acting as mediator.

In this line they were encouraged by the fact that in Europe the French NUS was similarly inclined. When in 1956 the leftist minority centered in Paris had taken control, this NUS had gradually taken a more radical line. Suspension by the French government of its subsidy in 1960 when the NUS demonstrated for negotiations between the French government and the Algerian National Liberation Front and for cessation of the war in Algeria, set the final seal on their policy. Relations with the Algerian NUS severed by the latter after French opposition in Ceylon, were resumed. Government opposition, such as the creation of a counter organization, opened the way for the French NUS to become a political pressure group. The provincial universities were not completely happy with this situation, but so important were the NUS's social activities that the political statements of the Paris group were accepted. This new line had strengthened relations with the French-speaking NUSes in Africa.

But since the latter were inclined to keep a certain distance from the ISC, the French NUS was beginning to find it difficult to continue to support the ISC unconditionally. The IUS assertion that the ISC was dominated by Anglo-Saxons, began to sound attractive to Paris also. The two camp theory would enable the French NUS to play a new role, and ensure the French Africans' support. These considerations plus the fact that an increasing number of communist students held high functions began to exert a considerable influence on the policy of the French NUS. Then the French example began to have its effect on several other Latin NUSes in Europe. There the two camp theory also began to find acceptance, not because they thought this theory was completely correct, but since its non-conformity offered more creative possibilities.

This had led to a situation in which the Latin American vanguard could count upon the support of an increasing number of NUSes who began to keep at a distance from the ISC and take up the attractive option of membership of the neutral third group. Constant identification of the ISC as a Western counterpart to the IUS began to increase this approach.

From the very outset the Latin American pro-communist group went into the attack and succeeded in keeping the Conference occupied for two days and two nights with an article by article discussion of the standing orders. Uruguay argued that a steering committee could only be elected if one knew under what standing orders the agenda would be discussed. When the Conference was finally willing to review the standing orders, an endless debate ensued which resulted in the nomination of a committee which was to combine the Spanish, French and English debating systems into one harmonious whole. Since there was no steering committee to provide work, the conference could not proceed.

When at last the standing orders committee returned without having reached an agreement, the discussion was continued in the plenary. Then the argument was advanced

that the Credentials Committee first had to decide upon the voting rights of each delegation before a steering committee could be elected. But this attempt at obstruction was all too transparent and did not receive the backing of the conference. Consequently a steering committee was elected by those NUSes recognized as such by the Peru ISC. The discussions on credentials was drawn out until the evening of 26th August so that it was only after six days of discussion on how, what and by whom, that the ISC could start working in commissions. One only needs to read the minutes of these six days - they take up half of the minutes of all plenary sessions - to understand that this obstruction did not improve the climate. The Latin American bloc, led by Uruguay and Argentina, who were playing into each other's hands, indignantly opposed any attempt to begin the real conference proceedings.

Of course, everyone had to admit that a discussion on credentials was essential to know whether an organization had the right to be accepted as an NUS. This discussion was in fact a discussion of the ISC's representativity itself. The ISC would lose tremendously in value if this matter were neglected.

It was, therefore, essential to devote a great deal of time to the credentials of South Vietnam (194) and South Korea (195), for instance. The former organization did not wish to admit communists and had introduced a very strict ballot system, whereas the Korean organization was closed to students who belonged to a political party. This clause had been inserted in their constitution because of unpleasant experience with student supporters of the Syngman Rhee government. Members of the Korean organization were expected to adhere to the principles of the April revolution which had caused the downfall of Syngman Rhee and was unsympathetic to the existing political parties. After a long debate it was decided not to give voting rights to the South Vietnamese pending a RIC inquiry. The Korean delegation, however, was granted NUS status since the exclusion clause affected few students and only those who had actively supported the previous regime. Although many delegates

opposed the principle, the conference's majority felt that legalism would be incorrect in this particular case.

The Conference discussed another ten dubious cases in a similar way, but here again obstruction was practised. Uruguay objected to the granting of NUS status to Basutoland, since it had no more than 180 students at its newly created university. (196) It was indispensable, it felt, to introduce a criterion of number to avoid affiliation of minute NUSes. This caused strong opposition, since it was not the fault of the Basutoland students that a university had not been founded until recently. Though convinced of the representativity of the Indian NUS, Argentina wished to know on what the Credentials Committee had based its decision (197), etc. Because the discussion was lengthened by such questions, the Conference finally had to be prolonged for two days.

When the Conference resolved into commissions after six days of plenary session, the climate had not improved in the least. In the most important commission, that on Principles of Cooperation, it was suggested that the formulation of these principles should be postponed and preceded by a free discussion on the role of a National Union in society. Although it had not been the intention originally to discuss this subject at great length, it was quite important to hear the different NUSes' views on this matter. It was significant that most NUSes who had adhered to the student-as-such clause in Peru, had changed their standpoint since. In most cases their constitution had been modified and a clause on the student's role in society added. (198) It was argued that an NUS also had the duty to defend the respect for fundamental human rights and not to remain indifferent to their violation by anyone.

This modification of the position of many NUSes illustrates how international cooperation influenced the character of many NUSes. Confrontation with other NUSes broadened the representatives' viewpoints and placed the problems and duties of their own unions in a different perspective. At their respective Congresses it had taken much discussion before they could persuade their membership, but one of

the strongest arguments had been that within the ISC it had proved possible to achieve results by moral and material support. They realized how successfully world public opinion could exert pressure on situations such as those in Algeria, Cuba, the Southern States of the USA, so that the NUS's political activity did have its effects. The international student movement did offer real possibilities and it was the responsibility of every NUS to use these opportunities or stand aloof. They could, therefore, support expansion of the ISC's basis with conviction.

Consequently the Klosters conference abandoned the students-as-such clause and acknowledged that the ISC owed its existence to the student's responsibility towards society. As long as in this society situations continued to exist where injustice was perpetrated under a cloak of legality, the students had the duty to make their own contribution towards the eradication of this evil. The ISC therefore put forward as its aims, apart from the defense of typical student interests, the fight against all forms of oppression which violated the fundamental rights of man. Apart from solidarity with those suffering from imperialism, colonialism, racism, totalitarianism and dictatorship, the ISC could also fight against social injustice by organizing leadership training seminars, scholarship programmes, assistance for overseas students, illiteracy campaigns and work camps. Confining these activities in the past to the student-as-such clause had sometimes required strange and tortuous arguments, but now the way was clear for a sound and dynamic ISC, meeting the demands made upon it by the majority of the students.

This conflict, on which feelings had run so high in Peru, having proved no longer a subject of dispute, the question of relations with the IUS was raised, on which profound differences of opinion continued to exist. The debate centred on the question of how unity could be realized. The NUSes who had decided not to participate in the RTC in Basel, now advanced their demands. They felt that the ISC should support the idea of an IPC to be composed of three ISC

NUSes, three IUS NUSes and one neutral NUS and which should have as its task the preparation of an RTC. In the opinion of others it would be unwise for the ISC to decide once more on one definite course of action. It had done so in Peru, but the IUS had then made more demands. If COSEC were to be given another restricted mandate, this mandate would once again not cover new developments. Under no condition should the ISC therefore make a statement on the desired representation within the IPC nor exclude the possibility that unity might be achieved by other means. They, therefore, proposed to adopt a resolution along the lines of the Basel formula, supporting any initiative conducive to world student unity.

During a confusing debate on an amendment which argued that the above IPC should be specifically mentioned in the resolution, the Latin American group declared that everyone who was against the IPC, was against the wishes of the IUS and therefore against unity. Put to the vote their proposal was first carried by 26 votes to 25, after a recount the votes were divided equally 26-26 and after a second ballot the proposal was defeated with 25 votes in favour, since certain NUSes who first abstained, had later decided to vote against. After much uproar these 25 NUSes left the hall and asked for a plenary session to discuss the proceedings during the vote.

After an intervention by the Congolese delegation at this plenary session, declaring on behalf of the minority that they were sincere in their desire for unity (199), the Cuban delegate took the floor to state his views on the incident. This delegate, former minister of education, former rector of the university, major in the Cuban army and then president of the Cuban NUS, strongly attacked the imperialist clique who had come to the ISC with reactionary intentions and had exerted pressure on certain NUSes such as Nigeria and Paraguay to vote with the minority. (200)

"The NUSes from powerful countries had used the same system as their governments to subject other NUSes from smaller, underdeveloped and relatively illiterate

countries which were fighting for independence and sovereignty. The former group did not care about the sacrifices and battles carried out by the latter. They were creating greater divisions by moving motions contrary to the views of those representing the true spirit of the people. On the one hand those who desired true democracy and freedom, had spoken sincerely and had been accused of impeding the progress of the Congress. On the other hand certain unions spoke of democracy and unity, yet accepted a divided vote on fundamentals where there ought to have been an absolute majority in favour. It was not a lie that the world was divided into two blocs which disputed over satellites and nuclear weapons. At this Conference there was, on one side, the group representing the oppressed countries. On the other side the powerful countries seeking to dominate the world. This was the true division of the earth, between the rich and poor."

This created an uproar since every NUS who had not withdrawn felt deeply insulted by being identified with the oppressors of the world. Not only that, but they could not express their convictions without being qualified as an imperialist lackey. That it was Cuba which made these accusations was all the more grievous, considering that only one year and a half ago several NUSes among whom were those from the "imperialist" countries, had taken strong action to make their governments stop supporting the Batista regime.

During the ensuing indignant discussion, Nigeria declared:

"any cooperation should be based on equality, understanding and tolerance. Many NUSes . . . were paying lip-service to "tolerance", however, and did not in fact tolerate other people's points of view, as indicated in an earlier speech where underdeveloped and illiterate countries had been mentioned. The allegation that certain NUSes were dominated was an insult to their

intelligence. NUNS had come to the Conference with an open mind, but was not going to be cajoled by any person to vote against its conscience. NUNS did not believe in blocism nor in selling the consciences of its delegates in the support of any particular bloc." (201)

After a debate between Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay on the one side and Paraguay, Nigeria and England on the other side, the tone in which Congo had opened the debate reasserted itself and a simple compromise was proposed. The final text would give special attention to initiatives taken by a group of NUSes representing the different trends in the international student movement. At this point the commission meeting reconvened.

The explosion at this special session had had a healthy effect on the development of the conference and the atmosphere improved visibly. The tactics of the anti-ISC organizations had been far too transparent during the first days of the conference, with the result that each of them now denied that they had adopted such tactics. But the middle group profited from this situation and saw its views reflected in many resolutions, since they were able to demonstrate to the others that their points of view provided a compromise between the two extremes.

Thus most delegations went home satisfied. It had been a turbulent ISC with heated discussions, yet the final results satisfied all groups, with the possible exception of the Latin American philo-communists. Their only success had been that the two camps theory had gained ground. The ISC might bring together all ideological tendencies in the world, but it remained branded as the mouthpiece of the imperialists. Just as it is easy to qualify a consumers' association which disagrees with a butchers' union, as a union of vegetarians, so it was easy to give the ISC a label that did not reflect the truth but made things considerably easier politically. That this was, in fact, an insult to the NUSes from the third world who formed two thirds of the ISC was neglected. Klosters had shown that the group who did not want to choose sides but preferred to mediate was growing in size. This

was illustrated by their reluctance to nominate candidates for the Supervision Committee or the Secretariat. Such a close relationship was not in keeping with the more distant role they wished to maintain.

As a result, the Congo was the only Union from the middle group to be elected to the Supervision Committee, Argentina, Peru, Algeria and Yugoslavia having refused to stand. (202) As members of the secretariat SUPCOM elected a New-Zealander, a South African, a Chilean, an American, a Rhodesian, a Turk and an Indian. And the IUS publications proclaimed that the majority had maintained its control. (203)

By standing at a distance the minority risked being left out in the cold. But paradoxically, within the limits of the two camps theory this was to their advantage, since it enabled them to play the role of arbiter.

But in future years it was to become more difficult to be an objective referee since more and more NUSes were wanting to cripple the ISC under the guise of neutrality.

XX. THE SIXTH IUS CONGRESS

For the first and to-date the last time in IUS history, an IUS Congress was held in a country outside the communist bloc, Iraq. (204) Previously, the IUS had organized events only in countries where it could count of full support of local authorities and youth organizations, but this time it dared to take the participants to Bagdad. Considering the political situation in Iraq in 1960, this was not too much of a risk. Two years earlier the dictatorial regime of Nuri el Saïd had been overthrown and replaced by a strongly leftist regime under General Kassem. It was generally recognized that Nuri el Saïd had only been able to maintain himself in power by undemocratic and dictatorial rule, but Kassem's reign of terror could not precisely be called the opposite. Yet the Soviet government supported Kassem heavily and consequently the IUS expressed nothing but praise for his policy. Kassem was pleased to receive the IUS congress in his country and warranted a peaceful and orderly development of the Congress. However, by the time of the Congress Kassem's initial popularity in Iraq had declined immensely. A strongly organized military regime and support of semi-military communist units alone enabled him to remain in power for another two years. Although the congress enjoyed Kassem's personal protection, the participants could not fail to notice the existing tension in the country. When the first IUS charter plane landed with members of the secretariat and technical staff, they were received by a large crowd of Iraqi students demonstrating against the imminent execution of five students whose activities had displeased the regime. Forced by this extremely painful situation, Kassem postponed the execution on the condition that no further demonstrations take place during or against the IUS Congress. But the Congress was only four days old, when the students of the Law Faculty went on a strike which led to mass arrests. Tension in Bagdad increased and the

students' hostility towards the organizers and participants of the Congress became noticeable. The military guard posted around the Congress hall and the hotel was doubled and the road from the hotel to the congress lined with troops. Participants wishing to go into town on their own were accompanied by pro-Kassem students who, in their own interest also, were careful not to stray away from the main streets. Meetings and parties with Bagdad youth were cancelled and substituted by less risky events.

As to participation in the Congress, the IUS had slowly begun to reap the fruits of its new tactics. Three NUSes who participated in the ISC had decided to join the IUS, bringing its membership to a total of 21. (205) The number of associate members increased from four to nine. (206) The number of overseas student organizations had fallen by one to eight, while voting rights were granted to five minority groups. (207) Albania had not turned up for reasons we shall go into later.

In contrast to the ISC, the credentials of the different organizations were hardly discussed. The nominations for the Credentials Committee were proposed and elected automatically. After a few days, the President of this Committee, who, like its other members, held a position in the IUS secretariat, announced that the credentials of all 43 organizations had been approved. When asked by an observer what status would be granted to minority organizations such as those from Mexico and India, he replied that these organizations came from countries where no NUS existed and that they were, therefore, entitled to the seat of an NUS. While a Mexican NUS might have been recognized by the 3rd Latin American Student Congress and the Mexican delegation might have declared that he also recognized this NUS and only represented the technical colleges, as long as an organization recognized by a previous IUS Congress did not withdraw, the Credentials Committee could not change its status. Thus, to the surprise even of the Mexican delegation itself, its voting rights were upheld. As for India, it was true that the All Indian Student Federation claimed to represent only progressive and communist students and that it recog-

nized the National Council of University Students of India as an NUS, but NCUSI was unknown to the Credentials Committee which therefore maintained the status of AISF.

Once again the Congress started with the reading of the Executive report by Pelikan. He briefly outlined the activities of the IUS and students in general over the past period and then passed on to the international situation. The main subjects of the report were peace and peace again, settlement of the German question, biting attacks on world-wide US imperialism.

Although at the time of the Congress East and West were engaged in regular negotiations on disarmament and the German question, the tone of the report was aggressive and harsh.

In Moscow Khrushchev was seeking a speedy solution to both issues, but his attempts at relaxation between East and West had earned him downright criticism from Peking. Immediately after his visit to the USA in September, 1959 and his positive statements on the "Camp David Spirit", he had had an extremely cool reception in Peking. The Moscow-Peking conflict was about to come out in public, although for the time being only the Yugoslavs and Albanians employed it as a vehicle for their mutual grievances. It is not possible here to discuss the background of the Moscow-Peking dispute. The fact that Peking reproached Moscow for taking a softer line towards the arch-imperialists in America is only one aspect of this conflict, but one of the most relevant to the role of the front organizations at that time.

The IUS had had the honour of witnessing the first public Moscow-Peking dispute in the presence of non-communists. (208) For the first time in the history of the international communist movement, the Chinese delegation openly accused the Soviet Union at the IUS Executive meeting in Tunis, 1960, of trying to come to an agreement with the imperialists (the unity question). Later, one congress after another was to witness the growing tension.

It had taken a lot of efforts on Khrushchev's part to get Chinese support for the top conference held in Paris in May,

1960. We know how this conference was to end. An American plane on reconnaissance over Soviet territory had just been shot down. Under the scrutiny of the Chinese, Khrushchev could not possibly accept this. Loftily he demanded that the Americans apologize and when they failed to do so, he left Paris. This did not mean that he had satisfied or even wanted to satisfy the Chinese, for he immediately proposed to have another conference in eight months time.

The Chinese were not silenced therefore, because it was the disarmament proposal which they opposed. For the Chinese, general disarmament equalled surrender of the third world to the imperialists. Coexistence and revolution by peaceful means were ideas diametrically opposite to their interpretation of Lenin. Consequently, when the World Federation of Trade Unions assembled in Peking at the beginning of July, 1961, the Chinese assumed an opposing role and tried to turn the other delegations against the Soviets. Relations between Moscow and Peking worsened rapidly. At the third Rumanian party congress the representatives of fraternal parties had a taste of the conflict that was to explode in November 1960, when at the conference of 81 parties in Moscow Soviets and Chinese tried to unseat one another.

What attitude should the front organizations take in this conflict? The following years were to prove that they had been instructed to keep the Chinese in at all costs and not oppose them unnecessarily, but on the other hand never to abandon Moscow's ideological stand on important questions. In other words, the front organizations should not become involved in the conflict or let themselves be provoked by the Chinese. Their primary task was to show the third world who were its real friends and who its real enemies. While not neglecting the policy of coexistence, they should continue unremittingly their propaganda against the evils of the West. As long as no matters of principle were raised, the Chinese, on their part, were - as yet - willing to keep up an appearance of unity in the presence of non-communists.

This policy worked a miracle in Bagdad. Practically all

delegations adopted the biting anti-imperialist tone set by the Executive report. For five days the participants were allowed to discuss the report at full length. In fact, most delegations enthusiastically joined in the anti-imperialist campaign without even referring to the report. Having no US embassy in its country, Mongolia was one of the few NUSes which had little direct reason to criticize the USA. The speaker therefore accused the USA in the strongest terms of ignoring and thus discriminating against his beautiful country.

Only the observers from England and Canada put questions to the IUS secretariat. Canada expressed its surprise that the Executive report had discussed all seats of trouble in the world at great length, but had maintained a deathlike silence on China's violent suppression of Tibet's autonomy in 1959. The IUS had sharply protested against atomic testing by the USA, England and France, but had not breathed a word about the Soviet contribution to radioactivity in the atmosphere. Finally, the IUS pretended to fight at the side of the Latin American students to free the university from political control, but had not uttered a word of protest against the East German directive which made the interest of workers and peasants the decisive factor in the nomination of professors.

These comments caused great uproar. East Germany told Canada first to study the growth of Nazism and revanchism in West Germany before expressing such objections against the education of East German youth in a spirit of anti-revanchism, peace and friendship. Rumania asked to know whether this speaker was paid for his remarks by the day or by the hour. China applied the old tactics of personal attack on this "hypocritical humanist" who revealed his true nature as "running dog of American imperialism, and that is not an insult, but a true description of his ugly face". At last the Congress resumed its work with the argument that there would always be reactionaries who enjoyed war but that this fact should not detain them any longer.

And yet a reply was given to the question on atomic testing

in the commission. In Peking the Soviet Union had not been mentioned in the resolution since at that time it had stopped its tests of its own free will. When it was forced to resume them, the IUS secretariat had had no mandate to protest. The passage in the new resolution on atomic testing wisely refrained from naming the atomic powers and called upon all these powers to sign a test ban treaty.

But this did not end the attacks on the Canadian representative and the servile lackeys of yankee imperialism (COSEC). The Iraqi delegate accused the ISC and COSEC of having supported the Nuri el Saïd regime. Observers reminded him that a RIC team had visited Iraq at the time and written a report, taking a strong stand against the regime. The Canadian speaker had been a member of this team and shared in the responsibility for this report. But he was interrupted by the Iraqi representative who qualified the report as a useless document because most of the people interviewed by the RIC team were notorious opponents of the present Kassem regime. He refused to admit that the RIC team had interviewed the people named on the list he had personally provided.

One of the tactics which largely set the tone of the congress was the practice of the IUS secretariat members of joining national delegations and speaking on behalf of these delegations. To legalize this procedure, the Congress changed the constitution so that in the future organizations would be elected to the secretariat who would then send a representative to Prague. As a result, the Steering Committee, in the same way as the Credentials Committee, was mainly composed of secretariat members, who in their turn nominated other secretariat members as rapporteurs of the commissions.

In the evening of the sixth day commissions finally started. Officially, their function was to prepare motions for presentation to the plenary session, but this amounted to little. It was suggested that the participants start with a free discussion on the subject tabled and then elect a subcommittee which would draft resolutions on the basis of the consensus of opinion. This seemed a good procedure, offering full opportunities to everyone. The subject of the commissions

(student activities for peace; activities of student organizations against imperialism, against colonialism and its legacies; International Student Cooperation; student activities for democratization of education) were such that the free discussions were just a repetition of the views put forth for six long days in the plenary session. Finally, a list of volunteers (mainly secretariat members) for the subcommittees was read and elected. There was only one objection, namely from the representative of British Guyana who wanted to be elected to the subcommittee. But his request could not be complied with, "since the committee should not be too large and there were so many volunteers to choose from!" But as soon as free discussions ended the resolution was already being distributed in all the languages of the conference. That more documents had been prepared in advance was further illustrated by the fact that the Canadian observer received by mistake the full text of the resolution of commission III before its subcommittee had even been able to meet. In other words, whatever was said in the commissions, the final result was known in advance. Certain commissions were allowed to discuss the document, but other resolutions, that of commission I for instance (peace), were presented directly to the plenary assembly. By these tactics the Chinese delegation was forced to limit its objections to the main points.

As a result, clashes were avoided except on two points. Unacceptable for the Chinese was the passage describing the UN as an important instrument of peace. The Chinese delegate declared that the UN was a well-known tool of American imperialism and mention of this instrument would taint the entire resolution. But since the Afro-Asian countries set great store by the UN, it was impossible for the IUS to accommodate the Chinese on this point. When a Bulgarian compromise proposal to add "the UN, as expressed in its charter" proved equally unacceptable for the Chinese, the problem was rapidly taken out of the plenary and passed on to a special subcommittee. After three hours of discussion, no agreement had been reached and the Bulgarian amendment was finally included in the peace resolution with China voting

against.

The second controversy arose on account of the sentence "the struggle for peace is usually bound up with the struggle against imperialism and colonialism". The Chinese wished to replace the word "usually" by "necessarily" and this time they received the backing of Latin America and North Africa. A compromise proposal reading "is intimately related with" was not accepted by China but gained some votes from China's supporters and the amendment was carried by a slight majority. This was one of the few votes in plenary session which was not virtually unanimous.

Consensus on the other resolutions was due to the way in which motions were put to the vote. Each time the Chairman asked the assembly whether anyone was against or wished to abstain, and since this was practically never the case, he no longer asked who supported the motion and the resolution was carried. With the lack of physical exercise under this system, interest in the voting operation had slackened and practically every motion put by the Chair was approved tacitly. But even this system proved to have its dangers when on the seventh day Peru suddenly proposed a motion. Once more no one was against, no abstention and when the Chairman suspected something was wrong and asked for votes in favour, the Peruvian motion was carried by 3-0-0. The Chairman asked for a second ballot, Bulgaria woke up and tabled an opposite motion. Put to the vote, it was carried with one vote against and no abstention. A second ballot on the Peruvian proposal was no longer necessary.

Finally, we should mention that the IUS stand on unity did not change. Once more it maintained that unity was only meaningful if directed at the familiar purpose, but the resolution added that the IUS was willing to cooperate with any organization, even if it did not agree on all these aims. The IUS expressed its joy at the vast support to the idea of an RTC, but the subject was pursued no further. Instead, it urged for direct negotiations between IUS and COSEC to establish the fields where cooperation would be possible. What was the purpose of this passage when the ISC had clearly stated for the n'th time that it was not an organization

and COSEC not an Executive and that COSEC therefore had no power to negotiate? But a COSEC with executive powers was an essential element of the ISC image the IUS wanted to propagate.

Summing up, we can say that this IUS Congress was just an official confirmation of the policy outlined in Prague. The paternalistic approach to initiatives of the 16 NUSes, members of both IUS and ISC, had been a significant experience for many. They were faced with the choice of opening up the IUS as they had done with the ISC, or operating within the possibilities offered by the IUS. The former would be the end of the IUS, since no Eastern European NUS would be able to take the risk of supporting a resolution it could not defend at home. It would also be the end of the neutrality theory, as one of the two camps would have ceased to exist. Finally, it would be the end of important material and moral support to aims that appealed both to the third world and to the communist countries.

Thus they opted for the second possibility and strived to achieve what they could within the IUS. A universal IUS, critical of the communist world also, was no longer considered as a possibility.

XXI. DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1962

In the year following the IUS Congress and the 9th ISC, several NUSes were once more actively trying to achieve WSU. Now that both assemblies had expressed their support, it seemed that an RTC could be held in the near future. But this was an illusion, however. The English NUS took the first step immediately after the Klosters ISC and proposed to the Soviet Union to jointly convene an RTC on a basis acceptable to the vast majority of the NUSes concerned. (209) At the 1960 IUS Congress in Bagdad the English observer repeated this proposal which received strong backing in the corridors, but the Soviet NUS was sceptical and had no mandate to discuss the proposal. When it became clear at the Congress that Prague wanted only an RTC if convened by an IPC, the English NUS realized it would be useless to insist and withdrew its proposal. In December 1960 an English delegation left for Moscow and North Africa to consult about the composition of an IPC that would enjoy the confidence of all NUSes interested. In Moscow results were few but it was agreed that the matter should again be raised with the different observers at the Congress of the Maghreb Student Confederation (the joint congress of the NUSes of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).

This Congress took place in Rabat in December 1960 but no agreement was reached here either. Two trends had emerged from discussions among the various observers. The one (IUS) wanted to reach an agreement as soon as possible on the composition of an IPC which was to convene shortly an RTC. The other group, including England, wanted first to discuss the differences existing in the international student movement before preparing an agenda for the RTC. The Basel experience had shown, it felt, that an RTC could get caught in endless discussion in advance. Although the Basel RTC had based itself on the principle that every national student organization was entitled to a seat, serious objections had been raised against equal participation in the

discussion by the official Spanish syndicate SEU. This Franco-controlled organization had arrived in Basel and formally had the right to attend the discussions. On the other hand, everyone was convinced that once unity had been realized, it would offer no place for fascist organizations. In order to avoid another RTC from running around on endless discussion, the IPC should previously agree on the basis on which unity would be possible. Was this question left for the RTC to decide, endless discussion of principles among some hundred NUSes would arise, England and its supporters felt. If an IPC were formed which was representative of the main tendencies, its conclusions could be used as a basis for the RTC. The other group, however, did not want to confine the discussion of principles to a selected group of NUSes.

Another difficulty arose when the composition of the IPC was discussed. When speaking about trends in the international student movement in general ISC and IUS terms, everyone agreed. But when it came to nominating NUSes as representative for a certain tendency, every choice made some NUSes feel neglected. Rough division into groups was inevitable and many NUSes felt not completely at home in the group in which they were put. It was agreed that the Soviet Union, England, America, Uruguay, Chile, Nigeria, North Africa, Iraq and China would sit on this IPC, but opinions differed as to representations of another NUS from Africa, Asia and Southern Europe. It was decided that this discussion should be continued in March 1961 when a large number of NUSes would grace the 50th anniversary of the French NUS with their presence.

These Caen talks (210) were more successful. Representatives of some 40 ISC and IUS NUSes agreed to add the Indian NUS to the list drawn up in Rabat. But divergencies on "principles and differences" proved so great that one group felt this discussion should never be entrusted to an IPC, while the other group was strengthened in its belief that an RTC which had this responsibility was doomed to fail. In their opinion, an agenda for the RTC should only be fixed, once it had been established where the differences lay and how agreement could be reached. The RTC was to be a

unity meeting and not a meeting on differences. If not, the RTC would be one endless discussion, and widen the gap among the participants even further.

The IPC agreed upon in Caen proved unacceptable to many NUSes. Uruguay announced its intention to make new proposals at the 4th Latin American Student Congress which would give Latin America the place it deserved. (211)

But no agreement was reached at this 4th LASC either. This was due to other factors however. (212) The rise of the pro-communist student movement in Latin America had given it complete control over the third LASC in 1959. The secretariat had been moved to Caracas, Venezuela, where it soon began to manifest itself as an instrument of Castroist propaganda. Although the secretariat was still based on the same principles as COSEC and had exclusively administrative powers confined by mandates, it began to develop a policy of its own without the slightest consideration for the views of those NUSes who thought otherwise. As a result, the Latin American student movement had slowly become aware that it was being dominated by what was in fact a minority. Christian democrats and left wing democrats (followers of the popular parties) consolidated their position and began to regain the ground lost to the castroists. By the time of the 4th LASC in Natal, Brazil, they had regained control over ten of the eighteen NUSes. But the others did not intend to let go of the secretariat and their control of LASC. They demanded apologies for the charges made against the secretaries, who had wisely remained in Caracas. When such apologies failed to be made, they left the hall, led by their Brazilian host, and Brazilian students closed the conference hall. The remaining ten NUSes continued their work in a school nearby and reached agreements on the main issues. The eight pro-communist NUSes declared all decisions to be invalid and hastened to tell the world through the intermediary of the IUS that divisionist elements, instigated by US imperialism, had torpedoed the 4th LASC.

Since its own unity was far to seek, it was not surprising that Latin America could not unite on the issue of world

student unity.

In this way, the enthusiasm of many NUSes about the RTC began to slacken. They started wondering whether the RTC was the end they were striving for or just a means to that end. Unity, and here IUS and ISC agreed, would only be meaningful if it had a purpose. Mere fusion of the NUSes included in the Prague and Leiden files, would only lead to administrative and formal unity. As to its purpose differences were so essential that a new superorganization could only be a weak reflection of both ISC and IUS. "The Student" as well as "World Student News" published articles stressing that fusion of the two organizations for the sake of unity would be meaningless if it were not conducive to unity of action. (213) If this action was to be limited to practical cooperation on matters of secondary importance, avoiding the most essential questions, then it was not worth the trouble. It was as impossible to find a basis for unity between ISC and IUS which both regarded as fundamentally right, as it would be for the South African NUS and the Afrikaanse Studenten Bond (ASB) ever to reach an agreement as long as the latter insisted on supporting the apartheid policy.

Prospects were also injured by the fierce attacks of the IUS on COSEC and the Western NUSes. "News Service" regularly offered the world negative information with little regard for the truth. "World Student News" directed a harsh attack against the English NUS partly for supporting the ISC in its activities and partly for not wishing to eliminate the student-as-such clause from its own constitution. (214) No mention was made of this NUS's role in connection with Algeria, Cuba, South Africa, etc. nor of the fact that these unambiguous activities were possible within the framework of the student-as-such clause. No mention was made of the intensive campaigns of the American NUS against the racial discrimination in the Southern States of the USA, against the Batista regime in Cuba, against the resumption of nuclear testing etc, but instead time and again the NUS was accused of being a lackey of the State Department. In this way almost every Western NUS was analysed and denounced by the IUS.

At the same time a maximum publicity was given to the World Festival of Youth and Students, which should take place in Helsinki in the summer of 1962. The IUS completely ignored the protests of the Finnish NUS, which could not appreciate such an abuse of Finnish neutrality. The fact, that the IUS proceeded with the arrangements in Finland if there were no Finnish NUS at all aroused wide-spread indignation. (215) The existing doubt, whether the IUS was interested at all in cooperation and whether this organization was prepared to take others seriously, was intensified by this attitude.

While constantly insisting on cooperation, the IUS had no respect for views that were not in line with the interest of world communism. In January 1961 one of the best-known West German student officers, Dieter Koniacki, received a telephone call, asking him to come to East Berlin where he was arrested and extradited by the East German secret service to its Czech colleague which took him to Prague. (216) Koniacki, whom Pelikan had given friendly taps on the shoulder in Bagdad, was very active in the West German liberation student association and had made a considerable contribution to increasing East-West contact between Germany and Eastern European countries. Neither his parents nor the West German government were allowed to contact him and at a secret trial in Prague, he was charged with espionage and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Despite the flow of urgent requests from NUSes in all parts of the world for IUS intervention to ensure Koniacki a fair and public trial, the IUS maintained a stubborn silence, since it considered kidnapping and trial of spies to be an internal affair of Czechoslovakia.

On 13th August, 1961 a wall was built right across Berlin, allegedly for the protection of the East German people against provocations from West Berlin. Four days later the East German NUS began to urge its members to form military units to assist the people's army in patrolling along the wall. The real purpose of the wall need not be described here. The number of citizens and students who have had to pay with their lives for their attempts to commit the crime called

"escape from the Republic" is still growing. But the IUS remained silent since it did not have to defend students who wanted to commit crimes . . .

When by the end of August 1961 the Soviet Union violated the moratorium of the three big atomic powers by exploding a fifty megaton bomb, causing a sudden and long delay in the negotiations for a test ban treaty, the organization which claimed to fight for peace and cessation of atomic testing, remained silent once more. Other NUSes asked the Soviet NUS to explain why it did not protest this time as it had done repeatedly in the past against Western atomic powers. It declared that one should differentiate between nuclear tests of aggressive nature and tests of a purely defensive nature, tests at the service of peace and tests directed against peace.

One can imagine the profound doubts these events of summer 1961 raised among many NUSes who were seeking a possibility to arrive at a basic agreement. Convocation of an RTC in this climate would not be conducive to unity at all. The Scandinavian NUSes therefore proposed to centre attention for the time being on the organization of seminars which could pave the way for an eventual RTC. (217) Such seminars should be organized outside the framework of IUS and ISC and deal with basic problems such as representativity, definition of common principles, etc. This satisfied the IUS's demand that no one should be excluded from the preliminary discussions and also accommodated those who wanted more guarantees for a fruitful RTC.

Although since then several NUSes urged for concretization of one project or another, no real progress was made. Finally most of them reached the conclusion that the Scandinavian proposals were the best intermediate solution. They began to look forward to the next IUS Congress and the next ISC and wondered whether the climate would have improved sufficiently to attempt the organization of an RTC.

XXII. THE TENTH ISC

During the two years following the ninth ISC of Klosters, the 70 NUSes who had voted for the deletion of the student-as-such clause, had ample opportunity to prove that they understood the implications of the student responsibility clause. The problems facing the world in the period between the 9th and 10th ISC were such that they could not be ignored. International tension had increased; Cuban refugees attempted to land in the Bay of Pigs and with US support had tried to overthrow the Castro regime; the Algerian liberation struggle was brought to a critical point by the Bizerta crisis and OAS sabotage; the Soviet Union resumed its atomic tests after three years of truce and Berlin was divided by the wall.

Students from the countries concerned could not take these developments for granted. Availing themselves of the COSEC distribution apparatus, they informed other NUSes of their stand and action and requested them to give support and solidarity. The ISC Information Bulletin proved that these requests were not made in vain. Contact and cooperation among the ISC NUSes in protest against these fundamental forms of oppression increased noticeably. Moreover, this form of international solidarity proved to have considerable effect. No one could claim that the coordinated stand of the student world suddenly made rulers repent, but it is an undeniable fact that these activities had their effect through the medium of public opinion.

This was especially clear in the Algerian case where the word "rebels" gradually disappeared from the world press and was replaced by more respectful terms. The student press had led the way. Although this student action did not succeed in eradicating all evils, it helped to create an atmosphere in which it became increasingly difficult to continue or start oppression. World public opinion is a powerful instrument which does not cure all but can prevent a lot! There is convincing evidence that the student world contributed to this on a large scale by drawing attention to situations that

may not pass unnoticed in today's world.

Naturally, results were more tangible in fields directly affecting student interests. Frequent student arrests on political grounds were given world-wide publicity. Prompt and effective reactions from sister organizations throughout the world often contributed to their release or helped ensure a fair trial since the police authorities knew that they were being closely watched. Illegal violation of university autonomy or restrictions of the NUSes' lawful activities provoked reactions which often prevented further evil. (218)

Then there was the practical programme implemented by COSEC on the basis of ISC mandates. This comprised a large number of seminars organized throughout the world on themes such as leadership training, welfare, press, travel and others, with a view to rendering the NUSes' work more efficient. At the same time COSEC organized illiteracy campaigns in cooperation with several NUSes, during which student teams visited villages and tried to lay the basis for education of adults and children from the neglected sections of the society. Moreover, it organized relief programmes for refugees, found scholarships for students who had been expelled from their university for political, religious or racial reasons and set up exchange programmes and work camps. (219) Since the 9th ISC, RIC had been preparing studies on sixteen territories in all corners of the world for presentation to the 10th ISC (220) Consequently, it was generally acknowledged that in its ten years of existence the ISC had developed a programme of activities which had proved fruitful for students in all parts of the world.

But those who expected the 10th ISC of 1962 in Quebec, Canada to be a festive occasion, were mistaken. (221) The embittered struggle in Latin America between communist sympathizing NUSes on the one hand and left-wing democratic and christian democratic NUSes on the other, had reached the point where it was clear that the former group wanted no cooperation except on its own terms. In Africa it had proved impossible to resolve differences of opinion between French- and English-speaking NUSes so as to make

organization of a third Pan-African Student Conference meaningful. The situation in Asia and the Middle East had remained unchanged, except that political developments with regard to West Irian had brought the Indonesian NUS closer to the IUS. And lastly, in Europe the new line of the French was becoming stabilized, thus having its repercussions on the Latin NUSes.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the IUS had firmly pursued the two camps theory. In the past it had been easy to ridicule the student-as-such ISC in the eyes of outsiders because of its twists and turns to comply with the demands made on it. The new ISC had become a rival whose power of attraction was not to be underestimated. But although IUS tactics in Klosters had failed, sufficient possibilities had remained for manoeuvring the ISC into a deadlock. Student responsibility was an ambitious principle, but wrongly applied it could lead to meddlesomeness. Who was to judge whether a situation was so important that it ought to be placed on the ISC agenda? Was the fishing-rights issue between England and Iceland one of those? Or the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic? The conflict between Syria and Egypt? The border dispute between India and Pakistan? For the students of these countries these were not problems of secondary importance. But was the ISC the appropriate body to take action on such issues? The Klosters ISC had foreseen the difficulties that might arise and had declared:

"That any problem raised shall not involve conflicts or contractual agreements between two sovereign States, except when they affect students according to the bases of cooperation adopted by the 9th ISC." (222)

Apart from specific rights aimed at effective functioning of the university, these bases of cooperation laid down two main guiding lines: peace and the intimately related struggle against all forms of oppression, colonialism, imperialism, totalitarianism, racism, dictatorship as well as social injustice.

But despite the definitions of these notions, it was clear that an eloquent speaker could apply these definitions to many a controversial issue. If the ISC was to remain viable, the participants would have to show a great deal of common sense and above all the will to keep the ISC sound.

But for the third time the ISC was attended by a group of NUSes who cared little for the ISC and at best regarded it as an obstacle in the IUS's path. Although its number had not increased since Klosters, the activity of this group was notably more effective. Developments around the new RTC had offered better prospects for the middle group. The idea itself of identifying themselves with neither IUS nor ISC became increasingly attractive. Both ISC and IUS gave this group more attention than would have been the case had it been a fervent supporter of either.

The anti-ISC NUSes knew that their attempt to lead the ISC into an impasse would be successful if they could identify the stand of their opponents with insincerity in its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist position. If such a climate could be created - and they would have ample opportunity if problems were raised which their opponents did not wish to include in the agenda on the grounds that they fell outside the scope of the ISC's activities - they could bring the middle group round to their side. But it was not to happen this way, since they were offered an earlier opportunity.

When on 27th June, 1962 the tenth ISC opened on the campus of Laval University in Quebec, the number of participating NUSes proved to have increased by seven, making a total of eighty, 22 this time from North- and Latin America, 22 from Europe, 16 from Asia and Australasia and 20 from Africa and the middle East.

Much can be said about the 10th ISC since it adopted many resolutions consolidating the course set in Klosters. Once again there were long debates on unity and the RTC. The IUS had written another open letter along the same lines as the previous one. (223) It proposed certain jointly organized events such as the travel conference and the press seminars. The Latin American group argued passionately that the ISC

should now show its willingness to achieve unity and accept this IUS offer. It was supported by the middle group, but the majority maintained its refusal and continued its opposition. Their experience of the IUS in the past had been bitter and they were not inclined to gloss over the controversies by entering into practical cooperation with the IUS. If the IUS wanted cooperation, then it should be on a basis of mutual respect. And it had shown none of this, rather the contrary. After a heated discussion the proposal was rejected, but the middle group, though disillusioned, were not unduly surprised.

As to the RTC, the conference decided to support any initiative conducive to a dialogue, thus making an RTC more viable. It recommended to the NUSes to create opportunities for any informal discussion which might contribute to a rapprochement, by means of seminars, organized outside the framework of IUS and ISC. (224)

But the most important aspect of this ISC was the discussion of the credentials of the participating organizations, in particular those of the Puerto Rican student organization, FUPI (Federacion Universitaria Pro Independencia). Despite doubt about its representativity, this organization had been admitted to the Klosters ISC as an NUS. On request of the Conference, RIC had been mandated to make an inquiry in Puerto Rico into restrictions of the rights of both the university and the student movement. During its investigations, RIC had discovered that among other things, the membership of FUPI (claimed by them to be 12,000 of the 22,000 students) was seriously open to question. Some Puerto Rican student organizations estimated its membership to be no more than 500. To restore unity among the Puerto Rican students these organizations had tried, together with FUPI, to form a democratic student council, but the attempt had failed because of strong restrictions imposed by the university. FUPI acknowledged that it represented less than half of the students, but claimed that at least 8,000 students who had signed one of its petitions, should be regarded as members. (225)

The Credentials Committee discussed this question at great length and reached the conclusion that numerically

FUPI could not be regarded as a representative NUS. However, opinions differed as to whether FUPI could not be granted NUS status on other grounds. Half of the members of the Credentials Committee, led by Uruguay, argued that although FUPI's membership was too small, FUPI's policy was representative of Puerto Rican student opinion, as would be proved as soon as academic restrictions were lifted. This standpoint was presented as majority opinion to the plenary session, with the recommendation that FUPI be granted NUS status. (226)

However, a large group of NUSes offered strong objections. They maintained that the Conference had decided five days ago to base itself once more on representative NUSes, and had given a definition of a representative NUS. The criteria established were primarily numerical. Only if an organization met these criteria, would it be entitled to voting rights. In FUPI's case, the organization itself had admitted that it was not supported by the majority of the Puerto Rican students, however regrettable the reasons might be. Therefore the ISC ought to decide to support FUPI in its activities and assist it in increasing its representativity. But it would set a dangerous precedent to close one's eyes to the partial nature of this organization's representativity.

Then the Latin American supporters of FUPI declared that the number of students represented by FUPI was less important than the organization's aims. This organization was in the vanguard of the struggle against yankee imperialism and for national independence. This struggle was so important that the ISC could not deny FUPI its support.

Chile, on the other hand, argued that everyone ought to recognize FUPI's importance and the value of its principles, but that this had nothing to do with FUPI's status. The fact that it was clearly impossible to give FUPI NUS status, did not mean that the conference did not want to support FUPI in its activities. But these activities did not make FUPI an NUS. It could become an NUS and to this end FUPI needed the support of all those who could identify themselves with its ideals. Chile, therefore, proposed an amendment to the recommendation of the Credentials Committee, promising

FUPI full support in its activities and giving it the right to participate in all ISC events, to speak at meetings and to table motions.

The supporters of NUS status for FUPI retorted that such a resolution would reveal the true nature of the ISC, since it was a question of supporting or opposing imperialism. FUPI was fighting a valiant struggle for Puerto Rican independence and those who wanted to deny FUPI the rights of an NUS, were discriminating against FUPI. But the NUSes who opposed FUPI's principles were well-known and had disclosed their true nature in trying to force FUPI out of the ISC by legalistic arguments.

Once again the others argued that their moral support to FUPI was above question. However, the question of FUPI's representativity paralleled that of the ISC's representativity itself. By admitting non-representative organizations the ISC would undermine its own foundations. In that case, voting rights would have to be granted to all organizations in the world who agreed with the ISC's principles, regardless of their membership. This would make the ISC a world organization of undoubtedly lofty principles, but which could no longer claim to speak on behalf of the students from the participating countries. At most, it could claim to speak for the students, members of the organizations participating in the ISC, which in some cases would mean all the students of a country, in others just a small grouping. This would have considerable effect upon the ISC's authority: "the question is not whether the ISC is a meeting of all the student organizations in the world who agree on certain principles, but whether it would remain a meeting of the representative organizations of the students from all over the world". To change the character of the ISC would be a backward step, with farreaching consequences. They, therefore, supported the Chilean amendment.

For thirteen hours the debate swung between these two positions and the atmosphere became electric. The Latin American group declared that the vote would prove whether the ISC was genuinely anti-imperialistic or only paying lip-service to the struggle against imperialism. In the latter

case, they felt no need to participate in the conference any further. Their opponents protested energetically that this was no way to influence the vote. Moreover, it was unfair to accuse those who wanted to preserve the character of the ISC of being lackeys of imperialism. After 44 speakers had taken the floor, the motion to recognize FUPI as an NUS was put to the vote and defeated by 33-41-2. (227)

Immediately 26 NUSes left the hall, after which the Chilean proposal was adopted by 42-3-5 without further discussion. (228) Then the conference was adjourned to allow feelings to calm down and work was continued in commissions.

When after two days the Conference reconvened in plenary session, no agreement had been reached in the corridors on the return of the group of 26 NUSes, which apart from the Latin Americans included also the French-speaking Africans, some Southern European NUSes and Indonesia. The 26 NUSes' condition for returning to the conference was reopening of the discussion on the FUPI issue. They also wanted the conference to pay more attention in future to the unity proposals made by this group of NUSes.

But the vast majority of the NUSes that had remained in the hall considered it not right to re-table the FUPI question after thirteen-hours of discussion. Practically every NUS had explained its vote and it was ridiculous to pretend that this vote had been cast without adequate consideration. The West-Indian NUS tabled a motion to nominate a commission to contact the 26 NUSes and inform them of the conference's strong desire that they reconsider their walk-out. (229)

After a few days this commission reported that the 26 NUSes stood by their decision and that only a review of the resolution concerning FUPI could induce them to return. With feelings of regret the Conference decided to continue its work. Meanwhile the 26 NUSes were meeting in another part of the building and drafted a statement expressing their profound disillusion. (230) Under the influence of the middle group, the statement was phrased in more moderate terms than had been the conference speeches. They declared that they regretted the majority's attitude which had had so little

consideration for the minority's position both during the discussion on unity and the FUPI debate. They were sorry to have to conclude that it was meaningless under these circumstances to continue attending the meeting. They could accept no responsibility for the resolutions of this ISC, but expressed the hope that this crisis would not prove unsurmountable. They promised to continue participating in ISC activities in the hope of being able to further cooperation of the entire world student movement.

This was the end of the FUPI incident, but the ISC had received a heavy blow, the consequences of which were difficult to foresee. Although the Conference continued its work and decided to expand its programme even further, there were no grounds for optimism. The future would show whether the ISC could recover. The minority statement offered some hopes.

The conclusion that this ISC had resulted in a serious crisis was fully shared by the IUS. "World Student News" extensively commented upon the background to the conflict which, they claimed, demonstrated the reactionary attitude of the majority and COSEC towards peace, national independence and imperialism. This attitude had proved unacceptable to the majority of the world student community which no longer wished to tolerate COSEC's lip-service. Unless the leading group in the ISC were prepared to face the facts, the ISC would not recover. (231)

But apart from these expected comments, the IUS was aware that the victory of the Latin American move had not been complete. Although the minority had felt that it could not justify to its members continued attendance at this legalistic and rigid meeting, it had clearly stated that it should be possible to cooperate with the ISC and that it was prepared to do so. The ISC had been split, but on both sides of the gap there was a willingness to form a bridge. The IUS therefore decided not to diminish but to redouble its attacks on COSEC and the majority within the ISC so that even attempts to bridge the gap could be made out as an irresponsible approach.

Significant in this respect are the comments of the Komsomolskaya Pravda: (232)

"The leaders of COSEC, of that dissenters' organization, did everything possible to make the appearance that the ISC is a wide democratic forum which will allow representatives of students from all countries to express themselves about problems which interest them. But in reality the aim of that Conference had only one thing in mind - to carry away the NUSes participating in the ISC/COSEC from solving urgent present problems: the fight for peace, general and full disarmament, for national independence, against imperialism and colonialism, for the liquidation of the split in the international student movement and the students from all countries.

From the very beginning there existed at the Conference two lines regarding the questions of unity of the international student movement, the fight for peace, against colonialism and imperialism. One line was the line of actual fight for the urgent interests and needs of students: this line was defended by the largest NUSes from Asia, Africa, Latin America and some Western European countries. The second line had nothing in common with students and their interests. This line was expressed and inspired by the leaders of students unions of USA, Canada, England, West Germany, Scandinavian countries and some other countries; this group represented the majority of those present at the Conference. Paying lip-service to unity and cooperation, this majority of delegations actually demonstrated that it is not willing to comply with the demands of wide layers of students all over the world. These representatives did not recognize the NUS of Puerto Rico as a representative NUS of that American colony. With this they played into the hands of colonizers, into the hands of the State Department of the USA which tries to maintain the existing colonial order in that small country. And so representatives of 31 (233) NUSes left the premises of the University. They sent to COSEC a declaration in

which they decisively branded the actions of the dissenters, underscoring that unless the Conference changes its attitude, they will be forced to leave ISC/COSEC and will not take part in its work. But COSEC remained faithful to itself, once again. This is understandable - they have to do it for the money which was given to them by Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller and others. (234) And these "gentlemen" do not throw away their money! As a result of this, the largest NUSes from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America left ISC/COSEC. By this they gave a loud slap in the face to the dissenters (the leaders of COSEC). COSEC is in a bad fix. The money of American milliardaires, generously supporting the dissenters, was crying! "

Unfortunately, the authors of this article forgot that of the NUSes remaining in the hall, 60 per cent came from Asia, Africa and Latin America. One wonders since when these students were inclined to pay lip-service.

XXIII. THE SEVENTH IUS CONGRESS

A month and a half after the ISC the 7th IUS Congress met in the Travida palace in Leningrad. (235) It was the first of such events to be organized by the IUS in the Soviet Union. The motive for the IUS's deviation from the rule not to hold the Congress in the Soviet Union itself will become clear later on. One of the reasons, however, was that the student participants in the World Youth Festival in Helsinki could, on their return, attend the Congress since practically all would travel back to their countries by train via Leningrad. The Congress of the other sponsor of the Festival, WFDY, was held in Warsaw for the same reasons.

But before dealing with the Leningrad Congress itself, it is useful to examine some of the factors that influenced the congress. First, there was the Moscow-Peking dispute which, as we know, had already manifested itself in Bagdad. But there was a notable difference between Bagdad and Leningrad in this respect. One should remember that hardly anyone in the communist world listened to China at the time of the Bagdad Congress (1960). At that time China was supported only by Albania and had therefore been forced to use a policy of pin-pricks. The communist world resented China's provocations which violated the communist code.

After the 81 party conference in November, 1960, discussion among communist parties from all countries had taken full swing and China had secured more support. Once China had finally succeeded in questioning Soviet leadership openly, neither Moscow nor Peking tried to bring the discussion out in public, and so the outside world hardly suspected what was going on. But this tolerant attitude in public could only be maintained as long as matters of principle were not raised. When a Congress could not avoid including controversial issues in its agenda, the Yugoslavs and Albanians had to bear the brunt of the storm and were attacked a substitutes of the two big powers.

One can imagine that this was a difficult situation for

the front organizations. Had they not been created and stimulated to back the Soviet stand on world political questions? The conflict with China should not result in silence of the front organizations.

Whereas in Peking the Yugoslavs had been ignored, relations between the IUS and Albania had deteriorated so much by the time of the Bagdad Congress that the Albanians had abstained from attending. Relations had not improved since, as is illustrated by the report published by the Komsomolskaya Pravda on the autumn congress of the Albanian Youth organization in 1961: (226)

"Mr. Lubon (first secretary of the Albanian youth organization) and the other speakers read all kind of slanderous nonsense addressed to the CPSU; they "rejected" resolutions of the 20 th and 22nd Congress of the CPSU and arrogantly were teaching millions of communists in other countries. The Conference presented an odd and pitiful picture during the appearance of the wife of Hoxha, who in various ways praised the "achievements" of her husband "for the international communist movement". Precisely at that moment appeared at the chairman's table her husband, received with hysterical shouts by the followers of his cult. At the Conference were present delegates of WFDY and IUS. Those delegates were indignant by the anti-Soviet spirit of the conference and by the slanderous fabrications of the leaders of the Albanian Labour Party and the UWYA directed against the CPSU. Always before the WFDY and the IUS supported and strengthened the friendly feelings among peoples of all countries for the Union of Working Youth of Albania. But the course of the 4th congress of that organization was so contrary to the matter of unity of the communist and democratic movement of youth, that the delegates of WFDY declared a protest and condemnation."

Having been instructed to remain outside the conflict, IUS nor WFDY publications did mention this friction. At the time of the Leningrad Congress, Soviets and Chinese alike were convinced that this should not be a forum to put each other to the test.

Sharp and personal attacks in the presence of others would not be made until a few months later. In Leningrad, however, it was clear that, despite of the good will of both, conflict was inevitable. The Congress took place a month after the World Peace Council meeting in Moscow and could not avoid raising the subjects that had called for a WPC congress. The fact that both the WPC Congress and the IUS Congress were held in the Soviet Union proved it was vital for the Soviet leaders that both meetings should not deviate from the official line. The Soviet Union was aware of Peking's objections to its disarmament proposals to the West, but it was determined not to be dissuaded by Peking.

On the contrary, the disarmament campaign was carried on energetically and the Soviet proposals were given the widest possible publicity. Like in the past, the front organizations were called upon to sway public opinion in favour of the Soviet proposals. The vast majority of the WPC Congress, attended by some 2,500 delegates, agreed with the Soviet view that it was not necessary to delay disarmament until imperialism had crumbled. For the "peace forces" all over the world were now so strong that they could check the imperialists even without arms. Whatever Lenin might have felt, people were now living in a nuclear age in which war might mean the extinction of mankind. It was, therefore, necessary, to destroy nuclear weapons and ban nuclear tests. But the armament race should not be allowed to shift back to conventional weapons. Consequently, total disarmament should be the aim. The WPC did not mention, however, that the USA were prepared to accept these proposals, provided effective control was established in the transition period. The Soviet Union objected to such control which would provide the enemy with information on its real military potential, which had remained a secret until then and was one of its most important strategical trumps.

Thus the WPC made a sweeping appeal to mankind based on the Soviet views. (237) only a minority group of some hundred

pacifist participants issued a statement of its own, attacking the attitude of all governments involved in the Geneva talks. (238)

It was the duty of the IUS to assist the WPC in this peace mission. This was not an easy task, first because it also had to widen the split in the ISC and alienate the minority unions from the rest. One could hardly create understanding among Western students for the Soviet concept of disarmament and at the same time accuse them of paying lip-service to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The IUS realized, however, that it could direct its peace campaign at all peace-loving students in the West, by-passing the NUSes. In view of the conflict within the ISC, attacks on the NUSes became even fiercer.

More difficult was the question of the WPC disarmament proposals. China would never give in, but continue its opposition in Leningrad. Total disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Union would, according to the Chinese, also deprive the national liberation movements of weapons, thus retarding the world revolution considerably. To deny these countries support for reasons of self-interest would, in China's opinion, be in flagrant contradiction with the principles of communism. Although the WPC had rejected this position, it remained to be seen whether the IUS participants would find China's line so ridiculous. Many participants belonged to the left wing of the communist parties in developing countries and supported a radical policy without too much consideration for Soviet interests. The IUS direction could therefore be sure that China would try to win their votes.

In view of this it would be extremely unwise to use in Leningrad the same tactics as in Bagdad. The development of the Congress would be too much jeopardized, if China were to express its arguments in the plenary session. The IUS therefore decided that the commissions should study all motions in full so as to place this inevitable discussion in a more business-like atmosphere. Thus they would be able to anticipate difficulties

and avoid a dispute in the plenary session itself.

When the Congress opened on 18th August, fifty-nine NUSes, according to IUS criteria, were present, an increase of sixteen. Apart from the 13 NUSes from communist countries, 14 representative NUSes were now members of the IUS, 7 of whom came from Latin America, 4 from Africa and 3 from Asia. (239) Associate membership was or had been granted to 13 NUSes, of whom 3 came from Latin America, 6 from Africa, 2 from Asia and lastly to the two Belgian organizations. (240) (At its last congress the Flemish NUS had decided to apply for associate membership and work within both international organizations for the realization of world student unity. The Wallonian delegation had been mandated to take the same position as the Flemish. Its application for associate membership was subsequently approved by the Wallonian NUS) The number of overseas student organizations that were granted NUS status had increased to 9 (241) and that of the minority groupings regarded as an NUS to 10. (242)

When Jiri Pelikan had presented the Executive report to the Congress, accompanied by an aggressive and cynical appraisal of the ISC, a five-day session started during which every delegation had the opportunity to comment on the report. As usual, the various delegations used their speaking time to express political views and hardly referred to the actual report. The two subjects common to most interventions were denunciation of American imperialism and its allies, ISC and COSEC, and the Soviet disarmament proposals.

The procedure practiced at the previous Congress whereby secretariat members could speak on behalf of their respective NUSes was once more applied and even the forty-year old Pelikan was still a member of the Czech delegation. Again requests for the floor had to be made in advance, so that the speakers' list could be arranged accordingly. Whenever observers or NUSes who were critical of the IUS mounted the rostrum, loyal delegates could contradict their statements immediately afterwards. Most interventions were no different from those in Bagdad, only the tone was sharper again.

Almost all delegates of the group loyal to the IUS were able to give examples of US imperialism in their own countries and supported the peace policy of the heroic Soviet leaders. The 10th ISC events provided the Latin American NUSes especially with an opportunity to express their opinion on the ISC in general and COSEC in particular. The Venezuelan representative gave a pungent description of the stifling effects on Latin America of US imperialism which was supported by COSEC. President Betancourt was a notorious imperialist lackey and the IUS alone backed the Venezuelan students in their fight against this puppet. The wild ovation he received was drowned by the playing of the record "Cuba si, Yankee no". The whole Congress joined in the singing in praise of the heroic Latin American fighters. The Puerto Rican delegate gave a full account of how it had been treated by the ISC and declared, pointing to the COSEC delegation, that these people had been so shameless as to claim they supported the Puerto Rican struggle for independence. If this were true, why had they sent a RIC team of spies to the island, who had asked for FUPI's membership list with the intention of having COSEC and the American NUS pass these names on to the State Department and the FBI? But FUPI had seen through these tactics and refused to show its lists to these lackeys of imperialism. Then the FBI had instructed COSEC to expel FUPI from the ISC. And again there was thundering applause, flowers, kissing and cheers.

It was the first time a COSEC delegation attended an IUS Congress. It had been mandated by the ISC to inform the IUS on the unity proposals adopted by the Quebec conference and to set forth to the participants the real purpose of the ISC. When the spokesman of the delegation had been given the floor to make his intervention and reply to the various questions asked during the session, he mentioned in full the nature and methods of the ISC. He expressed his regret that both the Executive report and the various speakers had repeatedly spoken of two groups within the ISC, one for and one against unity, completely ignoring the fact that the ISC brought together christian democrats, communists, socialists,

liberals, mohammedans, buddhists and many others, who ten years long had succeeded in finding a basis for cooperation. It had been asserted again and again that there was now a split within the ISC between pro- and anti-imperialists. Apart from the fact that all NUSes who had left the hall had declared their wish to continue operating within the framework of the ISC, how could it be argued that the remaining NUSes, 60 per cent of whom came from Africa, Asia and Latin America, were pro-imperialist? He read to the Congress several resolutions expressing the opinion of the ISC. These could not possibly be regarded as tactics of the State Department.

And yet after the COSEC intervention the negative tone continued. Only the representatives of the middle group tried to break the IUS's hostility towards the ISC. The North African NUSes, Chile, Nigeria, Ethiopia and some others all had objections against the ISC, but they refused to see the ISC as a servile instrument in the hands of a big power. They could not accept the passages in the draft resolution on unity which read "the leading group dominating the ISC, which imposes its policy with a small majority" and "the ISC cannot constitute a valuable platform for genuine international student cooperation". These passages were insulting to the ISC NUSes not associated with imperialism, because they implied they let themselves be taken in. Such a resolution did not further unity since it expressed no respect for other opinions. The resolution was then somewhat diluted and spoke of majority instead of leading group. A paragraph praising the high-principled stand of the minority was deleted.

The middle group clashed once more with the IUS when France proposed to add to the resolution on the fight for civil rights in the USA a paragraph expressing the Congress's appreciation for the American NUS's active participation in this campaign. But the majority felt this participation was not effective enough to be mentioned. FUPI maintained that it would be confusing if the IUS praised an organization which had often proved to be pro-imperialist and this argument turned the scale.

As we have seen, not all IUS members were prepared to blindly accept the secretariat's proposals. This was illustrated

most clearly by the Japanese NUS, Zengakuren, which had been a loyal member of the IUS from the very beginning. Its activities in Japan were mainly directed at the problem of nuclear armament with which the Japanese students felt closely concerned. In the past it had fully taken the Soviet line on disarmament, but Soviet violation of the moratorium had come to Zengakuren as a stab in the back. Ever since, it had always opposed all nuclear testing by any power. Indignant that the test ban negotiations had been delayed by resumption of the experiments, they had, on their way to Leningrad, demonstrated on the Red Square in Moscow with banners: "Stop the tests in East and West". The subsequent fight with the police had roused their indignation. Because of the treatment they had received, they had drafted a memorandum which they wanted to distribute among the participants of the IUS Congress. But the Soviet delegation confiscated the documents with the threat that they would be expelled within 24 hours if they did not observe the local laws.

But the Japanese were not to be deterred. In the plenary session they declared that any justification of nuclear tests was absurd and immoral. If any people was competent to speak on these matters, it was the Japanese. Convinced marxists as they were, they did not want Khrushchev to delude the world proletariat into the belief that Soviet tests were defensive in nature. If peaceful coexistence meant that such tests could be resumed needlessly, this policy was nothing but humbug. They strongly protested against the fact that the IUS wished to remain deaf and blind to this question. Just as China did not serve the interests of world communism by declaring disarmament to be impossible for the time being, so the Soviet Union was insincere when attaching importance to its own defense rather than to the interests of the world proletariat.

Although this speech had been expected, it had the effect of a bomb-shell. It was followed not by applause but by indignant booing and hammering on the desks. Burma stepped forward to declare that there should be at least one power for peace as against the imperialist forces. The Cuban

delegate asserted that it was to this power for peace that its island owed its independence. Albania praised the defensive tests of the Soviet Union and China regarded the Soviet tests as antibiotics to American germs. Shrugging his shoulders the Soviet delegate closed the incident by saying that there would always be people ready to mislead public opinion for money.

When every delegation had made his intervention, the Congress resolved itself into commissions for the preparation of resolutions. Once again the secretariat members occupied the key-positions on behalf of their NUSes.

A confrontation between the Soviet and Chinese lines could no longer be staved off and almost two full days were devoted to the resolution on peace. (243) The resolution had been drafted along the official Soviet line as supported two weeks earlier by the WPC. It placed emphasis on disarmament which was now possible because the peace powers in the world had become so strong that they could check the imperialists. The struggle for national independence was not mentioned, except for one brief reference. The resolution stated that withdrawal of foreign bases and conversion of the armament budget to assistance to the third world would considerably promote the progress of this struggle.

This approach was completely unacceptable for the Chinese. They received the backing of the Asian communist NUSes, most Latin Americans and practically all African NUSes who considered national independence to be at least as important as peace. A large group therefore supported Guatemala's proposal to add the words national independence after peace. The secretariat members and the Eastern European delegations desperately argued that there was a separate commission on the question of independence and that these two concepts should not be confused. Of course, the movement for independence was important, but one should not deviate from the subject.

After a lengthy discussion on the pros and cons, Pelikan suddenly announced that the question had been studied exhaustively and that the Guatemalan amendment was fully in keeping with the IUS's traditional policy. The amendment

was carried with no votes against and four abstentions! . . .

Then China proposed its most important amendment, deleting the paragraph on the salutary effect of disarmament on the movement for independence. The paragraph was to read instead that suppressed peoples had to support the movement for disarmament, but that they ought to concentrate on struggle for independence first.

China defended this amendment by arguing that disarmament could only come after independence, since peace could be achieved by independence alone. The Secretariat strongly opposed this argument which it regarded as an attempt to berate the value of disarmament. It maintained that the resolution had to be worded in a way so as to also gain support in the West. National independence was a less popular issue in the West and should not be associated with this resolution.

Needless to say that this argument did not convince China. When after a lengthy debate in which Pelikan personally defended the secretariat line, the question was put to the vote, many proved to support China's view. Then Pelikan also voted in favour and the amendment was carried by 31 votes to 3 with 7 abstentions. . . .

Finally, the Chinese objected against the paragraph praising and welcoming the results of the Moscow WPC Congress. The WPC had paid no attention to the movement for national independence and therefore deserved no praise. But this would belittle the WPC's work too much and the secretariat could not cede on this point. The Congress had made an effective contribution to world peace and deserved support. Although Indonesia argued that the IUS had not informed anyone on this Congress and that it would therefore be ridiculous to praise and welcome its results, the secretariat did not give in and the amendment was defeated by 8 votes to 21 with 12 abstentions. This brought the score up to 2 to 1 for the Chinese, but since the Soviet Union had entered the contest leading 10 to 1, the Chinese successes were negligible.

Meanwhile the other commissions had finished their work

with less difficulty. Only Nigeria had asked why the IUS wanted to unite Laos, Korea, Vietnam and China, but insisted on a partitioned Germany with a free and demilitarized Berlin. This question was ruled out of order, however.

In the plenary session, resolutions were carried unanimously or almost unanimously without difficulty. The only new point raised was the financial report, but interest was slack. Greater was the interest in Gagarin who was hailed by the Congress and talked about peace. Finally, 36 organisations were elected to the Executive. A remarkable fact was that here again no North African Union wanted to stand for election.

Striking a balance of the Congress afterwards, one noted how several fractions were slowly crystallizing within the once so monolithic IUS. The centre group was formed by the NUSes who had remained loyal to the Soviet line. To their left were China's followers, supported by the radical communists from the minority groups. And at some distance from both, the neutral NUSes from the middle group watched the proceedings. The latter showed that they did not want to cause too many difficulties for the IUS, but at the same time tried to have their honest conviction respected where possible. The way in which they defended the IUS within the ISC and the ISC within the IUS was evidence of a positive neutrality.

The only difference was that they knew the IUS to be rigid, restricted in its freedom of action. Within the ISC, however, they met a group of flexible NUSes who had to render account to no one but themselves. This explains why they could use other methods within the ISC with a real chance of swaying the vote, whereas within the IUS such methods would only be successful on minor points.

Thus both assemblies of the summer 1962 strongly stimulated the creation of a self-conscious and positive middle group which wanted to change both international structure for the better.

XXIV . DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1962 AND 1964

In the months following the congress summer of 1962, the members of both international organizations worked hard to ensure that appeals for international student solidarity at critical times were not made in vain. In the autumn the sabotage act was decreed in South Africa which crushed all hopes that Verwoerd had still some respect for justice. In Mississippi the negro student James Meredith found the doors of the university closed. In the last weeks of October and the first week of November China invaded India. In South Vietnam resistance to the Diem family regime was growing and burning buddhist monks tried to draw the world's attention to the country's plight.

On 22nd October President Kennedy announced that the presence of Soviet rockets forced him to blockade Cuba. During the days that followed the world held its breath seeing the threaten of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA. In Iraq the hateful Kassem regime was overthrown on 8th February, 1963 and dictatorship abolished. In the same month some hundred African students left Bulgaria in protest against the discrimination they had suffered. And we could quote several other cases in which NUSes asked their sister organizations for support.

In several fields the views of the ISC NUSes, IUS NUSes and the IUS secretariat proved to be concurrent. Where South Africa (244) and Mississippi (245) were concerned, IUS and ISC NUSes agreed that these forms of racism were unacceptable. Needless to say that the world press's attention to the situation in Mississippi and Alabama was a strong support for those in the USA who wanted to end all forms of discrimination. When the problem disappeared from the world press, ISC and IUS continued to bring it under the attention of students and their governments. This was also true in the case of the South African apartheid policy where it was clearly proved that no government in the world can

any longer for reasons of colour deprive part of the population of its most fundamental rights without evoking the indignation of world public opinion. On Vietnam and the situation under the Diem regime, the IUS and ISC could also agree to some extent (246), as they did on the Cuban blockade (247). Only the IUS statements did not mention that, for all the Soviet denials, Cuba did in fact have rockets. Most ISC NUSes strongly opposed the blockade which threatened to lead the world on the brink of war, but felt that the presence of Soviet rockets did not promote peace either.

Opinions were, however, diametrically opposed on China's aggression, Kassem's downfall and discrimination against African students in Bulgaria. The IUS's complete silence on the first event (248) was no surprise. It already had enough trouble with China. But its reaction to Kassem's downfall was incredible:

"Once more the reactionaries and imperialists have drowned Iraq in a sea of blood. Fascist gangs, modelled after the Hitlerite brown shirts have been let loose on patriotic elements, who are defending independence and fighting for democracy." (249)

It is true that within a year the new regime in Iraq forgot its democratic principles, but the IUS statement was not applicable to the short period in which the Iraqi people laid down its own rules. More striking still was its comment on discrimination in Bulgaria. As we said before, some hundred African students had left this country in protest against their treatment by the Bulgarian authorities and students. To defend their rights to the government they had tried to set up an organization of their own, but it was forbidden by the authorities and its executive arrested. Large groups of African students demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Education and organized a sit-in in the building until the Minister wanted to receive them. Through the intervention of their ambassador, twenty Ghanaian students were able to leave the country. The others were forced to stay in Sophia since the authorities refused to let them change their Bulgarian money into dollars with which they were to pay their tickets.

On the insistent request of the Ghanaian group, COSEC collected funds among the various NUSes, thus enabling the African students to pay for their travel. (250) Shortly afterwards they received scholarships and were able to continue their studies elsewhere.

One might have the impression that this action was not completely free of cold war elements. But then one forgets that the ISC had already given similar assistance for years and that since 1957 a separate ISC agency, the International University Exchange Fund, had been working in this field. Through this fund's intermediary, hundreds of scholarships had been granted to students who for racial, political or religious reasons were deprived from higher education. This was another case of students who suffered from discrimination and had, by currency restrictions, been prevented from leaving the country.

Today it is generally recognized that peaceful coexistence of different races on a basis of respect and equality is a problem of world-wide importance. Only the firm application of all groups involved can make this problem disappear. Just as malaria is not eradicated when a government declares its intention of fighting this disease, so racial prejudice does not disappear automatically at the moment when a government bases itself on the principle of non-discrimination. Unfortunately, no country in the world can claim that all its inhabitants are one hundred per cent free of racial prejudice. But the IUS proved unable to admit this. Having been asked by many NUSes to make investigations together with the Bulgarian NUS, the IUS first commented upon the events in April 1963. An IUS delegation had visited Bulgaria and spoken to more than 1,000 foreign students. This inquiry had revealed no trace of discrimination in any of Bulgaria's universities. On the contrary, Bulgarian youth was hospitable and kind and stood shoulder to shoulder with African youth in its struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The students who had left the country had trespassed the law and rules of the country and were not supported by those who remained. (251)

Despite this report African student continued to leave

Bulgaria. They reported that the IUS delegation in question had consisted of one single man, the Indian IUS Vice-President Chauduri, who had reproached them for having demonstrated in a socialist country and dismissed their evidence of discrimination as absurd. (252)

There is no need to discuss these events any further, but it is sad that the IUS so clearly wanted to prove that people are better by definition in Eastern Europe than anywhere in the world.

In spite of differences of opinion on such issues, ISC/IUS cooperation continued to be discussed. From 23rd to 27th March, 1963, the Tunisian NUS organized a seminar for an informal study of the "Structures of the International Student Movement and the Means of Realizing Universal Cooperation". In organizing this seminar UGET hoped to pave the way for an RTC and therefore invited all NUSes to discuss, outside the framework of ISC and IUS, the possibilities and problems of world student unity. UGET had asked both the ISC and the IUS Congress for their support and both assemblies had endorsed the initiative in special resolutions. (253) Great hopes were placed on this seminar, since it was the first attempt to analyze the situation outside the two existing structures. But time proved not ripe even for such a seminar.

When the Seminar began 49 NUSes, i.e. 14 from Western Europe, 8 from Eastern Europe, 10 from America, 8 from Africa and 2 from Asia, appeared to have accepted UGET's invitation. ISC and IUS observers had been invited to provide participants with documentation and information, if necessary.

But to the surprise of many delegations nine members of the IUS secretariat, in addition to the official IUS representative Chauduri, had come from Prague and taken the seats of their representative NUSes. (254) Having asked for clarifications in the corridors, the Danish NUS recalled at the opening of the seminar the decision to hold this seminar completely outside the framework of IUS and ISC. Therefore, anyone holding a full-time position in one of the two organizations should be satisfied with an observer's seat. The IUS staff protested indignantly that they represented their NUSes and that no one had the right to interfere with the choice of

their NUSes. The meeting adjourned to discuss the situation.

The supporters of the Danish view argued in the corridors that they did not question the sovereignty of the IUS NUSes. But in their capacity as IUS secretariat members, the delegates concerned had accepted the responsibility of implementing the IUS resolutions regardless of the stands of their NUSes. The RTC resolution clearly stated that both the RTC and the preparatory seminars were to be held completely outside the existing international structures. It was not without reasons that IUS and ISC had adopted this standpoint, for it were these two organizations that would form the subject of discussion at these events. Had there been any purpose in talks between the two secretariats, such a decision would have been taken. However, it had been the wish to keep this seminar completely outside the sphere of the secretariats. Even if the NUSes concerned had decided to accredit their representatives in the IUS secretariat, the latter's acceptance of this mandate was still contradictory to their personal responsibility towards the IUS.

But the IUS staff replied: "Return to the conference, apologize, and stop your provocations!" Deeply disappointed the Arab NUSes, led by UGET, tried to mediate, but without success. The Danes and with them the representatives of 11 other NUSes stood by their view that the seminar would be meaningless if the IUS was not prepared to respect the original intentions. The IUS staff, on the other hand, maintained that no one had the right to curtail the freedom of their NUSes in choosing their delegates.

The Seminar reconvened and the Danish NUS asked for the floor and declared on behalf also of the other eleven NUSes: (255)

"In this light we consider the attendance of 9 members of the IUS secretariat as a serious and premeditated provocation. In this way the IUS secretariat has effectively sabotaged the genuine intentions and aspirations of these student organizations who regarded this seminar as an important step which could lead to increased student cooperation throughout the world.

We fail to see how individuals who are working full-time at the IUS headquarters in Prague, or for that matter in the Coordinating Secretariat (COSEC) in Leiden, can be expected suddenly to disregard their loyalties to these two existing international structures. We consider this to be especially important as it is a generally recognized fact that universal cooperation can only be achieved outside these structures and that any progress in this direction will require a frank evaluation of both the IUS and the ISC."

Then he announced that the twelve NUSes in question felt obliged to abstain from further participation in the work of the Seminar. (256)

While the Seminar continued, further attempts to reach an agreement were made in the corridors. Once more UGET brought representatives of the two groups together and expressed its regret that both parties stood so firmly by their views. It could understand that the twelve found it difficult to accept the IUS secretariat's attempt to control the seminar but was also alive to the impossibility for the IUS staff to suddenly abandon their seats and leave their NUSes unrepresented. UGET proposed to bury the hatchet and include in the final communiqué a paragraph reading:

"The Seminar stated that it would be profitable in the future, in order that considerable progress could be made in the field of cooperation, if NUSes mandated representatives other than those who fill posts in the international organizations." (257)

This proposal guaranteeing the independence of future seminars was accepted by the twelve NUSes. They promised to return to the meeting. Mr. Chauduri declared that he also accepted this solution and would present it to the IUS staff. Hardly ten minutes later, however, the Soviet representative in the IUS secretariat, Yaravoi, announced that this was a slanderous and unacceptable proposal. He refused to compromise on the sovereign power of the Soviet NUS to mandate whatever delegate it wished. This closed the incident and the twelve did not return

to the seminar hall.

That same evening a cynical UGET president informed the participants that the Japanese NUS had sent a cable, expressing its regret at not being able to send a representative, but wishing the Seminar full success. The Japanese IUS Vice-President, Ishii, claimed that this cable was probably based on a mistake and that he would contact his NUS. . . .

In value the seminar had lost by the absence of so many unions as much as the RTC had three years earlier by the absence of the IUS, and yet it was a very important meeting for various reasons. It was remarkable that the French and two Belgian NUSes had decided to stay on, since they felt that joining the twelve would be incompatible with their neutrality. How difficult genuine neutrality was, however, became clear when another incident arose on account of the Iraq situation. The IUS member in this country, GUSIR, which had gone with the Kassem regime through thick and thin, had disappeared when the regime was overthrown and continued to exist only among Iraqi students in Moscow and London. The students who had joined the clandestine opposition against Kassem, had formed the National Union of Iraqi Students (NUIS) which was strongly supported by the Iraqi students. When the IUS staff proposed a resolution expressing solidarity with GUSIR, all Arab NUSes were indignant and left the hall, led by UGET. In order not to destroy the Seminar completely, the resolution was changed into a declaration of solidarity which could be signed outside the framework of the Seminar. (258) The Arab NUSes, though deeply disturbed, returned to the hall.

Meanwhile the position of the French and Belgian NUSes was somewhat confusing since they had neither signed the declaration of solidarity with GUSIR nor left the hall in solidarity with NUIS. In this way they were trying as middle group to achieve what they could without offending anyone.

The outcome of this Seminar brought nothing new. Another appeal (259) was made for the creation of an IPC with a purely technical mandate for the organization of an RTC as soon as possible. But everyone knew that an IPC on which

the Soviet NUS, the Chinese NUS and the American NUS would have to sit together, would have little chance of reaching an agreement. The Chinese hard line made unity on principles a very remote possibility.

XXV. THE ISC AT THE CROSSROADS

To understand the stormy life of the ISC in the years 1962-64, we should refer briefly to the months following the Quebec conference of 1962. The majority as well as the minority group, with the exception of the NUSes hostile to the ISC, were disillusioned by the split. After their return to their countries, they reviewed the situation.

The majority group felt that, considering the purpose and structure of the ISC, its decision concerning FUPI had been the only possible one. The Conference derived its authority from its representativity. Undermining this representativity was undermining the ISC itself. The minority group, however, felt that the majority might be right legalistically, but that the ISC's task was more important than its structure. If this task was hampered by its structure, the structure had to be adapted to the task and not vice-versa. Having defined its principles and declared that it was the duty of the NUSes to support fully the application of human rights, the ISC ought to seek the most effective methods. If the present structure offered no place for a militant organization such as FUPI, then something was fundamentally wrong.

Gradually, the two groups became less emotional in their discussions and began to seek a solution. The group hostile to the ISC continued attacking the ISC majority in the IUS publications, but it was the tone of the middle group, willing to take any opportunity to free the ISC from its impasse, which carried most weight. Several Unions from this group decided to continue supporting the ISC and to help keep it viable.

But it was not only the NUSes who were concerned about the deadlock in which the ISC found itself. The secretariat members also saw with anxiety how the ISC had become a subject of dispute and how confusion increased. They therefore decided to convene all NUSes, who felt involved in this discussion, at a seminar to analyze the past, present and future of the ISC.

This International Study Seminar was held in August, 1963 in Leysin, Switzerland and was attended by 31 NUSes (from the majority and middle group). Many students who had been involved in the ISC in the course of its history, had also been invited to inform the participants on what had been regarded as essential in their time. In a panel discussion the representatives of England, France, Tunisia, Guatemala and South Africa exchanged ideas on the purpose and possibilities of international student cooperation and discussed in how far the ISC met their demands. (260)

During the first days of the Seminar many expressed the opinion that the ISC's deadlock was not surprising. Since Edinburgh (1952) the ISC's structure had remained essentially unchanged. But at that time the participants had had very different intentions. Scared of a repetition of the IUS's development, they had decided on a very loose structure, placing most emphasis on the NUSes' autonomy. This structure had no membership, no executive and no one had to abide by joint decisions. In fact what it amounted to was a meeting of the Unions once every year and later once every two years, where joint positions were taken. The secretariat, which had been created very reluctantly, received purely technical mandates from the Conference and could never act on behalf of the participating NUSes. It could publicize joint positions but not make the slightest change. Only where technical mandates were concerned, the secretariat had the power to take all necessary measures for the implementation of the technical programme.

But since Edinburgh the ISC had concerned itself with totally different questions. Apart from the purely technical programme, the agenda now included questions that required a political rather than a technical solution. The technical conference of the past had developed into a dynamic conference which no longer wished to concern itself with student lodging and exchanges alone. It tried to contribute to the solution of other but no less essential problems that affected students. And in the course of the years these problems had begun to demand increasing attention. But the structure within which they wanted to work had remained unchanged. It was not

surprising that the machinery had jammed in two places: the position of the secretariat and the relationship between the ISC and the participating NUSes. Whether intentionally or not, COSEC was identified with the ISC. But COSEC could not live up to this reputation, because it could not issue any statement on what was most important for many NUSes, the ISC's political stand. After the Conference the secretariat could only inform the various authorities of what the ISC had decided but if the situation deteriorated or if other situations required attention, COSEC had to remain silent. In such cases the secretariat could only circulate the documentation sent by the NUS concerned and request the other NUSes to give effective support in accordance with the principles of the ISC. It was the NUSes who had to stand by their convictions in the period between conferences. Only they could take action outside the scope of the ISC programme. The situation was even more complicated when new NUSes arose and requested ISC assistance in the implementation of their programme. In those cases, the secretariat was forced to tell them that cooperation would be possible as soon as the next ISC had decided upon their representativity. Meanwhile COSEC could keep them informed on the ISC's activities and draw the attention of NUSes recognized by the ISC to these unions' problems. But it could do no more. As a result, these NUSes reached the conclusion that many NUSes supported them but that COSEC or, in other words, the ISC could be of no assistance. Was this static structure not in flagrant contrast to the dynamism and claims of the Conference? In preserving this structure, did the ISC not discredit its steadfastness of principle?

As a result of this structure, several NUSes had come to regard COSEC as an institution which carried out a large number of projects and which once every two years convened a Conference called ISC. This Conference decided on the implementation of a vast programme and expressed its opinion on a large number of political questions. But apparently COSEC attached little importance to the latter, since they were no longer mentioned after the conference and COSEC only organized more practical projects than ever

before. It did regularly publish the opinions of various NUSes on political issues, but never took a stand itself. Strong political support should, therefore, be asked from the various NUSes, since COSEC could only be expected to take apolitical action.

Was it surprising that a growing number of NUSes came to the Conference to meet practically all NUSes from all parts of the world, but felt little attracted politically to COSEC which was the only tangible element of the ISC that remained afterwards? Was the ISC just a large number of NUSes plus an organizing body? Or did the ISC represent more? If so, what did they expect from the ISC and what of the international student movement?

During lengthy discussions on these problems, the different views slowly began to blend and the participants reached the conclusion that the ISC in its present form could no longer meet the requirements. They decided to draft a joint declaration, setting forth what they regarded as essential in the international student movement.

This Declaration of Leysin became an inspired and dynamic document, expressing clearly the purpose of international student cooperation. (260)

It started from the principle that the student as a seeker after truth has a responsibility which commits him to participate actively in the development of his society. His concept of society must be based on equality of man and his right to a life free from fear, want and oppression. Consistent application of human rights and total eradication of all forms of oppression alone can lead to such a society and guarantee peace.

Many readers may find these ideas and purposes lofty and utopical, but this does not make them any less true. Their acceptance by many students will not change the world overnight. But it is important that an increasing number of people and groupings strive for these aims and join hands on universal level. This will create a climate in which opposing tendencies can at least be checked.

The second part of the Declaration spoke of the rights and responsibilities of NUSes on international level, while the third section was mainly devoted to the possibilities of a movement such as the ISC. It was acknowledged that these principles, though universal, were not acceptable to everyone and that therefore one should not expect world student unity to be possible within the framework of the ISC. Nonetheless, these principles should remain just as essential for the ISC, although it should not preclude contact with different opinions. Better were it to strive for universal cooperation where possible and where purposes coincided.

Finally, the Declaration discussed the structure of the ISC and stated that the Conference and its secretariat should be able to take appropriate action whenever ISC principles were violated. It was useless to lay down principles if these were not applied on every opportunity.

Several suggestions were made for adaptation of the ISC structure to its tasks. Having accepted this Declaration unanimously, the participants decided to present this document to the 11th ISC. All NUSes were requested to study this reorganization plan.

Within a few weeks the secretariat received the first reactions. The opinion of most NUSes on the document was positive and some even adopted it as basis for their own policy. The IUS, however, decried the Declaration as a fallacious and useless documents, designed to entice the credulous to support an ISC which, in fact, remained in the hands of the imperialists. The document reflected a desire to deepen the split in the international student movement as was illustrated by the paragraphs on so-called totalitarianism. For the Latin American group the document was also unacceptable, because the quantity of words turned attention away from genuine imperialism. And this group had yet another objection against the ISC and COSEC. The secretariat had presumed that all NUSes having presented their credentials to the Credentials Committee of the 10th ISC and recognized by the Conference, participated to the ISC unless they had expressly stated the contrary. For not one NUS had withdrawn its credentials and, on the contrary, the minority

had declared it would continue working for cooperation within the ISC. In accordance with this statement, COSEC had published the list of NUSes recognized by the ISC. The Latin American group had objected since this created the impression that they shared in the responsibility for the ISC's resolutions. To meet their objections, COSEC omitted thereafter the names of the minority group and the covers of the Information Bulletin listed only those NUSes which had attended the Quebec Conference to the very end. But the relationship between the minority group and the ISC remained uncertain. This was illustrated once more when the COSEC finance department had to send out requests to the NUSes for payment of their contributions. It told the minority group it was not sure whether these NUSes wanted to be listed as participants or not. If they regarded themselves as participants they would have all the rights and responsibilities of a participant. If not, they need not pay any contribution. They would still be able to participate in ISC events since these were open to all NUSes, but travel grants could only be given to participating unions.

Most minority unions informed COSEC that they did not wish to be regarded as having participated in the 10th ISC. The secretariat told them that their decision would be fully respected. To avoid misunderstandings, it clarified once more that they would still have access to all ISC events, but no longer be entitled to grants travel.

However, this did not solve the problem as became evident at the first session of the 11th ISC, held in Christchurch, New Zealand at the end of June 1964. (261) This ISC was attended by 55 NUSes, 17 from Africa and the Middle East, 10 from Asia, 18 from Europe and 10 from the American continent. But more important is to see which NUSes did not participate.

First the members of the groups hostile to the ISC did not attend. In spring 1964 these NUSes had met and decided that participation in the ISC would only be useful if they could get the ISC to go their way. Otherwise they would have the choice between two alternatives: another walkout or accept that the majority of ISC NUSes had a different opinion. The

first alternative had been used in Quebec and was not suited for repetition. The second amounted to reconciliation and this they were not prepared to accept. They, therefore, decided on a third possibility, that of isolating the ISC. The more African, Asian and Latin American countries could be dissuaded from participating in the 11th ISC, the more the Conference would become a Western organization. So they intensified their attempts to portray the ISC as an imperialist organization in disguise. Thus, even on the eve of the Conference a number of African NUSes received a cable from Prague, requesting them to withdraw in solidarity with the NUSes not present.

The group of NUSes who had informed COSEC that they did not want to be regarded as having participated in the 10th ISC, were also absent. Many of them had requested travel grants, but as COSEC already told them months in advance, it had no mandate to do so.

This was the cause of a lengthy discussion at the Conference, since all participants regretted the absence of NUSes for financial reasons. But the right or wrong of this policy was not easy to establish. According to resolution 184 of the 10th ISC, COSEC had the mandate to give travel grants to all NUSes having fulfilled their financial obligations or made an arrangement with SUPCOM. In addition, travel grants could be given to new NUSes that did not exist at the time of the 10th ISC.

Many had accused COSEC of wanting to exclude these NUSes from the ISC for political reasons. (262) An argument in their support was the fact that the New Zealand government refused to grant visas to the IUS delegation. This refusal roused the indignation of everyone, since the government had previously warranted that no one would be refused entrance into the country. Had this guarantee not been given, the ISC could not have been held in New Zealand. The New Zealand government argued, however, that no one could oblige it to admit foreigners who were liable to prosecution under the law in their own country. (263) The ISC did not accept this argument and drafted a strongly-worded resolution of protest. (264) Had the IUS sent a second delegation,

it would probably have been able to enter the country without any further difficulties, considering the critical comments in the press. Now only a reporter of "World Student News" was present to observe the conference on behalf of the IUS.

As far as these visas were concerned, it was impossible to assert that the ISC wished to exclude the IUS, but opinions continued to differ on the question of travel grants. COSEC argued that there would have been all the more reason to call its policy arbitrary, had it given travel grants to NUSes not covered by the appropriate resolution. To avoid this impression, all NUSes throughout the world should be given grants if they so requested. That at least would have been a completely unpartisan transgression of its mandate. But it would have been in outright contradiction to the letter and spirit of the resolution. Thus it had been impossible for COSEC to make an exception for just some NUSes. If it wished, the ISC could as yet send travel grants to these NUSes, but it could not accuse COSEC of not abiding by its mandate. The NUSes concerned had been fully informed of the consequences of their decision for COSEC. A number of these NUSes had independently raised funds to pay for their travel or had arrived in Christchurch with the assistance of some other NUSes.

Though legalistically COSEC was right, some NUSes continued to deplore this development which had caused the absence of the minority group in Quebec. This was mainly due to the wording of resolution 184 of the 10th ISC which had been copied more or less mechanically from Klosters and Peru. (265) It was impossible to blame the NUSes from the minority group for not wishing to review their attitude towards the ISC for the sake of travel grants, if they felt that the Quebec events gave them no reason for doing so.

Despite the absence of these Unions, the 11th ISC became a memorable event in the history of the international student movement. Having declared for fourteen years that the ISC was not an organization but just a meetingplace for all NUSes who set store by international student cooperation, the participants reversed their opinion and decided, for the

reasons mentioned earlier, to create an organization.

The reactions to the Declaration of Leysin which COSEC had received indicated that many NUSes realized the time had come to accept the consequences of the course they had hesitantly taken in Istanbul and confirmed in Klosters. But if the ISC in Christchurch were to decide on such a reversal, the NUSes should clearly define why they organized themselves within a new-fashioned ISC, what they wanted to achieve and how. On the basis of the reactions the secretariat had therefore decided to draft a charter. This charter was presented to the Supervision Committee which, after a few changes, submitted it to the ISC for its consideration.

Before the Conference embarked on a paragraph by paragraph discussion, the various NUSes expressed their opinion on the idea of such a radical change. Even those NUSes who had been the staunchest supporters of the student-as-such clause had, without exception, arrived at the conclusion that this step was the inevitable consequence of the greater responsibility the ISC had assumed. They realized that the charter would mark a turningpoint in the history of the ISC. The ISC as unfettered forum open to all representative NUSes would belong to the past. In its place would be created a movement which would welcome all who endorsed its purpose. The new-fashioned ISC should interpret the ideals of the NUSes and have a structure which enabled it to further effectively the realization of these ideals.

Having been accepted unanimously as basis for the discussion, the draft charter was debated in full detail for five days and two nights. The participants realized they should examine this document with the greatest care, first because they should strive for perfection, making the charter universal and non-partisan. Second, because no NUS should abstain from endorsing the charter for reasons of faulty formulation. As a result, dozens of amendments were made both in content and for the sake of clarity. The African delegations in particular were careful in removing all possible pitfalls from the final text which might prove an obstacle to the middle group. On 25th June, at 6 a. m., the charter was

finally adopted unanimously with great applause. (266)

This charter clearly defined the purposes of the new ISC. However, some remarks ought to be made concerning the structure.

The participants in the loose structure were to be replaced by members and associate members. Both still had to meet the criteria of a representative NUS, otherwise the authority of the ISC would be weakened considerably. The participants did not want an organization based on individual students gathered here and there within student organizations, but an international organization speaking of behalf of national student movements which enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the students in their countries and responsible to them.

The most important innovation was the clause that NUSes would qualify for membership only if they ratified the charter and gave evidence in their actions of support to this charter. This paragraph clearly demonstrated that the ISC wished to regard itself as an organization with a purpose. In the past this purpose had been of a quantitative nature - the gathering of the largest possible number of NUSes within one structure -, now it was qualitative: the implementation of the adopted principles. Anyone who did not wish to cooperate to this end should not join the ISC. Those who did take out membership, committed themselves to certain obligations.

If an organization such as the Afrikaanse Studenten Bond (ASB) applied for membership, it would have to state clearly that it no longer supported the apartheid policy and that it wished to fight for the principle of equal rights for all inhabitants of South Africa. Were it to give such a guarantee while giving no evidence in its action of having renounced apartheid, the ISC would not value its participation. However, many Latin American and African NUSes saw some danger in this formulation. The following ISCs might begin to closely analyze the activities of its members and this might lead to unpleasant situations. "Such and such a situation has arisen in country X. What was the reaction of the NUS in this country? And why did the NUS from country Y not give moral and material support to the students in country X?"

It would give everyone the right to inquire into the way in which member NUSes applied the ISC charter to concrete situations and the secretariat's interpretation would be binding. It might lead to a serious encroachment upon the NUSes' autonomy and turn the ISC into an organization where the majority dictated its opinion.

To avoid such a situation, it was decided that only when an NUS repeatedly acted in flagrant contradiction to the ISC's principles, membership could be refused.

Associate membership was created for NUSes who for one reason or another were unable to ratify the charter in its entirety, but did agree with the principles of the ISC. These NUSes would have the same rights as members, with the exception of the right to vote.

Supreme authority between conferences was once more entrusted to a Supervision Committee, composed of eleven member organizations from the different parts of the world. SUPCOM was to keep under review the work of the secretariat and to carry out all other mandates assigned to it by the ISC. SUPCOM was to appoint and dismiss the members of the secretariat on the basis of their capacities.

The Research and Information Commission (RIC) would continue to provide the participating NUSes with objective documentation. Finally, the secretariat was mandated to implement resolutions and specific projects and to take action, in consultation with SUPCOM and in accordance with the charter in all cases not covered by its mandate. The name Coordinating Secretariat was substituted by ISC Secretariat, the Administrative Secretary became Secretary General and would be assisted by Associate Secretaries from all continents.

After this lengthy discussion of the charter, the Conference resumed its normal work. RIC had presented eighteen reports based on the mandates of the previous ISC, and the participating NUSes raised another 21 issues. There was no change in the practical work of the Conference. The secretariat was mandated to implement a large number of practical projects, emphasizing the need for a more significant role of the NUSes in university and society. This was no different from the old

ISC. But the difference was remarkable in as far as relations with the IUS were concerned.

Once again the IUS had sent an open letter to the participants of the 11th ISC, setting forth the IUS stand on unity. (267) This letter insisted once more on the regrettable attitude of the 12 NUSes who had withdrawn from the Tunis Seminar for "completely ungrounded reasons":

"This seminar by UGET further proves that the leading group of ISC/COSEC NUSes only pays lip-service to questions of cooperation and unity, and in fact acts against such cooperation and unity. Such a paradoxical attitude, basically negative and sectarian, can only lead to a deepening of the antagonism between the leading forces and those unions inside the ISC who are striving for cooperation and unity. How should we interpret the results of the seminar organized by COSEC in Leysin, Switzerland? Such a seminar can in no way contribute to the development of international student cooperation, when it was attended only by a limited number of organizations and when not a single Latin American NUS was present, nor many others as well. It is not our business to judge how COSEC is implementing the resolutions of the ISC, but we can only express our astonishment at the fact, that COSEC presents the so-called "Leysin Declaration" as the student opinion on international student cooperation. How can the principle of cooperation as adopted by only 37 NUSes be definitive when the overwhelming majority of student organizations were not present?"

In continuation the IUS again stressed the need for an RTC organized outside the existing structures and prepared by a representative IPC. The second part of the letter contained proposals for joint activity, such as:

1. initiating direct cooperation and contact between the IUS secretariat and COSEC;
2. organizing a joint campaign for peace and peaceful coexistence;

3. organizing of joint activities in solidarity with the students and people of Spain, Portugal, Alabama and Mississippi, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, South Vietnam, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, North Kalimantan, Iraq, Panama, Cuba and Algeria.

If the ISC did not want to accept all proposals, it could also make a selection. If there were any questions, COSEC or a special ISC delegation could meet a special IUS delegation at the next IUS Congress and ask for clarifications.

In essence this open letter was no different from the other open letters which the IUS had sent the ISC in the past. Once more the ISC was given a choice from amongst several projects, some of which were in contradiction, others in agreement with the principles of the ISC. Previously the IUS proposals had been rejected as incompatible with the structure of the ISC, but now the situation was different. In accordance with the Charter which had just been adopted, the secretariat ought to do its utmost to realize the ideals of the ISC. In the fields where ISC and IUS action ran parallel, cooperation should be furthered. Nigeria and Switzerland therefore tabled a resolution, calling for universal student cooperation. This could not be achieved by a fusion of IUS and ISC nor by a world conference, which would have little chance of success. In accordance with the first item of the IUS open letter, the secretariat was mandated to contact the IUS directly for the elaboration of a joint statement of principles covering all possible fields. On this basis a joint programme of activities should be worked out.

Having received the enthusiastic backing of the majority of the delegations, this resolution which could bridge a rift of fourteen years, was adopted with no votes against and one abstention. (260) This marked the end of a long period in which the ISC had regarded the IUS as another kind of structure. It knew what the IUS was and what was to be expected from it. But it realized that it need not necessarily reject cooperation with the IUS if it promoted the realization of ISC ideals.

Thus the ISC ended in an optimistic mood such as had not

existed since Nigeria (1957). The new-fashioned ISC had taken a harmonious start and could move towards a dynamic development.

One of the first acts of the new-fashioned ISC was an open letter addressed by the Secretary General, the Englishman Gwyn Morgan, to the IUS. (268) The letter informed the IUS of the ISC resolution on joint cooperation and the unanimous support it had received. In continuation, it announced that the secretariat would send a delegation to the forthcoming IUS Congress to initiate cooperation between the ISC and the IUS secretariat. It proposed that the possibilities of joint action be discussed:

"We recognize that many proposals for joint action could be made on which our two organizations have decidedly different stands and which would, therefore, serve to prevent a positive first step towards cooperation. Consequently we make only a few proposals, which affect vitally world peace and on which joint action between our organizations would be warmly welcomed and enthusiastically supported by students from every corner of the world:

- a. Support for the Moscow test ban treaty and, furthermore, a condemnation of all nuclear tests whether conducted in the atmosphere or underground.
- b. A declaration of faith in the Charter of Human Rights and a call for its application in all parts of the world, whenever human rights are denied.
- c. A statement of support for the work of the United Nations and an appeal to all Governments to forgo out-dated nationalist attitudes and to give the UNO the fullest possible moral and material support in recognition of the unique role of the UNO in fighting for the dignity of man and for world peace."

XXVI. THE IUS AT THE CROSSROADS

In the previous chapter we have seen how events in the years 1962-64 had de decisive influence upon the development of the ISC and led finally to a reversal of policy in Christchurch. For the IUS these years were no less important, however. First the secretariat had been able to note an increase in membership on account of the Quebec events. The ISC deadlock had induced several NUSes from the middle group to maintain contact with both international organizations in the interest of the student movement as a whole. As a result, 7 student organizations joined the IUS in spring 1963 and 7 other organizations followed their example one year later. (269)

But it was not their affiliation which was decisive for the development of the IUS. The main obstacle during this period was still the conflict with the Chinese NUS, a true reflection of the Moscow-Peking dispute which was taking place at party level.

In the autumn of 1962 neither party took the trouble any longer to keep the conflict out of the public eye and began berating each other openly. The immediate reasons were both the Soviet attitude in the India-China conflict and Khrushchev's decision at the time of the blockade to withdraw his rockets from Cuba. It was no longer possible to restrict the dispute to a minimum in the outside world. Accusations of adventurism and capitulationism were fired from one party to the other. And in the spring, the Italians declared openly that it was ridiculous to attack Albania when the real target was China. The complete breach came in March 1963 when China attacked Khrushchev paraphrasing the historical first words of the communist manifesto: "A spectre is haunting the world, the spectre of real marxism-leninism and it treatens you. You have no confidence in the people and the people has no confidence in you." (270) One can read of the further development of the conflict elsewhere. It is

only important here to note that at the time of the 8th IUS Congress in 1964 the split was complete and the atmosphere bitter.

In March 1963 the Chinese NUS showed the IUS that it no longer believed in continuation of the traditional IUS policy. It contacted the Indonesian NUS, which in the previous years had moved even further to the left of president Sukarno, and tried to jointly organize an Afro/Asian/Latin American student conference where the "new emerging forces" would receive the place they deserved. (271) At the previous Afro-Asian Congresses, it had become clear that the Soviet Union was not recognized as an Asian power. Although the participants in the Conference could all be members of the IUS, this initiative would clearly imply separation from the IUS. The Chinese and Indonesian youth organizations took a similar initiative with regard to WFDY, in addition to which an Afro-Asian Youth Organization was to be created. The other front organizations (journalists, lawyers, radio, trade-unions, etc.) had already been confronted with similar tactics or would be in the near future.

Since the Chinese received little support, these rival organizations materialized only sporadically and none has been successful on IUS and WFDY level. Whatever the future might bring, the IUS secretariat knew clearly after March, 1963 that Peking was taking action and was no longer willing to accept the uncompromising stand of the secretariat.

This was illustrated by the next Executive Meeting. In February 1964 the different NUSes, elected as members of the Executive, met in Budapest. The Chinese delegation immediately began by protesting strongly against the Moscow test ban treaty concluded in the summer of 1963. This was an act of treason in surrender to USA nuclear blackmail. The IUS public statement of support was unforgivable. (272)

But the secretariat did not flounder. It was determined to obtain the meeting's support for the test ban treaty. After a heated debate during which the participants literally attacked one another, the Soviet stand received majority support and the IUS had taken, according to the Chinese, yet

another step along the erroneous line. The biting anti-imperialist tone of the resolutions, which branded even the peace corps as an example of imperialism's bankruptcy, could not make up for it. When debating its peace policy, the IUS refused to accept Chinese amendments which cited American imperialism as the main culprit whatever the occasion.

Although the IUS was willing to make some concessions, it was all too clear that it could expect no mercy from the Chinese at the next congress.

Finally this Executive Meeting decided that the next IUS Congress would take place in an African country, namely Nigeria. The interest of the Nigerian NUS and conditions in the country offered good prospects for the successful organization of the Congress. The Nigerian offer was, therefore, accepted and the secretariat was mandated to make the necessary preparations in cooperation with this NUS for the holding of the Congress in September. (273)

We do not know the detailed background to this decision, but the IUS secretariat's passivity in implementing this resolution proved that it was not very enthusiastic about it. It was not an attractive prospect to have to organize a Congress in a neutral country with a neutral host, when the Chinese would for the first time be in complete opposition. Despite the insistence of the Nigerian NUS no arrangements were made and by the beginning of August nobody knew if the Congress would be held at all. In September the secretariat finally informed the Nigerian and other NUSes that it had decided to accept the Bulgarian NUS's offer to hold the Congress in Sophia in November! As far as the ideological differences were concerned, the situation could be better controlled here from an organizational point of view and it would also be a rehabilitation for the Bulgarians after the discrimination affair of February 1963.

While NUSes throughout the world were closely watching developments within the IUS, another event occurred which made people look to the IUS Congress with greater interest. During the night of 13th October, 1964 the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was relieved of his duties and re-

placed by the duumvirate, Breznjev and Kosygin. The leader, once so venerated and respected, and certainly not only in the Soviet Union, was suddenly unmasked as an irresponsible adventurer. Was this a capitulation to China or did this adventurism refer to another aspect of his policy? It was clear that there would be a change of policy, but nobody knew what. And for the front organizations who were engaged in a fierce dispute with China, it was of utmost importance to know whether the change would affect foreign policy also. The cordial cable sent by Peking to the New Soviet leaders gave an initial indication that relations might improve. (274) But for the time being all outsiders were uncertain and there was a vacuum similar to that after Stalin's death. The first indication, however, that the new leaders would not change the Soviet position came three days later. For on 16th October, 1964, Peking exploded its first atom bomb. While the world heard the news with consternation, the Chinese government declared that:

"the test ban treaty was a big fraud to fool the people of the world that it tried to consolidate the nuclear monopoly held by the three nuclear powers and tie up the hands and feet of all peace-loving countries." (275)

This marked the end of the nuclear blackmail policy since, being in the hand of the "peace forces", the atom bomb was now reduced to a paper tiger. Of the dozens of messages of congratulations sent to Peking, none came from Eastern European countries (excluding Albania of course) nor from Moscow. This could be a clear indication that Moscow did not regard this bomb as a contribution to peace. (276)

But there was not yet absolute certainty about Moscow's position. Even if the new Soviet leadership were glad that China had entered the nuclear club, it still was doubtful whether it would openly say so. The communist world was disintegrating rapidly. Rumania no longer wanted to cooperate within the framework of the COMECON but instead wanted to determine its own policy. The Rumanian leaders established closer contact with the West and with

Peking and acted as mediators who spared the Soviet Union no criticism. (277) Further evidence of this disintegration was the number of requests from communist parties to the Russian leaders for clarification after Khrushchev's removal. They wanted to judge independently whether Khrushchev had erred or not and no longer wanted to rely on the Soviet Union's judgement alone. Positive reaction to the Chinese bomb could have made relationships between the parties explosive and it was, therefore, practically out of the question. The policy of peaceful coexistence was continued and the front organizations were to go on winning the support of Western countries for the Soviet policy on disarmament and against a MLF which would give West Germany a voice in nuclear armament policy.

Thus, it was not surprising that the IUS remained silent concerning the Chinese atom bomb. Only a month before it had organized, jointly with WFDY, a world youth forum in Moscow which called for cessation of all nuclear testing. Khrushchev himself had spoken to the participants and received a standing ovation. But when the Chinese exploded their bomb, the IUS could not be induced to proclaim its principles as in the past, since the culprit was still a member of the socialist camp, however split this might be. And it still had orders not to provoke the Chinese.

Whatever changes might have occurred in Moscow, it was clear that these did not have the slightest influence on the position of the Chinese who were determined to continue voicing their opinion. At the opening of the Congress on 28th November, 1964, the Executive was able to note with satisfaction that the IUS had grown to be the largest international student organization, since it comprised no less than 78 NUSes and had surpassed the ISC after more than ten years. But a careful analysis of the list of participants showed that at least 28 of these 78 organizations were overseas or minority groupings, not representative of the students of their countries. (278)

Of the remaining 50 NUSes 13 came as usual from communist countries, while 25 of the others were members and 12 associate members. Of these 25 members 12 came from

Africa, 10 from Latin America, 2 from Asia and 1 from Europe, while the figures were 4-2-2-4 in the same order among the associates. 15 of the 78 organizations on the membership list did not participate in the 8th IUS Congress and their membership was therefore uncertain. But it soon became evident that the geographical classification did not reflect the real situation at the Congress. The thirty-man Chinese delegation had secured the loyal support of Albania and Zanzibar which was represented by its Minister for Youth Affairs. In many cases, it could further count upon the support of North Korea, North Vietnam and Indonesia as well as that of a number of radical communist delegations from the third world who did not take a moderate approach to world problems. Then there was the Soviet following, including, apart from the Eastern European delegations, most of the secretariat members who as usual represented their respective NUSes. There were also the delegations gathered around Rumania who wanted to steer a middle course between Moscow and Peking. This group backed Peking in protest against the Congress direction and against the secretariat's tactics to influence the vote, whereas on most ideological issues they supported the Soviet point of view. And again the really independent NUSes saw most of the Congress's time being taken up by manoeuvring between these groups and tried either to mediate or to take advantage of any constructive opportunity.

Hardly had the Congress (279) begun when the conflict between the two major protagonists in the communist world broke out. When the participants had passed the Bulgarian militia control which closely guarded against the entrance of any outsider and after the heart-rending chant and trumpeting of the young pioneers, the Chinese delegate asked for the floor in order to suggest an amendment to the agenda. The first item on this agenda was the discussion of the IUS Executive report, one of the headings of which was the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Chinese delegate insisted to add the words "headed by the USA". This proposal was, however, rejected by the Congress.

Rumania then took the floor wishing to amend the standing orders so that important resolutions could only be adopted by a two-thirds majority. The secretariat, knowing how the votes lay, strongly opposed this amendment and it was also rejected.

But the Steering Committee and Credentials Committee had not yet been elected when China once more requested the floor for an urgent motion on the Congo. On 24th November, Belgian paratroopers had landed in Stanleyville with the permission of the Tshombe government to rescue the surviving white hostages from the hands of the rebels.

This act of aggression against the rival government of Sumaliot had aroused the profound indignation of the Chinese delegation which proposed the immediate discussion of a motion of protest:

"With their hands still stained with the blood of the Congolese national hero Patrice Lumumba, the US and Belgian imperialists have again brazenly launched aggression against the Congo and seized Stanleyville by force. . . US imperialism is not reconciled to its defeat in the Congo. Since its puppet Tshombe has failed in his attempt to stamp out the flames of the Congolese people's struggle for national independence, the Johnson administration has come out openly with sanguinary suppression and massacre against the fighting Congolese people. Imperialism, headed by the US, is the most ferocious enemy of the Congolese people, the peoples of Africa and the rest of the world."
(280)

This motion was discussed for two days, not because the participants wanted to change its tenor, but because none of the secretariat members wished to yield to the Chinese in expressing their solidarity. Several delegations having expressed their support for the Chinese motion, the Soviet delegation took the floor and proposed the sending of a strongly-worded cable of protest to President Johnson and a message to the progressive American youth, condemning American policy.

The Bulgarian chairman then proposed to have this important resolution discussed by a special sub-committee and to accept the Soviet cable there and then. Puerto Rico found this proposal somewhat strange since there was no need whatsoever for a commission to discuss this motion. The debate therefore continued and several other organizations read cables of protest to be sent to various governments and organizations involved. When practically everyone had expressed his solidarity with the Congo, FEANF proposed on behalf of 14 African organizations to close the discussion and accept the Chinese proposal. Several Eastern European delegations objected that they did not have the exact text. The meeting was therefore adjourned until the text was distributed.

The next morning the discussion started all over again. The Czech delegate felt that imperialism was a serious threat and that all its manifestations had to be fought. Several imperialist forces were involved in the Congolese crisis and it would be wrong only to name the US. He, therefore, proposed to add "Belgian, English and West-German" wherever US imperialism was mentioned in the declaration.

This met with strong opposition from the Chinese: (281)

"We regret very much that there are certain people who have talked a lot about anti-imperialism but when the problem touches the struggle against US imperialism which is the chief of all imperialism, then they want to avoid the essence of this problem."

Meanwhile, the African delegations had become greatly annoyed seeing how the Congolese issue was being misused by the Congress as an ideological battleground. To close the discussion the African group proposed to add "Belgian imperialism" and leave it at that. Rumania then asked Czechoslovakia to withdraw its amendment, since after all Africans were better judges of African affairs than Eastern Europeans! The last amendment accepted was one moved by the Belgian NUS calling upon the Belgian government to refrain from intervention in the future. One day before the

Belgian government had already complied with this request and paratroopers and hostages had left the Congo.

Thus, the Chinese motion was finally carried by 23 votes in favour, 3 against and 7 abstentions, under protest from China against the inclusion of several erroneous amendments.

To set the Congress at rest, the Executive decided to read the Executive report in full this time. The spokesman was not Jiri Pelikan, who having finished his studies in 1949 had come to the conclusion in 1963 that it was time also to put an end to his days as student-leader. In him the IUS lost one of its most amiable leaders who was highly appreciated by all the different groups both within and without the IUS. It was largely due to his leadership that the IUS overcame the crisis of 1956 and steadily increased its membership, so he certainly deserved the honorary membership bestowed upon him. The Czech NUS had nominated Zbynek Vokroulicky as his successor. One of Czechoslovakia's renowned journalists in the mid-fifties, he had initially been elected as member of the Central Committee of the Czech Journalist Union, but in April 1963 he was transferred to the Czech NUS Presidium and succeeded Pelikan within a month. (282)

The Executive report he presented was in keeping with the tradition. But remarkably more attention was paid to the Chinese standpoint at the expense of the report's homogeneity. Having painted all the horrors of nuclear war, the report stated:

"In view of this situation, the IUS stresses that the realization of the policy of peaceful coexistence among all nations with different social systems and based on full equality, mutual respect and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the recognition of complete sovereignty and the territorial integrity of nations, will be capable of preventing the outbreak of a new thermo-nuclear war and of guaranteeing a durable world peace. The principles of peaceful coexistence should not exist only among the great powers, but also between the big capitalist powers and the small countries and those which are developing and which have

different social systems such as China, Algeria, etc." (283)

A few paragraphs later the IUS asserted:

"But if the IUS speaks of world peace, of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and about general and complete disarmament, it wishes to make completely clear right from the start what it means by this, and what it is fighting for concretely. The IUS has not the slightest illusion about imperialism and its policies nor about the forces which are shaping up under new conditions, preparing terrifying means of mass destruction, new war adventures and a new world war. The IUS is well aware that the main danger to world peace and the independence of the peoples as well as the source of unjust and aggressive wars is the existence of imperialism. That is why we emphasize once more that the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not and will never mean coexistence of the oppressed and the oppressors, of the colonizers and the colonized. On the contrary, the IUS is convinced that the fight to achieve peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems absolutely requires the waging of a determined fight against imperialism and colonialism and the mobilization of as many peoples as possible in the fight against the main enemy of peace. To the same extent this is also true of the problem of general and complete disarmament. There can be no question of disarming nations, which are fighting against imperialism and colonialism for their liberation and independence." (284)

The report went on to speak of French and American nuclear tests, the different forms of American imperialism, West German provocations in Berlin, the Multilateral Force and other important issues, after which the audience was given a guided tour throughout the world during which many good and many evil situations were highlighted in countries

with which the Soviet government maintained either friendly (Sudan) or unfriendly (Gabon) relations. In passing it mentioned that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been drafted by the US State Department. (285)

The second part of the report dealt with democratization of education and pointed out in the usual manner what was being done in some countries and not in others.

The third part spoke of the growth of the international student movement, dwelling more than 20 pages on the ISC. The background of the Christchurch conference was that the majority of the ISC NUSes wanted to consolidate their position as leading group. It had, therefore, been ensured that none of the opponents, from the group in favour of international student cooperation, was present. The ISC Charter was a document full of ambiguities, but even so it was wiser to look at the deeds of the ISC. What support had the ISC given to FUPI, Cuba and other NUSes in the vanguard against imperialism? The IUS was convinced that the students of the world would not let themselves be deceived.

During the debate following the reading of the Executive report, this anti-ISC attitude was repeatedly manifested. It appeared that the ISC Charter had also been written by the State Department. Who were the individuals who requested observer status as an ISC delegation? FUPI felt that it would dishonour the IUS to grant observer status to the ISC, since it thereby admitted unmistakable agents of US imperialism.

Several African NUSes strongly protested against these assertions. The Tanganyikan delegation made it clear that the IUS's statements in the report on unity were nothing but humbug if it did not even want to talk with the ISC. After all, the ISC was the mouthpiece of a large number of NUSes who were not prepared to be taken for fools. After a lengthy discussion the ISC delegation was finally admitted by 21 votes in favour, 17 against and 9 abstentions. The proportionate division of votes was self-evident.

But it was not the status of the ISC delegation alone which caused great difficulties. First China had tried to promote a Japanese group as rival organization to Zengakuren and

then the application of the Israeli NUS (NUIS) developed into a considerable problem. The IUS secretariat had not been able to make a recommendation and left it to the Congress to decide whether or not the Israelis should be accepted. But this did not mean that the secretariat had no opinion, for one after the other the secretariat members got up to ask the Israeli delegation questions.

The East German secretariat member was the most eloquent of all. He accused Israel of close cooperation with West Germany since thanks to West German financing alone, Israel had been able to maintain itself as an imperialist stronghold in the Arab world. He wondered why the Israeli NUS had never sought contact with the East German NUS whose anti-fascism was common knowledge? In a long speech of defence, the Israeli NUS pointed to the work it had carried out in the spirit of the IUS. There was no need to give evidence of the NUS's anti-fascism and anti-racism. It gave several examples of its moral and material solidarity to Latin America and Africa. In the Middle East this NUS wanted nothing better than peace and a direct Arab-Israeli dialogue on mutual differences. It was working for a round table conference on the dispute and hoped that, through the intermediary of the IUS, relaxation of the situation could be achieved, in conformity with the mutual desire for peace. But these statements had no moderating effect on the Congress. The Arab NUSes, supported by the secretariat and certain Latin American NUSes would have no dealings with the Israeli NUS. An official Venezuelan delegation to Israel proved to have been a personal visit. Israeli support to students fighting US imperialism was nothing but demagoguery as long as the NUS did not work to change its government's imperialist activities in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Against this wave of accusations, Bolivia and Sierra Leone argued that it was ridiculous to hold the Israeli NUS responsible for the actions of its government, for in that case dozens of the NUSes present should leave the IUS. Nigeria stated that the only question relevant to Israel's admission was whether it

endorsed the principles of the IUS and wanted to act accordingly. But the Soviet delegation closed the debate, concluding that NUIS had supported several ISC resolutions, thereby proving its friendship with the imperialists. After a 14 hour debate Israel's application was rejected by 34 votes to 16 and 8 abstentions. Despite the intense indignation of the 16 NUSes who had voted in favour, nothing could change this decision. A walk-out like in Quebec would not have altered the IUS's position and this possibility was therefore rejected. But the inflexibility of the IUS where communist interests were concerned, left a bitter taste in the mouths of many people.

The Congress then continued with general considerations. While most participants spoke in the spirit of the Executive report, several delegations took a different line. The Albanian spokesman protested against the tone of the Executive report which stimulated fear of nuclear war. By working up such fears, the people were alienated from the struggle that had to be fought for national independence. The test ban treaty, it felt, was a triumph for imperialism and increased the threat of nuclear war. It was therefore a relief that an end had been put to nuclear blackmail of the peace-loving peoples, now that China had provided the peaceful forces of the world with a nuclear weapon of their own. Moreover, the Albanian had no time for talk about unity, etc. No unity was possible with the imperialist ISC nor for that matter with the revisionist Yugoslavs, a view which was endorsed by China. In the opinion of this delegation capitulationism was reigning supreme and it was high time that the IUS returned to its traditional policy. China had, therefore, decided to table a draft resolution on peace which they expected the Congress to accept enthusiastically. This would wipe out the ignominy of the World Youth Forum, which had been a pro-imperialist meeting, aimed against China from beginning to end.

Rumania wanted the IUS to review its constitution and pay more attention to the rights of small countries to take an independent line. The way in which the Congress was directed gave the Rumanian delegates reason to suspect that the IUS did not want to give all tendencies a chance. Pressure

had been brought on delegations, including the Rumanian, to change their point of view and the Bulgarian NUS had even gone so far as accusing Rumania of not having discussed its opinion in advance with the other NUSes and of having introduced it in the congress hall quite independently. In this way unity was impossible. The IUS ought to respect other people's convictions if it wanted to achieve unity. This also applied to the ISC with which the IUS should not refuse to cooperate. For, on the basis of common ideals, a programme could be elaborated which would be welcomed by students in all corners of the world.

These were harsh words, never before uttered by a member of the IUS nucleus. But different opinions were also expressed. The Ghanaian delegate declared that he had been so misled by information on discrimination in Bulgaria that he had set out for Sophia with a heavy heart. Seeing how peacefully and democratically the Congress developed, he felt ashamed. The hospitality of the Bulgarian people which he had experienced should provide an example for many other countries.

On the other hand, the representatives of Nigeria and Sierra Leone said they felt insulted by the disparaging paragraphs in the IUS report on the Organization of African Unity which had finally brought the African States together. The disparaging qualification of this promising organization as an initiative of the State Department was infuriating and slanderous. Silence on the Chinese bomb was incomprehensible. The IUS had many good sides but should realize that objectivity and honesty were necessary if it wished to retain the support of the students.

After these various speeches both of support and criticism, the general discussion finally came to a close three days before the Congress was to end. The commissions were still to meet and the new policy was to be laid down. Consequently, the proposal to prolong the Congress by two days was accepted unanimously.

The dispute continued in the commissions. After lengthy discussion the Chinese motion on peace was put aside and

the secretariat's resolution was taken as basis for the discussion. Several Chinese amendments were made to this 15 page resolution, but not sufficient to satisfy China. They made some headway however when the commission decided not to endorse but merely take note of the statement of the IUS secretariat in praise of the test ban treaty. When the final text was adopted with China and Albania voting against, China praised many delegations who had helped to make this resolution less objectionable. It was unfortunate that they had in many cases been outnumbered by the supporters of the erroneous line.

The Commission on the international student movement was a reflection of the debate in the plenary session following the ISC intervention. There the Indian representative of the ISC, Ram Lakhina, had explained what had happened in Christchurch and what ideals the ISC strived for. He conveyed to the Congress the ISC's desire for cooperation and quoted the concrete proposals made by the Secretary General in his open letter. He refuted the accusations that the ISC was an instrument of American imperialists by referring to the dozens of resolutions where the ISC's opinion was contrary to that of the State Department. Such accusations directed against the 59 NUSes who had unanimously supported the Charter, was not conducive to the realization of mutual cooperation and exemplified a regrettable attitude. There were problems in abundance on which IUS and ISC could take concerted action, if both were willing.

The debate on this intervention was opened by FUPI which rejected cooperation with the ISC, not wanting to work with employees of the State Department. The Chinese felt indignant at the ISC's reaction to the Chinese atom bomb and called the intervention despicable and schismatic. Albania had found the ISC intervention wearisome and had yet been struck by the eloquence of this "gifted disciple of the Dulles-Rusk school". The IUS secretariat tried to bring a more realistic note into the discussion and expressed its pleasure at the presence of an ISC delegation. The Charter, however, was strongly rejected as a backward step towards cold war.

The actions of the ISC and its new secretariat revealed the true nature of this organization. Nevertheless, it was also useful to reach an understanding with the students who felt they had to support the ISC and this once again stressed the need for an RTC. The fact that the ISC had rejected the RTC as effective means of achieving cooperation indicated that the ISC did not want cooperation, but the students of the world thought differently and whatever the ISC felt, the RTC would take place. The final resolution of this commission stressed the need for achieving universal student cooperation by means of an RTC and the ISC proposals were ignored.

When the plenary session finally reconvened, dispute flared up again. Zanzibar protested against the fact that its papers had been overhauled and copied. Rumania felt strong indignation with the way in which its delegation was subject to constant discrimination, pressure and slight. In the beginning it had thought this was unintentional, but now it saw clearly that such practices were used on purpose both with its own and other delegations. Such practices did not further the development of the IUS and threatened to undermine the student movement. The Rumanians had been astonished to see how party conflicts had been introduced within the IUS as if they were in itself student problems. Rumania felt that in this congress, only student convictions should be expressed and not the views of some political party.

China's last act at this Congress was a heavy attack on the Soviet Union. Although not mentioning it by name and referring constantly to the attitude of a certain people, it was only too obvious at whom the remarks were directed. It was shocking how obstruction at this Congress had prevented student opinion against American imperialism from being expressed and accepted. Although certain people continuously spoke of united struggle against imperialism, they had used fallacious arguments to sabotage every constructive initiative. China had discovered the true nature of these people and knew they could not be expected to take the action demanded by the majority of the students throughout the world.

At this point, however, the secretariat took action and

once more one secretariat member after the other took the floor praising the constructive atmosphere of the Congress where everyone had been able to express his opinion and which had arrived at well-considered conclusions. True, there had been differences sporadically, but that was to be expected in such a large organization as the IUS with participants from so many different countries and backgrounds. Had not many resolutions been carried practically unanimously and had it not become clear that the student was making an active contribution to the struggle for peace and against imperialism?

But when the final resolution was put to the vote, the development of the Congress proved to have shocked and displeased most delegations. While 39 votes were cast in favour and 6 against, 31 NUSes decided to abstain, an attitude more eloquent than any intervention.

Finally, 46 NUSes were elected to the new Executive Committee, but only 20 votes were cast in favour of the single slate. Nine NUSes voted against and 20 abstained. Attempts to achieve unanimity were no longer made. The Sino-Soviet dispute had put its stamp on the Congress and paralyzed it for several days. As in the case of the ISC earlier, the IUS now also found itself at the crossroads. (279) But whereas an organization, directed by students alone, can choose between several possibilities, the IUS does not have this freedom. The future will show what the consequence will be for the IUS.

XXVII. CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters the readers have been able to see the birth of the international student movement and how in the course of the years it grew to be an established notion. Some readers will no doubt have followed the growing politicization of the student movement with suspicion and fear. This reaction also exists in student circles, particularly in the "old established countries". No one will deny these critics the right to advance their arguments, but a few words in defence are called for.

The international student movement was born in a time when a very high percentage of the students were involved in politics, because World War II had little room for the apolitical. It is understandable that the primary aim of many post-war international organizations was to avoid a repetition of World War II at any cost by creating international understanding.

The international student movement shared these feelings. The more students could be made familiar with situations and opinions in other countries before taking up a position in society, the better. Lack of information on the true intentions and opinions of others had in the past led all too often to an unnecessary clash at the cost of millions of lives. We have also seen how in the post-war years it had proved impossible to keep the cold war out of the student movement. Before the IUS was even founded, some of its protagonists were already firmly convinced that the gathering of students from all parts of the World was not an end in itself, but a means to another end: winning support for communism. Years went by before the non-communist world was prepared to admit to itself that in 1946 it had already lost the battle of the cold war. It was not until 1950 that the hesitant decision was taken for a new initiative, aimed at bringing together the students from all parts of the world on a basis of equality and respect for the convictions of others. Fear lest political

issues might destroy the unity that had been achieved at last, prevented the ISC for a long time from abandoning its apolitical dogma.

Only when the participants in the ISC realized that in the age of decolonization most students in the world are concerned with problems other than those of scholarship, did the ISC dare to move gradually towards political engagement. Not until 1960 was this step consolidated and the primary importance of the student's responsibility towards society recognized. Another four years went by before a structure was adopted expressing the dynamism of this commitment to society. Since then, the ISC has been a political body whose purpose are unequivocally defined in its Charter. These purposes are nothing new or original. They are universal principles not invented but at the most re-worded by the ISC. Those who find its language high-flown and its content too idealistic, must remember that this Charter defines an ultimate goal which must guide the ISC in its activities. It is a well-known fact that many generations have already striven for this ideal and not achieved it. But the fault does not lie with the ideal but with the fact that world powers regard other objectives as more important.

But no one can deny that since World War II we have come nearer this ultimate goal than ever before. The difference is more than superficial. Due to technological development and the improvement of communications, in particular, no situation in the world remains unnoticed any longer. Protests against injustice and discrimination, that might have passed unnoticed before are now heard and judged in the court room of world public opinion. Today, any country which promotes aggression, racist immigration laws, unfair trials, etc. knows, it is watched and that the consequences will not pass unobserved. There are many cases in which governments have ignored this. But it is just as true that in many cases the intentions of governments have been ameliorated due to influence of public opinion. The contribution of the United Nations Organization in this respect has been immeasurable.

As a result governments are less free to violate universal

principles. The more publicity that is given to these violations and the more effective counteraction becomes, the more difficult it is for anyone to continue on the wrong road.

That the ISC is trying to make its contribution is not unrealistic but the logical consequence of its responsibility. If it uses the possibilities offered to objectively contribute to the respect for universal human rights, it deserves to be supported fully.

In addition to its political activities, the ISC carries out practical work, less spectacular but none the less important. This work is aimed at specific student problems and strives to improve the social position of the student and prepare him for a responsible role in society. NUSes regularly meet in different parts of the world to exchange experience and support each other morally and materially in an attempt to make their work more effective. Editors of student newspapers meet to exchange their specific experience. They receive regular information so that they may give their papers a higher standard than that of pure student entertainment. Tens of thousands of students use every year the facilities offered by student travel bureaux associated with the international student travel conference. NUSes meet regularly to discuss the problems of foreign students in their countries. They exchange experience on the running of student cooperatives which reduce the costs of living and studying. By coordinated action the number of student volunteer corps has doubled over the past years. At regular meetings of student experts in the different fields, each NUS learns from the past mistakes of its sister organizations.

It is hard to say how much more difficult all these activities would have been and how many NUSes would still be in their infancy, had international contact not existed. These aspects of international student cooperation have not been dealt with in the previous chapters because they are of no relevance to the history of the international student movement, but they are the backbone of many NUSes.

It is absurd that the IUS still brands an ISC, which devotes itself to the above-mentioned activities, as an

instrument of American imperialism. The stated position of the Conference and secretariat on American policy in Latin American and Southeast Asia leaves no doubt about its stand towards certain aspects of American policy. Should we regard this as tactics of the State Department? What interest can the State Department have in sharp condemnation of American intervention in the Dominican Republic or an appeal for cessation of bombardments of North Vietnam? Masochism?

And what interest can the NUSes participating in the work of the ISC have in ignoring their genuine convictions for the sake of the State Department?

However, IUS propaganda is encouraged by the fact that the ISC draws still some 60 per cent of its financial budget from American sources. This is regrettable, but it is not those who give who are to blame, but those who do not give because they believe that finance will always be forthcoming from the USA. Support from Western European countries is increasing, but it is still quite out of proportion with American support. It is not surprising that the countries from the third world have only been able to make small contributions until now. However, it is ridiculous to suppose that American finance could not be accepted without loss of independence. Last year American foundations have collected more than 11 thousand million dollars for the most varying purposes, (280) ranging from the preservation of pyramids to freedom from hunger campaigns and development projects. There are even American funds who collect financial support for assistance to Cuba and Vietcong flags are sold to raise money for support to the NLF. Should the ISC or UNESCO, FAO, World Council of Churches etc. then be blamed for accepting financial support from the USA because other sources are insufficient? If one claims that the principles of the ISC are in fact American principles, one forgets that no country in the world has implemented these principles 100 per cent and that no country can claim spiritual ownership of universal principles. Just as not all potato eaters today are servile imitators of the 16th century inhabitants

of the Latin American West coast, so not all supporters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are servile imitators of the American Declaration of Independence or the French Revolution. Quite another question is whether the Charter is perfect and if there is no criticism of the ISC.

As far as the Charter is concerned, it is clear that no formulation is infallible. Experience will show which parts of the Charter need revision because they no longer coincide with the concepts of the ISC's members. Somewhat confusing is the emphasis laid by the Charter on the notion of freedom without trying to define it more accurately. A free university in a free society may be a universal ideal, but no one can be blamed if he feels that it is not or not yet in the interest of his country to have an absolutely free university which would be free even to check the development of society.

Freedom means independence but not lawlessness. It means the possibility to develop free from any form of discrimination, oppression or want. But freedom is useless as ideal without the recognition that genuine freedom entails a heavy responsibility of not misusing it. Absolute freedom can exist only if guaranteed and at the same time restricted by regulations in the common interest. Those who misuse their freedom at the expense of the common interest, must be corrected.

In cases of contradiction between freedom and common interest, the one must give way to the other. It is generally acceptable that for the sake of common welfare freedom may not be unlimited. But common interest in that case should be genuine common interest and not the interest of one person, party, class or race. And this ought to be judged by the community as a whole. Only if this community can again and again determine what the common interest is and what restrictions it therefore imposes upon itself, limitations of the individual's freedom can be regarded as right and natural.

Acknowledging this relativity of the concept of freedom, the text of the ISC Charter will gain in reality. In each case of violation of freedom, one should establish whether it also infringes upon the inalienable right of every people to steer its own course.

The Charter starts from the principle that a free society is best served by a free university. But at the same time it states that the university is worthy of its freedom and autonomy only if it applies them to the interest of the society of which it forms part. The large number of NUSes having ratified the Charter or decided to apply for associate membership, proves that an organization like the ISC supplies a need.

Several NUSes from the minority group in Quebec 1960 have thus pledged their support to the new-fashioned ISC, whereas others are to determine their position in the spring of 1966.

Logically, the IUS has followed this development with preoccupation and care. The students sympathizing with this organization have used every opportunity to convince their respective NUSes that membership of the ISC would be in contradiction with the goals of the NUS. If the NUS did not shared this feeling, they have tried to prevent full membership and make the NUS decide to take out associate membership. The well-known arguments of the two-camps theory are advanced and full membership is claimed to be incompatible with neutrality. While these arguments are in some cases successfully used by communist students in countries of the third world, other tactics have been adopted in the "old established countries". The IUS has borne in mind that most students in these countries are attracted by the student-as-such position and are suspicious of political activities. Profiting from this attitude, the communist wing of the English NUS has argued that the political aspect of both international organizations is incompatible with the student-as-such principle upheld by the English NUS on its national activities, and that moreover, practical advantages for the English NUS are few, since the international organizations pay foremost attention to developing countries! For the first time these students have not advocated affiliation with the IUS, but joint hands with the student-as-such wing they once so despised, in order to prevent the NUS from supporting the ISC. As a result, this NUS has decided not

to apply for membership of the ISC for the time being. But it has reserved the possibility of reviewing this decision at the next congress.

However, this should be a warning for the ISC. It must remain conscious of the fact that it is a student organization. It must continue its activities in support of student ideals unflinchingly but not at the expense of student needs. The ISC must remain conscious that it is not the body of the international vice-presidents of the various NUSes but of the NUSes as a whole. Many NUSes in the world criticize the IUS for completely neglecting the non-political aspects of its work. This criticism has been accepted by the IUS secretariat and a change was promised at the last Executive meeting. The political work can function excellently with only an efficient publicity department, but practical work requires a great deal of expert knowledge for the various NUS experts to draw upon. There is a great need for practical advice not only in the "old established countries". The NUSes of the "new emerging countries" are also becoming more and more organizations of a syndical nature, where international action is just one sphere of their activity. The Executives of many NUSes realize that their members expect direct and effective promotion of their interests. Their cooperation or opposition to the educational policy of their government or university is decisive for the facilities available to the next generation of students. If their rooms are noisy, their scholarships inadequate, their health service deficient and study material scarce, they have little reason to be pleased with the activities of their NUS who failed to act at the time when decisions were taken concerning student apartments, scholarships, health service and purchase of study material.

Since the Executive members of most NUSes only hold their position for one year, regular contact among the various NUSes is necessary for them to fulfil their mandate as effectively as possible. In the past the ISC has become aware of this need. But the more the NUSes become syndical organizations, the more specialized the work of the ISC has to become.

The previous chapter ended on the words that the IUS now finds itself at the "crossroads". But whatever way the IUS may develop, in giving a prognosis only one factor is important: will the IUS remain a front organization at the service of a certain power's policy, or will it free itself and become a real mouthpiece of its members?

If it continues to work as a front organization, the development of the IUS will depend on the policy of its superiors, in this case the Soviet Union. And then it is up to the experts of Sovjetology to make a prognosis.

There remains the hypothetical case that the IUS will lose its character of a front organization. In my opinion this will never happen with the consent of the Soviet Union. The latter will never give financial and political support to an organization which acts independently and is as critical of the actions of the Soviet Union and its following as of those of other powers. Until now the Soviet Union has only offered assistance to international organizations that supported its policy or in cases where it could not afford to remain aside. In the latter case, it limited itself to the strictly necessary, as we see from the Soviet attitude to the United Nations and its agencies.

But the situation of the front organizations of which the Soviet Union avails itself, is different. These organizations have never been regarded as a means to achieve international cooperation but as a means of increasing the influence of communism.

If they fail, the Soviet Union will not hesitate to withdraw its support. If the withdrawal of financial support cannot make them see "reason", other means will be sought.

Where this is true for front organizations in general, it is all the more true for those front organizations active in the field of youth, namely WFDY and IUS. If the Soviet Union were to lose them as instruments, it would not hesitate to destroy them. "It is better that they not exist than that they turn against us." Youth leaders and student officials of many countries are a sample of the leadership of tomorrow. The Soviet Union will therefore never allow itself to be deprived of the machinery to contact them and will hamper

and stop rival organizations where possible.

For the moment it does not look as if Soviet control over the IUS is weakening. Concessions are being made to China, but not of such importance that the IUS has changed essentially. How far this control will continue in the future depends largely on the way in which relations among the communist countries themselves will develop, especially with regard to international policy. It remains to be seen what will happen if the host country of the IUS, Czechoslovakia, no longer agrees with the main lines of Soviet international policy. Never has a communist country permitted action on its territory of a front organization with which it does not agree. The IUS headquarters would then most probably be moved to another country that does remain loyal to the Soviet line. But whatever the communist country in which its headquarters are sited, it remains a fact that the organization will never be able to express an opinion regarded as "erroneous" by the host government or financier. Let us recall how in 1956 the front organizations withdrew to those countries where they could work according to their task.

What kind of influence can the middle group have on the IUS? In the past its influence has been slight. The possibilities and restricted freedom of the IUS were well-known. The group knew that the IUS meetings could not end without having praised the Berlin wall as an instrument of peace. Were the IUS to be forced to denounce the totalitarian regime in East Germany or China's aggression against India, it would mean the destruction of the IUS. For these reasons they have not yet made such attempts and have voted for one standpoint within the ISC and for the other in the IUS, or have abstained.

It would be short-sighted to regard this as an unprincipled stand. Many NUSes from the middle group feel that a communist controlled IUS which offers material and moral support is better than a highly-principled but paralyzed IUS. If all NUSes in the world were to join the IUS as a body, it would be easy to destroy Soviet control and move the secretariat to a country with full freedom of action. But this would make the IUS identical to the ISC and it would receive

no financial support in communist countries. The result would be a fusion of IUS and ISC but no world student unity. Shortly afterwards, a World Federation of Democratic Students or a similar organization would be created and this history could be written all over again.

What are the prospects for world student unity? As just shown, fusion of IUS and ISC would achieve nothing. The professed objectives of the two organizations do coincide on a great many points, but their implementation differs in many essential cases. Where political issues are concerned, this has become sufficiently clear in the previous chapters. But opinions differ already before all NUSes from all parts of the world are gathered around one table. The IUS can never give priority to a representative NUS rather than to a communist minority organization claiming to be representative. For according to communist principles, the latter expresses the will of the people and is, therefore, representative in spite of its small membership. The communist can not be expected to drop congenial minority organizations.

Should this necessarily lead to endorsement of the IUS views by non-communist NUSes who sympathize with the IUS? Opinions on this question differ among the non-communist NUSes. Some support the IUS policy on many essential points, qualify Soviet nuclear tests as contributions to peace, brand EEC and Peace Corps as non-colonialist initiatives and gloss over the Chinese bomb in order to be accepted by the IUS as genuine fighters for peace.

Some remain silent when their genuine conviction is not agreeable to the IUS in order not to damage relations. Others regard dialogue with the communist NUSes as meaningful only when expressing one's real convictions and not pretending to agree when one does not. They regard the attitude of the previous NUSes as false and resulting only in an artificial dialogue. One does not serve international understanding, they feel, by forgetting to explain one's own standpoint, and by supporting, instead, a view with which one does not agree. The fact that their communist partner is unable to express an understanding of their standpoint in public, if for them no reason to conceal their convictions.

World student unity is impracticable if one wishes to unite the NUSes of China, Yugoslavia, Norway, USA, Chile, Rhodesia with the Franco student syndicate in Spain or the pro-apartheid students in South Africa. Universal student cooperation can only be achieved on the basis of common objectives and discussion of similarities rather than differences. Unity is feasible in fields where principles are identical and opinions on the solution coincide. But this requires a will to cooperate on both sides. Since the Christchurch conference decided to accept support from any group sharing the same opinion on a certain problem, universal student cooperation on certain aspirations is possible. However, the IUS rejected the ISC's invitation to take a joint position and has continued to brand the ISC as imperialist lackeys. By qualifying anyone who disagrees with it on essential points as a criminal, the IUS proves that it is not yet so tolerant as to respect other opinions. Can such tolerance be expected of the IUS? This is not a decision the IUS can take, but only its superiors. The future will have to show whether they are willing to do so.

EPILOGUE

In the introduction I stated why I felt I should start with a chapter on the communist front organizations. For the reader who felt either pleased or dissatisfied with this approach I should emphasize that it was not intended to influence him. The words "communist front organization" are not a term of abuse, but a description of a reality. It will only be abused by those who want to use the word "communist" for all that is negative or disagreeable to them. As long as sincere communists use this term there is no reason why others should not.

If I devoted special attention to the development and problems of the IUS as a front organization, this is not because I am not a communist. One may have objections against communism, but it cannot be denied that this ideology has come to have real meaning for many. One may object to the ideology and the methods it uses, but not to the people who sincerely believe in the future of communism.

My main objection against the IUS, therefore, is not that this organization is promoting the interest of world communism. After all, everyone has the right to join with those who think alike to achieve his aims.

But in my opinion, this end does not justify just any means. My principal objection against the IUS is that it claims to adhere to universal principles, but in practice ignores violations of these principles by its superiors for the sake of the ultimate goal.

The strong indignation with which the IUS sometimes speaks of unjust situations, violating human dignity, is a hypocritical indignation if it refuses categorically to acknowledge that communism sometimes also uses inadmissible methods. The slander and base intrigues by which it rids itself of those who criticize its methods and strive for genuine universal student cooperation, are in flagrant contrast with the lofty principles it occasionally proclaims.

However, some words should be said in defence of the

IUS. The initiative to create the IUS did not originate from student circles and the goals of the IUS have not been formulated by students. It are politicians and party officials who are responsible for the way in which the IUS operates. If IUS officials from communist circles refuse to follow the IUS line implicitly, they risk their career. It is justifiable to believe that apart from those who use the IUS as a springboard, a large number of IUS officials do believe in the goal for which they strive. Communist ideology does not regard it as immoral that the end justifies the means. One can therefore not accuse these people of immorality. But it is not appropriate to promote this hypocrisy or paint it as something noble and lofty.

International student cooperation is valuable and useful. The student is an integral part of his society and should not regard himself as someone who temporarily has no role to play. His role flows from his special position in that he, as seeker after truth, does not resign himself to the notion that the errors of his society are inevitable. This is true both on national and international level.

The fact that the world is divided into East and West is not something in the face of which he should acquiesce. Real dialogue among the students of today can lead to better understanding among the responsible citizens of tomorrow. The world of today cannot afford to neglect an opportunity to achieve better understanding.

But one must not close one's eyes to the fact that there are other conflicts in the world than the one between East and West, and which are equally if not more important.

The racial problem can only be eradicated from the earth by the joint efforts of all races. Their 100 per cent commitment alone can overcome man's inclination towards discrimination. I am aware that it is easier to write down the principle of non-discrimination than to put it into practice. However, this makes it none the less essential to achieve a society in which everyone, regardless of his race, is accepted as an equal by his fellow men.

Another problem is that of the relationship between North and South, rich and poor, those with a full stomach and those who do not know whether the day of tomorrow will give them any chance to live. "The fight against any form of oppression" aims at creating a society where life is worth while living for everyone. The struggle for life in itself is no less important. Here, if anywhere, lies a task for the international student movement. Contact between students from North and South and different races within the international student movement will have to be used to the full. Leadership training seminars, illiteracy campaigns, community development projects and other programmes can make a tremendous contribution to an exchange of know how, know why, know where and know what.

These forms of intense cooperation can give real meaning to the notion of world student unity as an effective means of promoting these universal ideals. May the next decades see such a development.

Appendix A

CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT
CONFERENCE (I.S.C.)

We, the National Unions of Students and National Delegations gathered together in the 11th International Student Conference in Christchurch (22nd June to 1st July, 1964)

- deriving our strength and inspiration from the millions of students who form our constituents,
- committed to encourage, aid and defend the democratic student movement throughout the world, since only through dynamic, united and independent action can students fulfil their role as a conscience of society in the vanguard of political, economic and social progress,
- committed to the principle that the student community and the National Unions of Students are integral parts of society and share a common destiny with it,
- convinced that cooperation among representative, independent, democratically organized student associations, based on commonly shared and universally applied principles, is the most effective means for students to defeat oppression in all its forms and to build together a free university, a free society and a peaceful world order embodying the hope for mankind set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- hereby establish this Charter of the International Student Conference which will determine and guide the actions of its organs and members within the framework of the Conference.

I.

The Ideals of the International Student Conference1. A Free University in a Free SocietyA. The Free University

The International Student Conference, believing in a University accessible to all and autonomous in its functions, yet conditioned by the needs and aspirations of the people, whose dedication to educational, social and economic progress never weakens its resolve to seek and guard the truth, whose doors are open to society but invincible to racial, political or ideological assault, shall seek to realise and defend the freedom of the university so that:

1. It shall be a university which fulfils its vital role as a forum for the unfettered interplay of ideas, as a source of leadership for economic and social development, and as a centre where even the most basic assumptions and institutions of society can be placed in doubt, without fear of reprisals by any political, economic or social force.
2. It shall be a university to which students from all racial, political, religious, national and economic backgrounds have equal access on the basis solely of their individual abilities and needs.
3. It shall be a university fully sustained by the society of which it is a part and, in consequence, fully able to provide, in conditions of adequate welfare, an education based on national needs and responding to the demands of economic and social development.
4. It shall be a university in which students are free to defend together their legitimate interests and responsibilities, promote their common welfare and that of society, express their own viewpoints and take active

part in the formation of university policy without interference, restriction or censorship.

B. The Free Society

The International Student Conference, believing that the freedom of the university and the freedom of society are inseparable, believing that the free and open society must be fully independent of any form of external domination, that its citizens must be able to organize their national life in response to popular needs and aspirations, and that its political, economic and social structures must serve the genuine needs of the people as expressed through democratic channels of communication, shall seek to build and defend the following basic objectives of the free society: political democracy and economic and social justice.

1. Political democracy, based on the will of the people expressed in accordance with the principle of universal adult franchise and the practice of free and regular elections, shall be achieved only when political power is not the privilege of any group, class or race, but is exercised in conditions of full freedom of expression, assembly and association and the recognition of the full rights of the individual.
2. Economic Justice shall be achieved only when equality of economic opportunity, adequate material standards of living and the equitable distribution of the national wealth depend on precepts and methods of economic planning and growth based on popular needs and aspirations rather than the rigid adherence to any particular economic doctrine. Economic justice may be further fostered and nurtured by equitable and mutually agreed forms of international economic cooperation which aim genuinely to promote rapid economic development and to eliminate the economic exploitation and subjugation of one part by another.

3. Social Justice shall be achieved primarily through universal concern and action, based on full recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, in conditions of full equality of opportunity and treatment under the law, enabling all to live and work in freedom from hunger and want.

C. World Peace

The International Student Conference, believing that the freedom of the university and the freedom of society cannot be divorced from the struggle for world peace, and believing that lasting peace can only be achieved through national independence, self-determination and international cooperation and the eradication of all forms of oppression, shall seek to encourage permanent world peace and disarmament based on:

1. A strengthened United Nations in which all members fulfill their responsibilities and share equally the task of promoting peace, freedom and progress. The United Nations must be a medium for the arbitration and solution of all major international disputes and must become the basis of the future world order.
2. The promotion of sincere and constructive contacts between people from various countries, including those with different political, economic and social systems, leading to greater mutual understanding.
3. The conversion of economic and human resources now engaged in arms production to the urgent objectives of economic, social and educational development.
4. An Agreement to ban all nuclear weapons tests, endorsed by all nations and containing adequate controls and safe-guards to guarantee their full compliance as a first step towards complete and general disarmament.

5. The rule of law to protect men and nations against aggression, to provide peaceful channels for the exercise of impartial justice, and to create a world in which mankind, despite differences of ideology, race and religion, is united.

2. The Struggle for the Ideals of the International Student Conference

The International Student Conference,

Aware that oppression in all its forms (imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, totalitarianism, racism, dictatorship, social injustice and militarism) continues to threaten the free university, the free society and world peace, jeopardizing the rights and responsibilities of students in the struggle for justice, Believing that the struggle against oppression must not be subverted to the objectives of any ideological, religious, political or military bloc, since no power group in the world is free of oppressive systems, acts and policies,

Convinced that that the student struggle against oppression must stem from objective judgements freely arrived at by students themselves,

shall seek to achieve its ideals by struggling against:

1. Imperialism

the action of the government or economic groupings of one country to dominate or encroach upon another country and to exploit and subjugate its people either militarily, economically, politically or culturally. Imperialism takes many forms, is practised today by several powers, and cannot be viewed solely as the culmination of a particular economic system or as the natural expression of any particular ideology.

2. Colonialism

the deliberate suppression by one country of the economic

political and cultural sovereignty of another and the violation of its inherent right of self-determination. Colonialism is a flagrant violation of human rights and renders impossible the full economic, social and cultural development of the colonised country, and creates a climate in which neo-colonialism can thrive and entrench itself.

3. Neo-Colonialism

the indirect domination or encroachment by any country on the independence and integrity of a sovereign nation, primarily economic but also military, political and cultural, practised most commonly but not exclusively by former colonial powers over countries which possess nominal but not substantive independence. Neo-colonialism is oppression in a subtle form, which undermines the nation's sovereignty, integrity, freedom of action and control over its own economic resources. It is a travesty of mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political cooperation, based upon the free consent of both parties and upon mutual respect and equality.

4. Totalitarianism

the systematic and forcible imposition of a particular doctrine or belief upon all aspects of the life of a people, who are not permitted to express themselves freely, whether that doctrine be racist, religious or ideological in character. Totalitarianism need not necessarily exist in a one-party state provided that fundamental human rights are fully respected.

5. Racism

the violation, on grounds of racial origin, of the right of every human being to equal treatment and opportunity. Racial prejudice is based on ignorance, fear and hatred and seeks to destroy human dignity and corrode the human personality. Racial discrimination often

develops into a system of political, economic and social exploitation which can culminate in genocide. Racism can exist in any society, regardless of its political or social system, its official ideology, or its degree of economic development.

6. Dictatorship

the economic, military and political domination of the people by an unrepresentative regime, of an individual or a group, which tries to maintain itself in power by corruption, fraud or at the expense of human life and liberty.

7. Social Injustice

the grossly inadequate or unequal access by a part of the people to the economic, educational, social or cultural benefits of their society. The widespread illiteracy, hunger, poverty and disease which plague most of the nations of the world indicate the magnitude and the urgency of this evil.

8. Militarism

the use of military power to obtain political, economic and social control of a country by preventing or ignoring democratic elections, which results in the domination of a country by systems which favour the privileged classes. Militarism responds to imperialist interests using for its purpose repression in all its forms, violating the freedom of man and using simulated rights and laws which are not in accordance with the aspirations of the people.

3. The Rights and Responsibilities of National Unions of Students in the Struggle for the Ideals of the International Student Conference

The International Student Conference,

Recognising that the democratic student movement is an expression of the need of students to organise

themselves in order to advance their rights and fulfill their responsibilities both as students and as members of society,
Believing that only through the growth and encouragement of democratic National Unions of Students based on the will and work of students themselves and effectively representing their interests can the ideals set forth in this Charter be achieved,
Convinced that the independence and sovereignty of every National Union of Students in national and international affairs is a prerequisite to its success,
shall seek to defend and discharge these rights and responsibilities of National Unions of Students:

1. Every National Union of Students has the right to organise itself without outside interference, and has the responsibility to make every effort to exercise this right without fear of reprisals from any source, regardless of whether its opinions differ from those of its government or of any particular group in its society or outside.
2. Every National Union of Students has the right and responsibility to maintain complete independence from any non-student body whether a government, political party or youth organization, just as every National Union has the right to cooperate closely with these elements when such cooperation reflects and promotes the freely determined will of the student community.
3. Every National Union of Students in consonance with the principles of the Charter has the right to appeal for moral and material solidarity from other National Unions of Students and the responsibility to provide such solidarity when required.
4. Every National Union of Students has the responsibility, through regular assemblies, democratically organised, and through its executive officers, democratically elected, to derive its mandates exclusively from the student community which it represents so that no out-

side force may impose its own ideology or policy upon the Union in violation of the freely held opinions of its constituents.

5. Every National Union of Students has the responsibility to defend the free university and the free society and to work for world peace.
6. Every National Union of Students has the responsibility, taking into account the principles of this Charter, to work for world-wide cooperation and the universal application of those principles.
7. Every National Union of Students has the responsibility to promote, in the spirit of this Charter and on a bi-lateral and multi-lateral basis, practical cooperation between students of all countries with different social, political and economic systems in order to reach world student unity.

Summary of part II

Structure and Functions

The International Student Conference shall be an organization composed of National Unions of Students which adhere to this Charter and which fulfill their responsibilities as defined herein.

2. Membership

1. The International Student Conference shall have as members National Unions of Students and National Delegations who have ratified this Charter, who have given evidence of support for this Charter in their actions and statements, and who shall be admitted to the International Student Conference by a majority vote of its members present and voting at a Conference.
2. Decisions on membership status shall be based on appropriate documentation from organizations applying for this status. Such organizations shall submit

evidence of their adherence to this Charter and of their commitment to the International Student Conference as a framework for cooperation. They shall include in their application for status a statement of such adherence or commitment, an expression of their willingness to fulfil the responsibilities of a National Union of Students as set forth in the Charter, and a description of the body of the organization which has certified such adherence or commitment.

3. Other Statutes

1. Associate Status in the Conference will be granted to organizations who meet the structural requirements of a National Union of Students, who have demonstrated their commitment to the International Student Conference and their support for its programme, and who meet their financial and other responsibilities.
2. Associates shall have the right to speak and to move and second motions in all sessions of the Conference.
3. Observer Status may be granted to national, regional or overseas student organizations and other organizations who have shown an interest in the work of the International Student Conference.
Observers may speak in all sessions only at the invitation of the Conference.

4. Supervision Committee

8. The Supervision Committee shall be the sole authority in the interpretation of the Charter of the International Student Conference in the inter-Conference period.

5. The Secretariat

1. The Conference shall have a permanent Secretariat known as the Secretariat of the International Student Conference. The responsibility for implementing the resolutions and mandates of the Conference shall lie

with the Secretariat. The Secretariat, with the prior agreement of the Supervision Committee, may also initiate new programmes in the inter-Conference period to meet new circumstances which have arisen since the last Conference. It will base its actions and statements on the Principles of the Charter.

6. Research and Information Commission

1. The Supervision Committee shall elect a Committee of five individuals called the Research and Information Commission which shall have the primary responsibility for investigating allegations of the violation of student rights or the existence of one or more of the forms of oppression defined in this Charter. The members of the Commission will be elected as individuals on the basis of their personal competence, integrity and dedication to the principles of the International Student Conference. Their mandate will continue until a new Commission has been elected. One of these individuals shall be elected by the members of the Commission as its Chairman. The Commission may appoint such additional personnel to assist in its work as it deems necessary.
2. The Research and Information Commission shall receive all necessary technical assistance from the Secretariat without allowing such assistance to prejudice its work in any way.
3. The Commission shall be charged with making a full investigation of the student situations in the countries it is mandated to study, as well as whatever political, social and economic background may be necessary to an understanding of these situations. The Commission shall have the responsibility of informing student organizations and other sectors of world opinion as to any violation of rights or existence of oppression in the countries under study. It shall circulate its reports to member organizations for their action and shall also

submit these reports to the next Conference.

4. The Research and Information Commission shall initiate a study upon a mandate from the Conference or the Supervision Committee, or upon the request of five member organizations.
5. If a member organization feels an urgent need for a Conference statement on a particular situation not covered by the investigation of the Commission, that organization should submit a suggested statement along with sufficient supporting documentation to the Commission which, in turn, would report its recommendations to the Conference.

7. Finance

2. The Secretariat may seek and use funds for the implementation of the Conference programme from other sources provided that such funds are given in support of the Charter and that their acceptance and use is consistent with the policies and resolutions of the Conference.
3. Member organizations and Associates must pay their full contribution unless the Supervision Committee has decided otherwise.
4. Member organizations who have not paid their contributions, or that part thereof which has been decided upon by the Supervision Committee, for two (2) fiscal years, shall not be entitled to vote at the Conference until such time as they have cleared their financial arrears.

III.

Amendments

The provisions of this Charter shall stand until amended by the Conference. Amendments to the Charter must be sub-

mitted by Member organizations to the Secretariat for circulation among all Member organizations at least two months in advance of a Conference and shall be considered first by the Supervision Committee, although the Conference need not be bound by its recommendations. Amendments may be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting.

Schedule I

1. National Union of Students

A National Union of Students shall be an organization whose membership is composed of individuals engaged in study at universities and institutes of higher education in any territory, if that territory has a de facto separate governmental administration whether politically independent or not, whose function it is to represent the interest of these individuals, whose executive body is freely elected by the students, and whose membership is open to all students in that territory, provided that such an organization is either the only one in that territory claiming to exercise the function of a National Union of Students, or that, if there be more than one, it exercises this function on behalf of the majority of the above individuals.

2. National Delegation

A National Delegation shall be a representation from a country where no National Union exists, but which has credentials from a majority of university student unions in that country whose executive bodies are freely elected by the students, and which represents a majority of students in that country. Members of a National Delegation should make all possible attempts to form a single national organization in their country as soon as it is practicable.

Appendix B

THE IUS CONSTITUTION

Preamble

We, the students of the world,

- Gathered in Prague in August 1946 at the World Student Congress, called by the International Preparatory Committee elected by the London International Students Conference of November 1945,
- Conscious of the historic significance of this era, when the Charter of the United Nations is being established and when all workers and young people strive in the service of mankind towards the fundamentals of social and economic advancement,
- Faithful to the example of the best of our members who died in the fight of the democratic peoples for their liberty, Affirm our will
- to build again a better world, desirous of liberty, peace and progress, to take that place in the vanguard of the youth of the world, which we have held so often before in the course of history:
To this end, we do now constitute the International Union of Students.

The International Union of Students considers the unity of all democratic forces, which work for progress and base their activities upon the principles of the United Nations, to be an indispensable condition for the realisation of a just and lasting peace, and the equality of all peoples.

The purpose of the International Union of Students, which is founded upon the representative student organizations of different countries, shall be to defend the rights and interests of students, to promote improvement in their welfare and standard of education, and to prepare them for their tasks as democratic citizens.

ACTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Section I

Name

The name of the organization shall be:

The International Union of Students,
(hereafter referred to as the IUS)

Section II

Headquarters

The Central Offices of the IUS shall be situated in Prague.

Section III

Aims

The IUS, as a representative international student organization which defends the interests of students, shall strive for the following aims:

- a) The right and possibility of all young people to enjoy primary, secondary and higher education, regardless of sex, economic circumstances, social standing, political conviction, religion, colour or race; an extensive system of state scholarships and family allowances; the provision of textbooks and school materials free of charge; facilities for the maintenance of health and all other means of improving the living conditions of students.
- b) A better standard of education, full academic freedom and student rights.
- c) The promotion of national culture, appreciation of the cultures of all peoples and the love of freedom and democracy.
- d) The achievement of the unity of the student movement in all countries.
- e) Friendship, mutual understanding and co-operation among all students of the world and the unity of the world student community.

- f) The eradication of all forms of discrimination and, in particular, of racial discrimination.
- g) The realisation of the aspirations of students in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries struggling against colonialism and imperialism, and for full national independence, which is a prerequisite for the full development of education and national culture.
- h) The co-operation of students with other sections of the population and the development in students of a sense of responsibility towards society.
- i) World peace, international friendship among all peoples and the employment of advances in science and culture for the benefit of humanity.

Section IV

Activities

The IUS shall carry out its activities in the spirit of Section III of this Constitution. These activities, organised by the IUS directly or in co-operation with other student organizations may be as follows:

- a) International student meetings, both general and specialised, and any action necessary to realise the policies and programmes which may be decided upon at such meetings.
- b) International student correspondence.
- c) Various forms of student travel and exchange.
- d) The promotion of all forms of practical co-operation among students and their organizations on a faculty basis and the encouragement of student cultural activities.
- e) The collection of information concerning student problems and its dissemination throughout the world.
- f) The publication of official periodicals of the IUS in as many of the main world languages as is demanded by their circulation.
- g) The organization or support of student sport activities.
- h) The organization of relief work and, to that end, the extension of material and financial aid to students and their organizations which are in need of it; this to be under-

taken by the creation of special funds and the institution of national and international campaigns; in its relief work, the IUS should co-operate with appropriate bodies.

- i) The support and encouragement of contributions by students and their organizations towards the establishment of better international understanding and the preservation of peace.
- j) All possible assistance to students of colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries and the promotion of international solidarity activities in support of their struggle for freedom and independence.
- k) The maintenance of the closest possible relations with organizations of the United Nations and in particular with UNESCO: the development of close relations with other international organizations on matters of common interest to students.
- l) The presentation of student problems before international organizations.
- m) All other activities that may be necessary to further the aims of the IUS.

Section V

Members of the IUS, their rights and obligations

Membership

Categories of membership in the IUS shall be:

- Full members
- Associated members

Full Members

Full members of the IUS shall be:

1. National unions of students.
2. National co-ordinating committees uniting the various student organizations of the country concerned, where no national union exists.
3. One or more student organizations of a country where neither a national union nor a co-ordinating committee, as defined above, exists.

4. Representative student organizations abroad which unite the largest number of students of the country or countries concerned.

Rights of Full Members

Every organization which is a full member of the IUS has the right:

- a) To participate in all proceedings of the IUS Congress.
- b) To receive the status of delegate at the IUS Congress.
- c) To submit suggestions for discussion to the IUS Congress and executive bodies.
- d) To elect and be elected to the executive bodies of the IUS.
- e) To participate in meetings of any of the governing and executive bodies upon which it is not represented, whenever questions which concern it directly are being discussed or decided upon.
- f) To seek the assistance of the IUS for the execution of any particular activity or project which it may undertake.
- g) To employ in its title the status of membership and to use the emblem of the IUS.
- h) To disaffiliate.

Obligations of Full Members

Member organizations of the IUS shall accept the following obligations:

- a) To accept the IUS Constitution.
- b) To contribute to the implementation of decisions of IUS governing and executive bodies as far as these are in accordance with their constitution and policy.
- c) To pay such dues as are required by decisions of the IUS Congress.

Associated Members

Associated members shall be admitted, such members to be student organizations which are eligible for full membership in the IUS and who within the limitation of their own constitutions accept limited obligations and in return receive certain rights of associated membership. These obligations and rights

shall be determined by agreement between the IUS Executive Committee and the organization concerned, and must be ratified by the IUS Congress.

Admission and Disaffiliation

- a) Student organizations represented at the inaugural World Student Congress in August 1946, and on whose behalf the Constitution is voted and signed, may, subject to ratification by the Organisations concerned, become members of the IUS - this subject to Section V., Members. Such membership involves payment of the subscription provided for in Section VI., subsection I, a), VI. within six months of the inaugural congress.
- b) Student organisations applying for membership may be accepted by decision of the Executive Committee, subject to ratification by the Congress of the IUS.
- c) Member organisations of the IUS, intending to disaffiliate must inform the Executive Committee of their decision. The disaffiliation shall become effective immediately their notification is acknowledged by the Executive Committee. Such organisations may present to the following IUS Congress the reasons for their disaffiliation.

Organisations with Consultative Status

1. Organisations which do not qualify for full or associated membership but which desire to have working relations with the IUS may apply for and accept consultative status with the IUS.
2. They shall be:
 - a- Student organisations of a specialised character: cultural, sport, relief, faculty, press and travel, except in the case where an IUS member organisation in the country concerned raises an objection. They shall be entitled to give advice to and participate in the work of relevant departments and specialised

agencies of the IUS, to take part in activities related to their specialities and participate without voting rights in the IUS Congress on matters relevant to their organisations.

- b- Organisations of students studying abroad which are not eligible for membership and whose application for consultative status is not opposed by the IUS member organisations in the respective countries. Such organisations may take part in the IUS Congress without voting rights; seek the assistance of the IUS for special help in cases of need and participate in activities of the IUS.
3. Consultative status does not require acceptance of the IUS Constitution, but only of certain working relations connected with the activities of the IUS.
4. Consultative status may be granted to student organisations by decision of the Executive Committee of the IUS subject to approval by the IUS Congress.
5. Organisations withdrawing from consultative status must inform the Executive Committee of their decision. Such withdrawal shall be effective immediately after notification of the Executive Committee.

Section VI

Governing and Executive Bodies of the IUS

The highest governing body of the IUS shall be the Congress (hereafter referred to as the IUS Congress).

The executive bodies shall be: the Executive Committee of the IUS, the Secretariat of the Executive Committee and the Finance Committee. In exercising their functions, the governing and executive bodies shall be guided by the following general principles. They shall:

- take as their sole guide the interests of the students of the world, act in the spirit of mutual respect and equality

among different student organisations of the world and strive to reflect the views of member organisations of the IUS.

- respect the sovereignty and autonomy of member organisations of the IUS.

Subsection 1 - The IUS Congress

a) The Congress shall be empowered to:

- I. Work out the policy and programme of the IUS and review the work of the IUS since the last Congress.
- II. Approve amendments and addenda to the Constitution by a 2/3 majority of the total number of votes cast.
- III. Discuss the report of the work of the Executive Committee.
- IV. Create special agencies and commissions to assist the carrying out of the policy and programme of the IUS.
- V. Affiliate the IUS to other organisations.
- VI. Fix the scales of dues for the member organisations and the date of payment of the dues.
- VII. Approve the budget.
- VIII. Elect to the Executive Committee member organisations of the IUS. There shall be a Secretariat of the Executive Committee. The total number of members of the Executive Committee and of the Secretariat shall be determined by the Congress. The secretariat shall consist of the President, Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, Secretaries and the Treasurer who shall be appointed by those member organisations which the Congress elects. In the case of an organisation not being able to fill its position on the Secretariat, the Executive Committee is empowered to select an alternative organisation from among its own members.

No representative shall be appointed to the Secretariat who at the time of appointment has finished his (her) university or college course for more than

three years.

IX. Elect four members among its member organisations, which with the Treasurer shall form the Finance Committee.

- b) The Congress shall be composed of delegations from full and associated members of the IUS. Delegations of organisations affiliated according to Section V, points 1, 2 and 4 shall have equal votes at the Congress; the total votes of the delegations of member organisations affiliated to the IUS in any country according to Section V, point 3 shall not exceed the votes granted to each of the above organisations. The number of votes accorded to each organisation shall be defined in the standing orders of the Congress.
- c) The Congress shall meet at least once in two years; the Executive Committee shall inform all member organisations of the proposed agenda, date and place of the Congress not later than three months before the meeting of the Congress.
- d) Extraordinary Congresses may be convened at the request of not less than 1/3 of the total number of full and associated member organisations of the IUS.
- e) All votes at the Congress, except when otherwise stated, shall be by simple majority.
- f) The quorum shall consist of delegations of 2/3 of the total number of full and associated member organisations of the IUS.
- g) Observers to the Congress may be invited at the discretion of the Executive Committee subject to the approval of the Congress.

Subsection 2 - The Executive Committee

- a) The functions of the Executive Committee shall be limited to the carrying out of the policies, decisions and projects adopted by the IUS Congress.

- b) The practical activities of the Executive Committee shall be directed by the President, Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, Secretaries and Treasurer of the IUS who form the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the IUS.
- c) The activities of the Secretariat and of the various departments of the IUS shall be supervised by the Executive Committee and the Secretariat shall submit regular reports of its work to the Executive Committee.
- d) The Executive Committee shall assist member organisations in the fulfilment of any projects which may be entrusted to them by the IUS Congress.
- e) Members of the Executive Committee, if unable to attend the meetings of the Executive Committee, may be represented by nominees, who must be approved by the member organisation concerned. These nominees have the full right of members of the Executive Committee.
- f) The Executive Committee shall meet at least twice a year.
- g) 2/3 of the members of the Executive Committee shall constitute its quorum.
- h) All decisions of the Executive Committee shall be taken by a simple majority vote.

Section VII

Budget and Finances

- a) The financial resources of the IUS are derived both from the subscriptions paid by member organisations, according to the scales agreed upon by the Congress, and from other sources arising out of student activities carried out by the IUS and other student organisations.
- b) The draft budget shall be compiled by the Finance Committee for the approval of the Executive Committee and the IUS Congress.

- c) After approval of the budget, the IUS Congress may introduce changes in the subscriptions to be paid by member organisations in consideration of changes taking place within the said member organisations.
- d) The Finance Committee shall transact the financial business of the IUS, subject to the general supervision of the Executive Committee.
- e) The Chairman of the Finance Committee, in his absence the Vice-Chairman, shall have the right to be present at meetings of the Congress and the Executive Committee in a consultative capacity.
- f) The Finance Committee shall compile reports for submission to the Executive Committee and IUS Congress and shall submit audited accounts to the Congress.
- g) The Executive Committee shall appoint the official auditors of the IUS.
- h) The Congress shall decide upon the utilisation of the funds and property of the IUS should this organisation at any time be dissolved.

Section VIII

Standing Orders and By-Laws

Standing orders and By-Laws to be attached to the Constitution shall be adopted by the IUS Congress by a 2/3 majority of those present and voting.

Section IX

The Constitution

The Constitution shall be translated into the languages of all the countries from which student organisations are affiliated to the IUS. For the purpose of interpretation the official text in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish shall be authoritative.

NOTE: The above Constitution was duly ratified by an overwhelming majority of the delegates at the World Student Congress on Tuesday, August 27, 1946. From this date, the Constitution becomes operative.

The Constitution was amended at the 3rd World Student Congress, 1953, at the 4th World Student Congress, 1956 and at the 6th Congress of the IUS, 1960.

Appendix to the Constitution

Definitions

For the purpose and interpretation of this Constitution:

A. National Unions are regarded as student organisations:

- 1- whose governing bodies are democratically elected by members of the organisation.
- 2- which are open to all students of the country concerned without regard to their sex, economic circumstances, social standing, political conviction, religion, colour or race.
- 3- represent a majority of the students of their country organised on the basis of the two previous principles.

B. Students are regarded as:

Those who pursue courses of higher education at universities, training and technical colleges. The definition does not include young people at primary or secondary school.

Appendix C

International Student Meetings

a. International Student Conferences (ISC).

No.	Place	Date	Europe	North Amer.	Latin Amer.	Asia	Austr.	Afr.	Total
1.	Stockholm	Dec. 1950	16	2			2	1	21
2.	Edinburgh	Jan. 1952	18	2	1	2	1	1	25
3.	Copenhagen	Jan. 1953	19	2	8	3	1	2	35
4.	Istanbul	Jan. 1954	20	2	7	5	2	4	40
5.	Birmingham	July 1955	21	3	11	9	2	6	52
6.	Ceylon	Sept. 1956	21	3	12	10	2	8	56
7.	Nigeria	Sept. 1957	19	3	16	12	2	10	62
8.	Peru	Febr. 1959	19	3	16	9	2	13	62
9.	Klosters	Aug. 1960	20	3	19	12	2	17	73
10.	Quebec	June 1962	22	3	19	16	2	18	80
11.	Christchurch	June 1964	18	3	7	11	2	14	55

b. Latin American Student Congresses

- | | |
|---------------|------|
| 1. Montevideo | 1955 |
| 2. La Plata | 1957 |
| 3. Caracas | 1959 |
| 4. Natal | 1961 |

c. Pan-African Student Conferences

- | | |
|------------|------|
| 1. Kampala | 1958 |
| 2. Tunis | 1959 |
| 3. Nairobi | 1964 |

d. IUS Congresses and Council-meetings

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| 1. Prague Congress | August 1946 |
| -Prague Council | August 1947 |
| -Paris Council | August 1948 |
| -Sophia Council | September 1949 |
| 2. Prague Congress | August 1950 |
| -Warsaw Council | September 1951 |
| -Bukarest Council | September 1952 |
| 3. Warsaw Congress | September 1953 |
| -Moscow Council | September 1954 |
| -Sophia Council *) | September 1955 |
| 4. Prague Congress | August 1956 |
| 5. Peking Congress | September 1958 |
| 6. Bagdad Congress | October 1960 |
| 7. Leningrad Congress | August 1962 |
| 8. Sophia Congress | December 1964 |

*) In 1956 the Council-meetings were abolished. Instead the IUS Executive met annually.

APPENDIX DSurvey of National Student Organisations

The survey of National Student Organisations given below, is by no means exhaustive. Included are only those organizations, which are/were in one or another way participating in the international student movement, or might do so in the future.

The characteristics of some organisations will be out of date at the time this survey is published. On some other organisations no sufficient material was available, and in some cases the correctness of the facts could not be proved. Therefore this list must not be regarded as being 100% reliable. The changing picture of the international and national student movement makes it virtually impossible to provide exact information. Nevertheless it seems useful to give a general survey of the different trends dd. summer 1965.

At the right side of the following pages the presence of the organizations at the 8th IUS, 10th ISC and 11th ISC is noted. Only the voting organisations and those who received fraternal observer status are mentioned.

Abbreviations

Text: S : Number of student-members
 % : Degree of representativity
 U : Number of affiliated universities (= student
 R : Regional affiliations councils)

Column: M: Full member of the IUS
 'M': Included as member in the IUS membership list, but not present at the 8th IUS Congress. Therefore it is not certain if these organisations regard themselves still as IUS members.
 A : Associate member of the IUS
 'A': Associate member, which was not present. See 'M'
 D : Delegate status at the ISC

Dm: Delegate, who participated in the 10th ISC walk-out.

F : Fraternal observer at the ISC. Unlike an observer, a fraternal observer has speaking rights in all sessions.

Sources: History of National Unions of Students, CUS; Yearbook of Youth Organizations, UNESCO; the Student, ISC; World Student News, IUS; Africa Report, may 1965; IUS and ISC membership reports; interviews with student-leaders.

Country:	Organization:	8th IUS	10th ISC	11th ISC
Albania	<u>UWYA</u> (Union of Working Youth of Albania, student section) Activities on the political, cultural and educational field. Representative. Few international relations in Europe.	M	-	-
Algeria	<u>UNEA</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens) 1963 Successor of UGEMA, which was founded in 1955 to gather student-support for the Algerian Liberation Movement FLN. After the independence UGEMA (UNEA) remained autonomous, but cooperated closely with the Ben Bella government. After Boumedienne's coup d'état the UNEA administration has been taken over by his supporters, but some local branches still support Ben Bella. Outside Algeria, branches in North Africa, Europe and the USA. Representative and active. R: Confederation des Etudiants de Mahgreb; Pan-African Student Movement.	M	Dm	-
Angola	<u>UNEA</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants Angolais) 1962 Representative. Branches in Africa, Europe, Middle East and USA. Cooperated with the Angolan Liberation Movement FLNA but decided in august '65 to follow an independent line. See: Portuguese Africa.	-	Dm	D
Argentina	<u>FUA</u> (Federacion Universitaria Argentina) Represents approx. one third of Argentinian students. Only Arg. organization with an active international department. Highly critical of government. Main activity to urge for reform in university and country. Dominated by left radicals. Rest of Arg. students organized in small groups with limited international contacts.	M	Dm	-

Australia	<u>NUAUS</u> (National Union of Austr. Univers. Students)	-	D	D
S: 75.000 = 100% at 13 universities. Independent. Main activities: student welfare, education, living conditions aborigines and Papua's, immigration policy etc. Operates Austr. Overseas Stud. Travel Scheme in cooperation with Asian student organizations.				
Austria	<u>ÖH</u> (Österreichische Hochschüler-schaft). Compulsory membership.	-	D	D
Established by law as the Austrian student body, but is independent. Must be consulted by the government on all questions concerning students. Dominated by Catholic students (ÖVP). No membership of foreign students in Austria (= 20%) R. European Meeting.				
Basuto-land	<u>NUBS</u> (Nat. Unions of Bas. Students) 1959. Representative. Membership includes the students from Swaziland and Bechuanaland. Active in university affairs, national problems and support for South-african refugee students.	-	D	-
Belgium	<u>VVS</u> (Vereniging van Vlaamse Studenten). Union of the Flemish speaking part of Belgium. Representative and independent. Act.: student welfare, travel, french-syndicalist action, democratization of education and society. R. Common Market NUSes European Meeting	A	D	-
	<u>MUBEF</u> (Mouvement Universitaire Belgique d'Expression Francaise). Union of the French-speaking students of Belgium. Representative and independent. Activities along the same line as VVS. In 1959 both groups decided to go their own way, since	A	D	-

the educational and social circumstances of the flemish and french universities differed too much. Until that time the Federation des Etudiants Belgique took care of their international relations.

R. Common Market NUSes,
European Meeting.

Bolivia	<u>CUB</u> (Confederación Universitaria Boliviana). Representative.	M	D	D
Includes all 7 universities. Independent. Critical towards government. Act: welfare, reform, popular education through literacy campaigns.				
Brazil	<u>UNEB</u> (Uniao Nacional dos Estudiantes do Brasil) Representative.	'M'	Dm	-
Membership over 100.000. Was one of the most important NUSes in Latin America. Outlawed by Castello Branco government. Act: at the moment mainly political and underground, welfare, reform.				
Bulgaria	<u>National Student Council of Bulgaria</u> Representative. Political, cultural and educational activities.	M	-	-
R. European Meeting.				
Burma	<u>ABFSU</u> (All Burma Federation of Student Unions)	'M'	-	-
Organization virtually non-existent. Returns regularly in the publications of the IUS, but no student organization is allowed to exist in Burma.				
Burundi	<u>UNEBA</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants Barundi)	'M'	Dm	-
Branches in Burundi, Leopoldville, Europe and USA. Representative. Conflict between Leopoldville and Burundi-headquarters. Former is radical, while latter is more favourable towards Burundi Government.				

Cambodia	<u>UEK</u> (Union des Etudiant Khmers) Student organization in Paris. Representativity not known. Relations with Cambodian government not too close, due to UEK's radical left policy and lack of support for Sihanouks neutralism.	M	-	-
Cameroun	<u>UNEK</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants du Kameroun) Originated in Paris as opposition group against the government. Headquarters were removed in 1964 to Algiers. UNEK-Algiers now moderate- ly favourable towards government, while Paris branch is till in opposition. Paris branch is affiliated to the IUS.	M	-	-
Canada	<u>CUS</u> (Canadian Union of Students) Representative. Membership mainly English speaking students. Act. student welfare, education, press etc. Active inter- national policy. <u>UGEQ</u> (Union Générale des Etudiants de Quebec) 1964. Unites the French speaking students, who left CUS. Representative. Same activities as CUS, but a more french-syndicalist approach.	-	D	D
Ceylon	<u>CUSF</u> (Ceylon Univ. Students Federation). S. 10.000 = 60%. Based on faculty organizations. The two Buddhist univ. are not yet in CUSF, but attempts are made to broaden the represent- ativity. Act. education and welfare. <u>CNUS</u> (Ceylon National Union of Students) Membership mainly from secondary schools and teacher training colleges. Not representative.	-	D	D
Chili	<u>UFUCH</u> (Unión de Federaciones Universitarias de Chile) Representative and independent. Favourable	A	D	F

towards Frey government, since Christian
democrats have a large majority. Very active
in university reform, welfare, community
development, travel, seminars etc. active
international policy.

China (Comm.)	<u>ACSF</u> (All China Students Federation) Representative Main act. political, cultural and educational. Active international policy, mainly with Peking-groups in various countries.	M	-	-
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Colombia	<u>FUN</u> (Federación Universitaria Nacional). Act. welfare and opposition to the government. Independent, but leadership is linked with Col. communist party. Sino-sovjet split inside FUN. Two rival organizations: the Confeder. of Col. Univers. Students and the Nat. Union of Col. Students, but these seem to get no substantial support from the students.	M	D	-
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Congo (Brazz.)	<u>UGEK-B</u> (Union Générale des Etudiants et Elèves de Congo-B) Formerly the Ass. des Et. Congolais-B, one of the groups inside FEANF, Paris. Headquarters transferred to Brazza- ville, where it operates as the national youth organization supervised by the government.	-	-	-
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Congo (Leop.)	<u>UGEK</u> (Union Générale des Etudiants de Congo) 1961. After the Independence of the Congo critical towards Tshombe, Adoula etc. Branches in Europe and USA. Leopoldville branch moderate, Brussels-branch radical and pro-Soumialot.	'A'	Dm	-
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Costa Rica	<u>FEUCR</u> (Fed. de Estud. Univers. de Costa Rica) Representative and independent. Cooperating	-	D	D
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with government on domestic affairs, but critical towards governments international policy. Act. welfare and reform.
R. Conf. of Center American Univ. Students.

Cuba FEU (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria). Played an important role in the revolution against Batista. Within few months after the revolution transformed into a Castro front. Representative. Main activities to support Castro revolution. Internationally active. Is at the moment virtually the only country in Latin America where the IUS can organize events. M Dm -

Cyprus FNUCS (Fed. of National Unions of Cypriot Students) Representative, though no membership of Turkish-Cypriot students. Branches in Athens, Saloniki, England, Lebanon etc. Act: welfare and culture, cypriot problems. Turkish-Cypriots have their own organization the Turkish Cypriot Student Federation, with headquarters in Turkey. M D D

Czecho-Slovakia CSM (Ceskoslovensky Svaz Mladeze, student section) Representative. Act. political, cultural, educational. Host union of the IUS. Organizes regular international events. R. European Meeting. M - -

Denmark DSF (Danske Studerendes Faellesraad) 1932. Representative. Federation of councils at 2 universities and 9 colleges. Independent. Act. welfare, education, press, travel, student service etc. Active international policy. R. Nordic Presidents Meeting European Meeting - D D

Dahomey UGEED (Union Gén. des Etud. et Elèves Dahomeens) Independent. Three branches: Dahomey, Dakar, Paris. Paris branch is affiliated to FEANF and highly critical of government. The Dahomey branch is moderately in favour, while the Dakar branch (affil. to UGEAO) is split. - - -

Dominican Republic FED (Federacion de Est. Dominicanos) Representative. Since Dominican crisis the university is closed and situation unclear. Depends on who will be in the government and which group dominates the Union, how relations between both will develop. M Dm -

East Germany FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend). Student Section. Since 1945 the national youth front of the SED. Active in the political and ideological education of the East-German youth. Cooperates with the army to give students military training. No compulsory membership, but admission to university virtually impossible for non-members. Most members resign on completion of their studies. Is by the non-communist NUSes not accepted as a genuine NUS, since the lack of support from the East-German students is too evident. R. European Meeting. M - -

Ecuador FEUE (Federación de Est. Univers. del Ecuador) Repr. Membership from all 5 universities. FEUE is rather unstable, since headquarters move every year to another university. Highly critical towards military junta, which outlawed FEUE. Union is independent, but leadership mostly left-radical. Act. reform, welfare, etc. 'M' D -

El Salvador	<u>AGEUS</u> (Asociación General de Est. Univers. Salvadoreños)	A	Dm	-
Representative and independent. Highly critical towards government. Next to welfare and reform, AGEUS is politically very active in the country. Leadership mostly democratic left. R. Confed. of Center American Univ. Students.				
Ethiopia	<u>NUEUS</u> (Nat. Union of Eth. Univers. Students) 1961	M	Dm	-
Representative, active and independent. Act. welfare and community development. Moderately critical towards government. R. Pan african students movement.				
Finland	<u>SYL</u> (Suomen Ylioppilaskuntien Liitto) 1921. Representative.	-	D	D
S. 29.500 = 100% at all institutes of higher education. Act. welfare, education, student service, press etc. Active. R. Nordic Presidents Meeting. European Meeting.				
France	<u>UNEF</u> (Union National des Etudiants de France) 1911. Independent. Act.	A	Dm	-
student welfare, education, press, syndicalist actions, politics. Though membership is around 25%, it is generally accepted as NUS due to its welfare program. Political activities are dominated by Paris-branch. Relations with the government were bad, but are slightly improving. Dominated by left-socialist and communist students, but influence of the first group seems to increase. Active international policy. R. Common Market NUSes. European Meeting.				
	<u>FNEF</u> (Federation Nationale des Etud. de France) 1961	-	-	-

Established with government support to counteract UNEF. No substantial support from the students, except from Paris Law faculty and Montpellier. No international recognition.				
Gambia	National Union not founded yet, but is expected to be established in 1966 with the support of the West African Students Confederation.	-	-	-
Ghana	<u>NUGS</u> (National Union of Ghanese Students) 1961	A	D	D
Was representative and included all three universities. Active and highly critical of Nkrumah's government. Leadership was arrested in 1964 and imprisoned without trial. Since that time NUGS probably defunct. R. West African Students Confederation. <u>Ghanaso</u> (Ghana National Student Organization) Established on initiative pro-Nkrumah students to replace NUGS. Close cooperation with Nkrumah's CPP party. Was invited to take NUGS seat after the IUS Congress. R. Pan African Student Movement.				
Greece	<u>EFEE</u> (National Union of Greek Students) Representative.	A	D	D
Highly critical of government, supported the Papandreou line during the 1965 crisis. Leadership at the moment with the centrum democrats who took it over from communist students in 1964				
Guadeloupe	<u>AGEG</u> (Association Générale des Et. Guadeloupéens)	M	-	-
No facts known on its representativity. Students group in Paris.				

Guatemala AEU (Asociación de Estud. Univers.) Representative. - D D
Independent. Act. welfare and reform. Highly critical towards government. In february 1965 AEU almost split on the issue of reform, but seems to recover. Though the communist party had been banned, the student wing is still very active. Other groups are the Christian democrats and the a-political students. The latter have no influence on AEU policy.
R. Confed. of Center American University Students.

Guyana (Br.) PYO (Progressive Youth Organization). Youth wing of the Progressive Peoples Party. No facts on representativity and activity. M - -

Guyana (Fr.) UEG (Union des Etudiants Guianais) Student organization in Paris. Representativity not known. M - -

Guinea JPDG (Jeunesse de Partie Democratique de Guinee) - - -
Its membership was formerly affiliated to FEANF and UGEAO. Most students went however to Algiers, were the main branch of JPDG exists. Favourable towards government.

Haiti UNEH (Union National des Etudiants Haitiens) M - -
Student organization in Paris. Not representative. In Haïti itself no democratic organization is allowed by the Duvalier government. UNEH is the Marxist residue of an attempt to unite all Haitian students. Headquarters are at the IUS Secretariat in Prague.

Honduras FEUH (Federación de Estud. Univers. de Honduras) M - -
Representative. Act. welfare, education and reform. Moderately favourable towards the government.
R. Confed. of Center American Univ. Students.

Hong Kong HKFS (Hong Kong Federation of Students) Representative. - D D
S. 3900 = 100% at both universities. Independent. Act: student welfare, excursions, education, press community development. Political activities almost excluded, due to political situation in Hong Kong.

Hungary NCHSO (National Committee of Hungarian Student Org.) M - -
Though officially independent from National Youth Organization KISZ, all the organizations affiliated to NCHSO are created and controlled by KISZ. Main activity of NCHSO: to coordinate the international relations of the Hungarian students. Most other activities are carried out by KISZ itself. Though after the 1956 revolution the representativity could be doubted, the situation has improved.

UFHS (United Federation of Hungarian Students) - F F
Organization of Hungarian Student who fled from the country after the 1956 uprising. Branches all over Western-Europe and in the USA. Were highly critical towards the developments in Hungary, but changed their policy in 1964. Main activities: to promote a dialogue with the Hungarian students at home through exchanges, publications etc.

Iceland SHI (Stúdentarád Háskóla Islands) 1920. Representative. - D D

S. 980 = 100% at one university. Independent. Act. welfare, education, travel, bookshop etc.

R. Nordic Presidents Meeting.

India NCUSI (National Council of Univers. Students of Ind.) - D D

1958. S: 700.000 = 70 %. U: 30 = 60 %.

Independent. Act: welfare, press, travel, cooperatives, training seminars, community development. Political activities concern the national emergency problems: food shortage, Chinese aggression etc. Active international policy.

AISF All Indian Student Federation) 1945. M - -

Membership less than 1%. Political organization and student wing of Indian Communist Party. For many years no Congress, which could provide facts on membership, structure, policy and activities.

Indonesia PPMI (Perserikatan Perhimpunan 2 A Dm -
Mahasiswa Indonesia)

Federation of approx. 15 organizations (nationalist, religious, communist and local organizations). Emphasis on political activities on the national and international field. Is represented in the Indonesian Parliament as one of the functional groups. Very active on the issue of West Irian, Malaysia, Ganefo etc.

After the Communist PKI-coup in sept. 1965 failed, the dominating left-wing organizations were excluded from PPMI, and few weeks after it has been dissolved.

KAMI seems to replace PPMI.

Is a federation of all national student organizations, which opposed the communist Sept. 1965 coup. Officially recognised as the main student

body. Political very active.

MMI (Madjelis Mahasiswa Indonesia) Indonesian Students Council.

Has branches at almost all universities. Act. welfare and education. Almost no political activity. Delegated international relations to PPMI.

Iran CIS (Confederation of Iranian Students). Representative for - D D

Iranian students abroad. Branches in Europe, Iran and USA. Highly critical towards government. Not affiliated with any political party, but cooperates with National Front. Main activities are political: campaigns and publications. Assists students who suffer from repressive government measures, like withdrawal of passports and scholarships, arrests and imprisonment. Annual Congress decides on CIS policy. Inside Iran no exact figures available because the organization is forced to work underground.

TUSU (Teheran University Students Union). Organization M - -
virtually non-existent. Headquarters are at the IUS secretariat in Prague.

Ireland USI (Union of Students in Ireland) - D D
Representative. Activities in student welfare, education, travel etc. Independent.

Iraq NUIS (National Union of Iraqi Students) 1962. Was active in - - D
overthrowing the Kassem regime, and grew in a few months to the representative organization of Iraqi students. Act. welfare and national reconstruction. Branches in the Middle East, England and the USA. After the Baath party lost power, the government started to restrict

NUIS activities and arrested its leaders. NUIS returned underground and is probably defunct.

GUSIR (General Union of Students in the Ir. Republic) M - -

Pro Kassem organization, and at the time the student wing of the Kassem government. Non-representative. After the coup (febr. 1963) the organization was virtually non-existent, except for some branches in Moscow and England.

Israel NUIS (National Union of Israeli Students) Representative. - D D

S. 15.500 = 90% at all three universities. Independent. Very active in the field of student welfare, press, cooperatives, travel, foreign students service etc. Active international policy.

Italy UNURI (Unione Nazionale Univers. Rappresentativa It.) - D D

Representative. Act: welfare, democratization of education, travel, etc. Independent, but the Executive composition corresponds mostly with the national coalition government. French syndicalist approach. R. European Meeting; Common Market NUSes.

Ivory Coast UNECI (Union Nationale des Etudiants et Elèves de Cote d'Ivoire) Originally in Paris as

FEANF-branch. In sept. 1963 the headquarters were removed to Abidjan. Independent. Paris branch remains critical, the Abidjan branch is more favourable towards Houphouët-Boigny.

Japan ZENGAKUREN Was originally the only Japanese student body with international relations. Main activities were campaigns against nuclear testing. Membership left-wing socialist and communist. After the resuming of the Soviet tests the Zengakuren fell apart in several factions. After the sino-soviet conflict the number of factions grew till appr. 25, reflecting all shades of communism and left-socialism. One of these is represented in the IUS, another is HEIMINGAKUREN, which is pro-Chinese. Futural developments difficult to foresee. M - -

Jordan UJS (Union of Jordan Students). Has some branches in East europe, but is not regarded by the Arab NUSes as an Union. Name can be found only in the IUS publications. Headquarters in Leipzig (DDR) M - -

Kurdistan KSSE (Kurdish Students Society in Europe). Has some branches in Eastern Europe, with headquarters in East-Berlin. Not representative. Majority of Kurdish students study in the Middle East, where several organizations work openly or secretly with the Barrazani movement to create an independent Kurdistan. M - -

Kenya SUUC (Students Union, The University College) M D D

Representative and active national and international policy. Independent, but favourable towards government.

R. East African Student Confederation. Pan-african student movement.

NUKS (National Union of Kenyan Students) 1964. Initiative of SUUC to include also non-university students. Recognised by the government. Will probably take over some of the SUUC activities. - - -

Kuwait	<u>NUKS</u> (National Union of Kuwait Students) 1964. Has branches throughout the Middle East, England. Moderately critical towards Kuwait government. Active Arab policy with an Arab nationalist tendency. Active in welfare, culture etc.	-	-	-
Lebanon	<u>UNUL</u> (Union Nationale des Universitaires du Liban) S. 9600 = 90% at all four universities. Independent but favourable towards Arab Nationalists, who outnumbered Lebanese Nationalists at 1965 Congress. Both groups are negotiating to avoid that the split may paralyse UNUL.	A	D	D
Liberia	<u>LNSU</u> (Liberian National Students Union.) Formerly the organization had some welfare activities, but due to weak leadership its importance was little. Efforts are made to re-activate the Union. Independent and moderately favourable towards the government. Asked no status at 11th ISC, due to the fact that Union was practically non-active.	'M'	-	-
Luxemburg	<u>UNEL</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants du Luxembourg) Branches at Belgian and French universities, where majority of Lux. students is studying, as long as no university exists in their country. Due to the fact that their members study under different conditions, the activity of UNEL is little. R. Common Market NUSes.	-	D	-
Madagascar	<u>FAEM</u> (Federation des Associations des Etudiants de Madagascar). Representative and independent. Critical of governments foreign policy, moderately critical	'M'	Dm	-

	of its domestic policy. R. Pan-african students movement.			
	<u>AEOM</u> (Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache) Students group in Paris, but as an organization almost non-existent, except in IUS publications.	'M'	-	-
Malaysia	<u>PKPM</u> (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar2 Malaya) Representative. Federation of student councils at all Malayan faculties. Attempts to unite with Singapore universities were topped after Singapore left Malayan Federation. Act: welfare, community development, Malaysian integration. Moderately critical towards government. Active international policy.	-	D	D
Malta	<u>SRC</u> (Students Representative Council) Representative. Student body at the Royal University of Malta. Act. welfare, debate, travel etc. Independent.	-	D	D
Martinique	<u>AGEM</u> (Association Générale des Etudiants de la Mart.) Student group in Paris. Representativity not known.	'M'	-	-
Mexico	<u>CNE</u> (Confederación Nacional de Estudiantes) The only national student organization in Mexico. Independent. Act: welfare and education. Political importance seems to increase. Inside CNE two groups along the line student-as-such and student responsibility in society. Recently the latter gained the majority. <u>CJM</u> (Confederación de Jovenes Mexicanos, Seccion Est.) Student section of left radical youth movement.	-	D	D
	<u>FNET</u> (Federación Nacional de Est. Tecnicos.) Organization of	'M'	-	-

the technical colleges. Recognizes CNE as the NUS, but is not affiliated.

Mongolia Union of Mongolian Students. M - -
Representative. Act: political,
cultural and educational. Almost no inter-
national contacts.

Morocco UNEM (Union National des A Dm -
Etudiants du Maroc) 1956.
Highly critical towards King Hassan's govern-
ment. Independent but favourable towards
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires.
Representative. Subsequent UNEM' Presidents
were arrested and imprisoned. Attempt by the
government to outlaw UNEM was prevented by
court decision. Act: mainly political.
R. Confederation des Etudiants de Mahgreb.
Pan-african students movement.

Mozambique UNEMO (Unions Nationale des - D D
Etudiants de Mozambique)
Favourable towards FRELIMO, the Moz.
liberation movement. Branches in Tanzania,
Morocco, Europe and USA.

Netherlands NSR (Nederlandse Studenten - D D
Raad) 1945. Representative.
S: 58.000 = 95% at all 12 universities and
colleges. Main act: welfare, education, press,
travel, student service, seminars, voluntary
service. Independent. Critical towards govern-
ment educational policy. Cooperating with
government and universities in various fields.
Active.
R. Common Market NUSes.
European Meeting.

Nepal NSO (National Student Organization) - - -
Completely dominated by government
and no support from students. Can be compared

with SEU-Spain.

TUSU (Trilhuven University - - -
Students Union) Founded to re-
place NSO, but heavily restricted by the
government. Is gradually growing.

NNFS (Nepal National Federation 'M' - -
of Students). Student group in India.
Not representative, if it exists at all.

New Zealand NZUSA (New Zealand University - D D
Students' Association)
S: 18.000 = 100% at all seven universities.
Independent. Act: welfare, education, press,
research, travel.

Nicaragua CUUN (centro Universitario de la M Dm D
Universidad Nacional)
Representativity 70%. Act: university reform,
welfare, press, culture. Critical towards
government. Main groups in CUUN: Marxists,
Christian Democrats, independents. The first
group is split between Sino- and Soviet
supporters, with the result that the influence
of the second group is growing.
R. Confederation of Center American Univers.
Students.

Niger USN (Union des Scolaires Nigeriens) - - -
1960. Branches in France (FEANF),
Dakar (UGEAO) and Ivory Cost. Highly critical
of Niger government. No branch in Niger itself.

Nigeria NUNS (National Union of Nigerian M D D
Students) 1956. Representative.
Independent. Act: student welfare, culture,
training seminars etc. Active international
and pan-african policy.
R. West African Students Confederation.
Pan-african students movement.

North Korea	<u>Korean Students Committee.</u> Representative. Main activities political, educational and cultural.	M	-	-
North Vietnam	<u>UNEV</u> (Union Nationale des Etudiants du Vietnam). Main activities political - liberation of South-Vietnam - cultural and educational.	M	-	-
Norway	<u>NSU</u> (Norsk Students Union) Formerly NSS 1936. Compulsory membership. S: 18.500 at two universities and 4000 overseas members, organised in ANSA. Independent. Growing activities in student welfare, travel, press, voluntary schemes etc.	-	D	D
R. Nordic Presidents Meeting European Meeting				
Palestine	<u>GUPS</u> (General Union of Palestine Students) Representative. S: 15.000 students in 27 branches throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and USA. Act. welfare, refugee-problems, scholarship, Palestinian problems etc. Active political participation. Tends towards Arab nationalist/Nasserist line.	M	D	D
Panama	<u>UEU</u> (Union de Estudiantes Universitarios) Union of the Panamese students, which united with the union of secondary schools, to form FEP.	-	Dm	-
	<u>FEP</u> (Federacion de Estudiantes de Panama) Representative. Act: reform of university, defense of national sovereignty in the canal zone, welfare. Most important group, the Front for university reform, suffers from Sino-Soviet split, and	M	-	-

seems to be on the retreat.

Paraguay	<u>FUP</u> (Federación Universitaria del Paraguay) Representativity 65%. Independent. Highly critical towards the Stroessner government. Act: re-establishment of democracy in Paraguay, university reform, welfare. Its activities are in most cases restricted by the government.	-	D	D
Peru	<u>FEP</u> (Federación de Estudiantes del Peru) Representativity 80% at six out of eight universities. Critical towards government on issues concerning social and economic reform. Main groups the Apristas-student wing of the APRA-party - and the communists. Almost equal strength.	'M'	Fm	-
Philippines	<u>NUSP</u> (National Union of Phil. Students) Unites the councils of appr. 60% of the universities. Main activities welfare, education, sports etc. Independent.	-	D	-
	<u>SCAP</u> (Student Councils Assoc. of the Phil.) Unites appr. 40% of the universities. Same activities as NUSP. Difference between both organizations mainly historical.	-	D	-
	<u>PNCSIR</u> (Philippines National Council of Students for International Relations) Established by NUSP and SCAP to continue the joint participants in international affairs.			
Poland	<u>ZSP</u> (Zrzeszenie Studentow Polski) Representative. Main act: political, educational and cultural. Active travel depart-	M	-	-

ment. Active international policy.
R. European Meeting.

Portuguese Africa UGEAN (Union des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire sous Domination Portugaise). Originally the representative organization of Portuguese-african students. After the foundation of national student organizations of Angola (UNEA) and Mozambique (UNEMO) UGEAN lost its representativity. Relations with UNEA and UNEMO are tense, since UGEAN refused to support the Angolan liberation movement FLNA, which is recognised by the Organization for African Unity OAU. Instead UGEAN became the student wing of the concurrent MPLA, the marxist liberation movement. The latter is split in several factions, and has almost no African support. Branches in East Europe, Brazzaville, Germany and Switzerland.
R. Pan-african students movement.

Puerto Rico FUPI (Federación de Universitarios pro Independencia) M Dm -
Strongly opposed to the USA-Puerto Rican relations. Advocates complete independence. S: no exact figures available, but less than 15%. Marxist leadership is connected with the independence parties PIP and MPI. Active campus-political activities. Active international policy.

Reunion UGECR (Union Générale des Etudiants Creoles de la Reunion) 'M' - -
No facts available. Has no address, was not on IUS congress and is probably non-existent.

Rumania UASR (Union of the Students Associations of the RPR) M - -
Representative. Main activities political,

M - -

M Dm -

'M' - -

M - -

cultural and educational.
R. European Meeting.

Rhodesia NURS (National Union of Rhodesian Students) 1963 - - D

Representative and independent, but most leaders in favour of ZAPU-party. Before the unilateral declaration of independence there was a conflict with the National Association of Rhodesia Students NARS, whose leadership favoured ZAPU. After UDI both organizations united against the Smith government. Activities are restricted.

Scotland SUS (Scottish Union of Students) 1946. S: 75%. Independent. - D D

Act: student welfare, education, travel, debates etc. Active international policy.
R. European Meeting.

Senegal UGEAO (Union Générale des Etudiants d'Afrique Occidentale) M Dm -

1956. Membership consisted of students at the university of Dakar from Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, and Niger. Highly critical towards francophile governments in Africa. Independent, but leadership favourable towards Marxist opposition in Senegal. End 1964 UGEAO has been banned by the Senegalese government.

UNES (Union Nationale des Etudiants Senegalais) 1964. - - -

No exact figures available, but representativity seems to be growing. Independent. Critical to some aspects of Senghors government. Advocates a dialogue with the government on welfare questions.

Sierra Leone SLNUS (Sierra Leone National Union of Students) 1965. M D D

Founded on initiative of Students Union Fourah

Bay College. Representative. Main activities on student welfare and national development. Active national and international policy. Independent but cooperative with the government.

Singapore NUSS (National Union of Singapore Students) - D F

Was intended to unite the student councils of the three Singapore universities: Un of Sing ; Sing Polytechnic and Nan Yang univ. After demonstrations about the position of Singapore in the Malaysian Federation, the Nan Yang Council has been banned. The two other Councils prefer to wait with the re-establishment of the NUSS till Nan Yang is able and willing to join. The three councils are representative. Act: welfare, education, debate, press etc. Nan Yangs political activity is more radical than that of the other councils.

South Africa NUSAS (National Union of South African Students) 1924. - D D

Originally representative for all S.A. students, but most Afrikaner councils dis-affiliated after NUSAS started to oppose apartheid. At the moment representative for the English speaking white students. Membership includes some Africans and Asians, but they are liable to be expelled from their universities when their membership is known. Act: on welfare, education, multi-racial education, scholarships to students whose grants were withdrawn, correspondence courses for expelled students in cooperation with British Universities, etc. Though officially not banned, the activities are heavily restricted by the government. Executive members arrested during the past years, but

in most cases released. Luthuli is honorary President.

ASB (Afrikaanse Studenten Bond) - - -
Membership primarily Afrikaner students. Officially limited to white students. Declared objective is expansion of white Christian civilization in the struggle against communism.

Act. press, culture, debate, sports etc. Started an international information campaign on necessity of apartheid. No international recognition.

Next to NUSAS and ASB various Bantu-organizations exist and operate underground.

South Korea Initiative to create a NUS failed, due to government restrictions. - D -
International representation sometimes by national delegations.

South Vietnam No National Union, due to political and military situation. International representation sometimes by national delegation. Student welfare activities decreased during the last years. Some councils are still active in press and politics. Were highly critical towards Diem and Khan, and emphasized the need for a social revolution in South-Vietnam. - D D

UELSV (Union des Etudiants pour la liberation du Sud-Vietnam) M - -
Student committee in Hanoi. No facts available.

Spain SEU (Syndicate Espagnol Universitaria). Falangist organization with compulsory membership. Controlled by the Franco government. Educational and welfare activities subject to government approval. - - -

No support, except from falangist students. During 1965 the Spanish students held free assemblies at some universities to make their wishes known. Strongly opposed to present government. Meetings are heavily restricted.

FNEC: Catalonian student organization existing in Barcelona. Active.

Strongly opposed to Franco.

UED: Christian Democrat organization. Branches at most universities

but strongest in Madrid. Various activities on welfare, press, leadership training etc.

Strongly opposed to Franco.

EIA: Basque student organization. Headquarters in Bilbao. Act:

mainly political, press, leadership training etc. Strongly opposed to Franco.

FUDE/CUDE: Student organization in Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid.

Reflects all shades of the left. Strongly opposed to Franco.

Sudan KUSU (Khartoum University Students Union). Independent.

Representative. Was highly critical to Abboud government, and contributed to the coup in october 1964. Favourable to the new government. In autumn 1965 anti-communist demonstrations resulted in ban of the communist party, with the result that IUS Executive meeting turned to Czecho-slovakia instead of Khartoum. KUSU at the moment moderately in favour of the government.

Surinam SSV (Surinaamse Studenten Vereniging) Organizations of Surinam

students in the Netherlands. Was representative but support seems to decrease.

Leadership favourable to Castro and highly

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critical of Surinam government and its cooperation with the Dutch. Almost no members in Surinam itself.

Sweden SFS (Sveriges Förenade Studentkärer) Compulsory membership.

S: 52.000. Independent. Very active in welfare, education, press, etc. Organizes regular seminars with Latin-american students.

Active international policy.

R. Nordic Presidents Meeting.

European Meeting.

Switzerland VSS/UNES (Verband Schweizerische Studentenschaften) Representative,

independent. Act: student welfare, education, press, travel, etc. Presidents alternately French- and German speaking. Active international policy.

R. European Meeting.

Syria NUSS (National Union of Syrian Students) M. 4300 = 25% at both

universities. Individual membership. Independent. Favourable towards Baath- government. Act: welfare, bookshop, press, etc. Political activities directed on consolidation Syrian revolution.

Tanzania NAUTS (National Union of Tanganyika Students) 1964

formed on initiative of the active Univ. Students Union of Dar es Salaam USUD. Independent. Recognised by the government as representative student body. Active international policy.

R. East African Students Confederation.

Pan african students movement.

ZRSU (Zanzibar Revolutionary Students Union) Formed after the

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1963 revolution. Student wing of the Afro-shirazi party.

Thailand No national union formed yet, due to discouraging attitude universities and government. Sometimes national delegation. Moderately favourable towards Thai government. - D -

Tunisia UGET (Union Générale des Etudiants de Tunisie) 1953. A Dm -
Independent from Bourguiba government, but majority of the leaders belong to the Neo-Destour party. Active national policy on welfare and community development. Representative. Branches in Europe and the middle east. Active international policy.
R. Confederation des Etudiants du Mahgreb. Pan-african students movement.

Turkey TMTF (Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu) Representative. - Dm D
Active in student welfare, travel, press etc. Independent. Active support for the Turkish-Cypriot students.

Uganda NUUS (National Union of Uganda Students) 1964. Formed on 'M' D D
initiative of Makerere Students Guild MSG. Moderately in favour of government. Act. welfare etc. Active international policy.
R. East African Students Confederation. Pan-african students movement.

United Arab Republic GUSUAR (General Union of Students of the UAR.) 1960. Only national student organization. Reflects - Dm D
governments policy. Activities in close cooperation with government.
R. Pan-african students movement.

United Kingdom NUSEWNI (NUS of England, Wales and Northern Ireland) - D D
Representative. S: over 250.000.
Very active on welfare, education, press, travel, foreign students, culture, voluntary service. Active international policy.
R. European Meeting.

USA USNSA (United States National Student Association) - D D
Majority of university student councils affiliated. Act: welfare, civil rights, travel etc. Independent. Critical towards some aspects of USA foreign policy. Active international policy.

USSR Student Council of the USSR. M - -
Successor of the Anti-fascist Committee of Soviet Youth. Formed to coordinate the international activities of Soviet students and youth. Very active press and travel departments. Active international policy.
R. European Meeting.

Uruguay FEUU (Federación de Estud. Univers. del Uruguay) - Dm -
Representative and independent. Act: welfare and reform. Generally critical towards government. Active Latin-american and international policy. Dominated by leftists who are split in Soviet, Chinese and Castro factions.

Venezuela FCU (Federación de Centros Universitarios). Representativity M Dm -
appr. 50%. Primarely Caracas University. Only organization with international activity. Chinese/Castro communists outnumber the Christian Democrats. Highly critical towards

government. Main activities reform and political campus action.

West Germany VDS (Verband Deutscher Studenten-schaften) Representative and independent. Active welfare and educational policy, foreign student service, travel, press, seminars, etc. Critical towards governmental educational policy, but cooperates with government in several fields. Active international policy.
R. European Meeting.

West Indies RUWIS (Regional Union of West Indies Students) Representative and independent. Main act: student welfare in Jamaica, but attempts are made to enlarge their scope to the other former British colonies in the Caribbean. Independent.

UWIS (Organization of Jamaica students in England.) M - -

Yugoslavia YUS (Yugoslav Union of Students) Representative. Active educational and welfare policy. Unlike most other east-european unions, YUS has reached a more independent relationship with the party, and the monologue has grown gradually into a dialogue, at least in educational affairs. Is promoting several self-management projects, community development etc. Active international policy. Organizes a yearly seminar in Dubrovnik on democratization of education, which developed into an important meeting-place for student-leaders of East and West.
R. European Meeting.

Zambia NUZS (National Union of Zambia students) 1963. M - D

Originally the NUS of Northern Rhodesian Students NUNRS. Representative. Activities on student welfare and community development, national problems. Cooperating with the Kaunda government.

R. Pan-african student movement.

Overseas student organizations, who are not included in the list:

FEANF (Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France) M Dm -

Organization of French-african students in Paris. Included students from Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, Dahomey, Cameroun, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville.

Common element of its members: the same colonial power, which centralized the university education in Paris and Dakar. (See Senegal: UGEO). FEANF's activities mainly political. Highly critical towards francophile governments in Africa. Campaigned to vote against the 1959 referendum. The fact that the FEANF leadership cooperated closely with the French Communist Party, promoted the establishment of universities in those African countries, whose governments did not appreciate the Paris education of their students. When the importance of the African NUSes increased, the importance of FEANF decreased. Most Paris branches of the African NUSes are still affiliated to FEANF and are the radical-left wing of their NUSes. Relations with the African NUSes are in most cases not too friendly.

WASU (West African Students Union) 1926.

Organization of West African students in London. Included students from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, etc. For history see chapter C. Like FEANF its importance decreased gradually. At the moment dominated by Nkrumah-students, resulting in a decreasing membership of students with other political views.

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Appendix E

Glossary of Abbreviations

COSEC	Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students. Name of the administrative secretariat of the ISC 1952-1964.
IPC	International Preparatory Committee, whose task is to prepare a conference independently of the existing international organizations.
ISC	International Student Conference. 1950
IUS	International Union of Students. 1946
LASC	Latin American Student Congress.
NUS	National Union of Students.
PASC	Pan-African Student Conference.
RIC	Research and Information Commission (ISC)
RTC	Round Table Conference.
SUPCOM	Supervision Committee. (ISC)
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth.
WPC	World Peace Council.
WSN	World Student News - IUS monthly.
WSU	World Student Unity.

To avoid too many abbreviations, the names of the NUSes have been omitted. Instead, the names of the countries these NUSes represent, haven been used.

Appendix FSelected Bibliography

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ISC Publications: The Student, Monthly magazine since 1956.
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 Resolutions ISC since 1954.
 Reports of the ISC since 1954.
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101. Statement IUS Secretariat, August 8, 1953.
102. Report on 3rd World Student Congress (NUSEWNI)
103. IUS Congress Bulletin no. 5 and 7, 1953
104. See list of participating NUSes, presented by the IUS representative Mr. Chandra at the 5th ISC in Birmingham, attached to NUSEWNI-Report.
105. "Associate members shall be admitted, such members to be student organi-

- zations which are eligible for full membership in the IUS, and who within the limitations of their own constitution accept limited obligations and in return receive certain rights. These obligations and rights shall be determined by agreement between the IUS Executive Committee and the organization concerned, and must be ratified by the IUS Congress".
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141. "Who is for Cooperation and who is against".
Article by Jiri Pelikan in WSN, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 8, 10.
142. Information Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 19.
This resolution has not been printed in the IUS News Service, but was transmitted by a Polish NUS delegation to Denmark.
143. We should point out that the Polish government refused until the middle of March, 1957 to admit that the Hungarian revolt was counter-revolutionary, and so at the time of this resolution the students' opinion was conform to that of the party. Once Gomulka had given in, the Polish NUS also remained silent about Hungary, but it became evident at the 5th IUS Congress that they were not really pleased to do so. Although therefore this resolution was no proof of the NUS's independence, it did give the West confidence in the possibility of a dialogue with the Poles.
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153. Executive report Peking Congress, p. 24.
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155. Morocco, Algeria, Ceylon and Pakistan. The Pakistan NUS declared this decision null and void since its representatives had had no mandate to apply for such a status.

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159. Paragraph from resolution no. 1. Resolutions Peking, p. 8.
160. March 13, 1957. Reactions in Information Bulletin May, June, July, August 1957, and in News Service during the same period.
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162. Ibid. p. 114-115.
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165. Report Administrative Secretary to the ISC, p. 4.
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167. Ibid. p. 122. (Scottish intervention)
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173. WSN, vol. 13, no. 11, p. 11.
174. Peace is a Student Question. Report on the International Student Peace Conference, November 1959, p. 44. (IUS).
175. Open letter from the IUS Executive Committee Meeting to all NUSes.
Reproduced in: Documentation on the RTC and World Student Unity, (IUS 1963), p. 3, 6.
176. "Congress expresses its sympathy for the initiative presented by the NUS of Uruguay and supported by representatives of different organizations, members of the IUS and non-members, concerning the organizations of a RTC open to all national student organizations, which could discuss principles and projects for the common action of the student movement in different fields of student interests".
Resolutions Peking, September 1958.
177. "This conference, in reiterating its goal of universal student cooperation, decides that there shall be a round table discussion of at least three days duration prior to and on the same site is the Ninth ISC to discuss problems of world student unity and in particular to review the attitudes and points of view adopted during the year in the formal and informal discussions, envisaged in Resolution 12.
This Conference instructs COSEC to invite to this RTC all known student organizations at present not cooperating in the ISC as well as the ISC participants.
In doing this, the Conference wishes to place upon record, that acceptance of the invitation to the RTC by a non-participating national organization in no way obligates that organization to attend the ISC itself and further this Conference

- states that attendance at this RTC shall in no way be construed as cooperating within the framework of the ISC." Resolutions Peru, February 1959.
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 181. Ibid. p. 13-17.
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 184. Ibid. p. 26.
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 186. June 10, 1960, Appendix WSN, June, 1960.
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 191. Information Bulletin, vol. 8, no. 1.
 192. General: The Student vol. 4, no. 7, p. 13-17.
Information Bulletin vol. 8, no. 1, p. 5-10.
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 206. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua.
 207. India, Mexico, Nepal, Lebanon, Iran.
 208. Inter alia: Crankshaw, the Cold War; Moscow versus Peking, Ch. VIII.
 209. Information Bulletin, 1961, no. 6, p. 30-33.
 210. Information Bulletin, 1961, no. 7, p. 40-42.
News Service, 1961, no. 10, p. 5.

211. Ibid. p. 25-27.
212. The Student, 1961, no. 12, p. 4-8, 28.
WSN, 1961, no. 12, p. 6-7.
213. The Student, 1961, no. 6, p. 2-6.
WSN, 1961, no. 10/11, p. 5-8.
214. Information Bulletin, 1961, no. 12, p. 24-25.
216. Ibid. no. 10, p. 18, 20; no. 11, p. 4-8.
217. Documentation, op. cit. p. 99, 102.
218. See Information Bulletin passim.
219. See Resolutions 9th ISC.
Report on Implementation of Cooperation to the 10th ISC.
220. Angola and Mozambique, Dominican Republic, East Germany, El Salvador, Haiti, Hungary, Iran, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, Puerto Rico, South Africa, South-West Africa, Spain, USA, (racial discrimination), West Irian. During the 10th ISC new mandates were given for reports on Aden, Bolivia, Morocco, West-Germany and Problems of Overseas Students in Europe.
221. General: Resolutions 10th ISC;
Minutes 10th ISC;
The Student, vol. 6, no. 6;
Information Bulletin;
WSN, 1962, no. 7-8, p. 3-5, 37.
222. Resolutions 9th ISC, no. 14.
223. Open letter, April 1962, Documentation op. cit.
224. Resolutions 10th ISC, no. 15, 17, 19, 20, 57.
225. RIC report 1960-1962 on Puerto Rico.
226. Minutes 10th ISC, p. 31.
227. Ibid, p. 44.
228. Ibid. p. 44.
229. Ibid. p. 55.
230. Ibid. appendix 1b.
231. WSN 1962, no. 7-8, p. 36.
232. Komsomolskaya Pravda, July 28, 1962, p. 3.
233. Here the Komsomolskaya Pravda confused events. 76 NUSes participated in the first vote. After the walk-out, 50 unions voted on the Chilean amendment and, therefore 26 NUSes in all (including FUPI) had withdrawn. After this vote, some other NUSes left the hall, but an equal number returned.
234. The Komsomolskaya Pravda probably meant "others", since the three "gentlemen" have thus far refused to give the ISC financial support.
235. General: WSN, vol. 16, no. 9-10;
The Student, vol. 6, no. 10;
Resolutions 7th IUS Congress;
Reports of various participating NUSes.
236. Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 15, 1961.

237. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17-7-1962.
238. New York Times, 16-7-1962.
239. New: Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Honduras and Liberia.
240. New: Congo, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Flemish NUS, Wallonian NUS.
241. New: West Indian Student Federation (London).
242. New: Portuguese Africa, Ceylon, South Vietnam, Puerto Rico.
243. Detailed report: Frank Griffiths, The Sino-Soviet Conflict at the seventh IUS Congress, (CUS)
244. News Service, autumn 1962, passim.
Information Bulletin, autumn 1962 passim.
245. News Service, 1963, no. 2, p. 11.
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 3, 4 etc.
246. News Service, 1963, no. 3, p. 17-20 etc.
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 14, 15.
247. News Service, 1963, no. 5, p. 3-4.
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 4.
248. Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 4, 5.
249. News Service, 1963, no. 4, page 2, 3 and next issues.
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 5, 6, 9.
250. Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 7, 8.
News Service, 1963, no. 8.
251. News Service, 1963, no. 8, p. 2-4, no. 7, p. 3-5.
252. Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 10.
253. Resolutions 10th ISC, no. 57, 15, 17, 19.
Resolutions 7th IUS, no. 2.
254. They were the IUS secretariat members from Brazil, Cuba, Japan, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, Venezuela, Bulgaria and East-Germany.
255. UGET Documentation, reproduced in
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 9, p. 16-20.
256. These were the NUSes of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, West-Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, England, Scotland, United States and South Korea.
257. UGET Documentation,
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, p. 16-20.
258. News Service, 1963, no. 8, p. 12, 13.
259. UGET Documentation, op. cit.
News Service, 1963, no. 8, p. 11-12.
Information Bulletin, vol. 9, p. 16-20.
260. The International Student Movement, past present and future.
ISC 1963 (includes the major speeches, the panel-discussion and the Declaration of Leysin).

261. General: WSN, 1964, no. 7-8;
The Student, 1964, no. 8;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 12, 1965.
262. News Service, 1964, no. 15, 16.
263. Referred to the Iraqi delegate.
264. Resolutions 11th ISC, no. 20.
265. "A NUS that has with delegate or Fraternal observer status taken part in the last ISC is not eligible for a travel grant to the next conference, unless in the meantime COSEC has received its full contribution or that part there of that has been decided upon by the Supervision Committee".
Resolutions 10th ISC, no. 105.
266. Charter of the ISC, see appendix A.
267. News Service, no. 6-7, 1964, p. 78-82.
268. Open letter, November 12, 1964, (ISC Press Release).
269. At the Executive Meeting of May 1963, Algiers:
Full membership: Burundi, Dar es Salaam, Reunion, Lebanon and Nigeria.
Ass. membership: El Salvador and Ghana.
At the Executive meeting of February 1964, Budapest:
Full membership: Colombia, Jordan, Panama, Peru, Uganda.
Ass. membership: France, Kenya.
270. Jen-min Jih-pao, (Peking) March 1, 1963.
271. News Service, 1963, no. 9-10, p. 6.
272. News Service, 1963, no. 16, p. 1-2.
273. Resolutions Executive Meeting Budapest, p. 75.
274. Peking Review, 1964, no. 42 special supplement, p. 3.
275. Ibid. 1964, no. 43.
276. Ibid. 1964, no. 43 and 44.
277. See Ghita Ionescu op. cit.
278. For representativity see appendix. D.
279. General: See WSN, 1964, no. 11-12;
The Student, 1965, no. 1;
Working papers IUS Congress;
Distributed text of Chinese, Rumanian and Albanian speeches;
Reports of various NUSes.
280. This resolution was not published in the IUS Resolutions, but was printed in News Service, 1965, no. 1.
281. Chinese intervention in Sofia distributed by the Chinese delegation.
282. News Features, vol. 4, no. 5, June 6, 1963.
283. Executive report 8th IUS Congress, p. 6-7
284. Ibid. p. 8.
285. Ibid. p. 26.
286. Fortune, January, 1966.