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GUERRILLA WARFARE
IN
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This booklet is the third in a series on Guerrilla Warfare.

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INTRODUCTION

On June 11-13, 1971, Interdoc held a conference in the Netherlands (Noordwijk aan Zee) on "Guerrilla Warfare in Asia". This conference was attended by 31 participants from a number of Western and Asian countries.

Five papers were presented to the participants and the texts of these papers form the contents of this booklet.

The reason for Interdoc's choice of this subject is twofold: in the first place, because of communism's growing interest in "the national liberation movement"; in the second, because "the national liberation struggle" often takes the form of guerrilla warfare. The increasing significance of this type of war is being realized more and more, in both East and West.

Communism still pursues the same global goals. The split between the two main communist powers has not changed these goals, in spite of the mutual accusations. The Chinese communists reproach the Soviets for having abandoned the aim of world revolution, while the Soviets accuse the Chinese of damaging the international communist cause. In fact, they have different views on the strategy and tactics of revolutionary warfare.

The communist "peaceful coexistence" strategy is based on the assumption that wars are no longer inevitable. Major wars should be avoided with all possible means, as should limited wars also, since the latter can easily lead to major wars. An exception is made for "national liberation wars". These wars are fought against the imperialist powers to throw off the yoke of colonialism. Marxism-Leninism holds that the national liberation movement is one of the principal revolutionary forces of our age, an active ally of the world communist system and the international working class in the struggle against imperialism. Communism should therefore support the national liberation struggle in all its forms, both peaceful and non-peaceful.

During the last few years the communist world has taken an even keener interest in national liberation movements, as it is realized that the progress of communism in the world will largely depend on its ability to utilize these movements for its own ends.

The meeting of the Communist Parties in Moscow in June 1969 paid special attention to "the national liberation movement".

The belief was expressed that in many developing countries this movement has entered a new phase which is marked by an accentuation of the anti-imperialist content of the liberation movement in a number of Afro-Asian countries, the entry of some states on the non-capitalist road and the spread of an ever sharper class struggle in Latin America.

In World War II guerrilla warfare became so widespread that it is now regarded as an essential feature of warfare. Nuclear weapons do not change this situation: on the contrary, they make it more likely that guerrilla warfare will become a much greater feature in future conflicts. As Captain B.H. Liddell Hart put it in his introduction to the book "Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tsetung and by Che Guevara" (Cassell, London, 1962): "In the past, guerrilla warfare has been a weapon of the weaker side, and thus primarily defensive, but in the atomic age it may be increasingly developed as a form of aggression suited to exploit a situation of nuclear stalemate".

Communists throughout the world have utilized the methods and operations of guerrilla warfare. For them this type of warfare is a special technique of revolutionary warfare. This means that the goal is above all political, or in the words of Mao Tsetung: "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspiration of the people and their sympathy, co-operation and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character" (from: Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States, Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, p. 3).

In this booklet only some countries in Asia are treated and only some aspects of guerrilla warfare in that part of the world, and therefore a selection has had to be made. At the same time, it was believed that this subject cannot be treated without dealing with some general Asian problems.

C.C. van den Heuvel
Director Interdoc

STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

C. D. Kernig

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A. The Need for a Doctrine of Guerrilla Warfare in Western Strategy

I. Guerrilla Warfare as a Doctrine

As an integral part of a wider theory on the conquest and retention of power, the doctrine of guerrilla warfare applies to a special form of armed struggle designed to ensure both military and political victory simultaneously. In the communist world military and political doctrines are integrated to an extent unknown in Western military science. Communists regard strategy as an element in the art of war, and the art of war itself as the quintessence of military science; and, what is of fundamental importance, they consider both to be individual disciplines within the social sciences. Since in their eyes the social sciences are rooted in Marxism-Leninism, strategy is thus based on the same principles as the ideology governing their political activities. Their doctrine of guerrilla warfare therefore covers both the purely military aspects of war and the concomitant political issues - in other words, the general situation. In the West we call this "grand strategy". But while we tend to the view that only one general situation can obtain at a given moment, Mao Tsetung regards the existence of several general situations side by side as one of the peculiarities of guerrilla warfare. These are not mere phases of one general situation (i. e. varying conditions brought about by the passage of time) but sets of unique circumstances, separated by space and/or time, each of which is seen as forming by itself a general situation and on which Mao's whole doctrine of guerrilla warfare can be brought to bear. In Western military science, on the other hand, grand strategy as a whole cannot be applied to a single situation (e. g. an individual campaign); that would be the province of ordinary strategy. In communist military parlance the study of single situations within the complex whole is referred to as "the art of operations" (operativnoe iskusstvo).

II. The Importance of War Aims in the Formulation of a Doctrine of Guerrilla Warfare

Military science, as traditionally understood in the West, assumes that the state, alone or in alliance with other states, is the supreme executor in war. Preparations, planning and execution, whether the war be one of aggression or defence, are carried out at the highest level by the top political and military leadership. The Western concept of guerrilla warfare, which we have inherited from Karl von Clausewitz via T. E. Lawrence and General Grivas, has thus regarded partisan operations as merely diversionary or supporting actions subordinated to the interests of an army in the field. Nowhere have guerrillas, the ordinary people who take up arms to wage an irregular war, or the civilian population behind them been deemed worthy to supplant the established authorities in the running of the war. Even Soviet military science, while stressing the role of the masses in the German liberation movement against Napoleon, has never questioned the state's prerogatives of action and decision in time of war. True, the class aspect of every war is emphasized by all communists, who consequently attach especial importance to popular action. But although they believe that wars will continue to occur until communism is established throughout the world and until the state disappears as an institution, they look upon war and the state (or coalitions of states) as inseparable phenomena. Their doctrine of guerrilla warfare is based on this view and for that reason has no parallel in the West.

The originality of the communist doctrine in this field is insufficiently appreciated in the West. It should not be overlooked that wherever communists are still struggling for power their guerrilla campaigns are designed to lead to regular warfare, with the ultimate object of establishing a socialist state. Thus while the state looms large in the background, it is not responsible for military operations. Consequently any nation caught up in guerrilla warfare and basing its strategy on traditional lines will be hampered by the absence of any conventional opponent, unless

of course it can blame another state for the situation and enter into hostilities with it. The Vietnam War is a classic example of this. Here the Americans should either have declared war on North Vietnam or developed a counter-insurgency doctrine in which military and political objectives were integrated and fulfilled simultaneously. It is futile to fight an enemy using irregular methods of combat while committing yourself to non-interference in the political life of the population affected by your operations. Such a policy is doomed from the start, as is any other that does not provide an alternative to the enemy's political programme. Failing this, the wisest course is to avoid becoming involved, or, if hostilities are inevitable, to choose another state as opponent. Since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, for example, it has been Israel's policy to hold neighbouring states responsible for the acts of Arab terrorist organizations and to punish these states by severe reprisal raids. In the absence of an alternative political programme this is the only effective course. The bombing of North Vietnam was undertaken for similar reasons. By restricting the bombing without having formulated any definite war aims of political significance, the United States merely betrayed her embarrassment - an embarrassment which springs from Western military philosophy and its obsession with the notion that only the state can wage war.

The importance of political war aims for the successful planning and execution of hostilities has been stressed by such authorities as Clausewitz, Moltke, Wilhelm von Blume, Sigismund von Schlichting, Colmar von der Goltz and Ludwig Beck. Pointing to the example of Bismarck, Beck (Studien, Stuttgart, 1955, p. 92) maintains that wars are virtually decided by the political manoeuvres which precede them. Clausewitz's observations on the importance of war aims underline his famous dictum that war is "a continuation of political commerce... by other means" (von Clausewitz, *On War*, . . . , Vol. 1, p. 23). The greater the political motivation of a belligerent state, he claimed, the more crushing will be the blow it inflicts on the enemy. This thought led him to the conclusion that the complete transformation of political designs into warlike action enhances the latter to the highest possible degree. The military consequences of such a policy can be so impressive that they obscure the underlying political motives which they are in fact realizing.

"But the weaker the motives and the tensions, so much the less will the natural direction of the military element - that is, force - be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates; so much the more must, therefore, . . . the War appear to become political!" (ibid.. p. 24).

Unless therefore the political motivation is clear and binding and the ensuing action resolute, the former will not be adequately realized by the act of war. But military operations cannot altogether hide the political character of a war. And being only partially fulfilled, the political aims will consequently seem to form a different purpose which can be divorced from the war itself. They are then liable to be interpreted in various ways and end up by casting doubt on the military powers whose motivation they had provided.

Following Clausewitz's line of reasoning but viewing the problem from another angle, it could also be argued that if the political character of a war is too obvious and not hidden by the smoke of battle, it is a sign of poor political direction. Clausewitz postulated that inept leadership in war is more often than not the result of a policy based on "a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence" (ibid., p. 25). If we consider our present-day democracies in this light, we must conclude that their aptitude for war is limited - and when it comes to wars of aggression, non-existent. Communist politics on the other hand, with their doctrine based on force or violence, show a tendency in the opposite direction. This has been demonstrated on more than one occasion since the turn of the century. Owing to the similarity of their objectives both sides in World War I were unable to disguise the political nature of the war by crippling the enemy in one conclusive blow. The longer the war lasted the more obvious was its political motivation and the more unjustifiable the war itself appeared. It ended with both contestants in a state of almost complete exhaustion. But the well-camouflaged aims with which Hitler initiated World War II were so much more effective than those of the Western Allies, and the German people were so committed to them owing to years of nazi propaganda, that the force of German aggression practically reached its "abstract form" (to quote Clausewitz's

definition of the perfect act of war). After the battle of Stalingrad Germany's strength began to ebb rapidly, but her motivation (although admittedly not easily separable from the system of coercion) was still strong enough to induce the Germans to continue their senseless resistance to the point of total collapse. The Western Allies on the other hand were unclear as to their war aims; this prevented them from developing all their resources and helped to sustain their enemies. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was closely associated in the elaboration of the American victory programme and was later commander-in-chief of the US forces in China, brings out the cold facts (cf. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports. N. Y. 1958, p. 86-96: Propaganda and War Aims):

"Americans regarded war as a game which one simply strives with all one's might to win. Churchill's forensic utterances were useful in nerving up his followers, but his lack of any clearly defined aims beyond "killing Germans" and "total victory at all costs" was incredibly superficial, indeed tragic" (ibid., p. 89 et seq.).

"Twice in our generation America has intervened... in Europe. On both occasions we helped win the war only to find that our victory was barren or had generated worse evils than those we sought to destroy. These tragic results were due to the lack of reliable, realistic war aims" (ibid., p. 92 et seq.).

"Our failure so strengthened Stalin's hand that he alone gained from the war and took every trick at the peace table. Our demand for unconditional surrender naturally increased the enemy's will to resist and forced even Hitler's worst enemies to continue fighting to save their country" (ibid., p. 95).

Wedemeyer's observations make it clear that on the Anglo-American side the purely military objective was confused with the underlying purpose of the war itself:

"We had no American conditions of peace. Instead of carrying out a policy by military means, we had

used the means as ends in themselves" (ibid., p. 94).

Today the situation remains practically unchanged, for while the West has a fair idea of what it does not want, it has yet to decide what it does want. Contradictions arise whenever war aims have to be clearly formulated; and although diversity is the life-blood of democracy, the uncompromising act of violence demanded of the soldier can hardly be fostered by compromise and ambiguity at the political level.

"Without a clearly defined political objective, war is but aimless or senseless slaughter. This fact is understood by every military man with any pretensions to professional knowledge" (ibid., p. 90).

The arms race and the advent of rockets with atomic war-heads have not altered the West's incapacity for grand strategy; in fact our strategic thinking has become more confused than ever. Since we now assume that with the employment of "strategic weapons" any future war will quickly end in mutual annihilation, only the communists appear to possess such a thing as a political war aim.

The reason for this is that even where they regard military operations as coming within the jurisdiction of the state alone, the communists look upon war itself as an expression of the class struggle. Thus it is amongst the people that the roots of armed conflict are always to be found; the socialist state is conceived only as an advanced form of communal association. This philosophy is expressed most decisively in guerrilla warfare, where the masses are seen not only as the originators but also the executors of the war. This enables the communists to formulate their political aims with a vigour and clarity for which there is no parallel in the West. Unless guerrilla formations operate as an integral part of the forces of a belligerent state, the West does not accord them belligerent status, but regards them as insurgents; this is quite logical under international law. However it is often shown to be absurd in practice. For once these "insurgents" are victorious, de jure international recognition may well be granted them, if in a haphazard or arbitrary manner. Thus the United States recognized Castro as soon as he had gained power, but has withheld recognition from Mao Tsetung to this day. In itself, the fatal obligation

to ignore guerrillas as belligerents places their opponents in an untenable position and only reinforces and clarifies the political war aims of the partisans.

Faced with the communists' doctrine on guerrilla warfare, the West can find no answer but military tactics. And while we are in theory aware that in a guerrilla war it is essential to win the hearts and minds of the people, we seem unable to transform the tactics and strategy of our counter-insurgency operations into a truly comprehensive grand strategy based on war aims of sufficient clarity and simplicity to appeal to popular understanding.

B. The Communist Doctrine of Guerrilla

Warfare

I. Lenin's Theory

All theoretical works on the subject by communist authors are ultimately derived from Marx's theory on revolution, which in Capital is presented as the outline of an inevitable historical process (cf. Marx, K. Capital, Vol. 1. M., 1961, esp. p. 750 et seq.). The creation of a better world, a world without exploitation, capitalism or colonialism, is the objective to which all communist theories on partisan warfare are orientated. The extreme interest shown by Marx and Engels in all tactical questions to do with revolution, revolutionary struggle, and the organization and leadership of the masses found its strategic expression in their operational assessment of force as "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one" (*ibid.*, p. 751). This view of the role of force (cf. Engels, F. Anti-Dühring, M., 1959, p. 219-54) also influenced Lenin's reflections on revolutionary tactics, in which prominence was given to partisan warfare associated with popular uprisings (see Uprising). In the course of his preoccupation with questions of revolutionary warfare, which lasted for twenty years or more, the theme of armed insurrection - which he considered to be only "a special form of political struggle" (Lenin CW, Vol. 26, p. 179) - recurred constantly. It fascinated him because it seemed to offer the only means of overthrowing the Tsarist régime in Russia. Unlike individual terrorism, partisan action appeared to him to be a vital factor in the struggle for power.

"Terrorism consisted in acts of vengeance against individuals. Terrorism was a conspiracy by groups of intellectuals. Terrorism in no way reflected the temper of the masses. Terrorism never served to train fighting leaders of the masses. Terrorism was the result. . . . of lack of faith in insurrection" (*ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 117).

In censuring the haphazard acts of terrorism carried out by young revolutionary-minded intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century, Lenin made it clear that the importance of armed action lay in providing a mass basis for a subsequent armed uprising. Partisan operations seemed to him particularly well suited for this purpose:

". . . guerrilla warfare, constant strikes, wearing down the enemy in street fighting, now in this part of the country, now in another - this form of struggle has also yielded and continues to yield very important results. No state is able to withstand à la longue a stubborn struggle of this sort, which brings industrial life to a standstill, introduces utter demoralization into the bureaucracy and the army, and spreads dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs among all sections of the people" (*ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 339 et seq.).

He thus saw partisan tactics as an ideal method of escalating an atmosphere pregnant with revolution "from the strike to an uprising" (*ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 173).

"Guerrilla operations are not acts of vengeance, but military operations. They no more resemble adventurous acts than the harassing of the enemy's rear by raiding parties of huntsmen during a lull on the main battlefield resembles the killing of an individual in a duel or by assassination. Guerrilla operations conducted by fighting squads - formed long ago by Social Democrats of both factions in all the important centres of the movement and consisting mainly of workers - undoubtedly reflect, clearly and directly, the temper of the masses. Guerrilla operations by fighting squads directly train fighting leaders of the masses. The guerrilla operations of the fighting squads today do not

spring from lack of faith in insurrection, and are not conducted because insurrection is impossible; on the contrary, they are an essential component of the insurrection now in progress. Of course, mistakes may be made in all things and always: premature and unnecessary attempts at insurrection are possible; so also are over-zealousness and excesses, which are always and definitely harmful, and may injure even the best of tactics" (ibid., Vol. 10, p. 117 et seq.).

In 1906, wishing to avoid the danger of alienating popular support for the revolutionaries, Lenin put forward so well balanced a conception of partisan action as a tactical programme for the Communist Party that it is still valid today. He stated:

"... (1) that the Party must regard the fighting guerrilla operations of the squads affiliated to or associated with it as being, in principle, permissible and advisable in the present period;

(2) that the character of these fighting guerrilla operations must be adjusted to the task of training leaders of the masses of workers at a time of insurrection, and of acquiring experience in conducting offensive and surprise military operations;

(3) that the paramount immediate object of these operations is to destroy the government, police and military machinery, and to wage a relentless struggle against the active Black-Hundred organizations which are using violence against the population and intimidating it;

(4) that fighting operations are also permissible for the purpose of seizing funds belonging to the enemy, i.e., the autocratic government, to meet the needs of insurrection, particular care being taken that the interests of the people are infringed as little as possible;

(5) that fighting guerrilla operations must be conducted under the control of the Party, and, furthermore, in such a way as to prevent the forces of the proletariat from being frittered away and to ensure

that the state of the working-class movement and the mood of the broad masses of the given locality are taken into account" (ibid., Vol. 10, p. 154).

As it transpired, the bolsheviks were able to seize power without having recourse to partisan operations, for Russia's disasters in World War I brought them the requisite mass support. Nevertheless they carried out their revolutionary operations entirely in the spirit of determination demanded by Engels. The effectiveness of their tactical methods was later made apparent in rather an unexpected way during the civil war, when the opponents of the Soviet system turned them against the communists themselves. Thus it is understandable that Lenin, as a revolutionary leader established in power, finding himself assailed with his own weapons should urge:

"Fear like the plague the unruly guerrilla spirit, the arbitrary actions of isolated detachments and disobedience to the central authorities, for it spells doom" (ibid., Vol. 29, p. 553; cf. also p. 260, 292 & 522; Vol. 30, p. 194 & 395; Vol. 35, p. 408).

To sum up: while guerrillas played no significant role in the revolution, their contribution to the civil war was outstanding.

II. Mao Tsetung's Theory

The works of Mao Tsetung which have had the greatest influence on guerrilla warfare in South East Asia and Cuba after World War II were written in 1936 (Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War) and 1938 (Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan; and On Protracted War). Mao wrote with only China in mind, just as Lenin's writings on revolutionary strategy and tactics had originally applied to conditions in Russia alone. Their subsequent world-wide application was neither intended nor even suggested. Mao began by repudiating three possible misinterpretations of his thoughts, stressing that: (1) the classic theories on war did not provide all the answers for the revolutionary struggle in China (Lenin, on the other hand, had largely based himself on Clausewitz); (2) it would be inopportune to apply the experiences of the Russian Civil War to China (the Comintern had always held up the Soviet Russians as a model, and Stalin ordered the completion

of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks; Short Course by 1938 in order to strengthen this view); (3) it would be wrong to drive "straight ahead to seize the big cities" (Mao, Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, , p. 181; yet this is precisely what had been done in Russia, and the conquest of the main proletarian centres was regarded as the key to world revolution). Mao had developed his own line by the end of the Twenties and because of it he was relegated to the opposition from 1932 to 1935.

Mao considers military science under three headings: strategy, campaigning and tactics. In this he follows the example of the Russians who place campaigning (under the name of operativnoe iskusstvo) between strategy and tactics. With regard to strategy, which is concerned with the general situation in a war, Mao points out that "the war situation as a whole may cover the entire world, may cover an entire country, or may cover an independent major operational front" (ibid., p. 183). His principles of strategy may therefore be compared to those hollow Russian dolls which fit inside one another. Their application can be parallel and synchronized, covering greater or smaller areas, and in every case the universal nature of the operations can be detected, for "any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole" (ibid.) Mao goes on to stress the importance of subjective factors in an almost spectacular way when viewed in the light of communist party tradition. "War", he declares, "is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies" (On Protracted War, . . . , p. 164). While in no way minimizing the significance of objective conditions, he also departs from the imitative line followed by other Communist Parties in asserting: "The only way to study the laws governing a war situation as a whole is to do some hard thinking. For what pertains to the situation as a whole is not visible to the eye" (Problems of Strategy , p. 185). Mao's views are most definite on this point: "If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost" (ibid., p. 184). The firmness and unshakeable self-confidence reflected in Mao's doctrine explains the tenacity and imperturbability of communist guerrilla movements based on a proper appreciation of the general military situation.

The phrase "because we are the oppressed" (ibid., p. 207) was seen by Mao as the key to an understanding of the general situation in the Chinese revolutionary war. For if they feel oppressed, he argued, the revolutionaries will be convinced of the justice of their cause and will look upon its triumph as a foregone conclusion. Once a clear case of exploitation of the oppressed by a powerful ruling class has been established, the next step is to involve the individual in the common effort, e.g. to enlist the support of every peasant for the first volunteers to take up arms, thereby intensifying the struggle and dedicating the entire war to a righteous cause. Ernesto "Che" Guevara (cf. Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, . . . , p. 8) underlined the social basis of the struggle in Indo-China, Algeria, Cuba and Latin America; for "in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage" (Mao Tsetung, Problems of Strategy, . . . , p. 192) only this social factor can account for the successful resistance of, for example, the relatively weak Vietnamese forces against the strongest of the world powers. And nobody but a Marxist can ideologically assess, interpret and put to good use this social situation. When writing his work, Mao had only the peasantry in mind (the urban population being specifically excluded from his considerations). Of the four decisive factors affecting revolution, the agrarian revolution is the most important by far. It ensures that though "small and weak", the Red Army "has the support of the peasantry" when fighting a "big and powerful" enemy in "a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically" (ibid., p. 196 et seq.). Mao bases the entire concept of revolutionary warfare on this popular support, and sees in it the factor rendering possible the situation which he describes as resulting from both the military operations and the support of the people: "The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army" (On Protracted War, . . . , p. 186). Such a view can of course only be held by one who sees the exploitation of the oppressed as the fundamental reality of society and history - in other words by a Marxist. Once accepted, it means that a revolutionary war must be prosecuted under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Chinese guerrillas in the Thirties drew their strength from a strong feeling of oppression coupled with reliance upon the wisdom and experience of party officials. Since then all successful guerrilla activity has been based almost exclusively on the

application of this formula (agrarian revolution plus Party to other conditions).

For the fighting itself Mao lays down the principle that it must consist of three stages:

"The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat" (ibid., p. 136 et seq.).

He describes these phases in detail, stressing the first one in particular: the strategic defensive. This entails retreat, evasive action in face of a superior enemy and the abandonment of one's own bases. This corresponds fully to the policy formulated in 1928:

" 'The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue' " (Problems of Strategy...., p. 213).

When this was first advocated it gave rise to vigorous objections which Mao stigmatized as left-wing opportunism and subjectivism, condemning those who rashly sought to engage the enemy in battles for which they were not equipped. He supported his argument with a detailed analysis of the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns" carried out by the Kuomintang against the Chinese Red Army. These led finally, under the watchword - which Mao described as mistaken - of coming rapidly to a decisive battle, to a communist flight which the Kuomintang could not block and to the legendary long march. Mao insists upon the need for a withdrawal in the first phase of hostilities. The enemy must be made to advance, dividing his forces and extending them thinly over a wide area; in this way one retreating guerrilla will cause ten enemy troops to waste time and energy in seeking him. Defensive action of this kind is therefore partly active and positive. It saps the enemy's strength, confronts him with enormous supply problems and generally exhausts him by forcing him to control an extensive terrain and to protect his long lines of communication. Only then will come the time for a guerrilla counter-offensive in

which a maximum of force is concentrated against minor enemy strongpoints: "Our strategy is 'pit one against ten' and our tactics are 'pit ten against one' " (ibid., p. 237). While one unit can thus cause ten enemy units to lose cohesion, that same unit could destroy only a minute fraction of all the enemy strongholds. Guerrilla warfare consists in endlessly luring on, exhausting and finally beating the enemy: "Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win" (ibid., p. 241).

Mao knew from experience that, faced with these tactics, the enemy had but one idea; to encircle and suppress the guerrillas (cf. the current American "search and destroy" programme in Vietnam which not only testifies to Mao's theories but also indicates how difficult the guerrillas have made it for the enemy to locate them). One point which Mao emphasizes almost more firmly than any other is that the guerrillas' answer to this enemy strategy must be strategic defence with all its implications. Even the original two-phase formula of 1928 could easily be extended to cover a third phase, for "within the defensive, it covered the two stages of the strategic retreat and the strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only a development of this formula" (ibid., p. 213). The dispersal of the enemy achieved by the strategic defensive would be of little avail to the guerrillas if it entailed the complete abandonment of their bases and not just a temporary withdrawal. But this need not happen if the guerrillas, concentrating secretly during a lull in the fighting, counter-attack in force and reoccupy strategic points which have fallen into enemy hands. Flexibility of movement and the lightning transition from evasive to aggressive action is the very essence of warfare. Mao cites numerous examples, both historical and theoretical, to illustrate what he means by flexibility. One of the best of these figures in the section devoted to types of encirclement:

"Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations

in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own - rather like a game of weichi. Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of 'dominating the spaces' that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed" (Problems of Strategy...., p. 101 et seq.).

"If the game of weichi is extended to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart the Universe, and the modern Sun Wukungs - the fascist aggressors - will finally

be buried underneath it, never to rise again" (On Protracted War, ..., p. 147).

Flexibility does not only mean adaptability in battle. It implies in particular the ability to synthesize, the art of seeing individual events as general situations - i. e., seeing each of them as an example (each local situation typifying the situation in general) and as part of a whole (all local situations adding up to a general situation) - while at the same time being able to reverse the viewpoint, so that the correlation of all local situations clearly emerges as the situation as a whole seen in its historical context. The situation described towards the end of the above quotation from Mao did in fact occur in World War II. Mao himself demonstrates the flexibility which he regards as being typified in the game of weichi in his fondness for paired concepts such as "interior and exterior lines", "strategic defensive and strategic offensive", "dispersal and concentration of forces", and the manner in which he relates the one to the other, applying them alternately to his own side and the enemy. To interpret facts in more than one sense is an art in itself, but the successful military campaigner must go a step further; he must transform correct deductions into well-planned action.

"We can change the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over him in campaigns and battles. We can put the enemy who is in a strong position strategically into a weak position in campaigns and battles. At the same time we can change our own strategically weak position into a strong position in campaigns and battles. This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity" (Problems of Strategy, ..., p. 235).

Another of Mao Tsetung's favourite concepts is the "reversal of the situation". This constitutes a guiding principle, governing both his assessment and his operational planning. Its application produces an identity of theory and practice unparalleled in

Marxism. For it is not only in revolutionary warfare that Maoist theory and practice are in principle identical; they also merge in the wider sphere of revolution (where the same military principles apply). Mao's axiom "because we are the oppressed" is both the historical expression of the underdog's point of view and a summary of the situation justifying the support of every civilian for the guerrillas. And the term "reversal of the situation" signifies the revolution itself, whereby all relations based on exploitation will be abolished, transformed or reversed and mankind will at last find peace and fulfilment. This ability to interpret one and the same fact or situation in various ways constitutes dialectic in its purest and original form, of a kind which vanished in Western European Marxist thought with the transition from Leninism to Stalinism. It results in the fusion of all short-term and long-term objectives and in the harmonizing of theory and practice in action.

Mao rounds off his doctrine on revolutionary warfare with this reflection on war in general: "The aim of war is to eliminate war" (*ibid.*, p. 182). Only by revolutionary war can "war, this monster of mutual slaughter among men" be eliminated. "The banner of mankind's just war is the banner of mankind's salvation" (*ibid.*, p. 183). Here again we see a dual concept typical of Mao's philosophy, on the one hand, war is a uniform phenomenon (every war uses the same means and every war is cruel) and on the other hand wars are diverse (some being just, other unjust). Mao adds significantly: "War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes, or political groups" (*ibid.*, p. 190). If we recall how Mao saw general situations each contained within the other, we can appreciate that all principles of strategy and tactics in revolutionary war, whether applied by powerful nations or minor political bodies, are interchangeable within a constantly recurring pattern. A certain order, governing the relations between oppressors and oppressed, is always discernible at every level, from the smallest combat unit to the guerrilla base right up to the world revolutionary front. Even the most insignificant of guerrilla units will be victorious - as inevitably as the proletariat must triumph, according to Marx - and its victory will be a victory for world revolution. The final triumph, which Mao regards as certain, will be delayed only if the

revolutionaries commit errors. This explains the scandalously exaggerated importance, from the orthodox Marxist point of view, that Mao attributes to subjective factors. Humans are liable to error. But being a historical anachronism and hence doomed, the counter-revolutionaries are bound to make mistake after mistake, whereas the progressive forces can keep their own quota of errors to a minimum: "The enemy is liable to make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes miscalculate" (*ibid.*, p. 218). For this reason planning is of vital importance: "Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. True, guerrilla conditions do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare, and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare" (*Problems of Strategy...*, p. 89 et seq.). But the optimum should be achieved, even if "construction plans covering several years are out of the question" (*Problems of Strategy...*, p. 240). War is "of a jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically and culturally" (*On Protracted War...*, p. 148) in which as many correct solutions as possible have to be found for a maximum number of problems. Thus and only thus will the situation gradually change, for the enemy can envisage every move that the guerrillas might be planning in principle (after all, Mao's works are available everywhere). "However", says Mao, "he can neither prevent our victories nor avoid his own losses, because he does not know when and where we shall act. This we keep secret" (*Problems of Strategy...*, p. 239). In this way the guerrillas will gain victory after victory.

"War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort - winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility into actuality both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role" (*On Protracted War...*, p. 161).

If correctly calculated, subjective efforts will conform to objective conditions, guaranteeing victory. The unity of both

factors is reflected in the unity of officers and men on the one hand and in that of the army and the people on the other. This unity on two levels is ensured by political activity. Provided all concerned have the same political aims they will be invincible (cf. *ibid.*, p. 186). Fundamental to this political outlook is the control of subjective opinion among the people. Mao habitually expresses himself in the first person plural, only very occasionally employing a term such as "in my opinion". It is therefore significant when at one point he introduces a personal note. This occurs at the end of his theoretical reflections:

"Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle), of having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude that the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from this attitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong" (*ibid.*).

Here Mao wishes to stress the two main elements contributing to national discipline: firstly, the respect due to the ordinary soldiers and people, which is the alpha and omega of every revolutionary war, and secondly, the subjective factor. His use of the first person singular in this passage is not a mere matter of style. It has a far deeper significance, being deliberately adopted to underline the final and most important dualism; the absorption of the heroic individual into the masses and the transformation of the latter into a heroic political group, nation or class. Mao's lessons in guerrilla warfare - the transformation of strategic defence, via strategic stalemate, into the ultimate offensive, and the multiplicity of tactical moves related thereto or derived therefrom - are seen in their full effectiveness only when viewed within the framework of the entire doctrine to which they contribute and in which the individual and the collective masses are taken equally into account.

The works of Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh, "Che" Guevara, Francois Fanon and Régis Debray have in principle added nothing new to Mao's doctrine. Nevertheless, they constitute such an impressive historical confirmation of that doctrine that it is hardly surprising if Lin Piao considers it to be strategically

applicable on a world scale. This view was reflected in "Che" Guevara's appeal for the creation of many Vietnams all over the world. Henceforth the peasantry in the underdeveloped countries was seen as the motive force in a world-wide revolution designed to infest and conquer the "urban" regions - Europe and North America - from the surrounding "rural" ones: Asia, Africa and Latin America.

It is debatable whether this global strategy is supported by Mao's theory. Mao did not think of guerrilla warfare as an isolated phenomenon. He made it quite clear that guerrilla operations must eventually develop into a war of movement fought by regular units, the guerrillas' initial role being essentially to harass the enemy behind the lines. At a later stage these guerrillas would become regular formations equipped to deal the final blow, for "only a decisive battle can settle the question as to which army is the victor and which the vanquished" (*Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*, . . . , p. 224). Whether this theory of the "decisive battle", which is an essential feature of Mao's doctrine, could acquire universal dimensions is a matter for further investigation. The tentative suggestion made by others that such a possibility might exist cannot, judged according to the rules of Mao's theory, be regarded as an adequate political and military strategy.

C. Critical Appraisal

In examining Mao Tsetung's theory, one is impressed by its many-sidedness - its admixture of elements both fascinating and disconcerting, intellectually and aesthetically pleasing and at the same time disturbing. While denouncing war as the scourge of mankind, Mao also describes it as a stage "built upon objective, material conditions", on which the military can "direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur" (*ibid.*, p. 191). Alternately depressing and impressive, his work is characterized by a blend of poetic sensitivity and military exactitude from which there emerges a picture of cruelly logical clarity. Never in military history has there been a theory of war so comprehensive and so self-sufficient.

Western military science, still bearing considerable traces of Clausewitz's influence, upholds a strategy in which the army accepts without question the political war aims already set down.

In Mao's theory strategy itself is of political and historical significance and gains worldwide political and historical validity. In this respect Mao comes close to Soviet doctrine on the subject. But whereas the Russians insist upon the leading role of the Party, Mao stresses the part played by the individual (the subjective factor), although he views it in the collective context since, as he points out, the individual - be he peasant, soldier or prisoner of war - represents the people. To the Russian military mind "the party" is an anonymous entity, or at the most a pseudonym for a well-recognized authority. To Mao, however, the bond between officers and soldiers, between the army and the people, can only be assessed and understood as an everyday fact of life, experienced by every individual. This phenomenon is not only responsible for making the popular struggle possible in the first place, but also enriches the life of every member of the community. It is the "respect for human dignity" which affords Mao's doctrine its incomparable integrity.

"Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude are indeed wrong, and they should correct their view" (On Protracted War, . . . , p.187), Mao states; and with this remark he shows his contempt for the Western (and Soviet) concept of army discipline based on technical considerations and command structures rather than on human relations. His insistence on the human element can have unexpected consequences, one of which is the practice of brainwashing. In Chinese eyes this is the supreme expression of the respect owed to the human dignity of the prisoner of war. Being human, the former enemy merits consideration and must hence be given the opportunity to acquire a progressive outlook. This alone justifies the trouble of converting him. In theory therefore brainwashing is a humanitarian act. Moreover, when one remembers that thirty years ago Mao's thought was governed by this theoretical unity, one can understand the disgust which must have been felt by the Chinese leader and his comrades on learning of Khrushchev's announcement that a great war between communism and capitalism could now be avoided thanks to nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The simplicity of Mao's rules of warfare and the clarity of his aims (which can be summarized as the transformation of our evil society and the abolition of war) appeal not only to the

unsophisticated mind, but also to the more exacting intellect, the latter being attracted by their dialectical implications. The reduction of complicated social problems to the most elementary terms is a characteristic of Maoism. Agrarian reform is a typical example: give the peasant the land he cultivates. To an overwhelmingly rural population this simple message answers the common man's longing for a better world, with justice for all and a fair distribution of wealth. With the struggle in its infancy and all the prizes still to be won, the question as to whether better results might not be obtained by adopting a modicum of the specialization that goes with the application of modern technology remains undiscussed. But it is precisely this fact which renders guerrillas operating in a peasant area so hard to counter. The opponent can also institute agrarian reform, build schools, roads, bridges and hospitals. But apart from the fact that such improvements are usually long overdue (there may be sound historical reasons for this, but nevertheless the delay is inexcusable), his efforts do not in all conscience stem from the belief that he is building a better world. If he held such a belief, his aid would not be rejected by those whose lot he was trying to improve, but he might well be mocked by his own side. For example, whenever a colonial power has publicized its achievements in overseas development there has always been someone to point to the reverse of the medal. And if any admirer of the "American way of life" ventured to present it as a brave new world, he would be treated with scornful derision. Similarly, Asian communists simply cannot believe that any intelligent European or American - appreciating the functional and competitive nature of our Western world and familiar with the political systems, hierarchies, élites, status distinctions and numerous degrees of dependence prevailing therein - can honestly maintain that our way of life is worth adopting. If we persist in claiming such a thing, we are presumed to have an ulterior motive, for nothing in our world is thought to be without purpose.

The competitive critical awareness belonging to the structure of industrial life and induced in nearly everyone by the necessity of self-assertion has rendered virtually impossible any simple description of this civilization - e.g. as the embodiment of freedom, justice, democracy or prosperity -, since it critically permeates everything straightforward, just as it

has dissipated the simple selfsufficiency of rural life in the cyclical division of labour in modern industry. Thus any opponent of Maoist-inspired guerrillas who is equipped with this critical awareness is thereby robbed of any possibility of setting up against them war aims of a comparable simplicity and clarity. While the men behind the communist guerrillas claim the betterment of the world to be their ultimate objective and realize their immediate aims in agrarian reform, their Western opponents are denounced as hypocrites as soon as they mention a generous final aim, even if they succeed in implementing the same short-term reforms as the communists. They thus find themselves in a threefold quandary.

1. They may refrain from declaring a long-term objective, not having thought of any. In that case they would be hard pressed to explain why they are fighting at all. For if their immediate aims coincide with those of the communists, why should they engage in mass slaughter, in order to prevent someone else from carrying out a policy of which they themselves approve? Popular support is bound to go to the communists, who know what they want and say so clearly - the transformation of our corrupt society.

2. Alternatively: (a) the guerrilla's opponents announce a final objective ostensibly as simple as that for which the guerrillas are fighting (e.g. prosperity, progress, democracy, justice, etc.) and are denounced for their pains, not only by their enemies but also within their own ranks; or (b) they declare an ultimate aim which, though genuine enough, is of a complicated nature. Yet this kind of objective (e.g. a modern society, a developed economy, varying degrees of prosperity) is precisely what the communists claim to be combating. They combat it, so they say, because the age-old relationship of oppression would merely continue behind its facade in a modernized, more efficient and hence more ruthless form. Moreover, by equating the various forms of economic dependence to be found in capitalist society with sheer oppression and offering instead to establish equality by their land reforms, the communists are putting forward promises of a tangibility far more persuasive and engendering of enthusiasm than anything which could be achieved by all the efforts of an "imperialist" enemy representing class interests and exploitation.

3. Finally, even if the guerrillas' enemies, having formulated short-term objectives similar to those of the communists, were to present the creation of a highly developed Western-type society as their final goal - in terms considered to be acceptable - their troubles would still not be at an end. An objective of this kind is an incentive only in developing countries such as Algeria, Cuba or Vietnam. In the United States and other industrialized countries (i. e. those which for the most part engage in or support counter-insurgency) the modern consumer society is no longer a distant goal; it has become an everyday reality requiring only further expansion in certain aspects.

The truth is that those opposing the guerrillas have no ultimate goal. All they desire is that their present living conditions should be perpetuated or at the most, gradually perfected as time passes. In their society, human dignity seems to them to have been universally attained and human degradation to be universally impossible. In principle, there is little left to strive for; what Western man has, he hopes to keep for ever more. Having reached the horizon, he finds that what was once a distant prospect is already within his grasp. There are no more long-term objectives - they have all been reached. In practice, the same can of course be said of the highly industrialized Soviet Union, though not in the realm of ideology. In Soviet ideology - as in Marxism generally, and hence in the ideology of the communist guerrillas - all immediate aims are overshadowed by the prospect of a final Utopia. And since this Utopia is patently unattainable in the near future, the guerrillas need only pay lip service to it when bringing their ideology to the masses. At the same time, they can accuse their opponents of lacking all progressive intent. During hostilities theory and practice coincide for the guerrillas, whereas their opponents are hampered by the contradictions which are inherent in their creed. Moreover the counter-insurgents have no hope at all of overcoming this disadvantage, for they can offer no glowing long-term objectives; on the contrary, it is from these very contradictions that they derive their fundamental principles.

Enmeshed in their triple dilemma, the guerrillas' enemies have no war aims that can conclusively affect the contested issues. Whatever aims they have are comprehensible only to people living in a westernized industrial society and familiar with its principles. The remoteness of these aims from the

traditional basic values of the rural population involved in the fighting makes it possible for the enemy to denigrate them as the expression of imperialism and power politics, and hence morally worthless. Moreover, the gulf in religious and cultural traditions between the underprivileged nations and the industrial powers of Europe and America only serves to accentuate this aversion.

When a Western power is involved in hostilities with communist-inspired guerrillas in a developing country, the political and military commitment of the two sides differs greatly. Once the partisans have succeeded in winning over the indigenous population, whether by force or by persuasion, only the tightest possible control of that population by counter-insurgency forces can deprive the guerrillas of local support. The effective implementation of this control probably calls for about one soldier to five to ten inhabitants, and when a population runs into millions, it requires the maintenance and replenishment of an army of occupation over years and even decades beyond the resources of any nation. And when the guerrillas can operate from a neighbouring country (for example from Cambodia into Vietnam) they need only small contingents in order to carry out raids and ambushes of sufficient intensity to harass and tie down vastly superior enemy forces. The principles of law, according to which Western nations order their international conduct, rule out punitive incursions into a neutral state unless authorized by a system of alliances. But even then, by extending its operations an occupying army also extends its lines of communication, disperses its forces still more and adds to the number of civilians to be controlled. Although guerrillas clearly cannot win a war by themselves, they can exhaust the enemy to such an extent that he finally abandons the contest of his own accord. In modern guerrilla warfare therefore the survival and reinforcement of a guerrilla force in the field depends upon the enemy's ability to control a third party, namely the civilian population from which the partisans draw their strength. If the enemy cannot exercise effective control, he must either admit defeat or treat the civilians as combatants - and bomb them. If as a result of this the civilians seek refuge with him rather than endure the bombing, they will be acting under duress and will owe him no loyalty. And the greater the flood of refugees the harder it will be to control and support them. Caught in a vicious circle, the occupying army

finds itself once more in its previous quandary.

It would seem from this that guerrillas operating in the manner of the Chinese or the Vietcong cannot be defeated unless they are isolated both militarily and politically. But where poverty and riches, rural misery and urban affluence exist side by side there can be no question of any political isolation, for ideology thrives on injustice and insurrection is inspired by ideology. Their military isolation can probably be achieved only if, as happened with Guevara in Bolivia, they operate far from bases in a neighbouring country and enjoy no direct supply lines from any communist state. No guerrilla force can be constantly on the move: troops need rest from time to time, the wounded must be tended, recruits must be trained and political work carried out. Only by unceasing recruitment will a guerrilla movement maintain its vigour over a lengthy period. But by applying Mao Tsetung's rules and refraining from attacking in force until they have the population behind them, guerrillas can become virtually invincible. Their enemies then pay for mistakes committed and opportunities missed not just generations but even centuries ago.

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THE POWER SITUATION IN ASIA

- A WEST EUROPEAN VIEW -

Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson

Over the next two decades the struggle for power in Asia and the Indian Ocean is likely to become far more intense. Three of the five main contestants are already nuclear powers: Russia, the United States and China; and the other two, India and Japan, will almost certainly become so within this period. Paradoxically, this is likely to increase the importance of the part that guerrilla warfare will be playing in the Asian power struggle.

The object of this paper is to put in very abbreviated form, as background to our discussions, the essential factors in this struggle for power as I see them.

The outstanding historical events in Asia since World War II have been, I suggest, as follows: the withdrawal of British power from the Indian subcontinent, leaving it divided; the renewal of the long-standing confrontation between the Russian and the Chinese Empires, under the guise of an ideological quarrel; Russian arbitration of the Indo-Pakistan war at Tashkent; the breakthrough of the northern power, Russia, into the southern tier of Asia and the Indian Ocean; the conquest of United States public opinion by North Vietnam; and the emergence of Japan as second or third richest nation.

Before enlarging on the significance of these events, a very brief historical background to the balance of power in Asia seems appropriate.

Strategically, the Eurasian continent is one. Indeed, the Russian Empire virtually occupies the whole northern half. The concept of a balance of power has, however, always been far more clearly defined within the European peninsula of the continent than in Asia.

Until late in history Northern and Central Asia contained a pool of nomadic peoples which from time to time changed its course by invading the more settled lands of China. Europe and Southern Asia. There has, of course, been an ebb and flow of power between more civilized peoples. centred on Macedonia, Persia, the Arab conquests and spread of Islam, and the

resurgence of Europe. In Asia, there has throughout history been the cross currents of an East-West and a North-South balance of power. As the nomadic peoples came under control, the East-West balance settled down into a confrontation between the Chinese and Russian Empires, the outcome of which still remains to be settled.

In the North-South balance defence of the southern tier of Asia has been greatly aided by natural features of desert and mountain ranges, to which the Himalayas are central. For long periods of history the balance of power between North and South has been mainly maintained by whatever power was seated in Delhi. Natural obstacles make lateral communication between the countries of Southern Asia difficult except by sea, and it was by sea that Hinduism, the Theravada form of Buddhism and Islam spread to South East Asia. At its widest extent Indian met Chinese cultural influence about the 16th parallel in Vietnam, where Indian culture was represented in the ancient kingdom of Champa.

When the Mogul power in Delhi began to falter, power in Southern Asia passed to the maritime powers of Europe. When, late in the fifteenth century, Portugal turned the flank of Islam and established the Cape route, she established bases on the islands of Socotra and Hormuz to prevent the Mamelukes of Egypt and the Venetian Republic penetrating the Indian Ocean by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, respectively.

In the nineteenth century the main concern of the Government of British India was to prevent the advance of Russian influence into the Indian subcontinent or adjacent areas. Policy wavered between a forward policy of occupying Afghanistan and treating that country as a buffer state. An Anglo-Russian Treaty with Persia, still extant, divided that country into two spheres of influence, the Northern Russian and the Southern British.

Russian and Chinese interests first clashed in the seventeenth century, in the Far East. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century, during China's period of weakness, that they clashed in Central Asia. The United States began extending her influence across the Pacific in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1853, Commodore Perry forced Japan into the comity of nations. Japan had taken little interest in the Asian

mainland since her fifteenth century invasion of Korea.

So much for a very brief look at the past. Let us now look at developments since World War II. Everywhere there has been dramatic change. The colonial empires of Europe, with the exception of the Russian, have been swept away, leaving a situation of great instability in Indo-China, Indonesia and Burma. The British did better in what are now Malaysia and Singapore, but in leaving the Indian subcontinent divided they made a decision which, I believe, historians may well see as a turning-point, though, as I will suggest, its worst effects may still be recoverable.

China, rightly proud of her ancient culture and civilization has recovered from a century of weakness and humiliation. In 1949, Mao Tsetung took over power from the Kuomintang, and China became the most populous and second most powerful communist power. China has always regarded herself as the centre of the world, surrounded by peoples of varying depths of barbarism. Those near her borders she used as buffers against the outside world and brought into a tributary relationship with her. Against the former colonial powers, with the exception of Russia, she has taken her revenge, including the United States who least deserved it. Britain still retains the colony of Hong Kong and the leased territory of Kowloon, for it is in China's interest for her to do so.

China has made no effort to conceal her desire to extend her influence at least to the frontiers of her former Empire, and it is significant that the boundary claims of Communist China have the support of Nationalist China. Communist China has laid claim to all territory in the Far East and Central Asia ceded to Russia from the late seventeenth century onwards, by "unequal" treaty. The frontier disputes between Russia and China, which have already led to sharp armed clashes, are over areas which were neither Chinese nor Russian, but non-Chinese parts of the Chinese Empire wrested from her by the Tsars. It is, of course, true that both countries have followed a colonial policy of planting their nationals in these areas and are still doing so.

In 1950 China invaded and occupied Tibet and this led to the 1962 Indo-Chinese war, in which Delhi was humbled. India turned down General Ayub Khan's final bid for a joint defence of the subcontinent on the eve of the Indo-Chinese war, and this led to China and Pakistan becoming allies. Thus was established

a sort of triangular balance of power within the Indian sub-continent, with the Anglo-Saxon powers presumably ready to intervene against any overt effort by either Russia or China to assume paramount power in India. China has constructed strategic roads all along the southern edge of the Tibetan Plateau, from Sinkiang into Pakistan, and from China into Northern Laos.

Following World War II, Russia flooded India with communist literature. She began constructing strategic roads in Northern Afghanistan, which America kindly complemented by continuing them in the south. India and Russia backed the Paktoonistan movement against Pakistan, which helped drive Pakistan into alliance with China. However, Russia was able to mend her fences with Pakistan sufficiently to be accepted by both countries as the arbiter of the Indo-Pakistan war, a position involving two members of the Commonwealth which one might have expected Britain to exercise. This set the seal on the new situation in which the influence of the Northern Power has broken through into Southern Asia. India has since become largely dependent on Russia for arms.

In the recent revolt in East Pakistan, Russia and India gave verbal support to the rebels, while China, despite Maoist elements among them, supported the Pakistan Government. There is thus a struggle for power and influence between Russia and China throughout Southern and South East Asia, a struggle in which national ambitions override ideological considerations.

In the past few years Russia has brought to this struggle a new element, that of maritime power. At the European end of the Eurasian continent, Russia is acting on internal lines of communication vis-à-vis the NATO Alliance. At the eastern end she is on external lines vis-à-vis China, and here the development of her maritime power enables her to bring influence to bear in South East Asia, outflanking China. This is important to Russia for both powers are determined that their influence, and not that of their rival, will fill any power vacuums left by American and British withdrawal.

China is at present supporting armed insurgents in North East, North and Southern Thailand, in Burma and in India, including the Nagas. Russia controls the Middle Eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean down to the Horn of Africa, and is establishing a chain of ports in which she can expect to find facilities for

her Navy. Besides her position in Egypt, she has developed the port of Hodeida, in the Yemen, and has naval facilities at Port Sudan, and naval and air facilities at Aden.

She has, it appears, established certain facilities on the island of Socotra. There are Russian advisers in all the departments of Government in Somalia. At Gwadar, near the western frontier of Pakistan and commanding the exit from the Persian Gulf, she is building a naval and submarine base. She has naval facilities at Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India, and has shown an interest in the Andaman Islands, and, with China, in obtaining naval and other facilities in Ceylon. The presence of Russian warships, surface and submarine, is now a permanent feature in the Indian Ocean and is increasing.

So far, India has only been discussed as a pawn in the developing power struggle and it will be necessary to assess her future as an independent power. Before doing so, however, I want to say something of the remaining maritime powers, the United States, the Commonwealth countries of Australia, Britain and New Zealand and Japan.

The future of United States policy in Asia is far from clear. The war in Vietnam has brought great disenchantment with previous policies. Though no country, from its historical background and the nature and style of its forces, could be less well suited than the United States to tackle the problems of the Vietnam war, it is not the American forces who have been defeated by Hanoi but the American public, largely, in my opinion, through their own news media, in particular television. This has produced a most serious situation throughout the Western democracies, for the state of public opinion in America must cast grave doubts on the value of the United States as an ally.

President Nixon has propounded a doctrine of the United States maintaining an interest in Asia but with a "low profile" - how low still remains to be seen. It can, I believe, be expected that the United States will continue to exercise maritime power on the western side of the Pacific and as far west as Thailand and Australia.

America could put a squadron into the Indian Ocean with afloat support, but until the naval base at Cockburn Sound, in Western Australia, is completed its main base would have to be Guam, the Philippines or Thailand. The Americans are not prepared to replace withdrawing British power in the Indian

Ocean, but they are prepared to go on deploying Polaris submarines there and are currently constructing a communications centre on Diego Garcia, which they will share with the British.

The British Government have reversed the intention of the previous Government of pulling out of the Indian Ocean by the end of this year. Instead, they have negotiated a five-power defence pact with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. This will involve joint defence against external aggression, and, if the nature of the conflict is what I suppose it to be, makes considerable sense. European interests in the area are oil, commerce and investment, and strategic. Britain as a member of the E.E.C. would be well suited to represent these interests.

Let us turn now to what is perhaps the most unknown quantity in this complex equation of power, Japan. In 1947 General MacArthur drew up a new Constitution for Japan. In it Japan was forbidden to have defence forces. In 1950, under the impact of the Korean War, this was changed to the extent that the right to self-defence was accepted as being within the Constitution, and small self-defence forces were raised.

In the meantime, Japan forged ahead in the industrial field to become one of the world's greatest industrial powers, and an overseas investor second only to the United States, Britain and Germany. In building up her industries she acquired nuclear reactors and much technical know-how through the manufacture under licence of modern American aircraft and long-range rockets. In a very short time Japan could become a nuclear power, should she choose to do so.

In the past three years, her defence budget has considerably increased, a trend expected to continue. Her army is now about the size of the British, but being all home-based has a much greater front-line strength. The mood of withdrawal in America has stimulated the Japanese to look to their own defences and it seems likely that their forces will be doubled by 1975.

Japan's economy is much like Britain's, her standard of living being entirely dependent on overseas trade and the ability to import raw materials. It was the latter that largely decided her to occupy Manchuria. Today, about two thirds of her exports go to the United States and she obtains over two thirds of her oil from the Middle East. Much of her raw materials could be obtained from Eastern Siberia and China. Moreover, under different conditions, China could provide the markets now found in America. Russia has been making advances to Japan, in part no doubt as part of her confrontation with China.

but culturally China is Japan's Greece and despite "the China Incident" Japan has a special regard for that country. There is a sort of "love-hate" relationship between them.

I have always regarded Chairman Mao as a bit of a romantic, and were the Chinese people to find a successor inspired by the thoughts of Lee Kuan Yew, rather than those of Mao Tsetung, there could for Japan well be a reversal of alliances. Commercially the West would not know what had hit them. Whether this comes to pass or not, it is logical that Japan should develop her maritime power to safeguard her sea communications in the Indian Ocean and to do whatever she considers necessary to assure passage for her oil through the Eastern Gateway of that ocean at Singapore.

Lastly, let us turn to India, keystone in the great arc of countries bordering the Indian Ocean. What has enabled Russia and, to a lesser extent, China not only to penetrate the Indian subcontinent with their influence, but to threaten Western interests throughout the whole southern tier of Asia, has been the lack of a strong outward-looking power in Delhi, a situation for which the failure of Britain to leave a united India must take much of the blame. Combined, India and Pakistan could have provided such a power; divided, they have dissipated their energies and centred their foreign policy around their mutual confrontation.

India faces immense problems in trying to raise the living standards of her huge, fecund, multi-racial and multi-lingual population. Nevertheless, neither under the traumatic experience of the Indo-Chinese war or successive political crises has she disintegrated, as many have prophesied, nor has she ceased to be a democratic society. It is as yet too early to foresee the outcome of the civil war in East Pakistan. There are forces at work aimed at creating an independent Bengal, comprising East and West Bengal, under communist direction. But whatever the outcome, I would expect India to gain in confidence vis-à-vis Pakistan and this in turn should make her more ready to play a more positive part in the struggle for power in Asia.

There is, I believe, a dangerous tendency in the West to underestimate India. India's industrial and scientific base has been expanding steadily, and should she decide that she must become a nuclear power, as I believe she will, then she could certainly produce her own nuclear warheads in a comparatively

short time. India has often been criticized for paying too much attention to heavy industry and not enough to agriculture. Improvement in her food production undoubtedly lagged behind the increase in her population but now, from all accounts, there has been a considerable breakthrough in this most important area.

India is by far the most populous open society in the world and it is of the greatest importance to the West, and for the creation of an acceptable balance of power on the Asian side of the Eurasian continent, that she should be stable, prosperous democratic and strong.

What, you may ask, has all this to do with the subject of our discussions: "Guerrilla Warfare in Asia"? A lot, I believe.

That an overt state of war may develop between Russia and China cannot be ruled out, certainly further and perhaps more serious border incidents will take place, or that limited wars, of the Korean type, may not take place elsewhere. But I believe that the deterrent power of nuclear weapons will remain strong. Nor do I believe that their possession by other powers leads to irresponsibility, rather the reverse. This restraint is reinforced by the triangular relationship that is being established between the United States, Russia and China, no two powers wanting to see the third given a bye into the final.

My conclusion is, therefore, that the major contenders for power in Asia will pursue their ends, so far as possible, by low key methods of warfare. That is, by political, economic and psychological means. When it comes to shooting, the chosen method will be: by wars by proxy, by subversion and by the support of armed insurgents. In all this the size, believed effectiveness and proximity of the protagonists' conventional forces will play a crucial part, though, for the most part, a passive one.

As I have already written, armed insurgency is already rife throughout South East Asia. In Indo-China it has Russian and Chinese support, in Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, India and Ceylon it has Chinese support. These are the so-called "wars of liberation" which it is Mao Tsetung's proclaimed policy to support. One may, therefore, expect to see Russia lined up on the side of the legitimate governments, but the civil war in East Pakistan, in which Russia has criticized, and China has supported, the Pakistan Government, has shown that

imperial interests take precedence over ideology for both these powers.

As elsewhere, the struggle for power and influence between Russia and the United States will be by manoeuvre and not by battle, each side building up political influence and the ability to turn local crises to their benefit by the deployment of superior conventional force at the decisive point. It is here that the Commonwealth can play a part.

China is developing her road communications, the better to support armed insurgents in Thailand and Burma. A communist victory throughout Indo-China would enable China to boost this effort and this in turn might, if the West is unwilling, provide Russia with the opportunity greatly to increase her influence by giving assistance to the governments of Thailand and Burma.

Burma is of great importance to China, particularly in checking Russian maritime power. She is also of great importance to India, and is an area in which a strengthened and outward-looking India could play a significant part. With the completion of a major road, capable of taking heavy military traffic, from Lhasa to Katmandu, Chinese influence has been brought right into Nepal, which in any case has been anxious to offset that of India.

Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan are considered by China to be within their sphere of influence and to be tributaries. Within Nepal, she is constructing an East-West road and there are clear signs that she is gaining influence in the country at India's expense. Were Nepal to fall within the Chinese orbit, she would secure a 525 miles' frontier with two of India's most populous and impoverished states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, from which to promote armed insurgency. A prerequisite for India to play a more positive part in the Asian balance of power is that she should deal successfully with the armed insurgency within her own borders.

The West has a positive part to play in the coming struggle for power in Asia, largely, so far as the armed forces are concerned, in a maritime role. There is, however, much that can still be done to support the countries of Asia's southern tier, helping them to help themselves. They have no wish to be subordinate to any foreign power or ideology but want independence and national dignity, of which much of Asia was deprived in the last century. These are the psychological forces

that the free world must enlist on its side.

One potentially powerful nation has not been touched on - Indonesia, with a population of one hundred million and rich natural resources. Her role in maintaining a balance of power in Asia conducive to the growth of open societies would be as a partner with the other nations of South East Asia in promoting regional solidarity through ASEAM, an organization which should receive Western encouragement and support.

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM

Douglas Pike

The title of this paper more accurately would be Revolutionary Guerrilla War in Vietnam, or to be exactly precise, Neo-revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare in Vietnam. Like all else in this futuristic age, shock warfare has changed rapidly and drastically in Vietnam during the past ten years. In effect three wars followed one after the other: Revolutionary Guerrilla War (1965-69); limited small scale or "big unit" war or, to use communist terminology, regular force strategy war (1965-69) and and what I have termed, Neo-revolutionary Guerrilla War (1969 onwards).

I have written elsewhere * of these wars but will summarize and recapitulate what I feel is currently relevant before singling out for special consideration one aspect that should be of major concern, portending ill for us it does.

I

Warfare, as Clausewitz stated long ago, is of two elements: mass, both mass of men and mass of fire-power; and movement, both in terms of manoeuvre and of mobility. The communist Vietnamese abandoned their earlier strategies, in 1965 and again in 1968 because they were unequal to the enemy challenge of mass and movement. The techniques had worked against the French - but then wars were once won with cross-bows. The communists found that their orthodox revolutionary guerrilla war strategy (the military aspects, not the political) had been out-dated by a generation of military technology. So the problem faced by General Vo Nguyen Giap, to personify it, was that the enemy had too much mass (too many men, too massive fire-power) and too much "movement" (chiefly, here, in the form of the device which has revolutionized warfare, the

* Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1966, War, Peace and the Viet Cong, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969.

ubiquitous helicopter). General Giap, and perhaps more importantly Le Duan, set out to overcome the admitted advantage which the enemy had with respect to mass and movement. Their response, which is still evolving and has not yet been shaped into a workable military doctrine, is Neo-revolutionary Guerrilla war.

II

It should be clearly understood that all revolutionary guerrilla war is chiefly political, as any revolution is political. Violence is supplementary and mandatory but not the essence. Revolutionary guerrilla war aims for political power by special means. Its god is organization. The greatest political invention of the 20th century, the united front, serves as the base for intrusion. A net of organization is dropped on the villager, enmeshing him. Then the organization communicates, using rational appeals of self-interest or, if these fail, coercion. Through organization to mobilization and through mobilization to motivation. The trinity combines to form the mystique. The masses, now organized, mobilized and motivated are unleashed to create social pathology. First, control the people. Then forge them into an organizational weapon. Then hurl them against society. This, in academic jargon is what Confucius meant when he said: Gain the people and gain the kingdom, but lose the people and the kingdom is lost.

This Neo Revolutionary Guerrilla War resembles the "people's war" of Lin Piao and the Chinese Communists in many ways. It seeks to exploit contradictions in the imperialist and feudalist camp (see below). It employs the national salvation propaganda theme. It makes full use of the united-front concept. It seeks to protect the rural base at all costs. However it does not root the struggle in the village in quite the same way as would the Chinese. Nor does it endorse the Chinese idea of self-reliance, pursuit of the struggle without outside assistance and support, for such would be patently impossible in Vietnam. And it only partially accepts the Chinese arguments in the people v. weapons debate, the notion of the superiority of human strength over material strength, or, "the people as a spiritual atom bomb" as Mao Tsetung has put it.

In broad outline then the characteristics of Neo Revolutionary Guerrilla War which seem to me to be emerging in Vietnam are these:

1. The orthodox Mao-Giap three-stage guerrilla war concept forms the base of the doctrine, but is greatly modified and amended. It in effect asserts that it is possible to fight and win at stage two and never go on to stage three.

2. Organization of the military apparatus is retained - two forces, the full military (or main force units) and the paramilitary (or guerrilla) units. But priority is assigned to the paramilitary, even at the expense of the main force. The quality of the paramilitary must be improved, chiefly through increased training, indoctrination and better logistic support. This involves reallocation of resources. It also entails geographical relocation of the war westwards to the even more remote areas of the highlands and into Laos. As far as possible, the burden of the war is shifted back to the PLAF forces, with less direct PAVN involvement*.

3. The ability of the enemy to initiate battles must be limited by constantly occupying him and, ideally, confining him to his enclave cities. He must not be permitted to choose the time and place for battle. To accomplish this, dozens if not hundreds of small-scale daily actions must be mounted, either simultaneously or in waves. One's casualties in these actions are not of major consequence, nor is it vital that these engagements end in victory, for even in defeat they serve the objective of pinning down the enemy and closing options for him.

4. United-front groups must be fully utilized. The GVN's pacification and national development programmes must be blunted, sabotaged, frustrated. Control of the villages as sources of supply and manpower must be continued by whatever means necessary. The GVN effort to break up the communist organizational structure in the villages must be resisted at all costs.

5. Emphasis is placed once more on the protracted conflict

* By 1970 some 80 per cent of the day-to-day combat in South Vietnam was being done by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), that is North Vietnam troops, and the remainder by the People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF) of the National Liberation Front.

thesis* and hence Neo Revolutionary Guerrilla War works without a timetable. The term victory is redefined as "short-term success with long-term impact". Thus, logically it can be asserted that the cause is to be fought as a "protracted conflict achieving decisive victory in a relatively short time".

6. The struggle must be communicated and portrayed as a national salvation effort, employing the "country-saving" theme by agit-prop cadres. Above all, it must be pictured as a struggle, not of Vietnamese against Vietnamese (for example, Vietnamese Catholics versus Vietnamese communists), but of all Vietnamese against the foreign invader.

7. Organization must be such as not to require dependence on the villagers for support. Food, money, shelter, and other requirements may be commandeered, and full coercion is authorized. This would represent no new approach by the communists, whose strength through the years has been the ability to enmesh the villager in a tightly constructed network of village-control organizations. The cement in this doctrine is the "certainty of victory" propaganda theme. The leadership reasons that if it convinces the villager that it will win, support will then follow regardless of villager attitudes.

8. The chief weakness - which must be met at all points possible - is logistical. The strategy is vulnerable to a counter-strategy which seeks to destroy supply concentrations and installations involved in training. In short the danger is that the enemy will turn the struggle into a logistics war which constantly debilitates.

III

There is still another, vital, characteristic of Neo Revolutionary Guerrilla War, consideration of which I have reserved for the remainder of this paper. It is: maximize the already intense

* Protracted conflict is not a strategy in itself since it simply asserts but does not demonstrate that time inevitably will deliver victory; it is the military counterpart to the communist notion of communism as the political wave of the future.

externalization programme throughout the world to undercut policy among the American public in the United States and to undermine American diplomacy abroad.

An integral and major part of communist grand strategy in its ten-year war in Vietnam is what it calls its external dau tranh chinh tri programme. This term and the concept it conveys is the subject of the remainder of this paper. Suffice it at this point to define dau tranh chinh tri (lit. political struggle movement) as the effort to employ words and deeds outside Vietnam to shape perception in such a way as to persuade outsiders, primarily Americans, that the Viet Cong deserve to win, are going to win.

By the spring of 1971 virtually all American official and public opinion held that the only feasible course for America to take in Vietnam was to disengage. Such differences as existed were confined to the question of rate of disengagement. This conclusion, ironically, came at a moment when the military situation, from the non-communist side's view, was as favourable as it had ever been, certainly at least since early 1963. Disengagement of American military and logistic support, of course, had been a major long-range goal and the primary short-run goal of the communist forces since the build-up of American military force in Vietnam beginning in 1965.

Probably no student of the Vietnam war would deny that the perception which Americans, official and private, held of the Vietnam struggle as well as the policies that flowed from that perception, were shaped to some degree by the conscious deliberate communist effort represented by the various dau tranh chinh tri programmes. The ultimate question is to what degree? How successful were they? How responsible were they for the perception that was formed abroad.

IV

Let me quickly insert here that I am advancing no simplistic devil theory that the communists have manipulated the world's perception of the Vietnam War and therefore are to be credited with all the dissent, criticism, opposition that subsequently developed. That would be an absurdity.

American and foreign perception of the Vietnam War is compounded of many factors. A consideration of these is

beyond the scope of this paper. However, I might briefly list what I believe to be the primary ones.

First, the hard events. The length of the war, its interminableness. The nature of the war, its complexity, the lack of logic in events; the apparent inability of the situation to become decisive.

Second, interpretation of events, chiefly by the mass media. The richness and power of television. The lack of symmetry in reporting, absence of balance due to inaccessibility of reporters to the communist side. Difficulty in depth reporting, difficulty of reporters to "get a handle on the story", the tendency to be "seduced by the trivial", concern with transitory, less important events at the expense of deeper long-range trends. Poorly trained or prepared reporters. Real or perceived unattractiveness of the South Vietnamese socio-political scene.

Third, normal vested political-interest activity in the US and elsewhere. Political gestures by opposition politicians, the war as a political football. New Left activity in the United States. Criticism for non-objective or parochial reasons by Europeans and other friends.

Fourth, failures, shortcomings and mismanagement by the American government in explaining its case (And here I must take some of the blame onto myself, personally).

Fifth, the temper of the age. The war came at a time of rising domestic troubles in the United States, of racial, demographic, economic and ecological problems. It was a period that saw the rise of irrationality, the advent of the anti-hero, the emergence of a strange youth culture, a resurgence of neo-isolationism.

And finally, the external campaign by the communists, the dau tranh chinh tri programmes.

All of these factors, and many more, shaped the perception. But I am dealing here with only one, the final one. The communists for ten years have pressed a massive campaign to shape American perception of the war with the goal of getting the Americans to end their involvement. American involvement is ending. Fact two is not - to repeat - simply an outgrowth of fact one. That would be ascribing far too much to the communists. But whatever causal relationship exists cannot be delineated today. It will take at least a generation before historians will be able to describe the relationship and measure

the correlation. In any event, I don't feel it is of much importance, for that is past. What is needed now is greater understanding of this communist phenomenon, so as better to deal with it in the future.

V

The ideological or psychological dimension of all warfare, reduced to its crudest element, consists of two basic assertions.

- Certainty of victory for the just side (or the righteous, or the deserving; previously, God's side).
- Monopolization of virtue (and the corresponding vilification of all the enemy).

Each side in every war in history has employed, fully or half-heartedly, with or without success, these two notions. Each has done so both in its own ranks and against the enemy. Until the rise of revolutionary guerrilla war or people's war this ideological dimension was regarded at best as an adjunct. There was, earlier, something of a common agreement between warring powers that victory must be, would be, decided by combat. The battle would be the pay-off. Perhaps ideological considerations might make a contribution.

The Vietnamese communists were the first, really, to break with the belief that the chief and primary test must essentially be military. The Vietnamese communists realized, dimly at first and then with increased clarity, that it might be possible to achieve an entire change of venue and make the primary test take place away from the battlefield*.

The true genius of revolutionary guerrilla war is not simply that it updates the long effective axiom of divide-and-rule - although it does do this - but that it employs the judo principle and turns the weight of the enemy's philosophic system against himself. It works best, therefore, against a democracy of decent people (and least against barbarians or fanatics). It agrees victory will go to the just, because justice must triumph. But it does not assert that the enemy is unjust with a brush that tars all in the enemy camp. Rather the enemy is an abstraction. It is the unjust and misled among the leadership, perhaps a

* The Chinese communists might have arrived at this conclusion, for they were moving towards it, had not events (i. e. victory) overtaken them.

few selected other individuals. The more or less normal war-time polarization is denied. Again and again it asserts to the opposite camp, particularly to the vast civilian population at home, we are not your enemy. The enemy is the unjust person who wishes to pursue an unjust war and surely you are not among these. It stands not for victory but for justice.

Thus it does not seek to monopolize virtue, but rather will share it. Although it declares that it itself is, without single exception, virtuous, it agrees that many right-thinking persons exist in the opposing camp. Again, it stigmatizes and vilifies only selectively.

Thus the ideological struggle becomes a test of virtue. The individual, looking on, is presented, on the one hand, with the communist's own idealized picture of himself (but denied any objective inspection of the communist camp). And on the other hand, he sees or perceives the errors, shortcomings and follies of his own, very human side. Reality seldom stands a chance against image. The further the onlooker is from the scene, or the less factual knowledge he has about Vietnam (and such knowledge in the US is close to non-existent, generally) the more apparently odious becomes the comparison.

VI

The National Liberation Front, since its inception in 1960 has been used by the communists to shape world perception. But these efforts, when taken under scrutiny, at once plunge the observer into the muzzy world of the pseudo-event that logic dictates should be dismissed at once and out of hand as the figment of a collective imagination. The NLF assumed the image of a true government, representing and controlling most of the South Vietnamese population. It signed treaties, sent missions abroad, dispatched ambassadors, and brushed aside the Saigon government as the "rebel authority".

In that earlier period, 1963, I wrote of this phenomenon almost without hope of explaining. In those days the National Liberation Front leadership hid in the South Vietnam mangrove swamps, its "diplomats" fleeing at the approach of any sizable Vietnamese army force. Even later it had none of the appurtenances of a government or a foreign ministry. Therefore its assertions were preposterous. As a governmental organization conducting

foreign affairs it existed only in the minds of its planners and of those outside the borders of Vietnam, whose own purposes were served by playing out the pretence. Yet it could not so easily be dismissed. What had been asserted, however patently untrue, after years of effort became real, or at least relevant, because men and governments acted as if it were reality. In frustration at the time I wrote that in attempting to expose what at first glance appeared to have been a gigantic hoax, one was bogged down first in semantics and then in metaphysics, asking first the question "What is truth? and then "What is reality?" *

VII

The mechanism by which this communication process takes place is the famed van or action programme, of which there are three. They are dan van (lit. action among the people, i. e. people controlled by the communists); dich van (lit. action among the enemy, i. e. non-military activity in the GVN-controlled areas or abroad); and binh van (lit. action among military, i. e. South Vietnamese and Allied military personnel and civil servants, both in Vietnam and abroad). These three programmes, plus the armed dau tranh (or what I call the violence programme, i. e. guerrilla war, kidnappings, assassinations, etc.) comprise the entire Vietnamese communist effort. Every act of the communists, every statement by its various leaders in the south and in Hanoi, every decision taken from the village level to the Politburo, all comes within the scope and framework of the van/armed dau tranh programmes.

Dan van essentially is an administrative and motivational programme in the so-called liberated areas, those parts of South Vietnam under communist socio-political control. Dan van activities seek to provide material assistance or psychological support for the cause, assure safe haven for the communist troops, produce food, manufacture or assemble weapons and other instruments of war. The liberated areas represent a major source of manpower where recruitment goes on both by communist military and Party elements. It involves internal

* Viet Cong, pp 306-7.

static defence tasks, financial activities such as fund-raising, collecting "taxes", selling "war bonds" etc. Permeating these dan van activities, but not separated from them, is communication and indoctrination work, carried on by special agit-prop cadres and employing most of the techniques found in communist societies: emulation campaigns, massive propaganda sessions, khiem thao or self-criticism sessions, education (which is indistinguishable from indoctrination in content, though differing in organization). In terms of external activity, the dan van programme attempts to project the image that the liberated area is a peaceful, tranquil place, with an advanced egalitarian social order, where not only hostility but even animosity has vanished. Carefully selected visitors to these areas (coming via Hanoi) describe it in these terms *.

Dich Van is the set of non-military activities of the communists directed against the people not under communist control, both urban and rural South Vietnamese, but also anyone reachable throughout the world. Through the years cadres have demonstrated great imagination and resourcefulness in pursuing various dich van activities. Typical are propaganda leaflets surreptitiously placed during the weekend in the desks of students in a provincial town school, to be found on Monday morning by the students, or cars stopped on the Saigon-Dalat road an hour before dusk one afternoon, the passengers led to a clearing a half mile from the road where they are lectured by an agit-prop cadre. There are daily broadcasts by Radio Liberation to be heard by those who choose to tune in the frequency. An armed propaganda team may appear in a GVN-controlled village some afternoon when the local defence force is off on a mission, assemble the villagers and perform a short drama that is part entertainment and part propaganda. Rumours are spread. Local demonstrations by townspeople are infiltrated, captured, and turned to communist purposes. All of these are examples of dich van. Another phase, of more relevance to our consideration

* Wilfred Burchett's works, for example; or the reports of the Frenchwoman Madeleine Riffau.

here, is the intensive effort to seek support from organizations and individuals abroad. Elsewhere I have tabulated and described the enormous effort that has been put into this contact work *. Indications of its scope and nature appear below.

The deadly binh van programme ** is a proselytizing effort among enemy military and civilian personnel, both Vietnamese and foreign. It has the goal of destroying the opposing military and governmental structure by nonmilitary means. The target is the individual soldier or civil servant. Ideally, the binh van programme would induce universal desertion or defection. Failing this, it seeks at the very least to lower the morale of the soldier or civil servant, so that he pursues his activities with lessened enthusiasm. Binh van techniques include the enunciation and dissemination of the communist policy of welcoming all Vietnamese now opposing it, as well as wide and intensive war of nerves and intimidation, usually against elite ARVN units such as the Rangers or Paratroopers. In addition, undercover agents are employed to penetrate the military and civil service and work from within. Family ties and friendships are used to reach and motivate persons on the other side; tangible and intangible rewards are offered to those who defect or desert. There are massive propaganda campaigns as well.

In terms of manpower assigned to the van programmes, as opposed to armed dau tranh activities, it is interesting to note the cadre ratio:

PERIOD	Estimated Number Civilian Cadres/ Political Commissars	% Assigned to Van Programmes (non-military)	% Assigned Armed Dau Tranh or Mil. Prog.
1959-63	15,000-20,000	90%	10%
1966-68	35,000-40,000	60%	40%
1971	20,000-25,000	70%	30%

* Op. cit. Appendix F: NLF Externalization Efforts, pp 440-474.

** Originally the Binh (military) Chinh (civilian) Van or B and C Programme; shorter term now includes civil servants.

VIII

We are dealing with image here, not reality and it is as ephemeral, or as real, as the flickering shadows on a motion picture screen, a thousand fragments of light. Among the thousand fragments of appearance, not reality, which make up the communist image I have taken these, more or less at random, from my files:

- "New Progress in Development of the Liberated Area of South Vietnam. In his political report at the South Vietnam national delegates' congress, lawyer, Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee presidium pointed out: "Our armed forces" and people's great victories have led to the establishment of vast liberated areas from the southern bank of the Ben Hai River to the cape of Ca Mau, placing them in a strong position to attack the enemy everywhere. It was in these liberated areas, the revolutionary administration, an administration genuinely representing our people's just interests and aspirations came into being. The works related to production, culture, education, information, and public health have constantly developed. The foundation for an independent, free, and genuinely democratic life was built..." (Hanoi magazine, Nhan Dan, July 16, 1969). (Article goes on to list names of districts and provinces making up the liberated area and discusses social, economic and political activity within them).

- "The Viet Cong Mystique. A teenage terrorist, clutching a claymore mine to his chest, throws himself at an American detachment and explodes like a human bomb; suicide squads fight their way into American-held buildings, while elsewhere groups of guerrillas shoot it out to the last round against tanks, troops and strafing aircraft. From Saigon and the shaken cities of South Vietnam reports tell the same tale of shocking Vietcong violence, and shocking Vietcong valour, demonstrating as Senator Robert Kennedy has grimly pointed out that half-a-million American soldiers..... are unable to secure a single city from the attacks of the enemy". (Dennis Bloodworth article, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, February 25, 1968).

- "Voices of the Viet Cong... One understands, I think, with greater clarity the opportunities handed a very tough and clever enemy. There is a record here of Government impotence

and stupidity and Vietcong shrewdness... We see a view of an accumulation of grievance and then the Front, quite well and tightly organized, rising up to exploit that grievance". (David Halberstam, Harpers Magazine, Jan. 1968)

- "U.S. Study Team Details Repression in South. The truth on the dictatorial regime of the US aggressors and their puppets in South Vietnam and their crimes against the South Vietnamese people have been revealed to some extent in a report by the US study team on religious and political freedom in Vietnam. The study team included Bishop James Armstrong of the United Methodist Church; John J. Conyers, representative; Rev. Robert F. Drinan, Dean of the Boston College Law School; Rabbi Seymour Siegel, Professor of Theology at the Jewish Theological Seminary; and Admiral Arnold E. True, US Navy, retired. We reprint below some excerpts from the report..." (Vietnam In Struggle, Nov. 1969) (There follows a lengthy article dealing with political oppression in South Vietnam. The article subsequently was read into the US Congressional Journal at which time - Dec. 1, 1969 - Radio Hanoi rebroadcast it, describing it as an official report to the Congress, which it was not).

- "Premier Phan Van Dong Sends Message to American Anti-War Demonstrators. The Vietnamese and world people fully approve and enthusiastically acclaim your just struggle. We are firmly confident that with the solidarity and bravery of the peoples of our two countries in the world, the struggle of the Vietnamese people and the US progressive people against US aggression will certainly be crowned with total victory. May your fall offensive succeed splendidly". (Radio Hanoi, October 13, 1970)

- "Anti-War Storm of High Intensity. A political storm is raging in the United States. Gathering from everywhere in the country, it is swirling most violently in Washington and San Francisco with torrents of people from everywhere flocking to the streets in a show of strength. From the capital and then from everywhere in the United States..... This is a peaceful storm, an anti-war storm, and a storm rising from the American people's freedom- and justice-loving tradition... This is a storm of fire, the fire of hatred for the US Government's atrocious war policy. This is a sign of the genuine patriotism and respect for honour of the American people, a people in whose hearts flows the blood of Lincoln, Washington..."

(Radio Liberation broadcast, April 28, 1971) (Both Radio Hanoi and Radio Liberation gave extensive coverage to the demonstrations for the entire period they were taking place).

- "Xuan Thuy Meets National Council of Churches Group. On March 23, 1971, Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV Government Delegation to the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam, received a delegation of 50 leaders and representatives of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States. At this meeting, Minister Xuan Thuy talked to the US religious delegates about the course of the US imperialists' intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam.... Minister Xuan Thuy expressed gratitude to the US religious circles and the representatives of the Churches of Christ who had been concerned with the Viet-Nam situation and who had shown their attitude or had acted to demand that the Nixon Administration end the war of aggression, so that peace may soon be restored in Viet-Nam and Indochina. The US delegates listened attentively to Minister Xuan Thuy's talk and later split into two groups to exchange views with members of the DRV Delegation to the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of understanding and friendship". (Paris VNA, March 24, 1971)

- "Deserter Shows Up in Hanoi. An American soldier who allegedly deserted his ranks in Vietnam and has been living with the Viet Cong for the past 17 months was introduced in Hanoi, Friday, the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) reported Friday. VNA said the American was introduced at a news conference given by Truong Cong Dong, acting head of the special representation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in Hanoi. The news conference was called for the American deserter, who is soon leaving Hanoi for Sweden to engage in an antiwar campaign, VNA said. The deserter's name was given as John M. Sweeney, registration No. 2367056 of Mike Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Regiment, US 3rd Marine Division..." (UPI Story in Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo, July 12, 1970) (Remainder of story consists of quotations from Sweeney).

- "Communiqué on US War Crimes For First Half of 1970. The Commission for Investigation of US Imperialists' War Crimes in Viet Nam has made public a communiqué on the war crimes committed by the US and its puppets in both parts of the country in the first half of this year. The communiqué, dated July 1st said..." (Radio Hanoi, July 4, 1970) (Then

follows lengthy statistical account of alleged atrocities by Allied forces in South Vietnam).

- "VC Halt Attacks on Americans. Saigon (AFP) Communist forces suddenly halted their four-day-old offensive against American troops Tuesday in a move observers believed to be linked with the new Viet Cong propaganda campaign directed towards American forces".... (Mainichi Shimbun, April 29, 1971).

- "Our People's Revolutionary Power. The Daily Telegraph reported on November 16, 1968: The U.S. Mission in Saigon said that Liberation Committees had been set up or elected in all Viet Cong-controlled or contended areas and that so far they had been established in 17 provinces, 5 townships, 33 districts and 1,270 villages. This is not an accurate statistical figure. Inferior though to the actual one, it suffices to show the birth and constant and momentous growth of the people's revolutionary power in South Viet Nam from the village to the provincial levels..." (NLF Magazine, South Vietnam in Struggle, January 1, 1969). (Remainder of article detailed organization and activity of the revolutionary committees throughout South Vietnam)

- "All We Want is to Be Left Alone, are the words of a Vietnamese army captain who deserted to Toronto... 'I am not important' he said simply, 'Me, I am nothing. It is our work that matters'. The Association of Vietnamese Patriots in Canada has three objectives, he told me, and these are: 'One to unite with all peace-loving Vietnamese in Canada and in the US; Two: to assist and cooperate with all American and Canadian anti-war movements, and other Vietnamese organizations in foreign countries: Three: to support totally and unconditionally the struggle of the Vietnamese people against foreign invaders and their native allies leading to independence, neutrality, peace, democracy and prosperity in South Vietnam'. (Article in Weekend Magazine, Dec. 5, 1970) (Objectives of organization are identical to official slogan of the National Liberation Front).

- "Foreigners to Probe Viet War Crimes. A group of foreign investigators has arrived in Hanoi to 'make inquiries into war crimes perpetrated by the US in Indochina', the Vietnam News Agency said on Tuesday... 'The delegation headed by Jostein Nyhamar, vice-chairman of the Norwegian Movement in Support of Vietnam and editor-in-chief of Aktuell

consists of Dorothy Normann, co-chairman of the Women Strike for Peace, Vic'or Maevski, Pravda's political commentator and member of the Soviet Peace Committee, the Swedish micro-biologist Sven Allan Ekberg and the British doctor Martin Roger Rosedale..." (Associated Press story in Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, May 19, 1971).

- "Professor Toynbee Describes America the Dangerous. Recently the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee answered questions put to him by the New York Times. He said: 'To most Europeans I guess America looks like the most dangerous country in the world...' " (Radio Hanoi, May 19, 1970).

- By far the most concentrated effort in building via mass media came in December 1970 on the 10th anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front. At that time the NLF and Hanoi published a series of histories and lengthy interviews and speeches by NLF officials. I have compiled the material and hopefully will be able to have it published in the near future. It is book length, will run to about 200 printed pages.

IX

It should be underscored that all of this activity was not simply pretence. It was not just sham. The communists worked hard to create their image. They altered policy in its name. They shot looters, purged cadres, refused alliances, ordered military offensives, all for the sake of perception abroad. They devoted enormous amounts of effort, manpower, money and time to the dau tranh chinh tri programmes. If not elsewhere, there was reality here. The programmes succeeded in part simply because of the heavy investment put into them - that much effort had to have some results.

Out of it came a sort of single personified image: The Viet Cong, while tough and sometimes ruthless, is essentially a noble human being. He is highly motivated, honest, incorruptible, dedicated to what he believes in, which, generally is laudable and virtuous; namely self-determination, justice, peace, democracy. His cause essentially is a defensive one - he threatens no one, certainly not those outside the borders of Vietnam. He is, by comparison with other Vietnamese, not

unattractive.

XI

As noted earlier the important thing now is to understand this phenomenon. Indeed it is imperative that we see the process clearly. If and when guerrilla wars develop elsewhere, the new insurgents will use the techniques to influence thinking abroad developed by the Viet Cong. Quite possibly some of the major world developments now underway, for example the abrupt image change by the Communist Chinese, may owe much to the Vietnamese example. Conceivably the Russians could see a whole new attack possible in the Middle East, or a means of emptying the ICBM silos in Kansas. In short, the face of warfare of the future, so vastly changed that many do not even recognize it as warfare.

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY WITH HINDSIGHT

Dennis J. Duncanson

My title contains the word "hindsight", in order to emphasize that my own analysis of the factors and forces in play, made when the Malayan Emergency was in its early stages, has changed. I am impatient with other people whose analysis at that time came close to my own and who have not changed in the meantime as I have myself; but, more than that, I believe that the persistence of the post-war conventional wisdom about the relationship between colonial rule, communism, and colonial emancipation, in the teeth of events which have given it the lie, has been a grievous disservice to the whole cause of Western civilization. Needless to say, I have the case of Indo-China much in mind.

In 1949 and 1950, I had some responsibility in Kuala Lumpur, immediately after my return from language study in China, for the official supervision of privately owned schools in the Federation of Malaya whose classroom language was Chinese; that language was mysterious and suspect to our professional educationists. It was known that the teachers in Chinese schools were heavily subverted, some of them being agents of the Chinese Communist Party who had come to Malaya deliberately to make trouble. The manpower for the communist guerrilla bands was recruited more from the schools than from the rubber estates and tin mines. Youngsters were not being press-ganged: they were volunteers. I wrote a study, for circulation within the Education Department, of the intellectual background of Chinese education which I believed accounted for this "movement": I said that Chinese nationalism had increased in China under the pressure of foreign encroachment, and specifically Japanese invasion, and that, transferred to Malaya, it was asserting itself under the pressure of racial privileges accorded the Malays, especially in the field of education. I believed, like other people, that communist strength was derived from the championing of this grievance, more patriotic than selfish, and that correction of the disadvantages under which Chinese intellectuals felt they laboured was a necessary preliminary to defeat of the communist terrorists (as we called them - not an inappropriate description). In the event, the terrorists were

defeated, and yet, to this day, the grievances which so pre-occupied me have never been attended to, and even to mention them publicly in Kuala Lumpur today is a criminal offence.

I was influenced, in those far-off days, you can see, by the conventional wisdom of the times. I too believed in "the rising tide of nationalism"; I took at its face value the communist self-portrayal as "holders aloft of the banner" of what I called "generalized grievance", to which the aggrieved single-mindedly flocked of their own accord. I was not taken in by communist propaganda myself, I hasten to add, but I supposed that many young Chinese boys (and some girls) were. That was several years before Professor Lucian Pye conducted his inquiry, under the auspices of Princeton University and with the collaboration of my colleagues in the administration, into the motivation of terrorists who had surrendered or been captured. His, undoubtedly, is the most revealing book that has yet been written about the Malayan Emergency. Briefly, Pye discovered that the slogans and causes and banners of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) were understood by those who followed them, not as true objectives, but as pretexts for actions to promote the power of the Party as an end in itself; to suppose they were genuine, the men he questioned replied, was ingenuous. Their own motives for joining had been many and often multiple; the ambition to get on through the Party to a degree of importance unlikely to be attained outside the Party occupied a prominent place in all their minds.

Fortunately, these facts had generally been grasped within the government before Professor Pye came on the scene. In planning and executing measures of defence against the guerrillas, the government was already working from the principle that the struggle was over power, not over ideas. It followed that what would impress the public, and mobilize its activity on the side of the government against the terrorists, would be which side was the stronger at any given time and place, balanced by an estimate of which side looked like coming out on top in the end. Those measures were worked out with a view to their practical, concrete, effect, not for their abstract "appeal": the question for ordinary folk was who was going to win, not whom it would be desirable to see win - still less help win at personal risk.

A number of authors writing about Malaya at second hand assert that the secret of the defeat of the MCP was twofold:

Britain's grant of independence to Malaya, and the turning of the Malays against the Chinese. Looking back, we can see that both assertions are false - that there is, indeed, an element of irreconcilability between them: if the Malays had been turned against the Chinese - at what risk of a race war - the prospect of "self-determination" could have held few attractions for the Chinese if the "self" was going to be predominantly Malay. On the contrary, throughout the Emergency, the Chinese community itself was the chief sufferer from terrorist action, and the success of the defence depended on promoting inter-racial co-operation, both within the government, especially the police, and within village communities: any identification of the MCP with the interests of the Chinese community against the authorities, such as my own study emphasized, had to be negated in the public mind and an identity of interest between Chinese community and authorities against the MCP cultivated in its place. As for independence, that was actually delayed while the back of the insurrection was broken; it was, in any case, of significance to a limited elite among any of the races; the guerrillas who gave themselves up invariably did so for quite practical reasons; and the hard core never has abandoned the struggle.

There is no doubt that the MCP suffered from disabilities by comparison with other guerrilla movements in South East Asia, and some writers make a lot of this factor. Their chief disability was isolation: they had foolishly counted on the Chinese Red Army continuing its march south beyond the frontiers of China proper. When it halted its advance, they found they enjoyed no sanctuary on the other side of a frontier - or at least only one in Siam which lay too far from the scene of action to be of regular use -, and they were never supplied with arms from outside Malaya by fraternal well-wishers, although they did benefit in the early days from mercenary gun-running on the fringe of the conflict in the Netherlands East Indies. Yet these disabilities are not explained by geography alone; the Vietcong in South Vietnam, for instance, in their early days, only had the weapons they could get hold of in the vicinity of their operations, by purchase, theft, or capture, nor did they have any sanctuary nearer than North Vietnam. The fact is that every communist insurrection so far has counted on a progressive, Clausewitzian escalation: both the receipt

of arms from abroad, and the exploitation of a sanctuary in which the defence must not (for political reasons) operate, demand a developed organization on the spot first, with adequate reception, communications, and transport facilities (usually porters), and can only be entertained after the initial phase. The setbacks encountered by the guerrillas sent into Sarawak from Indonesia during Konfrontasi illustrate the difficulty of exploiting a sanctuary, with external supplies of munitions, before the insurrection is viable. That the MCP never reached the requisite stage of viability was due to the practical measures taken by the defence to contain its operations at the lowest level possible; we did not, in General Westmoreland's much publicized idiom, wait until the enemy stood up before we struck him down.

Not only were the special defence measures in Malaya designed for their practical effect rather than for popularity, but most of them were positively unpleasant. What was called food denial entailed serious inconvenience for the communities which had been supplying the guerrillas because, under this special regime, all cooking was done centrally and it became illegal to have uncooked food of any kind in a private house for as long as the measure was in operation. But experience repeatedly showed that its psychological effect was not to make the people "hate the government and turn to the guerrillas" (as Miss Han Su-yin would have liked to persuade the English-speaking world through her fiction); on the contrary, the people were relieved of the agonizing choice between doing as the government wanted them to and responding to guerrilla demands; having no choice, their minds were at rest. The restrictions quickly starved the guerrillas out of the neighbourhood, and were then lifted, restoring conditions of peace and personal security - and at the same time leaving the government locally the victor. That was the moment for the government to promote schemes for village betterment, by way of reward. The opposite policy was pursued in Vietnam, with opposite results: village betterment came first, in order to buy popularity while the guerrillas were still active in the neighbourhood, so that they were able to demand even bigger contributions from the people than before and bring them by that degree more tightly under their control. The strength of the insurrection increased instead of diminishing.

Then there was experience with the modification of judicial procedures. Rules of evidence were relaxed to the detriment

of the interests of the accused because of the problem of intimidated witnesses, or witnesses whose identity could not be given away in open court for reasons of their own security or that of the intelligence services; wartime provisions for detention without trial were reintroduced. Such measures are by nature "unpopular". But although these provisions amounted to tampering with the liberal concepts of justice we all cherish, they were still precisely drawn in the emergency regulations and strictly applied, all detentions being subject periodically to automatic judicial review. Everybody then knew where he stood - what he could do and what not, and what fate awaited him if he transgressed. To the Western mind, persons who might well be guilty ought to be set at liberty unless convicted by rigorous standards of trial; to the Eastern mind, persons known to be guilty ought to be confined, and judicial niceties not allowed to get in the way. A government which allowed itself to be made a fool of would not be worth backing, one which did not would.

Two more measures merit mention in order to complete, not the list of defence measures, which was a very long one, but the different aspects of the defence policy taken as a whole. First was the ingenuity of the facilities made available to the public for laying information against terrorists. It would have been less than realistic for the government to suppose that the security forces, especially the police, were immune to enemy penetration or that they could be made impervious to intimidation merely by appealing to their loyalty, even though that was conspicuous and buttressed by good pay; in any case, however conscientious the police might all be, it was expecting too much that the public should trust them to the extent of risking their own lives to give the terrorists away; the sanction for betraying the authorities might be a fine, or a short term of imprisonment, or detention for a while - that for betraying the Party would be death for sure. Roundabout ways were therefore thought up to enable information to be laid, and acted on, without the source being traceable, even by the police who took the action. The second measure was the great attention paid to "psywar", by which I mean attacks on the morale of individual terrorists singled out by name. Judicious use of money played a big part in all these operations, carried out very much in the eye of the people in rural areas upon whose support the targets were

dependent; every success had a double impact - on the remainder of the guerrillas in the surrendered man's unit and on the people who knew about him. It goes without saying that highly sophisticated operations called for a combination of profound local knowledge with professional experience gained in other times and climes, long before the Malayan Emergency began.

The total effect of measures of all these kinds, co-ordinated with vigorous military action, was to make the security forces visibly the stronger side at most times and places and, at the same time, to impress the public with the government's grasp of its business, so that it appeared to be the likelier force to win in the end also. These two considerations therefore were not merely in balance - they supported each other in the defence's favour. However, the entire public administration had to be efficient, not simply in order to carry them out, but no less in other spheres less relevant to the Emergency, otherwise the psychological effect on public opinion would not have been maintained consistently. In this connection, another misapprehension about the Emergency has been widespread: that British officials were able to command implicit obedience from a multi-racial administrative machine, whereas in Vietnam Americans could only advise. I do not deny that there is a significant difference between the respective relationships to the local administrations. All the same, British officials had to carry the Malay rulers and Malay officials with them, and, the reserve powers of the High Commissioner (never invoked) notwithstanding, all (to my personal knowledge) was not plain sailing. What was more significant in Malaya was the reliability of the administrative machine and the grasp of practical Real-politik of both planners and executants; in Vietnam few if any of the American planners were at home in what they were advising about, nor did experience appear to bring improvement - for reasons I have analysed elsewhere.

The lessons I draw from the Malayan Emergency do not amount to a general plea for high-handed action by governments. My plea would be that we should break out of the providential, propitiatory conception of relations between the West and the former colonial territories - break out of the faith that "doing good" (that is, being generous with the West's worldly goods) will necessarily be rewarded by victory, "doing wrong" (e.g.

paying for the construction of "tiger-cages") will necessarily bring defeat. We are all taught at school how the Romans, in time of war, suspended their democratic institutions and procedures and appointed a dictator, in whose fiat they acquiesced willingly. The rubber tappers and mining coolies of Malaya did not democratically appoint the Director of Operations in Kuala Lumpur, but their reaction to his dictates was not unlike that of the Romans. It is a doctrine of our conventional wisdom that dictatorships, because they run counter to natural instincts of self-determination, are more vulnerable to subversion than is an open society - hence the fatal misinterpretation of the regime of Ngo-dinh-Diem in Vietnam. Apart from the Vietnam example, it seems to me impossible to read the classics of Marxism-Leninism and still hold that view. The essential point is that government and people should have their wits about them; after the first two or three years of the Emergency, that was the position in Malaya - we cultivated the people's hearts through their minds, not their minds through their hearts. And yet, if the international news media of the early 1950s had possessed the technology of the late 1960s, the MCP would have had it in its power to disarm us through public opinion in Britain. Whether it would have had the wit to play its cards as well as the Chinese and Vietnamese have, I cannot say. I like to think that, if it had, my colleagues might even then have found the means to outwit it - but it is no more than a wishful thought.

THE WARS GOING ON IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

Frank N. Trager

I. Introduction

The title I have chosen is a paraphrase of Richard Cobden's angry "How Wars are got up in India: The Origin of the Burmese War" (London, 1852). This was a slashing attack on the policy of Dalhousie who forced England's second war on Burma in 1851-52, and after victory, annexed the remaining centre of that country's delta. The final take-over, transforming the Kingdom of Burma into a colonial province of British India, emerged from the third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885.

The three wars, beginning with the first in 1824, came about as a result of the British "Forward Policy" defined by Wellesley at the turn of the eighteenth century. Thus it can be demonstrated that the absorption of Burma into British India was not an "accident" of imperial or colonial advance; rather it resulted from a conscious, political-military policy more or less expertly executed *. It is in this sense of a planned, political-military policy, prepared by, and not infrequently executed with, considerable resources from abroad, that I shall discuss the wars going on in South East Asia.

I do not, however, mean to say that all military action in South East Asia has its political roots abroad. For example, since we meet in the Netherlands at a time when its government is renewing ties with an erstwhile colony, Indonesia, it may be useful to mention the Republik Maluku Selatan, (RMS), the Republic of the South Moluccans, whose leadership seeks to separate those islands from sovereign Indonesia. A group of Moluccans, usually referred to as Ambonese, seized the Indonesian Embassy and held some of its staff hostage early on August 31, 1971, on the eve of President Suharto's state visit to the Netherlands. They wanted to use that occasion in Holland

* See Frank N. Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, A Historical and Political Analysis, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, Chapter 2, pp. 20-42.

for forcing discussions between Suharto and RMS "President" J.A. Manusama. Another religious group - the Ambonese are chiefly Christian - the very orthodox Darul Islam has also carried on intermittent rebellion since independence (1945 or 1949) against the secular, though predominantly Moslem, Indonesian government.

Religious, ethnic or racial, and political separatist or secessionist groups have engaged in armed conflict in various South East Asian states both before and after the latter became independent in the wake of World War II. Such conflicts have been, and, where they continue, remain serious obstacles to internal stability and national unity. If they intensify to the stage of sustained violence, they may utilize the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare as we know it today. They may solicit and receive aid from abroad. Examples of such recent and current civil warfare are numerous: witness those of Northern Ireland (religious in origin), Biafra-Nigeria and Pakistan (ethnic), the Congo-Katanga (political) - and many others. South East Asia, as I have suggested above in the Indonesian example, and could additionally illustrate in ethnic Burman-Karen strife in Burma or the Malay-Chinese situation in Malaysia, the religious Catholic versus Moslem contest in Mindanao, the Philippines - and others - has not escaped from such violence.

The contestants in these conflicts may resort to guerrilla strategy and tactics and may on occasion join a communist "revolutionary front" or seek or accept aid from abroad as in the current instance of ex-Premier U Nu of Burma. However, such conflicts are not my concern in this paper because whatever, if any, their external relations, they are, by their very nature almost exclusively domestic in origin or causation. In this paper, I shall focus on communist warfare in South East Asia because it, like the imperialist warfare cited in the opening paragraph, is almost exclusively foreign in origin or causation. It springs from a conscious, political-military policy, prepared by and not infrequently executed with, considerable resources from abroad. It differs to some extent from traditional imperialist policy, in that it enjoys the advantage of having cadres or supporters from within the country under attack *. The fact that communist warfare and domestic

* This distinction is by no means to be generalized. Imperial power has sought, and on occasion found, willing hands in countries under attack. Witness the Quislings in Norway and Vichyites in France during World War II.

or civil warfare in South East Asia (and elsewhere) may both employ guerrilla strategy and tactics is here irrelevant. Consideration of the military and related arts - the means to an end - is a worthy subject matter, but such consideration would not add to our understanding of the policy or policies involved.

II. Lenses for the Correction of Historical Myopia in South East Asia.

I have elsewhere pointed out that millions of words have been employed - and millions more may be expected - to service satisfaction or cover humiliation on the outcome of the war in Vietnam. In the sixteen years since the so-called second Indo-China war began, we have designed a new, or refurbished an old, vocabulary to name and generally describe such warfare: "wars-by-proxies", "brush-fire wars", "insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare", "limited and sub-limited warfare", "guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare", and "wars of national liberation" or "people's war". The difficulty in all this spillage of words about Vietnam is that in no small measure preoccupation with it has blocked or downgraded our concern with the larger issue in South East Asia (and elsewhere) of which Vietnam is its most visible and costly current example. The larger issue is communist revolutionary warfare in the historical setting of post-World War II newly independent South East Asia (SEA)

Communist revolutionary warfare in SEA has not been what is so loosely referred to as "Cold War" competition - a type of mixed aggressive behaviour initiated by Stalin in Europe in 1946 and limited by that series of US and Allied acts associated with the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, the 1948 Berlin Air Lift and Marshall Plan, and the 1949 NATO accords *.

* This and the next three paragraphs are taken from my testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C. May 13, 1967. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see my "Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia", William Henderson, ed., Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963; and Marxism in Southeast Asia, A Study of Four Countries, Stanford University Press, 1959.

The sobering fact is that Communist Parties took up arms against most Asian states after these states had got rid of their imperialist masters, had become newly independent and had based themselves on democratic or democratic-socialist political and economic models. When the Burmese communists began their hot war against Burma in March 1948 - barely three months after independence, they attacked a new nationalist government that had already adopted a democratic constitution and a socialist or welfarist economic programme. The same communist hot war was launched against the Indonesian nationalists in September 1948, when the latter were still fighting to secure their independence from the Dutch. In between these two dates the communists began their armed attacks on Malaysia on the threshold of independence (subsequently postponed until 1957). Newly independent Philippines was next on this communist hot war schedule, followed by Tibet and Korea (1950), by Laos after its Treaty of Independence was signed by the French (1953), by the state (later Republic) of Vietnam (1955), by India (1959-62) and against Thailand which had never lost independence *.

A second sobering fact is that such communist hot warfare continues today against Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam - that is,

* Note that I have omitted mainland China and North Vietnam from this list. In the former the communists after an initial defeat by the nationalists in 1927 returned to the battle in 1935 and won a military victory in 1949. In Vietnam both communists and nationalists fought against the war-time Vichy and later, the returning so-called Free French. In this struggle the communists in 1954 won North Vietnam against the French and liquidated or otherwise disposed of the nationalist leadership in the North. The Nationalists won in South Vietnam, also in 1954 and have had to face communist warfare ever since. See my Why Vietnam? New York, Praeger, 1966.

against every non-communist country in South East Asia.

The third sobering fact is that this communist warfare was directed against newly independent states in Asia by the decision-making authority of the "Communist Information Bureau" i.e., the 1947 successor to the Communist International (Comintern), that met in Warsaw at the instigation and under the continuing leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. The communist hot wars in Asia have been nurtured, supplied and otherwise supported by Moscow and/or Peking ever since. They have found other means to transmit ideas, values, objectives, aims, etc., since Khrushchev ended the Cominform in 1955-56. The five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence sponsored by Peking in 1954-55 and the de-Stalinizing measures initiated by Moscow in 1956 did make a difference. They made it possible for the governments of the USSR and the People's Republic of China to call for "friendly" government-to-government relations and simultaneously to continue their support for communist warfare, even against those Asian countries with which they had concluded "friendly" government-to-government agreements.

This two-tier or two-track policy has been diligently pursued by both Moscow and Peking, sometimes in concert (before the Sino-Soviet conflict began in the late Fifties), other times separately. Each communist centre, whether it be Moscow or Peking or Hanoi and their respective followers, has endorsed and supported the thesis of "holy" or "just" "wars of national liberation" within the SEA countries, while also seeking at different times "friendly" government-to-government relations.

The experience of Burma since independence on January 4, 1948, perhaps best illustrates the effects of these communist war-making policies. When the leaders of the Burma Communist Party returned from the Cominform-directed conferences held in India between November-December 1947 and February-March 1948, they announced that they would fight the moderately socialist government. And they did, beginning shortly after the latter date. At least until 1953-54, Russian and Chinese communist sources publicly supported the communist insurrection against the "running dogs of the capitalist-imperialists" in Rangoon. The death of Stalin - or shortly before - heralded a new line of "friendly" government-to-

government relations. Moscow "gave" aid (but was paid for it with Burmese rice in return); Peking, led by Chou En-lai spread the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" through Burma and at the 1955 Bandung Conference. But communist insurgency with sanctuaries and training areas on the Yunnan side of the Sino-Burma border continued to function.

In the meantime, Burma, unsuccessful in the earliest years of independence at getting sufficient Western aid to defend herself, decided to pursue a neutralist course in foreign policy. And of all the neutralist countries from India to Indonesia, it may be said that Burma was an honest neutralist. Her neutralism, however, did not really help her when U Nu was Prime Minister. He issued one of his many Reports to the People. In the one for 1957, he details the overt and covert support given to the communist insurrectionists by the Sino-Soviet Axis before Stalin's death and after that event. Later, in 1960, a Soviet information officer stationed in Burma defected to the Burmese and gave a public account of Soviet and Chinese economic and other warfare directed against that country *.

The Burmese then proceeded to negotiate a border and peace treaty (1960) with Communist China, hoping thereby to secure the 1500 mile-long Sino-Burma border. The treaty was ratified and implemented with a considerable Peking no-interest aid loan to Rangoon. But by 1967, Burma was the object of an unsuccessful Maoist attempt at an uprising. Government relations were suspended, while Peking upgraded her public support for across-border insurrectionary activity **. Today, diplomatic exchanges have been restored between Rangoon and Peking, but the latter still trains, supports and otherwise assists the Burma Communist Party guerrilla forces in their attacks on Burma from bases in Communist China. The war goes on.

* See A. Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy, Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1962.

** See my "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era", Orbis, V. XI, no. 4 Winter 1968, and "The Ninth CCP Congress and the World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia", Orbis, V, XIII, no. 3, Autumn 1969.

The following chronological summary is designed to illustrate a second type of experience. In a further paraphrase of Cobden it might be headed: The People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Thailand; or, How Wars of "National Liberation" are got up and sustained.

The story in Thailand begins shortly after the end of World War II when in a complicated series of moves for political leadership Pridi Phanomyong, a French-educated, somewhat socialistic Thai is displaced from power (1946-47). He had been a leader of the so-called Free Thai movement in Thailand during World War II, while his chief opponent, Field Marshall Phibul Songkhram, was in the saddle as the war-time ally of Japan, and head of the Thai government. Pridi made an abortive effort to regain political power in a coup in 1949, but again was defeated (by Phibul who retained the power and office of Prime Minister until 1957). Pridi then retired to Communist China.

In the early Fifties, one begins to hear about the Free Thai Movement, formerly associated with Pridi during the war against "Japanese fascism and imperialism", now operating on Chinese soil. The development proceeds as follows:

1950's The Free Thai Movement based on a so-called Thai Autonomous Area in Yunnan, allegedly led by the former Prime Minister Pridi, then in Peking, was announced. It had a clandestine radio called the Voice of the People of Thailand, and sought support from former Pridi followers in Thailand, particularly in the area adjacent to Yunnan. It was the subject of an article by the late US Ambassador Edwin Stanton in Foreign Affairs in 1954. Few people in Thailand or elsewhere paid any attention to this early attempt at creating a communist insurrectionary base in Thailand at the time.

1961-62 Communist guerrilla activities are stepped up in the seventeen northeast provinces of Thailand. This is an area of ethnic variation and is less prosperous than the rest of the country. "Operation Sunrise", one of the earliest counter-insurgency plans, prepared with US assistance and implemented by the now concerned Thai government.

March 1962 The US advises Thailand that under the terms of the SEATO Treaty it will come to its assistance if her government required our aid. (The Rusk-Thanat Khoman Understanding).

October 1964 The outlawed Communist Party of Thailand, (CPT) based in Communist China calls for a "patriotic, democratic, united front" against the Royal Thai government.

November 1964 A 'new' Thai Independence Movement, (TIM) is launched from Yunnan and calls for a "united front".

January 1965 Peking announces that the Thai Patriotic Front has been formed by the CPT, the TIM and the earlier (1950's) Free Thai Movement.

March 1965 The Thai Patriotic Teachers and Professional Group is announced from Peking. It joins the Thai Patriotic Front as do the following:

May 1965 The Thai Patriotic Workers Federation and the Thai Lawyers Group:

February 1966 to the present The Thai Patriotic Youth Organization joins the foregoing. All these China-based groups, part of the Thai Patriotic Front, are announced as participants in events prescribed and heralded by Peking and Hanoi.

From time to time the following additional groups whose reality but not propaganda utility may well be questioned have been announced as being component elements in the Thai Patriotic Front: The Self-Liberated Farmers and Planters Association; the Poor People's Groups; the Southern Rubber Plantation Workers'

Group; and the Patriotic and Revolutionary Writers in Thailand. By 1969 Radio Peking was announcing not only the formation of the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Force" - the military arm of the Thai Patriotic Front - but also its victories in the field.

On many occasions the well-known Thai names of Pridi and Thep Chotinuchit, a founder of the Thai Economist Party in the 1950's had been cited as organizers or forerunners among the leaders of the Thai Patriotic Front. Pridi has been dropped, (1970-71). He has quit his "asylum" in Communist China and is now in France. Among other leaders more recently named are: a former Thai Lt-Colonel, Phayom Chulanon; Mon Kon Manakon; an ex-Navy Lieutenant, Vattanachai Chayaket Dhives; Amphorn Souvanabon; Saing Marangkul; Suchin Akrasamit; and Kularb Saipradit.

Reports of Thai People's military victories are regularly broadcast by Peking, allegedly taking place in the Northeast provinces. More recently ethnic sub-groups have been lauded for their factual attacks (assassinations) on Thai government officials in the Northern provinces. Happily, the Thai government has found corrective lenses for past myopia.

The other papers presented at this conference offer data on other communist insurgencies in South East Asia. The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) publishes a monthly intelligence report on such activity. From personal knowledge and frequent visits to South East Asia, I can affirm that externally inspired, incited, and supported communist insurgency is, as I have indicated above, a significant factor today in Burma, Thailand, Laos (especially so) Cambodia, of course Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines - nor is Singapore immune to it. The degree of significance depends less on local issues and local frustrations than on physical proximity to sources of supply and

sanctuary. Thus mainland South East Asia is more troubled than island and archipelago South East Asia but the difference in degree is not a ground for complacency. Ping-pong diplomacy from a once-again-smiling Chou En-lai - he is more dangerous when he is smiling than when he is dour - merely tends to repeat 1954-55 over again. As Tillman Durdin pointed out in the New York Times (May 25, 1971) after his visit to Mainland China, "recent Chinese moves for a thaw in relations with non-communist countries have been accompanied in the last few days by a splurge of propaganda from Peking reaffirming its commitment to revolution, particularly in South East Asia" *.

Thus, it may be said that for more than two post-World War II decades - during and after the successful struggle for independence - Communist Parties, whether regarded as "monolithic" or "polycentric" in orientation have kept Asia in general, and South East Asia in particular, in revolutionary turmoil. I have elsewhere documented the fact that "at virtually every stage of their political conduct, these Communist Parties have accepted or adapted whatever conflictual strategy had been approved by the main Communist centre to which they were loyal and attached". Our preoccupation with "guerrilla" or conventional warfare in Vietnam has hindered our vision and our counteraction of the eroding character of communist revolutionary warfare everywhere else in South East Asia.

What is important to note is that guerrilla warfare is a tool in the hands of those whose ideas, values and interests are directed towards the acquisition of power whatever the legitimacy of any government or regime in power. And further that these ideas, values, interests, aims, objectives - call them what you will - do proceed from superior headquarters - singular or plural - outside the boundary of any afflicted South East Asia State, to which lower ranks inside those boundaries attach themselves or are attached by one means or another.

* It should be noted that Mr Durdin has had some three decades of experience reporting on China from China. Unlike the New York Times on Vietnam he is not a biased reporter. See also J. M. Van der Kroef, "Peking and Guerrilla Insurgency in South-east Asia", The Intercollegiate Review. Volume 7, No. 1-2. Autumn, 1970, pp. 45-57.

III. Communist Revolutionary Warfare in South East Asia

I recently wrote an article * based on Sir Robert Thompson's concluding volume in his trilogy: Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-69, And What To Do About It. (The first two titles were: Defeating Communist Insurgency and No Exit from Vietnam). Some paragraphs of this are here pertinent. I wrote them while in Vietnam during August 1970, revisiting areas in the Vietnam Delta, that as early as 1964 Sir Robert, his colleague, Dennis J. Duncanson (who is with us today), Brigadier F. P. Serong (for the Australians) and I reached by "chopper".

In concluding his book Sir Robert writes:

"Vietnamization (a word not particularly liked in Vietnam) is not just a matter of Vietnamese troops replacing American troops in the war. It means a progressive build-up of South Vietnamese capability for future defence and development so that, in the end, they can stand on their own feet, thereby resisting outside interference and giving their people the opportunity to choose their own form of government and their own way of life..... This requires a stronger administration, a stronger economy, stronger military forces and stronger police for internal security. To achieve these, limited American support in all forms will still be necessary but at a steadily decreasing rate. Not only can the war in Vietnam still be won through this new strategy, but, unless that strategy is first proved successful in Vietnam, it will lack all credibility for those nations of the Third World, and in Europe, which must still rely on limited American support".

That, in purely military terms, the war in South Vietnam is now on the threshold of victory is the case. That is, the Vietnamese and the Allied Forces have defeated the North Vietnamese attempt at a conventional "third phase" war take-over in South Vietnam. This judgement is not based on the unreliable optimism of a McNamara, who was an unintentional victim of

* See Frank N. Trager, *Intercollegiate Review*, Volume 7, No. 3, Winter 1970-71.

his own satisfaction in "quantification" as the touchstone of reality - nor is it based on an earlier American military penchant for massive and massed military force deployed on an acceptable terrain. It is based on a perceived intertwining - at long last - of military force and political action designed to bring a large measure of security to the Vietnamese countryside.

If the South Vietnamese continue to strengthen provincial and local administration, face up to the problems of the war economy, transforming it morally as well as economically, and extend as they have, on a continuing basis, security and stability to the seventy per cent of the population that is rural, they will have demonstrated, as I expect them to do, that communist revolutionary warfare can be roundly defeated.

It is in this sense that Vietnam is not something far-off, affecting a small piece (66,000 sq. miles) of unimportant real estate, holding a mere 17 to 18 million people. It is a war that brought down a US President who opted for "negotiation" instead of learning how to use military and political power in tandem. It has endangered a successor President who for an excruciating time seemed to have fallen into the same trap as his predecessor. It is a war, better, it is a front in a global war.

Revolutionary warfare, as Sir Robert points out "enables a small ruthless minority to gain control by force, over the people of a country and, thereby, to seize power by violent and unconstitutional means". All of us have become familiar with its well-advertised three phases: organization in the countryside, followed by a gradually rising tempo of guerrilla action against the local and regional government leading to offensive, open warfare until the central or national government is toppled. In the first and early stages of the second phase such warfare, as the Thai case illustrates, rarely is undertaken in the name of the Communist Party. The latter seizes on real, fancied and invented grievances to win support and recruits. It engages in infiltration, subversion, terror and assassination but seeks to maintain its popular base, without which it could not prosper. Even in the later guerrilla periods its ruthless tactics against its opponents are carried out so selectively as to inhibit local objection. In the last phase, the Communist Party feels strong enough because it

believes it has sufficient command over people, its "home support base", to take the offensive in the name of a Front it has created and of which it is an acknowledged part. At this stage, it no longer hesitates to wipe out people, as in the massacre at Hue in 1968, if they do not respond as the communists wish.

Revolutionary warfare is based on Lenin's concepts of, and lifetime emphasis on, "organization" and the absolute dedication to the aim of political power. No Leninist from Lenin to Stalin to Mao and their epigoni - has ever failed to rephrase and emphasize the Clausewitzian formula that prescribes the essential intertwining of war and politics as the means for achieving power. Hence, communist-inspired and led revolutionary war cannot be "negotiated" into a real peace, for a real peace, would mean a surrender of the Leninist principles. "It (the communist revolutionary war movement) will be defeated by establishing a superior organization and... measures designed to break the revolutionary organization". This in Vietnam is called rooting out/destroying the communist infrastructure in the countryside; and this is precisely what successful pacification and development, civic action and other such phrases mean. The issue in revolutionary war is not one of partition of territory, or of a share in the government, or of a more equitable distribution of wealth and land, all of which might be negotiable. It is a struggle for power and a question of who will control the future of the country concerned. It is an instrument of policy that carries forward the communist purpose, while avoiding a direct nuclear confrontation. It is in that sense a "low-risk" war requiring patience and time.

Such revolutionary warfare, as I have indicated above, goes on steadily in South East Asia. Its inspiration, guidance and support comes from one or several of the major governing communist centres, whatever the prevailing "line" in that centre. Variations among the intended victims in and among the states of South East Asia emerge as a consequence of communist perceptions of opportunity and logistics. It is, obviously, easier for Communist China and North Vietnam to stoke the revolutionary warfare in mainland South East Asia than in island-archipelago South East Asia. But, as in the case of Indonesia, the opportunity in 1965 appeared to be present. It failed - many Europeans and Americans are aware of this - by a hair's breadth. If a few additional generals could in fact have been

assassinated on the night of September 30 it is quite possible that the loyal military and mobilized citizenry could not have been mobilized and led in time to defeat one of the largest Communist Parties in the world - a party making its second attempt at an armed take-over in independent Indonesia.

Epilogue

I have brought with me another paper about to be published: "Alternative Futures for Southeast Asia and US Policy". If anyone at this Conference is interested in reading it, it is available. I find that there are many historical South East Asian questions on which our research efforts may well focus; but I see no reason here at this Conference to pile up the data on the past quarter century. If any here wish to argue the general thrust of my paper, I will be glad to accommodate them; if fine points are to be raised, I will be glad to engage in scholarly debate. But I am really concerned not with our past expertise, rather with our future policies. What of the 1970's in South East Asia?

There is no "conclusion" to this paper. The wars go on. The data are there for all who wish to examine them. The stakes are high in lives and treasure. The sad part of the story is that the adversary has so clearly indicated what it is he believes, why he believes, what he intends to do about it, and his conviction that he will be successful because "history" is on his side and because the contradictions in our society will so tear us apart as to render us incapable of defence. The adversary sounds fierce and impatient. He also purrs and waits to pounce. He is, in a curious way, open about his intentions and even perhaps a bit boastful about his capabilities. He can truly say that he alerted us. Can we truly say that we have responded to the alert? I find a strong and implacable adversary on the one hand and a weakening will among ourselves. I find a anxious war-torn South East Asia, uncertain of its future and not yet capable of insuring its free future. It is once again as it was in the 17th-19th centuries, a prize to be won because "wars are got up" in South East Asia, this time by new power centres - communist, not capitalist ones. The outlook is not good.

SUMMARY

Frank N. Trager

- I. Emerging from the geopolitical analysis presented by Brigadier Thompson, certain issues were discussed:
 - a) The rise and importance of Asian Regionalism.
 - b) The complementary or disjunctive character of ideology and power.
 - c) The importance as well as the irresolution of the many problems of economic development in many developing countries.
 - d) The well-recognized but difficult issue of communications, agitprop and the role of propaganda as word and deed in wars of national liberation.
- II. Based on Frank N. Trager's paper, the following points were made and discussed:
 - a) The continuity of revolutionary warfare in South East Asia waged against the newly independent countries, the policies adopted at the Cominform in September 1947. These policies were further implemented after October 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party won the mainland of China. "The Cold War has been hot since 1947-48".
 - b) The modifications of Stalin's policies after his death in 1953 leading to the two-tier policy of Moscow-Peking begun in 1954. Two-tier defined as government to government "friendly" relations, while using the party apparatus for carrying out revolutionary, armed and political warfare against that government. Chou En-Lai was the foremost spokesman for such a two-tier policy during the Bandung period though subsequently, especially during the Sixties, Mao succeeded in reversing Communist China's policy by reverting almost exclusively to revolutionary warfare. The recently initiated ping-pong diplomacy has once again in Asia set the stage for going back to the two-tier policy.

- c) The case histories of Burma and Thailand as intended victims of Peking's policy.
 - d) Indonesia was saved by the accident of an "insufficient" number of assassinations on September 30, 1965.
 - e) Protracted warfare, a feature of life.
- III. Mr Pike outlined eight major points for consideration:
 - i. North Vietnam is in a time of change because of the military (Tet) defeat she suffered in 1968. Also, because of Ho's death and the changing character of leadership. There seems to be a current debate in the Politburo over how the North Vietnamese should achieve victory. Seven of the nine members seem to suggest military means, two political means. Three of the seven who propose military means seem to be saying by main, regular forces (Giap) and four of the seven seem to be saying by protracted fifty years of war (Truong Chin). Giap admits a loss of 600,000 men between 1965-68 out of a total manpower pool of 5,000,000. The Americans say about 700,000. There is further discussion in the Politburo on how the government should allocate resources for the military and for development. All members of the Politburo, whose average age is 63 (in contrast to the South Vietnam leadership's average age of 37), seem to agree that the quality of life in North Vietnam has deteriorated because of the loss of morale, corruption, and black marketeering. The hardliners in the Politburo would seek to repair the deterioration by Mao's ideological approach. The pragmatists would do so by presenting incentives, by releasing the population from the tensions of intense war.
 - ii. The strategic balance in North Vietnam vis-a-vis South Vietnam has shifted.
 - iii. The grand strategy of North Vietnam and its Viet Cong forces has moved from diplomacy to guerrilla warfare

to big unit warfare to technologically trained neo-guerrilla war, to be used for future protracted warfare.

- iv. The war is trending down.
- v. Increased organization and administrative strength in South Vietnam's government and society. In this the South Vietnamese have surpassed the NLF. 80% of the combat forces in the South are from North Vietnam. The total is about 96,000. 20% of the combat forces are black pajama NLF.
- vi. Vietnamization is beginning to progress well in part because the communists are not reacting to it. The US will continue logistic and air support and withdrawals will stop only when the prisoner-of-war issue is settled. It is a major question today.
- vii. Lon Nol's government was not destroyed quickly, as the communists expected, hence they reverted to protracted warfare.
- viii. There appears to be some change in the communist world with respect to Hanoi; disenchantment is setting in, both in Peking and Moscow. They seem to suggest that the North Vietnamese have botched the war. The Sino-Soviet dispute used to be useful to Hanoi, now there appears to be anxiety as a result of SALT talks and ping-pong diplomacy.

IV. Mr Duncanson, on the basis of his examination of the Malayan emergency made these points:

- a) In guerrilla warfare there is the primacy of political action over military action; of minds over hearts, of stern behaviour if necessary.
- b) The need to distinguish between psy-warfare and propaganda. The former is designed to inactivate the adversary, to deter him, to dominate the situation and then occupy it. Propaganda is to persuade those at whom it is directed to action, to occupy the situation and then to dominate.

c) Among the principles to be employed against the adversary are:

- i. Cut their supply line and eliminate their sources of funds.
- ii. To subvert before converting.
- iii. To highlight the role of intelligence with a flourishing police force (in Malaya, intelligence had given the administrative biographies of 15,000 terrorists who were gun toters - 75% of the total).
- iv. To control weapons.
- v. To put security first (hence the "new villages") before welfare.

During the course of the conference other questions received attention. For example:

- a) How do we regard the USSR in terms of its external policies?
- b) Is it carrying out what might be called the aims of imperial Russia or is it adhering to its ideological and theoretical base - Leninism?

As a corollary to this discussion the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute was examined.

A second question discussed at some length was whether we could begin to formulate a general theory of communist insurgency, or whether we were better advised in examining individual cases in some depth, in order to be better able to handle such situations.

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