

Vol. IV, No. 3

May 1970

# EAST-WEST *contacts*

*A Bimonthly Review*

International Documentation and  
Information Centre (Interdoc)  
The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10  
Netherlands

The purpose of INTERDOC is to promote a better and wider knowledge of East-West problems, through the exchange of documentation and information.

INTERDOC specialises in the collection of information, the preparation and dissemination of periodicals and special studies, and the organisation of conferences.

Editor: Dr. S.W. Couwenberg  
Editorial office: Van Stolkweg 10,  
The Hague, Netherlands

Annual subscription: Guilders 12,-

Per copy: Guilders 2,-

Suggested ways of payment:

1. postal cheque and clearing service,  
number 633695, Interdoc, The Hague,  
Netherlands
2. international money order

This review is an effort to meet the growing need for information and documentation on the political, cultural, psychological and other aspects of East-West relations. It will indicate briefly views and facts which have been presented already in pamphlets, papers, articles etc.

## C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
<u>P O L I T I C S</u>	
1. Erfurt meeting and European trends	1
2. After Erfurt	5
3. Brandt's East Policy and U.S. Relations	10
4. "Ostpolitik" in the Czechoslovak Media	12
5. Warning to Dissidents	14
6. Arms and the Man	17
7. Proletarian Internationalism and the Brezhnev Doctrine	21
8. The Second Indochina War	25
9. Prominent Politicians Purged	28
10. China in the Historic Battle against Time	33
<u>E C O N O M I C S</u>	
1. Workers blamed for economic failures	38
2. Protecting the Environment from Pollution and Other Dangers	43
3. CCMS Makes Rapid Progress	52
4. Twenty Years of Self-Management	56
5. Unjustified Demolition of Good Housing Must Stop	63
6. Checks in the Soviet Diet	65
7. Possibilities of All-European Economic Cooperation	70
8. Holland and Self-Management	72
<u>C U L T U R E</u>	
1. The University and Society	75
2. Academy of Sciences holds Lenin Centenary Session	80
3. Censorship in the Soviet Union	82

	<u>Page</u>
4. New Programme for all Schools	88
5. East Berlin Afraid of Western Hits	90
6. Revolution in the Classroom	91
7. Twenty-First Ukrainian Komsomol Congress: Criticism of Youth	93
8. Lenin's Thought Today	97

## POLITICS

### ERFURT MEETING AND EUROPEAN TRENDS

Branko Skrinjar

(Review of International Affairs, 5-4-'70, Belgrade)

The meeting between West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and East German Premier Willi Stoph cannot yet be evaluated in terms of its implications which in any case do not depend on the participants alone but on non-German factors as well. The Erfurt parley provokes thoughts of a turning point in inter-German relations; unless sudden trends to the contrary put a stop to the present course, it could go down in the history of new intra-European processes.

Judging from the available news, the outcome of the first top level dialogue held on March 19th between the two delegations and their chiefs reflected no noticeable change in the two governments' views, frequently and publicly proclaimed. The approaches to the state of relations between the two Germanys and the visions of their future development continue to remain at odds with each other. Nevertheless, no matter how much each side insists on its own opinion, something essential has changed: there is now obviously a prevailing awareness, regardless of its origins, that direct inter-German contacts are necessary and inevitable. The fact that this step was taken at all is significant in itself, even if it only means the presentation of familiar and disputed viewpoints and demands. Only a few years ago, such a step would have been proscribed as national treason in the Federal Republic; also, until recently, the German Democratic Republic would have made it hinge upon prior formal recognition. The agreement for the two premiers to meet again in Kassel, West Germany, in two months' time to continue these contacts, in an endeavour to determine what is acceptable to both sides as the beginning of communication, therefore takes on additional meaning.

As delicate and complex as the problems between the two German states are, they have been complicated further and continually by new problems reflecting not only processes on both sides but also the interests and requirements of the two antagonistic military-political groupings. Contradictions went on piling up and a highly charged atmosphere was created

threatening to explode, or actually exploding in crises, confrontations and incidents (the 1948/49 Berlin blockade, sporadic closure of approach roads, demonstrations of West Berlin's links with the Federal Republic, the conflict of the "big four" over the city's status, mutual non-recognition and discrimination and occasional displays of armed might on both sides of the border bearing clearly the signs of bloc engagement). Germany and Berlin became the symbols of antagonism, tension, cold war in Europe. Propaganda for unification was brought to a fever pitch on both sides while actually mutual relations were further exacerbated and every effort at relaxation and rapprochement was for years doomed to futility. It is in this part of Europe that war has raged most frequently and it is here that it tarried the longest; this region has most often been the focus of antagonistic bloc actions in which both German states played the part of forward patrols not only in the geographic but in the ideological and political sense as well.

Hence, the Erfurt dialogue reflects a change not only in the inter-German but in the general European scene as well. The Brandt-Stoph meeting was held in the course and framework of a reshuffle taking place, to a more or less obvious degree, in the world of the super-powers; while consolidating their old positions and relations, they are also making efforts to re-examine them. In Europe, these endeavours mean, apart from other things, initiatives for regulating relations born of the war, for respecting the status quo.

Since the end of January, talks - unusual in their diplomatic form - have been in progress in Moscow. The West German Secretary of State and a person enjoying the trust of the Chancellor, Egon Bar, has been conducting talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to examine the conditions under which the two countries would be willing to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force in mutual relations. After the most recent pause in these significant contacts, it was intimated that the discussions so far and the stage reached in exchange of views justified the hope that progress would be possible in further talks. The Soviet Union insists on recognition of the status quo as the basis for agreement on relations among European states and mutual guarantees of security. This means recognition of and respect for the boundaries drawn after the Second World War, that is, the boundaries of the German

Democratic Republic and Poland whose definitive inviolability has been disputed by previous Federal Republic governments whereas the present one, judging from certain statements and hints, is ready to "respect" them. An intermission in the contacts with the Bonn emissary was used by Gromyko for a visit to East Berlin to acquaint the leaders of the German Democratic Republic with the vistas being opened. In the general opinion, this offered impetus to the East German government to enter into direct contact at the highest level with the government of the Federal Republic. All circumstances point to the fact that the Soviet side now also considers Bonn's "eastern policy" as one of the components of the inter-German political scene which must be taken into account in any all-European conception.

Poland, one of the knottiest and most complex problems in the Federal Republic's foreign policy is the second most important goal in the present campaign of the new "eastern policy". Good results were achieved during the two rounds of talks conducted by State Secretary Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz in Warsaw, conceived primarily as an endeavour at rapprochement through increased economic exchange. Both sides arrived at the conclusion that there is room for cooperation to an extent greater than had been thought the case until recently. It turned out that the consideration of problems could also include elementary questions of Polish-German relations: formal recognition of Poland's territorial integrity (by a treaty of mutual non-application of force) which assumes one of the central premises of the policy of status quo - recognition of the Western Polish borders at the Oder and Neisse (actually, the border with the German Democratic Republic) by Western Germany. It seems beyond a doubt that this most delicate and important controversial question also came up for discussion, obviously not without Bonn showing some signs that it was ready for an agreement. This could but be reflected in the German Democratic Republic in terms of its showing an intensified interest in re-examining its relations with the Federal Republic.

A meeting of representatives of the four big powers at ambassadorial level in Western Berlin is the last in the chronology of events touching upon the German problem. The very fact that it was convened had an emphatic influence on preparations for the inter-German dialogue. Revival of four-way

talks on Berlin seems to hint that the four powers are ready to take advantage of the abandoned possibilities of the Allied Control Council to launch new talks and communications about one of the most highly controversial questions in relations among Germans, and among the wartime allies. Renewal of discussions between the four ambassadors also creates for Bonn's "eastern policy" the possibility of a more flexible approach to certain problems that have defied solution and a freer hand in dealing with some previous taboos.

Under such circumstances of historical time and political strategy, the Erfurt meeting between Brandt and Stoph was not only the outcome of the "eastern policy" of the present Bonn Government which did undoubtedly work toward that end, having assessed with greater realism than any previous government the relations between the superpowers in Europe and in the world. It was also not simply the consequence of the other Germany's realizing that a dialogue with Bonn representatives was the best way for the German Democratic Republic to assert itself. This important meeting would not have been held had not the wishes and needs of both sides coincided with needs and interests on a broader European scale. Conversely, the broader European situation acted as an incentive to activity (although in different ways) for both Bonn and East Berlin.

As was to be expected, for the Federal Republic's delegation (and for the present government coalition which is formulating an alternative to the prolonged, futile and - in the long run - dangerous policy of anti-communistic crusading and confrontation from positions of strength), the Erfurt parley was an opportunity to launch the policy of "small steps": relaxation in communication between the two parts of Berlin and the two German states, promotion of trade relations and improvement of other ties in proportions and under conditions that also correspond to the interests of the German Democratic Republic. This involves de facto recognition of the state in which the Federal Republic would be represented by a plenipotentiary delegate (and not an ambassador as is the case with "foreign countries"). The other side laid stress on its state-legal and general political interests, asking for recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign, equal state; for exchange of ambassadors and other acts (including the formal and total renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine) as well as for restitution in the amount of

100 billion marks, the assessment made of the damage suffered by the German Democratic Republic before the construction of the boundary wall in Berlin. Although earlier replies to both demands had been largely negative, now, with the decision to continue the dialogue, they can, at the very least, be examined, explained and possibly corrected from case to case. It would appear that a phase of realistic policy in relations between the two German states has begun.

The "inter-German aspect" of present European strivings is now naturally the focus of attention by the direct participants in this dialogue of inquiry. It has also aroused lively interest in other countries as any step in relaxation and rapprochement between the German states represents an achievement, even if it consists only in reconciliation to the fact that there is no hope for solution of the German problem outside the scope of negotiations and understanding. Even if that step is taken with caution, tardily, or in response to impetus from abroad.

Willy Brandt's trip to Erfurt is probably the boldest step taken so far in the Bonn Government's implementation of its "eastern policy" just as Willi Stoph's presence is the most determined enterprise by East Berlin toward realistic solution of the problems of the German Democratic Republic as one of the participants in developing intra-European relations and consolidation. For both sides, the Erfurt talks are an important turning point; they may also become the beginning of better relations between them. They can discharge this function for Germans, for their neighbours and for the rest of Europe only when both sides stop acting the role of forward patrols and plenipotentiaries of the two blocs and bloc interests. They will become that if they make themselves part of the aspirations of our continent, which is striving to transcend intra-European barriers and establish relations in which all equal and sovereign states can build a common future in peace and security.

#### AFTER ERFURT

(Radio Free Europe Research, 24-3-'70)

Summary: The following paper reviews the main topics covered during the first intra-German summit meeting at Erfurt. It also relates the highlights of the reports of both German leaders to their respective parliaments,

and draws some conclusions regarding the results of the meeting.

The historic first intra-German summit meeting has passed and both heads of government have delivered their reports to their respective parliaments. (Chancellor Willy Brandt spoke to the Bundestag on the day following the Erfurt meeting, (20 March 1970) while Premier Willi Stoph addressed the Volkskammer on March 21.) On the basis of what transpired at the Erfurt meeting itself, of the accounts of the numerous journalists in attendance and of the parliamentary reports of both government leaders, an initial balance sheet can be drawn regarding the course and results of the meeting.

As was expected, (See RFE Research report No. 0525, "The Meeting at Erfurt," 19 March 1970, by Dorothy Miller.) the Erfurt summit began with the presentation of position papers by both the East and the West German leaders, who once again explained the views of their respective governments. Neither of the exposés revealed anything either new, surprising, or in any way different from what was already known about the standpoints of the two German states. Premier Willi Stoph repeated the demand for full international recognition and suggested that any further discussions between the two German states should be held on the basis of the "Draft Treaty" which the GDR had presented to the FRG last December. In addition, Stoph also insisted on mutual respect for territorial integrity and on the inviolability of presently existing borders; on both German states applying for membership at the U.N.O.; on further discussion aimed at eliminating the remnants of World War Two; on the renunciation of atomic weapons and on the reduction of the military budget by fifty percent; and, finally, on the FRG's settling all its debts, allegedly amounting to 100 billion marks, with the GDR. Chancellor Willy Brandt, for his part, reiterated the West German position that the two German states could not consider each other as foreign countries. He suggested that both governments attempt to collaborate in a "neighborly" fashion and that various aspects of such collaboration could be regulated by governmental agreements. He further explained that both states should respect the responsibility of the four wartime allies for Germany as a whole and for Berlin, and that the Four Power attempts to improve the situation in and around Berlin should be

supported. Brandt also mentioned his well-known interest in increasing facilities for human, cultural, athletic etc. contacts between the citizens of the two German states. He assured Premier Stoph that he was willing to discuss any subject with him on the basis of a complete absence of discrimination, and finally he invited the East German Premier to the FRG for a return visit.

These in brief were the main points presented by both sides. As was pointed out above, the two statements did not really reveal unexpected offers or demands. However, Stoph's plea for FRG reparations to be paid to the GDR to the tune of 100 billion DM as a point which the East German side considers essential, represents in effect an escalation of East German conditions. The debt allegedly incurred by the FRG during the period previous to the construction of the Berlin Wall has been mentioned by East German spokesmen in the past; (The figure was in fact mentioned first by Walter Ulbricht during the 9th SED-CC on 28 April 1965.) this was the first time, however, that the demand for such repayment was voiced in a formal way as an essential point.

One surprising aspect of this first top-level exchange is only indirectly related to the meeting itself, namely, the fact that Neues Deutschland chose to reproduce the full text of Chancellor Brandt's remarks to Premier Stoph. ( Neues Deutschland, 20 March 1970.) The publication by the official organ of the SED of Brandt's pleas for greater freedom of movement between the two German states, or of his defense of "his friend Helmut Schmidt" and of the policy of the FRG, cannot fail to have a deep impact on the population and on the functionaries of the GDR. Western reporters present in Erfurt have noted that the Neues Deutschland issue containing Brandt's remarks was sold out almost immediately after hitting the news stands. In this respect, the present situation is reminiscent of the weeks preceding the abortive SPD/SED speakers' exchange in 1966, when the East German regime published an open SPD letter spelling out similar requests for the improvement of human contacts. At that time, the impact on the population was tremendous, and SED functionaries had their hands full trying to answer embarrassing questions at Party meetings and mass gatherings. It was clear that the average East German was more interested in possible improvements in his daily life than in Party slogans

and such major issues as international recognition of the GDR. One wonders what induced the SED to repeat what from their point of view must be considered a serious mistake, fraught with the risk of creating disquiet among the population. It is possible of course that now, as in 1966, both sides had agreed ahead of time to give to the statement of the negotiating partner the same publicity as to their own. In retrospect, the fact that the SED might have agreed to such a condition would in itself be significant.

There is all the more reason to point this out when one re-considers the spontaneous pro-Brandt demonstration in Erfurt as soon as the Chancellor arrived. In a state as regimented as the GDR, the surge of several thousand people to acclaim the leader of a government which for two decades has been systematically demonized by the regime is, besides any other emotional consideration, a reminder to the East German leadership that they are not able under certain circumstances to control the governed as they would like. For the SED, the demonstration certainly was a danger signal and one might wonder if the East German government will once again be willing to take the chance of a public reception in the GDR of a prominent West German politician of Brandt's stature. As we know, East German television painstakingly avoided recording the incident, focusing only on the organized groups of Stoph-cheerers who were marched out later during the day and shouted their well-learned slogans. East German radio, on the other hand, could not avoid in its first live broadcast to transmit the shouts of "Brandt to the window." In subsequent newscasts and commentaries, however, the crowd was described as a "small group of provocateurs"; later the incident was no longer mentioned at all. In any case, the Erfurt sympathy demonstration for Brandt showed to the whole world, and particularly to the East German regime, how small the East German leeway is for granting possible human improvements to the GDR population and how explosive the mere appearance of a West German politician can be in East Germany.

The afternoon and part of the evening of March 19 were spent on talks between the two delegations, on a lengthy private session between Premier Stoph and Chancellor Brandt, and on a trip by the Chancellor to the former concentration camp at Buchenwald. According to the reports of Western journalists and

to the remarks made subsequently by Federal press spokesman Conrad Ahlers, the atmosphere between the two government leaders was relaxed. The various sessions ended with the issuance of a communiqué which, in a very sober tone, contented itself with the enumeration of the participants and with announcing Premier Stoph's acceptance of an invitation to come to Kassel in the FRG for a return visit on 21 March 1970. Indicative of the difficulties in composing the text of the communiqué was the fact that the titles of the Minister for Inner German Relations Egon Franke and of Foreign Minister Otto Winzer were simply omitted; they were called simply FRG and GDR Ministers.

In their first reactions to the meeting, both East and West German leaders termed its advent as "useful". Chancellor Brandt added that it had been "necessary and important", and the SED leader himself (during a speech made on the occasion of the Kapp putsch in Suhl) (Neues Deutschland, 21 March 1970.) called it "useful". In reporting to the Bundestag, the Chancellor again expressed his hope that, despite the GDR's insistence on international recognition, practical and gradual improvements could be attained eventually to ease the consequences of Germany's division. Premier Stoph in his speech to the Volkskammer stressed in contrast how clearly and unequivocally he had demanded of Brandt that the FRG recognize the GDR and that there could not be any special relations between the two German states. When speaking in Suhl, Walter Ulbricht raised the ante, stating that it would be only after the conclusion of an internationally valid treaty that the GDR would be willing to discuss "certain questions of detail".

Now that Erfurt has passed, how can the achievements of this meeting be assessed? Though it would appear from all reports that the two heads of government got along personally better than anticipated, neither of them was willing or able to make major concessions to the other. In their reports to the two parliaments, both leaders emphasized that they had maintained their own respective positions and had not given up any essential ground. This emphasis on having held the line most probably was aimed at the opposition factors in both countries, an opposition which has been clearly expressed in the West German Bundestag, but one which can only be presumed to exist within the East German leadership. The intra-German summit, however, will have its repeat performance in late May

and in the Federal Republic, indicating the interest of both partners in continuing the dialogue. This might not seem too great an achievement, but it corresponds to Chancellor Brandt's minimum expectations.

#### BRANDT'S EAST POLICY AND U.S. RELATIONS

(International Herald Tribune, 17-4-'70)

Chancellor Willy Brandt's opponents, probing for targets in his attempt to improve relations with Eastern Europe, have started to zero in on the question of how this affects U.S.-West German ties.

For the past month, the political opposition here has slowly been crystalizing a line of attack centered on the contention that Brandt's Eastern policy does not really enjoy the confidence of Washington.

That this approach is now building up steam was underscored Wednesday when Brandt gave the Bundestag a brief report on his meeting with President Nixon in Washington last week.

As one German newspaper commented, his speech "contained no new information", and was notable mainly because it provoked a heated exchange between the leader of Brandt's Social Democratic party in the Bundestag, Herbert Wehner, and the parliamentary floor leader for the Christian Democratic opposition, Rainer Barzel.

What seemed to touch off the name-calling duel was the persistence of Barzel and other Christian Democratic deputies in citing U.S. press reports implying that the Nixon administration has doubts about Brandt's multi-pronged series of negotiations with Eastern European countries.

In recent days, the Christian Democrats and their press allies have been placing heavy stress on reports from Washington pointing out that Mr. Nixon failed to issue a public commendation of Brandt's Eastern policy.

In addition, a stir has been caused here by a New York Times editorial (published in yesterday's Herald Tribune) contending that Bonn's efforts "have been greeted with public coolness and private questioning in Washington". This editorial was specifically cited by Barzel.

#### ' Light Already Green '

In his Bundestag speech, Brandt insisted that he has "the understanding, support and trust" of Mr. Nixon despite the absence of a public endorsement. Moreover, he added, those who think he went to Washington in hopes of obtaining a "green light" for his Eastern policy are mistaken because "the light was already green when I arrived for the talks".

In the view of many analysts here, this growing debate about the U.S. attitude is prompted by what seems to be a Nixon administration desire to be deliberately ambiguous. The result is to enable the opposing sides here to claim either that the glass is half empty or half full - depending upon whether the aim is to attack or to defend Brandt's policy.

Privately, U.S. officials both here and in Washington have presented a unanimous front in contending that Brandt's policy is in line with Mr. Nixon's hopes for shifting global politics from confrontation to negotiation.

As a result, U.S. sources say, Washington endorses the principle of West German negotiation with the Soviet Union and its East European allies. This much, at least, Mr. Nixon has either said himself or has allowed to be said in his name.

Beyond this point, however, the U.S. position becomes much less clear. While Washington approves the concept of negotiation, it is said, it has taken no stand on the specific negotiating tactics being pursued by Brandt, and it also is reserving judgment on any possible results from these negotiations.

#### Open Options

Most neutral German political observers tend to interpret this vagueness as a deliberate attempt by the Nixon administration to keep its options open.

If Brandt's initiatives prove successful, they say, there still will be plenty of opportunity for Washington to embrace them. Conversely, if the Eastern policy goes off the tracks or turns in directions inimicable to U.S. interests, Mr. Nixon currently is holding it at sufficient arm's length to disown the whole business.

Additionally, there do seem to be some definite cleavages in U.S. policy-making circles toward the Eastern policy. Some American officials are clearly optimistic about the chances for



at least limited success, others are known to have nagging fears that Brandt will weaken the Western position without getting any substantial concessions in return, and still others regard it as such a long-range process that no clear-cut forecast can be made about its potential success or failure.

Undoubtedly, all of these factors contribute to the ambiguity of the U.S. position and are likely to keep it so for some time to come. Now, the question is whether this ambiguity might provide the basis for a serious and even crippling assault on Brandt's Eastern policy.

#### "OSTPOLITIK" IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA

(Radio Free Europe Research, 13-3-'70)

Diplomatic moves in connection with the preparation of the Brandt-Stoph meeting and Chancellor Brandt's visit to London have been discussed by the Czechoslovak communication media.

Comments on the Chancellor's trip to London were negative, or even hostile, while opinions on the attempt of West German diplomacy to make possible a dialogue between the Chancellor and Premier Stoph were mixed; some were critical, but other acknowledged the serious efforts which were being made to overcome the deadlock in relations between West Germany and the Eastern Bloc.

There are two reasons for the negative attitude to the Chancellor's statements in London.

When asked about the relations of the FRG with Czechoslovakia, Brandt declared at the press conference given in London before his departure that Czechoslovakia "still has certain problems, and it might be wise for us not to give the impression that we were adding to her difficulties". This enraged radio commentator Miloslav Skalicky (Radio Prague, 4 March 1970), who described this passage in the Chancellor's statement as "the last straw" and accused him of lacking a coherent policy toward Czechoslovakia.

The part of the Anglo-German communique referring to the military-political ideas of the two governments was also viewed with displeasure. Dusan Rovensky in his article in Rude Pravo (6 March 1970) vigorously opposed any increase in the British Army of the Rhine and complained about "joint British-German military projects, one of them being the production of Uranium 234".

The response to East Germany's political activity vis-a-vis Eastern Europe passed through the whole spectrum from an unequivocal rejection ("the new Ostpolitik, as the West German variation of the fascist Drang nach Osten is now called" -- Milos Marko, Radio Bratislava, 8 February 1970) to such a positive appraisal of Bonn's policy as that in the article "The Present Situation Favors a Dialogue" (in Smena, 26 February 1970).

The official view is reflected in an article written by editor-in-chief Miroslav Moc in Rude Pravo (28 February 1970), demanding that the FRG make good the injustices inflicted upon the Czechs and Slovaks by the Munich diktat and during the Second World War. Moc actually reworded a sentence in Husak's speech (Rude Pravo, 25 February 1970) in which the latter had called for "very concrete deeds" on the part of the Bonn government.

Kvetoslav Faix, Bonn correspondent of Rude Pravo, talked about the aims and methods of Bonn's policy on 7 March 1970 on Czechoslovak television. According to him, the aim of this policy is to keep open for the German bourgeoisie the possibility of liquidating the "socialist order" of the GDR by means other than those envisaged by the CDU/CSU government. Faix said that the Brandt-Stoph meeting would bring no concrete results. At the same time he welcomed the meeting itself as a political success for the GDR, whose invitation Brandt could not have rejected at the present stage of world politics. Faix indicated that de jure recognition of the GDR is one of the fundamental conditions of an understanding with the East.

In a moderately worded article, the Slovak youth daily Smena (26 February 1970) viewed West German policy with sympathy and referred to "the vital eastern policy". This article has, of course, no influence whatsoever upon the official policy of the Czechoslovak government.

The Czechoslovak regime has not shown much public readiness to follow up Bonn's initiative. Although Gustav Husak declared (Rude Pravo 25 February 1970) that the CSSR wants a consolidation of good relations with all its neighbors, he added that he expects "very concrete acts" on the part of the Bonn government, thus hoping, no doubt, to shift the whole responsibility for future progress onto West Germany.

This rather negative attitude to Ostpolitik was confirmed last week by Max Reimann, leader of the West German Communist Party, during his visit to Prague. His attitude to West Germany's initiative was absolutely negative (Radio Prague, 6 March 1970). In the last sentence of his statement, Reimann asked the Czech and Slovak Communists to support his Party -- and thus also the policy of the SED upon which the West German CP depends.

#### WARNING TO DISSIDENTS

Moscow finds difficulty in demonstrating the relevance of Marxism-Leninism for the 1970s.

Among the non-ruling Communist Parties, notably those of Western Europe, Moscow's efforts to restore its hegemony in Eastern Europe and over the Communist movement as a whole provoke fears that the concept of national roads to Communism is soon to be as circumscribed for them as for the parties in power. The Western Communists, whose appeal depends partly on their ability to demonstrate a regard for national interests, are alarmed at Moscow's growing stress on "proletarian internationalism" with its old overtones of unquestioning obedience to the Soviet party as the first and most important centre of the Communist movement.

Recently, Moscow's most bitter comments have been directed towards the Marxist philosophers and political thinkers on the fringe of the French, Austrian and Italian Communist Parties, who have been urging a fresh look at the traditional Marxist and Leninist doctrines and a more critical appraisal of the way the Soviet Union and its East European followers have put them into practice. Assertions that existing models of Communism are unsuitable for Western Europe seem to have roused the special ire of Brezhnev and his colleagues, who are just as unwilling as their predecessor, Khrushchev, to admit that there was any fault in the system itself under Stalin or any other leader. They are clearly also angered by the numerous Western Communists who refuse to accept their version of events in Czechoslovakia and who even, in the case of the French Marxist Roger Garaudy, declare that "the Socialism that we want to build in France is not what you are imposing in Czechoslovakia".

Moscow did not hide its satisfaction at Garaudy's elimination from the French party Political Bureau and Central Committee

in February. M o s c o w R a d i o, on February 17, cited the party's "dissociation from his revisionism", together with the Italian party's expulsion of a "divisive group with right-wing opportunist and left-wing views" (i.e. the Manifesto group) and the Finnish party's moves to end the split in its ranks, as proof of a genuine search for Communist unity. Yet administrative methods of restoring discipline are clearly no answer to the questions that have been raised, and the spate of Soviet broadcasts and Press articles on the evils of revisionism and anti-Sovietism reveal Moscow's anxiety to counter the critic's views - though its own contributions are usually put in such doctrinaire terms that they must defeat their purpose. Writing in the Soviet international weekly, N e w T i m e s, on January 27 (No. 4, 1970), Platkovsky, a member of K o m m u n i s t ' s editorial board, used the coming centenary of Lenin's birth to reaffirm that Leninism was not merely a Russian phenomenon or one of many national varieties of Marxism, as the "falsifiers" claimed, but "the Marxism of the 20th century". Marxism-Leninism was a "comprehensive system of philosophical, economic, historical and political knowledge" whose validity was borne out by the practical building of Communism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

#### Basic doctrine

Rigidly spelling out the basic Communist principles, Platkovsky reaffirmed that the dictatorship of the proletariat was an historic necessity for the transition from capitalism to Socialism, that the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class must guide the building of Socialism and Communism, and that the party's "leading role" was bound to assert itself more and more in the process. But the author showed some awareness of the currents of criticism now flowing through the Communist movement, for almost as much of his article was devoted to arguing against heretical interpretations as to expounding the orthodox case.

Yet the most outspoken among the dissidents, Ernst Fischer in Austria, the M a n i f e s t o group in Italy and Garaudy in France, were eventually dealt with by rather crude administrative methods. Platkovsky's praise for the way in which "revisionist manoeuvres" were being uncovered and rebuffed

by those who adhered to the proper "revolutionary theory" obviously reflected the prevailing Soviet attitude.

Moreover, by concentrating their attacks on the alleged political sins of their main targets - their "search for contradictions" in the works of the founding fathers of Communism, their "frenzied assaults against Marxism-Leninism" - many Soviet commentators purposely ignore the real message of the dissidents. This is the growing importance of social and economic factors, as opposed to political ones, in the Western Communist Parties' current strategies. Thus a writer like Garaudy would not quarrel with the orthodox view of the need for class warfare to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish the power of the workers, headed by the Communist Party. But he calls for a much more sophisticated analysis than is given by any Soviet theoretician of the composition of the working class and the proletariat in a modern society, and openly rejects the old dogma about the increasing misery of the workers under capitalism. Similarly, Garaudy, like the Soviet leaders, is a believer in "scientific Socialism", but interprets it in a radically different way, urging the application of scrupulously scientific methods to the study of contemporary social phenomena instead of trying to fit them into a pre-existing dogmatic scheme. At a time when they themselves are giving such prominence to Lenin's writings, the Soviet leaders are probably particularly angered by Garaudy's pointed reminder in his book, *Marxism in the 20th Century*, that "Lenin gave Marxism back its revolutionary life by a return to what was fundamental. . . . and by a scientific analysis of the reality of his times, scientific precisely because it did not try to interpret events as if they were simply the acting out of a script written fifty years before, but on the contrary to grasp what was new in them".

Garaudy's elimination from the top organs of the French Communist Party will no doubt simplify matters for the leadership and quell the debate in the party for the time being. But like Milovan Djilas and Professor Svetozar Stojanovic in Yugoslavia, he is likely to continue raising even more awkward questions about the bureaucratic tendencies of existing Communist régimes and the straitjacket of Marxist formulas in which so many Communist leaders are still confined. In Italy, by contrast, it seems as if the debate will go on inside the party, even though it may be somewhat muted for the time being in

response to Soviet pressure. In addition, the Italian Communist Press still carries a wide range of opinions by both Italian and foreign Communist contributors.

#### Spanish Communist views

An interesting example has been the coverage given by the monthly journal, *Rinascita*, to the views of the exiled Spanish Communists - at present at loggerheads with Moscow. Their Central Committee session last December concluded with the expulsion of two high-ranking pro-Soviet members, Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez, for their refusal to accept the majority's continuing criticisms of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Six weeks later, *Rinascita* carried a lengthy survey of the latest events in the Spanish Communist Party, including details of the party's reasons for expelling the two members and, more interestingly, of the agitation they carried out among the Spanish Communist exiles in Moscow and in Spain itself - to the point of endangering the party's clandestine organisation. The report revealed that Gomez, now living in Moscow, had sent messages to "emissaries" in the Basque country inside Spain (evidently with the help of the Soviet postal authorities) in an attempt to organise opposition to the party leadership. Gomez was said to have commented that such agitation was justified because of the leadership's "revisionist, nationalist and anti-Soviet" character. The Italian party's sympathies clearly lie with the Spanish party leadership (mainly living in France) with whom it has close links. And though in general the Italian Communists are careful not to publicise attacks on the Soviet leaders, *Rinascita* carried one remark by the Spanish party organ, *Mundo Obrero*, likely to be echoed by many party members as well as dissidents. The Soviet Union, it said "has no worse friends than those 'ultras' who confuse defence of the first country of Socialism with unconditional submission".

#### ARMS AND THE MAN

(International Herald Tribune, 14-4-'70)

It has now been 13 years since a young and obscure Harvard lecturer, in a book that was to make him famous, wrote these sentences:

"The notion that armaments are the cause and not the reflection of conflict is not new. It has been the basis of schemes of disarmament throughout history; it was the rationale of all the disarmament conferences in the Twenties and Thirties. Nevertheless, it is open to serious doubt".

The author, of course, was Henry A. Kissinger and the book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy". One of its readers was Richard Nixon and the reading was one of the factors which led him to put Kissinger at his right hand in the White House 15 months ago. Most important, much of the Kissinger thinking coincided with Mr. Nixon's own evolving ideas. Perhaps this is nowhere more the case than in the concept lodged in those Kissinger words.

To understand President Nixon's approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which resume in Vienna on Thursday, requires an analysis of his approach to the other nuclear superpower involved, the Soviet Union.

The relationship between arms and war has a chicken-and-egg quality: no one can prove which came first. President Nixon, like Kissinger, takes a geopolitical view of the world. The experts who have worked up the American proposals for the Vienna talks focus on a host of technical and tactical problems. They are important to the Nixon-Kissinger team but they are not central.

Richard Nixon came of political age in the coldest of the cold war years. The Soviet-American antagonisms he felt then he still feels, though a man's view of them cannot fail to be altered from the prospect of the Oval Office in the White House. But, fundamentals are fundamentals.

#### 'Still Communists'

In a hitherto unpublished Nixon speech, made in California on July 29, 1967, before he announced for his second presidential try, Mr. Nixon took account of the changes in the Communist world since his vice-presidential years in speaking of what he termed "Subject A, the Soviet Union".

His summation: "They (the Soviet leaders) are still Communists and they are committed to the goal of a Communist world; they are battling the Chinese for leadership of that world. They want to achieve that goal without war. At the same time they

want more economic progress at home. They will work with us only when doing so serves one or more of these three objectives".

Mr. Nixon added that "diplomatically, we should have discussions with the Soviet leaders at all levels to reduce the possibility of miscalculation and to explore the areas where bilateral agreements would reduce tensions. But we must always remember in such negotiations that our goal is different from theirs: we seek peace as an end in itself. They seek victory, with peace being at this time a means toward that end. In sum, we can live in peace with the Soviet Union, but until they give up their goal for world conquest it will be for them a peace of necessity and not of choice".

From such a philosophical base, what Mr. Nixon said at his first presidential press conference about the SALT talks flowed logically:

"I favor strategic arms talks. Again, it is a question of not only when but the context of those talks. . . . It would be a mistake, for example, for us to fail to recognize that simply reducing arms through mutual agreement. . . will not, in itself, assure peace. . . ."

"What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace".

Partly as a result of this Nixon geopolitical view, the United States today is involved in Soviet-American talks on the Middle East, contacts on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, meetings (in a four-power context) on Berlin and, through ally West Germany, East-West talks on West German relations with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany.

It is against this massive backdrop of diplomatic activity that one must view President Nixon's approach to the SALT talks this week. The President is operating on the premise indicated by the quotations from Kissinger's book: Arms are not in themselves the cause of tensions; the key is the political relationship between the two super-powers. And so SALT proposals must relate to that political scene.

This has been called "linkage" and the idea has produced a lot of unhappy, even angry, words from the Soviet Union. Despite such a reaction, the men in the Kremlin operate on the same principle, for they, too, take a geopolitical view of the

world. In both the Washington and Moscow version, geopolitics is the bringing to bear on foreign policy all the factors of modern society, political, economic and military. None is viewed, or used, in isolation.

In the case of SALT, the reasoning means that proposals for the conference table in Vienna must relate to much more than simply holding down on arms expenditures and/or seeking to prevent the nuclear arms race from moving into a new and more dangerous plane with the deployment of multiple warheads and anti-missile defense systems.

In his worldwide foreign policy report on Feb. 18, President Nixon said that "we are under no illusions" about the problems of what he has termed "an era of negotiation", in part because "we know there are enduring ideological differences".

He went on to say that "we will deal with the Communist countries on the basis of a precise understanding of what they are about in the world, and thus of what we can reasonably expect of them and ourselves". And he added that "we did not invent the inter-relationship" of international events such as arms control and political issues, "it is a fact of life" because "political issues relate to strategic questions".

### Arms Superiority

The President long has been an exponent of military superiority; in that 1967 speech, for example, he said: "Because the primary Soviet goal is still victory rather than peace, we must never let the day come in a confrontation like Cuba and the Mid-east where they, rather than we, have military superiority".

The facts of life forced him to substitute "sufficiency" in nuclear arms for "superiority" but the old suspicion, remains in the Nixon mind. In his world report in February, he said that "the growing strategic forces on both sides pose new and disturbing problems". That his concern is chiefly about the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal, begun after Nikita Khrushchev's humiliation o v e r Cuba in 1962, is really what Mr. Nixon meant can be deduced from his next sentence in that report:

"Should a president, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?"

Many of those outside government, and some inside, who are highly knowledgeable about the arms race disagree with this presidential worry. They contend that the United States, with its three nuclear weapons systems (land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles and long-range aircraft), is in no such danger of Soviet nuclear blackmail.

The point, however, is that it is President Nixon, not his critics, who makes American policy. And the logic of his views leads him in the direction of high caution in approaching the Vienna conference.

"We must insure that all potential aggressors", said the President, "see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe".

It is far more difficult to divine the motivations of the men in the Kremlin who make the decisions on what their delegation will do in Vienna. The evidence is conclusive that in many respects their views are a collective mirror image of Mr. Nixon's.

### PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

(Radio Free Europe Research, 18-3-'70)

Summary: The closer Lenin's birthday celebration comes, the more intensive become Moscow's attempts to use this occasion to legitimize the present policies of the Party leadership vis-a-vis the other socialist countries. While earlier efforts centered on justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia by means of Lenin quotations, the present stage of the campaign is directed at legitimizing the theory that it is the duty of all socialist countries and communist parties to recognize the Soviet model of socialism as the one binding pattern.

In Filosofskie nauki, the journal of the Ministry for Higher and Special Education of the USSR, and abridged version of a speech by Professor E. Sitkovskiy, doctor of philosophy, was recently published. (E. P. Sitkovskiy, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, "Marksizm-Leninizm -- yedinoe internatsional'noe uchenie rabochego klassa," Filosofskie nauki, No. 1, 1970.)

Sitkovskiy is a professor at the Academy of Social Sciences in the Central Committee of the CPSU and is recognized as one of the more important Party theoreticians. The article attempts to define more precisely than heretofore the relations between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, based on the works of Lenin. The author refers to the "basic principle of Leninism": the establishment of the national peculiarities and the interests of the individual communist parties in other countries, on the one hand, and the fate of the world communist movement as a whole, on the other, in such a way that they can be brought into accord with one another. The Parties which have remained true to Leninism "avoid actions which could stand in contradiction to the tasks of the general struggle of all communist parties against imperialism". From this, Sitkovskiy concludes:

Out of this results their posture vis-a-vis the first country in the world in which socialism has been victorious -- vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. There is no (such thing as) anti-Soviet communism. . . . At the international meeting of communist and workers parties in Moscow in 1969, Wladyslaw Gomulka, Janos Kadar, Gustav Husak and other leaders of communist and workers parties said this appropriately.

The Professor becomes more modest when stressing that the question of a country's or party's position on the Soviet Union is not being asked by the Soviet Union: "This question is posed by history".

#### Soviet Model Valid

Sitkovskiy's position on the idea of various models of socialism is typical of the cynical tactics of the Soviet theoreticians. In the socialist countries this question was discussed especially in connection with the situation which arose following 1945 which necessitated adopting the methods of rule and institutions provided by the Soviet Union or of developing more effective and national methods. Recently the most important consideration, especially in Czechoslovakia, was that "new models of the socialist society had to be developed because of technical progress, automation and the necessity of implementing as quickly as possible those discoveries which had been made in the sciences and technology.

Sitkovskiy recalls that a model can only take on significance if it can be realized or if it already exists. The experiments of the Czechoslovak communists to set up such a model in the CSSR were, of course, quashed by the military intervention and the constant interference of the Soviets in their internal affairs. Sitkovskiy now says:

. . . . it transpired that, in the case of the authors of similar "models" of socialism, their a priori construction (which) had however not been realized anywhere contradicted the experience of the Soviet Union and the whole international communist movement.

Although the originators of such experiments had only concerned themselves with problems applicable to their own country (otherwise all their efforts would have been utopistic and pure fantasy), Sitkovskiy accuses them of wanting to teach other countries how socialism should be constructed.

A "model" is an example, a pattern which is based on the generalization of a certain experience which has proved itself to be correct and which has been tested in practice. This is the experience of the construction of a socialist society in the Soviet Union which has been adopted by the communist and workers parties as the basic model of socialism, with consideration of the fact that the concrete and specific implementation of this model is correct when it evolves from the basic and unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The most irritating demand (understandable enough) for the Soviet Party theoreticians is that for a "humanist socialism":

Socialism "with a human face" is directed against Leninism, against the revolutionary working class and the international communist movement. . . . This "model of socialism" contains defamations of "Soviet communism" and of Leninism in the form of the claim that the latter lack a "human face" and are anti-humanist.

One paragraph of Sitkovskiy's article deserves to be quoted in full, for it demonstrates the manner in which the Soviet leadership avoids a question which is uncomfortable for it; namely the question of the reprisals against and liquidation of func-

tionaries in socialist countries, which was an integral part of the despotic system of rule under Stalin:

Often, this sort of "personal socialism" (lichnostny sotsializm) refers in its argumentation to the fact that in the Soviet Union, the construction of socialism went together with such negative phenomena as Stalin's personality cult, reprisals, methods of force, etc. Czechoslovak supporters of "personal socialism" also cite Novotny's actions. But in this case these people make a standard error (committed by) all revisionists: they replace dialectics with sophistry. It is not permissible to throw together in one pot legal reprisals and methods of force which were used by the socialist state against the enemies of socialism and the unjustified use of these measures on innocent people which occurred not according to concern about and defense of socialism, but according to ideas which were foreign to socialism. To confuse these very different things with one another -- that is revisionist sophistry.

Filosofskie nauki complements this philosophy with the note that Roger Garaudy, the French philosopher, is also guilty of having committed such errors. The Austrian communist intellectual Ernst Fischer is also referred to as a "social-reformist revisionist". The essence of Sitkovskiy's article is found in the conclusion that:

The discoverers of these "models of socialism" have come out against Leninism, against Lenin's ideas and their implementation in practice in the Soviet Union and in many other socialist countries.

#### Soviet Model Plus Soviet Rockets

Sitkovskiy's article is by no means an isolated example of such thinking. It is perhaps only remarkable for the clarity with which the ideas have been formulated and the manner in which it exposes the "dialectics" of the Soviet theoreticians. Numerous articles in the Soviet press indicate that it is in fact not only a matter of presenting the Soviet model of socialism as a pattern to be followed. Very often, the Soviet theoreticians have written

about the "international function" of the Soviet armed forces and about their importance not only in the defense of the fatherland but also in the guaranteeing of a specific course of development in neighboring countries. The most recent "Leninist" article to appear in Pravda is written along these lines. (Colonel S. Lukonin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, "V.I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva," Pravda, 7 March 1970.) Here too, the real reason for the defense of Leninism is quickly revealed. Using quotations taken out of context and ignoring the fact that they were in the first place designed to describe a situation which pertained more than 50 years ago, the article justifies Brezhnev and Kosygin's policies as "Leninist":

A convincing confirmation of loyalty to the principles of internationalism was the act of the five fraternal countries who came to the aid of the Czechoslovak peoples in the defense of their socialist achievements.

The author of the article, Colonel Lukonin, attacks not only "revisionists" but also those leftists who, according to his thesis, support the "theory of relying only on their own forces". This applies to the Chinese Communists. Such a theory rejects de facto "the internationalist principle of the defense of the socialist fatherland and serves as a facade for adventurous, hegemonistic tendencies (among) its proponents".

Lenin's birthday anniversary is being used and misused for many purposes in the Soviet Union, including "advertisement" for socialist competition and special shift work in plants, as well as the attempt to set Lenin up as the leader and prophet not only for the Soviet Union, but for the whole world. For the Party bureaucracy, however, the most important consideration is always the most pressing concrete problem at hand. Hence, the attempts to reinforce those positions and directives which became apparent with the invasion of the CSSR are in the foreground. While the words "Lenin's proletarian internationalism" are mouthed, the meaning behind them is "the Brezhnev Doctrine".

#### THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR

(International Herald Tribune, 31-3-'70)

The late Bernard Fall, one of the wisest Western observers of Asia, insisted for years that the Vietnam conflict was actually a sequel

to the struggle between the Communists and the French for supremacy over the entire Indochina peninsula that raged for a decade after World War II.

Therefore, Fall argued, the United States and its allies were involved in what logically should have been termed the "Second Indochina War".

If that idea seemed somewhat esoteric before, it is now being proved prescient. For not only is the conflict spreading beyond Vietnam and Laos into Cambodia, but it is currently threatening to extend into Thailand as well.

The obvious danger in this growing turmoil is that President Nixon may feel compelled to escalate the American commitment to the region despite his repeated pledges to reduce the U.S. posture in the area.

However, there is the more hopeful possibility that the major powers may somehow sober up sufficiently to seek a multinational settlement for Southeast Asia in order to prevent an explosion that might ignite a worldwide catastrophe.

#### Growing Crisis

Thus the present situation may well be a turning point that could lead, depending on the options taken, to either a wider war or a chance for peace. In short, it is a time of both hazards and opportunity.

Though climactic moments have a way of flaring into sudden headlines, a crisis is the gradual accumulation of events. So it has been in Indochina.

The conflict in Laos, a sideshow to the Vietnam theater, had long remained a minor affair because the contending forces there tacitly respected the unwritten partition of the country worked out during the 1962 Geneva Conference.

But last summer, when Gen. Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas and their American advisers moved into the Plaine des Jarres, they violated the understanding that kept the balance in Laos.

The Communists counterattacked this winter and, in addition to reacting with increased air support for the government, the United States openly strengthened the Thai units that have covertly operated in Laos for years.

The entry of the Thai reinforcements has in turn prompted the Chinese, who also have troops inside Laos and thousands

more poised on the border, to warn that they "will not sit idly by" - a phrase reminiscent of the days before their "volunteers" poured into Korea.

Hence a spiral of irrational challenges and responses threatens to transform the primitive kingdom of Laos into a battlefield on which no side can possibly attain victory.

Meanwhile, the ouster of Prince Sihanouk has disrupted the fragile equilibrium that served to spare Cambodia from becoming actively engaged in the war.

Hardly was Sihanouk deposed than the South Vietnamese, evidently acting with the approval of the new Phnom Penh regime, hit Communist bases across the Cambodian frontier. The U.S. command in Saigon, almost delighted to disclose the change of ground rules, announced that B-52 bombers were also bombing Cambodia.

Apparently anticipating a larger American role in Cambodia, the Communists have already started to stir up trouble. They are exhorting Cambodians to overthrow Sihanouk's successors, and they are using their own forces in the country against the new Phnom Penh regime.

#### Sihanouk's 'Army'

At the same time, from his asylum in Peking, the prince has cloaked the Communists in legitimacy by creating a government-in-exile and a "national liberation army" to fight "with other anti-imperialist people's forces of fraternal countries".

And seizing Sihanouk's appeal, which they probably inspired, the Chinese and North Vietnamese are increasingly referring to the "struggles" in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as a single "struggle for Indochina".

To a large extent, Communist strategy appears to be designed to create diversions to the Vietnam arena, where Hanoi's dreams of rapid success have been punctured.

Their references to a bigger conflict are also calculated to stimulate anti-war sentiment in the United States and, in the process, raise the pressure on the White House to accept their conditions for peace in the region.

But whatever their motives, the Communists are making it clear that they are prepared to expand the war over the artificial boundaries that separate the Indochinese states, and there is no



reason to doubt their intentions.

In another forecast that has become significant, Bernard Fall confided to a friend not long before his tragic death in Vietnam that his knowledge of that country might eventually seem irrelevant if the conflict continued to escalate.

"I feel," he remarked, "like it is 1913, and I am an expert on Serbia who is about to be dépassé par les événements - outstripped by events."

#### PROMINENT POLITICIANS PURGED

(Radio Free Europe Research, 25-3-'70)

Summary: Radio Prague (March 21) quoted substantial excerpts from a Rude Pravo editorial of that day, in which the paper's orthodox editor-in-chief, Miroslav Moc, announced ousters of prominent progressive politicians from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. According to the article, the screening commissions which had interviewed the persons concerned with reference to the Party cards exchange recommended that the credentials of Josef Smrkovsky, Josef Spacek, Zdenek Mlynar, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, Frantisek Pavlicek, Karel Kaplan, Ladislav Kreperat, Jiri Sekera and Cestmir Cisar should not be reissued. Along with this recommendation went a proposal to expel them from the Party. At the same time, Moc revealed that the Party membership of Alexander Dubcek had been suspended pending an investigation into his earlier activities. Most of the above recommendations, according to Moc, had already been debated and approved by the CPCS Presidium.

Further expulsions from the Party were reported by the Yugoslav agency T'njug and Reuters. Tanjug claimed on March 21 that Party cards would not be reissued to Frantisek Vodslon and Miluse Fiserova. The agency based this news on an interview given by CPCS Presidium member and CC Secretary Vasil Bilak to Vychodoslovenske Noviny on March 21. Reuters of March 20, quoting Zivot Strany (probably of March 17, which is not yet available), revealed

that Marie Mikova, Josef Macek and Josef Boruvka had also been expelled from the Party.

Alexander Dubcek was First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia between 5 January 1968 and 17 April 1969. In September 1969 he lost his membership in the Party Presidium and a month later had to resign from his office of Federal Assembly chairman, a post he had held since April 1969. Last January he was forced to comply with the wish of the Party Presidium and give up his post in the CPCS Central Committee, before departing to Ankara as Czechoslovak Ambassador.

Josef Smrkovsky was the closest Czech associate of Dubcek and a more radical reformer than Dubcek himself. He was the leading Communist in the Prague May 1945 uprising, was imprisoned during the period of the "cult" between 1951 and 1955, and rehabilitated in 1963. Subsequently he held ministerial portfolios, played a major part in Novotny's fall, and became chairman of the National Assembly (parliament) in April 1968. Between March 1968 and April 1969 Smrkovsky was a Party Presidium member. He was ousted from the Central Committee in September 1969 and had subsequently to relinquish his office of chairman of the Chamber of the People and his parliamentary mandate.

Josef Spacek was leading regional Party secretary in South Moravia (Brno) and, during the reform period, also a Party Presidium member and CC Secretary. Between April and December 1969 he lost all his Party and parliamentary offices.

Zdenek Mlynar headed, during the last stage of Novotny's regime, an interdepartmental team studying the problems of political reform, and was a major contributor to the reformist April 1968 Party Action Program. In April 1968 he became a member of the CPCS Secretariat and in June 1968 a CC Secretary. On 31 August 1968 he was elected to the CPCS Presidium. He lost all the Party posts in November 1968, and in September 1969 was expelled from the Central Committee.

Zbynek Vokrouhlicky was head of the International Union of Students since 1963 and chairman of the Czechoslovak Youth Union since March 1968. In September 1969 he lost his chairmanship of the youth movement, and was expelled from the

CPCS Central Committee. A month later he forfeited his chairmanship of IUS.

Frantisek Pavlicek was director of the Prague-Vinohrady theater and vice-chairman of the Theatrical Union. He was a member of the CPCS Central Committee between 31 August 1968 and May 1969, when he was expelled as an "unreconstructed" signatory of the "Two Thousand Words" manifesto.

Karel Kaplan is a noted historian, and a member of the Academy's Historical Institute. Between 31 August 1968 and October 1969 he was a member of the CPCS Central Control and Auditing Commission, and was also a member of the Party Rehabilitation Commission established under Jan Piller in 1968. He achieved international renown as author of the study on the political trials of the 1950s (cf., Nova Mysl Nos. 6, 7 and 8/1968).

Ladislav Kreperat is a former leading Party secretary of the North Bohemian region (Usti nad Labem). He lost his post in July 1969. In October that year the regional Party committee demanded his ouster from the CPCS Central Committee, of which he had been a member since 31 August 1968. He was probably expelled from that body last January (on that occasion the names of those expelled from the CC were not announced).

Jiri Sekera is a Party journalist of some standing. He had been on the staff of the Party journal Nova Mysl between 1964 and 1966, then served as deputy head of the CPCS CC ideological department, and between August 1968 and April 1969 was editor-in-chief of the still reformist Rude Pravo. In May 1969 he was appointed editor-in-chief of the economic weekly Hospodarske Noviny, an office he still held in mid-March 1970.

Cestmir Cisar is a Party ideologist who served as CPCS CC Secretary for education in 1963 and Minister of Education and Culture between September 1963 and November 1965. From December 1965 to March 1968 he was Czechoslovak Ambassador in Bucharest, where Novotny had dispatched him to get rid of a budding reformer. Between March and August 1968 he was CPCS Secretary for education, culture and science, and between July 1968 and November 1969 chairman of the Czech National Council (Czech parliament).

Frantisek Vodslon is a veteran Communist who had been instrumental in Novotny's political demise. Between 1957 and 1967 he was chairman of the Czechoslovak Association for Physical Training, and subsequently, until October 1969, vice-chairman of the People's Control Commission. He was expelled from the CPCS Central Committee in May 1969 because of his resistance to the October 1968 Status of Forces Treaty, which authorized the Soviet occupation.

Miluse Fiserova chaired the Czechoslovak Women's Union from January 1968 to November 1969, when she had to yield to Soviet fellow-traveler Gusta Fucikova. She was a member of the CPCS Central Committee from 31 August 1968 until September 1969, when she was expelled.

Marie Mikova was deputy chairman of the National Assembly and subsequently of the federal Chamber of the People. She was a candidate member of the CPCS Central Committee since 31 August 1968. Expelled from the CC because of her courageous stand against the Status of Forces Treaty in September 1969, she had to relinquish her parliamentary offices later that year.

Josef Macek was director of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences since 1952 and a member of the CPCS Central Committee since 1966. An orthodox historian formerly of a Stalinist camp, he had to pay for having tolerated the publication of the "Black Book", which depicted the first week of the Soviet occupation. He was dismissed as director of the Historical Institute in November 1969 and possibly from the CPCS Central Committee in January 1970.

Josef Boruvka, a veteran Communist, was ousted from the Party because of his reformist stand as Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture between April and December 1968. A colorful parliamentary deputy under Novotny, he had to resign his seat in the legislative body last December. After having served on the CPCS Central Committee, first as a candidate and later as full member since 1949, he was expelled from that body in September 1969.

With the sole exception of Josef Macek, all of the above were prominent reformers of the 1968 period. In the framework of the current exchange of Party cards, their elimination from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had to be expected. In a

project involving a sizable purge in regions, districts and localities, it would have been naive to expect that prominent politicians who had been responsible for the liberalization process could retain Party membership. Their elimination was only a matter of time, in particular since the Soviets may be assumed to have pressed for the expulsion of some of them (Srnkovsky, Cisar, Mlynar, and Mikova in particular).

The only actions which are somewhat outside this predictable framework are the ouster of orthodox Josef Macek (actually for negligence) and, of course, the suspension of Dubcek's membership in the Party. For some time it seemed that the former Party leader would be spared this humiliation. In the past, Dubcek was presented as a weakling, rather than as one of the leaders of the rightist-opportunist deviation. Moreover, it appeared to be Husak's and Svoboda's intention to remove him from the direct line of fire by appointing him Ambassador to Turkey (incidentally, a similar project to send Cestmir Cisar as Ambassador to Belgium failed in the face of conservative opposition).

There is no doubt that ultras of the Prague-Liben or the Slovak Kovarce type demand Dubcek's expulsion from the Party, sometimes even from official Party platforms. Thus, the Brno municipal CP secretary Vaclav Zima, in a speech commemorating the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth, flatly declared that people like Srnkovsky, Spacek and Alexander Dubcek "have no place in the Party" (Brnensky Vecernik, 16 March 1970).

Ironically enough, Alexander Dubcek now shares the fate of Antonin Novotny, whose Party membership was suspended on 29 May 1968 for very different reasons. Novotny then was to be subjected to an investigation of the part he had played in the preparation of political trials.

The inclusion of Dubcek in this further stage of "purification" shows that the salami tactics of the ultras are bearing fruit, and that Husak and his group are being pushed into ever greater concessions. After the suspension of his Party membership it is questionable whether Dubcek will be allowed to retain his ambassadorial post for any prolonged period. . . . .

## CHINA IN THE HISTORIC BATTLE AGAINST TIME

Mihailo Saranovic

(International Herald Tribune, 5-4-'70, Belgrade)

It may sound like an oversimplification, but the question of capital accumulation was one of the essential problems of the cultural revolution initiated in China late in 1965. The rate of capital accumulation figures significantly not only as an internal aspect of Chinese development but also in terms of that country's tactical and strategic conceptions on the international level.

The end of her revolution and struggle for liberation dawned on China in 1949, when she had one of the lowest national incomes in the world - a mere 27 dollars per capita. And so she began her existence as a free country under circumstances that were far from fortuitous. The heritage of the past lay too heavily on her to be removed overnight. Tens of millions of people lived in the earliest stages of feudalism and slavery, while hundreds of thousands had not even reached that level of development but rather languished in the most primitive kind of community.

The international situation, too, bode no good for China: the cold war was in full swing, so that the war-devastated country had no alternative to aligning herself with another power. By the logic of her system, China turned to the socialist countries, above all the USSR which had frequently assumed a disapproving attitude toward China during the revolution, but gave her considerable material assistance in the first few years after it.

For a number of years after liberation, China kept in step with the policy pursued by the Soviet Union. This does not mean she was sincerely in agreement with it, but the objective situation and the mood of significant forces within the country made her acquiesce.

The ratio of forces in the world was influenced to no mean extent by the existence of China as the earth's most populous country, covering one-quarter of the Asian continent. But China did not obtain the place that rightfully belonged to her in the world; she was not recognized by most countries, her representatives still do not represent the Chinese people in the UN (although China was one of the founders of the world organization) and so on.

China had to seek a way out of this staggering situation - the unenviable economic legacy and the unpropitious moment of her emergence as a people's republic - by engaging hundreds of millions of people to build up the country, as her requirements for investment resources were so insurmountably great that they would present a huge problem even for the world's mightiest financial powers. Hence, China proclaimed the policy of "relying on her own forces" which, internally speaking, meant that the greatest possible efforts had to be made to achieve her goals; internationally, it had a twofold meaning. First, the developing countries were cautioned that they could not expect any great help from China, at least not while she was at that stage of underdevelopment; and second, that it was better for them to rely on their own forces than to become the plunder of "imperialists and revisionists" by seeking foreign financial assistance.

This "reliance on her own forces" means that China is struggling alone to approximate the biggest world powers, both economically and militarily, including atomic potential. Naturally, this also means that great sacrifices must be made, as China's possibilities are not exceptional.

In some estimates, China today has between 37 and 38 million industrial workers. Her industries account for the smaller part of the national income and even make use of capital accumulation from agriculture. According to the assessment of many China experts, her arable land comprises 12% of the total at best, or about 110 million hectares - and this with a population of some 600 million living in the rural districts. The land is intensively cultivated, but land hunger is chronic to such an extent that there has even been talk of transforming graves, covering 1.9% of the arable land, into plowland. (According to the ancient custom, homesteaders are buried on the best land they owned, saturated with the perspiration of their lifelong labour, and members of the family are also interred among the furrows).

Many set the national income today at 90 dollars per capita, while others (fewer in number) go up as far as 100 dollars. China is thought to be investing about one-fourth of her national income. Finally, China's foreign trade (no matter how minor its importance in such a consideration as this) ranges between 3.8 and 4.1 billion dollars annually in both directions, with China for the most part enjoying a positive balance of several hundred million dollars.

It would seem indispensable to mention all these elements, as they give indication of China's rather modest possibilities. All references to China's economic development inevitably raise the question of the accumulation rate, that is, the tempo of the country's further development. This development is significant in its repercussions not only on the internal but the world level as well.

Apparently it was no coincidence that the cultural revolution was launched precisely when discussion of the third five-year plan got under way, after the period of the so-called policy of adjustment. The period of adjustment came at the beginning of the sixties after years of elemental disasters which reduced agricultural output considerably. According to assessments still valid in the outside world, it was also a response to the unsuccessful "great leap forward" when the country's economic situation was exceedingly grave.

The period of the policy of coordination was marked by a slower and not so "sudden" tempo of economic advancement, showing certain tendencies for which responsibility was ascribed, during the cultural revolution, to the former president of the republic, Liu Shao-Chiu. Among other things, an effort was made to give the peasants as large a household plot as possible, to enable them to sell part of their products privately on the village market-places. In industry, it meant the attempt to take profit as an important yardstick for economic efficiency and to offer the workers material incentive to raise production. During the cultural revolution, these efforts were dubbed "walking at a snail's pace" and were replaced by the slogan of "faster, better and more economical production".

It seems that the question of tempo was one of the sources of dispute between Liu Shao Chiu's policies and Mao Tse-tung's line. The "snail's pace", meaning less risk of dislocation, was characteristic of Liu Shao-Chiu and his followers whereas the spokesmen of the cultural revolution strove for greater acceleration in development. Another feature of the cultural revolution was reflected in the idea that work should be done "for the revolution and not for money". Chairman Mao Tse-tung saw in this element of his policy the possibility for raising accumulation at the present productive level and of increasing it with the growth in production that would ensue from the policy of accelerating output and making bigger investments.

The discussions during the drafting of the third five-year plan obviously exacerbated the aforementioned differences between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chiu on the tempo of further development. In the vision of Mao Tse-tung, all the ideas of raising the living standard, stimulating the workers, making profit an important element in the business activities of enterprises, building primarily large industrial capacities, increasing the size of household plots for peasants, and other elements, were great evils threatening to restore capitalism in China. Irrespective of whether this was a question of capitalism or not, the processes launched, had they lasted, that is, had they been legitimized in the third five-year plan (1966-1970), would have initiated an inexorable process of strengthening and stabilizing the above tendencies. That is why the cultural revolution was started at "a minute to twelve", and that the hour was late was something Mao Tse-tung undoubtedly felt when he analyzed the implementation of his ideas in society.

By neutralizing those tendencies (regardless of the fact that some time had to pass before Mao's notions were completely adopted and put into practice) the idea was to increase the rate of accumulation by assuming a simplified attitude toward production and the standard, by substituting enthusiasm for a rising standard. There is no available data as to what it amounts to today, but any one-thousandth of an increase would represent a large sum in view of the fact that nearly 800 million people are involved.

Accumulation increases not only by the simple increase in its rate, but by neutralizing the tendencies to adopt the "sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie". So there are in China no lipsticks, no nylon stockings, no great consumption of meat, whereas an enormous number of industrial articles is produced for export, and so on. Privately-owned TV sets are quite out of the ordinary, to say nothing of automobiles and other "luxury" items. This, naturally, need not mean that China is accumulating capital this way to be used for investments, but in any case her exceptionally modest people and modest standard mean that the national income is not being spent to any great extent for such purposes.

The standardbearers of the cultural revolution feel that only by accelerated advancement, by "tightening their belts", can they achieve many of the goals they have set themselves. At

the national level, this would mean more rapid transcendence of backwardness, which would in turn mean general stabilization according to the conceptions of Mao Tse-tung. Externally, it would signify more rapid and significant steps in reducing the difference in degree of development between China and her principal rivals on the international scene - differences both in economic potential and in force of arms. Thus would China, in the view of her leaders, rapidly acquire the attributes of a big economic and military power and assume her rightful place in the world. This would also change the balance at the international level and counter US and Soviet influence in some regions.

It is therefore not accurate to say that China pays no heed to time, that it is all the same to her if a process takes ten or one hundred years. Quite the reverse, as far as capital accumulation and accelerated development is concerned, she is running a feverish race against time. The cultural revolution suffices to confirm this, as one of its goals was to transform the "snail's pace" into a "new leap forward" but more rationally and realistically than was the case in 1958.

## ECONOMICS

### WORKERS BLAMED FOR ECONOMIC FAILURES

Fedir S. Hayenko

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 14-4-'70)

Summary: The chief blame for Soviet economic failures in 1969 is now being attached to "breaches of production and labor discipline", i. e. to the workers themselves and not to the system. Stricter measures clamping down on the high rate of absenteeism and alcoholism and the widespread pilfering of State property are expected. Many economists feel that this is putting the cart before the horse, and suggest that greater rationalization of production, better working conditions and more autonomy for factories and enterprises would drastically curtail labor problems.

In 1969 the Soviet economy suffered a marked setback: in a considerable number of branches production plans were under-fulfilled and in the majority of these cases output levels failed to reach even those of the previous year. Sales to the public of certain important commodities and foodstuffs were also lower than in 1968: "...public demand for certain goods, particularly for meat, herrings, vegetables, some woolen fibers, clothing, footwear, building materials and various articles for household use, was not fully met" (Izvestia, January 25, 1970). This report of the Central Statistical Office claimed that real per capita income rose by 5 per cent during 1969, but as supplies of many essential goods were below 1968 levels, living standards actually fell.

Last December's plenary session of the Party Central Committee spent most of its time analysing the reasons for these shortfalls with a view to future improvements. The findings provided the basis for an article by a leading Soviet economist, Prof. A. Birman, in Literaturnaya gazeta (February 11, 1970) in which the chief blame for economic failures is placed on the workers themselves and not on the system. Listing measures to straighten out the economy, a Pravda leader said: "Particular

attention must be paid to the tightening of labor and production discipline. The fight against such anti-social behavior as theft of socialist property, absenteeism and the abuse of alcohol must be stepped up" (January 13, 1970). For this purpose a nationwide campaign has been mounted to eliminate "every form of disorganization of production" (ibid., January 23, 1970) and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) has pledged its support: "It is necessary to put a stop to the unprincipled attitude of trade union organizations in infringements of labor and production discipline, to drifters, shirkers and drunkards who harm the economy and society" (Trud, January 29, 1970). Early last March, the Party Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee jointly appealed to Soviet workers "to improve the utilization of production resources and practice greater thrift in the national economy" (Pravda, March 4, 1970). The appeal was followed by organized meetings of workers throughout the country at which promises were made to eliminate inefficiency, fulfil plans ahead of schedule, etc.

Shop-floor discipline has always been a weak link in the Soviet economy, and the authorities have sought to underpin it with a wide variety of measures, including making absenteeism, unpunctuality and frequent changes of job into legal offences, but without noticeable success. The situation has, in fact, deteriorated, because many so-called breaches of labor and production discipline (e.g. irregular production flows, idle time, unpunctuality, high labor turnover) are due to the nature of the Soviet economic system. A prime example, almost unknown in properly balanced economies, is the use of storm-tactics (shturmovshchina) in a desperate attempt to fulfil production plans at the end of a period. Experts have strongly condemned this practice in recent years, but it is proving tremendously difficult to eradicate. The cycle goes like this: at the beginning of each month, due to bad planning, late delivery of materials, delays in resetting machinery, etc., the production section of an enterprise falls behind schedule; at the end of the month this backlog has to be made up, usually through an all-out effort involving excessive overtime and the sacrifice of weekends and holidays. The average 1969 figures for a particular Moscow factory provide an example: during the first ten days of each

month 14.6 per cent of the scheduled monthly output was attained, while in the last ten the figure rose to 60.4 per cent (Trud, March 3, 1967). This example holds good for a great many Soviet factories, including some of the largest.

One result of this frantic haste at the end of each month is that the quality of the manufactured articles suffers. This is so well-known that purchasers of durable goods try to avoid products made during this period (ibid., December 3, 1969). The same issue of Trud published a selection of readers' letters on shturmovshchina and overtime, with the editorial comment that "the overwhelming majority of letters consider irregular, unorganized production to be a constant source of breaches of labor discipline.... sometimes causing people irreparable moral harm" (ibid.) Some 16 per cent of readers, however, believe that these last-minute blitz tactics are a necessary evil, and one senior manager was even indignant that the newspaper had broached the subject, because in his opinion "it is impossible to organize smooth production flows in the short period of time under discussion, so there is no point in getting worked up about it. It only upsets people to no purpose and drives a wedge between workers and management". (ibid.)

Pravda (January 13, 1969) conceded that "beneath the internal causes of unevenness lie deep economic reasons", thus admitting that general economic conditions are largely responsible for breaches of labor discipline. Whatever the reasons, the loss of working time in the Soviet Union is enormous; an investigation conducted by the Central Statistical Office established that 10-15 per cent of the working time on a shift is lost (Sotsialisticheskiy trud, No. 2, 1969, p.12), while 70 per cent of stoppages within the shift are caused by reasons beyond the workers' control (ibid., No. 9, 1967, p. 66). The result is that enterprises must employ a larger labor force than would be necessary under more rational conditions of production. In 1966, for example, a Central Statistical Office survey of 2,000 undertakings revealed that "for one single day the loss of work time amounted to 254,000 man-hours, that is to say, approximately 36,000 people were as good as not working at all" (Izvestia, December 24, 1966). In the USSR there are 48,000 industrial plants and some 16,000 construction enterprises (Kommunist, No. 18, 1969, p.12), so that in these branches alone, according to the findings of the above survey,

around one million workers are idle each day. In 1968 in Minsk Oblast 2,200 workers were surplus to requirements in this way throughout the year (equal to 627,400 man-days), and in 1969 there were 2,500 such workers in Tula Oblast, 3,000 in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, 10,000 in Sverdlovsk Oblast, etc. (Trud, February 10, 18 and 27, 1970).

Poorly organized or inadequate amenities contribute to the loss of work time: in some cases where the lunch-break has been set at 30 minutes the staff must spend no less than 40 minutes queuing in the canteen (ibid., December 9, 1969). Many people arrive late at work due to inadequate urban and suburban public transport services, as witnessed by this extract from a letter to Pravda from Kharkov: "Passengers don't have an easy time of it in our city. At the morning and evening rush-hours streetcars, trolley buses and buses go to work as though into battle" (February 14, 1970). The editors note that complaints of this sort are a regular feature of their postbag.

The high rate of labor turnover, caused by workers switching from one factory to another in the search for more suitable jobs, is severely frowned upon in the Soviet Union and is considered a breach of labor discipline. Yet in a situation where strike action is virtually impossible because it is regarded as organized protest against the regime, changing jobs is one of the few legal means of expressing dissatisfaction with labor conditions. The Soviet press calls it "the most acute industrial problem" (ibid., February 27, 1969), understandably when some factories have to replace 61.2 per cent of their labor force, with an average of 22 per cent for industry as a whole (Sotsialisticheskiy trud, No. 2, 1969, p.12). There are further complications: in the machine-building industry, for example, half of those changing their place of work also change their trade (Planovoye khozyaystvo, No. 8, 1966, p.25) and in agriculture the annual loss of trained tractor and combine drivers is 25-30 per cent (Molodoy kommunist, No. 10, 1969, p.56).

The average time spent between leaving one job and starting another is 28 days (Trud, January 23, 1970). Considering that in 1968 the average number of people employed in Soviet industry was 30.4 million, then with an average labor turnover of 22 per cent the (disguised) unemployment figure for the year from this cause alone was more than 510,000. Labor turnover

in other branches of the Soviet economy is apparently as high as in industry, and in construction even higher. On this basis, the total unemployment figure for 1969 due to workers changing their jobs exceeded 1,480,000. Fluctuation of labor on this scale inflicts heavy losses on the Soviet economy: in 1962, for example, it cost a calculated three thousand million rubles in unrealized gross production (Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, No. 7, 1963, p. 88) and with a greater volume of output and a larger labor force today's losses must be even higher. Economic performance is also adversely affected by the expense of re-training workers who have changed their trade, by decreased labor productivity for a period before leaving the old job and after starting a new, unfamiliar one, and by recruiting costs.

The economic damage caused by the high rate of labor turnover in the Soviet Union exceeds that caused by strikes in the United States. Moreover, Soviet workers are very adept at taking it easy without actually laying themselves open to the charge of shirking: "But what if a man doesn't break any rules? What if he just works at his own pace and doesn't show any particular initiative? He still pockets his pay, so everything is fine. How do you make someone like this get a move on and give his best?" (Trud, January 17, 1970). This go-slow attitude cannot compete with alcoholism as a cause of dislocated production, however. Excessive drinking is responsible for a great deal of bad time-keeping and practically all (around 90 per cent) absenteeism, which always rises sharply after holidays and paydays. Drunkenness is still on the increase and Izvestia (January 23, 1970) notes with alarm that retailers of alcohol are setting up their stalls right outside the factory gates. Alcoholism is now openly admitted to be the country's causes, although the previous official explanation that it was a legacy of poverty and exploitation under capitalism has now been scrapped because it was "without adequate foundation" (Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 4, January 21, 1970).

A whole range of tough measures are now being applied to try to cut down breaches of labor and production discipline: habitual offenders are put on less qualified and therefore less well-paid work, irrespective of their skills; it is more difficult for them to get hired; their bonuses are stopped and they are refused passes to sanatoria or rest homes; they may not receive assistance from social funds and they forfeit their place on the

housing list; if dismissed for drunkenness this is noted in their labor book (which contains an employee's work record) and they may be expelled from the trade union, which reduces chances of quickly finding employment in another enterprise practically to nil. The authorities seem unconcerned that the majority of these measures flagrantly contradict existing labor legislation.

Vigorous appeals to the public to help combat breaches of labor discipline and the pilfering of state property largely fall on deaf ears: "Our society is insufficiently indignant and impassioned in its condemnation of actions that are degrading not only for the individual but also for the nation at large" (ibid., No. 4, January 21, 1970, p. 13). The public in general does not regard it as theft when a worker helps himself to a pot of paint, a dozen nails or a piece of wood, especially as these items are difficult to find in the shops.

The introduction of special legislation aimed at tightening labor discipline can be expected, but there are two schools of thought. Some people feel that "the time has come to consider the question of adopting more effective measures against infringers of discipline" (Pravda, January 6, 1970), while others think that harsh measures will boomerang and suggest that the more rational organization of production, the provision of better amenities and the granting of greater freedom to enterprises will result in the automatic disappearance of many labor problems. The attitude of the workers themselves is simple and to the point: "You provide people with good working conditions and the question of discipline will vanish from the agenda" (ibid., January 27, 1970). The author of the Pravda article quoting these sentiments agrees with them, because like many people in the Soviet Union he realizes that in the vast majority of cases so-called breaches of labor and production discipline are due to built-in defects of the Soviet economic system itself.

#### PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM POLLUTION AND OTHER DANGERS

(Soviet News, 14-4-'70)

In this article B. Bogdanov, head of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture's Department for the Protection of Nature, Nature



Reserves and Hunting Grounds, discusses, as they affect the USSR, some of the problems of environmental deterioration and pollution which are exercising the minds of thinking people all over the world today. This article was published in the magazine *E k o n o m i k a S e l s k o v o K h o z y a i s t v a* ("Economics of Agriculture").

The national economy and the vast scale on which industry and agriculture are developing are involving more and more of the natural resources in economic life, and this makes it necessary, in using them, to pay increasing attention to their protection and reproduction.

Without this technical progress, economic growth and general prosperity will be impossible. Without this, the successful construction of the material and technical foundation of communist society is inconceivable.

In speaking of nature protection, what I have in mind, mainly is the rational use of the natural wealth, i.e., rational use of natural resources ensuring both the full restoration of those resources and their extended reproduction.

Nature protection involves a set of government and public measures designed to make rational use of natural resources and to restore and multiply them. This is an important economic and social problem of our times. Its significance also lies in the fact that it is primarily a means of preserving and multiplying the material wealth of nature in the interests of ensuring the greatest possible development of the economy and the maximum improvement of the people's wellbeing.

To protect nature is to promote economic progress and to increase the fertility of soil and the productivity of forests and water resources.

#### Immense harm

The harm being done to the economy through improper use of natural resources and through environmental pollution is immense.

Erosion of the soil by wind and water is also doing a great deal of damage. It takes thousands of years for a layer of fertile soil only 16-20 centimetres thick to be formed. A single dust storm or torrential rain can very often destroy by erosion thousands of years of nature's work.

According to experts estimates, about 50 million hectares<sup>1</sup> of land in the European part of the USSR alone are subject to water erosion. Some 40 million hectares of arable land are in potential danger of wind erosion in the eastern regions of the Soviet Union, and this figure increases very substantially if the areas subject to wind erosion in the North Caucasus, the Volga regions and the Southern Ukraine are added.

Other estimates made by experts show that the annual losses of water resulting from snow melting and causing erosion of arable land in regions with insufficient or unstable moisture, add up to between 50,000 and 60,000 million cubic metres. If only 50 per cent of that water could be kept in the fields, the threat of erosion would be very substantially reduced and harvests would be increased by between 60 and 120 million tons of grain.

Scientists estimate that if erosion by wind and water were completely eliminated, the country would benefit to the tune of 4,500 million roubles annually. Professor N.A. Gladkov, in a pamphlet entitled *The Problem of Nature Protection and its Economic Significance*, says that control of erosion could give the Soviet Union an additional 250 million tons of grain.

Water and wind erosion is not the only thing responsible for the loss of good agricultural land. Much of it is unnecessarily lost by being allocated in an indiscriminate way for purposes other than farming. For instance, the lowering of the designed level of the water reservoir of the Saratov hydro-electric station has made it possible to preserve more than 16,000 hectares of fertile land in the Volga region without reducing the station's capacity. The construction of the Rybinsk water reservoir led to the flooding of 175,000 hectares of excellent land in the Mologo-Sheksna district - land which had been the source of fodder for a large livestock farming region.

Thousands of hectares of arable land are annually bulldozed and lost to quarries and opencast mines. The area of worked-out peat fields increases by some 15,000-20,000 hectares every year.

---

1 One hectare = 2.47 acres

A lot of land is eaten up by industrial dumps. The proper upkeep of dumps requires a great deal of money and large quantities of materials. At the same time, by simple processing, slag can be transformed into a valuable fertiliser. Land released from slag heaps, etc., and recovered for farming, as the experience of the Urals thermal power station has shown, yields up to 45 centners of lucerne hay per hectare.<sup>2</sup>

Much of the land is lost by being allocated to industry. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of land in the USSR have been lost to the mining industry. Open cast mining alone causes some 30,000-35,000 hectares to be lost annually. In the Ukraine more than 40,000 hectares have been lost as a result of industrial excavations, and in the Russian Federation more than 260,000 hectares. Very little land is retrieved when open cast mining operations are concluded and the process of recovery is in any case a very slow one. Only 500 hectares retrieved from industry have been reafforested, for instance. In the Moscow coal basin only 600 out of 8,000 hectares of land spoiled for agriculture have been reclaimed.

Losses due to water pollution are estimated by scientists to cost 6,000 million roubles a year. Rivers are polluted by industrial waste and untreated sewage. The Moscow, Leningrad and Kazan meat-packing plants alone have been found to dump into the rivers enough fat to supply a quarter of the demand of those cities for soap. Fibre lost in the waste of the pulp and paper mills amounts to 10 per cent of the total pulp processed by them.

#### Excessive tree felling

Much of the felling of timber is done in sparsely forested regions in spite of the danger which this creates to the soil and water resources. Over the past 25 years some 18 million hectares of felled and burnt forests have been left without replanting. To this day more timber is being cut than is replaced. Excessive felling of trees and uncontrolled use of toxic chemicals in agriculture and forestry have had a harmful effect on animal life and on the trapping industry.

---

<sup>2</sup> Nearly 36 cwt. per acre.

Industrial fumes discharged into the air lead not only to atmospheric pollution but also to the loss of enormous quantities of valuable materials. The power stations burning fuel from the Moscow coal basin could annually produce half a million tons of sulphur dioxide, used in the chemical, pulp and paper, and other industries.

About 400,000 tons of cement of the finest grade could be gathered if efficient dust collectors were installed at all the cement mills in the USSR.

Thousands of tons of sulphuric acid, 41,000 tons of sulphur dioxide, 38,000 tons of nitric oxide, 220,000 tons of fluorine gas, and 350,000 tons of superphosphate dust are lost annually at the Voskresensk chemical plant alone.

The toxic gas content of the atmosphere in a number of towns exceeds the permissible level. Smoke and dust control is becoming an urgent necessity. The use and control of detergents, and pesticides, which pollute the water, air and soil, is becoming a serious matter.

Far-reaching measures are needed to deal with the mountains of refuse and industrial waste accumulating in urban areas. Parks and other places of recreation are contaminated and spoiled, often by the very people who use them. The organisation of tourism is also becoming a problem which presents its own difficulties.

At the same time many factories which have taken the trouble to install purifying plants are obtaining valuable by-products which help to cut down production costs. The Chelyabinsk chemical mill, for instance, has installed a purifying system and has ceased to discharge into a reservoir waste water polluted by acids and ether. The processed waste is now being used to produce fertilisers.

The Izhevsk iron and steel mill used to dispose of carbon dioxide and phenols with its waste. Now these substances are being retrieved and what flows into the reservoir is pure water.

What are the main tasks of the nature protection service? First of all, it must prevent any cases of imbalance developing in nature when its riches are being exploited and it must restore the balance where it has been upset. This can be achieved only by a series of organisational and economic measures, and particularly by efficient planning, which is possible only in a socialist society.

The Great October Socialist Revolution made it possible for the first time to adopt a new approach to nature. Lenin regarded the protection of nature as a matter of great national importance and as a vital concern of the Soviet government.

In drafting plans for the economic development of the country Lenin called for a scientific approach to the exploitation of natural resources and the safeguarding of the sources of raw materials for industry. The Leninist decrees on the land, forests, etc., issued in the first years of Soviet government, provided for control of the exploitation of the forests, land, fisheries and hunting grounds and for their protection. The decree on "The Protection of Natural Treasures, Gardens and Parks", adopted in 1921, was also an important piece of legislation in this respect.

Party and government decisions provide for comprehensive and rational exploitation of the natural resources and outline the principles to be applied in their protection. Among them are the "Principles of Land Legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics" approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the decision of the CPSU central committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on "Urgent Measures to Protect the Soil Against Wind and Water Erosion". In the latter, the control of wind and water erosion of soil is treated as a major national task in the system of measures taken by the party and government to promote agriculture.

#### Collective-Farm Rules

The Model Rules of the Collective Farm adopted by the Third USSR Congress of Collective Farmers contains a special clause on "The Land and Its Use", which reads: "A collective farm undertakes to utilise most fully and properly and constantly improve the land secured to it, to raise its fertility, to utilise unused areas for agricultural production, to take measures for irrigating and draining the land, to combat soil erosion, to plant forest shelter belts, to husband and strictly protect collective-farm land from being squandered and to observe the rules for nature conservation and the use of forests, water sources and minerals (sand, clay, stone, peat, etc.). The management and the heads and specialists of the collective farm are responsible for the land being used in the most efficient way".

The manner in which natural resources must be used, protected and reproduced is prescribed by special and general laws and regulations of the USSR and the republics.

With the introduction in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties of the Law on the Protection of Nature by the Supreme Soviets of all the Union republics the problem of the protection of nature was reflected in the legislation of every Union republic as an all-embracing problem.

The Supreme Soviets of all the Union republics and many of the local Soviets of Working People's Deputies have standing commissions for the protection of nature and these commissions keep an eye on the way in which ministries and departments enforce the legislation on the protection of nature and the government decisions on the proper use of natural resources.

People's Control Committees pay close attention to the protection of nature, and especially to supervision over river waters, and have committed themselves to taking special care of Rivers Volga and Dnieper. The central committee of the Young Communist League and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions educate the public on the need to protect nature.

#### Industrial waste

Much money is allocated for nature protection measures, including large sums for the building of purifying plants.

More attention is now being paid to the improvement of industrial processes. Most new factories are built with circulatory water supply systems equipped with filters, purifying units and other devices for the collection of harmful substances.

The fact that a definite turning point has been reached in the protection of nature is evident from the situation in the Ukrainian Republic, for instance. During recent years large-scale operations for the purification of waste and the treatment of sewage have been undertaken in the republic. While the total amount of waste drained into water basins is increasing, the amount of pollution is becoming less. In 1962, only 570 million cubic metres of waste out of 2,270 million cubic metres (25 per cent) were purified. In 1968 there is twice as much waste - 4,530 million cubic metres - and 80 per cent of this was being purified. However, the first encouraging results ought not to divert

attention from the danger of pollution. Only between 50 and 70 percent of the money allocated for purification work is actually being spent.

What should be done to improve the protection of nature in the Soviet Union and to ensure the proper use of natural resources?

To begin with, a higher degree of responsibility must be demanded from the respective ministries and departments for efficient use of the country's natural wealth and the protection of nature in general, and a narrow departmental approach to the problem must be overcome.

The heads of enterprises and organizations exploiting natural resources must be held legally responsible for their safety, economical exploitation and reproduction and must see to it that the exploitation of these resources is carried out in such a way as not to damage other natural resources, and in particular the general environment. Measures must be taken to ensure that in the course of planning, designing and developing industrial processes the necessary provision is made for the rational use of natural resources and the pollution of the environment is prevented.

In drawing up the annual national economic plans and the budget estimates of the various ministries and departments, special funds should be allocated for the protection of the air, soil and water from pollution, and lists should be provided specifying the amount of land eroded by industry or natural causes to be reclaimed, the length of river beds to be cleared of sunken timber, etc., with precise work schedules, timetables, etc.

A law on the protection of nature, covering the entire country, must be passed. It should formulate general principles governing the treatment of nature, lay down rules and regulations for the preservation and exploitation of the natural wealth common to all the Union republics, ministries and departments, and more important still, specify the penalties to be imposed on government officials and private individuals for any infringement of these rules.

A system of control over the organizations exploiting natural resources must be set up. This system must safeguard the interests of the state as regards the protection of nature and do this at every step, beginning with the drafting of construction

schemes and ending with the completion of projects and their subsequent operation.

As things stand at present, each ministry and department is supposed to protect those natural resources which it exploits. Protection of the land is the responsibility of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, which is also entrusted with protecting the forests belonging to collective and state farms and with the responsibility for some general problems of nature protection.

#### Co-ordination

The protection of the water resources in 11 of the republics is the responsibility of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Conservancy. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia have their own State Committees for the Use and Protection of Water Resources, and in Byelorussia these functions are performed by the Byelorussian Committee for the Protection of Nature.

The protection of fishing resources is the responsibility of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries. Forests are supposed to be protected by the State Forestry Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers and the forestry departments of the various republics, but these, however, have extensive timber programmes to attend to as well. Environmental control of pollution by waste, sewage, exhaust gases and toxic chemicals is the concern of the USSR Ministry of Health and the Hydrometeorological Service of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Because of their narrow approach, the departmental inspectorates have proved incapable of exercising full control over the protection of nature, especially since many of them have been entrusted with industrial functions that divert them from the performance of their direct duties. The system of departmental inspectorates, each working on its own, without proper co-ordination, cannot take into account and foresee all the fatal consequences which neglect of the rules may have for individual resources and for nature as a whole. But nature is an integral system, all of whose parts are interconnected. The condition of the lands and forests directly affects the water basins and springs. Any change in the water table affects the fertility of the soil, the vegetable and animal worlds, etc.

Measures for the interdepartmental control of nature protection are obviously required. Nature protection research should,

it seems to me, be extended with a view to working out scientific principles for the allround exploitation of natural resources. What is especially needed is an industrial technology under which all harmful substances which are at present discharged into the environment would remain within a self-contained production cycle or be isolated by purification as separate products.

It is high time to set up a national nature protection research institute and broaden the study of nature protection problems at the departmental institutes already in existence. The teaching of nature protection at schools should be improved. This subject should be incorporated in the school curricula and textbooks. Students of higher educational establishments and specialised secondary schools should be given an obligatory course of lectures on the protection of nature and a nature protection department should be opened at one of the country's universities to train teachers, scientists and practical workers for this field.

Greater energy should be put into the work done in the sphere of nature protection by the nature protection societies, hunters' and fishermen's organizations, and geographical, botanical and all other public organizations, as well as the Znanie ("Knowledge") society, and more power should, of course, be given to the public nature protection inspectors.

All the mass information media should be enlisted to spread knowledge about nature and the protection of nature among the population at large.

A country which has been endowed with all the riches of nature and which is building communism must see to it that the land remains fertile, the air pure, with the plains and forests abounding in animals and birds, and the rivers in fish, for the sake of both the present and future generations.

#### CCMS MAKES RAPID PROGRESS

(NATO Latest, 15-4-'70)

"In four months we feel we have made advances that would quite literally have consumed four years in the normal pace of international affairs", commented Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan, President Nixon's adviser on urban affairs, at the opening session of the second meeting of NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

High level experts on environmental problems had come to NATO's Brussels Headquarters for the two-day meeting held on 13 and 14 April. They reported on the progress of the seven pilot studies already adopted and proposed future action.

Chairman of the CCMS, Dr. Gunnar Randers, recalled that seven pilot studies had been selected at the first meeting of the Committee on 8 December; these were submitted to the NATO Council which, on 28 January, gave the go-ahead for work to begin on them. He said that pilot nations had already organised three meetings of experts: one was held in Ankara on air pollution, another in Rome on disaster assistance programmes, and recently a third in Brussels on road safety.

During the second CCMS meeting, it was decided to recommend to the Council that an eighth study should be added to the list. Proposed by France, which would act as pilot nation, the study would investigate a strategy of regional environment aimed at co-ordinating differing aspects of environmental problems on a regional basis and would include the field of administrative co-operation.

To be considered again by the CCMS is a proposal by Mayor Richard G. Lugar of Indianapolis, Indiana, USA, who travelled to Brussels at the suggestion of President Nixon to address the Committee. He suggested that a conference of mayors of major cities in member countries should be held in order to discuss environmental problems in the urban affairs field. "It is my hope that this proposed conference might be a first step, but an important one, in establishing an urban affairs pilot project with the CCMS", Mayor Lugar said.

Progress reports were given on the original seven projects:

- (1) The problem of the transmission of scientific knowledge to the decision-making sectors of government, with the Federal Republic of Germany as pilot nation. Professor R. Dahrendorf presented the preliminary conclusions of his country; he pointed out that the intention was not to pursue theoretical research but to arrive at practical recommendations, and he outlined a proposal for studying how scientific data is employed in political decisions;

- (2) air pollution, with United States as pilot and Turkey and Germany as co-pilot nations. The American delegation reported that detailed analyses of air quality are to be carried out in Ankara (Turkey) and Frankfurt (Germany). An attempt was to be made to achieve a set of criteria for air quality standards; such a document will be the first of its kind and illustrate the value of a forum like NATO.
- (3) open water pollution, with Belgium as pilot, and Canada, France and Portugal as co-pilots. Belgium proposed a major experts' meeting on how to deal with oil spills. It is envisaged that a preliminary organizational meeting in May will be followed by a full scale experts' symposium in October. In addition, at the national level, Ambassador Jean Leroy of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, indicated Belgium's intention to set up an inter-university research team and experts group as a model for possible further international action;
- (4) inland water pollution, with Canada as pilot nation and France and the US as co-pilots. The Canadian delegation reported that it was proposed to organise a preliminary experts' meeting in June and a final meeting in the Autumn of 1970. A major research project on water resources management is envisaged.
- (5) disaster assistance, with United States as pilot, and Italy as co-pilot. The American delegation proposed conferences on earthquake detection and relief planned for April 1971; and on flood control planned for October 1970. At the suggestion of the Turkish delegation, it was decided that the studies on earthquake relief should draw upon the experience of the recent tragedy in the Western Turkish town of Gediz. A further recommendation to the Council arose from this project, as the Council is to be asked to accept a proposal that the NATO Headquarters role as a clearing house for disaster assistance should be strengthened;
- (6) the problems of individual and group motivations in a modern industrial society, with the emphasis on individual

- fulfilment, with the UK as pilot country. Dr. A.H. Cottrell (United Kingdom) said this study was still in an early stage of development. The co-operation of other members of the Committee is needed and therefore a full-time project leader is about to be appointed who can make contact with experts in other member countries. He thought that a report would be produced in about 12 months;
- (7) road safety, with the United States as pilot. Dr. Moynihan reported that work was already underway on an experimental safety vehicle which could withstand a crash at up to 50 m.p.h. with no serious injury to passengers; all the technology involved in this project would be readily available to interested automobile manufacturers. He also said that a conference was being organised for 11 and 12 May to consider automotive passive restraints, i.e. devices to prevent injury but which do not depend on any action by the passengers such as fastening a safety belt. Such a device, which was receiving a lot of attention in the United States, was the air bag. It was also planned to hold a conference in Brussels during June on accident investigation - to find out how vehicles protect or fail to protect passengers in an accident.

#### No duplication

During his opening statement on the first day of the CCMS meeting, Dr. Randers emphasised that steps had been taken to establish relations with other international organizations, working in the environment field, in order to reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.

"I paid a visit to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and so did my Deputy, Mr. Laulan", he said. "The Secretary General of the Council of Europe came to Brussels to meet with Mr. Brosio. There was also a NATO observer at the Conference on the Protection of Nature which took place in February in Strasbourg. In addition, the Secretary General of NATO with myself and Mr. Laulan went to Paris a week ago, in order to have an exchange of views with the Political Commission of the Council of Europe. Meetings have also been held between the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary

General of OECD. The Secretariat has had many contacts, both formal and informal, with the staff of the OECD working on the same problems. It is envisaged to get in touch with the Common Market which is apparently also considering taking an initiative in the field of environment".

The next meeting of the CCMS is planned for 19 and 20 October this year.

### TWENTY YEARS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

- Preparations for the Second Congress of Self-Management -  
Borivoj Romić

(Review of International Affairs, 20-3-'70, Belgrade)

#### Two Decades of Self-Management

It is twenty years this year since the adoption of the historic law that handed over all factories and enterprises to the working collectives for management - a law that marked a turning point in the development of socialist relations in Yugoslavia. A long way has been covered in the past two decades, that is, since the day workers' councils were formed as advisory organs in industrial enterprises. During this period the system of self-management has developed to such a degree as to have become an integral system covering all spheres of life and work.

Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish three phases in the development of self-management to date.

The first phase covers the period in which workers' councils exercised a relatively minor influence on economic policy and relationships within the enterprises. This was a period during which the administrative system of management was still dominant. Obviously, the maintenance of the administrative system hampered the development and functioning of the workers' councils. It thus became increasingly clear that the economic system would have to be altered if self-management were to be further developed.

The second phase began with the adoption of measures of a new economic system providing for considering decentralization of economic management and expansion of the rights of enterprises (independence in managing production, conducting

business policy, deciding on further economic development and formation of funds and similar).

With the decentralization of state functions the material basis of enterprises began expanding. Instead of the earlier state plan, which suited the administrative system of management, the system of social plans was introduced providing through general proportions for unified economic development. Another characteristic of this phase was that the regulation of internal relationships - including policy on wages and salaries - became more and more a matter on which the working collectives, themselves, decided in accordance with the principles of self-management.

It should be noted that during this period the system of self-management began expanding to embrace non-economic activities as well. The extension of the system to social activities meant that all working people now enjoyed the same status.

The increased independence of enterprises and the enlarged material means at their disposal necessitated the expansion of self-management beyond the enterprises. In other words, it became necessary to adjust the social superstructure to suit the new relationships in the economy. In accordance with this need, the communal system began to be developed.

The third phase, which is still in progress, is distinguished by further expansion of the influence of working people on all decisions affecting their working and living conditions. Radical changes in the manner in which income is disposed with - in favour of the direct producers, abandonment of statist management of the expansion of productive forces, changes in the instruments by means of which society influences economic development and a clear orientation towards the creation of conditions under which income will be earned and disposed with in strict dependence on performance and the results of economic activity - these are but a few of the elements responsible for the growing assertion of self-management as the decisive social relationship in Yugoslav society.

As regards the present orientation in the development of self-management we might best describe it as an effort to further the process of democratization of self-management so that the working people will be able to participate more directly in decision-making on all matters affecting their position.

## The Second Congress of Self-Managers

The second Congress of Self-Managers of Yugoslavia is scheduled to take place this year which marks the 20th anniversary of the law handing the factories and enterprises over to the workers for management. For some years now there has been a growing demand for a congress of self-managers. In working organizations, at meetings in various spheres of activity and within the communes attended by representatives of all working organizations, there has lately been increasing mention of the need for convening a congress which would afford self-managers an opportunity to exchange ideas and experience gained in the development of self-management so far and to outline the further course of development of self-managing, socialist relationships.

The First Congress of Self-Managers was held in 1957. The delegates were elected exclusively from among the members of the workers' councils of enterprises. The congress was to provide the answers to the many questions raised by the development of self-management in practice. Its results doubtless did much towards furthering progress in transcending statist conceptions and thereby towards promoting self-management.

A fairly long time has passed since the First Congress. During this period many outstanding changes have taken place both in terms of material development and in regard to the development of self-managing socialist relations. Once one of the least developed of the European countries, Yugoslavia has contrived to create a material basis which has included her among the medium-developed countries of Europe. She has made these outstanding advances precisely during the period of accelerated development of self-management. The system of self-management, now completely affirmed, has spread to a greater or lesser extent to all spheres of social life in Yugoslavia resulting in the development of a highly ramified self-managing structure of society.

The degree attained in material development and in the advancement of self-managing relationships determines the tasks and character of the Second Congress of Self-Managers.

## The Aim and Tasks of the II Congress of Self-Managers

The prime purpose of the Congress is to sum up past experience in the development of self-management and to identify the fundamental problems, phenomena and tendencies in the present stage of development.

In a comprehensive discussion the producers, themselves, should indicate all such positive experiences in self-management which have already proved their values and produced significant results. In doing so, in pinpointing and supporting all progressive tendencies in the development of self-management and all that has proved its vitality and worth in actual practice, we would make it possible for all these positive experiences to be used by as many organizations as possible and thereby contribute to the further advancement of self-management.

Bearing in mind the experience of working and other organizations the Congress should also draw attention to all such negative occurrences and tendencies which proved an obstacle to or which had shown themselves to be directly opposed to the aims of the development of self-management. We still have to contend with the remains of bureaucracy, various aspects of technocracy, managerial tendencies and other overt and disguised forms of opposition to the development of self-management. Resolute resistance against all these phenomena and tendencies will contribute to the further assertion of self-management as a form of socialist relationships.

Through a comprehensive exchange of ideas and experience, the Congress should help to understand the problems preventing a faster development of self-management. The existence of such problems is a fact. Let us mention a few of them. First and foremost, the further advancement of self-management and self-managing relationships requires new, very significant qualitative changes, as the reduced role of the state in the economy and in society in general calls for a different form of social guidance of the activity of self-managing units and increases the responsibility of working people, in general, for the entire economic and social development.

Furthermore, our legislation still contains elements of the administrative system. We know, for example, that a certain number of outdated regulations are still valid and that they



are hampering the development of self-management by favouring the administrative method of management in the economy. To eliminate these shortcomings, the Federal Assembly last year appointed a number of commissions which, in line with the economic functions of the state administration under the changed conditions, are to propose the necessary changes in the legal system to make it conform to the altered socio-economic and political relations.

Despite the significant advances made in recent years, since the introduction of the economic reform, in the development of a system based on the principles of self-management, the system of economic self-organization is still in the process of constitution. The fact is that while self-managing relations are relatively well-developed in the working organizations, a corresponding self-managing structure outside the working organizations is only partly developed, thus facilitating the continued presence of certain old statist forms and an outlived structure inherited from the past.

Another matter the Congress is sure to discuss is the further development of the self-managing commune. Regardless of the results achieved during the past period in affirming the constitutional concept of the commune, a great deal more remains to be done to assert in full the self-managing character of this basic political-territorial unit.

By taking into account all the positive experience gained during the past period and by simultaneously paying due attention to the adverse phenomena and tendencies encountered and to the problems that need to be tackled, the Congress should determine the further course of development of self-management under conditions of scientific-technological progress.

#### Preparation of the Congress Materials

With a view to embracing the problems of the development of self-management and self-managing relationships as completely as possible, four separate working groups have been appointed to deal with four separate subjects: 1) "Further Advancement and Promotion of the Effectiveness of Self-Management in the Working Organizations"; 2) "Expansion of Production and Integration on the Principles of Self-Management"; 3) "The Material Development of a Self-Managing Society

as the Basis of a Rising Living Standard of the Working People", and 4) "Strengthening the Role of the Associated Producers as the Basis of the Further Development of a Self-Managing Socio-Political System".

The working groups face two fundamental tasks. The first is to organize the writing of reports by the working organizations and the communes in which the working collectives and the basic socio-political communities will describe their activity and experience in the development of self-management so far. Copies of these reports will be distributed among all the delegates to the congress. This is to make it possible to consider both the achievements and shortcomings recorded in the development of self-management on the strength of actual practice and experience. In terms of this way of preparing its materials, the congress will differ from similar meetings. It is reckoned that some 80 reports will be presented by working organizations and another 20 to 25 by communes.

The second task is to synthesize the materials covering each of the four mentioned subjects on the basis of the reports of working organizations, studies, monographs, various documentation (obtained from meetings of self-managers, working organizations, congresses and conferences) and on the strength of the results of scientific research. The working groups will organize symposia and consultations to help them adopt clear-cut attitudes towards given matters. The materials will be presented to all the congress delegates and will serve as a basis for the elaboration of the introductory reports to be submitted in the congress commissions. They are scheduled to be completed by the end of May.

The main report to be submitted at the congress will provide a comprehensive assessment of the path covered in the development of self-management and outline the courses to be followed in the further development of Yugoslavia's self-managing, socialist society.

The reports of the working organizations and the synthesized materials will serve as a basis on which the final congress documents will be drafted. Although a definitive attitude has not yet been taken, there is increasing support for the idea that the congress approve one document consisting of two parts. The first part would constitute a sort of charter of self-management, while the second would specify future tasks in the development

of self-management and self-managing social relations.

### Mobilization of all Self-Managers in Preparations for the Congress

The adopted concept of the congress presupposes mass and direct participation by self-managers in the pre-congress activities. It has been proposed that while electing the delegates to the congress the working and other self-managing organizations should also analyse comprehensively their past activity along the lines of self-management. This would make it possible for the ample experience in self-management of the numerous working organizations, local and wider socio-political communities to be utilized in a direct manner for realizing the aims of the congress.

It has also been envisaged that all the materials prepared for the congress (the reports of working organizations, the synthesized materials and the draft congress documents) be submitted for public discussion.

Considering that the basic materials for congress will be prepared within the working organizations and communes, themselves, and that all the materials to be presented at the congress will be the subject of an extensive discussion, we have reason to believe that the conclusions of the congress will be the result of agreement among all the self-managers of Yugoslavia.

It is expected that some 2,000 delegates from all social activities in which self-management is practised will take part in the congress. In addition to the delegates of the working organizations, delegates of political-territorial communities (the communes, provinces and republics) will be elected on the principles of provincial and republican delegations. Delegates of the Federal Assembly and the Federal Chamber of Economy will also attend the congress. In this manner, as regards the composition of the delegates, the congress will reflect in full the ramified self-managing structure of Yugoslav society. Whereas the first congress of workers' councils was mainly attended by representatives of the workers' councils in economic enterprises, the second congress of self-managers will bring together delegates from working organizations in both economic and non-economic activities and those representing all provinces of self-managing association. Given this composition of the

delegates and the tasks facing it with regard to the determination of the further course of development of self-management, the Second Congress of Self-Managers is sure to constitute an outstanding event in the revolutionary development of Yugoslav society.

### UNJUSTIFIED DEMOLITION OF GOOD HOUSING MUST STOP

Party and Government Decision on Urban Development

(Soviet News, 7-4-'70)

Unjustifiable demolition of good housing in connection with new construction and road-building projects is one of a number of phenomena which are sharply criticised by the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers in a recent decision on housing and urban development.

A report published in *I z v e s t i a* in this connection says that the party central committee and the government have taken note of serious breaches of state discipline in urban construction and housing.

In many towns, the authorities concerned, instead of concentrating financial and material resources on the construction of housing, schools, hospitals and children's establishments, give priority to administrative buildings, entertainment establishments and sports facilities, especially in the capitals of republics and in centres of territories and regions.

In a number of places, administrative and other public buildings, not provided for in the plan, are built in place of housing, hostels or schools or out of the financial resources of enterprises.

#### High buildings

The number of residential buildings more than nine storeys high has increased appreciably in the recent period. In many cases, there is no architectural, technical or economic justification for these high buildings and they frequently entail an unjustified increase in costs and provide less value for the money invested, apart from creating other difficulties of various kinds.

In spite of the fact that the Soviet government has come out

against the unjustified demolition of old housing when new housing construction is in progress, the solution of the housing problem is still being hindered by unjustifiably large-scale demolition of good housing, connected with the premature building of new thorough-fares and squares, the widening of streets and bypasses and the elimination of low buildings, regardless of the fact that the housing that is demolished in this way could have been used to good effect for a long time to come.

In many towns residential accommodation becomes unfit for use long before the normal time because of unsatisfactory management of housing, a systematic failure to comply with plans for capital overhauls and the diversion of the finances and manpower resources of repair and building organisations to work not connected with capital repairs to housing.

#### Call for discipline

These shortcomings were sharply criticised at the plenary meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in December 1969.

The CPSU central committee and the USRR Council of Ministers have made it incumbent on party committees and government and local government bodies to eliminate these shortcomings and to establish permanent supervision over the observance of state discipline in the spheres of urban development and housing and also to call to account anyone responsible for the unjustified demolition of good housing or the diversion of resources to building projects and other work not figuring in the plan and not absolutely necessary at the time.

The party committees and the authorities concerned have been told to revise within three months the lists of administrative, entertainment and sports buildings and large public edifices and structures under construction or planned for construction, and also residential accommodation more than nine storeys high (in cases unwarranted by architectural and economic considerations) and to remove from those lists projects whose construction is not economically necessary at this time and to channel into housing and municipal construction the financial and material resources made available in this way.

They have also been instructed to take effective steps to keep

existing housing in good order, to reduce sharply the amount of housing to be demolished under construction plans and to bring about a considerable improvement in the upkeep and repair of housing by organising a check-up of the way in which government decisions on this subject are being carried out.

The USSR State Committee for Construction and the USSR State Planning Committee are to work out, jointly with the appropriate Ministries and departments of the USSR and the Councils of Ministers of the Union republics, measures designed to avoid excesses in the construction of tall residential buildings and administrative, entertainment and sports buildings and other structures.

The USSR Construction Bank and the State Bank of the USSR have been told to increase their supervision over the observance of state discipline in capital construction and town development and to prevent the financing of building work which does not figure in the corresponding plan.

The USSR Committee of People's Control has been instructed to increase its supervision over the observance of state discipline in urban development and housing and to pay special attention to preventing financial and material resources from being diverted to work that has not been included in the plan.

#### CHECKS IN THE SOVIET DIET

(Radio Free Europe Research, 20-3-'70)

Summary: The provision of an adequate diet with the proper balance of protective foods is a universal problem facing industrialized countries, the Soviet Union included.

Improvements have been made in that country, but in the main quality foods are still deficient in the national diet -- livestock products, vegetables, fruit, and serious shortages have arisen in recent years, prompting consumer dissatisfaction and official explanations. The outlook for improvement in the diet is not encouraging in the immediate future.

Improving the structure of the national diet has become an important issue in the development plans of most nations, both

advanced and developing. A betterment of the food consumption pattern promotes better work efficiency, improves the health and welfare, and lengthens the life span of the population. It also is a good indicator of the state of a nation's agriculture, and of the effectiveness of its agrarian policy in overall economic development.

Today, no responsible government has an interest in keeping part of its people undernourished. The solution of the problem lies in directly expanding the output of a nation's agriculture. For it is a striking feature of the food consumption pattern in most countries that all but a small fraction of the food is produced in the country where it is consumed, much of it in the same locality. Only in the most highly developed countries is there a moderate variation in this pattern. Thus each nation is faced with the task of adjusting the food supply, in quantity and quality, to improve the well-being of its people. This is a formidable task in all but the most industrialized countries.

Reflecting the growth in agricultural output during the sixties, accompanied by the rise in disposable consumer income, the structure of the Soviet food diet has continued to improve in recent years, although with periodic setbacks. The Russian average diet is wholly adequate in caloric content -- the FAO estimates an average intake of 3100 calories in 1965. (FAO Yearbook, 1966.) The share of calories in the diet supplied by grain and potatoes is too high however, with 60 percent in 1960 and 57 percent in 1967, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. (USDA, Agricultural Situation in Communist Areas, 1969.) The Food Research Institute has suggested if a nation's diet is composed of cereal-potato calories to 70 percent, the diet is inadequate. On the other hand, if the proportion of calories derived from animal products is 35 to 40 percent, dietary deficiencies are not likely to occur in the population. (Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1947 Future Food and Agriculture Policy, p. 41) The latest Soviet figures indicate a 25 percent share from livestock products.

In recent years food consumption schedules have appeared in the statistical yearbooks of the Central Statistical Administration. These, however, are not comparable with western standards (the delineations are not precise): fats are included as meat, there is no listing for fruits, melons are in-

cluded among the vegetables. A recent study in the planning journal, where per capita consumption figures for two selective years are compared with a "scientific norm", provides a more comprehensive picture of current trends in the Soviet dietary pattern, as well as a documentation of the setback in the output and consumption of certain quality foods.

USSR Per Capita Food Consumption:

Actual vs. Desirable

kilograms per year

	Based on scientific norm	1960	1968	1968 in % of norm
Cereals	120	164	149	124
Potatoes	97	143	131	136
Vegetables and melons	146	70	79	54
Meat and lard	82	40	48	59
Milk products	433	240	285	66
Eggs, pieces	292	118	144	49
Sugar	36	28	37	102
Fish	18	10	14	79

Source : Planovoe khozyaistvo, No. 12, 1969, p. 49

It will be seen that improvement has been made in a moderate reduction in the calories derived from cereals and potatoes, but the overall consumption is still about 30 percent above the "scientific established norm". The least progress has been made precisely in these quality foods most in demand and which give the protective value to a diet: meat, vegetables, eggs milk. At the 1960-1968 rate of growth -- and distinct progress was made in that span of time -- it would take 34 years to achieve the norm for meat, 67 years for vegetables, 49 years for eggs. If fruit had been included in the list the time span would have

lengthened.

The table is selective, however, and thus indicates a perceptible growth. In recent years critical reports on the shortages in some food have regularly appeared in speeches of Kremlin leaders, in the annual reports of the CSA, and in press editorials. The understatement is deadly: "Consumer demand for certain goods, particularly meat, vegetables and fruit was not fully met and some shortages occurred". Western correspondents have reported shortages in these foods as critical and sustained for the last few years.

In the disappointing agricultural yields last year, the setback in vegetables -- a basic component of the diet -- was frequently overlooked. Reaching a high point of 20.5 million tons in 1967 it fell 18.2 million tons, an 11 percent decline. As vegetables are the main substitute to quality foods in the diet, the dimensions of the setback in the Soviet diet can be graphically seen in the table.

Meat - Vegetable consumption, per capita,

USSR \*

	<u>Veg</u> kgs p.a.	<u>Meat</u>
1967	87	49
1968	79	48
1969	75	45

There has been a persistent decline in the per capita availability of vegetables for food during the last half of the decade, when shortages were already clearly felt. As vegetables are meat substitutes in the diet, and given the stagnation and decline in the availability of meat in the same period, it is apparent that the average Soviet consumer has suffered a deterioration in the quality of his diet and been forced to eat more cereals and potatoes. In fact, the vegetable supplies per capita

\* Derived from data in Narkhoz 1968, pp. 7, 318 and the 1969 CSA report, Pravda, 25 January 1970

have declined since 1961, which rather oddly coincides with the creation of special vegetable state farms clustered around industrial centers.

Based on the reported changes in retail trade in 1969, almost wholly confined to cities, meat, vegetables and fruit sales showed declines of 5 percent over the previous year, while the sale of cereals rose 3 percent and potatoes one percent. (Ibid, CSA report for 1969.) The Narkhoz consumption chart indicate a 15 to 20 percent greater consumption of quality foods in the urban centres than in the rural regions. The volume of imported vegetables, kept rather constant at 440,000 tons a year, is consigned almost exclusively to the urban areas and the armed forces. It should also be kept in mind that the private plots still furnish over 40 percent of the vegetables and 60% of the potatoes in the USSR.

The above table lends credence to the frequent reports of consumer dissatisfaction with the shortages of meat, vegetables, and other quality foods evident in the principal cities. Nor are Kremlin officials oblivious to the chronic shortfalls. Yet somehow their exhortations to raise output prove counter-productive.

In the Western industrial countries, where the average diets are 40 to 100 percent higher in the quality foods than the Soviet levels, optimal improvements in food intake are also indicated. In general, the pattern is the same, but of a relative posture: more livestock products, more citrus along with better balance of vegetables, and less animal origin fats. Here the need for better food is determined by population and income. In the communist countries these determinants are also operative, but in the absence of a market mechanism there is a sluggish response in production to these factors of effective demand. To approach the Western European and U.S. dietary standards (and they are by no means optimum) would require almost a doubling of the livestock output and of fruit and vegetables. This is a large and complicated task: the production requirements for these foods require more capital inputs, longer time, and effective labor. Improving the starchy, monotonous average Soviet diet will require serious reconsideration of priorities in the allocation of resources.

POSSIBILITIES OF ALL-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

- 25th Session of the European Economic Commission-

Kazimir Vidas

(Review of International Affairs, 5-4-'70, Belgrade)

In the past year there have been several initiatives in Europe designed to strengthen security and develop cooperation in this region. In all of them, regardless of where they came from, the role entrusted to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe had a prominent place. This only reaffirmed the generally positive assessment of this organism which in the present situation in Europe is a unique one. In conditions of the still present bloc division, which has taken on very definite features in the economic field, the European Economic Commission has remained the sole general European organism and forum for economic cooperation. All the European countries take part in it on an equal footing, without consideration of existing bloc delineations. It is also of interest that in addition to the USSR, the USA, the second super power, also has membership in the Economic Commission. It would not be amiss to reiterate all these facts, because they hold the key to the exceptional political significance of the Commission's overall activity for the development of relations in Europe. Previous experience has demonstrated that political happenings in Europe, including relations between the two super powers, have a direct bearing and an immediate reflection on the activities of the Commission; i. e., that the European Economic Commission, even in the most difficult periods of European relations, has always managed to make its positive influence felt. Today, at a time of favourable trends in Europe, new possibilities are opening up for its activity, primarily in the realm of economic relations, but also on a broader plane.

It is therefore understandable that this year's 25th regular session of the Economic Commission of the United Nations for Europe in Geneva in April is attracting considerable public attention. The recent positive trends in Europe should have a good influence on the proceedings and decisions at the forthcoming session. And this is what is rightly expected. Let us hope that the latest favourable development in relations between

the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic will also have an effect in this direction. All this would be in the interest of promoting European cooperation, along the line of strengthening the security of all countries, with the equal participation and contribution of all, regardless of their size, and military and economic potential.

An auspicious development in the activities of the Commission took place in the period following the meeting of ministers in 1967 and the adoption of the declaration on cooperation. Since that time the Commission has achieved outstanding results. It has adjusted its programme to the new requirements of modern trends in science and economy. Substantial adaptations were also made within the body of the Commission, bending to the needs of greater efficiency. It would seem that requirements have also been thereby met for its even more successful activity in promoting general European cooperation.

This year's session will devote particular attention to the development of the intra-European trade, which recorded a steep rise between 1957 and 1967. The discussion on this question is being anticipated with special interest, since the report prepared by the executive secretary for this meeting shows a constant growth of the share of the member countries of the Commission in total export: from 67 per cent in 1955 to 73 per cent in 1968. Europe (Western and Eastern) also increased its share in world trade, from 48 per cent on the eve of the Second World War to the present 53 per cent.

In addition, the agenda for this year's session of the Commission also contains other questions of importance for the development of cooperation in Europe. Science and technology, the problems of man's environment, and industrial co-production are certainly priority issues of equal interest for all countries. Continued talks on the problems of the less developed countries in Europe and an increased effort of the Commission and its subsidiary organs in this direction are also expected. The decision of the Commission to make a special observance of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations should add to the significance of the debate. The mere listing of the questions on the agenda indicates the possibilities that have opened up for all the member governments to assert their views on the development of cooperation in Europe within their activities in the European Economic Commission.

In the Declaration adopted in 1967 at the 22nd meeting of the Commission, the member countries agreed that the present situation in Europe "requires the active direction of affairs and concerted efforts to foster cooperation within the framework of the European Economic Commission that would correspond to the interests of all nations and would enable Europe to become a powerful factor of peace and understanding in the world".

The time and circumstances in which this year's 25th session of the Commission is being held appear to offer particular favourable possibilities for positive decisions to be made on the basis of the agreed policies of all members. There are still many opportunities open for the Commission to influence European affairs, in the interest of developing allround and equal cooperation among European countries and overcoming of all obstacles standing in its way, whether or not they arise from the existence of bloc structures. It would therefore be important to see how far the provisions of the Declaration adopted in 1967 have already been realized and to define new, concrete measures for their implementation.

#### HOLLAND AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

##### - The Significance of Yugoslavia's Experience-

Dr. M. J. Broekmeyer

(Review of International Affairs, 5-4-'70)

Exactly twenty years after the Yugoslav press first mentioned the formation of the first workers' council, Yugoslav presence in Amsterdam, during a symposium attended by scholars of 14 countries which I organized from January 7-9 in the Dutch capital, stood as proof of Western evaluation of the workers' self-management system.

A coincidence? I presume not.

It can be said that Dutch social history - alas a distant history by now - is fairly acquainted with the idea of workers' councils as a means of organizing a socialist society.

Was it not in 1905 that the Dutch Marxist and astronomist, Pannekoek, edited his book on workers' councils, to be followed later in 1925 by the well-known Dutch poet Herman Gorter, who then published a cyclus of poems under - again - the title "The Workers' council"?

So it was in Amsterdam again that, for the first time I think, Yugoslav experiences were brought to an audience of about 250 Western observers, ranging from managers of big business to sociologists, economists and students.

Because the papers of the six Yugoslav speakers (Najdan Pasic, Zoran Vidakovic, Ivan Maksimovic, Mitja Kamusic, Emerik Blum and Rudi Supek), and the comments by six non-Yugoslav experts (T. Bottomore, H. Hugenholtz, Jan Tinbergen, Peter Wiles, A. Stikker and Pierre Naville) will be published shortly (April 1970) including the discussions, I will not dwell on the content of the various contributions.

Let us better make some observations about the confrontation itself.

First of all, the Western audience was for the most part not acquainted with the established Marxist terminology, and this greatly hindered mutual understanding.

Secondly. As guests, the Yugoslavs may have been more polite and more on the defensive than should have been the case. I think it is not forbidden to ridicule a critic who does not know what he is talking about or who exaggerates beyond recognition (the case of foreign capital in Yugoslavia).

Thirdly. Except for a few people really acquainted with Yugoslav society, most Western observers were still largely under the influence of this line of thought: socialism means state management, even if it has been somewhat democratized, and: a society where justice is not dispensed by the state is hardly a socialist society. That, on the contrary, Yugoslav society is not a brand or a mixture of Soviet -type communism and Western type neo-capitalism, is awfully difficult to understand.

Fourthly. Interest, I mean genuine interest, in the Western world for the Yugoslav experience is very great; take e.g. the Dutch Trade Unions intensively studying Yugoslav selfmanaging society, take the managers of big business coming to Amsterdam to see for themselves what it is all about, that cry for workers' selfmanagement voiced more and more.

Fifthly. I consider it important that this symposium get a follow-up. Let us learn from the first one. As a starting point it was not bad, but it could have been better.

I am deeply convinced that the Western world needs up to date information via personal meetings and mutual discussion about the building of a society that is really a selfmanaging one, where

the worker is liberated from any tutorship, where the surplus value is managed and directed by the workers themselves and by their various associations.

On the other hand, I think it might be useful for our Yugoslav friends to be followed closely by a scientific evaluation by foreigners of their system. For nobody can deny any more that the Yugoslav experience in building selfmanaging socialism has acquired an international meaning.

Therefore I submitted concrete proposals to the Yugoslav authorities for arriving at a more permanent form of confrontation and exchange of points of view concerning workers' and social selfmanagement.

The student of Slavic languages who helped in building the Zagreb students' city and who worked in a Moslim brigade cutting a youth railway through the Bosnian hills could hardly foresee at the time that he would act as one of the links between Yugoslav socialism and the Dutch workers' movement. It shows only that the importance of Yugoslavia has been definitely understood - twenty years later.

## CULTURE

### THE UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY

Mijalko Todorovic

(Review of International Affairs, 5-3-'70, Belgrade)

A thorough reorganization, or more precisely a revolutionary transformation of the entire educational system, which would facilitate the continuous and intensive education of the entire active population and youth, particularly the working class as direct producers, is an essential prerequisite for the further advancement of the country. The immediate and most urgent task is reform of the universities.

1. This reform would call for radical changes in the content and technology of educational and scientific work, along with its intensification on the basis of modern materials and techniques, a larger number of professors and other scientific and teaching staff in proportion to the number of students, etc.

2. The University has become an essential part and the highest stage of a uniform system of education of all citizens, regardless of age group. Accordingly, it should be open and equipped to accept both regularly enrolled students from the ranks of the youth and workers as well as earlier graduates who systematically come for occasional refresher courses or advanced study in accordance with the development of science and the demands of practice.

3. It means the linking up of scientific research and other creative work with educational instruction, where students and professors are workers and co-workers in a joint effort which erases the hierarchical distinctions between them.

There are at present 163,000 regular students and 10,000 teachers in Yugoslavia, which represents an enormous research and technical creative potential which today is hardly being used at all (except through the part-time work of individuals).

These trained persons could very successfully carry out many research projects, studies, analyses, plans, and so forth for local governments, the state administration, working organizations, socio-political organizations etc.



This would change the public function and status of the university. It would become a productive centre of creativity which would place its full intellectual contribution at the disposal of the entire society.

To mould men - says the resolution of the Paris students - does not mean to fill their heads, but rather to awaken their intellectual curiosity, to develop their feeling of responsibility, to exercise critical thinking, to stimulate the spirit of initiative, imagination and creative abilities.

4. In this connection and in accordance with the new technology, a new internal structure is necessary, with relationships on the basis of self-management. This would mean self-managing working units (teams) of students and professors equipped for research, educational and other work (when necessary also made up of specialists from several disciplines) which would in principle earn and manage their own income on a self-managing basis; these teams would be integrated in broader self-managing working organizations and other entities - all the way up to faculties, institutes and even universities.

5. The material base, the income of such self-managing working organizations, is the price of educating a student and the price of research and other work. The price contains material expenditures, the salaries of teachers, students and other workers, capital accumulation and funds. The price is to be paid from public resources, but only when examinations are taken and studies completed on time. The price of education is to be determined by the educational community, which comprises institutions of higher learning, working organizations and their associations, socio-political communities, etc. The price is to be paid by those interested public factors who need specialists. The student receives the money.

6. The university, i.e. the schools and colleges of the university will become open, self-managing working organizations, working communities of professors and students, integrated in a uniform process of public work with material production and other fields through various self-managing associations, educational communities, and so forth. In this way the development of education becomes the result of mutual agreements within these associations. Thus the development of education,

its structure and scope are directly connected and dependent on the needs and potentialities of the economy and society.

7. The student, therefore, becomes a subject, an employed worker, and earns a salary on the basis of distribution according to the results of work from the special self-managing (cash loan) fund. In fact, this is a specific case where the investor is at the same time the worker, the "executor" of his own investment. There is a similar situation when a working organization takes financial investment loan, and under its own direction and with its own workers carries out an investment project. The wages and salaries are paid out from the investment loan. The workers receive their personal incomes which are to be returned from the future operation of the investment project.

To put it in simple terms: a student receives a salary for his work, which is study, while credit is repaid to the community by the engineer with his knowledge and skill, and he returns to the community (directly) not the entire expense for his schooling, but only the credit for his salary.

Here the essential question centres on the socio-economic relationship, the status of work and the job - which clearly follows from the concept of the new university as a productive centre of creativity, from the idea of study connected with work, and study as work.

Most frequently the working organizations shall undertake to pay for the training of a young engineer at a time of his employment, usually with the obligation to remain for a certain time in the same organization. This expenditure is formally and factually a part of the labour costs, and is accounted under the wages and salaries over the required length of time. It is exactly the same when the loan is repaid by the young engineer himself. Since this shall be the situation of all, the young engineers as well as the working organizations will include loan repayment in their salaries and thus this loan will form part of the price of the highly qualified work of the engineer as well as of his product. In any case it is economically more rational for this element of price of highly skilled labour to be expressed through an engineer's salary rather than through the income of his parents who may, or may not, use this money for the education of the child.

In other words, the student's salary (credit) at the faculty will now form part of investment into a future expert, and in the material production it is included in the price of highly skilled labour and the price of the product. This closes the circle of the process of expanded reproduction for highly skilled labour.

In view of the high material resources necessary for this, a start may be made with differentiated personal incomes of the students according to their parents' financial status.

In this manner differences in the students' material conditions shall be reduced; it shall be possible to make a better selection of talented students from an entire generation, irrespective of their parents' income, and the social structure of the students shall be improved.

As students become materially independent, they shall be able to engage in an intensive work and this fact obliges and stimulates them, just like any other employed working man, to timely fulfil their working obligations.

The emancipation from a direct and exclusive material dependence on parents means not only that the students will become materially and socially emancipated sooner, but also that they will no longer be in a dependent position vis-à-vis their parents and that they will in good time assume full personal responsibility for their own future.

It will permit the student to integrate himself fully and equally as a free personality in social life. This means over-coming the contradiction between the actual physical, potential working, and unrecognized social maturity of the students.

Furthermore, the public financing of education through credits and the student's direct relationship with society without mediation of his parents will lead to the abolition of the private relationship in the acquiring of education, which gives rise to the feelings and tendencies of monopolising knowledge and to the consequent social inequality, domination and subjection.

8. Thus the way is opened to both students and professors to gradually go over to the socio-economic positions of the working class, to identify their interests and future with those of the working class and direct producers.

This brings them into the position of interested, competent and responsible participants in decision-making on all questions concerning broader communities and society as a whole.

Economically independent of the social division of labour in the unified community of direct producers and creators, they shall acquire real criteria, interest and possibility of influencing and deciding on questions interesting the community, just as the workers direct producers.

The changed socio-economic position of students shall also change their social consciousness and behaviour. It will no longer be the "young intelligentsia brought up in the spirit of socialism", or "popular intelligentsia", which will ideologically and politically join the working class and the socialist movement because it had been so taught, but young workers who shall work and learn, the most educated part of the working class youth. This should be the essence of the reform of the university and education in general.

Today, as a result of the present social position of universities and internal relationships within them, they are outside social events and this must inevitably affect their consciousness and behaviour. Thus students, who are the objects of education, may also become the objects of manipulation, feel themselves outside the self-governing social edifice, sensitive to many negative phenomena and difficulties in their own and society's positions, and may be induced to attack from outside the social edifice and to senselessly and irresponsibly break its windows, instead of being inside and participating in decision-making as equal worker managers and citizens.

Only a complete reform of universities on a self-managing basis shall resolve this problem.

It is obvious that such a reform requires additional, and probably very considerable material resources for its complete implementation. It can and must be carried out gradually, according to the material possibilities. From the outset there must be a well worked out concept of a comprehensive transformation, and the first step must be sufficiently radical for the transition into a new situation, whence the new university will be open to further changes according to social tendencies, requirements and possibilities.

It is remarked that society cannot at present set aside such large resources, and this is used as an excuse to postpone the entire reform. However, the question is not whether or not the reform can be carried out because of the material difficulties; the fact is that society cannot move forward without this reform.

The present university cannot give society the required number and quality of skilled cadres regardless of material resources, not to mention socio-political reasons which were referred to earlier.

The main carriers of the reform must be only the progressive forces at universities. They, however, cannot be that without the full support and participation of the League of Communists and all the society's progressive forces, because this is a revolutionary task in the true sense of its word, by its content, by its depth, size and complexity, which requires great scientific and skilled efforts, organizational moves, material investments and a sharp and resolute ideological and political struggle.

#### ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HOLDS LENIN CENTENARY SESSION

(Soviet News, 7-4-'70)

At a meeting held in Moscow's Bolshoi Theatre on April 2, President Nikolai Podgorny presented the Order of Lenin to the USSR Academy of Sciences. The award had been made in recognition of the Academy's outstanding services in developing Soviet science and culture and in strengthening the country in the economic field and in the sphere of defence.

Among those present at the meeting, which was held in order to mark the centenary of Lenin's birth, were Andrei Kirilenko, Kirill Mazurov, Pyotr Demichev and Dmitry Ustinov.

"The Communist Party and the Soviet state will continue to do everything necessary for the development of science in our country", said President Podgorny in a speech which he made during the presentation ceremony.

He pointed out that Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, had been very well aware of the prime importance of science for the building of the new social system.

In Lenin's works the questions of the immense transforming role of science and the major change in its social significance in the conditions of socialism, and the fact that science, technical progress and culture were inseparable from communism were profoundly developed.

President Podgorny said that socialism had given great scope for the development of science, had made science the concern of the entire country and had placed it at the service of the noblest humanist ideals of mankind.

"Following Lenin's behests", he declared, "the party and the state show constant concern for the creation of the most favourable conditions for the training of scientists and for their development and fruitful activity".

Soviet scientists, he said, could solve the most complicated scientific problems of the present day and reveal nature's most closely guarded secrets.

"Their creative work", he continued, "is tapping new reserves of economic growth and is multiplying the country's resources, accelerating technical progress and strengthening the Soviet Union's defence potential".

#### Rapid growth

Research conducted by institutes of the academy, he said, facilitated the very rapid growth of the power industry, metallurgy, electronics, automation and other branches of Soviet industry.

The extensive development of the most important branches of science and the country's high industrial potential had ensured a qualitative breakthrough in the fields of aviation, rocketry and the building of unique machines, he went on.

"Problems of harnessing the energy of the atomic nucleus, creating an atomic industry and utilising nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for the first time in the world were solved within the shortest possible period of time" he said.

The Soviet Union, he declared, was leading the world in the implementation of the main stages of space exploration.

President Podgorny drew attention to the substantial contribution made by the Academy of Sciences to the study of new phenomena of socio-historical development and to the elaboration of various questions concerning communist construction.

"The further development of the social sciences is acquiring special importance in the present conditions of a drastic sharpening of the ideological struggle in the course of the historic competition between the different social systems", he said.

"Scientists working in this field must actively oppose and expose the various bourgeois theories, anti-communism, right-wing and left-wing revisionism and any tendencies that are hostile to Marxism-Leninism".

He expressed confidence that Soviet scientists would advance further along the road of creative quests.

"Lenin was the first to see the beginning of the grandiose scientific and technological revolution which we are witnessing", said Mstislav Keldysh, the president of the Academy of Sciences, in a speech at the meeting.

He spoke about the achievements of Soviet scientists in the peaceful utilisation of atomic energy, space exploration and other fields of knowledge.

"Science and technical progress have now become one of the main factors in the competition between the socialist and capitalist world systems" he said.

"All the great transformations in our country will always be linked with Lenin's name".

### CENSORSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION

Herman F. Akhminow

(Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, 3-3-'70)

Summary: The main speakers at the international conference on Soviet censorship organized in London from January 5 to 7, 1970, by the Munich Institute for the study of the USSR were the following prominent representatives of Soviet art and letters who recently defected to the West: A. V. Belinkov, literary critic and author; his wife, a former literary editor of Moskva; writer A. V. Kuznetsov; L. V. Finkelstein-Vladimirov, former associate editor of the journal Znaniye-sila; the poet Yuri Demin; film director I. I. Yeltsov; Professor A. A. Yakushev, and the violinist and composer, M. E. Goldstein. This week's "Analysis" concentrates on some of the main points raised at the conference, the full proceedings of which are now being prepared for publication by the Institute.

The conference, which was attended by several dozen Western sovietologists, opened with Arkady Belinkov's report on the nature of Soviet censorship. He pointed out that although the roots of this censorship are to be found in Russian history, pre-Revolutionary suppression of suspect material was purely defensive reaction aimed at safeguarding the existing order,

whereas Soviet censorship also tries to compel the writer to serve the objectives of the regime at the expense of his artistic integrity. Censorship in the USSR cannot be divorced from the essential nature of the political system itself: it is not the institution of censorship as such, but the all-embracing dictatorial regime that has destroyed one of the world's greatest national cultures. By "suggesting" the themes and forms which a writer is to adhere to in his work, the authorities cripple the true creative spirit; these "suggestions" are disguised orders, and if he ignores them the least a writer can expect is that his work will not be accepted for publication.

Replying to questions put by conference participants, Belinkov gave several examples showing that the "advisory" function of the Soviet censorship is by no means limited to keeping rebellious writers on a short rein; even such orthodox writers as Novikov-Priboy, Parfenov, Fadeyev, etc., have fallen foul of the system. Fadeyev, a former chairman of the Writers' Union was several times forced to make major alterations to his works upon the "recommendations" of the censors. He later committed suicide.

Belinkov also illustrated the changing forms of Soviet censorship over the years. For example, under Zhdanov, Stalin's watchdog over the arts and literature, censorship was by ukaz and writers whose works did not fit in with the Party line of the moment were shot or deported. During the present period repression is less acute, and writers are thus emboldened to seek ways of penetrating the controls. The relationship between writers and the censors also changed, and the latter now at least try to give their directives the appearance of suggestions or well-meant advice. This also applies to top-level censorship: if senior Party functionaries such as the chairman of the Ideological Commission, Demichev, or the Party's chief ideologist, Suslov, intervene in a literary controversy, they tend to offer "advice" rather than actually issue orders, although the result is still the same.

Anatoly Kuznetsov provided a further illustration in describing how he got his Babi Yar past the censor. Sometimes the first hurdle is an editor who, says Kuznetsov, frequently turns out to be a considerate, understanding person who proposes a few deletions from the manuscript. The chief editor of the journal then makes more drastic corrections, which the author

tolerates because everyone says that "they" will object. Kuznetsov sees this as a universal dread of authority: "Ivan fears Pyotr, Pyotr fears Semyon, Semyon fears Yemelyan and so on up the scale. It is like a pyramid with its apex somewhere in the Party Politburo. But nobody knows anything definite". By the time this filtering process is over and the manuscript passed to the official censor, says Kuznetsov, "the author is already pinned down".

In the course of the frequent attempts to define censorship during the conference it became clear that censorship in the Soviet Union should be understood not as an official institution but rather as a particular form of political force which suppresses the publication of works which do not square with the aims of the regime and also makes the form and content of these works serve the interests and objectives of the country's rulers. Apart from defining the nature of Soviet censorship Belinkov also referred to such factors as formal and unofficial censorship, self-imposed censorship, and the evasion of the censor. He also pointed out that formal censorship was actually established on the fourth day after the bolshevik seizure of power (October 28, 1917).

Leonid Finkelstein-Vladimirov's paper was devoted to an analysis of the formal censorship, an important prop of which is the law rendering anyone printing a book, a leaflet or even a beer label without the permission of the censor liable to a prison sentence of up to eight years. The censorship, officially known as the "Main Board for the Protection of Secrets in the Press at the USSR Council of Ministers" but usually abbreviated to Glavlit, is headed by P.K. Romanov, former head of the department for heavy industry at the Party Central Committee and a non-literary man. It works hand in glove with the state security organs, but final authority lies with the top Party leaders. In Stalin's day the chief censor was Stalin himself, who sometimes intervened personally, as in the case of the award of the Stalin Prize to Nekrasov for his novel "In the Trenches of Stalingrad". Recent defectors from the Soviet Union confirm that final decisions are now taken in the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee.

An official censor must read each piece of printed matter twice -- before it is sent to the printers and again before it is released for publication, to eliminate the possibility of

alterations being made in the print shop. He checks the work for deviations from the approved political line and for the presence of any material -- unauthorized photographs or information, etc. -- considered to infringe state security regulations. Prohibited items are listed in a thick book, accessible only to the censor, which is known colloquially as the "Talmud" and which is amended annually.

The censors generally try to cooperate amicably with editors, suggesting various alterations to manuscripts which "they", i. e., higher organs, require to be made. Cooperation is particularly close between the censors and the editors of the daily newspapers, where offending articles must sometimes be replaced at short notice. Many Pravda leading articles are discussed at Central Committee level, in Agitprop or the Secretariat. The official censor of a newspaper must scrutinize the text of articles, the galley proofs and all alterations effected during the making up of the newspaper, including even the most minute changes in photographs, layout of the various reports and news items, etc.

The Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) has its own censorship apparatus and its reports in newspapers and journals do not have to be censored. An editor may abridge TASS material but may not change it. Reports by foreign correspondents are subjected to strict censorship, especially where they concern military matters, nuclear weapons, etc. A "supercontrol" at Glavlit also takes over from the local censor where particularly sensitive material is involved.

Security at Glavlit is strict: visitors are admitted only if they have an appointment, and their pass, valid only for entry to a specific room, is checked by uniformed and armed police. Finkelstein-Vladimirov pointed out that the censors themselves are strictly supervised: they attend frequent seminars and other courses of instruction, but their most important asset is their "political nose". A censor is expected to be able to use his judgement, and both a too harsh or too lenient use of his powers can soon lead to the loss of his job. Speaking of the censor as an individual, Vladimirov said that he should not be thought of as some sort of monster; censors are, in fact, ordinary Soviet citizens who are seldom active propagandists and in some cases are rather embarrassed by the work they perform. Recently,

he added, there has been a certain shift of responsibility onto the shoulders of the editors, and whereas now the censor does not always bear responsibility for any "mistakes", the editor is always culpable. A. Yakushev confirmed that this is also the case with regard to scientific publications, with which he was concerned, commenting: "The editors including me, for my sins, were themselves the actual censor". By Soviet standards censors are very well-paid and, as the entire apparatus consists of some 70,000 people, it is an expensive undertaking.

Enlarging upon Finkelstein-Vladimirov's report, A. Yakushev spoke about the censorship of translated foreign literature, particularly scientific, at the publishing house level. Censorship of scientific literature exists but, due to the shortage of people qualified to assess it, is frequently inefficient. Under Stalin, censorship in his publishing house was simpler and more formal: everything that did not fit in with Stalin's work on dialectical and historical materialism was automatically expunged. The main consideration in the publication of foreign works is the political attitude of the author, and if there are any doubts about his political reliability the book is translated and published in a limited edition, sometimes as a single copy. It is not unknown for the author's real name to be replaced by a pseudonym.

Other reports on the subject of formal censorship in their respective fields were given by I. I. Yeltsov, a former Soviet film director, and by M. E. Goldstein. Yeltsov informed the conference that in the cinema, the art medium with the greatest mass appeal, censorship is a much more involved matter than in literature. The plans of the film studios, librettos, scripts and cutting and assembly of a film must be checked and passed by a variety of people and bodies, including editors, the film workers' union, and, where relevant, military censors, the KGB, Glavlit, the Party Central Committee, etc. The censor at the Ministry of Culture has no great part to play and frequently approves a film for release without having seen it. Because of this interference from so many sources it is hardly possible to speak of individual creativity in the Soviet cinema; Yeltsov enumerated eighteen different official bodies through whose hands a film must pass before reaching the audience. Many of the examples of "censorship" quoted by this speaker suggest close cooperation between film-makers and officials. A case in

point is his own experience with senior members of the Soviet counter-intelligence service during the making of a spy film. Yeltsov considers that controls over films are much stricter than in the literary field: each new script submitted to the State Committee for Cinematography at the USSR Council of Ministers goes first of all to the Party Central Committee. But the members of the state committee are themselves highly sensitive to the way the wind is blowing, and act accordingly. Anatoly Kuznetsov added to this account of film censorship by mentioning several examples of films made from his scripts, from which it was obvious that the main concern of the censorship was to see that Soviet reality is depicted in the best possible light.

M. E. Goldstein referred to the features shared in common by the Writers' and the Composers' Unions. Obviously, formal censorship in the narrow sense of the word can be applied only to librettos, but musicians are kept in check by the simple refusal to sanction performances of works displeasing to the authorities. One such work is Shostakovich's Thirteenth Symphony, dedicated to Babi Yar. Many composers write in the knowledge that their works stand little chance of being performed. Whereas pieces in the "classical manner of Tchaikovsky and Mussorgsky are exempt from censorship, "modernism" is a dirty word and avant-garde works may not be performed. Contemporary foreign composers are judged in the Soviet Union purely according to their political views.

One of the subjects discussed at the conference was unofficial censorship, which was not on the agenda and arose spontaneously. It was not precisely defined, but during the discussions it emerged as a combination of a number of forces interfering with, and stultifying, artistic creativity. Belinkov's first paper made it plain that censorship in the Soviet Union is something bigger and more comprehensive than the actual institution itself: it is in fact, the Soviet regime in its entirety, and formal censorship is merely one of the arms of the dictatorship. N. Belinkova referred to the many other people apart from the official censors, such as editors, critics, proof-readers, members of scientific councils and committees, etc., who meddle with an author's work and distort it.

Finkelstein-Vladimirov stated that: "During the half century of its existence, Soviet dictatorship has been strikingly success-

ful in its main crime, that of deforming the reader. The mass of Soviet readers now have no taste for real literature". Yu. Demin qualified this view, saying that "youth, the readers of the post-war period, are a special case. They are reaching out towards good literature". When Yevtushenko or Voznesenskiy give public readings of their works, they attract this type of reader in vast numbers.

Self-censorship was treated in Belinkov's introductory paper and in a special report by A. Kuznetsov, who used this term in an extremely broad sense to include every form of submission by the writer to pressure from above. According to Kuznetsov, all writers in the Soviet Union indulge in self-censorship to some extent because under Soviet conditions there is no alternative: nobody can openly announce that "the emperor is without clothes".

A. Belinkov claims that "inner censorship" is a psychological condition and begins in the kindergarten, because from childhood Soviet citizens learn to express only ideas that are politically suitable and safe. On the basis of this habitual thought process, Kuznetsov separated Soviet writers into the following four categories: (1) Those who prostitute themselves morally and work only in the interests of the Party and the regime; (2) Those who operate on the principle that to have a job is better than nothing; (3) Those who write "for the drawer", i. e. not for immediate publication, but in the hope that one day their work may see the light of day, and (4) Those who produce clandestine literature.

An interesting discussion took place on the methods used by writers and artists in the Soviet Union to evade the official gagging system. A lively exchange of opinions was also conducted around the issue of Western reactions to the struggle between writers and officialdom in the Soviet Union, with the most recent emigrants from the Soviet Union taking part in the conference expressing a number of interesting ideas on this subject. A detailed account of the discussions on these last two questions, and also on other issues raised at the conference, will be contained in the verbatim report now being prepared for publication by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich.

#### NEW PROGRAMME FOR ALL SCHOOLS

(Soviet News, 31-3-'70)

New programmes will be introduced in all Soviet schools within

the next two years, said Nikolai Kuzin, chief learned secretary of the USSR Academy of Educational Sciences, speaking at a recent meeting of the Academy.

A special commission of scientists and teachers has drawn up the new programmes, giving special consideration to the latest achievements in pedagogy and the main trends in the development of the sciences.

Nikolai Kuzin pointed out that the purpose of the reorganisation of education which started in the USSR four years ago, was to give all young people a ten-year school education meeting present-day requirements.

The reform began with the introduction of three-year primary education, instead of four years as previously. First forms (for children of about seven) switched to this system last autumn. One of the features of the new programme is that it acquaints seven-year-old boys and girls with elements of algebra.

In senior forms pupils will study the fundamentals of mathematical analysis and the principles governing the operation of electronic machines.

Since it is not possible to switch over simultaneously to new syllabuses in all subjects, this is being done gradually. Literature, biology, history, geography and social sciences are already being taught on the basis of the new syllabuses. The rudiments of genetics and selection have been introduced into the biology syllabus, while the new syllabus for chemistry includes information about the spatial structure of molecules and the electronic nature of chemical ties.

The 22 authors of the new textbooks include such prominent figures as Academicians Andrei Kolmogorov, Isaac Kilkoin and Militsa Nechkina.

The first to complete the entire improved course will be the pupils who will be leaving school in 1975.

Among those who attended the recent meeting of the Academy of Educational Sciences were scientists, educationalists and writers. Artists and composers concerned with problems connected with the aesthetic education of the younger generation also took part.

The Academy has eleven research institutes which are tackling problems of improving teaching methods, vocational guidance for schoolchildren, polytechnical education and the

preparation of pupils for future employment.

The Academy has an Institute of Educational Problems which is to become a co-ordinating centre.

"This institute", said the president of the Academy, Vladimir Khvostov, "will attract teachers of secondary schools to the solution of fundamental problems of the theory of pedagogy and methodology".

### EAST BERLIN AFRAID OF WESTERN HITS

(Radio Free Europe Research, 11-3-'70)

The weekly Volksarmee (first March issue) has explicitly warned East German soldiers not to listen to popular music programs as Western stations. The hit tunes, broadcast by "326 stations from the NATO sphere", were said to fulfill certain functions "in the psychological warfare of imperialism against the socialist countries". Through the lyrics, "the listeners are to be familiarized with certain stations and therefore also with certain policies". According to Volksarmee, the listeners of music broadcast by Western stations are being prepared "to betray their Republic and to commit ideological desertion".

In order to support its contention, Volksarmee quoted some lyrics of West German songs, such as "the good old days which will never return"; "we never want to part"; "we can only write letters to each other" or "we can still hope to meet again".

Commenting on such lines, the Volksarmee wrote:

What is this "hope to meet again"? In an imperialistic Germany? This at least is specified by the Paris Treaties. But socialism and capitalism cannot ever be united. What then are these "wishes and dreams" which are being sent in the directions of the GDR?

The paper took particular exception to a Czechoslovak hit called "Dondiridon" in which Freddy (Quinn), "the ill-reputed singer of revanchist sob-songs", sings of "days without sunshine" and "nights without love", of "hearts harder than stone" which do not "build the future". Volksarmee commented on this song by stating: "Yes, we have hard hearts in fighting imperialism and militarism, and we have strong class positions". The

paper concluded that it was not a question of popular music as such, or whether it was "hot" or "less hot", but rather of the fact that imperialism uses hit tunes for purposes of ideological subversion.

### "Pop Art an Acute Danger for GDR Art"

Dr. Manfred Grüttner, musical director of the Pedagogical Institute in Potsdam, has called, in the Märkische Volksstimme, "Western avant-gardism" an acute danger to the "socialist development of art and literature", the West Berlin information agency IWE reported (4 March 1970). According to Dr. Grüttner, avant-gardism is the newest method of ideological diversion in the realm of art and literature; the West was described as spending enormous funds in order to hamper any systematic development of art and culture in the GDR and the whole socialist camp. In any case, avant-gardism is supposedly reactionary and its aims cannot be reconciled with the principles of a socialist society. The same was said to apply to pop art, and to the products of the "Rolling Stones" and of other beat groups. The cultural functionary stressed the necessity to uncover such phenomena on the basis of scientific socialism and to "avoid their penetrating into our territory by all means at our disposal".

### REVOLUTION IN THE CLASSROOM

(China Reporting Service, 1-1-'70)

In the continuing campaign to carry out the revolution in the field of education, mainland China's press and radio commentaries have recently again stressed the importance of "school-run factories" (as opposed to "factory-run schools") and "revolutionary mass criticism".

Neither of the programs can be described as new; but both significantly reflect Chairman Mao's great fear that the younger generation will not maintain sufficient revolutionary zeal. One of the motivations for the Cultural Revolution was the desire that the youth of China experience revolution while at the same time helping rid the country of its remaining "feudal and bourgeois" tendencies.

However, in some places, notably the universities and colleges, it is charged that these tendencies remain entrenched.



Thus, the "school-run factory" and the "revolutionary mass criticism" programs are currently being stressed to eliminate such "counterrevolutionary" ideas.

### Factories and Farms

The first of these two programs places renewed emphasis on school-run factories and farms. This idea was originally put forth in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward, but a host of problems seem to have prevented large-scale implementation. Its renaissance has come about in the wake of determined efforts to reform old colleges of science and liberal arts universities.

The plan calls for teachers and students to build their own factories or agricultural experimental centers. This is supposed to imbue the teachers and students with the much stressed "qualities" of "self-reliance" and "arduous struggle". It is also designed to break down the barriers between mental and manual labor, something which is considered to be of primary importance. Once the factory or farm is set up, it becomes the basis of learning, experimentation and study. For example, an investigation group was sent out from a school-run chemical factory to study an unnamed disease that seriously jeopardized rice production. After seven months of experimentation, the teachers and students developed a method to eradicate the disease. Thus, it is claimed, they produced something useful while at the same time undergoing a learning process. This combination of education and productive labor is the school-run factory's greatest asset.

Fearful that students and scientists will become too wrapped up in theory, the regime feels that school-run factories are a good way to bring scientific experiments and research out from behind closed doors, and of making them more utilitarian and community-serving.

Simultaneously, there are efforts to eliminate old textbooks and have the teachers and students write new ones. It is felt that by unifying production, curriculum and scientific research, the school-run factories are able to write new textbooks which, theoretically are related to production realities.

Another pragmatic aspect of the school-run factories is that they put the machinery and equipment of the colleges of science

to practical use and don't "waste" them on theoretical research.

### Mass Criticism

A second program designed to eliminate "counterrevolutionary" ideas and "completely transform" old college and university systems is that of "revolutionary mass criticism" in the field of education. The current Peking leadership claims that under the "pernicious" influence of Liu Shao-ch'i and his Minister of Education (Chiang Nanhsiang), students were taught by the professors, standardized textbooks were used, students were allowed to choose the subjects they wished to study, and knowledge was gained from books. One of the aims of the Cultural Revolution was to change the system to one in which professors learn from students, students and teachers write their own textbooks, subject matter is strictly controlled, and classroom work is combined with field study.

Apparently, however, these innovations encountered resistance even after the Cultural Revolution. Many students and teachers are reported to have felt that since the struggle was over they could return to the old system of learning in which mass criticism, which consumes valuable study time, has no place. But according to the official doctrine these students were in error. Revolutionary mass criticism must still be carried out. Its aims are to ensure the acceptance of "revolutionary" innovations and to "criticize the reactionary bourgeois ideological systems in the fields of philosophy, history, literature, political economy, journalism, and education".

This seems to imply a total overhaul of the normally accepted concepts of a college or university: it can no longer be a place where "books are read behind closed doors", but must become instead, a "battleground for the study and practice of Mao Tse-tung Thought and the criticism of the bourgeoisie".

### TWENTY-FIRST UKRAINIAN KOMSOMOL CONGRESS:

#### CRITICISM OF YOUTH

(Radio Free Europe Research, 9-4-'70)

Summary: The recent Komsomol Congress in the Ukraine has revealed the degree to which discontent

prevails among the Party bureaucracy regarding the ideological training of young people in the Soviet Union. Criticism voiced at the congress stressed military-patriotic education, fanned feelings of hate for the "enemy" and demanded increased discipline from the Soviet Ukrainian youth. Similar objectives were formulated recently at Komsomol congresses in other republics. Because the Ukrainian Komsomol organization numbers 3.4 million members, its Congress merits attention.

On 25 and 26 March, the 21st Congress of the Komsomol of the Ukraine took place in Kiev, an event to which the Party attached great political importance. The CC of the Ukrainian CP sent a message of greetings to the Congress, and the Party's First Secretary, P. Ju. Shelest, delivered a lengthy speech.

#### Deficiencies and Dangers in Ideological Education

In his speech, Shelest referred to the fact that the Weltanschauung of the younger generations in the Soviet Union has been influenced by the struggle between socialism and "imperialism", and the government regards this as the enemy's last attempt to win over the minds of Soviet youth. For this reason, Communism's influence on the young must be strengthened:

Bourgeois propaganda is increasing its ideological pressure on Soviet youth. It is attempting by all means to discredit the latter, to blunt its class consciousness, to spread the idea that peace is possible between contradictory ideas and to educate (the youth) to class peace. Some (propagandists) express the hope that 'with the advent of a younger generation in the communist countries' important changes will take place.  
(Molod Ukrainy, 26 March 1970)

The speaker allowed that there are youths in the Soviet Union who demand personal freedom and who consider it more important than their responsibilities to society:

Unfortunately, there are individual young people who are in the first place interested in some sort of 'personal freedom' and who do little or nothing

for society. They have become prisoners of dirty suspicion and sometimes become a toy in the hands of murky manipulators.

He reminded young people that they are apt to commit the greatest number of impulsive actions. That, he said, makes planned action necessary in order to protect the youth from bourgeois ideology. This is the task of Komsomol functionaries he said, and criticized some of them sharply for being unable -- as a result of their low intellectual level -- to fulfill this task.

#### Criticism of Komsomol Newspapers and Journals

The First Secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian Komsomol, A. S. Kopto, voiced strong criticism of the publications which are provided for or published by the Komsomol. He repeatedly criticized the literary magazines Dnipro and Ranok, in addition to negatively citing the over-all activity of the "Molod" publishing house. In the period under review, Kopto noted, many measures had been taken to eliminate these deficiencies. The individual criticisms which he voiced are most interesting. For example, he said that the editorial boards were much too frivolous in their choice of works from young authors and had published material which had little intellectual value. He said current political and ideological problems were treated in an off-hand manner, as evidenced by the ineffective support of Party actions in the Komsomol press.

During the Congress, the author Ju. F. Yarmych stated that a portion of the young authors "are not at the avant garde of our art". Some tended to "false neo-ism" and others "indicated intellectualism which was borrowed from other books". (loc. cit., 28 March 1970)

#### Favorite Topic: Military-patriotic education

In May of this year the Komsomol will celebrate, in an especially vociferous manner, the 25th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Germany. The main speakers at the Ukrainian Komsomol Congress, Shelest and Kopto, reporting on the extraordinary decisions of the Party, stated that these celebrations will make an important contribution to the ideological education

of the Soviet youth. Especially in Shelest's speech, but also in the comments of the First Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol, Je. M. Tyashelnikov, there was apparent concern over the younger generation's dwindling interest in and knowledge of the Second World War. The young also seemed to show less concern for the heroic achievements of the Soviet people.

The approaching celebration is also intended to strengthen the military-patriotic education of the youth. The CC of the All-Union Komsomol has resolved that a "Week of Honor" will be held on 2-9 May 1970, during which the military education of the Komsomol organizations will be emphasized. Also, special respect will be paid to the invalids, veterans, war orphans and widows for having contributed to the defense of the fatherland during the war. (Ibid.)

The initiative for this resolution resulted from the experiences of the CC of the Ukrainian Komsomol. At its last Congress, it had decided to hold annually in May a "Week of Memory of the Heroes" during which there would be such activities as torch-light parades and meetings of youths and war veterans. In addition to these scheduled functions, Kapto reported that presently there are 600 so-called military-sport camps, all playing an important role in the military-patriotic education of the youths. Kapto noted that military propaganda among the young was too weak and was carried out on a much too low level.

#### Conclusions

In conclusion, it can be said that the Party leadership is concerned about the possibility of firmly and effectively controlling the younger generation. The problems discussed at the Ukrainian Komsomol Congress were confirmed in a recent memo circulating in Moscow and addressed to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny: namely, that there are signs of demoralization among the youth. While Shelest and the leading functionaries of the Party ascribe this result to "imperialist propaganda", it is, in fact a result of the Soviet system itself. One of the most revealing statements made by Shelest was his admission that the young desire personal freedom and wish to detach themselves from social activities which, in the Soviet Union, have little to do with personal initiative and much to do with manipulated mass-action programs.

#### LENIN'S THOUGHT TODAY

Putnik Dajic

(Review of International Affairs, 5-3-'70, Belgrade)

One hundred years have passed since the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, and as this jubilee is being observed throughout the world, we revere his work as a great heritage of Marxism, a fountain of creative thought and revolutionary action.

Lenin's personality was an extraordinary combination of the virtues of a great theoretician, scientist and thinker, but also organizer and practioner, an ingenious strategist of the proletariat's class struggle. In his early youth already, thanks to his great energy and dedication to revolutionary ideals, he succeeded in mastering all of the most significant works of Marx and Engels and of other Marxian theoreticians. However, what distinguished him from the others was his approach to Marxism. In his early works he stressed that he did not view Marxism as a set of fossilized canons and dogmas, as an inviolable catechism of a permanent, unalterable teaching, where nothing may be either added or subtracted and which can only be applied the way its founders formulated it. Lenin's deeds, much more than his sayings, demonstrate that he was not satisfied with just the interpretation of Marxism, although even here his role was great. In his theoretical work, in his practice of revolutionary work, in accordance with the concrete conditions of the historical situation, he enriched and developed Marxism. He struggled against the transformation of Marxism into a system of petrified axioms, separated from practice. He therefore frequently repeated Engels' thought that Marxism was not a dogma but leadership into action, considering that this best expressed the revolutionary character of the theory of the founder of scientific socialism. On many occasions he pointed out that to overlook this aspect would be to destroy the "live soul" of Marxism, to undermine dialectics which forms its theoretical basis.

In the history of Marxism there have been various interpretations of Lenin's heritage of what we usually describe as Leninism, and even today frequently different definitions with pretended scientific and historical value are being put forward. According to one, it is Marxism in the epoch of the highest stage of capitalism, in the imperialist epoch. According to another, Leninism is seen in a broader context and is Marxism

of the epoch of communism. Among the vulgarized "interpretations" there is the conception that Stalinism is a form of Leninism in which Lenin's main premises were brought to their final consequences. A truly scientific approach to Lenin's heritage would show that these interpretations were too narrow, one-sided and wrong, deduced by vulgar and dogmatic methods of seeking analogy between quotations and reality. We cannot accept the fragmentation of Lenin's thought into different historical epochs without at the same time neglecting its revolutionary continuity, its wealth of forms and diversity of influences. This is because his teaching was not written for one epoch only, for the one in which we are living, nor is it there that its topicality lies, as contrived by the "orthodox" Leninist. If this interpretation were to be taken as correct, it would be in contradiction first of all with Lenin himself, who did not create abstract schemes in order to fit reality into them, the reality in which he lived or the one that was to come. As a dialectician-revolutionary, scientist and practitioner, armed with Marxist theory, he studied reality in order to change it, he enriched the theory by changing the practice, by means of theory he discovered new roads, sought new forms. Without a revolutionary theory, he said, there is no revolutionary practice.

This Lenin's creative approach makes it incumbent upon the contemporary revolutionary and progressive movement to continually research and through its own theoretical and practical activity to enrich Lenin's thought. Historical development of these movements and practice has shown that this need has always been present. There is no question of the obsolescence of Lenin's heritage, as claimed by the critics of Leninism, of its alleged outdatedness in our epoch of much changed circumstances, conditions and even subjects of political struggle for the emancipation of the working class, scientific and technical revolution, etc., but rather of actual obsolescence and inadequacy of the method of interpreting Lenin's thought and its significance, its permanent values, which is usually done by seeking suitable quotations and claiming devotion to Leninism. Such methods, of course, have never been a reflection of creativeness in the research and application of Marxism, but of creative impotence and dogmatic laziness in finding a true answer to the questions set by life. It is evident how progressive thought in the world would be impoverished and how different

would be the picture of the world today had Lenin in his own time, while preparing the greatest revolution in history and leading it, limited himself only to the classical Marxist quotations and given their "faithful interpretation". In preparing the October Revolution and during the first years of Soviet power, Lenin gave an example of a creative approach to Marxism, to the search for new solutions and roads.

Lenin's creative approach reveals the reality which surrounded him. Because he did not regard Marxism as a dogma but as leadership for action, he found frequently solutions which at the time appeared to the orthodox theoreticians as a complete revision of Marxism. For example, summing up the experience of the workers' movement in the imperialistic stage of capitalism, Lenin developed the theory of proletarian revolution and found the possibility of its victory in the backward Czarist Russia as the weakest link of imperialism. After the October revolt some of his closest collaborators failed to understand its character and did not believe that it could survive without a whole chain of revolutions in the West. Lenin endeavoured to prove that revolution could win a victory in a separate country. History has confirmed the correctness of his conceptions, which he arrived at by analysing reality.

It is only after the October Revolution that Lenin faced problems which he had to solve theoretically in an altogether new manner, because it was the first time in history that a socialist revolution had succeeded and that the working class had taken over power. In the thick tomes of Marx, Engels and latter-day Marxist theoreticians there were by no ready recipes for the newly arisen historical situation. But here again we come across the constant values of Leninism - creative ability to adapt general premises to reality, to generalize the experience of reality. Lenin did not understand revolution as a Blanquist act but rather as the creativeness of the masses, as the achievement of the organized class. It is on this conception that his interpretations of the role of the revolutionary vanguard, of the state in socialism, of democratic centralism and socialist democracy are based.

Early in this century Lenin outlined the basic contours of the Marxist theory on the party, which he subsequently developed. Although his conception arose in the specific conditions of the

struggle of the Russian proletariat, many of its ingredients have a permanent value of a precious experience for the revolutionary movement. Lenin rejected the objections by Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg and others that he was endeavouring to create a narrow, conspiratorial, centralist organization of a Blanquist type. He explained the need for close cooperation between the party and the masses, between the party leadership and the rank and file. Democratic centralism, as the basic principle in the work of the party, he understood much more broadly than it was assumed. He was in favour of party unity, but of a unity which is based on a wide confrontation of different opinions before adopting a common policy. Party members must not be robots who only execute the decisions by higher organs, but active participants in formulating party policies. Lenin developed his conceptions about democratic centralism in internal party democracy especially during the early years following the October Revolution. His own style and method of work have confirmed how anxious he was to see democratic principles realized in practice. During his life after the October Revolution, party congresses and conferences were held regularly, at which some different and often even completely opposing attitudes were presented in the process of fixing policies. When one of his collaborators objected that "central committee - it is Lenin", he took this as a painful insult.

In the contemporary struggle for socialism, particularly significant are Lenin's views on the state. According to him it is a political form of power in which the working class is organized as the ruling class, it is a state which changes itself continuously as it withers away. It is, in effect, a continual transformation of political forms of a classical state into a live, creative activity of millions of direct producers, who are freely united and increasingly become the subjects of production and of their own conditions of life and work. On the eve of the October Revolution, in his capital work *The State and Revolution*, Lenin outlined the prospects of such a development of the future political community of free and equal peoples. The reliance upon the masses, upon their creativeness and involvement in government was not just a political slogan of the moment but a constant preoccupation of Lenin, arising from his basic theses about the withering away of the state in socialism and is in fact one of the main premises of the

transformation of the political forms of government. Lenin pointed out that to attract the working people and to govern the state was an exceedingly hard but historically necessary task, because socialism could not be established by a minority party. Along with this task there is the constant struggle against bureaucracy. Democratic participation of masses in public affairs is the main condition for the success of this struggle. It is only possible to win a complete victory against bureaucracy, Lenin said, when the entire population takes part in the government. This is the way to ensure democratic centralism, which as Lenin said, on the one hand, ensures coordination and unity in the functioning of enterprises of general significance, and at the same time a "full and unhindered development not only of local features but also of local enterprise, local initiative, diversity of roads, methods, and means of moving toward a common goal". The hard conditions of the civil war and of the foreign military intervention, great war destruction, inherited economic backwardness and the pressure from the bourgeoisie, made it impossible for these Lenin's views to be implemented during his life. As a great dialectician Lenin sought new solutions in new circumstances, although even then he did not abandon his fundamental policies. Some contemporary interpreters of Leninism, however, on the basis of natural, tactical, although basically marginal departures in Lenin's policies of that time, built an entire theory about Lenin's "iron" centralism, about Lenin as an alleged critic of self-management. There where true analysis of Lenin's thought ends, begins its pragmatism and adaptation to the aims and interests of a determined policy.

For the contemporary politics, when socialism is developing as a world process, highly significant are Lenin's policies about relations among peoples, about national and international affairs. Just as he had been against the export of revolution, against "imposing a universal system which allegedly can be brought upon the Red Army bayonets", so Lenin was against the imposition of ready-made solutions to other parties and peoples, pointing out that communism could not be established by force. Whenever he was in favour of that which is general and universal, he never failed to point out that it should also reflect what is individual, specific and national. Lenin's vision of the emerging society and its relationships was clearly expressed in his attitudes on the equality of nations and nationalities,

on the need to respect national independence and sovereignty of nations, on their right to self-determination, the struggle against supremacy of the "great" over the "small" nations. He said that unity in the international tactics of the communist movement does not presuppose the removal of diversity nor the liquidation of national differences (these are "silly dreams", he underlined), but the application of g e n e r a l principles of communism, modified in details, adapted to the conditions of national differences. On several occasions he underlined the validity of Engels when he said that the nation which enslaves other nations cannot itself be free. The essence of what is international should be found not in the subordination of what is national to the prescribed general aims, but in the affirmation of the national, particular, and its mutual enrichment with what is truly general and international. The communist and workers' movement has already rejected the theses on the leading centres and parties which have had negative consequences on the contemporary struggle for socialism, bringing about the passivization of a part of this movement and stagnation of its, always needed, creative ideological and political activity.

Lenin's titanic activity, which unfolded in an extraordinary wide range, touched upon all the fields of revolutionary theory and practice, leaving behind an indelible trace. It has been correctly pointed out that no personality in modern history has made such a deep influence on its development. Lenin's heritage belongs to the entire revolutionary movement, no one can hold a monopoly upon it nor pretend to be its only interpreter. It is the inspiration for a scientific study and changing of reality, reaffirming itself and enriching itself in the practice of the struggle for socialism. But at the same time it calls for a bold search of new roads, for a freer confrontation of ideas and for a further development of Marxism.