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IDEOLOGY

SELF-MANAGEMENT - THE BASIS OF CLASS AND NATIONAL EMANCIPATION

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Only through a socialist revolution and democratic transformation on principles of self-management and on condition that the working class pays the leading social role could Yugoslavia traverse the path, full of trials and tribulations, from a typical country of national oppression, such as she was in the period between the two world wars, to a free community of increasingly equal peoples and nationalities united of their own free will, who see in such a community their vital interest, the condition for their free national development and their own socialist prospects.

The entire experience of revolutionary movements, in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, testifies to the fact that the problems attending revolution and the socialist transformation of society cannot be resolved outside the scope of the national question. A nihilistic attitude toward the phenomenon of the nation and any underestimation of its significance can only do serious harm to the working class movement, irrespective of whether such an attitude is adopted in the name of "a pure class struggle"; abstract internationalism which aspires to present itself as a higher, supra-national interest; or ambiguous cosmopolitanism or some remote vision of a society of the future without nations or classes. Whenever a working class movement has neglected national problems and evaded the formulation of its own national policy, whenever under the guise of quasi-radicalist a national phraseology it has treated national interests as second-rate interests and national feeling as an inferior category of feeling, the result has inevitably been its estrangement from the realities of life, from its own people, from its interests and aspirations. This kind of essentially sectarian and opportunist approach can only favour the protagonists of a policy of national inequality and create scope for the activity of reactionary nationalist forces.

The social emancipation of the working class and working man and national emancipation have always been inseparable

components of the struggle of the Yugoslav revolutionary movement. The achievement of a synthesis between the class and national elements - in programme, policy and practice - has become the main criterion of the truly revolutionary character and the mainspring of strength of Yugoslav communists.

This was fully asserted in the character of our national liberation war, whose massive basis and victorious evolution can be explained, above all, by the successful achievement of a synthesis of the struggle for the national liberation and equality of our peoples and a socialist revolution.

Such an orientation resulted in the creation of the new Yugoslavia as a free federation of free nations organized on socialist foundations.

Under conditions of the existence of an organic link between the authentic interests of the working class and national interests, the country was able to cope with the year 1948, and all that came in its wake. The defence of the independence, sovereignty and freedom of our peoples, which had been jeopardized from abroad, was again linked to the defence and further development of the very essence of the socialist revolution.

On the principles of a synthesis of the class and national elements, a complex struggle for socialist self-management has been waged for the past twenty years. Every step towards strengthening the position, role and influence of the working class in terms of self-management has simultaneously been a step forward in promoting the equality, autonomy and self-management of nations.

In a new manner, the interdependence and interconnection between the development of relations in production based on self-management and internationality relations are expressed in the concept and substance of the proposed constitutional amendments.

Like a red thread, the pursuit of a synthesis of the class and national factors - in a different way during each phase - has run throughout our revolution. This general truth cannot be disputed or refuted by the generally recognized fact that, in the course of evolution of our multi-national socialist community, there have been occasional waverings, standstills and crises, inconsistencies and even disruptions in the development of productive, political and inter-nationality relations.

The concept and practice of the system of self-management and even the proposed constitutional reform start out from the fact that in a socialist system, too, the nation is a progressive socio-historical subject and a stable socio-economic, cultural and political community. Just as the modern nation is an integration of social labour and an integration of consciousness, the national interest - even under socialism - is a realistic category representing the synthesized expression of the community of interests of all those engaged in social labour and creativity.

The differences in economic and social structure, under conditions of development and within the entire complex of socio-historical circumstances, are expressed in the different structure of the interests of each nation within socialist Yugoslavia. Despite a high degree of unity of interests and the fact that they intermingle and are inter-connected, the interests of our nations in some concrete economic and other matters are not only different in many respects but are often objectively contradictory. The situation in this respect is complicated by the effects of the laws of uneven development, the marked disparities in the degree of economic development between the republics or provinces, the hitherto extensive possibilities for the transfer and alienation of the surplus product through application of methods of economic and political coercion or owing to the absence of control over tendencies on the integral market or the effects of instruments of the system and measures of economic policy, which are reflected in different ways in various economic, social and national environments. Problems in the sphere of movement of the surplus product were thus ever-present, assuming in some cases the form of acute controversies. It is around these questions that the vital interests of both the working class and each nation have been concentrated. This has influenced inter-republican or inter-nationality relations in many ways.

It is a natural aspiration of each nation and of the working class, as its leading force, to manage itself and to be the master of its fate; to possess the necessary conditions for the full realization of the right to self-determination, unrestricted in any way; to exercise its sovereignty, to have its own state, to be independent in economic, political and cultural life; to enjoy an equal position in the socialist community and other

conditions for unhindered, free development. Also, the working class and working people of each nation in Yugoslavia are vitally interested in ensuring all the essential prerequisites of economic independence; in controlling the conditions, means and fruits of their work; in disposing independently with the surplus product which they create and in deciding on the global expansion of productive forces; in thus consolidating the basis and determining independently the policy of development of their economic and social life and national culture and in fully asserting their own potentials and creativity. These and related questions determine the substance of an organic link between the interests of the working class and national interests under conditions of self-management, of socialist social development. These premises served as the starting position for the elaboration of the proposed changes in the system of political, inter-nationality and socio-economic relations.

Inter-nationality relations in our country have always - during all phases of development - shared the fate of self-management and particularly of relations of self-management in production and income distribution. It is on the real position of the working class in those relations, especially in the sphere of expansion of society's productive forces, that the degree of the equality of nations and nationalities, of the autonomy of the republics and provinces and the state of affairs in inter-republican relations have depended to a decisive degree.

Stagnation or obscured prospects in the development of self-managed production and socio-economic relations invariably increased friction and aggravated problems in inter-nationality relations.

When on the basis of the state's monopoly over property, federal statist centralism achieved a high concentration of economic, financial, legislative and political power, it not only maintained the organizations of associated labour, in a state of dependence, not only restricted the scope for free action by them and hampered the strengthening of the material basis of self-management, but at the same time took over a large part of the sovereign jurisdiction of the republics and restricted the autonomy and responsibility of nations for their own development and the fate of the entire community.

Centralized statism was the source of many national problems.

These were reflected, inter alia, in the alienation of the surplus product by administrative methods and in its transference to others; in the struggle for a share of the "federal cake"; in real and often ostensible national injustices; in the creation of a feeling that each contributed more than it received; in the levelling off and standardization of many solutions in social and national environments differing considerably in structure; in disintegrating tendencies; in various local or special interests assuming the guise of national interests even when there was no connection between them, etc.

This is why the reform of relations in the federation, the radical restriction of the functions of the federal state, and stripping federal statism of its power also create scope for strengthening the position and influence of self-managing associated labour and for reinforcing the self-managed position of nations, that is, the role of the republics as autonomous socio-political subjects. Many mystifications surrounding the real nature of the general, class and national interests are about to be dispelled.

Under the proposed constitutional reforms, the restriction of the power of federal statism will gain momentum. The orientation towards giving the republics a new quality and far greater autonomy, towards their assertion as states and social communities, has already taken on the character of a process which cannot be checked. Thus - even if until recently there might have been some justification for asking: which type of statism is worse - the federal or republican type, there is very little if any today.

The questions which emerge in the forefront are: on what productive and political relationships will national emancipation be promoted and, depending on the answer to this question, what will be the social substance of the sovereignty and statehood of the republics? In other words, which social interests will basically determine the national interests, which social forces will "rule" the nation or exert a decisive influence on the shaping of national policy? Will the relations, forces and ideology of socialist self-management become increasingly prevalent throughout the base of society and within the frame-

works of each republic or will the positions of statist and technocratic-bureaucratic monopoly gain ground?

The extent to which socialist self-management will become the basis not only of class but national emancipation and the main factor in the realization of the synthesis of class and national interests depends on the courses and results of this struggle. Strengthening the socio-economic position of associated labour, particularly in the sphere of expanding society's productive forces, and the decisive influence of the working class and self-managed social base on all the centres of political decision-making is in our conditions the only reliable path for the pursuit of authentic national interests and promotion of the essential equality of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia. This is the path leading to the self-managed integration of Yugoslav society.

Contrary to this, if in real life the course leading to centralized decision-making at republican level, to the strengthening of state-ownership and group-ownership and the linking of centres of political power with the monopolies of economic power, were to prevail, then the mediatory role of political representatives and administrative structures would be converted into domination over the working class and over the nation. Political, administrative-managerial and cultural élites would take over the monopoly of representing the national interest. In the context of such relations, the basis of direct democracy would inevitably be narrowed and democratic freedoms restricted; apart from this the consequences would include the "rallying of nations", and confrontations in the name of both real and illusory national interests; national obsessions of every kind; the appearance of "leaders" and self-styled vanguardism and similar. Such situations are fertile soil for the escalation of nationalist prejudice and pressures.

If it were to gain strength and prevalence within a republic, bureaucratic statism would take on the form of hegemony over others - whenever and as much as this is possible - depending on its power and available means. While restricting and distorting productive and political relations within its own nation, republican statism would also impair relations between our peoples; acting from the positions of "the right of the stronger" or entrenching itself within republican boundaries in

the name of independence.

It can therefore be said without fear of exaggeration that under conditions of administrative socialism and in a bourgeois society the emancipation of a nation is seen mainly in its statization, in the strengthening of the might of a republican state, separate from the development of socialist self-management and direct democracy and separate from the strengthening of the social position and influence of the working class.

The working class is unable to clear the path to its own emancipation in a nation which is not free itself. Every programme and policy of social emancipation of the working class and human personality must encompass national emancipation as one of its fundamental prerequisites. The real, essential and long-term interests of a nation are at the same time the interests of its working class. Any act jeopardizing vital national interests jeopardizes the interests of the working class. And one may say, conversely, - the interests of the working class under self-managing socialism constitute the social substance of the national interest. However, these two mutually conditioned and organically linked interests cannot be considered - for some time yet - as being identical, primarily because of the heterogeneous character of the socio-economic, social, political and ideological structures and tendencies within each nation.

The interests and aims of the working class transcend the frameworks of national freedoms. They are not the only or highest range of man's freedom in a society which is developing relations on the principle that "the free development of each individual is the condition for the free development of all". For this reason, the working class and its political movement cannot confine their class platform to a national platform. The associated producers are therefore always specially interested in the substance and course of development of relationships in production which underly national relations. This is why they focus attention on the social and class meaning of national emancipation.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

FRENCH COMMUNIST MOURNS PRAGUE SPRING

Summary: The French Communist intellectual Pierre Daix has published in the cultural magazine Les Lettres Françaises, which he edits, an extremely outspoken preface which he has contributed to the French edition of Pavel Kohout's book, Diary of a Counter-revolutionary - which repressive "normalization" has kept from the Czechoslovak public for which it was written. Daix hails Kohout as a prophet and protagonist of the Prague Spring, which he sees as a process of national renewal and socialist renaissance after the corruption, police tyranny and bureaucratic degeneration of the Novotny regime.

In French Communist circles one no longer hears or reads much about the Prague Spring and the invasion that doomed its hopes. Most of those prominent French Communists who continued to regard the invasion as a betrayal of socialism have left, or been expelled from the PCF - Garaudy, Tillon and Noirot are obvious examples. Solidarity with the CPSU is again the watchword of the party. If the occasion arises, party spokesmen will explain that, of course, the party's "disapprobation" of the Warsaw Pact "intervention" remains unchanged; but that, equally of course, this does not and should not prevent the PCF from maintaining warmly fraternal relations with the Soviet and Czechoslovak Communist parties.

There are, however, some encouraging exceptions to this dismal pattern - men and women who have remained members of the PCF while continuing to fight, as effectively as circumstances allow, for the values of "socialist democratization" which flourished in Czechoslovakia in 1968. An outstanding example is Pierre Daix, Editor-in-chief of Louis Aragon's literary weekly, Les Lettres Françaises. Although it normally deals only with strictly cultural affairs, the review under Daix has reacted with condemnation and protest to the successive stages of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. One recalls in particular the occasion when Les Lettres Françaises published, and Aragon roundly condemned, the infamous circular which the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior, Hrbek, sent to university rectors and deans, commanding them to submit reports on the "right-wing" opinions or activities of colleagues

and students. (1)

The current issue of Les Lettres Françaises contains an article by Daix, in which he is more outspoken than ever in his exaltation of the Prague Spring and in his denunciation of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime which preceded it, as well as of the enforced "normalization" which followed it. (2) It is, in fact, not really an article but the preface which Daix has contributed to the French edition of the book, Diary of a Counter-revolutionary, by his friend, the now-silenced Czechoslovak writer, Pavel Kohout (3) - and to say that is to say just where Pierre Daix stands in the complex struggle over ideas and values that cuts across national and party boundaries.

Prophet and Protagonist

The Journal may rank as the most impressive literary work to come out of the euphoric springtide of Czechoslovak reform. Using novelistic and dramaturgic techniques with practiced skill, it presents the complex political drama in personal terms, and on three levels, so to say. There is, first, an absorbing account of the historic events of 1968, and of Kohout's part in them, told in the form of extracts from "the diary of the writer PK". This alternates with the two other "levels". One presents aspects of, and reflections on, the invasion of 21 August and the events that followed, through the first-person account of a Czechoslovak Communist who was in Italy when the Soviet tanks entered Prague. The third "level" gives a graphic picture of post-war Czechoslovakia - the imposition by satellite leaders of a Stalinist system, with all the trappings of dogmatism, power-intrigues, police terror and cynical bureaucracy - told through the episodic, first-person account of a young Czechoslovak Communist, whose career seems to offer parallels with that of Kohout.

- (1) See Louis Aragon, "D'un questionnaire", Les Lettres Françaises, 8-14 October 1969, p. 3.
- (2) Pierre Daix, "La frontière de Pavel Kohout", Les Lettres Françaises, 5-11 May 1971, p. 3-4.
- (3) Kohout's book has so far appeared only in a German edition, "Aus dem Tagebuch eines Konterrevolutionäers!" published in 1969 by the Swiss firm, C. J. Bucher, Luzern. It was to have appeared simultaneously in the original Czech edition, according to the contract Kohout made with two Prague publishing houses; but "normalization" put an end to that project. Kohout returned to Prague from Switzerland in October 1969; shortly afterwards the police confiscated his passport. He has been repeatedly attacked by regime media.

Daix begins his preface to the French edition with a moving sketch of Kohout as prophet and protagonist of the movement toward "socialism with a human face", recalling the role he played at the historic congress of the Writers' Union in 1967, when he read out the proudly defiant letter which Solzhenitsyn, in his lonely integrity, had addressed in vain to the Soviet writers' congress. With that act (for which, inter alia, he incurred party sanctions, later lifted by the Dubcek leadership) Kohout "crossed a frontier", says his French Communist admirer - the frontier between two conceptions of what socialism is, or ought to be. On one of the three "levels" the book is the story of how one man discovered that frontier - one man who once dreamed of revolution, and then (as Daix puts it) for twenty years experienced "the crumbling away, the decomposition, the putrefaction of his dream" through a reality which left "his revolution disfigured, debased, emptied of its meaning; perhaps betrayed; in any case denied".

Daix relates the semi-fictional and artistically shaped retrospect to the lived reality:

At the heart of this diary, as in the heart of this man, there is a great moment when all is at stake, between two meetings typical of the style peculiar to the Prague Spring, which was a decisive political invention: not just a restoration of socialist democracy but a renewal of it. At first it was a question of making it possible for each individual to put to those in authority all the questions which preoccupied him - this in a country in which no one had been able to pose questions for twenty years.

The first of these meetings..... was held on 20 March 1968, two days before the resignation of Antonin Novotny. Broadcast in full, it was the true signal that the Spring had begun. The second took place..... on 15 January 1969, to commemorate the anniversary of the Central Committee session of January 1968 which started the process of renovation. That was the time of the death of Jan Palach, and, in the occupied country, the Spring was no more than a memory, (its champions) still in power, but its days numbered, as everyone knew.

Pavel Kohout was among those who answered questions at both meetings. The last one put to him on the second occasion

- a moving detail revealed by Daix - was from his own 16-year-old son:

After January you began to say that you were building socialism with a human face. I would like you to explain to me: what sort of socialism were you in fact building before that?

"Supreme Crime"

Departing from this crucial question, Daix offers his own analysis of Novotny's "strange empire of incompetence". It is a drab picture of corruption and of the power that corrupts - of a society in which "all life is blighted" by the covering up of the "supreme crime" of the hangings of 1951-54. Moreover, Novotny himself was a product, rather than the cause, of this process of degeneration:

If, with the efflorescence of the Spring, the individual Novotny was caught in the glare of the search-lights, it was because, through his autocracy, he formed an obstacle to political change. Here, moreover, one sees that if a country does not always have the leaders it deserves - for example, because of the pressures of powerful neighbors - the head of a party is always similar to those who hold the levers of power in that party. If Novotny was able to attain the absolute, unsocialist, unconstitutional monarchy which he did enjoy, it is not only because he had the trust of the "Great Ally" (as Kohout puts it), but because the Czechoslovak Communist Party of the resistance and of February 1948 had been shattered by the trials and purges which followed. When Novotny, who had already been head of the party since the arrest of Slansky, took over the highest state post in 1957, he was by nature the incarnation of the interests of a bureaucracy for whom the 20th (CPSU) Congress was not a synonym for the revival, the moral and intellectual renaissance of socialism, but on the contrary stood for disorder, anarchy and danger - just look at Budapest.

Degeneration and Corruption

Pierre Daix, we learn, can make a personal contribution to this story of men morally deformed by a power-structure which

they helped to create. He had, it seems, known both Novotny and his lieutenant, Hendrych, during the wartime struggle against Nazism; and the knowledge leads him to pass withering judgement on the latter:

One will find here the portrait of the No. 2 man, Jiri Hendrych, who in 1967 was responsible for ideology, and hence was the manipulator of the Writers' Congress. It happens that I knew Hendrych, as well as Novotny, in the Mauthausen concentration camp. But if between the Novotny of those days and the Novotny of 1968 the line of development is, to my eyes, clear and continuous, the Hendrych with whom I collaborated in the resistance organization in May-June 1944 and the whom Kohout shows at work in June 1967 and June 1968 have in common no more than certain gestures and ways of doing things. It is not a matter of simply growing older. It is a degeneration (dénaturation)... The political malady of the regime led to the blindness of those who controlled it, at least as much as the malady was the consequence of their blindness, their sickness. And the Spring really was the cure. The healing of the regime: the chance of health for those who had served it - at least for those in whom the malady was not incurable....

It was against this regime, marked by pervasive "corruption and its accompaniment, blackmail", that the writers - "intellectuals immured in the gilded prison of those who profited from the regime through their privileges" - it was against this that the writers raised the standard of battle in 1967:

One cannot understand the conduct of the writers, but also of the politicians, the Communist of the Prague Spring, if one does not see that foremost among their preoccupations was the will to break with caste privileges which symbolized connection with the political bureaucracy, its sharing out of power, its corruption. In the last analysis, it was a question of regaining the confidence of the people.

"Thunderbolt of the 2, 000 Words"

From his discussion of that historic congress of the Writers' Union in 1967, when Kohout, Vaculik and Liehm finally spoke out, heedless of "all the taboos, all the weight

of material privileges, but also that of the omnipresent State Security (police)", with the result that "the whole edifice of lies" began to collapse - from this, Daix passes on to "the intervention of Ludvik Vaculik a year and a day later, the thunderbolt of the Two Thousand Words":

Those who sent into Czechoslovakia three tanks and 300 soldiers for each one of those words knew what that manifesto meant; and in rereading it today one is astounded by its clarity and simplicity - its naked truth. Vaculik, who in 1967 had told the people that they must see to it that revolutionary power was restored to them, told them a year later.... that it depended on them whether the practical conditions for this new start would be completed - that is, that corruption be finally eliminated, that democracy triumph over bureaucratic resistance in the Communist Party; that the nation take up socialism.

(One can only comment that this view of the Two Thousand Words manifesto is not shared by the leadership of the French Communist Party.)

"A Moral Civil War"

In the face of this invasion, Daix concludes, the Czechoslovak reformers proved that "they were not only for socialism with a human face, but simply for socialism - that it may have a future". And this leads him on to a wider and more provocative conclusion:

In doing this, they did more. They revealed to the world that there really was a war going on, a fratricidal civil war, a moral civil war. A war between the hope and the non-hope of socialism, a war between the will-to-change-the-world and the refusal-to-change-the-world-because-it-was-changed-once-and-for-all-in-1917. Jan Palach is the Unknown Soldier of this war. A known soldier, but essentially unknown if one thinks of all the deaths of this war - those who have died, those who are to die, but all forming a single death: the death of their hope, the death of their morale, the death of their socialism.

This is an intellectual civil war, in which one massacres ideas, dreams, springtides. Let us be on guard... if we

want to change the world, we must take sides.

Pierre Daix, for one, has clearly taken sides; and his position in the firing-lines is not far from those taken by his compatriots, Garaudy and Tillon, of Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek in Austria, of the Manifesto proto-party in Italy, of Teodoro Petkoff in Venezuela. His outspoken preface to the French edition of Kohout's explosive work, as much as the activities and utterances of these and other rebels against "normalization", supports his own contention that the shock-waves caused by the invasion of Czechoslovakia nearly three years ago are still shaking the international Communist movement, or important sectors of it - and that no armistice is in sight in this "moral civil war".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

ERNST FISCHER: THE REVOLUTION IS DIFFERENT

Summary: Ernst Fischer's latest book, a collection of ten questions and answers relating to modern communist theory and practice, has just appeared in West Germany. In Die Revolution ist anders, the Austrian theoretician expresses his conviction of the necessity for dynamic development in the sphere of "leftist politics". The following report surveys several of the questions and answers in this volume.

Ernst Fischer, the doyen of progressive Western Marxist theoreticians, proclaimed at the time of his expulsion from the Communist Party of Austria (KPOe) in October 1969 that he would "continue to champion outside the Party that which is no longer possible within the Party". (1) This month, his latest contribution to this crusade was published by the West German Rowohlt Verlag: a volume entitled Die Revolution ist anders (The Revolution is Different) in which Fischer replies to ten questions addressed to him by a Bremen school class. The dominant theme of Fischer's answers is his oft-stated conviction that the potentials of leftist politics have been smothered

(1) In an interview with Austrian radio, 15 October 1969.

by the dogmatism of their Soviet variation and by the projection of a Soviet hegemony upon the rest of the communist world.

The first question posed to Fischer by the pupils reads: "Do you see a parallel between your expulsion from the Party and the removal from all his significant Party offices of the important French Marxist Roger Garaudy?" Fischer's affirmative answer is given in terms of the process of normalization. Moscow and its allies, he says, consider the following situation "normal":

The communist parties must support the Russian great power policies, approve of and justify every diplomatic or military action, not permit any criticism of dogmas or methods.

Neither Fischer nor Garaudy adhere to these rules of the game, of course, and this represents the common denominator of their expulsion from their respective CPs and, not incidentally, of their being damned by the East. But they are not the only ones to be effected by this Soviet Weltanschauung. Introducing the reason behind these "rules", Fischer says:

As absurd as it is, I assume that their fear of a leaflet on the Red Square, of a critical article in a communist journal, of communism without censorship, is not faked, but rather genuine. They fear nothing as much as an autonomous revolutionary movement.

Here Fischer touches on what is to be a main theme in his answers to the more theoretical questions which follow: the necessity of autonomy from Soviet state interests and their corollaries at the party level.

The Possibilities of Leftist Politics

Fischer devotes the most time to answering the second question: "What possibility do you see for leftist politics in the capitalist countries?" Defining "leftist" in general terms (someone who encourages expanding democratic rights, supports the weak against the strong, aspires to improved social security, who struggles against poverty and for equal educational opportunities, et al.), Fischer then moves on to the basic Marxist issue of the class struggle and class consciousness. His thesis is that:

The structure of the industrial society and, with it, of the working class, has, since Marx analyzed them, changed so fundamentally, that not only the preconditions but the possibilities of revolutionary politics as well are thoroughly different from 100 or 50 years ago.

For example, Marx' classification of "productive" and "commercial" workers is no longer applicable; today, one must include those in the service sector and "a myriad of intermediate and transitional levels". Likewise, the ratio of rural to urban population (and related professions) has shifted tremendously since Marx' days. Under present conditions, Fischer concludes, the intellectuals, for example, have become true members of the working class. Thus, as Antonio Gramsci would have it, a new historical bloc must be formed between the workers, in the classical sense, and the intellectuals.

The phenomenon of class consciousness, Fischer asserts, is likewise a very different matter today from what it was 50 years ago. As the clearly identifiable classes of the past have disappeared, so too has the possibility of developing an identification with a particular class position. Instead, Fischer says, it is a matter of developing a "social consciousness", a consciousness of one's society "in contrast to the consciousness of those who are interested in their profit; their power, their lack of responsibility".

While Fischer embraces the classical Marxist assumption of the presence of system-related conflicts in the capitalist order, he notes that that order has learned to cope with its problems in such a manner that a revolutionary élan no longer prevails among the workers. This lack of revolutionary impulse within the workers, he says, is

aggravated by the lack of a socialist model; Yugoslavia is too underdeveloped a country; the socialist democracy which was evolving in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was put down from outside; the suppression of every freedom of opinion in the Soviet Union and other "socialist" countries, this deformation of a great idea, serves the profit economy more than does any reactionary propaganda.

The degree to which the Soviet Union has suffocated this revolutionary leftist potential in the Western world is then

stated, with direct reference to the Prague Spring. Since Stalin's time, in Fischer's estimation, it has been normal procedure in the Soviet Union to invent theoretical reasons, after the fact, for political decisions which contradict the nature of socialism.

Brezhnev is no different, proclaiming after the attack on socialist Czechoslovakia, which contradicted all the basic principles of socialism, that it was the duty of proletarian internationalism to subordinate the autonomy of individual socialist states to the over-all interests of the Warsaw Bloc and, in order to preserve these over-all interests, to move in, with armed force if necessary, so as to provide "fraternal aid" to the "true" communists. The principle of independence and equal rights of all the communist parties was thus overturned; the "over-all interests" always identical with the power-political interests of the Soviet Union justify the military suppression of any upstart party, as well as the division which Moscow has contrived of heroic illegal parties such as the Greek and Spanish (parties).

Fischer's response to this situation is not resignation but an impulse toward renewal. Independent leftist groups, for example, are seen as potentially useful contexts for genuine revolutionary activity. Likewise, the trade unions are singled out as fertile ground for sowing the seeds of revolution. What is important in the final analysis is not, Fischer asserts, membership in a particular party or group, but the willingness to engage in total revolutionary commitment, and "always to put the over-all interest of the working class before one's own prestige and leadership claims".

Dictatorship of the Proletariat?

Examining the idea today of instituting a dictatorship of the proletariat, Fischer turns first to the Paris Commune ("rich with revolutionary tendencies, but not with experience as to how such a system further develops"), and then to the Soviet Union. With Stalin's rise to power, "what had begun as a dictatorship of the proletariat became a dictatorship of great Russian chauvinists". While this is often explained away by communist apologists as a manifestation of a "revolution of

a specific sort" in the Soviet Union, Fischer asks if, in fact, there can ever be any other sort of revolution than a specific one, under specific circumstances. For example,

in general in the modern industrial society, the revolution which wins in one blow and considers a dictatorial regime necessary to secure this victory has become unlikely.

Developing this thesis, which bears strong resemblance to Roger Garaudy's assessment of revolution in modern society, (2) Fischer sees the factor of power as having become not only more concentrated but more complicated. Therefore, "in the highly organized industrial society, and organized force is necessary so that the revolutionary movement does not miss its chances". The question is, however, what sort of force this should be. Fischer assumes that "the demand for a dictatorship, whether it is called a dictatorship of the proletariat or an educational dictatorship or whatever, encourages the dictatorial and paralyzes the democratic tendencies":

Thus, from the very beginning it is a matter of guaranteeing the members (of such a force) a maximum of democratic decision among alternatives, of encouraging forms of direct democracy, democracy from below, control from below, the possibility of calling leading comrades to responsibility, and limiting the apparatus and constantly renewing it.

In addition to this politically motivated insight, there exists a second "behavioral" reason for questioning the viability of a dictatorship of the proletariat, the basic thesis of which is: the revolutionary party or society or confederation must anticipate through its example the society to which it aspires.

The contradiction between this basic thesis, founded in historical materialism, and "dictatorially structured parties which . . . are only good for setting up dictatorial regimes" is evident. In the final analysis, Fischer concludes, it is necessary to recognize the risk which any regime runs of turning the corner to a dictatorship, and therefore not to aim for a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a euphemistic reformulation for dictatorship of a party, a power apparatus, but rather in the revolutionary movement itself to secure a maximum of democracy, initiative and critical thought, of revolutionary "pluralism".

(2) See "Garaudy: Reconquest of Hope", East-West Contacts, May 1971.

Moscow and Peking

Another reason why "the revolution is different" results from the lack of unity in the international communist movement and the tensions which accompany it. Fischer traces the roots of this conflict to the opposition of Yugoslavia to Moscow's rule, Palmiro Togliatti's theory of "unity in diversity", through the Sino-Soviet split, to the effects which the "attack on Czechoslovakia" had on the Western parties: it "led to the split of the Greek and Spanish CPs, to the collapse of the KPOe, to the expulsion of communists who did not recognize Moscow as the supreme authority".

The tension within the international movement arises, in Fischer's estimation, from the fact that the idea of a "communist 'world party'" was a fallacy from the very beginning, bearing no relation to different situations in various countries and continents, and promoting "Russian great power policy and proletarian internationalism as synonyms".

Comparing China and the Soviet Union, Fischer concludes that:

What is happening today in the Soviet Union is no longer, as it once was, world history, but merely world politics; what is happening in China is world history, the dawning of socialism in the "Third World".

While hardly an appropriate candidate for the label of "Maoist", Ernst Fischer cannot conceal his respect for what he calls an "impressive attempt not to conform to the "Establishment" (i. e., Moscow), not to regard the given as the necessary and to jump beyond the present".

Here, as throughout this book of questions and answers on the modern communist situation, the "spoiler" in international Marxism emerges as its first proving ground, the Soviet Union. As he says elsewhere in the book, (3)

the military attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the end of the last illusions about the Soviet Union as socialism's "guiding light".

But Ernst Fischer and the other Western communists who share his assessment of the state of world communism today are continuing, without that "guiding light", their pursuit of the elusive ideal of democratic socialism.

(3) In answer to the question, "Has the world capitalist system stabilized itself?", p. 68.

THE SOVIET UNION, THE UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Soviet Union has consistently abstained from or opposed any proposals to extend the United Nations' rôle in preventing the violation of human rights.

The Soviet attitude towards human rights has come under critical scrutiny as minority groups and ordinary citizens have begun to demand basic rights so far denied them. The Soviet Union's poor record on human rights, now being increasingly exposed, is paralleled by its obstructive attitude to human rights development within the United Nations.

Since 1948, when the Soviet Union abstained from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has opposed all efforts to enlarge the UN rôle in this field. Recently, with its Communist allies, it prevented action on two proposals: the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights and of machinery to deal with individual petitions. The ruthlessness of Soviet tactics to obstruct progress has shocked even those UN members accustomed to Soviet political manoeuvring.

Individual petitions

Procedure for dealing with individual petitions and communications alleging violation of human rights has since 1968 been discussed in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Human Rights Commission and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. At present no effective machinery exists to deal with the estimated 14,000 petitions annually addressed to the Secretary-General. They are forwarded, normally without the name of the writer, to the government concerned for comment. More often than not, no comment is made. Nevertheless, a confidential list of communications received by the Secretary-General is presented to the Human Rights Commission at its annual session in February-March. No action is known ever to have been taken.

Under new proposals, a working group of five drawn from the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities would meet annually to consider privately communications received by the Secretary-General with replies by governments. Those complaints revealing "a

consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights" would be referred first by the Sub-Commission to the Human Rights Commission and then to ECOSOC. If the government concerned agreed the Human Rights Commission would be empowered to set up a committee of investigation. Proceedings would remain confidential until the Commission made recommendations to ECOSOC.

Such machinery would be a logical sequel to the ECOSOC decision of June, 1967, authorising the Human Rights Commission to investigate situations revealing a consistent pattern of violations of human rights, and the Sub-Commission to bring similar cases to the attention of the Human Rights Commission. So far, however, both bodies have been hampered because a "consistent pattern" of violations needs to be shown. This has necessitated individual members of the Sub-Commission or the Human Rights Commission taking the initiative in raising and presenting such cases. Under the new proposals, these cases would be revealed through the special scrutiny given to communications by the Sub-Commission's working group and would be more likely to find their way up to the Human Rights Commission and ECOSOC.

The new procedure, which most UN members regard as a modest step forward in the protection of human rights, has been opposed by the Communist States at all stages, on the basis of a strict interpretation of Article 2 of the UN Charter which forbids UN intervention in matters "essentially" within domestic jurisdiction. In fact, most members consider that sovereign rights would be adequately safeguarded under the new procedure since no investigation into an alleged violation could take place without permission of the government concerned. Moreover, UN feeling tends increasingly towards the view that the protection of human rights should transcend national boundaries. The former British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, pointed out in the General Assembly on October 14, 1968, that Article 56 of the UN Charter "makes it clear that no country can say that the human rights of its citizens are an exclusively domestic matter". *

* Article 56 pledges member States "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the United Nations" to achieve, among other things, universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language or religion.

The feeling that the new procedure dealing with individual petitions would help to guarantee the principles set out in the UN Charter, was clearly shown in July, 1969, when the Secretary-General asked governments to comment. Among Western and developing countries who supported the new procedure, Finland described it as a "modest but positive attempt to promote the application and implementation of the norms and standards set forth in international instruments relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms". The Philippines thought it would "contribute significantly" to the implementation of UN resolutions and declarations on human rights. Norway observed that the procedure "may give some reassurance to all those who have earlier turned to the UN with their complaints and received little comfort".

Soviet opposition

The USSR not only "categorically opposed" the procedure on the grounds that it would amount to interference in domestic affairs, but also claimed to see behind the idea "the desire of certain States to use the UN not for the development of friendly relations among its members but for the organization of all kinds of hostile and slanderous actions against State members of the UN".

Nevertheless, the proposals were carried a stage further at the ECOSOC meeting in 1970, when a resolution authorised the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to set up its working group to consider private petitions and instructed it to devise, at its 22nd session in August-September, 1970, "appropriate procedures" for dealing with communications. The Sub-Commission, however, was prevented from taking action by the filibustering tactics of Rybakov and Federov, whose presence as Soviet representatives in any case contravened the Sub-Commission's terms of reference, which state that members should serve in a purely personal capacity. They are both Soviet Foreign Ministry officials and members of the Soviet Union's permanent mission to the UN.

The Sub-Commission began its 22nd session on August 10 with 11 agenda items: in three weeks it had dealt with only three, mainly because of Soviet time-wasting. Rybakov and

Federov intervened in debate 145 times, frequently straying from the subject. On August 19, for instance, during a debate on the elimination of racial discrimination, Rybakov discoursed irrelevantly on the events leading up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. On other occasions, the Russians imputed to speakers statements they never made, spending an hour repudiating the alleged remark. When the original speakers defended themselves, the Soviet representatives wasted more time in conceding that they might have been mistaken. They also tabled numerous amendments of questionable merit - Mr. Santa Cruz (Chile), who had prepared a special study on the elimination of racial discrimination, complained that many of Rybakov's amendments either did not correspond with the findings of the study, duplicated existing paragraphs, or seemed unnecessary. Other Soviet time-wasting tactics included frequent demands for roll-call votes and for separate votes on individual paragraphs of resolutions.

When the item dealing with individual petitions was eventually reached on August 26 (two days before the end of the session), Rybakov moved an adjournment in an attempt to prevent discussion. He repeated this demand next day, when he also proposed that no decision should be taken, disputed the Chairman's ruling on August 27 that there should be a time limit on speeches, and finally argued that the Sub-Commission had no mandate to set up a working group to consider private petitions. Other delegates pointed out that under the earlier ECOSOC resolution, the Sub-Commission's terms of reference were "perfectly clear". The French representative, M. Paolini, added that he had "difficulty in understanding the attitude of certain members". He reminded Rybakov that ECOSOC had authorised the Sub-Commission to set up a working group because the Sub-Commission had itself agreed to such a procedure at an earlier session.

By August 28 it was obvious that no progress was possible: members had to defer the entire question to the next session in August, 1971.

High Commissioner proposal

A few weeks later, the Soviet Union and its allies again dis-

rupted UN business when in the Third Committee of the General Assembly they tried to prevent the establishment of a post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, first proposed by Costa Rica at the General Assembly's 20th session in 1965. A resolution calling for a High Commissioner has been on the agenda of the Third Committee for the last four years, but has still not been fully debated as a result of Soviet tactics. At the General Assembly's 25th session in 1970, when it was obvious that if the resolution was put to the vote it would probably be carried, the Communist States again filibustered. So much so that by the beginning of December, with two weeks left of the three month session, the Committee had dealt with only three of the 15 agenda items.

Rybakov, in his efforts to prolong the debate, provoked quarrels with Western and some African representatives. The Communist filibuster was aided by Saudi Arabia and, more particularly, by the bias of the Romanian Chairman Miss Groza. After permitting time-wasting tactics for ten weeks, she supported a Communist manoeuvre which cut the number of meetings earmarked for the High Commissioner item from seven to five. On December 1, she suggested that the number should be reduced to four - a revision of work which, as the Netherlands delegate pointed out, could hardly be regarded as "normal", particularly as supporters of the High Commissioner issue had already compromised over the item's position on the agenda: they had urged at the beginning of the session that the proposal be given the "highest priority" in accordance with a General Assembly resolution of 1969. Faced with Communist opposition and the prospect of a lengthy procedural wrangle, however, they had compromised: the subject was allocated fourth place.

In the ensuing debate Miss Groza ignored both the Senegalese and French delegates when they attempted to table motions which would have allotted seven meetings to the item. At one point, the proceedings became so heated that the session was suspended. But on resuming, the Chairman continued to refuse to put the French motion to the vote. Instead the Russians and their allies were allowed to launch an irrelevant attack on the American Press and to give a lengthy explanation of their votes on the French motion before the vote had been taken. As the French delegate complained, their speeches amounted not so much to explanations of vote as to "appeals to other members of the Committee to vote in a particular way".

Obstruction

The Saudi Arabian delegate had already threatened that he would use obstructive tactics to ensure that consideration of the High Commissioner item was never completed. He carried out this threat during the general debate when he spoke on the French Revolution, ancient Greek democracy, the Russian Revolution, desegregation in the United States, the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising before dealing with the post of High Commissioner (which he described as "a farce or a sinecure").

If the post is created, the High Commissioner's function would be to receive complaints from individuals and groups that their rights have been violated. He would be empowered to approach the government concerned and seek permission to investigate. The High Commissioner would work in close consultation with the UN Secretary-General and with existing human rights bodies. He would be assisted by a panel of experts of different nationalities and legal backgrounds. Costa Rica, the original proposer of the post, has said that a High Commissioner "may not be properly considered as an international 'ombudsman', nor as a judge", but that his rôle would be to ensure the promotion of respect for human rights. His work would "consist mainly of analysis, study, discreet representation, good offices and persuasion". The Senegalese representative pointed out at the Third Committee debate that "every precaution has been taken to ensure that the High Commissioner could not act as a public prosecutor". He added that countries which opposed the proposal ran the risk of being suspected of committing violations of human rights which they wished to conceal.

There is wide support for the establishment of the post among UN member States, including many from Africa, Asia and Latin America. During the Third Committee debate, Madagascar commented that the High Commissioner could make a new contribution to the protection of human rights which were clearly still being violated. Pakistan pointed out that the High Commissioner would be able to seek solutions "through discreet representation" to States, especially in situations where existing UN bodies either could not or should not take action. The feeling of a majority of UN members was summed up by El Salvador when, in a reply to the Secretary-General's request

for comment in 1968, it observed that there was a "pressing need for competent organs to keep an international watch over human rights". The Communists, however, continue to allege that the High Commissioner would act as a virtual dictator and be an "imperialist tool", and have served notice that if the post is created they will neither recognise it nor assume any political, moral, financial or other obligation to it.

Lip service to UN covenants

The reason behind the Soviet Union's obstructive tactics is undoubtedly the realisation that if the post of High Commissioner or machinery for dealing with private petitions were created, Soviet citizens would try to use these facilities. They are already tending increasingly to appeal to the UN for assistance* and to remind the Soviet authorities of their rights under UN covenants which Moscow has signed.

In March, 1968, the Soviet Union signed (but has not ratified) both the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, but persistently contravenes many of their provisions, including those dealing with freedom of movement and choice of residence, interference with privacy, freedom of assembly, freedom of information and ideas, and freedom from arrest and detention. They did not sign an optional protocol to the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, under which private citizens may complain to the UN Human Rights Commission.

A detailed set of principles guaranteeing freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right of arrested people to communicate with those necessary to their defence and essential interests has been under study by the Human Rights Commission since 1961-62. If the principles are adopted there seems little doubt that the Soviet Union will sign them, even though many of the

* Because of postal censorship in the Soviet Union, many petitions probably do not reach UN headquarters. Some Soviet citizens tried to enlist the help of the UN Information Centre in Moscow to forward complaints to New York, but as a result of Soviet pressure, the UN Secretariat was forced in 1969 to instruct all UN Information Centres not to accept any more petitions for transmission to New York.

principles are scarcely in accord with Soviet practice - not least that of confining dissidents in psychiatric institutions. However, the Soviet Union seems reluctant to see work on draft principles concluded: in a comment addressed to the Secretary-General on September, 15, 1970, it expressed the opinion that "this study is of secondary importance and lacks any urgency".

KOVALEV ON NON-VIOLENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM AND EVER-INCREASING IMPOVERISHMENT

Summary: Theoretician S. M. Kovalev, known principally for his exposition of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty in a two-part article in Znamya (Nos. 2 and 3 of 1971) argues against the thesis of a peaceful transition to socialism and the preservation of democratic political institutions. A denial of such propositions effectively nullifies the programs of the major Western European communist parties as well as that of Chile. Kovalev is more clearly concerned with "the turning away from the development of socialist democracy" achieved by "socialist countries" and, having formulated the Brezhnev Doctrine as the ultimate therapy, is propounding a little preventative medicine in the form of eliminating diverse political opinion. In so doing he has not only undermined the ideological positions of important free world communist parties but admitted that without systematic repression of the political wishes of the people in "socialist countries" their communist regimes would stand little hope of retaining their positions.

The theories of S. M. Kovalev are always of some interest, since it was he who provided the first ex-post facto ideological justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. (1) Now he has contributed 34 pages of polemical theorizing to the February and March issues of Znamya, a literary monthly with a circulation of only 150,000 copies.

- (1) See Pravda of 11 and 26 September 1968 for his theory of "peaceful counterrevolution" for an exposition of the theory of limited sovereignty (i. e., the Brezhnev Doctrine).

He divides the sixties up into two periods, beginning with the "ferocious and continuing" attacks of Maoism, and ending with the intensification of the "right-revisionist" danger. Since he is the leading ideologist on the subject of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is understandable that he devotes much more space to the latter menace than to the former.

He argues that the breeding ground for the Hungarian "events" of 1956 and for those in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was provided by the descendants of bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata whose interests had been harmed by "socialist" transformation. "Survivals of capitalism, including nationalist prejudices in the consciousness of a part of the population make it possible for revisionist elements, particularly during difficult times of change, to attract a certain number of adherents to their side". (Note the use of the present tense.)

It is unfortunate for Kovalev's analysis that it was published so soon after the December 1970 riots in Poland which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be made to fit into his picture. He divides the revisionist ideologists into two groups, the "old" revisionists being listed as A. Lefevre, M. Markovic and E. Bloch, while the new menace is said to consist of R. Garaudy, the Manifesto group in Italy, E. Fischer, (2), T. Petkoff, (3) "some Polish students" (not further specified) and the Maoists.

The Prague historian, O. Janicek, is criticized by Kovalev for his view that "there is no regularity in history, and therefore no possibility of foreseeing the trend of events. The search for laws and their study is a mistake". This type of thinking descends from Bernstein, in Kovalev's eyes, and tends to justify pluralism, of which the CPSU has an understandable fear. Here, of course, the Yugoslavs are equally blameworthy, so P.

Vranicki (Zagreb) is also castigated for writing that:

The most varied concepts of Marxist philosophy and sharp divergences between them are admissible. We must resolutely reject the theory that there is only one Marxist philosophy or only one structure of it, and recognize the necessity for several variants".

(2) Austria.

(3) Venezuela.

Garaudy's sins appear to be legion. His "Marxism of the 20th century" is berated for attempting to link Marxism with the "reactionary morals" of religion, while in "Réalisme Sans Rivage", he offended Kovalev by linking it with "all the former literary trends, including the most reactionary". In his latest book, The Whole Truth, Garaudy defends the multiplicity of models of socialism and the admissibility of differences of principle between them. For these heresies Kovalev calls him a "traitor, who began by differing ideologically from the CP and slipped back into positions of the most extreme apostasy".

One example of this apostasy is the fact that, together with the Praxis editors in Yugoslavia, Lefevre in France, the Manifesto group and the Czechoslovak adherents of "socialism with a human face", Garaudy believes that in the USSR, "socialism" has created a new type of alienation in the form of "bureaucratic étatism". To the outside eye, Kovalev's article itself would seem to be a convincing proof of the correctness of the Garaudy view, since only a system of "bureaucratic étatism" could ever have enabled it to be printed.

Ernst Fischer, it appears, loses the class appraisal of alienation, and treats it as any form of dependence of man on other people. Therefore he denies the need to organize the workers, because any organization leads to alienation. "Fischer has even reached a conclusion on the need to dissolve the CPs in capitalist countries", according to Kovalev.

The Soviet ideologist does not want them dissolved, but merely remade in his fashion. For instance, he finds it distressing that ever since Bernstein there has been talk about peaceful evolution growing into socialism:

Despite the fact that history has smashed these apologist concepts to smithereens, today's revisionists strenuously propagate them. Thus, L. Markovic says that what is now happening is the 'capitalist abolition of capitalism by reforming it' ".

In this attack on peaceful transition, Lovalev has obviously forgotten his own party's propaganda. Only a few years ago when the Maoist Red Flag and People's Daily were pouring scorn on the whole theory of a peaceful road to "Socialism" as being one of the main signs of CPSU revisionism, several Soviet ideologists pointed proudly to the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 as proof that peaceful transition is a practicable pro-

position. Has Kovalev really forgotten that, or would he argue that the 1948 takeover in Prague was an example of the use of violence? And if he thinks that Khrushchev and most of the West European CPs (Italian, French, British, et. al) are wrong to believe in peaceful transition, then he must logically be opposed to developments in Chile.

Kovalev is at his most defensive in trying to bolster the "Marxist-Leninist theory of the impoverishment of the masses under capitalism", as he calls it. He admits that there has been a real increase in the standard of living of workers in the developed capitalist countries during the last decade, but argues that it was the result of certain historic circumstances which in no way favor capitalism:

Rapid scientific and technological progress demands better trained workers, which to some extent raises the cost of the labor force, of its training and upkeep. At the same time the immense growth in the productivity of labor leads to the cheapening of consumer goods, and that causes an opposite tendency: the decline in the cost of labor and the increase in the profits of the monopolies. Capitalists who mechanize and automate production achieve a frantic intensification of labor which massively increases the norm for the exploitation of labor. Moreover the existence of the socialist countries, where exploitation has been abolished, inspires the workers in their struggle and causes the bourgeoisie to grant certain concessions. Thus a certain growth in the material prosperity of the working people testifies not to the removal of the contradictions of capitalism, but on the contrary, to their intensification.

The revisionists resort to direct trickery when, in striving to refute the Marxist theory of impoverishment, they ascribe to Marxists the idea of the inevitability of an incessant decline in the living standard of workers under capitalism. They give the impression that they do not know of the demands of Marxism to regard poverty as a social phenomenon, as a discrepancy between the increased level of the requirements of society as a whole, on the one hand, and the living standard of the masses, on the other.

The absolute impoverishment of the working people is manifest in the fact that as capitalism develops, the gulf increases between the real living standard of the workers

and their real needs, which grow together with the growth of the needs of the whole of society.

This is a greatly watered-down version of Varga's famous theory, and it does show that even a neo-Stalinist such as Kovalev is forced to revise his opinions to some extent under pressure from the facts. As for the latter, Vestnik Statistiki (no. 3, 1971), has just published a fascinating article by L. Nesterov on the national wealth of the USA.

This says that in 1967 the property of the population of the US was valued at about \$300 billion, consisting of cars, TV sets, refrigerators, radios, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, furniture and other consumer durables.

Of this impressive figure, some \$100 billion are accounted for by the net worth of 80 million cars owned by the people, according to Nesterov, who adds that the average value of cars sold is from \$2,000 to \$3,000.

Any Soviet reader knows that the population of the US is smaller than that of the USSR, and that 80 million cars work out at about one per family for the entire country. Accordingly, he is unlikely to be much impressed by even Kovalev's unconvincing and diluted version of the "Marxist theory of impoverishment".

He also knows that the \$300 billion figure given by Nesterov as the wealth of the people in the US in 1967 works out at an average of about \$1500 a head for every man, woman and child in the country, and that the USSR is a long way from attaining that level.

In his second article, Kovalev expands on his fear of peaceful reform, making it clear that what frightens him is not its alleged lack of success in the West, but the danger that it might spread to East Europe.

He criticizes the "many fraternal parties in the developed capitalist countries" for advocating peaceful structural reform at the International Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in 1969:

Some parties envisage in the event of success for this concept the possibility of retaining in the framework of the socialist structure certain political institutions of the bourgeois; the liberal parliamentary system, particularly the right of activity for opposition parties. Communists think that the fraternal parties can, of course, develop

even such a prospect in their programs, although it has never yet found any application in history. But it would be wrong for the parties to absolutize this point of view, and particularly so if they expect that the CPs in power in the socialist countries should adapt their political practice to this point of view. . . . To give free play to all political forces in the socialist countries in the present atmosphere would mean the suicide of socialism.

Kovalev is surely right in thinking that freedom for all political parties in East Europe would mean inevitable defeat for the CP, but nevertheless it is astonishing that he should admit it so bluntly. At least on this one point in his 34 pages one can fully agree with him. This view also explains his limited sovereignty doctrine. According to him, and Brezhnev, if the East European CPs cannot be kept in power by votes, they must be maintained in place by tanks, even if the latter have to be manned by the Red Army. It is an unattractive prospect but more realistic than his ideas on the Marxist theory of impoverishment.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE 'NEW LEFT'

by Robert A. Scalapino *

Let us look next at Mao, the youth culture enthusiast. It should be said quickly that Mao most emphatically does not approve of much of that which would pass for the contemporary American "youth culture". Long hair and beards, rock music and idleness - not to mention drugs - get short shrift in Mao's China. Indeed, a type of puritanism has persisted in Communist circles, and during the height of the Cultural Revolution, there was even an attempt to discourage smoking (Mao, of course, was exempted from this effort).

Mao's relation to the youth culture is of a different sort. Like Herbert Marcuse who has recently been in vogue with some

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American radicals, Mao merely promised youth power. Hailing them as the inheritors of the revolution, the vanguard of the future, Mao appealed to youth to save him and the Communist cause (as he interpreted it) by seizing power, overthrowing "the capitalist roaders" and "revisionists" who had obtained control of the party by deceit. This represented a climax, moreover, to an era in which youth had played a greater role than ever before in Chinese history. Understandably, the Communist leaders had doubts about the trustworthiness of many individuals who had come to maturity in a different age. To train youth so that they would be both Red and Expert became a cardinal party task. The importance of youth to national development was stressed, and in other ways, youth were fostered, featured, and flattered.

At the height of the Cultural Revolution, in 1967, it appeared that Mao might actually place young men and women in commanding positions within both the party and state. Millions of youthful Red Guards roamed the country, operating with considerable freedom and terrorizing many of those in authority. Even the army was ordered not to interfere. Had the millennium for youthful radicalism come?

Power Elusive

No. In the sober aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, most Red Guard leaders not only found that meaningful power had eluded them, but a number were severely punished for various "crimes against the state". When chaos threatened to reach major proportions, Mao was forced to authorize the military to crack down hard upon dissident youth. In effect, as noted earlier, the People's Liberation Army took over most functions previously under the control of the party and state. China, in many respects, was operated as a military government.

Nor have youth emerged in prominent positions in the re-constructed party, at least at the national level. The 9th Party Congress, meeting in April 1969, produced a Politburo that was not only heavily military, but composed of individuals whose average age was in the mid-sixties, and a Standing Committee of even older men. While data on the full Central Committee is incomplete, all members except the "mass representatives" (who are mainly window-dressing) appear to be

about the same age, on the average, as Politburo members. China today is governed at the top by one of the oldest elites currently holding power in any society.

The policies recently applied to youth, moreover, have been far from lenient. As indicated previously, millions of young people have been sent from the overcrowded cities to the countryside, and told to remain there indefinitely. Discipline has been firmly re-established in the military services where additional millions serve. Only in certain branches of education, as we shall later note, does "youth power" seem to have substantially increased in recent years. That is significant, because many of our "New Left" hope to seize power in the American educational system first. Elsewhere in the Chinese system, however, the control by youth of the levers of power is decidedly more limited than Mao's earlier promises seemed to imply.

Nevertheless, among the ranks of Mao's Western supporters, the image of an indulgent, benevolent father granting voice and power to his children persists. One suspects, however, that there is another side to this coin. Mao's unquestioned authority - ruthlessly applied on occasion - may also evoke some secret admiration from a group that often searches for the frontiers of discipline without finding them. Generally, this admiration for toughness will not be admitted, perhaps not even recognized except in the subconscious. Most individuals within the "New Left" like to talk about freedom, love and the evils of power. But when the occasion demands (allows), they know how to hate, how to organize, and how to vie for power. It would be surprising if they did not appreciate this aspect of Mao.

Another aspect of Mao that unquestionably attracts "New Left" support is Mao, the ideologist. At first glance, this seems incredible. Maoism has added little or nothing of intellectual substance to Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Indeed, one of the most impressive aspects of contemporary China is the extent to which ideology under Mao has been drained of intellectual content. As in the case of other Asian Communist states, true creativity is now channeled elsewhere - into science, technology, and problem solving at administrative levels. "Mao Tse-tung Thought" is at root a set of simple maxims intended for popular consumption.

All of the efforts of recent times, moreover, have been directed toward making "Mao's Thought" an article of un-

questioning mass faith. (Very recently, it might be noted, an attempt has been made to elevate Maoism by speaking of Mao's "philosophical thinking", but no new substance has been added). Thus, in Communist China, the task of ideology has been that of establishing a new faith; the role assigned Marxism-Leninism-Maoism has been emotional and religious.

Why should any part of the "New Left" be attracted to this aspect of Mao? The answer lies mainly in the fact that our "New Left" at present are embarked upon a profoundly anti-intellectual course, with the chief motto being "Feel, don't think". Within them is harbored not merely a deep antagonism to institutions and organizations (other than their own), but also to science, to rationality, and to complexity.

Indeed, the phenomenal growth of the United States in recent decades, and the problems inevitable in such growth have bred the first generation of American primitivists to be active in the political arena - individuals for whom the term "progress" has essentially evil connotations, a small but growing group of young men and women who are anti-science, anti-rational, anti-development. (Many of them, it might be noted, come from well-to-do families, and know nothing of the problems of poverty and backwardness).

Hence, theirs is the quest for a new faith, a new set of beliefs that is at once simple, easily understood, and "pure". In certain respects, Maoism satisfies these needs, for while Maoism contains many paradoxes (the Maoists, for example, want development although they want politics at all times to be in command), its Western adherents can emphasize those portions of it which suit their purposes. And it is above all the element of faith and of utter simplicity in Maoism that attracts dissidents too impatient and too troubled to be bothered with the complexities which would ensue were they to grapple with the real problems that confront us.

Closely related to Mao, the ideologist, is Mao, the promoter of a radically new educational system. It is perhaps here that our "New Left" find an affinity with Mao in the most concrete sense. To understand recent trends within Chinese higher education, one could do no better than to start with the observations of Alberto Jacoviello, himself a Communist and editor of the Italian Communist organ, L'Unita. One would scarcely

expect Jacoviello to be a determined critic of the Peking regime, and, indeed, after completing a recent state-sponsored tour of China, he made all of the remarks one might have expected, including the statement that it was ridiculous to believe that China was governed by the military because its soldiers were more humble than any other group within the society.

But even Jacoviello found an institution like Tsinghua University "puzzling". He was greeted not by the rector (who had been reduced during the Cultural Revolution to the status of "ordinary worker"). Rather, he was received by the "revolutionary committee", a group representing students, campus workers, and professors. He found that the students had been admitted on a quota system - 45% workers, 40% peasants, and 15% soldiers - and without regard to their scholastic achievements. Indeed, admissions were handled wholly through political channels. An individual wishing to be admitted to the university applied first to the revolutionary committee of his unit, and if approved, the application went on up to higher revolutionary committees. As can be imagined, the critical criteria for admission is whether one has served the party and state loyally.

The role of the teacher has also changed, reports Jacoviello. He no longer "teaches", but he "lives, works, and discusses" with the students, and they "guide" him as much as he "guides" them. University courses have been reduced, now running from 2-3 years, and the emphasis is upon studies closely integrated with practical work. Jacoviello met a few elderly professors "who had been extremely famous throughout the world", and they told him how grateful they were for having been "reeducated" by the Cultural Revolution. One can be reasonably certain that they will not step out of line again - but of course, not all survived as university professors because not all were willing to recant their lives.

One can imagine that the system described above truly delights some of our "New Left". It represents precisely the role for student power, the intense politicization of the university, the assault upon the dignity of the teacher, and the concept of "relevance" for which they have dedicated themselves in recent years. Indeed, to read Jacoviello's report on Tsinghua carefully is to see the aims - and quite possibly, the inspiration - of our "New Left" with startling clarity.

The assault upon what the "Left" calls "bourgeois democracy" starts with an attack upon a free educational system. That attack has been accelerated almost everywhere in the Western world and in such nations as Japan, and it may well be the most crucial battle which will be fought in our generation.

Finally, there is for our "New Left" the solace of Mao's anti-Americanism. Mao, to be sure, distinguishes between what he calls "American ruling circles" - who are to be despised and destroyed - and "the American people" - who are basically good, and can be "reeducated" once their leadership has been changed. This is, of course, a standard Communist theme, a part of the broader thesis that if one is "good" (a supporter of the Communist cause), one is a part of "the people", whereas if one is "bad" (an opponent of Communism), one is "an enemy of the people". Thus, the United States as a government is "the Greatest Public Enemy of the People of the World", in Mao's eyes, although occasionally one suspects that we drop to the Number Two position, behind the Soviet Union.

Our "New Left" finds these views generally compatible with their own. The basic standard of judgement which they use is not necessarily support for Communism, since many of them - indeed, most of them - are not Communists with a capital "C". But the United States is rigidly divided in their minds into "the good guys" and "the bad guys". All of "the bad guys", moreover, are members of the "establishment", including the government. There are many more of them, they hold all the power, and they are totally bad - if we are to believe "New Left" dogma. Naturally, therefore, everything that the United States does is wrong. Not only is it wrong - it is immoral. We are an evil nation, and many of us are evil people.

To be a member of the "New Left" in good standing, one must stand firmly on a mea culpa platform. Nationalism is excellent for every nation except the United States. No matter what actions they take, the nations and leaders opposing us deserve to be understood and respected; but American policies are always irrational and without merit. One cannot demand democracy and freedom in such states as the Chinese People's Republic because "conditions are not ripe", but if there is not full democracy in the Republic of Korea - or in the United States - these latter states should be completely repudiated.

Thus, both the intensity of Mao's anti-Americanism and the

particular form which it takes (setting "the establishment" against "the people") conform to cherished positions of our "New Left". Their alienation is deep, and it often takes its origins in hostility to parents, to church, and to the society at large. It is not surprising, therefore, that one major thrust of the "New Left" is the effort to establish a "counter-culture" that will pose a challenge to American mores and institutions at every level.

In these terms also, Maoism offers a model. The Communists came to power in China partly because they successfully used traditional organizational methods, namely, focusing upon the small, nuclear group and intimate face-to-face experiences, "converting" the individuals involved, and gradually aggregating these nuclear groups into larger and larger units. In the course of this operation, moreover, the Communists created their own "counter-culture", so thoroughly involving converts into the movement, so completely altering their way of life and pattern of thought as to make continued involvement in - or return to - "the old culture" difficult if not impossible.

To a considerable degree, these are the efforts of the "New Left", albeit with ultimate objectives that are considerably less clearly focused and less sharply defined than those of the Chinese Communists.

These are the central links between Mao and the "New Left". To explore these links is to reveal something of the inconsistencies and the paradoxes implicit both in Chinese Communism and in certain current forms of American radicalism. It is also to reveal the essence of these movements, and especially the profound gulf which separates them from the causes to which they pay lip service - freedom and democracy.

(AFL-CIO Free Trade UNION News)

POLITICS

BREZHNEV'S CONGRESS -1

Consolidation at home

The disagreements which were probably responsible for the year-long delay in staging the 24th Soviet Party Congress were not allowed to ruffle the surface of its course from March 30 to April 9. As at the 23rd Congress, in March and April, 1966, the proceedings concluded with a minimum of change in both policies and the composition of the top party organs. The publication of the new Five-Year Plan directives last February probably represented another compromise within the leadership on the allocation of resources between industry, agriculture and defence, and the much-vaunted "discussion" of the document before the congress brought only minor amendments. Yet in his main report on March 30, the party's General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, still seemed at pains to dampen down controversy by balancing his remarks on sensitive topics or avoiding them altogether, an approach probably as much due to his own bureaucratic outlook as to any special need for caution. For like the preceding build-up of his personality, the new Politburo confirmed Brezhnev's position of supremacy in the post-Khrushchev "collective" leadership.

By contrast, Moscow's position at the head of the world Communist movement was given little prominence, and Brezhnev's claim that Communist cohesion was becoming "ever stronger" sounded defensive. He acknowledged that the consolidation of unity over the past five years had been a "complex task", and his lengthy endorsement of the Czechoslovak party's statement on the "lessons" of the 1968 upheaval (including the false claim that the Russians were invited into Czechoslovakia) indicated a continuing need to justify the Warsaw Pact invasion. Though a number of East European speakers, including the Polish and Czechoslovak leaders, expressed support for Soviet policies, the rift in the world communist movement was emphasized by the absence of China and Albania.

The North Koreans and North Vietnamese, who like the Chinese had boycotted the world Communist conference of June, 1969, came to the congress and Le Duan, Hanoi's representative, was given the honour of being the first foreign delegate to speak.

Despite Moscow's words of praise and support for the Vietnamese "struggle", however, neither of these parties was prepared to join the anti-Chinese chorus, in which the voices of several Soviet regional party secretaries and that of the Mongolian leader, Tsedenbal, were particularly loud. Brezhnev's own references to the Chinese were comparatively moderate, though he put the onus for any further normalisation of relations squarely on Peking and reiterated that its ideological and political platform was "incompatible with Leninism".

Among the European Communists, the ruling parties of Romania and Yugoslavia, together with those seeking power in Italy, France and Spain, also refused to be drawn into Sino-Soviet polemics and restated their line on the need to respect the independence and equality of each party. Despite Brezhnev's sharp warnings against "right- and left-wing revisionism" and "nationalist tendencies in the Communist movement", the Italian party's Deputy Secretary General, Enrique Berlinguer, noted on his return home the continuing differences of view on the key question of independence, as well as on the more detailed problems raised by the Czechoslovak events. The Italian party, he said, could never be a "slavish imitator" of somebody else's models, for such a party would cease to be an international force at all.

For most of the 5,000 Soviet delegates, however, Communism as a revolutionary and international creed clearly took second place to the Soviet Union's efforts to become a more modern and consumer-orientated society - though Brezhnev made it clear that centralised planning is to stay and that there is to be no radical overhaul of the old-style command economy. On most internal issues, Brezhnev showed concern to conciliate the different lobbies while reaffirming the familiar policy lines. For instance, despite persisting fears of a return to Stalinism, he endorsed Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation by referring to the "beneficial effect" on the country's general political and ideological situation of the campaign against the "consequences of the personality cult", at the same time aiming oblique criticism at Khrushchev himself by praising the overcoming of "subjectivist errors". In the cultural field, he tried to perform a balancing act by condemning both those (unnamed) who emphasised problems that had become "irrevocably a thing of the past" and those who attempted to "whitewash" them and to pre-

serve old concepts. Meanwhile, the ultra-conservative Vsevolod Kochetov continues to edit the monthly literary journal, *O k t y a b r*, whereas Alexander Solzhenitsyn cannot be published within the USSR and suffers from increasing discrimination.

But both Brezhnev and one of the two main speakers on cultural affairs, the writer, Mikhail Sholokhov, indirectly pointed to the drawbacks of conformity by admitting that too many works of poor quality were being printed. Sholokhov added that the Writers' Congress in June would provide a good opportunity for "shaking the dust out of the literary carpets". A. Chakovsky, editor of the weekly *L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e*, gave a particularly hard-line speech, warning against attempts to "corrupt" the Soviet intelligentsia with phrases about freedom and independence and expressing gratitude to the present leadership for clarifying certain important ideological matters and eliminating the "voluntaristic crazes" of the Khrushchev era - presumably meaning an over-tolerant attitude to some literary works. Chakovsky was for the first time elected a candidate member of the Central Committee.

More computers

Though it was the task of Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, to present the 1971-75 Plan, Brezhnev devoted nearly half his report to the economy - without revealing any new policies. He did, however, confirm that the Soviet Union had had an exceptionally good harvest, producing over 186 million tons of bread grain and 6.9 million tons of cotton in 1970.

As indicated by the plan directives, the better satisfaction of consumer needs is now a dominant theme of Soviet economic pronouncements, but at the congress Kosygin also stressed that heavy industry "was and remains the foundation of the country's economic might" - a phrase widely echoed by the Soviet Press afterwards. Despite an optimistic summary of economic progress over the past few years, Kosygin stressed that the possibilities offered by the reform scheme introduced by him in 1965 had not been fully utilised; for instance, those favouring the new methods had often come up against die-hard conservatives who made it impossible to operate enterprises on a profit and loss basis. Re-affirming that profits and profitability were important indicators of efficiency, he promised that even

more factories would go over to the new system in the next five years. But the continuing rôle of central planning was also emphasised. Short-term plans will be geared to a new long-term plan for ten to 15 years, and a rapid increase in the use of computers (their output is to rise by 160 per cent under the new plan) is clearly intended to act as a short-cut to greater industrial efficiency - without releasing what are still regarded as dangerous market forces.

On agriculture, there were the usual calls for greater mechanisation and use of fertilisers, but the "link" system - giving small groups of farmers more responsibility for the land under their cultivation - was ignored, despite the extensive debates on the subject during 1969 and apparent high-level endorsement. Indeed, Brezhnev's approving references to the expansion of ties between collective and State farms in the form of "productive associations" and to the creation of "agro-industrial complexes" seemed to point in the opposite direction, though the purpose is probably mainly to provide employment for farm-workers during the winter months. Several speakers from the outlying republics used the occasion to draw attention to local interests and problems. Piotr Shelest, from the Ukraine, urged the continuing development of the coal industry (much of which is centred in the Donbass), and the Moldavian party Secretary blamed the lack of clear instructions about economic reform for many of the shortcomings in his republic. But in general no one at the congress was prepared to revert to the sensitive questions of resource allocations or to discuss the reform scheme as a whole.

The unadventurous approach of the rank and file reflects the lack of dynamism at the top - now reinforced by the virtual absence of leadership changes. The new Politburo elected by the Central Committee on April 9 was increased from 11 to 15 members, with all the old members retaining their seats and three of the four newcomers being promoted from candidate membership. They are D. Kunaev, the Kazakh party First Secretary, V. V. Shcherbitsky, the Ukrainian Prime Minister, and V. V. Grishin, who in June, 1967, replaced Egorychev as head of the Moscow City party organisation, following the latter's abrupt dismissal (apparently for leading an opposition group that may have looked to Shelepin). Both Kunaev and

Shcherbitsky had been rescued by Brezhnev from the relative obscurity to which they were relegated under Khrushchev. The Ukraine is now particularly well represented in the Politburo since its First Secretary, Shelest, is already a full member. The fourth newcomer, F. D. Kulakov, is the party Secretary responsible for agriculture. All four can be considered Brezhnev supporters, thus strengthening his hold on the most important policy-making body in the Soviet Union.

Select band

The listing of Politburo members also points to his pre-eminence. Alexander Shelepin, the trade union Chairman who at one time appeared a possible challenger to Brezhnev, has dropped from seventh position to 11th. Voronov, a champion of the link system of farming and Prime Minister in the Russian Federation, has fallen from fifth in the 1966 list to tenth. The 72-year-old Latvian party First Secretary, Pelshe, has moved up from 11th place to sixth, while Kirilenko, Mazurov, Polyansky and Shelest have each risen one place. Brezhnev remains in first place and the veteran ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, in fourth; but Kosygin and the President, Podgorny, have reversed positions, with Podgorny now listed ahead - probably for protocol reasons.

The promotion of Kulakov has put him into the select band of four - with Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko - who are members of both the Politburo and the ten-member Secretariat, the main executive body. There was also a striking lack of change in the Central Committee, where 153 of the surviving 185 members of the 1966 committee have been re-elected. Though it increased in size from 195 to 241 members (candidate membership has been reduced by ten to a total of 155), 38 of the new members were merely promoted from candidate membership. The only notable feature of the new committee's composition was the increase in the proportion of central government and party officials. Those dropped included ten who had earlier fallen from grace, such as Egorychev.

The announcement that the party's Statutes have been altered so that congresses will be held every five instead of every four years confirms existing practice, as well as bringing them into line with the span of the five-year plans. Brezhnev's

additional promise of an overhaul in the party ranks - through the first exchange of party cards since 1954 - suggests that discipline is to be strengthened. Noting a slowing-down in the rate of admissions to the party (from 760,000 a year between 1961 and 1966 to 600,000 since the 23rd congress), Brezhnev revealed dissatisfaction with the quality of many new entrants. But a party in which the Politburo members' average age is still over 60 can hardly expect to attract the most dynamic people.

Brezhnev's congress - 2 External ambitions

Moscow's concern with extending its activities as a world power was as much in evidence at the congress as its hopes of remaining a centre of world revolution. Underlying both was the need to counter the Chinese challenge - reflected in Brezhnev's pledge of Soviet support for liberation struggles throughout the world and his plea for the cohesion of all "anti-imperialist forces". He opened the section of his report devoted to world affairs with a doctrinaire picture of the "crisis of capitalism", in which the United States, the six countries of the European Economic Community and Japan were described as the "main centres of imperialist rivalry", while militarism was said to be on the increase, particularly in America, West Germany and Japan. In a similarly broad survey of class struggles in the West, Brezhnev claimed that the workers of France and Italy were moving not only against individual capitalists but also against the whole system of the State monopolies, and that "large-scale class clashes" were taking place for the first time for many years in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. But he acknowledged that Communism still had a "long and difficult struggle ahead" in its confrontation with capitalism and imperialism, tacitly admitting the need for allies by offering co-operation to the "revolutionary democratic parties" of Asia and Africa and "left-wing Socialist parties" in the East, the West and Latin America (Chile was given special praise for the victory of the left-wing front). He even included the Social Democrats, though the Soviet party would - "of course" - not give up its ideology and revolutionary principles.

Turning to bilateral State relations and to areas of special interest to the Soviet Union, Brezhnev underlined the dangers of the situation in Indochina and the Middle East, stating for the

first time that the Soviet Union was willing to create with the other permanent members of the Security Council, international guarantees for a settlement in the area.

Moscow's "Arab friends" were assured of its continuing support and US policy in Laos and Cambodia was condemned. Brezhnev was also critical of "zigzags" in US foreign policy connected with internal political manoeuvres, but does not seem to have lost interest in a continuing Soviet-American dialogue. In a specific reference to the talks on the limitation of strategic arms, he stressed that negotiations involving such delicate military and technical considerations could be productive only if they took equal account of the security of all sides.

Disarmament was also prominent amongst the "concrete tasks" listed in Brezhnev's six-point "peace" programme, but a majority of the suggestions seemed designed to make a good impression rather than to open the way to fruitful exchanges. There was a strong propaganda flavour about the appeals for nuclear-free zones, the ending of all foreign military bases and the reduction of military expenditure. The one-sided nature of the call for the simultaneous abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact was underlined by Brezhnev's description of the network of treaties now linking Moscow and its East European allies as a "comprehensive system of mutual allied obligations of a new Socialist type". Two proposals advanced more explicitly were those for a conference of the five nuclear Powers (as urged at one time by General de Gaulle) and for a world disarmament conference. But since both clearly depend for their success on China's participation - which is virtually ruled out - they, too, amount to little more than propaganda.

Greater flexibility

There seemed to be slightly more to offer in the proposal for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, as it was no longer confined to foreign forces (as in the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' June, 1970, Memorandum) and was more specific about the area affected. However, the idea of a European security conference was given little prominence by any of the congress speakers, and Warsaw Pact representatives subsequently repeated the Memorandum's wording about foreign forces. Both Brezhnev and the Soviet

Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, who spoke on April 4, foreshadowed further hard bargaining on this subject. Gromyko in particular rejecting the NATO demand for agreement on Berlin before serious preparations can begin for a European security conference. The various outstanding European problems should be tackled in parallel, he insisted.

As befitted a party occasion, Gromyko confined himself to a cursory review of his own field of activities, presenting an image of the Soviet Union mainly as an impregnable bastion of peace and anti-imperialism. The only unusual feature of his speech was the light thrown on the rôle of the various Soviet bodies in formulating foreign policy. He revealed that the party Politburo was "daily" concerned with foreign affairs issues, while the Central Committee considered them "frequently". The task of the government and diplomats was to carry out the party line in detail.

CHINA'S NEW PRIORITIES

China's emergence from the self-imposed isolation of the cultural revolution accelerated in the weeks before the opening of the Canton Spring Fair on April 15, though her much-publicised "ping-pong diplomacy" had been preceded by President Nixon's gesture of March 15 in removing passport restrictions on private visits to China. Moreover, Peking's invitation to the American table tennis team to play in China was soon followed on April 14 by President Nixon's five further proposals, which included the raising of certain trade restrictions, the use of American ships to transport Chinese cargoes, the easing of currency controls and the granting of visas to Chinese wishing to visit the United States.

Peking's moves are clearly directed in part at winning wider diplomatic recognition before the United Nations General Assembly vote in the autumn on the question of Chinese representation - suggesting that she now wishes to secure admission. The appointment of one of Peking's most experienced diplomats (and former Ambassador to Cairo), Huang Hua, as the new envoy in Canada, may presage more active diplomacy in North America. At the same time, the Italian Government's recognition of the CPR last November seems to have encouraged a revival of Peking's interest in Europe. British table tennis

players were given a warm welcome alongside the Americans and journalists from Britain, Federal Germany, France, Italy and Norway were invited to tour China.

However, Peking has also restated its refusal to compromise on the question of its sovereignty over Taiwan (Formosa) and the status of the Nationalist Chinese Government, while the West remains concerned about Maoist instigation of extremist and "anti-imperialist" movements in the Third World. An authoritative "Commentator" article in *People's Daily* on May 4 emphasised China's inflexibility on the "two Chinas" issue, rejecting Washington's view that Taiwan's status was unsettled and claiming that the US Government had shown itself "hostile" to the Chinese people. Throughout the recent exchanges, Peking has attempted to differentiate between the "peoples" and governments in Western countries and its main appeal has been to the former - though a *New China News Agency* commentary on May 4 claimed that the US Government was trying to make political capital out of the improvement in relations between the two peoples. Other prominent themes have been the American negroes' struggle against Washington's "fascist rule" and the growth of a "new revolutionary storm" of opposition to its Vietnam policy. In Singapore on May 2, the Australian Foreign Minister welcomed Peking's "ping-pong exercises" (which had included a visit to China by an Australian table tennis team), but warned that they did not preclude the promotion of Communist subversion and, in some cases, insurrection.

Moscow has been particularly incensed by China's "unprincipled manoeuvres" to make friends with the West while posing as the leader of the world-wide revolutionary struggle. When one of the Chinese May Day slogans urged countries subject to "intervention or bullying" by the United States or the Soviet Union to unite and oppose the "super-Powers", *Radio Peace and Progress* (April 30) retorted that Peking was trying to replace the correct class view of the world by "concocted categories of neo-political essence". This clearly referred to China's identification with the "poor" Third World against the "rich" industrialised countries (which in Peking's view include the USSR as well as America). Moreover, "social-imperialism" (the Soviet régime) is said to be in the

same economic, financial and monetary difficulties as capitalism as a result of the Soviet leaders' alleged return to capitalist methods, with the USSR and "some East European countries" (apparently meaning Poland) facing more discontent at rising prices and shortages. The same commentator - an economist, Yin Hang - claimed that, by contrast, the "matchless superiority" of Chinese Communism had resulted in bumper harvests, vigorous industrial development and a plentiful supply of commodities.

Trade with USSR

A more realistic Chinese attitude to the state of the Soviet economy is reflected in the two governments' recent agreement to step up their trade exchanges. China's trade with the Soviet Union slumped as the ideological quarrel with Moscow developed in the early 1960s, and after the border clashes of 1969 trade fell to under \$57 million. Now the two sides have agreed to raise their turnover to \$134-144 million in 1971, according to Soviet sources. This will treble the 1970 figure - but is still far below the 1960 level of \$1,867 million.

Trade with Eastern Europe continued at a reduced level in the 1960s. Peking now apparently hopes to encourage a greater turnover, particularly with Yugoslavia and Romania, the two countries most independent of Moscow. Both have recently signed new trade agreements with China, and in November, 1970, Romania received a Chinese loan worth \$200 million. Yugoslavia plans to hold an industrial exhibition in Peking at the end of this year to show iron, steel and mechanical engineering products, in which China has expressed particular interest.

In China's trade overtures to Western Europe politics seem to count little, for Greece has recently become one of her trading partners, selling surplus tobacco in exchange for mutton (Le Monde, January 17-18). Federal Germany, which does not recognise the Peking government, has become China's largest trade partner after Japan. According to the Italian Minister for Foreign Trade, Mario Zagari, Peking (unlike Moscow) is even ready to trade with the European Economic Community (EEC), not only through bilateral exchanges but with the Community as a whole. It has been suggested that the Chinese might send a special representative to the EEC Commission in Brussels.

In the developing world, Peking seems interested in opening up markets for its consumer goods. The visit of a 19-member Malaysian trade delegation to China in May was another reminder of Peking's willingness to overlook political differences. According to the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, the mission had been invited by an agency which could "speak for China", a formula clearly designed to get round the fact that the countries have no official relations. The Malaysian Government plans to open a trade office in Hong Kong, partly to step up its trade with China. China's friendship with Pakistan has paid dividends by opening up port facilities in Karachi for Chinese exports to Africa and the Middle East. The overland route connecting Sinkiang with Gilgit in Pakistan is now a fourlane highway open in all weathers. Pakistan is said to be planning to double her present fleet of more than 30 cargo vessels with a view to the increased trade.

While foreign trade plays a minor part in China's economy and she imports virtually no consumer goods, the appointment of a prominent Politburo member, Pai Hsiang-kuo, as Minister for Foreign Trade, indicates a greater interest in this subject. The Canton Spring Fair, which drew unprecedented numbers of foreign businessmen, also seemed to be geared to an increase in trade with the outside world with many more goods on show - though the Chinese leaders were no doubt also keen to impress foreign visitors with their country's stature.

KGB -- SAMIZDAT

Summary: In the first two issues of Ukrainskyj Visnyk, a Ukrainian samizdat publication which has just been issued in Paris, there are many references to the methods which the KGB employs in combatting opposition forces in the Soviet Union. Among them are the letters, documents, etc., forged by the KGB, which are spread as supposed samizdat materials.

Ukrainskyj Visnyk (1) reports, among other things, on the

(1) Ukrainskyj Visnyk, (Ukrainian Herald), Issue 1-II, January-May 1970, P.I. U. F. and Smoloskyp, Paris 1971.

KGB's tactics in its struggle against opposition forces. At the beginning of the 1960s, the KGB attempted to misinform the public by spreading provocative rumors. When in 1965, for example, a Russian had burned part of the library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the KGB spread the rumor that it had been a deed of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists". When the Russian and Ukrainian samizdat began to expand, the KGB decided to organize its own samizdat. Ukrainskyj Visnyk has reported on this in an article entitled "On the KGB's Samizdat". (2) This article serves as the basis for the following information.

One of the favorite forms of KGB samizdat is the anonymous letter many of which are sent to leading personalities in cultural and political circles, and in which various dissident persons are discredited. For example, at the beginning of 1969, it was claimed in such a letter that the two literary critics, I. Svitlychny and I. Dzyuba, were stirring up interest in the late author W. Symonenko "for low-down reasons", because they wanted "to bathe in the glow of his glory". W. Symonenko died in 1963. He wrote a series of poems of social criticism which were published together with his memoirs in the West. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of his death, many memorial meetings were held, and the two literary critics mentioned above took part in the Kiev celebration. The KGB letters were designed thereafter to defame the two critics publicly.

Similar methods were used on the granddaughter of the Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko, Zinoviya Franko, who was a candidate of philosophical sciences. Because of her protests against Russification, the persecution of the Crimean Tatars and anti-Semitism, she was expelled from the Party and lost her position at the Institute for Linguistic Research at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. According to Ukrainskyj Visnyk a secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian CP supposedly told her "privately" that "all the ideas and plans of the Ukrainian opposition had no chance to be realized, and in the event of war, they and their intellectual comrades would simply be shot. . . ." In order to discredit her, the KGB used another trick. A well-known writer in Kiev received a letter

(2) Ibid., Pro kagebivsky samizdat", p. 228 et seq.

from abroad, in which someone claimed that Zinoviya Franko had "taken possession of things which were sent from abroad for political prisoners who were wasting away in prisons and camps". Ukrainskyj Visnyk recalls with a large dose of skepticism that all letters from abroad are censored in the Soviet Union and the "dangerous ones", such as this one, are confiscated.

The author Antonenko-Davidovich, a former prisoner in a Stalinist concentration camp, found a letter in his mailbox one day which was signed "Russian friends". This time, the KGB had attempted to defame V. Chornovil, the author of the well-known Chornovil ("Lykho z Rozumu") Papers. These Russian friends informed Antonenko-Davidovich in the "letter" that Chornovil "was a dangerous man", they warned him against taking up contact with him because he had been responsible for the arrest of the "well-known fighter for democratic freedom, General P. Grigorenko".

At the end of 1969 and in early 1970, the KGB spread a letter around Kiev which had allegedly been written by political prisoners in the Mordovian SSR. This letter was reprinted in part in Ukrainskyj Visnyk. These political prisoners "pleaded with" the Ukrainian intelligentsia "to examine some gentlemen who were posing as leaders of the national movement, and to give them a thorough answer: are they worthy of our trust? Can one depend on them? Because the facts, which have come to us through thick walls and barbed-wire, prove something else again".

In this letter as well, the rumor is being spread that some of the representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had taken goods and money belonging to political prisoners and used them for their own purposes. The object of such rumors is clearly identifiable: the opposition has no idealists, but rather amoral and greedy people who in no way deserve the public's respect.

Ukrainskyj Visnyk made a linguistic analysis of the letter and proved that it could only have been written by a Russian using a Ukrainian typewriter, as it is full of "Russianisms".

From this information it emerges that the KGB forgeries are spread throughout the Soviet Union. Ukrainskyj Visnyk caustically observes that once a KGB samizdat edition about the Crimean Tatars was once confiscated during an arrest and later used as evidence against the accused.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

DUBCEK: FROM PARTY LEADER TO MOTOR POOL CHIEF

Ever since the recall of Alexander Dubcek from his ambassadorial post in Turkey and his expulsion from the party in June 1970, rumors about his fate and whereabouts have been cropping up in the West. The Czechoslovak regime's restrictive information policy has, of course, done little to stem the flow of speculation or to clear up the mystery.

In such circumstances it was not surprising that in recent months Dubcek has been located alternately as a technician in the Trencin (western Slovakia) woodworking factory (AFP, 22 July 1970); in a minor embassy post in one of the bloc countries (Daily Telegraph, 4 September 1970); in prison (Il Messaggero, 22 September 1970); in a deputy directorship in the Bratislava Social Security Institute (Neue Zeitung, Vienna, 24 November 1970); as an employee of a Brno trade company dealing in farm equipment (Der Spiegel, 1 March 1971); as a mechanic in a Slovak village (AFP, 11 March 1971); and as a member of a maintenance crew in a sawmill near Bratislava (Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 April 1971, and Deutsche Zeitung, 23 April 1971). There was a host of other unofficial rumors placing him in still other localities and occupations.

Closest to the truth, as it turned out, were reports to the effect that he was employed as an official in the Slovak Ministry of Forestry and Water Conservation (see, e.g., The Times, London, 20 February 1971). Doubts about Dubcek's whereabouts were dispelled by party presidium member Antonin Kapek. At a conference with students at the Prague Electro-technical Faculty on 6 April 1971, in reply to a direct query from the floor he stated that Dubcek was employed "at a regional forestry administration, where he takes care of mechanization". This piece of information was passed over by the Czech news reporters covering the event. The only paper to mention it was the Czech youth weekly Mlady Svet (14 April 1971) which printed the news inconspicuously under a photograph of the conference.

On 13 April 1971, the West German Bild Zeitung published a photograph purportedly showing Dubcek working as a "gardener" at the forestry management in Krasnany", a suburb of Bratislava. On 27 April 1971 commentator Bohumil Rohacek reacted to this allegation over Radio Prague. He rebuked the paper for "sensationalism", but did not deny the truth of the

story. He said that the picture was a clandestine shot of a working brigade organized on Good Friday by a group of officials of the Krasnany forestry administration who were engaged in embellishing and tidying up the surroundings of their working premises.

An undoubtedly authentic report, with photographs, on the current circumstances of Dubcek's life appeared in the West German illustrated weekly Quick on 5 May 1971. The story claimed that he is working as motor pool chief in the municipal forestry administration in Bratislava; he allegedly draws a monthly salary of 2,300 Kcs (the average wage of an industrial worker is about 2,000 Kcs), lives with his family in a small villa at 49 Misikova Street in Bratislava, and gardening is his main hobby. Each morning at about 0600 hours he travels on the No. 5 streetcar to his office at 21 Pekna Cesta, Krasnany, where he works until about 1500 hours. He is reportedly very shy, and people mostly ignore him. Apparently, for a number of reasons, the once great appeal of Alexander Dubcek has vanished almost completely. In his present position, he has no opportunity (nor has he the temperament) to counter the vicious propaganda of the regime or the genuine disenchantment of the population.

Incidentally, on the occasion cited above Kapek also revealed the current status of another prominent Czechoslovak reformer, Josef Smrkovsky. Responding to a question, he said that Smrkovsky was retired (the former party presidium member and National Assembly chairman is 60 years old and in poor health).

THE NEW CHINA HANDS

by James Reston

So many plans have gone wrong for the United States in Asia in recent years that it is sometimes forgotten that other plans have gone very well indeed. For example, if Peking and Washington do finally agree to re-establish diplomatic relations, the U. S. government will be ready with a new generation of China specialists.

The old "China service" of the American government was, of course, severely weakened by the political attacks on John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service and

other distinguished Foreign Service officers. But there is now a new crop of superb Chinese-language officers who have been trained in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and in the China studies sections of the American universities.

Also, some of the Foreign Service officers trained on the China mainland are still around. Among these are Alfred Le Sesne Jenkins, who was a language student in Peking and a political officer in Tientsin in 1948 and 1949. He is now director of Asian Communist affairs in the State Department.

Edwin Webb Martin, who is now a diplomat-in-residence at the University of California, also served in Peking and Hankow from 1946-48; and Larue R. Lutkins, now in Johannesburg, Oscar V. Armstrong and Gerald Stryker have all had similar experience on the China mainland in the early days of their diplomatic careers.

'Experts' in Theory

The younger China hands find themselves in the odd position of being regarded as "experts" on the People's Republic of China though they have never been there. Among these are John H. Holdridge, a former West Pointer, who took his China studies at Cornell, served in Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong and is now the principal Chinese aide to Henry Kissinger in the White House.

David L. Osborn, the present U. S. consul general in Hong Kong, was trained in the U. S. language school at Taichung in Taiwan, as was Paul Kreisberg, who was formerly head of the State Department's Asian Communist affairs section. And the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Marshall Green, while not a China scholar, has been concentrating on Asian problems ever since he went to Japan as secretary to Ambassador Joseph Grew before World War II.

For most of the 1950s, after the attacks by Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin on the China experts in the State Department, very little was done to replace the casualties of McCarthy's raids. But in 1959 a conference of China scholars including John Fairbank of Harvard, Doak Barnett of Columbia and the late John Lindbeck met in a Gould House conference to dramatize the need to restore the old tradition of Chinese

scholarship in the Foreign Service.

In Three Tiers

Since then, the Ford Foundation has contributed about \$22 million to the China-language area studies. Other foundations have added a little over \$2 million, and the government has put up about \$15 million under the National Defense Education Act. Meanwhile, the universities of the nation have contributed another \$20 million to this effort over the same period of time.

Thus there are now these three layers of China specialists available - men like Fairbank, Barnett and Robert A. Scalapino of the University of California, the older mainland-trained Foreign Service officers in the State Department; and the younger men now serving in the White House, the State Department where there is a large Chinese-speaking population.

In some ways this ambitious training program resembles the Soviet studies experiment started during the Harding administration almost a decade before the United States recognized the U. S. S. R. in 1933. It has not produced officers as prominent as George Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, and Llewellyn Thompson, who helped guide U. S. Soviet policy for a generation, but it has produced a competent group of diplomats and scholars who are prepared to serve in China if they get a chance.

This of course, will probably take some time. The guess here is that we are far short of diplomatic recognition due to the difficulty of settling the Taiwan question. Also, it could be, ironically, that the Peking government will not be eager to receive American diplomats who are scholars of Chinese history and who have in many cases been trained in Taiwan.

The present leaders in Peking have tended to discourage scholarship in Chinese history prior to the Communist take over. So much so that perhaps the most distinguished scholarship on China is now taking place in the United States.

Nevertheless, there has been foresight in restoring the China service. It is too late for the old China hands and too early for the new, but it is prudent if normal U. S. -China relations are restored.

(International Herald Tribune)

SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES PRESENT-DAY DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. IMPERIALISM

"The past five-year period can justly be regarded as a very critical one in the history of American imperialism", writes Georgi Arbatov, director of the Moscow Institute of the United States and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in a recent article in *P r a v d a* in which he discusses the most important features of the present-day development of imperialism, including United States imperialism, and its policy.

He points out that in the period from 1965 to 1970 the United States was confronted by growing domestic difficulties and problems and those domestic problems were closely inter-linked with problems of foreign policy, such as the war in South-East Asia and the arms race.

Growing doubts

All this has had far-reaching consequences on the moral-political situation in the country, where there is direct evidence of growing concern and doubts regarding the correctness of the policy carried out, and evidence of an increasing process of political polarisation.

Georgi Arbatov points out that in the past five years the United States has made quite an effort to increase its economic and military potential.

"All this must be taken into consideration so as to avoid any under-estimation of the strength and potentialities of the class enemy", he writes.

In the past five-year period, he continues, imperialism, including American imperialism, has been confronted with a further change in the correlation of forces between the two world social and economic systems - a change in favour of socialism. This process has been going ahead, both because of a further strengthening of the positions of the Soviet Union, the other countries of socialism and the international working-class and liberation movements and also owing to a serious worsening of the internal contradictions within the imperialist camp itself.

In these circumstances United States imperialism is trying to adjust itself to the new realities of the world, both in home and foreign policy. Thus, instead of putting an end to the war in Vietnam, Washington has concentrated its main efforts on searching for methods of muffling the opposition inside the United States and thereby ensuring for itself the possibility of continuing the aggression indefinitely.

The same trend is seen in the United States' policy in the Middle East and in its attitude on the questions of the strategic arms race and relations with the Soviet Union, and the slogan of transition from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiations has actually become a means of calming the public down, but not a real programme for the normalisation of relations and an improvement in the international situation.

Georgi Arbatov points out in his article that in order to expose the manoeuvres of imperialism it is of great importance to work out a correct policy and correct tactics of anti-imperialist struggle.

Elements of realism in the home and foreign policy of capitalist powers should not, however, be rejected on the grounds that such attempts merely express a desire to retain imperialism.

Any concession made by imperialism, any step made by the bourgeoisie towards adjustment to the existing situation is a forced concession made under pressure from the forces of peace and progress and can objectively have consequences which are in the interests of the peoples.

Important distinction

For the peoples it is far from being a matter of indifference whether international relations are developing in the direction of preparing a thermonuclear war or in the direction of peaceful co-existence between states and a political détente, which certainly do not eliminate the actual struggle between the two systems but which do take it into a channel in which that struggle does not lead to military conflicts. The importance of making such distinctions was stressed by Lenin.

Georgi Arbatov points out that the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has once again shown that the CPSU is firmly carrying into life the Leninist principles of

foreign policy.

"This is also true of the line formulated by the Congress on the question of Soviet-American relations, a line combining readiness to normalise these relations and to settle controversial questions by means of negotiations with a firm rebuff to aggressive schemes of American imperialism in relation to the USSR or any other country or people in the world", he writes.

After remarking that the future will show what direction the further evolution of American policy will take, he goes on to say:

"One thing is clear: no manoeuvres and no attempts to resort merely to a modernisation of the methods and means of imperialist policy, without making practical and realistic corrective amendments in it, can now open up prospects for normalising the international situation. Nor can such manoeuvres open up acceptable prospects for the American people themselves or for the real national interests of the United States".

MOCZAR OUT OF FAVOUR

The decline and fall of a Polish hard-liner

by D. L. Price

Summary: Ambitious, ruthless and independent, Poland's secret police chief for seven years, General Moczar, was stripped of office four months after the party leadership changed hands. This article traces the elements which secured his downfall and examines the Soviet role in his deposition.

In the tradition of East European politicians who have lost favour with their bosses and Moscow, Poland's secret police chief, General Mieczyslaw Moczar, is suffering from ill-health. In other words, Moczar is on the ropes.

Last seen in public on April 9, Moczar was noticeably absent from the Warsaw May Day parade. He was missing also from the guest list at a Soviet Embassy reception on April 21 given by the newly-arrived Soviet Ambassador. At a meeting of the Polish Politburo on April 16, certain of Moczar's responsibilities were delegated to an unknown "moderate",

Stanislaw Kania. In practice, Kania now becomes the secret police chief, and Moczar's hopes of being Poland's leader have been destroyed.

A burly, large-headed, vain man, Mieczyslaw Moczar has been a creature of the secret police apparatus for 25 years. Immediately after the war he became head of the secret police in his home town of Lodz, where, in 1947, he crushed a strike in which two workers died and eighty were wounded. When Gomulka returned to power in 1956, Moczar became number two in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in 1964 became Minister.

As secret police chief, Moczar presented Gomulka, later Gierek, with the threat of an alternative leader. Gomulka found Moczar a dangerous and ruthless Minister, frequently prepared to adopt public postures that the pragmatic Gomulka would have preferred to eschew.

In 1967, Moczar's secret police inspired and prosecuted anti-semitic purges, in which many of Gomulka's allies and supporters found themselves under attack. In March 1968, the Warsaw student riots were savagely quelled by the militia and the secret police. Moczar distrusts the intelligentsia, especially those of Jewish origin, and in cultural matters he is a professed "hard-liner". Eighteen months ago, Moczar published a volume of poetry - his own - and a Polish literary critic had the temerity to review the volume critically. That reviewer is now in exile in London.

The beginning of the end for Moczar was at the time of the Polish food riots last December. Over 60 people were killed by the militia: it is clear now that Gomulka had opposed the use of troops but Moczar, as the Minister responsible for internal affairs, had pressurised the moderates and secured his own way.

Moscow 'Rattled'

In the December reshuffle - Gierek for Gomulka - Moczar was appointed to full membership of the Politburo and was nearer the position of leader than at any previous occasion in his career. He drew his support from two sources: from the security apparatus and from a war veterans' organisation - Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy - which has

about 300,000 members and of which he is chairman. Heading this sinister alliance of security police and the armed services, Moczar presented a real threat to Gierek.

Moczar's harsh reprisals of December rattled Moscow: as it was, Soviet leaders had very little enthusiasm for him because of his stand as a nationalist and leader of the "partisans". (The "partisans" represent a group in Poland who were communist resistance fighters who stayed and fought in Poland throughout the war. Consequently there is little love lost between the "partisans" and those Communists who served their wartime apprenticeship in Moscow.) The independent position he adopted was not in the Soviet scheme of things for eastern Europe.

The protagonists for the struggle of the Polish succession were in position by the end of December but four months later Gierek's supremacy is certain - unless he fails to deliver the goods. His victory over Moczar is compounded of several elements. As a sop to the hard-liners Gierek made Moczar a full member of the Politburo but in a gesture of utter cynicism, granted Moczar the responsibility of liaising between the party and the church in an alleged attempt to start a dialogue between the two. Moczar cannot have failed to get the point.

Gierek then sought to counter-balance the secret police chief's influence in the Politburo by appointing a professional soldier - General Jaruzelski - to the central committee. Moczar's vanity and authority were, possibly, most offended, by Gierek's treatment of the police chief's home province of Lodz. In February, strikes crippled the Lodz textile factories; the Government climbed down and in a shake-up of provincial bosses, Gierek replaced 10 of the 19 representatives, including that of Lodz. Moczar, the local boy and a big one, was not consulted on the Lodz appointment.

Most leaders prefer to have their own men in the security apparatus or those which Moscow advises them to appoint. Gierek and Moscow appeared to have been at one on this point. At the end of March a new Soviet Ambassador arrived in Warsaw and he is reported to have expressed Moscow's dissatisfaction at Moczar's presence at the 24th Congress. Within three weeks there was a new man at the Polish secret police headquarters.

On the one hand, it is clear that Moczar's defeat is a

victory for the moderates. But the Soviet role in his demolition will mean that any Polish moves towards liberalisation must be proportionate - at this stage - to the degree of pressure exerted by Moscow.

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1971)

PEKING'S VIEWS ON NEGRO MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Summary: In two separate articles published earlier this month, the Chinese communists have expounded their current views on the American Negro movement. In reviewing the two articles, this paper points out the lack of understanding for the complexities of the American scene which stems, for the most part, from Peking's attempt to classify the Negro problem as being merely a manipulation of class struggle in the United States. While hinting that some American Negroes have embraced Marxist ideology, Peking now seems to endorse no political party as the true representative of the Marxist-Leninist cause in the US.

In what could be an attempt to counterbalance recent friendly overtures to the United States, the Chinese communists have published two interesting articles in support of the Negro movement in America. (1) In timing, the present articles coincide with the third anniversary of Mao's 1968 statement on what he called "the Afro-American struggle against violent repression". (2) Mao's message was prompted by the assassination in April 1968 of American Negro leader Martin Luther King, one of the

- (1) "The Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression Is Sure To Win", by Wu Hsin-ping and Tung Hsing-lien, "fighters of a certain PLA unit". People's Daily, 16 April 1971; "Afro-American Revolutionary Struggle Develops In Depth", by Hsinhua correspondent, NCNA, 16 April 1971.
- (2) Mao's Statement "In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression" was published on 16 April 1968.

major exponents of non-violence in the US civil rights movement. The conclusion drawn by the Chinese from King's death was somewhat contradictory to actual developments. Mao's statement used the occasion for pointing out the "inadequacy" of non-violence, and claimed that it was "US imperialism" that "used counterrevolutionary violence and killed him in cold blood".

Today, three years later, the Chinese communist approach toward the American civil rights movement remains unaltered. People's Daily claims that following King's death, the Black people of the United States "have come to realize that the creed of non-violence and reformism are impracticable in their strivings for liberation". Instead, we are told, the Negro masses have embraced the "idea of armed resistance against violent repression".

The Chinese arguments suffer both from a lack of understanding of the situation of the Negro movement in the United States and from its inclination to publicize outright racist appeals while at the same time appearing to be anti-racist. Thus the People's Daily article claims that

terrorism, lynching, kidnapping and assassination may at any moment befall the Afro-Americans who live in the shadows of hunger, illness and death.

In an attempt to emphasize the "racial discrimination" allegedly suffered by the Negroes in the United States, NCNA maintains that "the rate of unemployment among the Afro-Americans is twice as high as that among the Whites", and the casualty rate of Blacks in Vietnam is "twice as high as that among the Whites...".

Yet, the Chinese insist that the Negro movement has nothing to do with the question of race; "the Black masses and the masses of White working people in the USA share common interests and have common objectives to struggle for", People's Daily writes. The just struggle of the Afro-American people "enjoys the sympathy and support of the White workers", according to NCNA. The same article also claims that White workers "in many of their big strikes adopted a clear-cut stand against political and economic discrimination against the Black workers. Moreover, NCNA adds somewhat emotionally, "many White workers fought alongside their Black brothers...".

Looking at it from Peking, the American Negro problem is

basically a problem of class relations. As People's Daily put it: "the contradiction between the Black masses in the USA and the US ruling circles is a class contradiction". (3)

The class struggle, by the nature of Marxist ideology, should be led by a Marxist party. Yet, Peking presently does not claim the existence of a pro-Chinese party in the United States. Somewhat revealingly, People's Daily, the official paper of the CCP and the Maoist regime, makes no connection between the Black movement in the US and Marxism-Leninism.

NCNA, on the other hand, addresses itself to this problem. Through their revolutionary practice, the article claims, many "Black pioneers" have found "the powerful ideological weapon - Marxism-Leninism". These "pioneers", it is pointed out, "have organized themselves into groups to study and disseminate the great truth of Marxism-Leninism". Moreover, according to NCNA, "progressive papers of the Black people often carry writings by or selected quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin or Chairman Mao, to criticize all kinds of absurdities spread by the reactionary ruling circles, sum up experience in the struggle, and guide the current struggle".

The most interesting fact that emerges from the above sentences (as well as the two articles under review) is that Peking fails to recognize any existent grouping in the United States as a real "Marxist-Leninist" party. Peking has of course long rejected the CPUSA as the representative of the American working class. Yet, the Chinese communists have also abandoned the so-called "Hammer and Steel" group, which they once recognized and frequently quoted through the services of NCNA. Nor do they continue quoting statements of the "US Progressive Labor Party" whose anti-non-violence they endorsed two or three years ago. Most interestingly, there is no reference to any militant group active in the American Negro community such as the Black Panthers, who, for one reason or another, never seemed to enjoy Peking's full confidence. (It should be noted, however, that the "Black Panther Party" is given full support and recognition by the North Korean Communists in Pyongyang.)

(3) This element of equating the movement of the American colored people with class struggle first appeared in a statement issued by Mao Tse-tung in August 1963. "In the final analysis", Mao said, "the national struggle is a question of class struggle". (NCNA, 8 August 1963.)

Thus Communist China's view of the American Negro scene still suffers from the lack of understanding of the main issues and the forces involved. Most importantly, as a reflection of their own Weltanschauung, they still continue to look at the Negro problem in America as a form of class struggle. The latest Chinese "analyses" of the Afro-American movement therefore suffer from the same inadequacies that characterized Peking's previous articles on the subject.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

ECONOMICS

SOLID GROWTH DESPITE HEAVY COMMITMENTS

by Michael Simmons

There is probably more self-awareness and critical self-examination present in the discussions going on in the Soviet Union today about economic planning and management than there has been at almost any other time in the country's history. The commitments of the country have meant unprecedented burdens for the national economy, and it is not surprising that Mr. Brezhnev, the Party leader, himself should have unequivocally told the recent Party Congress that there was "an urgent need" to improve planning methods.

Precisely how this urgent need will be fulfilled remains an open question, but the present leadership, in most respects unchanged since the going of Mr. Khrushchev towards the end of 1964, has not hesitated to speak of unresolved shortcomings and problems.

Post-war growth

This is not to deny the massive achievements of the country, particularly in the post-war era. Nor is it to deny that even when the growth rate for industrial output slipped to 7 per cent, a couple of years ago - against 10 per cent two years before that - that the increase was very considerable by, say, West European standards. The overall growth rate set for last year, important on the Soviet calendar as Lenin's centenary year, was at 6.3 per cent, one of the lowest ever forecast - but was still high and, according to the official statistics, was comfortably exceeded.

But the burdens, economic as well as military and political, undoubtedly do mean pressures and, on occasion, the diversion of much-needed resources. Leading the working-class movement, like maintaining the secure frontiers of those countries under Communist rule, costs money. But Mr. Brezhnev was able to assure the Congress delegates that the Soviet Party would "continue to promote" multi-lateral inter-party ties.

In some respects, the burdens must have been of an unex-

pected nature. Discussing progress on the national economic front over the past five-years period, Mr. Kosygin, the Prime Minister, stated that "the aggravated international situation" had affected Plan fulfilment. This gave rise, he said, to the need to carry through additional measures of a defence character, calling for "some diversion" of resources and manpower.

Mr. Kosygin, not unexpectedly, did not say what "aggravations" he was talking about - but it can safely be assumed that the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia, the movement of manpower and military equipment to the long Chinese frontier, as well as the commitments to assist Egypt, have all meant unforeseen new spending. An estimate of total Soviet aid to Egypt, not given by the Russians themselves, but by the Institute for Strategic Studies, is as high as \$4,500 m.

Sought co-operation

But the leadership, in its endeavours to maintain secure frontiers for the socialist camp, has - particularly in the last year or so - sought to marry its thinking with appeals for co-operation with the West. If these appeals were met, then the Russians, like the Western leaderships to whom they are addressing themselves, would be able to re-divert resources back into industry.

They would also, if their ends were achieved, be able to enter into some uncharted territories so far as international economic co-operation was concerned. Thus, the calls for a European Security Conference have taken in suggestions that closer economic and technical co-operation between East and West could be placed on the agenda. The willingness to discuss strategic missiles with the Americans, and possibly to cut back on the number of troops based in Europe could obviously lead to significant savings on the economic front.

Convergence theory

But none of this should be mistaken for any notion that socialism and capitalism might one day "converge". The convergence theory is rejected by the Soviet leadership, and Mr. Brezhnev, speaking of economic developments in the non-Com-

munist world; declared "the general crisis of capitalism has continued to deepen".

On the domestic front, the Russians see computerisation as one of their most important life-lines in the years ahead. As what the East Europeans like to call "the scientific and technical revolution" (discussed in further detail on other pages) gathers momentum, so the role of electronic equipment will increase. Mr. Kosygin acknowledged this to the Congress, when he said:

"In the present conditions, the improvement of the system of planning and economic management requires the broader application of economic and mathematical methods, the use of computers, managerial equipment and advanced means of communication. The use of computers will speed up the receipt and processing of information, the elaboration of many variants of the Plan and the finding of optimal Plan solutions".

The State Planning Commission, he went on, as well as the Commission for Material and Technical Supplies and the Central Statistical Office, have set up computer departments. In the newly started five-year period it is planned that at least 1,600 automated control systems should go into operation in industrial and agricultural production units, as well as in the sectors of communications, internal trade and transport.

How this will be achieved, and the precise nature of the role to be given to the computer, also remain open questions, and are the subject of keen debate in Moscow. Nor is it yet clear where all the computers are to come from, and how sophisticated they will be. A large proportion, certainly, will be produced by domestic manufacturers, but at least an equally large proportion, probably, will be imported. The apparently fruitless talks aimed at co-operation held with International Business Machines some months ago must have come as something of a setback to the planners.

The chief aim of domestic policies, of course, is to achieve "full Communism", when "each will receive according to his needs". Mr. Khrushchev, in an impetuous moment, suggested this might be achieved by 1980. This date has now been quietly shelved, and any Party member worth his salt, in Moscow or elsewhere, would concede that fixing a date of such a millennium is a very difficult exercise. Mr. Brezhnev made it plain in his report that, despite the failure of certain key economic

sectors to reach the targets that were set for them in 1966, there had been "another great stride forward" in the past five years. But he also warned the 6,000-odd people present that there could be "long decades dividing the sowing from the harvest".

In its determination to raise the living and cultural standards of the population, the leadership has taken another discernible step. As other articles in this survey indicate, much stress in the economic discussions is being laid on the need for more and better consumer goods. The coming on stream of the huge car plant on the Volga, built in co-operation with Italy's Fiat and scheduled soon to produce 660,000 cars a year is evidence of this.

In the world economic context, the main centres of what Moscow calls "imperialist rivalry" are seen as the U.S., Western Europe (above all, the Common Market countries) and Japan. Growth rate comparisons, however, are currently restricted to the U.S., Britain and West Germany. Comparisons are not made, for obvious reasons, with Japan, just as when the integration and effectiveness of the Moscow-based Comecon organisation are being discussed, no comparisons are made with the relatively efficient Common Market. The latter, after all, is an organisation the Russians would rather did not exist - though there are indications that a *modus vivendi* with it might prove acceptable.

Unmentioned reform

There was little specific mention during the Congress of the economic reform, introduced by Mr. Kosygin in September, 1965. This presumably is partly because, as a programme for action, it is taken as read, and partly - as I was told during a conversation with senior officials of the State Planning Commission - because it has produced some of its own difficulties. It did not, for one thing, give a long enough perspective for forward planning; it did not solve the gnawing problems connected with productivity; and it did not go far enough to influence the quality - as opposed to the quantity - of goods being produced.

Mr. Brezhnev, warning that the "class struggle" between socialism and capitalism was in fact being intensified and this had to be taken into account, emphasised that there had to

be an improvement in building standards, that there had to be more efficient accounting, that science and technology had to be mastered, and that living standards had to go up. Even he, one fancies, would not be reluctant to admit that secure frontiers and a strong army are not the only evidence of Soviet might.

(The Financial Times)

AFTER THE SECOND CONGRESS OF YUGOSLAVIA'S SELF-MANAGERS

Summary: The Second Congress of Yugoslavia's Self-Managers took place in Sarajevo on 5-8 May 1971. More than 3000 delegates from throughout Yugoslavia and their guests from abroad discussed the problem of the workers' self-management system and its future prospects. It was decided that the self-management system should be further strengthened and that a new Self-Managers' Code should be adopted as soon as possible. In his two speeches, President Tito dealt with the Yugoslav situation, threatening all people who have not been abiding by the decisions passed at various state and party levels. He promised some administrative measures which would remove current political and economic difficulties.

The Second Congress of Yugoslavia's Self-Managers, held in Sarajevo on 5-8 May 1971, took place with Yugoslavia experiencing a serious crisis in its political and economic life. This problem was not ignored by either President Tito, or by any of the speakers at the Congress. In another respect, the self-managers' congress in Sarajevo was a spectacle seldom, if ever, seen in the other Communist states of Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The freedom and vehemence with which several hundred delegates spoke at the congress (about 3,000 delegates and guests attended) (1) is something to be considered when

(1) The following East European states sent their delegations to the Sarajevo Congress: the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. No names of the delegates have thus far been published.

the Yugoslav situation is discussed. (2) A Zagreb daily, in commenting on the recent Bulgarian Party Congress, sarcastically said: "And after six days of work the (Bulgarian) delegates went home to treat their palms". (3) In other words, unlike the Yugoslav delegates who criticized, attacked, counterattacked and hailed things which they considered worth praising, the Bulgarian delegates had no privileges whatsoever except to applaud their "wise" and "infallible" leaders.

The extent of freedom enjoyed by the Yugoslav delegates is best indicated by a remark from President Tito who concluded that "democracy could be rather damaging to the development of socialism", especially if it is "being misused by the enemies of socialism". (4) This formula is not new, of course; but Tito's latest reference to it should be viewed in connection with the Yugoslav President's announcement that a certain number of people would be held responsible for not abiding by the agreed upon decisions. Yet not only Tito but almost all the speakers at the congress kept repeating that for Yugoslavia there is no other road than the self-management system.

The congress itself can be divided into two main parts: the first section was devoted to the reports (read in the plenary session and in the four commissions) and to the discussions which followed them; the second part was devoted to Tito's opening and closing speeches. The congress passed the following 28 resolutions (5): 1. On Associated Work; 2. On Income; 3. On Self-Management in Science; 4. On Linking of Different Areas

(2) The agenda of the Self-Managers Congress was as follows:
1. The acceptance of the Congress' Standing Rules; 2. Election of the Congress' Working Bodies; 3. "Economic and Political Relationships in the Self-Managing Socialist System", the main report by Edvard Kardelj; 4. Report by the Verification Commission; and 5. The (four) Commissions' Acceptance of the Reports and the Congress' Documents.

(3) Vjesnik, Zagreb, 30 April 1971.

(4) Borba, Belgrade, 9 May 1971.

(5) Politika, Belgrade, 8 May 1971.

of Associated Work; 5. On Self-Managing Arrangements; 6. On Social Security; 7. On Responsibility; 8. On Cadre Policy; 9. On Conditions of Work; 10. On Working Capability and Protection at Work; 11. On the Position of Associated Work in Extended Reproduction; 12. On the Policy of Development; 13. On Personal and Social Living Standards; 14. On Employment; 15. On Housing; 16. On Relations Among Nationalities; 17. On the Commune as a Self-Managing Community; 18. On Communities of Interests; 19. On the Realization of Direct Self-Management in Local Communities; 20. On Socio-Political Organizations; 21. On the Socialization of Political Decision-Making and the Role of National Assemblies; 22. On Culture; 23. On the Association of Citizens; 24. On the Nationwide Defense System; 25. On the Acceptance of Constitutional Changes; 26. On the Preparation and Acceptance of the Self-Managers' Code; 27. On the Proclamation of June 27 as the Day of Yugoslav Self-Managers; (6) and finally 28. The main Resolution of Topical Political Tasks -- the only resolution published thus far. (7)

Kardelj and Ribicic

The following 12 requests, in their condensed form, were expressed by the workers during the discussion held mainly in

(6) On 27 June 1950 the Law on Workers' Self-Management was adopted by the Yugoslav National Assembly in Belgrade. The full title of the document which President Tito presented to the deputies was : The Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Working Collectives, (The text was published in Sluzbeni list (Official Gazette), Belgrade, No. 43 for 1950. It was subsequently shortened to the Law on Workers' Self-Management.)

(7) Borba, 9 May 1971.

the four commissions: (8)

1. President Tito should remain President of the Republic for life;
2. More democracy must be practiced through increased strengthening of the self-management system;
3. June 27 should be proclaimed the Day of Yugoslav Self-Managers;
4. The Self-Managers' Code (including the right of the workers to strike) should be accepted as soon as possible;
5. The constitutional changes should be adopted and implemented without delay;
6. The equality and sovereignty of all Yugoslav nationalities and republics must be strictly observed;
7. Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy based on non-alignment should be continued without change;
8. All decisions passed by various state and party bodies must be strictly implemented and all violators called to responsibility;
9. Communes must be given greater rights;
10. All efforts must be made to solve the adverse economic situation, especially inflation which is considered "the chief enemy of the working class";
11. Differences in salaries must be stopped unless based on the principle that everyone is paid according to his work;
12. The payment of wages and salaries in factories must be given top priority.

(8) The First Commission, headed by Dusan Petrovic, president of the Yugoslav TU Confederation, discussed "Further Construction, Development and Advancement of Self-Management in Working Organizations"; the Second Commission, headed by Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, discussed "Extended Reproduction and Integration on the Self-Managing Basis"; the Third Commission, headed by Kiro Gligorov, discussed "Development of the Self-Managing Society and Living Standards of the Working People"; and finally the Fourth Commission, headed by Milentije Popovic, discussed "Strengthening the Role of the Associated Producers - The Basis of the Self-Managing Socio-Political System". Immediately after the congress ended, Popovic - who was president of the Yugoslav National Assembly - died of a heart attack.

The main resolution with its nine points included, in one way or another, all the above-mentioned 12 points voiced by the delegates at the congress. In addition the resolution fully supported the decisions made at the 17th session of the Yugoslav Party Presidium (held at Brioni on 28, 29 and 30 April 1971) and Tito's speech in Labin of 1 May 1971.

Kardelj's main report was published and distributed in advance and because of this, he restricted himself to some introductory remarks. As in his main report, Kardelj praised the workers' self-management system as the only way to enable the working class to really exercise power. He denied criticism by some people both in Yugoslavia as well as abroad who have been placing the blame for the country's difficulties on the self-management system. Kardelj did not hide the fact that political and economic difficulties exist, but he added that acceptance of the constitutional changes would solve most of the existing problems. Centralism must be completely abandoned and self-management must be strengthened, Kardelj said; this is the only way out of the current crisis. He also supported the Croat thesis that greater independence for individual republics does not mean any weakening of the country as a whole. "On the contrary", Kardelj said, "the independence of individual republics will contribute to our unity". (9) He rejected all "ultra-leftist and ultra-liberalist radicalism, Stalinist dogmatism and ultra-rightist chauvinism". Kardelj admitted that political and economic difficulties existed but warned against any dramatization of them.

Kardelj's Slovenian countryman Mitja Ribicic - Yugoslavia's Prime Minister - also spoke about the political and economic difficulties. He warned that if the present economic deficiencies continued to develop in the present direction, "serious social tremors might be felt". (10) Ribicic also said that "inflation is the greatest enemy of the working class - the cancer which corrodes the economic organism" of the country. He concluded

(9) Borba, 6 May 1971.

(10) Politika, 8 May 1971.

that "most of the open problems being discussed at the congress would be solved when the creators of the income and labor surplus (i. e., the workers) would be able to make their own decisions".

Tito: No Shooting of Empty Guns

In his opening speech on May 5, President Tito spoke about the "great successes" of the self-management system. He said that Yugoslavia now finds itself "at a turning point" and announced a series of new measures. His closing speech of May 8, however, is more important. In it Tito used the opportunity to "settle accounts" with Yugoslavia's enemies both within the country and abroad, and to announce steps similar to purges. Because some unnamed Western journalists described his Labin (May 1) speech as a repetition of verbal threats which are usually not followed by any action, Tito said: "Oh no, it is not going to be an empty gun; we have got plenty of ammunition left. We would know how to prevent some people from confusing and placing obstacles before our socialist development". (11)

Who are the people who "confuse and place obstacles" before Yugoslavia's socialist development? Tito mentioned some unnamed army generals and retired generals; he also mentioned some intellectuals and "philosophers". The latest are most easily identifiable: people associated with the Zagreb periodical Praxis and several professors at the Belgrade philosophical faculty. As far as the army generals are concerned, there is a difference between what Tito actually said in his speech and what the Yugoslav papers published. In his original speech (monitored here) Tito said:

Among the critics who receive "fat" pensions - such are the things in our society, because of the laws - there are also generals; yes, I say there are generals, but also other people who - no active (generals), you know, the retired ones, who talk only in cafes and find only negative things which they do not like. There are also megalomaniacs who, all of them, wanted to become president of the republic of Yugoslavia - at least ministers. (12)

In the edited newspaper text, it said: "There are also re-

(11) Borba, 9 May 1971.

(12) All Yugoslav radio stations, 8 May 1971.

tired generals". Tito promised to call them to responsibility. He also revealed that not everything which was discussed in April at the Presidium's Brioni session, was published:

Had we published everything we said there, we would have confused the general psychosis - which has been created artificially in our country, especially in the big cities - and would have created such a mess so that nothing would have been achieved. We would have created a much greater confusion than the one which now exists. (13)

From Tito's speech it appears that at Brioni no conflicting side (i. e., neither the Croat nor the Serbian Communist leaders) was ready to yield an inch and practice self-criticism. The Croats maintained their charge that a plot was organized against them which included some people in the central government in Belgrade (the State Security Service); the other side denied this. Both views were then included in the Brioni communique.

It appears however, that some of the most interesting aspects of Tito's speech were the topics he failed to mention. In none of his speeches did he refer to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact (even his May Day speech in Labin avoided any mention of the bloc), a fact which can be seen as a reflection of the problematic relations between Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Tito's criticism of the West, i. e., his sarcastic remarks that the West, "has been suffocating in monetary and various other crises", could only be considered by the Yugoslav workers to have been made out of necessity. The more than one million Yugoslav workers in the "crisis-stricken West" (represented at the congress with 50 delegates) offer the best proof that Yugoslav citizens have a different opinion about the Western "situation". (Fundamentally, the latest monetary developments in West Germany will further increase the value of the money Yugoslav workers earn in West Germany.)

One must, in conclusion, ask the same question which the unnamed Western journalist, according to Tito, posed: Will the Yugoslav President really introduce some administrative measures and carry out purges, both in the Party and the state

(13) Borba, 9 May 1971.

apparatus? Even if one believes the claim that his gun is not empty, one cannot but emphasize that it is the solution of the problems rather than the purges of some functionaries which could bring about an improvement of the Yugoslav situation. True, the removal of some persons may create a new atmosphere favorable for problem solving. However, in most cases, it is the Croats or Serbs whose nationalism has been considered their biggest sin. Their replacement could increase the dissatisfaction among these two groups which, in turn, could intensify the nationality conflict. The only solution seems to be a true implementation of the self-management system and even more freedom for the workers. This is precisely what the Second Congress of Yugoslavia's Self-Managers demanded and decided to carry out.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

GERMAN 'OSTPOLITIK' OR SOVIET 'WESTPOLITIK'?

Bonn industrialists' hopes of Soviet orders cooling

by George Embree

Summary: 'Much of the original unrealistic German optimism for the Russian market has turned sour', reports George Embree, a freelance journalist specialising in European trade developments, in this article, in which he analyses the course Soviet-West German industrial exchanges have taken since the treaty between the two countries was signed last August.

When West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" suddenly resulted in a treaty with Moscow last August 12, speculation was rife here about why the Russians were so anxious to reach an agreement. One explanation heading the list was that they hoped to "dip into the German honeypot for advanced technical know-how, long-term credits, and capital goods" in order to accelerate their lagging economic development.

For the first few months after the treaty had been signed, German industrialists were rubbing their hands with glee over the orders they expected to see come rolling in without any political complications tied to them. Allied political observers

were more sceptical. They preferred to think in terms of a Russian "Westpolitik" rather than a German "Ostpolitik".

They argued that for many German companies domestic and foreign markets have just about reached the saturation point. If, however, the Soviet Union suddenly placed huge orders, it would require them to build new capacity. Once committed to the Russian market, they would have to keep the orders flowing in if this expansion was to pay for itself.

Thus, Western diplomats tended to forecast that German industrialists would become a major internal political lobby for Moscow which Bonn would have an extremely difficult time ignoring. But after less than a year, much of the original unrealistic German optimism for the Russian market has turned sour, despite extensive efforts on Moscow's part to keep it alive.

Last January, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin invited the elite of German industry to inspect for themselves the industrial areas of the Siberian steppes.

Later, over a glass of vodka in the Kremlin, he declared: "Gentlemen, you have seen the great possibilities. Please help yourselves".

But when a Soviet trade delegation showed up in Bonn a month later to negotiate a trade agreement between the two countries, the Russian terms were so stiff that even Bonn's willingness to relax some of its normal restrictions were insufficient, and after 10 days the Russians departed for home without their treaty.

'Playing Off' Tactics

The difficulties experienced by Daimler-Benz of Stuttgart in reaching agreement with the Russians over the construction of a complete factory for the production of trucks are typical.

For nearly two years the company has been negotiating with Moscow for a plant which would have a production capacity of 150,000 vehicles. In order to compete with the French and the Italian automotive industries, which already have footholds in the Russian market, Daimler-Benz is prepared to grant licences as well as give expert advice on the actual construction of the factory.

However, it doesn't want to become involved in the managerial role, because this would tie up too much of its resources.

In a typical Soviet effort to play one company off against another, the Kremlin has now begun negotiating with Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz in Cologne for a truck factory. The major difference is that its engines are air-cooled while the Daimler-Benz ones are water-cooled.

How to pay for what it wants to buy is another major Soviet problem. Russia doesn't qualify for Bonn's state credits, which are available only to developing countries.

This means they must turn to the German capital market, because they lack foreign exchange. But their demands for long-term low-interest rate loans simply aren't profitable banking business in a country where domestic interest rates are very high. If Russia were to resume the sale of its gold reserves, much of the problem would be solved, but there are few indications that this is likely, according to German banking circles.

Even so, the Germans have come up with the funds for some major projects. Franz Heinrich Ulrich, spokesman for the Deutsche Bank, declares: "Our banks have managed to carry through the biggest private deal to date, delivery of steel pipe (produced by Mannesmann) worth 2,000 million marks".

The Russians would also like to make payment through barter agreements, but Professor Matthias Schmitt, a specialist on East-bloc trade, calls this a type of "mediaeval bartering".

The Confederation of German Industries in Cologne has never been terribly optimistic about expansion of trade with Russia. Within a couple of months of the August treaty with Moscow it issued an analysis of trade possibilities which stressed that after all existing Soviet commitments had been accounted for, "only one-third of its total foreign trade is left over for the rest of the (non-Communist) world".

Also, its studies indicated 90 per cent of Soviet exports are raw materials and only 1.5 per cent are machinery.

In return, the Russians want capital goods and will have nothing to do with German consumer goods producers. Firstly, their foreign exchange is in too short supply for such "luxury" items, and secondly Western goods would show up the shoddy quality of domestically produced ones.

The President of the Federal Republic's industrial and commercial committee, Otto Wolff van Amerongen, who is also a specialist on East-West trade is nevertheless, optimistic.

"Trade with the East is one of the greatest investments of the future for the Federal Republic", he declares.

But the size of this investment is staggering. One company spent four years negotiating a co-operative deal with Bulgaria and then another two trying to figure out why it didn't work. The whole process cost the company seven million marks in capital investment.

Normal Growth

Advanced technical know-how is another commodity highly desired by the Soviets, and Krupp in Essen has probably had the most experience in this area.

Bertold Beitz, chairman of the advisory board at Krupp, believes the meagre 4 per cent of Germany's total foreign trade with the East could easily be doubled. "This dream has long been reality at Krupp. Our figures are between 9 per cent and 15 per cent... we have never lost through trading with the East bloc and have always earned handsomely", he says.

He sees no reason for a formal trade agreement. "Since 1963 (our) trade had doubled to almost 3 billion marks per year", he points out.

Some years ago, when Beitz was a voice crying in the wilderness because the ruling Christian Democratic government refused to take him seriously, Kosygin promised him an honoured burial place in the wall of the Kremlin if he moved to Moscow.

But Beitz answered dryly: "For as long as I live, I shall remain a capitalist. When I am dead, you perhaps can have me then".

(Copyright Forum World Features
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WOMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Women's Liberation movement in West Europe and North America has attracted the attention of Soviet and other Communist commentators who claim that in Communist countries women have been "freed" from exploitation and placed on an equal footing with men in all spheres of economic, government,

cultural, political and other activities.

Although there is no movement in the Soviet Union comparable to Women's Liberation, the debates in the Soviet press on the women's question has revealed that the lot of Soviet women is far from enviable. Latest official statistics (published in National Economy of the USSR in 1969) show that women now number just over half the total labour force in the Soviet Union. The number of women employed in the medical and teaching profession exceeds the number of men, and in both these professions good opportunities are open to them. Nevertheless it should be remembered that medicine and teaching are among the lower paid jobs.

Many women are engaged in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs which still involve hard physical labour. Opportunities for women in senior political and administrative posts remain limited. They are very under-represented in the Party and government: at the moment there are no women members of either the Politburo or the Central Committee Secretariat, while less than 10 per cent of Central Committee members and less than one-third of the Supreme Soviet are women. There is only one woman member of the USSR Council of Ministers (Mme Furtseva, Minister of Culture). High-level political representation compares unfavourably with some Western countries (for example, Britain and the USA) where the female labour force is considerably smaller.

Opportunities are similarly restricted in industry where the proportion of men in the top administrative jobs far exceeds that of women. The number of women in the lower-qualified, lower-paid, and not infrequently some of the most arduous, jobs is high.

A breakdown of figures for 1969 shows that women accounted for 48 per cent of industrial workers; 43 per cent of State farm and other agricultural workers (excluding collective farmers); and 27 per cent of construction workers. It is still common on Soviet building sites to see women doing bricklaying while men operate machines.

Women are in theory protected by labour laws from some types of heavy manual labour but many abuses occur. Ballerina, T. Vecheslova, a persuasive spokesman for the position of women in the USSR, wrote to the Party paper Pravda (February 24, 1969): "We must try to rid women of heavy unskilled labour.

Though our labour legislation protects the woman from work beyond her physical abilities unfortunately this point is not always strictly observed, while public organisations often tolerate it. To fill in the (manpower) gap we use woman-power and often in arduous jobs that are not at all for women".

Similarly, Socialist Legality (No. 10 of 1970) criticised those enterprises which employed women "in heavy labour or in conditions harmful to their health". In particular, it noted infringements of the law relating to the health of pregnant and nursing mothers, citing certain factories which had employed expectant mothers on night work right up to the start of their maternity leave. Literary Gazette (January 8, 1969) found after interviewing 100 married couples that only ten of the wives earned more than their husbands, twenty earned an equal amount, twenty-five up to 30 per cent less and forty-five more than 30 per cent less. A similar survey in Leningrad, reported in Socialist Justice (No. 11 of 1969) found that in 73 per cent of families, the wages of the men were higher.

The problem of how to hold down a full-time job while running a household and having a family is one which is not confined to Soviet women but it seems to exist in a more acute form there than elsewhere. There is no doubt that in the Soviet Union due to shortage of labour-saving devices, household duties are more arduous and time-consuming and the Russian wife can apparently expect less help from her husband than her counterparts in West Europe and North America. It was in this context that Nedelya, weekly supplement to the government newspaper Izvestiya, remarked in 1969 that the Soviet Union may have produced a New Woman, but man has remained very much the same. Similarly, Literary Gazette commented (September, 1968) that women had "won the right to work, but lost the right to leisure".

Soviet News (June 9, 1970) reported that at a meeting of women from all East European countries a Czech delegate claimed that women had to spend from 4-6 hours a day on household chores - on what has come to be known as the "second shift". The situation in the Soviet Union is obviously similar. In Moscow for instance only 15 per cent of women own washing machines, 37 per cent refrigerators and 20 per cent vacuum cleaners. Outside services which might help to lighten the domestic load, such as laundries, launderettes and

restaurants are also quite inadequate. Shopping, as a result of the vagaries of the Soviet production and distribution system, may take up to 2-3 hours a day and Sovetskaya Rossiya, reported on October 30, 1969 that their queuing accounts for between 30 and 50 per cent of time spent on all household chores.

For working mothers, additional problems arise from the lack of crèches and kindergartens - they are only available to 30-50 per cent of pre-school children, according to Ogonek (February, 1971). In the past, working women could rely on their mothers or mothers-in-law to care for the children and do household work. Now there is a growing tendency for the two generations to live apart. At the same time, grandmothers, possibly having caught the spirit of 'liberation', are no longer as willing to spend their day as babysitters and cleaners.

The difficulties and pressures facing Soviet working wives are undoubtedly contributory factors in the declining birth rate (it fell in the USSR from 24.9 per thousand in 1960 to 17 per thousand in 1969). This is a problem of major concern to the Soviet authorities and they fear that unless it is remedied, it will seriously aggravate the already existing manpower shortage in years to come. At the same time, however, if a substantial number of women leave the work force to have children, it might solve the population problem for the next generation but would certainly create difficulties for the present Soviet economy in terms of lost manpower.

Some sociologists and demographers maintain that the problem should be tackled by the provision of nurseries at all places of employment which would look after children even when they are sick, thereby allowing mothers to stay at work and encouraging them to have more children. Other sociologists, however, are already concerned at the social problems posed by a generation raised outside the traditional family unit. Among this group of experts there seems to have been a shift in the original Soviet position that a woman should be first a worker, then a mother. An article in the monthly magazine Moskva (No. 10, 1970) deplored the fact that "child bearing has faded out of the conception of what is our duty to our country and our people". Commenting that even some experts are "suffering to some extent from the illusion that children are a side issue, a burdensome waste of time for the mothers", the magazine stated: "The first task is to assist the woman to get

rid of the false shame for her female inclinations, or instincts if you like. Teach her to find joy in her house... to delight in her children".

Other suggestions for solving the birth rate problem include one that mothers be paid a salary and be allowed to work only until the birth of their first child and after they have brought up the last. Such proposals for the compulsory withdrawal of labour, although they may appeal to some women employed in the more arduous and menial jobs, have not been well received by other groups of Soviet women. Many women need to work to supplement their husband's income. Others undoubtedly would prefer to devote at least part of the day to a job, rather than spend all their time looking after the family. The question of part-time work remains a problem.

Clearly what Soviet women want is the right to compete with men on equal terms in all fields of employment, as well as changes in present domestic conditions and child-care facilities so that the task of combining a career and a family can become a realistic proposition.

Communist leaders in East Europe as well as the Soviet Union are evidently aware, despite their propaganda, that considerable strides need to be taken before women can be said to enjoy "genuine equality". This was apparent from some of the comments made on the occasion of International Women's Day on March 8, 1971. At a meeting of 140 women from the Czech lands, Czech premier Josef Korcak admitted that "although women had equal access to education and work under the law, the reality of life was still lagging behind good intentions" (CTK, March 8, 1971). On the same day the Polish paper Trybuna Ludu observed that "the new model of a family in which domestic duties are more evenly divided between the spouses, is only in its initial stages". It suggested that "perhaps it would be a good thing if every day some of the domestic work were taken off the women's shoulders, so as to give them more time and better health, so that life may be easier for them, and so that they may be able to smile more often".

SOME CONFLUENCE IN INVESTMENT PATTERNS: USA AND USSR

Summary: Soviet annual investment outlays now comprise one-third of the country's gross national income. Last year they reached the American total for the first time, although the US GNP is twice that of the Soviet Union. Per capita consumption remains at about one-third the US level. A comparative study by Soviet sources corrected for methodology shows a fairly uniform trend of investment sectors: industry and housing construction are the primary sector of the economy, with some variation in transport and agriculture. The breakdown of national income into what share for investment and how much for consumption is a political decision made independent of consumer opinion.

The high rate of forced accumulation from national income has been the primary source for the high rate of investment and growth in the Soviet economy. Nearly one-third of its gross national product is extracted as savings and channeled into the economy to promote future growth; this amount is about three times greater than that for the United States, although the US real gross national product is twice that of the Soviet Union. (1)

While these basic trends have long been known, both US and Soviet sources now maintain that the absolute amount of annual investment in the Soviet Union during 1969-70 reached the American total for the first time. (2) So in the investment sector, the Soviets have realized one of their long established goals - to catch up with the United States. This is indeed an achievement but it has been made possible only by reduced consumption; for it is impossible to have both higher investment and higher consumption out of the same output. Throughout the plan periods the Soviets have sacrificed some present consumption for greater investment, regardless of the wishes of the consumers. During 1969 a little more than half of the Soviet national product was channeled into consumption. Meanwhile, per capita consumption rose by three-and-a-half per cent, but it remains at about only one-third of the US level. (3)

(1) US Congress. Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, 1970, p. 6.

(2) Ibid., Vestnik statistiki, No. 4, 1971, p. 42.

(3) Ibid., p. 7.

Because the Soviet population is larger and a smaller fraction of its GNP is allocated to consumption, it follows that Soviet per capita consumption is an even smaller share than the American.

With gross annual investment now at comparable levels, it would be revealing to compare the differences, such as the rate of growth, returns on investment, and the distribution of investment by sectors between the two countries. This paper will concentrate on the tabular distribution of investment since the material is more complete and uncomplicated by dollar versus ruble price indices. In addition, a recent study on perfecting the methodology for comparative investment studies was completed by a Soviet economist, B. Ryabushkin. In a series of schematic diagrams, he shows how the structural composition of capital investment is arrived at by Soviet standards of classification. Essentially the value of total investment consists of: 1) outlays for equipment, instruments, and inventory, 2) outlays for construction, assembly and installation work and 3) other capital outlays, such as land, surveys, designs, etc. (4) The study is based on comparisons in the share of total investment using the money measure for each country, thus obviating the difficulties of a dollar-ruble ratio.

The study showed that the share of outlays for new equipment reached 33 per cent of total investment in the Soviet Union, and 37 per cent in the US during 1968-69. This is quite in balance and the differences can be attributed to a lower volume of new construction in the US because the concentration is more on modernization and new equipment rather than overall new plant construction as in the USSR. To the construction of new industrial projects, however, the Soviets allot about 40 per cent of total investments compared to almost 20 per cent for the USA. (5)

The comparative results of the study, based on adaptations and corrected for the Soviet methodology, over an 19-year period, cover both private and public investment and are based on the share of total capital investment using the respective currency of the country.

(4) Ibid., pp. 36-39.

(5) Ibid., p. 38.

Distributional Structure of Capital Investment: USSR & USA

(in % of Total Investment)

	1950		1960		1969	
	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA
Capital Investment Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
of which						
Industry	34.8	30	35.3	31	34.7	33
Construction Industry	2.6	2	2.8	1	3.4	2
Agriculture	14.2	9	13.6	5	18.4	5
Transport & Commun.	12.4	10	9.6	14	9.6	16
Housing Construction (*)	32.4	49	38.7	49	33.9	44

(*) including private construction of trade and communal enterprises, forestry, mining, procurement, centers for science, art, culture, education and health.

Source: Vestnik statistiki, No. 4, 1971, p. 43.

A bird's-eye view of the above data covering 19 years shows a greater uniformity and balance between the countries than expected. With some exceptions, the share of investment outlays by sector for each has been remarkably stable over the years: Soviet agriculture has shown the largest increase - by 30 per cent. In transport and communications the Soviet share dropped by over 20 per cent of the total since 1950. Overall housing construction outlays showed more than a ten per cent decline in 1969, a year in which both countries experienced housing difficulties.

The really revealing sector is industry where both countries maintained a level of around one-third of the total investment outlays. It has been generally assumed that the Soviets continually outdo the US in industrial investment flow but this study refutes the generality. As previously indicated, the US concentrates more on modernizing existing plants while the Soviets are more occupied with new plant construction. Technological modernization is a dimensional step beyond basic construction that usually assures high labor productivity, plant profitability, and enhances accumulation possibilities. The uniformity of the investment allocations in the two systems over nearly two

decades indicates that the future flow will continue in this direction with the US leading in industrial technology. Moreover, in both systems, almost all of the defense and space industries are located in the industrial sector.

In the agricultural sector the investment pattern follows that of a still developing economy in need of raising its output of quality foods against that of a country with a surplus. Soviet direct farm outlays have risen 30 per cent while the US remains in equilibrium at a relatively low percentage just enough to replace its machinery, rationalize the farm structures and acquire new technology. The Soviets are still sharply backward in mechanizing production processes - their power park is still undersized and the rural construction tasks (barns, granaries, repair centers, living quarters) are formidable.

In transport and communication the Soviets have shown a regression in the share of gross capital outlays while the US shows a substantial growth rate over the 19-year period, almost double. This high level is accounted for by the extensive motor road network built in the last two decades. Conversely, it reveals the backwardness of Soviet road construction.

In the all-inclusive "housing construction" sector, the table lists the Soviet components while for the US, only those construction areas that are applicable are included. It should be stressed that both private and public housing projects are covered along with border costs such as land, surveys and designs. The Soviet share in housing comes to one-third of total capital outlay, while for the US it reached 44 per cent during 1969, maintaining a rather steady pace during the two decades. This sector would include investment to improve the quality of living and environmental work which will play an ever-expanding role in the future.

The Soviet Union now invests nearly one-third of its gross national product. The absolute amount of annual capital outlay is now comparable to the American level, although the US GNP is twice that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet consumer has had to underwrite this high level of investment by reduced consumption against his will. And since the GNP is half that of the American, it is a revealing measure of the sacrifices and comparatively lower living levels of the Soviet masses. Investment plans are made on political decisions in the planned societies and welfare for the consumer becomes secondary. Worker unrest in Eastern Europe this year could well trigger down-scaling in the share

of income channeled into capital outlays.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

PRODUCTION BEFORE CLEANLINESS

Keeping air and water clean appears to be even more difficult in Eastern Europe than it is in the West. The special difficulties stem from the absence of power or pressure groups which can translate vital interests of the population into political action. There is no electorate to restrict the Communist Governments entrepreneurial freedom, by making them take account of the environment. The problem is not new but the holding of the United Nations Symposium on environmental problems in Prague this month has focused attention on it.

The Prague meeting, originally scheduled as a fully-fledged ECE Conference, was preceded by one of those last minute diplomatic tussles whose absurdity reveals how international politics lags behind industrial reality. The problem was how to admit the diplomatically disqualified East Germany. In the end it was resolved by giving the meeting another name - and the East German representative a badge of a different colour from the rest.

Disabilities

From an environmentalist's point of view East Germany suffers from other disabilities more serious than lack of full diplomatic recognition. Though its Government has been urging international compliance with U. N. recommendations against discharge of foreign matters into the sea - to protect its fishing in the Baltic Sea - it has been slow in taking anti-pollution measures at home. East Germany is not only highly industrialised, it also takes the efficiency of its industry seriously.

This high regard for industrial efficiency and disregard of other values is one of the reasons why East Germany moved fastest of all Comecon countries in the development of science-based industries, and of chemical industries in particular, but delayed fixing ceilings on untreated wastes that could be released into the environment until 1969 and 1970.

Czechoslovakia, the only one of the Comecon countries which

has an industrial history going back to 18th century, has never been as single-minded as East Germany about the blessings brought to the country by populating it with factory chimneys. Its programme of water purification was even singled out for praise in a recent survey by E. C. E.

Yet even in that country, where public awareness of the environmental hazards is probably greatest, the Prague Government has the greatest difficulty in forcing itself and industry to keep air and water reasonably clean and to avoid further devastation of the countryside. Under similar conditions, in the Netherlands, for example, the chemical industry accepts that 10 to 15 per cent of its investment outlay will be spent on anti-pollution devices. But in Czechoslovakia there is no organisation which can oppose Comecon demands for greater productive capacities. The Prague economic planners have only their consciences to fall back on and these are apparently not strong enough to make them put aside 10 per cent of the scarce investment funds for reasons of health and beauty alone.

As a result, the U. N. experts converging on Prague on a sunny day could see from the distance a pall of smog permanently enclosing this pearl among Europe's cities. According to the Czech press, more than 40 per cent of the population living in the western half of the country are exposed to air pollution exceeding the legal limits. By 1967 the poisoning of air by chemical factories in north Bohemia had already reached catastrophic dimensions that the local authorities were obliged to evacuate children for protracted periods. Add to this the devastation caused by open-cast lignite mining and the complete destruction of a town by deep coal mining, and it will be clear why the Czech public was already so concerned a long time before environmental problems became fashionable.

But in spite of the pressure of public opinion improvement has been achieved only in the treatment of water, of which industry is not only the chief polluter but also the main user. And even though water pollution has been reduced below its 1965 peak by a substantial expansion of water treatment plants, official reports still describe 3,100 miles of streams as heavily polluted and 310 miles as completely dead.

Poland, like East Germany, is greatly concerned about the biological effects of pollution in the Baltic Sea and co-operates in this field with the United Nations. It took domestic anti-

pollution measures before East Germany but without notable success. The Polish press takes the optimistic view, claiming that the diminishing number of fines levied indicates an improved standard of water treatment. The authorities also claim that water pollution has passed its peak and have an impressive programme for the construction of 1,000 more water treatment plants in the period 1971-75, mainly in southern and western Poland where there is a heavy concentration of chemical and other heavy industry.

Things may be better in the future, but they are certainly not good now. Some rivers are said to be so full of dirt that their water is unfit even for industrial and agricultural use. In many rivers, the fish cannot survive and two-thirds of the rivers are unfit to serve as a source for drinking water. Only a few Polish communities are reported to have an adequate sewage treatment installation. Even so, air pollution is considered to be the bigger problem: less than five per cent of the 12m. tons of dust produced annually is caught before leaving the factory chimneys. The rest clogs the air, already poisoned by another 5m. tons of industrial gases.

Hungary has a smaller concentration of heavy industry, but the tale of woe is about the same. Radio Budapest reported in April that air pollution in Budapest was well above the "level which the human organism can permanently endure without harm". According to the broadcast commentary, pollution in the south Hungarian city Pecs is higher than in the industrial Ruhr area of West Germany. Around the mining town of Varpalota, air pollution has destroyed all plant life in a 1½ mile radius. A Budapest journal complained recently that there is no national law against air pollution and only the equivalent of £60,000 is being spent on control installations although damage done by corrosive gases to health and property is very great.

Nonsense

The question arises of why industry should ride so heavily on the population of countries whose governments despise the profit motive and claim to be guided by a desire to the maximum well-being for the greatest number.

There is, for one thing, the losing battle for anti-pollution

investments, fought within the souls of economic planners. Then there is no-one to force them, for example, to dismantle a six-year-old ethylene factory or to give up the construction of atomic power stations, as the Ludwig-shafen town fathers recently forced on BASF, one of the three West German chemical giants.

In East Europe more than anywhere else the management of the local industry comes also from the Town Hall, and the "anti-pollutionists" cannot hope for an effective support from the local Communist Parties.

As for the influential party organisation in the factory, it will suffer no anti-pollution nonsense which would interfere with output and bonuses. And at the "street organisations" of the Party there may be concern, but the housewives and retired officials who occasionally attend their meetings do not carry any adequate political weight.

(The Financial Times)

THE DOLLAR CRISIS

by Mihailo Stevovic

At present and until now the most serious phase of the already chronic crisis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is a logical and expected sequel to abnormal relationships among the leading world currencies. It has clearly shown that all the measures taken so far to stabilize the IMF were only of a palliative nature. Therefore, instead of resolving the crisis they only succeeded in assuaging it at the moment of grave upheavals.

This time, in the centre of the present crisis is the US dollar, the pillar of IMF, the main world reserve currency. Hence the IMF crisis is in fact the crisis of the dollar, and its gravity arises from the dollar's role in this system. The dollar has recently had an inglorious fate at almost all the major world stock markets. This once very much sought after and esteemed currency, worth as gold and even more than gold, was barred from the treasuries of the central banks of West Germany and a number of other Western countries. For this reason, concern in the world as to the outcome of this crisis is great and quite justified.

The steps which have recently been taken in connection with

the dollar have been necessary and may be regarded as a final warning to the US government to bring its internal and foreign finances in order. The earlier warnings did not help, and the measures taken to settle the IMF crisis (the dual price of gold, the system of special drawing rights, etc.) were misused by the US, which took advantage of their positive sides without fulfilling the obligations on which the efficiency and success of these measures depended.

The United States' insistence on increasing international monetary liquidity for the sake of an untrammelled development of the world economy and the world trade proved to be a screen designed to achieve greater foreign liquidity for the US, so that it can continue its policy of the deficitary financing of military, political and foreign-economic operations. Instead of bringing its balance of payments into equilibrium the US recorded last year a 9.8 billion dollar deficit, and about 5 billion dollars in only the first three months of this year. West Germany, where most of these dollars flowed, sounded the alarm.

Inasmuch as the IMF crisis is clear and evident in its gravity and consequences, a way out is not very easily seen. The dollar crisis cannot be viewed separately from the crisis being undergone by the American society as a whole, its institutions and its foreign policy. All this makes the dollar crisis more complex and delicate, both for the US and for its principal Western trade and political partners. The interrelationships of economic and political interests of the Western countries tends to extend the crisis and difficulties from one country to all the others.

The fact that the economies and currencies of some countries are in a more, and those of others in a less favourable position, is the result of the uneven development of the capitalist countries in which occasional breakdowns are inevitable. It is already known for whom the bell tolls today. It is not certain for whom it will toll tomorrow, but it certainly will. Hence the need for greater mutual cooperation and tolerance, for the sake of individual as well as common interests.

We all know what the US has done to rebuild the Western European economies after the Second World War within the framework of the Marshall plan. It is obvious that the majority of the Western countries owe their present prosperity partly to

American economic aid and the investments of American private capital. However, it cannot be said that Western Europe has not already repaid those services and aid. The private capital has already drawn, and is continuing to draw, quite sizeable profits from the West European countries. The subsidizing the American balance of payments deficits, which in this year reached, in Euro-dollars, the total amount of about 50 billion dollars, is regarded as the upper limit beyond which the countries of Western Europe cannot go without jeopardizing the stability of their own economies. For this reason they had to partly withhold support for the dollar which, according to the propositions of the International Monetary Fund, the convertible currency countries are bound to do. Present practice has shown that whenever other currencies, to mention only the pound sterling and the Deutsche Mark, came into a similar crisis, a way out was found in their devaluation.

The US is still deeply involved in the war in Indochina, which, as we know, is one of the main causes of the present difficulties of the American economy's balance of payment deficits and the weakened international position of the dollar. For years now the US economy has been operating on a semi-wartime footing, and the resulting deformations are bound to leave difficult consequences for a long time to come. It is obvious that Western Europe is less and less prepared to participate indirectly, through the deficit of the US balance of payments, in the financing of this war and to suffer its consequences on their own economies.

Whatever the outcome of the present phase of the IMF crisis, the dollar crisis will again be of a provisional character. The combination of the revaluation of some currencies with the fluctuating exchange rates of others, or the retention of a fixed exchange rate for others, again, is bound to introduce an even greater uncertainty in the IMF. What is quite certain now, is that the dollar can no longer stabilize itself, i. e. return to the parity it had at the beginning of the crisis. Its value has definitely dropped, and thus its role in the IMF has been further weakened. What remains is to wait for the moment when the factual dollar devaluation will be recognized and confirmed de jure as well. The sooner this is done the better it will be for the dollar, for IMF, for the stability of the world economy.

and for international trade. It will certainly be a very difficult operation, but it will be still easier than if the present abnormal situation in international monetary relationships were to continue being artificially maintained.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

A TIME FOR SOME SOBER RETHINKING

by Michael Simmons

There comes a time in a period of détente when one might say that the kissing has to stop and some sort of sober assessment has to be made. Each side in the partnership remains willing to acknowledge the attractions of the other, and each can see what the other has to offer. The trouble is that they see this just a little too clearly, that the snags of a close relationship have started to become somewhat clearer than might have been expected, and that the initial shyness, which prevented any mention of snags being made, has evaporated.

Despite the fact that in many areas it is business as usual, this time has now come for East-West trade. Détente had arrived at about the beginning of last year, when the Russians had concluded their very big deals of natural gas for steel pipes with carefully chosen member countries of the Common Market; when Herr Willy Brandt, the West German Chancellor, had moved into a forward-Ostpolitik gear; and when Henry Ford II had made his offer to take part in Russia's huge Kama River lorry plant.

Everything, it seemed, was going swimmingly. But then the atmosphere changed. Henry Ford, to the fury of very top people in the Kremlin, was constrained to admit that for strategic reasons he would not be taking part in the Kama project; Herr Brandt was nudged by the Western allies to make haste a little more slowly; and, despite the continued availability of Soviet gas, there was some talk of difficulties in construction work on the trans-European pipe-line that was to carry that gas.

All these developments might of course be only temporary set-backs. The lorry plant, as Soviet-West German talks in Moscow this week seem to indicate, will go ahead; so, sooner or later, and a Berlin settlement permitting, will the Ostpolitik;

and so will the gas-for-pipes deals.

EEC strategy

But the setbacks have created time for reflection, and have given further scope for circumspection on the part of partners in East as well as West. Thus, while some civil servants in the West have (usually privately) declared that Moscow's assiduous commercial wooing of West Germany and France is only part of an endeavour to break up the hitherto hated - by Moscow - Common Market, there are now senior officials in Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary, for instance) who are willing in very guarded terms to talk business with the Common Market authorities.

What sort of business they are discussing they are, of course, reluctant to disclose. But the Yugoslav non-preferential trade agreement, signed with the EEC last year and to be designated preferential a few weeks from now, has excited a lot of interest in the Comecon area. It offered safeguards for sales of agricultural produce - something the East Europeans would also like to achieve if they can overcome their formerly reiterated dislike of the "closed grouping" EEC. (These very words describing the Six were in fact used by Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, at the Party Congress in Moscow earlier this month.)

But there is reason to believe that exploratory talks - or maybe only talks about talks - have been held by Communist officials with Brussels. The Hungarians, representing a timid avant-garde, have now gone so far as to state explicitly that there should be closer East-West co-operation in energy, oil and gas pipelines, and communications.

Even the Russians, despite rearguard pronouncements from their Prime Minister, are watching Common Market developments with something decidedly other than hostility. Why else, at the setting-up earlier this year of the big-deal Anglo-Soviet Inter-Governmental grand commission, should they have asked to hear from Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, the responsible Minister, about the likely effects on bi-lateral commerce of Britain joining the Six? And why else, in a lunch a few days ago for the Polish Foreign Trade Minister, should a Minister from the Department of Trade and Industry seek to placate Poles, whom

he describes as "naturally anxious" about the side-effects of Britain's possible membership?

Sooner or later, one feels, the Hungarian view that Comecon and the Common Market "should not go on developing more or less isolated from each other" will gain even more acceptance in the East. It runs counter to the ideologically entrenched view that it might be a better thing to break up the Six - or whatever they might become - by having massive deals with individual members, but not to the view which says the sought-after European Security Conference should devote at least a part of its time to the possibilities for closer co-operation, possibly at bloc level.

Meanwhile, so long as Comecon itself remains so ill-coordinated and so unintegrated, as some Communists will reluctantly concede is the case, the rantings and ravings will probably continue. As a precautionary measure intra-trade within Comecon will be stepped up, and the calls for greater integration will continue to be heard.

This prognosis is endorsed by the UN Economic Commission for Europe whose report earlier this month drew the conclusion that there would therefore be some slowing-down in East-West European trade. The Commission supports this conclusion with a note that the Soviet Union plans to increase its own trade with Comecon countries by 50 per cent in the five-year period to 1975, and with some partners by even more than that. Machinery which may drain hard currency reserves if purchased from the West, and which when offered for sale to the West is seen as not always up to qualitative expectations, will give an especially strong impetus to Comecon's intra-trade.

Another reason why there could be a slowing-down of purchases from the West is that in many of the countries there has in recent years been a serious tendency to over-invest. Unused, sophisticated equipment, imported from the West, has been seen in more than one Comecon country, while the factory to take it is an unconscionable time being time being finished.

None of this means that some very big deals indeed are not being discussed. Far from it. The Russians, having committed themselves to start producing lorries from the Kama site by 1974, are patently pulling out all stops to meet this commitment. A number of British firms are confidently expecting to be

supplying parts for the lorries, and for the factory that will produce them, as are companies from West Germany and France. Talks have also been held with Britain, Japan and France about joining in the exploitation of Soviet mineral deposits, and other projects, on an unprecedented scale.

One important reason that the kissing has, if not stopped, then at least lost some of its former ardour, is that the major pre-occupations of the East Europeans have started to centre not so much on the nuts and bolts of hardware actually changing hands, but on the feasibility and - so they keep saying - importance of co-operation agreements. France and West Germany, as is made clear elsewhere in this survey, have for different reasons been to the fore in soothing those who are preoccupied.

Many East Europeans openly admit - when their pride is not at stake - that a technological "gap" yawns between their countries, in some sectors (such as computers), and those of the advanced West. They have therefore been very diligent in attending bilateral meetings with countries that matter under the terms of scientific and technological agreements, which have of late been proliferating quite noticeably. Flexibility, tempered with a certainty that there will be some element of worthwhile reciprocity, is emerging in this sector as it has always done in the hardware sector, as vitally important for would-be partners.

Chinese ping-pong

It is ironical that at this time of pause and circumspection the American and Chinese ping-pong players should start their peculiar games. Their results will in the first instance be political though, as reports in this newspaper from the Canton Fair have shown, China is opening doors to willing businessmen.

This means the Soviet Union and its East European neighbours will almost certainly have to re-assess their trade as well as their foreign policies. Indeed, the new-style thoughts now being heard from Peking could well provoke some of the European Communists - and particularly the Russians - into clarifying where their real trading priorities now lie. Japanese traders with a keen eye for the Chinese market, as well as West European businessmen interested in Eastern Europe, will be listening carefully for such a clarification.

(The Financial Times)

CULTURE

LITERARY TURMOIL IN THE SOVIET UNION

Summary: During the party congresses in the 14 union republics and the 24th CPSU Congress, all those writers were criticized who at any time have departed from the party line and have not or cared not to participate in the "ideological struggle against capitalism". The party leadership has decided to take further measures to transform the Writers' and Artists' Unions into dependable instruments of the party's literary and artistic policy.

In his report to the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev said: The literary and artistic creators are at a juncture where the ideological struggle is being carried out with particular sharpness.... When a literary creator denies Soviet reality, when he helps our ideological enemies to struggle against socialism, then he deserves only one thing: society's disdain. (1)

Several commentators in the West interpreted this phrase as being proof of a "softer course", according to which disliking writers should not be arrested or punished, but simply "disdained". The error in this interpretation is found in the fact that the "social disdain" which Brezhnev proclaimed has nothing to do with society as a whole. In the context of the bureaucratic system of rule in the Soviet Union, the apparatuses of the state and party are seen as representatives of "society". The Writers' Unions should fulfill the function of carrying out "social disdain". They should see to it that the writers whom the party scorns are expelled from the unions, that they are prevented from publishing their works, in short, that they are "taken care of". The real meaning of social disdain can best be seen in Solzhenitsyn's case: he was expelled from the Writers' Union, he can no longer publish his works in the Soviet Union and thus belongs to those whom the party would define as being "disdained by society". In truth, however, he has an enormous amount of authority in society as a whole as one of the greatest contemporary Soviet writers and his works, reproduced mainly in

(1) Pravda, 31 March 1971.

newwritten form, are enthusiastically read throughout the Soviet Union.

Upcoming Reorganization of the Writers' Unions

The party bureaucracy's plans for the literary field became most clear at the Ukrainian CP Congress. Several oblast secretaries demanded increased supervision of the writers' unions by the party and a tightening up of these unions whose leaders should assume the major responsibility in the struggle against dissident writers. The Oblast First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP in Dnepropetrovsk, F. Vatchenko, said:

The ideological institutions and organizations in the Republic should try harder to educate artists to have a greater feeling of responsibility in their activities vis-a-vis the party and people. The comrades responsible for ideological questions in the Ukrainian CP CC should analyze the status of the ideological educational work of the culturally active in the unions more basically and more critically in order to improve the selection of their cadres and strengthen the supervision of their work. (2)

Soviet newspapers currently are announcing that serious ideological discussions will take place during the writers' congresses in the republics as well as at the upcoming 5th All-Union Writers' Congress. The purpose of these congresses is to engage the writers in the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. Further information on this is provided in the report on the expanded session of the secretariat board of the Writers' Union of the USSR on April 12. (3) During a conference of the Kiev oblast party officials the Deputy Chairman of the Writers' Union of the Ukrainian SSR, Ju. O. Zbantsky, said:

The forthcoming writers' congresses will be able to assess objectively and from a Marxist-Leninist position our successes, reveal our deficiencies and take measures for the further development of multi-national Soviet literature. (4)

2) Radyanska Ukraina, 18 March 1971.

3) Literaturnaya Gazeta, 21 April 1971.

4) Literaturna Ukraina, 20 April 1971.

A campaign, under the slogans "literature and ideology" and "partiinost and literature", is already under way in party publications. The "rabid activity" of the bourgeois propagandists who try to influence Soviet literature with all possible means, is being talked about. The Nobel Prize award to Solzhenitsyn is not seen as recognition of his literary activity, but rather as a "direct intervention" of the West in the literary process of the Soviet Union:

Bourgeois propagandists are not ashamed to directly intervene in the literary process in socialist countries, they organize various provocations - for example the noise in the press about A. Solzhenitsyn and the awarding of the Nobel Prize to him. (5)

An article in the Latvian CP CC organ, Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii, reveals just where the stress will be placed by the party bureaucracy in the literary field:

In our society literature can only fulfill its mission when it is based on positions of communist partiinost and educates the people in the spirit of communism. Otherwise, to a greater or lesser extent, it retards the development of society. (6)

Several "negative manifestations" in literature were listed in the same article:

In individual works, and especially in poems, attitudes which are foreign to us, and elements of national limitation appear from time to time. It is characteristic that often the thing which is false is presented in the pose of false heroism. But immature people, lacking political experience and who are insufficiently schooled politically, especially youth, can be attracted to this. It is exactly here that the danger for similar manifestations lies, especially in the event that the writers' unions do not always meet these undesirable tendencies with the necessary resistance. (7)

(5) Arvid Grigulis: "Za partijnost' literaturny", Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii, No. 4, April 1971.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

Young Writers - Target of Party Offensives

As early as during the republican party congresses, harsh criticism of the young writers could be determined. The First Secretary of the Lithuanian CP CC, A. Snechkus, can be cited here as characteristic:

Today young people go into the artistic life better prepared than people of the same age 10 to 20 years ago. However, it is not seldom that we confront an enthusiasm for passing fashions, unfruitful experiments, pseudo-renewals, all which cost much valuable time and strength and lure a talented person away from the proper course. The union's party organizations for the culturally creative should constantly take care - and there has been more attention paid to this recently - that an atmosphere of well-intended, mutual help and principled requirements is created for young artists and writers... (8)

The problem of the young writers is also examined in the above-mentioned Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii:

The Writers' Union has done much to help youth develop their talents and become well-known writers. A special organization was created for them - the Union of Young Authors But practice has shown that the forms of organizing cooperation with the up and coming (writers) employed, up until now do not bring about the necessary results. In their union the young authors often have only "stewed in their own juice". The older generations' writers' role of teacher was as good as none. Thus, some young authors lost their modesty and self-criticism. (9)

In conclusion, the main points of the party bureaucracy's policy in the literary area following the 24th Congress can be summarized as follows:

) The writers' unions, their boards and secretariats will be transformed in the near future into active instruments of the party's policy. It will be their task to remove all "negative"

(8) Sovetskaya Litva, 4 March 1971.

(9) Grigulis, op. cit., p. 53 ff.

manifestations from the literary process and to nip undesirable developments in the bud and expel writers who go against the party line;

2) A concentrated campaign will be undertaken against young authors who can look forward to more stringent supervision ("influence of the older writers"). Their own organizations will probably be dissolved;

3) All these measures will be accompanied by a call for better "quality" in literary works and for a struggle against "monotony" and low standards.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

SECONDARY SCHOOLS SUBJECTED TO CLASS CRITERIA

The process of politicizing the Czech system of education under the patronage of Minister Jaromir Hrbek has reached a new stage. After extensive purges at the universities, technical colleges, and academies of art, and after efforts to change the social structure of the intelligentsia at the institutes of higher learning, a new operation has just begun, under Hrbek's supervision, whose purpose is to change the existing rules governing the admission of pupils to secondary schools by adding class-political criteria to the entrance conditions.

Josef Ernest, the director of the department of secondary and apprentice training schools at the Ministry of Education of the Czech Socialist Republic, had this to say about this operation:

The selection of applicants for study at secondary schools has a clear-cut political character... We make no secret of the fact that we want... to select students for these schools in a way that guarantees that when... they graduate from them they will stand up loyally for socialism and will place their knowledge fully at the service of socialist society. Where the preconditions for this do not exist, there is no reason to admit an applicant". (Ucitelske Noviny, 22 April 1971.)

Ernest also explained why it is necessary that there be an expressly political aspect to the enrollment of pupils at secondary schools. The 1970 rules were outdated, he said, because they overemphasized the students' progress. According to Ernest, it was strange that a number of teachers agreed with the opinion - widespread in 1968/1969 - that a pupil's progress made it

possible to judge his abilities. Making progress the sole criterion in this respect led to the practical application of the theory of elites in the Czech secondary school system, and this was also the reason why this criterion was propagated with so much energy by exponents of the reform process. Ernest declared that a political approach was a moral obligation vis-a-vis socialist society.

The main new principles in admitting pupils to secondary schools can be summarized as follows: The elementary nine-grade school will prepare a complex evaluation of every pupil who applies for admission to a secondary school. The relevant regulations issued by the Czech Ministry of Education instruct the special commission set up for this purpose (composed of the school director, the pupil's class teachers, and a representative of the national committee) to pay special heed to the class profile of the applicant and to the civic-political aspect of his personality. "Consideration of the class background and the political and social commitment of the parents, and of the degree to which they participate in the building of socialism, will be important considerations in arriving at a decision" (Narodni Vybor No. 15, 14 April 1971).

The representatives of the national committees will be primarily concerned with seeing to it that the entire development of the parents and their political attitude are considered in this judgement of class-political aspects. Narodni Vybor commented that the selection procedure is designed to change the existing social structure of the pupils at secondary schools. The main considerations are class background, civic-moral-political record, and the political commitment of the parents.

The issuing of these directives under Hrbek's authority and the state of affairs which they apparently seek to bring about is reminiscent of the 1950s, when the educational system in Czechoslovakia was merely an exact copy of the overpoliticized Soviet system of secondary education, hampered by constant controls and by a paucity of purposeful pedagogical work. This had an adverse effect on the quality of the secondary school graduates, as well as on studies at institutes of higher education.

UNIVERSITY ADMISSION DIFFICULTIES

This is the season in which applications for admission to Hungary's universities are submitted. The deadline was in fact May 3, but preliminary data are already available on the number of people seeking to matriculate. It is expected that some 14,000 students will be admitted to the universities this year, since in some of them the number of places has been slightly increased. (Last year 13,500 places were available.) Nepszabadsag (April 28) announced that 25,000 applications are expected, less than last year but enough to represent a very serious problem because of the high rejection rate it implies.

Entrance examinations will be held between June 28 and July 31. These examinations have two parts: written and oral, and applicants will be informed of the decision of the examination committees by the end of July or the beginning of August. The right of appeal exists, but in view of the limited number of places available it is unlikely to succeed.

This excess of applicants over places is a chronic problem for Hungary's universities. It is true that the figures are showing a decreasing trend, but the imbalance remains a sensitive point in the country's academic life. In 1967-1968 applications were 269.2 per cent of admissions, while in the next two academic years the figures were 259.6 and 241.4, respectively. It is explained by Magyar Nemzet of 16 August 1970 that the apparent decline is to some extent illusory, because it applies only to certain universities and academies. For instance, application for admission to all scientific universities - primarily to the medical university, the technical universities, and the agricultural academies - are increasing every year in spite of the over-all decline.

Extremes can be discerned within the general picture: there is enormous over-application in the philological faculty for instance, while in the natural sciences the excess is only two-fold. This year, a vast number of students have applied for admission to the medical, philological, and law faculties; the excess is about 100 per cent in the first of these and 400 per cent in the other two (see Vas Nepe, 6 March 1971).

A special problem is the question of how far the social origin of the pupils is taken into consideration. The eighth party congress abolished all requirements with respect to social origin,

but later it was realized that the new system would effectively hold back students of peasant or worker origin. Consequently, specific measures have recently been introduced to ensure that the proportion of students of peasant and worker origin entering the universities is increased (see Nepszabadsag, 18 September 1970). Nepszabadsag openly admitted that without these special measures - which have never been specified - the "correct" proportion of peasant and worker youth could not have been achieved. The paper cautiously admitted that certain "corrections" had become necessary to guarantee the maintenance of this policy in the future.

Although the regime press gives little information on this point, it seems that an effective weapon in the political screening of would-be university students is the political profile which is prepared on all high school graduates by school committees in co-operation with the appropriate Communist Youth League organization. Koznevelés of March 1971 criticized the rather generalized way in which these profiles are prepared. It appears that in 1968 the Ministry of Culture issued an internal order which prescribed the forms in which such reports were to be written. This lays down that the local Communist Youth League secretary must attend all the meetings of the committee when these reports are being prepared. One of the alleged shortcomings of the reports is that they are often of a routine character only and a serious consideration of the ideological position of the person involved is often omitted. They are supposed to reflect the attitude of a student who has spent four years at high school and accompany him throughout his time at a university.

There is another aspect of the university problem which is never mentioned by the press. It is an understandable grievance among Hungarian students that while thousands of them are excluded from university life, numbers of foreign students are accepted and even given substantial scholarships, which place them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis their Hungarian colleagues. Previously, exact figures were never given about the number of foreign students in Hungary, but according to the Budapest Weekly Bulletin of 23 September 1970, there were "nearly" 2,000 of them at the beginning of the 1970/1971 academic year. Most of these students come from countries considered particularly "friendly" to Hungary, such as North Vietnam and some Arab and African countries, although no less than 80 countries are represented altogether.

UNIVERSITY ADMISSION PROBLEMS: MANUAL WORKERS' CHILDREN

In connection with university entrance examinations in Hungary and the oversubscription of available places, a problem arises every year which particularly concerns the regime. It is the position of one particular category of would-be entrants - the children of manual workers. Since abolishing social origin as a basis for admission in 1963, the regime has paid particular attention to the admission of children of manual workers to the universities. Keen interest was shown when the annual statistics on this point were released, and the steady decline in the number of such students was viewed with concern.

The rector of Budapest University recently offered striking evidence of this decreasing trend. He stated that nationwide statistics for the last four years (1966-1970) showed that the average number of peasant youth seeking admission to the universities was not more than 3.2 per cent of total applications. This is only one tenth of the number which the cultural leadership expected. Only 25 peasant youth were admitted to the philological faculty of Budapest University in the period in question (see Szabad Fold, 27 December 1970).

A more general figure is available on the social composition of the undergraduate population. Roughly speaking, some 150,000 children are born in Hungary each year. The parents of more than 100,000 of these are of worker or peasant origin, but greater numbers of university entrants come from the c. 50,000 "intellectual" families, offspring than from the 100,000 children of workers and peasants.

What are the reasons for this state of affairs? It is generally agreed that the main reason is financial (i.e., workers' children are needed to help increase the family income). The secondary one is that the attitude of a social stratum has a powerful influence on the question: intellectual families often consider it a tragedy if their children are not admitted to a university. Manual workers frequently send their children to apprentice schools even when university training would be justified. Statistics show that 75 per cent of children, completing elementary education come from manual workers' families (including agricultural workers), but only 25 per cent of them apply for high school, while among the intelligentsia the picture is reversed: 75 per cent of their children apply for

admission to high schools (see Vas Nepe, 22 December 1970).

What causes university dropouts? The primary reason is that parents living in the rural areas pay less attention to their children's university training and prefer them to find their way into the world of commerce so that they can earn money. The other reason, which is not mentioned by the regime media, is that the young people coming from the rural areas do not enjoy the intellectual background which is so helpful to university studies. A further reason is that some rural high schools have lower standards than those in Budapest and students from these schools are handicapped vis-à-vis their contemporaries from elsewhere.

The regime's dilemma is that on the one hand it does not want to reintroduce its policy of social categorization, while on the other hand it wishes to enforce selectivity in the sense that the number of children coming from manual workers' families should be steadily increased.

The regime would like all concerned to devote more care to the raising of the intellectual level of those who start from "disadvantageous" positions - in other words, from manual workers' families.

Some attempts have been made to deal with this problem. Budapest Technical University, for instance, decided to prepare detailed information on its requirements and make it available in the schools from which the students are primarily recruited. In assessing the value of high school diplomas, the university will carry out its own selection among the children of manual workers and will give them special training before the entrance examinations, thus helping them to obtain the necessary accreditation points for admission. The Medical University plans to introduce approximately the same system. Budapest University decided to open next year a special college of about 100 students exclusively for the talented sons and daughters of manual workers.

There are of course many calls for help from society in this matter. Enterprises, co-operative farms, and institutes are asked to allocate a certain amount of money for the creation of special "circles" in which young people in this category can be prepared for the universities. In Szabolcs-Szatmar County the trade unions' council has already offered 80,000 forint this year for this purpose (Keletmagyarország, 3 March 1971). This

is the most recent scheme to be tried and its extension will naturally depend on the spirit of sacrifice shown by the various bodies concerned; it seems, however, that the movement is centrally inspired and press articles leave no doubt that the enterprises must expect heavy pressure to display an altruistic spirit.

Among the various schemes, that of the Csongrad County Council should be noted. It has created a special fund for the support of manual workers' children in order to facilitate their admission to the universities. In two years 400,000 forint have been distributed among 154 students.

The most important achievement in this field has been the creation (in 1967) of a new type of college in Budapest whose sole purpose is to prepare manual workers' children for the universities. Only students of proven ability are admitted to this college and in the third year of its existence (i.e., in 1969) 100 per cent of its pupils were admitted to the universities or academies. Various study groups work in the college and the teachers come from the high schools or from the universities themselves. Those in the latter category know better than anyone else the nature of the universities' requirements. This college is still regarded as an experimental college, because it is the only one of its kind (see Elet es Irodalom, 9 January 1971).

It seems, however, that this type of college may well be the pattern of the future. Nepszava (10 January 1971) suggested that a network of such colleges be formed in the next 10 years; high school students coming from "disadvantageous circumstances" could then be admitted to these institutions, which could be attached to high schools in central areas. The children of manual workers could gradually enter the intellectual milieu and in the years ahead the proportion of worker and peasant families' children entering the universities could, it is hoped, be considerably increased.

"NEUE LITERATUR" ON THE MENTALITY OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION

Issue No. 2/1971 of Neue Literatur, the German-language literary monthly of the Rumanian Writers' Union, is entirely devoted to school problems and to an investigation of the

opinions of the younger generation. Although this investigation was carried out only among pupils in the German-language high schools in the Banat region, the conclusions of the study are representative of the problems and desires of 14- to 16-year-old pupils throughout Rumania. The problems which these young people raised concerned free and open discussion; the authority of parents and teachers; personal freedom; and the form and content of the teaching process.

The "motto" prefacing Neue Literatur's February issue is a quotation from RCP leader Ceausescu's speech at a meeting with the Communist Youth Organization (UTC) on 19 February 1971; it is probably intended to back up the critical remarks of the young people: "In speaking about the education of the younger generation, we must keep in mind the need to create conditions under which young people can learn about everything that is going on in this world. We must not fear that an open, free confrontation between our dialectical materialist outlook and idealist concepts might harm our youth".

When they were given an opportunity to express their opinions freely in the anonymous investigations and in round-table talks with the Neue Literatur editors (Paul Schuster, Helga Reiter, Anemone Latzina, and Gerhard Csejka), the Banat pupils suddenly realized that they were unfamiliar with democratic discussion procedures, and that they did not know how to cope with more open discussions. Comments made by some of the pupils during the round-table meetings point up this fact:

We are not used to discussions, . . . Often it is not worth while discussing - in many hours with teachers and in many UTC sessions, discussions are purely formal. . . . As a matter of fact, we are hardly ever able to say what we think and to take a definite stand in a discussion. This is perhaps because up to now hardly anyone has done such a thing; everyone keeps his opinion to himself, because he is afraid of being criticized by his colleagues or by the teacher.

The lack of free discussion is said to be felt particularly at the UTC sessions. A UTC class secretary made it clear that discussion can only begin when the "formalism" characteristic of these sessions is done away with. In this respect, the pupils expressed the desire for "a more democratic choice of topics for discussion, no staged interventions, and the right to use their mother tongue during the sessions", with translators for

those participants (usually higher UTC and party officials) who do not speak German.

The generation problem and the conflict of authority between parents and teachers on the one side and pupils on the other is to a certain extent a problem which is characteristic not only of Rumania. It is, however, significant that young people in Rumania want to be freed of the obligation to recognize and follow authority blindly:

One should not and must not blindly subordinate oneself to a superior without having fought for one's own point of view... We want more freedom, so that we need not continually feel the yoke of authority.

The problem of personal freedom is particularly important for young people, because here the clash between rigid restriction and their own aspirations is most violent. For one of the young participants in the talks, "fashion, music, and entertainment are forms of freedom of which the young people should not be deprived if they are to be happy". For another pupil, "beat music is a kind of intellectual freedom". There is general dissatisfaction with the school uniforms which the pupils are forced to wear in spite of the fact that they are unhygienic (they are worn all day long, summer and winter), and despite the protests of their parents. For many of the young, these uniforms represent, in the words of Neue Literatur editor Gerhard Csejka, "a political problem". They also wish to spend their spare time as they wish, and to lead their private lives according to their own desires. They complain of the fact that, whereas any worker or employee can do what he likes in his spare time, the pupil has no private life: all his actions are supervised by the school. Many pupils protested against "patriotic work" and against the enormous number of books they are forced to read, which keeps them from reading books of their own choice.

The problems connected with the form and content of the teaching (and learning) process are also not free from political implications. A great number of pupils protested against the present school system, which is based principally on mechanical memorization of facts, not on the development of creative mental faculties.

We want to become creative people, not intellectual garbage heaps. At present our heads are stuffed with the ideas and theories of other people. We are not given an opportunity to develop our own personality. Are we to become human beings or hypocrites? We do not ask for the freedom of action, but why is our freedom of thought limited?

Although it involved only a limited number of German-speaking pupils, the Neue Literatur investigation can be considered a valuable sociological document on the state of mind of Rumanian youth.

STUDYING THE STUDENTS

New report on Western radical youth theories about 'pre-adults'

Summary: A new report on student revolutionaries of the last decade in the West draws together much that has been written on this subject. As well as providing a useful account of events and a sketch of ideologies and groups that make up the radical student 'movement', the report attempts a deeper understanding of trends among 'pre-adults' and looks at the events from an individual - and readable - angle.

Whatever the future direction of political activity among students, says a new report *, the movers among this generation have inherited a world and life-style that developed around the hippy-radicals of the sixties. Karel van Wolferen, the author, emigrated from the Netherlands 10 years ago to travel widely. He was in Tokyo for seven years lecturing at Waseda University and is currently engaged on a comparative study of cultural developments in Japan and the West.

Mr van Wolferen describes the hippy-radicals as "the generation that surprised" and points up the confusion among the experts when faced with the disturbances that shook Berkeley, the Sorbonne, Nanterre, Berlin, Columbia, the London School of Economics and other places in the prosperous West in the 1960s. His report, extremely well-documented, summarises

* Student Revolutionaries of the Sixties by Karel van Wolferen. Interdoc, The Hague, Holland.

the writings on student rebellion of an impressive range of authors and academics and examines the literature of the new radical movements.

Briefly, the report outlines elements relating to the situation of the entire young generation in the West viewing them against the background of rapidly changing social and educational conditions. It describes reactions to these conditions and the radicalisation process a part of youth goes through, while investigating factors aiding rebellious expression. It then describes the preoccupations, values and "sub-culture" of youth and examines the actual radical groups and the extent to which they can be said to adhere to an ideology and what this ideology seems to be. The tactics of confrontation and the reactions to this by their elders are also treated. The author's personal opinions conclude the report.

Mr van Wolferen rejects as "seeing ghosts" the simplistic conclusion that there was an internationally organised effort behind student disturbances in the various countries in the sixties - i. e. a left-wing or Communist conspiracy - and concludes that undoubted Communist efforts to use radical groups as tools for furthering their own ends have so far failed in the face of pre-adult radical refusal to submit to any organised control. He urges, however, a "continuous vigil" against the peril which irrational and irresponsible forces might bring to society. He postulates, for instance, that "direct democracy", if introduced, would result in anarchy and would be appeased by leaders chosen less for political capacities or wisdom than for their power to charm people - setting the stage for a plethora of petty demagogues.

Flight from Reason

Reading the report, one is struck with the similarity of present Western trends with the Romantic Movement in the nineteenth century in Europe - the flight from Reason to Feeling, the rejection of argument and the welcoming of the idea of an unknown "revolution". (The author tells of a conversation he overheard between a student and a professor at Berkeley in which it took the latter some effort to convince the former that in fighting against Hitler intelligent men in the United States truly believed that they were fighting for a good cause, and comments that

the generation brought up in prosperity without experience of totalitarian systems cannot understand the morality of any war.)

Mr van Wolferen identifies the "lack of revolutionary faith" of the present-day student radicals as the new element in their concept of revolution. A revolutionary faith calls for a radical break with the past, whereas the student radicals do not want a radical break with the past but prefer to ignore it altogether. History to them is "bunk". They thus do not learn what they should break with, comments Mr van Wolferen drily. The absolute that most rebels appear to believe in is the rejection of authority and the arguments of those who disagree with them. "Childish", many of the older generation comment; "pre-adult" is Mr van Wolferen's name for it, and he advises adults to think out basic values and communicate them to succeeding generations.

And Mr van Wolferen has something to say about those basic values. Democracy, he points out, is, of course, a very elusive concept. It has been a formula which, when applied to governments or decision-making processes, allowed a wide variety of views, religious and ideological principles, etc. to be balanced against each other, granting them influence proportionate to their strength. Democracy is thus a process and not a belief in itself. However, with the decline in strength of religious and ideological viewpoints, and with "consensus politics" as a substitute for, rather than a result of, a clash between principles, "Democracy" has become a faith and can rapidly become a dogma, and result in some odd notions about democracy.

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CUBA'S CULTURAL CRACK-DOWN

Summary: The arrest of the Cuban poet Heberto Padilla and his subsequent public self-criticism have drawn international attention to a striking shift in cultural policy presently being implemented by Havana. The following report deals with the theoretical basis of this cultural shake-down, as exposed in Castro's recent speeches and in the Declaration of the First National Congress on Education and Culture recently held in Havana.

"The writer of our times must place his knowledge at the service of the society in which he lives. It is not enough to simply speak of the Revolution; the Revolution must be built as well". With these words, Lisandro González Otero, then vice-director of the Cuban National Cultural Council, closed the first National Meeting of Young Writers and Artists in October 1968. (1) Two-and-one-half years later, at a congress of the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, the poet Heberto Padilla carried the above hypothesis of the writers' (or, in general, the intellectual's) role in the socialist society to the following conclusion:

Honestly, it cannot be possible that the revolution should have to be constantly generous with intelligent people... Let us be soldiers of our revolution and do whatever the revolution asks of us.... (2)

These two statements stand, for the moment, at either end of a pattern of cultural development in Cuba, one measure of which is the poet Padilla himself. In 1968, his controversial poems were harvesting harsh verbal criticism from the Cuban regime, but he was nonetheless awarded Cuba's outstanding official literary prize and enjoyed a relatively broad measure of personal freedom to write and travel. By 1971, the verbal attacks had turned into imprisonment and - some believe - physical punishment and his "service to the revolution" into a hair-raising 4,000 word exercise in self-criticism and pointed accusation of other Cuban writers for being "counterrevolutionary" and not doing "whatever the Revolution asks". (3) Padilla has said that his experience "will serve as an example" for Cuba's intellectuals, and there is clear evidence that a broad cultural shake-up is presently underway in Cuba.

- (1) Reported in Granma Weekly Review (English), 27 October 1968.
- (2) In a speech delivered on 27 April 1971, reported by Prensa Latina, 29 April 1971.
- (3) For detailed reporting on the Padilla case specifically, see Le Monde of 5 April, 28 April, 29 April and 30 April 1971.

Havana Radio reported on May 6, for example, that Luis Pavon, the former director of the armed forces publication Verde Olivo (a hard-line journal, which as early as November 1968 had carried out a scathing campaign against intellectual liberalism in general and Heberto Padilla in particular), has been appointed the new director of the National Cultural Council. As a former vice-director of the political directorate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Pavon has the proper background for overseeing the "militarization", the tightening up of Cuba's cultural life. A few days earlier, Granma (29 April) reported that several shifts had been made in the editorial echelons of Juventud Rebelde and Bohemia. Juventud's editor, Angel Guerra Cabrera, a former secretary of education and culture of the National Committee of the Union of Young Communists, has been promoted to director of the weekly Bohemia. His predecessor, Enrique de la Osa, will (vaguely enough) "move on to other duties appropriate to his status as a journalist". Guerra will be replaced at Juventud Rebelde by Jorge Lopez, also a former functionary in the Union of Young Communists.

Castro Sets Tone

Most telling of all, however, have been Fidel Castro's recent speeches. He has charted the future course of Cuban cultural policy and at the same time indicated the extent to which the repressive treatment of the mildly dissident Padilla may become standard procedure in Cuba in the near future.

On April 19, for example, at the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, Castro found time in a speech devoted primarily to the Latin American political revolution, to point out the importance of a stringent cultural control. Speaking of the necessity to be on guard for "intellectual tutelage and cultural colonialism", he said:

We have to learn to think along these lines... we must educate ourselves culturally along these lines to prevent cultural colonialization from surviving economic colonialization. We mustn't forget that the imperialists didn't base their domination on economic and political weapons alone, but very much also on spiritual weapons, the weapons of thought and of culture. (4)

- (4) Granma Weekly Review (English), 2 May 1971.

In a speech delivered on April 25, on the occasion of the dedication of a new junior high school, Castro became a bit more precise about this rather vague matter of cultural colonialism, in a scathing attack on some sections of Cuba's cultural intelligentsia:

These foreign impositions (of "the best of world culture imposed on us from abroad") result from our massive ignorance and the low level of our culture that makes possible the development of that snobbery, that servile copy of decadent art reflecting the contradictions of rotten societies which are echoed by some absolutely minority and neo-colonializing elements in the cultural movement of our country. (5)

Combatting "Cultural Imperialism"

It was at the First National Congress on Education and Culture on April 30 that Fidel Castro, flanked by two prominent Soviet visitors, (6) lost his verbal inhibitions and got directly to the point.

(5) Ibid.

(6) The First National Congress on Education and Culture met in Havana from 23-30 April 1971. Originally planned as simply an educational congress, it was expanded at the last minute to include cultural matters. One reason for this was the turmoil which had been caused in international cultural circles by the Padilla case, or, in Castroist terms as stated in the Congress' Declaration, "the negative cultural influences trying to penetrate our society, influences which our revolution is meeting with decision and energy". But another reason for the expansion of the Congress to include cultural affairs was apparently provided by the presence of a Soviet cultural delegation in Cuba at the time. According to a Prensa Latina report of April 19, an "important Soviet cultural delegation headed by Nikolai Fedorenko, director of the magazine Inostranniya Literatura", arrived on 19 April in Havana, having been invited by the Cuban National Union of Writers and Artists. The visit was scheduled to last for 12 days, or until the beginning of May. In photographs of the Congress speakers' platform, Soviet planning boss Babaikov is sitting to Fidel Castro's left (and next to Raul Castro), and to Castro's right is an unidentified figure bearing a convincing similarity to Federenko.

After devoting the opening minutes of his speech to matters relating to education, Castro turned once again to that "other subtle form of colonialism" which "we have discovered", namely "cultural imperialism". (7) Although he asserted with some force that the present cultural turmoil in Cuba was a "minor problem" not worthy of public attention, his own treatment of the subject contradicted that description. Calling those artists who have obviously fallen into disfavor with the regime "two-bit agents of cultural imperialism", Castro said that their "unfortunate situation arises from the fact that 'they are not given the right' to continue with their poison, their plots and intrigues against the Revolution". Because of these dangers of cultural imperialism, Cuba is closing its doors to what Castro called "pseudoleftists in Paris, London, or Rome", international members of juries for Cuban contests and magazines, which from now on "will be open (only) to revolutionary writers", "bourgeois intellectuals and bourgeois libelants, agents of the CIA and the intelligence services of imperialism" (a catch-all term recently used to describe such unlikely candidates as K. S. Karol and Rene Dumont). In spite of this massive threat, as Castro sees it, he nonetheless feels "that the Congress and its Resolutions are more than enough to completely smash these currents". The reason? - "when it came to revolutionary matters, when it came to political matters, there was only one attitude (at the Congress): a firm, solid, unanimous, attitude".

Congress Formulates Cultural Declaration

This "attitude" itself has been set down in a lengthy official document entitled "Declaration by the First National Congress on Education and Culture". (8) Education receives the most space, with treatment of such topics as environmental conditions, links between the home and the school, relations between the centers of production and the schools, fashions,

(7) Reported in Granma Weekly Review, 9 May 1971.

(8) Ibid.

customs and extravagant behavior, sex education, religion, juvenile delinquency and extracurricular activities in the community. The cultural issues emerge in the final section, devoted to "mass media".

As the mass media are "powerful instruments of ideological education", the Congress "considers it imperative that there be a single politico-cultural leadership" to watch over their activities. The principle upon which this decision is based reads: In the field of ideological struggle there is no room for palliatives or half measures. The only alternative is a clear-cut uncompromising stand. There is room only for ideological coexistence with the spiritual creation of the revolutionary peoples, with socialist culture, with the forms of expression of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Following the traditional communist line that "socialism creates the objective and subjective conditions which make possible real freedom of creation", the Cuban Congress sees a necessity "to establish a strict system for inviting foreign writers and intellectuals, to avoid the presence of persons whose works or ideology are opposed to the interests of the Revolution...". In sum:

Culture, like education, is not and cannot be apolitical or impartial, because it is a social and historical phenomenon, conditioned by the needs of social classes and their struggles and interests throughout history. Apoliticalism is nothing more than a reactionary and shamefaced attitude in the cultural field.

Not only does this declaration foresee the disappearance of any artistic endeavor which does not comply contextually with the most stringent definition of socialist realism, but the "elitist" image of the creative artist himself is also to be eliminated in the future:

True genius is to be found among the masses and not among a few isolated individuals. The class nature of the enjoyment of culture has resulted in the brilliance of only a few isolated individuals for the time being. But this is only a sign of the prehistory of society, not of the nature of culture.

The crux of Castro's quarrel with West European leftists,

namely his growing inability to digest their criticism, is also served in the Declaration. It will be recalled, that Castro and his recent cultural convert, Heberto Padilla, have both strongly attacked such Europeans as Rene Dumont, K.S. Karol, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, the signatories of a protest letter addressed to Castro concerning Padilla's arrest including such figures as Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, Rossana Rossanda, Jorge Semprun, Mario Largas Llosa, and Marguerite Duras, (9) and other "bourgeois intellectuals", as Castro calls them.

The Declaration's treatment of such critics reflects the growing inability of the Cuban government to accept the sort of critical analyses which Castro used to welcome as a source of revolutionary inspiration:

We reject the claims of the Mafia of pseudoleftist bourgeois intellectuals to become the critical conscience of society... Being an intellectual does not give a person any kind of privilege... Those who, with the "lordlike arrogance" of past days to which Lenin alluded, arrogate themselves the role of exclusive critics while abandoning the scene of the struggle and using our Latin-American peoples as themes for their literary creations thereby becoming favorites in bourgeois circles and imperialist publishing houses, cannot appoint themselves judges of revolutions.

End of an Era

"The vocabulary in Padilla's confession, reminding one of famous past examples, is apparently the beginning of the end of Cuba's exceptional situation among the communist-led nations of the world, which has been very productive for artists and writers". This conclusion was reached (among others) by the West German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on May 5, discussing the recent developments in Havana. As such, it supports the assertion made by the group of pro-Cuban West European intellectuals in their protest letter to Castro in early April, namely, that:

(9) See New York Review of Books, 6 May 1971, and Le Monde, 9 April 1971.

the use of repressive measures against intellectuals and writers who have exercised the right of criticism within the revolution can only have deeply negative repercussions...

However, not these Western intellectuals, who wish the Cuban Revolution well, but the artists and writers within Cuba itself - and thus the sum of contemporary creative endeavor there - will be the real victims of these "negative repercussions". After more than 10 years of atypical independence from the cultural strictures which bind the arts in the communist countries of Eastern Europe, Castro has ordered a cultural shift which is already bearing the depressing characteristics of monolithic, state-organized "creativity".

(Radio Free Europe Research)

BIG FIVE-YEAR PROGRAMME OF COMPUTER DEVELOPMENT

The production of improved programme-compatible computers based entirely on integrated circuits will be started in the USSR and a number of socialist countries from 1972.

There will be a unified series of six machines, of which the smallest will be capable of performing 10,000 arithmetical operations per second, while the largest will be able to perform more than two million.

Writing in Pravda about these developments, Mikhail Rakovsky, vice-chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, says that 1,600 automated control systems and more than 3,000 computer centres and systems for controlling technological processes will be set up in the USSR in the period from 1971 to 1975.

It is intended to bring about a drastic improvement in the degree of efficiency with which such systems and centres are utilised.

Of the 1,600, more than 150 will be large systems operating either for the USSR as a whole, or for an entire republic or a whole branch of the economy.

This will speed up the transition to the creation of a unified system of computer centres for the USSR as a whole, writes Mikhail Rakovsky. Already in the very first stage these systems will be of assistance in finding reserves for accelerating the

the development of the national economy, in ensuring balanced and progressive development as between different branches of the economy and within particular branches, in drawing up long-term plans for economic development and in arriving at the best possible decisions for achieving a growth of the efficiency of the socialist economy and a rise in the living standards of Soviet people.

Third generation

Towards the mid-70s between 12,000 and 15,000 of the most up-to-date computers of the third generation will be produced in the USSR.

The distribution of metals among industrial enterprises throughout the territory of the Soviet Union is to be managed with the help of an automated control system.

This system, which is now being developed at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Control Problems, will help to achieve the optimal utilisation of metallurgical plants and a rational interconnection between them and the consumers of metal. It will also help to improve the way in which available stocks are used.

Professor Akop Mamikonov, who is in charge of the project, told a Tass correspondent that "having automated the retrieval and processing of a vast amount of information, the 'Metal' system will suggest the most advantageous ways of linking the consumers with the suppliers.

Among other things, this will make it possible to achieve a sharp reduction in expenditures on the transportation of materials.

The information-reference system of "Metal" will be put into operation first of all and will be followed by the systems for optimal planning and operational control. The first of these systems is now undergoing trials at the main computer centre of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies.

The Directives of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union envisage the creation in the present five-year period of a country-wide system of retrieval and processing of information for accounting, planning and control in the national economy.

"SOVIET SCIENTISTS NOT SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE USA"

The well-known East Berlin economist Dr. Jürgen Kuczynski expressed the opinion that scientists in the Soviet Union are not basically superior to those in the USA. In an article in the youth organization's paper Forum of mid-May, Kuczynski maintained that no one who is really informed about the subject could claim that scientific institutions in the Soviet Union are really better equipped than those in the USA, that "the creative scientists are more devoted there to science, are more diligent and have more work discipline". Team work, according to the author, is just as developed in one state as in the other. The difference, however, concerns the prerequisites for scientific-creative work which exist "to a much greater extent" under the socialist educational system, thus enabling the discovery of potentially creative scientists.

In this context, Kuczynski termed the high number of "lost creative scientists" in the "exploiting societies" as "tragedies of the spirit". These were due, according to the East Berlin author, to the capitalistic system's failure to provide equal opportunities to all, and to the undemocratic system of education which hampers the creative capabilities of many children of the working population.

The Lighter Side of Life

The cabaret of the Halle District in its most recent program, "The Tactless Ones", criticized wide-spread competitions which are organized in all enterprises with the purpose of achieving greater productivity. Such competitions exist among cleaning personnel as well as among scientists and production branches, even though frequently the participants ignore those with whom they are competing or to what aim. The following dialogue from the Halle cabaret satirizes this point:

Listen Paul, are you also engaged in the competition?

Of course.

Since when?

I don't know that.

What aims are you trying to achieve?

Don't know.

Do you have a cultural and educational plan?

Don't know.

And the others don't know it either?

No.

How do you know that you are participating in a competition?

Well, we turned out to be the winners again yesterday.

Recent Leipzig joke: Q. : What is the difference between the capitalist and socialist economy? A. : Under capitalism, there are many social faults, and under socialism, capital shortcomings.