

Vol. IV, No. 5

September 1970

EAST-WEST *contacts*

A Bimonthly Review

International Documentation and
Information Centre (Interdoc)
The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10
Netherlands

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Editor: Dr. S. J. C. van den Berg
Editorial office: Van Stolkweg 10,
The Hague, Netherlands

Annual subscription: Guilders 12,-

Per copy: Guilders 7,-

Suggested ways of payment:

1. postal cheque and credit transfer
number 633695, Interdoc, The Hague,
Netherlands
2. international money order

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I D E O L O G Y

SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE CONVERGENCE THEORY

Fedir S. Hayenko

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 7-7-'70)

Summary: Party criticism of the theory that capitalism and communism (personified by the United States and the Soviet Union) are developing along converging paths in the new technological age has been intensified in recent years. The Soviet public is deliberately kept in the dark about the true nature of this process and is presented with only one side of the argument, but it is less easy for the Kremlin to prevent top scientists, who are the spearhead of the technological revolution, from speaking their minds.

During the past five or six years in the Soviet Union there has been much criticism of the theory that the world's two major social, economic and political systems -- capitalism and communism -- are moving along converging paths. Objections have been voiced by professional journalists, economists, philosophers, prominent historians such as A. Galkin and the leading Party theoreticians A. Romyantsev and M. Mitin.

The opponents of the "convergence theory" appear to be attacking an unseen enemy, because works supporting the theory are simply not published. Consequently, the broad mass of the Soviet population has no means of acquainting itself with the pros and cons of the theory apart from the biased accounts of its detractors. In the Soviet Union the convergence theory is officially regarded as the most subtle anti-communist weapon and the campaign to discredit it, usually conducted at a purely propaganda rather than an impartial scientific level, is being stepped up.

Convergence as a socio-political concept arose during the 1950s. In natural science it signifies a similarity in the substance or functions of organisms only distantly related to one another in origin which comes about under the influence of similar environmental conditions. Sociology and economics adopted this term to describe the process by which Western capitalism and Eastern communism (personified by the United States and the Soviet Union) are drawing closer together with a possible fusion at some point in the future. The term first

came into use in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s, prior to which there had been talk only of a theory of synthesis or hybridization of the capitalist and socialist systems.

Many scientists regard the struggle between rival ideologies as the main source of present international tension. It is, they say, the real obstacle to world stability and peaceful competition between opposing systems because every ideology is basically an unscientific justification of a given social order. Now, however, it is not the spectre of communism which is haunting Europe but the technological revolution which looms before the world and is unfolding independently of ideology. The struggle between two opposing ideologies is merely an obstacle to this development and therefore obsolete. Hence the present talk of dismantling ideologies, a concept arrived at earlier by political economists.

Critical situations are now arising in both the capitalist and the socialist systems in equal measure. Neither system approves of the classical market economy and modern economic theory considers the ideal solution to be a mixed economy with a more extensive socialized sector than at present common in the West and more importance attached to the private sector than is the case in the Soviet bloc. In other words, what is needed is a synthesis of capitalist efficiency and socialist equality. This is indeed the trend. In the West, pressure for greater economic efficiency is leading to more centralized planning and state management, while for the same reasons the Soviet bloc is reducing the amount of centralized planning and state interference in the running of the economy.

In certain important respects both systems are becoming increasingly alike: they have the same technology and similar economic problems regarding capital investment, labor productivity, material incentives, etc. They are experiencing the same scientific and technological revolution and, mastering their own individual problems and adopting positive features of the other system, are moving in the same direction of optimal efficiency leading to social and economic standardization. The economists and sociologists who are studying this process see an increasing number of common features and believe that a new socio-economic system, superior to capitalism and socialism or communism, is in the making.

The convergence theory, therefore, points to the direction in

which modern man is evolving, and a prominent Soviet economist, E. Bregel, admits, although with reservations, that this theory corresponds to present realities (Sovremennye burzhuznyye teorii o sliyanii kapitalizma i sotsializma (Contemporary Bourgeois Theories on the Merging of Capitalism and Socialism), Moscow, 1970, p. 62).

In a comparatively short space of time the convergence theory has also found wide acceptance in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America among leading economists, sociologists, politicians and scientists. Even in the West, however, it is not a single, uniform theory, having been modified according to whether it is applied to the natural and social sciences, art, philosophy, etc. Nor is there unanimous agreement about the nature of the convergence. An American professor, G. Griffin, believes it is only the Soviet Union that is developing in the direction of the United States, while most experts maintain that both systems are drawing closer to one another and differ only in the principal motivation behind this development. The French scientist and publicist, M. Duverger, is confident that the United States and Western Europe will never become communist because, as a result of inevitable processes of liberalization within the East bloc and progressive socialism in the West, both systems will arrive at a single democratic socialism. Herbert Marcuse, a stern critic of both capitalism and socialism, sees no future for either of these systems.

In the Soviet Union the convergence theory is officially rejected on principle. It is unacceptable because communists believe that mankind is predetermined to turn to communism and to acknowledge the convergence theory would be an admission that the Soviet socialist system is not evolving towards the left in the direction of communism but towards the right in the direction of capitalism. It would also be an admission that modern capitalism is capable of reforming itself and not doomed to extinction as Marxism-Leninism teaches. The Party leaders want to limit the spread of this theory at all costs and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that Soviet experts misrepresent it as an unscientific theory based on facts which "falsely reflect objectively existing phenomena and processes" (ibid., p. 25). Soviet supporters of the convergence theory are said to exaggerate the advantages of capitalism and to caricature the socialist countries, while a well-known Soviet economist,

V. Cheprakov, claims that "objectively the concept of a synthesis of the two systems is an attempt to achieve two ends simultaneously: to find a sense of purpose for capitalism and to weaken the attraction of socialism" (ibid., p. 132). Soviet authors allege that "bourgeois ideologists" are unable to advance ideas capable of attracting wide support and are therefore obliged to poach socialist ideas to give their own worn-out concepts a fresh flavor palatable to the masses. They maintain that formerly, when faith in capitalism was unshaken, there was no thought of acknowledging the viability of the socialist system let alone talk of converging with it. And Kommunist, the theoretical organ of the Party Central Committee, states: "Obviously this apparent 'doctrine' compromise is being concocted by the ideologists of imperialism not from the goodness of their hearts, but has been produced by the immense rise in the popularity of socialism in the international arena" (No. 4, 1970, p. 124).

The scientific and technological revolution began in the West, however, and was imported later into the Soviet Union, which is still forced to go shopping in the West for the most modern plant and patents but has no equivalent to offer in exchange. This cannot be concealed in the Soviet Union and thus experts must publicly answer questions such as: "How did it happen that the imperialist system, a decaying system, the entire economic and political life of which experiences the oppressive weight of the monopolies, has expanded opportunities for the application of the achievements of science and technology in production" (Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, No. 8, 1969, p. 31).

G. Frantsov, a leading specialist on the history of ideology, has a ready answer to this question. The existence of a socialist society, he says, forces the monopolies to continually stimulate technological advance because otherwise they would be overtaken by the socialist world (ibid., pp. 31-32).

Criticism of the convergence theory is now one of the most important tasks of Soviet propaganda, even though this theory is said to be far-fetched and based on distortion of facts. Rumyantsev and Mitin warn that although the arguments of bourgeois ideologists hold no water in practice they must still be carefully analysed and "skilfully refuted" (Pravda, September 16, 1969). V. Cheprakov was even more specific:

This compels criticism of the theory of convergence,

which possesses a certain virulence, from the position of creative Marxism, which explains facts and is able to penetrate deeply into phenomena. This is why old, fossilized notions, which do not embrace new phenomena, are unable to assist in revealing the bankruptcy of the theory of convergence, which operates with specific facts. (Sovremennye burzhuzaznye teorii o sliyanii kapitalizma i sotsializma, op. cit., p. 133)

Soviet critics of the theory point to an unbridgeable gulf between private property in the West and socialized or state property in the USSR, and claim that there is increasing exploitation of the workers in the West and a total absence of this exploitation in the USSR. But not all communists consider that property in the Soviet Union is owned by all the people. In a textbook entitled "Political Economy", published in Yugoslavia in the late 1950s, M. Perovic said that "state property is not the property of the whole nation" and that "socialism and the state, and also socialism and state property are two opposed and incompatible concepts" (G.I. Zinchenko, Kritika sovremennogo revizionizma v oblasti politicheskoy ekonomii (A critique of Contemporary Revisionism in the Field of Political Economy, Moscow 1959, p. 55). The same applies to the exploitation of labor, which is said not to exist in the Soviet Union because the means of production are in the hands of the workers themselves. In fact they are controlled by the state, and as far as the appropriation of the surplus product is concerned the Soviet state takes a larger cut than any industrially developed country in the West.

The weak spot in Soviet criticism of the convergence theory is that, unlike their counterparts in the West, Soviet experts must view the future prospects of modern capitalism and world socialism through the eyes of Marx, Engels and Lenin, who provide no answers to many contemporary problems. Soviet critics must also adhere to the propaganda line which the Party considers it opportune to put out at a given moment and even such prominent figures as Rumyantsev and Mitin can find no more sophisticated argument than that

the theory of "convergence" serves as a kind of pseudo-scientific basis for making tactical advances towards

individual socialist countries in order to "build bridges" and "dig trenches" and, with the aid of a "silent counter-revolution", to wrench these countries from the socialist commonwealth, restore capitalism in them and undermine the power of world socialism. (Pravda, October 13, 1969).

There is good reason to believe that the convergence theory enjoys considerable support in thinking circles in the Soviet Union, especially among the higher technical intelligentsia. A. Sakharov's famous pamphlet "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom", published illegally in the Soviet Union, is proof that its author firmly believes in the theory and is expounding views held by many scientists. An appeal by Sakharov, V. Turchin and R. Medvedev to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, critically analysing the condition of the Soviet economy and pleading for further extension of the economic reform on Western lines, recently became known outside the Soviet Union. Earlier, in 1968, a Soviet critic, V. Shchebin, also stated that many artists and cultural workers favor a "single stream" in art and deplore the distinction between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" or "socialist" culture (Literaturnaya gazeta, October 30, 1968, pp. 4-5).

In 1969, the leading Soviet physicist, Peter Kapitsa, visited the United States. In a lecture to the National Academy of Sciences in Washington on October 8, 1969, he expressed his belief in the concept of convergence and also praised Sakharov's memorandum. His speech was reported the following day in The New York Times but ignored by the Soviet press. Several days later, however, Pravda published a long article by Rumyantsev and Mitin entitled "Current Questions of the Struggle Against Anti-Communism" which, although it did not mention Kapitsa by name, can be considered a reply to his speech in the United States. The article stressed that "... the chief assignment of anti-communism is... the creation of such socialist doctrines which could serve as a counterbalance to Marxism and prove the possibility of a non-communist path of development for human society" (October 13, 1969).

Kapitsa's speech in the United States is thus regarded as a manifestation of anti-communism. The article by two leading Party theoreticians was directed not so much at Kapitsa himself,

however, as at all those who consider the convergence theory worthy of attention and for whom Kapitsa, taking advantage of a visit abroad, was acting as spokesman.

THE THEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

Julio Lobos

(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, 20-6-'70)

In answer to the question as to whether a "theology of violence" is really being advocated by a sector of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America to justify social violence as a method of revolution, a pro-clerical, right-wing journal, minimizing the importance of this phenomenon, deplored what it regarded as an unhappy expression taken by a small group of clerics, and explained that in the present situation, when social realities are removed from the social Christian doctrine based on justice and equity, tendency appears for the establishment of a social-Christian state by means of a violent revolution. Quoting statements made by the head of the Roman Catholic Church and some of his encyclicals, the journal naturally suggests that it is the wrong road which in its opinion bodes no good for the mission of Christianity, nor for that matter for the oppressed classes of society. The journal does not mention, however, that the priests and monks who preach this "theology of violence" do not question their religion but rather seek to revalorize and implement the Christian dogmas on social justice, which in their opinion are best expressed in today's world by the socialist thought in the broadest sense of the word.

One might well wonder how this phenomenon could arise on a continent which is so completely Roman Catholic, and within an institution which, no less than the conquering regiments, helped establish a social order which it has for centuries zealously defended as its most select ideological vanguard.

As a result of the three hundred years' colonization by Spain and Portugal, the countries of Latin America inherited not only some important elements of the cultural tradition of the colonizers but also two economic and politically dominant social forces - first the landed oligarchy and later the export-import bourgeoisie closely linked by trade with foreign monopolies. The entry of foreign capital, first British and then American which

became dominant, determined the one-crop nature of the Latin American economies. But in spite of its large natural resources, Latin America has remained underdeveloped as a continent, and very unevenly developed from one country to the next. Although the average national income per capita is around 350 dollars, it is distributed extremely unevenly. Some five per cent of the population have an income higher than 200 dollars, whereas one half earn less than 120 dollars. Yet in many of these countries, one fifth of one per cent of the nation (the well-known ruling groups of a dozen rich families) have an income that is several hundred times greater than the population as a whole, which illustrates the unbelievably deep social differences. These differences are rooted in an unequitable land ownership pattern which permits two per cent of the population to hold more than four fifths of arable land in all of Latin America. The fact that the differences among countries in per capita national income range up to 12 times as high needs no comment. On the other hand, however, by concentrating on the lucrative extractive activities and trade, the American and other Western capitals not only make a three dollar profit for every dollar invested, but also retard the development of Latin American national economies by making them increasingly dependent. The situation in the sector of commerce is particularly difficult in view of the problems of the prices of raw materials and services, which result in an annual deficit in the balance of payments running to several milliard dollars. Therefore, the large landholders, who are not particularly interested in modernizing agriculture even within the framework of a capitalist system, and American capital are the main culprits for the slow and very uneven development of this continent. The living conditions for the majority of the population are extremely bad, because of economic stagnation, deficit, indebtedness, lack of capital, small investments and constant inflation. Since in almost half the countries not even the necessary minimum calories in the diet are attained, and shanties of mud, cardboard or tin - the notorious favelas, villas miserias, barriadas, etc make up more than half of the available housing, the undernourishment of the population and the housing shortage are serious problems of this region, whose picture is made even more wretched by high mortality, particularly among children, and illiteracy which involve on the average one third of the population. Of course all

this is linked with the problem of acute unemployment, or underemployment, and a very limited system of social security which according to some estimates only covers one fifth of the economically active population. The unbroken chain of political instability, social upheavals and unrest, political clashes and conflicts ranging from the method of democratic dialogue to the method of armed action, are the natural consequences of such activity.

The Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, which for centuries has been a solid ideological bulwark and patron of the existing social orders, has recently tried to make an about-face and to consider the problems of the situation which is giving rise to the "theology of violence". These efforts are also partially the result of certain circumstances and factors which, at least so far as this region is concerned, have had a negative effect on the church as an institution. The foremost problem is that of rejuvenating the clerical ranks. Every year this problem becomes more acute, as the number of candidates for the seminaries steadily dwindles. To make matters worse, an enormous majority of students, even as many as four fifths, drop out of seminary during the course of studies, and this number usually contains the most able and promising students. The papal Curia is therefore compelled to fill the gaps by sending priests and monks from Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy). But in spite of these measures, the Church leadership continues to be concerned by the fact that although every third Roman Catholic in the world is a Latin American, this continent accounts for only one tenth of the total clerical staff in the world. The sizable presence of foreigners (in some countries the ratio of foreign to native born priests is as much as four fifths, while foreign monks account for half of all the monks in Latin America) causes new problems and difficulties for the mission of the Church. By the very fact that they are foreigners, the newly arrived priests have less feeling for the problems of the country, particularly social problems, whereas native born priests are as a rule more liberal and more radical. On the other hand, as a result of time-honoured tradition, the social order and the closed school system which favour the rich, most of the high clergy of Latin America still cling to their conservative views, in spite of the attempts by the liberal wing to adapt the Church to modern needs as soon as possible.

The division into the liberal and conservative wings springs from the differences on how to change the church and its dogmas institutionally, and how far to go in changing the obsolete socio-economic structures. The lower clergy who are in direct contact with the broad masses have the image of the most desperate poverty constantly before their eyes. Of course they participate in various charitable organizations under the auspices of the Church and initiate many humanitarian projects, but all this taken together appears to them as a mere drop in the ocean of poverty and destitution. Consequently, they have been disillusioned by the stereotyped sermon to the rich to be generous, and to the poor to be humble, because it does not give the desired results. This is why there have been various attempts within the liberal wing to find a way to distribute the national income more equitably, which means to establish social justice, which is still far from becoming a reality. Thus the idea of exerting pressure on the ruling circles began to take root. This idea, very broadly conceived, has already taken on very diverse forms of action.

One of the most popular currents in the liberal wing of the Roman Catholic Church is that represented by H. Camara, Bishop of the Brazilian town of Recife, whose movement of "moral and liberal pressure" is nevertheless opposed to violence. In fact this current advocates ideas of a strong reformist programme involving structural changes in the present social and economic system, which can only be carried out by socialism adapted to Latin American conditions. The importance and moral strength of this trend is not only because it is championed by a high official in the Church's hierarchy, but because its deep criticism of the present state of affairs is the expression of the broadest and most progressive circles within the clergy. The study of the difficult social situation and its representation in its true colours has become the preoccupation of the day. It seems that there is a rather broad agreement as to the object of creating a new society, which will be non-capitalist and based on social justice. It is interesting to note that a certain number of the lower clergy hold the view that in an established socialist society with developed self-management there is no need for the existence of the Church as an institution, where faith would acquire a different role and retain the same significance. Whereas

there is much unanimity about the first phase, the studying and portraying of the real situation, there are several variants concerning the second phase. Thus there is rather widespread endorsement for violence as a method of action. It arose out of demands for social justice, making a clear distinction between the violence of the rich who rule and the justified violence of the oppressed, and insisting on the recognition of the rights of the people to legitimate self-defence and to every method which would promote their emancipation and the abolition of oppression and exploitation. This is what is popularly called the violence of "hunger, poverty and backwardness". Violence has thus theoretically gained acceptance, although there is a variety of opinions and even movements on how it should be implemented. Many would go no further than the theoretical justification of violence, while others think that they should actively join in workers' and student demonstrations. Still others try to persuade the military about the need for far-reaching reforms, even by over-throwing the existing multiparty parliamentary régime, the institutional mechanism of government in the capitalist system. The most radical ones even consider guerrilla, the most outstanding example being Roman Catholic priest Camillo Torres who was killed some years ago in the mountains of Colombia. Since the urban guerrillas have gained ground, a good portion of the clergy and monks assist them or even become directly involved, as witnessed by some facts recently come to light particularly in Brazil and Uruguay.

The fact is that the Roman Catholic clergy in Latin America have been swept up by a strong wave of different ideological, and primarily reformist currents. The well-known papal encyclical, "Popularum progressio", has been given various interpretations, one of which e.g. allows the organization of armed rebellion because the peaceful means which were previously advocated had ceased to be effective. Thus the so-called "underground church" has come onto the scene as a protagonist of violence and represents a threat, but for some also a promise. However, all these currents resulting from the ideological crisis within the Church have been more or less spontaneous. They first erupted into sight at the time of the Eucharistic Congress the year before last in Bogota in the presence and with the direct participation of the Pope himself, who was deluged with dozens of petitions, declarations and resolutions sent by often

as many as several hundreds of priests from the entire continent. The theme "Christianity and Violence" became a frequent topic of discussion in various forums and even congresses, both of advocates and opponents of violence. What organized forms these movements will take, if they take any at all, and what social forces they will rely on is hard to tell in view of the traditionally strict discipline and hierarchical subordination within the Church. Some movements have already appeared, of which the "Movement of Priests of the Third World" has a very indicative name. Those whose activities send them to prison, or who are victimized in other ways, evoke the early days of Christianity and thus give rise to large new problems, putting Church authorities in the delicate position of having to act in their defence. This in turn inevitably leads to frequently serious crises in the relations between the Church and State, which in some countries are taking on very alarming aspects.

The governing circles in all countries are obviously vitally interested in condemning any violence as a method of solving social and other problems. In this they enjoy direct support of the high clergy, who tell the advocates of the "theology of violence" to concern themselves first of all with the "moral part" of the life of the people, and leave the material side of life to the politicians. Whereas some priests gladly take on the label of "rebels" or "revolutionaries", in these warnings they are called objects or victims of "communist infiltration". The Church authorities state in no uncertain terms that it is unacceptable for the clergy to hold a Bible in one hand and a machine gun in the other, forgetting incidentally that their predecessors almost five centuries before had conquered a new continent under the banner, deposed the Indian states and mercilessly wiped out their civilizations.

A great unrest among the masses, which are seeking ways of a faster development and solutions to social inequalities and various contradictions that have accumulated for years, has caught up the whole of Latin America. The most articulate spokesmen of this unrest are representatives of the lower clergy, who are putting forward demands for radical changes. Their desires reflect ideological ferment within a very dynamic, inventive, but unfortunately disunited political left. These desires constitute an attempt to start a centuries-old institution, enslaved

by its own dogmas and bound by an almost blind obedience, on the path of reform more rapidly and effectively than it has been doing itself and to adapt it to the new, contemporary needs of society.

PARTY THEORETICIANS VS. SOCIOLOGISTS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 24-7-'70)

Summary: The USSR Institute for Empirical Social Research of the Academy of Sciences was founded to the accompaniment of Party support; a broad propaganda campaign and great hopes expressed in its future accomplishments. It was supposed to become a clearing house for the investigations, heretofore scattered among various institutions, in the field of empirical sociology. However, after only a few months the Institute became embroiled in a deep conflict involving Party ideologists, philosophers, and economists. A report was published recently on a conference called by the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU CC at which the attitudes of some sociologists, incompatible to the Party line, were discussed. The following paper deals with this report.

On 20-24 November 1969, a conference took place at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CC of the CPSU, dealing with the "Lessons on Sociology" written by Yu. A. Levada, a doctor of philosophical sciences. Professor Levada's lectures were delivered for the most part in 1967 and had already been published in the "Information Bulletin" of the Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in two volumes. The attempt was then made at the newly-founded Institute for Empirical Social Research of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to use these "lessons" as a sort of foundation for all Soviet sociology. This plan provoked the resistance of Party ideologists within a short period of time and led to the convocation of the above-mentioned conference. The meeting did not take place at the Institute itself but rather at the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A report has just appeared.*

* V. E. Kozlovskij and Yu. A. Sychev "Obsuzhdenie kursa lekcii Yu. A. Levady po sociologii", in Filosofskie nauki, No. 3/1970, p. 173, et. seq.

Conflict Between Historical Materialism and Sociology

The main points of this conflict deserve mention not only because they indicate the problems confronting sociology in the Soviet Union today, but also because the unrest which the sociologists provoked among the Party ideologists is a symptom of the crisis of communist ideology. In the Soviet Union, sociology was only allowed a "resurrection" after years of resistance by conservative Party ideologists and philosophers to the discipline's specific tasks and methods. They had maintained the point of view that dialectical materialism was in itself a Marxist sociology, and together with historical materialism, it was said to represent the basis of all social sciences, and naturally of sociological activity.

In the course of time, sociology became established as an entity unto itself, although the interdependence between dialectical and historical materialism and sociology and its methods remained a problem. It was especially unpleasant for the Party to realize that the new Institute did not rid the USSR of these conflicts, but in fact only deepened them. This is one explanation for the vehemence with which criticism was directed at Levada.

For example, the doctor of philosophical sciences, F.M. Burlatsky accused Levada's "lessons" of ignoring the complexity and sharpness of the ideological battle and of revealing an "abstract" attitude toward social problems. The well-known philosopher, G. E. Glezerman, scolded him for practising behaviour "which stands apart from the classes" and of encouraging Soviet sociology to adopt the same categories, principles and laws as are usual in a capitalistic society:

Levada considers culture as well as language to be a general means of communication between men... But an observation of culture from the standpoint of class analysis is lacking. This author lacks completely a class content in the definitions of phenomena like state, fascism, totalitarianism, etc. Thus, the state, for example, is regarded solely as an institution for the preservation of the culture which applies to the society and for its imposition on men.

Professor A.A. Amvrosov accused Levada of seeing sociology as but a generalized science whose content is in-

dependent of the various social systems.

The strongest criticism against Levada was, however, apparently the result of his critique of the state of Soviet social sciences. For example, the doctor of philosophical sciences I.A. Kryvelev claimed: "In his work, our social sciences, with the exception of sociology, whose role is artificially inflated, are described in caricature". F.V. Konstantinov, a leader of the Soviet Association of Sociologists, an organization which participates in international sociological congresses, also joined in the criticism. In the Party, he is seen as a high authority for sociology. After granting that Levada is a "talented scientist", he continued in the same breath to say that his greatest mistake was ignoring historical materialism, the "soul of Marxist sociology", in his work.

The Influence of Parsons and Western Society

One major criticism which is levied by Levada's opponents is that the latter's work is influenced by Western, and especially American, sociology. For example, Professor M.V. Jakovlev said:

In the lessons one senses a certain influence of the theoretical constructions of T. Parsons and other bourgeois sociologists. One can excuse the author for his superfluous enthusiasm for his field, as well as for his conviction that sociology forms the life-saver of our social sciences. Unforgivable, however, is a certain departure from the social-philosophical foundations of Marxism.

Levada was also criticized by other speakers for having adopted nearly the entire range of Western sociological methods. These speakers claimed to have found in this "mistake" the reason for Levada's lack of criticism of bourgeois society in his work. The above-mentioned G. E. Glezerman was especially stringent in his criticism here. Levada is accused of having repressed the results of Soviet sociological investigations, or of having underrated them. C.A. Stepanyan, a well-known philosopher and Academy member, said further:

The major deficiency lies in the fact that the author has attempted to create a new theoretical sociology,

which by definition differentiates itself from historical materialism. Yu. A. Levada wanted to realize this immediately by reducing the role of social sciences in our country and indirectly (by formulating) his periodic table of the history of sociology in the second half of the 19th century with alchemy. It was at this time, as we all know, that for example Marxist sociology already existed.

Fear of Sociology as a Force of Reform

If one examines the other contributions made to the conference's discussion, the reasons for the meeting in the first place become clearer. Party ideologists and their "assistants" in the scientific field were first and foremost upset by the attempts being made to emancipate sociology as an independent science. Levada's critics have distorted the conflict between sociology and historical and dialectical materialism for their purposes. Levada is, according to everything known about him, in no way an opponent of Marxist methodology, in sociology as well as elsewhere, but rather is convinced that sociology's rapid development will have certain effects on the social sciences as a whole and will not only enrich them but call for their reworking. It is not by chance that the sharpest criticism came from those philosophers who had already made a name for themselves as interpreters of the Party line under Stalin and who still see their main task today "in the battle for the purity of Marxism". Professor Glezerman did not have much luck with his attempt to turn one of Levada's own sentences into a boomerang against the sociologist: "It doesn't mean much to regard oneself as a Marxist, one must employ Marxism in practice".

A further reason for attacks was Levada's acceptance and encouragement of the use of Western sociological methods. Yet the Party ideologists were unable to find something in these methods which they could turn down on a scientific basis. For purely ideological reasons they deny Western methods, especially as regards empirical research whose methods reveal facts which the Soviet system would rather ignore. Instead of profiting from the revelations, the attempt is made to influence the interpretation of the results or their formulation along lines sympathetic to the Party and the Soviet system in general.

The most interesting thing about this conference is that neither Professor Levada nor a number of other sociologists surrendered their standpoints. Levada explained at the conclusion: "Historical materialism forms the foundation of every (branch of the) liberal arts, but sociology cannot be reduced to that; indeed to a certain extent it departs from social philosophical sciences". In a report on the discussion, it is said:

Yu. A. Levada did not agree with a single critical remark of the speakers. In the final analysis the impression was created that Yu. A. Levada saw the criticism of his book not as the concern of the public about the development of the science and the quality of sociological literature, (that) he did not sense in this criticism the wishes of his comrades to be of assistance to him in overcoming errors.

Several of his associates at the Institute attempted to defend Levada by pointing out only secondary, unimportant mistakes. V. N. Shubkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, for example, called the process of development of sociological research in the Soviet Union contradictory. On the one hand, the sociologists can make a contribution to the development of the social sciences, but on the other hand are upset about the "mass profanation" of certain results of sociological research. He praised the positive sides of Levada's work, and located its deficiencies in different areas than did the other speakers. B. A. Grushin, also an associate of the Institute, was in agreement with some of the criticism, but at the same time accused the other critics of not taking into account the fact that "Levada took it upon himself to make up for the urgent need for development of a system of categories for social research".

The well-known sociologist G. V. Osipov, doctor of philosophical sciences, recognized the work which Levada had done. He found it a positive fact that in the discussion a number of points had not been brought up which, but a short time ago, had still been debatable in the Soviet Union; for example, the use of sociology and its importance as a Marxist-Leninist science of society.

Under pressure from the Party, the conflicts will now apparently be dealt with in the Institute itself. This was hinted at by the deputy director, F. M. Burlatsky, who said that

there were projects and currents at the Institute other than Levada's, and its major goal was to aid "the party and state apparatuses in the solution of the most important tasks of communist construction".

This conference makes it clear that the great hopes which the party had set on the creation of an institute for empirical social research have not been fulfilled. On the contrary, the Party ideologists have been provided with new, unpleasant problems as the result of this institution.

POLITICS

BRANDT'S HISTORIC INITIATIVE

'Ostpolitik' could prove to be 1970's most important world move, writes French ex-premier

Pierre Mendès-France

(Prime Minister of France, 1954-55)

Summary: Pierre Mendès-France, the French politician and writer who while in office devoted much thought to the possibilities of an eventual European settlement, here assesses the importance of the continuing moves by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to improve and stabilise relations with the East.

The year 1970 is already turning out to be a vintage one for events of international significance (South-East Asia, the Middle East, Great Britain and the Common Market, etc.). But when history comes to be written, its most important feature, and the one likely to have the widest consequences, will, I think, prove to be the radical change in direction which relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union have taken.

Obviously a process of this nature will have its ups and downs and setbacks as it develops. The 25 years that have just passed have left situations in their wake which cannot be amended from one day to the other; it was only recently, after all, that the cruel happenings in Czechoslovakia aroused a deep feeling of shock throughout Europe, and particularly in Germany, which is still far from being forgotten. The new Ostpolitik is inevitably meeting very strong opposition from people in both East and West Europe, as was shown very clearly by the meeting between the heads of government for the two Germanies at Kassel on May 21, the regional elections in the Federal Republic and the French hesitancy when confronted with Chancellor Willy Brandt's initiative.

Nonetheless, the Chancellor appears to have decided to continue along his chosen route. He knows what obstacles must be cleared and he is aware of the relative precariousness of his position in Germany itself and the sort of reaction to expect if East European countries and, above all, the Soviet Union become too demanding. But he seems convinced that the USSR wants the

negotiations to succeed and that a situation is being created which even his most determined opponents will not be able to back out of if they return to power. He has obviously weighed the enormous advantages, both in the short and medium term, to his country from a solemn agreement with the Soviet Union, knowing that such an agreement would considerably enhance West Germany's political role in Europe (and elsewhere), while at the same time actually diminishing the influence of the GDR (German Democratic Republic).

The GDR knows this too -- hence its negative attitude in the face of the very real advantages offered to it by Brandt. For Brandt's proposals at Kassel in fact amounted to a de facto recognition of the GDR which would inevitably have been followed one day by a de jure one. By rebuffing these proposals, Herr Willi Stoph was perhaps trying to delay developments which he fears but which he well sees are likely to continue, in spite of him, with the active concurrence of Moscow and Warsaw.

Stoph's stopping power

One is therefore faced with the paradoxical situation that very favourable provisions will figure in the texts signed by Brandt and Kosygin (independence, frontiers and diplomatic relations to be respected, eventual entry of the two Germanies into the United Nations on an equal footing, etc. -- all things about which the Democratic Republic has preferred not to negotiate itself) and will only benefit the GDR through the agency of the USSR. Nevertheless, East Germany retains a means of applying pressure and a bargaining power which is far from negligible: it is clear that the four-power discussions on the status of Berlin are hanging fire because the USSR (which, let us not forget, proposed them in the first place) is unable to make the slightest concession without the consent of the GDR.

This does not alter the fact, however, that the governments of Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest appear anxious that the present détente between themselves and Bonn should continue. The Federal Republic of Germany has more than once in the past 10 years tried to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union, and in particular with Poland, on the basis of commitments to non-aggression and a renunciation of force, and to the consolidation of the balance achieved since the last war. On each

occasion these proposals were either ignored or rejected by the East Europeans. This year, however, they hastened to welcome Brandt's advances, which have made it possible for them to draw up a plan whose main point is known here and now. It seems that the grave preoccupations of the USSR in Asia and its open conflict with China are leading it to seek a stabilisation of the situation in Europe, and that involves establishing normal relations with the Federal Republic whatever the objections and reservations of the GDR.

In the agreements now being drafted, West Germany has undertaken to renounce the use of force and to respect the existing frontiers, especially the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the two Germanies. In actual fact these pledges were already made in Chancellor Adenauer's time in the Paris agreements of October 23, 1954. Contrary to what Kiesinger, Strauss, Barzel and their friends of the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) are saying, if one goes to the bottom of things, the present government in Bonn is making no really new concessions, nor is it "capitulating". It is simply setting the seal with the Soviet Union on a situation which in fact no one dreams of challenging and which in truth the Federal Republic had already explicitly agreed to respect up to 16 years ago.

Same Direction

At the same time -- and the fact that it happens now could hardly be said to be fortuitous -- the USSR and its allies have overcome their long-held repugnance and on June 22 accepted the principle of the American presence in the European security system. If the Soviet proposals, made with an eye to convening a European conference and a general agreement on security and co-operation between all the countries of Europe, are to succeed, then they must be worked out and applied -- in the interpretation that the East European countries give them today -- with the co-operation of the United States. (Under such a security pact one provision would probably call for a reduction of the military potential over the whole European continent which in turn would speed up the reduction of the American military presence in Europe).

Present diplomatic developments are not therefore working towards the dissolution of the two blocs but tend instead to

to confirm the détente between them. The essential issues, let there be no doubt about it, continue to be debated and even organised by the two super-powers. Far from providing an obstacle, the present policies of Federal Germany are moving in this direction and it is for this reason that they have gained America's approval.

CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S EASTERN POLICY

(German International, June 1970)

Amid all the excursions and alarms and the brouhaha surrounding the second inter-German summit meeting at Kassel, one fundamental fact has tended to be obscured.

The eastern policy which the Brandt Government launched on taking office late last year is essentially long-term in concept. Each step such as the Kassel meeting or the increasingly productive parallel negotiations in Moscow and Warsaw must be seen in perspective, and in a perspective not only of circumstance and place but, above all, of time.

For, to deal with the Soviet Union a very long-term view indeed must be taken. Just how long-term is the Soviet Union's view -- of for example the threat of China -- was emphasized years ago by the former Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov in the months before he was exiled as manager of a Siberian power station, in a conversation with British Cabinet ministers. "By the end of the century", he warned, "there will be a thousand million of them (the Chinese) and we, the Russians, will have to face them with only a quarter of that number".

The Kremlin thinks in decades. To negotiate with the Kremlin one must think in the same dimension. Of course, if quick results can be achieved -- and Secretary of State Egon Bahr p r i m a f a c i e would have appeared to achieve just that in Moscow in his conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko -- all to the good.

But Chancellor Brandt's eastern policy goes much further than the mere rapid attainment of tactical gains. As he has repeatedly stated he believes in gradual step by step progress towards his goal.

Much of the Brandt Government's policy, however, must be seen in the context that most well-informed students of develop-

ments in Russia's Eastern European Empire now believe that a completely new era is dawning. The success of the Brandt policy, therefore, depends on political, sociological, and economic changes which are already becoming apparent in Eastern Europe, and which will almost certainly become of fundamental importance in the next quarter of a century. As a result most previous cold war type thinking is now completely obsolete.

No one, of course, can predict accurately what will happen in the Communist world in the next 20 or 30 years, but there is already considerable evidence of the trend.

Anglo-Saxon diplomats in the Eastern European capitals are already convinced that Soviet influence -- despite Brezhnev's terrible blunder in Prague -- is on the decline.

The consequences of that decline, of course, are double-edged. For if Mr. Ceausescu in Bucharest has become more independent, so too has Herr Ulbricht in East Berlin -- with consequences which were very apparent in Kassel.

But then East Berlin, the capital of the most prosperous Soviet satellite with by far the highest standard of living in the Soviet bloc, however, is something of a curiosity in the communist world.

One of the world's greatest left-wing thinkers and analysts, Djilas, recently pointed out that "nobody today really believes any more in Communism -- except Ulbricht or maybe Gomulka (Polish Communist Party Chief)".

Walter Ulbricht, that venerable relic of a Stalinist past is now in his late seventies. He cannot last indefinitely. And with the inevitable disappearance of Ulbricht in the next few years, even the East Berlin hardliners must come to realize that they cannot remain insulated from what is going on in the rest of Eastern Europe.

Increased freedom in Eastern Europe, of course, must largely depend on trends within the Soviet Union itself.

But Djilas, among other experienced Kremlinologists believes that Russia -- with an economy already in serious recession -- may very well need help from the West in coming years.

"Her economy is more and more inefficient and the Comecon (Communist Bloc Trade Organization) is a failure. Russia will be forced to cooperate with the West, because she cannot afford to

remain isolated", says the brain which originally conceived many of the revolutionary reforms which today make Yugoslavia the laboratory of experimental socialism.

"And don't forget China", he says, "in 20 years she will know how to throw the hydrogen bomb on to any Russian city, she will have more people, more divisions, and if she has a mind to expand, she will go in one direction only -- West.

"Russia must then go towards resolving all her problems with the West. She cannot have two enemies".

Even in the Soviet Union itself there are notable signs of new thinking -- even within the Kremlin. During the celebrations to mark the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth, the supreme Soviet ideologist, communist "party pope" Mikhail Suslov, made the astonishing confession that during the thirties a fundamental error of the Comintern had been to regard the Western social democrat parties -- and particularly the German social democrat party -- as the arch enemy instead of cooperating with them against Hitler.

The nod in the direction of Brandt and the SPD is too obvious to require further comment. To back that up, influential Politburo member Kirilenko recently told the French Communist Party: "It is very far from the intention of the Soviet Union to ignore the changes which have presently taken place in the leadership of the Federal German Republic".

Internationally famous Soviet intellectuals in public go much further. Famous Soviet atomic scientists ranging from the Nestor of Soviet physics, Cambridge-trained Peter Kapitza to his distinguished pupil, Academician Zacharov, in urging reforms of the Soviet Union's political and economic system, now openly discuss the so-called "convergence theory" which envisages the gradual coming together of communist and capitalist economic practice if not theory.

The future implications for divided Germany are so obvious that the whole question of convergence is now the secret nightmare of East Berlin Communist leaders. East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph even went out of his way at Kassel to deny strenuously to Willy Brandt that there was not the slightest possibility of a mixture of socialism and capitalism.

In this vast perspective, details of what was or was not achieved at Kassel became irrelevant. And however valid the

criticism made by the CDU of Chancellor Brandt's policies may have been in terms of cold-war and immediate post-cold-war thinking, many of their arguments now seem outdated.

Chancellor Brandt and his closest collaborators from the outset have warned that the course on which they are may well take years. Even if no further meeting between Herr Brandt and Herr Stoph takes place this year or even next year, from a fundamental long-term standpoint it will not be of enormous importance. The important fact is that after a long period of years, during which the Bonn Government pretended that the German Democratic Republic did not exist, the leaders of the two Germanies can sit down together and in good fellowship discuss their differences.

The East Germans at the moment are adopting an all-or-nothing attitude. They believe that time is on their side. Short term that may be so, but in the long term nothing is further from the truth.

It was obvious at Kassel that Herr Stoph was following a well-mapped plan of campaign. He was hard and tough and made no concessions -- but he had no intention of breaking off the negotiations. He was clearly following the brief which he and his boss Walter Ulbricht and his rival Erich Honecker had received in the Kremlin a few days earlier. Equally clear was the fact that the East German delegation had been warned that the Warsaw Pact Bloc would take a very low view if East Berlin caused the negotiations to collapse. And the obvious regard of the Kremlin for Chancellor Brandt's domestic political welfare was demonstrated 24 hours later by the announcement that agreement had been reached between Bonn and Moscow on the groundwork for a treaty on the mutual renunciation of force.

All the evidence suggests that a substantive draft treaty is already in existence. That is very remarkable progress within a little more than six months.

But the possibilities amid the imponderables of the future may go very far indeed. Herr Ulbricht will disappear in the fullness of time and age. Herr Stoph with a new prestige gained by his most efficient conduct of his negotiations with Chancellor Brandt, and in the developing climate of the Eastern Bloc, may well prevail over his hard-line rival Honecker.

Future Kremlin policy as always is an enigma wrapped in a mystery. But whatever the zig-zags between reform and reaction,

the Soviet Politburo in the present or future must face two hard facts:

1. The economy of the Soviet Union, far from overtaking the United States as Khrushchev once boasted, is moving in the opposite direction.
2. Chairman Mao's China within a few years will have nuclear weapons and a delivery system which, if small compared with the Russian armory, will be sufficient to destroy many Soviet cities.

To all these vast geo-political facts and expectations must be added another factor which I personally believe the leaders in both West and East Germany tend to play down -- in public at least -- for very obvious reasons.

That is the fundamental basic instinct of the Germans on both sides of what is no longer the Iron Curtain to come together again as a united German people.

An innate feeling for this basic instinct is no doubt the reason why Chancellor Brandt, although saying that he does not expect German re-unification in his lifetime, refuses to abandon the concept of two German states within a single German nation.

The East German leaders, however, in their deep-dyed old-fashioned Marxism will have no truck with a bourgeois Western Germany. But even already in this context, significant by-products of the intrinsic fact of the German summit meetings are beginning to appear.

The East Germans, as a result of a remarkable rise in material prosperity, have recently according to many observers, begun to develop a sort of East German national identity. But they, and still more their leaders, have a deep-seated inferiority complex towards the Federal Republic and all its works. Clearest manifestation of this is their claim for full diplomatic recognition by Bonn -- a claim which at best can lead to nothing more than a paper confirmation of a fact that has existed for 20 years.

This inferiority complex is compounded of the ghetto dwellers' classic reaction to what is outside and a curious love-hate attitude to the still greater material prosperity of West Germany. For it must never be forgotten that the citizens of East Germany, too, are Germans; ambitious, pushing and with that typical German belief that nothing is so successful as success

itself.

But since the Kassel meeting there has been a subtle change which has produced curious contradictions in the East German propaganda machine. While carrying on a constant barrage against Bonn to dampen down any expectations of the East German people, the Communist party newspapers and news agencies have emphasized with apparent pride that the East German Premier has been received with all dignity attached to his rank on West German soil for the first time. In simple words, they have now been accepted by the Joneses.

Any steps towards making the East Germans feel they are on a par with the West Germans are, therefore, an important step towards a major amelioration in the relationship between the two Germanies. And there can be little dispute that the mere fact of the latest meetings of the two German statesmen has transformed the position in a psychological if not a political sense.

The cold war attitudes of the past 15 years have disappeared and the people of the two Germanies, whatever may be true of their leaders, are again much closer to the outlook of the late forties and early fifties, when reunion still seemed an ultimate possibility.

The more able and constructive of Chancellor Brandt's critics in the Christian Democratic Opposition, such as the Baron von Guttenberg, are of course completely correct in their claim that every German, East or West, has the right to freedom and political self-determination. But politics as always is the art of the possible. Any progress to improve relations between the two parts of Germany, even in the most favorable circumstances, must be gradual. What has already been achieved, therefore, is a step in the right direction.

Chancellor Brandt has said that the primary aim of his policy is to achieve that reconciliation with the Federal Republic's Eastern neighbors which was reached a decade and a half ago with her neighbors in the West. But even Konrad Adenauer took six years to gain sovereignty for the Federal Republic in negotiation with powers who were basically benevolent.

If that be the measure, the present Government has still much time in hand and all the evidence is that international developments are on its side.

STANDARD-BEARERS OF REACTION IN WEST GERMANY

(Soviet News, 28-7-'70)

The objective logic of political struggle in the Federal Republic of Germany has led the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union bloc to become the standard-bearer of the most reactionary chauvinist forces in West Germany, writes A. Yulyev in an article published in *Pravda* recently.

Examining the attitude of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union leaders in their opposition to the Brandt-Scheel government, he writes:

"The present programme of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union absorbs everything negative, unrealistic and dangerous in the political life of the Federal Republic of Germany and in essence merges with the lines of policy of the neo-nazis".

He describes the policy of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union leaders, who are continuing to call for revision of the results of the Second World War, violation of the existing frontiers in Europe and the creation of a new "Great German Reich", as "a policy directed towards worsening international tensions and intensifying the arms race, a policy directed towards another war".

Yulyev goes on to say that the removal from the government of the political bankrupts of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union, who had turned West Germany into a centre of dangerous tensions in Europe, was natural since the entire course of postwar development, and above all the interests of the Federal Republic itself, necessitated a change in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, taking present realities into account.

Noting that "understanding of this is making headway in West Germany", Yulyev goes on to say that it is probably this, more than anything else, that infuriates all those who want to establish a new Reich.

When the need to introduce a note of realism into the country's policy is mentioned, they start screaming that the Federal Republic "is being stabbed in the back".

They are ready to accuse the present government of the

Federal Republic of all the deadly sins, since it is trying to find a way out of the blind alley created by two decades of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union policy, even though the government, in so doing, is very timid and inconsistent, making all kinds of reservations and showing excessive caution.

The opposition is not squeamish in its choice of methods for attacking the government. It has recourse to the "leaking" of government secrets, not being in the least concerned about the international standing of the Federal Republic of Germany or about observance of political decency. They mix charges of high treason with sinister prophecies about an approaching economic slump, inflation, etc.

In short, the Christian Democrats are making an attempt to prove something which cannot be proved, namely, that an improvement in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and socialist countries will involve West Germany in incalculable tribulations, both on the international scene and in the country's domestic life.

Although the Brandt-Scheel government has not introduced into the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany anything that was not long overdue and might have been expected, the fact remains that one can see its aspiration even though not very clearly expressed, to bring the political guidelines of the Federal Republic into accord with political developments on the continent of Europe, to assess the existing situation in Europe in a more realistic way and to take objective requirements into account. Nevertheless, even the very idea that the Federal Republic of Germany might have normal relations with socialist countries on the basis of the existing order of things meets with fierce resistance from the Christian Democrat and Christian Social Union bloc.

The Federal Republic of Germany, Yulyev writes in conclusion, is facing important problems -- problems on the solution of which the paths of its future development will largely depend. The solution to these problems will not come of its own accord.

"The future of the Federal Republic of Germany can be assured only on the road of peace and peaceful co-operation with other nations", he says. "This is precisely why it is necessary

to face up to the realities in Europe, with its systems of states and frontiers as they are, and not to look at them through the spectacles of dogmas and concepts whose inconsistency has been thoroughly demonstrated by life itself".

NEW ENCOURAGING TRENDS IN EUROPE

-- Phases and Processes --

Dr. Djura Nincic

(Review of International Affairs, 20-7-'70)

The increasingly dynamic and broad-based political trends in Europe have lately been assuming certain novel features which introduce new and definitely interesting elements into the pattern of relations on our continent. Although still burdened with many old interests, ideas and attitudes, which hamper them in various ways, these trends -- with all the new and positive things they bring in their wake -- are nevertheless gaining ground more and more clearly so.

The dialogues which have been started on some of the problems that lie at the very core of European security and principally the talks of Bonn with the Soviet Union, Poland and the Democratic Republic of Germany based on an understanding of the present realities and their implications along with the increasingly intensive contacts among the European countries on other questions in the sphere of European cooperation and security point to an upsurge of these trends on an ever broader and -- one would say -- on a more durable basis evidently as a result of the growing awareness of the European countries as to where their real and long-term interests, both political and economic, lie. The number of those supporting such tendencies is increasing and so is the scope of their individual and collective activity which, logically, is the cause and consequence of the breadth and constructive nature of the trends in question. In other words, the role of the small European countries, both non-aligned and aligned, and their influence on the present currents on the old continent are gaining scope and intensity and this explains to a good measure their favourable prospects. In this context the recent Rome meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers is characteristic for two reasons: for the contribution

of the small European members of the alliance and the introduction of certain novel, more flexible accents into the final documents of the meeting and for recognition of the place and role of the neutral and non-aligned countries in all phases of the planned consultations and negotiations (to our knowledge this is the first time that in a European context the term "non-aligned" has been entered into a bloc organization's document) whereby the natural yet long denied European dimension of the policy of non-alignment has also been recognized in a document of this sort. This new dimension is expressed in a perhaps less direct but no less characteristic form in the acknowledgement, if only a verbal one, of the need for a non-bloc approach to the problems of European cooperation even on the part of bloc policy protagonists.

At the same time, as a consequence and as a component part of these positive trends, the differences of opinion which naturally remain are nevertheless being reduced and there is increasing scope for agreement on a number of vital and so far controversial aspects of the problem of European cooperation and security. Moreover, what appears to us of singular importance is that an understanding is not being sought or attained along the lines of a compromise between the mutually opposed conceptions of the two blocs only or as much as in the sense of a common denominator for broader European interests and aspirations. In this context, it would suffice, for example, to compare the present deliberations on the proposed European conference to the discussion on this subject last year, when the conference was still considered by some quarters as being an expression and possible instrument of particular short or long-term political interest and was thus made a subject of bloc bargaining and even propaganda competition. Having emerged from this context, although not entirely so, this idea is today widely accepted, even among many of those who were earlier reserved to it, as a democratic alternative, as a potential significant factor in the development of more just and stable relationships on the European continent. It is viewed, more and more so, as an integral part of broader European processes and is therefore often referred to as the first in a series of conferences that could develop into a multilateral form of all-European cooperation and embrace corresponding organs whose functions would also cover the sphere of European security. Not

even the question of the agenda, i. e., the content of this kind of European conference, seems to be provoking any longer such "insurmountable" differences of opinion as it did before, although some differences of view still remain reflecting to a greater or lesser extent divergent approaches to the essence of the problems which the conference should deal with. Apparently, there is general agreement that the conference should encompass both questions in the sphere of security and those in the sphere of cooperation and this in fact means recognition of the link between the two spheres -- which Yugoslavia has never missed to highlight -- and bears out the conviction that cooperation generates conditions for security and that security expands the field of cooperation. Moreover, the prevalent opinion is that the conference should devote separate items of its agenda to these two spheres; within the framework of the first item it should assert and elaborate the basic principles on which European cooperation and security would be promoted and within the second one it should provide for ways of stimulating European cooperation. The differences emerge when it comes to a more detailed elaboration of the two items. What to encompass in the principles, how to formulate them and what spheres of intra-European relations to have them apply to? Should one of the elementary principles formulated in the UN Charter -- that which appears most topical at the given moment -- be singled out or at least accentuated or should the emphasis be on the fullest possible application of all the principles contained in the Charter? How far should one go in elaborating the principles? Should they be made to apply to relations between all the European states or should their application be restricted, if only tacitly, to specific categories of intra-European relations? Different answers are still being offered to these questions reflecting, as we said before, different ideas -- static or dynamic, narrow or broad-minded, -- about the essence of the problem of European security. The idea according to which one should tend towards a consistent application of all the principles of the UN Charter in relations between all the European states is obviously in agreement with the concept of security as a process in the course of which the European nations would acquire increasing scope for organizing their own free and unhindered internal development and

for pursuing an independent international activity on a footing of equality. Some differences of view also remain over the question of what aspects of cooperation should be envisaged although there seems to be growing support for the necessity of cooperation in diverse areas of common interest. Another matter over which views are somewhat divergent concerns the relationship between the European Conference and the existing organizations and bodies concerned with the promotion of European cooperation, although it should be clear here, too, that the role of the Conference in this sphere should be to stimulate and not to take over the activity of those organizations and bodies of which certainly the most important is the Economic Commission for Europe. Finally, as regards the question of regional measures of disarmament, no one any longer disputes either the significance of such measures for the promotion of European security or the complexity of the problems they create. Some divergencies remain as to when and how this outstanding issue should begin to be resolved (or considered) but it would appear that such differences were being exploited for political-propaganda ends far less today than in the past when reasonably enough this had hampered the creation of the conditions for positive treatment of this problem. If European deliberations and the European conference and regional measures of disarmament in Europe were all to be understood as the components of one and the same general process, then the most natural course to take would apparently be to include individual measures of disarmament into definite phases of that general process (meaning the talks, conferences, etc.) in a manner that would best suit the real possibilities existing within a given phase and at the same time work towards the furthering of the actual process itself.

Naturally enough, all these positive trends within Europe and what they bring in their wake are still evolving within the framework of the old pattern of European relations and within the wider international context which is by no means favourable at this moment and which, for its part, is making itself felt in a variety of ways. The bloc divisions with all their political, military and other implications are still present and at work counteracting and intermingling with the positive trends discussed here, narrowing their field of action and distorting their character. The adverse developments in other parts of the world

and particularly in the Mediterranean are not without repercussions of their own on the European continent in spite of the relative "Europeanization" of European trends. One is still aware of efforts being made to keep European currents under control and to have them subjugated to other "broader" interests and have them follow the "tested" bloc courses. Nevertheless, and this seems to be a characteristic feature of the present instant, these tendencies no longer appear in such an open and "frontal" form as before but tend to take on more subtle and less conspicuous forms. We are particularly aware in this context of endeavours to establish a rigid inter-dependence between various aspects or phases of the European trends, in fact to have broader European current conditioned by and thus subordinated to narrow bloc dialogues. Although, of course, it would be unrealistic in the extreme to refute the mutual connection between individual forms in which the European processes appear and phases in which they unfold and even less so to deny the significance which the talks between the Federal Republic of Germany and some of the European socialist countries have in this general context, one must bear in mind that this connection -- as confirmed by experience -- is not in one direction only, that it implies "inter-dependence" and not "dependence" (if, for example, there is no denying the fact that the mentioned dialogues have contributed to the creation of a favourable climate for other European contacts and for consultations on the proposed European conference, neither is there any doubt that these contacts and consultations have, in turn, improved the conditions for the dialogues). About the same could be said of the conditioning of individual phases of European talks and even of the preparations for a European conference on the "successful" outcome of the previous one -- which in fact means laying conditions for the beginning of the "next" phase. Even if we put aside all the arbitrariness of this sort of demarcation of individual phases of what is in fact a unified process it is still clear that the party called upon to assess whether or not the required conditions have been met would be in a position to start or obstruct the actual process depending on whether it considers the process to be unfolding in line with what it believes to be its interests or not. Disparate in terms of their starting positions but not so very different by their im-

plications are suggestions that the preparations for a European conference be entrusted to a narrow and actually bloc-conceived body under the pretext of stepping up their progress. This would not only reduce the scope of the preparations and restore the actual European talks to bloc foundations but would determine in advance the very character of the conference in a sense distinctively opposed to the aspirations and interests of the European countries. In contrast to such tendencies and ideas, efforts are being made by an increasing number of European countries under the impact and within the scope of the described positive European currents to make sure that the present consultations and talks are continued with increasing intensity and in all directions and that they also take on multilateral forms so that they may naturally develop into such a broad-based democratic meeting as the proposed European conference has been imagined. It is, therefore, imperative, of course, that the "multilateralization" should be effected on the broadest possible basis (enabling all the European and other directly interested countries to take part) and on one that would be widely acceptable.

All these complex and in many ways controversial trends, taken together, present an encouraging prospect. The positive tendencies can be discerned more and more clearly and so can their supporters, the courses of development are becoming more clearly outlined, the problems tackled more comprehensively, the differences -- although still considerable -- gradually reduced. Tendencies to the contrary are still at work and the opposition is still strong. However, the manner in which they have been forced to adjust shows that their positions have been undermined. In Europe, the old is definitely giving way to the new.

PROPOSALS FOR AGENDA OF ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE

Memorandum of Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers

(Soviet News, 30-6-'70)

The conference of Foreign Ministers of member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in Budapest on June 21 and 22, worked out and approved a memorandum on questions concerning the holding of an all-European conference.

The conference proposed that the agenda of the all-European conference should be expanded to include an item on "the setting up at the all-European Conference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe".

The government of the Hungarian People's Republic, in whose capital the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Treaty member-states was held, has presented the memorandum to the governments of interested states, possible participants in the all-European conference. The text of the memorandum is given below:

The governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics find it necessary to inform interested states of their views which, they believe, would be in the interests of preparing and convening an all-European Conference on Questions of Security and Co-operation in Europe.

They note with satisfaction that in the course of bilateral and multilateral consultations and exchanges of views, the positions of interested states on a number of important questions connected with an all-European conference were brought closer. The results of the consultations and exchanges of views show that the proposals advanced in Prague in October 1969 created a basis for putting preparations for the all-European Conference on to a practical plane in the very near future and for passing on, along with bilateral talks, to multilateral forms of preparing the all-European conference. It is desirable that interested states take a direct part in all stages of the preparation and arranging of the all-European conference in forms that will be found feasible, including appropriate preparatory meetings by representatives of these states.

The question of the composition of the participants in the conference has been clarified: all European states can take part in it, including the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, on an equal footing with each other and on equal terms with other European states, as well as the United States and Canada. The initiative of the Finnish government in proposing to hold the conference in Helsinki is meeting with a

positive response. An understanding exists that the holding of the conference should not be made dependent on any preliminary conditions.

The view is shared in many countries that the success of the first all-European conference -- the preparations, organization and holding of which should be the result of contributions by all interested countries -- would pave the road to a joint discussion in the future of other European problems, especially the problem of creating a firm system of European security, and that in this connection it would be useful to hold a number of all-European conferences and to set up an appropriate body of all interested countries on questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

The discussion of questions concerning the content of the work of the all-European conference and its agenda is continuing. The two items on the agenda, proposed in Prague, are in accord with the interests of ensuring security and developing co-operation in Europe and are questions on which extensive accord can be reached. These proposals do not evoke principled objections. At the same time, a number of states comes out for an expansion of the agenda of the conference.

Proceeding from the desire to reach accord on an agenda of the all-European conference that would be acceptable to all interested states, the governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics propose the inclusion on it also of the question of the setting up at the all-European Conference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

The governments which adopted the present memorandum believe that a study of the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states would serve the interests of a d é t e n t e and security in Europe. In order to create in the shortest possible period of time the most favourable conditions for the discussion of appropriate questions at the all-European conference and in the interests of securing fruitful results from the study of the question concerning the reduction of foreign armed forces, this question could be discussed in the body which it is proposed to set up at the all-European con-

ference or in another manner acceptable to interested states. They believe, moreover, that problems of the environment could be discussed within the framework of the second item of the agenda proposed in Prague, and that this item could be expanded by including into it a proposition on the development of cultural ties.

Thus, the following questions could be submitted for consideration by the all-European conference:

On ensuring European security and on the renunciation of the use of force or the threat of its use in mutual relations between states in Europe:

On the expansion of trade, economic, scientific - technical and cultural ties on an equitable basis, directed at the development of political co-operation between European states:

On the creation at the all-European conference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

The governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics express the hope that the proposals contained in the memorandum, which take into consideration the views expressed by many interested states, will meet with a favourable response from the governments concerned. These proposals are especially directed at reaching agreement on an agenda acceptable to all interested states and on methods of preparing the all-European conference. Preparations could be started in the very near future.

The governments which are putting this memorandum forward are convinced that the holding of an all-European conference, following joint efforts by all interested states, would be an important contribution to the attainment of a d é t e n t e, to the strengthening of security and to the development of peaceful co-operation in Europe.

THIRTY YEARS OF SOVIET RULE IN THE BALTIC STATES

(Radio Free Europe Research, 21-7-'70)

Summary: This year marks the 30th anniversary of Soviet rule in the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Soviet media continue to falsify history as to the nature of their incorporation into the Soviet Union and fail to mention the activities of persons and groups opposed to Soviet rule. This paper attempts to give a background for both.

Thirty years ago this summer, the Soviet Union forcibly occupied and annexed the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the heraldry that surrounds such "liberation", Soviet media continue to misinform its audience as to the true nature of this event. The latest TASS report, for example, explains "the restoration of Soviet power" as "a result of the revolutionary struggle and Latvia's voluntary joining with the fraternal family of the Soviet republics" (1) while Pravda claims that the "toilers of Lithuania voluntarily joined the socialist family of the peoples of the USSR". (2) In fact, the destiny of all three nations had been decided by two foreign powers -- Fascist Germany and the Soviet Union.

In violation of treaties made by the Soviet Government in the post-revolutionary years recognizing the independence of the Baltic states, (3) the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 included: 1) the "Secret Additional Protocol" of 23 August 1939 which stipulated that: "in the event of the territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the sphere of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R."; and 2) the "Secret Supplementary Protocol" of 28 September 1939 which recognized

(1) TASS, 19 July 1970

(2) Pravda, 18 July 1970

(3) Signed with Estonia on 2 February 1920; with Lithuania on 12 July 1920; and with Latvia on 11 August 1920

"that the territory of the Lithuanian State falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR". (4) In June of the following year, the Red Army overran all three nations. In sham elections (held while the countries were under military occupation), puppet governments were established which, within seven days of being elected, requested the incorporation of their countries into the USSR -- a request that was granted in each case by the Supreme Soviet the following month.

Failing to take the above facts into account, the Soviet press is also reluctant to mention the executions and mass deportations of over one-half million of the Baltic peoples during the first decade of Soviet rule.

Despite the severity and duration of the communist regimes, there are many indications that resistance and dissent have not been eradicated. Manifestations of dissent in the Baltic countries can be categorized as being primarily of three types: 1) a devotion to the particular nation, a reverence for its past, both cultural and political, and resistance to the encroachment of a foreign, particularly Russian, nationality; 2) a supra-national concern for human rights that transcends the boundaries of a particular nation and deals with the Soviet Union as a whole; and 3) less regard for reform and change and primary concern simply for escape through emigration.

Although censorship in the border republics is extremely rigorous, evidence of the first type of activity was provided in a Pravda article last year. The correspondent, writing from Vilnius, Lithuania complained:

There are still some people in our country who, though sharing the socialist ideology as a whole, continue to remain partially under the influence of nationalist views and traditions on one question or another.

Lenin, as is known, warned that Communists too are not insured against nationalistic mistakes.

One still encounters people who underestimate the great strength of the fraternal assistance and mutual aid among the peoples of our country and the significance

(4) Nazi-Soviet Relations, Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 78 and 107

of the exchange of cadres among the peoples of the USSR, people who sometimes express distrust for cadres of other nationalities and take a non-objective attitude toward other nationalities. Such sentiments are often manifested in an unwillingness to combat survivals among representatives of one's own nation. . . . In everyday life as a whole, survivals of nationalism still make themselves felt more forcefully than anywhere else. (5)

On the basis of the above, it seems both Communist and non-Party Lithuanians share common ground in their love of country, resistance to Moscow's policy of political, economic and cultural integration, and antipathy toward "other nationalities", a thinly veiled reference to the Russians. A specific example of the way in which this feeling manifest itself took place on 18 November (6) of last year when a number of Latvians gathered at the grave of Janis Chakste, the first President of independent Latvia. "Nearby graves were decorated with flowers -- a row of red bouquets, a row of white ones, then red again, after the colors of the Latvian national flag. Candles were lit on the graves, a row of red, a row of white, then of red. The red-and-white striped flag was raised at President Chakste's graveside". (7) Predictably, the authorities' reaction is to suppress such activity. On this occasion ten persons were arrested though released eight days later. Others have not been so fortunate. Viktor Kalnynsh, a Latvian, was arrested in 1962 for belonging to "an underground anti-Soviet nationalist organization" and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in a concentration camp. (8)

(5) Pravda, 24 January 1969

(6) The day on which a Latvian national government proclaimed independence in 1918. According to the Chronicle, "In Latvia it is almost an officially recognized date". The Chronicle of Current Events, No. 11, 31 December 1969

(7) Ibid

(8) Posev, No. 6, 1970, p. 8

A recent issue of the Chronicle lists the names of several persons in Vladimir prison "convicted for so-called nationalist cases" (9) and various issues of the Chronicle have reported the arrest of nationals from the Baltic states for anti-Soviet activity. Apparently nationalist views are so strongly held that the authorities found it expedient to arrest 84-year old Dr. Fricis Menders, one of 38 persons who in 1918 proclaimed an independent Latvia, and sentence him to five years in a concentration camp for spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. (10) Naturally, such needless repression only aggravates the situation.

On a broader plane, Baltic nationals have also participated in the inter-national movement within the Soviet Union to demand more rights for all its citizens. The Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, for example, was composed by "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic (States)" the political aims of which included: "the creation of a democratic state -- a Union of Democratic Republics, governed by representatives of all parties, non-party (i. e., independent), national, class or religious groupings of society", and a demand for ten fundamental rights and freedoms for all citizens of the Union.

In the second half of 1968, a large number of the technical intelligentsia of Estonia compiled an appeal for the democratization of Soviet society and insisted on a reconciliation between East and West, freedom of press and political activity, the liquidation of Stalinism, the liberation of all political prisoners, a fundamental transformation of the Soviet economy, and the moral rearmament of all Soviet citizens. (11)

On 13 April of the following year, Ilya Rips, a student from Riga, came near to sacrificing his life in protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Standing in Freedom Square in Riga next to the Freedom obelisk (built during the period of

(9) The Chronicle of Current Events, No. 11, 31 December 1969

(10) Arbeitet, 5 October 1969

(11) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 December 1968

Latvia's independence), he unfurled a banner proclaiming "Freedom to Czechoslovakia" and attempted self-immolation. (12)

A part of the Jewish population in the Baltic countries, however, shares neither nationalist aspirations nor the desire for reform but simply the right to leave the Soviet Union and to emigrate to Israel. Their petitions graphically describe their plight at the hands of the Communist rulers. A recent letter to U Thant and other United Nations officials signed by seven Lithuanian Jews declares: "Our only desire -- is to leave the USSR and return to the land of our fathers, to the Jewish state of Israel. . . . At present there are few of us left in Lithuania. . . it has been entirely transformed into a mute grave where 300 thousand of our brothers and sisters (comprising 87% of the Jewish community in Lithuania on the eve of the Second World War) were tormented. And today, no-one but us remembers them. Even the inscriptions in the Jewish language at the places of mass executions have been rubbed out. . . . For almost five centuries the life of part of our people glimmered here, the sons of whom in gratitude named its capital 'Yerushalaim de Lita' ('Lithuanian Jerusalem'). In Lithuania, especially in Vilnius, our distinctive culture developed, precisely here we had secondary schools in Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) and Yiddish. . . . a Hebrew Scientific Institute (IVO), many books, newspapers and journals in Ivrit and Yiddish, Hebrew theaters and clubs. This used to be, but it is no longer and will never be. . . . If Hitler's Fascists accused every Jew. . . of being a communist, then suddenly (under communist rule) we became cosmopolitans and spies, murderers in white gowns (a reference to the anti-Semitic nature of Stalin's contrived "Doctor's Plot"), currency speculators, etc. Our culture was immediately rendered leaderless -- our bards and poets were killed, as were our writers and artists, and our learned men of world-wide renown. And all because they were Jews. . . . Let us go. Let us go home!". (13)

(12) The Chronicle of Current Events, No. 7, 30 April 1969

(13) English text in Moshe Dekter (ed), Redemption: Jewish Freedom Letters from Russia, New York, 1970, pp. 84-87

According to the above, anti-semitism in Lithuania under Communism has been as bad as that under Hitler and much worse than under Tsarist or independent rule. Since Jewish emigration is discouraged and since no significant steps have been taken to eradicate anti-semitism (indeed, it has probably increased in view of the recent deluge of anti-Zionist propaganda), the appeals continue. Most recently 30 Jews from Riga asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to consider the question of emigration (14) and 28 Jewish scientists, also from Riga, appealed to foreign scholars for assistance in their attempt to emigrate to Israel. (15)

From the available information, it is not possible to predict whether these three dissident groups will ever be able to achieve their aims, but their very existence testifies to the Soviet failure either to forcibly suppress public opinion or to satisfy its needs.

DUBCEK -- WHAT THEY CAN'T FORGIVE HIM FOR

His real 'crime' was not political: it was his human sincerity

Sonia Winter

Summary: The fate of Alexander Dubcek, the former leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, has reached a crucial stage. In the past few weeks articles published daily in the Czechoslovak press have attacked his character and policies with increasing ferocity. Sonia Winter, a young writer of Czech parentage who had first-hand experience of the 1968 'Prague Spring', gives here a personal view of Dubcek - both the man and the politician.

"I am so sorry about poor Mr Dubcek", commiserates my next-door neighbour. "Such a nice man with such an open face, if you know what I mean". "Yes", I say, "I know what you mean". And indeed, these few words uttered by a middle-aged British housewife convey the essence of the Dubcek phenomenon.

Her sympathy was not for Alexander Dubcek, the lifelong communist, the former leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was never Dubcek the politician who inspired the loyalty and support of 14 million Czechs and Slovaks two years ago. It was Dubcek the man. Today, long after the politician has been stripped of all power, it is Dubcek the man who is being vilified and humiliated and persecuted far beyond the

(14) New York Times, 15 July 1970 and the Chicago Tribune, 15 July 1970

(15) The Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1970

rationale of political sacrificial offerings.

When Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as First Party Secretary in January 1968, he was virtually unknown. He seemed to be a typical Party official: born of a working class family, son of a dedicated Slovak communist, he joined the Party at 15. He was educated in the Soviet Union and had devoted his life to a career within the Czechoslovak Party apparatus.

Elected as a compromise to bridge the conflict between the conservative and progressive elements in the Central Committee, this record satisfied the hardliners, while Dubcek's criticism of Novotny's centralism gave hope to the reformers. Dubcek deeply resented the arrogance of the Prague leadership towards Slovak communists, the high-handed treatment of the intellectuals and the economic discrimination against Slovakia. He saw this as a manifestation of Novotny's dictatorial system rather than as a consequence of the practice of communism in Czechoslovakia -- a belief he acquired much later gradually and painfully. He resolved therefore to rehabilitate the Communist Party in the eyes of the population, to replace the fictional unity between Party and people with a genuine bond of mutual need and voluntary support.

Even then, many of his friends and admirers doubted the wisdom of Dubcek's appointment. One of them said to me at the time: "Dubcek is an exceedingly nice man, sincere and honest, but he is not the stuff of which First Secretaries are made. He hasn't got what it takes to be a leader".

True, there was little to impress anyone in Dubcek's appearance -- a tall, slightly gauche figure, always meticulously dressed in a dark suit, plain white shirt and sober tie, he could have been an accountant from the provinces on a weekend trip to the capital, or a minor bureaucrat on the town council. Thinning light brown hair neatly brushed back, small eyes peering from behind glasses, the quiet voice and modest unassuming manner completed the picture of a conventional white-collar worker. Only the nose was remarkable -- long and pointed, it dwarfed the rest of his features, adding a slightly comical touch.

This similarity to the "man in the street" proved, however, to be one of Dubcek's greatest assets in the most powerful office of the state. He had none of the arrogance, of the air of infallibility and righteous superiority that characterise most

communist leaders. He displayed an emotional warmth, a readiness to laugh and joke, to argue and discuss, that was utterly new in a top Party official.

He often engaged in impromptu chats and discussions, but he was essentially a shy man and was always reluctant to make a formal public appearance. Most of all he dreaded speaking on television and for a long time he evaded all efforts to get him in front of a camera. When he did finally consent (in late February 1968) it was an ordeal for everyone in the studio.

I sat watching him as he hesitantly faced the camera, his face pale and expressionless, the tension he felt spreading throughout the room. He read his text awkwardly with frequent pauses and each time he faltered and repeated himself, his glasses slipping further and further down his nose, we willed him silently to go on and get it over with. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief when the broadcast finally came to an end. Dubcek turned apologetically to a technician who happened to be the man nearest him and promised: "Next time it will be better".

Out of Frailty, Triumph

It never was better, often it was even worse, but what would have been a catastrophe for any other politician became a triumph for Dubcek. Here was a man, a fellow human being in all his frailty, and the people embraced him as one of their own. The long nose, the precariously balanced glasses, the badly read script became a familiar feature on television. So did the picture of Dubcek's attractive wife and three teenage sons. It became common knowledge that his occasional weekend trips to Trencin in Slovakia were a tribute to the city's soccer team, that the new First Secretary (now known by his diminutive, Sasha) was an enthusiastic football fan. For the first time in 20 years people paid attention not to the office, but to the man who held it.

For Dubcek, however, there was no such division. He assumed his political responsibilities with a characteristic conscientiousness, working long into the night and turning a deaf ear to his colleagues' entreaties to get some rest. His health was not particularly strong, but he would carry on regardless, even resorting to little boys' tricks to dupe the doctors. "There's so much to do", he would say repeatedly. "There's

so much to do".

Dubcek was the easiest of men to work with, always ready to listen and discuss and accept advice -- with two fatal exceptions. Against the judgement of many of his colleagues and friends, he would not resort to strong measures in dealing with his political foes, but treated them with the same humaneness that characterised all his actions. He allowed them to remain in office because he respected their long-term membership in the Party, because he believed their hypocritical proclamations of good faith, or simply because he felt sorry for them.

On one occasion the wife of Salgovic, a discredited Stalinist functionary, came to see Dubcek with a woeful tale of anonymous letters and "persecution" by the press. It touched him so deeply that a short while later he appointed the husband head of police.

Dubcek was easily swayed to emotion, but when he felt an issue to be one of moral principle nothing would persuade him to alter his decision. His surprising obstinacy on these matters proved to be politically disastrous, for it was this attitude that permitted the Stalinist diehards to retain their seats in the Central Committee throughout the Prague Spring, right up to the Soviet invasion and after. And it was his unshakeable conviction that every genuine communist, above all the Soviet communists, could not but share his ideal of creating a truly representative popular Communist Party, that rendered him blind to the nature of the opposition. He believed firmly that this arose solely from a misunderstanding of his policies and all he had to do was to explain them patiently over and over again.

The nation, however, understood. To the people Dubcek's faith meant that an era of power politics was over, that government without regard for human values was "finished". The nation respected, and was willing to follow him not because, but in spite of the fact that, he called his policy communist. Communism was given another chance in Czechoslovakia because Dubcek had lent it his "human face".

POLITICAL ACCOUNTING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from the Czechoslovak Communist Party on June 26 was the logical sequel to his gradual demotion since April, 1969, when he was replaced as party leader by Gustav Husak. Apart from ending his public

career, the Central Committee decision symbolised the winding up of the reform movement for which he stood. Indeed, virtually the only survival of the Prague Spring is the present leadership's continued commitment to legality. But although Husak emphasised again that there would be no return to the show trials of the 1950s and that no one who obeyed the laws need fear for his security, much still depends on the interpretation of the law, as well as on the resolution of any political struggle behind the scenes. Recently the evidence has been of continuing pressure by the hard-liners.

Husak's report to the Central Committee (which met on June 25 and 26) on the implementation of the May, 1969, party directives, made no mention of Dubcek, though it concentrated on the process of "cleansing" the party of undesirable elements. He revealed that at its meeting on April 14, the Presidium had decided to stiffen cadre policy because of "the growing manifestations of liberalism and the conciliatory attitude which has accompanied the exchange of party cards". According to the report on the purges presented by Milos Jakes, head of the Control and Auditing Commission, the interviews confirmed that the party had been "deeply hit by right-wing opportunism". Husak said that rectification would take a long time; at present those responsible for the past crisis were being made politically accountable, but this would not automatically eliminate the roots of trouble. While warning that the danger from the rightists was the greatest, Husak also said that the fight against them was not helped by people who weakened the party by divisive action -- even if they used "revolutionary demands and watchwords". And though he held out the prospect of stricter party controls in all State organs and more ideological indoctrination of the masses and the young, he also offered reassurances.

There would be "fair, legal but rigorous prosecution of anti-social activities", and yet "we shall not take the path of rigging so-called political trials", he said. The difficulty is that almost anything could be represented as being anti-social or not "in full harmony with our valid laws". Husak's claim that "firm foundations of social and legal certainty" have been laid down is open to doubt.

Harsher measures seemed to be foreshadowed in Husak's

criticisms of the judiciary. He complained of persisting liberalism and connivance at criminal offences of all kinds and declared that the party would not tolerate "inconsistent action against anti-social activities". The same point was made by the Federal Prime Minister, Lubomir Strougal, to the National Assembly on May 29, when he stated that the recent purge of the public prosecution offices and the courts was aimed at imposing "a precise line of policy" reflecting correct ideological principles on organs judged to have acted too independently. On May 27, the Assembly had dismissed seven Supreme Court judges, including the Chairman, Otomar Bocek, who was accused of having contributed to the "disorientation of the Court".

Reasons unexplained

A brief party resolution on the progress of "consolidation" and a list of cadre changes accompanied the publication of Husak's report on June 27. It was confirmed that as well as his party membership, Dubcek has lost his seat in the Federal Assembly and his post of Ambassador to Turkey. No reasons were given for these measures, nor was there any announcement of the expected expulsion from the Central Committee of Oldrich Cernik, who was recalled from his last government post two days before the party plenum, when Dubcek's dismissal as ambassador was first officially announced.

Two Slovaks were promoted to important party posts. Miloslav Hruskovic ceases to be a member of the party's Ideological Commission and a Federal Deputy Prime Minister to become a party Secretary and Chairman of the party Economic Commission (in place of Frantisek Penc). Matej Lucan leaves the Slovak Ministry of Education to become a Federal Deputy Prime Minister and, like Hruskovic, a Central Committee member. Five others co-opted to the Central Committee were Jan Baryl, a Secretary of the Czech Party Bureau, Jaroslav Kozesnik, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Michal Kudzej, head of the defence and security department of the Slovak party, Miroslav Mamula, party First Secretary for the North Moravian region and Zdenek Zuska, head of state and social organisations in the Czech Party Bureau -- all of whom have taken over from liberals.

The hard-line editor of the party newspaper, R u d e P r a v o

(which Husak praised for its ideological rectitude), Miroslav Moc, wrote on June 29 that Dubcek's expulsion from the party had ended another chapter in Czechoslovak party life. Judging by his charges against the fallen leader, there are forces in the country which believe that the settling of accounts has not yet gone far enough.

THE CLASS ENEMY -- THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL

(Radio Free Europe Research, 24-7-'70)

The view is generally accepted that the main causes of the unscientific approach to crime lies in the idealized, voluntaristically interpreted thesis about survivals from the past in the minds of the people, and in the theses about the class-enemy attitude of the deposed bourgeoisie as the main causes of lawbreaking. (Professor D. Ladislav Schubert, Director of the Institute of Criminology, General Prosecutor's Office, in Pravnik No. 6, June 1965).

This view is by no means generally accepted today. Lt. Col Rudolf Pathy, Head of the Federal Center of Criminal Investigation, has recently said the very opposite:

Some survivals in the thinking of the people alien to the cause of socialism.... are strongly supported... by the actions of the internal and especially the external enemy.... It is certainly not accidental that a serious increase in the incidence of violations of the law has been particularly evident since the beginning of the Sixties, when theories about a complete overcoming of class antagonism began to be advanced (Zivot Strany No. 14, 6 July 1970).

The Czech Minister of Justice, Dr. Jan Nemeč, advanced a similar theory when he said that the incidence of lawbreaking has been evaluated wrongly since 1960 and is in conflict with the facts, because the number of violations of the law in the 1962-1969 period had risen by 50 per cent (Radio Prague, 14 July 1970). Nemeč went even further than Pathy when, mentioning the increasing number of fires, he said that this trend was not fortuitous, but was due to direct action by the

forces of subversion. He did not substantiate this statement, however.

These coincident statements by two representatives of the present establishment form a new peak in a campaign which has already lasted some months. The tenor of everything that has been written on the subject is clear and uniform. The incidence of violations of the law rose by 7 per cent in 1968, i. e., several times faster than in the preceding years; and in the first half of 1969 it actually went up by 20.4 per cent. On the other hand, the number of offenders apprehended is falling constantly; this decline is viewed as a direct result of the reforms introduced after January 1968.

According to Pathy, in 1968 and 1969 the newspapers, radio, and television made concerted efforts to discredit the police and the judiciary. "Support from the public" (a euphemism for denunciation) was no longer forthcoming, and the relaxation of the central management of the economy created favorable conditions for criminal offenses in that field. Illicit enterprise became rampant.

Pathy indicated the measures which had been taken to stem this tide of offenses: investigation and prosecution of those who engage in trading without permission, who speculate, or buy foreign currency; raids on bars where, allegedly, the police found many persons who were supposed to be at work at the time. He admitted that the flushing out of shirkers was not really a job for the police, but said that he could not keep silent about these things because "floaters and loafers are a breeding ground for crime...."

Nemeč's statement about the duties of the judiciary was made at a recent meeting of judges (Radio Prague, 14 July 1970). He asked them to implement the Party line consistently and reminded them that they are a part of the power structure of the "socialist" state. He described penalties imposed by the district courts as too mild. These observations by the Czech Minister of Justice amount to massive pressure on the judges by the justice department. And the Czech judges are not the only victims of this interference: the Slovak Minister of Justice, Dr. Felix Vasečka, told the Slovak judges recently that it was their duty to protect "the will of the ruling class". A judge who interpreted his official duties in this spirit did not

require instructions, Vasecka said (apparently judges who saw their office in a different light did need "instructions"), and judges could boldly exercise this kind of "independence", because they were doing so "in the spirit of the policies of the Party and in the interest of fulfilling the function of the socialist state" (Nove Slovo, 11 June 1970).

It is hardly surprising that at the conference held under Nemeč's chairmanship, the judges penitently declared that they were aware of their shortcomings and that they were determined to step up the "struggle against liberalism" in judicial decisions.

ARMS AND THE (RUSSIAN) CHILD

'Little Octobrists', aged 7-10, on parade

George Embree

For the last two-and-a-half years the Russians have considerably intensified their already substantial military indoctrination of children from the moment they enter kindergarten. This is the chief conclusion of S.A. Paas, a professional Dutch officer who specialises in Soviet affairs.

Writing in the Dutch magazine Oost-West, he points out that military education and indoctrination for school children existed under the Czars and has always been a part of the Soviet ideological training. But a revision of the compulsory military conscription law of January 1, 1968, included provisions for para-military instruction in the schools to be taught by reserve officers under the command of General A.I. Adintsov, who heads the Ministry of Defence's para-military training operations. This is the first time professional soldiers have been given school teaching jobs, he points out.

The 1958 education law provided for military-political education to begin in kindergarten, where patriotism, hatred for the West, and respect for the Communist Party and the army are taught. In addition to such courses, during grade school about 30 per cent of the gymnastic classes had to be devoted to military-oriented sports. During secondary school 50 class hours a year had to deal with purely military subjects.

Instruction however, was in the hands of regular teachers, who

concentrated their attention on the communist youth organisations, the "Little Octobrists" (7-10 years-of-age) and the "Pioneers" (10-14). "It's highly doubtful that teachers were completely enthusiastic about this programme, because of their already heavy teaching schedules and their lack of military experience", Paas writes.

All the Skills

This failure to implement the existing law, plus Moscow's decision to cut military service from three to two years, were the chief reasons for the new legislation, he believes. The schools are now, in effect, responsible for indoctrinating new recruits and giving them basic instruction in such purely military skills as firing a full range of weapons (everything from pistols to anti-tank weapons) and even basic tactics.

Children attending Russian ten-year schools, which combine grade and secondary education, must receive 15 hours a year of civil defence training taught by reserve officers when they are 11-13. Between 14 and 17 they receive 140 hours of pure military instruction in classes of no more than 10 students each, to ensure each boy or girl masters the subjects. "An additional 140 hours a year is required during vacations and takes the form of manoeuvres in the field", reports Paas.

To ensure the success of this phase each school is "adopted" by army units at local camps, which the kids visit regularly during their "free" time for instruction in the use of weapons, military traditions, tactics, etc.

Upon graduation they are conscripted into the army for two years. "The trade schools are given the special job of turning out skilled young people already trained to take over specialised military jobs such as radar operators, communications technicians, and mechanics".

The training programme for young people who leave school at 14 is less exacting, even though it is just as well organised by the factories and collective farms where they work.

"The Soviet leadership clearly doesn't want this instruction to interfere with the production process", Paas comments.

The "voluntary" communist organisations such as the "Pioneers" have been clearly given the job of stimulating interest

in the army by making a "game" out of war which 10-14 year-old boys and girls are encouraged to play.

The Moscow publication Kalendarj sjkolnika of August 8, 1969, gives some idea of how realistic this "game" is made: "It's 10 o'clock in the morning, and outside the school the 'Blue' (army) has assembled. Their orders are to capture the fortifications. The 'Green' (army) hasn't arrived yet. The commander of the 'Pioneer' unit called the 'Sputnik' gives his officers their orders: 'By-pass the enemy, who is already on the move; capture the nearby hill and defend it at all costs until reinforcements arrive' ".

'Sharpshooter' Medals

Another "voluntary" group is DOSAAF, a well-established Soviet civil defence organisation. Everything points to it having been given a new leading role in para-military training of young people, particularly those who have left school to work in the factories and on the collective farms.

Since 1965 it has organised military-oriented sports programmes which offer medals to the kids who qualify as being "Ready for the Defence of the Fatherland". It also gives courses which award "Young Seaman" and "Young Sharpshooter" medals to those who successfully complete them.

Soviet press comment about the success of this para-military training is mixed. M. V. Seremenko, Party Committee Secretary for the city of Mogiljev-Podolski, recently reported in Kommunist Vooroezjonnich sil that training in the local factories is excellent. However, M. Nazirov wrote in Wojennie Znanja in 1968: "Para-military training in the schools still has not been properly organised. Only a small number of schools have actually adopted the new system. . . . (There is still too little experience and co-operation in this instruction".

STRUGGLE TO REGAIN ITS FEET

(Financial Times, 16-7-'70)

One year short of its 50th anniversary, the "great, glorious and correct" Chinese Communist Party still does not exist as

a viable nationwide organisation. The process of restoring it to life after the Cultural Revolution is infinitely slow and introspective -- this month's 49th Party anniversary drew rather less publicity in Peking than Prince Sihanouk's triumphant visit to North Korea and the anniversary of the Korean War.

It is enough to make the student of Communist affairs, steeped in the Leninist gospel of an omnipotent Party, give up in despair. The sinologist can only humbly explain to his sovietologist friend that they order these things differently in China. Early in 1966 all Party organisations were placed in suspense except for those at the top (the Central Committee and Politburo) and those at army level or above in the armed forces. In April last year the ninth Party Congress elected a new Central Committee to replace the surviving Maoist rump; the Party had begun to rebuild itself lower down the scale a few months earlier.

The next rung

Nearly two years later, the Party has only regained the use of its limbs in a few places, and it is still totally trunkless. The Chinese Press has publicised the establishment of a fair number of local Party branches, and a much smaller number of Party Committees at the level of "county". The next rung on the ladder, the province, continues to be served throughout China by the hybrid "revolutionary committees" which replaced the Party organisations all over the country during the Cultural Revolution.

The political picture in China to-day easily lends itself to the worst of interpretations. These "revolutionary committees" are officially defined as a triple alliance between the army -- which assumed so much responsibility for running the country while the Cultural Revolution was at its height, the "revolutionary cadres" (those officials who took the Maoist side), and the representatives of the Red Guards and other "mass organisations". Perhaps inevitably, the army representatives dominate the leadership of these committees in most cases. So here we have a situation where the Party struggles to regain its footing on ground already pre-empted by the all-powerful army.

This explanation makes sense in terms of power politics, but the sinologist must again explain, with humility and some fear of being thought hopelessly naive, that this is not the Chinese way. Certainly the Cultural Revolution has left a legacy

of a greatly increased military influence in running the country. But probably of more importance are the new attitudes engendered by the Cultural Revolution in Chinese civilian society towards political participation and the expression of dissent. The Party has indeed lost prestige and standing, but less so by comparison with the army than with the "masses" who became politically active and assertive (often in pursuit of their own sectarian interests) during the Cultural Revolution.

Hence one of the major and most frequently highlighted problems to-day is to restore the Party member's badly eroded sense of confidence, to make him both feel like and behave like an "advanced element of the proletariat" -- the key Maoist phrase in a recent People's Daily editorial on the Party anniversary. Recently he has been urged to do so in terms which could never have been used in the more egalitarian days of the Cultural Revolution. In Fukien province he has been told "not to regard himself as an ordinary person".

At the same time -- and here is the familiar Maoist contradiction -- the Party member (and much more so the Party leader) must come from the masses and stay close to them. To some extent the delay in Party rebuilding may be caused by a genuine process of protracted consultation and debate, which also helps to ensure that the leadership represents the various interest groups which become more vocal in the Cultural Revolution.

The more obvious source of delay in Party rebuilding -- obstruction by the revolutionary committees -- certainly has been a factor in the past year, but it seems to be on the wane, except in a few places where factional disunity was especially pronounced.

In cases like that of Yunnan where the struggle to set up revolutionary committees was long and fiercely contested by the popular factions, people may argue that it is better not to upset the compromise result by starting all over again with the Party.

Once the Party group has been set up, it must still establish its authority over the revolutionary committee. In theory the former "exercises leadership" over the latter; in practice it may not be so easy, especially when the membership of the two bodies overlaps, but the principle of Party leadership is being made increasingly clear.

However, a recent definition of this relationship from Shanghai, coined at the No. 17 Cotton Mill (a celebrated "model" for Party building in the Chinese Press) introduces a new note of ambiguity. It explains that the Party should only make decisions on "major questions", rather than "monopolise all activities". Thus the revolutionary committee would still retain some initiative for policy-making; one can imagine the demarcation disputes to which this concession might lead.

Whether the Party is fully revived in time for next year's 50th anniversary remains to be seen, although that is presumably the intention. Since May there has been a fresh spurt in Party building, and much more emphasis on observing the Party constitution. But any shift leftwards in national policy which lays more stress on "class struggle" and on the role of mass criticism is likely to slow the pace again. A slight shift leftwards has in fact been detected by some observers recently, though the evidence is not conclusive. Politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih, the man who ran Peking and kept it on an even keel during the Cultural Revolution, has disappeared from sight since the middle of March, amid rumours that he is under criticism for his earlier handling of one of the "ultra-Left" Red Guard groups.

Only country

The future shape of the leadership could become clearer later this summer, when, according to some indications, the National People's Congress may be held. This is the highest organ of State (as distinct from Party) power, and it will have to redefine the whole apparatus of government and administration in the country which, like the Party, has been largely submerged in the revolutionary committees. (It may also tell us who is Minister of which Ministry -- China must be the only country in the world on which we lack this basic information).

What we shall not learn from the Congress or from any other expression of national policy is the real shape and texture of political life at the local level. Nor may it be entirely clear to the Chinese leadership itself. But we can predict with some safety that the monolithic Leninist Party, all-powerful and unquestioned by the masses, is a thing of the past.

FIDEL ADMITS IT, FAITH IS NOT ENOUGH

After the bungling, will the technocrats be given a chance in Cuba?

Robert Moss

Summary: Fidel Castro's extraordinary admissions of widespread political and economic mismanagement in Cuba have deservedly drawn worldwide attention. In this article Robert Moss, a specialist in Latin American affairs who has travelled widely in the region, reviews the Cuban leader's confessional speech -- and singles out some significant implications.

"Our enemies say we have problems, and frankly, our enemies are right". Eleven years after he came to power, Castro was admitting failure. He was speaking to a crowd of 150,000 in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución on Sunday, July 26. It was a double occasion: the anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks that started the Cuban revolution back in 1953, and the official end of the sugar harvest that has gone on for the best part of a year -- the longest spate of cane-cutting in Cuban history.

For 24 hours, the Cubans were let loose with rum and cigarettes and music to catch up on all the holidays they have missed since Castro's drive for revolutionary austerity got under way two years ago. But for Castro himself, there was no cause for celebration. The sugar harvest was a record crop -- 8.5 million tons -- and more than enough to comfortably fill the Cuban quotas in Europe and the Soviet bloc. But it was a very long way short of the magic target of 10 million tons that all of Cuba's propaganda media have been booming out over the past year. All Castro's battle-rhetoric -- the product of the siege-mentality that made him urge workers to get out into the fields and chop down the weeds nicknamed "Uncle Sam" and "Don Carlos" -- suddenly sounded hollow. And the failure to reach the target could not simply be blamed on mechanical defects, heavy rains, and a "conspiracy" of traitors and exiles. The whole system was at fault: the desperate haste, the lack of careful planning, the sheer wastage of manpower through over-regimentation and the failure to understand that men work best

for rewards.

Castro's speech on July 26 was an attempt to come to terms with his mistakes. He confessed not only that the harvest had been mismanaged, but that an obsessive concern with the cane-cutting had damaged most other sectors of the economy. With remarkable frankness, he recited a series of figures that revealed stagnation or decline in most of the lesser industries. Cuba has been trying to build up to lessen its perilous dependence on sugar for 85 per cent of the export income. The milk supply was down by 25 per cent, cement production dropped by 23 per cent (from 1968) and the manufacture of soap and detergents was down by 32 per cent. There was even 11 per cent less toothpaste available than last year. Sagging production often reflected a crippling diversion of manpower to the canefields. Cane-cutters were often forced to work in shoes without soles, for example, because the shoe factories were desperately short of men and were suffering from a rate of absenteeism even higher than the appalling national average of 15 per cent.

The "great leap" into the canefields had other harmful side-effects. Trucks and cars were commandeered to move sugar-cane, while vital imports piled up at the docks awaiting delivery. Huge stockpiles of fertilisers have failed to reach the farmers. And there were only two-thirds as many private passengers as there were last year.

Short of everything

These figures fail to convey just how badly the standard of living has slumped in Cuba. Havana has become the city that is short of everything, where you have to queue for three hours to buy an ice cream and have to queue on Monday to get a table in a café on Saturday. Castro admitted in his speech that there is a general spirit of defeat and disillusionment. It seems that his idea that men can be made to work well without material incentives has misfired. His Russian advisers are said to have been telling him for some time that the only way to get things moving again is to install a system of rewards commensurate with labour. Castro has been trying to make the Cubans function on faith alone -- on the idea that they are fighting a crusade against "Yankee oppression" and backwardness. That faith has now worn thin.

In an extraordinary moment during his speech, Castro shouldered personal responsibility for his country's ills. "The problem is the responsibility of the leadership and mine in particular". He even offered to resign if the people wanted it. That offer should not be taken too seriously. Castro can play the prima donna to perfection, and this was one of those moments when, by threatening to walk out, he wanted to make his audience tell him to stay. But he may be planning radical changes in the administration.

Early in July, Castro threw out two of his cabinet ministers. One of them, Francisco Pardon, minister responsible for the sugar industry, was a predictable casualty of the disillusionment following the harvest. The other, Jose Llanusa, minister for education, was an old crony of Castro's and his replacement -- a bright young army technocrat called Major Castilla Mas -- may be the spearhead of a "technocratic takeover" in Cuban politics. The party hacks (uneducated men from the hills unfitted for the tasks of promoting economic development) have held power for too long.

Todor puts his foot in it

In recent years, Cuba has been drilled and militarised. Soldiers ran the sugar-harvest, and men in uniform now head many of the public corporations, and even the lunatic asylums. Regimentation and rule from above are symptoms of popular disappointment with life in Castro's Cuba. Castro acknowledged in his speech that workers have lost motivation and should be allowed to participate more fully in the administration of factories and plantations. He has projected a new type of committee system for industry. But this may fall into the trap of merely adding to the amateurism of Cuba's managerial class. Cuba is desperately short of experts. That is only partly because so many trained men have sought refuge in what Castro calls "the dolce vita of Miami". It is also because students and professional men are made to spend far too much of their time wielding machetes or fitting bolts beside the men on the factory-floors -- possibly an admirable egalitarian approach, but hopelessly wasteful.

Castro had one sop for his audience. After his speech, he disclosed that the hands of Che Guevara (rescued by the Bolivian

defector, Antonio Arguedas) are going to be put on display in Havana. Some of the crowd looked a little happier when they heard the news. But the only man who seemed confident that all is well was Castro's guest, Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria's Prime Minister), who seems to have been without an interpreter, since he stood up after Castro, sublimely oblivious to all that had gone before, and congratulated him on Cuba's prosperity.

E C O N O M I C S

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The path to strengthening peace in Europe

(Soviet News, 30-6-'70)

Europe can and must be a continent of fruitful co-operation, an area of peace and mutual understanding, says Nikolai Patolichev, the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade, writing in *P r a v d a* on June 18.

In his article, published under the heading "Economic Co-operation -- The Road to the Strengthening of Peace in Europe", Nikolai Patolichev says that socialist countries, in proposing that an all-European conference should discuss the question of expanding trade, economic, scientific and technical relations between European states, are proceeding on the basis of the fact that "a general European agreement on the development of trade and economic, scientific and technical co-operation would be an effective means of strengthening mutually beneficial economic and political relations.

"An agreement of this kind", he writes, "would help to bring about a more rational and effective solution to problems posed by the scientific and technical revolution".

He points out that the USSR is one of the biggest trading powers of the world. Last year, its foreign trade turnover amounted to nearly 20,000 million roubles.

Soviet trade and economic, scientific and technical co-operation are developing particularly intensively with socialist countries, and above all with the member-states of Comecon.

At present, about 600 Soviet research and design organisations and enterprises have joint plans with more than 700 organisations in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. International research centres concerned with different branches of science are being set up.

Pointing out that the USSR's trade, economic, scientific and technical relations with developed capitalist countries have recently been becoming more extensive and diversified, he notes that Soviet trade turnover with t h o s e countries increased

from 1,200 million roubles in 1958 to 4,300 million roubles in 1969. Included in this is an increase from 1,100 million to 3,500 million roubles in the case of trade with countries in Western Europe.

He writes that the reasonable approach displayed by government and business circles in France to co-operation with the Soviet Union has resulted both in a strengthening of inter-state relations and in an expansion of mutually beneficial business ties.

Sound basis

Trade turnover with Britain has increased by more than 50 per cent since 1965, amounting to 600 million roubles in 1969.

Nikolai Patolichev notes the stability of Soviet economic relations with Finland and points out that the USSR's trade with Sweden, Holland, Austria and other west European countries is developing actively.

He goes on to say that the Soviet Union's economic ties with capitalist countries are closely intertwined with scientific and technical co-operation.

All this, he writes, points to the fact that there already exists a great deal of experience in the sphere of trade and economic, scientific and technical co-operation which can serve as a sound basis for the further development of this co-operation and at the same time for the solution of general European political questions.

At the same time, he continues, it is necessary to state that the trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation between socialist and capitalist countries would have been greater and the scope of the trade turnover would have been more in keeping with the economic potential of these countries if certain artificial barriers erected in the way of this development had been removed.

"These obstacles", he writes, "are the aggressive policy of NATO, the maintenance of the ban on the export of so-called 'strategic' goods to socialist countries, the quantitative restrictions in western countries on exports from socialist countries, and the existence of exclusive economic groupings in Europe, especially the Common Market, which has erected protectionist barriers against countries not belonging to that grouping.

"Pressure by imperialist circles in the United States also plays a considerable negative role. The policy of discrimination in trade runs counter to the trend towards the development of all-European co-operation and is objectively in contradiction with the solution of general European problems".

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN 1969

(Radio Free Europe Research, 15-7-'70)

Summary: This paper gives the first details of Soviet foreign trade turnover in 1969. The growth of trade with the "socialist" countries was again slower than with the capitalist world, since China, Cuba and Yugoslavia all recorded setbacks, whereas W. Germany, Italy, France, Japan and the US made major advances.

The first detailed statistics on foreign trade last year have now been released in Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (No. 6, 1979). The turnover rose by about 10%, from 18 billion rubles to 19.8 billion. As usual, exports exceeded imports by a substantial margin (10.5 billion rubles compared with 9.3 billion).

As a percentage of total Soviet foreign trade, business done with the "socialist" countries continued to decrease last year, although in absolute figures it rose substantially from 12.2 billion rubles to 12.9 billion. It is now down to about 66.7% (1) compared with 67.8% in 1967 and 67.4% in 1968. For individual countries, the figures are given below:

	Soviet Foreign Trade Volume (millions of rubles)		
	1967	1968	1969
Bulgaria	1382	1657	1754
Hungary	1064	1210	1277
GDR	2546	2801	3031
Poland	1633	1873	2091
Rumania	737	786	833
N. Vietnam	152	159	186
N. Korea	196	264	295
Mongolia	224	222	224
China	96	86	51
Cuba	842	812	770
Yugoslavia	462	456	425

(1) M. Kuzmin, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, No. 6, 1970

Points to note include the expansion of trade with North Vietnam (although these figures do not cover arms supplies). The whole of the growth was in Soviet exports, since imports from Hanoi actually decreased from 16 to 15 million rubles. In the case of North Korea as well, the growth of Soviet exports was much greater than of imports.

Concerning China, the bulk of the drop was in Soviet exports, which fell from 53 million rubles to 25 million during the year. Imports also decreased from 33 million to 26 million. The outlook for 1970 must now be a little better, if it is eventually confirmed that China has accepted the nomination of V. Stepanov as Soviet ambassador to Peking.

In the case of Mongolia, Soviet trade is still stagnant, as it was in 1967-68, but with exports running four times as fast as imports.

Cuba is an example of a steadily decreasing trade exchange, and Cuba now is a less important trade partner than Rumania, for the first time since 1966. Cuba is also a much more expensive partner, with Soviet exports to the island now running at a rate about three times as fast as imports.

Trade with Yugoslavia has been falling for the past two years, but in this case exports and imports are almost in balance, as is usual with all the East European countries.

As regards trade with the major capitalist nations, there have been some notable developments.

Soviet Trade Turnover (millions of rubles)

	1967	1968	1969
Britain Turnover	450	576	600
Soviet Exports	273	330	384
" Imports	178	246	216
F.R.G. Turnover	319	394	497
Soviet Exports	172	189	199
" Imports	146	205	298
Italy Turnover	348	396	493
Soviet Exports	209	209	208
" Imports	139	188	285
France Turnover	299	388	417
Soviet Exports	130	123	127
" Imports	169	265	291

	1967	1968	1969
Japan Turnover	467	519	559
Soviet Exports	318	352	321
" Imports	149	166	237

If these trends continue, Japan is likely to overtake Britain as the USSR's largest trade partner in the free world at some time during 1970. Moreover, Britain now exports much less to the USSR than any of the others in the "big five", but still imports much more than all the rest.

U. S. trade with the USSR almost doubled in 1969, up from 89,000,000 rubles in 1968 to 160 million. Most of the improvement was due to U. S. exports which rose by 54,000,000 rubles to 105,000,000. Soviet exports to the U.S.A. went up less rapidly, from 39 million to 54 million. The evidence suggests that the U. S./Soviet trade expansion will continue in 1970, since it consists largely of machine-tools for the Fiat plant at Togliatti, which is not yet completed.

It looks as though the growth of Soviet foreign trade in 1970, at about 10%, was only slightly below the world average, which has been estimated by GATT's Secretariat at about 13.5% (2) in value, of which 2-1/2% is accounted for by greater volume. But the rise in Soviet exports seems to have been considerably below the growth rate for exports of the industrialized countries, which averaged some 15%, subject to the same qualification concerning prices.

During 1970, Moscow has received a credit of \$ 810 million from France for 1970-75, (3) \$ 400 million from West Germany for 12 years, (4) and about \$ 200 million from Italy. (5) Moreover, if the Kama truck plant is eventually contracted out to a European consortium (Franco-German?), as now seems probable, another \$ 300 million or more of long-term credit would be forthcoming, mainly from West Germany. With financing on this massive scale already available or in prospect, the chances are that Soviet trade with the industrialized nations of the West and with Japan will continue to grow faster than

(2) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 February 1970

(3) AFP, 13 March 1970

(4) Christian Science Monitor, 31 January 1970

(5) Part of the natural gas deal, see The Times, 11 December 1969

Comecon trade, at least until the end of the 1971-75 plan.

END OF ENTERPRISE COUNCILS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 17-7-'70)

On 16 June 1970, the Bratislava evening paper Vecernik briefly noted that the federal government had "recently quashed all resolutions concerning enterprise councils and had abolished with immediate effect any bodies of this kind which still exist. The ideological substantiation of this radical move was provided by federal Vice-Minister of Planning Nikolaj Zlocha, on July 7. In an interview with the Ceteka news agency he claimed that the government resolution on enterprise councils (of June 1968) had been cancelled because it was "a result of gross subjective and demagogic pressures" in the framework of a "right-wing and antisocialist strife".

Using much dogmatic verbiage, Zlocha declared the aim of the enterprise councils to have been the complete destruction of a unified system of management, deprivation of the Party of its leading role in the economy, introduction of "group ownership" as opposed to "ownership by the whole of the people", and the removal of Communists from trade unions. The Vice-Minister emphatically denied that the abolition of enterprise councils precluded workers' participation in economic management. As a substitute for this "revisionist" venture he suggested -- though in general and vague terms only -- "a new harmonious system" of directing and advisory activities in the context of which the workers' interests would be safeguarded.

The governmental decision and Zlocha's statement mark the official end of a shortlived but extremely popular experiment in self-management. The origin of enterprise councils goes back to the Dubcek era, and they resulted from studies by Czechoslovak economists (headed by Ota Sik) which were designed to improve economic management under "socialism" by personally involving all categories of working people, and adding genuine control from below to direction from above. The practical implementation of the project was given the green light in June 1968, and met with an enthusiastic response in major enterprises, especially in the Czech Lands. By early March 1969, about 500 enterprise councils had been constituted (see Oldrich

Cernik's statement over Radio Prague, 6 March 1969). Since the establishment of new councils was halted in October 1968 as a result of the August 1968 invasion and occupation, it follows that they had been formed, at least in their preparatory stage, within a period of only four to five months (for a sociological study of the popularity of enterprise councils, see Czechoslovak SR/16, RFER, 17 April 1970, Item 2).

The enterprise councils have met with the same fate as other major progressive ventures initiated during the 1968 thaw. Their doom actually began in October 1968 when Karel Polacek, then Czechoslovak trade union chief, declared on return from the Soviet Union that enterprise councils weakened the role of trade unions. Soon afterwards, the most active enterprise council in the Republic, that in the Plzen Skoda Engineering Works, was forced to dissolve (see Czechoslovak SR/98, RFER, 13 November 1969, Item 4). Similar moves followed in other major enterprises.

It remains unclear what kind of workers' "participation" is to replace this foray in "progressive socialism". The theoretical answer should be provided in the Law on Socialist Enterprise, which has been repeatedly postponed and is still under discussion. There is little doubt, however, that the legislation, when it comes, will have to fit into the overall centralistic system of planned management. In such a model, control from below has little effect, while enterprise autonomy and business initiative play at best a secondary role.

RUSSIA GRANTS ICL SPECIAL TRADING STATUS

(The Times, 7-8-'70)

International Computers has been granted "fully accredited" status by the protocol department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Trade, a spokesman for the company said yesterday. It has thus become the second British group to gain a firm foothold in the Soviet Union.

The first was M. Golodetz, the London import/export merchanting business which handles I. C. L. 's trade with other agencies and established a landmark in Soviet trade relations from the fact of being the first foreign company to win such status.

The advantages of fully accredited status are manifold. They include permission to set up permanent offices with its own telex facilities; visa-free entry and officially allocated dwellings for resident British staff, as well as permission to hire Russian personnel. These facilities are available as a rule only to diplomatic and press personnel.

Other ancillary advantages are that staff can shop in Moscow's hard currency stores, register cars and import office furniture without having to pay duty.

About 30 foreign firms have the same privilege -- they include Renault and Sifal from France, Fiat, Montecatini-Edison and ENI from Italy, the Dutch Stemmler-Imex and a number of other European and Japanese firms -- most of them trading organizations.

All other exporters to Russia have to base themselves in temporary quarters, usually hotel accommodation.

In I. C. L. 's case the permission to take up permanent residence concerns two employees. The company has already hired five Russian nationals: among them a systems analyst, a driver and three secretaries. Soviet nationals are hired through the U. P. D. K., government employment agency, which fixes salaries and terms of employment.

The British company has yet to find permanent offices and to set up a private telex link, but the fact that it has joined the select community of foreign firms "augurs well for the future", said Ralph Lard, manager for the U. S. S. R., especially as I. C. L. is the only Western computer manufacturer in this category.

Russian orders for I. C. L. equipment exceed £ 8 m. while the value of installed computers is over £ 4 m.

THE APPEAL OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 10-7-'70)

Summary: The work of Western management consultant firms received good grades in an evaluation of their results by the Dean of the Moscow Institute of National Economics. It was clearly indicated that the Soviet industrial system could well apply the methodology of

the MC firms as an aid toward rational use of resources and to assure maximalization of profits.

Ever alert to learn of new innovations and technology from Western sources, following the behest of Lenin, the Soviets have had a hard look at one of the modern developments in the capitalist business world and found it of "pronounced interest".

Writing in the literary weekly, a leading Soviet source of new ideas in fields other than literature, the Dean of the Moscow Institute of National Economics described the effective contribution management consulting firms have made to the development of private and public enterprises and institutions in the West. (1) The implication was rather clear that the Soviet industrial system could well use the methodology of the management consultant firms as an aid toward rational use of resources and to assure maximalization of profits. Although an editorial comment reminds the reader that "the Soviet economy is free of market fluctuation and competition and functions under the laws of the planned development of a socialist economy", nonetheless the operational methods of the management consultant firms are "of decided interest to us".

The Dean leads off with the query:

When a person becomes sick he consults a doctor; when a business firm gets "sick" to whom does it turn? In the Western world, management consulting firms play the role of the doctor.

The growth of the Management Consultants (M. C.) firms has been spectacular. In Great Britain during the last decade they have tripled and their personnel now number about 3,000 consultants. In continental Europe the volume of business based on fees reaches 29 million £ sterling a year, while in the USA it is five times greater. Private industry is the main area of operation, but in recent years government agencies have also begun to turn to M. C. to maximize resources and administrative inputs, the Dean maintained.

The services of M. C. firms are usually called in when a firm's business is not progressing satisfactorily, when profits decline, the Dean said. The M. C. then examines every aspect of the firm and apart from suggesting remedies in the reallocation of labor, capital and management they often analyze the wants

(1) Literaturnaya gazeta, 24 June 1970, p. 10

of a particular product, the need for product changes, new markets, promotion and overall reorganization to maximize profits, according to the Dean. In the Galbraithian analysis, however, a prime motive would be the self-perpetuation of higher management, a goal, needless to say, of Soviet management, too.

M. C. firms operate internationally and concern themselves with EEC problems, tariff issues and competitive aspects of industries. A knowledge of what competitors are doing is also one of the main points in the sales appeal of M. C. s. The Dean may have been impressed with this aspect, and it is not inconceivable that some Soviet plant managers may toy with the idea of getting such assistance, particularly in technological innovations. The Dean described a Japanese shipbuilding firm which hired an English M. C. for 40,000 £ sterling to figure out ways to reduce costs of constructing marine power plants. After two years study of foreign firms the M. C. came up with a new approach to building which saved the company 1.8 million £ sterling a year.

Even profitable firms hire M. C. s, the Dean said. It provides a sound analysis to compare one firm's technique of operations with another's: the analysis done by an independent professional group of experts who often have a knowledge of the technology of the competitors.

The personnel of the M. C. s impressed the Dean. In a visit to the American firm, A. D. Little, he found 700 scientific workers of a wide array of specialties; almost every profession was represented. The average man was from 28 to 35 years of age, with graduate training, one who had spent some time in industry and was generally a later graduate of a business management school. The work of the M. C. s is so challenging and rewarding that the M. C. s have no trouble getting the top men in a field; the "birds-eye view of industry is more challenging" than work in a line sector of an enterprise.

The work of the M. C. s has won for it a lasting place in the economy of the capitalist countries, the Dean concluded. In England, he claimed, about one-third of the effective growth in production can be traced to the sound work of the management consultant firms.

Apart from the news value, what would prompt the Dean of

the faculty for planning industrial production at the Moscow Institute of National Economy to report so positively on the effectiveness of the M. C. s in the capitalist countries? By contrast, in the Soviet Union most firms are on "khozaschet", cost accounting, with their own staff of economists-engineers-et al. specialists to analyze operations. Their end product is much the same as in private firms: profits, prices, increased labor productivity, capital productivity. Besides, frequent inspections for "control" are carried out by ministries and/or central boards (glavki), whose work generally leads to confusion and apathy at plant level. The factories are a part of the hierarchical system of administration. One cannot imagine a plant director protesting against a ministerial order, an order usually based on infra-structure inspecting committees. The appeal of the M. C. s, particularly to those plants converted to independent khozaschet (an important improvement which in practice means that they are not paid from the budget of the ministries but by the plants which those ministries direct), lies in the independent, impartial analysis of outside experts to improve realistically the profits and well-being of the plant and the tenure of management.

C U L T U R E

FRENCH FILM ON STALINISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Radio Free Europe Research, 16-7-'70)

Summary: The Confession, a film made in France by the Greek director Costa Gavras and starring Yves Montand and his wife Simone Signoret, was recently shown in Zagreb before a selected audience. The film produced extremely friendly responses because of its anti-Stalinist message. After its showing a round-table discussion took place in which Lise London (the wife of Arthur London whose life is the subject of the film), Yves Montand, Costa Gavras and script-writer Jorge Semprun explained why they found it necessary to make a film which both the extreme Right and extreme Left call "anti-Communist".

Yves Montand, the famous French leftist film star, stated recently in Yugoslavia that his friendly attitude toward Soviet Communism changed "on the day Imre Nagy was killed". (1) Montand, his wife Simone Signoret -- also a well-known film personality -- Costa Gavras, the Greek-born film director, Jorge Semprun, a script-writer, and Lise London, the wife of Arthur London (Czechoslovakia's deputy Foreign Minister in the early Fifties and one of the defendants in the show trial of Rudolf Slansky in 1952) recently visited Zagreb to attend the premiere of Gavras' film The Confession, which was taken from the book of the same name by Lise and Arthur London and filmed in France.

The film, which describes Stalinist methods in extorting false accusations from alleged "lackeys of Tito" and "traitors",

(1) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 15 July 1970 (Imre Nagy was the Hungarian Prime Minister during the fateful October 1956 anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary. He was executed by the Russians in 1958).

had been shown only in France prior to its premiere in Yugoslavia and has provoked lively debate. The Zagreb screening was by invitation only, but afterwards the editorial board of Vjesnik u srijedu staged a public round-table discussion which was later published in the weekly.

Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia Attacked

During the discussion the Yugoslavs expressed their enthusiasm for Gavras' new film -- just as they did after seeing his film Z which is critical of the rightist dictatorship in Greece. The Confession -- an obviously anti-Soviet film -- has been called "anti-Communist" both by the extreme Right and extreme Left. To these groups Gavras answered: "Communism was severely damaged by the Stalinist system, especially by what is described in my film. By telling the truth about the Stalinist system we prove that we have not lost our faith in Communism, a point which is continually emphasized by Arthur London".

As for the claim made by pro-Soviet Communists throughout the world that Gavras' film is being misused by the enemies of Communism for their anti-Communist propaganda, Gavras answered:

Yes, our enemies can misuse it. They can use it for their own purposes. However, I consider that the rightist groups have benefited much more from the (Soviet) intervention in Czechoslovakia (in August 1968) and from show trials in the past; I think that those actions have been more damaging than our film. He who claims that enemies can use our film for their purposes, presents the problem in a false way. Obviously this happens to be the only way to hide the real essence of the problem.

Simone Signoret said that the group which made the film "is a united team", even though she and her husband, Yves Montand, have never been "registered members of the Communist Party". Costa Gavras is not a Communist and "Arthur and Lise London, and Jorge Semprun have been members of the Communist Party for a long time". All this does not prevent their holding personal views on many questions. Said Mme. Signoret:

Look, we have so many things in common, but still we are very different; we even belong to different generations, especially as far as Gavras is concerned. He is 12 years younger than Yves and myself. We have united our forces in order to present to the world a true story. The decision to make this film, which I must emphasize was not ordered by anyone, is our own decision. We wanted to tell the story of an event without being advised by anybody from outside, least of all by any political organization.

Mme. Signoret added that she and Montand had in the past held certain incorrect views, but that they are not sorry for them "because they were sincere... We see only now that these views were wrong". This was one of the chief reasons why they decided to appear in The Confession: "You must understand us. Yves and I have felt it our duty to make this film. It was a debt due to our consciences".

Stalinism Should be Totally Destroyed

A Yugoslav participant in the discussion questioned whether Gavras' film deprives people of hope for the future and undermines their wish to concern themselves with politics. He was answered by Jorge Semprun, the film's script-writer, who said:

I do not believe that political action is possible and necessary only when direct hope exists, when political fighters know or assume that in the near future they will be successful. I consider that political action, especially Communist political action -- but Communist in the correct sense of the term -- can be taken even if it is assumed that conservative forces will be successful in preventing us from implementing our ideas. This is why I do not see why the lack of an immediate prospect of success should inhibit political action.

To support his argument, Semprun mentioned the case of Yugoslavia which in 1948 had no hope whatsoever of successfully opposing the mighty Soviet Union. "Was not your decision-making in those days a gamble, a challenge to the future? Did not all

this seem utopian?" Semprun continued:

However, today, 20 years later, we see that your policies were effective, that they have become accepted practice. We see that you were correct in not capitulating (to Moscow) even though you conducted your Communist policies against the whole "community" of the then international Communist movement.

Linking The Confession with the Yugoslav struggle against Moscow's supremacy, Semprun said that "the first condition for successful political action is to know all the facts correctly". The film's only task is to present these facts. That is why it can be called "amateur politics" only by people "who are not courageous".

Lise London, whose husband could not come to Zagreb because of bad health, said that the film should be viewed "as an appeal to all Communists to return to their original thinking and to fight for true Communism". In her opinion the film should help "outmoded, conservative Communists to open their eyes and to finally realize what Stalinism actually was".

Another criticism by a Yugoslav journalist was that the film did not explain why certain things which happened to Arthur London were done and in whose name they were perpetrated. Semprun admitted that the film had not really answered all questions concerning Stalinism. "I personally do not know of any global, scientific, if I may say, Marxist explanation of the phenomenon called Stalinism, what it was and what it is today", he said. Not even the Yugoslavs have gone to the logical conclusion in unmasking Stalinism, Semprun added. "It seems to me that even today you meet this phenomenon in your own country and outside it", he stressed. He concluded:

By the way, one of the basic conditions for making a complete analysis of Stalinism is (the belief) that above all, it should be totally destroyed.

For his part, Yves Montand admitted that in the film "not all the horrible things that happened were described. Some of the things which are shown in the film are difficult to bear; had we included the torture scenes, the film would be even less bearable". Lise London then took the floor again and talked about

the motives which made them shoot the film:

The first show trials in Moscow were held in the Thirties, so the problems dealt with in The Confession were not confined to the Slansky trial at which my husband was one of the defendants. In all Stalinist show trials such confessions were extorted. And it is precisely these confessions which had such a tremendous impact on the international Communist movement. They led to the mystification and bureaucratization of power. The greatest personalities of the international Communist movement confessed to the most horrible crimes. Of course, one asks now how it was possible for them to do this. It is a special merit of London's book that the technique by which confessions were fabricated is unmasked.

Yugoslav Example Extolled

The Belgrade film critic Emilia Bogdanovic thought that only individuals rather than the masses are presented in the film. Does this mean, she asked, that in Gavras' opinion politics occurs only in top Party apparats? She said that in her opinion "the best sections of The Confession are those... in which Gavras used cuts from original newsreels showing the intervention in Czechoslovakia" in August 1968.

Gavras admitted that his film is about the Party apparat rather than the popular masses. The people as a mass are present in only a few sequences -- for instance, in the scene where workers congratulate Lise London "for having sent to the President of the Republic a letter in which she condemned her husband as a traitor".

Slobodan Lang, the President of the Zagreb Student Association, posed an "awkward question":

I see in this film, and even more in London's book, yet another trial, yet another confession. We should not forget that Slansky, the protagonist at the trial, had -- before being arrested -- signed in the name of Czechoslovakia a Stalinist accusation against Yugoslavia. Arthur London was in favor of

the death sentence for Laszlo Rajk. When London was arrested by the Stalinist police, they found in his pocket diplomatic discount cards. The film indicates in a way that London and Slansky, at the time of their arrest, were callous Stalinists. They behaved, in their dealings with other people, as hard-core Stalinists. That is why I also see in this film the trial of Arthur London against himself. That is the second trial in this film.

Montand answered: "I can only say that we were all Stalinists, not only Arthur London". Mme. Neda Krmpotic, an editor of Vjesnik u srijedu, said she would like to talk "about the third trial" and about the "third confession" in the film, the confession about Yugoslavia. She said that in Yugoslavia the Stalinists had succeeded in surviving many years after Stalin's demise and that Aleksandar Rankovic was removed only in July 1966, at the well-known Fourth Plenum of the Yugoslav Central Committee at Brioni. The showing of The Confession coincided with the fourth anniversary of the Brioni Plenum, Mme. Krmpotic said, and this statement evoked tremendous applause. She added:

I see the greatness of this film in the fact that it says that the chief problems, the main difficulties for socialism, come not from the outside but rather from within. Not even we in Yugoslavia have yet found adequate and effective ways and means of making people economically free and of still having the (Communist) system functioning rationally. That is why we are motivated by the film to think about the third phase, or about the third trial. In Z, Gavras dealt with the bourgeois society and the police. In The Confession (his second film) he deals with Stalinism within socialism. However, we have seen that even the fighters against Stalinism could become Stalinists if they employed Stalinist methods.

Slobodan Budak, the Zagreb State Attorney, said that Gavras' film is a story that could have happened in any socialist country. Socialism, he said, must be achieved only by humanistic means

rather than through crude force. Ante Rumora, a student from the Yugoslav "New Left", said that Stalinists are the predominating groups "in most of the ruling Parties and in those which are struggling to assume power". He wondered how anyone could see a film "presenting the Stalinist psychical and physical annihilation of human beings and not become sensitive to the socialist exploitation of the working class". Rumora added that if a team decides to deal with problems endangering a class rather than with those imperiling individuals, then the whole approach must be more Marxist. Rumora reproached the makers of the film: "Both Z and The Confession are an indirect apology for fascism as a political and social evil represented by militant American imperialism".

Angered by such a claim Gavras answered very sharply that in France there are also young people who, living in comfortable conditions and freedom, speak in the same way but are totally confused about reality. "As far as Stalinism is concerned, if what we saw in the film existed here in your country, you would not be able to talk as you do", said Gavras, frenetically applauded by the audience.

THE MIND-CHANGERS

What Yves Montand has in common with Dr Nezhad of Iran
Brian Crozier

Summary: In this article, Brian Crozier comments on some recent and spectacular changes of mind: by an Iranian doctor, two French film stars, and a leading member of the French Communist Party.

The case of an Iranian called Parsa Nezhad gives food for thought. Dr Nezhad worked for a communist revolution in Iran for years, then decided he was wrong and told his story to the Iranian press and on the radio some weeks ago.

To change one's mind in politics takes courage and deserves credit. To change one's loyalties usually invites disapproval if not horror. All languages have words like "turncoat" or "traitor". And yet, what if a man should honestly believe in something, give his loyalty to the powers that represent it, then find out he was wrong all the time?

The history of our times is rich in such cases, for it is largely the history of totalitarian ideologies and regimes. Take the case of Count von Stauffenberg and the other German Army officers who tried to assassinate Hitler by planting a bomb in his office. Were they traitors, or patriotic Germans who wanted to rid their country of a monstrous tyrant? The answer depends on where you stand: Stauffenberg and his friends were executed for treason.

That is why the term "defector", though it carries a hint of opprobrium, is bound to be morally neutral. Strictly speaking, Parsa Nezhad was not a defector when he confessed his errors. But he had been a defector before that. His story is interesting.

Siavash Parsa Nezhad graduated from the Medical School in Munich in 1964. He had gone to Munich University for further study in 1957. The feudal backwardness of his country worried him and he wanted to do something about it. Communism seemed to be the answer and in 1961, while still in Germany, he joined the communist Tudeh ("Masses") party. Through his new political friends, he was permitted to visit East Germany several times.

By 1964, however, he had become disillusioned with the Iranian Communists, having discovered that the Tudeh Party was controlled by Moscow. But he still believed in communism and revolution. At that time, he told Tehran radio in a lengthy interview on May 17, 90 per cent of the Iranian Communists in exile left the Tudeh Party. He was one of those who did, then got together to form the Iranian "Revolutionary Organisation".

Now Dr Nezhad was a full-time Marxist-Leninist revolutionary. The Revolutionary Organisation sent him to Cuba, then to China, to study revolution and revolutionary techniques. Next, he was sent on a "mission" to Iraq to study the Kurdish revolt. Finally, armed with false identity papers in the name of Mostafa Kavandi, he re-entered Iran through Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf.

His "studies" in Cuba had confirmed the programme of the Revolutionary Organisation. What Iran needed was land reform and the only way to accomplish it was through a peasant revolutionary uprising. This was what the great revolutionary leaders, Mao Tse-tung in China, and Che Guevara of Cuba, had preached, and there was no other way.

Once he was back at home, however, Dr Parsa Nezhad says he saw with his own eyes that land reform was actually being

carried out by the Iranian farm corporations of Darius the Great and Arya Mehr. It was this realisation that made him change his mind and appeal for the Shah's pardon as a former member of the outlawed Tudeh Party.

Simone Signoret's Second Thoughts

Dr Parsa Nezhad's case, though interesting, is not unique. For the past two or three months, Paris had been buzzing with passionate debates over the case of those two famous film-stars, Simone Signoret and Yves Montand. Husband and wife in private life, Miss Signoret and Mr Montand were, for many years by their own admission, the most reliable fellow-travellers of the French Communist Party, always ready to find excuses for whatever the rulers of Russia decided was necessary on historical grounds.

Now, there has been a dramatic change of heart. Simone Signoret and Yves Montand star in a film entitled L'Aveu ("The Confession"), which is breaking attendance records in French cinemas. Based on the memoirs of Artur London, a former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia who in the 1950s was tortured and forced to confess to crimes he had not committed, the film was made by the same team that made the sensational film "Z", about torture in Greece. The screenplay is by the former Spanish Communist Jorge Semprun, and the director was Costa Gavras.

Whereas "Z" was a fictionalised account, however, "The Confession" is strictly factual.

Naturally, the fact that Yves Montand and Simone Signoret should consent to star in a film denouncing actions which they were previously on record as defending, has provoked many questions. In an extended interview in the Paris news-magazine L'Express for May 11-17, the two stars explained how they had supported the Communists for many years, until disillusionment gradually came after the crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. For a long time after that, however, they were so conditioned by years of thinking along certain lines that even while they were making "The Confession", Simone Signoret, for instance, had to battle with herself to buy a book by the distinguished Hungarian writer and former Communist, Arthur Koestler. In the end, however, the couple did change their minds

and had to explain why in public.

The Crime of Criticism

Simone Signoret and Yves Montand were not, in a formal sense, members of the Communist Party. This perhaps made retraction less difficult for them than for their compatriot, Roger Garaudy, whose case is both similar and tantalisingly different, and which also caused a sensation in Paris this year.

For 14 years, Garaudy was a member of the political bureau of the French Communist Party, and for 25 years, he served on its Central Committee. During those years, he had built a reputation as the leading Marxist philosopher in France. Even at the time of Hungary, his public loyalty to the Soviet Union had not wavered. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, however, was too much for him.

The French Communist Party, indeed, took the unprecedented step of condemning the Soviet occupation in 1968. Shortly afterwards, however, the Party started back-peddalling, and attacking Communists who persisted in criticising the Soviet Union. One of those who did was Garaudy who had published his views abroad, most notably in Yugoslavia. Soon, he was the only member of the political bureau who was out of step. In May this year, the Party at last expelled him.

Garaudy, too, had courage, although unlike the others, he has gone on declaring himself to be a Communist. His courage consisted of standing up to the entire apparatus of the Party he had faithfully served all his working life.

I wonder what he would think of the case of Parsa Nezhad.

THE NEW CONCEPT OF SOCIOLOGY

(Radio Free Europe Research, 25-6-'70)

One month after the purge in the Czechoslovak Sociological Society (see Czechoslovak SR/20, RFER, 15 May 1970) an article entitled "Sociology from a Critical and a Positive Stand-point" (translated excerpts from this article appear in Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2322, RFER, 26 June 1970) was published in Tribuna of 10 June 1970. It appeared to have been produced by five sociologists: Docent B. Filipcova, Docent J. Houska, M. Hulakova, J.Krejci, and Docent M. Soukup,

but in the following number of Tribuna the head of the sociology department of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Dr. Frantisek Charvat, was cited as another co-author. Following the purge a new team was installed in the Sociological Society, and this team outlines its program in the article referred to.

Most of the article is polemical, which is hardly surprising since this is also true of a major part of the political program of the present Czechoslovak leadership, whose directives the new sociological team carries out and on whose support it relies. The polemic is directed against so-called right-wing opportunism and liberalism and against those who represent these currents of political thinking and endeavor. The article attacks sociology as practised in the 1960s (and especially in 1968) and against those scientists who, in articles and discussions at congresses, wanted to renew Czechoslovak sociology's co-operation with the rest of the world, a collaboration which existed prior to 1948 but was forcibly interrupted by the events in February of that year.

The article attacks the chief representatives of Czechoslovak non-Marxist sociology (see the Czechoslovak SR quoted above) as well as Miroslav Jodl, a former fellow of the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; Rudolf Battek, a former member of the Sociological Institute and a deputy of the Czech National Council who has been in prison since August 1969, when he joined in a spectacular protest against the occupation; and Vladimir Horsky, who is blamed for having gone "not only beyond the borders of Marxism, but also beyond the frontiers of our state".

The authors ask how it was possible for these sociologists, who had been "professional Marxists" for many years, to turn in a direction which was "anti-Marxist". The answer, they believe, is easy. These sociologists had been exponents of dogmatist Marxism (read, Stalinism) and when the political situation changed they were unable to recognize "genuine historical movement" and became "dogmatists in reverse" -- who defended the opposite dogma with the same rigidity. But in the view of the authors this opposite dogma was anti-Marxist because their expelled colleagues, "at a time of dramatic class struggle" (between January and August 1968) denied the justification of that struggle. The authors also claim

that their former colleagues are incompetent as sociologists: they failed to recognize the winds of change in Czechoslovak society in 1969 and stuck to the old ways of 1968. A good sociologist, they say, should be able to recognize a change in time -- in other words, he should always adapt himself quickly to new political realities.

This last criticism implies the main intention of the new team's program: to build a new Czechoslovak sociology on the political and ideological foundations established through the occupation of the CSSR by the Soviet army. The authors of the article immediately follow up their criticism by saying that Czechoslovak sociology "will be open to socialist society and its political needs", a science that "expresses social and hence class tasks and interests".

It is in this spirit that the new team will tackle the tasks which were set for Czechoslovak sociology in the recent past, for instance a survey of religious belief -- a task which the old Sociological Institute could not carry out because of its "wrong political orientation".

The new team will undoubtedly be aware of the new trends and "class responsibilities" of Czechoslovak sociology, and will complete the proposed survey to the satisfaction of those who have entrusted it with the supervision of Czechoslovakia's sociology.

BEETHOVEN IN THE GDR

(Radio Free Europe Research, 10-7-'70)

Beethoven's music can be truly appreciated only in the GDR, a front-page editorial of Neues Deutschland maintained (25 June 1970). The article, authored by Hans-Jürgen Schaefer, Secretary of the GDR's League of Composers and Musicians, dealt with the response of the East German population to Beethoven's music and with the revolutionary character of the composer himself. The arguments advanced in the article are of such an extreme and dogmatic nature that they are, in the final analysis, thoroughly untenable and, in a sense, highly entertaining.

Thus, the author maintained that the German working class, "led by its Marxist-Leninist Party", has a particularly close relationship to Beethoven's work. As proof of this contention,

the writer cited Friedrich Engels, who in 1873 reportedly called Beethoven's compositions "the culmination of music". It might, of course, be proven historically that Engels was a music lover, but it does seem rather far-fetched to project all his personal likes and dislikes on the whole German working class.

Schaefer further claimed that Beethoven's music gave expression to the elan of the French revolution. So far so good. He then went on to say that the great composer wrote his music so that "it would become an active and activating part of the life of the whole people", which is really nothing but a platitude. What composer does not, after all, desire to reach and move a great number of people with his music?

Beethoven was further described as having seen beyond "the feudal and bourgeois limitations of his time", and therefore, Schaefer argued,

. . . . it can be maintained without exaggeration that the revolutionary composer and thinker Beethoven strove already in his time for a genuine humanism as we have attained it in our community. . . . That is the reason why Beethoven's music can no longer have any function in the state-monopolistic system of West German imperialism. Beethoven's work, as that of all progressive humanist artists of the past, comes alive only through integration into the culture of the socialist community.

If such extreme statements are the result of socialist realist training, the East German regime should really find another more acceptable form of cultural policy.

BRODYAGI - HOODLUMS A LA USSR

(Radio Free Europe Research, 24-7-'70)

Summary: Once again it is evident that certain social phenomena which crop up throughout the world also appear in the Soviet Union. The socialist order is unable to protect society from alcoholism and drug addiction, nor does it do away with some forms of juvenile behavior. In addition to the hooligans, shirkers and other manifestations of less positive youthful behavior,

Soviet society -- and especially the militia -- is now having to deal with hoodlums, or brodyagi as they are called. In certain areas of the Soviet Union they have become something of a plague, especially in the warmer and sunnier climates. High-level legal authorities are engaged in combatting this problem.

The Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Turkmenian SSR, V. Sokolov, recently reported on the growing number of brodyagi in his republic. The picture he painted, however, is not objective; it tends to depict any sort of behavior which does not conform to the system as the next thing to criminal activity. Sokolov sighs: "This hoodlumism is a great evil". (1) The hoodlums are, he says, for the most part healthy people who could be usefully employed, a fact which is borne out by statistics and medical examinations. The largest numbers of them are supposedly "fleeing fathers", trying to escape alimony payments. This presumption is certainly just as much a part of Sokolov's slanderous tactics as is the claim that most of them live off the fruits of thievery and "at least half of them" have criminal records. The same accusations are repeated over and over; they never worked anywhere, they never finished school, they base their existence on petty thievery.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenian SSR recently formulated a resolution on measures to be taken against shirkers and hoodlums. In the resolution, it becomes apparent just how large a problem the hoodlum element has become in this climatically favorable republic. In the European section of the Soviet Union this sort of behavior has somewhat deeper roots. The daily newspapers have long been publishing reports complaining about such behavior and expressing concern that even young girls are charged with being hoodlums. For example, Elizveta Leoncheva, a graduate of an intermediate school and a milk-maid at a sovkhos, began her career as a hoodlum when she came to Moscow at 19. Ten months later she was arrested and was unable to give any verifiable explanation of where she

(1) "Turkmenskaya Iskra" of 11 July 1970

had been and how she had lived in the meantime. All attempts to resocialize her failed and she was sentenced in court. She was accused of having supported herself by petty thievery, something to which she did not admit. The militia major I. A. Ovanov, who was temporarily responsible for her, said: "I can only guess how Liza lived. I only know one thing for certain, every brodyaga is a potential criminal". He showed the life stories of some hoodlums to the press and the editorial board of Selskaya Zhizn. O. V. Egorov, a healthy 30-year-old has, for example, been a hoodlum since September 1967 and was caught by the militia in Ksyl-Orda Tashkent, Semipalatinsk and Barnaul. The militia got him a job several times, but he never remained longer than a few days in each place. When last heard of, he had jumped on a train from Tomsk to Moscow. (2)

In other cases as well it was revealed that the hoodlums are constantly on the move. They do not reveal their real names, or they use pseudonyms. They are all in good health and differ from the normal Soviet citizen in but one way: they don't want to work. The large number of girl hoodlums is striking. Major Ivanov's final judgment of them: "Repulsive people, repulsive for their attitude toward work, toward people, for their parasitic attitude".

While there were but few cases of hoodlumism in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s, the social problem has grown considerably since then. It is combatted with brutal methods in the USSR. Hoodlums are assumed to be criminals and are sent off to rehabilitation camps. The "resocialization" to which they are subjected is usually nothing more than being given a job somewhere. Educational and social rehabilitation is completely lacking.

SOVIET HISTORIANS PREPARE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

Pavel Urban

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 23-6-70)

Summary: From August 16 to 23, 1970, Moscow plays host to the Thirteenth International Congress

2) See, for example, "Sel'skaya Zhizn'" of 19 September 1969

of Historians. Despite assurances that Soviet participants will try to preserve "an academic spirit of international collaboration", it is highly likely that the Kremlin will use the congress as a platform for further attacks on bourgeois falsification of history and Western imperialism, if not directly by Soviet historians then by selected delegates from the East bloc communist countries.

From August 16 to 23 of this year Moscow is host to the Thirteenth International Congress of Historians, an event of considerable political importance for Soviet historians. Some 4,000 participants from all over the world are expected (over 2,400 at the previous gathering in Vienna in 1965). It will be held against the background of an intensified Soviet campaign to combat so-called bourgeois-imperialist ideology and rightist and leftist revisionism.

The Moscow congress offers Soviet historians a convenient opportunity to parade the "achievements" of their historical method and, because it coincides with the Lenin anniversary year, they will try to use it as a propaganda platform for Leninism and its practical realization in the USSR. The opening ceremony will be held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, recently the scene of festivities in honor of the Lenin centenary. Soviet historians have undertaken extensive preparations for the forthcoming event and, since late 1968, the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, ordered by the Party to demonstrate the "strength of Marxist-Leninist methodology", has been compiling monographs and collections of articles relevant to the items on the agenda of the congress. Special conferences on problems to be discussed in Moscow in August have also been held (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1969, p. 15; Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 6, 1969, p. 166).

The first Soviet delegation to attend a world gathering -- the 1928 Sixth International Congress of Historians in Oslo -- was led by the prominent Marxist historian, M. N. Pokrovsky. A small Soviet delegation, headed by V. P. Volgin, also appeared at the 1933 Seventh International Congress in Warsaw, after which contact with the outside world was severed for many years. During the period of Stalinist dogmatism and political and ideological absolutism Moscow sent no representatives to the

1938 Eighth Congress in Zurich or the 1950 Ninth Congress in Paris. During the Stalin purges many Soviet historians perished and in 1938 the orthodox Marxist historical school founded by Pokrovsky was abolished and great-power chauvinism and Soviet patriotism began to be propagated. 1950 saw the triumph of dogmatism and the isolation of Soviet historical studies as the struggle against "rootless cosmopolitanism" and "Western influences" was stepped up. It became tabu to consider the contribution of the pre-Marxist, "unscientific" period to the development of Soviet historical science and Western "bourgeois" historiography was dismissed as "pseudo-scientific". The Soviet approach to the study of history was proclaimed to be the only genuine one and therefore there could be no question of collaboration between Soviet historians and their foreign colleagues.

A change came after Stalin's death and 1954 brought the announcement of a new course in Kremlin foreign policy in the direction of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems. Soviet historians received the appropriate instructions, which were best expressed in Voprosy istorii (No. 8, 1955, pp. 3-10; No. 1, 1956, pp. 3-12). These directives condemned the former isolation of Soviet historical studies and conceded that international contacts are essential. Voprosy istorii maintained that Marxism-Leninism has a high regard for the work of outstanding historians of the past and also for that of contemporary non-Marxist historians in the capitalist countries, whose valuable research should be noted by Soviet historians, who should, therefore, collaborate with Western historians "to further historical science and promote scientific and cultural progress through their joint efforts" (ibid, No. 8, 1955, p. 9). The former negative assessment of pre-Marxist historical studies and the reference to contemporary Western work as "pseudo-scientific" were condemned (ibid, No. 1, 1956, p. 8).

As part of the new policy of peaceful co-existence Soviet historians and their colleagues in the satellite countries joined UNESCO in 1955 and in the same year took part in the Tenth International Congress of Historians in Rome, since when Soviet historians have played an increasingly active part in international congresses and symposia. Soviet scholars also establish bilateral contacts with fellow historians in various capitalist and develop-

ing countries and actively participate in the work of the numerous Soviet societies for friendship with foreign countries and in such organizations as the Soviet Committee for Asian and African Solidarity.

This more open attitude is not primarily motivated by a desire to contribute to the furthering of world historical studies or science and culture: it is still maintained that the study of history is only a science in the Soviet Union, where it remains faithful to Lenin's statement that "materialism included Party-mindedness, which means the obligation to directly and frankly regard every event from the point of view of a specific social group" (Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Works), Vol. 1, 5th ed., 1958, p. 419. Soviet historical science is an extension of politics and a "potent ideological weapon" (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1969, pp. 4 and 5). These claims are an obstacle to purposeful collaboration between East and West in this field. The instructions which accompanied Soviet historians to the Tenth International Congress in Rome read:

In the present situation each Soviet historian is faced with the question of whether his work will assist the cause of peace and friendship between nations or whether his work will be exploited by the enemies of international collaboration to inflame chauvinistic sentiments and racial and national hatred for the preparation of a new world war. Every historian who is conscious of his responsibility to the people and science cannot support a policy which leads to the unleashing of a war. Concern for the preservation of peace and for scientific progress can and must unite honest historians throughout the world. (Ibid., No. 8, 1955, p. 10)

But the Soviet leaders themselves regard international collaboration in this field as part of the struggle against what they call bourgeois historical studies. This was shown at the 1955 Rome and, in particular, at the 1960 Stockholm International Congress of Historians. Soviet ideologists are fond of quoting the statement by a Canadian historian that at the latter congress "Marxism took the offensive and its opponents had to defend themselves" (ibid., No. 3, 1966, p. 6). Soviet historians rejoice that "in Stockholm bourgeois historical science suffered a clear

defeat" and that this congress" was an undoubted success for Marxist historical science" (Kommunist, No. 17, 1960, pp. 86 and 94). Here, however, the Soviet press was careful not to distinguish between a pseudo-Marxist or simply positivist interpretation of history and the subjective and voluntarist structures of Soviet Marxism-Leninism.

According to some Western observers, the 1965 Twelfth International Congress of Historians in Vienna was marked by a less aggressive Soviet attitude and a degree of reconciliation between the views of Soviet and Western historians. It also revealed growing discord among Marxist historians, particularly behind the scenes in private conversations and at receptions, etc. (Helmut Neubauer, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol. 14, Wiesbaden, 1966, No. 1, pp. 149-54).

Not all Soviet historians are inflexible dogmatists, of course; many entertain private opinions differing from those expressed in public in defense of the official Party line. In the latter years of Khrushchev's reign and the first years after the present "collective leadership" came to power more liberal tendencies were evident, especially in the reassessment of Marxist-Leninist dogmas, and disagreements have arisen between Soviet historians and their colleagues in the other East bloc countries.

Although Soviet historian M. V. Nechkina stated in her paper delivered to the Vienna Congress and entitled "The Evolution of Historical Thought in the Middle of the Twentieth Century" that the study of history should not be turned into a vehicle for resolving contemporary political disputes, there was little evidence of reconciliation with Western standpoints. Nechkina attacked Western historians for being "colonialist" and for holding "reactionary nationalist racial theories" and claimed priority for Marxist influences on the study of history in the West and the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The forthrightness of Soviet historians at the Vienna congress contrasted with the reticence of their Western counterparts in the debates on such papers as "Nationalism and Internationalism" and "Decolonization", where the colonial expansion of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union was barely touched upon. On the first of these themes an American historian, Hans Cohen, referred to the revival of proletarian internationalism as a form of socialist nationalism. These words, and also various

allusions in the course of debates about the attitudes of national minorities in the Soviet Union and the socialist camp were seen by Soviet historians as attempts to discredit the Soviet Union and the socialist camp in general, although in the discussion on the problems of decolonization in Asia and Africa, Soviet historians found support from some Western colleagues.

At the forthcoming Thirteenth International Congress of Historians the Soviet delegates will be expected to present a united front. To ensure this, the Party propaganda published in connection with the Lenin centenary has condemned isolated attempts by Soviet historians to question basic principles of methodology (Kommunist, No. 5, 1969, pp. 68-81). There are also more attacks on "bourgeois writing of history" and its "falsification of history", as can be seen from the relevant Party directives (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1969, pp. 3-16; No. 9, 1969, pp. 3-13) and the plans for research during the period 1971-75 (Istoriya SSSR, No. 6, 1969, pp. 3-25; Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 6, 1969, pp. 164-66). These plans call for a large number of general works, on all epochs of world history, which must prove the validity of the Marxist-Leninist approach. Soviet historians will also be required to write many works devoted especially to criticism of the "bourgeois concept" of history and "bourgeois falsification" of the history of Russia and the Soviet Union.

It is probable, therefore, that the forthcoming Moscow congress will be marked by some ideological skirmishes between Soviet and Western historians. This is suggested by A. A. Guber, chairman of the National Committee of Historians of the USSR, which is responsible for organizing the congress (Voprosy istorii, No. 3, 1970, pp. 3-11). Although there is a promise to steer clear of political arguments, and the fact that Moscow is the host puts the onus on Soviet historians to preserve an academic spirit of international collaboration, Guber says that "Marxist - Leninist historical science can lead the offensive against hostile positions and achieve success only if it is professionally armed with knowledge of all contemporary material" (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Soviet historians will read a comparatively small number of papers at the Moscow congress (11 out of a total of 89) and no reports, but they will be represented in force in the discussions and debates on all papers. The 14 papers on "major themes" (i. e. on the methodology of history) and the 22 "major papers" on ancient, medieval and modern history will be discussed in the

main by those who read them and a panel of experts in the respective fields, who will be nominated by the national committees of the relevant countries.

In his report Guber announced:

Our task not only consists in ensuring that the papers presented by us are of the highest ideological level and rest on all the discoveries of contemporary science. It is important that our voices ring out with scientific conviction and assurance from the lips of experts and other participants in the discussions..... The most important task for all our organizations, institutes and groups is to put forward the best specialists on the problems treated by the papers to be read at the congress for participation in the discussions. (*Ibid.*)

The Moscow congress will open with the paper "Lenin and History", to be read by Ye. M. Zhukov, academic secretary of the Department of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Judging by the current spate of Leniniana it can be assumed that Lenin will be presented as the figure who has given the greatest inspiration to all seekers after historical truth. This paper will not be debated, but during the course of the congress a special symposium on Lenin will be held at which Western historians will be able to comment on Zhukov's opening contribution. Therefore, "it is the duty of Soviet historians to prepare properly for worthy participation in this symposium" (*ibid.*, p. 10). The congress will close with a paper by V. N. Lazarev entitled "Medieval Russian Art and the West".

Allegedly to preserve an "academic spirit of international collaboration", Soviet historians will read no papers on the first part of the major theme "The History of the Continents", which is devoted to "Nationalism and the Class Struggle in the Process of Modernization in Asia and Africa" (second major theme with discussions by experts). On the second part of this theme, which deals with Latin America, they will present one paper -- "Latin America and the World Historical Process in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries". There are also no Soviet contributions in the section "Contemporary History". Here Soviet historians will merely read papers on "The Basic Features of the Cultural Revolution in the USSR" and "Change in the Social Structure of the

Population of the USSR". Soviet contributions are also absent among the papers to be read on the first major theme of the congress ("The Methodology of History", "The Historian and the Social Sciences"), but there will be many contributions from historians from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania. All this has obviously been carefully planned by Soviet ideologists. When the Congress opens in August, the Soviet participants will appear to support the "academic spirit of international collaboration", and adopt a moderate stand, while, at the behest of the Soviet Party Central Committee, certain selected historians from some East bloc countries are likely to use the discussions to bring Western imperialism under fire on the strength of their researches.