Vol. IV, No. 1
February 1970

EAST-WEST contacts

A Bimonthly Review

International Documentation and
Information Centre (Interdoc)
The Hague - Van Stolkweg 10
Netherlands

The purpose of INTERDOC is to promote a better and wider knowledge of East–West problems, through the exchange of documentation and information.

INTERDOC specialises in the collection of information, the preparation and dissemination of periodicals and special studies, and the organisation of conferences.

Editor: Dr. S.W. Couweenberg
Editorial office: Van Stolkweg 10,
The Hague, Netherlands

Annual subscription: Guilders 12,–
Per copy: Guilders 2,–
Suggested ways of payment:
1. postal cheque and clearing service, number 633695, Interdoc, The Hague, Netherlands
2. international money order

CONTENTS

POLITICS

WESTERN COMMUNIST DOUBTS

The Soviet leadership's reluctance to abandon Stalinism causes difficulties as well as dismay among foreign Communists.

The centenary of Lenin's birth, due in April, 1970, has already caused a wave of commemorative articles in the Western Communist Press, as well as in that of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the occasion threatens to exacerbate some of the rifts between the ruling and non-ruling Communist leaders by renewing the debate about Leninism, Stalinism and why grave abuses occurred in building "Socialism" in Russia and Eastern Europe. Once again the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has been in the forefront, and its leaders decline to go along with Moscow's efforts to bury the whole issue of Stalinism and its aftermath. Prominent figures in both the Italian and French parties have voiced particular concern at the latest trends in the Soviet Union, where the victimisation of Solzhenitsyn has given another reminder of the ideological rigidity of the present Soviet régime.

Moscow's reply to earlier fraternal protests about Soviet policies was to accuse the authors of being too preoccupied with their parties' electoral prospects. The element of tactical manoeuvring seems evident from the fact that while defending their right to criticise Soviet actions and policies, most Western Communist leaders also proclaim their loyalty to the world Communist movement. Whatever reservations they might have about "individual actions and events" in the Soviet Union's history, Luigi Longo said at a rally in Rome on November 9, the Italian Communists believed that the attitude towards the Soviet Union and the October Revolution remained a distinguishing feature among those working for revolution or peace. This ambivalent stand enabled Moscow to claim that the World Communist Conference in June amounted to a vote of confidence in its leadership. Many Western Communists, on the other hand, declared that the meeting marked the beginning of a new, allegedly more democratic era, in which controversial opinions could be put forward without fear of immediate Soviet contradiction. Both groups clearly saw the dangers of quarrelling in

public, and for a time after the conference they were careful to avoid open polemics.

Now the repressive measures against Soviet dissenters and the series of purges in Czechoslovakia under Husak have again made foreign Communist critics unwilling to pretend that all is well within the Soviet camp. Moscow's reaction so far has been a defensive silence, though the Soviet Press and radio issue numerous warnings against "anti-Sovietism" and the adoption of "nationalistic positions" by foreign Communist Parties. The need to avoid the charge of subservience to Moscow and above all to avoid too close an association with the Soviet Union's Great Power interests, however, remains a key factor if the critics are to improve their image. The principle was restated in outspoken terms in the Italian party's weekly magazine, R i n a s c i t a, on October 17. Any subordination to Soviet State policies on the part of the Communist Parties or régimes was "no longer necessary" and created "tensions and contradictions which obstruct the transition to Socialism", it said; the PCI's efforts to create a new unity in diversity were aimed at preventing any revival of "universal models" for the strategy of revolution and for building Communism.

Both R i n a s c i t a and the party newpaper, U n i t à, have recently become bolder in their questioning of what went wrong with the Soviet model. It was one of the major complaints of Togliatti, the former Italian party leader, that Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress was never adequately followed up. The Italian party's own promised enquiry did not get effectively under way, and pressure from the militants inside and outside the party seems to have been mainly responsible for the PCI leaders' promise at their congress last February to launch a new programme of research into Stalinism and its aftermath.

Continuing suppression

Luigi Longo formally inaugurated the PCI "debate" on this subject with an article in R i n a s c i t a on October 24 (under the title of "Our Stand on Problems of Socialism"), which promised a seminar, the setting up of a special research group by the party's Gramsci Institute and a programme of discussions

in the party branches and journals. Referring back to Togliatti's Yalta Memorandum of 1964, with its demand for a proper enquiry into past mistakes, Longo's article made it clear that the Italians were particularly concerned at the Russians' "slowness and resistance in returning to Leninist standards" and the continuing "régime of restrictions and suppression of democratic and personal liberties installed by Stalin". These, he said, could no longer be excused on the grounds of "capitalist encirclement" and the weakness of the Communist States; the Italian Communists were not trying to teach Moscow how to conduct its affairs, but a Socialist society could not be characterised by its economic structure alone and must offer the workers a real opportunity for taking part "in an organised way" in shaping society. Longo suggested that there should be a comparison between the ability of workers in Communist and in non-Communist countries to have a voice in determining their working and living conditions.

Settling accounts

R i n a s c i t a carried another major contribution to the debate on October 31, in the form of an article by Valentino Gerratana, a party ideologist. The very idea of Socialism caused some difficulties nowadays, he wrote, because so many layers had accumulated in "the Communists' cultural baggage" that the resulting mixture - given the noble name of Marxism-Leninism - contained "only a little Marx, a little Lenin and a lot of Stalin". He saw the present task as being mainly one of settling accounts with "theoretical Stalinism, that is to say the way in which Marxism and Leninism have been disfigured by the Stalinist tradition".

Gerratana stressed that "Socialism" was only a transitional system (to full Communism) and as such must take into account the national, cultural and economic conditions of the country to be transformed: one of his accusations against Stalin was that he had thrown away the "classic" theory on this point. Like Longo, he emphasised that greater participation in decision-making should be a hallmark even of the transitional Socialist stage and that any attempt to "build Socialism from the top", asking from the people "only work, discipline and trust in their

leaders", would inevitably result in crises of confidence.

He say the Czechoslovak reform movement as an attempt to "cure the evil at the roots" and to establish a new relationship of trust between the party and the masses, restoring to them a real rôle in building Communism. In his view, world Communism should have welcomed this development and discussed it constructively, showing that it "did not fear confrontation of ideas". Instead, "to the relief of all the bigots of so-called Marxism-Leninism and in the name of the defence of Socialism", old methods had been revived. To those who might accuse him of pushing disagreements with Moscow on this issue to the point of rupture, Gerratana replied that the PCI's dissent was based on "internationalist motives" - whereas the old concept of internationalism (i.e. unquestioning loyalty to Moscow) was "unacceptable and harmful".

Personal vendetta

The prospect of a deeper enquiry into Stalinism must be most unwelcome to the Soviet leadership at this juncture, when its own historians have just produced a new edition of their History of the Soviet Party which tones down most of the criticisms of Stalin inserted into the second edition of 1962. The outrage of one Soviet hard-liner at the trend in the PCI has already been made apparent in the polemics between Rinascita and the conservative Soviet literary journal Oktyabr - to the point where Oktyabr has probably even annoyed a good many of the more progressive Soviet writers. In October and November the magazine carried two more instalments of a novel by its editor, Vsevolod Kochetov, in which his enemies were mocked and denounced under the thin disguise of fictional characters. Prominent among these was "Benito Spada", clearly meant to represent Vittorio Strada, a lecturer and expert on Russian studies at Turin, who last September described Kochetov, Sofronov and Chakovsky as bad writers in a reactionary tradition dating back to Tsarist times. In the second instalment, Kochetov drew a sharp distinction between the "Trotskyist" Spada and his politically more acceptable Russian wife (Strada has a Russian wife, too), while in the final instalment he cited Spada's ill-treatment of his

wife as the final proof of his moral and political degeneracy.

After the last episode had appeared on November 8, Unita's Moscow correspondent, Enzo Roggi, commented that the final expulsion of Spada from the party in Kochetov's story was meant to be a recommendation to the PCI to rid its ranks of all those who thought differently from Kochetov himself, rather than a sign of underlying confidence in the Italian Communist Party to do so. In the book Spada is expelled for his action in smuggling "anti-Soviet material" out of Russia, but as Roggi pointed out, Spada's views seemed to be an amalgam of all the features of the Italian approach most disliked by the Soviet hard-liners. Roggi firmly denied, however, that these included anti-Sovietism and he stressed that the last episode in this unedifying Soviet tale had appeared on the very day that the Italian Communists were publicising the anniversary of the October Revolution and expressing solidarity with the Soviet people.

Two days later the news of Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the Russian Writers'Union prompted a warning from Unita that this act could not pass unnoticed among writers outside the Soviet Union. An editorial note paid tribute to the authenticity of Solzhenitsyn's talent and expressed special concern at the fact that in addition to expelling him the union had the right to prevent him from having his works published. An even more outspoken reaction came from the distinguished Italian novelist (and sympathiser of the Communist Party), Alberto Moravia, who commented that the expulsion was "absurd": the Soviet leaders had an idea of literature marked by their "cultural limitations" since Socialist realism had been largely created by a half-educated class of bureaucrats.

French objections

Communists and their sympathisers in other European countries voiced similar concern. On November 19, the French Communist literary weekly, Lettres Francaises, gave prominence to a declaration by the left-wing National Writers' Committee, which includes Louis Aragon, his Russian-born wife Elsa Triolet, Vercors and Jean-Paul Sartre. It described Solzhenitsyn's expulsion as a "monumental error"

which would only serve to confirm the view of Socialism propagated by the Soviet Union's enemies. It was almost unbelievable, the statement said, that "what even a Nicholas II had not dreamt of doing to Chekhov - who had freely published his S a k h a l i n should happen "in the land of triumphant Socialism" to Solzhenitsyn, a writer in the true Russian tradition.

The French Com. unist leadership, too, has dissociated itself from the increasingly oppressive intellectual climate in the Soviet Union, though more obliquely. One of the Theses issued on November 15 for the party congress next February reaffirmed the party's belief in freedom of expression and debate as a matter of the greatest importance. Thesis No. 47 said that the party favoured the activity of intellectuals and the debate and research necessary for the advance of science: it would not oppose these debates, "nor will it impose any truth a p r i o r i, still less use its author i t y to cut short debates between specialists... artistic creativity is inconceivable without research, different currents, different schools". The party's daily newspaper, L' H u m a n i t é, nevertheless limited coverage of the Solzhenitsyn affair to the briefest mention of his expulsion. The Soviet régime's continuing proofs that it is not evolving towards the more democratic and progressive system envisaged by some Western Communists are apparently a source of deep embarrassment to them.

NEW FRONTIERS FOR THE '70s

by C.L. Sulzberger

(International Herald Tribune, 26-12-'69)

For the first time since World War II ended with the world dividing into ideological blocs a generalized effort to break down artificial barriers appears to be under way. The 1970's may mark a historic watershed in modifying outmoded philosophical and political prejudices.

The former have already been weakened as communism and capitalism each developed internal quarrels, most marked among the Marxists but also featuring disputes between members of the Western alliance.

The old messianic fervor that once marked NATO policy toward Communists and vice versa has faded. President Nixon,

himself a veteran of the era of Foster Dulles and the old morality, is taking a lead in the new pragmatic approach. He wants to judge nations by their actions rather than their political credos.

Philosophically, there is talk of "convergence" between evolving capitalism and evolving socialism. Some Russian Communist intellectuals think they have discovered such a trend but it is primarily a Yugoslav find. Its original philosopher was Edvard Kardelj, Tito's right-hand intellectual, and Khrushchev's 1954 voyage of penance to Belgrade was its first tangible symptom.

Special Moment

The idea behind this conception is that as industrialized and highly populated nations develop they face similar problems requiring similar answers, no matter what their abstract ideological tenets may be. Thus, extrapolating a future from these tendencies, one finds a moment when their economic and political methods and requirements could become increasingly alike although approached by differing roads.

While this moment remains a long time away, the trend toward negotiations is increasingly evident, as for example the promising SALT talks between overarmed Russia and overarmed America. Bonn, especially, is making the running for the Western capitals, because the most serious political problem in Europe is still Germany.

Chancellor Brandt has taken an audacious initiative in trying to straighten out the mess bequeathed when the victors of World War II chopped Germany up and couldn't agree how to put it together. He has clearly if not yet legally accepted the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent frontier between Germans and Poles, and he is about to join reluctant East Germany in discussing means of establishing some kind of relationship.

His idea vaguely resembles the old Metternich theory which permitted the separate German states of the post-Napoleonic period to confederate while retaining separate national military and foreign policies. By implying willingness to contemplate a similar arrangement and while simultaneously improving Bonn's relationships with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, Brandt

has outflanked the East Germans and forced them to at least discuss change.

Other Developments

Simultaneously, behind the scenes, there are concurrent developments. The Vatican has started quiet talks with Bonn and Warsaw on possible de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse border for church administrative purposes. Washington, Paris and London have made clucking noises of approval although Paris is chary about any moves toward German reunification and London wants to be sure Bonn consults its NATO allies well in advance.

Everybody wants to temper the hostility of alliances inherited by the 1970's from the postwar past but nobody is in an undue hurry. Even a Communist ambassador known to favor the end of existing blocs confides:

"It would be a mistake to terminate this arrangement too abruptly. Changes must be worked out gradually and slowly, preceded by growing economic and cultural exchanges between both sides." He cites as an example to be followed the slow but steady development of friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia. Once they were suspicious enemies and now they are very close friends; yet the shift required fifteen years.

There is now an impression of movement with respect to Germany, nub of the European problem. And Brandt's probing expeditions find their counterpoint in the Western Big Three notes to Moscow on Berlin, clearly designed to test the extent of Soviet interest in detente.

The new atmosphere of diplomatic exploration does not seem merely an attempt to rework old positions and restate old formulas but, tentatively at least, to try and find novel approaches acceptable to both sides and applicable to new circumstances in a new decade. Yet it takes time and will as well as pragmatic pressures to achieve results.

The effort aiming at political convergence is in itself well worth while. Should it eventually be followed by ideological convergence, so much the better; but, if one considers the world's long-stated preference for variety, any real parallelism appears hardly probable and surely not imminent.

THE BEGINNING OF EUROPEAN DIALOGUES

Ljubomir Radovanovic

(Review of International Affairs, 20-12-'69)

The International chronicle for late November and early December recorded momentous moves in European politics which may signify a new step toward the normalization of international relations in Europe. This refers largely to the meetings of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow, the NATO in Brussels, and the launching of Soviet-German negotiations in Moscow. Nor should we leave out the special meeting of Common Market countries in The Hague, convoked at France's initiative, at which some major problems plaguing that community were tackled, primarily those concerning agrarian policies, economic and social policies and finally the problem of enlarging the organization to include new members, for the present, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Negotiations with Great Britain will start at the earliest after June 30th, by which time expert analyses and studies should have been completed.

1.- The meeting in The Hague has no direct connection with general European policies and European security such as were discussed in Moscow and Brussels, but neither was it totally without any bearing on those general European problems. Today, true, the Common Market is still only a narrow regional economic organization, more or less like a customs union, but that is only one aspect of the Rome agreement on the European Economic Community. The second part relates to a broader and firmer integration of economic policies and common institutions, circulation of capital and labour, social legislation and cultural policies and, finally, the creation of European, or rather West European political institutions and organs. General de Gaulle, having assumed power soon after the founding of this Community and opposing its integrationist goals, put the brakes on this process. His successor, as was apparent at the meeting in The Hague, has not completely adopted the policy of his predecessor. He supports the consolidation of the present organization and its continued development and improvement according to the Rome agreement, and has accepted the schedule set for the admission of other European countries, primarily Great

Britain. The communique made no clear allusions to specific measures of integrational policy but it did stress, to an extent greater than before, the community of political goals and the wish to see this organization, improved and expanded, participate in European politics as an institution holding uniform political views. By creating such a community, the Common Market countries are convinced that they are contributing to the general easing of international tension and to rapprochement among all the peoples of Europe.

The Hague communique and discussions do much more to stress the political tendencies of this group of countries than do the concrete decisions passed at the meeting, which are yet to be implemented, and do so in a much more palpable way than has hitherto been the case, despite the first impression that only internal economic measures were concerned. The basic feature of these tendencies is the expanding of the political role of this "Little Europe" by transforming it into a "greater Europe" which would, on the basis of a common political program grounded in common economic and social interests, be in a position - as stated in the communique - to assume its responsibilities in tomorrow's world and to make a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.

But the improvement of the European Economic Community and its enlargement through the admission of other European states (not only those mentioned above but others as well) are matters of the near or distant future. The immediate effect on the course of present European policies is reflected in the obvious growth of Chancellor Willy Brandt's influence on the policies of the Common Market, and also in the rehabilitation of the Federal German Republic as a powerful partner on the West European political scene. It was impossible to conceal from the public, despite the care taken not to give that impression, that two basic theses clashed at The Hague, one Pompidou's and the other Brandt's, and that the latter's enjoyed broader support than the former's. Thanks to the circumstance that Pompidou is not de Gaulle, Willy Brandt's intervention could find more expression and a compromise could be reached to satisfy both sides. The inclusion of Great Britain in the European Economic Community (if it does take place) will perhaps be attended by

many complications but it will undoubtedly change the present relationship in this organisation and relieve the Federal Republic of certain dilemmas which had beset it, in substantial part due to the preponderant influence of France.

2.- Thanks to the dynamic political character of the new German Chancellor, the Federal Republic finds itself in the foreground of today's European politics along a line that has two characteristics: a realistic assessment of the European situation and of the interests of general European politics, and a grasp of the actual possibilities and therefore also of the best-conceived interests of German policy. The policies of the present Federal Government are marked by the effort to dovetail the useful with the possible, in contrast to the policy of the Christian-Democratic government which considered that anything useful for Germany was also possible.

Among the foregoing major moves in European politics, the launching of direct talks between Moscow and Bonn may be considered as the most significant, although nothing can be predicted about the final outcome. The difficulties will, of course, be considerable and the Federal Government has assumed the great burden of finding a workable compromise between the conditions which will be placed before it, and the pretensions which took root among the German public during the period of the kind of antinationalistic day-dreaming on which the previous government built up its positions. The present German Government will have to scrap some of the formulae which were part and parcel of the program of German state policy for the past twenty years. Fortunately, it shows no great affinity for them. But regardless of the outcome, which is uncertain, the very fact of direct contact between Bonn and Moscow in the sphere of political relations (things have gone somewhat better in economic matters) represents a noteworthy event introducing a new element into the German problem.

The conclusion of a treaty renouncing the use of force, on which the Federal Republic particularly insists, and which provided the motivation for these negotiations, depends on certain Soviet conditions some of which the Willy Brandt governement has already agreed to, such as joining the nuclear non-proliferation pact. For others, which it is also ready to accept, it

has a formula differing from Soviet demands, such as, for instance, the international recognition of the German Democratic Republic. However, all signs point to the extension of the negotiations to cover other questions as well.

Regardless of how the Soviet-German negotiations end, favourably - which seems more likely - or not, they will wield a broad influence on Soviet-German relations and in the same sense on the development of relations between the Federal Government and other Warsaw Pact members. It would be safe to say that Brandt's entire conception of Germany's "eastern policy" depends on the outcome of the talks with the Soviet Union.

If this assumption about the political consequences of Soviet-German negotiations has foundation, it would be warranted to conclude that Willy Brandt's government will concede as much as possible in the negotiations upon which depends perhaps the most important half of its state policy. This does not, however, mean that the other party can remain indifferent to the possibility of failure. The economic consequences of a favourable outcome aside, if failure in Moscow would destroy Brandt's eastern policy, it would equally create great difficulties for the further implementation of the conception of all-European security and cooperation, strongly supported by the Soviet Government and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The German question is not the only but certainly the central problem of a European security based on normalization of relations and cooperation between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Consequently, should tension engendered by a parting of ways with the Soviet Union again set between the Federal Republic and its eastern neighbours, it would be hard to imagine continuation of the course of rapprochement between Western and Eastern Europe.

This interdependence between general European policy and the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union in the first place, is something of which the Soviet Union is also aware. This can be concluded from a certain degree of relaxation in earlier rigid positions relating to questions of particular concern to the German Democratic Republic and the considerably subdued tone of the Warsaw meeting communique in referring to the Federal

Republic and the present policies of its government.

3. - The initiation of Soviet-German negotiations in Moscow was somewhat overshadowed by the fact that the Warsaw and Atlantic Pact parleys, held within 2 or 3 days of each other, may also be looked upon as the beginning of a dialogue between these two groupings on problems of overall European policy and the proposal to convoke a European security conference.

A comparison of the Warsaw meeting's communique and the NATO declaration would reveal that there is no disagreement between these two groupings in regard to the principles on which should rest the security of Europe and relations among all European nations. According to the Warsaw communique, these are the principles of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the present boundaries. The document states that adherence to these principles would make it possible for peaceful coexistence to become the general norm for relations between European states with different social systems. According to the Atlantic Pact declaration, peace and security in Europe can be based only on general respect for the following principles: the sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of European states; the right of every European people to build its own future; peaceful settlement of controversies; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, no matter what their political and social regime; and renunciation of the threat to use or the use of force against any other state whatsoever.

Any other European state not belonging to these groupings would also undoubtedly accept a system of European security based on the principles contained in the Warsaw communique and Atlantic Declaration. The proclamation of these principles is no novelty. But practice has shown that disagreements have arisen because of different assessment of the significance and substance of these principles, and that not only these two sides but other countries as well do not understand each other even when they use the same language about them. In one place, the Atlantic Declaration indicates the source of such misunderstanding, claiming that experience shows these principles have not

been conceived in the same way everywhere. However, in this first exchange of views between the Warsaw and Atlantic communities, there were open differences, particularly as regards the attitude toward the proposed European conference.

The Warsaw communique is actually a supplement to the communique from the previous ministerial meeting in Prague, and the declaration issued in Budapest presenting the initiative for convoking a European security conference early next year. It proposed that the draft agenda stress only two points: the conclusion of an agreement renouncing the use of force and consideration of ways to promote peaceful cooperation between European states. Other states were also asked to present their proposals for the agenda. The Warsaw communique confirmed the attachment of those concerned to the foregoing general principles and stressed that, in the interests of peace and security, all states should establish equal relations with the German Democratic Republic in line with international law and recognize European boundaries, including the Oder-Neisse, as final and immutable.

The Atlantic Declaration takes a different approach to the problem of European security, and a European conference. It does not reject the idea of a European conference but considers it necessary first to seek partial solutions to various problems, in bilateral or multilateral contacts, gradually reducing tension and improving the political climate in Europe, thus helping to assure success for a possible European conference in the future. Among measures of this sort the declaration lays special stress on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, improvement of the situation and status of Europe, working out a modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany, expansion of economic, technical and cultural cooperation in bilateral frameworks, and so on.

It would transpire from the first dialogue between the two blocs that the outlook for a European conference in the near future, according to the idea of the Warsaw Pact, is not encouraging, while the discussion at the Atlantic Pact demonstrated that uniformity of views does not exist among the Western allies either. A fatal misunderstanding about methods keeps repeating itself, as has been the case in previous attempts to

reach agreement. It comes down to this: whether to facilitate the achievement of agreement on concrete problems - as proposed by the Warsaw group - through a general European agreement on security, under present European conditions, or to create more favourable conditions for a general system of European security - as proposed by the Atlantic Declaration - by solving individual concrete problems.

At the Atlantic Pact meetings, the French Foreign Minister, M. Schuman, defended the view that the European conference should not be a conference of two blocs but of all European countries, and that preparations for it should be so guided. Therefore, the agenda of such a conference should not contain questions that are exclusively of interest to the two blocs. France did not consequently agree with paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Atlantic Declaration, referring to mutual reductions in armaments in Europe, considering this a matter for the blocs to arrange between themselves.

In any case, it must be observed that such dialogues exclude the countries and peoples of Europe who do not belong to either of these groupings. This is an unfavourable circumstance as it is natural to expect each bloc to be mindful above all of the interests of its own group. Given such a confrontation, it would be difficult to expect the rapid achievement not only of a general European security system in which all the nations of Europe are interested - and not only the bloc members - but also of agreement to convene a conference to consider the problem of such a system.

It obviously ensues that the other European countries, outside the blocs, should strive more actively for direct participation in discussions on all-European security and a different type of European conference which would not simultaneously mean an exclusive confrontation between bloc conceptions but which would, rather, correspond more to the interests of all the European nations.

THROUGH THE CHINESE WALL

(International Herald Tribune, 7-1-'70)

As Sino-Soviet talks appear to be petering out in mutual recriminations, the prospect that conversations will be resumed, on the ambassadorial level, between Washington and Peking, grow brighter. This is probably not altogether a paradox. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are linked, in Mao's public thought, as enemies of the Chinese people and of all the oppressed. But Red China seems to prefer the exchange of words - whether in diplomacy or the press - to the exchange of gunfire.

"Seems" has to be used in place of any more definite statement. The China-watchers perched in Hong Kong are having more difficulty than ever in deciding just what is going on behind the Bamboo Curtain; indeed, that phrase, with its suggestion of inviting interstices, should give way to the more formidable Chinese wall as a symbol of the growing density of the barriers Peking has erected against understanding of its moods and plans. It has been pointed out that during the cacophony of the Cultural Revolution, the very profusion of statements - on wall posters and elsewhere, while confusing, at least gave indications of trends and purposes. Now there is doubt whether Peking is engaged in an internal power struggle that paralyses action, or whether the Mao regime has simply found more secretive means of conveying its orders.

This Chinese wall will not make the resumed Warsaw talks any easier; even if ambassadors are not necessarily sent, as the old joke has it, to lie abroad for their country, diplomatic jargon is always more understandable against the background of a clear picture of public opinion and governmental action in the home country. At the same time, however, such glimpses of Chinese policy as may be gained from formal interchanges will be all the more valuable for the darkness that surrounds the Chinese mainland.

President Nixon has affirmed - and Vice-President Agnew has emphasized - that America's purpose is to lessen tensions between the United States and Red China. This could have, among other benefits, at least peripheral influence in lessening the danger of a Sino-Soviet war. But if it takes two to make a quarrel, the converse - that it only takes one to avoid a

quarrel - is not necessarily so. The obscure intentions of Red China, the strains within that huge country, and the forces at work there must be seen much more clearly than at present before there can be real hope of a detente.

FRENCH SHAKEN BY BRANDT'S SPEED

(The Times, 10-12-'69)

The opening of the Russo-German talks in Moscow precisely on the date proposed by Bonn has come as a bombshell in France. It was known that since the Social Democrats came to power west German foreign policy had begun to move fast, but it was also known that speed of progress depended on the degree of receptivity, especially on the part of Russia and the other communist states. Now it seems that Russia is in a hurry, too, and Poland hardly less so.

The speed of the thaw between west Germany and her eastern neighbours has astonished the French. For years General de Gaulle had urged on Bonn that reunification depended on relaxation of tension and recognition of the political realities inherited by Germany from the war: and that the key lay in Moscow, not with other members of the communist camp.

Herr Brandt and Herr Walter Scheel, his Foreign Minister, have made all the gestures and concessions that France recommended. They have turned directly to Moscow instead of going by way of their western allies, and it has paid off. Even the insistence of Herr Ulbricht, the east Germany leader, on recognition of his rump state has been brushed aside by Russia.

French commentators agree that all this marks a tremendous success for Herr Brandt and that German foreign policy has come of age.

The French can hardly complain, but the new development is rather like German reunification - highly desirable in theory but so productive of complications that the status quo seems the lesser evil. An almost "economic giant" can be coped with as long as he remains a "political dwarf". That he now shows signs of ceasing to be a "political dwarf" provokes misgivings in this country.

French press comment is highly significant. "Towards a new Russo-German pact" is the headline of the conservative

L'Aurore: "From the Rhine to the Urals" that of the independent left wing Combat. Le Monde published an article some weeks ago in which it argued that the most idiotic policy for France in reaction to the economic challenge of Germany would be to turn away from a united Europe from fear that Germany would dominate it.

The Common Market summit at The Hague demonstrated Herr Brandt's concern to pacify Germany's western neighbours by pushing ahead with the reinforcement and enlargement of European unity, stilling fears that her economic strength could cause a dangerous imbalance in Europe. This is part of the reason why Britain's acceptance into the Common Market seems not only inevitable but positively desirable to President Pompidou, his government and the vast majority of the Gaullist party. Someone suggested to me the other day that if General de Gaulle were still in power he would favour Britain's entry as the only means left of achieving the "independent Europe" that was his aim.

The opening of the Moscow talks has brought home to the French that the Federal Republic no longer needs France to speak to the Russians, and that for the Russians, France is no longer the privileged conversational partner in the west.

Herr Brandt remains unshakably loyal to the Franco-German friendship, but he does not regard it as exclusive; and as a man of the north, turned towards Britain, Scandinavia, and the open sea, he does not share the enthusiasm of the Christian Democrats in his own country for the "little Europe" of Adenauer and de Gaulle.

US FOREIGN POLICY AND EASTERN EUROPE

Dr. Radovan Vukadinovic

Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Zagreb

(Review of International Affairs, 5-1-'70)

Relations with Europe's socialist states hold a special place in America's post-war foreign policy. Irrespective of the intensity of these relations, the phases in which they emerged and the methods applied by the USA, the socialist countries continue to figure importantly in America's foreign policy activities.

Since the time when the boundaries of socialism expanded and a number of socialist countries were established outside of Europe, the USA started differentiating between them, placing the European socialist countries in a special category in the endeavour to find the most adequate ways of achieving America's foreign policy goals. While changing the forms of these relations and methods of functioning - from open emphasis on military pressure, through economic blockade and cultural isolation, to the proclamation of liberation movements - US foreign policy has found its lasting ideological and political inspiration in powerful anti-communism as the fundamental motor force.

Now in the shadow of American-Soviet talks and an increasingly explicit wish on the part of both superpowers to increase the number of problems they can profitably discuss, the European socialist countries have been relegated to the background both in the very conception of foreign policy and in practical foreign policy moves. Furthermore, the most important problem confronting the new American administration - the Vietnam conflict - also acts as a factor consuming time and energy that might otherwise be spent in developing firmer ties with European socialist countries.

President Nixon's spectacular visit to Rumania where, as he himself stressed, he was given an exceptionally cordial welcome, and the rather ambiguous statements by the State Department about the so-called grey zone to which Rumania might also presumably belong, are only tiny and above all declarative aspects of America's readiness to develop or continue action in relation to Eastern Europe.

In the course of America's foreign policy so far, the socialist countries of Europe have not represented a key point of confrontation, although the entire area did hold a notable place in policy particularly during the cold war. From the one-time attempts to suppress and eject communism from Eastern Europe, to the extremely militant - later utterly discredited - slogans about the "liberation" of the East European countries, this sphere of confrontation was an important zone where it was easy to follow all the oscillations in relations between the two sharply polarized bloc structures. At the same time, the program of action, even though established only in theory in

relation to that part of the world, became a component of significance in the political programs of the Republicans and the Democrats who always endeavoured to adjust their activities in this region to internal and foreign policy requirements.

It was only with Kennedy's "new look" at the substance and possible forms of American-Soviet relations that the place of the East European socialist states also began to change and to acquire emphasis in new foreign policy conceptions. Peaceful engagement as a theoretical framework supported by a number of American theorists and politicians quickly brought corresponding concretization in the action of building bridges to the East. Despite important initiatives and extremely competent supporters of this new line, in which Eastern Europe represented an important sphere of activity, nothing could be done to change radically a picture marred by stockpiled mistrust and mutually negative experiences from the past.

Consequently, the practical results achieved in this field by the Democrats were not particularly noteworthy. The range of means designed to bring about a greater American presence in Eastern Europe did not turn out to be specially effective, while neither the long-term, nor even the medium-term, goals of American foreign policy were attained. Although it was probably assumed that it would be extremely difficult to achieve the long-term aim - the elimination of the "communist regimes" from Eastern Europe - it is certain that the medium-term aims had their value in thinking on the results of action. Within that context, the democratization of socio-political regimes, the development of national solutions and the weakening of ties with the Soviet Union were goals which, in the assessment of American foreign policy planners, could be achieved gradually thanks also to favourable international conditions.

In working out the measures to be applied by the USA in Eastern Europe, emphasis had once been placed in this comprehensive and long-lasting process on : economic aid, expansion of trade ties and intensive cultural exchange. Apparently however, account had not been taken of a number of objective difficulties which quickly acted to paralyze American efforts for greater engagement in Eastern Europe. Insufficient attention was also paid to the complex of international relations and the

impossibility of a selective approach to certain socialist states, although great store had been laid by that approach, and much was expected of it.

American economic assistance to the East European countries was extended primarily to Poland where evolutionary changes were expected to ensue in short order. Somewhat over 500 million dollars worth of aid and credit were designed to assist the emergence of national Polish solutions, changes within the socio-political system and a greater degree of rapprochement with US positions. But in spite of American aid, Polish policy went off on another tangent, emphasizing that the sole alternative was the strengthening of the Polish-Soviet alliance in the economic, ideological and military-political spheres. The other East European countries, partly for their own internal reasons and partly because of possible pressure from the outside, were extremely cautious in accepting American assistance, preferring to develop suitable bilateral ties of an economic nature. But there were also a number of objective obstacles to the expansion of these commercial ties. Eastern Europe has never been an important exporter to the USA whereas the tremendous potential of attractive purchases from the USA could not be covered by the East European countries either by the export of their products or through payment in foreign currencies. In this respect, the development of economic ties between the West and Eastern Europe, despite difficulties regarding equivalent exchange, was nevertheless a more stable way of developing mutually interesting economic ties. The fact that the American administration was rather sluggish about applying the most-favoured nation clause to the East European countries also did its part to obstruct the promotion of even that token trade.

Expectations were also not fulfilled by the bridges of cultural cooperation and understanding in the form of scientific and cultural exchange. Despite the involvement of a relatively large number of scientists and people in the cultural fields, particularly from Poland, general political positions did not change perceptibly in favour of the USA, nor was there any intensification of pro-American ferment in social and cultural life, at least not to the extent that it could directly reflect on political trends.

In addition, the Vietnam conflict began gradually acquiring internal political dimensions, apart from its foreign political overtones, and Congress was moved on several occasions to take a clear stand against the strengthening of ties with the East European countries, accusing them of assisting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The attempts by Johnson's administration, before he stepped down, to map out a solid path for negotiations with the Soviet Union and to strive for Soviet influence to be brought to bear on the other side for the purpose of ending the Vietnam War, worked in the direction of practical American disengagement in Eastern Europe, even after August 21, 1968.

In the opinion of many analysts of American foreign policy, it was precisely this wish not to spoil relations with the Soviet Union and to better the prospects for an American-Soviet global dialogue that influenced the posture toward Eastern Europe, the abandonment of peaceful engagement and of the desire to create bridges of cooperation.

When emphasis began to be placed on the American-Soviet dialogue and on continued activity designed to develop a feeling of mutual confidence, rather than on sharp confrontation between the two super-powers with all its familiar consequences, the significance of the East European countries for American foreign policy automatically began to wane.

It is interesting to note that one section of American Sovietologists, who had been extremely active in mapping out the basic lines of relations with the East, started pointing out, as soon as Nixon assumed power, that in this new phase interest in the European socialist states would decline considerably. It was stressed that this could work great harm both to the long-term interests of the USA in Europe and to the unfolding of the internal situation in that group of countries as increased isolation could only have a negative effect on their own development.

Today these voices are louder and more ubiquitous in the comments being made on US foreign policy. It is claimed, for instance, that in spite of the indispensable negotiations between the USA and Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders must have it brought home to them that the USA does not intend accepting

the thesis that the East European zone is exclusively one of Soviet influence. Furthermore, that it is America's duty to activate its policies in the East European countries although not, of course, to an extent that would violate the realities of Soviet presence. Also it is stated that the USA should, within the framework of preparations for the European summit conference, revalue its place and role in Europe, and in that connection its practical attitude toward the East European socialist countries.

Opinions also differ on the possible approaches to Eastern Europe. One section of theorists and policy-makers feel it is necessary to start a frontal action for greater American presence in that area, whereas others claim that a selective approach should be made only to countries where American influence could tangibly grow and which on their part evinced an explicit interest in developing ties with the USA.

In this thinking on new slants of American foreign policy toward Eastern Europe a special place is held by the conceptions of Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinsky who supports the long-term approach to general international development. The creation of an integral community of developed nations should be the long-term goal of the USA on the basis of which the question of relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR would be posed in a different light as they would, in Prof. Brzezinsky's view, together with the West, be the carriers of such new international activity. The common solution of problems of broader interest such as those connected with the intensive development of technology, economic progress, city planning and joint study of social questions should in practice help relegate ideological differences to the background and promote the basis for this new type of international community founded on mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

Of course, within the complex of these differing opinions, it is difficult to see what direction American action will actually take or which means will be used in a possible new approach. The experience accumulated so far will certainly be of value as American foreign policy planners will be able, from the results achieved so far, to draw certain conclusions about the adequacy of the forms and methods of their activity.

Despite the reduced scope of activity now, Eastern Europe continues to be an important sphere of American interest. Although positions have not been defined yet, the intensification of discussions and the number of well-known analysts participating in them offer confirmation of this view. Despite this, however, it does seem that the present American-Soviet ties are of primary significance for the American posture toward Eastern Europe and that the American policy of opening toward Eastern Europe will hinge especially on the character of these trends.

ECONOMICS

SOVIET CONCERN AT POPULATION TRENDS

Official concern at the declining Soviet birth-rate was evident from an article in the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, on October 5, 1969. The decline, common to most industrial societies, has been accelerated in the USSR by social and economic conditions, and the article suggested that measures must be taken to popularise larger families.

Past discussion of the falling birth-rate has been confined to the Literary Gazette and other journals. Carrying the subject into the main party daily newpaper suggests that the situation is now regarded more seriously, especially as the decline is most marked in European Russia, a factor which must make it more difficult to settle Europeans in the non-European areas of the Soviet Union.

It has been known for several years that the non-Russian nationalities, especially the Central Asians and Transcaucasians, are increasing at a much faster rate than the Great Russians. Figures in the latest Soviet statistical handbook for 1968 showed a population increase in Central Asia of 3.5 per cent a year over the past ten years compared with the All-Union average for the same period of 1.3 per cent. The total Central Asian population over this period increased by 41 per cent. It is likely that the forthcoming national census in January, 1970, will show for the first time that the Great Russians no longer represent the majority of the total population. At the last census in 1959 they numbered 54.65 per cent. Concern has been expressed at this disproportionate increase and it has been suggested that discretionary measures be taken to redress the balance. So far no measures have been taken.

Moreover, according to an article in The Times (London) on November 21, the divorce rate in the Soviet Union is highest among the European population and the lowest rates are in Armenia, Georgia and Central Asia. This would be another reason for the diminishing birth-rate in European Russia, and a steady increase in Central Asia.

The Pravda article of October 5 by two Soviet demographers, said that between 1960 and 1968, the Soviet birth-rate fell by almost one third. The natural rate of growth (preponderance of births over deaths) in 1968 was 10 per 1,000 of the population, which the article claimed was still higher than most developed countries.

But concern was expressed at the very different birth-rate in different areas of the country, ranging from 30 - 36 in some republics to 14 - 17 in others. In the low birth-rate areas, the decline was a continuing trend. The article claimed that an average of 2.2 - 2.5 children per family was necessary to maintain the present population, and 2.6 - 2.7 per family to ensure a population increase.

The authors believed that psychological and social attitudes and not material conditions were the main reason for low birth-rates in some ares. Certainly some social and economic conditions in the Soviet Union are likely to have encouraged the decline. These include: the higher percentage of working women; legal and easily available abortion*; easily available divorce following a change in the law in 1965 (since when the divorce rate has increased by 80 per cent); inadequate family allowances (small allowances are in theory payable after the birth of the third and subsequent children, but in fact only apply to those who earn less than 50 roubles a month, i.e., a very small section of the population).

There are some maternity benefits, but against these must be set the cost of crèches and nursery schools. Following the statutory 112 days paid maternity leave, unpaid maternity leave (extended from three months to 10 months in 1968) may be taken, but during this time maternity benefits are not payable. There is a tax on childless men and women of six per cent, but since the cost of maintaining a child amounts to much more than six per cent, this is ineffectual as a measure to stimulate the birth-rate.

*Literary Gazette on February 28, 1968, reported that in large Soviet towns there were considerably more abortions than live births.

The falling birth-rate presents social, economic and in the longer term political problems to the Soviet Union. Socially, the decline in births, together with the longer life expectancy, is leading to an ageing society with an ever-increasing ratio of pensioners to active workers. In 1959 12 per cent of the population was drawing a pension, and in 1967 15 per cent, according to a leading Soviet demographer, V. Perevedentsev in Literary Gazette (No. 12, 1968). Economically it leads to a reduction in manpower; over the past two or three years, the Soviet Press has increasingly complained of a manpower shortage. In both the United States and China, the population, and therefore eventual manpower, increase has been almost double the Soviet rate over the past few years.

Long-term political problems are also presented by the Soviet population figures in relation to world figures. Between 1963 and 1967, the American population increased by 2.1 per cent while over the same period, the Soviet population increased by only 1.2 per cent. In China, the increase rate over the last few years has been two per cent. Perevedentsev wrote in Literary Gazette (No. 12, 1968):

> "The position of a country in the world, other things being equal, is determined by the number of its population. In 1940 the share of the USSR in the world population was 8.6 per cent. In 1960 it was 7.2 per cent and in 1967 it was 6.9 per cent. If we assume that the world population will increase at the rate of two per cent per annum (as it has been doing in recent years) while the population of the USSR increases by one per cent, then by the start of the 21st century the population of the USSR will amount to five per cent of the world population".

Soviet Far East and Central Asian migration

Another problem is presented by the difficulties of populating the Soviet Far East. According to Problems of Economy in April this year, only 65 - 70 per cent of the required manpower was available in the Far East. According to a Soviet authority*

*V.I. Kantorovich, Novy Mir, No. 12, 1967.

in spite of efforts to resettle large numbers of people in Siberia, the population remained static from 1939 to 1959, and decreased thereafter.

The population density, according to the Soviet economist, Y. Manevitch, in an article in the American journal, Foreign Affairs in October, 1968, is 1.4, compared with the All-Union average of 9.4 per square k.m.

Many of the settlers leave within the first year because of the arduous conditions, in spite of considerable wage bonuses and an earlier retirement age. A recent All-Union conference in Moscow on the use of manpower discussed "implementation in the most efficient manner of the scheme set out in the national economic plan to send families in an organised way to eastern Siberia and the Far East". China has been more successful in building up its population in border regions and possible future demographic pressures from the Chinese may be causing anxiety to the Russian leaders.

Writing on problems of population migration in the Soviet monthly journal, Nature (No. 9, 1969), a statistical expert from the Soviet Ethnology Institute referred to an anomalous situation which was developing in Central Asia due to migration. Large numbers of European trained personnel continued to migrate to the Central Asian towns where:

> "the economy is undergoing such rapid development and the range of resources expanding so fast.... that without the influx of trained personnel from outside the economic growth would be held up".

The author realised that serious problems would arise from such an imbalanced situation where there was a large rural population of untrained local population on the one hand, and an expanding urban population of skilled European labour on the other:

> "Obviously not full use of the labour reserves in the rural localities has been made. As time goes on the growing numbers of the local population who have not been recruited into industry may become a problem. The entire situation shows how important it is to intensify the training of personnel from the local farm population in the Central Asian republics. This would ... get rid of the problem of recruiting skilled workers and specialists from the central area of the Russian Federation".

Not enough effort appears to have been made to train the local population. Since the trained personnel enjoy certain privileges and are paid higher wages, resentment among the local population is likely to build up. The policy of bringing in European specialists to fill the skilled jobs could easily backfire, and, because of the growing division between the two groups, lead to additional nationalist troubles.

Short-term economic gains

Soviet demographers are by no means unanimous on either the seriousness of the problems, or measures to be taken to stimulate the birth-rate. Perevedentsev criticised those who saw the decrease as a desirable trend. In Literary Gazette (No. 12, 1968), he wrote:

> "They claim that it means less living accommodation, schools, pre-school institutions, etc. If the birth-rate slows down the living standards can be raised more quickly. That is an extremely short-sighted and erroneous view".

For some time he has been calling for material incentives to encourage the birth-rate in the form of a salary paid to mothers. In his view, the main reason for smaller Soviet families was that parents had to support their children for much longer than in the past, and spend more on their upbringing. An economist writing in Kommunist (of Armenia) on November 16, 1968, said that the State ought to have an active demographic policy and suggested that the policy be "differentiated", i.e., measures to stimulate the birth-rate should not be the same in republics where it was already high, (e.g., in Central Asia) as in the Baltic States or the RSFSR.

The downward trend in birth-rate has provided the Soviet Union with some short-term economic gains. There has been less strain on child-care facilities, and less pressure on the

inadequate housing facilities. Reluctance so far to deal with the issue may in part be due to the expense that any extra family allowances would incur, and the difficulties of a "differentiated" policy which would run the risk of inflaming national feelings.

Bureaucratic inertia and an archaic system of social insurance will mean that any effective change is likely to take a long time to implement. The recent Pravda article may be the prelude to the beginning of some official action. Preliminary work already undertaken for the national census in January, 1970, may have revealed a problem more serious than previously realised.

CLOSER ECONOMIC TIES WILL MEAN GREATER SECURITY IN EUROPE

by Nikolai Patokichev, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade

(Soviet News, 23-12-'69)

In this article published in Izvestia on December 10 under the the heading "For Stronger Economic Ties", the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade shows the close links which exist between stronger economic ties and co-operation among European countries, on the one hand, and the strengthening of security and peace on our continent, on the other.

The Warsaw Treaty states' B u d a p e s t Address to all European countries with regard to the calling of a general European conference on questions of security and co-operation has a t t r a c t e d the attention of the public and met with a wide response in political circles both in Europe and throughout the world.

The communiqué on the recent meeting in Moscow of party and government leaders of socialist countries declares:

"The socialist countries will insistently continue to press for good neighbourliness to replace tension on European soil, for peaceful co-existence to become the universal standard of mutual relations of European states with different social systems and for the people's desire for security and progress to be embodied in actual deeds and in the solution of the topical problems of this part of the world".

The Finnish government, as is common knowledge, has suggested that the all-European conference be held in Helsinki. All the states that signed the Budapest Address are among the 23 states which have already responded favourably to the Finnish move.

Proposed agenda

European countries have shown a keen interest in the recent statement issued by the Prague meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty states, which put forward two specific questions for discussion at the all-European conference: 1. The ensuring of European security and renunciation of the use or threat of force in relations among European states and, 2. The development of commercial, economic, scientific and technical relations on an equal footing, directed towards the development of political co-operation among European states. This document also expresses the view that the conference could be held in Helsinki in the first half of 1970.

The specific proposals and ideas put forward by the countries taking the preparatory steps towards the calling of an all-European conference provide the basis for a discussion on urgent problems, and, in the first place, the problem of creating conditions for peace and security in Europe.

It is clear to everyone that the success of this conference and the ensuring of reliable security in Europe would make it possible to draw up measures for establishing a healthier political climate and easing international tension, and would lead to the easing of the burden of military expenditure and to the gradual release of vast material and manpower resources, which are at present being diverted from peaceful constructive work.

The military machine of the West European countries annually consumes a considerable part - amounting to about 30.000 million dollars - of the material resources which are being created. Hundreds of thousands of scientific workers and engineers are involved in military research, and from 30 to 50 per cent of all expenditures on science and technology are being allocated in individual West European countries for the development of ever more sophisticated military equipment.

In the conditions of the arms drive and continuing tension in the world, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are also compelled to spend a considerable amount of money on defence.

There is no doubt whatsoever that if agreement were reached on questions of collective security in Europe, a favourable atmosphere would also be created for mutually beneficial co-operation on the broadest scale among nations with different social systems, for fuller use of the benefits of the international division of labour, for the development of specialisation and co-operation in production, and for an exchange of achievements in the fields of science, technology and culture.

All this would also be reflected in a further expansion of trade. Foreign trade, more than any other form of international relations, depends on stability in international affairs. Its successful development depends on firm and lasting peace, on a policy of peaceful co-existence.

Another immutable truth is that the expansion of commercial, economic, scientific and technical ties between states of East and West Europe will itself help to bring about an easing of tension, the establishment of better understanding and the development of peaceful and friendly relations between these states. It is not by change that, in the agenda proposed by the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries for the all-European conference, the item on broadening co-operation is linked with that on ensuring European security.

Meanwhile, the opportunities for all-European co-operation are enormous. The expansion of economic ties would enable various countries jointly to work out and implement big projects on a European scale in power engineering and transport, in the air and in water basins, and in public health - questions which directly affect the wellbeing of the population of our continent.

Such projects include the construction of big trans-continental oil and gas pipelines, the creation of a single system of internal waterways linking European rivers, the construction of big power grids and the organisation of a unified European power system.

A conference held in Vienna in 1968 discussed the conditions and opportunities for scientific co-operation in Europe. That conference, organised on the initiative of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, also demonstrated the urgency of numerous other all-European projects, the implementation of which could be considerably easier if all European countries were to tackle them jointly.

The present scientific and technological revolution poses many problems. Some of them could be more successfully solved by pooling and co-ordinating the efforts of states with different social and economic systems. The establishment of good-neighbourly relations between countries in Western and Eastern Europe would also make it possible to bring about a considerable expansion in the sphere of scientific and technical co-operation. This, in turn, would accelerate the rate of technical progress and would bring tangible advantages to all states.

Need for co-operation

All the West European countries, being worried as they are about the steadily increasing gap between themselves and the United States in engineering and technology, recognise the beneficial character of international co-operation in science and technology today. At the same time there is also a growing awareness that the solution of problems concerning the acceleration of technical progress in Europe is linked up with more effective utilisation of the experience of all countries, and in particular the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

One of the important and promising forms of economic co-operation between European countries is industrial co-operation, the wide-scale development of specialisation in production, a reciprocal exchange of patents and licences and, on this basis, a considerable expansion of trade in products of the engineering and chemical industries and a number of branches of manufacturing industry.

The socialist countries have already amassed considerable experience in the fields of science, technology and production, including the co-ordination of research and specialisation and co-operation in production, which provide for a considerable increase in the efficiency of production and a rise in labour

productivity. The decisions of the special 23rd session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are aimed at further developing and improving this mutual co-operation.

The social countries are prepared to expand scientific, technological and production relations with the capitalist countries as well. Given normal relations between states, co-operation on a wide scale is possible in various branches of the economy, in tackling large and mutually-beneficial undertakings and in carrying out joint work.

Let me cite a few examples. In recent years the Soviet Union has concluded agreements on economic, and scientific and technical co-operation with France, Italy and Finland. There is no need to point out that these agreements help to strengthen peace on the continent of Europe with the organisation of co-operation on a wide scale.

Co-operation between the USSR and France is developing successfully. In particular, joint research is being conducted in nuclear physics on the Serpukhov accelerator of elementary particles; the French-Soviet SECAM system of colour television is being introduced in a number of countries; joint work is being done on research into the desalination of sea water and on the high-tension transmission of electricity. The permanent Soviet-French commission is doing a great deal to explore opportunities for expanding specialisation in different branches of industry at an international level and for extending mutually beneficial trade.

Numerous business contacts have been established with Italian firms, too. The Italian Fiat concern is co-operating with Soviet organisations in the production of motor cars; Olivetti is co-operating in the field of computers and Montedison in the chemical industry.

Finland

We are extending economic and technical co-operation with our northern neighbour Finland. The Soviet Union has given Finland a considerable amount of assistance in the construction of a rolling mill for the Rautaruukki firm. Soviet organisations have also helped in the restoration of the Saimaa Canal and in building an atomic power station in Finland. Finland has built

four hydro-electric stations in the Murmansk region in the period since the war. The Soviet-Finnish intergovernmental standing commission on economic co-operation is investigating other fields of economic and technical co-operation.

Our agreements with Britain and Austria provide good prospects for scientific and technical co-operation. Other socialist countries, too, are promoting scientific and technical co-operation with capitalist countries.

The easing of tension and the establishment of relations of trust among European countries will undoubtedly result in the sphere of scientific and technical co-operation being broadened between countries with different social systems and this, in turn, will provide an important impetus for the expansion of trade. The European Economic Commission could also play a positive role in the promotion of economic, and scientific and technical co-operation between European states.

The Soviet Union is one of the world's leading trading powers. The number of countries that are trading partners of the USSR is over 100. With 80 of the, trade is proceeding on the basis of trade and payments agreements. As has already been reported in the press, the Soviet figure for exports exceeded 18,000 million roubles in 1968. In the first nine months of this year, Soviet foreign trade turnover has been developing at a rapid rate, showing an increase of 10.8 per cent over the corresponding period last year.

The resolutions of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union laid kown important steps with regard to our foreign trade. It is not only necessary to increase the volume of foreign trade but also to improve its economic effectiveness. The successful accomplishment of these tasks will promote the development of the national economy and the expansion of Soviet economic relations with foreign countries and will be conducive to the steady implementation of a Leninist foreign policy by the Soviet state.

In carrying out our party's decisions, the Soviet state is making every effort to develop economic relations with foreign countries so as to achieve a further upsurge in the Soviet economy, to strengthen the unity of the countries of the world

socialist system and to increase its might. The Soviet Union's economic relations with foreign countries have become a factor of great international importance and this is in keeping with the interests of the struggle for peace and social progress.

East-West trade

The failure of the cold war policy and a certain lessening of world tension made it possible, at the end of the "fifties", to achieve a substantial development of trade contacts between capitalist and socialist countries. The trade turnover between the USSR and developed capitalist countries increased from 1.223 million roubles in 1958 to 3.852 million roubles in 1968 (the turnover with countries in Western Europe increased from 1.121 million to 3.066 million roubles over the same period). As a result, freight traffic between the USSR and West European countries increased to a great extent.

In exchange for its exports, the Soviet Union purchases machinery and equipment to meet the needs of industrial development, as well as consumer goods and raw materials for industry, in order to satisfy the requirements of the population. This expansion of trade is obviously of benefit to our partners, That is why the expansion of trade contacts has been received with satisfaction both in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe.

Our trade with Finland, France, Italy, Britain, Sweden, Austria and some other West European countries has recently been developing quite successfully. In 1968 alone the turnover of goods with Britain increased by 125 million roubles as compared with 1967; with France it increased by 89 million roubles; with the Federal Republic of Germany by nearly 75 million roubles; with Italy by 48 million roubles, with Sweden by 41,500,000 roubles, and with Belgium by nearly 35 million roubles.

The rapid rates of growth of goods turnover have continued into this year as well. The conclusion of long-term trade agreements and the establishment of generally accepted credit terms for the export of equipment to the USSR by a number of West European countries, have been highly conducive to the extension of trade relations.

At the same time, it is obvious that the adherence of certain West European states to the aggressive policy of NATO hinders utilisation of the objective possibilities for further developing mutually beneficial economic contacts with socialist countries.

The share of socialist countries in the world's industrial output, as we know, amounts to about 40 per cent, with the share of the USSR being nearly 20 per cent. If certain western countries revise their trade policy in relation to the USSR and other socialist countries and take the increased economic potential and big possibilities of these states into account, trade will grow at a much faster rate.

It should also be pointed out here that the restrictions on the export of certain goods to socialist countries which were imposed by NATO strategists when the cold war was at its height, are still having a negative effect on economic contacts. It is obvious that attempts to preserve discriminatory restrictions which are an anachronism nowadays, do not make for the necessary confidence in the stability of trade contacts between partners and interfere with the fruitful development of trade and economic ties and with the establishment of a climate of trust and mutual understanding.

The establishment of a collective security system in Europe will help to create favourable trade and political conditions and to expand East-West trade on this basis. A problem which is objectively ripe for solution is that of organising general European economic co-operation, presupposing the ending of discrimination of any kind and in any form within the framework of Europe as a whole.

The development of all forms of economic contacts between European countries is an important factor for r a p p r o c h e m e n t among European nations and the establishment of an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding among them. These contacts, along with the overall development of scientific technical and cultural co-operation, may become a vital factor making for security and lasting peace in Europe.

Europe can and should be a continent of fruitful and friendly co-operation, an area of peace and mutual understanding.

EUROPEAN TRADE UNION COOPERATION

Raif Dizdarevic

Secretary of the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions' Council

(Review of International Affairs, 5-12-'69)

The need for more extensive and closer cooperation among the European trade unions was again pointed out recently. Some initiatives to this end have come in the wake of the renewed proposal for a dialogue between the European governments on European peace and security. It is only natural that the idea of a dialogue on European trade union cooperation should have been revived at a time of improving climate in European relations and following a number of proposals for the promotion of peace, cooperation and security on the European continent.

The fact is that in the period since the war the relations between the trade unions of the European countries have depended substantially on the relations between the European states in general. The cold war, bloc divisions and extreme tension in relations among different currents within the working-class movement led to a split in the European trade union movement and were responsible for a total absence of any cooperation over a number of years between trade unions supporting various ideologies, political ideas and international affiliations. As a matter of fact, not only was there no cooperation during that period but the trade unions became actively involved in the cold war and all its implications. When the tension in European relations began easing, the divisions inside the European trade union movement, too, became progressively less marked. The improvement of relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe encouraged contacts and initial cooperation among trade unions of various orientations. The disruption of this positive trend in European relations caused by the military intervention in Czechoslovakia temporarily froze the process of improving and expanding trade union cooperation. Now that a favorable tendency in European cooperation has been resumed, relations among the trade unions, too, are showing signs of improving.

Not only have relations between the trade unions belonging to two basic groups [1] been strictly dependent on the general

1 Those enrolled in the World Trade Union Federation and those enrolled in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

state of affairs in relations between states, but any change for the better in trade union relations - almost as a rule - came later, often much later, than improvements in interstate relations. This shows how profound the split in the European trade union movement has been and how much more remains to be done to eliminate its consequences. It is this reality which must be taken into consideration during exchanges of view on the subject: which are the realistic and sure ways of further developing European trade union cooperation and in what manner can the European trade unions increase their contribution to the struggle for peace, cooperation and security on their continent?

The trade unions are interested in anything that could help to promote understanding and cooperation among all European countries and peoples. For, it is the working class of Europe, which they organize, that suffers the consequences of confrontations, bloc rivalries and restriction of cooperation which is becoming so vital a prerequisite of every country's progress. Any aggravation of international relations inevitably stimulates the growth of anti-democratic tendencies within countries and this again most affects the working class. It is therefore normal for the trade unions to support all initiatives conducive to improving relations in Europe. The trade unions do not content themselves merely to uphold and popularize initiatives of state policy, i.e., to remain strictly within the frameworks of government proposals, but wish to advance and encourage proposals of their own for expanding European cooperation on the largest possible scale in a manner which will ensure that this cooperation is not inspired by any bloc considerations and that genuine cooperation among all the European countries is not replaced by any sort of understanding between the two blocs.

The trade union organizations of the European countries can best contribute to such a development of European relations by advancing their own mutual cooperation, by helping to bring peoples and countries closer together through promoting closer relations among themselves, by seeking to overcome the divisions within the European trade union movement, divisions which are a reflection of the existence of the two rival blocs. Genuine co-operation is the way to surmount the consequences of the profound split. This is indeed becoming a necessity of which the vast majority of countries is increasingly aware. The level of

Europe's economic, industrial and technological development, the rapid growth of productive forces and concentration of the means of production, integration and the scientific and technological revolution with all their implications - all this has made comprehensive cooperation an imperative of European progress. For the trade unions - mutual cooperation, exchanges of experience and knowledge, solidarity and collective action are becoming an essential prerequisite of successful activity by the trade union movement of each European country.

With this aim in view, the trade unions of all the European countries - regardless of their ideological and political orientation and international affiliation - must develop extensive and all-round cooperation in a totally independent manner. Practice has shown that there is a growing tendency in Europe toward bilateral contacts and cooperation between trade unions of various orientations. Fostering concrete, meaningful and broad-based bilateral cooperation, grounded in the absolute right of each organization to decide autonomously all matters relating to its internal and international policies, provided a sure way of overcoming the division within the European trade union movement.

We must not forget that bilateral cooperation between trade unions of various orientations has played an important role in eliminating or mitigating the cold war atmosphere in trade union relations and prevented its revival as a result of the latest crises. Not a single opportunity for expanding bilateral cooperation among the trade unions and countries on this continent should therefore be missed.

The permanent orientation of the Trade Union Confederation of Yugoslavia has been development of cooperation with all trade unions willing to cooperate and to make, in this manner, a contribution to international trade union cooperation and working-class solidarity. The Yugoslav trade unions have developed extensive and varied cooperation with practically all the European trade union organizations (with the exception of a few which refuse to cooperate) and are thus contributing tangibly and steadily to general European trade union cooperation.

Well-developed bilateral cooperation provides a sound basis on which to foster other forms of trade union cooperation. It would be wrong, of course, to oppose bilateral forms of

cooperation to multilateral ones, as any form of collaboration which genuinely contributes towards understanding and rapprochement is good and desirable. What is certain, however, is that the kind of multilateral actions resulting from well-developed mutual relations and devised on the basis of a sincere belief in the necessity of joint activity is likely to produce the greatest effect. In point of fact, a variety of form and content in multilateral cooperation among the European trade unions is more necessary today than before. Indeed, it is essential that efforts be made and concrete proposals advanced for new ways of multilateral cooperation which will not be confined to the limited circle of members of one international trade union organization or those unreservedly following a particular policy. Initiatives are needed today for multilateral meetings to discuss matters of general concern to trade unions and countries irrespective of what their basic orientation may be. Such matters are numerous indeed. Most European trade unions today sense the need to exchange and compare views and ideas on such matters as, for example: the effects of the scientific and technological revolution on the structure and position of the working class and on the activity of the trade unions; the position of workers in production and the need for, and forms of, participation by them in management; the problems created by the large-scale migrations of labour and the need for collective action in support of equal conditions for all in the migration areas; the role of trade unions in programming economic development and in the approval of measures of economic policy; the common interest of workers in developed and under-developed countries and the engagement of the trade unions in the quest for ways of reducing the existing differences; experience gained in the struggle against monopolies and the possibility of collective action and so on. The many common problems and interests of working people in various professions and activities afford a broad field for collective activity. The mentioned questions are but a few of the many, in the multilateral consideration of which there may be a broad interest. For a fruitful discussion of these and similar matters it is necessary to seek and find the most flexible kind of forms which would be acceptable to the largest possible number of European trade unions and which would truly contribute to a successful development of European trade union cooperation (trade union forums, for example, where

free discussions on particular questions would be held periodically; or round table conferences, symposia and seminars; meetings of trade union functionaries or experts in various activities; meetings of representatives of the trade union press; debating columns in trade union newspapers, etc.).

Experience has shown that proposals for joint discussions of various matters and joint actions should not be devised only by organizations belonging exclusively to one orientation and should not be based on platforms determined in advance by one group of trade unions. Proposals with a realistic chance of success are those jointly tabled by trade unions of various countries and various orientations and carefully prepared on the basis of extensive preliminary consultations among potential participants - and not only them - proposals which, following such thorough preparations, will ensure an atmosphere of complete tolerance in which the participants will engage in an unbiased exchange of ideas, views and experience on various matters before undertaking joint action in such areas in which they may have a common interest. European trade union cooperation today requires a multilateral approach and it is therefore necessary to devise realistic proposals and to see to it that they are realized. One must start from what appears feasible at this moment so as to generate an atmosphere in which it might also be possible to achieve action unity on matters in which this has not been possible before.

We have reached a stage in which the need for fresh efforts to encourage European trade union cooperation is making itself increasingly felt and in which such efforts have a realistic chance of success. It is encouraging that most European trade unions are studying ways of meeting this necessity and that they should already have approached a dialogue to this effect in which it is imperative that all the European trade unions take part.

The Trade Union Confederation of Yugoslavia will continue to work in this sense, primarily by intensifying its relations with the European trade unions and, besides this, by advancing proposals of its own and supporting all foreign constructive proposals - regardless of where they come from - for expanding European trade union cooperation and for the intensification of relations between the trade union movements of Europe and

other parts of the world.

The Yugoslav trade unions have never viewed European trade union cooperation otherwise than as an integral part of international trade union cooperation. Any initiative which would mean confining trade union cooperation strictly within European boundaries and isolating the European trade union movement from those in other parts of the world would be unacceptable to the Yugoslav trade unions. Intensification of cooperation among the trade unions of the European countries must contribute to the expansion and strengthening of cooperation and solidarity among the trade unions of all the countries of the world. In the past the divergences inside Europe were all too often exported from this continent to trade union movements in other parts of the world. It is now time for the European trade union movement to contribute to international trade union unity much more so than in the past.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TIES PAVE WAY TO ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

(Soviet News, 6-1-'70)

In recent years scientific and technical ties with firms in a number of capitalist countries have become a basis for the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on economic co-operation.

This is one of the arguments in favour of developing scientific and technical co-operation that was mentioned at a recent press conference in Moscow by Djermen Gvishiani, vice-chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology.

Referring to Soviet relations with Fiat of Italy, he said that the contract under which Fiat is taking part in the construction of a huge motorplant in the Volga area had been preceded by numerous contacts between specialists.

Co-operation now extended to many spheres, including technological processes in the production of diesel engines, tractors and other machines.

As well as Italy, the USSR now had intergovernmental agreements on scientific, technical and economic co-operation with France, Britain, Finland, Austria and Belgium.

Soviet-French relations provided a very good example of mutually advantageous co-operation in science and technology, he said.

Colour television was being successfully introduced in both countries on the basis of the system which had been worked out jointly and Soviet and French specialists were taking part in joint exploration of space.

The Soviet Union and France were jointly planning technical projects of importance to both countries, for example for the joint mining of natural resources on the territory of the Soviet Union.

An active exchange of specialists in various industries was taking place with the Federal Republic of Germany and it was planned to establish co-operation with the firm of Thyssen in the production of large diameter steel pipes.

In the recent period Japanese business circles had shown interest in strengthening co-operation in a number of fields, and particularly in chemicals and electrical engineering. Both sides were in favour of developing contacts in instrument making, metallurgy, electronics and radio engineering.

Djermen Gvishiani said that certain western circles, notably in the USA, were proceeding on the basis of the illusory hope that they would be able to hamper Soviet economic progress if they put obstacles in the way of scientific and technical contacts.

It was United States firms which lost by this, because the Soviet Union was always able to solve any problems independently or through co-operation with firms in other capitalist countries, he said.

In conclusion, Djermen Gvishiani said that scientific and technical co-operation between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries now had very great range and depth.

C U L T U R E

SOVIET VOICES OF DISSENT

The growing flow of protest literature from the Soviet Union reflects determination to fight the régime's continuing abuses of basic freedoms.

The expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn from the Russian Federation Writers' Union, following a new civil rights petition by Soviet intellectuals to the United Nations Secretary-General, and an Israeli appeal to U Thant on behalf of Soviet Jews who wish to emigrate, once again highlighted the plight of dissenters in the Soviet Union. Despite arrests, reprisals and harassments, non-conforming intellectuals and minority groups have continued to take advantage of the authorities' concern for the facade of "Socialist legality" to press their case and insist on the observance of the letter of Soviet law. Since the trial of the two Soviet writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, nearly four years ago, they have made it their business to protest publicly against acts of arbitrariness and violations of justice, and their underground publications have listed case histories of repression in scrupulous detail.

While intellectual dissent under Khrushchev largely took the form of unorthodox literature with political overtones and a preoccupation with throwing off the straitjacket of Socialist Realism, the present underground protest movement is more directly political, but in no way subversive. Nor does it, on the whole, question the Marxist-Leninist basis of Soviet society - though criticism of prevailing conditions in works of literary distinction and philosophical insight (like Boris Pasternak's novel, D o c t o r Z h i v a g o) inevitably raise wider issues by implication. The civil rights movement is directed primarily at Soviet practices and the dissenters have made clear that they are appealing to world public opinion only because they have been unable to obtain redress of their grievances through the available legal and administrative channels in their own country.

Reluctance to embark on another Pasternak affair no doubt accounts for the Soviet authorities' delay in letting the diehards of the literary establishment and their allies in the security police (KGB) engineer the disgrace of Solzhenitsyn, who has won

international acclaim as an outstanding writer in the classical Russian tradition. Ever since Khrushchev, in 1962, personally authorised the publication of his novel, One day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich - a harrowing account of Stalin's labour camps, of which the author was an inmate - Solzhenitsyn has been a target for the Stalinists in the writers' union and elsewhere who have now taken their revenge by expelling him. The news was officially confirmed on November 12 in the Soviet weekly, Literary Gazette, which said that two days previously the Secretariat of the Russian Federation Writers' Union had upheld the expulsion decision taken on November 4 by the union's local branch in Ryazan to which Solzhenitsyn belongs. His behaviour was described as "anti-social" and he was accused of helping to promote the campaign of slander against the Soviet Union by not preventing his books from being published abroad.

Solzhenitsyn has denied that he had any part in the smuggling of his works to the West; indeed, he pointed out that the Soviet authorities first obstructed his efforts to convey his refusal of publication rights to publishers abroad and then deliberately waited until Cancer Ward was published before accusing him of not objecting strongly enough.

Defiant stand

One of Solzhenitsyn's unforgivable crimes in the eyes of Soviet officials was his refusal to retract his letter of May, 1967, to the Fourth Writers' Congress, in which he demanded an end to censorship, criticised union officials for their complicity in persecuting controversial writers, and exposed the methods used to silence and defame him. Solzhenitsyn's last works to be published in the Soviet Union were a series of short stories which appeared in 1963 in the progressive literary monthly, Novy Mir, and a further story in the same magazine in 1966. The novels Cancer Ward and The First Circle, which received high praise in the West, were banned by the Soviet censor and even One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich has been withdrawn from Soviet libraries. But Solzhenitsyn's books continue to circulate clandestinely in typescript among his admirers. The support he commands among fellow writers was reflected in the reports

that the eminent writer, Kornei Chukovsky, who died recently, had left him money, that Novy Mir's editor, Alexander Tvardovsky, had defended him at the Moscow meeting, and that several other writers, including the Georgian poet and ballad writer, Bulat Odudzhava, had demanded an emergency meeting of the Writers' Union to discuss his expulsion.

Loss of union membership deprives the 51-year-old Solzhenitsyn of the last chance to see his work published in his own country under present conditions and is bound to make his life even more difficult. Unofficial transcripts of his arguments at the Ryazan meeting, where he was expelled by five votes to one (his own), and of his impassioned denunciation of the Moscow proceedings showed, however, that he is not giving way. Solzhenitsyn emphasised that his expulsion had been a shabby plot executed in disregard of the union's own statutes. By not informing him in time of the Moscow meeting and denying him the right to attend and defend himself, his detractors had "openly shown that the decision preceded the deliberations". Disregarding the considerable risks involved in continued definance of the authorities, Solzhenitsyn pledged to pursue the struggle for "honest and complete free speech - the first condition of health in any society, including our own". He recalled the union's record in hounding great poets like Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova and indicated that reprisals may be afoot against other dissident writers like Lev Kopelev, who had "served ten years in a camp though innocent", and Lydia Chukhovskaya, who challenged Sholokhov's reactionary views in an open letter two years ago At the collective farmers' congress in November Sholokhov again associated himself with the campaign against liberal writers, likening them to Colorado beetles - "those who eat Soviet bread but want to serve Western bourgeois masters."

Citizens' petition

Solzhenitsyn's case has given added point to the petition addressed to U Thant in September by the Soviet Action Group for Civil Rights. Like its predecessor of last May, this appeal to world opinion by 46 intellectuals and others drew attention to the persecution of individuals for their convictions and urged the Secretary-General to place the issue before the United Nations

Human Rights Commission. Again the signatories had submitted their appeal to the United Nations centre in Moscow for transmission to New York. (The centre, staffed entirely by Soviet citizens, denied ever having received the first appeal and refused to forward the second, which was communicated to foreign correspondents in Moscow on October 1.) The May petition had listed the political trials of intellectuals resulting in the conviction of more than 100 people since the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel, the persecution of national minorities such as the Crimean Tartars (deported from their homeland in 1944) who are campaigning for the full restitution of their rights, and the moves against Soviet Jews and believers of other religious denominations. The signatories of the second appeal included the wife and son of General Grigorenko, who was arrested last May in Tashkent for defending the cause of the Crimean Tatars; Ludmila Ginsburg, mother of the sentenced writer; the young son of Yuli Daniel; the mathematician Alexander Esenin-Volpin, who has been confined several times to mental institutions for criticising Soviet malpractices, and the poets Anatoly Jacobson and Natalia Gorbanevskaya. One of the group's leaders is Petr Yakir, the 46-year-old historian and son of General Yakir (executed during Stalin's purges of the Red Army in 1937), who has spent many years in prison camps.

The petitioners reported that several of the signatories of the first appeal to the UN had already been victimised. Those arrested recently included G. Altunyan, a Kharkov engineer; A. E. Krasnov-Levitin, a religious writer and former prisoner of Stalin's camps; Vladimir Borisov, a Leningrad worker; Mustafa Dzemilev, a Crimean Tatar, and Oleg Vorobiev, who has apparently been confined to a psychiatric hospital. The detention of three more petitioners, one of whom is Mrs Grigorenko, has since been reported, as well as the sentencing to three years' jail of Altunyan.

Among four appeals accompanying the letter to U Thant, one on behalf of Krasnov-Levitin and Boris Talantov, a teacher known for his protests against religious persecution, was addressed to the World Council of Churches, the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was signed by young Orthodox believers, including Vera Lashkova, a friend of Alexander Ginsburg. In view of the constant intimidation to which they are

exposed and the fate of civil rights workers like Dr. Pavel Litvinov and Mrs. Larissa Daniel, sent into exile for five and four years respectively after their silent protest in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the courage of those who continue to dissent is remarkable.

Abortive reprisals

So far the Soviet authorities' policy of selective rather than whole-sale repression and of infiltration of the dissidents' ranks has been unsuccessful. Though the civil rights activists are a small minority, consisting mainly of teachers, scientists, technicians and idealistic young people, a much larger segment of the intelligentsia is clearly in sympathy with them. Academician Sakharov's essay on P r o g r e s s, C o e x i s t e n c e a n d I n t e l l e c t u a l F r e e d o m, which was circulated in typescript, and the reports that hundreds of letters were sent to the editorial board of N o v y M i r in support of its stand against the attacks of its conservative detractors, point to the strength and spread of the ferment.

A recently compiled bibliography of clandestine literature which has percolated to the West runs into 30 pages, while the most important Soviet underground compilation, the C h r o n i c l e o f C u r r e n t E v e n t s (nine issues of which had reached the outside world by the end of October) lists and summarises many documents as yet unknown outside the Soviet Union. The C h r o n i c l e brings evidence of multiplied contacts among formerly isolated dissident groups and its purpose is to arouse the uncommitted mass of the intelligentsia by drawing attention to the frequent infringements of "Socialist legality". An interesting example of the civil rights workers' constitutionalist approach is their dissemination of A. Esenin-Volpin's J u r i d i c a l h a n d b o o k f o r t h o s e f a c i n g i n t e r r o g a t i o n.

The unchecked growth of underground writings known as s a m i z d a t (self-publication) - a tradition going back to the 19th century when circulation in manuscript form was one way of evading the Tsarist censors - has caused increasing concern to the Soviet authorities. In the January issue of the youth magazine, Y o u n g C o m m u n i s t, a KGB General, A. Malygin, complained about "all sorts of manuscript writings of an ideologically harmful nature which have begun to be

circulated in recent times", and the August issue of the atheist journal, S c i e n c e a n d R e l i g i o n, referring to manuscripts on religious matters, accused one of their best-known authors, Krasnov-Levitin, of "political disloyalty".

The Soviet régime is worried, too, at the effect the flow of protests is having on its image abroad. In an article in I z v e s t i a (October 17), Vladimir Kurovedov, Chairman of the USSR Council for Religious Affairs, tried to refute "the mendacious fabrications that freedom of conscience is suppressed in the USSR" and to prove that only those who broke the Soviet laws on religion by "illegal" meetings, demonstrations in public places and the distribution of leaflets were punished. His special target was the breakaway movement of Russian Baptists known as i n i t s i a t i v n i k i, whom he accused of actively co-operating with the foreign purveyors of anti-Soviet propaganda by circulating slanderous documents about religious persecution in the Soviet Union. The article, however, tended to confirm what the writings smuggled out of the Soviet Union are saying - that the offensive against dissident believers is gathering strenth.

Despite the increasing evidence reaching the outside world, action by the United Nations is hampered by the fact that the Soviet Union, while adhering to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has not signed the optional protocol to the covenant on "communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any rights set forth in the covenant". At home, as in its international undertakings, the Soviet Union subscribes to the principle of the individual's right to freedom of expression and belief, while denying him the possibility of complaining effectively about its violations. Indeed, many s a m i z d a t documents demonstrate the risks which attend such legitimate complaints.

SOVIET-WESTERN 'THINK TANK' CONSIDERED

(International Herald Tribune, 19-12-'69)

A joint Soviet-Western research institute or "think-tank" to study problems of modern industrial societies, such as congested cities and pollution - could be in the offing.

Delegates including McGeorge Bundy for the United States

"have met several times, most recently last summer," and concrete action "might possibly come early next year," said Science Magazine, organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The meetings have been "entirely non-governmental," other sources said, though Mr. Bundy, now head of the Ford Foundation, was asked to launch the project in late 1966 by President Johnson, while he was Mr. Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs.

"What happened," said one source, "is that the whole thing was dormant for I don't know how long. But in recent days it began to pick up new interest."

Another source cautioned that "nothing dramatic has happened yet. But it may be gradually evolving. And the British, not the Americans, were the recent convenors. It is not secret - there were low-key newspaper accounts and a communique out of Moscow some time ago."

Mr. Bundy declined comment, but Science said: "It is reported that Bundy feels at this point that his role is completed."

Among others taking part in the discussions: Herman Gvishiani, vice-chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology and son-in-law of Soviet Vice-Premier Alexei Kosygin; Sir Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific adviser to the British government; Aueriolo Peccei, executive of Italy's Olivetti Corp, and West German and French representatives.

A joint Soviet-Western research institute, it was stated, might have a staff of some 40, with a site in Western Europe.

According to an American source, said Science, "the intention is to operate it as a private, non-governmental organization, perhaps on the U.S. pattern of government funding for non-profit research institutions, such as the Rand Corp. The institute, it was explained, would be concerned not so much with studying specific problems of industrialized societies as with developing techniques and methodologies that might be universally employed in dealing with such common problems as pollution, transportation, housing and education."

LENINIST PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET ART AND LITERATURE

Joint Meeting of Creative Workers

(Soviet News, 16-12-'69)

"Lenin put forward the only true criterion by which we should judge the value, social importance, and fidelity to truth of a creative work; that criterion has always been and continues to be the class basis."

This was stated by the Khirghizian writer Chingiz Aitmatov at the joint meeting held in Moscow on December 10 and 11 of representatives from different Soviet organisations of intellectuals and creative workers.

"Guided by these principles," he said, "we have created a multinational artistic culture which is unprecedented in the history of mankind.

"This culture has concerned itself with the achievements of big and small peoples and with the whole of world culture."

And the sculptor Nikolai Tomsky, president of the USSR Academy of Arts said:

"The art of socialist realism is based on a true communist attitude. We do not hide the class nature of our aesthetic position.

"We require that art should be a means of bringing people closer together in the service of the greatest creative ideas - the ideas of the triumph of communism."

The meeting was called to discuss the implementation of the Leninist principles of communist spirit and people's art in Soviet art and literature.

It was attended by over a thousand representatives from the organisations of writers, artists, composers, film workers, architects, journalists, and the USSR Theatrical Society, as well as secretaries of central committees of Communist Parties of the republics and some local party committees.

Pyotr Demichev, alternate member of the political bureau and secretary of the CPSU central committee, attended and spoke at the last session.

Speaking at the first session, Nikolai Ponomaryov, one of the leaders of the Artists' Union, said:

"What matters is not just the number of medals and prizes won by Soviet artists at international exhibitions - although their number is considerable - but also recognition of the achievements of socialist art and the spread of humanist ideology in wide circles abroad."

While scoring successes abroad, he said, Soviet artists should fight actively against bourgeois reactionary culture and assess the ideological struggle in presentday art abroad in concrete terms.

"We have always supported and will continue to support those foreign artists who express the interests of the working people and fight for democracy.

Solidarity

"We express our deep solidarity with the artists of the heroic Vietnamese people and are glad to popularise the art of Siqueiros, Manzu, Fougeron, Guttuso, Kent and many other progressive artists," he said.

Speaking in another session, Georgi Markov, secretary of the board of the Union of Writers, said that socialist literature, contrary to the predictions by bourgeois ideologists, was continuing to advance steadily.

The Leninist principles, he said, had made literature into a powerful social force in the building of socialism and had made it part of the common working class cause.

The level of ideological militancy among writers had been raised, which was of great importance under the conditions of acute political struggle and increasing attack by enemies.

The Ryazan Writers' organisation had shown its political maturity by making a profound and correct assessment of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's anti-social behaviour.

And its decision had been widely supported by writers generally throughout the country, he said.

He quoted Lenin's statement that modern philosophy was as partisan as philosophy was 2,000 years ago as an example of Lenin's deep understanding of the class character of all aspects of culture in a class society.

"This is why we must remind ourselves again and again of the immutable demands of Lenin's method: to assess phenomena in their concrete historical conditions, to expose their class basis and to look for answers to today's urgent problems in the present, carefully examining the main modern trends and analysing, critically and systematically, the cultural expression of the present, without ever losing sight of the goal we are all aspiring to," he said.

"Lenin taught that art belonged to the people, not only because it serves them but also because it derives its origin from the life of the people and is directly connected in the cultural experience of the people.

"Leninism teaches that a true artist is always involved in the life of the people by various threads, and a true work of art is one which reflects at least a small part of the life of the people, at least part of the thinking and mood of the people."

Other speakers included the poet Nikolai Tikhonov, the actor Mikhail Tsarev, film directors Lev Kulidjanov and Sergei Gerasimov and the composer Tikhon Khrennikov.

The theme which ran through all the speeches was that Soviet artists should create in their work the picture of the new man, a fighter and creator, reassert noble humanitarian ideals and infuse with their enthusiasm millions of readers and spectators.

Soviet artists should actively fight with their works against alien bourgeois ideology. The main task was to give a true portrayal of life and describe the spiritual and material struggle of the Soviet people to build communism.

The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that Soviet intellectuals, loyal to the Leninist principles of communist spirit and people's art, would carry out their supreme social duty with honour.

MEANING OF YUGOSLAV PARTY PRESIDIUM DOCUMENT ON INFORMATION MEDIA

(Radio Free Europe, 4-12-'69)

Summary: A document dealing with the role of the information media in Yugoslavia was adopted at the November 17 meeting of the Presidium of the Yugoslav League of Communists. The text of the document was published on November 27. The chief purpose of the document is to prevent the "misuse of freedom" in the press, radio and television, and to mobilize the journalists and members of the Party, to follow more carefully tne YLC's ideological line. The document promises not to alter the essence of press freedom. It maintains that the information media should become neither weapons in the hands of private persons, nor instruments of state and party organs.

On November 17 of this year, the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia met in Belgrade to discuss the position of the information media in Yugoslavia. Only ten days later, on November 27, an 8,000 word document was published under the title, "Topical Questions Concerning the Social Position and Role of Information Activity and Information Media in General in the Present Phase of the Development of the Socialist Self-Managing System." (Komunist, Belgrade, 27 November 1969) The sub-title of the document is more revealing: "Ideological-Political Platform for the Activity of the League of Communists."

The purpose of this paper is not to outline this lengthy document, but rather to comment on the meaning of the Presidium's decision. It will try to answer the basic question: does the document mean a simple tightening of the screw on the information media (press, radio, and television), or is it only one of the "regular measures" taken from time to time for the purpose of preventing "misuse of freedom," without touching the essence of freedom itself? (Articles 39 and 40 of the Yugoslav Constitution of April 1963 deal with freedom of expression. Article 39 stipulates in brief: "Freedom of thought and determination shall be guaranteed." The first three (out of seven) paragraphs of Article 40 read: "Freedom of the press and other media of information, freedom

of association, freedom of speech and public expression, freedom of meeting and other public gatherings shall be guaranteed. "The citizens shall have the right to express and publish their opinions through the information media, to inform themselves through the information media, to publish newspapers and other publications and to disseminate information by other communication media."
"These freedoms and rights shall not be used by anyone to overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order determined by the Constitution, to endanger peace, international cooperation on terms of equality, or the independence of the country; to disseminate national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance, or to incite to crime or in any manner offend public decency." Sluzbeni list, (Official Gazette), Belgrade, No. 14, 10 April 1963, p.268.)

A close reading of the document indicates that the latter might be the case. While promising not to alter the basic freedom of the journalists working in the press, radio and television, the Party also insists that "especially the journalists, members of the Party," must carefully watch the ideological line on which the system of self-management has been based.

Two-front Struggle

As far back as at the Ninth Congress of the LCY (March 1969), Tito maintained that "freedom of writing implies greater responsibility for the journalists, especially those who are members of the Party." (Borba, Belgrade, 13 March 1969) He advised the journalists "not to go sensation hunting." Even though market laws are accepted in Yugoslavia as one of the bases of the economy, "one should be aware that any absolutization and uncontrolled activity of the market laws in the sphere of the press, and a struggle to increase circulation at any price, especially when all this becomes an end in itself, inevitably leads to the outbreak of uncontrolled actions, blind commercialism, petty-bourgeois sensationalism, trashy literature, kitsch, lack of culture and a flattering of primitive taste." (Ibid.)

The above-mentioned ideas, expressed by Tito at the Ninth Congress, are now restated in great detail by the Presidium's document. As Tito in his report, the document also pledges that no restriction upon the operation of the market laws in the

sphere of information media, especially in the press, will be introduced. However, everything should be done to prevent the "privatization" of the information media both by definite groups of people who have until now behaved as separate "power groups" and by state and political organs which are inclined to turn the media into mere instruments serving their own interests.

Of course, all this is easier said than done. The basic trouble is that, in the economic field, the market laws have gone rather far -- also influencing the publishing houses, which would like to earn money for their employees -- yet, the liberal measures applied in economic matters have not yet been accepted when it comes to ideology. This is why the document separates: (a) the self-management system in publishing houses, radio and television, whose chief aim has been to regulate "the socio-economic relationships, "from (b) the policy of the editorial boards. Every attempt to merge these two "different" activities must inevitably lead to a conflict between ideology and everyday practice, the Yugoslav leaders believe.

The following example can best clarify the essence of the problem; if a publishing house, organized on the basis of the self-management system, would want to pay its workers better salaries and wages, it would have to start publishing popular newspapers and periodicals, whose high circulation would then bring the enterprise more money. This is why, for instance, many Yugoslav publishing houses publish pornography and comics, or at least include in their "decent," everyday issues, full pages of sexy photographs and comics. Were such a publishing house to observe the "ideological line," it would have to publish the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Tito, which would automatically make the enterprise go bankrupt.

For this reason, the document passed by the Presidium insists that the material situation of the journalists be solved. In other words, the publishing houses should be subsidized in order to avoid being dependent on the market. Thus, both the ideological and material situation of the journalists would be improved. What would still not be solved is the situation on the press market, because nobody in Yugoslavia, least of all the intellectuals, can be compelled by anybody to buy newspapers and periodicals which are dull and monotonous. In the past, something which people popularly called "ideological pornography" was in demand, i.e.,

polemics with other East European countries. But if such polemics are discontinued, then the citizens -- accustomed to press freedom -- may try to find the equivalent in the West. After all, there are now about 500,000 Yugoslavs working in Western Europe.

This is the reason for the very slim probability that the provisions of the document could be fully implemented. While "editorial councils" (popularly called "watchdog" committees) to watch over the ideological line will be created in the publishing houses side by side with the already existing editorial boards, it will be extremely difficult to achieve the ideological purity envisaged by Tito and his colleagues. Kardelj himself said recently that he was afraid that everything contained in the document might remain "only a formula, rather than reality." (Borba, 18 November 1969) Still, the document is hoped to achieve at least three things: (1) to make it impossible for everybody to write about foreign policy, especially to polemicize with the Soviet Union and its allies; (In his speech in the shipbuilding yard of Kraljevica in Dalmatia, President Tito revealed that "our press is being accused of continually writing against the Soviet Union." Tito warned the journalists to be careful and never to forget the country's interests. (Politika, Belgrade, 3 May 1969). (2) to prevent "nationalistic-chauvinistic outbursts" in the press; and (3) to compel the state authorities to become "more open" toward the press, thus avoiding difficulties arising from the people's insufficient information concerning everyday politics. A new press law now being discussed is to deal with all these problems.

JUVENILE CRIME RISE REPORTED BY PRESS IN EASTERN EUROPE

(International Herald Tribune, 29-12-'69)

Newspapers in the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe have been presenting an increasing number of reports on juvenile crime, teen-age addiction to drugs and sexual promiscuity, indicating that they are becoming serious problems.

The Bucharest press describes bands of teen-age rowdies roaming the streets and jostling passers-by, particularly unescorted women.

To combat juvenile delinquency, Hungary has just lowered to 14 the age at which every citizen has to carry identification papers at all times. The age previously was 16.

In Czechoslovakia, according to the press there, Bratislavan youths get high on cleaning fluid sniffed through a rag wound around a soft-drink bottle and young addicts in Prague steal cactus plants from the botanical garden to extract mescaline, a hallucinogenic drug.

In Poland, venereal diseases, especially among young people, are spreading at an epidemic rate, the newspapers say.

The Wild West

Alienated youth used to be depicted in Soviet-bloc countries as a typical product of the "decadent" capitalistic West.

Few, if any, attempts have so far been made in print in Eastern Europe to analyze the sociological cultural and, possibly, political causes of what's wrong, if anything, with growing numbers of young people there.

Hooligans is a frequently used name for all wayward youths. Circumstantial evidence that can be gleaned from Eastern European newspapers and random observation point to bored and politically frustrated children of a relatively affluent new class of officials, technocrats and plant managers as a major source of the present teen-age trouble.

The Hungarian press has repeatedly blamed the severe housing shortage in Budapest, where beds are often rented to two or three persons in shifts, as a reason for juvenile delinquency.

The Prague weekly Kvety rejected recently the theory that youthful drug addicts were actually political protesters. "They do not lean toward Maoism or anything else, as many sociologists or educators think," the magazine contended.

Kvety, a Communist party publication, quoted a 19-year-old worker as having boasted he was receiving small doses of LSD from friends in the United States. The magazine declared that most of the drugs used by Prague addicts were bought on forged prescriptions or stolen.

ANOTHER KIND OF 1984

by C.L. Sulzberger
(International Herald Tribune, 17-12-'69)

"I have no doubt that this great Eastern Slav empire, created

by Germans, Byzantines and Mongols, has entered the last decades of its existence. Just as the adoption of Christianity determined the date of the fall of the Roman Empire but did not save it from the inevitable end, so Marxist doctrine has delayed the break-up of the Russian Empire - the third Rome - but has been powerless to avert it."

The extraordinary thing about this gloomy forecast is that it is made by a Soviet citizen in Moscow - a young writer and journalist from the s a m i z d a t group of dissidents who, unafraid of Soviet bureaucracy, have developed a self-published underground of writing. Andrei Amalrik is the 31-year-old author of an article called "Will the U.S.S.R. survive until 1984?" in the current issue of Survey, a Journal of Soviet and East European Studies. The article will appear in a book soon to be published in America and has obviously been sent out of Russia by unofficial means.

Exiled to Siberia

The author, a member of the small cultural opposition in the Soviet Union, has once been imprisoned for his audacity and once exiled to Siberia. According to Survey: "Now, in patient expectation of further imprisonment, he occupies himself growing cucumbers and tomatoes." Any reader of his article cannot doubt that Russia's toughly intolerant regime will not wait long before it again sends Amalrik to jail. For, using George Orwell's famous fictional date of 1984, he arrives at conclusions cataclysmic for Russia.

He begins by asserting that Soviet bureaucrats "once having gained power, possess a brilliant capacity for keeping it in their own hands but have no idea whatever of how to use it" and "regard any kind of new idea as an assault on their own rights." Although conceding that citizens now feel freer and more secure than in Stalin's day, Amalrik insists:

"The degree of freedom which we enjoy is still minimal as compared with that needed for a developed society." He reasons: "If, however, we consider the current 'liberation' not as the regeneration but as the growing decrepitude of the regime, then the logical result will be its death, after which anarchy will follow."

War predicted

His scenario is a horror story starting with war between Russia and China which he predicts "will start sometime between 1975 and 1980."

In this conflict he assumes the Soviet Union will not dare unleash its enormous nuclear power to destroy the Chinese and, as a consequence, will become bogged down in massive and hopeless partisan-type campaigns.

"As soon as it becomes clear that the military conflict between the U.S.S.R. and China is assuming a protracted character," Amalrik forecasts disaster for his country. The Germans seeing Russian forces switched into Asia, will reunite. This will encourage "desovietization " of East European lands.

"The 'desovietized' East European countries will dash round like bridleless steeds and, finding the U.S.S.R. powerless in Europe, will put forward territorial claims that have not been forgotten, though long hushed up: Poland to Lvov and Vilna, Germany to Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg), Hungary to Transcarpathia, Romania to Bessarabia. It is not excluded that Finland too may possibly advance claims to Viborg and Pechenga" and Japan to "the Kurile Islands, at first, then to Sakhalin and later, if China gains successes, even to part of the Soviet Far East."

Amid this fury, Amalrik sees Moscow's "bureaucratic regime unable by its habitual half-measures simultaneously to wage a war, solve the economic difficulties and suppress or satisfy public discontent." It will consequently "lose control over the country and even contact with reality.....power will pass into the hands of extremist groups and elements and the country will begin to disintegrate in an atmosphere of anarchy, violence and intense national hatred."

This is an unreal and most unlikely prospect but boldly set forth in Amalrik's provocative nightmare. The vital fact is that idealists exist in the U.S.S.R. who are brave enough to proclaim their shattering deception with the Communist dream, although aware they must suffer for it.

A new generation of revolutionists in revolutionary Russia worships truth as freedom and, as the post-Stalin regime is bitterly discovering, one cannot hope by rationing freedom to obscure truth. This is more important than Amalrik's morbid forecast.

TASKS OF SOVIET LITERATURE DEFINED BY MOSCOW WRITERS' LEADER

(Soviet News, 6-1-'70)

The tasks of Soviet literature and art are the truthful portrayal of the life of Soviet society and the assertion in this of the new communist relations b e t w e e n people, said Sergei Mikhalkov, head of the Moscow writers' organisation, in a recent interview given to Mr. Mark de Villiers, the Moscow correspondent of the T o r o n t o T e l e g r a p h.

T a s s quotes the Soviet writer as saying:

"No politically neutral works have existed in world literature, nor do they exist, for denial of the political nature of art and literature is in itself a political position or stand on the artist's part."

Asked by the Canadian correspondent if possibilities existed in the Soviet Union for expressing various tastes and views in art, Mikhalkov replied:

"The Soviet Union's multinational literature and art are diverse in nature and express the views and tastes of many gifted writers in all genres and directions.

"The main thing is the writer's world outlook," he went on. "If it is in complete contradiction with the world outlook and ideals of most members of society, it will inevitably clash with society. For instance, the views of the writer Alexander Solzhenitsin, based on his world outlook, clashed with the views of most members of the voluntary organisation of Soviet writers, as expressed in the charter of the USSR Writers' Union. That is precisely why he is no longer a member of that union."

Going on to explain his own point of view, Sergei Mikhalkov said:

"An ideologically immature writer is one who, even if he is a gifted writer, has not attained the level of advanced social consciousness."

Referring to the western concept of "absolute freedom for creative work," Sergei Mikhalkov said: "Absolute freedom of creativity does not exist..... In the West the artist is pressured

by the system, with which he may disagree but on which he is completely dependent."

He summed up the features of decadent bourgeois art as follows:

"The idea of man's vulnerability and lack of faith in his creative powers. Contempt for the heroic. Unlimited scepticism, pessimism and cynicism. Contempt for the people. The treatment of man as a consumer. Racialism and pornography to suit the tastes of backward readers and to indulge their animal instincts. The dependence of art and literature on business and profit."

At the same time he emphasised that in the Soviet Union it had never been the case that all western art had been regarded as decadent and bourgeois.

"A realist art and an art with a socialist orientation are successfully developing there," he remarked.

"Existing in capitalist countries are various trends in literature and art - different trends which are sometimes represented by outstanding masters from whom much can be learned."

Touching on problems of creative method, Mikhalkov said:

"Modernism leads the artist away from reality into the world of subjective i l l u s i o n s. The pseudo-innovator is carried away by form for form's sake."

MASS MEDIA CRITICIZED FOR DEMORALIZING YOUTH

(Radio Free Europe, 5-1-'70)

In its 13 December 1969 issue Nepszava, the trade union's Budapest daily, carried an article by journalist Jeno Gerencseri entitled "Press, Radio, Television, and Youth," which criticized the mass media for not combating bourgeois ideology forcefully enough.

Gerencseri said that the mass information and entertainment media have a tremendous impact on youth. When the mass media are used by the community to further society's ends, a great service is done for the moral and political education of youth. When, however, these media are not in step with socialist education they may devastate the young people's souls. The

educational potential of the mass media is much greater than its present utilization suggests. The dissemination even of bourgeois ideology by the press and by radio and television is tolerated. This situation enrages those who work for socialism enthusiastically. It is especially irritating at the present time, when imperialism is attacking most vigorously on the ideological front, yet gives no opportunities for Communist propaganda on its own territory.

The capitalist states spread the belief that "capitalism" means "free world," and that a complete and unrestricted freedom of press exists only within the capitalist system, because under socialism the press is directed. Many Hungarian citizens and young people are misled by this lie. The facts, however, expose the falsity of such propaganda. The bourgeois press, radio and television shun the straight forward presentation of speeches made by Communist statesmen: they comment on them instead. Western theaters, movies, radio and television do not perform plays, films or songs which disseminate Communist propaganda, whereas Hungarian theaters, movies, radio and television continually present Western works which show the American, English, French or Italian way of life -- sometimes without comment, sometimes imputing a progressive spirit to these works which in reality exists only in the imagination of the Budapest petty bourgeois. It is questionable whether our young people draw the proper lesson from these overabundant "works." Moreover, trash is creeping in with these "artistic works" from the West, trash which enables the more extreme Western fashions, bourgeois morals, and the bourgeois way of life to gain ground and to exert a tremendous influence on Hungarian youth. Sometimes under the guise of "contemporariness" and "modernity", old material is imported to corrupt the healthy and developing spirit of youth. The socialist countries should not be isolated from international culture, but should be screened from that culture's worthless trash; the ideological poisoning of youth should be prevented.

Gerencseri then argues that the main problem is caused by the fact that Western works, presented in Hungary without proper comment and adequate counterpropaganda, are often of dubious quality. Critics who are strict when dealing with socialist works are lenient toward the products of bourgeois art; they assess their artistic values but avoid any criticism of their ideological content or political message. They accept it as natural that a bourgeois

work should have a bourgeois content, forgetting that it also has a bourgeois effect. Youth, which lacks experience and a critical sense toward capitalism cannot be allowed to draw conclusions from such works without guidance.

If the merchants of culture are affected by business considerations, the press workers at least should combat disturbing and demoralizing works.

For understandable reasons, cultural policy does not erect barriers round literature and art. Even works which differ from socialist principles can be published or performed. The view of the Party is that style and taste cannot be imposed on people by administrative measures. However, Communists working on the cultural front have to fight works which are harmful because they spread bourgeois ideology. Those who disseminate bourgeois ideology among youth in the pursuit of business interests or spurious success cannot be held blameless, nor can those who pursue an ostrich policy be relieved of their responsibility.

The educational work of parents, teachers and activists of the Party and mass organizations will be successful only when the workers in the press, in radio and television, in the theaters and movies, accept a greater responsibility for the socialist education of the younger generation.

INDEX TO VOLUME III, 1969