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# **EAST-WEST** *contacts*

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This review is an effort to meet the growing need for information and documentation on the political, cultural, psychological and other aspects of East-West relations. It will indicate briefly views and facts which have been presented already in pamphlets, papers, articles etc.

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## POLITICS

### KASSEL AND THEREAFTER

(Radio Free Europe Research, 29-5-'70)

Summary: This paper reviews the results of the second German summit meeting which was held in Kassel on 21 May 1970. It also describes the atmosphere which prevailed on that day as well as the incidents that occurred. An attempt is made to analyze the motivations behind East German rigidity and to point out the limitations on the GDR's freedom of action.

Chancellor Willy Brandt stated before the second German summit that he was taking no illusions with him to Kassel on 21 May to meet East German Premier Willi Stoph. At the end of the long hard day, even Brandt's very low-keyed expectations were probably not met: despite the West German claim that the talks indicated "certain points of possible contact", the East German side had not budged one inch from its maximal demands. These demands had been formally enumerated in Walter Ulbricht's Draft Treaty of December, 1969, which the GDR still insists must be concluded before the talks can be continued, and before any other agreements can be signed. This "all or nothing attitude", as Willy Brandt termed it, was once again expressed very clearly during the afternoon press conference given in Kassel on 21 May when GDR press spokesman Peter Lorf said:

The continuation of talks between the governments of the GDR and the FRG will be possible if the Federal Government indicates its readiness to conclude a treaty concerning normal, equal relations.

In reply to Brandt's proposals and his 20-point program, Willi Stoph expressed the same point of view:

It would make little sense and would bypass the main subject of the matter were certain commissions or charges appointed at this present time to start deliberating about second- and third-ranking questions before a basic agreement between the chiefs of government has been reached concerning the establishment of equal international relations.

Stoph's position in Kassel was subsequently reinforced by the GDR Council of Ministers at a meeting in East Berlin on 25 May. They issued a communiqué which reiterated that the GDR would be willing to continue the dialogue only if the FRG decided to establish international relations with it:

The Council of Ministers of the GDR expressed its regret that the government of the FRG had not yet been ready, in Kassel, to agree to the establishment of equal, international relations between the GDR and the FRG, and to conclude a treaty on the subject. . . . The course of the talks in Kassel has shown that the FRG government still requires some time to review its position in order to reach a more realistic point of view. The Council of Ministers expresses the hope that, as a result of such a pause for reflection, the FRG government will recognize that the suggestion of the GDR concerning the establishment of equal relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of international law represents the best way to achieve peaceful coexistence between the two states.

As a result of this totally inflexible stand the Kassel meeting ended in an impasse. No final communiqué was issued and no definite prospects appeared either for another summit or for lower level governmental meetings. That this second inter-German summit meeting would fail to produce substantive results could have been anticipated if one listened to the preponderance of East German propaganda throughout the nine-week period between Erfurt and Kassel. Before, during and following the Erfurt meeting GDR media refrained from their customary anti-West German campaigns; but the Kassel meeting was preceded by a steadily increasing stream of invective against the FRG, Social Democratic politicians and West German policies, which indicated that the GDR was not really interested in coming to terms with the West German government on any issue. These polemics were also undoubtedly mainly intended for GDR internal consumption. Popular reaction to Erfurt had shown the Pankow regime that sympathies for the FRG and hopes for possible improvement of human relations between the two German states were far from extinct among the GDR population. Therefore, the continuous barrage of attacks against the

FRG, the distortion of West German intentions, the maligning of SPD spokesmen was aimed not only at the West German negotiating partner but also, and perhaps primarily, at the East German population in order to dampen hopes which the regime is unable or unwilling to fulfill. In fact these polemics took on such proportions by early May that some observers concluded that the GDR intended to withdraw from the Kassel meeting even before it took place, a situation reminiscent of the East German abrogation of the SPD-SED speakers' exchange a few years ago. It is in this light that one must view the mid-May blitz visit to Moscow of the highest ranking member of the GDR leadership: Ulbricht, unwilling to go to Kassel where his rigidity would once again be demonstrated to the world, was most likely persuaded by the Soviet leaders that the onus for breaking off the dialogue could not be placed on the Eastern side and further convinced him to send his premier to go through with the Kassel meeting, although he would be permitted to maintain his inflexible position.

According to the some 1,500 correspondents present in Kassel, the atmosphere from the very beginning was frostier than it had been in Erfurt. Erfurt was clearly a great "first", the first meeting between the two German leaders; Kassel was the necessary return visit; devoid of the excitement of a premiere, it was much more along the lines of an enforced, repeat performance and at least from the East German side, no new aspects were revealed.

Before turning to some features of the 20-point proposal by Willy Brandt, a few incidents at the Kassel meeting should be mentioned:

1. When Chancellor Brandt as the host began presenting his proposals, he was interrupted by Premier Stoph who voiced his objections to alleged discriminatory West German laws which permitted the unrestrained activities of neo-Nazi and fascist groups, and permitted threats of murder against the representative of a foreign state (an allusion to the charge filed with the West German Ministry of Justice by an extreme rightist editor against Willi Stoph for being co-responsible for the murders at the Wall). While Stoph was speaking, he was handed a piece of paper informing him that the GDR flag, hoisted before the Schloss-hotel where the talks were taking place, had been desecrated.

2. The planned laying of a wreath, at the monument to victims of fascism during the midday break in the talks was prevented by a battle between extremist rightist (NPD) and leftist (DKP and DFU) groups. As a result the Kassel police chief was unable to guarantee the safety of the East German visitor. (The wreath was placed later in the evening, unplanned in the protocol, and with Chancellor Brandt attending).

Although these two Kassel incidents did not affect the results of the meeting, they did serve as grist for the East German propaganda mills and facilitated the East German anti-FRG campaign: slogans were launched which described the FRG as a state subverted by neo-Nazi elements and identified the extremist minorities with the FRG government. Headlines such as "Nazi Provocations Were Planned", "Nazi Terror, Flag Defiled and Wild Excesses -- This Is What Is Behind Bonn's Talk of Peace, Freedom and Humanity", have detracted from any rational discussion of Chancellor Brandt's substantive offers.

What are some of the elements in the West German 20-point proposals? Chancellor Brandt offered the Communist regime "inner sovereignty", a formulation not far removed from formal recognition; he offered an exchange of "plenipotentiaries", again a formulation which falls just short of the East German request for an exchange of ambassadors; he further offered eventual de jure recognition, provided the East Germans were to cooperate in certain sectors in alleviating human hardships between the peoples of the two German states; and he suggested certain steps intended to normalize the daily relations between East and West Germans.

In his suggested program Chancellor Brandt indeed went further in Kassel than in Erfurt toward satisfying East German demands: he argued that if the regime were to grant concessions for the alleviation of human suffering due to the East-West German border, the desired GDR goal of international recognition may be in sight. What effect did such future vistas have on the East German negotiating partner: It was entirely negative: the more willing the West German side was to make concessions the harder the East German side defended its rigid position. Stoph and his colleagues had obviously come to Kassel to emphasize the GDR's inflexibility. They could not take Brandt's outstretched hand because they could not respond with any

liberalizing measures which might effect East German internally. For example, more cultural, scientific and tourist contacts with the West would no doubt undermine the GDR's ideological rigidity and would serve the officially condemned concept of "bridge-building and convergence". Despite the FRG's offers of: renunciation of force, respect for the borders, consideration of the independence of the state, exchange of plenipotentiaries, and settlement of membership in international organizations, the GDR further insisted on the judicial formulation of "international recognition". This insistence underlines the suspicion that the GDR is neither interested in any contacts with the FRG, nor in any compromise formulas. From the West German governmental point of view (and contrary to the statements of the CDU/CSU opposition), a great deal was offered, nothing was given away unconditionally and nothing was accepted. From the East German standpoint, the more that was offered the less acceptable the situation became, because the GDR is afraid of liberalization in any shape or form.

Furthermore, the establishment of relations with the GDR does not necessarily begin with the establishment of international relations; there are trade missions and consulates in many countries which do not recognize the GDR in an international sense. However, the GDR's intransigent position, that international recognition must precede further negotiations with the FRG, is due solely to the former's unwillingness to make certain liberalizing concessions.

The GDR probably did not plan this period of "deliberation" only in order for both it and the FRG to think over their respective positions; more than likely it was also meant to provide time while the GDR awaits the results of the Bonn-Moscow negotiations and of the Four Power talks on Berlin, before it commits itself to a definite line of German policy. In its talks with Bonn, East Berlin is intimately linked to the seemingly favorable negotiations between Bonn and Moscow and to the indeterminate Four Power Talks about Berlin in the Western part of its alleged capital. Pankow cannot transgress these limitations which represent higher political interests than its own limited sphere. Hence Kassel will be recorded as the site of another historical handshake; but in the eyes of the world it will also reflect that the GDR refused to take the proffered

hand, that it maintained its inflexible position and that, for the sake of its survival, it prefers to remain isolated from Western contacts.

### THE INDOCHINESE FRONT

The "summit conference of the Indochinese peoples", held in what its joint declaration vaguely described as "the Laos-Vietnam-China border area" on April 24 and 25, marked a further step towards the realisation of the Vietnamese Communists' ambition to assert their influence throughout the former French territories in South-East Asia. Since the formal dissolution of the original Indochinese Communist Party in 1945 (not openly revived until 1951 and then only as the apparently narrower Vietnam Workers' Party) and the emergence of four separate States in the area, this aspect of the party's policy has had to be disguised, despite the presence of Vietnamese Communist troops in both Laos and Cambodia. One of the chief inhibiting factors was the independence and neutrality of Cambodia, and Hanoi's inability to find there a client comparable to Prince Souphannouvong and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) in Laos.

Prince Sihanouk's decision after his deposition as Cambodian Head of State to throw in his lot with the Communists, and his creation of a "National United Front of Kampuchea", (FUNK) -- partly removed this difficulty. The conference was represented as having been held on his initiative and Cambodia was the principal topic. His delegation was made up of FUNK representatives. With the striking exception of the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, most of the other delegates also represented the principal Communist fronts in each country. The Vietcong and its allies were represented, not by senior Ministers of their "Provisional Revolutionary Government" (PRG), but by the Chairman of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), Nguyen Huu Tho (who is also Chairman of the PRG's Advisory Council), accompanied by the Chairman of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces (VANDPF) and other NFLSV and VANDPF figures, including a PRG Vice-Minister. Prince Souphannouvong had with him other NLHX leaders and the Chairman of the allied "Patriotic Neutralist Forces". Pham Van Dong's group included

representatives of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. While conceding that there might be some diversity of approach towards "unity in struggle against the common enemy", Pham Van Dong asserted that the Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese peoples displayed "militant solidarity" with one another.

### Hanoi's objectives

The Vietnamese Communists' main objectives at the time of the conference were presumably to secure their sanctuaries outside Vietnam and to re-establish their supply routes. (Communist activities in Cambodia during April seemed mainly directed at disrupting local administration near the border and severing communications with Phnom Penh.) The delegates' expressions of reciprocal support in the struggle against "American imperialism" were not translated into concrete terms, except for a general agreement to hold further meetings when necessary.

One realistic note appeared in the reference in the final declaration to "all problems arising in the relations between the three countries", though it was held that these could "be solved through negotiations in a spirit of mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual assistance". The chief problem must be Vietnamese Communist use of neighbouring territories. Prince Sihanouk himself referred to it in his statement from Peking on March 20 as "this infiltration which I myself have denounced to the world many times". Yet the conference pledged to adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, including mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference. A similar contradiction appeared in the speeches of Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Huu Tho, who emphasised their continuing respect for Cambodia's frontiers and regard for her neutrality while expressing their gratitude to both Laotians and Cambodians for past "support and assistance to our fight against US aggression". At the same time the participants' insistence on the formula of four delegations representing "three countries" indicated that the reunification of Vietnam was considered to be a foregone conclusion.

The reference in the joint declaration to "time-honoured friendly relations" between the three countries also had a

hollow ring. Historically the Vietnamese were the enemies and invaders of Cambodia, as China was of Vietnam. Commenting on Vietnamese Communist protestations of friendship, Prince Sihanouk said on September 16, 1969, in Kandal province:

"Can we be absolutely sure that they will no longer do anything against us? We know how the Vietnamese and the Thai are from experience". (Phnom Penh Radio, September 17, 1969.) As for the Communist Pathet Lao (who had not given formal recognition of Cambodia's frontiers until October, 1968, 16 months after the others), Prince Sihanouk said at a Press conference on May 23, 1968: "Everyone knows that the Viet Minh are behind the Pathet Lao". Three weeks later, referring to reported Pathet Lao claims to the Cambodian province of Stung Treng, he said that if Souphannouvong came into his hands he would "have him shot immediately" (Phnom Penh Radio, June 13, 1968.) A further touch of irony was added on April 23 with the message of support for Prince Sihanouk's new policies from the Pracheachon, the obscure Cambodian Communist front party denounced by the Prince in November, 1966 as "lackeys of the Viet-Minh".

In the past, Prince Sihanouk has spoken with equal candour about China, successfully defying her attempts to export the cultural revolution in 1967 and telling foreign journalists on November 9, 1968, that "the US must not leave Asia or Cambodia will be at the mercy of the Chinese". Yet at a banquet given by the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, on April 25, he spoke of this "inspiring reunion of the Sino-Indochinese big family" and quoted from Mao Tse-tung. His example was not followed by the other participants, who confined themselves to thanking China for providing, in Mao's words, a "reliable rear area". Chou En-lai himself now spoke of China as the "reliable rear area" not merely of Vietnam, as previously, but of "the three Indochinese peoples".

#### Chinese rôle uncertain

The extent of Chinese sponsorship of the conference and the attitude of the Vietnamese remain uncertain. Although the exact location of the conference was not revealed, the NCNA description on May 2 of Chou En-lai making "a special trip from Peking" to give a "grand banquet" to the delegates on April 25

is consistent with reports that the site was a South Chinese city such as Canton or Nanning. Prince Sihanouk, despite his earlier declaration that he would divide his time between Moscow and Peking, had returned to Peking by May Day. He probably calculated that taking up residence in Hanoi or any other Vietnamese-controlled area would further diminish his chances of gaining support in Cambodia. It was at a Press conference in Peking on May 5 that he announced the creation of a "Royal Government of National Union", claiming that "our companions in the guerrilla movements (presumably, if Cambodian, the Vietnamese-aided "Khmers Rouges" whom he used to denounce so bitterly) tell us that, for the moment, we have certain tasks to perform in China and the countries which support us". The Chinese Government immediately announced its recognition of the new "government" and the severance of relations with Phnom Penh. Its example was followed by North Vietnam.

Chinese propagandists displayed more enthusiasm for the creation of an Indochinese united front than for any Vietnamese Communist venture since the opening of the Paris talks two years ago, of which they disapproved. A Chinese Government statement on April 28 praised the "protracted common struggle" of the three Indochinese peoples and said that the conference was "a heavy blow to US imperialism" and "a tremendous encouragement" to revolutionary struggles throughout the world. (In similar vein, the Communist Party of Thailand's Central Committee said in a message on April 20 to the Communist Party of Malaya - both guided by Peking - that "the Thai, Malayan and Indochinese people" would "co-operate closely to expand the people's war... and drive all US imperialist invaders from the Indochinese peninsula".)

The Chinese part in these developments was naturally ignored by Moscow, whose reactions to the conference included a message from Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, expressing his belief that the conference would help to "consolidate the united anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina" (Moscow Radio, April 29). But whatever Soviet and North Vietnamese views may be of the Chinese rôle in relation to Prince Sihanouk and the Indochinese front, the Communist powers were unanimous in condemning an Indonesian attempt to bring peace to

the area. The Asian and Pacific conference on Cambodia proposed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Malik, with the suggested participation of 20 Asian and Australasian countries (including the Communist states), was dismissed as a "smokescreen" covering up imperialist interference by Pravda on April 27 and as "a new despicable plot hatched by US imperialism" by the Peking People's Daily on May 2. Invitations were rejected by China and North Korea, as well as by North Vietnam, whose Foreign Ministry coupled the proposal with the reported supply of Indonesian military aid as "a vicious act" aimed at legalising foreign intervention in Cambodia (Vietnam News Agency, April 28). The Indian Government also decided against the proposal, and Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs, told the Indian Parliament on May 6 that it would prefer either a conference limited to non-aligned countries or talks between all interested parties as proposed by the French Government on April 1. The United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, also repeated his support for the French proposal on May 5 and appealed for a solution on the basis of the Geneva Agreements.

Unexpected support for the calling of a new Geneva conference came from the Soviet representative at the United Nations, Mr. Malik, at a Press conference on April 16, but this overture was subsequently retracted. While the North Vietnamese probably disapproved of the move, there was no doubt about the Chinese reaction. NCNA commented on April 25 that the interest aroused by this attempt at "betraying the people of the three Indochinese countries" had put Malik "in a tight spot" and he had "changed his tune". The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart, sent a message to his Soviet counterpart on May 1 asking him to reconsider his attitude to a conference. But on May 4 Mr. Kosygin told a Moscow Press conference, "this is no time for conferences but for actions".

This remark was prompted by South Vietnamese and US operations against Vietcong bases in Cambodia. However Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese complaints that these amounted to the invasion of a neutral country ignored the long-standing violation of both Cambodian and Laotian neutrality by the presence of Vietnamese Communist troops.

## INDOCHINA IN THE HOLOCAUST OF WAR

Dr. Brezanic

(Review of International Affairs, 20-5-'70)

Peace in Southeast Asia is a much more distant perspective now that US troops have perpetrated aggression against Cambodia and thereby spread the Vietnam War to that area. This makes even less tenable President Nixon's claim that this American armed intervention will allegedly shorten the war and enable American soldiers to come back home earlier. Since the American aggression against Vietnam, we have heard these claims any number of times - every military measure of escalation is explained away by the same arguments and the same prediction of military victory. However, military victory has not been achieved and it is a certainty that it never will be, regardless of the fact that this war is going to drag on for some time.

The expansion of the war to the territory of Cambodia clearly demonstrates that the Government of the USA and the Pentagon have not given up the idea of a military victory in Vietnam. At one time, before President Nixon took over and also shortly after his inauguration, it may have seemed that a political solution was favoured, among other things because the number of American troops in Vietnam was reduced somewhat. However, the US never reconciled itself to the prospect of leaving Vietnam and guaranteeing the Vietnamese the right to decide their destiny themselves without any interference from the outside. Important and extremely influential forces in the USA have been inclined all along toward a military solution, the kind of solution that would assure long-term US presence in Vietnam. Those forces, together with President Nixon, calculated that developments and the ratio of forces were such as to permit them to pursue their policies by military force and that there would be no hindrance to their doing so. Their assessment was that the conflict between the USSR and China is a long and profound one and that it is reflecting unfavourably on the struggle of the Vietnamese people, thereby giving the Americans a chance to implement their own plans. In the concrete case of the aggression against Cambodia, the point of departure was clearly the prediction that neither the People's Republic of China nor the USSR would react in a manner that would make things unbearable for the US, that is, that the



whole thing would wind up with political condemnation and propaganda activity, but that the dialogue launched between the two big powers would continue nonetheless. In other words, their notion was that it would pay to risk an incursion into Cambodia from which military benefit would presumably be derived.

For a superpower like the USA, apparently the condemnation of world public opinion is of secondary importance for, in the ultimate analysis, President Nixon has not given much consideration to his own country's public opinion or to that of the Senate which castigated this deliberate spreading of the war.

Reaction in the world and the sharp condemnation of this aggression is easy to understand: if the integrity and independence of small countries are going to continue being violated this way, and if the big powers go on acting like the policemen of the world - what is left of the already fragile system of world security based on the principles contained in the UN Charter?

There should be no dilemma about condemning the aggression clearly and loudly, as appeasement of the aggressor simply serves as encouragement to all potential aggressors to behave the same way, under the same or other pretexts but always "in the name of peace", against other weak and unprotected countries.

The peoples of Indochina - the Vietnamese, Laotians and Khmers, faced by a common enemy, have undertaken important steps to unify their forces so as to pursue the struggle jointly. The conference of the four Indochinese political factors - the Republic of North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Pathet Lao, attended by the highest-ranking representatives of the peoples of Indochina, demonstrated complete unity on the basic goals of the struggle to liquidate American aggression and to win independence for each nation in that region. The goals that were proclaimed, also familiar to us from the documents ensuing from the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, may be described briefly as follows: withdrawal of the forces of the aggressors and their allies, the achievement of independence, the assurance of peace and neutrality, the refusal to be drawn into any military bloc or alliance, elimination of foreign troops and foreign bases

on those territories, prohibition of the use of their territories for aggressive wars against other countries, and so on. In the meantime, having learned a lesson from their bitter experience, the peoples of this region continue with arms in hand to oppose foreign military power and to regard with a large dose of scepticism the numerous proposals to convoke a conference on Cambodia or Indochina.

In this new crisis, the People's Republic of China appears as a factor of growing influence upon whose behaviour and activities future developments in Southeast Asia hinge to a considerable extent. Peking has given full support to the decisions of the Conference of the Peoples of Indochina and to the newly-formed government of Prince Sihanouk. Support and assistance has also been promised to all liberation movements. It is hard to figure out exactly what this means for the volume of assistance can vary from the minimum to the maximum, from material aid to more sweeping military assistance. This remains to be seen although it is certain that Peking is attentively, and justifiably, following what is going on along the southern border of China. At the same time, China, while roundly condemning US aggression, has not broken off talks with the USA and, as matters stand now, the next meeting in Warsaw is going to be held.

The Soviet Union has assumed an extremely cautious position since the very inception of the Cambodian crisis. Almost a month and a half after the coup d'état in Phnom Penh, precise stands were defined in Moscow at a press conference given by Premier Kosygin, unequivocally condemning the American aggression in Cambodia. However, the Soviet Union has still not to this very day recognized the new government of Prince Sihanouk and the Soviet Ambassador in the Cambodian capital is still discharging his duties. Other Warsaw Pact countries are following suit. The USSR is continuing negotiations along all lines with the Western countries: in Vienna with the USA on restricting strategic arms, on Berlin, with the Federal German Republic and other countries. We do not have the answer to many questions about the position of the USSR but it obvious that Moscow is behaving as though its assessment of the situation were that a new constellation has taken shape in Southeast Asia, that all the facts are not in yet and that it would therefore be the better part of reason to wait for further developments, without losing sight

of those fronts that the USSR considers of vital interest for the socialist camp.

The fact that the People's Republic of China is continuing talks in Warsaw and the USSR is doing the same in Vienna - which is positive and normal in both cases - indicates the extent to which the war in Indochina is part of a tripartite framework in which matters are not only black and white but are growing in complexity.

In this perilous situation which has alarmed the world, various efforts are being made to achieve the appropriate goals by diplomatic methods. The day after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk, the British Government took action to convene a conference of the countries that had participated in the Geneva parleys. The Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations did mention that the idea of a Geneva conference was useful, but withdrew the notion the next day with the explanation that it was unrealistic under the present circumstances. France was particularly insistent about convoking a conference on Cambodia. Indonesia also proposed that a conference of Asian and Pacific countries be held. All these initiatives preceded the American aggression against Cambodia. The Indonesians continue to be actively engaged in calling for a conference which has even been scheduled for the second half of May. Considering the composition (apart from the other countries also Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam and Cambodia) this conference could do more harm than good. This has provided numerous Asian countries with sufficient reason to refuse to comply with the initiative in which the US and its allies have evinced interest.

On May 5th, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, threw his support behind the holding of an international conference on Indochina to be attended by all interested parties. U Thant's proposals are in line with the French idea and take support from the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.

Not much can yet be said about the reaction to these fresh initiatives. However, the mood of those most directly concerned is extremely important; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, Pathet Lao, Prince Sihanouk and their principal allies and friends.

Any proposals that might exclude these factors in one way or another would be condemned to failure and in fact provide wind in the sails of the USA and Saigon. This is the fundamental truth which must be kept in mind by all those who for one reason or the other undertake diplomatic initiatives in connection with the situation in the countries of Indochina. Conferences are welcome but only on condition that they condemn the aggressor and help the victims of aggression. Negotiations aimed toward consecrating conquests, the violation of independence and the striking of bargains with the aggressor would certainly be unacceptable and the motivation of those who refuse to join them would be understandable. US intervention in Cambodia has upset the balance and it would be hard to imagine the other side at any conference showing willingness to sign a document confirming this. There is always room for negotiations and international conferences, but a fetish should not be made of all formulae, while those that represent an extension (diplomatic) of the arm of the aggressor should particularly be rejected. In any case, if the US Government wishes to negotiate, there is nothing simpler than referring to the delegations already in Paris.

In the final analysis, the war will not terminate with an American victory - that is the most certain thing of all. However, for Washington to grasp this truth fresh defeats will apparently be necessary on the battlefields in Indochina, America will have to see itself isolated even further in the world and big upheavals will probably be needed in American society which is becoming increasingly restive about the US playing the role of a self-styled world policeman.

#### SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY RATIFIED IN BOTH CAPITALS

(Soviet News, 2-6-'70)

The treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was ratified on June 1 in Moscow and Prague. The treaty was signed in Prague. The treaty was signed in Prague on May 6 during the visit of a Soviet party and government delegation led by Leonid Brezhnev.

Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU central committee, Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the

USSR Supreme Soviet, and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, were present at the meeting of the Presidium which ratified the treaty.

In Prague the treaty was ratified by President Ludvik Svoboda.

Speaking at the ceremony in Moscow, President Podgorny said that the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, which served the fundamental interests of both countries, heralded a new stage in the development of their friendship and co-operation.

#### A new society

"This treaty embodies the feelings, sentiments, desires and aspirations of our peoples and gives clear-cut legal form to the spirit and high level of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia", he said.

"Every article of the treaty is imbued with the desire to strengthen further the inviolable fraternal friendship of the peoples of both countries, to base their relations on mutual respect for sovereignty and equality and to give each other friendly assistance in carrying out tasks of building a new society and in putting into practice the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism", he said.

President Podgorny declared that the treaty would further consolidate the entire world system of socialism, the steady strengthening of its might, cohesion and unity, and the reliable defence of the socialist gains of the peoples.

"The treaty contributes to the creation of an effective system of European security, to the easing of tension and to strengthening the positions of the forces of peace and progress in the struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism and reaction", he said.

On behalf of the Soviet government, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said:

"The provisions of the treaty ensure the development of effective co-operation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in political, economic, defence, cultural and other fields".

The treaty ensured on the basis of international law the main

principles of the relations that had taken shape between the socialist countries as the international relations of a new type, based on unity of Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist internationalism.

"The new treaty is intended to help to consolidate peace and security in Europe and all over the world, to create reliable bastions against the intrigues of imperialism and to contain the forces of reaction and militarism, which is in the interests of all the peoples", Andrei Gromyko said.

The treaty once again demonstrated how vain were the plans of international reaction to divide the socialist countries, which conducted a single policy and based their relations on close fraternal co-operation in all fields, he said.

Boris Ponomarev, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, said that the new treaty was in accord with the national interests of both peoples and demonstrated their desire to advance together to their great goal of communism, to help each other in every way to achieve this goal and to strengthen the unity of the socialist community.

Referring to the international importance of the new treaty, Boris Ponomarev said:

"This treaty reflects the principles of peaceful co-existence and willingness to exert every effort to safeguard peace and the security of the peoples in Europe and all over the world.

"The treaty stresses that the consolidation and defence of socialist gains is the common internationalist duty of the socialist countries. It is a serious warning to aggressors and enemies of our socialist states".

#### FRANCE CALLS FOR END TO 'ABSURD' EAST-WEST SPLIT

(The Times, 3-6-'70)

President Pompidou said today that he hoped the talks between Russia and West Germany would succeed. Speaking at a luncheon for Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, he said he hoped they would be part of a "general process of detente that will enable us to wipe out the absurd division between east and west".

The French President said in a toast to Mr. Gromyko that divisions in Europe must be swept away and outstanding problems settled.

"The search for a solution requires detente, increasing exchanges in all fields and a better understanding between European countries".

Franco-Soviet co-operation must be "an essential element in European stability and peace, and a far from negligible factor in world peace".

On relations between the two countries, M. Pompidou said that the present French Government was loyal to the action taken by General de Gaulle. "A new, a very necessary boost" must be given to economic, scientific and technical co-operation between France and the Soviet Union.

M. Pompidou, who visited the Soviet Union in July, 1967, when he was Prime Minister, said that his next visit, in October, would confirm the close links between the two nations.

"There exist between our two peoples traditional bonds and a natural sympathy - which explains why we find profit from, and attach value to, these contacts between leaders", he said.

"The Soviet Union and France have good reason to consult each other on the main international affairs. The world is far from being settled.

"Outside Europe, conflicts that do not cease to worsen continue to divide men. And as long as there is no end to them on terms conforming with independence, integrity and security for all nations, the peace of the world will be threatened.

"In Europe, a long and difficult task lies before us. We are in the middle of an important phase in European history.

"In the west the economic construction begun 12 years ago on pragmatical bases is continuing and strengthening. Franco-German reconciliation, doubtless one of the most striking events, is an established fact.

"You have yourselves been in talks with West Germany for some months. We hope these conversations succeed, in other words, that they form part of a general process of detente that

will enable us to wipe out the absurd division between east and west and allow us to restore balanced relations from one end of Europe to the other, based on confidence and respect for everyone - as a people and as a state.

#### SOVIET PENETRATION IN EGYPT

(Swiss Press Review and News Report, 8-6-'70)

Soviet penetration into Egypt has become an international scandal of major proportions. There is no doubt of that. In the last few months, whenever people have been asked to explain the dangers of allowing the Communists too much influence in a developing country, or of taking too much economic aid from the Communists, they have tended to prove their point by talking of Egypt; - for this is now a state almost entirely taken over by Russian imperialism. We all remember when its formerly great and respected leader told the world - oh, so many times, - that he at least could take the proffered hand and keep his balance however hard he was tugged.

That is not Nasser's tone now. Today there is remarkably little talk of keeping Egypt's independence. There may be dangers greater than this, we are told at first; but then we stop and ask what dangers can be greater than the danger of losing independence.

The war with Israel is very useful to the Russians in their attempt to take over Egypt. And it is because of this that they have always seemed so uninterested in bringing the sides together round a Middle East negotiating table. If the leaders of Egypt and Israel were to meet, it would be the greatest diplomatic defeat the Soviet Union has suffered in many years.

Though the commando raids over the Suez Canal from Egyptian to Israeli-held territory are carried out by Egyptian soldiers, they are now being planned by the Russians. This at least the Russians have been obliged to furnish in terms of practical aid in a sphere where everyone can see the results. It is not good for Russian prestige that the ally of the Soviet Union should be seen to be unable to keep up the fight in the enemy's territory. For a long time the Russians have tried to save the face of the Egyptian dictator by keeping obvious military aid to a minimum

and exerting their influence more subtly. But in recent months the dangers of peace in the Middle East have become so alarming to the Russians that they have preferred to forget Nasser's reputation and wade right in. We have had the Russian air patrols, we have had the SAM radar sites, and now we have Russian control of war planning.

The dangers of peace. . . . For the Russians - in contrast to the rest of us - these are the dangers which really dim the Middle East horizon. We would prefer to talk of the dangers of war, dangers to human beings, to people. But for them the dangers to be considered first and foremost are the political dangers.

It is really wonderful for the Russians after all this time to have a foothold in one of the key strategic countries of the world: a country with one coast on the Mediterranean and another in the Indian Ocean, a country which is the gateway to Africa. And what chance would the Russians have of keeping their foothold in this new empire if peace were to come and deprive them of their reason for being there - just before they had had time to consolidate their hold?

#### TWO TRENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Aleksandar Prlja

(Review of International Affairs, 5-6-'70)

Two different trends have been apparent in the evolution of the Middle East crisis in recent weeks, possibly more clearly so than at any previous time. One is the increasing incidence of armed conflicts on the potential frontlines between Israel and its Arab neighbours, conflicts which are causing increasing casualties and material damage on both sides and threatening to produce far-reaching consequences. The other is the evident efforts of some Arab governments, notably those of the UAR and Jordan, to "open safety valves" even at this belated hour for an improvement of political relations with the American administration and for encouraging intensified action by those representatives of the US administration who clearly disapprove of the risky military adventure of the Israeli "hawks". As a matter of fact, this adventure is threatening to lead to an undesirable more

direct confrontation in the Middle East with the rival eastern power. In view of this, what has been happening in the Middle East in the past few days and weeks may well be an effort to "find a last chance" of avoiding the worst.

#### Nasser's Appeal to the USA

Of the political events that have recently attracted attention, two are particularly important; one is Nasser's speech on May 1st in which he addressed a "last appeal" to the United States to "avert a complete and irrevocable about-face by the entire Arab nation against America" and the other - the somewhat surprising and unexpected statement of King Hussein of Jordan that he was prepared to accept in principle "direct talks with Tel Aviv provided the question of sovereignty over Jerusalem were included in the talks". As the two statements are obviously along the same lines it would be interesting to assess their possible influence on American policy in the Middle East in the coming phase of the crisis.

For more than a year, a section of the American "oil men" has been worried by growing anti-American feeling in the Arab world. The United States "extracts" from the Arab world about two thousand million dollars net profit every year. Apart from this, about one thousand three hundred million dollars of the United States' global foreign trade surplus of two thousand million dollars in 1969/70 came from the Middle East area, i. e., from trade with some of the Arab countries. Last year's events in Libya and the Sudan, the relative instability of King Feisal's pro-American régime in Saudi Arabia and the extensive potential opportunities which the newly-discovered oil fields in the UAR have opened to American oil companies - all these are elements which have made circles close to David Rockefeller, a powerful figure in American petroleum and banking business, look upon the United States strategy in the Middle East, hitherto almost one hundred per cent pro-Israeli, with growing disapproval. Nor can the military aspect of the Middle East situation appeal to the USA in view of the logical, unavoidable but potentially dangerous strengthening of the role of the Soviet Union in the defence of the attacked Arab countries, the UAR in the first place.

Thus the slightly pathetic May Day appeal of President Nasser to Washington's diplomacy must inevitably be assessed as an

event whose full impact is yet to reveal itself. King Hussein's offer for "direct talks" with Israel provided Israel renounced the "fait accompli" in the annexation of occupied territories including Jerusalem should be seen in the same light. Let us recall that two years ago the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring null and void the decision of the Israeli Knesset "to annex" the old part of Jerusalem and calling on Israel to have its parliament abrogate this decision. The resolution was unanimously approved without even the American delegation voting against. King Hussein's offer, which instantly met with the condemnation of certain "ultra-radical" Arab governments, thus also reflects renewed Jordanian hopes that after Nasser's appeal and Jordan's agreement in principle to "direct talks", American diplomacy will finally be persuaded to bring pressure to bear on Israel.

So far, however, the United States has not answered Nasser's appeal in any form whatsoever - the appeal having reached Washington in a somewhat different form, through normal diplomatic channels (there are over twenty American diplomats with a semi-official status in Cairo) and neither has it replied to King Hussein's offer. At his latest press briefing, the official White House spokesman found it necessary to underline that "the USA had not yet sent a reply to Nasser" and that "such a reply could be expected in the near future". At the same time considerable publicity was given in Washington to the news that the Nixon administration had declined "for the moment" Aza Harebi's renewed request that the temporary ban on further deliveries to Israel of modern American aircraft be lifted.

#### The Essence of the Matter: Israel's Withdrawal from Occupied Territories

It is now clear that both Cairo and Amman insist almost exclusively on a public declaration by Israel in which it would renounce its expansion at the expense of the occupied territories. All other matters could be a subject of negotiation the modes of which could be settled by a compromise. Considering that Israel is already obliged by the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, to do so, a possible change of American diplomatic strategy, which until this moment has been absolutely pro-Israeli, would hardly mean "losing face", although it would

certainly meet with internal resistance - from quarters which unfortunately have lately influenced more and more obviously, yet hopelessly, the shaping of American global strategy.

One should take into account the fact that Nasser's latest appeal to Washington and Hussein's offer for conditional "direct talks" have both considerably angered the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Actually, what this organisation fears more than anything else is the possibility of "treason" being committed by some Arab governments which might "come to terms with the big powers" to the detriment of the struggle of the banished Palestine people. Although it cannot be said that Nasser's appeal in his May Day speech or Hussein's offer for talks under certain conditions signify a public denial of unreserved support for the fundamentally just struggle of the Palestinians, the general impression is that these two events have drawn the line of the Arab's negotiating position in eventual political talks more clearly than any previous Arab offers. This and the unfavourable development of military operations in the "war of attrition" which has already incited concern among part of Israeli public opinion, is exerting "pressure" on the hitherto biased and one-sided American approach to the crisis.

As Kosygin's latest press conference in Moscow, along with some more recent statements by President Nasser, confirmed that in the present situation, in which the Arab world is confronted with spreading aggression and Israel's campaign for "assimilating" the occupied territories, the Soviet Union is resolved to commit itself more energetically to strengthening the Arab countries' defence, it is only reasonable to assume that another "fateful" instant has now occurred in the crisis, similar to other decisive moments in the past. Since April 18, Israeli bomber aircraft - according to the writing of Hassanein Heikal in his latest editorial - have made no attempt to penetrate deeper into Egyptian air space. During the past few weeks, their daily operations and raids have been confined to the narrow zone of about 25 kilometres behind Egyptian positions in the Suez Canal. With intensified defence of the air space around vital economic and political centres of the UAR, the Egyptian army, which now numbers about 600,000 is becoming increasingly troublesome vis-à-vis Israel's positions in the Sinai. About ten days ago, Egyptian frogmen accomplished another outstanding

feat by penetrating into the well-guarded port of Eilat and damaging an Israeli vessel there. For the first time in three years, Egyptian aircraft recently flew across occupied territory as far as El Arish. In the second half of April and the first half of May, the Israelis lost four times as many men as during the previous thirty days. Even official Israeli sources admitted they had had about thirty dead and about forty wounded during this period. Judged against the number of the population, these are considerable losses. Syrian MIG aircraft have recently flown over Haifa, for the first time since the June war, and pierced the "sound barrier" above this town which, according to official statements, Dayan believed to be "so well protected against air raids that enemy pilots would not even try to molest it".

To all this, one should add the now increasingly obvious miscalculations of Israel and possibly the USA, too, that - confronted with a military and economic challenge, Nasser's régime would sooner or later have to accept defeat and practical capitulation. However, the past economic year, which many people in the world have already termed a "little Egyptian miracle", was one of the best in the last ten years. The strategic aim of the aggression in June 1967 has thus again been proven as practically unattainable.

All this goes to show that the present state of affairs cannot be extended indefinitely. The alternative is again as potentially dangerous as it is simple: either an extension of the war ad infinitum risking the increasingly direct possibility of major, although unwanted, involvement by the big powers in the Middle East disputes, or, at least, a partial change in American-Israeli policy in regard to the crisis in that area. For the moment there are few signs to indicate such a change. The crisis, as we have already said, is following two parallel but divergent trends. It is certain, however, that we shall not have to wait long to see some qualitative changes take place in the entire situation - for better or worse.

## ECONOMICS

### EAST-WEST TRADE: NEW PERSPECTIVES OPEN UP IN PERIOD OF DETENTE

Michael Simmons, East European Correspondent

(The Financial Times, 1-5-'70)

East-West trade, for all the political undercurrents, has arrived at a period of detente. The Soviet Union has committed itself to long-term deals which will enable it to sell huge quantities of natural gas in return for much needed steel pipes, and the Americans - represented in this instance by the Ford Motor Company - are showing an interest in co-operating in the building of a massive Soviet lorry plant. Britain has decided, with effect from today, that restrictions on a wide range of imports from Eastern Europe should be removed, despite the fact that the trade balance with the seven countries involved is adverse to Britain to the extent of £ 100m. a year. By doing this, Britain hopes to encourage the Communist trading organizations to increase their purchases from the U.K. Now less than 10 per cent of Britain's East European imports will be subject to bilateral quotas (although the Board of Trade retains the right to reimpose restrictions at any time).

#### Arms talks

These three developments alone might be described as symptoms of a general state of well-being in this particular sphere. But there are a whole series of developments, political as well as commercial, that are now combining to present new perspectives that might have been considered unimaginable a few months ago, even a few weeks ago. Even the strategic arms limitation talks, now going on in Vienna, have some relevance. A happy ending to these talks - or even a mildly satisfactory adjournment - could not implausibly pave the way to the European security conference so much wanted by the Warsaw Pact; and such a development, one imagines, could make the USSR and their fellow socialists, as well as their ideological opposites, more accommodating in questions of bi-lateral, and ultimately perhaps, multi-lateral, commerce.

#### Soviet motives

The Soviet gas deals, and especially those with Italy and West

Germany, certainly represent the biggest East-West deals ever transacted. They have committed the gas buyers to a measure of dependence on Communist supplies which only a political disaster, probably, would halt. Some observers in the U. S. have read the deals as attempts by Moscow to disrupt the NATO alliance: but most have conceded that they can only lead to some relaxation of tension. Whatever the Russians' motives - and it is surely more sensible to read them as primarily commercial - it should be remembered that they, in their urgent need for pipes, are committed just as much as their trading partners. But to say that Soviet motives in transactions on this scale are "primarily commercial" begs a host of questions. Many of these can be answered with a rejoinder that the Russians have their own, ideologically based, notion of what is commercial, or of what is profitable. Relations with Italy (which has West Europe's largest Communist Party), with West Germany (which is pursuing an arguably conciliatory Eastern policy), and with France (another probable gas customer, also with a big Communist Party) are all being assiduously fostered by the Russians. The "profit" from the gas deals may be called psychological: an acknowledged shortage of steel pipe and sophisticated equipment, badly needed for the exploitation of the country's untapped oil and gas reserves, will be alleviated. But trade is seen in the East as a political activity, and while intra-Comecon trade is promoted as essential for the well-being of "proletarian internationalism", deals between Moscow and the West, on the other hand, tend to be restricted to the absolutely necessary. Exports represent only 4 per cent of the national income of the USSR.

#### U.S. trade

This lends a certain flavour to the recent dialogue between the Soviet Government and Henry Ford II. U. S. - Soviet trade is a relative trickle - reaching last year only \$ 150m. - though trade done by U. S. subsidiaries in Western Europe would boost this figure considerably. A contract to help in the building of a motor plant of the dimensions envisaged by the Soviet planners - to produce 150,000 lorries a year - would rival in value the \$600m. one won by Fiat of Italy in 1966. Small wonder Henry Ford is consulting with Washington as to whether such a commitment might be construed as a defence item. It is significant that this dia-

logue should have taken place while the Vietnam war still rages on the ideological as well as military front, and should come to a head in a week when the Soviet Party leader, Mr. Brezhnev, forecasts the end of imperialism in "a sea of crippled souls". Since half a dozen Western companies and another from Japan had all been approached before Mr. Ford to build the plant in question, one must assume there are not too many "crippled souls" designing the West's much sought-after lorries....

#### Yugoslav view

Today, May 1, may go down as a highly significant date in East-West trade relations. It sees the coming into force of Yugoslavia's three-year, non-preferential and non-discriminatory trade agreement with the Common Market signed in Brussels six weeks ago. Yugoslavia professes to belong to neither East nor West and is the only Communist country which officially recognizes the EEC. Not unexpectedly, therefore, this is the EEC's first commercial treaty with a Communist country - even though there are some limited "arrangements" with some Comecon members. The agreement testifies to Yugoslavia's so far unique resourcefulness in such matters. It has sent countless ripples of interest, and some of concern, eddying through the Comecon camp. Some Yugoslavs are convinced that Hungary, or Rumania, or even Poland perhaps, would like to follow their example. Certainly, it will be interesting to see to what extent the move will stimulate those Comecon countries anxious to protect their bilateral arrangements with EEC members, especially in agricultural produce (where the Yugoslavs will be particularly active). The Russians, for all their willingness to enter into complicated arrangements with EEC members, will certainly not be to the fore in any fresh "accommodation" with the Six. Their official view is that the EEC is an economic arm of NATO, bent on a political and military alliance directed against themselves and the other Socialist countries. Yugoslavia characteristically, has dismissed such charges as "not well supported by argument", while both Hungary and Rumania have been comparatively restrained in their criticisms. A further Common Market development has been the formal agreement reached in Brussels last December for a common import system in trade deals with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

No member of the Six under this system, will be able unilaterally to re-impose quotas or restrictions on products



appearing in the Community's "liberalisation lists". The proportion of exports from West to East varies according to the country. France and Italy - before the recently concluded long-term agreements - sent something over 4 per cent each in this direction; West Germany, if one includes tariff-free trade with East Germany, sent around 6 per cent; while Austria (like Finland a geographically well situated partner) sent about 18 per cent. The U.S., for the record, conducts about 0.6 per cent. of its trade with Eastern Europe. The dependence of Comecon members on foreign trade is vastly different from that of the USSR. The ratio of exports to the national income is estimated to be as high as 35 per cent for Hungary (whose economic reform programme may stand or fall by its trading successes); 30 per cent for Czechoslovakia (where the same parenthetical comments might have applied but for the "events" of 1968: though, even now the economy has been "dereformed", trade remains vital); 28 per cent for Bulgaria; and 25 per cent for the GDR. A further batch of statistics, recently published in Moscow, show that the Socialist countries' overall share in world trade has fallen quite perceptibly since 1960: exports from 13.1 per cent to 12.5 per cent in 1968, and imports from 12.6 per cent to 11.8 per cent.

#### Comecon exports

But no two regions in the world have been expanding their trade exchanges more dynamically than East and West Europe; it has been rising at an annual rate of 12 per cent, since 1953, a rate only exceeded by the intra-trade of the EEC itself. The potential for further expansion remains enormous - or should be. Until recently, the flow has been mainly of machinery, equipment and other manufactured goods from West to East, with a preponderance of raw materials and semi-manufactures flowing the other way. A more sophisticated marketing mechanism and an improvement in the quality of the manufactured goods offered from the East may well continue the process, already started, of changing this sort of balance. But just as Eastern goods and processes are becoming increasingly acceptable to Western buyers and manufacturers, so the bourgeois specialist (as he was called in Lenin's time) is once again becoming persona grata in the East. "Technology", as Mr. Janez Stanovnik, secretary of the UN Economic Commission for

Europe, pointed out in London recently, "is the key. Trade exchanges are moving away from the mere bartering of goods. More and more the invisible products of brain and skill are traded. "It is not only a question of patents or licences or even of what is called 'know-how'. What is becoming more and more important is the exchange of knowledge of how to organise scientific research and production units, manage workers and industrial processes and, finally, how to find markets".

#### NATIONS TAKE SECOND PLACE

(The Financial Times, 15-4-'70)

Speaking about Socialist integration - a favourite theme of Comecon - in Budapest recently, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Party leader, said that Socialist countries must not defend their national interests if these clash with the international interests of Socialism. This is likely to be the basic theme running through the 24th session of Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) due to be held in Warsaw next month.

He was answering Mr. Janos Kadar, the Hungarian Party Secretary, whose emphasis was more on the co-ordination than sub-ordination of national interests. The Rumanian reluctance to integrate, meanwhile, seems to be reviving, and even the Bulgarians seem to be demanding a better price for the tomatoes which they export to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union now has pressing grounds for going ahead with integration which, as Mr. Wladislaw Gomulka, the Polish leader explained in a recent article in Pravda "is not only an economic but also a political necessity". This is the first time a political objective for Comecon has been admitted. Mr. Gomulka went on to say that co-ordination of economic plans and of trade was no longer enough and that all member countries should carry out the decisions adopted a year ago, which were aimed at economic integration.

#### Hard winter

His exhortations were addressed not only to the reluctant Rumanians and the hesitant Hungarians. They were meant to counter the wave of hope which has been spreading in East Europe in the wake of talks recently held by Bonn's representatives in Moscow, Warsaw, Erfurt, Prague, Budapest and Bucharest.

The Comecon countries are emerging from a hard winter, bad enough by any meteorological standards but which Government spokesmen tend to call "the worst in living memory", blaming it for the appalling shortages of fuel and other essential supplies. Thus the exasperated citizens are only too ready to seize on the glimmer of hope that European détente may be round the corner and will bring a better life for everybody. Even the otherwise rational Czechs seem to believe a popular astrologer of Brno who is reported, by word of mouth, to have predicted that in 1972 Europe will be united and the Soviet Army gone. They also tend to believe that the Soviet Union is hard pressed by the Chinese and that this is the reason why it must seek agreement with the West. But the more immediate concern of the Soviet leaders must be the state of the Soviet economy. Even assuming equality with the West, on the nuclear front, grave strategic disadvantages must result from the increasing Western lead in the wider industrial field, not to speak of agriculture, where 45 per cent of the Soviet working population cannot produce enough bread. In Western Europe, 14 per cent of the population produces more than enough. Western help is therefore sought to help close the technological "gap" with the West. Working relations have already been established with some Western countries, but if the détente is not to generate centrifugal tendencies in East Europe, the political barriers between Moscow and Bonn can be lowered only as fast or as slowly as Comecon is being integrated. In the military sphere integration has been achieved to a very high degree, and the repeated cry for economic integration should not obscure the fact that this, too, has already occurred on a substantial scale. The smaller partners in Comecon transact roughly two-thirds of their trade within the region and between a third and a half with the Soviet Union. About 40 per cent of all Soviet trade is transacted with East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the engineering industries of these four countries are completely geared to the Soviet Union as a market and supplier of raw material irreplaceable without a major economic upheaval. The size of this commitment is £500m., the lower limit for the estimate of 1969 Soviet imports of machinery and industrial equipment from other Comecon countries. Integration thus exists, but its economic benefits could be much improved. The trouble is that in a centrally ruled

economy the interest of the ruling centre will always be opposed to the interests of the peripheral regions - there is no common-wealth where the product of joint effort can be arbitrarily allocated by an uncontrolled government of the dominant power.

Translated into topical language, the Hungarians are unhappy (as the East Germans and Czechs were before them) because they export to their Comecon partners more than they import from them and have no use for the rouble balances accumulating on their account with the Comecon bank in Moscow. They want Comecon trade to become multi-lateral, the rouble balances to be transferable within Comecon, and possibly convertible into Western currencies. This, of course, cannot be done without harmonising prices which are now fixed in each country by bureaucrats according to their particular and very local needs. That is an even greater problem than a hard-boiled Western marketing expert might think. As Professor Piotr Alampiev explained recently in the Moscow magazine, *New Times*, the Soviet Union believes that the prices it obtains for crude oil, gas, raw materials and agricultural produce in Comecon are not high enough and that the exporters of machinery are reaping great profits. The exporters of machinery think just the opposite. The real problems of Comecon spring therefore from the Soviet strategic need to maintain its radial pattern in which each of the smaller partners are primarily dependent on the Soviet economy rather than on the Comecon economy as a whole. The terms of trade and flow of investments will also come up for discussion in Warsaw. In this sector Comecon economists now admit that price harmonisation is near impossible. Instead, they recommend the streamlining of the enormously complicated system of currency multipliers, and commodity subsidies and special taxes used in intra-Comecon trade and also trade outside the bloc. This system is already used in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. They also dream that one day a high interest should be paid by surplus importers and that at least part of the balances with the Comecon bank may eventually be repaid in gold.

#### New currency

Realising that this road to multi-laterality is likely to be made very arduous by the disinclination of the Soviet Union to

keep in step, the Comecon economists have another suggestion up their sleeve: that at least trade in less essential goods should be liberalised and financed by means of a new common currency, freely transferable in Comecon. However, as long as there is no common market producing a common price, even these "unessential" commodities will continue to be bartered between the governments controlling the trade corporations and the proposed new currency will follow the fate of the now strictly non-transferable "transferable rouble" that was introduced in 1964. The only Comecon reforms that can be expected to take firmer root at the coming Warsaw meeting are those replacing the co-ordination of economic plans that has existed hitherto by joint planning and joint investment, both managed from the Comecon office in Moscow. A new research institute for the joint study of the many vexing problems that remain will also be established.

#### BANK TO AID INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIA

(The Guardian, 20-5-'70)

The new international bank which is to be chartered by seven Communist countries in July is expected to be mainly used for increasing "investments" in the Soviet Union by her allies, particularly in exploration of the Siberian oil and natural gas finds.

This is the conclusion of East European observers following last week's meeting of Comecon, the Communist economic and trade bloc, in Warsaw. The meeting was a severe disappointment for countries such as Hungary, which have been looking for ways to put the area on a solid monetary footing, and an indication that the Soviet Union intends to press forward with plans to "integrate" the East European economies.

The Russians are thought to have received solid support from the Poles, who at one time had been close to the Hungarians on wanting major reforms, but none from the Rumanians, who actually refused to participate at this stage in the setting up on July 10 of an "investment bank".

Under the plans mapped out by Comecon, the bank will be used mainly to fund joint explorations in the raw material and energy fields. But this has been taken to mean East European help for Soviet projects. For some time, the Russians have been

encouraging their allies to invest directly in Soviet projects in this area, rather than limit their payments to barter for Soviet goods.

Four days after the close of the Warsaw meeting, Yugoslav correspondents in Poland have pointed out that "it is still unknown how the bank's capital will be formed". Most of the other results of the meeting are equally nebulous. Leading officials, such as the Hungarian Prime Minister, Jeno Fock, have emphasised that the meeting was only one step in a "long, difficult and persistent work". The refusal of the Bucharest Government in Rumania to go along with the bank, though reportedly agreeing to it "in principle" indicated its refusal to support any move toward economic integration without guarantees that political integration will not follow.

For some time, the Hungarians have been pressing for a plan that would put their economy and that of their trading partners on a monetary footing, less dependent on the cumbersome, inefficient, barter arrangements now used. Under the present system, year-end surpluses and deficits are balanced out by an elaborate clearing technique. The net effect is that creditor countries are under pressure to help debtors by buying more of their goods. Hungarian planners say this penalises efficient economies. They have been cautiously putting forward a plan whereby an escalating percentage of year-end balances would be cleared with gold or other hard reserves. By the end of the decade, they believe, Comecon could have moved to full monetary transferability, and would be ready to announce that its currencies, or the common monetary unit in use, was convertible on world exchanges.

However, last week's meetings, and previous statements by the Soviet Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, and Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka suggest that this plan has been discouraged. The approval of integration suggests instead that the five-year plans now in the making will have to be even more closely coordinated with Moscow's. Forty per cent of Hungary's economy is dependent on foreign trade, mainly with the Russians. Thus, little can be done to streamline the economy. In March, the Hungarian press revealed that several blast furnaces had been working at half capacity because supplies of iron ore and coke from the Russians had fallen short.

### TOO MANY "AMERICANISMS" IN EAST BERLIN ADVERTISING

(Radio Free Europe, 20-5-'70)

The East Berlin monthly Neue Werbung ("New Advertising") reported in its May issue that a number of East German firms have recently been using too many Anglicisms and Americanisms in their advertising. "Nortak", a state-owned tobacco factory, brought out a new pipe tobacco last October which, in addition to being "wrapped extravagantly", used mainly English terms in its advertising. According to the magazine, the cosmetic industry is guilty of the same abuse -- "appealing to the buyer's feelings of prestige which are foreign to socialism". The industry was upbraided for praising such products as "pre-shave and after-shave lotions, lather shaving cream, hair tonic, etc.". The magazine also detected similar trends in the soft drinks industry and commented that a client who might use the German word "Pampelmusensaft" instead of the English "grapefruit juice" might run the risk of being ridiculed.

The magazine concluded that these advertising practices indicate a marked failure to differentiate from capitalist advertising concepts; such terminology also lacks statements on the "special basic concerns of socialist society". The magazine said one of the basic concerns which should be expressed in any advertising campaign, is the idea that "the individual consumer is simultaneously social producer and socialist owner". Neue Werbung urged East German advertisers to implement such ideas rather than to emulate Western practices.

### THE ROUBLE IN THEIR POCKETS

(The Guardian, 21-5-'70)

It is just as well that there is no equivalent of Wall Street in Moscow just now. If there was it would present as depressed a picture as does the New York stock exchange. The growing economic crisis in the United States has drawn a lot of attention in the past few months. But the increasing evidence of Russia's economic problems has attracted nothing like the same publicity.

Russian industry has been experiencing a recession for the

past 12 months. Growth has been flagging and there have been reports of embarrassingly large pockets of unemployment. It also appears that production targets for a number of key industries have been scaled down for 1970 and 1971. The authorities admit that there are all the signs of an accelerating price inflation. This is being reflected in reports of dissatisfaction of consumers over the quality of goods in the shops, in particular the quality of food. There is a serious shortage of decent meat and poultry thanks to the cuts in production caused by the drop in output of animal foodstuffs. Of course, the Russian consumer has rarely had cause to be satisfied with his lot. But the younger generation is less prone to accept without protest shortages in the shops, price inflation or unemployment. The Russian authorities today have to be more wary of labour discontent. Strikes have an unhappy way of escalating and evolving a political character - as the East Germans found in 1953, the Poles and Hungarians in 1956, and the Czechs in 1968.

The economic deterioration has provoked controversy, initially among the managerial and planning caste, and more recently in the leadership of the Communist Party. Predictably the two sides line up along the lines of the debate which started nearly 10 years ago by the suggestion that Russian industry needs a greater degree of managerial devolution and the introduction of an internal profit mechanism. Since Professor Liberman made his famous appeal for a market pricing system there has been significant liberalisation within the administration of the economy. Plant and industry managers do have greater autonomy than ever before; some of them now have freedom to negotiate directly with Western firms over the heads of the planning ministries in Moscow. There has also been a partial introduction of market pricing within some industries. The liberals argue that it has not gone far enough to be effective. The conservatives argue that it has gone too far. In their support the conservatives cite the experience of Yugoslavia, which, in spite of its relative economic liberalism, faces worrying problems of economic stagnation, increasing foreign trade deficits, and higher unemployment.

Behind the debate about economic method lie the stark facts of Russia's involvement in the international missile race and the chronically backward state of her agriculture. Either factor

would be serious. The combination could be deadly to Russia's prospects of economic growth. Although 42 years have passed since Stalin signed the great collectivisation orders, Russian agriculture is still plagued by appallingly low productivity. The disparity between the standard of living in the cities and on the countryside continues to militate against rural enthusiasm for increasing output. In all probability some further concessions will have to be made to private agricultural initiative. Already the private open air food markets in the cities rival the state-owned food supermarkets.

The problem of raising industrial productivity is just as intractable. More encouragement is now being given to importing foreign skill; for it is expert skill that the Russians want when they offer manufacturing facilities to "capitalist" concerns, such as Ford of America and Fiat of Italy. But Russia's ability to buy foreign skill and technique is restricted by her success in selling abroad. The competitiveness of Russian industry in export markets is, as anywhere else, largely controlled by domestic inflation.

The Russians also know that the problem of inflation will get worse the greater the burden of keeping abreast of the Americans in the arms race. Some sections of the Russian bureaucracy, particularly the military, are determined that there shall be no slackening in Russia's military preparedness. Others want agreement at the SALT talks, so that there can be some diversification of resources from those industries feeding the military sector. The Russians also calculate that the Americans, as much as themselves, need an understanding over the arms race in order to contain their own domestic economic problem. Cambodia and China permitting, the world's two economic giants must hope to turn their attention from each other to deal with the crisis at home.

## CULTURE

### SOVIET SOCIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS

Sergei S. Voronitsyn

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 26-5-'70)

Summary: Soviet sociology, still trying to free itself from the trammels of official ideology, has an equivocal status. The authorities are reluctant to recognize it as an independent discipline and sociologists themselves are divided about the influence historical materialism should have on their work. But if Soviet sociology is to come of age its more enlightened practitioners must continue to strive for objective research based on sound theoretical principles.

Among the scientific disciplines partially rehabilitated in the Soviet Union during the post-Stalin period it is sociology that finds itself in the most equivocal position. The Party's attempts to introduce a modicum of social reform as a concession to the times have given sociologists a freer hand, but simultaneously their work is still badly hampered by a host of unnecessary difficulties. The fact that among the thousands of Soviet sociologists not a single one is properly qualified by accepted international standards testifies to the abnormal situation. Literaturnaya gazeta recently confirmed this:

Mechanics, engineers, teachers, historians, mathematicians, geologists, philologists and even former pilots are working as sociologists. If the full statistics were gathered together they would reveal that although there are members of hundreds of respected professions among alleged sociologists, our higher education institutes have not yet produced a single sociologist and when they will do so remains unknown. (No. 12, 1970, p.12)

More than 600 sociologists attended the 1966 All-Union Sociological Symposium in Leningrad of whom 27 per cent were historians, 25 per cent philosophers, 10 per cent economists and 3 per cent psychologists; 30.5 per cent represented other

branches of the humanities and 4.5 per cent were from technical professions. The majority of delegates had only three to four years of experience of sociology and no more than three-quarters were to some extent familiar with the methodology and techniques of sociological research (Voprosy filosofii, No. 10, 1966, p. 156).

For several years now sociologists and their representative bodies have been trying to persuade the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education to establish facilities for the training of sociologists at the universities, so far without conspicuous success. Soviet economist V.I. Perevedentsev, who has frequently raised this question with the Ministry, points out some of the difficulties:

Ministry officials even maintain that they are doing everything necessary and everything in their power. But what are they really doing? Just as a year ago, they are studying the results of the work of sociological laboratories. Why? In order to work out specific recommendations regarding the activity of a laboratory. But the real issue is personnel training and not laboratory work. Then they reported that it is "generally" not possible to train sociologists because, they say, nobody knows what a sociologist really is and nobody will undertake to train "pure" sociologists.

(Literaturnaya gazeta, op. cit.)

The request by the All-Union Council of Scientific and Technical Societies that the Ministry organize the training of specialists in industrial sociology has also been so far unavailing. In its reply the Ministry demanded proof of the need for industrial sociologists during the next five years and a firm definition of their duties. The difficulty of meeting these stipulations is well illustrated by the answers received from thirty Moscow factories to the question whether they had or required sociologists on their staff:

Three factories were quite perplexed and asked: "What sort of people are they?" At twenty others they obviously knew what was referred to and answered with a categorical "No". At the Avtoshtamp works they were

equally definite: "We manufacture crockery and not sociologists. These professions are of no use to us". The Vladimir Ilich electro-mechanical works also rejected the services of sociologists; a few months back they sent home the man supposed to be a sociologist and curtailed his duties. The No. 2 Housing Construction Combine gave the most diplomatic answer: "It is a very fine profession, but we shall get by with our own resources. (Komsomolskaya pravda, February 15, 1970)

So far the only result of requests for university trained sociologists has been the establishment of a department of social psychology at Leningrad University and a department for the methodology of applied sociology at Moscow University. Because the official list of permitted subjects at Soviet higher education institutes does not include sociology, students at both these departments will be registered as taking philosophy.

The majority of sociologists will continue to qualify through post-graduate studies at the Party Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and practical field work. The latter is frequently an unsystematic process producing a stream of sociologists whose ignorance of research methods all too often discredits the profession:

The majority of "sociologists by appointment" still believe, as formerly, that the whole of sociology consists in preparing questionnaires. They simply do not know any other methods of sociological research and they regard the questionnaire as a universal master-key. Some assume that they can solve sociological problems by means of mathematics. These "teething troubles" were apparently inevitable, but they have lingered too long already. (Literaturnaya gazeta, op. cit.)

Soviet sociologists engaged on research fall into two clear categories -- the philosophical and the empirical. The former, usually in administrative positions in sociological institutions, are theoreticians of historical materialism and only concern themselves with sociology where absolutely necessary. The majority, according to a fellow sociologist,

regard historical materialism primarily as a philosophical world outlook and have a very hazy conception of its sociological functions. Not being well acquainted with the procedures of applied social research, the sociologist-philosopher assumes that social statistics can be directly utilized for corroborating general theoretical concepts without any form of intermediate structures. In practice this leads to the notorious method of illustrating social laws with the help of more or less felicitously selected examples. (Ibid., No. 9, 1968, p. 11)

The empirical sociologist is most often an enthusiast prepared to examine everything from all angles as long as he can learn something new:

He does not care too much about theoretical premises but "boldly invades life", painstakingly gathering all possible information and grouping it according to similarity and dissimilarity. Here the source of inspiration is very often the immediate practical effect of his investigations. The sociologist is seeking means of improving the organization of labour or the struggle against negative social phenomena, without considering the problem as a whole. (Ibid.)

For all their differences, both types of Soviet sociologists are a hindrance to the proper development of their science. The enormous popularity of sociology in the Soviet Union of late is also a serious handicap, as B. G. Grushin explains in his book "Opinion About the World and the World of Opinion", published in Moscow in 1967:

Anyone who ever took it into his head to conduct some sort of survey is beginning to call himself a sociologist. Journalists and industrial managers, Party and Komsomol workers, directors of film theaters and policemen -- one and all are now busy with their questionnaires. The reasons for this are obviously complex. It is not only that sociology has become fashionable; the main reason is that people are trying to satisfy their long-standing hunger for knowledge of the specific processes taking

place in society and to fill the vacuum that has existed in this respect for a long time. (p. 345)

This boom has led to the mushroom like growth of sociological institutes and laboratories in Party, Komsomol and trade union organs, scientific and educational establishments, newspaper editorial offices and economic organizations. By 1968 sociological institutions of various types existed at establishments of the CPSU Central Committee, some branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences, several union republican academies of sciences and the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Departments and faculties of poly-technical, medical, veterinary, agricultural and physical culture higher education institutes joined in and, not to be outdone, some union republican Party central committees and some oblast, kray, rayon and local Komsomol committees set up sociological laboratories and working groups.

This rapid expansion produced, alongside larger research centers with qualified staff and equipment, a multitude of diminutive groups inadequately prepared for serious scientific work, a trend pointed out several years ago by two Soviet sociologists who stated: "This fragmentation causes parallelism, duplication and irrational use of existing scientific resources and opportunities and encourages works the relevance and theoretical and practical value of which is extremely dubious" (Izvestia, November 13, 1966). The majority of these faults are due to the almost complete absence of quality control and centralized co-ordination of scientific work. For example, only 15 of the 200 sociological laboratories in existence in 1965 were in close contact with one another (Voprosy filosofii, No. 5, 1965, p. 24).

Ideological restrictions on the choice of research subjects and official insistence that work be conducted "with the active participation and under the guidance of Party organizations" (Partiynaya zhizn, No. 20, 1967, p. 41) had a powerful retarding effect.

For many years Soviet sociologists unsuccessfully urged the establishment of a co-ordinating center, but it was only in June 1967 that the Institute for Applied Social Research was set up for this purpose. The avoidance of the word sociology in the title of this institute confirms that historical materialism is jealously guarding its privileged position in the Soviet Union. This attitude reduces empirical research to the level of an anonymous supplier of data, has so far prevented the publication of a Soviet sociological journal and places many other obstacles in the path of development of genuine sociology.

Soviet sociologists themselves have quite varied opinions about the relationship and respective merits of historical materialism and sociology, but they can be reduced to three main groups. The first, a fairly small group, regards sociology and historical materialism as identical and consists largely of Soviet philosophers working in the field of historical materialism and who, for one reason or another, are unable to change their standpoint. The second, and larger group consists of people directly involved in empirical research who do not deny the link between theoretical sociology and historical materialism but who consider empirical sociology an absolutely independent science. Thirdly, there are those who maintain that sociology as a whole is as much an independent science as history, economics, ethnography, etc., and that historical materialism is merely its philosophical-methodological basis. Originally numerically small, this latter group has recently begun to grow at the expense of the empiricists, who were at work before the necessity of elaborating independent sociological theories (without which empirical sociology must stagnate) was appreciated.

It is this third group that poses the greatest threat to historical materialism because, despite the methodological and technical imperfection of much of the extensive sociological research that it carries out, it nonetheless furnishes much evidence refuting major postulates of historical materialism. Sociological research indicates, for example, that class and social distinctions have not been abolished in Soviet society. Not only has a classless society not been achieved, but the scientific and technical intelligentsia is evolving as a privileged class and consolidating its position. By securing the best education for its children it is transforming itself into a

a hereditary privileged class while the working class, supposedly the leading class in Soviet society, is disintegrating into numerous professional and social groups and gradually becoming more bourgeois.

It is this discrepancy between historical materialism and the facts unearthed by sociological research that so disturbs many of the more moderate orthodox Soviet sociologists:

The difficulty is, however, that between world sociological theory and specific social phenomena studied by empirical methods several transitional stages must be established in the form of special theories in the field under investigation. For example, the sociological theory of labor or the theory of personality.

The neglect of particular sociological theories (there are still philosophers who persistently deny the need to elaborate them) leads to the self-isolation of empirical research from theory in general.  
(Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 9, 1968, p.11)

But the formation of a body of sociological theory is beset by many other difficulties, some of which are discussed by a Soviet philosopher, G. Ye. Glezerman, in his article "Historical Materialism and Problems of Social Research" in Kommunist. Criticizing the sociologist, Yu. A. Levada, he writes:

Whether this author wanted it or not, objectively his lectures appear as an attempt to create a "neutral" sociology located outside the sphere of the ideological struggle. It is noteworthy that in his lectures no place has been found for criticism of bourgeois sociology. Even the term "bourgeois sociology" itself is not used. The author thus breaks with the Marxist-Leninist tradition that positive exposition is always combined with the struggle against our ideological opponents.  
(No. 4, 1970, p. 80)

These lectures have been published by the Learned Council for Problems of Applied Social Research and the Institute of Applied Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and also by the Soviet Sociological Association, so Glezerman's



remarks can be read as an official warning by Party ideologists to these sociological institutions. If this warning discourages Soviet sociologists from working out the theoretical basis for genuine research, there can be no progress in their field.

#### YUGOSLAV YOUTH'S REBELLIOUS PRESS

(Radio Free Europe, 29-5-'70)

**Summary:** The political ferment and dissatisfactions displayed in Yugoslavia during the student riots of June 1968 are still very much alive. The extremely active Yugoslav youth and student press is currently characterized by its non-conformist attitude and merciless criticism of social injustices. Although the youth press, generally speaking, is an expression and instrument of the so-called youth "subculture", it is also a measure of this group's strong political involvement and is indicative of its constant struggle for greater freedom in all spheres of social and political life.

In spite of their violence and extension, the student riots of June 1968 in Yugoslavia caught the attention of the Yugoslav leadership and the general public for only a short time.(1) But the events provoked by the Czechoslovak crisis and the subsequent armed invasion of that country, were the most important topics covered by the Yugoslav mass media at that time. They also provoked serious concern among the State and Party leadership.

However, neither increasing tensions between Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Five during the period that followed, nor Tito's

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(1) On 2 June 1968, thousands of students demonstrated violently after having been expelled from a beat music show organized for the youth of Belgrade. The following days, after having occupied several faculties of the University of Belgrade, the students submitted a four-point list of demands, three of which dealt with political issues. For more details see also RFE Research report "Analysis of Belgrade Student Riots", 4 June 1968, by S. Stankovic.

personal efforts to find an adequate solution to student and youth problems have caused them to disappear completely. (2) On the contrary, through the daily press and periodicals, they have remained in the public eye and persist today as one of Yugoslavia's major problems. Now, two years after the summer of 1968, it seems certain that the student rebellion was just a symptom of a growing malaise among students and youth throughout Yugoslavia.

#### Under the Censor's Stroke

That a malaise persists among students and youth in Yugoslavia is evidenced by their publications, and because of their non-conformism, open criticism and their independence from the Party organization, they can in no way be compared with similar publications in other East European countries.

Open criticism and radical non-conformism are reasons why youth and student publications are so often objects of judicial prosecutions and prohibitions. (3) While writing about prohibited publications, the Belgrade weekly Ekonomska politika noted that the greatest number of such periodicals during 1968 was published by student or youth organizations. (4) The Belgrade Student, for example, was indicted and legally prohibited three times; Susret, another Belgrade youth paper, met the same fate.

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(2) On 9 June, President Tito received a delegation of the Student Committee of the Belgrade University and openly took the side of the revolting students saying that he would resign if he failed to solve the problem for which the students demanded a rapid solution. Radio Belgrade, 9 June 1968, 2000 hours.

(3) There is no preventive censorship system in Yugoslavia today. Instead, the State prosecutor may invoke a pledge against any incriminated text or publication based on the "Law on the Press and Other Information Media" from 31 October 1960.

(4) Ekonomska politika, Belgrade, 16-22 December 1968

In Zagreb, Croatia, four student and youth papers were obliged to stop circulating particular issues. Omladinski tjednik ("Youth Weekly"), Studentski list ("Student Paper"), Razlog ("The Reason") and Paradox, like their Belgrade counterparts, were accused of publishing articles "expressing doubts in the Yugoslav social and political system" (5) Katalog, the Slovenian youth periodical, and Tribuna, the official Ljubljana student publication, have also provoked animated discussions with their merciless criticism of social conditions expressed in an anarcho-pornographic vocabulary. However, in spite of its campaign led against these two Slovenian student periodicals, the Slovenian Government refused to intervene. Instead, it stated openly that the problem is a matter of cultural and political concern. (6)

The Student affair provided even stronger evidence of a confrontation between Yugoslav youth and the establishment. This Belgrade weekly, published by the Association of Students of Belgrade University, was openly accused of supporting anarcho-liberal and anti-reform ideas. However, because that paper is extremely influential among Yugoslav students, State and Party authorities abstained from taking any legal or administrative action against the publication. Instead, they implemented an ideological campaign, together with massive political pressure. Supported by the mass media, the Party leadership mobilized the entire Party organization at Belgrade University and succeeded in splitting the student movement. It also dismissed the Student's non-conformist editorial board. (7)

#### Booming Youth Press

In spite of these legal prosecutions, prohibitions and political manipulations, the Yugoslav youth press is still booming. This flourishing of the youth press coincides with a steadily increasing interest in political problems -- a reaction that has been registered recently by young people throughout the world. This increased

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(5) Ibid.

(6) Vjesnik u srijedu, Zagreb, 5 February 1969.

(7) Radio Belgrade, Domestic, 10 January 1970, 1930 hours. For more details see RFE Research report No. 0439, "Belgrade Students Still Resisting", 14 January 1970, by Z. Antic.

interest in political questions, along with the increased need for political engagement, became particularly apparent after the student riots in June of 1968. The June riots in fact seemed to have added momentum to such a development.

Like their free-world counterparts, Yugoslav youths are seeking a more active and independent participation in social and political activities, while simultaneously and resolutely rejecting Party tutelage. As a result these elements have combined to produce a phenomenon which in the West is often referred to as the youth "subculture". The youth press in Yugoslavia is also one of these elements -- an instrument of expression in the "subculture" of youth.

There is no available statistical data about the number and circulation of youth publications. According to an inquiry initiated by the Belgrade weekly NIN, there were about 70 youth publications in Yugoslavia in 1969. (8) The greatest number of these is published where there are concentrations of cultural centers. Most of these are located in the northern part of the country. For instance, 60 youth periodicals are published in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, while in Macedonia there are only six; in Bosnia, four; and in Montenegro, none.

These papers and periodicals are published by various social, political and other organizations such as republican, communal or local youth organizations, youth centers, student, college or high-school organizations, etc. Their circulations vary; some are published in bulletin form and have a circulation of a few hundred copies. Others, like the Belgrade Student, or Zagreb Studentski list, are well-edited weeklies with a circulation of several thousand copies. (9)

Another characteristic of the Yugoslav youth press is its unstable physiognomy and discontinuity. With the exception of "great" student publications, smaller periodicals change their editorial boards and editorial policies often. They also suddenly appear and then disappear from the "literary scene". In 1968 alone,

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(8) NIN (Nedeljne informativne novine), Belgrade, 17 May 1970

(9) Belgrade Student has recently reached a circulation of 30,000

12 new youth publications appeared; in 1969 the number was even greater. (10)

### Merciless Criticism

The main objective of the Yugoslav youth press is not to inform but to comment and analyze. This is quite understandable in view of its periodicity, limited means, and political engagement. Specific problems of youth and students are subjects most often reviewed. Other socio-political problems, however, are also commented on, analyzed and, too often, criticized.

Criticism is usually merciless. The youth press shows no respect for any social or political elements in the country. It renders "a criticism of all that exists". (11) A good example of such criticism was an affair connected with a series of articles published in 1968 by the Slovenian student periodicals Tribuna and Katalog. In two installments under the titles "Essay on the Cultural Revolution" and "Slovenian Apocalypse", both publications rejected all moral and political values of the revolution, national history and their nation. Slovenian public opinion, of course, reacted sharply and representatives of all cultural institutions requested that administrative measures be taken against the two incriminated student publications.

Instead of administrative measures, however, the Slovenian Government took the role of mediator. It summoned a large meeting of representatives from all Slovenian cultural institutions and confronted them with student representatives in order to reach a compromise. Although not all problems were solved, the meeting achieved some workable solutions. The flexible attitude of the Slovenian Government has lately been cited as a good example in the use of liberal and democratic methods to solve various social and political problems.

In the case of Student, the Serbian Party leadership, however, was obliged to take more severe measures. Student, with a circulation of over 30,000, has achieved nation-wide influence. Closely connected with the philosophical periodical Praxis and the non-conformist Serbian Philosophical Association, Student

(10) NIN, 17 May 1970

(11) Ibid.

became by the end of 1969 a porte-parole of the intellectual opposition in Yugoslavia. For this reason the Serbian Party organization was required to use political manipulations in order to obtain a more conformist editorial board. (12)

In spite of such measures and of a gradual tightening of Party control, there has been no evidence that the Party will introduce any kind of censorship or use administrative measures when confronting opposition youth groups. High Party functionaries have given repeated assurances of this. Miko Tripalo, a member of the Executive Bureau, also guaranteed this at a session of the Party Presidium on 15 December 1969. While speaking about methods of confronting opposition groups, Tripalo stressed the need to use only ideological persuasion and political instruments. Consequently, the Yugoslav youth press has so far had abundant "working space", within which it will be able to express its non-conformist and critical views in the future.

### STAGNANT SOVIET CULTURAL SCENE

The feud between progressive and conservative intellectuals is getting more bitter, but the party still does not intervene too overtly.

The recent publication of several unusually reactionary novels, coupled with the departure of Alexander Tvardovsky from the editorial board of N o v y M i r, the journal which has courageously upheld human and aesthetic values, suggested a hardening of the official line. It seems more likely, however, that continued indecision at the top about how best to ensure conformity without open repression has provided the literary hacks with fresh opportunities to attack their more distinguished colleagues on grounds of unorthodoxy. Nevertheless, they could hardly have done so without support in some of the publishing houses and editorial offices where the party leaders' ideological directives guide the selection that turns manuscripts into printed matter.

Meanwhile, news of the arrest on May 21 of Andrei Amalrik,

(12) The Belgrade Student reappeared in March 1970 with a new editorial board

the prominent young Soviet dissident writer, whose essay, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* has been published in the West, confirms that the authorities do not feel inhibited in proceeding against "underground" intellectuals. More proof is provided by the numerous cases of repression listed in recent issues of *The Chronicle of Current Events*, the clandestine mouthpiece of the Soviet "democratic opposition".

Tvardovsky's resignation from *N o v y M i r* was confirmed by the journal's February issue, which belatedly appeared in April and for the first time in 12 years did not show his name as chief editor. His departure had been expected since the radical reorganisation of *N o v y M i r*'s editorial board last February, when four of his closest collaborators, Vinogradov, Kondratovich, Lakshin and Sats, were replaced as part of the drive for cultural conformity. The shake-up, reported on February 11, appears to have been engineered by the conservative elements of the literary establishment despite opposition from individual writers.

For some time it still seemed possible that a compromise might be achieved whereby Tvardovsky would retain his post while accepting some of the new appointments. However, without his presence and prestige, the journal is unlikely to retain its stimulating and progressive character - though it has weathered many storms in the past, including Tvardovsky's own dismissal in 1954.

The February issue is an uncertain guide to *N o v y M i r*'s future quality; it is difficult to tell how much of the contents originally prepared for publication by Tvardovsky himself survived censorship. The first part of a long feature on Japan, remarkably free of the obvious propaganda points, was very much in the spirit of the old *N o v y M i r*. It may well be attacked for its "objectivism", especially as *P r a v d a* on May 19 assailed a work on the foreign theatre on similar grounds. The most remarkable feature was *N o v y M i r*'s silence on the departure of its chief architect and moving spirit, but the lack of any explanation or tribute to Tvardovsky suggested that he had stood out for his ideas to the last. His successor, Valery Kosolapov, is the only one of the new editors who could be described as a moderate; in 1962 he was removed from his post as

editor of *L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e* after he allowed the publication of Evtushenko's poem, *Babi Yar*, denouncing anti-Semitism in Russia.

#### Writers warned

Despite his eclipse, Tvardovsky remains on the board of the Russian Federation Writers' Union, which held a three-day congress in Moscow at the end of March. His re-election was a gesture of respect for his literary eminence rather than a sign of the prevailing political trend, reflected more accurately in the choice of successor to the union's outgoing Chairman, Leonid Sobolev. Sergei Mikhalkov, the new Chairman, is a hard-line poet and dramatist and one of the most outspoken critics of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, author of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*; who was expelled from the Writers' Union last November. But neither the Solzhenitsyn affair nor any other controversial themes were aired at the congress, which opened on March 24 in the presence of the Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin. Most of the speeches published in *L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e* suggested that they had been tailored to a directive to avoid a slanging match on the eve of the Lenin centenary celebrations. Nevertheless, the shift in favour of the diehards was unmistakable.

Sobolev's opening speech stressed that the keen ideological struggle in the world gave "special significance" to the Leninist concept of politically committed literature, a sentiment also flatly expressed in the party Central Committee newspaper, *S o v e t s k a y a R o s s i y a*. Mikhail Alekseev, editor-in-chief of the journal *M o s k v a*, accomplished the feat of presenting the report on contemporary prose without any reference to Solzhenitsyn's famous novels - though on his return from a visit to the USA he had complained in *L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e* (January 28) about the ubiquitous availability of Solzhenitsyn's books abroad and praised his expulsion by the Soviet Writers' Union as timely and just. Mild criticism was levelled at a novel by G. Vladimov (recently published in *N o v y M i r*), while other authors, notably the science fiction writers Arkady and Boris Strugatsky, were chided for debunking heroism and patriotism. The long report on poetry read by V. Fedorov, a union secretary, contained muted criticism of poems by Evtushenko and Voznesensky. The severest denunciations were

aimed generally at "intellectual literature" and the concept of apolitical art. Fedorov poured scorn on some intellectuals who were so "preoccupied with their own sore spots" (i.e. the shortcomings of Soviet society) that they had failed to provide guidance for the younger generation, thus playing into the hands of bourgeois propaganda. He revealed his personal sympathies when he discussed S. Smirnov's Stalinist poem, I Testify Myself. This poet, he said, had not been afraid to mention "historical names which have played a large part in the life of our country", while their suppression had disrupted "our ideological communications".

#### Anti-intellectual novels

Similarly, an unashamedly Stalinist novel, V. Kochetov's What Then Do You Want?, published last year in the conservative journal O k t y a b r, of which he is chief editor, received qualified praise from Alekseev. Kochetov's philistine attacks on the liberal intelligentsia had earned him opprobrium and ridicule not only among Soviet writers but also in the Italian Communist Party, a prominent member of which he had lampooned in the book. Last February his novel was condemned in L i t e r a r y G a z e t t e for its crude exaggerations about the harmful influence of decadent foreigners and intellectuals on the fabric of Soviet life and the morals of the young. But although Alekseev felt bound to criticise certain artistic aspects of the novel at the congress, he expressed approval for Kochetov's basic attitude.

An even more scurrilous novel by Ivan Shevtsov, a retired naval officer who is not a member of the union, recently became the centre of yet another wrangle between hard-liners and progressives. The novel, In the Name of the Father and the Son, was criticised by the Soviet youth newspaper, K o m s o m o l s k a y a P r a v d a, on April 9 as absurd, illiterate, harmful and morbidly preoccupied with "Philistine dirt". Apart from a penchant for obscenities and violence, its main characteristic seems to be hatred of Jews, foreigners, and intellectuals; two of its bogeys, thinly disguised as fictional characters, are the popular contemporary Soviet poets, Andrei Voznesensky and Bella Akhmadulina. Perhaps more ominous than the fact that the novel had been published in a large edition by the military publishing house was the way in which S o v e t s k a y a

R o s s i y a sprang to its defence on April 25 in an article by I. Kobzev. He attacked K o m s o m o l s k a y a P r a v d a's critic, Sinelnikov, for the "unbridled hooligan tone" of his article and suggested that the "turgid verbal fog" it released was meant to obscure the acute problems raised by the novel. Shevtsov had shown commendable concern for the "lofty purity of our ideological principles" and he was praised for his "passionate and angry exposure of the reactionary essence of international Zionism". S o v e t s k a y a R o s s i y a also published extracts from six letters to the publishers of the novel from grateful readers. At the beginning of the month the Soviet Ministry of Defence publishing house had also released an equally lurid and strongly anti-Semitic Shevtsov novel, Love and Hate, which has so far not been reviewed in the Soviet Press. Shevtsov's earlier work, Plant Louse, which showed the same obsessions, had been reviewed scathingly in N o v y M i r by Andrei Sinyavsky, later sentenced to seven years in a prison camp for "slandering" the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to gauge the exact position of the party leadership in these literary quarrels, which have important political implications. At best the party has been an uninspiring overseer, bound by its nature to resist genuine artistic emancipation; at worst it has shown itself ready to condone anti-Semitism and other forms of witch-hunting in pursuance of political goals. Given the Communist system's lack of inbuilt checks against intolerance and persecution, the only brake to Stalinist repression would appear to be the present Soviet leaders' realisation that it would be counter-productive. But in a year, when numerous reminders have been given of Lenin's emphasis on the need to use flexible tactics to maintain power, the party has shown itself particularly unimaginative. Its presence in the literary as well as in other fields continues to be felt mainly as a dead weight.