December 1971.
Vol. V, no. 12

EAST-WEST contacts

A Monthly Review

International Documentation and
Information Centre (Interdoc)
The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10
Netherlands

CONTENTS

	Page
IDEOLOGY	
- Soviet Attitude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights	1
- Yugoslav Marxist Philosopher Critical of Soviet Bloc Communism	7
POLITICS	
- The U.S. and the Third World	11
- Successful Chinese Diplomacy Vexes Moscow	17
- China's World Strategy at Moscow's Expense	22
- A New Great Wall - of Words	26
- Communists Compete for Japan	28
- Brezhnev's Visit to Yugoslavia	34
- EEC Dilemma for the Soviet Bloc	36
- The Prize that glitters	42
- Espionage versus Diplomacy	44
ECONOMICS	
- Economic Development in Eastern Europe	48
- Ota Sik: Down with State Planning	53
- East-West Economic Congress in Vienna	55
CULTURE	
- Pop Songs make Propaganda set to Music hard to hear	57
- Soviet and U.S. Scientists plan Search for Extra-Terrestrial Civilisations	60
- Culture plays vital part in life of Soviet Man and Woman	63
- SED'S new Instrument in Federal German Universities	69
- "Lupta De Clasa" on the "Efficiency" of Literature	71
- Writers continue to resist Ideological Campaign	72

IDEOLOGY

SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Summary: Despite its refusal in the United Nations' vote in 1948 to support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Soviet Union has since tried to exploit the human rights issue in the UN and elsewhere

The Soviet Union's attitude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been based on the premise that its principles were long ago established in the USSR. The party newspaper, Pravda, marking the tenth anniversary of the Declaration, declared on December 10, 1958:

"...in the USSR the basic human rights are not only proclaimed but are guaranteed and consistently implemented".

A Novosti publication issued in 1965, USSR: Questions and Answers, claimed:

"If we compare the Soviet Constitution with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations it is clear that citizens of the USSR have been granted the principal democratic rights and liberties proclaimed by the Declaration. What is more, many of the rights and liberties secured by the Constitution are broader and fuller. And the chief thing is that they are not merely proclaimed, but are guaranteed by the social conditions obtaining in the USSR".

This approach, ignoring violations of basic rights and freedoms throughout Soviet history, has enabled Soviet spokesmen to claim that the Declaration is in some ways "inadequate" to criticize alleged violations in "capitalist" countries and to exploit the Declaration in an "anti-imperialist", "anti-colonialist" direction. It has also helped them to explain why the Soviet Union and other Communist countries failed to support the Declaration in the UN vote in 1948.

Abstention Excuse

A Soviet booklet published in 1968 claimed that the USSR, Poland, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia abstained because they "regarded the Declaration as an insufficiently consistent document, which suffers from a number of substantial omissions, despite the efforts of these

countries" [1]. Elsewhere, the booklet admitted that failure to secure the adaption of the majority of Soviet proposals on the Declaration was the reason for Soviet abstention.

During the UN debate Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, declared:

"The draft contains such yawning gaps, such important shortcomings, that to adopt the Declaration of Human Rights in its present form at this session would be a serious mistake" (Pravda, December 13, 1948).

On Article 19, concerning freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to "seek, receive and import information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers", Vyshinsky objected that it did not "correspond to the demands which should be made in resolving questions touched on in this article". Freedom to transmit information, he said, would also include freedom to impart Fascist ideas.

He proposed the inclusion of clauses guaranteeing freedom of street processions and demonstrations, and the provision of printing materials, etc., for the publication of "democratic" organs of the Press - as provided for by the Soviet Constitution, but of no practical significance in the Soviet context.

In this way the Soviet Union sought to postpone adoption of the Declaration so that it could make further attempts to introduce modifications. The lack of importance attached to the Declaration in the years immediately after 1948 is apparent in the fact that the Large Soviet Encyclopedia (Vol. 9, passed for publication December, 1951) contained no entry on it. But by 1955, under Khrushchev's more realistic influence, it was being given grudging approval in Soviet publications, the text of the Declaration being printed in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International Affairs) No. 12, 1955. An accompanying commentary maintained that most of the Declaration's rights and freedom were:

"proclaimed as early as the period of the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century..... However, the Declaration also contains references to a number of rights unknown in

1) Ya. A. Ostrovsky, The UN and Human Rights (in Russian). Other countries abstaining in the vote on the Declaration were Saudi Arabia and South Africa.

bourgeois constitutions but which are typical of the constitutions of countries of the socialist camp, and in the first place the USSR. These are such rights as the right to work, leisure, education and social insurance".

If certain Soviet proposals had been adopted, it added:
"then the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could have become a document of great practical value".

A particular shortcoming of the Declaration, the magazine claimed, was the absence of reference to the duty of States to observe the rights it proclaimed. To rectify this the following clause should be inserted in the Declaration:
"The rights and basic freedoms of man and the citizen enumerated in this Declaration are guarenteed by the laws of States. All infringements or limitations of these rights, direct or indirect, are violations of this Declaration and are incompatible with the high principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter".

(That this could rebound on the Soviet Union - as it did in the shape of the Soviet civil rights movement, which in turn gave rise to increasingly repressive legislation - does not seem to have struck the drafters).

In 1958, Volume 2 of a new edition of the Small Soviet Encyclopedia contained a brief entry on the Declaration, noting that the USSR had abstained in the vote because the Declaration "does not contain real guarantees of the rights proclaimed".

Soviet Re-think

Only two years later, however, the Soviet attitude appeared to have undergone a major reappraisal - perhaps because of recognition of the increasing importance of the newly-emerging countries [1], and the widespread international approval of the Declaration. Volume 1 of the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary (1960) gave the Declaration a much more positive gloss:
"The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflected those world-historical changes in international relations

1) Ostrovsky op. cit. (p. 68) lists 33 Afro-Asian countries whose constitutions proclaim adherence to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

which are taking place as a result of the growth of the forces of democracy, peace and socialism. The imperialist countries were not in a position to ignore the unanimous demand of the peoples on the defence of the rights of the individual and democracy" [1].

The Diplomatic Dictionary added that the Declaration was "undoubtedly a great help in the struggle of the peoples of capitalist and colonial countries for the recognition and respect of democratic rights and freedom".

The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Legal Knowledge (1965), after giving a factual account of the Declaration's provisions, concluded:
"Although the Declaration was approved by the majority of UN member-States, all its provisions are frequently violated in capitalist countries".

The most comprehensive review of the Soviet attitude to the Declaration is the booklet by Ostrovsky, The UN and Human Rights. Clearly intended to fill a gap in Soviet writings on the subject, the booklet admits (p. 40) that:
"up to the present time questions concerning the character and importance of the Declaration..... have not found adequate elucidation in Soviet juridical literature".

Ostrovsky alleges that during the drafting of the Declaration the "Western Powers pursued a line directed towards weakening this important document, giving it a limited character" (p. 46-47), while the Soviet Union "strove for the adoption of a document which could in practice further the guarantee of the basic freedoms and rights of the working people" (p. 52).

He quotes the Soviet delegation to the UN as stating that the Declaration
"should not only proclaim rights but guarantee their implementation, taking account, of course, of the economic, social and other circumstances of each country" (p. 59).

Despite his reservations, Ostrovsky concedes that the

1) Ostrovsky, op. cit. p. 67-68 explains the Declaration's shortcomings by the fact that at the time of its adoption Afro-Asian and Socialist countries were not adequately represented in the UN, and by the pro-Western composition of the drafting committee (p. 42).

Declaration was an "important step forward", although not as significant as some United States spokesmen claimed. And although its provisions are not legally binding "this does not mean that it can be ignored and violated" (p. 66). Modifying his earlier statements on the pro-Western nature of the Declaration, Ostrovsky admits:

"In importance it was raised to the level where, in the voting it received as a whole unanimous support on the part of UN member-States. Taking into account the importance of this document, no-one opposed and obviously no-one could oppose the Declaration in principle".

Although the USSR strongly disapproved of the Declaration, it could not afford to be seen to oppose a document which was widely supported at the time.

Propaganda exercise

The Soviet Union has sought to fill the "gaps" in the Declaration by influencing the content of international pacts on human rights in the required "anti-imperialist", "anti-colonialist" direction. So far, it has signed three international covenants whose terms are in theory binding on signatory states, and which derive from and supplement the Declaration. Although Soviet practice and laws violate numerous articles of these international documents, the Soviet authorities feel able safely to ignore the exposure by dissident elements of the hollowness of such Soviet international undertakings [1], doubtless calculating that Soviet adherence to such documents will create a favourable impression especially in Third World countries.

In March, 1968, the Soviet Union signed two International Covenants - on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Culture Rights. It did not, however, sign an Optional Protocol on the first Covenant, and abstained in the General Assembly vote on it - presumably because it provides for the right of aggrieved individuals to appeal to the UN Human Rights Commission. The Covenants have not so far been ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

1) The best known Soviet dissident publication, A Chronicle of Current Events, carries the text of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its masthead.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was, however, formally ratified by the Soviet Union in January, 1969. But again the Soviet Union refused to accept Article 22 on the racial discrimination convention, which provides for reference to the International Court of Justice of disputes between States over the interpretation or application of the Covenant. Clearly unwilling to permit international investigation of the conduct of its domestic affairs in the human rights field, it thus reserved a right of veto.

Conclusion

The Soviet attitude to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is seen to be largely determined by the impression it will create in the international community. This consideration has necessitated modification of early attitudes to the Declaration, and the seeking of other ways to exploit the human rights issue in the United Nations.

The Soviet authorities maintain the pretence - in the face of ample evidence to the contrary - that the Soviet Union's record in the human rights field is without blemish, and that the Declaration of Human Rights and documents embodying its provisions are directed at "imperialist" and "colonialist" countries.

Inside the Soviet Union, the Declaration of Human Rights now appears to have assumed the status of a subversive document: it was for example among documents seized by the authorities from Reiza Palatnik, the Soviet Jewess who in June, 1971, received a two year sentence in Odessa for possessing and distributing "anti-Soviet" literature. Indeed, there is evidence that the primary aim of the Soviet authorities in paying lip-service to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar humane documents has been to extract maximum propaganda advantage. When it has been a matter of guaranteeing practical exercise of human rights in the UN context, however, they have been consistently obstructive. In 1970, by the use of filibuster tactics in, first, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and then in the General Assembly's Third Committee, they succeeded in preventing progress on, respectively, procedure for dealing with individual petitions and communications alleging violation of human rights and a proposal for the appointment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

YUGOSLAV MARXIST PHILOSOPHER CRITICAL OF SOVIET BLOC COMMUNISM

Summary: In his recently published book the Yugoslav Marxist philosopher Predrag Vranicki writes that the specific Polish road to socialism has been suffocated by Soviet pressure. The changes which followed October 1956 led people to believe that de-Stalinization would finally arrive in Poland to begin a much desired course of liberalization. But centralistic-bureaucratic forces stopped any liberalization. Well-known Marxists such as Kolakowski and Schaff as well as many others, were removed not only from their political positions but also were denied recognition of themselves and their works as scientists and philosophers.

Professor Predrag Vranicki completed his book History of Marxism (1) almost one year before Wladyslaw Gomulka was ousted from power in Warsaw. Even so, Vranicki unequivocally stated that Gomulka and his regime were "dependent to a great extent on the Soviet Union". For the Poles themselves Vranicki shows a great understanding - for these people "who in their suffering history, torn between German feudalism and Russian imperialism, have seen socialism as a solution to their centuries-old, justified strivings toward a free national development".

However, their dependence on the Soviet Union, especially the Soviet Union under Stalin, made it impossible for Polish Marxists - many of whom are well known beyond Poland's borders - to work out and implement "the specific Polish road to socialism". After World War II all Polish dreams were destroyed. Vranicki summarizes the situation at that time as follows:

To begin with the most important fact, Poland did not succeed in liberating itself by its own force; it could not free itself from the narrow-minded and un-dialectical Stalinist concepts which held that there was only one road to socialism, a concept supported by many leading personalities; finally, Poland's unfavorable geographic position did not allow any extensive ideological moves. All this indicated that the Stalinist pressure

would prevent the growth of an original development for which the Poles were capable. Even people such as Gomulka were suspicious in Stalin's eyes. (2)

Gomulka was replaced in 1948, expelled from the Central Committee in 1949, and arrested in 1951. Through such actions, "the most Machiavellian methods", Vranicki writes, the Russians effectively gave substance to ideas "which were so contrary to Marxism". The result of such a policy was counterproductive in all countries dominated by the Soviet Union. No wonder, therefore, that "the consequences of the Stalinist regime (in Poland) were catastrophic and that the working class and especially the intelligentsia - for which freedom is the sine qua non of its existence - happily welcomed the introduction even of the half-way de-Stalinization after the 20th Party Congress" in Moscow, in February 1956. Gomulka returned to power but still remained under the Russian influence.

In dealing with the period since October 1956 Professor Vranicki analyzes the ideas of three most important Polish economic and philosophical theoreticians: Oskar Lange, Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Schaff. Lange, according to the Yugoslav historian, was very close to Tito's idea of "socialist ownership" and held that the influence of the "law of value" should not be neglected.

In Kolakowski Vranicki sees the leading Polish Marxist in an adamant stance against a Stalinism "which has rendered impossible any discussion and choice" - a situation to be compared with a race with a single horse. In such circumstances every criticism of the Stalinist situation has been considered an identification with capitalism. Analyzing Kolakowski's criticism of Stalinism, Vranicki writes:

Essentially Stalinism is a political sect. The Stalinist type of party is a party which has ceased to consider itself the instrument of an historical development; it has rather become an aim in itself, resisting even the forces which have created it. The borders which Stalinism has drawn between itself and the rest of the world do not recognize any transitional phases. Stalinism is a closed system. This is why the world has been divided into a world of the damned and world of the delivered, into a kingdom of god and a kingdom of the devil. In this way every area of social life is consigned forever either to the one or to the other sphere. Without permitting any alternative Stalinism has demanded either total rejection or total submission. (3)

Of Adam Schaff's theories, Professor Vranicki writes, "Schaff has seen that many difficulties, contradictions and manifest problems of socialist development cannot be solved by the proclamation of political resolutions only, nor by a single political group (i.e., the party) which very often cannot free itself from one-sidedness and particularist interests". (4) The only solution is "the critical approach" in all spheres of life, something which the political bureaucrats hate. For Schaff the consequence of such theorizing was a divestment "not only of his political but even of his scientific functions", Vranicki writes.

Other Polish Marxists, especially the sociologists J. Wjatr and Z. Bauman, "have sharply resisted a monopoly of Party leaders over the development of sociological theory". Under the weight of Soviet opposition, de-Stalinization in Poland, says Vranicki, "very soon stuck half way". The idea of workers'self-management, "under strong pressure from the Soviet bureaucrats", was watered down. Accordingly, some of the young have responded with "extreme reactions" having accepted the Trotskyite idea of the bureaucracy "as a new class which must be overthrown through a revolution of the working class".

When in 1968 the students rioted demanding the implementation of the proclaimed principles, the bureaucratic authorities reacted mercilessly. The most progressive Marxists and also Jews were denounced as the chief culprits responsible for the difficult situation within the country, even though it was the bureaucratic centralist mode of management and the extensive economic malfunctions which were the real culprits. So it appeared that in a socialist country L. Kolakowksi, B. Baczko, Z. Bauman, S. Morawski, A. Schaff and many others - precisely the intellectuals who have made Polish Marxism famous beyond the Polish borders, were removed by administrative measures. (5)

The worst thing, however, has been the persecution of the Jews "which has been an evidence of the deformations in the structures and consciousness of socialism inflicted by the centralistic-bureaucratic monopoly".

---

(1) Predrag Vranicki, History of Marxism (Naprijed, Zagreb 1971), two volumes, 960 pages.

(2) Ibid., pp. 142/143.

(3) Ibid., p. 150.

(4) Ibid., p. 158.

(5) Ibid., pp. 160/161.

POLITICS

THE U.S. AND THE THIRD WORLD

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Director Institute for Issues of Communism, Columbia University of New York

I consider it a privilege to appear on the pages of the Yugoslav Review of International Affairs. Yugoslavia has played a pre-eminent role in world affairs during the last twenty-five years. This is a remarkable attainment, considering its relative power and population. It is testimony to the proposition that, in the final analysis, it is the spirit of the people and the power of its ideas that count, not merely material strength.

In responding to the invitation to contribute and article, I should make it very clear that the views expressed are my own personal opinions. They represent an American contribution only in the sense that the author is an American. In addition to reiterating the personal character of my statement, let me immediately say - in all frankness - that the subject assigned evokes from me rather pessimistic conclusions.

I should also add that my purpose here is not to review the very extensive economic aid assistance program that the United States has for many years maintained for the less developed nations. Whatever the shortcomings of American economic assistance both operationally or in scale, the fact remains that the United States has donated more than any other nation. Even today, despite cuts in foreign aid, American assistance to the less developed nations is six to seven times higher than that of the Soviet Union, even though American GNP is twice that of the Soviet Union. Foreign aid has become an integral part of the American relationship with the rest of the world, and every American president has reiterated his strong support for these programs. The last few years, moreover, have seen very extensive studies of existing foreign aid practices, and a number of far-reaching recommendations have been made, pointing at reform and aiming at more effective and efficient policies. (1)

(1) For a thorough and analytically penetrating review of the problematics of American foreign aid - both in regards to organization as well as to objectives - see Samuel P. Huntington's "Foreign Aid - For What and For Whom", Foreign Policy, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter 1970-71 and Spring 1971.

The world today is undergoing a very basic change, the sort of change that does not come often, even though everything changes all the time. It is possible to identify qualitative historical breakthroughs - even though it is easier to do so retroactively - and our age appears to be experiencing one of them. I argued not long ago, in my recent book (Between Two Ages), that our time can in some ways be compared to the dislocations and discontinuities initiated by the transition from the agricultural to the industrial ages. That transition produced great many uncertainties as to the nature of our time, as to the purposes of human existence, as to the desirable and possible ways of organizing mankind's social, economic, and political life. It was only after several decades of sustained confusion that the two great organizing concepts of the industrial age - namely, liberalism and Marxism - emerged.

Our time marks the transition of the more advanced industrial states from the industrial age to the post-industrial, or the technetronic, era. I prefer the latter term, for it seems to convey more clearly what the principal impulses for change are for our time: science and particularly that aspect of science which involves rapid computation and communications. Our age is post-industrial just as the preceding age was post-agricultural; the term industrial indicated more precisely what the new post-agricultural age truly meant; similarly, technetronic indicates in a truer sense the new phase in human history.

The new age not only means a qualitative discontinuity in the history and social development of the more advanced states, but it poses a special challenge to the less developed nations. For one thing, our world, though much more congested and physically no longer divided by distance, is now much more differentiated in social-economic conditions and even in psychological-philosophical states of mind. In the past, space consumed time; today, time compresses space. Yet in some ways mankind is more divided than ever before.

This division afflicts the less developed nations with particular intensity. Their elites, on the whole, tend to identify emotionally with life-styles of the more advanced parts of the world. The desire of these elites is to emulate the Western style of life, to have the maximum access to the latest technological gadgetry, to partake of the material benefits and fads of what is considered to be "high style". The masses of the less

developed nations tend to be exposed, on an increasingly wide basis, to various processes which induce rapid subjective change: mass literacy, increasingly broad access to higher education, massive dissemination of newspapers, increasing availability of transistorized radios, even spreading television. The result is a rapid and very profound subjective revolution, which moves forward at a pace far greater than the objective change in their social-economic conditions.

In effect, in the less developed countries, subjective revolution triumphs over the objective revolution. This process is the very reverse of the European and American experience in the course of the industrial revolution. At that time, objective change was more rapid than subjective change. Indeed, one of the functions of revolutionary Marxist parties was to close the gap between the two by deliberate mass proselytization, designed to develop in the masses a truly revolutionary class consciousness.

The supremacy of subjective change over objective change has manifold and, on the whole, negative consequences: it tends to produce pressures pointing towards social and political fragmentation, it breeds intense psychological tensions, it creates a fertile soil for charismatic dictators, appealing to mass nationalist emotions. It makes little difference whether the dictators consider themselves leftist or rightist; in either case, they are responding to an essentially emotionalized political setting. Nineteenth-century European Marxism, originally addressed to an urban proletariat only recently divorced from a rural file, is thus romantically adapted by many "leftist" revolutionaries to conditions of industrially backward twentieth-century new post-colonial and underdeveloped societies, where psychic tensions are as acute as social conflicts. This is why Fanon tends to be more relevant than Marx.

Given this emotional context, external aid, designed to overcome the specific condition of backwardness and poverty often becomes an additional point of friction and - even when it helps to improve the objective situation - stimulates further subjective tension. Indeed it is important to realize that economic aid can at best be only a partial response to a condition that has as profoundly psychological as well as material roots. Economic assistance can be effective only if, in addition, the recipient country's emotional resources are mobilized and a sense of

popular enthusiasm and sustained purpose is created. This requires native leadership that knows both how to stir the masses and how to use foreign aid intelligently. Such leadership is rare; where it does exist, it frequently tends to be unresponsive to foreign interests and advice, and thus stimulates foreign resentment.

Moreover, even allowing for the possibility of some economic progress in the less developed countries, the fact remains that the material conditions of life in the Third World cannot keep pace with the factors that make for psychic change. The prospect is therefore strong that feelings of intense resentment will most likely grow as the gap between the less developed nations and the developed world widens. That that gap will widen seems to be inevitable. Even assuming generosity on the part of advanced countries toward less advanced countries, it is simply unrealistic to expect that the present gap can be significantly reduced.

Moreover, if it is even somewhat reduced, it will not meet the new psychological aspirations of the peoples of the less developed countries. These aspirations are defined by the standards already now prevailing in the more advanced parts of the world. Mass communications no longer permit the luxury of limited aspirations; they dictate universal egalitarianism, all the more tragic because it is simply unattainable. It can be calculated that if the less developed nations were to reach the standards currently enjoyed by the more advanced countries, global annual production of some basic industrial commodities would have to increase between 200 and 400 times the present world annual output (e.g., more than 60 million tons of iron, about a billion tons of lead, 700 million tons of zinc, and more than 50 million tons of tin).

The combination of unfulfilled aspirations and the actuality of widening social and economic divergencies is likely to prompt acts of desperation, of widespread frustration, and of explosive anger. The process of political-social fragmentation has already engulfed Pakistan and it is likely to affect similarly some of Pakistan's neighbouring countries. Political-social fragmentation seems similarly likely in parts of Latin America. Social anarchy, ethnic hostility and racial resentments are likely to interact, creating a truly chaotic and violent situation in many parts of the world.

It would be a gross error to view that violence through perspectives derived from the nineteenth-century European experience. I consider it extremely unlikely that the chaotic turmoil that is so probable for the next several decades can be effectively channelled and organized by revolutionary parties, based on an ideology derived from nineteenth-century West European experience, or by a single revolutionary center, dogmatically proclaiming itself as the fountainhead of true knowledge. To be sure, many of the more extreme revolutionary outbreaks will borrow its rhetoric and its slogans from existing available doctrines, but in its essence and content revolutionary activity is likely to be more indigenous, less focused on foreign models. This is particularly likely to be the case because the gap between the less developed nations and the more advanced ones will include on both sides also states with different social economic models, on different sides - so to speak - of ideological barricades. Hence a clear and clean ideological dichotomy will not be possible.

Given these circumstances, it seems to me absolutely essential for the more advanced countries to try to reduce the increasingly irrelevant ideological conflicts that still divide them and to move towards the creation of a community of the developed nations. Such a community of the developed nations should not be a rich man's club designed to perpetuate the status quo. It would involve closer cooperation among states which, having reached a certain level of social-economic development, recognize that their common interest lies in reducing areas of conflict and turmoil in the world and not in exploiting such turmoil to their own narrow purposes. I would therefore hope that it should be possible in the years ahead for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in the first instance and some other countries which have close economic ties with the foregoing in the second instance, to develop closer collaboration economically and then politically. Such collaboration should include, to the extent possible, those Communist states inclined to put a higher premium on international cooperation than on the waging of an international "class conflict".

Without such a community of the developed nations, it is difficult to see how an effective, broadly gauged response to

the problems of the Third World can truly be launched. The United Nations - which has a constructive but an altogether different role to play - obviously cannot undertake such a response; it has neither the means nor the needed political will. Such a common response can be undertaken only by states that share, at least in some measure, a common sense of responsibility and of interest. This common response, moreover, will require much more deliberate pooling, not only of resources but of social-political planning. It will require a very deliberate effort to allocate resources in such a way as to maximize the progress of those less developed states that are truly capable of seizing the opportunity offered. How to make that choice will be extremely difficult, not to make it is to condemn most of the less developed nations to protracted misery and pain.

Let me conclude these general observations with one final thought: in our age, spheres of imperial hegemony are no longer compatible with the intimacy of the global condition. The United States has for many years enjoyed special privileges in Latin America. These are now coming to an end. The United States is engaged in a process of trying to define more normal, though occasionally in some respects even somewhat more remote relations with Latin American states. This, on the whole, is to the good, for true national development requires the cultivation of national pride and self-help. It is therefore important that other major states which still exercise a hegemonial relationship towards other countries similarly undertake the process of re-defining these relations on a more equitable and free basis. The Soviet government's declaration of October 30, 1956 offers highly relevant guidelines for the relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Precise adherence to the principles enunciated in that doctrine would be a most constructive contribution to the development of a kind of international order in which a more effective and wide-ranging response to the problems of the less developed countries can be effectively mounted.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

SUCCESSFUL CHINESE DIPLOMACY VEXES MOSCOW

Aleksandr A. Kashin

In the last few months, a radical change in Chinese foreign policy has taken place which is causing some alarm in the Kremlin and may fairly be described as having ushered in a new stage in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Hitherto, the USSR, although highly irritated by China's aggressive competition for influence, did not feel her vital interests seriously threatened. Chinese attempts to undermine the Soviet position in countries where Moscow's word already carried weight, including those politically uncommitted, met with only modest success. The Chinese found their insistence on revolution a decisive handicap, since it understandably found little favor with established regimes, nor was there a warm response to their appeals to countries of the "third world" to turn down economic and military aid from the USSR as well as the West and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

It was only when Peking, having brought the cultural revolution to a halt, unexpectedly switched to a Khrushchevian policy of peaceful coexistence and cooperation with all states that the situation changed. The Soviets are sensitive to China's new doctrine that, in contrast to her own peaceful and selfless policy, the two superpowers USA and USSR are busy carving up the world between them. In a recent issue of Izvestia (September 9, 1971), G. Apalin commented:

The proclamation of this doctrine has brought a shift of emphasis in declarations by Chinese leaders on a number of vital problems. For tactical reasons they are pushing into the background Mao Tse-tung's thesis, legalized at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, on the inevitability and desirability of war and are even trying to present themselves as advocating the prevention of war and as being the most staunch champions of peaceful coexistence..... whereas previously the Soviet Union was subjected to jibes from Peking for its "fear" of war, for propounding a disarmament program and advocating a policy of peaceful coexistence, Chinese propaganda now, after having made a turn of 180 degrees, is accusing the USSR of being involved in a "wild arms race" and of pursuing a "policy of threats and blackmail".

China's new tactics of following the Soviet example of placing

considerations of state above those of ideology and being prepared to enter into diplomatic and other relations even with countries she continues to brand as "capitalist" and "imperialist" - tactics most dramatically demonstrated by the dialogue with the USA - have increased her influence particularly in countries which are on bad terms with the USSR. For example, while Moscow clashed with the Sudan following an abortive Communist coup against President Numeiri, China continues to enjoy the most amicable relations with the Sudan, as a result of which her influence on the African continent has greatly increased. Apalin lamented:

The Chinese leaders previously claimed hegemony over current revolutionary forces under "revolutionary" banners, calling in particular for the creation of "the broadest possible united front against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism", the front being given a predominantly anti-Soviet slant. Now, however, while leaving the idea of an anti-Soviet "front" in force, they are dropping the last "revolutionary" camouflage and seeking out nationalistic sentiments, wherever and in what form they may show themselves, claiming leadership of everyone and everything on a non-class basis. (Ibid.)

Although the Soviet press tries to maintain that China's efforts to organize a front against the two superpowers are encountering considerable scepticism in the Afro-Asian countries, Moscow's deep concern was clearly documented by the reprinting in Literaturnaya gazeta of an article from Neues Deutschland, organ of the East German Socialist Unity Party, which warned:

A stream of invitations to visit the capital of the Chinese People's Republic is pouring into the Afro-Asian countries. Peking is making promises to left and right and extolling and showering false assurances on this or that politician, provided there is a hope of winning him over to an anti-Soviet course. Today, one can meet Chinese diplomats engaged in this instigative activity in the most remote corners of Africa. The gestures with which they accompany their offers of military, economic and technical "assistance" are calculated to testify to their outstandingly noble generosity. (Literaturnaya gazeta, September 8, 1971, p. 9)

Peking's diplomatic offensive against the USSR has thus assumed global proportions and is no longer confined to

squabbles within the world Communist system or to attempts to create an anti-Soviet bloc of "progressive" states. Now, Peking's struggle for influence has moved from the periphery of the world political arena into the very heart of the Soviet empire - the Balkans. Whereas previously China had only tiny Albania on her side in this region, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces and the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty have now brought her Rumania and Yugoslavia as allies. In an article in the September 4 issue of Pravda a certain I. Aleksandrov (evidently a pseudonym for some highly-placed official) declared flatly that Peking was sparing no effort to create a "war psychosis" in Albania in order to "sow seeds of tension in the Balkans", adding that the Chinese leaders had also "solidarized with anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia and their imperialist sponsors, and then bewailed the collapse of their counter-revolutionary plot". Pravda continues:

Whereas previously Peking carried out a broad propaganda offensive against all socialist countries, it is now striving to "narrow the sphere" of battle and show a discriminating approach to socialist countries in order to draw some of them into its political orbit. All this is to the accompaniment of expansive gestures and promises. At present Peking is not demanding much from those receiving its advances. The Chinese leaders are happy about any step which in their opinion, can lead to even a small crack in relations among socialist countries.

Such a crack, and no small one at that, has, however, already appeared: Rumania has categorically refused to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on her territory, and in May Rumanian Party leader and head of state Nicolae Ceausescu visited Peking, where he endorsed the Chinese thesis of a plot by the two superpowers against the rest of the world. In the same month, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac was a guest in the Chinese capital. In order to alleviate the effect of Soviet economic sanctions against Rumania, China has offered that country a credit worth 250,000,000 US dollars, according to Japanese sources. At the conference of heads of ruling Communist parties held in the Crimea on August 2, Rumania was conspicuously absent, and two weeks later, Rumania once more demonstrated her unique position in the Soviet bloc when (on August 22) a Chinese military delegation led by Li Ta-shih, a candidate member of the Chinese Party Central Committee Politburo and head of the

political department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, arrived in Bucharest. Among those greeting the delegation at the airport was the Albanian Ambassador to Rumania, Nikola Profi. During their talks both sides constantly reaffirmed the special ties existing between them. Some kind of military agreement may even have been reached, because an article entitled "The Hearts of the Chinese and Rumanian Peoples Are Beating in Unison" published in the August 22 issue of the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Jenminjibao concluded: "We deeply value our friendship with the Rumanian people. We are full of determination to fulfil our proletarian, international duty and support the Rumanian people in its fight for sovereignty and socialist construction". Similarly, China records with satisfaction statements in the Yugoslav press to the effect that Yugoslavia, too, is fully determined to resist any encroachment on her sovereignty. The Peking German-language journal Freie Rundschau, for example, quoted in its August 31 issue pertinent articles from the weekly Nedeljne Informativne Novine and the newspapers Borba and Vjesnik.

All these developments, and in particular rumors of a forthcoming visit to the Balkans by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, have given rise in the Soviet bloc to talk of a Peking-Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis. The Slovakian youth newspaper Smena, for example, observed in its August 18 issue that Ceausescu's visit to Peking had enabled China to establish a second bridgehead in the Balkans and furthered its drive to break up the "socialist community". The communiqué published at the end of the visit, it said, testified that Rumania had departed from the principles of proletarian internationalism. Chou En-lai's forthcoming visit to the Balkans was a sign of a new, "more elastic" Chinese foreign policy which would serve only the interests of "American imperialism". Chou's rumored visit also sparked off a sharp exchange between the Yugoslav and Hungarian press. Following the publication by the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Hirlap of an article accusing Yugoslavia in no uncertain terms of aiding and abetting Chinese penetration into the Balkans, Nedeljne Informativne Novine protested at interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, hinting that it was thinking here not only of the Hungarian commentators but those who stood behind them (i.e., the Soviets). To allegations of the existence of an "anti-Soviet axis", the weekly retorted that Yugoslav rapprochement with China was merely part of a policy of peaceful coexistence with all states, being in no way directed against any third party.

It concluded: "One cannot help asking whether Magyar Hirlap considers that its concern for developments in the Balkans is furthering Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. There can be no doubt that its comments are in sharp contradiction to everything said only recently on friendship with Yugoslavia in Budapest and elsewhere" (Tanyug, August 21, 1971).

However, Moscow is understandably far more concerned about the increasingly close relations between Peking and Bucharest, a development about which there is little she can do at the present time. Military intervention in Rumania - a socialist state which is running its internal affairs on almost Stalinist lines and which is committing no worse sin than cultivating friendship with another socialist state - is scarcely possible, yet vain protests not followed up by force are an admission of impotence. The solution selected by Moscow is to delegate the task of protesting to its East European allies. On August 11, Literaturnaya gazeta reprinted an article from Trybuna Ludu, mouthpiece of the Polish United Workers' Party, which contained the following warning:

In this question/i.e., that of attitude towards Chinese policy/ one of importance for the cause of socialism, world peace and the freedom of nations, there cannot, in the opinion of our Party, be any equivocation or attempts to take up a "neutral position". The attitude to the USSR and the CPSU is the touchstone for a standpoint adopted on fundamental problems of the socialist community and the anti-imperialist struggle.... In such a situation, any lenience towards Peking's schismatic policy cannot be evaluated as anything but harm to the unity of the socialist community and to proletarian internationalism.

Thus, although the USSR well realizes that in the immediate future China cannot become a serious rival to her in the Balkans either militarily or politically, she does see that Peking's policy is eroding the unity of the "socialist community" by encouraging the East Europeans to become more national-minded and independent of Moscow, and that the "second front" opened by the Chinese in the Balkans could one day bring the empire built by Stalin crashing to the ground.

(Current Developments in the Soviet Union)

CHINA'S WORLD STRATEGY AT MOSCOW'S EXPENSE

China's new outward-looking foreign policy, based on greatly strengthened party and government machinery at home and backed in the past year by an ambitious foreign economic aid programme, is clearly designed to secure for China a major stake in world affairs over the next few years at the expense of the Soviet Union both as an ideological fountain-head within the world Communist movement and as an influence in the developing world.

Component parts of Peking's world strategy evidently include improved relations with the United States, the campaign for admission to the United Nations and exclusion of Taiwan, the wooing of non-aligned countries and the encouragement of regionalist tendencies in the Balkans. In pursuing closer relations with Third World governments, the Chinese have been prepared to place normal diplomacy above their usual militancy.

The ideological motivation of China's more positive external activities was outlined in a widely publicised article in the party theoretical journal Red Flag (No. 9), which formed part of a Press and radio campaign to explain the reasons for the Chinese leaders' new cordiality towards the US and to justify President Nixon's planned visit. The article, presented as an analysis of Mao Tse-tung's 1940 study On Policy , set out the advantages of a flexible foreign policy capable of exploiting international tensions and rivalries to advance revolution, and the need for "various forms of struggle" against the counter-revolutionary policy of the enemy. Mao's 1940 precepts on forming tactical alliances with secondary enemies to defeat the primary one were said to be applicable today - a reminder that the Soviet Union itself has been elevated to the first rank of China's enemies.

The attempt to assume the leadership of the Third World by cultivating closer friendships in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America was also given a doctrinal basis. Red Flag cited the "contradiction" between the industrialised and developing worlds as one which China was capable of exploiting in the interests of world revolution.

Apart from feeling a need to provide ideological justification for normalising international relationships to give them the correct revolutionary overtones, the Chinese Press and radio

have been careful in recent weeks to mute criticism of American policies, although the Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted sharply to Washington's proposal that Nationalist China should keep its seat in the UN General Assembly. That Taiwan belonged to China and had no independent existence, the Ministry retorted on August 20, was an "incontestable reality". Peking Radio's home service also twice quoted an editorial which had appeared in the North Korean party newspaper, Nodong Sinmun, on August 8, claiming that President Nixon's initiative betrayed the "bankruptcy" of American foreign policy and was a victory for the Chinese people. But the Chinese themselves have not taken this line.

The Chinese leaders are making known their approval of the non-aligned policies of many Third World countries and in recent weeks government delegations from Sierra Leone and Algeria have been praised in this connexion. It was clear from a message sent by the Premier, Chou En-lai, to the Third Non-Aligned Conference in Lusaka last September, that Peking saw the potential of a bloc that was unattached to either of the major Powers. Also China must have been encouraged by the Conference's call for her admission to the United Nations. President Tito's influence in the non-aligned movement may be a factor in Peking's overtures to Yugoslavia; but China's more immediate objective is no doubt to exacerbate anti-Soviet feeling in the Balkans and encourage a spirit of regionalism in order to loosen Moscow's hold. Chinese spokesmen are increasingly critical of Soviet efforts to curb Romania's independence and in a speech in Peking on Romania's National Day (August 23) the acting Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, accused Moscow in scarcely veiled terms of hegemony in the Balkans and denounced military manoeuvres there. A high-level Chinese military delegation, which had been in Albania from August 16 to 22, arrived in Bucharest for the National Day celebrations. Ten days earlier, the Hungarian weekly, Magyar Hirlap, claimed that Chou En-lai himself planned to visit Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania later in the year to foster an anti-Soviet grouping.

China's pursuit of friends has been supported by aid offers that for the first time have put her in the lead of Communist donors of economic assistance to developing countries. In 1970 Chinese credit offers approached $700 million - at least $400 million more than those of the Soviet Union and over $500 million more

than the East European offers combined. Three countries accounted for $600 million of the Chinese credits - $200 million each to Tanzania and Zambia for the 1,000-mile Tanzam railway and $200 million to Pakistan covering commodity imports and seven projects, including expansion of the heavy engineering plant at Taxilam, a bridge over the Brahmaputra in East Pakistan and several other industrial developments.

Aid programmes

China is now by far the biggest Communist aid donor to Tanzania and Zambia, and would have exceeded Soviet aid offers to Pakistan in 1970 had not the Soviet Union confirmed an earlier promise to build a major steel plant in Karachi with a new credit of $208 million. So far this year China has continued to back friendly gestures with practical economic aid.

China's aid performance has not only outstripped that of the Soviet Union in value but in the striking softness of the terms. The Tanzam credit, for example, is interest-free and allows repayment over 30 years after a five-year grace period, while the Pakistan credit gives a ten-year grace period before repayment over ten years. On Soviet credits, repayment usually begins no later than a year after completion of a project or delivery of goods, and the normal maximum repayment period is 12 years, with interest rates varying from $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent a year on medium-term credits to 4-6 percent on "commercial credits" used for financing export transactions. Peking clearly believes that the goodwill gained by its easy terms outweighs the extra economic risks it incurs.

Apart from her major commitments in Tanzania, Zambia and Pakistan, China has been active in Ceylon, the Middle East and several Latin American countries. In September 1970, she provided a $9 million credit to Ceylon for 100,000 extra tons of rice and renewed a grant for a conference hall which had lapsed during an earlier period of strained relations. In May of this year Chinese support for Mrs Bandaranaike's government was underlined by a new interest-free credit of $25 million in convertible currency.

China backed the Nimeiri government in Sudan in 1970 by reactivating a credit of $41.6 million for industrial construction and road-building. She continued to support Nimeiri at the

time of the abortive Communist coup in July 1971, and gained a political advantage from Moscow's embarrassment. In reply to Nimeiri's message of thanks on August 4, Chou En-lai assured him that China would champion Sudan's independence "against all pressure". On August 24 the Sudan government announced a further $40 million credit from Peking. The radical régime in South Yemen has also received a Chinese credit, worth over $40 million and repayable over 20 years, for textile mills, agricultural machinery and road-building.

. Peking is also following up overtures in Latin America with economic inducements. After diplomatic relations had been established with Chile in January, a trade agreement was signed under which China would buy 65,000 tons of copper a year in exchange for rice, tea and light industrial articles. A similar agreement signed in the same month with Peru, covering China's purchase of copper, lead and silver and supply to Peru of raw silk, machinery, chemicals and domestic and office equipment led to an announcement by the Peruvian President at a Press conference on August 6 that his government had approved the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking.

Other friendly gestures from China - after years of hostility - have included a donation towards the Peruvian earthquake relief fund in May, 1970, and propaganda support for Peru's claim to a 200-mile limit for its territorial waters. The presence of a Colombian table tennis team in Peking in April could herald a similar détente with Colombia.

Peking's decision to improve its ties with Cuba, which have been strained since 1966, and to send an Ambassador to Havana in December, 1970, for the first time in four years, is a clear sign that ideology is not dictating Chinese policy. In addition to Castro's commitment to the Soviet Union there are fundamental differences between the two party leaders. Castro's apparent disregard of the party's leading role in revolution, and his approval of unco-ordinated "Guevarist" guerrilla tactics, are contrary to Mao's own revolutionary theory. Pro-Peking splinter groups have developed in the Communist parties of Chile, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru and China has given them propaganda encouragement but little material support. As it seeks to expand State ties with the governments they oppose, Peking may feel even less inclined to boost their activities - particularly in the case of the Chilean Partido Comunista

Revolucionario (PCR) which, with other extreme left-wing groups, is excluded from President Allende's Government of Popular Unity.

A NEW GREAT WALL - OF WORDS

Chinese being 'educated' about the West

Eric Chou

Summary: The Chinese people are being given a derogatory picture of Western nations, following Peking's cautious departure from its policy of self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world, writes FWF correspondent Eric Chou. In this article he describes some of the methods being used.

China is busy building a new Great Wall. This one is not being made of bricks, but mainly of words. The aim is to protect the 750 million population in the wake of Peking's cautious departure from its policy of self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world.

The change has become noticeable in the subtle shift of news coverage and editorial comment contained in the People's Daily, which represents the opinion of China's leadership. It began after the announcement that President Nixon was expected to visit Peking. The paper has started publishing an unscheduled supplement called International Knowledge, which is contrary to usual practice. The supplement has recently been occupying half of one of the paper's six precious pages. It goes without saying that the United States has been occupying pride of place in this international news analysis. A recent article on the American political system was accompanied by a comprehensive map which was very much out of date. It showed Louisiana as being still a French possession, while New Mexico was shown as being outside US territory. The article went to great lengths to explain how the American "monopoly capitalists' greed for territorial expansion" had been satiated at the expense of the French and the Spaniards. Readers were informed in a small footnote that the map was "not a current one", although no reason was given.

Especial prominence has been given to President Nixon's new economic measures. On August 12, perhaps by sheer coincidence, the paper published a report on the dollar crisis

forecasting that "it has developed into such an extremely serious stage that a total collapse is imminent". The American economic crisis has been played up every day since the Nixon announcement. Western Europe's monetary chaos, Japan's counter- measures and unfavourable comments in the world press have all been reported with relish, stress being laid on " the inevitable conflicts between the capitalist countries", and forecasts being made about the "breaking up of the Imperialist camp". The paper devoted a whole page to American news on August 24. Apart from one 4,000-word article claiming the futility of Nixon's new economic measures, industrial strikes in New Jersey, Iowa and Washington were vividly reported, as was an anti-Vietnam demonstration staged by over 100 American servicemen in London.

'Barbarian State'

Being constantly fed on this kind of news, the Chinese people will certainly form their own picture of the United States, since they have no access to reading material published outside their country. It is only natural, therefore, that when President Nixon eventually arrives in Peking for talks, the Chinese will regard him as the head of a barbarian state coming to pay homage to their "great helmsman", Mao Tse-tung. They might even feel that the American leader has no alternative but to come to terms with China because, to them, Maoism is an "all-conquering thought".

During the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, in the last stages of the Manchu Dynasty, xenophobia was encouraged and the people were told to rely on spirits and gods to vanquish "foreign devils". Today the people are encouraged to believe in the supremacy of their social system as a guard against foreign intervention. So the xenophobia still exists, although the Peking leadership is thought to be more forthcoming about some form of accommodation with the West.

Indeed, judging by recent moves, it appears the Chinese leaders are prepared to admit a considerable number of visitors from the West. However, they still feel concern over the possibility of the "corrupt influence of decadent capitalism" affecting the Chinese people. Isolation from the outside world has safeguarded their "ideological purity and political correctness". The Chinese leaders are now thought to be concerned about the invisible dangers of increased contacts with the West. As a precaution, the ordinary people are being "educated" about

Western affairs through the People's Daily. It is the ideal medium of dissemination since the paper is compulsory reading for the cadres and, in fact, for people in all walks of life throughout China.

So far the "anti-imperialist" propaganda has been fairly temperate. Even the NATO organisation has been treated lightly. In one of its recent briefings, the paper listed the military contributions of member countries and the deployment of NATO forces. A passing mention referred to "this war machine which is dominated by US imperialism". The European Common Market seems quite acceptable to the People's Daily. It was described in one article as "the joint effort of Western European nations to resist American economic domination". The article stated that the "special relationship between Britain and the United States" accounted for the rejection of previous UK applications to join the Community. The tone of the whole article was undoubtedly pro-French, with the late President de Gaulle being praised as a champion of the European cause.

Iron Control

All this type of propaganda fits in with China's policy of attempting to estrange various Western nations from the US. A person whose sole source of information is the People's Daily would get the impression that the West was disintegrating. and that the US was near its doomsday. The Peking leaders are hoping that if the democracies are shown in these terms they will hold no attraction for the Chinese people. These precautions, aimed at preventing the erosion of the people's revolutionary ideals, may seem absurd to outsiders. But, in any form of totalitarian state, the leadership must keep an iron control on the people's thoughts.

COMMUNISTS COMPETE FOR JAPAN

Changing relations between Washington and Peking and the possible effects on Tokyo's China policy have spurred the Russians and Chinese to renewed competition for influence in Japan. The Chinese probably hope that their image of greater reasonableness will help to woo Japanese political opinion away from the present government and achieve its downfall, whereas

the Russians are above all anxious to prevent a future Tokyo-Peking rapprochement. As part of their campaign to win Japan's favour both Communist Powers are seeking to exacerbate current strains between Tokyo and Washington. An editorial in the Peking People's Daily on September 18 claimed that the United States had no wish to see an independent and prosperous Japan and that "far-sighted" Japanese were aware of this, while the previous day Pravda devoted an article by a senior political commentator to the problems of US-Japanese relations. After citing alleged examples of Japanese subservience to America (the "unequal" Security Treaty and Japan's economic "dependence" on the dollar) the Soviet journalist added that Japan was in danger of becoming an instrument of American policy in Asia and intensifying her "militarisation".

The People's Daily editorial, which was Peking's most significant statement on Japan since last July's announcement of President Nixon's plan to visit China, claimed that the USSR ("social imperialism"), too, wanted to enlist Japanese "militarism" to oppose China and undermine revolutionary movements in Asia. China's own aim is apparently for a "neutral new Japan" which would abrogate the treaty with Washington and shun all military groupings,no doubt including, in Peking's view, the type of Asian security system projected in Moscow.

The Chinese leaders evidently consider that their best method of bringing about an acceptable Japanese policy is to encourage all pro-Chinese elements in Japan irrespective of political colour - a tactic that according to the Maoists should aggravate the "contradictions" within the country. Thus Hideji Kawasaki, representing a pro-Peking group in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was received by Prime Minister Chou En-lai on September 15. On the day of his departure three days later, a 22-man all-party team of MPs from the League for the Promotion of Diplomatic Relations with China arrived in Peking for talks and was also received by Chou - as were delegations to Peking during June and July from the Komeito party and a pro-Socialist workers' group led by a former head of the Japanese Trade Union Council.

Though the Chinese have fostered links with the militant Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) for some time, the Japan Times pointed out on July 3 that the Komeito was the first non-Marxist

party to send a mission to Peking, confirming China's new interest in cultivating a wider arc of Japanese opinion. Until recently the Komeito was either ignored or criticised for its religious background by Chinese commentators, but on May 19 a New China News Agency (NCNA) report included the party with the Left (pro-Peking) JCP, the JSP and the pro-China lobby in the LDP as one of the forces promoting Japan-China friendship.

Compromise possible

The communiqué signed after the Komeito visit indicated that China is prepared to make compromises to win the support of such parties. Although the document spelled out five points * which Peking endorsed as constituting the preconditions for a restoration of Japan-China relations, the Komeito delegation avoided open condemnation of Mr Sato's administration or of the "four enemies" of the Japanese and Chinese people frequently cited by China - "US imperialism", "Soviet revisionism", "Japanese militarism" and the Japanese Communist Party. In contrast, the JSP group which visited Peking in November, 1970, was far more critical of the Japanese leaders and responsive to the Chinese line.

Further signs of China's interest in reducing tension with her powerful neighbour have appeared in the advancement of the annual Memorandum Trade talks to the end of this year, probably in November, rather than delaying them until March or April (as in the last few years), which may presage a more helpful attitude to a meeting traditionally used by China as a propaganda platform. The government's decision to send a senior official, Wang Kuo-chuan, to Tokyo for the funeral of the veteran LDP advocate of Japan-China friendship, Kenzo Matsumura, on August 26 was a cordial gesture to which the Japanese Government responded. Wang, Vice-Chairman of the

---

* 1. China is one, and the Peking government is its only legitimate government;
2. The question of Taiwan is an internal problem;
3. Japan's treaty with Taiwan must be renounced;
4. All US forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Strait area;
5. The legitimate UN rights of the People's Republic of China must be restored, and representatives of Chiang Kai-shek must be expelled from the world body.

China-Japan Friendship Association, was accorded high-level treatment during his visit and Mr Sato asked him to convey greetings to Chou En-lai. Nevertheless, Peking's hostility to the present leadership in Japan could hinder a détente for some time yet. Despite Mr Sato's reported readiness to hold talks with Wang Kuo-chuan, his Chinese visitor concentrated on meeting members of the opposition JSP, Komeito and even the centrist Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The People's Daily editorial on Japan confirmed the impression of China's unwillingness to negotiate with Mr Sato's government.

Soviet overtures

The Soviet leadership, though also highly critical of the present Japanese Government, continues to demonstrate a readiness to combine ideological hostility with a search for closer ties, notably in the economic field. Japan is already the Soviet Union's major non-Communist trade partner and economic co-operation in Siberia is likely to increase. In September the Japanese Foreign Minister agreed to a proposal by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev, that the government should join Japanese businessmen in collaborating with the Russians in a major oil pipe-laying project. The pipeline, joining the Tumen oilfields to the port of Nakhodka, is expected to cost up to $3,000 million, for which, according to Moscow Radio on September 19, "the prerequisite is Japan's credit".

Mr Patolichev's main purpose in visiting Tokyo was to sign a trade and payments agreement for 1971-75, but before his departure on September 25 he also had political discussions with the Prime Minister. The growing importance Moscow attaches to closer links with Japan in view of the prospect of a Sino-US détente was also indicated by the arrival of its special Ambassador, Semyon Tsarapkin, for official talks in Tokyo on October 5, and an invitation to Zentaro Kosaka, Chairman of the LDP's Policy Committee. During his stay in the Soviet capital from August 24 to 30, Kosaka was received by Kirill Mazurov, a First Deputy Prime Minister, Nikolai Baibakov, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Nikolai Rodionov, a Deputy Foreign Minister. On his return home,

Kosaka commented that the Russians "seemed to be closely watching the outcome of the Sino-US rapprochement" and reported that he had discussed not only the promotion of friendship and economic co-operation but also his idea for "active interchanges" between the LDP and the Soviet Communist Party. On the territorial dispute, he had conveyed the "entire Japanese people's wish" for the return of the islands seized by the Russians in 1946 - but apparently made no headway on this issue.

Earlier, the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo had assured the Japanese Government, before leaving for consultations in Moscow, of his country's interest in discussing both bilateral and international topics, such as disarmament and ocean development. But while the Japanese authorities are ready to develop a variety of contacts with Moscow, they have so far shown little enthusiasm for the Soviet proposal for an Asian security pact - with its clear overtones of hostility to China. Moreover last year the government extended Japan's Security Treaty with the United States, which Moscow has for long cited as an obstacle to a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. In addition, there seems little prospect of an early solution to the territorial dispute over the four Northern Islands, though Mr Brezhnev is said to have hinted to the JCP Chairman that Moscow might be prepared to reconsider its occupation of the islands as part of a diplomatic deal. In Japan's view, a settlement of this issue is a precondition for signing the peace treaty.

While dealing with the government, Moscow has by no means ignored the Japanese Opposition. A Komeito delegation visited Moscow in July (while a parallel team was in Peking) and in September three groups of JSP members arrived in the Soviet Union. One was received in Khabarovsk; Seeichi Katsumata, a former JSP Chairman, left Tokyo on September 4 for a 20-day visit to Russia at the invitation of the Soviet party; and on September 14 a team led by the chairman of the JSP policy board was received in Moscow on the first leg of a study tour which includes East Germany and Yugoslavia. Its purpose is to examine "Socialist" systems of government.

Unlike the Chinese party leaders, whose quarrel with the Japanese Communist Party has worsened recently and who support the small and uninfluential JCP (Left) splinter, the

Russians apparently hope to improve their ties with the JCP as part of their approach to the left-wing Opposition. Relations deteriorated in the late 1960s when Moscow championed the dissident Voice of Japan faction in the party, but began to improve in April, 1971, after it gave the JCP an undertaking to withdraw this support. In September, a JCP delegation led by the party Chairman, Kenji Miyamoto, which was to tour Romania, Italy and North Vietnam, changed its itinerary at the last minute to include two visits to Moscow - presumably at the Soviet party's suggestion.

The JCP's choice of the Romanian, Italian and North Vietnamese parties for an exchange of ideas had no doubt revived Moscow's old fear that it might shape a "third force" of uncommitted Communist Parties making common cause of their right to independence. Hanoi, although neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, can ill afford to antagonise the Soviet party at a time when Peking's attitude to Indochina may be in flux, and the communiqué issued after the JCP's visit was limited to declarations of solidarity over war aims and joint opposition to Japanese "militarism" and "monopoly capitalism".

"Non-interference"

But in Italy and Romania, where the delegates also had talks with independent Spanish Communist Party leaders, much publicity was given to the need for parties to avoid interference in one another's internal affairs and this was said to be the principle on which a united anti-imperialist front could be built. The more orthodox French Communist Party, which sent a delegation to Tokyo from August 6 to 13, signed a statement endorsing the principles of independence, equality and non-intervention in relations between Communist Parties. Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues no doubt covered the same ground in their talks with the JCP delegates in Moscow from September 19-26 and the joint communiqué described these principles as the "generally accepted norms" of relations between the fraternal parties. However the communiqués acknowledgement of some parties' "differences of opinion" in various subjects and its reference to the "frank" as well as comradely nature of the talks indicated that the JCP is still determined to maintain a degree of independence.

The Russians are probably willing to tolerate considerable

ideological differences mainly because of the JCP's potential as an anti-Chinese political force. An article in its organ, Akahata, on September 9 claimed that Peking's "great nation chauvinism" was a serious obstacle to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan - a view for which it came under fire from other Opposition parties. On October 4 Miyamoto claimed that the JCP maintained "splendid isolation" from the rest in their "race to approach China". But the party had given signs of greater flexibility a few days earlier when it agreed with the JSP to form a common front against the government at the October Diet session, including a commitment to work for diplomatic ties with China and her admission to the UN.

The other Opposition groups are more equivocal in their attitude towards the JCP. It has no part in the Democratic Socialist Party's plans to reorganise the Opposition camp into a new party comprising the JSP, Komeito and itself, all of which resent the Communists' attitude to China. On the other hand, the JCP was the only party to show marked gains in the April local elections and its popular following was largely responsible for the success of the two joint JSP-JCP gubernatorial candidates. For the DSP and Komeito, however, Miyamoto's statement in July, 1970, that the JCP would only form an alliance with them if they supported a programme drawn up by the Communists and JSP remains a powerful deterrent to co-operation.

BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

The four day meeting between President Tito of Yugoslavia and the Soviet leader Brezhnev which took place in Belgrade from September 22-25, seems to have been approached by each side with different objectives. President Tito was anxious publicly to commit the Soviet Union to a reaffirmation of the 1955 Belgrade Declaration which commits both countries to "mutual respect for, and non interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature". The same principles were confirmed at a party level by the Moscow Declaration of June, 1956; when Tito visited the USSR: this declaration is also endorsed in the joint statement issued after Brezhnev's visit.

Brezhnev, was apparently primarily interested in laying the foundations of a new relationship between the two countries in which Yugoslavia will be drawn closer into the Soviet orbit.

Both sides seem to have achieved their objectives.

President Tito and the Yugoslav information media had made their views clear from the start of the visit. In his welcoming speech at the airport, Tito referred to the development of co-operation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union "based on equal rights and mutual respect" (Belgrade Radio September 22), while at a dinner given in Brezhnev's honour on September 22 he emphasised that "international cooperation can make no progress if it is based on any monopoly or on a negation of the legitimate rights and interests of individual countries and peoples". And to show that the experience of Czechoslovakia has not been forgotten, the Zagreb Radio commentator, Milika Sundic, noted on September 22 that "equality and non-interference are principles from which there can be no departure, particularly since practice has shown that socialist countries are not immune from attempts at imposing their views on others".

As the Yugoslavs are no doubt aware, only the future will show whether the Soviet Union really is prepared to abandon its hopes of changing certain aspects of Yugoslav life. As Brezhnev admitted during a speech to Yugoslav workers on September 23 (Moscow Radio) "it is no secret that the current organisation of Yugoslav social life does not seem acceptable to Soviet Communists and Soviet people". Certain ambiguous remarks made by Brezhnev during the course of his visit suggest that the Russians will continue to place the broadest possible interpretation of the Belgrade Declaration and on the document issued following the recent talks. His statement during the factory workers' meeting on September 23, for instance, that the Soviet Union "firmly protect the interests of socialism from all its enemies" could be seen as a reaffirmation of Soviet policy as it is being applied in Czechoslovakia. In a similar vein was his remark on the same occasion that "we, as Communist Marxists, know that there are certain common laws of socialist construction and common features of principles of socialism, without which socialism could not exist at all". His statement, during the dinner given in his honour, that the Belgrade Declaration should be applied in "contemporary conditions", caused Zagreb Radio to state on September 23: "We are not in a position to unravel what 'present-day conditions' affect the implementation of the principles of the Belgrade Declaration. For us, everything in

the document concerned is equally important, whether it refers to the future or to the past. The principles of equality cannot become obsolete".

Brezhnev's chief interest in the communiqué issued at the end of his visit was undoubtedly that part of it which commits Yugoslavia to wider and more frequent party and government consultations on bilateral and foreign policy matters. Brezhnev's achievement in securing this development is in line with stated Soviet aims regarding Yugoslavia at the Soviet Party Congress earlier this year. It was then said that "the Soviet people want socialism in Yugoslavia to grow stronger and her relations with socialist states to become stronger". There seems little doubt that Moscow is aiming, particularly once Tito has gone, to draw Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet Union and thus reconstruct a Belgrade-Moscow axis against Chinese efforts to promote its influence in the Balkans.

Although President Tito has agreed to closer links with Moscow, there is no evidence that at the same time he has agreed to abandon his ties with China. The subject of China is known to have arisen during the talks (although the outcome was not mentioned in the communiqué) and it seems likely that failure to agree on this topic was the reason why, as the Yugoslav Press noted on September 26, "differences in approach to certain issues" remained between the two sides. This could also be the reason why the talks could not be said to have shown a full identity of views but as having been conducted in a spirit of "mutual understanding".

EEC DILEMMA FOR THE SOVIET BLOC

The Soviet leaders' approach to the European Economic Community (EEC) underlines the dilemma they face over this issue - how to reconcile their hostility to the EEC as a potential political and economic barrier to their ambitions in Eastern and Western Europe with their desire to take advantage of the attractive trading prospects which the Community has to offer. Like other European nations, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have benefited from the EEC members' dramatic economic advances: their exports to the Community have trebled over the last 12 years and the Soviet bloc now accounts for seven per cent of its foreign trade, according to Dr Klaus Terfloth, an official

from the Common Market External Trade Commissioner's Office, who gave these figures to British industrialists on September 10.

The Soviet leaders' pursuit of long-term bilateral deals with individual members of the EEC points to their desire to step up trade even as they denounce the Community as a "closed economic grouping" which "limits international trade" and "increases tension" on the continent. Indeed, one of their motives seems to be to conclude durable arrangements before the EEC's common commercial policy towards centrally planned economies comes into effect and Moscow will in theory be debarred from concluding further trade agreements with the EEC members unless it formally recognises the Community. The deadline for activating this policy has been deferred from 1973 until 1975, subject to formal approval by the Community's Council of Ministers.

During his visit to Britain, Dr Terfloth predicted that the facts of life would become so convincing to the countries of the Soviet bloc that they would come round to formal recognition of the EEC. "We believe", he said, "in the force of realities". At the moment, however, Moscow shows no signs of recognising the Community and may even be hoping that national interests within the area will eventually cause individual members to press for some sort of compromise formula under which bilateral arrangements might still be permissible.

Until Moscow makes a move on the recognition issue, there is little chance of the East Europeans taking this step themselves, although it is clear that the Poles and Hungarians, and probably the Romanians, are envious of Yugoslavia's arrangement with the Six. During 1970, the first year of her formal trade agreement with the EEC, 34 per cent of Yugoslav exports went to the Community and 40 per cent of her imports came from it. Last June the Belgrade newspaper, Borba, reported that trade exchanges had continued to rise at about the same rate during the first five months of 1971. Borba also welcomed the beginning of co-operation between Yugoslavia and the EEC in other spheres such as science and engineering and Yugoslav participation in technical standardisation talks and in the preparation of a convention on the European system of patents. The previous week, Borba reported with approval the recently adopted EEC scheme of general preferences, within the UNCTAD

agreement, which enables developing countries, including Yugoslavia, to sell their manufactures and semi-manufactures duty-free, subject to certain limits and exceptions. Under the same scheme, customs duties on processed agricultural products will be lowered by 20-50 per cent. As for the expansion of the Six, Borba noted on June 25 that it would have a "considerable influence" on future Yugoslav-EEC relations". "This is clearly borne out by the mere fact that over 50 per cent of our commodity exchange is with the EEC area", the newspaper said.

Self-interest

Though the Soviet bloc States may be unable to recognise the EEC formally as yet, they are ahead of Moscow - publicly as well as in private - in acknowledging both the need to come to terms with the Community and the likelihood that it will be enlarged, notably by the accession of Britain. Recently, the Press and radio in Poland and Hungary have carried reasoned discussions of the arguments for and against EEC membership on much the same lines as the current debates in the candidate countries. On June 27, the Hungarian newspaper, Magyar Nemzet, even put forward (without comment) the idea advanced in some West European capitals that expansion of the Six could help co-operation with Eastern Europe and strengthen the "peaceful and stabilising" trend in the world - a view that Moscow would be unlikely to echo at present.

Polish anxiety is still evident at the effect expansion of the Six might have on the export of her foodstuffs to Britain, especially bacon, eggs and butter, and in August a Polish delegation spent three days at the Department of Trade and Industry in London seeking assurances for the continued sales of these items. Britain, for her part, has undertaken to ask the Community for help in maintaining Poland's food trade and may if necessary cite the "disruption clause" negotiated in Luxembourg specifically to prevent undue damage to established trading partners.

Even before this news there had been little criticism in the Polish Press of Britain's application to join. Comments has been realistic; the Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powszechny, pointed out on August 1 that while to Poland "British contacts play an important role, to the British, Warsaw is rather a marginal partner". Urging that Poland should take positive

action on her own behalf, specifically by seeking new export openings, the newspaper admitted that Polish goods were not always sufficiently "flexible" to meet the demands of Western buyers. Failure to expand export markets was mainly the "outcome of our internal economic structure", the newspaper said, and it revealed that Poland accepts only about 20 per cent of Western orders for specific products. The others are refused because of a lack of goods, bad quality, the impossibility of meeting deadlines or difficulties over meeting the buyers' requirements concerning packing.

Economic self-interest clearly plays a part in Poland's comparatively flexible and positive attitude to the EEC, for like several other East European States she has a much larger stake in East-West trade than the Soviet Union and is particularly anxious to export to the West in order to buy Western patents and technological help. At the July session of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Poland fully endorsed the new long-term programme of economic integration, but has not lost sight of the value of trade outside the bloc. A commentary in the newspaper Slowo Powzechne on August 9 pointed to a connexion between CMEA co-operation and developments in the EEC. Integration was in the interests of the whole of Europe's economic equilibrium, it said, and the two large community areas should "develop more or less side by side" and establish between each other "natural and even necessary" ties of trade and co-operation. The same line of thought was reflected in a recent decree giving the Minister of Foreign Trade wider powers in co-ordinating commercial activities abroad conducted by other Ministries. Romania's comments on the EEC reflect her desire to match her co-operation within CMEA with the development of more trade ties with the West. In the wake of the CMEA session, her propaganda has stressed the value of East European economic collaboration and the need to develop it, but the underlying trend of Romania's policy is revealed by the fact that 25 per cent of her imports in 1969 were from the EEC, compared with 11.7 per cent of Poland's and under ten per cent for Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

East Germany made the most of the dollar crisis in August to highlight alleged differences among the EEC members, and

throughout July the party newspaper echoed Moscow's gloomy predictions about the "new burdens" that would be laid on the British workers as a result of Britain's accession. But East Germany has on the whole been reticent about Common Market affairs in recent months - possibly for fear of jeopardising its privileged position in relation to the EEC. Its trade with the Federal Republic is treated as internal German trade and therefore outside Community tariff rules - a benefit which East Germany would in theory have to forfeit if it achieved international recognition as a sovereign State, though in practice this is unlikely.

Soviet manoeuvring

Moscow, by contrast, still gives prominence to the alleged evils of the Community and warns would-be members against joining. The Soviet Press frequently argues that the workers bear the main cost of membership, while the "monopolies" alone enjoy the benefits. On June 26, the party organ, Pravda, greeted the Luxembourg agreement between Britain and the Six on the draft terms for Britain's entry as a "marriage of convenience" which sought to ensure "maximum profits for big capital". The Soviet Press also alleges that Britain will act as a "Trojan horse for the US monopolies" and that expansion of the Community is aimed at strengthening the nucleus of the "aggressive NATO bloc". And just as Moscow made much of the problems and differences accompanying the talks in Luxembourg, it is now developing the theme that Britain's entry will aggravate internal strife in the Community.

The Soviet international weekly, New Times (No. 27, July 1971), claimed that economic integration had failed to iron out the "inter-imperialist contradictions" among the Six and that these contradictions "are no less likely to make themselves felt among the Ten". The marriage of Britain and the Common Market might be one of convenience, it said, but it "will hardly mean bliss and harmony for Western Europe". Two issues later New Times speculated about a possible Anglo-French entente directed against West Germany, or alternatively an Anglo-West German line-up agains the French, and likened the situation in the EEC to "a war of each against all". Nevertheless, an unusually mild commentary in the government newspaper, Izvestia, on September 3 suggested that the Soviet leaders are

abandoning their stance of blanket condemnation of the EEC and all its activities and tacitly admitting the inevitability of its enlargement. Izvestia even listed some of the advantages which Britain hopes to derive from EEC membership, and while arguing that many of the benefits were dubious it can have left little doubt in the reader's mind that they are not totally illusory.

There has recently been a slight diminution in Moscow's propaganda barrage to other candidate countries seeking entry. The question is likely to be raised during visits to Norway and Denmark in December by the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, but before then, Soviet anti-Market propaganda may well be intensified in an attempt to influence the referenda on EEC membership to be held in the two countries during the first half of next year.

London rally

Moscow's moves towards coming to terms with an expanded EEC, however tentative, have not so far been followed by the Communists of the candidate countries, who still use opposition to their country's entry as a major plank in their political campaigns. The Communist Parties of Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Britain announced after a meeting in Copenhagen at the beginning of August that they are to examine ways of co-ordinating "the struggle" in their countries. The British party sponsored a rally in London on September 28 on the theme of how joining the Common Market affects the working class. Those attending included Jacques Duclos, a member of the French Communist Party's Politbureau; Luca Pavolini, assistant editor of the Italian party newspaper, l'Unita; high-ranking Communists from Holland and Denmark and an Irish party Secretary. But while the Italian and French parties give some support to the British party's anti-Common Market attitudes, they admit that membership of the EEC has brought considerable economic and social advances in their own countries and are prepared to play a role in the Community's social institutions - possibly seeing this as a means of spreading Communist influence in parts of Europe where the parties are weak.

For the Chinese, the EEC offers none of the uncomfortable challenges of a prosperous and growing economic community near its borders, and Peking has welcomed West European

integration as a counterweight to both the USSR and the United States. New China News Agency on June 28 interpreted the Luxembourg agreement as a "further development in the trend of unity among the West European countries against the super Powers' control and interference". China is also interested in expanding her own trade links with the Community and on July 6 the first steps were taken by the EEC towards a common trading policy with China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia. The Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers that a certain number of imported products from these countries should be freed from quota restrictions on a Community basis.

THE PRIZE THAT GLITTERS

Joseph Kraft

Typically the Nobel Peace Prize goes to neutral doers of humanitarian works on the Albert Schweitzer model who are truly irrelevant to the improvement of international security. So the selection of Chancellor Willy Brandt, a political leader who has grappled with the real problems of peace, carries an important message.

It says that peace nowadays is a practical possibility, that there is merit in President's Nixon's talk about a generation of peace. At the same time it raises a question about how much he is doing to help the leaders who are prepared to practice the politics of peace - the Willy Brandts of the world.

Mr Brandt's selection was based on the treaties he has negotiated with Russia and Poland, which led to the recent Big Four agreement on Berlin. What those accords do is recognize the territorial status quo in Europe. They constitute the peace treaty for World War II.

Engaging the Communists in fruitful negotiation was only one part of the achievement. Not less difficult is what Mr Brandt has done inside West Germany.

In-Fighting at Home

On his home ground he has had to break through the Cold War politics practiced so assiduously by former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successors in the Christian Democratic Party. He had to brave charges that dealing with the Communists is a national betrayal, a sell-out to the enemy.

The American role in Mr Brandt's achievement was not negligible. By steadfast presence in Europe, this country made it plain to the Communists that they had nothing to gain from threats and pressure.

More important still, American leadership played a role in promoting political evolution inside West Germany. President Johnson, in particular, indicated over and over to Bonn that Washington attached a higher priority to ending the Cold War in Europe than to keeping it up. He made the political atmosphere in West Germany safe for Social Democrats, and he deserves at least a little piece of Mr Brandt's prize.

President Nixon has understood the role that American power has to play in securing a generation of peace. He has not yielded to the pressures for precipitant dis-engagement or rapid winding-down of American military power.

If anything, he has tended to set too much store by military superiority. And the encouraging thing about his coming visits to Peking and Moscow is that they express a recognition that it is necessary to come off the hard line in order to do some bargaining.

But there seems no correspondence between Nixon's policy toward adversaries and his approach to friends and allies. While he has set up Communist capitals for a parley, he has done nothing to favor the players on his own side who can do so much to help in the bargaining. On the contrary, his approach to them has seemed a quixotic thing, heavily influenced by personal likes and dislikes.

Sato's Importance

For example, Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato is potentially a player of great importance in any Pacific settlement. But in order to achieve the coup of a surprise TV announcement on China, President Nixon embarrassed Mr Sato in a way that makes it very hard for the Japanese leader to play a constructive role. And the reason seems to have been pique at Tokyo's long delay on limiting textile exports.

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is another figure with a considerable role to play in East-West detente. But this country's international economic policies are severely hurting Canada. And the Nixon administration, apparently

because the President does not like the Trudeau style, has not even bothered to express regret.

In contrast, Mr Nixon has been an unwavering supporter of President Nguyen Van Thieu, the Saigon leader who is a principal obstacle to any settlement in Vietnam. Similarly, ties of personal loyalty seem to inhibit American pressure on President Yahya Khan of Pakistan to be more reasonable about the East Bengali secession issue.

In short, despite all the talk of a generation of peace, the President is not well organized for the task. He has allowed his personal ideological preferences to stand in the way of the most effective politics of peace.

ESPIONAGE VERSUS DIPLOMACY

> " I do not accept your contention that in the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations Her Majesty's Government should abstain from taking measures to prevent, limit or inhibit the espionage conducted by Soviet officials and other Soviet citizens in this country on such an extensive scale".
>
> Sir Alec Douglas-Home in a letter to Mr Gromyko, August 4, 1971.

In one of the biggest moves since the end of the war to reduce the Soviet Union's spying activities in a country with which it is ostensibly on friendly terms, the British Government announced on September 24 that 90 Soviet diplomats and officials had been asked to leave Britain within two weeks and another 15 at present out of the country would not be permitted to return. It was also made clear that the Soviet Union would not be allowed to replace any of the officials or to make up the numbers again if more were expelled at a later date. In its aide-mémoire to the Soviet Government, Britain noted that all those asked to leave had been concerned in intelligence activities. Both the number of Soviet officials in Britain and the proportion engaged in intelligence work had been causing grave concern for some time, it was pointed out, and despite a curb on the size of the Embassy in November, 1968, the total of personnel had now reached 550 - higher than in any other Western country, including the United States. A Foreign Office statement added that further evidence of the

scale and nature of the spying in Britain, conducted under the auspices of the trade delegation and other organisations as well as the Soviet Embassy, had been provided by an officer of the Soviet Security Service (KGB) who had defected to Britain early in September.

Setting this drastic action in the context of Anglo-Soviet relations, the statement underlined that repeated efforts had been made to solve the problem of Soviet espionage by persuasion and that the matter had been raised privately with the Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, during his visit to London in October, 1970. Two subsequent letters to Mr Gromyko from the British Foreign Secretary had been neither answered nor acknowledged, but Soviet officials had continued to engage in espionage on an undiminished scale. The British Government intended that its latest measures should remove an obstacle hampering the development of closer Anglo-Soviet understanding, the message said, and hoped that the Soviet Government would recognise that Britain sincerely desired to improve both Anglo-Soviet relations and East-West relations in general.

Moscow's reply completely ignored the British point about the difficulty of co-operating with another government in the search for genuine European security when that government is trying to undermine Britain's own security, and accused London of hypocrisy and of wanting to obstruct the path of détente. In addition, the Soviet aide-mémoire which was handed to the British Ambassador on September 26 denied all the charges of espionage and described Britain's action as an attempt to cover up her own "anti-Soviet" activities. The message concluded with the ultimatum that if Britain refused to revoke the expulsion orders, the Soviet side would have to take "corresponding reciprocal measures" - though the smaller size of the British official representation (40 diplomatic staff plus 38 without diplomatic status) hardly makes a direct tit-for-tat policy feasible.

A pointer to the Soviet Union's wish to avoid hasty decisions on this matter was the Press and radio's thin coverage. The Soviet public was given no information about the expulsion until September 26, when the news agency Tass and the television news gave the text of the Soviet reply to the British aide-mémoire. The following day Pravda also carried the text, together with a report from London accusing the British Press

and radio of launching a government-inspired campaign of "anti-Soviet slander". The purpose of this campaign, the commentary claimed, was the desire of "certain Conservative circles to spoil the climate of détente in Europe" by "fabricating" accusations against Soviet representatives in Britain.

Warnings disregarded

The Soviet Union normally denies that any of its officials engage in inadmissible activities, but a feature of recent cases in which its representatives have been expelled from a foreign country has been the obstinacy with which intelligence work has been continued even after official warnings have been given. The genuine Soviet diplomats must have realised that normal friendly relations would be affected, but the KGB network appears to have called the tune. For instance, when a Soviet trade mission official was expelled from Ghana on July 22, 1971, after having been caught in activities described as "incompatible with his status", it was revealed that two months earlier a Soviet consular official had been apprehended with a top secret Cabinet document in his pocket and expelled. According to the government-owned newspaper, the Daily Graphic, the case had been hushed up after the Soviet Ambassador had promised that he would curb espionage activity in Ghana. Yet only a few weeks later, the trade official was found in possession of a government document concerned with security matters, and though not a diplomat he attempted to use the identity card of a Soviet diplomat who had left the country some years earlier. The Daily Graphic regretted in particular the time and energy that had to be devoted to dealing with this kind of activity.

Another feature of Moscow's espionage effort is its growing interest in industrial spying, particularly in advanced Western countries. The Italian newspaper, Il Messaggero, reported on June 12, that a Soviet diplomat had just been expelled for engaging in this, and of the seven members of the Soviet Embassy in Italy expelled since 1965, several had been assigned to the commercial section. In many countries the Soviet trade missions form a huge separate establishment, with some members holding diplomatic status, and there are further Soviet officials working in Soviet-owned firms and in branches of Intourist and the Soviet airline, Aeroflot. Premises of the official news agency Tass have become notorious as centres of spying. The host countries have virtually no comparable representation, most of their trade, for instance, being negotiated by private firms.

Moscow's anxiety

Various motives underlie the current stress on industrial espionage, including the need - the most dangerous feature from the point of view of Western security - to break strategic embargoes, the desire to avoid paying the commercial price for new technology, and finally, no doubt, the Soviet intelligence services' wish to show returns for the costly espionage effort. The underlying problem is serious in that the gap, probably widening, between Soviet and Western technology in many important research-based industries makes it imperative for the Soviet Union to acquire advanced Western equipment and know-how within a reasonably short time. The Soviet leadership is deeply concerned at the very uneven development of the economy in research and development and in particular by the slow and unsatisfactory incorporation of new products in output plans.

Since the decree of October, 1968, which sought to rationalise research and shorten lead-times to actual production, there has been little sign of progress. Another decree issued last June aimed at raising quality and productivity in the automobile and chemical industries of the Gorki region. Pravda's complaint that there seemed to be no plans for introducing new scientific and technological achievements in these industries was clearly intended to have a wider application.

ECONOMICS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Background

The radical post-war changes in the East European trade patterns which made these countries depend on the USSR for about one third of their foreign trade and on each other for about another third were not achieved through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON). This organization was not set up until 1949 and then as a propaganda device to counter the Marshall plan. It was left practically dormant until 1954. Stalin's design seems to have been the preservation of separate nation states organized on the Soviet model and maintenance of the USSR's hegemony over them. Predominance was freely used for economic exploitation. Following the revolt in the DDR, Gomulka's accession to power in Poland and the Hungarian revolution, Stalin's successors considered it politically necessary to accord better economic terms to their satellites. They tried to reduce costs by promoting a division of labour between their CMEA partners but this organization did not prove a very adequate instrument. Conflicting national interests were asserting themselves and the treaty formally respected national sovereignty and international equality. In any case, the practical achievements of CMEA remained modest:

Plan co-ordination has, since 1962, been proclaimed as CMEA's "basic method of operation" but it has until now mostly been geared to sectors heavily involved in production of goods for intra-CMEA trade and to transport facilities servicing this trade.

Specialisation agreements aim at bringing about greater efficiency by concentrating manufacture of a given product in one or a few member countries. Although several thousand products - mainly in the engineering, chemical and ferrous metal industries - are covered, the share of total output affected even within these industries is small, for instance, 6 to 7% of the machinery output in CMEA countries. Certain organizations for co-operation in special fields such as Intermetall (bearings industry) and Interkhim (light chemical industry) have been set up (without Rumanian participation) and seem to have performed

to the satisfaction of their members.

Scientific-technical co-operation. An extensive exchange of technical information, standards and models is said to have taken place and research has been co-ordinated on a number of major problems. However, CMEA's spokesmen have complained that this co-operation lags behind "needs and possibilities". One of the major problems was that information and documentation was to be exchanged free of charge. This meant that the more developed countries were sharing the fruits of their research with other members that had little to contribute in return. Since 1967, it has been possible to request payment for technological assistance when it involves considerable expenditure on the part of the assisting country, but the extent to which this principle is applied is not known.

The creation of the International Bank for Economic Co-operation in 1964 and the introduction of a transfer ruble, an accounting unit, were meant to facilitate multilateral exchanges but have, in fact, only brought about very minor improvements in intra-CMEA trade. CMEA has further served as an umbrella under which deals of all sorts between two or more member countries are made, including specialisation arrangements and joint investments under which one country delivers entire plants, machinery or equipment to another and is repaid in the material or commodity produced by the facility in which investment is made. As it is often easier to develop common interest and balance mutual advantages among a smaller number of states, this might well have been the kind of co-operation which has yielded the most tangible practical results.

As an instrument of Soviet policy, CMEA has had both advantages and disadvantages. It has institutionalised the trade pattern which was set in the first post-war years and provided a forum where the Russians could legitimately press for upholding a high level of trade between all the CMEA countries. CMEA might have helped to maintain this pattern in all but one of the East European countries. But it did not prevent Rumania from modifying it. In fact, the bargaining power of the smaller East European countries may sometimes have been enhanced by the existence of the organization. On the whole, CMEA has been more successful in conserving the status quo than in developing new forms of economic order imposed on Eastern Europe by the USSR, its impact has been much smaller than that exerted by the USSR through direct economic ties with the East European countries, through inter-party communication lines and, in the

last resort, through direct military intervention or the threat of it.

THE NEW "COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME"

The unanimous adoption by the 25th Session of the CMEA Council held in Bucharest on 27th-29th July this year of a 72-page new programme does not seem of a nature to change the modest role of the organization in any radical way. The communiqué states that implementation of the programme requires conclusion of further agreements. The substance of the programme represents a compromise which gives something to everybody and which could provide impulses in several directions.

This is notably the case as regards the central question of how to achieve economic integration among socialist countries. Two possible ways exist: to develop supranational planning as a framework for close co-ordination of national plans or to create a common socialist market which inside a framework of indicative planning would allow a degree of competition among enterprises across national frontiers. The first solution, advocated by the USSR, might spell the end of the remaining economic independence of the smaller East European countries. The latter, advocated by Hungary and Poland, pre-supposes profound reforms in the system of prices and intra-CMEA payments. The main obstacles to any meaningful convertibility and multilateralism inside the CMEA system at present are arbitrary prices and the difficulty of acquiring goods of interest to the buyer from production lines which are normally fully committed to planned deliveries (lack of "commodity convertibility").

The part of the programme dealing with monetary problems, which has been widely covered and partly misinterpreted in the Western press, contains a decision of principle to "strengthen and intensify" the role of the collective currency (the transfer ruble) and a timetable for the conclusion of studies of how to do this. Perfectly logically, the first step is seen as one of introducing "economically substantiated and mutually agreed" exchange rates. The stated aim is to formulate an agreed methodology during 1971 and to introduce new exchange rates in the period 1972 to 1974. In the 1976-79 period the preconditions for abolishing the present multiple exchange rates

and for introducing a single rate for each national currency will be studied. Agreement on a deadline in introducing single rates should be adopted in the course of 1980. Convertibility is only envisaged among the national CMEA currencies and between them and the transfer ruble. It is proposed that this question be studied during 1971-72 though only with the view "possibly of introducing it in the long-term". The need "to resolve the questions of the relation between domestic wholesale prices and foreign trade prices" and "to saturate the domestic markets of the CMEA countries with goods" are recognised but no indication is provided on how this should be achieved. The adoption of a Hungarian proposal to introduce, from 1971 onwards, in CMEA exchanges a category of goods not subject to quotas or bilateral balancing may be seen as an attempt to introduce some measure of "commodity convertibility". More active measures are suggested to "enlist other countries", primarily among the socialist and developing countries", to carry out trade on the basis of the transferable ruble but there is no question of introducing convertibility of the transfer ruble into Western currencies or gold.

Any meaningful measure of convertibility is certainly a long way off and could be considered dangerous to the prevailing system. The realignment of exchange rates and introduction of some conformity between domestic and foreign trade prices is a more realistic aim, but there is no hint on what principles a reform would be based. Measures of the latter kind would have the advantage that some CMEA countries could consider it as a first step in establishing the preconditions of a system which would make some allowance for market forces whereas others could consider it as a means of facilitating the working out of multinational plans.

The section of plan co-ordination sets out the aim of "deepening" co-ordination and starting it at an earlier date than hitherto. It concerns long-term (20-year) plans as well as five-year plans. There are several novel features such as joint forecasting in major sectors as an initial stage of socialist planning and joint planning of major sectors. It is, however, carefully noted that participation in all the new activities is voluntary, that it can be carried out on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis, and that even in joint planning the independent nature of domestic planning is maintained.

The general trend seems to be one of allowing those countries

that want to go ahead with a given project to do so - together with those that agree. It is specifically stated that the non-participation of one or several CMEA countries must not prevent the interested countries from effecting joint co-operation. This seems to end the veto power which apparently to some extent, has existed until now and which in the past often has been used by the Rumanians. From a Rumanian point of view this is somewhat counter-balanced by other provisions: non-participants at any moment are accorded the right to ask for participation; the voluntary nature of participation is strongly emphasised; it is asserted that economic integration is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs; and the principle of non-interference in member countries' internal affairs is affirmed. On balance, the programme seems to bear witness to a greater mutual willingness to compromise and to agree to disagree.

Conclusions

There is little indication that CMEA in the 1970s will play a very different role from its present one. If carried through, the proposed realignment of exchange rates and of the relation between domestic and foreign trade prices will somewhat facilitate trade among the CMEA countries and probably also East/West trade. The plan of introducing some kind of convertibility among the national CMEA currencies and between them and the transfer ruble is a long-term one. It would appear optimistic to expect substantial progress in this direction in the present decade. Otherwise, CMEA will probably continue as a forum for multilateral consultations and for developing limited areas of closer co-operation, perhaps with time becoming more efficient in this latter respect. It is likely to remain a rather loose regional association, without any executive powers, of countries whose economies are closely linked together through bilateral trade channels. In the economic field, the direct link between the USSR and each of the East European countries will continue to offer the former better leverage than the one provided by the CMEA structures. As to these bilateral links with the USSR it is likely that most of the East European countries would prefer to do rather less trade with the USSR and rather more with the West. However, the Soviet Union does not seem prepared to admit any significant diminuation of its share of the East European countries trade. It is true that the new CMEA programme recognises that trade

should be developed with capitalist countries and that Rumanian and Hungarian efforts to enter GATT are condoned by a statement in this programme to the effect that member countries, jointly or individually, will seek equal membership in international economic organizations. However, indications are that bilateral links between the Soviet Union and East European countries will be tightened rather than loosened in the first half of the 1970s. According to the Soviet plan its trade with CMEA countries will, in the period 1971 to 1975, grow faster than its total trade. This accords with the known long-term trade agreements between the USSR and the East European countries for this period: in all cases, except in that of Rumania, exchanges with the Soviet Union are set to grow more than total trade. Such plans, if carried out, would increase East Europe's economic dependence on the USSR.

OTA SIK: DOWN WITH STATE PLANNING

The spirit of Prague '68 lives on - elsewhere

Little pockets of Czech refugees in various parts of Europe are all that remain of the Prague Spring of 1968. Ota Sik, chief architect of the economic reforms proposed in '68, is now a professor of economics at the Swiss universities of Basel and St. Gallen, and there he pursues his dream of a "market economy under socialism". These remarks, reprinted from a Munich-based journal for Czech émigrés, were delivered to an audience of students near Munich in late June.

Experience in various communist countries has proved that planning of the sort Marx and his generation of economists had in mind is impracticable today because there are too many products being made, specialization of labor is too complex and market demands so changeable that no government is capable of telling each manufacturer what and when to produce. Only large-scale tasks for industry can be planned. An example of the problems faced today is that Czechoslovakia, even four years ago, produced one-and-a-half million products of which only some 12,000 could be guided by planned production.

Another fundamental drawback is that the socialist system does not know how to reward economic activity in true proportion to the usefulness of that activity to society.

The main trouble is that socialism has been made a dogma, so that orthodox Marxists have become apologists for their ideology and ceased to be scientists, renouncing the fundamental principle of Marxism that no knowledge is final and that the only criterion of theory is practice.

There is never a confrontation of theory with practice since that would prove most of the postulates untenable. I am deeply convinced that the state-monopoly system in the East is incapable of further development. The possibility that this system can maintain itself by its own power for several more decades is no proof of its vitality.

The managed economy on the Eastern pattern is disappointing primarily because it cannot meet the declared needs of society. Where the state can afford to regulate specific programs - as in the armament industry and the space program - it can be successful. But this is not possible in mass production of consumer goods where there will always be fluctuating supply and demand.

Judging the fifth Czechoslovak five-year plan from this point of view, it is clear that, for instance, more apartment houses can only be built if there is enough capital and skilled labor available and if these projects do not conflict with foreign programs. The fundamental question which is not answered is where existing resources can best be used, for international trade or to satisfy needs at home.

How can the results of the so-called "complex socialist rationalization" be measured when all prices are artificially determined and more or less fictitious, and when more often than not the "rationalization" benefits superfluous production which is only minimally useful to society?

The market economy appears to me to be an indispensable way of regulating economic systems. Flexible prices, competition among manufacturers and in the market place and a well-planned economy backed by a purposeful state financial policy are the preconditions of harmonious development.

I see a difference between socialism and communism. I am a socialist and because the only communist system I have seen in operation has discredited the idea of economic socialism for most people in the West, I must reject it. Socialism can win only if its achievements are attractive enough to convince others of its value and not through force, as the Soviets believe.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC CONGRESS IN VIENNA

Between 11 and 14 October 1971, the Donau Europaeisches Institut and the Stanford Research Institute of California held a conference in Vienna to discuss the problems of trade between East and West. It was attended by about 200 economic leaders and specialists from many countries, and the Hungarian delegation was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Jeno Baczoni, Vilaggazdasag (12 October 1971) said that:

The Comecon countries were represented at the congress by senior ministerial officials, financial experts, and the general managers of foreign trade enterprises. From other parts of the world the general managers of important international firms attended.

Vilaggazdasag gave an account of Hungarian contributions made at the congress, which is summarized below.

Baczoni emphasized the necessity for intensive economic relations between countries with different social systems. Considerable qualitative changes have taken place in these relations, he said, mainly as a result of the conclusion of long-term agreements and the expansion of industrial co-operation, but "in the development of East-West economic relations achievement lags far behind potential". He went on to say that the integration program accepted by the Comecon countries will not prevent the individual Comecon countries from pursuing an open policy toward the West. Turning to Hungary's specific problems, Baczoni said that his country is aiming at membership of GATT "and in general welcomes co-operation with international economic organizations". Collaboration between enterprises is the most rewarding form of international co-operation.

The Vice-President of the Hungarian National Bank, Janos Fekete, spoke about currency problems. He said that there is a need for a currency system which will reflect actual power relations, because economic power relations have changed since Bretton Woods. In the working out of such a system, the Comecon countries have the right to voice their opinion. He criticized American economic policy, which has "divorced itself completely from reality", a failing which also applies to the US's attitude toward the communist countries. Fekete said that refusal to increase the price of gold was

equally unrealistic, since the dollar crisis cannot be solved merely by revaluing the currencies of other countries. He repeatedly made the point that:

The situation makes the development of a new international currency system an urgent matter, because without it we are in danger of a general economic depression. All countries have an interest in the removal of this danger.

Dr Virag, the general manager of the Budapest Intercoop enterprise, stated that the Hungarian Ministry of Finance is studying the problem of establishing joint or mixed enterprises with Western firms, since "no exact guidelines exist" on this question. But, he said, quite apart from this there are many opportunities for co-operation with Western firms by means of "mutual undertakings" (joint ventures) and other forms of partnership. One interesting possibility was that of investments made through Hungarian enterprises in countries "where the Western partner is reluctant to invest directly for some reason".

Gyorgy Oblath, the general manager of the foreign trade enterprise Hungarotex, dealt with the problems of the Hungarian textile industry and its links with the West. The most successful form of international co-operation in the industry so far has been the exchange of licenses, a field in which Hungary has several well-established connections, mainly with Dutch and West German firms. It is hoped to increase textile exports to the West by 30 per cent in the near future, and an "adequate" rise in imports is also planned. Hungarian textile factories "will effect price reductions on items made through work carried out for Western firms on commission, in order to offset the cost of transferring licenses and know-how".

At the end of the conference, Baczoni made a statement to MTI in which he said that the Vienna talks had been "useful" because:

An opportunity presented itself to introduce the principles of Hungarian foreign trade policy and the major questions of trade and foreign exchange policy.... We were given a chance to provide adequate information on how far and in what direction the Hungarian system of economic mechanism will promote the development of foreign trade relations (Vilaggazdasag, 15 October 1971).

CULTURE

POP SONGS MAKE PROPAGANDA SET TO MUSIC HARD TO HEAR

Michael Goldstein

The officially approved songwriters in the Soviet Union face growing competition from foreign pop stars and nameless amateur colleagues whose songs are evidently truer to life and closer to popular sentiment. Sovetskaya kultura (June 22, 1971) sums up the problem in an article entitled "The Song and Life: Reflections on Readers' Letters". The author of the article, M. Ignateva, quotes a reader from Kuibyshev as avowing that "the Beatles are understood by and are close to millions of my contemporaries". Three readers from Gorky are reported as writing in:

We young people need recreation, and light recreation at that, since in the main, modern youth is engaged in working and studying. Then there is scientific and technical progress. One has to keep in step with everything. How can you suggest listening to and singing ballads and marches after a difficult, strenuous day?

Schoolchildren too are evidently tired of the stereotyped, martial propaganda songs they are forced to sing in the Young Pioneers and in amateur art circles as part of their political indoctrination. Ignateva observes:

.... besides incompetent persons in charge of school singing lessons or singing circles we are faced with the "hits" which are deluging children's senses in a mighty wave pouring from tape recorders, screens, stages, and phonograph records and forming a familiar and easily comprehensible acoustic background.

The names of top foreign pop singers are household words among the Soviet younger generation, and their voices are recorded on tape at every opportunity. When such singers appear in the USSR they are received with wild enthusiasm as a welcome breath of fresh air. Their songs depart from the customarily stuffy images and cant of Soviet popular music. It was significant that critic V. Lednev of Sovetskaya kultura recently ascribed the success of Caterina Valente in the Soviet Union exclusively to her professionalism, deemphasizing the content of her songs:

Whoever has seen Caterina Valente on the stage cannot fail to be struck by the extraordinary plasticity of this singer, the polish of her movements, her kind of magic ability to create an optical image of a song. (Sovetskaya kultura, June 5, 1971)

Understandably, the authorities are suspicious of any popular music which is produced without their blessing. In a reference to the letter from the Beatle fan, for example, Ignateva asks: "How can one be so sure that young people need only that kind of music?" But it is clear that the professional, established composers, who are organized in state-sponsored associations and derive substantial material benefits for placing their art at the service of the Party, are badly out of touch with the people. Their "positive heroes" simply lack ordinary human qualities, being unconvincing, cardboard figures whose sole interest appears to be to perform heroic deeds for the sake of the Party. The established composers are, of course, themselves aware of the problem. V.P. Solovev-Sedoy, a Lenin Prize Laureate and himself the composer of many easy-to-understand, melodious, and even melodramatic songs, has asked:

Where does the success of certain amateur songs lie? Above all in their vivid poetic images. A text which, as a rule, is better than the music and which is on a burning topic. The authors of the songs, the so-called bards or minstrels, are well acquainted with the psychology of their audience. They have a sure recipe for success: unrequited love, loneliness, personal frustration and an exalted romance. (Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 15, 1968)

This analysis is echoed in considerably less concrete terminology by the orthodox composer Serafim Tulikov, a Stalin Prize winner, head of the Moscow section of the USSR Composers' Union, and a delegate at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, who writes:

Are we prepared to accept a new mass audience under our influence? Not entirely, it would seem. There remains much to clarify and define in our professional medium; problems of intelligibility and democratism in art, problems of form and musical language..... We must determine the means and principles of musical expression which guarantee us close contact with our musical audience and make it possible to

inculcate and propagate lofty Communist ideals. (Sovetskaya kultura, April 15, 1971)

Tulikov harks back wistfully to the days of the Stalin personality cult, when official propaganda songs did not have the same competition from the efforts of amateurs:

We need flexible and varied forms of propaganda which correspond to the new tasks confronting Soviet art. But, while looking into the future, it does no harm to look back and recall the valuable experience of past years.... With extremely rare exceptions, today we do not find anywhere such determined, persistent propagation of even the most successful compositions. (Ibid.)

As Tulikov indicates, it is precisely because Soviet "official" music is oriented toward "inculcating and propagating lofty Communist ideals" that it is proving so unsuccessful not only at home but abroad, at international song competitions, for example. (The performances of such persons as Bulat Okudzhava are the exception which proves the rule.)

More potentially dangerous for the Soviet regime than the infiltration of foreign pop music is the spread of home-produced "samizdat" songs, particularly protest songs, whose melodies and texts are recorded on tape, jotted down in notebooks, or simply passed on by word of mouth. These songs are written by anonymous composers in Soviet prisons, labor camps, army installations, factories, and universities; they are performed in youth hostels, private apartments, in the street, in trains, on pleasure steamers, and wherever informal groups of young people gather. Usually, these songs are accompanied by guitar. Not only do they lament the more depressing aspects of Soviet reality, such as the frustrating lack of personal freedom, poor living conditions, and sordid surroundings; they also poke clever fun at the regime itself, at the Party big-shots who fence themselves off from the people in luxurious villas, making inhuman demands of the population and vague promises of a better tomorrow. These songs are outside the control of the hard-pressed censors, who sometimes even let un-Party-like ideas and sentiments creep into published work. In the journal Moskva (No. 6, 1971, p. 201) critic V. Kuznetsov, for example, complains of a poem in which the "lyric heroine suddenly experiences a desire to 'stand for a while by the light of icon lamps'"). It is worth mentioning in this connection that even back in the early years of the Soviet regime, the well-known

Soviet singer Leonid Utesov included in his repertoire ribeled songs of Odessa jail-birds. The official propaganda songs of the time were also challenged by Gypsy melodies and jazz bands, and even then "samizdat" music existed: in his book Vospitatelnaya rol muzyki (The Educational Role of Music) (Moscow, 1962, p. 59) Soviet musicologist A. Sokhor complained that "a philistine taste manifested itself in the form of the acquisition of home-made phonograph records on x-ray film with recordings of Leshchenko's vulgar ditties".

In Sovetskaya kultura (June 22, 1971), Soviet central radio workers T. Rymshevich and V. Lazarev observe in a readers' letter:

The song is the shortest distance between human hearts. It captures the mind, exerts an esthetic influence and, if you like, educates quicker than all other literary and art forms. And for the most part it educates young people.

The trouble from the Party's point of view, however, is that Soviet youth seems to be opting for the "wrong" kind of song.

(Current Developments in the Soviet Union)

SOVIET AND U.S. SCIENTISTS PLAN SEARCH FOR EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL CIVILISATIONS

Soviet and American scientists met at the Byurakan Astrophysical Observatory in Armenia from September 6 to 11 to discuss the possibility of extra-terrestrial civilisations existing and of communicating with them if they do. Their symposium was held under the joint auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and scientists from other countries were also invited to take part.

"The successes achieved in recent years in the fields of astronomy, communication, technology and cybernetics have created feasible technical possibilities for establishing contacts with extra-terrestrial civilisations, if there are any", said the well-known Soviet astronomer Victor Ambartsumyan, speaking at a press conference held at the end of the symposium.

"The fact that this meeting has been attended by prominent specialists in different fields of science indicates that the problem of extra-terrestrial civilisations has assumed very topical significance in the minds of scientists", continued Academician Ambartsumyan, who is president of the International Council of Scientific Unions.

"It has turned out to be impossible to give any convincing arguments denying in principle the possibility of a highly-developed civilisation existing outside our planet".

Prospects

Answering questions, Victor Ambartsumyan said:

"Circling round the thousands of millions of stars in our galaxy there really must be many planets, including planets with favourable conditions for the development of life and in some cases with an advanced civilisation".

"However, this question will be finally settled on the basis of further research calling for a long period of time and large funds".

He announced that the symposium had discussed a future programme of research which might result, he said, in contact being established with extra-terrestrial civilisations.

The symposium was very interested in a paper read by Soviet radio physicist Professor Vsevolod Troitsky on observations which have been made over the past three years.

During this period observations of a number of stars resembling our own Sun have been carried out by means of equipment operating in the decimetre and centimetre bands.

The scientists have been looking for powerful impulse radiation which could be a result of "astro-engineering activities" on the part of extra-terrestrial civilisations.

The symposium discussed the problems involved in discovering planets in the vicinity of the nearest stars. The view was expressed that present-day telescopes working in the infra-red band were capable of spotting such planets.

There was also the possibility of detecting planetary systems by the movements of stars caused by the revolution of planets round them. One of these efforts has already met with success and a planetary system consisting of at least two or three planets has been discovered circling round Barnard's Star, which is one of the nearest to us.

One of the valuable results of the Soviet-U.S. symposium, in the view of those taking part, was the reaching of a common view on a number of basic aspects of the problem of communicating with extra-terrestrial civilisations.

It was pointed out that if such civilisations are discovered, this may have a tremendous effect on the scientific and technological potential of mankind and have a favourable influence on its future.

Those taking part in the symposium believe that at the present stage it is advisable to discuss and co-ordinate specific programmes of work and to have a wide exchange of scientific information.

The symposium was told about an American programme based on the assumption that truly gigantic systems operating in the micro-wave band are required if contact is to be made with technically developed civilisations on distant worlds.

Many of the scientists present did not believe that this was the best way of tackling the problem, although they agreed that research in the micro-wave band was promising.

Professor Minski, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told the symposium that contact with a developed civilisation would mean communication with a highly intellectual machine-based society. This meant that we could send into space not only pulse signals of the call signal type but also special programmes for "extra-terrestrial computers" as well as television pictures of computer circuits.

The symposium's last day of work was devoted to drafting mankind's first programme for organising a search for intelligent beings in space and for establishing communication with highly-developed extra-terrestrial civilisations.

Commenting on the conference, Izvestia says that outstanding astro-physicists, radio astronomers, theoretical physicists and biologists went to Byurakan from the United States, Britain and other countries, as well as from various parts of the Soviet Union.

Anthropologists, historians, sociologists and archaeologists also took an active part in the discussions. Communication with extra-terrestrial civilisations presents a task of such tremendous scope that its solution is impossible without the creative co-operation of representatives of the most diverse sciences.

The newspaper goes on to say that all the speeches at this unusual scientific forum were marked not only by depth of approach to the questions under consideration but also by great emphasis on details and practical aspects. It might have seemed to an onlooker that what was being discussed was not distant stars and unknown worlds, but, say, the building of gas pipe-

lines of road making.

(Soviet News, London)

CULTURE PLAYS VITAL PART IN LIFE OF SOVIET MAN AND WOMEN

Call for integrated study of whole question

Culture is playing an increasingly important part in our Soviet society and is becoming a vital necessity in the lives of our men and women. This is evidence of the development of a balanced man, of having "man return to his true self as social man, i.e., human man", Professor A. Arnoldov said in an article published in Pravda recently.

The prestige of culture is very high in our socialist society, and so, consequently, is the prestige of someone with high cultural standards, he goes on.

Encouraging the desire of every man for education and high cultural standards does not only mean solving cultural problems but also an entire range of political, economic and ideological problems.

The development of productive forces and, in this connection, the increasing complexity of tools, machines and technology puts increasing demands on man. Different social formations have reacted in their different ways to this, however.

Capitalism has, in practice, led to making man into the slave of the machine.

Basic difference

Socialist civilisation, as it makes use of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, channels its efforts towards emancipating man from monotonous and heavy manual labour and seeks to turn him into the master of complicated machinery and into a dynamic and conscious participant in scientific and technological progress.

This is a basic difference between bourgeous and socialist civilisations. It is only under the conditions of socialism that the scientific and technological revolution can most clearly and consistently display its true human essence and serve the cause of both society and the individual.

This, naturally, also makes new demands on the member of

society who must, in the labour process, make the maximum use of his creative potential as he continually raises his intellectual and educational standards.

The Communist Party considers it to be one of its basic tasks at the present stage to foster a universally educated and highly cultured worker, a conscientious citizen of a new society, and to work for high standards in labour and the management of production.

Delivering the CPSU central committee report to the 24th Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said:

"A great project - the building of communism - cannot be advanced without the harmonious development of man himself. Communism is inconceivable without a high level of culture education, sense of civic duty and inner maturity of people, just as it is inconceivable without the appropriate material and technical basis".

It is well known, Professor Arnoldov continues, that in bourgeois bourgeois society, cultural polarisation increases and the "spiritual range" of its social groups, as one writer has put it, resembles "the distance between the godlike Socrates and an animal-like degenerate", while socialism is marked by entirely different processes under which the process of "polarisation" does not take place. Instead there is an approximation of the bulk of the population to the highest spiritual level. This trend can clearly be seen in an advanced socialist society.

Bourgeois society has engendered a so-called "mass culture" - the antithesis of a people's culture. The ideological role of the "mass culture" is to be seen from the fact that it is attuned not to a socially active personality but to a passive mass, not to a thinking personality but to a mediocrity, not to the creation of true cultural values but to conformism, to the spiritual standardisation of society and to the perversion of the human psyche.

In bourgeois society man is surrounded by a fence of "depreciated" culture, advertisements and superficial television programmes.

'Consumer society'

Enormous sums are spent on asserting the concept of a "consumer society" and on introducing a "spiritual mass production line" with the aim of consolidating the infantility of the

masses, of transforming man into a passive philistine with restricted intellectual aspirations and beggarly spiritual interests.

All this is presented as having the aim of making culture "intelligible" and "democratic".

Bourgeois culture, with its cynicism and the cult of violence crude greed, sadism and sex, with its contempt for everything truly humane and with its bestial hatred for progress and its bellicose anti-communism and chauvinism, seeks to deprive the individual of true human qualities, maims his moral make-up and mutilates his moral world.

The forces of progressive culture, however, are developing and growing stronger in the acute struggle against the corrupt ideology and "culture" of imperialism. They are linking their destiny with the revolutionary liberation movement of the working class and of all working people.

Under the conditions of scientific and technological advance, socialist society gives rise to a social and cultural atmosphere which creates ever wider and more favourable opportunities for the all-round development of the individual and his intellectual capacity and to apply his knowledge fruitfully, acquires special importance.

Professor Arnoldov goes on to examine cultural problems which arise under socialism.

Under socialism, he says, there is at times a certain contradiction between the abundance of information available and the extensive opportunities for meeting spiritual requirements with the capacity and ability of the individual to choose what is most valuable for his development, i.e., with his ability to select what best satisfies his intellectual interests.

We often encounter people who restrict their spiritual world and their interests, he says.

While having no desire whatsoever to belittle the role of the mass media, it must nevertheless be admitted that someone who devotes his free time every evening only to the television screen and who does not visit a library or read books loses a great deal in his development.

One-sided

A one-sided passion for detective films or detective stories, the proclamation of jazz as the only value in music, the opposing of the natural sciences to the humanities - all this can reflect

an intellectual one-sidedness and an inability to enjoy the remarkable wealth of socialist culture.

The cultural climate of Soviet society creates favourable conditions for the all-round cultural development of the individual. Each collective and each family, however, also has its own cultural microclimate, which at times comes into conflict with the progressive demands of society and hampers the development of the individual.

Obviously the various forms of the system of education and enlightenment should act more effectively here. It is a question of the continuous improvement of the scientific principles of adult education and the carrying out of a well thought out system of measures aimed at the aesthetic education and enrichment of the cultural world of man, starting with an ability to select cultural values and ending with self-discipline and self-education.

An important principle of our society is the high culture of mutual relations based on the mutual respect and comradely trust of Soviet people. The importance of creating a wholesome cultural and moral atmosphere in each collective, an atmosphere in which a principled and exacting attitude to a worker is combined with consideration and tactfulness, has increased in present-day conditions.

An important factor in the successful planning of the development of culture and the realisation of these plans is the enlistment of the broad masses in cultural construction, the raising of their activity and creative initiative, their day-by-day initiative and participation in scientific and technical innovation and in producing new, mass forms of art.

The development of the mass media allows every person - irrespective of his place of residence - to be well informed about the events of our dynamic epoch. However, this does not at all remove the problem that the cultural climate in the so-called "small" towns still differs from the intellectual life of large cities, and that the culture of the countryside still lags considerably behind the cultural level of the town.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state are striving to create an equally high level of cultural life throughout the country.

Lenin wrote that "there are absolutely no technical obstacles to the enjoyment of the treasures of science and art, which for

centuries have been concentrated in a few centres, by the whole of the population spread more or less evenly over the entire country". (Collected Works, English language edition, vol. 5, p. 154).

District centres

Today the expansion of the "geography of culture" is assuming special importance. The Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress for the Five-Year Plan point to the need to build houses of culture in all the district centres and envisage the opening of cultural-enlightenment establishments in all the large built-up areas.

What is intended here is the gradual solution of the problems which arise due to the still remaining territorial unevenness in the development of culture and the disproportion in the rates of growth in large and small towns.

The solution of problems of cultural development cannot be examined in isolation from the point of view of narrow departmental interests. What is needed is the pooling of efforts in the sphere of providing scientific and methodological guidance to cultural and educational institutions and vigorous efforts by the local Soviets to ensure a correct distribution and utilisation of cultural establishments.

These questions go beyond the range of interests of one or other organisation and call for serious and well thought out co-ordination and an integral approach from top to bottom.

A profound Marxist-Leninist theoretical working out of these questions is needed in order to make scientific forecasts of the development of culture and successfully to solve the most diverse questions of a scientifically grounded policy in the sphere of cultural development.

One can now safely speak about the emergence of a new scientific subject - the theory of culture, setting itself the task of cognising the more general laws of the development of culture and the specific laws of its establishment and progress under the conditions of building communism.

The development of this trend enables cultural workers to realise even more closely the importance of the concrete tasks they are solving in the overall process of society's spiritual transformation and to comprehend the unity and multiformity of this process both in its relative independence and its close ties with other aspects of social life.

At the same time, the working out of a Marxist-Leninist theory of culture is obviously important today for analysing the process of the de-humanisation of spiritual life in bourgeois society and criticising anti-communism and various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois concepts of a cultural-historical process, the theories of an "elite", of "mass culture" and so on.

Special importance attaches to giving the lie to all kinds of rightwing and "left" revisionist concepts of culture aimed at disarming the working people ideologically.

It is inconceivable that these problems can be solved without the co-ordination of all the forces in this co-ordination of all the forces in this sphere in the task of comprehensively working out the scientific principles of cultural policies and guidance of cultural development.

What is needed, is improved guidance of research in the state institutes of culture and the arts. Moreover, it is time to tackle in real earnest not only the scientific working out of the problems of the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture and cultural policies, but also an improvement in the training of highly skilled cadres of cultural workers.

Enhancement of the role played by cultural workers as ideological fighters calls for greater concern for them and attention to them.

Forecasting and planning

Some leading workers have not yet acquired the habit of bringing their daily practical work into accord with scientific conclusions. Yet the strengthening of ties between science and life is, indeed, a two-way traffic making certain demands on practical workers, too.

In the light of the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, the need for generalising and profoundly analysing the cultural processes taking place in our society and for seriously forecasting and planning the development of socialist culture in a scientifically grounded manner becomes particularly clear. An all-round scientific interpretation of the tasks outlined by the congress in the sphere of the development of Soviet society's spiritual life will facilitate their successful fulfilment.

SED'S NEW INSTRUMENT IN FEDERAL GERMAN UNIVERSITIES

Throughout the 18 months since efforts began to bridge the widening gulf between East and West Germany, the East German Communist Party has maintained its subversive campaign against the Federal Republic and has been in close contact with the new Communist Party (DKP) in the Federal Republic. The SED organ, Neues Deutschland, devoted a page on August 18 to the draft Theses for the DKP Congress planned to take place in Düsseldorf in November, and since the beginning of the year four DKP delegations have visited East Germany to study party organisation, cultural policy and collectivised agriculture.

The SED has recently acquired a new instrument which it has discreetly helped the DKP to develop over the past two years. This is the Marxist Student League Spartakus, which held its founding congress in the Federal Republic in May, 1971, and claims 500 members in 40 universities and colleges. The first mention of this organisation in East Germany appeared in the Communist monthly, Einheit, in February, 1970. An article criticising the student protest movement in the Federal Republic said that Left-radicalism had proved incapable of directing students' energies into "a genuine non-utopian campaign for anti-imperialist democratic renewal at the universities". Consequently it had "quickly gone the way of all pseudo-revolutionary movements". It was now necessary for "truly Marxist theory, strategy and tactics to win influence within the student movement" - a procedure which recognised that

"the main force in the campaign is not the student group but the working class, with which students must ally themselves. The aim of this strategy must not be the creation of utopian 'Socialist islands' in the form of 'liberated institutes' and 'student councils'".

Instead they must "fight the imperialist system stage by stage with the support of all possible effective allies" and must offer "practical alternatives".

Claiming that there was "growing interest in Marxist strategy among West German students", Einheit reported the formation of the League of Marxist Students Spartakus, which "acknowledges the leading role of the working class and the need for a revolutionary workers' party". It said that the new group rejected Left-radicalism and was in close touch with the DKP, which at that

time had circulated its own proposals for university reform as a basis for discussion at a rally of all student opposition groups.

The League's foundation followed many months of work by DKP officials, most of them trained in East Germany and backed up by East German student agitators and young academics who travelled round West German universities and colleges. They gradually built up numerous small groups from disillusioned members of the SDS (Socialist German Students' League) and other radical bodies who were prepared to renounce their former anarchic notions and co-operate in a disciplined organisation. When enough reliable small groups had been established, they were linked up in the centralised organisation.

Christoph Strave, the League's Chairman, was quoted in its newspaper Rote Korrespondenz Spartakus (No. 11, 1971) as saying that while the League would discuss all problems, it was "not a debating club for those misled by bourgeois pseudo-intellectuals". It would tackle "practical problems such as housing for students, better study conditions, financial assistance, etc". Its aim was "democratic control of the universities and education" but this was only part of its wider campaign to "change the social order in favour of the working class and overthrow capitalism". The League would oppose the League for Academic Freedom - a movement founded in June, 1970, by over 100 professors, lecturers, students, politicians and trade unionists to "oppose Left-radicalism at Federal German universities and safeguard the freedom of learning". It would also co-operate with the DKP and would support the party's proposals for university reform.

The League is not prepared to co-operate with "Left-sectarian" and "Maoist" groups. These, for their part, have attacked the Spartakists' organisation as "a Right-opportunist society" (Roter Pfeil, organ of the KP/Marxist-Leninist group of the University of Tübingen, No. 10, 1970).

The Communists chose an opportune moment to lauch this new organisation while the central body of West German students, the Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften (VDS), was in disarray. This made it possible for the Spartakus groups to gain influence in the Studentenschaften. The Marxist Student League already holds one of the four posts in the VDS Executive and will certainly aim to obtain more.

"LUPTA DE CLASA" ON THE "EFFICIENCY" OF LITERATURE

In its No. 9/1971, Lupta de Clasa, the theoretical monthly of the RCP, published a number of articles discussing "the measures to improve political and ideological activity and the Marxist-Leninist education of party members and of all working people". The article, signed by Paul Schuster (who writes in German) and entitled the "The Engaged Writer - Considerations of Amortizing the Investment in Culture", is an interpretation of the role of literature after the proclamation of the new ideological policy in July 1971.

Although he refuses the label, Schuster's view of the culture-society relationship is a completely utilitarian one. To his mind, culture in general and literature in particular must repay the investments made in them by the party. The "efficiency" of literature is not material but rather ideological, ethical, and moral in nature. The present situation is viewed by Schuster in the following way: discontent is being felt with the writers because that they have not produced a sufficient number of (ideologically, morally, and ethically) "valuable" books to justify the "investments made in the course of carrying out the cultural policy of the party". (It is interesting that Schuster always speaks of the investments by the party, not by the state bodies). Schuster refuses to be called a "dogmatist" or an "enemy of stylistic diversity"; he tries to give the impression of a broadminded person of wide interests: "The formal experiment cannot be regarded with contempt, but only its absolutization as the only adequate means of art.... I detest neither beat nor oneiric literature, nor do I condemn a priori the literature of the absurd". However, he does not fail to stress the fact that formal experiments must be judged primarily on the basis of their "artistic authenticity" and their "social responsibility". No writer is permitted to disbelieve in the social force of art and in the civic responsibility of the writer, according to Schuster.

Although it appeared in Lupta de Clasa, the CC political and theoretical review, Schuster's article did not adopt the style and the terms used at the July meeting of the party aktif. Obviously, he did not want either to shock the writers or to give the impression of "a return to dogmatism".

WRITERS CONTINUE TO RESIST IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

It is becoming more and more apparent that party leader Ceausescu is determined to use every possible means to carry out the new ideological and cultural policy proclaimed at the July 9 session of the RCP aktif. This has become evident in the administrative sector (the transformation of the former State Committee on Culture and the Arts (SCCA) into the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, directly under party guidance and control); in the field of political and ideological education (the recent reorganisation of the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy); and particularly in Ceausescu's policy vis-a-vis artists and writers. The opposition of a great number of Rumanian writers to the new cultural policy appears to be increasing, however, and it is difficult to see how the party, which succeeded in rallying the writers behind its foreign policy in 1968, will now force acceptance of its new, restrictive cultural policy.

The resistance of Rumanian writers may be due to a number of considerations. Since changes are expected to be made in the leading body of the Writers' Union at its Congress later this year, a number of writers may not see any need to engage themselves openly. Or perhaps the roots lie even deeper, and may reflect the fact that even some members of the party hierarchy may have reservations about the program. Some of the more moderate elements in the party leadership may fear that those segments of the population (intellectuals, youth) whose support for Rumania's foreign policy was considered indispensable in periods of tension may become alienated. However, all members of the party Executive Committee (including Maurer) have attended some of the ideological-cultural meetings of the county party committees held in past weeks, and in their speeches have supported the essentials of the party's policy in this respect.

From the beginning, a kind of passive resistance to Ceausescu's new line could be detected in the literary field. A number of prominent writers, as well as editors of the more important cultural and literary reviews, have so far refrained from taking part in the ideological campaign. Writers like Dumitru Radu Popescu, Marin Preda, Stefan Banulescu, Nichita Stanescu, and many others seem to persist in their disapproving silence. CC member Nicolae Breban has left no doubt about the motives

which prompted him to resign his post as Romania Literara's editor-in-chief. (He is also a member of the leading bureau of the Writers' Union.) In an interview with Le Monde (22 September 1971), Breban, who did not return to Rumania after his film On the Green Hills was shown at the Cannes festival, declared that his decision had been prompted by his desire "to defend the condition of the intellectuals as well as the vital interests of artists and writers". According to two Western newspapers (France's Le Monde and Italy's Corriere della Sera), open resistance to Ceausescu's policy was also expressed during his meeting with members of the Writers' Union on September 21. Although, in contrast to their usual practice, Rumanian media published only a brief report on the meeting, Le Monde (October 7) and Corriere della Sera (October 9) provided a number of particulars. According to these two journals, several writers could not be convinced of the necessity for the new ideological and cultural policy, and characterized it as "a return to Stalinism". Ceausescu is said to have categorically rejected this accusation, saying that the measures had been made necessary by the intolerable "anarchy" which had for years persisted in Rumanian literature.

In an interview published in the Sunday Times (London, October 10), Ceausescu complained that the West had failed to understand his new cultural policy, saying that it was a question of acting against intellectual and cultural "pollution". He also said that the new measures would not affect international cultural relations.

In spite of the reported protests from writers and artists, Ceausescu has continued to insist that the government has a right to interfere in matters involving literature and the fine arts. Although at the July 9 meeting he promised that administrative measures would not be resorted to in implementing his new policy, certain changes in personnel occupying key positions in Rumanian literary life have become necessary. The first of these was the appointment of a "substitute" for Nicolae Breban on Romania Literara, the most important weekly published by the Writers' Union. After Breban's resignation, Romania Literara appeared for two weeks (Nos. 39 and 40, 23 and 30 September respectively) with no editor-in-chief listed on the masthead. Its new head, it now appears, is

George Ivascu, 60, former editor-in-chief of the Bucharest weekly Contemporanul, who has been given the title of "director". Ivascu's appointment to this key position is significant for many reasons. First of all, he is an "old" communist. As a philosophy student in Iasi University, he wrote for the "antifascist" journal Manifest, and later became a contributor to George Calinescu's review Jurnalul literar: Since 1956, Ivascu has been editor-in-chief of Contemporanul, published by the State Committee on Culture and the Arts (now the Council on Socialist Culture and Education). He became a member of the SCCA in 1962, and in 1965 was appointed to the Writers' Union leading bureau (but was not re-elected in 1968). He is primarily a journalist, and (though he teaches at Bucharest University) a not-very-gifted literary historian. Compared to Luceafarul in the early 1960s and to Romania Literara between 1968 and 1970, Contemporanul gives the impression of being a "conforming" review. Ivascu fits the definition of the "ideal editor" recently formulated by Nicolae Stoian (in Scanteia, 18 August 1971): "The editor's function is a political one: he is a link in the party guidance of literature and art".

Illustrative of the new orientation of Romania Literara under Ivascu's directorship is the publication, on its first page, of a telegram addressed to Ceausescu by the participants in the meeting of the Writers' Union Party Committee. The text of this telegram was approved at a general assembly of the Writers' Union Party organisation on October 5, attended by Dumitru Popescu, the new chairman of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education. The message assured Ceausescu that the writers are ready to support the "mobilizing measures" taken by the party leader to "improve" the political and ideological education of the people "with patriotic élan and in a revolutionary spirit". According to Contemporanul (October 8), Ivascu remains a member of the review's editorial board and according to an unofficial report in Le Monde (October 7), his successor as editor-in-chief of Contemporanul is CC member Mihnea Gheorghiu, but he was not mentioned at all in the October 8 issue of Contemporanul. Gheorghiu is a first vice-chairman of the Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and an editor of Secolul XX, the Rumanian monthly devoted to foreign literature. He also became a member of the Radio and

Television Council earlier this year and he was chairman of the cultural section of the former State Committee on Culture and the Arts.

At the meeting of the party aktif on July 9, Gheorghiu sharply criticized the SCCA and condemned it for having chosen Nicolae Breban's film On the Green Hills to represent Rumanian cinematography at Cannes. He has been one of the most active promoters of Ceausescu's ideological campaign. According to Corriere della Sera, "the shifting of editors on the most important cultural reviews in Rumania forecasts, in the opinion of many observers, a change in the directorate of the Rumanian Writers' Union", whose congress is to take place at the end of December.