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I D E O L O G Y

NEW SOVIET VIGILANCE CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED

Summary: Ostensibly designed to strengthen ideological and political rectitude, a new Soviet campaign has a second objective: to poison the minds of ordinary Russians against foreigners

At a time when Soviet propaganda is criticising the West for allegedly being reluctant to take part in a European security conference, and accusing the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of reviving "cold war" methods, a new campaign has been mounted to try to ensure ideological and political rectitude and vigilance within the Soviet Union. It is aimed at both the intellectual community and the populace in general.

A major article in the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, on December 17, 1970, signed by I. Aleksandrov, said: "The Soviet people are increasing their political vigilance, their irreconcilability towards rotten bourgeois ideology". It accused the bourgeois "enemies of the Soviet people" of "digging among the refuse" and "scavenging for booty among rotten isolated individuals who are ready to sell anyone and anything for a foreign mess of pottage", and of "having recourse to the services of all kinds of criminal elements, all sorts of renegades, drones, scoundrels and swindlers, and even persons in whom only psychiatrists could be interested".

In a clear escalation of the earlier low-key campaign against Solzhenitsyn's award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, the article reflected Soviet frustration at being out-manoeuvred by the writer, and irritation at support for him abroad, not least in West European Communist parties. It described his works, unpublished in the Soviet Union but circulating there in samizdat * form, as "lampoons . . . which blacken the feats and achievements of our homeland and the dignity of Soviet people". Solzhenitsyn was described as an "internal emigré, alien and hostile to the

* Clandestinely reproduced manuscript or type-script versions passed from hand to hand.

entire life of the Soviet people". Andrei Amalrik, whose Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? and Involuntary Journey to Siberia have been published in the West, was described as a "petty slanderer and currency speculator" who had received three years' detention from a Soviet court (thus confirming earlier reports from dissident sources), while Vladimir Bukovsky, another dissident intellectual who completed a three-year sentence this year, was called a "renegade" who was expert only on the doorways of the Moscow residences of foreign correspondents.

Dissident intellectuals in general were said to be "mercenary ignoramuses" who "lurk behind the mask of scientists and men of letters who disagree with the system" - a charge which would apply to Academician Sakharov (the "father of the Soviet H-bomb"), the biologist, Jaures Medvedev, the eminent mathematician Yesenin-Volpin and other prominent scientists and intellectuals.

In a leading article on November 23, Pravda had stressed that ideological and political indoctrination formed an important part of the preparations for the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Invoiking the April, 1968, Central Committee plenum on ideology, it said that party organisations must "not permit even a shadow of liberalism" in ideological matters. As for the spiritual purity of Soviet man, the qualities of a Soviet patriot were "incompatible with the slightest concessions in the field of ideology. Here there can be no compromise and no neutrality".

Young people were a cause of particular concern. Pravda stressed that "imperialism" was "devoting increasingly greater efforts to political and ideological sabotage against the Socialist countries" and called for the "further stepping up of vigilance and the resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology and the penetration of views and morals alien to Socialism".

Soviet scientists, whose specialist knowledge is essential to the further development of the Soviet economy, have received particular attention in the campaign. Clearly, the apolitical attitude of many of them is causing the party increasing concern. The August 28 issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya, CPSU Central Committee daily newspaper for the Russian Federation, criticised the scientific community in Novosibirsk for underestimating the influence of bourgeois propaganda and for opting out of party work. It warned also against the "psychological warfare" said

to be carried out by foreign scientists visiting the city. Pravda (October 13) attacked the former organiser of an unofficial discussion club in Novosibirsk, and at the end of the month Party Life (No. 21), the Central Committee journal aimed primarily at party cadres, reported a Central Committee decree on the Lebedev Physics Institute. According to the decree, scientists at the institute had been influenced by "ideological conceptions of anti-Communism and revisionism" and, it was implied, they did not study Marxist-Leninist theory sufficiently or apply it in their work.

Party members excluded

In November three prominent Soviet scientists, A. D. Sakharov, V. N. Chalidze, and A. N. Tverdokhleov announced the formation of a Human Rights Committee. (Sakharov had close connexions with the Lebedev Institute). Their action implied that neither the Communist Party nor the Constitution was able to guarantee basic human rights to Soviet citizens and that a non-party organisation was required. The scientists added to their offence by stipulating that only those who "are not members of a political party may join the new committee", thus excluding the 14 million members of the CPSU.

The formation of the committee, and the party decree on the Lebedev Institute, may have prompted a Moscow district party secretary to state at a plenum of the City Party Committee on November 11:

"..... we cannot tolerate individual cases where certain representatives of the scientific and technological intelligentsia display political shortsightedness, are not able to withstand the influence of bourgeois ideology and are not capable of understanding present-day phenomena from a clear, class, position" (Moskovskaya Pravda, 12 November).

The decree on the Lebedev Physics Institute was referred to in a Pravda leader (November 23) on ideological shortcomings and on December 2 the newspaper carried an interview with V. P. Silin, Secretary of the Institute's Party Committee. Silin was quoted as saying:

"We must more actively promote the deep, Marxist-Leninist understanding by every scientist of political, socio-economic and philosophical problems of the present day. . . . to inculcate an irreconcilable attitude to the ideas of anti-Communism and revisionism. We have no right to forget even for a minute the acute ideological struggle in the modern world. Some people, flaunting the fact that they do not belong to the party, simply expose their flank to the enemy".

Spy scare

Trud, the trade union newspaper, carried on November 26 an article on vigilance by a Col. F. Nikitin, evidently a KGB officer. Emphasising the duty of every Soviet citizen to be vigilant in the face of subversion and espionage carried out by Western agencies, Nikitin stressed that "every hour, every minute on fronts which have no borders, the enemy is conducting a secret war against us. And there is no sector, post or any sphere of activity where complacency, carelessness and gullibility can be permitted". Increased exchanges with other countries and the use of ever more sophisticated espionage techniques posed new problems. Nikitin quoted an unnamed Western publication to demonstrate that journalists, commercial travellers, members of scientific expeditions, rich travellers or students acted as agents of Western Intelligence. He concluded:

"Spy mania, suspicion of all foreigners and mistrust of one another among our own people are alien to us. However, we know that the imperialists will not for a minute stop the work of their propaganda machine. Our state and social system and our way of life are subjected to attacks. The ideological saboteurs twist and turn, have recourse to falsification, lies and various subterfuges and baits, especially when they take young people into their calculations. In these circumstances there can be no place for complacency and relaxation. The ideological upbringing of every Soviet person was and remains the most important of all tasks".

Sovetskaya Rossiya (December 3) followed with an article by E. Maksimov, "On the Vigilant and the Careless". The message was that the vigilant Soviet citizen took prompt action and reported anything suspicious to the KGB, while others were careless in guarding the official secrets with which they had been entrusted. In the latter category, Maksimov included people who mentioned secrets in reports and speeches or in telephone conversations or left secret documents lying about. It was the duty of everyone to "close all cracks through which enemy scouts can get at our country's secrets".

Apart from demonstrating the increasingly uncompromising attitude of the Soviet leaders to any reconciliation with Western ideas or to the relaxation of internal cultural policy, the current campaign reveals the extent of the failure of Soviet propaganda to capture the minds of important sections of the population - the scientific community and the cultural intelligentsia, young people, and many ordinary citizens, and the failure of the policy of repressing dissident intellectuals such as Sinyavsky and Daniel.

The articles and interviews used in the drive are clearly designed to poison the minds of ordinary Soviet people against dissident intellectuals, and stimulate suspicion of all foreigners and Western thinking. Apparently, when Soviet spokesmen talk about increasing scientific, technical and cultural contacts with the West, they do not have in mind a free flow of ideas, but only exchanges for a specific purpose beneficial to the Soviet State, involving only trusted Soviet citizens. In this respect, the present leaders of the Soviet Union are no different from their predecessors.

GARAUDY SEEKS TO RALLY PCF OPPOSITION

Summary: Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon and other former members of the PCF leadership have issued a six-point declaration calling on dissident Communists to work for "the renewal of socialism" through the creation of "centers of Communist initiative". Their manifesto is strongly critical not only of the "normalization" which Secretary-General Marchais is said to have imposed upon the PCF but also of the

"bureaucratic and authoritarian perversions" which have disfigured socialism in the USSR and other East European countries.

Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon and other former leaders of the French Communist Party (PCF) have launched a movement to rally "opposition" forces inside and outside the party through a network of "centers of Communist opposition". Their six-point "Declaration of Intent" has been published by the independent weekly Politique Hebdo, edited by the dissident Communist Paul Noirot. (1) Their aim is the revolutionary transformation and democratization of the PCF; but it is evident that there is disagreement among them as to whether this should be approached through action inside or outside the party.

According to Politique Hebdo, the declaration is the product of several months of discussion among "some hundreds of militants". Many of these are adherents of the Unir-Débat faction (itself composed of an "open" sector of former members and a "clandestine" sector of present PCF members). All of them supported the "Appeal to Communists" issued on 10 July 1970 by 28 former members of the PCF leadership (the signatories included Garaudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau, Marcel Prenant and Jean Chaintron - all formerly of the Central Committee or Politburo). The appeal denounced the PCF leadership's acceptance of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia, its maintenance of centralized discipline and the stifling of internal debate.

Politique Hebdo notes that "a certain number of questions" have still to be settled by the leaders of the anti-Marchais alliance. Some of them, notably Garaudy, hope for a gradual transformation of the PCF from within, while "others, such as Pronteau and (Maurice) Kriegel-Valrimont, judge that such a renewal cannot be expected without a modification of the situation through outside factors, and give their attention to the evolution of ultra-leftist groups". Despite this strategic divergence, the commentary continues, all are agreed on one thing - that their initiative should not lead to the formation of a small "dissident

(1) "Ce que veulent les 'oppositionnels' communistes",
Politique Hebdo, 31 December 1970.

Communist Party", since, they say, this "would complicate the task of convincing others carried on by the comrades who continue to work within the ranks of the party". In the circumstances, one can understand that "for the time being they do not contemplate publishing the names of militants who join them".

The first point in the declaration makes it clear that the movement is in opposition to the Communist establishment not only in France but abroad. It affirms that "the crisis of the international Communist movement, due to the abandonment of the principles of communism and, as far as our country is concerned, the attitude of the PCF leadership, gravely compromise the chances of the socialist alternative".

Soviet, East European "Perversions"

The second point presents one of the key differences between these rebels and the PCF leaders - their readiness to expose the failings of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe on a basis of principle, and not merely in defensive-dissociative reaction to such scandalous developments as the Polish disturbances or the Leningrad trial. The reference to Czechoslovakia reminds one that for many of these dissidents the moment of truth came on 21 August 1968:

Bureaucratic and authoritarian perversions - of which the occupation and "normalization" of Czechoslovakia, manifestations of antisemitism and violations of socialist legality, notably in the USSR and in Poland, are the most recent expression - disfigure and discredit socialism.

The leadership of the PCF remains silent about this situation, as it did earlier about the crimes of Stalinism. It thus persists in an alignment which leads numerous Frenchmen to doubt the reality of the perspectives of socialist democracy which it claims to seek for our country.

At the same time the party leadership is accused of being too conservative. The "ideological 'normalization' which it is attempting to impose on the PCF" prevents it from analyzing

objectively not only the state of the international Communist movement but also political developments in France, so that it fails to "draw the lessons of May 1968" and to take account of the new possibilities for militant action, using "new forces" in addition to the working class. What the party offers militants is no more than "the practice of electoralism..... with no real prospects of fundamental political, economic and social transformation".

One sees the hand of Garaudy, however, in the balancing insistence that, while the present leadership is beyond redemption, the party still represents the great hope for revolutionary socialism in France:

The bureaucratic functioning of the PCF - symbolized by the de-facto assumption of the secretary-generalship by a man discredited by his past and who is principally responsible for the present "normalization" of the party - makes it impossible to solve these problems and find a way out of the impasse. So far, it is only through expulsions that the leadership has replied to the demands of militants for a true political debate

Nevertheless, it is mainly in the tens of thousands of active militants of the PCF that the essential revolutionary force is to be found, a force capable of inspiring the struggle for socialism in our country - on condition that it is enabled to play this role.

Call for Critical Debate

So far the declaration has offered analysis; with Point 5 it moves on to initiative. "Aware of the urgent need for an action of renewal", the authors call upon all comrades, "whether members of the party or not", to come together in pursuit of the following goals:

To impose discussion on the real functioning of the political and economic regimes of the countries which lay claim to socialism, and on the deep origins of the bureaucratic and authoritarian deformations, from the USSR to People's China.

To analyze the crisis of the international Communist movement and determine in what manner relations should be established between Communist parties so that, with real independence and freedom of criticism for all, their solidarity and proletarian internationalism may be strengthened.

To work out, starting with the Leninist contribution, what must be the (internal) structures of a revolutionary party in our time and in our country; what should be the nature of its relations with the mass organizations and with the working class; what means should be adopted to ensure the free confrontation of ideas and respect for democracy in the elaboration of the political line and in the election or dismissal of leaders.

To work out a revolutionary strategy on the basis of an objective analysis of present developments in the capitalist mode of production and the new contradictions which ensue on the national and international level.

The last paragraph of the declaration calls on like-minded "comrades of the party, those who are no longer members and non-party militants" to come together in "centers of Communist initiative" where they would undertake this preparatory work of analysis in an atmosphere "devoid of all sectarianism", joining theoretical discussion to militant action.

The existing network of open and "clandestine" cells which the Unir-Débat faction has built up since the mid-fifties form an obvious basis for such "centers of initiative". Politique Hebdo and its monthly companion, Politique Aujourd'hui, will provide a forum for public discussion. But it will be difficult to determine what headway this new challenge to the PCF leadership is making - and that is one reason why Georges Marchais should be concerned about it.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

THE ECLECTIC EXERCISES OF AN OPPORTUNIST

by M. I. Mokhnachev and S. S. Romanov

The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow (1969) directed particular attention in its materials and documents to the need for an intensification of the ideological fight against various opportunist trends. In the opinion of the Communist movement in Latin America, this fight is a matter of equal urgency for the revolutionary movement of that continent. The purposeful and determined fight of the Communists of Latin America against opportunism, for the ideological purity of theory has already produced satisfactory results. But opportunism has not surrendered. It assumes new forms and new disguises. One example of this is provided by a brochure by T. Petkov, which appeared in Venezuela, and which has been seized upon by anti-Communist propaganda, which has created a whole storm of advertisement around it.

In this brochure, Petkov tries to revise Marxism-Leninism, the factors in the building of Socialism, the principles of proletarian internationalism, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to re-examine the role of the Communist Party and the place of various classes and social groups in the revolutionary process.

T. Petkov's belligerent anti-Leninism stands out. The author repeatedly tries to cover himself by references to Lenin, but in doing so he distorts and falsifies his ideas. Following the traditions of the Right Social Democrats, he avoids using the very term "Leninism" and speaks only about Marxism, never about Marxism-Leninism.

T. Petkov's "method" of conducting research work is marked by an absence of any proletarian class approach in analysing social phenomena. Claiming to take up a "neutral" position, he makes play with his "unbiased" approach, representing his own attitude as being the only genuine one, the only creative one in the interpretation of Marxism. Claiming to exercise "independence of judgement", he nevertheless gives away his complete dependence on the bourgeois and anti-Communist line, trying at the same time to conceal this. In actual fact, T. Petkov's book provides a classic example of the way in which revisionism, in its effort to take up objective and super-class positions, slides down into a condition of militant anti-Leninism, anti-Communism.

Maosim inspires particular enthusiasm in the author. In China "the fossilisation and bureaucratisation of party and State, those two curses of a socialist country, are being eliminated in the course of a cultural revolution" (p. 7). According to him, efforts are being made there "to create a New Man, laying the main stress on the moral and ethical levers of socialism, and trying to revive certain excellent and even romantic revolutionary traditions, in order to keep the people in a state of constant revolutionary tension, which provides the best school for socialism" (p. 8). "The cultural revolution is the best school for socialism" - there you have T. Petkov's conclusion.

The author tries to implant a distrust in the socialist countries. He considers his task to be "an exposure of a number of the simple-minded and naive myths, a mass of the epic features, which the Communists have come to associate with the building of socialism in those countries in which the Communist parties have taken over power" (p. 3). That is to say, he sets himself the purpose of reducing and degrading the experience of the socialist countries.

In what way T. Petkov "dissipates" these myths can be seen from the example of his interpretation of the origin of the European socialist countries.

T. Petkov sets out the process of the creation of the countries of People's Democracy in the spirit of Trotsky's contention about the export of revolution. There is nothing accidental about that. He feels a manifest sympathy for Trotsky, trying to breathe fresh life into his anti-Lenin line, shattered by the march of history itself. With undisguised delight the author says that some sections of youth (misled by bourgeois propaganda, let us add) display an increased interest in Trotsky's works (p. 162). In his opinion, that is the very best method of getting to know Marxism.

T. Petkov's brochure insistently repeats the slanderous assertion about "unequal" relationships between the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries. These assertions are aimed at undermining the unity of the socialist camp and weakening its power in the face of imperialism. Along with an appeal to the European socialist countries not to pursue an agreed foreign policy, the author makes poorly disguised attacks on collaboration between the socialist countries in the sphere of defence within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. According to T. Petkov, it would appear that the European socialist countries have no

need "to fear any victory for the internal counter-revolutionary reactionaries and imperialist intervention" (p.109). Therefore, lo and behold, they can "welcome processes of renovation, the search for new aims, even at the cost of internal upheavals" (.110). If we take into account that T. Petkov regards the attempt at a counter-revolutionary overthrow in Hungary in 1956, the anti-socialist actions of a section of the students in Poland in 1956 and, finally, the attempt at a "quiet" counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as being events which are supposed to have exercised a good influence on the development of the socialist countries and the international Communist movement, then one can form a pretty clear idea of what "internal upheavals" he has in mind.

T. Petkov tries to refute one of the most important principles of the whole of the international workers and Communist movement - the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Expressing long-winded diatribes about imaginary dangers to the international Communist movement which are supposed to be created in the USSR, T. Petkov makes practically no mention of the real danger presented by our class enemy, imperialism. He considers that this danger has been very strongly exaggerated by the international Communist movement.

T. Petkov tries in every way to convince his readers that the Soviet experience has no universal application. "The Soviet Union was born in exceptionally peculiar historical conditions, and socialism in that country has developed in accordance with unique and peculiar features. The Soviet Union presents a special example of socialism concretely and completely limited by its own historical framework" (p.188).

The distorted interpretation of the question of a variety in the forms and methods of building socialism is needed by the author in order to rebut, from a standpoint of revisionism, the Marxist-Leninist governing laws and principles of a socialist revolution. Denying them, he mentions only the "identical essence of socialism", reducing it to the "abolition of private ownership of the means of production and a social revolution" (p.6). Rejecting these laws and principles, the author calls for the "abandonment of the theoretical models set forth in Marxist literature" (p.5).

Trying to provide historical-theoretical "grounds" for his assertion that the socialism which actually exists "is not socialism",

T. Petkov re-echoes the dogmas of the opportunists of the II International. He says that revolutions have triumphed, not in the most advanced, but in backward countries which are not yet ripe for socialism. Therefore, according to the author, what question can there be of any "genuine socialism" anywhere.

In his book, T. Petkov does not limit himself to blackening the socialist countries, and above all the Soviet Union, in a tone of the most glaring anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism. Having started to slide down the slippery road of hostile, anti-Soviet slander, T. Petkov can no longer stop himself. The logic of opportunism drives him mercilessly along the line of revising the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism about the role of the working class and the other toiling classes in the revolutionary movement, about the party of the working class, about the proletarian dictatorship, etc. One has only to recall the history of many of the opportunists and renegades of the working class in order to recognise that this line, from malicious criticism of the Soviet Union to open opportunism and betrayal of the interests of the workers and revolutionary movements, is a perfectly natural one.

All the further arguments and appeals of T. Petkov, about "pluralism" of political parties in the socialist countries, freedom of the press, the necessity for the Communist Party to give up its directing role in the State, the fading out of the State, etc. are based on a non-class and super-class opportunist approach, which is entirely alien to Marxism.

The revisionist presentation by T. Petkov of the problems facing the socialist countries has for its aim the removal from the revolutionary movement in Venezuela of any clear Marxist-Leninist prospect. Arising out of the impossibility of identifying socialism with the countries of the socialist commonwealth, says the author "we must ourselves, in the course of the present struggle, discover and establish the basic features of that particular socialism that we desire for Venezuela" (p.6). Therefore it is question of "discovering" some new principles of a socialist revolution which would be different from those of Marxism-Leninism, that is to say, of a revision of these latter ones.

T. Petkov considers that one condition for the success of the Venezuelan revolutionary movement would be a public repudiation of genuine socialism. He proclaims pompously "The Venezuelan revolutionary movement will hardly succeed in emerging from its

present limited framework if it shows itself to be incapable of eliminating the flattering and hypocritical propaganda concerning the socialist camp" (p. 9). It is by these means that he hopes to "win here the trust of those who listen to us" (ibid).

T. Petkov pushes the Venezuelan Communists onto the road of national isolation, the road of criticising and condemning the socialist countries and the international Communist movement. He says: - "A critical attitude is in complete accord with the conception which I support on the subject of the international policy which should be pursued by the Venezuelan Communists. This policy is based on critical independence. To ensure a genuine exclusion of an unconditional acceptance of the standpoint of any one of the big world centres of Communism, this policy cannot be merely neutral. It must be critical" (p187).

It would be appropriate at this point to ask the question what provided the reason for Petkov's "supreme ability to express criticism on the problems of socialism"?

The push which started T. Petkov's slide down to the position of bourgeois liberalism, and then further to the positions of anti-Leninism and anti-Communism was provided by his ambition to assume the role of leader of the opposition, to confuse the party masses and ride on the crest of the muddy wave of anti-Sovietism. It was for that purpose that his brochure was written, providing an example of the eclectic exercises of an opportunist.

(Questions of Philosophy, Moscow)

POLITICS

"OUR POLICY STANDS OR FALLS AS AN ALLIANCE POLICY"

"For our Eastern policy we need the support and the unqualified confidence of our partners in the Western Alliance", the Minister of the Interior, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, said last week during a visit to New York.

Speaking to a Rotary Club audience on the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign policy, Genscher went on to explain that this situation explains why "we have taken no action without first consulting our allies". He noted that their agreement is expressed, for example, in a resolution adopted by the recent NATO Ministerial Conference.

No "Deadline"

Minister Genscher continued:

"The German Federal Government has from the very beginning avoided imposing a 'deadline' on itself for its East European policy and has set forth all the more explicitly the sequence in which it wants to proceed with its policy.

"In the treaty with the Soviet Union which was signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970, both parties have started from the actual situation in Europe and both have undertaken to settle all mutual disputes by peaceful means:

"The Soviet Union has abandoned its alleged pre-emptive right of intervention in the Federal Republic.

"Neither party is forced to retract from obligations which it has entered into with third countries.

"We have said nothing that is inconsistent with our constitution or with the Federal Republic's agreements with the Western powers.

"Nor does the Moscow Treaty affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole.

"Our Criteria"

"These are also the criteria against which the Federal Government measured the treaty with Poland before it was signed

in Warsaw on December 7. For us it was essential that the treaty should fulfil the following conditions:

"We can, and shall, continue our efforts to consolidate the alliance and intensify our co-operation with the United States. Consequently, the United States, and Canada, must be a party to any talks and negotiations on European security.

"We shall continue to have the European option, that is to say, the treaties with East European countries will not hamper progress towards economic, and one day perhaps, political integration in Europe, including the Federal Republic.

New Opportunities

"The Eastern policy pursued by the Federal Government does not lead Germany away from Europe; rather does it open up new opportunities for Europe.

"Again, we shall continue to have also the German option. In other words, the Federal Government cannot allow itself to be bound by any treaty or country to renounce the right of self-determination of all Germans or the aim of bringing them together again. Here our constitution gives us a clear political mandate.

"We wish to safeguard the freedom and viability of West Berlin and the ties that have developed between the city and the Federal Republic. This means that the responsibility of the Four Powers for Berlin must on no account be affected. The Federal Government neither can nor does it want to, release the allies from their responsibility for Berlin; nor can the allies relinquish that responsibility of their own accord.

"Indeed, what has to be sought is a solution for Berlin that will be satisfactory both to ourselves and to our allies. In so far as this requires the participation of East Germany, this participation must under no circumstances lead to an erosion of Four-Power responsibility.

"Berlin, the Testing Ground...."

"Berlin is the testing ground for the policy of détente. Here we shall see how much the Soviet Union is interested in genuinely safeguarding peace in Europe. The Federal Government has therefore left no doubt during the negotiations on the treaties that

ratification is not possible before a satisfactory arrangement has been found for Berlin.

"It is not possible to exclude Berlin and to settle other matters in advance. All this forms an indissoluble whole.

"If our policy is successful, it will either be a success of the entire alliance or it will be no success at all. The Federal Government pursues its *O s t p o l i t i k* with the intention of thereby rendering a contribution to world peace. It does so on the secure basis of its firm integration in the community of the allied nations. But it also does so with solid domestic support.

"Our efforts to achieve conciliation with the East are attended by a clear delimitation vis-à-vis the Communist State and social system. The principles of parliamentary democracy and the principles of our free social order are not being discussed in our talks with the East.

"We are prepared to do and accept a great deal, and to make many a sacrifice, but there is one thing we cannot do, and that is to place our freedom at somebody else's disposal, for freedom is not a price to be paid in politics.

(The Bulletin - A weekly survey of German affairs issued by the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany)

LAMENT FOR THE LOST EAST

Countess Marion Dönhoff, Editor-in-Chief of the distinguished Hamburg liberal weekly "Die Zeit", who has written this (abridged) remarkable and moving commentary on the new Bonn-Warsaw treaty, is herself a refugee from the former Eastern territories of the Reich. A member of one of Prussia's great historic families, she escaped on horseback from the advancing Red Army in 1945. She is now probably the Federal Republic's most distinguished political commentator.

The treaty on the Oder-Neisse frontier has been negotiated. It will be said that the West German Government has given away German land: but the cross was put on the grave of Prussia 25

years ago. It was Adolf Hitler whose brutality and megalomania extinguished 700 years of German history, but until now nobody had the courage to ask for the death certificate - or to accept it.

Home, for most people, is something beyond reason or description. It shapes their entire life. For people from East Germany this is particularly true. To someone who was born there, in that great lonely landscape, with its endless woods, blue lakes and broad river estuaries, home probably means more than for someone who grew up in an industrial area or a great city.

The Federal Republic, with its open society and its possibilities for a person to live fairly freely, is a state in whose growth it is worth participating and working. But home? No, never to someone from the east.

My family lived there for centuries, which I mention only because it illustrates the fate of millions of people.

Loyalty was not primarily, as in the west, to the rulers, but to the land. The decisive thing was not which of the many changing powers held sway - the Teutonic knights, the Poles, Swedes, Danes, Russians or Prussians.

The decisive thing was to hold on to the land and to remain connected with the land. Only in the last century, as the spirit of nationalism poisoned all relationships, did everything change.

The Germans have now been driven out of their homeland east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, and the turnover of rulers has ended.

The land is now Polish. Nearly half the people now living in the former German territories were born there. The Poles, like the Czechs in Bohemia, made a merciless, clean sweep. Never before had anybody in the east tried to take final possession of lands and provinces by driving eight million people from their homes. But who can blame the Poles? Never before has a people been subjected to so much suffering as they during the Third Reich.

Hitler's Governor, Hans Frank, who with the SS terrorized the Polish people, deported them and sent them to gas chambers, once clarified Nazi policy as follows: "No Pole shall rise above the rank of foreman. . . . That which we call the Polish elite must be liquidated. Any new elite which grows up is to be taken care of and eventually removed. . . . We will liquidate the matter on the spot".

After the Warsaw uprising of Autumn 1944, Hitler ordered the city to be razed to the ground and the SS excelled themselves in thoroughness and brutality. When they left, there were only 2,000 people surviving in the cellars and ruins of a city once populated by millions.

Nobody can hope any more that the lost territories will ever again be German. Anybody who thinks otherwise must still dream of reconquering the world. That would mean again expelling millions of people, which in reality nobody wants. One must hope that the polemics of the expellee organizations, for whom anybody is a traitor who does not take their illusions for reality, will at last end.

One may hope that in future the Poles will also spare us their own chauvinism, their references to "the recovered territories" and their claim that the Western territories under German rule were mostly occupied by Polish people. The truth is that in East Prussia, Pomerania, East Brandenburg and Lower Silesia, 98 to 100 per cent of the population was German.

Upper Silesia was the only province with a significant Polish speaking minority. The eastern frontier of East Prussia remained unchanged for 700 years and Silesia's frontiers have remained the same except for the upper Silesian industrial area since 1335.

In all these questions there are many clichés on both sides, and very seldom sound judgements. The history of the east is too complicated and too unknown. Many also forget that it is always the victors who write history. Who in east Europe still speaks of the secret protocols in the treaties which Hitler and Stalin signed on August 23 and September 28, 1939? They were the basis for a Russian attack on Poland, agreed with Hitler, in which Moscow took over what at that time was half of Poland.

Nobody is without sin, but the attempt to reckon up each other's sins is not only senseless, it means that the curse of evil deeds gives birth to more evil. A new beginning? Yes, for otherwise there will be no end to the escalation. Does that mean farewell to Prussia? No, for the spirit of Prussia must work on in this age of materialistic greed if this state which we call the Federal Republic of Germany is to have any durability.

(German International, Bonn)

HUNGARY: CONGRESS OF COMPROMISE

Summary: The apparent price for being allowed to pursue reforms at home is rigid alignment with Moscow's foreign policies.

The Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, had reason to be satisfied with the Tenth Party Congress (held from November 23 to 28), which gave him a mandate to continue his present policies with virtually the same team for another four years. Summing up the marathon of speeches as a demonstration of "complete unanimity on the main issues", Kadar ascribed the success of the event to its thorough political preparation. In the three preceding months, thousands of party organisations had held preparatory meetings and conferences, followed in mid-November by a special Central Committee session devoted to finalising the congress documents, already outlined in the guidelines published in August. Thus it was a foregone conclusion that the reports of the Central Committee and the Central Control and Auditing Commission, the amendments to the party rules and the final resolution would be adopted unanimously.

Kadar, who said that the congress had proved the party's resolve to pursue consistently "the same path as hitherto", used an anecdote to point its direction. On a recent visit to the party headquarters in a Budapest district, he had noticed a portrait of Lenin on the wall. His advice to the comrades had been to hang a clock beside it. The moral was obvious - within the Marxist-Leninist framework, the party must keep up with the times. The emphasis on greater party and State democracy, the rôle of the National Assembly, legality and constitutional order, the workers' alliance with other classes and economic efficiency was part of the new look. But it goes hand in hand with continuing insistence on the party's leading rôle.

Indeed, the Hungarian leaders left no doubt that the social and political changes entailed by the economic reform launched nearly three years ago will not be allowed to bring a diminution of party controls. The congress resolution stressed that "unprincipled liberalism" must be prevented from gaining ground; the Central Committee Secretary in charge of cultural matters, Gyöergy Aczel, called for the strengthening of Marxist-Leninist positions in culture, and Kadar said that the party's influence in all

information media should increase and that members must assert official policies more vigorously when confronted with problems arising from the economic decentralisation.

Though much of this was doubtless meant to reassure the Soviet leaders, who have shown great reluctance to introduce changes at home, it was no mere window-dressing. Long before Dubcek's downfall, the 1956 Hungarian uprising taught Kadar the dangers of uncontrolled relaxation: four Soviet divisions are still stationed in Hungary. Referring to his party's record of "internationalist unity" with other parties (an allusion to its participation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968), Kadar pledged even closer union with them in the future. Acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine, which implies that no Communist State in Eastern Europe can deviate significantly from Moscow's line, remains a cornerstone of Hungary's policies - not least because Kadar's own rule is buttressed by it.

Soviet approval

In a comparatively short speech, the Soviet party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, praised the Hungarian party and Kadar personally, endorsing the economic and other reforms, as well as the leadership's "principled stand" against both rightist and leftist distortions of Marxism-Leninism. But his main theme was "Socialist unity" and the advantages to the Communist Parties of ever closer co-ordination in economic, political, ideological and defence matters. The favourable references to greater integration within CMEA may have been aimed at Hungary's moves to diversify her trade and intended as a counter-weight to his public approval of her economic reforms. Similarly, a Lenin quotation on the proletariat's struggle against the return of the "old exploiters" could have been a disguised warning to Kadar not to go too far in his conciliatory approach to former class enemies. But on the whole Brezhnev left no doubt that Kadar had the full backing of the Soviet Union and that, especially after the upheaval in Czechoslovakia, Moscow was content with the degree of stability achieved in Hungary under his leadership.

While it is possible that the Soviet leaders are watching the Hungarian economic experiment with a view to adopting some of its features, Moscow's primary interest in strengthening political

and defence co-operation throughout Eastern Europe was evident throughout Brezhnev's references to foreign policy. He claimed that the united policies of the Communist States had been a major factor in the relaxation of the European political atmosphere and he also paid tribute to the realism of the Bonn government. The agreements signed with the Soviet Union and Poland, based on recognition of the post-war realities in Europe, he said, had created a favourable climate for extending peaceful co-operation as well as protecting the "legitimate interests" of East Germany and the other Communist countries.

For his part, Kadar made it plain that Hungary's foreign policy would remain identical with Moscow's. He even used the old formula that relations with the Soviet Union were the touchstone for distinguishing between progressive and reactionary attitudes. Asserting that Moscow's internationalism had always been "exemplary", he said the Hungarian party rejected all forms of anti-Sovietism, because even the slightest concession to any attitude hostile to Moscow benefited the class enemy.

Kadar's review of Hungarian foreign relations, therefore, held few surprises. The reference to an improvement in State relations with China - "despite our prevailing serious and numerous ideological and political differences of opinion" - was in line with the Soviet approach, as were his remarks about the rôle of East Germany and Hungary's growing contacts with Federal Germany. He appeared to be satisfied with the trend of Bonn's policies and expressed readiness to resume full diplomatic relations "when the time is ripe". A long-term trade agreement with Federal Germany was signed in September, after four months of negotiations, and several West German Ministers visited Hungary in the autumn - although East Germany remains Hungary's largest trading partner after the Soviet Union. While Kadar's reference to the "existence of the GDR" fell short of the demands of the East German delegate, the final resolution called for full international *d e j u r e* recognition of Ulbricht's government.

Notable absentee

The absence of the East German leader was conspicuous among the 37 representatives of foreign Communist Parties at the congress. The reasons behind the decision to send - as in 1966 - a relatively minor Politburo member, Herr Ebert, to Budapest,

remained obscure, especially as Ulbricht was fit enough to receive the Warsaw Pact leaders in East Berlin on December 2. But displeasure at the whole trend of the Soviet camp's attitude to Herr Brandt's *O s t p o l i t i k* may have been an ingredient. At the congress, Mr. Gomulka voiced Poland's agreement to the progressive normalisation of relations with Bonn, while Mr. Husak added that Czechoslovakia was once again a firm link in the Communist camp, having been saved from counter-revolution only by the "fraternal internationalist help of the USSR and its allies".

The Romanian delegation was led not by the Secretary-General, Mr. Ceausescu, who abstained from the invasion and whose relations with Kadar are no more than correct, but by Niculescu-Mizil, a party Secretary and Presidium member. The absence of President Tito of Yugoslavia was not surprising in view of the Hungarian boycott of the Yugoslav party congress last year, although the Yugoslavs showed their interest in Hungarian economic developments - the most adventurous in Eastern Europe after their own - by sending a member of the Presidency's Executive Committee, Mr. Gligorov. There were no delegations from Albania or China.

Few changes

Kadar was re-elected as party First Secretary and all 11 former Politburo members retained their posts. The three newcomers to the enlarged Politburo are not likely to initiate any policy changes. Gyoergy Aczel, already a party Secretary and Chairman of the Agitation and Propaganda Committee, will continue to watch over cultural matters. The elevation of the powerful First Secretary of the Budapest party Committee, Karoly Nemeth, from alternate to full Politburo membership was to be expected, while the promotion of Miss Valeria Benke, a Central Committee member since 1954 and editor of the party monthly theoretical journal, *T a r s a d a l m i S z e m l e*, reflected party promises to give more attention to the still unequal position of women. (Kadar stated that during the preparations for the congress, the number of women in the newly elected party bodies had increased by a third.) The Central Committee membership was expanded from 101 to 105, of whom 25, including the Minister of Finance, Peter Valyi, were elected

for the first time. The decision to abolish alternate membership of the Politburo (paralleling the abolition of alternate membership of the Central Committee at the Ninth Congress in 1966) neatly solved the problem of demoting the Minister of Defence, Lajos Czinege, whose reputation for loose living contrasted awkwardly with the emphasis in the Control Commission report on the high moral standards expected of party members.

The report, delivered by Janos Brutyo, revealed that because of widespread corruption, 20,000 party members had had to be reprimanded in the past four years and 5,000 expelled. "Lapses in private life, high living, greed and moral laxity", pilfering favouritism and intrigues affected even party members in leading positions. Kadar, too, referred to the need to arrest the deterioration of public and private morality, which he claimed had been aggravated by the economic changes. Official assurances that there will be a drive against corruption and the dubious accumulation of wealth seem to be aimed at allaying popular discontent over the privileges of the "new class" and greater wage differentials, as well as at asserting the primacy of ideology over market laws for the benefit of orthodox party members incensed by the success of apolitical businessmen. The leadership has to steer a careful course between the needs of managers and technicians committed to the success of the new economic policy and the resentment of the party stalwarts. With social and political factors still taking precedence over a purely economic rationale, the problems of incentives, wages tied more closely to productivity, greater labour mobility and a tougher attitude to unprofitable enterprises are only beginning to be tackled, while the most important political issues raised by the economic reform have not yet been faced. The party's dilemma is how to foster a more liberal climate conducive to popular co-operation, without eroding its own monopoly of power or arousing Moscow's suspicions. Though the economic reforms have already brought a higher standard of living, Hungary's fear of overstepping the mark will continue to restrict the pace of progress.

LABOUR CAMPS IN RUSSIA

by Ludmilla Thorne

Seven years ago Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life*

of Ivan Denisovich was published in the Soviet Union. The work had an immediate and profound impact both in the Communist world and in the West, not only because of its sheer artistry but also because of the political function it performed.

Now we have a new book from the Soviet Union - one which makes it sadly clear that labour camps are still a part of the Soviet reality. Stalin has passed on, but the camps have not.

The book, titled simply *My Testimony*^{*}, was written by Anatoli Marchenko, a 31-year old labourer with an eighth-grade education. Unlike *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, Marchenko's book was not published in the USSR and probably never will be, because for several years now writings on the "camp theme" have been forbidden. But like many other Russian books, *My Testimony* circulates in the Soviet Union in manuscript form. In the summer of 1969 it was published in Paris in the original Russian, and now it has appeared in English translation in England, Canada and the United States. The English edition has an excellent introduction by Max Hayward, who underscores the importance of Marchenko's book as "the first detailed and completely unvarnished report on conditions in Soviet camps today by someone who knows at first hand".

The author of the book was born in 1938 of illiterate parents in the small western Siberian town of Barabinsk. Before completing his secondary education - the regular "ten-year school" - Marchenko started working on the Novosibirsk hydro-electric station and on other similar projects in Siberia. Like other young workers, he lived in a dormitory. One day, a fight broke out in the living quarters of the young men. By the time the police arrived, most of those involved had run away or gone into hiding. Those who remained were arrested, among them Marchenko. "They sentenced us all in a single day, with no attempt made at finding out who was guilty and who innocent", he writes. "Thus it was that I found my way to the terrible camps at Karaganda".

Unable to reconcile himself to the idea of being unjustly imprisoned, Marchenko planned an escape from the camp. In October of 1960 he and another prisoner tried to cross the border into Iran but were captured about 50 yards from the frontier. They were taken to Ashkhabad, the capital of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. Marchenko was then 23 years old.

After being detained in solitary confinement for five months, Marchenko faced a closed trial; not even

^{*} *My Testimony*, Anatoli Marchenko, New York, E.P. Dutton; London, Pall Mall Press; Toronto, Clarks, Irwin & Co., 1969.

his mother was allowed to attend. He was tried for treason by the Supreme Court of the Turkmen SSR and was sentenced to six years at hard labour - a ruling not subject to appeal. His companion, who testified against Marchenko in order to gain leniency for himself, was given only two years for attempting to cross the border. However, even Marchenko's sentence was relatively light; as a "traitor to the homeland", he could have been shot.

Marchenko's experiences during his long six-year journey through a maze of Soviet jails and forced-labour camps comprise the main part of his account. He says that after he was sentenced, "I had only one sensation, and that was that an injustice had been committed, a legalized illegality, and that I was powerless; all I could do was to gather and store my outrage and despair inside me....." It is amazing that such sentiments are expressed in his account not in a spirit of hatred or vindictiveness but as a straight, stark narration of the facts. His story is written in simple but literate Russian, with an ample sprinkling of camp jargon, some of which is impossible to translate.

Artistically, Marchenko's book cannot be compared with Solzhenitsyn's classic narrative - but Marchenko does not claim to have produced a great work of literature. In his introduction he states: "I don't consider myself a writer, these notes are not a work of art". Literary quality aside, however there are strong parallels in the two works. Marchenko himself reminds one of Solzhenitsyn's hero. Like Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, he is a simple worker and not a member of the intelligentsia. Like Ivan Denisovich, Marchenko lives each day as well as he can. Unlike other prisoners (called "zeki" in Russian camp jargon), neither of the two men tries to ease his frightful existence at the expense of his fellow inmates. They do not kowtow to the administration; they do not go after "soft" camp jobs.

Marchenko's term began at the large camp compound near Potma, about 250 miles east of Moscow. There are no statistics available on the total number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union today, but Marchenko tells us that at Potma alone there are about 3,500 prisoners. He mentions other prison compounds located in the areas of Vorkuta and Kazakhstan, as well as certain "death camps" - notably Norilsk - from which no prisoners return.

Comparing the present with the past, Marchenko states that

"today's Soviet camps for political prisoners are just as horrific as in Stalin's time; a few things are better, a few things worse". It appears that the only really significant difference is a quantitative one: whereas prisoners under Stalin numbered in the millions, today they number in the thousands.

One aspect of prison policy which does not seem to have changed is the use of hunger as a disciplinary measure and as a means of inflicting punishment. In a chapter titled "Hunger", the author gives us a penetrating description of what it means to be tortured by starvation "day after day, month after month, year after year". The regular fare in camps is scientifically designed to provide the minimum nourishment that will keep a human being alive and "able" to do hard physical labour.

Prisoners are exposed to other privations - cold, filth and disease. They are also exploited by members of the camp administration, who frequently bully or bribe prisoners into doing "personal favors" (such as loading logs for firewood or helping build their private homes). Above all, the prisoners are constantly subjected to personal humiliation, reminding them that in the camps they are no longer considered human beings.

Toward the end of Marchenko's term, the writer Yuri Daniel was sent to Potma and was assigned to Marchenko's work-gang. The two men became friends. Daniel and Andrei Siniavsky had of course become a *c a u s e c é l è b r e* when they were sentenced in February 1966 to five and seven years respectively for publishing their works abroad and "slandering the Soviet Union". Marchenko gives us the most accurate report yet available on Daniel's imprisonment. He also provides some insights into the other prisoners' attitudes toward the two writers.

Daniel emerges as a man of great will and simplicity, traits which endear him to his fellow inmates. There is a moving description of how Marchenko and several other prisoners tried to shield Daniel from the vindictive persecution of the camp authorities, though without much luck. Marchenko reports that in June 1966 Daniel was sent to the *s h i z o* for 15 days despite the fact that he was suffering from an infection that had developed in an old wound. No sooner was he released than he was put right back in for another 10 days.

Other camp inmates, men from all walks of life, are

portrayed by the author with equal sensitivity. We meet Anatoli Burov, the son of a dispossessed "kulak" family; the Lithuanian Richardas, who was shot while trying to escape and was left lying unattended for five days; Andrei Novoshitsky, a young soldier who had defected to the West but returned because he felt homesick; and many others. All have ended up at the bottom of the pit. As the author makes distressingly clear, the law of the jungle rules life in labour camps. The strong devour the weak, and only the strongest survive. Animal instincts prevail over human instincts among prisoners whose only purpose is to keep alive.

M y T e s t i m o n y is not an easy book to read, with its fearful details of suffering and horror. Most readers will be shocked, depressed and disturbed by it. But for Western observers interested in all facets of Soviet life, it is necessary reading. Max Hayward notes that in addition to providing information on Soviet labour camps, Marchenko

... also succeeds.... in giving very revealing glimpses of Soviet life in general. Not only is there a wealth of information about social habits (including sexual mores), but the reader is given the "feel" of real life at the humbler levels of existence in the Soviet Union. Marchenko introduces us to the vast submerged reality which few foreigners or educated Russians ever see.

Anatoli Marchenko's six-year term ended in November 1966. But today he is once again in prison, because his courage did not stop with the writing of *M y T e s t i m o n y*. After his release, he authored a number of open letters of protest against conditions in Soviet labour camps as well as against Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, vexing the Soviet authorities to the extent where they were determined to put him behind bars again.

On July 29, 1968, he was arrested on a trumped-up charge of violating passport regulations and was jailed for a year. His release was scheduled for July 1969, but instead he was sentenced on August 20 to two more years in prison camps for "defamation of the Soviet political system". Marchenko's friends now fear for his life; they are not certain whether his health can survive another jail term.

(Condensed from an article in Problems
of Communism)

POLISH UPHEAVAL

"The party must maintain a lasting link with the nation".
Edward Gierek, December 20, 1970.

For the Soviet leaders the primary factors in their attitude to a Communist ruler in Eastern Europe are his loyalty to the Soviet alliance and the firmness of his grip within his own country. On the first point, Moscow may have had doubts about Mr. Gomulka in 1956, but obviously recognised that he was the only popular and effective leader who could restore stability in Poland in the aftermath of the Poznan bread riots. He subsequently gave proof of his devotion to Soviet-Polish friendship - not least by supporting the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia with both troops and words. But by his failure to prevent the escalation of the troubles in Gdynia, Gdansk and Szczecin, Gomulka fell down on the second requirement, and when the leadership changed, his successor, Edward Gierek, received a speedy accolade from Moscow. Indeed, the Soviet leaders were probably consulted before the shake-up was announced. In a message on December 21, the Soviet party leader, Mr. Brezhnev, congratulated Gierek and expressed confidence that his party would "successfully overcome" the difficulties that had arisen.

In line with the relatively humane methods now prevalent in much of the Communist world, Gomulka (party First Secretary since 1956), was allowed to resign on the probably genuine grounds of deteriorating health, while four of his Politburo colleagues were dropped without any accusations being levelled against them. A communiqué on December 20 stated merely that the party's Central Committee had met in Warsaw and elected Gierek, hitherto First Secretary of Katowice Province in the industrial region of Silesia, as First Secretary, also listing certain changes in the Secretariat and Politburo and conveying the meeting's good wishes for Gomulka's speedy recovery. The four outgoing Politburo members were Boleslaw Jaszczuk, mainly responsible for Poland's economic policies, Zenon Kliszko, the chief ideologist, Ryszard Strzelecki, in charge of party organisation, and President Sychalski. Both Sychalski and Kliszko were close associates of Gomulka.

The five newcomers are Edward Babiuch, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Mieczyslaw Moczar, Stefan Olszowski and Jan Szydlak. Babiuch,

a 43-year-old miner from Silesia, has spent most of his life as a party official in Warsaw, where he has been head of the Central Committee's Organisational Department since 1965. Szydłak, two years older, also has a Silesian background and spent some years as a party official there before becoming First Secretary of the important provincial committee in Poznań (1960-68). In November, 1968, he joined the central party Secretariat and was made a candidate Politburo member. Jaroszewicz, best known as Poland's permanent representative on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), has been a Deputy Prime Minister since 1952 and a candidate Politburo member since 1968. Now aged 61, he spent most of the war years in Russia. General Moczar, also a candidate Politburo member since 1968, has probably been promoted to emphasise the importance attached to order and security. He was Deputy Minister of the Interior from 1956 to 1964 and was then promoted Minister, a post he held until July 1968, when he became party Secretary with special responsibility for security and a candidate member of the Politburo. He is also head of the ex-servicemen's organization ZBOWID (Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy) and is thought to have wanted to use this power base to secure for himself the succession to Gomułka, but after the student riots he and Gierek appear to have come together again in their bitter condemnation of the demonstrators.

In a parallel reshuffle of the Secretariat, Gomułka, Jaszczuk, Kliszko and Strzelecki were also dropped from this body, the newcomers being Babiuch, Kazimierz Barcikowski and Stanisław Kociolek in addition to Gierek. The 38-year-old Kociolek, then First Secretary of the Gdansk provincial party organisation was appointed to the Politburo at the last party congress in November 1968. Another notable member of the old guard fell on December 23 when a special session of Poland's parliament the Sejm, accepted the resignation of Mr. Józef Cyrankiewicz, who had been Prime Minister for 21 years (with a two-year break). He has become President in place of Marshal Spychalski, and has been replaced as Prime Minister by Mr. Jaroszewicz. One of the new government's first undertakings was to freeze food prices for two years.

In his radio and television appeal on December 20 immediately after the announcement of the party changes, Gierek had urged the people to remain calm and to return to work, but he was

frank about the background to the demonstrations. In contrast with the early Press silence about the riots, followed by suggestions that only "hooligans" had been involved, he acknowledged that workers had taken part in the disturbances and that people had been killed. Now it was the duty of the party and government to examine the causes of the tragedy honestly, he said, admitting that there had been "badly thought-out conceptions" in economic policy as well as "real difficulties". He also insisted that the leadership must make it an "iron rule" to consult the working class and the intelligentsia fully, for the recent events had given a painful reminder of the need for the party to retain its "common language with the working people". However, apart from promising a re-examination of long and short-term economic plans and an immediate enquiry into the special needs of low-income families hit by the price rises, he gave few indications of the new leadership's approach. But he was at pains to reaffirm that Poland intended to consolidate her alliance with the Soviet Union and continue to march alongside the "entire great Socialist community".

Economic stagnation

The causes of the crisis which erupted on December 14 with workers in the Baltic ports, notably Gdansk, demonstrating against the steep pre-Christmas increases in meat and other food prices, seem to have been entirely domestic. Over the past few years, Poland's economy has become increasingly stagnant, without any adequate remedies being introduced. The tentative approaches to economic reform were never far-reaching enough to keep up with the problems, let alone inject new dynamism into the economy. Agriculture, allowed to return to the hands of the private farmers in 1956 when the collectives fell apart, has never been given sufficient help by the State. Moreover, Poland's concentration on exporting food to gain foreign currency has had damaging effects on the people's diet - a point recognised by the party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, on November 17.

Failure in the agricultural sector was the particular economic weakness which provoked the government's ill-judged decision on December 12 to raise the prices of foodstuffs such as meat and meat products (by 17.6 per cent), flour (by 16 per cent), fish (by 11 per cent) and fuel (by 10 to 20 per cent), while lowering

the prices of some consumer durables such as refrigerators and television sets. There had been warnings throughout the year that the 1970 harvest promised to be even worse than that of 1969 - largely because of the severe and extended winter. On December 2, Gomulka himself painted a gloomy picture, in a speech to a miners' rally in Zabrze, of the "tensions and disproportions" that had arisen in the economy over the past two years, resulting in a reduction in fodder reserves, a decline in animal production and, most recently, "acute difficulties" in the meat market. Remarking that there had been a considerable increase in the domestic consumption of meat, Gomulka said that supplies had only been maintained by reducing the amounts exported. This in turn meant that there was less currency to spare for importing the necessary grain and animal feeding stuffs. Gomulka announced with some pride that the Soviet Union had now agreed to supply Poland with two million tons of grain to help her out of her difficulties.

In the longer term, however, there are clearly no ready-made solutions to Poland's economic weakness, and Gierek, who has made his reputation as an efficient administrator in Katowice, is probably aware that the country's overall problems will be less easy to solve. He got off to a good start by admitting that there had been errors of policy as well as inherent difficulties in the situation, but he faces the prospect of a period in which progress can be made only slowly, and under a threat of further expressions of popular discontent.

THE LENINGRAD TRIAL

Summary: The Leningrad trial and sentences, which aroused protests all over the world, focus attention on the present plight of Jews in the USSR.

Soviet justice and human rights are again under scrutiny following the trial in Leningrad of nine Jews and two non-Jews on charges arising out of an alleged attempt to steal an aircraft at Smolny airport last June. The verdicts of guilty were reached on December 24 after a ten-day trial which has focussed attention not only on the plight of Soviet Jewry but on the hazards which face any Soviet citizen wishing to leave the country.

Two of the accused - Mark Dymshits and Edward Kuznetsov - were sentenced to death and the remainder given prison sentences ranging from 15 to four years. Following world-wide protests the death sentences were commuted to sentences of 15 years hard labour.

The Leningrad defendants were charged with treason under Article 64 of the Russian Federation's Criminal Code. This defines "flight abroad or refusal to return to the USSR from abroad" as one of the treasonable offences which may be punishable by death. But in a commentary on Article 64, Criminal Law: The Special Section, a Soviet legal textbook published in 1968, stated that "if the passage of a citizen of the USSR to the territory of a foreign State is motivated by family or similar circumstances" then the charge of treason is not applicable. The prosecution must also prove that the defendant intends "to carry out activities hostile to the Soviet Union" in a foreign country. Finally, the textbook commentary states that if the attempted flight abroad is unsuccessful the accused may only be tried for "attempted treason".

As the accused stressed during the trial, they were not motivated by anti-Soviet sentiments but by the desire to go to Israel. Kuznetsov is reported to have said: "The public prosecutor proceeds from the proposition that once abroad I would have undertaken anti-Soviet activities. I have never expressed anti-Soviet sentiments to anyone. I never intended to harm the Soviet Union. All I wanted to do was live in Israel". Other defendants also emphasised that if they had been free to go to Israel the entire affair need never have taken place. "We did this because we had no other way", said Israel Zalmanson. "All our requests to go to Israel legally were turned down".

Although the Soviet authorities have reason to be genuinely concerned about aircraft hijacking, the Leningrad case has underlined the difficulties facing any Soviet citizen who wishes to emigrate. The Soviet Union still operates an internal passport system to control residence within the Soviet Union and normally restricts even temporary trips abroad to carefully vetted delegations. An exit visa is rarely given - and an application in itself carries the risk of victimisation by the authorities. A letter by a Soviet Jew, V. Prussakov, who had sought permission to emigrate to Israel, summarised in the Soviet underground publication, Chronicle of Current Events (No. 12, February 28, 1970), gave details of his persecution over a number of years.

He had been searched, shadowed, expelled from his institute, driven from his work and told by the security police (KGB) that "your place is behind barbed wire".

Yet in March, 1968, the Soviet Union signed a United Nations Covenant on Human Rights which inter alia states that "everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" and that "everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own".

World protests

The trial and sentences produced a hostile reaction both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Protest documents drawn up by Soviet citizens have been sent to the United Nations, to Soviet leaders, to Israel and to foreign governments. In one appeal addressed to the UN Human Rights Committee, a group of 60 Soviet Jews declared: "We demand not mercy but justice for those sentenced... whose only fault was an invincible desire to live in their land, which they have not been allowed to do by legal means". In another appeal, addressed to President Podgorny on December 29, the Soviet nuclear scientist, Andrei Sakharov, described the planned executions as an "unjust brutality" and demanded that the Soviet President take into consideration the fact that "the reason for the action of the accused was restriction by the authorities of the legal right of tens of thousands of Jews who wish to leave the country".

Protest demonstrations have taken place in many countries. The Vatican and the International Commission of Jurists issued appeals for clemency and the President and Secretary-General of the Soviet-dominated International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) were reported by the French Communist newspaper, L'Humanité, on December 28 to have requested a new enquiry into the case and a revision of the sentences. Foreign Communist Parties have also been alarmed by the Soviet action: the British, French, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and Australian parties all expressed "concern" and "regret".

The sharpest protest came from the Italian Communist Party, whose newspaper, L'Unità on December 27 commented: "There are many things that it is difficult to understand about the conduct and conclusion of the trial in Leningrad against a group of Soviet

citizens for trying, unsuccessfully, to hijack an aircraft". While the party did not question each State's right to protect its airlines against would-be hi-jackers, "the fact that the trial proceeded in secret, behind closed doors, does not correspond to those criteria of personal guarantees for the accused which are inalienable".

Many protests centred on the severity of the sentences and the fact that the alleged bid to seize the aircraft was unsuccessful. Others were concerned about the secrecy of the trial.

Whether or not there is substance in the suggestion that the entire incident was provoked by the KGB, its "discovery" coincided with action against a number of Jews not implicated in the incident. About twelve people were arrested at Smolny airport, but others were seized by the KGB less than hours after the airport arrests in places as far apart as Leningrad and Odessa. At least two more Leningrad Jews were arrested after protesting to the Procurator-General about the airport raid. Further arrests were made in July and August in Riga and Kishinev. In most cases, those taken into custody had applied to leave the Soviet Union and had been active in the Jewish protest movement which is trying to revive Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. The "evidence" taken by KGB officials during raids on Jewish homes included letters from Israel, Hebrew textbooks, articles on Jewish history and tape recordings of Jewish songs. More trials are apparently being prepared in various cities.

It is possible that in bringing Soviet Jews to trial and passing harsh sentences, the Soviet authorities might be seeking to put pressure on Israel to adopt a more flexible attitude over the Middle East situation. It seems more likely, however, that they intended to retaliate against those involved in the Jewish protest movement and to intimidate others into dropping applications for emigration visas.

Anti-Jewish pressure

The increasing number of Soviet Jews who have applied for permission to leave for Israel has been estimated by one underground Soviet Jewish source as possibly as high as 240,000. Many Soviet Jews, remembering Stalin's anti-Semitic campaigns, have been alarmed by the anti-Zionist campaign launched in

the Soviet Union soon after the Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967. The Socialist International noted in a report issued in Stockholm on December 8 that the situation of Jewish minorities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had generally deteriorated since the Middle East war. In some respects it was worse than at any period since Stalin's purges.

Signs of increased anti-religious pressure against Soviet Jews can be seen in the reduction of the number of synagogues. In 1960 there were about 150; by last year these had apparently dwindled to fewer than 50. An estimate by the Minority Rights Group, newly established in Britain under the chairmanship of the former Liberal leader, Mr. Grimond, puts the number of active rabbis at no more than 35 to 40. (The total Jewish population in the USSR numbers about three million). In the last few years prison sentences have been imposed for baking unleavened bread and prayer groups maintained by Jewish communities have been closed down.

The absence of opportunities for practising their faith and culture, rather than any anti-Soviet feeling, seems to have been the deciding factor behind many Jew's decision to apply for emigration papers. Typical of the appeals delivered to Soviet leaders was one from 37 Leningrad Jews which appeared in the underground Jewish publication, Exodus (No. 2, 1970). It said: "We are loyal citizens. None among us is in any way linked with Soviet State secrets. Our motives are not social or political; our motives are deeply national and spiritual. We want to live in the re-born State of our ancient people, for its future and for the future of our children. We want our children to be closely associated with the treasures of Jewish national culture, we want them to know their own language, their history and the traditions of their people. We want to live in our historic motherland, in our own country".

SOVIET CALL FOR "POPULAR FRONTS" IN THE 1970'S

by Panas V. Fedenko

Summary: Appeals for the creation of "alliances of the forces of the left" voiced by an authoritative Soviet journalist can be interpreted as a pointer to

Moscow's future political strategy in the non-communist world. But memories of the CPSU's exploitation of the Popular Fronts in France and Spain during the 1930's and, more recently, of the way in which political alliances were used to introduce communist dictatorships into postwar Eastern Europe, should be sufficient to put most social democrats on their guard.

A leading Soviet journalist, Ernst Genri, recently wrote a lengthy article entitled "New Prospects" which extended over three issues of Literaturnaya gazeta (July 1, 8, 15, 1970). In this article, which is sub-titled "The 1970's - A Time for Alliances of Left-wing Forces?", Genri states that after World War II, openly anti-communist and anti-Soviet governments were in power almost everywhere in the "bourgeois world" and that these governments have since remained loyal to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, falling into line with American policies; socialist and coalition governments in various West European countries have also continued to adhere to NATO policies, and the communist parties have been left isolated.

Genri believes that this situation is beginning to change, and he hopes for the creation of "coalitions, and possibly of governments of a new type". He also sees opportunities for the formation of a united political front of communists and social democrats, the two workers' parties which "for more than half a century have been traveling different roads" (ibid., July 1, 1970). The reason for the lack of unanimity between the two movements, he claims, is that whereas the communists created new, socialist states, the social democrats preserved the existing state framework and contented themselves with reforms. The history of the twentieth century would have followed a very different path if both parties, communist and social democrat, had kept in step at junctures critical for the whole international labour movement. He accuses the right wing of social democracy of retarding the historical process by many decades and claims that the social democrats bear a heavy responsibility for a great amount of bloodshed in the world because they did not succeed in "preventing World War II" (ibid., July 1, 1970, p. 14), an astonishingly naive allegation considering that it was the non-aggression

pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in Moscow on August 23, 1939, which enabled Hitler to invade Poland the following month, making war inevitable.

Genri regards social democracy as part of the international labour movement, but cannot refrain from quoting Lenin's unflattering description of it as a "locked room" in which representatives of the bourgeoisie bring pressure to bear upon the workers (*ibid.*, July 15, 1970, p. 14). Lenin also said that social democracy was "rotten" and he changed the name of the party of the bolsheviks from "social democrat" to "communist", and both during the reign of Stalin and after, the leaders of the world's communist parties vilified social democrats as "lackeys of the bourgeoisie", "social traitors", "social fascists", etc.

Yet now, after fifty years of acrimonious ideological dispute and political warfare, a prominent Soviet journalist suggests alliances between communists and social democrats as a guarantee of world peace, social justice and economic progress. He considers that the international situation demands joint action by social democrats and communists for the defense of peace and democracy, but ignores the fact that the Soviet leaders are doing nothing to prevent the arms build-up in the Middle East and other parts of the world, and that it was not NATO but Warsaw Pact forces that invaded Czechoslovakia and are still stationed there against the will of the people. For the CPSU leaders the crushing of the Czechoslovak communists' attempts to introduce democratic principles into their country and construct "socialism with a human face" was an example of the "defense of democracy"; even the modest Czech steps towards liberalization were interpreted by the Kremlin as a threat to its hegemony and duly suppressed.

Genri claims: "Democratic or left-wing fronts - alliances of democratic parties and organizations, whose nucleus will be formed by the workers' movement united for joint action - can prevent the incursion of reaction and the forces of war in various countries" (*ibid.*, July 1, 1970). He admits that communists and social democrats are still going their own ways and that ideological discord between them has not disappeared and in some respects has even deepened, but he condemns as "incurable pessimists" those who see no hope of co-operation on important political issues. He tries to convince sceptics by quoting the case of Finland, where in 1966 communists and social democrats joined

forces and formed a coalition government under a socialist leader after winning a majority in the elections. Although they forfeited this majority in March 1970 - the Finnish electorate evidently having decided that the alliance was dangerous for the country - Genri maintains that Finnish social democratic workers recognized the value of solidarity and will remain loyal to the alliance with the communists irrespective of whatever direction the Finnish social democrat leaders might take.

The author's hopes for the creation of coalition governments with communist participation in various parts of the world are based primarily on an analysis of the situation in the countries of Western Europe. In Italy, he says, "if left-wing Catholics join forces with the communists and the socialists, the democratic front will have a clear majority" (*ibid.*, July 8, 1970), but fails to mention that the Italian Communist Party (the largest in Western Europe) sharply condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and, as an advocate of polycentrism in the world communist movement, does not recognize Moscow's right to issue directives. Genri anticipates that a left-wing government would withdraw Italy from NATO and claims that this would help "strengthen peace".

The prospects for a left-wing alliance under communist leadership are less rosy in France, thinks the Soviet commentator, because here forces are at work which would like to see France rejoin NATO and which are seeking an agreement with right-wing circles in West Germany in order to create a West European federation. He expresses satisfaction with the electoral successes of the French communists, however, and quotes French Communist Party secretary G. Marchais as calling for an alliance of all workers' and democratic forces.

Because opposition parties are banned in Spain and can only operate illegally it is difficult to judge their attitudes to one another. Yet Genri feels able to assert that "the unity.... of communists, socialists, progressive catholics, Basque nationalists and some bourgeois parties is taking shape" (*ibid.*). He has nothing to say about the Communist Party of Great Britain, which is not even represented in Parliament, but he does have hopes that the Labour Party will move to the left in response to an expected leftwards trend in France, Italy and Spain, and similar shifts in West Germany, Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. Taking his crystal ball, this

Soviet journalist also forecasts growing communist influence in India and Japan and expects that the latter will swing far enough to the left to adopt a position of neutrality. He regards the situation in Latin America as extremely promising for the communists and approves their support of the socialist S. Allende's candidature for the Chilean Presidency: "The communists have given a practical demonstration of how precious this unity is to them" (*ibid.*). At present, he writes, the key to the creation of left-wing blocs is in the hands "of the two parties of the workers' movement: the communists and the social democrats" (*ibid.*, July 15, 1970), and he admits to the organizational strength of the social democrat parties and to their political influence, realizing that without their participation "left-wing blocs" have no chance of securing majorities in parliamentary elections. The present situation is favorable for an alliance of four social classes - workers, small peasants, the intelligentsia and the urban petty bourgeoisie - who would be joined by the middle classes in some western countries and the "national bourgeoisie" in the former colonial countries. But only the communists can instil dynamism into these left alliances and make them durable. An important role in these political line-ups would be played by the technical intelligentsia who loath fascism, understand the immensity of the danger of nuclear war and are "becoming more and more imbued with socialism" (*ibid.*).

Having assessed the prospects for a united front of "progressive forces", Genri rails against the leaders of the social democratic parties: "It is no secret that the most right-wing leaders of social democracy do not want unity of action at any price; they fear the forces of the left like the plague. They still want nothing but to make a deal with the bourgeoisie" (*ibid.*) They are "political corpses" about to be buried by history, because they stand in the way of the peace and socialism which both communist and social democratic workers want.

Genri goes on to write about guarantees of world peace at some length, suggesting that the way to achieve it lies in the dissolution of military blocs and the cessation of the arms race. Again, however, he forgets to mention that while conducting a loud propaganda campaign about disarmament Moscow refuses to agree to any form of international control on Soviet territory.

In his concluding article in Literaturnaya gazeta on July 15, 1970, Genri made only a passing reference to the "Popular Fronts"

formed in France and Spain before World War II. But it is important to remember the events of this period: in 1935 the French Communist Party received new directives from Stalin and ceased to oppose French rearmament in view of the growing Nazi threat. A Popular Front embracing socialists, communists, radical socialists, neo-socialists, trade unions, etc., was formed and in the election of April 1936, the socialists, radical socialists and communists adopted a common platform and won an absolute majority. Nonetheless, the communists refused to join the Popular Front government formed by the socialist Leon Blum in June 1936, since they wanted to retain the right to criticize the new government in the hope of increasing their support among the French people, because they knew Blum would have to introduce unpopular measures to straighten out the country's finances. They were also able to exploit the internal political difficulties caused by the Spanish civil war, which broke out in the summer of 1936. Blum's government feared that direct French intervention in support of the Spanish Republicans would lead to a European war, and he adopted a policy of non-intervention. Violent attacks on Blum by the French communists brought them increasing popularity among the French workers, and party membership, which was only 50,000 in 1934, rose to 350,000 by 1938 (see Julius Braunthal, "The History of the International", Vol. II, New York 1967, p. 438).

The Popular Front tactics had been dictated to the French Communists by Stalin, who needed an alliance with France to guard against the growing threat of German aggression, but after the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler had been signed in August 1939, Stalin no longer needed the Popular Fronts, and the French communists received instructions from Moscow to welcome the victories of Hitler's troops in Poland, France and other countries, up to the moment Germany attacked the Soviet Union itself on June 22, 1941.

The Popular Front in Spain was formed in January 1936 by socialists, left-wing Republicans and the Communist Party (which at the time could muster only some 10,000 members) and was also supported by the semi-Trotskyist POUM party. In the election of February 16, 1936, the Popular Front secured a clear majority: the socialists were the largest faction with 99 deputies and the communists were represented by 16 deputies. After General Franco's revolt in June 1936, Moscow began to

supply the Spanish republicans with munitions and military instructors. Gradually, the communists and their "advisers" - Soviet political police agents who established their own reign of terror in the Republican ranks - took over the key positions in the army, administration and police and began to conduct a civil war of their own in order to exterminate the Trotskyites, accused of being "fascist agents who, in the interests of Hitler and General Franco, are trying to smash the Popular Front" (see Resolution of the Comintern Presidium of December 28, 1936, Rundschau über Politik, Wirtschaft and Arbeiterbewegung, Moscow, June 7, 1937).

Tutored by the NKVD, the Spanish communist police organized their own prisons, secret courts and a network of secret agents which operated independently of the Spanish government. Having purged all the Spanish Republicans who wanted to conduct policy independent of Moscow, Stalin was free to decide the fate of Republican Spain, where the civil war now stood in the way of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Therefore, in 1939, he decided to discontinue aid to the Republican Government, and this inevitably led to Franco's victory. Stalin's machinations at this period have been described in detail by Jesús Hernandez, a former communist official of the Spanish National Front and one-time member of the Republican Government (see Jesús Hernandez, La grande trahison, Paris 1954, p. 103).

Genri, calling for the formation of "left-alliances" in his article "New Prospects", claims that foreign communist parties are answering Moscow's appeal, but he overlooks the disarray in the once monolithic communist movement. In the single phrase which he has to spare for the Chinese Communist Party - the world's largest - he remarks that "the Maoists in the Far East are not stirring from their schismatic positions" (Literaturnaya gazeta, July 1, 1970). In fact, the Maoists are not only active in the Far East: communist parties taking their lead from Peking exist in practically every country alongside parties owing allegiance to Moscow and are launching furious tirades against the "renegades of Marxism-Leninism", the "Red Tsars" and the "social imperialists". Genri hopes for a shift to the left in Britain and certain other countries, but fails to take into account Yugoslavia, Albania and Scandinavia, where communist parties condemned the occupation of Czechoslovakia and do not acknowledge

the authority of the CPSU. In the same way he appeals for the creation of "left alliances" but deliberately excludes the Chinese communists and other like-minded parties. Because Peking refused to negotiate a non-aggression pact with Moscow, the Soviet Government now has a welcome opportunity to stigmatize Mao Tse-tung and his supporters as "enemies of peace and democracy".

Another Soviet publication - Komunist Ukraini - has also called for united action by all revolutionary forces, but considers China a major stumbling bloc: "The malicious attacks of the schismatic-revisionists on the CPSU and other fraternal parties and on Marxism-Leninism and the discrediting of the ideas of socialism essentially constitute a new front in the ideological battle" (August 1970, p. 73).

Insofar as Literaturnaya gazeta is urging the formation of "left blocs" one might expect the first concern of the Soviets to be reconciliation with other communist parties. But Moscow apparently considers this aim to be beyond reach and therefore is appealing to public opinion in those countries where they hope to evoke a sympathetic response to their propaganda for peace, democracy and social progress. Since, however, Moscow describes the leaders of the socialist parties as "representatives of the bourgeoisie", this in itself should be sufficient warning that the CPSU, through the formation of left-wing alliances on the pattern of the 1930's, is seeking first to weaken and then destroy the social democrat parties in the non-communist countries in order to gain full control of the workers' movement.

The bitter experience of the Popular Fronts formed in France and Spain before World War II and of their equivalents in Central and East Europe after the war, which were transformed into communist run "people's democracies", remains as a warning against the overtures emanating from Moscow. Nonetheless, appeals for joint action by the forces of the left in the interests of peace, democracy and the general good of mankind have a tempting ring to idealistically-minded youth in the non-communist countries. Inexperienced in the dialectical ruses of the CPSU leaders and largely ignorant of the true situation in communist countries, where the "new class" of communist bureaucrats holds sway over the population, suppressing all signs of resistance, some young people might turn an attentive ear to Moscow's latest blandishments. This is one of the chief dangers of the appeals

for creation of popular fronts.

(Institute for the study of the USSR)

CHILEAN PRESIDENT CREATES YOUTH, PEASANT ACTION GROUPS

Summary: In a speech delivered on 21 December 1970, President Salvador Allende of Chile announced the creation of a General Secretariat of Youth and a National Peasant Council. The following report deals with the purpose and structure of these two "action groups" in the context of Allende's professed intention to put Chile in the road of a socialist society.

Salvador Allende Gossens, the Socialist president of Chile, announced shortly before Christmas the impending nationalization of the Chilean copper industry, and at the same time publicized the creation of two significant social and economic action groups: the General Secretariat of Youth and the National Peasant Council. The long-publicized intention to nationalize copper in Chile has received broad coverage in both Eastern and Western media, but it is, in fact, less characteristic of Allende's philosophy of government than are the two newly created action groups, which have largely been ignored by journalistic sources. The youth and peasant groups are unique in the continental Latin American context (though bearing some similarity to institutions created in the different social and economic context of Castro's Cuba), while the tendency to limit the role of private foreign or domestic capital in basic national industries has become a veritable sine qua non of "national leftist" governments in Latin America. The creation of the two action groups can be seen as an attempt to involve crucial segments of the population as directly as possible in the business of introducing socialism in Chile. Success in this undertaking would serve to limit the sort of bureaucratic *Entfremdung* which has become characteristic of the Eastern European and Soviet style of socialist rule.

Youth Secretariat

The General Secretariat of Youth is - because of its area of concern and its method of organization - the more controversial of the two newly created groups. In a speech delivered on 21 December in Santiago de Chile, President Allende made the following description of the role which Chile's youth is to play in the "popular government":

Youth could not be a spectator of this great economic and social transformation of Chile... We need, we demand and ask for the creative energy of youth. Its revolutionary loyalty will be placed fully at the service of Chile and its people. ... Chilean youth will go through the valleys, the countryside, the villages, the towns, carrying the message of redemption, the will, the popular government's creative and revolutionary decision... that (the) centennial weariness will be replaced with the energy of youth to make Chile a different country, a community of all Chileans, independent economically and sovereign politically.

According to Allende's own statistics, the youth in question amount to some 4,600,600 Chileans under 30, or about 60% of the entire population.

The executive decree by means of which the General Secretariat of Youth was created stipulates that it will be an "organization to cooperate with the government in the preparation of policies relative to the problems which concern the youth and their participation in said plans". The extent to which provision is made for youth to influence the government is seen in the second article of the decree which, Allende said, states that "the job of the Secretariat is to propose to the Executive concrete plans of organized youth participation" in various areas of social and governmental reform, including "dissemination of the Popular Unity program and the increasing of political participation by the Chilean masses". The secretariat may also "suggest to the government the legal and administrative measures it deems adequate for the accomplishment of its respective programs and plans".

The creation of a mechanism for direct participation by Chilean youth in the Popular Unity government is, to be sure, not without less idealistic reason. In early December, at the University of Concepción, the latest episode in the "fratricidal struggle" between forces of the Popular Unity coalition (in particular, the Communist Party of Chile) and the guerrilla-oriented "MIR" led to one death and a shock wave which rocked the month-old Popular Unity government in Santiago de Chile.* The leftist youth - as indeed the Left in all generations in Chile - is far from being the homogeneously integrated force which some observers would assume. President Allende apparently hopes, through the General Secretariat of Youth, to provide a more constructive outlet for the superficial tensions at least, to convert aloof criticism into concrete participation, to bring about a truce of sorts within the Leftist youth.

The organizational aspects of the new youth organization leave room for initial scepticism. It will be composed of six representatives appointed by the president on the basis of suggestions from the national leaders of the Popular Unity Youth Command. It will be attached to the President's office, thus setting it above legislative control. While the Popular Unity is a carefully patched together compromise among six political parties - and its representatives could, thus, be considered as coming from a pluralistically organized "party" - the Christian Democratic and nationalist forces in the country in fact represent more than 50% of the population, based on the presidential vote. While their exclusion from the Secretariat has a certain logic to it - one could hardly expect a political opponent of the Popular Unity to be charged with "dissemination of the Popular Unity program" - it remains to be seen if this will result in a direct or indirect lack of freedom for the Allende government's youthful opponents. Experience in other parts of the world do not give much cause for optimism, but the final judgement must be provided by the Chilean experience, whose context is vastly different from that in Europe, for example.

* See, for example, Malcolm Browne in the New York Times, 11 December 1970

National Peasant Council

Concurrently with the General Secretariat of Youth, a National Peasant Council was announced by President Allende. According to the decree, the national council will be "an entity that will make official the participation of the farmers in agrarian policies, its plans, program, budgets, production, agrarian reform, and prices and taxes related to agriculture", Allende said. It will also make "suggestions, proposals, and pronouncements to coordinate the government's action and the aspirations of the farmers". The basic aim of the council at its outset will be to see that the agrarian reform program which Allende intends to institute is understood - and accepted.

Here, too, the attempt to place in the peasants' hands a certain measure of responsibility for the government's actions, and success, has more behind it than idealism and loyalty to Chile's peasants as a class. The latifundium system of working the land which has dominated Chile's agriculture in modern times was already subjected to certain reforms during the Christian Democratic government of President Frei. The absence of the landlords has resulted in a low percentage of cultivation of arable land: Allende set the figure at 2.6 million hectares from a total of 6 million hectares of fully arable and 5 million hectares of partially arable land. Chile is, as result, an importer of meat, fats, wheat, butter and oil, foodstuffs of which Allende feels the agrarian reform could provide sufficient domestic production. There are, however, indications that the peasants have taken Allende's promise of land reform and redistribution all too literally, and reports have come out of Chile of bands of peasants storming and forcefully taking over the large estates. In compliance with his expressed intention to carry out reforms within the framework provided by Chile's law and democratic tradition, Allende has expressed disapproval of such actions, calling for a "respect for the law". The creation of a National Peasant Council is undoubtedly designed to serve this end. The Council will be organized on the national, provincial and community level. On the ultimate goal of this organization, Allende said:

We want it to be created by the democratic will of the community's peasants, in the provinces and

at the national level, and the day will come when the peasants, not only through the Chilean Trade Union Confederation, but directly, will have representation in all of the primary public services that are in any related with work in Chile's soil.

Conclusion

While the projection and the achievement of such aims are two distinctly different affairs, Allende is optimistic: "We are going to fulfill (this task), because you (i. e., the people of Chile) are going to be part of this task. . . . It will always be our goal to talk to the people, to ask the support of the people, to recognize our mistakes, and to learn from them. . . ". For reasons of geography and tradition, Chile is a society which cannot be compared successfully with any country in Europe, its European heritage notwithstanding. Therefore, the coining of a prognosis for success for Allende's programs in his country is a difficult - if not impossible - task, when viewed in European terms. What is clear is that the tasks which Chile's Marxist president has undertaken to accomplish will necessitate the support which he is asking of the people. The youth and peasant action groups are at once an appeal and a framework for such support.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

E C O N O M I C S

"COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION" TRAILING AT THE HALFWAY STAGE

by Valery M. Albert

Summary: The preoccupation of the Soviet news media with the final stages of the five-year economic plan has - probably intentionally - obscured the fact that 1970 also ends the first decade of the grandiose twenty-year program of communist construction announced in 1961. But Khrushchev's boast that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States as the world's foremost industrial power by 1970 has proved to be so wide of the mark that this official reticence is no cause for surprise.

The year 1970 has been politically and economically a significant year for the Soviet Union. It marked both the centenary of Lenin's birth, and the end of the country's eighth five-year plan, which was the first to be carried through under the present leadership team.

Because of the disappointing performance by industry and agriculture in 1969 and mediocre results in previous years, the success or failure of the five-year plan (and also of the government's policies) depended on the 1970 figures, and for this reason during the final weeks of this year the Soviet press, radio and television have been busily informing the nation of successes in the fulfilment of economic plans during 1970 and for the five-year plan as a whole. But neither the Party leaders nor the press have at any time during the past twelve months reminded the public that 1970 was a landmark in that it closed the first and decisive decade of the twenty-year program for the construction of a communist society in the Soviet Union, which envisaged considerable increases in industrial and agricultural production and a much higher standard of living for the population.

All this was laid down in the Party Program approved by the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in 1961, which is still the basic guide for the Party and government organs, and it seems odd that the Party propaganda media should ignore a date which was once

given such wide publicity. The answer appears to be that the present CPSU Program, particularly with regard to economic development, has proved to be unrealistic, so much so that no amount of juggling with statistics could possibly disguise the huge gap between promise and achievement.

In working out the present Party Program - officially known as the "Program for the Construction of a Communist Society" - for the first time in its history the CPSU committed itself to a specific time schedule, forecasting that by the end of 1980 "a communist society will be constructed in the main in the USSR" (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1961, p. 65). The three main tasks to be completed in the economic, ideological and socio-political fields over the twenty-year period were: creation of the material and technical basis of communism; the rearing of a new type of individual guided by a lofty sense of communist morality and purpose; and establishment of communist production relationships. The Program claimed:

In the next decade (1961-1970) the Soviet Union, creating the material and technical basis of communism, will surpass the United States, the richest and most powerful capitalist country, in per capita production; the material welfare and cultural and technical level of the workers will be significantly raised, and material sufficiency will be guaranteed for all. . . . in the main, the people's needs for well-planned accommodation will be satisfied; arduous physical labor will vanish, and the USSR will become the country with the shortest working day. (Ibid.)

In the years prior to the drafting and ratification of the 1961 Party Program and until quite recently, the Soviet leaders attached great importance to economic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, even maintaining that the very fate of mankind and the social and political future of the world hung on the outcome of the economic contest between the capitalist and the socialist systems, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States as the leading protagonists. It was, of course, the Kremlin which saw future developments in terms of economic competition and turned the race to over-

take America as the world's foremost industrial country into a favorite slogan of Party propaganda. But now that the promises made by Khrushchev in July 1961 have proved to be hollow and the demands of the Party Program Utopian, this slogan has been quietly dropped.

According to the last official Soviet figures (1969), the volume of production is about 70 percent of that of the United States. When it is remembered that the Soviet Union has about 40 million more people than the United States, output per head is only about 58-59 percent of that in America.

Agriculture is an important factor in the economy of every country, and in the Soviet Union exceptionally so. Yet in this sector of the economy, Soviet planners have made their gravest miscalculations and seriously disrupted the scheduled rise in the standard of living. The Party Program claimed that the United States would be overtaken in the output of basic agricultural products per capita by 1970, and to achieve this it was intended to "raise the overall volume of agricultural production by approximately two and a half times over ten years" (*ibid.*, p. 78). Grain production was to be more than doubled and livestock-breeding was to expand at a rapid pace. "With regard to cattle products, the output of meat will be approximately trebled over the first decade and milk production more than doubled over the same period" (*ibid.*). All these forecasts have proved to be unrealistic. If these targets had been fulfilled by 1970, as promised, public demand would have been satisfied with regard to quantity, quality and variety of food available. Over the ten-year period from 1961-1969 gross agricultural production rose by 28 percent (Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1968 (The Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, 1969, p. 316; *Izvestia*, January 25, 1970). Total output of grain increased from 125.5 million tons in 1960 to 160.5 million tons in 1969, and although the provisional figures indicate that the 1970 grain harvest is larger than that of the previous year, it is still below the targets set by the Party Program.

A threefold increase in meat production over the past ten years means that by 1970 output should have exceeded 26 million tons (8.7 million tons were produced in 1961). In 1968 and 1969, however, production stagnated at 11.6 million tons (Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1968, *op.cit.*, p. 399; *Izvestia*, January 25, 1970), and even if the planned increase of 4.3 percent for

1970 is achieved and meat production for this year reaches 12.1 million tons (Izvestia, December 17, 1969), it will still be only 46 percent of the target. Output of meat and dairy products is insufficient to cover the needs of the population, as has been admitted by the Soviet leaders and the press, and in particular by M. Suslov, Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, at a Moscow meeting last November 6 in honor of the fifty-third anniversary of the founding of the Soviet State. One of the reasons is that although the Party Program states that arduous physical work will have been eliminated by 1970, it is still very much present in Soviet agriculture and particularly in such labour-intensive branches as livestock-breeding. According to the latest data of the USSR Central Statistical Office, Soviet agriculture "employs 29 percent of all the country's labour reserves" (Literaturnaya gazeta, December 17, 1969, p. 10), which is far higher than in any non-communist developed country. In the United States, for example, "only 2.5 percent of the population produce twice the amount of food required to feed all the inhabitants of the country" (Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (World Economy and International Relations), No. 2, Moscow, 1968, p. 10).

Two other unredeemed promises made by the Soviet Party leaders and anchored in the Party Program are also likely to remind many Soviet citizens that 1970 marks the end of the first half of the twenty-year scheme to overtake the United States industrially. The first of these was the assurance of a shorter working week by the end of the initial ten-year period. With regard to the latter the Party Program stated:

In the course of the next ten years, the transition will be made to a six-hour working day with one free day a week or a 35-hour working week with two free days, and in the case of work underground or in unhealthy conditions to a five-hour working day or a 30-hour, five-day working week. (p. 95)

It was also claimed that after these measures had been introduced the Soviet Union would have the shortest and highest-paid working day in the world. But the working week has not been cut to 35 hours. According to official Soviet sources it is now 40.7 hours for industrial workers generally, and where work conditions

are harmful to health (such as in the coal industry) it is 37.6 hours (Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1968, op.cit., p. 557). It is true that Soviet industry and administrative organizations began to switch to a five-day week in 1967, but only conditional upon the strict preservation "of the existing duration of working time per week" (ibid.).

The increase in real incomes in the Soviet Union has remained well below the levels forecast in the Party Program, which promised that

... in the first decade the real incomes of all workers and employees (including social funds) will on average be almost doubled for each employed person, and the incomes of the lower-paid groups of workers and employees will rise approximately three times. Thus, by the end of the first decade there will no longer be any low-paid groups of workers and employees in the country. (p. 92)

In his report at the above-mentioned Moscow meeting of November 6, Suslov announced that the average monthly wage in 1970 "will amount to 122 rubles, or 164 rubles if payments from social funds are taken into account" (Pravda, November 7, 1970). In 1960 the basic average wage was 80.6 rubles, and 107.7 rubles after the addition of benefits from social funds (Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1968, op.cit., p. 555). Thus the real incomes in the Soviet Union have risen by some 51 percent over the past ten years, but have certainly not doubled or trebled. Also, there have been price increases over this period and the purchasing power of the ruble is somewhat lower. The consumer has to buy some essential foodstuffs, which are not available in state-run stores, on the private collective-farm market at inflated prices.

Other areas in which progress lags behind the aims of the Party Program at the halfway stage are the provision of adequate housing, the easing of the burden on married women who are forced to go out to work and run a home, the satisfaction of the demand for kindergartens and nurseries, longer holidays, and the provision of more cultural and social amenities.

A retrogressive trend was to be observed in the country's artistic and intellectual life, particularly from 1965 onwards. Since Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, the new "collective

leadership", sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, have pursued a course in some ways suggesting a re-Stalinization. Recent years have seen not only a degree of rehabilitation of Stalin, but have also brought the increasing application of quasi-Stalinist methods in the control of the country's intellectual life. Yet the Party Program explicitly condemned "practices incompatible with Leninist principles of Party life" which led to the violation of democracy and "fettered the ideological life of the Party and the creative activity of the workers" (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp. 137-138).

It was during 1970, the year of the Lenin centenary, that the Soviet leaders widely resorted to Stalinist practices, staging secret political trials, confining numerous dissident members of the scientific and artistic intelligentsia in special psychiatric institutions and sharply intensifying censorship over literature and art. None of this is now reflected in the Soviet news media, however, which are full of references to the forthcoming New Year celebrations; New Year is the most popular and widely-celebrated holiday in the Soviet Union, probably because it is the only public holiday without any sort of political associations. This does not deter the Soviet leaders from trying each year to turn it into an organized political demonstration. On December 31 the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers publish a special appeal to the nation which not only lists the economic and political achievements of the past year and sets forth the wishes of the Party and government for the coming year, but also calls upon the people to raise their glasses and toast the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the "beloved socialist Homeland". And in factories, offices and educational establishments mass celebrations are arranged by Party and trade union organizations at public expense.

Nonetheless, the vast majority of Soviet citizens prefer to celebrate New Year at home with their own family or among their close friends and acquaintances. Here there is no place for Party propaganda.

(Institute for the Study of the USSR)

ENVIRONMENT BECOMES AN ISSUE

Pollution is giving cause for concern in Russia to-day for unpredictable as well as predictable reasons. At the same time as the Americans were making the most of what proved to be a very fashionable debate on the subject at the beginning of this year, there were many very pointed articles in the Soviet Press on water and air pollution. These were unusual for their outspoken criticism of measures taken to date.

Outspoken

But (and this is the less predictable part of the argument) perhaps for once the papers were too outspoken. The number of articles suddenly decreased and the subject of pollution is now seldom mentioned. It was not only officialdom which disapproved of the airing being given to such an unpleasant topic, but also a section of the public, many of whom wrote to the papers asking that these articles be stopped as they were only filling the younger generation with pessimism.

Their letters suggested that as they themselves could do nothing about pollution, they would prefer not to know about it.

Water pollution holds a particular threat as there is already said to be a shortage of water. The Soviet geographer S. Vendrov wrote that as the territory of the Soviet Union forms 16 per cent of the world land mass but includes only 11 per cent of the fresh water of the world, on average the Soviet citizen has less than his fair share of water. Moreover, the distribution of this water is highly unfavourable, 88 per cent being located in the north and east where only a quarter of the population live and 12 per cent in the highly populated regions of European Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The picture, however, is not as black as it was made to appear in the Press. Pollution is a very localised problem in the Soviet Union and exists on the American level only in the industrial areas of Central Russia, the Urals and Central Asia. There are large tracts of this vast country where the problem does not exist at all. New industry is built away from town centres and residential areas and, as yet, the volume of traffic is not sufficient to make towns unpleasant for pedestrians.

The problem of water pollution is closely connected with

irrigation. With only 12 per cent of the fresh water in the highly populated areas of the country this water is highly prized and the reclamation of land for agriculture is not viable at the expense of important water sources. Fears were expressed recently at the possible extinction of the fishing grounds in the Azov Sea (off the Crimea), as a result of increasing salinity and pollution. The main culprit was found to be the Ministry of Land reclamation and Internal Waterways, which had been using two out of three of all the rivers flowing into the Azov Sea for irrigation.

Supervisory

At a time when ocean fishing is becoming less profitable, the loss of valuable home fishing grounds through pollution is also causing particular concern. Although plans have been made to safeguard these waters, in many cases they do not cover all sources of pollution or have not been fulfilled. All industrial plants on the Azov Sea have built some kind of purifying system since the end of the war but a further £ 1.4m. which was designated for the completion of these systems has not been spent. As Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote, by failing to use this money, a far, far greater sum has been lost.

The need for a central supervisory organ to combat pollution and to back up the individual measures that have been taken, was shown two years ago when an area of the Azov Sea was unexpectedly polluted by fertilisers blown off land in the Krasnodar region by dust storms and carried into the sea. A while later, as many as eight dead fish were found on every metre of the sea-shore for 500 kilometres near the mouth of the Kuban River.

Ineffective

The present system for checking against industrial pollutions seems very ineffective since in most cases, once found, the offending plants continue to pollute the air or water to the same extent as before. In theory, any industrial plant must have the approval of the sanitary Board that its purifying systems meet the required standards. Many cases have been cited in the papers though of plants working without this approval and little action seems to be taken against them.

The sanitary Board has the power to fine the directors con-

cerned and in extreme cases to close the plant. In effect, plants are very seldom closed and the fines are so small that many directors prefer to pay a fine than install purifying systems. The director of a metallurgical plant which had been seriously polluting the Ural River, an important water source which is also the dividing line between Europe and Asia, was fined less than £ 5.

Contrary to a statement by the Council of Ministers, directors usually pay fines not from their own pocket but with the funds of the plant, thereby merely transferring State money from one department to another. As their main concern is to keep production up to the required level, they often simply neglect to spend the money allotted for building purifying systems, claiming that it is not profitable and that there is a shortage of expertise. Out of approximately £ 8.5m. allotted for a five-year construction plan for purifying systems in Orenburg on the River Ural less than £ 250,000 had been spent after two years.

The work of the sanitary board is also not respected everywhere by the local authorities, many of whom seem more concerned with the expansion of industry than pollution. There has been a number of cases where a sanitary inspector who refused to give his approval to a certain plant was punished by the local authorities for acting arbitrarily. This anomalistic situation has been largely remedied in the Ukraine and Byelorussia where Republic organisations to oversee the use of natural resources have been set up. The Ukrainians have also made a step forward with the invention of a filter press for industrial sewage, licences for which have been sold to Japan and West Germany.

Air pollution in the Soviet Union exists at a dangerous level only in a number of relatively old industrial towns and is attracting much less attention than water pollution. As a rule, blocks of flats are heated by a central gas system and almost all new residential areas seem to be free of smoke.

Hysterical

From newspaper reports, however, it appears that although positive steps are being taken to avoid further air pollution, little is being done in towns where it already exists. The Soviet Medical Newspaper cited the example of the important Ukrainian industrial town of Zaporozhe. Many of the factories are situated

in the town centre and a lot of dust containing harmful particles is carried by the prevailing wind to the main residential area. The same is true in the Uzbek town of Chirchik where an electrical-chemical plant poisons the air with nitric acids and ammonia. Estonian newspapers have been printing a number of almost hysterical articles complaining that not only have no measures been taken to date, but nothing is planned for the next few years. According to one report, a plant sending large quantities of ammonia into the air was recently built with no purifiers even in the design, a glaring oversight which supports the demands being made for a powerful State body to oversee the preservation of nature.

(The Financial Times)

THE COUNCIL OF DIRECTORS -- A NEW MANAGERIAL DEVICE

Summary: The Soviet economic reform which led to the establishment of production associations (mergers of a number of similar small plants into one large entity) has now given rise to a new managerial body called the council of directors. In most cases the council of directors has only consultative powers, but in some firms and in certain questions it can be decisive. Its powers are not yet legally defined, but it is already a small step towards reducing the dangers of the usual system of one-man command. It seems also to be clearly an imitation of a Western-type board of directors.

The economic reform in the USSR has led to the introduction of a new type of managerial body, known as the council of directors. It is described at some length in a recent article from *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, (*) which explains that the gradual establishment of production associations (i.e., mergers between factories and enterprises engaged in the same industry) has encouraged the rise of this "new form of collective management of production".

(*) *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, 29 October 1970

The council of directors is certainly a logical step in the right direction, since previously Soviet factories were led on the principle of "one-man command" by the general director, who in the case of the production associations, will now have to yield at least some of his power to the council. The latter appears to function in almost precisely the same way as a board of directors in the West.

Its agenda is laid down two or three weeks before the meeting, according to *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, and copies of reports and draft decisions which are to be discussed are circulated to members not less than ten days in advance.

The council of directors can be used as an additional means of carrying out party policy in an enterprise, it seems, since one recent session of the council of directors of the *Melodiya* firm (which makes gramophone records) was concerned with discussion of the letter from the CC, CPSU, the Council of Ministers, USSR, the All Union Council of Trade Unions and the CC of the Komsomol, "On the Improvement of the Utilization of Production Reserves and the Intensification of the Policy of Thrift in the Economy". This letter was circulated early in 1970, apparently on the basis of Brezhnev's speech in December 1969.

In cases like the *Melodiya* example it is apparent that whenever the managing director of a production association is remiss in some aspect of the firm's work, the council of directors can be used by either the Party or government to jog his elbow.

As *Sovietskaya Rossiya* puts it:

The leaders of certain associations underestimate the significance of this democratic organ which has been brought about by the new conditions of planning and economic incentives; they still have not learned to respect its rights.

As yet, it is by no means clear what its rights are, because its legal status and charter have not yet been fully defined. One can well imagine the bitter infighting which will begin when the present managing directors of the larger production associations see the draft charter of the council of directors and attempt to preserve their present degree of freedom of action. But that is still in the future. As yet no draft charter exists, but there are some working regulations, one of which states that "all the recommendations of the council of directors are put into practice as orders of the

leader of the association".

Sovietskaya Rossiya objects to this rule on the grounds that, in cases where the leader has voted with the majority of directors on the council, no further order is necessary, and if it were issued it would only lower the authority of the council.

On a few major questions, such as ratification of the draft 5-year and annual plans, the establishment of norms for the factory incentive fund, and the naming of "victors in socialist competition", decisions made by a quorum of directors have the force of an obligation on the leader, not merely a recommendation for action.

In most areas at present the council of directors is only a consultative organ (except for the major questions outlined above). But the Melodiya firm is one example of an association in which the council of directors takes compulsory decisions on a broad range of problems. The future Charter will eventually have to lay down some guidelines on this point, and also on the composition of the council.

Some councils at present include not only the general director, the leaders of enterprises and subsidiaries, and the deputies of the general director, but also secretaries of party organizations, the chief accountant, the chief engineers and technologists, as well as the chief legal advisor. The result is that they must be fairly unwieldy bodies, some of which meet once a month, but some at present are only convened once in six months.

Sovietskaya Rossiya accepts the fact that procedures must vary from case to case, depending on the size and structure of the production association concerned, but it argues that the present considerable variations in the work of the council of directors in similar production associations should be at least reduced, if not eliminated altogether.

The primary advantage of the council of directors, in the Soviet paper's eyes, is that it combines "one-man management with board management". To this extent, it must reduce the danger of arbitrary management, although at the cost of considerable complication of the management structure, and presumably some degree of delay in decision-making. The council of directors also seems to have one other clear disadvantage, in that one of the original purposes of establishing the production associations was to save money by streamlining management, reducing the number of directors needed by the association and eliminating the ill-

trained and sometimes poorly educated managers of the small plants from which it was formed.

The establishment of the council of directors may tend to run counter to this original purpose in that it provides an alternative function for some of the lower-grade managers who might otherwise have been eliminated, and therefore it may prove to be an expensive device in terms of salaries and overheads. Nevertheless, it is a step towards a limited degree of decentralization of the decision-making process in the production association and should probably be regarded as a step forward for that reason. The fact that it appears to be modelled so closely on a Western-type board of directors is surely no mere coincidence, but just another example of convergence in action.

(Radio Free Europe Research)

HUNGARY'S MANAGERS TOLD TO IMPROVE

Greater managerial efficiency is being demanded in Hungary, where managers are expected to have a sense of political responsibility as well as professional skills.

Deploping the loss in productivity caused by indiscipline, the party newspaper, Népszabadság, said on December 16, 1970, that more resolute leadership and greater severity were needed in factories. Managers must stop labour fluctuation by a more rational use of manpower. To reach the target of 5.5 to 6 per cent increase in the national income, Népszabadság said on December 6, new methods of work and more efficient management were needed. A determined switch from extensive to intensive management demanded that managers should abandon obsolete methods:

"The period when management aimed primarily for security, which is petty, short-sighted and inefficient, is over. Foresight, work, willingness to take risks, responsibility and understanding are wanted".

Neither the outlook and methods of many managers nor the system of management had developed according to the requirements of the economic reform. Despite decentralisation, managers did not share responsibility with heads of departments and workshops.

Most enterprise managers were now concentrating on preparing the new Five-Year Plan, and this was a good opportunity to show their foresight, initiative and efficiency. Their reward for success in increasing the national income would be higher income for themselves and their staffs and faster economic and technological development.

In his address to the Tenth Party Congress, (Népszabadság, November 25) Prime Minister Jeno Fock emphasised that better management was essential. In the more developed industrial countries productivity was still about twice as high as in Hungary, Fock said. Only a third of this discrepancy could be attributed to the difference in technical equipment. Thus the lag was mainly due to the relatively backward methods of enterprise management and administration:

"The way of thinking and outlook of many thousands of managers cannot develop at the same rate as economic conditions. Patience is evidently necessary. Nevertheless it must be continuously emphasised that economic conditions cannot become rigid and that the rate of change is fairly fast the world over. This demands a capacity for quick adaptation from economic managers....."

At a party conference in one of Budapest's largest factories, the Csepel Iron and Metal Works, before the party congress, it was decided to establish within the factory a "scientific centre of direction" which would examine the "professional knowledge, political reliability and ability in the management of affairs" of the persons concerned. Candidates for new leading posts would have to pass tests. Improved managerial work was essential since:

"there are production fields where the complexity of the situation is beyond the comprehension of some managers. These men find themselves helpless and incapable of deciding which new methods of solving their problems they should choose...."

Hungarian factory and collective farm managers evidently will not find it easy to satisfy the requirements laid down in the party congress guidelines:

"They (the managers) should improve their management expertise, make more courageous use of their authority, and keep up with developments. They should learn to think in long-range terms, to equip themselves with adequate international experience, and to educate themselves".

TOKYO AND PEKING - BUSINESS AND POLITICS

by Bora Mirkovic

Will Japan be the last of the big allies of America to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China? The question is a pertinent one, as Italy and Canada have already established relations, and a number of other countries have announced their intention of doing so (Belgium, Austria, etc.). Of the total number of 15 NATO countries, 7 already maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, during the recent balloting in the United Nations on the question of representation for China and expulsion of the Taiwan regime, a majority of member-countries of the world organization voted to seat the PR of China. Against this background, one might well ask what Tokyo's intentions along these lines are?

Whether relations between China and Japan are good or bad is something that reflects importantly not only on Asian relations, but on the broader context of world affairs. In Asia, the nature of these relations affects a number of important spheres- diplomatic-political, economic and military-strategic.

Changed Relationship

The new phase in Sino-Japanese relations began right after the termination of World War II in that part of the world. Having signed an unconditional capitulation in August 1945, Japan was forced to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in Asia, most of which had been grabbed from China.

China's successful revolution and inauguration of social transformation also gave it a new role in international affairs where its presence was strongly felt.

Somewhat later, Japan entered into a relationship of alliance with the United States of America, a fact which had a bearing on the Japanese attitude toward Peking. One would be hard put to it to find

many similar examples in post-war diplomatic practice of a treaty between two countries determining the relationship of one of them with a third party, to the extent that Japan's attitude toward China was based on its obligation to the USA. Namely, Japanese Premier Yoshida, immediately before ratification of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951, wrote a letter to the head of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, John Foster Dulles, promising that Japan would not sign a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China.

By signing a treaty with the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan in 1952, in spite of the fact that a legitimate government already existed in Peking, Japan considered it had solved the problem of terminating the state of war between the two countries.

China's reply was logical: "China will never acknowledge this treaty and reserves the right to compensation".

For many long years, Japan took the view that only one China existed, the legitimate representative of which was the regime on Taiwan. This attitude was largely responsible for its becoming the most important economic partner of the island regime. (1)

In Japan's otherwise rather limited investment ventures abroad, Taiwan with 60 million dollars of Japanese resources is among the top countries in this respect.

On the whole, during the past two decades Japan has had an exceptionally significant place in the chain of relationships the USA has developed in Asia in order to "tame China".

Political Watershed

The problem of Sino-Japanese relations is one of the most relevant themes in Japan's internal political life, a point of polarization in the many currents of Japanese politics. All political parties have a precisely defined position on the issue of Sino-Japanese relations.

The Socialist Party of Japan was the first to establish political contacts with the Chinese in 1957, when a delegation headed by the then President of the Socialist Party Asanuma visited Peking where he signed a joint communiqué that for long represented the basis

(1) In 1968, Japanese exports to Taiwan amounted to 606 million dollars and imports to 180 million dollars. Economic Statistics Annual 1969. The Bank of Japan, p. 235

for its policy toward China. Over many years, this Party remained consistent in its attitude towards China. In the autumn of 1970, the Party sent a high ranking delegation on tour to a number of socialist countries, culminating in November this year with a trip to Peking. The joint communiqué signed on the occasion subtly defines the position of the Japanese Socialists. Normalization of relations between the two countries is considered to be obstructed by a series of factors: American imperialism, the revival of Japanese militarism, the American-Japanese Peace Treaty, and the treaty between Japan and Taiwan. All four points are largely acceptable to all factions of this otherwise heterogeneous party.

The Komeite Party, which emerged from the religious sect of Soka Gakkai and today represents the second strongest opposition party, (2) defines its position toward Sino-Japanese relations in the following way: normalization of relations should unfold through various forms of contacts between the two countries which should in the final analysis result in the establishment of diplomatic relations. This gradual improvement in the climate of mutual relations should be implemented during the first phase through exchanges of student groups; cooperation in education, culture, information; and all other forms of contact designed to create confidence along a wide front. This Party gave expression to its political attitude at the Annual Conference held in the autumn of 1970 when it pinpointed normalization of Sino-Japanese relations as the principal foreign policy task.

At almost the same time, the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan organized a gathering devoted exclusively to consideration of Sino-Japanese relations, in autumn this year. It was observed on this occasion that the Japanese Government's policy toward China was based on fictions and lack of respect for realities. The Party also took a critical view of the Socialist Party's positions, considering that the latter unnecessarily posed a number of Japanese internal policy questions, on which opposition parties do not agree, in connection with its commitment to establishment of diplomatic relations with China. "The action to establish diplomatic relations with the

(2) The ratio of forces is as follows in the lower house of the Japanese Parliament: Liberal-Democratic Party 288 seats; Socialist Party 90; Komeite 47; Democratic-Socialist 31; Communist Party of Japan 14; independents 16

People's Republic of China must be based only on elements that have a bearing on the subject. In deciding in favour of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, Japan must remain loyal to its Western allies" - this in main outline is the position of the Japanese Social Democrats.

During the last decade, the Communist Party of Japan has passed through a number of phases in terms of its relationship with the People's Republic of China, and the latter's Communist Party. Up to 1967, relations were extremely close. A large part of the trade between the two countries was conducted by "friendly firms" on good terms with the Communist Party of Japan. During the initial stage of the dispute between China and the Soviet Union, the Party stood up staunchly for China. However, in 1967, it changed its attitude toward China and assumed a neutral position on the Sino-Soviet controversy. Only two years later at the general elections, it felt the positive repercussions of its independent attitude, receiving 14 votes as against its previous five and thus recording the most significant progress among the left wing groups. The Communist Party of China describes the Japanese Party as "one of the obstacles" to Sino-Japanese co-operation. In spite of ideological disagreement and tension, the Communist Party of Japan supports the establishment of relations between the two countries.

In view of its having several factions, the Liberal Democratic Party is not a homogeneous organization. One of the issues over which there has been a parting of ways is the attitude towards China, although today an increasing number of voices is being raised for recognition of China.

This fall, the Socialist, Democratic Socialist, and Komeite parties founded a committee for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PR of China, as a joint effort in their struggle against the government.

However, election results indicate that the opposition is no longer as powerful a factor as it had been during the past two decades. As the opposition is the principal vehicle of the policy geared toward normalizing relations with China, the pressure it brings to bear in this direction cannot be overly effective.

Business as usual

Although there are no diplomatic relations between the two

countries, trading is rather vigorous. The total value of trade in both directions has totalled over 600 million dollars for several years. Japan is the most important trading partner of China. (3) Trade between China and Japan is conducted along two lines: "semi-official" exchange determined by annual memoranda of the two countries' governments, and via "friendly firms". The "memoranda" trade accounts for about one-third of the commodities exchanged, and the "friendly firms" for the remaining two-thirds. The last few years have brought a steady decline in the unofficial portion of trade.

In April 1970, when a delegation of Japanese businessmen visited Peking, the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai stated that China would not trade with firms which extend help to or invest in Taiwan and South Korea; which supply arms for Vietnam of Southeast Asia, or which maintain close business ties with American firms.

In spite of the severity of these restrictions, the most interested Japanese firms have not wavered in their intention to assure their presence on the Chinese market, over the long term. One of the leading Japanese steel producers, the "Japanese Steel Corporation" declared after hearing this statement that it was ready to meet the terms laid down by the Chinese Government. The information that this Corporation exports over a million tons of steel to China annually speaks for itself.

In the first half of 1970, trade achieved the figure of 370 million dollars in both directions, offering some basis for the belief that 1970 might well be a record year in trade between the two countries.

There has been some exaggeration in appraising the pressure of Japanese big business circles for normalization of relations with China. Certainly, with their well-known sense of organization and pragmatism, the Japanese have not failed to apply their business acumen to this sphere, too. Those business circles who directly or indirectly maintain ties with China have been the most clamorous in their demands for normalization. The other

(3) Exports 390 million dollars, imports 234 million. Source: Economic Statistics Annual 1969, The Bank of Japan, p.235

section, and by far the larger one, is oriented towards intensive relations with the USA (33% of exports go to the USA) and is therefore not very active along these lines. However, after Canada established relations with China, there were not a few people in Japan who considered this as representing an indirect American business overture to the most populous country on earth - "we should not like to see the Americans and Chinese shaking hands over our heads because of our loyalty and short-sightedness".

China bases its economic relations with foreign countries on a strict equilibrium in the general balance of trade, or on cash purchases. Its economic orientation also stresses reliance on its own forces and on savings. All these elements are objectively limiting factors on a wider economic opening toward the world today.

This essentially limiting factor is certainly one of the reasons why the warning of the Japanese Association for International Trade to the effect that countries enjoying diplomatic relations with Peking would gain an economic advantage that even Japan, as the nearest neighbour, could not hope to match, did not call forth any important reaction from business and government circles.

What next ?

For almost two decades, the Japanese Government has kept to the view that where China is concerned economic relations must be sifted out from political. To what extent can this formula be applied today?

The process of relaxation, although extremely uneven and tending to considerable oscillations, is one of the features of international relations at present. In Europe, acknowledgement of the present boundaries and elimination of remnants of World War II are among the foundations of this process. The importance of the Federal German Republic's action along these lines, in view of its being one of the legal successors of the Third Reich, is of overwhelming importance as it should not only annul the grave legacy of the past but also, by stabilizing the present position, help map out future relations and create trust.

Similarly, Japan, as the vehicle of Axis policies in Asia in

the past, has certain obligations as its historical heritage which cannot be ignored.

A few elements have recently indicated some not very significant changes in Japan's attitude toward the complex problem of its relations with China.

"Japan is inclined to consider as inadequate continued adherence to the formula that the question of China's legitimate rights in the UN is an 'important issue' " was the oblique comment made by the Japanese Foreign Minister after the voting in the UN when China received a majority for the first time. (4)

Instead of referring to "one China" - meaning the one on Taiwan, Japan today supports the view that there are "two Chinas". This signifies some progress but not enough to warrant any substantive talks with Peking. (5)

Relations between Tokyo and Peking depend on an intricate tangle of historical, political, strategic and other circumstances and cannot therefore be reduced to the question of formal establishment of diplomatic relations. Improvement in the climate is the first step - one of those elements that it is most difficult to define - but which represents the grounds for more stable relations.

Obviously, two sets of factors influence Sino-Japanese relations: external and internal. For the present, on the internal political plane, the mechanism for the establishment of relations with China can draw energy from some of the existing reservoirs of Japan's political or economic power.

Regarded from this angle, the opposition is not now strong and efficacious enough for us to anticipate any powerful impetus from that quarter.

Having associated itself closely with the Americans, big business is doing well and in its present vertiginous development can hardly be expected to replace the present trend by the uncertainty of possible but not sure prospects. On the other hand,

(4) Mainichi Daily News, December 4, 1970

(5) When Canada and Italy established relations with the PR of China, the same formula was used in the communiqués: "The Chinese Government confirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PR of China, and the Canadian (Italian) side takes cognizance of this position of the Chinese Government and recognizes the Government of the PR of China as the sole lawful Chinese Government".

business is guiding a lesser part of its potential - in the amount that can now and in the near future satisfy the requirement of limited consumption - toward Peking.

As regards foreign policy, the determining factor is the USA and all the relationships binding Japan to that country. There is for the present no reason to believe that any essential change in the attitude toward China is in the offing.

With all this in mind, it is not anticipated that Japanese foreign policy, extremely pragmatic in essence, will take any sudden steps in the near future, particularly not along these lines.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EEC

by Michael Simmons

There is certain, but not irreconcilable ambivalence in the attitude of the Russians and the East Europeans towards the Common Market and the current Western moves for greater economic and political integration. On the one hand, the EEC is consistently denounced as "a closed economic grouping" of no positive use to those countries now seeking to join it; on the other hand, there seems to be an unstoppable willingness on the part of the East to have unprecedentedly large commercial deals with individual members - and would-be members - of the Community, as well as a constantly reiterated wish to get down to brass tacks diplomatically and politically at a European security conference table.

Ever since its inception, the Common Market has been grist for the Soviet propagandists' mill. At the beginning, when the Rome Treaty was signed in early 1957, they dismissed the new body as one likely to be subjugated to the aims of NATO and unlikely to have much appreciable impact on the world. The broadsides have been kept up, off and on, for 13 years.

The reason for such continued sensitivity does not take much finding. It is in a sense two-pronged. One is that the eastern bloc has not, economically, really been a bloc at all and that Comecon, until very recently anyway, offered little that remotely approached the cohesiveness of the Six; and the other is the desire not to be left behind. Qualified officials in eastern Europe

admit to the existence of the technological gap between East and West in certain key sectors; their concern now is that this gap should not grow too wide.

The ideological purists, of course, have their own reservations. If the EEC in any way falls short of its objectives it is they who will applaud most happily. Make no mistake, said a senior member of the Soviet Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System some months ago, this "great capitalist monolith" is of course directed against Comecon.

Only now, when Britain and other countries are endeavouring to make this "monolith" of the Community even bigger (and more threatening?), is the East European grouping of Comecon showing some real signs of getting into gear. There has been more talk, from Moscow and elsewhere, in the past year or so, of integration than during any other time since the group was formed - a year after the Common Market.

Common purpose

Though the member countries have developed from vastly differing bases at very different rates, a common sense of purpose on matters of integration - born in part of a common concern at the development of the Common Market - is emerging. Mr. Mikhail Suslov, of the Soviet Politburo, told the Kremlin recently that Comecon's integration programme "was beginning to be implemented".

Hungarians, closer in more than one sense to the Common Market, put things differently. Mr. Reszo Nyers, one of his country's leading economists, told the Hungarian Party congress recently that he expected in due course, to see "two enduring European integrations" - the EEC and Comecon. He talked about the feasibility of widening the appeal of Comecon, but stressed that there were "some very important matters still on the list of those not yet properly clarified".

More importantly he referred - though not in very satisfied tones - to negotiations currently being conducted by Hungarian agricultural producers with the authorities in Brussels to achieve more sales in EEC countries. Most eastern European countries have been watching the progress of the agreement signed last March between Yugoslavia and the Six to facilitate

the flow of Yugoslav meat into the EEC - but this is the first time, to my knowledge, that one of them has publicly admitted that some action is also being taken.

West European quota systems, whether in the Common Market or out of it, are a constant source of irritation to would-be East European exporters. They claim they are unfairly discriminated against - though they are less willing to concede that their own State-decided selectivity in trading is also, effectively, discriminatory.

If one is talking in terms of intra-bloc rivalries - and, consciously or unconsciously, they do this in the East somewhat more overtly than they do in the West - then Eastern Europe is ahead in one important field - that of political integration. The proletarian solidarity argument, advanced with particular vigour after the tanks went into Czechoslovakia in 1968, takes care of this.

All East European countries seem to be substantially agreed on what should be the agenda for a European security conference - though one must question to what extent there would be harmony within the bloc if and when there was a hint of West-East accord on the minutiae of such an agenda. Balanced force reductions, urged by the West, will have a different appeal to, for instance, the Czechs than they will to the Russians themselves.

Another Eastern bloc proposal - which, if it is ever discussed, will have some bearing on the EEC-Comecon co-existence theory of Mr. Nyers - is that the conference agenda should also include "the widening of commercial, economic and technical-scientific relations with a view to the development of political co-operation based on parity between the European states". This, of course, puts a new complexion on the Moscow adage that politics is politics, trade is trade, and ne'er the twain shall meet.

Meanwhile, against this campaigning for the conference - taken, so the Soviet Press is arguing, several stages further by the recent tour of the West by Mr. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister - there are the tactical attempts by the Russians to interest seemingly as many Western countries as possible in huge business deals in the Soviet Union. These began a few years ago with the gigantic contract won by Fiat to build a car plant on the River Volga and, after a two- or three-year

break, have regained momentum in the past 12 months with the huge steel pipes for natural gas contracts placed with Italy, West Germany and, soon France.

Increasing use is being made by the Russians of Western technology, plant and equipment to boost their own economy in such newly developing sectors as petrochemicals. There is also as assiduous wooing of selected Western European countries to become "partners" in exploiting untapped mineral resources in Siberia and the frozen north, to say nothing of the efforts to get a Western consortium together for the production of heavy duty lorries.

Colossal sums

All such deals add up to colossal sums of money, as well as very substantial economic interests, being committed to helping Soviet development programmes. But they also mean that in some economically very significant places in western Europe questions are being asked or will be asked as to whether one's first allegiance is to the EEC or to assisting the growth of a system whose masters are avowedly anti-EEC.

However, the fact that such questions are being asked is evidence of the drawing power that these banks, or companies or whatever have for the Russians and their allies. Taken in conjunction with the present and potential cohesiveness of western Europe, one can only assume that the East will go on seeking the concessions that, economically and politically, it so much wants. And so long as it goes on seeking these concessions - and making propagandist criticisms of the "closed economic grouping" - one can assume that the West, if and when we get to the multi-lateral conference table will in at least some sectors be negotiating from strength.

(The Financial Times)

CULTURE

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

by Milija Komatina

Why raise this question in regard to relations between the Party and the intelligentsia? Is there really a "conflict" between them? If there is, is it intrinsic in their natures or do we only have occasional conflicts in practice between parts of the intelligentsia and a section of the Party, because of concrete leaderships, programmes and relationships?

Unity of theory and practice

In view of the unity of theory and practice, which is one of the main tenets of Marxism, it may be more appropriate to talk of an interdependence between the Party and intelligentsia. Antonio Gramsci described the vanguard of the working class as a "collective intellectual". A clash with the intelligentsia as such is not immanent to an organized "collective intellectual". The intelligentsia is in a permanent conflict with the ruling class and the organized forces of this class whenever its social status depends on that class, whenever its status is that of hired labour, as is the case in capitalism. The working class, just as its vanguard, is not out to subject any social stratum, because the path to freedom is at the same time the path of overcoming all hired labour relationships. The proletariat would not be able to cover the road from the class by itself to the class for itself without science, i. e. without the intelligentsia's progressive role. It is then obvious that a class, whose true mission is to create a new world on the "wobbling wheels of the world" cannot possibly be interested in negating the intelligentsia; on the contrary, it is rather in its interest to rely on its creative potentials and actions.

Just as it has frequently failed to become what is actually inherent in its being - a part of the class, because of being subjected to the inertia of insularity (bureaucratization) which is peculiar to virtually any organization, so the Party has not always been entirely free of scepticism and distrust as regards

the intelligentsia. A suspicion of the intelligentsia, as an "unstable", "vacillating" social stratum, being socially often placed close to the bourgeoisie, at times became almost a general attitude.

Nor is a clash with the communist movement intrinsic to the intelligentsia. Although, socially speaking, the intelligentsia is not identical with the working class movement, its spiritual orientation, its compulsion to create, which also implies breaking up, in order to do away with the existing state of affairs, are close to the revolutionary movement. Someone said that the communist movement was some kind of a mandatory of history, because it designs the goals and roads which mankind must take in order to survive, develop and humanize itself. The intelligentsia also has the spiritual mission of participating in the designing of history; in fact its job is to uncover the laws of social evolution.

This creativeness engenders the need for the intelligentsia to relate its ideas to living society. There are few theories which are an end unto themselves (if they indeed are, it is due to their creative impotence rather than to design) and there are few theoreticians who are not tempted to apply their theories to actual life. How can the intelligentsia exercise a progressive influence? The intelligentsia in itself is no movement, nor is it homogeneous as a social stratum, although in very general terms it is a social entity and it certainly has an interest of its own which, again only in very general terms, may be distinct from that of another social stratum. Since it is not a movement it can consummate its "intellectual", spiritual essence, its compulsion to produce ideas, ennoble life and change the world, only by attaching itself to social movements and their forces. Certainly, the intellectuals will attach themselves to any movement which corresponds to their own ideas, just as social movements and social forces will accept those ideas of the intellectuals which best meet their interests. This implies that the intelligentsia by definition does not necessarily have to adhere to the communist movement only, or that by definition it must necessarily be progressive. The history of all the movements is at the same time the history of the development and ideological affiliation of the intelligentsia, which means that within the intelligentsia there is a great deal of disparity.

However, two of the intelligentsia's basic characteristics, a) to create, and b) with its creativeness to wield a revolutionary influence on life and social relationships, bring it close to, and even link it with the revolutionary movement of the working class.

Organizing of practice and organizing of theory

When we in Yugoslavia refer to the relationship between the Party and the intelligentsia, we stress that there is no conflict as such, that it is not immanent to either the Party or to the intelligentsia. We emphasize that any confrontation between the Party and intellectuals or - as it is more frequently stated - between the ruling policy and intellectuals - is "artificial". However, the very fact that such a distinction exists, or that it is represented as an actual situation, suggests that there is obviously a need on someone's part to insist on the hostility of interests and positions; some problems certainly do exist there. What is it in fact that does bring about confrontations, or at least misunderstandings?

We have said that the unity of revolutionary practice and revolutionary theory is the platform on which rests the unity of organized revolutionary practice (the Party) and the creators of the theory (intellectuals). However, it is the practice of establishing the unity of theory and practice, or to put it in another way, the practice of fulfilling the aspirations of the intellectuals to create and communicate their ideas, as well as those of the vanguard of the working class to guide the creation of the theory, that gives rise to real conflicts and confrontations. It is not fair, however, to draw general conclusions from the concrete actions by either the Party or the intelligentsia. We are all the time referring to concrete relationships, where it is difficult to make a generalized and generally applicable judgement either on the communist organization or on the intelligentsia.

In order to be efficient, revolutionary practice must be organized. Communist organization is the force which guides this practice. To be able to give its ideas the force of a movement, the intelligentsia must join a revolutionary movement. However, having thus "merged", the Party and the intelligentsia have not resolved their mutual relationships. Problems appear

at the level of individuals and the organization. This problem arises from the somewhat objective contradiction between the need of the intellectuals to be as independent as possible and have a full freedom of creation, and the fact that each organization has its own rules of conduct and demands the observation of these rules, which in itself is a kind of restriction.

Having established the goals and direction of action, the Party as an organized force helps its members to develop and make a proper use of their creative powers. If the basis of the communist movement is to uncover social laws of society's development, and if this movement is guided by the principle that the world must be not only explained but also changed, it is then a sufficiently broad basis for a creative intellectual whose spiritual forces and whose life options have made him search into the possibilities of humanizing society and man, of altering the existing relationships and seeking new and more humane ones.

Whilst dealing with the problem of the relationship between the intelligentsia and the communist movement, we must draw a certain distinction between the communist movement and the communist organization. The communist organization, as an institutional organism, restricts in a certain way the communist movement. Although it exists for the sake of developing and enlarging the communist movement, of rallying new social forces, the communist organization may sometimes produce the reverse effects, it may even dogmatize the movement and behaviour within it. In emphasizing this point we have in mind a concrete historical experience, the institutional insularity of the communist organizations, their bureaucratization. In such cases, the creative freedom of intellectuals had little elbow room, intellectuals were subordinated to party leaderships, which virtually meant restriction and even obstruction of their creative work.

It is difficult to resist the need to organize the theory in a certain sense, as must necessarily be the case with the revolutionary practice. It is also difficult to imagine a situation in which the "organizing of theory" does not carry with it a levelling and constriction of creative thought.

There can be no practice without theory, but taking theory as its guide, deliberately choosing to use it, practice - always embodied in those who carry it out - reserves itself the right to

make use of only those theoretical results which suit its purposes, it claims the right to be selective. If the promotor of practice is at the same time a pragmatist, which is so frequently the case, it is not difficult to imagine what would then be the situation of the creators. There is no doubt that disputes arising from such situations are not imaginary but are a sequel to something which genuinely exists in real social practice.

Science - its own judge

In Yugoslav society this problem of selection most frequently arises with the question - which holds ascendance, theory over policy or vice-versa? The League of Communists of Yugoslavia has resolved this problem by stating in its own programme that science is its own judge. This has defined, within our own time and in our movement, what should be the relationship between theory and practice, which mainly means between the Party and the intelligentsia. However, sometimes even good policies are taken as an excuse for bad practices. In some intellectual circles this is also understood to mean that no "outsider" is entitled to make pronouncements about the products of mind. When the "independence" of intellectual work is thus conceived, it logically follows that "practitioners" should follow the wisdom coming to them from the intelligentsia, now regarded as a special academic stratum. Here the conflict is inevitable. In fact, it boils down to a struggle for ideological and other social positions. In our movement this conflict manifests itself in different forms, with unequal intensity, kindled now by the one and now by the other side.

Another variant of this conflict on the "independent status of intellectuals" was the dichotomy of the so-called aesthetical and ideological criteria, wherein critics manipulated as they saw fit, now with one and now with the other criterion. To such critiques, a work of art is dual - ideologists should judge its ideological values, and artists its artistic values. This obviously left critics in a partial, pragmatic framework, and all that was achieved was to emphasize the dichotomy of politics and ideology on the one hand, and arts, culture, and the intelligentsia on the other.

These circumstances brought about certain confrontations or

at least have created an impression of antagonism between the Party, and the intelligentsia, or between the ruling policy and the intelligentsia.

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade)

SOVIET-FRENCH CO-OPERATION IN MOON EXPERIMENT

Highly accurate measurements being carried out

The arrival of Lunokhod I on the Moon is an important event in the history of Soviet-French co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space. It marks the beginning of direct joint experiments in space.

The Moon vehicle has a French-made reflector for laser location of the Moon. This reflector, which was made by the Sud Aviation concern on behalf of France's National Space Research Centre, has good optical properties.

With the help of this reflector and laser units on the Earth, it should be possible to measure the distance between the two given points on the Earth and the Moon and to obtain a result accurate to within a few yards, and also to measure the Moon's orbit, to determine the shape of the Moon and to carry out geodetic research.

Academician Nikolai Basov, a leading Soviet physicist and Nobel Prize winner, says that by using these techniques the margin of error may be reduced to 10 or 20 centimetres in the not very distant future.

The reflector, he says, has 14 tetrahedral prisms and since it is being subjected to a great range of temperatures and the necessary precision of its prisms must nevertheless be retained, it is clear that its makers faced a complex problem of engineering and physics.

Soviet specialists looked after the mounting of the reflector, its protection from dust and its orientation in the direction of the Earth.

The sets of ground laser-locating equipment have been developed both in the Soviet Union and in France. They are mounted on telescopes in the Pyrenees and in the Crimea.

Co-operation between France and the USSR in the exploration and use of outer space is developing on the basis of an inter-

governmental agreement signed in 1966, when General de Gaulle was visiting Moscow. On the Soviet side the work in this field is being co-ordinated by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Inter-cosmos Council and on the French side by the National Space Research Centre.

Vladlen Vereshchetin, vice-chairman of the Intercosmos Council, recently told a Tass correspondent that the Soviet Union and France had started joint experiments in which French scientific equipment would be launched on Soviet spacecraft during the coming years. For instance, the preparation of French equipment was being completed for the "Stereo Project" aimed at studying the radio emission of the Sun.

The "Calypso" experiments, which will study low energy particles and neutrons, are being successfully prepared, as are the "Snow" experiments, which will study gamma rays of solar origin.

Plans have been made for a Soviet booster rocket to put a small satellite into orbit next year in order to check the efficiency of plastic film for solar batteries when subjected to ultra-violet and cosmic rays. Under the "Arcade Project" Soviet and French experts are working on satellite equipment for the study of electron and proton beams in the regions of the Northern Lights.

New experiments are planned in space communications and meteorology.

On Kerguelen Island, in the southern part of the Indian Ocean, and in the Archangel region in the north of the USSR, which are linked by the same lines of force of the Earth's magnetic field, joint experiments have been going since 1968. In this connection a large group of specialists have taken part in launching from Soviet territory high-altitude balloons with scientific equipment which have risen to altitudes of up to 25 miles. The information about processes of the Earth's magnetosphere which has been obtained as a result of these experiments is being jointly processed and published.

For some years, Soviet meteorological rockets carrying French and Soviet scientific equipment have been systematically launched from Hayes Island, in Franz Josef Land. These rockets carry equipment for measuring the temperature and other characteristics of the upper layers of the atmosphere. This year alone, French experts have taken part in launching nine of

these rockets.

Meteorological rockets

Joint experiments on the simultaneous photographing of cloud formations from Soviet meteorological satellites and French balloons are proceeding successfully.

Since the autumn of 1969 observations of sources of radio emission in the 18-centimetre band have been carried out with the help of Soviet equipment and the French radio telescope at Nancy.

For about 12 months, Soviet and French specialists have been co-operating on Kerguelen Island in the photographing of artificial satellites. A high-precision Soviet camera has been taken to the island for this purpose.

Practical results arising from the co-operation of Soviet and French scientists in space exploration were seen when colour television programmes concerned with President Pompidou's visit to the USSR in October were beamed to Paris via a Molniya 1 communication satellite.

The main fields in which Soviet and French scientists are co-operating in space exploration are space physics, space meteorology and astronomy and space communications. An agreement has been reached to start co-operation in space biology and space medicine as well.

Vladlen Vereshchetin told the Tass correspondent that Soviet-French co-operation was progressing from simple experiments to complex scientific and technical tasks. New scientific ideas were being put forward in the course of joint work and friendly contacts were increasing.

(Soviet News)

SCHEEL SEES BONN'S CULTURAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMME AS A TWO-WAY STREET

Summary: During the past year, German cultural policy abroad has undergone a thorough re-examination by the Foreign Office in Bonn. Writing in the German language Bulletin of December 23, Minister Walter Scheel discussed some of the

results of this re-appraisal. Excerpts from his article appear below.

At the very outset I would say that we want nothing more nor less than to promote and strengthen international co-operation in cultural matters.

How broadly, however, should the term "culture" be defined? I believe that international co-operation in the cultural sphere should include all aspects of intellectual and creative activity insofar as it relates to education, training and science, as well as, of course, "culture" within the word's traditional meaning.

Using this broadened basis, our cultural policy should be integrated with our other foreign policy objectives of seeking international peace and understanding, namely in the spirit of the preamble to the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): To work towards peace and understanding on the basis of freedom and human rights, through the promotion of co-operation between nations in the broad field of culture.

A few points to be made in this connection:

Numerous prejudices have led to hostility, and even to wars, between nations. Such prejudices always occur whenever nations know too little about each other's customs and intellectual life. Anybody wanting to fight prejudice must first eliminate this unawareness through information, cultural exchange and co-operation.

Our cultural policy is confined not merely to describing our own cultural development, but also means being open to and interested in the cultural achievements of other nations. We realize that our contribution to international co-operation in cultural affairs is only valuable insofar as we are also prepared to be receptive to the contributions of other cultures.

International cultural co-operation must be based on the principle that all nations should share their knowledge and experience for mutual benefit, with the object of creating stable and lasting friendly relations between all countries.

Co-operation with international cultural organizations plays an important role in achieving this objective. We intend, therefore, to strengthen even further our co-operation with such organizations.....

Cultural affairs have changed radically over the past decade.

New tasks have been added; others have lost their significance, and we must draw the consequences from this fact. For this reason we must make certain shifts of accent in our policy.

We must convey to the world an unvarnished picture of our culture.

We want to promote our language only wherever it is a suitable means of communication, has future potential and where an interest in it exists - but not for reasons of national prestige.

The German schools abroad must keep in step with our own social development, be centres for cultural contact with our partner countries and offer graduating certificates meeting both Federal Republic standards and those of the partner countries.

Our cultural centres should be more engaged in disseminating information, especially in the field of contemporary social developments, and be more oriented in their work towards the wishes and interests of the partner country.

We have already begun to convert a number of our reappraisals into practice.

We have learned in the course of time that we achieve the greatest amount of goodwill through international cultural co-operation if we offer our partners what they need, what interests them and what leads to joint action. Naturally, we can attempt to interest them in something they are not familiar with, but it seems completely wrong to me to want to thrust something on them simply because we like it. In other words the principle of supply and demand should be in effect.

The demand which arises depends on the reputation, the image and the quality of the educational system and scientific research of the 11 L ä n d e r (states) in the Federal Republic of Germany. Cultural and scientific achievements on an international level are basically the prerequisites for effective participation in international co-operation. The Foreign Ministry and its affiliated organizations can thus be considered the intermediaries.

In answer to the question how, in practice, we wish to carry out our cultural efforts abroad, I can offer a no more pointed and concise answer than that which was given by the director of a Goethe Institute in a Western capital recently which contained the following conditions:

1. We can only convince with quality.
2. Our contribution must possess originality.

3. The work must have international relevance.
4. We must be up-to-date and place more emphasis on contemporary problems.

If these conditions are met we can reasonably expect that public funds for our cultural policy abroad will be used optimally and sensibly.

(The Bulletin - A weekly survey of German affairs issued by the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany)