

6261

**Communist Reassessment of
Capitalism, its Resultant Strategy
and the Western Response**

E 21

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN



1 208 268 6

Communist Reassessment of Capitalism, its Resultant Strategy and the Western Response

Interdoc Conference

**Schenking van de Leidse
Studentenvereniging
voor Internationale
Betrekkingen (SIB)**

Bad Tönisstein, 22nd and 23rd September, 1967

International Documentation and Information Centre
(INTERDOC)
Van Stolkweg 10, The Hague
The Netherlands



Contents

Some thoughts on Communist policy by Rolf Geyer	5
Reform as a form of revolution. New Communist tactics and arguments for the region of Western Europe by Professor Hans Lades	13
The British situation in regard to Communist reassessment of capitalism by C. H. Ellis	24
Discussion following the presentation of the British paper	
General trends in the program of action of the Communist party of France by Dr. W. Berner	30
Discussion following the presentation of the French paper	
An analysis of the situation in Germany by Dr. N. von Grote	37
The New Left in the German student body by Dr. E. Foertsch	43
An Italian response by Professor A. Benedetti	48
Discussion following the presentation of the Italian paper	
Suggestions for a Western response by C. C. van den Heuvel	56
Conclusions by Rolf Geyer	65

Some Thoughts on Communist Policy

by

Rolf Geyer

The theme of our meeting is: Communist reassessment of capitalism; its resultant strategy and the Western response.

Within the framework of this subject I have set myself the task as a basis for the following speeches of giving an outline of the present Communist policy towards the West. This policy seems to be self-contradictory, although, for instance, one may still recognize world-revolutionary motives for policy towards the Near East (to quote a recent statement by our Foreign Minister). Communism, at present, does not reckon with the possibility of violent and quick internal changes within Western countries.

The following can be seen as aims:

Dissolution of NATO

Expulsion of the USA from Europe, and the effort to block the policy of the German Federal Republic towards the East, –

that is to say, aims of which the motives and connections with other problems of the Soviet Union may be judged differently according to the attitude of the person who makes the analyses. It is even more difficult to find an answer to the question regarding Communist policy if one takes into account Soviet policy in Asia or the Soviet Union's attitude towards Latin America. One may ask the question whether there is a uniform Communist concept which is not immediately revealed to us, or possibly whether the Soviet Union is in a position which compels her to act incoherently or even forces her to tuck about in order to avoid taking a fundamental decision – as is being said by many commentators.

The question concerning the existence of 'hawks' or 'doves' in the Kremlin, or of the momentary standing of Communist ideology is – on

this assumption – as understandable as all the deliberations made as to an alleged or real change in Communism.

One can define policy as the purposeful and systematic action of politically relevant groups – in this connection, the Soviet bloc. Such action is dependent on various factors:

- The political aims;
- The specific individual situation in the broadest sense.

(It therefore involves the specific spiritual, political, and ideological view of life as well as the military and economic potential.) Assessment of the situation on the part of the political partner or opponent certainly also plays a role; yet it is quite irrelevant whether this assessment is correct or whether it is distorted or even merely the outcome of "wishful thinking". Political decisions and the methods applied are largely influenced by this judgement, even within Communism.

Let us deal first with the Communist evaluation of the situation. The general situation of the capitalist world hardly conforms to the expectations which were cherished by World Communism on the prognostications of its classic theorists. Theory and reality are highly contradictory, in spite of certain secondary events which are seized upon with relief as confirmation of this theory. Capitalism, which was declared to be nearly dead by Lenin 50 years ago, has turned out to be remarkably viable in spite of all the "malaises" which we are faced with; despite all internal criticism which makes itself heard among us and which sometimes manifests itself in strikes, disturbances by students, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, Easter marches etc., the prospects for foreseeable changes in our own social order are negligible. And it cannot be concealed from the Communist theorists that the "impoverished proletariat" which is to be "freed" has disappeared, at least in industrial societies.

Since 1956 this realisation has led to –

1. Reexamination of the theory;
2. Development of the doctrine of state monopolistic capitalism;
3. Reconsideration of theories of the Revolution, at least with regard to the highly-developed industrial nations.

Moscow's attitude in Havana possibly indicates that this theory should also determine Communist practice in Latin America.

The practical conclusion that the Communist parties have reached – as far as they are accessible to Moscow's influence – is in fact to adhere as hitherto to their original programme to change the world in accord with their ideas, but they now propose to realize this aim by means of dialogue and cooperation with all groups which are willing to cooperate.

Starting points for such a dialogue are to be found in a group of 5 questions which, in the West, have aroused widespread discussion:

1. Principles of a policy for easing tension;
2. The so-called 'convergence' theory;
3. Western theories about disintegration in the Eastern bloc as well as its growing 'will for peace';
4. The ideological dialogue;
5. Social criticism within the West.

The primary aim of the dialogue is to free the non-governing Communist parties from their isolation and thus, gradually, to provide conditions for establishing "popular fronts".

Secondly, these tactics aim at lulling anxiety about revolution and the not yet abandoned revolutionary objectives of World Communism which still prevails in the West.

The ever-increasing campaign both within and outside the Soviet bloc against every kind of 'anti-Communism' is an essential aspect of these tactics. It is noteworthy that from the Communist point of view anti-Communism does not mean simply to remain on the defensive against the system, but it also means to adopt every means to activate the spiritual values that are inherent in our ranks and to make them familiar to peoples dominated by Communism. The Communist criticism of Brzezinsky labours this very point.

This attempt to come to a dialogue has become the guide for Communist action since the Karlsbad Conference in late April 1967. In this respect at least, the conference does not deserve the disregard shown to it in the Western press.

As this outline indicates, dialogue is the more or less essential reaction to a situation which has arisen contrary to Communist expectations and intentions. This reaction, however, is no less dangerous and calls for close attention. In this connection, it is sufficient for the moment to refer to the following first results of these new tactics:

1. Participation in the Finnish government;
2. Renaming of the CP in Sweden; successes in local elections;
3. Discussion about assimilating joint action between the CPF, the Mitterand group and SFIO;
4. Attempts of the Italian CP to enter into talks with Catholicism;
5. The dialogue between Christians and Marxists (Marienbad);
6. Attempts of Communist world organizations to establish co-operation with non-Communist organizations (World Federation of Trade Unions, World Peace Council, members of the resistance movement etc.);
7. The formation of an initiative committee in order to re-establish a Communist party in Germany is the latest stage of development for the present.

Naturally, the foreign policies pursued by the West are also carefully analysed by the Communists. It is hardly necessary to state that in the Communist press our foreign policy is generally stamped as aggressive, and that its theorists – Rostov, Brzezinsky, Kennan – are severely criticized. A desire for peace and disengagement in Western policy is conceded as arising from discernment of the strength of the Communist side or serving the provisional tactical interests of the Soviet bloc.

This seems to us to be all the more incomprehensible as we ourselves remark the progressive disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance to our greatest discomfort and which cannot fail to render us very apprehensive regarding the period after 1969. Moreover, there cannot be a shadow of doubt about the firm desire of our governments and peoples to come to a real easement of tension and to coexistence. We adopt a too easy attitude, however, if we treat the Communist charges against Western policy – that we interpret 'strategy for peace', 'bridge building', 'peaceful engagement' etc. merely as ideological obligatory exercises or 'smoke screens' behind which the real intentions of the Communist governments are hidden in deference to Red China.

In point of fact, Western policy, which can be considered as the counterpart of the so-called policy based on the principle of coexistence, is regarded with distrust and disquiet by Communist governments. The policy of coexistence, however imperfect it may be so far, has at least made the Iron Curtain (with the exception of East Ger-

many) more penetrable than formerly. In consequence of the improved ways and means of communication, the populace of the Communist states come within reach of our ideas and way of life. This applies not only to countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Rumania, but also the USSR.

While it must be continually stressed that in the Soviet Union the 'West' is still hardly known, we have much evidence that the desire to become acquainted with the West in all its aspects is growing. We should, however, take care not to identify this desire for acquaintance with an immediate good understanding. A transformation of thinking in this direction has already made progress, even in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the Communist view the danger of 'diversion' has considerably increased through contact with the West.

This 'meeting with the West' is taking place at a time when, in spite of the consolidation of the political systems, the ideological co-ordination of the population within the sphere of the satellite states is stagnant, and in the case of the Soviet Union, a frustration among the intelligentsia, or what is more significant, a certain ideological weariness is becoming noticeable. There is sufficient evidence for this statement; one needs only to refer to the constant difficulties with writers in all Communist states. These, of course, are unlikely to be a danger to the social and governmental systems for the present. The coincidence of these developments is indicative of an element of unrest and disturbance which must be taken into consideration.

It is also in the interest of the new tactics of the non-governing Communist parties, which would otherwise appear to be unworthy of trust, not to renounce the opening to the West. Economic reasons also call for improved possibilities for communication. The stream of tourists to the countries of the Eastern bloc provides a substantial source of revenue in free foreign currency, apart from commercial treaties. In the Communist viewpoint, however, this opening demands a firm Communist consciousness on the part of the population. From this emerges, in addition to internal motives, a strong impulse to reactivate ideological education and to exercise control over contacts with people from the West and restrict them as far as possible. Proof for this can easily be made available from sources within the domain of the whole Eastern bloc.

While the non-governing Communist parties have to make an effort to eliminate political and ideological differences with other political sections in order to enter into a dialogue, the government Communist parties feel bound to draw ideological reins more tightly and to restrict communication of their population from the West.

It is to be expected that the restrictive measures, especially for tours abroad, will be intensified.

As the first characteristic of the Communist general policy we have named the "dialogue" as a preparation for subsequent popular fronts. One can also add that the effort of the Communist states to activate the formation of public consciousness, as well as the effort to restrict intercourse with the West is the second characteristic, and does not contradict the dialogue but are in accord with it.

It is in accordance with the Russian disposition to formalism to indicate the importance that is placed on different aspects of political questions, in the order of their enumeration.

In the era of Khrushchev, policy according to the principle of coexistence always came first. In the speech made by Brezhnev on Nov. 7th 1964, immediately after Khrushchev's overthrow it took the fourth place.

In Polyansky's speech on Nov. 7th '65, it appears in the fifth; in Pelsche's speech on Nov. 7th 1966, in the 6th place. Finally in the thesis for the 50th Anniversary of the October revolution it is to be found again in the 6th place.

The following points now appear to be in the latest accepted order for the policy of coexistence:

1. Rejection of foreign attempts to intervene;
2. Organization of Communism within the domestic sphere;
3. Strengthening of the Communist camp;
4. Efforts for a détente by the USA;
5. Growing anti-US sentiment in Europe;
6. Commitments of the USA in other places.

A further conclusion arises from this Communist policy. On the one hand, for a temporary stabilization of the present status in Europe, it must avoid a direct confrontation with the USA so as to prevent any slackening of US détente efforts, and to avoid any reactivation

of NATO. On the other hand, however, quite apart from consideration for the world revolution image of the USSR, it must take care to ensure that US commitments in other places do not diminish, but on the contrary, are intensified so as to encourage any impulse existing in the USA to reduce its presence in Europe. This conclusion, as I see it, which is confirmed by the attitude of the Soviets, not only towards Vietnam, but also in the Near East conflict, and recently in Nigeria, should at least impel us to judge sensibly all speculation regarding 'doves' und 'hawks' in the Kremlin.

The German Federal Republic represents both object and means in this calculation. Communism still relies on animosities which exist against the Germans, and which it hopes to activate. The longing for re-unification is troublesome, and the flexible policy towards the East initiated by the government of the Great Coalition is not only felt to be inconvenient but also aggressive, as (at least in some countries of the Soviet bloc) it meets with some willingness, chiefly for economic reasons, even though this willingness cannot be openly expressed.

From the Communist point of view, it is therefore necessary to make clear to the Federal Republic of Germany the hopelessness of her endeavours, and at the same time to declare her to be simply a mischief-maker. The hardening of Soviet positions and an intensification of the defamation campaign, even through the channel of the Communist world organizations, can be observed.

An examination of the momentary tactics and objectives of the Communist world organizations would show us that these, too, have adopted the general scheme of Communist policy – dialogue and propagation of a European security system – which I have set forth.

The aloofness, on the other hand, which the Soviets, as well as the parties in line with Moscow observed at the Solidarity Conference at Havana, might be due, according to the 'Economist Report', last but not least, to a sober critical examination of the present status of power in Latin America. Here, too, the revolutionary situation has not fully matured in spite of the many unsolved social problems. Therefore any engagement which went beyond present practice could upset the effort to make progress at the diplomatic level. Here, too, we can assume conformity with the general course as indicated above.

The problems resulting in particular for the USSR from the situation in China and from the disturbed relationship with that country, cannot be dealt with within the framework of my report. They are, doubtless, of the highest importance for the USSR and for world Communism. For the purpose of this meeting they can be ignored.

Reform as a Form of Revolution

New Communist Tactics and Arguments for the Region of Western Europe

by Prof. Hans Lades

I.

The well-known American diplomat Averell Harriman took an information trip through the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, when he also visited the Institute for World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. The Institute has become very important in connection with elaborating Communist theories on the Western industrial state. Harriman describes his impressions in his interesting report "Peace with Russia?" as follows: the Institute

"is an establishment which studies economic conditions around the globe and provides the statistical data with which Khrushchev and his colleagues can chart the future course of world history according to Karl Marx.

I asked Professor Arzumanyan, the head of the Institute, how he reconciled the predictions of Karl Marx on the decay of capitalism with the realities of American economic life. He replied that the predictions were being fulfilled on schedule, and his thirty or forty colleagues who had congregated in his office for the meeting all murmured warm approval... The subsequent discussion, in which other members of the Institute participated, indicated such a lack of understanding of American economic realities that I finally suggested that the members of the Institute should review their findings more carefully lest they, like other Soviet economists before them, lose their jobs for inaccurate predictions about the American economy.

Khrushchev used the same figures as these economists in asserting that our economy was slowing down. I told him that our democratic life was in its most creative stage, with a vast potential in social and economic gains. I warned him that his economists were dangerously wrong in miscalculating our future growth. Khrushchev took violent exception to this, and Mikoyan joined him. They maintained that by the Marxist doctrine they could analyse the American future better than we could."


So far, the Harriman report. We are able to note that the analyses by Communist party experts on the Western industrial state have become somewhat better in the meantime. In view of this improvement, one might even speak of a genuine "analytic Communism" which is practised in a number of party institutions. Aside from the above-mentioned Moscow Institute, the Maurice Thorez Institute in Paris and the Gramsci Institute in Rome may be named. In East Berlin, the most outstanding is the Institute of Social Sciences connected with the SED Central Committee. The result of these analyses is – in appropriate ideological trappings – the theory on so-called „state monopolistic capitalism“. This theory – and this is crucial for us – has become in many countries the basis of new tactics on the social plane: the "dialogue tactics" between Communists and other "progressive" forces. On the governmental and diplomatic levels, it corresponds to the Soviet Communist concept of a European security system without the USA. The three levels – new theory, "dialogue tactics" on the social plane, governmental-diplomatic activities for achieving a European security system without the USA – belong together. The result is a Soviet Communist tactical system for the region of Western Europe designed to bring our countries under the influence of the Soviet Union and to lead them into a long-term process of social transformation.

An essential part of the new theory, in due simplification, may be presented on the basis of the volume *Imperialism Today – State Monopolistic Capitalism in West Germany*. The book was edited in 1965 by five political economists of the above mentioned institute in East Berlin and is now in its fourth edition. Numerous conferences, discussions and articles have promoted the propagation of these theories. Work by French and Italian party experts tends, while taking into consideration the special conditions in their countries, in the same direction.

II.

The "classic" economic cycle has always been of eminent importance for the Marxist "political economics of capitalism".

Graph I




Specific expectations in regard to the social or social revolutionary movement were closely linked to the phases of the economic movement.

The SED political economists now argue: by the mid-fifties, the perfect system of "state monopolistic capitalism" had evolved from originally small beginnings. The new element in this system lies in the fact that the state is no longer merely subordinated to the monopolies, i. e. a tool of the monopolies; the state itself is an economic power. If one takes into consideration the significance economics has for the Communists and recalls that everything else, including the state, was declared to be merely a superstructure, one may imagine the consequences of such a statement. According to the new theory, the Western industrial state has developed a comprehensive regulatory system for steering the economic process. It applies it successfully. For example, through an active policy it can influence the economic cycle. It no longer waits until there is an over-production of goods, but curbs production in good time. Numerous measures are tried to check an exaggerated expansion during the upswing phase; when the boom becomes overheated, the state attempts to initiate measures to curb it.

The gradual movement towards the crisis is slowed down, the outbreak of the crisis is weakened, and overcoming the crisis is facilitated. In this way the economic cycle of capitalism undergoes a basic change. The swings of the pendulum become less violent, the cycles level off.

Graph II

"Regulatory Measures of State Monopolistic Capitalism"




Result:

Instead of the abrupt pendulum swings of the old cycle:
a levelled-off cycle: —————>

Graph III

"Classic" Economic Cycle and Cycle of the Revolutionary Movement

According to the old Doctrine of Revolution




III.

Hitherto, the doctrine of the capitalistic economic cycles was of extraordinary significance for the Communist theory on revolution. Up to now the Communists have argued: when there is a boom in the capitalist economy, i. e. when wages are high and unemployment is low, the revolutionary zeal of the working class wanes and the revolutionary movement is at "low tide".

When, conversely, the capitalist economy enters a stage of depression, when social crises develop from the economic depression with its growing unemployment, then the revolutionary movement receives a strong impulse; it is at high tide. This means that the capitalistic economic cycle and the cycle of the revolutionary movement are juxtaposed.

Graph IV

Ultimate Crisis of Capitalism and Revolutionary Break-Through to a Dictatorship of the Proletariat – according to the old doctrine of revolution




Under favorable conditions a **revolutionary break-through** can occur **at high tide**. Then the bourgeois state will be destroyed and the **dictatorship of the proletariat** will be established. Only then will begin the economic and social transformation of society which is to lead to socialism.

This concept no longer prevails. It has been given up against the will of the doctrinarians.

IV.


This opposition on the part of the doctrinarians is understandable. For if "state monopolistic capitalism" is in a position to inhibit phenomena of an explosive character and deep economic depressions such as the 1929-33 world economic crisis; if it can slow down the swings of the economic pendulum and level off the economic cycle, where then are the high and low tides of the revolution?



Our Communist political economists, of course, may not admit that the capitalist system thus becomes invulnerable; instead, they must prove that by doing away with the deep depressions the capitalist system also prevents the steep rises, that it becomes permanently unstable and is in a state of permanent crisis. How do they go about this?

They say: by regulating and programming the economic processes, state monopolistic capitalism already anticipates one part of the future socialistic planning. Thus, the private capitalist becomes a completely superfluous figure. At the same time, the state promotes in every way the further rapid concentration of capital and production.


On the other hand, it also increases in this way the size of the non-monopolistic classes in the population. Notwithstanding, the state favors the monopolies by its one-sided measures and does all it can to raise the profits of the monopolies to a maximum. It masters the scientific and technical revolution and invests immense sums in research and development. But it saddles the non-monopolistic classes with these costs, as well as with the expenditures for rearmament. These classes already extend from the workers through the farmers, the middle-class, the intellectuals-especially the technical intelligentsia - to the smaller and middle-level non-monopolistic capitalists.



The uneasiness of these classes about the system of "state monopolistic capitalism" is mounting. But their forces are still split. Here it will be the task of the Communist party to act as a catalyst for an anti-monopolistic front. With the help of the dialogue tactics, it must win over the other forces, the Social Democrats, the trade unions, progressive Christians, etc. to an "anti-monopolistic coalition".

Graph VII

"Anti-Monopolistic Coalition" through "Dialogue Tactics"




The Communists want to establish an "anti-monopolistic front" ("anti-imperialistic", "democratic", etc.) via the "dialogue tactics".

The struggle then to be fought does not aim at a revolutionary break-through. It aims at "democratic reforms", at "democratic alternatives to state monopolistic capitalism". In this connection, the trade unions play a very large role in the struggle for a greater say in management and politics. Since the power of the state and the strength of the monopolies are closely linked, every wage dispute becomes at the same time a political struggle. This struggle will be both long and very complicated. Its objectives are to harass the monopolies both from without and within, to infiltrate with personnel the existing power apparatuses of the state, to win one influential position after another until, one day, the anti-monopolistic popular front has become so strong that it takes over the regulatory apparatus created by "state monopolistic capitalism". "Reform becomes a form of revolution."

Graph VIII

"Reform as a Form of Revolution"



So much, then, about some perhaps not quite uninteresting aspects contained in the new Communist analyses on the Western industrial state.

V.

The tactical operations undertaken or initiated on the social plane by the Communists in some countries are understandable against the background of these new theories on so-called "state monopolistic capitalism", and the consequent reflections on – as the party jargon has it – the "strategy and tactics of the working class in the struggle for peace, democracy and Socialism in the 3rd stage of the general crisis of capitalism".

In France it is the dialogue tactics with the Socialists and then with the Mitterand bloc. We recall the election pact made for the presidential and parliamentary elections. The main goal is for 1971/72 when the administration of General de Gaulle comes to an end. The French Communist party seriously hopes then to become the heirs of Gaullism with an "anti-monopolistic coalition".

The second arena is Italy. Here, too, the dialogue of the Communists with both of the Socialist parties began in 1965 with the goal of creating a party of the united left and of thus coming closer to the seat of power. When, however, the Nenni and Saragat Socialists merged without the Communists, the Italian Communist party attempted to initiate the "dialogue with the Catholics".

The year 1966 afforded a third example in Germany: the "dialogue" tactics in the form of a speaker exchange program between the SED and the German Social Democratic Party. In a moment of weakness, the SED cancelled this operation. It struck its colors before the superior tactics of the Social Democrat leader Herbert Wehner. Since then, it finds itself in a frustrating situation which it tries to compensate by an aggressive attitude based on a propaganda of bluff.

The activities on the governmental and diplomatic levels, the striving for a European security system without the USA are just as strong as before. These activities were illuminated in an interesting manner at the April Karlsbad Conference which, as we know, was the first gathering of the governing and non-governing Communist parties from East and West Europe. Admittedly, some parties were not present, especially the Rumanians and the Yugoslavians. By 1969, the Communists hope to have set in motion a European mass movement for preventing the continuation of NATO, in whatever form. During the conference, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, Brezhnev, stated that the problem of European security is not only a problem of foreign policy, but also "a highly important social problem". The reason for this, he added, is that the "hand of the political barometer moves to the left during an international détente", whereas "the cold war and atmosphere of military threats . . . seriously hamper the activity of the revolutionary, democratic forces".

This is an elegant repetition of the thesis of peaceful coexistence which, as it used to be formulated, creates favorable conditions for

conducting the world-wide class struggle. Above all, Brezhnev also emphasized, "united action by the Communists and Socialists (could) guarantee a sharp turn in the entire political situation of Western Europe". United action on the part of the European working class, the activities resembling a popular front of a great "unifying alternative", as another version reads, and the European security problem – these three elements are combined as one in the new Soviet tactics for the region of Western Europe. Thus, these tactics also manifestly bear the outward imprint of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party.

It will be our problem to judge whether these regional tactics in various countries have a chance of success – not today or tomorrow. But let us by all means think of the transition from the nineteen-sixties to the seventies.

Our problem will also be to reflect on how we should react to these new tactics. I am optimistic, but optimistic under one condition: that we carefully analyze the various aspects of these tactics and recognize their purpose. Then we can counter the Communist analysis of our society with the friendly challenge that they, too, proceed further with the analysis of their own system. For this, we would offer our cooperation, even when it would mean improving their economic system and effecting the economic reforms they so fervently desire. We would help them by telling them how one goes about effecting the principles of profit and market economy in a modern industrial society.

This is my personal opinion. There are good reasons, even in this new phase, not only to believe in the ability and strength of our system, but also to recognize these superior abilities with a natural self-confidence and, perhaps in a new phase of the contacts, to prove them. One of the signs of the coming phase could be "to help" the reformers in the Communist societies to achieve a true reform of their system. However, since the term "help" is also of importance to the Communists and certainly has more than one meaning for them, we, too, could permit ourselves a wide latitude in its interpretation.

The British Situation in Regard to Communist Reassessment of Capitalism

by

C. H. Ellis

It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with questions of government policy. An attitude of 'wait and see' in regard to developments in the Soviet Union has been that of post-war British governments, and may represent, in general terms, the present attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

The common view that Soviet policy is being influenced by developments in Soviet relations with China cannot fail to be shared by those responsible for British policy. Immediate and practical issues such as trade with Eastern Europe (as with China) are undoubtedly a matter of intense official interest. Equally, any change in the economic structure and policy of the Communist countries must of necessity be a matter for concern, both as to its internal and external effects and with full regard to any modification of the political aspect of developing trade that may ensue.

The extent to which such changes may result in official Communist re-evaluation of the capitalist world, or merely in a change of tactics, can only be deduced from their practical application and may be reflected by discernible modifications of the programmes of national Communist parties as well as domestic pronouncements. On national issues, such as defence, security, expansion of production and trade and the major outstanding European questions, it is recognised in responsible circles that there is little likelihood that these will be affected by changes in systems of management and production in the economic field, whether these result from a basic transformation or mere expediency.

There are already indications of some change of attitude (whether simply tactical or basic only time will tell) in the Communist propaganda line on a number of matters. For instance, the policy of a united front with socialist parties is again being emphasised; the world dialogue is common parlance and less stress is placed on the immutability of dogmatic first principles, particularly in relation to discussion and evaluation of non-Communist concepts and points of view; the role of religion and the possibility of common contact and recognition of differences of approach; also in the fields of art and culture lip service is given to freedom of expression and international exchanges, albeit on home ground, this is expressed in somewhat different terms.

Foreign Communist parties, in their published statements of policy, on many issues adopt the note of respectability, independence and reasonableness, and while on such issues as NATO, the United States and US policies, non-proliferation, foreign bases, and colonialism, they follow the official line of declared Soviet policy, the tone is less aggressive and clearly designed to appeal to a wider area of public opinion.

The last report of the Executive Committee of the 30th national congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain, emphasises these points, while its many published pamphlets combine an effort to steal the thunder of Labour attitudes (as distinct from HMG policy) on domestic issues while maintaining the official Communist line on such questions as Vietnam, US bases, Common Market and NATO. In fact, the draft resolutions for the 30th Annual Congress of the British Communist Party to be held in November sets forth its demands on British foreign policy in the clearest possible terms, all points conforming 100% to the main objectives of Soviet policy on NATO, Vietnam, US policy, the Common Market, colonialism, Aden, support for 'democracy' in Greece, Portugal, Indonesia, and Ghana, a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and recognition of the 1945 frontiers in Europe and the existence of two German states. Thus the 'reasonable line' and declared aim for "unity" in domestic affairs is counterbalanced by reiteration of all the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

Those front organisations which take their cue from Moscow, or follow a line similar to that of the BCP are active in promoting the 'new look', but these organisations, beset by the rivalry of the pro-

Chinese bodies, as well as the Trotskyist and Marxist groups, can hardly be regarded as apostles of the idea of unity.

Following the announcement by Moscow of a policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with the West, the Communist parties throughout the world, with the exception of the Chinese, changed their line. As a result, practically every Communist party was split and pro-Peking Communist groups were founded. The British Communist Party attempted to change its image in order that it could be accepted as a bona fide political party with representatives in the House of Commons and at various local authorities. This has met with some success as is indicated by the documents that are to be placed before the British Communist Party's 30th National Congress to be held in London in November this year.

Because of a new image in the last few years, practically all national trade unions in Britain have re-opened contacts with the Soviet and East European trade unions and now frequently exchange delegations. The Communist World Federation of Trade Unions has been successfully promoting the new look and at the recent Brighton Trade Union Congress, a motion was accepted calling on the TUC General Council to explore ways and means of closer unity in world trade unions. This means that they are seeking unity between WFTU and the non-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), founded when non-Communists stormed out of a WFTU meeting in the immediate post-war years.

Another development arising from 'peaceful co-existence' has been the increasing dialogue between Communism and religion. This issue will also be dealt with in documents to come before the next British Communist Party's National Congress.

However, in spite of all these moves, the British Communist Party has still not revoked its adherence to the Communist Manifesto. This is too bold a step at present but could well be in the offing. Arising from these developments is the growth in pro-Peking Communist organisations. There are some who believe that within the next few years the Communist Party will be recognised as a responsible political force in the U.K. lined up against China and pro-Peking political groupings. But it is also noteworthy that the British Communist Party leaders have contact with one of the largest pro-Peking bodies "The Marxists", and actually advise their members who develop anti-Moscow views, to join it.

The effort by the Communist Party of Great Britain to present itself in a new image is accompanied by energetic steps to secure key positions in the trade unions, in particular the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Electrical Workers Union. Communist activity among workers on building projects, the docks, railways and industrial concerns, such as the car industry, follows a constant pattern, and is usually as much of an embarrassment and annoyance to the trade unions as to the institutions and organisations under attack. Party activity among teachers and students has not lessened, but is complicated by the competition between the Communist Party, the Trotskyists, the pro-Mao faction and other groups following the China line.

This continued pursuit of what has become a time honoured process of stirring up disorder hardly suggests any modification of Communist subversion and penetration into key positions. The one new development in the situation is the confusion in Communist ranks brought about by the Moscow-Peking breach, which takes a number of forms, one of which is the intense effort on the part of the pro-Chinese element (sponsored by certain left-wing personalities) to support the extremist groups among the new Asian and African emigrant population. An organisation with the title BRITISH COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, a Communist front organisation, is also active, not only in the promotion of trade with the Communist world, notably with China, but is linked with a number of other companies and groups with connections in the Communist camp. In a number of ways, Communist links are thus established in the business world, and propaganda of a 'realist' type favouring the development of trade and cultural relations with the East is thus fostered through a number of channels.

There are clear indications from the tone and content of recent Communist propaganda, as well as from the publicity and resolutions of national Communist parties that the Soviets are once more promoting the popular front idea, and in favouring dialogue between Communists and Socialists, Christians, intellectuals and trade unions the clear object is not a relaxation of conflict, but a weakening of resistance to an ultimate take-over of popular and democratic institutions.

This is coupled with propaganda against NATO and the elimination of American influence, a line of publicity that takes account of anti-

American trends among a large section of society, especially among the younger generation, in a number of Western, as well as Asian and South American countries. The question is being asked: what is the British estimate of the strength and quality of the exploratory work that appears to have been undertaken by the Communists before embarking on a new campaign, but using new methods?

No positive answer can be given to this question, which implies that there is widespread knowledge and understanding of such a development. Outside "expert" and presumably government circles, the present mood is one of qualified optimism, and an inclination to consider that the Soviet and East European countries are undergoing a process of internal change which, it is hoped, will ultimately bring about a closer relationship and more mutual understanding between 'East and West'. The behaviour of the Chinese, both in relation to the Soviets and ourselves, has produced in the popular mind a feeling that on one major issue at least, we are in the same camp, or at least that the Soviet Union is likely to be so deeply involved in her own difficulties with China, that in the West, for some time to come, the Soviet bark is likely to be worse than her bite.

Needless to say, this facile outlook is not shared by those who are more familiar with the course of events and the various forces at work in the Communist and the wider international fields. In these more informed circles, official and unofficial, there is constant appraisal of developments in the Communist camp, in all its aspects, and among those who are actively engaged in the study of these developments and in taking counter measures, both to contain Communism and extend public knowledge of the realities of Communist endeavour, an exchange of views, such as is taking place in this gathering, can be of the greatest value and benefit to all concerned.

*

The discussion following the presentation of the British paper went into details on the situation and activities of the British Communist Party:

The strength of the dissident groups (pro-Chinese, Trotskyists etc.) is not known exactly. The strength of the Trotskyists will be approximately one thousand, the main CP strength being 33,000. There is a move in Great Britain to enlist immigrants, the Indians and Pakistani as well as those of

African origin, into the dissident group. Their number is difficult to calculate and may increase rapidly.

As for the motives of Communist action: When Communists are conducting industrial subversion, they do not appear as Marxist leaders, but operate on pretexts dissociated from their Marxist concepts. They act with sincerity, with more planning and far more funds than people give them credit for. If it were not for the active work of some trade union leaders in higher positions dedicated to defeating Communist activities, the position of the trade unions in British industry would be far worse than it is now.

The British Communists are opposed to the European alternative and to British entry in the Common Market, but are not so vocal about this in recent months as they were previously.

There are links between Marxism and pacifism in England, which do damage to the cause of the campaign for nuclear disarmament, conscientious objectors, etc. Communists also exploit every discussion to promote excesses in public feeling. This infiltration is true even for the Church, particularly since the dialogue with Communists was initiated by Pope John XXIII. A number of priests in the Church of England who are closely associated with "fellow travellers", if not actual members of the CP, attempt to promote constructive progressive ideas among the younger clergy, activate a progressive outlook, and take advantage of the progressive movement among the clergy. But even while recognising the deep differences between religion and Marxism, the British must be prepared to recognise the honesty of purpose which inspires many active followers of Marx and to see how much they can share of this activity on the practical level.

General Trends in the Programme of Action of the Communist Party of France

by

Dr. W. Berner

As compared to the size of the CPI, which has about 1,6 million members, the estimated 265,000 members of the CPF do not form an excessively impressive force. But this first impression is wrong. In the last general election in March 1967 the Communist candidates in the first ballot obtained more than 5 million, i. e. 22,5% of the valid votes. With these figures they follow closely the Italian Communists, who got 6,6 million votes, or 26%, at the provincial elections held in 1964.

Despite this low figure of 265,000, the CPF has the largest membership of all French political parties, while also the party discipline is greater than with the others. Second to them are the SFIO socialists of Guy Mollet.

In recent times the CPF leaders, have often mentioned their ideological independence of the CPSU. This they do to neutralize, both in their own ranks and with respect to the other Communist parties of Western Europe, the impression that they would be less autonomist than the Communist leaders in other countries. The CPF pretends, for instance, that as far back as in 1930 its then president, Maurice Thorez, adopted the "antisectionarian" course that was to be accepted, in 1935, on the 7th Comintern Congress, as the official popular front course.

In the same way Thorez is nowadays represented as the real pioneer of the dialogue with the Catholics, because he offered an alliance to the Christians long before Togliatti did so, namely in 1937.

It is again on the authority of Thorez that the CPF bases its attitude towards the problem of party pluralism in the phase of transition to socialism, i. e. during the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The

party does not put forth absolute power as a strict condition for the socialist revolution. However, it wants its presumed social democratic coalition partners to renounce any "class collaboration", which means that they should agree to a full dependence on the Communists. Generally speaking the CPF, in view of the social conditions in France, regards a peaceful transition to socialism as possible. But at the same time they believe that a bitter, systematic class struggle is unavoidable and thus they make the degree to which the workers' class will have to use violence dependent on the degree of resistance offered by the Bourgeoisie.

The ideologic "top" discussions on various fundamental questions, started between the CPF and SFIO in 1964, have gradually led to easing the tension and putting things on a more objective basis in the relations between the two parties. However, they have recently lost importance, when SFIO joined other groups of the non-Communist left in a Federation of the Democratic Socialist Left (F.G.D.S.) under the leadership of Mitterand, in order to reduce the risk of a political alliance with the CPF.

A decisive factor in the relations between the Mitterand Federation and the CPF was the consideration that the latter would probably be prepared, in order to get its fitness for coalition recognized again, to pay a good price for being freed from its isolation, which had lasted from 1947 on, without being able to demand from its partner political or ideological concessions.

This reasoning seems to have been correct so far: in the elections for the Presidency in December 1965 the Communists had no candidates of their own, but they supported Mitterand already in the first ballot of the parliamentary elections in March 1967, despite the fact that they had demanded a concrete government programme of the united left, i. e. the creation of a real political united front.

The agreement of December 20th 1965 proved very advantageous for the F. G. D. S. in the parliamentary elections: with 4,2 million votes in the first ballot it had 116 mandates whereas the Communists, with more than 5 million votes, got only 73 seats. Thus, the latter, despite its higher number of votes, saw its part in the united left restricted to that of a junior partner in parliament.

Obviously, this form of cooperation has a different meaning for the two sides: the Mitterand Federation got, for a short period, a relatively great success at the elections, to the detriment of the Com-

munists. But the CPF perhaps opened to itself – at a long term – access to power, dependent on whether they succeed in changing the present “community of action” into a real “united front of the left”.

There is no doubt that General Secretary Rochet has been very much engaged personally in this course, as was expressly mentioned by one of his colleagues of the Politbureau on the 18th Party Day. Yet, Rochet must act cautiously. Within the leading cadres of the CPF there is a strong group of conservative dogmatists who obviously succeeded, at the latest party day, in considerably restricting the trend within the CPF towards an ideologic emancipation.

Waldeck Rochet's dilemma can be described as follows: the more concessions he makes to gain the Federation over to the formation of a united front, the bigger becomes the risk that he will be attacked in the back by the dogmatists of his party. Inversely, however, the more his offers are made reluctantly, the smaller his possibilities to realize the popular front. Moreover, his position of secretary general is at stake. At a plenary session of the Central Committee in March 1966 Rochet therefore recalled Maurice Thorez' words:

“As regards the forms of the popular front, the great doctrine teaches as follows: No schematism; a variety of forms are possible. One should not stick to prerequisites. We have to prove now and again that the most complete cooperation between Communists, Socialists and other Republicans is necessary nowadays.”

Rochet indeed soon found a favourable opportunity to organize manifestations of solidarity of the entire left, from which the Federation could not possibly refrain. When Pompidou's government asked special authority for new measures on social security and the relations between employers and employees, the various unions, led by the Communist C. G. T., reacted on May 17th with a general strike of protest. But this was not all. In the National Assembly the CPF fraction, together with the Federation, put through a motion of censorship to which altogether 236 representatives adhered, which meant that the opposition lacked as few as 8 votes to have absolute majority.

While these actions were still being considered Rochet undertook a new attack by asking for a common programme of action for the left. After having dealt in detail with the most essential points of dif-

ference between the CPF and the Federation, among which before all the latter's sticking to NATO and the Common Market, he made perfectly clear his willingness to grant further concessions. He said that the agreement on the electoral alliance of December 20th 1966, with its catalogue of common objectives, might be considered a useful basis of discussion, provided they were supplemented to a certain small extent. Above all it was necessary to indicate means and deadlines for the realization of the objectives.

It would appear as if Rochet is determined to pay almost any price for an agreement on a united front. This price would include a shift of accent from objectives to methods and deadlines.

At a press conference on September 6th Rochet emphasized that the CPF would not make its action for unity with the Mitterand Federation depend on France leaving NATO. Moreover, the problem of European security ranked before differences of opinion on the project of political integration of the six Common Market countries.

Rochet's so-called concessions in questions on NATO and Common Market may have been influenced by the consideration that the CPF might leave it to de Gaulle to push developments in the direction they want them to go. If the President wishes to discontinue France's NATO membership in 1969, he would at the same time prejudice the political integration of the EEC countries in an almost prohibitive way. Then all differences between Communists and the Mitterand Federation in this field would disappear.

Thus it is to be expected that in future negotiations with the Federation the CP leaders will work mainly towards inclusion of their domestic demands into the joint action programme. In the economic sphere the Communists wish to nationalize not only private banks and the armament firms – as the federate ones – but also all so-called key industries. In addition, they want the Federation to accept the plan of the general increase of wages and salaries, as well as a considerably shorter working week. Finally, the CPF asks clear and binding promises on a general tax reform in favour of the lower income brackets, while on the other hand the big corporations have to be saddled with a heavier burden.

As a result of the necessity to wage the war against de Gaulle's regime mainly on the domestic and social-political scene, the French Communists, at an early date already, have had to find improved definitions of the so-called “state monopolistic capitalism”, at it was

newly formulated by Eugen Werga in the Soviet Union at the turn of 1959 to 1960 and also referred to by the Moscow 81-party declaration in December 1960.

Since 1961 the French Communist paper "Economie et Politique" has been concentrating on this subject with growing enthusiasm. Secretary-general Rochet himself attended various conferences on state monopolistic capitalism.

According to French ideologists de Gaulle's France has developed into a showpiece of state monopolistic capitalism, characterized by the increasing concentration of capital in the hands of a small group of financial oligarchs, the nationalization of unefficient industries, the supply of private economic sectors with public funds, the economic planning by the state in the interest of monopolies and an unprecedented exploitation of the workers, who form 90% of the population.

On the 18th party day in January of this year secretary-general Rochet said: "The workers' class and the working people in this country have never been exploited as badly as they are now".

But at the same time he quoted Lenin, according to whom state monopolistic capitalism is really the "ante-room to socialism", because it created, by increasing socialization of capitalist production, the most favourable material conditions for the transition to a socialist economic order.

In any case one should not expect – thus Rochet – that state monopolistic capitalism would let itself be transferred into socialism without any struggle. On the contrary, the exploited part of the population should unite in order to bring about the collapse of this system. That is why his party regarded as its first task to come to a

"large class movement embracing the majority of the people, all progressive, democratic and national forces, which means that the development of unity in action for Communists, Socialists and Republicans should have priority. The CPF confirms that an agreement between the democratic parties, organizations and groups on the basis of a common programme, or a programme to be set up in common, is indispensable."

Summarizing, one can say that the real general trend in the programme of action of the CPF is nowadays directed towards the conclusion of agreements, like the formation of a popular front, with the Mitterand Federation. If necessary it would even be prepared to grant

concessions as regards NATO and the EEC if these would enable it to take part in Government after the de Gaulle period.

At the same time it will probably try to carry through its social-political requirements in the programme of the United Front-to-be in order to be able to pursue later on, within the agreement, its agitation directed towards radicalization of the masses.

As leading CPF theorists declare, the "phase of democratization" will perhaps, under the regime of the united front, and as a result of the preparatory work done by state monopolistic capitalism, be transferred into a "phase of socialization" owing to a process of polarization within the united left, of which the CPF of course hopes to become the dominating coalition partner.

Obviously the French Communists, basing themselves on the Leninist prognoses as regards state monopolistic capitalism, now already consider themselves the legitimate heirs of Gaullism.

*

The discussion following the presentation of the French paper went into details on the situation in France.

In the rather complex political situation in France, it was for electoral purposes, mainly, that the alliance between the CP and the Federation has been created:

The CP having got more than 5 million votes, that is 22,5% of all votes, has a membership of only 265,000. If its electoral position is nearly the same as it was before, we have to remember that in 1956, the CP already got more than 5 million votes, representing at that time 25–26%; and in 1945/46, membership of the CP was up to one million.

Even if the electoral influence of the CP has grown, its immediate political influence on the country has not increased. In 1956/58, they lost many of their adherents and votes as a result of what happened in Hungary and other East European states. Ever since, the CP has wanted to emerge from its political isolation, which even the Algerian war, when conditions seemed favorable, did not permit.

It was due to a combination of circumstances in the inner political life of France that the CP re-entered the political scene: In 1965, an effort was made by the democratic forces of the opposition, not willing to accept an alliance with the Communists, to create a unity of action with the socialist mayor of Marseilles, Gaston Deferre, as their leader. Only after its failure and when Mitterand presented himself as person representing the progressive forces of the country, Socialists and Radicals – because of French electoral law – had to choose between the possibility of another electoral failure

or the possibility of working with the Communists. Tactics prevailed over ideology: elections in March 67 were a success for the combined efforts of the CP and the Federation.

For that reason, opposition in France is not ideological in nature, but above all opposition to the regime. An analysis of the various electoral districts would show that no unity of action has resulted from this combined opposition.

Of interest is the internal position of the French CP:

Both in the CP and in the Socialist Party there are tendencies towards more unity of action. In the time of Thorez, Communists kept apart for 20 years and were inspired by Moscow. Since then, the situation in France and in the world has changed. Waldeck-Rochet, an "apparatchik" and representative of this period of transition, is not as free in his movements as was Thorez, nor has he as much prestige. He has to take into account the thinking of the younger generation. If the CP has not many farmers, representatives of the working class or intellectuals among its members, it has many adherents in the "bourgeoisie moyenne": engineers, technicians, cadres, who hope by means of the CP to bring about certain social objectives. Its main objective is to adapt the life of the local communities to modern life. It seems to them, that the CP, without Stalinism and its revolutionary character, would be able to solve all the problems in the social scene. The interest is directed mainly towards internal problems.

Socialist, progressive and Christian forces, as well as the Communists, show this trend towards an alliance for improving the social conditions of the working class. Therefore a dialogue seems possible, this dialogue being not merely tactics, but having a far deeper sense.

CP politics are therefore obeying two principles: to do everything to prevent their falling back into isolation, and to keep the Socialists from rejoining the Centrist parties. Their tactics will be:

1) Not to rebuff public opinion and to play the parliamentary game thus being eventually able to take place in the government. The recent pro-Chinese movement can but serve their aims, giving them the opportunity to point out that the real revolutionary danger comes from China.

2) They will stick to day-to-day realities and give all their attention to the needs of the French communities.

3) They will be very careful not to affect the policy of the government towards a détente with Eastern countries.

The life of the alliance will depend on whether the CP can avoid difficulties with its NATO and European Common Market concepts and whether it will be able to overcome the everlasting hostility against it in the Federation, the trade unions and the Christian Workers Trade Union.

Analysis of the Situation in Germany

by

Dr. N. von Grote

Before Dr. Förtsch of the Studienkolleg für Zeitgeschichtliche Fragen reports on the unrest in the German student body which has become known throughout the world, it is necessary to present briefly the general situation, of which these events are an essential aspect.

This general situation in Germany, insofar as it in itself concerns the basic topic of our conference, is influenced by two – one may say, fundamental – elements:

- the division of Germany and the resulting wish to abolish this division, as well as
- the 1953 prohibition of the German Communist party (KPD), whereby it is forced both to operate illegally and also to work with the help of other organizations.

In addition, one must realize that the German Communist party is almost completely financially dependent upon the SED and is directed by it. Both parties, however, disguise by every means at their disposal this dependence and maintain that they are two organizations independent of each other. This is done for the sake of the "image" of the German Communist party, as well as for the sake of the German Socialist Unity Party's (SED) policy concerning the recognition of the German Democratic Republic (DDR).

In passing, it should be noted that the SED is admitted as a party in West Berlin. The West Berlin SED also claims to be a party in its own right, independent in its organization from the East Berlin SED.

As you are aware, the SED which controls East Germany, upholds the thesis of two separate German states and of West Berlin as an independent political entity. The policy of the "DDR" as a state

is therefore directed towards underlining the separate statehood of the German Democratic Republic and obtaining recognition under international law – not least from the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, all still existing connections in common with the Federal Republic – both in the political, as well as in the over-all social sphere – are being abolished. They continue to see to it that

- no new connections in common arise;
- the Federal Government's eastern policy is crippled and that
- the Federal Republic's continued wish for a later reunification is branded throughout the world as an expression of aggressiveness and revengefulness.

On the other hand, Lenin's saying that Germany is the key to revolutionizing Europe is still considered valid. In addition, the SED knows only too well that

- in All-Germany, the division is felt to be unnatural;
- the East German population holds the SED responsible for this;
- in the case of an express renunciation of reunification, the illegal German Communist party would lose every chance of success, however minimal, in West Germany.

The SED and the German Communist party must therefore strive to enforce on the international level and in public, especially German opinion, the thesis of the existence of two separate German states and of West Berlin as an independent political entity. But at the same time it must also strive, working both openly and subversively in the Federal Republic, to create the conditions for the later transformation into a Communist state as the first step towards a reunification. In this connection, Ambassador Zarapkin stated in an interview given about July 16 to the newspaper "Rheinpfalz":

Before a reunification, both German states should first have a common ideology. Reunification – he said – presupposes changes in the Federal Republic of Germany in respect to ideology, economy, society, culture and democracy.

There are, of course, any number of similar statements – some of which are far more precise – on the part of SED chiefs.

The illegality of the German Communist party, the SED-state's policy concerning recognition of the DDR, the aim of a social transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany through the German Communist party and the SED therefore necessarily determine the methods of the Communist struggle with the integrating forces of the Federal Republic. These methods thus show that the Communist views and theories as presented by Professor Lades also represent the basis of practices on the territory of the Federal Republic. They also show, however, that the apparently existing contradictions are in reality not present, but that there are for Germany the same inter-dependencies and correlations – applied, however, to the special German conditions – which are attempted to demonstrate in the introductory paper.

The German Communist party has at the present time about 6,000 members, mostly of the older generation. There are few younger people who are willing to become registered party members. The party is tightly organized. The financial needs are taken care of almost exclusively by the SED. The total amount of funds supplied by the SED – i.e., for the German Communist party and other activities – probably is about 25,000,000 DM (West) and 250,000,000 DM (East). The focus of the work lies in the factories. There are work councils in which (former) Communists play an important role.

The German Communist party also works with publications, some of which appear sporadically. Of the regular publications which can be called Communist, the most important is the weekly "Blinkföer", published in Hamburg with a circulation of 12,000.

Aside from the work in the factories, we find former supporters of the German Communist party primarily in the Deutsche Friedensunion (DFU – German Association for Peace), which at present is represented only in a few local legislatures, as well as the insignificant Bunder Deutschen (Federation of Germans), which was founded by a former Reich Chancellor Dr. Wirth (of the former Center Party).

The foreign policy programs of both groups correspond to the demands of the SED, i.e.:

- Recognition of the German Democratic Republic;
- Pact of non-aggression with the German Democratic Republic;
- Disarmament treaties between the two German states, etc.

Domestic policy aims are directed towards a gradual socialization, but are stated in such a way that they cannot come into conflict with the stipulations of the Basic Law and that the numerous non-Communist members will not be frightened off.

Insofar as subordinate groups of the Communist world organizations exist in Germany, their members also number proven former members of the Communist party. In the same way Communist steering of the Easter marches and similar demonstrations is almost certain, although in most cases prominent persons who are proven non-Communists are active in the top committees.

A readmission of the Communist party, which was prohibited by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1953, is not permissible under our constitution.

However, a movement to reestablish the Communist party is in motion at the present time. If a newly formulated program and the party statutes should comply formally with the Basic Law, the re-establishment could be realized sometime in the future without interference on the part of the executive branch.

For its part, the SED is doing away with everything in its sphere of power which could be considered as an all-German institution. Thus, among others, the name of the State Secretariat for All-German Affairs was changed to State Secretariat for West-German Affairs. Consequently, the SED also refuses – in contrast to the practices of just a year ago – to send functionaries to so-called “all-German” meetings – for example, those of the DFU. On the other hand, the Central Committee and the Politburo of the SED have an office for directing the work in West Germany.

It is interesting to note that in 1966, 1,430 SED functionaries – despite the so-called handcuff law – visited the Federal Republic for purposes of political agitation. During these visits

- the separate statehood of the German Democratic Republic is particularly emphasized;
- the well-known foreign policy claims were raised and
- finally, the necessity of transforming society in the Federal Republic of Germany is pointed out.

One can state that the appearance of such functionaries shocks West German participants in nine out of ten cases. The SED's proselytizing work is also – and on the whole, more successfully – carried

out in its own sphere of power. Hereby, the persons at whom it is directed are on the one hand the approximately 1,000,000 people who come to visit their relatives; on the other, participants at official functions or those of the party in question. The best-known are:

- the annual Baltic Sea Week which takes place in Rostock and which is the counterpart of the Kiel Week;
- the Leipzig Workers' Conference which is held each year during the spring fair.

Naturally, the organizers encounter primarily sympathizers here (which, in turn, leads the SED to incorrect and exaggerated appraisals of the situation in West Germany) and the curious; nonetheless, the number of participants at these functions is growing. The SED claims to be responsible for these, too, while the German Communist party stays in the background. By the way, at these and other occasions, the SED describes the “German Democratic Republic” as the true and real German state, which – as guarantor of social progress – has the sole claim to act in the name of all Germans.

This taking-over of the sole right of representation by the so-called German Democratic Republic also indicates that a Communist united Germany is definitely a long-term goal in the minds of the SED. However, the conditions for this

- consolidation of its own power within the “German Democratic Republic”;
- transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany into a socialistic society

are not yet fulfilled.

If one adds up the results of all the efforts on the part of the German Communist party and the SED, the increase in anti-American feeling, which is ignited especially by the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and an increase in the number of voices advocating a recognition of the “DDR”, can be observed.

Furthermore, one must indeed concur with the SED's observation that the West German working population lacks a revolutionary consciousness and that much effort is still necessary in order to prepare the West German population for the necessary social changes.

In this situation, a development is now taking place in Germany which is originally non-Communist in its inception. It is the appearance of a Marxist movement within our intelligentsia, which corresponds

quite closely to the "New Left" in the United States. These circles propagate a pre-Leninist, pure Marxism and aspire to a socialist social and economic order. Consequently, they have moved to the "left of the SPD", find their forum for the time being only in political circles, such as the August-Bebel-Gesellschaft e. V. in Frankfurt on the Main and they have at their disposal several well-edited publications of a remarkably high standard; for example,

- "Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik" (Journal for German and international politics)
- "Marxistische Blätter" (Marxist Journal)
- "Atom-Zeitalter" (Atomic Age).

It is thus understandable that the German Communist party and the SED observe this development attentively and hope to influence it, as is proved by the participation of foreign and German Communists at the meetings held up to now.

We must wait and see whether these groups will at some time join a German Communist party, if it is reestablished; this is, at least, not out of the question.

This intellectual and political movement is especially virulent in one section of our student body, although the organized groups close to this trend are small in number. Thus the Socialist German Student Association (SDS) has only 1,000 members. The Social Democratic Students Association (SHB), which is still close to the SPD, has approximately 1,000 members.

Since the events at the Free University of Berlin have become known throughout the world, Dr. Förtsch will - I believe - have the interest of us all when he now examines, the situation among the German students.

The New Left in the German Student Body

by

Dr. E. Foertsch

In comparison with the issues dealt with so far, my subject is more specific. Summarizing my paper I want to submit 12 statements and theses on "The New Left in the German Student Body".

As this problem is entirely new for us in the German Federal Republic, I cannot offer a cut-and-dried solution but merely a subjective opinion. Anyway, we Germans may be proud that a worldwide movement has reached also our country. But as we are in Germany, quite a lot of problems are bound to turn up.

First Thesis:

Since the formation of the Grand Coalition in the Federal Republic, parliamentary opposition has been on the wane. The Communist party is constitutionally outlawed. Other left-wing parties have so far failed to attract any sizeable following. Extra-parliamentary opposition, on the other hand, has shown considerable growth. This opposition cannot and will not engage itself in the existing institutions, but rather concentrates on the extra-parliamentary scene, including the street.

Second Thesis:

The exponents of the new opposition are to be found among the students, especially in Berlin. This would be nothing unusual if our situation were different from that in Amsterdam, Paris or Los Angeles.

We live in a divided country. The Communists in the other part display a lively interest in us, as Professor Lades has shown in his paper. The students have been given a special place in the theory of state monopolistic capitalism. Tactics and analyses get across despite the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the Federal Republic is a meeting place of Communist agents and it is difficult to tell apart friend and foe, fellow traveller and mischiefmaker.

Third Thesis:

There are Communist analyses of the present situation in the Federal Republic and its revolutionary prospects. Just to mention one example: At the Prague Conference of the non-ruling Communist parties in November 1966, Josef Schleifstein, Secretary of the outlawed Communist party of Germany said:

"In the Federal Republic, socialism is not the order of the day. But there are questions that may stir up large sections of the population and drive them into opposition to the government. Among these questions are: co-determination in enterprises and at universities; emergency legislation; the Vietnam conflict; and the lack of strong parliamentary opposition."

The Eastern analyses state that on these questions many intellectuals and workers, middle-class people and students, trade unionists and artists are agreed among themselves in principle.

Fourth Thesis:

The Communists want to organize movements and build up a "unifying alternative" to the various phenomena and shortcomings of our political life. The Communists do not strive merely for partial changes but for structural reforms: "Reform as a Form of Revolution", with reform meaning to go to the roots (radix), i.e., reform is designed as a radical movement.

Fifth Thesis:

Of our students, only a minor part is interested in political questions. The most active group is the Socialist German Student Association (SDS). It has not quite 1,000 members, 200 of them in West Berlin.

The "moderate wing" of the Socialist German Student Association is Marxist-orthodox in outlook. It wants to achieve a university reform and remove the authoritarian hierarchy of our universities. Moreover, it aims at a socialist transformation of society, a so-called "democratization". This moderate wing, and this is an important point, does not confuse conceptions but draws a clear line between university reform and social reform.

Sixth Thesis:

Contrary to the moderate wing, the leftist wing of the Socialist German Student Association is radical-socialist, anarchist and totali-

tarian in outlook. Its leader is Rudi Dutschke, its fathers are Herbert Marcuse and Mao Tse-tung.

This group constitutes the new left. It goes even further than the Communists themselves. It does not aim at a reform but at a radical change. In harmony with Marcuse and Mao Tse-tung, this group considers democracy an instrument of oppression, a "tyranny of the majority". The minorities, among them the conscious students and workers, are being oppressed. They cannot play the parliamentary game because, by doing so, they would recognize democracy. That is the reason why they have to find ways and means not provided for by the constitution and other statutes.

Seventh Thesis:

The aim of the new left is a lawless society. Mao's cultural revolution is being interpreted as a gigantic attempt at keeping bureaucratic structures in permanent motion with the object of abolishing them and establishing direct relations between the masses and the leadership. Permanent rotation at the top is being equated with permanent revolution.

Eighth Thesis:

The small group of the left needs followers. First of all, it wants to attract a sizeable number of intellectuals and persuade them that all their actions are determined by the coercion of capitalist society. Here is the opening for contacts with the workers. Here, too, is the opening for international contacts: the peoples of the developing countries are being regarded as allies.

Ninth Thesis:

The tactics begin at the university. The universities are to be politicized. They have to be given new functions. To this end, they are to be transformed into "forges for revolutionary cadres". They are to provide the testing ground for the movement's tactics.

There are the following phases at this level:

First Phase: In mass meetings the crystallization slogans are tested. The topics of such meetings do not matter. They may range from the Vietnam issue to the visit to Germany of the Shah of Persia, or measures taken by the university chancellor. What imports is that a connection

is being established between the topic of the meeting and the necessity of transforming the present society.

Second Phase: There are numerous demonstrations with varying slogans. The public becomes confused. The demonstrators are becoming aware of their power and solidarity, while the authorities are getting nervous.

Third Phase: There are clashes between the authorities (police, law courts, administrative bodies) and the demonstrators. Nobody knows who started the clashes. There are scuffles and possibly some people are even killed. The demonstrators are then able to prove that the authorities are repressive and have to be combated.

Fourth Phase: Those who feel indirectly attacked, declare their solidarity with the provokers. Thus, a feeling of antagonism is developing: students versus policemen; defendants of democracy versus official authorities.

Fifth Phase: The preceding phase has offered a basis for an organization. The followers and sympathizers, i.e., all that feel involved, gather around the nucleus. The "unifying alternative" is growing.

Sixth Phase: The new left establishes contacts with the workers. It has proved its activity and can, therefore, demonstrate the explosive character of its slogans. It plans a "cadre forge", a rival university where to indoctrinate the fighters.

Seventh Phase: The showdown is being continued. The next steps include: a break in into parliament during the debates on the emergency legislation and a boycott of the papers of the Springer group. "Agitation by action" goes on.

Tenth Thesis:

We cannot prove that the new left is being directed and financed by East Berlin, although the new left and East Berlin have a striking number of features in common. The theoreticians of state monopolistic capitalism and the radical left both want to revolutionize our society. If necessary, they want to resort to violence. East Berlin and the new left strive for the same ultimate objectives and largely use the same terminology. Even the tactics are identical in principle (organization

in concentric circles, popular fronts and the "unifying alternative" as a mass basis).

Eleventh Thesis:

But there are also striking differences, which are interesting for the formulation of our tactics and responses. The left-wing students are anarchistic in outlook. Historically, they are closer to the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia of the 19th century than to Lenin, Stalin or Ulbricht. The new left openly rejects present-day Communism in Europe as being to bureaucratic. Instead, it sides with Mao.

Twelfth Thesis:

It will soon emerge how far this development has to be taken seriously. At the moment it is still difficult to say whether the movement will prosper or decay. Dutschke and his followers are in favour of a "guerilla warfare" in the big towns. This plan sounds rather dashing and they will hardly be able to realize it. Yet they may cause trouble for the very reason that they disregard the democratic rules. Moreover, they may divert many of us from problems that are more important indeed: viz., a genuine university reform and a new approach to European and all-German policies.

We need not fear the development. Yet we should be on our guard. We should not lose our nerve but take measures in order to fulfil reasonable demands and channel unreasonable ones.

An Italian Response

by

Professor A. Benedetti

1. The problem of the West's reply to Communist reassessment of capitalism is not easily explained by Italian experience. The attitudes of the two systems on the doctrinal level are kept in the background by the immediate needs of the struggle for power. And this struggle does not always take place within the framework of coherence with the doctrine.

Usually the discussion between West and East is centered around the economic aspect. But the omission of political and cultural components produces considerable loss of doctrinal coherency.

Naturally a lack of doctrinal coherency weakens the democratic forces more than it does for Communism which has other elements of recovery at its disposal. Communism has not fully understood the strength and significance of the economic system which it intends to combat. In the same way, democratic systems, unfortunately have not fully understood the intimate nature of Communism from the doctrinal point of view.

The reply of the West to the present development within Communist doctrine concerning capitalism could be supported by a more objective understanding of the factors which are at its roots.

This understanding in the short term would not only serve the exigences of the political struggle, but would provide the managing classes with the possibility of a more profound analysis of the reasons for the crisis of the democratic system and of the culture by which it is inspired.

The reflections which follow have their roots in the Italian context, but they may also serve to establish a better understanding of situations in other countries.

2. There is a widespread opinion that adhesion to the Communist ideology derives from the economic dissatisfaction of the lowest social classes. This dissatisfaction would be augmented by the "demonstrative effect" of the badly distributed wealth, and by the desire, stimulated by mass media, to participate in the benefits of economic development.

This interpretation does not provide the right assessment of Communism as an organised force. The limits of the interpretation are underlined by the following facts:

- a) Differences of income are only a superficial aspect of social differences. The differences which really affect the life of men are expressed in terms of culture and of power.
- b) In Italy the adhesions which strengthen Communism and give to it cohesion come very often from social classes which are absolutely remote to this problem: middle upper classes or intellectuals who have both wealth and power.
- c) The adhesion to Communist ideology does not cease when the reasons for economic dissatisfaction are abolished. In the most brilliant period of Italian economic development millions of men have passed from a low standard of living into one of greater affluence. But their mental attitude is not changed by this; on the contrary, the attitude of political rebellion has risen almost in the same proportion as the growth of material well-being.
- d) Where Communism has attained power it has not always been able to increase the global efficiency of the system or abolish the differences.
- e) The major contribution to the reinforcement of the Communist party in Italy has not come from the really poor regions in which misery, hunger and illiteracy are a distressing reality, but from the industrial regions of the north. The electoral geography of the Communist party in Italy would be absolutely incomprehensible in the light of the preceding hypothesis. Several mainly Communist cities and regions have the highest rate both of "pro capita" income and of investments.

3. The sentiment of protest against the unequal distribution of wealth constitutes a useful climate and motive for the presentation of the ideology but not a substantial part.

The strength of Communist ideology has to be sought in the fact that democratic systems attain a high degree of efficiency but do not succeed in employing human energy within the framework of accepted ideals.

For instance a wide gap divides the economic doctrine of the West from the political philosophy in which these systems seek their basis for the social organisation.

The strength of Communism lies in the dissociation between economic patterns and political patterns of interpretation and organisation of reality. Man is, in the logic of the free economic systems, a subordinate component. The cynical and intellectually repellent aspect of the doctrine becomes evident when the economic language is compared with the totally different language of the constitutions which give expression to the political philosophy of democratic systems.

The democratic systems have not yet discovered a rational element of reconciliation which can render consistent the doctrine that must give order and structure to employment of the scarce resources, and the doctrine that must provide order and structure to the social organisation within the framework in which this employment takes place.

A significant aspect of this dissociation between economic and the political life can be provided by the competitive concept of the social life. This concept stimulates all men to pursue success insofar as it gives prestige to success itself. The area of social rebellion increases in the same proportion to which the number of those excluded from success increases.

Communism with a high degree of logical coherence does not preach well-being and success but sacrifice, the service to the common enterprise, the ideal and reason in the organisation of life.

Men, who are unable on their own to achieve for themselves ideals or reason, find in this doctrine a useful pattern for the interpretation of life, a fascinating promise of freedom in contrast to the universal apathy or silence of other cultures.

Communism attempts to give expression to moral energies and ideals which remain under-employed in certain areas of the democratic systems, in order to disrupt and promote rebellion against them.

It organises the need of order and rationality in social life which is present in every man (this explains in particular the fascination of

the Communist ideology upon several areas of Christian culture, Catholic or Protestant).

Naturally, whilst Communism indicates a desirable moral end, and moves the human endowment of good will towards it, it ignores the implications which derive from this premise. It preaches ideal and reason but it does not specify the conditions of their attainment.

In fact, where power has been attained by Communism, it has happened that to defend the right to work and income of lower classes, the basic rights of many other citizens have been taken away and especially the right to live.

The ideal of service to the common enterprise is fed by the ideal of collective action and of social redemption by oppressed classes.

Communism affirms the exigence of a type of collective action, not only as an instrument of efficiency and correction of the mistakes that freedom did not avoid, but as an instrument of moral participation of all people for a common enterprise. This ideal of collective action permits the reabsorption of the frustrations of the individual into the rational of the community development.

It affirms the vocation of the oppressed classes to restore freedom and justice. The oppressed classes immune from the errors of the traditional society will be creators of the social rationality of tomorrow.

This vision is repellent to the scientific spirit but has in itself the fascination of a religious ideal and responds to the need of many spirits who hope to see realised a sort of "economic kingdom of God" on earth. That is the dream of a total social rationality.

4. This hypothesis permits a better comprehension of several aspects otherwise inexplicable of Communism. It isolates more clearly its zones of doctrinal incoherency, and above all it permits a better interpretation of the factors of crisis within democratic economic systems.

In so far as the Communist strength lies in the doctrine, many habitual elements of the anti-Communist struggle in the countries of the West are sterile, in that they do not touch the essential nucleus which generates its persuasive force.

The reply of the West which until now has been centred upon the promise of a superior efficiency should take account of the real nature of Communism. More than by the challenge of efficiency, the reply of the West will be supported in the future by an economic

doctrine which may provide the man of our times with an acceptable vision of himself and of his progress in the world.

The conflict between the opposing systems will not be resolved solely on the plane of efficiency (both systems may realise this) but on the plane of the ideals, in the light of which, the various societies search to give efficiency a human significance.

The first phase of this process of doctrinal elaboration is constituted by the need to stress the zones of incoherence of the Communist doctrine. One of the most evident of these zones is to be found in the logical jump with which the Communist doctrine gives interpretation to economic facts before and after the conquest of power.

Communism, in fact, makes use of the conceptual patterns of the spiritual vision of life (justice, right, morals) when it needs them to attain the break-up of the existing system, but it appeals to the patterns of materialism when it must impose, after the conquest of the power, organisational patterns which are incompatible with the former.

The nucleus of the problem in this light is the connection between right and power. Where truth, right and justice cannot be absolutely measured they will identify themselves with the contingent positions of society and therefore with the political power expressed by it.

The exercise of power becomes a ruthless game, insofar as it cannot be constitutionalised.

The second phase is constituted by an analysis of the factor of crisis within the democratic systems.

The West makes a bad use of his doctrine inasmuch as it does not derive coherent consequences from the ideals that it has been preaching during the past century and a half (liberty, equality and fraternity).

Where, together with economic progress, the moral values by which it can be justified are not made clear, a rebellion against some irrational aspects of the economic system will always be possible, even when misery is overcome. If a coherent economic and political doctrine is not hammered out, the fascination of Communism will remain unaltered and the West could meet with disastrous failures in developing countries.

5. To mobilise human energies through freedom, as Communism is capable of doing through coercion, it is necessary to promote ideals

which today do not exist. From this point of view, there are several points for reflection.

It is necessary to integrate the concept of individual freedom as the right of expression of his own talents into the concept of the right-duty to serve the community welfare. Only where the more gifted people accept the task of creating conditions that are required to express the talents of the less endowed people, and of giving to every human life an acceptable goal, can the rebellion of the masses be prevented.

It is necessary to provide justification and rational foundation for economic power. This entails the need to improve managerial habits and to stress in the managerial function competence and service, and not merely investment and privilege.

It is necessary to insert man into the economist's equations, his needs and his ideals, as an independent component to which the use of physical resources has to be subordinated.

It is necessary to work out a concept of development as a conscious enterprise and not merely as a casual result of anonymous laws and of conflicts of egoism. The key of the future strategic relations between the opposing systems may be looked for within the area of ideas. Whatever may be the future development of organised relations, and the quantitative expression of the attained results, the strength of Communism will remain unaltered if the economic and political philosophy of democratic systems does not find a coherent integration and does not provide a coherent basis for closer co-operation between political and economic leaders.

6. These considerations acquire a specific meaning within the framework of the relations between developed and developing countries. The West has exported capital and resources but maybe it did not succeed in exporting accepted ideals. The consequence is that developing countries are using these resources against the West and are looking elsewhere for a political inspiration and ideals.

Economic development is today a technical possibility and a moral necessity. A great project for human civilization appears in the future: that of making all nations free from hunger, fear, and ignorance. But the accomplishment of this project demands that all available human energy should be directed toward this project.

It requires, therefore, that criteria, motives and ideals should be provided; in fact, human energy expresses itself efficiently only in the presence of accepted motives and ideals.

*

The discussion following the presentation of the Italian paper dealt with Italian experiences, the position of Italian CP leaders and trends within this party:

There are those who believe the Italian Communist party should stick to its traditional line of behaviour, and not be open to any revision or dialogue, because this is necessary for keeping strong internal discipline and preventing the younger generation from objecting and demanding free expression within the party.

There are those of the younger generation who try to assimilate the democratic pattern of behaviour of other parties, to use it especially for a dialogue with the Catholics.

The Communist press gave the most complete report of the last Catholic documents. They try to attend all conferences of Christian associations. Their best success is in giving to the opposing parties some aspects of their language, which can be seen in many final protocols at conferences organized by democratic parties or organizations.

After the death of Togliatti a struggle for power began, not a struggle for certain ideological positions:

Luigi Longo is an old man, the moral heir of Togliatti, but is not accepted by the younger generation. (Togliatti defending the Italian way to Socialism and the dialogue with the Catholics.) Amendola, the spiritual son of Togliatti, is a politician with the mentality of an intellectual, who has a family name to defend and an intellectual tradition to express. He does not refuse the dialogue with the Catholics, even if it would mean a loss of coherency with the premises of the Communist party.

Ingrao is a politician, an "apparachik", with nothing special to defend. But his position — bargaining with Catholics, no real dialogue — is more clearly accepted by CP members. Guido Fanti, mayor of Bologna, will soon be the third man of the CP. He is clever, however without a Communist background.

There is much talk about collaboration between Communists and Catholics. This collaboration is of vital interest for the CP in order to emerge from its isolation. In fact, the Democrazia Cristiana will refuse its collaboration, because its votes come from anti-Communist positions in the country. And not all left-wing D. C. members accept collaboration with the Communists, as does only a small group of intellectuals, not 1%, within the CP accept it. The Church does not promote collaboration; it shows great prudence. Dialogue with all forces is accepted, but the Church avoids definitive statements. Even at the level of local authorities, there is not a single example of

political collaboration between the two partners. Election forecasts for April 1968 are optimistic. The D. C. will improve its present position and then, the ideology of collaboration will lose its actuality.

The question, in which way the economic situation of people influences their political views, was answered in the sense that the Italian experience will be repeated in developing countries: Communism becomes an accepted mental attitude when people are able to see the irrationality of the economic system during the process of industrialization. And there is no relation between economic development and consciousness of education. The distribution of political rebellion in Italy is not according to the distribution of poverty, but according to a certain distribution of intellectual vision.

Remarks during the discussion by Professor Benedetti in connection with his lecture:

The propaganda of the West is not merely negative. But our doctrine does not derive coherent consequences from the premises. This incoherency is quite clear in the developing countries: We preach a nation and do not perceive that the ideal of a nation is quiet irrelevant to people who are just emerging from tribal life. What we preach is for all, not merely for the gifted, and we must say so, and not only presume that all people will understand the consequences. Economic doctrine tries to defend a certain logical neutrality which does not exist, which is merely an ideological position. When economic doctrine says that we are merely concerned with needs, what is human need? It is a mode of judging, not a quantity. We need to make correct use of a certain sociology of knowledge in order to revise our traditional economic doctrine. In this sense, I repeat that we need to integrate into economic doctrine the concept of man, of human needs and a certain mode of judgement. We adjust human needs to our economic calculations and we transfer men in order to adjust men to resources!

There are two essential ideas which we must introduce into the culture of the West:

1. To overcome the useless logical neutrality of economic doctrine, to avoid any ideological stand which is clear when our economic calculation is wrong.

2. To develop a coherent doctrine of the ideal of freedom for all, not only for gifted people. And therefore we need to develop a valid doctrine of leadership. Leaders have not only to provide the conditions for their own independence, but for the freedom of all. Therefore we have to stress, both in economic and in political doctrine, the idea of service.

The idea of service is not present in our economic doctrine.



Suggestions for a Western Response

by

C. C. van den Heuvel

Within the framework of the theme of this meeting the Western response is treated on the one hand as a reaction to the Communist policy of "European security" and on the other hand as a response to the "United Front" policy.

European Security

As Communism regards "peaceful coexistence" as a basis for relation of the Communist world towards the capitalist world, European security must be seen as a part of that overall strategy.

The following basic ideas of peaceful coexistence seem to have a direct bearing on European security:

1. It is necessary to prevent war, which can no longer be tolerated as a means of settling differences.
2. There should be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. An attempt must be made to cultivate better economic and cultural relations with other countries.
4. Economic competition must take the place of military confrontation, and must show the world which system will prevail.
5. Peaceful coexistence and economic competition do not imply ideological coexistence.
6. Peaceful coexistence promotes the world revolutionary aims of Communism, as it is a form of international class struggle.

The idea of European security is entirely in line with these concepts; it uses similar slogans such as: "The struggle for peace", "struggle against aggressive imperialism", and "struggle against West German revanchism". The last one is a favourite slogan, and the extent to

which this spectre is used was shown at the Karlsbad Conference, where Mr. Brezhnev suggested that serious danger of war exists in Europe as a result of West German revanchism.

In the Communist concept of European security the present frontiers are regarded as inviolable. Mr. Kosygin stated this quite clearly when he spoke before both houses of parliament during his recent visit to Britain. The German National Democratic Party plays an important part in Communist anti-German propaganda. (The significance and influence of this party are excessively exaggerated.)

Direct Soviet intentions embodied in the Soviet policy of European security may be summarized as follows:

To end the American hegemony in Europe and to replace it by a Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is probably now more than ever interested to reach an understanding with the West. The mounting difficulties with the Chinese and the increasing independence of East European countries and Communist parties outside the Communist world, deter the Soviet Union from provoking serious situations on the front of the capitalist world. The Soviet Union desires peace on this front.

As European security must be seen within the framework of Communist peaceful coexistence, so the Western response to European security must be seen within the framework of the "strategy for peace". In spite of differences of opinion most Western countries agree on the following objectives which have a direct bearing on the theme of this meeting:

1. to prevent Communism from extending its power;
2. to encourage certain positive developments within the Communist world.

As far as the first objective is concerned, NATO constitutes the continued effort of the Western countries to prevent Communism from extending its power in Europe. The present crisis within this alliance is largely caused by the new East-West situation. Various proposals have been made by representatives of NATO countries to promote cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe. No doubt this is necessary, but on the other hand it should be taken into account that NATO has been established as a defense against a Soviet military threat, and that this threat will continue until Communism has given up its world revolutionary aims. Western governments face the difficult task not only of pursuing this apparently ambivalent policy, but

also to explain it to the general public. In this task they should be supported by opinion moulders in the private sector. In regard to the second objective it seems desirable that the present policy of most Western governments towards Eastern Europe should be continued, as it is the duty of developed, civilized, democratic countries to do everything that is possible to promote peace and better relations. The time is ripe for a more dynamic and offensive approach. It has already been pointed out that the Soviet Union, because of mounting difficulties on other fronts, is interested to reach an understanding with the West.

A second factor which is important in this connection is the situation of the Eastern political elite. Increasingly, the main concern of these elites is to maintain themselves in power. They have become conservative and they are more interested in the status quo than in progressive action in the domestic and in the foreign field. Therefore they cannot be expected to form a positive and creative force for the establishment of new conditions in Europe. This situation affords the West a good opportunity to take initiatives in this field.

A further point of importance is the growing fear on the part of the ideological and political leaders in the East European countries of infiltration of Western ideas into their society. Their constant warnings prove that they regard this as a serious danger.

Another factor may be the growing significance of public opinion in the Communist countries. This is shown by the increasing amount of critical books and plays, as well as articles in newspapers and magazines.

A fifth factor of importance – perhaps still relatively insignificant, but nevertheless slowly and surely growing – is political opposition within the Communist countries. This opposition takes different forms ranging from mild criticism to disloyalty to the system.

If all these factors are taken into account the next question which arises is: What is the West aiming at in regard to the Communist world?

These aims may be summarized as follows: to bring the presence of the Western world to the Communist world; to change the wrong image of the West which exists in the Communist world; to encourage certain processes within the Communist world, which it is hoped, will eventually lead to democratization of those countries through erosion of the negative traits of the Communist system.

As has already been pointed out, it would seem that the new policy of the Western countries towards Eastern Europe provides good opportunities to promote these aims. It cannot be denied, however, that this policy can cause confusion within the Western camp. In their zeal to pursue this policy, governments may promote a picture of Communism which leaves out certain realities, such as subversive activities, efforts to aggravate contradictions between the Western countries and other negative activity. Efforts should therefore be made by governments and by the private sector to minimize this danger through provision of accurate information on these subjects, whenever that is necessary.

A reassessment of capitalism and its resultant strategy within the Communist world is being voiced. If the processes of the formation of ideas and of decision making on these subjects in the Communist world could be influenced, it could mean a definite step towards meeting that challenge. It is unlikely that a direct and immediate influence could be exerted on the political elite of the Communist countries. This elite, however, is more and more influenced by various groups within their society. The West should therefore try to establish relations with those groups, which are much more interested in, and open to contact with the West. In this regard the following groups may be mentioned in particular:

1. writers;
2. economists;
3. youth.

Writers form an important group in the various Communist countries. Increasingly they are engaged in action for freedom of expression. They have emerged as a powerful force, accelerating the process of liberalization and opposition. They are eager for contact with the West, and occasionally even call upon the West, as the recent petition of the Czech writers has shown.

The important role of the economists is increasing. More and more they incline to look to the West for improvement of the Communist economic system. This development may have far-reaching results as economic reforms can contribute to changes in the political system. Economic decision-making, moving from political centres to economic units, is already an important step in that direction.

Youth in the Communist world is becoming increasingly critical of their own society. They are anxious to establish contact with the West. They want to know about Western ideas, institutions and ways of life.

There are other groups which exert increasing influence, such as artists, lawyers, journalists, educators and natural-scientists.

Although trade unions in the Communist world cannot be regarded as real pressure groups, in some Communist countries they are becoming increasingly independent.

With all the groups mentioned above contact should be established, either by inviting representatives to the West or by accepting invitations to visit their countries. It goes without saying that the representatives of the West engaged in those exchanges should have the necessary qualities for such contacts. They should try to convince the representatives of the Communist world that their image of the West, and their views on capitalism are wrong, in particular their ideas about state monopolistic capitalism. It should be pointed out that their convergence theories are incorrect, and that their hope of being able to penetrate successfully into the power machinery of the Western states is unfounded. It should be made clear that the purpose of European security is not served by international class struggle, or by encouraging anti-American and anti-German sentiment. Finally it should be pointed out that Communism should give up its world revolutionary aims, as this endangers peace seriously. It is hoped (although it is realized that no immediate results can be expected) that in due course, through constant contact, the representatives of those groups will be influenced and that their influence will help to change the Communist assessment of capitalism and its resultant strategy.

Finally, in this connection something may be said about the Communist international front organisations.

It is clear that they play a significant part in the new Communist strategy towards capitalism. The World Peace Council directly supports the European security policy; the World Federation of Trade Unions seeks to expose present capitalism as state monopolistic capitalism. All front organisations promote the United Front policy.

Action on the part of the international front organisations can be opposed to a considerable extent by non-Communist international

organisations in the corresponding fields. These are engaged in a continuous confrontation with their Communist counterparts.

United Front

In many Western countries the Communist parties are now pursuing a United Front policy. The aims of this policy are clear: to dominate in this alliance to such an extent that it will allow the Communist party to take over power gradually, in the alliance and in the state bodies. Their chances of achieving their goals differ in the various countries. Therefore, the response of the non-Communist forces in the country concerned to this challenge must correspond accordingly. In whatever country concerned, however, one action should be taken – that is exposure of the new “United Front” tactics of Communism. In spite of the fact that Communism in the capitalist countries (as well as in the Communist countries) is changing, it should be pointed out that it still aims at the establishment of a Communist order and that this struggle is promoted and led by a foreign power with world revolutionary aims. It should be made clear that in spite of the fact that Communist ideology is on the decline, this ideology has not essentially changed.

Although the gap between theory and practice is widening, as long as the foundations and principles of ideology remain intact, the direct and indirect significance of Communist ideology should be stressed.

A point that should be exposed in regard to the United Front policy is the new methods being used by Communism, in particular, the dialogue with other groups. There is an obvious need for a dialogue in various circles, notably in political and religious circles. In this connection it is interesting to notice the increasing need for a dialogue between Marxists and Christians. In both camps it is felt that they can learn from each other. The positive sides of these efforts are obvious; on the other hand the negative implications should not be overlooked. If – in case of the so-called Christian Peace Conference – genuine peace and oecumenical feelings are used to support the goals of Soviet foreign policy, then this should be exposed in clear terms.

The dialogue takes different forms in the various Western countries. In one country the Communists concentrate on a dialogue with the churches, in another country they are more interested in the socialist party or in trade unions. It seems that in various countries Communism

is displaying more interest in student movements. There is a growing development of radical student movements which is being exploited by Communists.

Furthermore it is necessary to counter certain slogans frequently used in Communist propaganda and agitation. In particular the two slogans "American imperialism" and "West German revanchism". The first one is used to expose American capitalism as a power aiming at the subjugation of Europe. The second one is used to expose West Germany as a country again becoming Nazi. This aspect of the Communist agit-prop – stressing the dangers for peace – aims at driving a wedge between the Western countries. Existing anti-American and anti-German sentiment is exploited.

As these feelings usually have an emotional basis, it is comparatively easy to reinforce them. What should be done is to prove to opinion moulders with a sense of responsibility that the facts presented by the Communists are incorrect and that they are exploiting existing emotional feelings for their own purposes.

The exposure of Communist ideology, strategy and tactics, is much more difficult in a time of United Front than in a time of cold war. It should be undertaken in a much more intelligent, subtle and sophisticated way. The groups which are most important in this connection are journalists, politicians, teachers, the clergy, trade union leaders, youth and student leaders. Communist parties and their front organisations which promote the United Front concept seriously, will engage in a dialogue with all those groups.

Those on the non-Communist side who are actually engaged in the dialogue have a dual task. On the one hand they should expose in their own group the aims and activities of Communism. This should be done in a way that takes into consideration the views and attitudes of the group concerned. Negative anti-Communist statements may have the contrary effect to that which is sought. The opponent should not be pictured in black colours only, neither should one's own party be pictured in white colours only.

On the other hand, they should be capable of conducting the comprehensive dialogue with the Communists. This may take the form of the exposure of Communism, but it should also have a more positive goal. If the dialogue is conducted over a longer period of time, the opponent may become more influenced by what he learns about

values and institutions of a democratic society than by constant denial of his own values and institutions.

As has been previously pointed out while most Western countries have a more or less common policy towards the Soviet bloc, in regard to Communism within their own countries they have differing opinions. An important reason is that Communism as far as status, strength, influence, and other factors are concerned differs in Western countries. Another reason is that Communism is judged differently in those countries. In most countries the Communist party is regarded as a legal political party, but in some countries it has no legal existence. Some countries which fall into the latter category are becoming more inclined to reconsider their policy, as developments in other countries have shown that it may be better to allow a Communist party to lead a legal existence. Isolation often leads to frustration, and frustration to hate, increased negative reactions and greater militancy. Recognition of a Communist party can produce an opposite effect, as for instance where Communists have to cooperate for some time with non-Communists in official bodies, it often happens that they become "bourgeois" (to use their own terminology). They get more accustomed to democratic ideas, principles, institutions and procedures, and this democratic environment may influence their views and attitudes in regard to capitalism.

Western response and the private sector

As Communism is operating both internationally and regionally, Western responses should react accordingly. It is clear that Western response should be coordinated as much as possible in order to have the greatest effect. As has already been pointed out, the response should not be left to governments only but the private sector should participate as far as this is possible.

There are many institutions, centres and organisations in the Western world which are more or less engaged in activities which have a direct bearing on the Western response to Communism. What are sadly lacking however, are coordinated efforts to meet certain Communist challenges. In this connection the Communist world youth festivals may be mentioned. It took a very long time before it was realized in the West that it was necessary to undertake some action against the effects of those gatherings on participants, in particular participants from the developing countries. It also took a long time before even modest attempts at coordination finally took shape.

How much remains to be done may be shown by the fact that efforts to make a Western world wide inventory of research centres, information agencies, organisations, key-men, journalists, writers, political leaders, religious leaders, youth and student leaders etc., who may contribute one way or the other, are still in an initial stage. On the other hand there is a growing inclination towards more co-operation, on a regional basis as well as on an international basis. Interdoc exists as an outcome of the growing need for information on East West problems. This information is particularly needed by those who are actively engaged in confrontation with Communism in their respective countries, in international organisations, and by those who are actually engaged in East West exchanges.

In regard to the Communist reassessment of capitalism and its resultant strategy, I n t e r d o c should aim at providing the necessary information and documentation to those who need it. This may be shown in special Interdoc or Interdoc related publications; in a critical article about the theoretical foundations of state monopolistic capitalism in a scientific periodical review; in a pamphlet against Communist efforts to penetrate certain institutions; in a paper enabling a student leader to conduct a successful dialogue with Communists; or in a document which can be used by representatives of international organisations in their confrontation with representatives of Communist international front organisations.

If it is felt that written information is not sufficient, information could be given in the form of briefings, lectures, seminars. This may be necessary if an international or regional Communist meeting on the subject is anticipated.

Finally, Interdoc could promote the meeting of experts in this field, as well as of those who need the information, to analyse the situation and to discuss the necessary line of action.

Undoubtedly, more could be done, and it is to be hoped that in this conference practicable suggestions will be made that way.

Conclusions

by

Rolf Geyer

At the beginning of our meeting we stated that the Communist policy was characterized by three interrelated elements:

- a) Efforts at a European security system in order to get rid of NATO and to render more difficult the presence in Europe of American armed forces by committing them elsewhere.
- b) Tighter control of domestic affairs in all Soviet Bloc states and of all uncontrollable communications with the West.
- c) The dialogue between the non-ruling Communist parties and "progressive" non-Communist groups.

Professor Lades then gave an outline of the Communist theories underlying the "dialogue" and of the methods to be applied. The development of these theories of state monopolistic capitalism and the new form of revolution suggests the frustration of the Communist attempts to realize the utopian idea of a Communist society within the highly developed Western industrial society by applying the methods of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

The dialogue and the subsequent establishment of a popular front are, therefore, necessary in order

1. to gain control of the Western industrial society somehow and at some time, and
2. to free West European Communist parties from their isolation, and to reactivate them.

If we accept the validity of this analysis on the basis of Professor Lades' paper and the subsequent discussion, we may formulate the first conclusion of our meeting as following:

First Thesis

The dialogue as demanded by the non-ruling Communist parties and its underlying theories are dictated by necessity. They also reveal that modern Communism may decide on major modifications of its methods without touching the essentials of its creed.

The consequences to be drawn from these facts are:

1. Agitation must be harmonized with dialogue.

It must contain subjects appealing also to non-Communists in order to veil its objectives. By pursuing such a line the Communists will, of course, win no followers, but at best fellow-travellers.

If agitation is not in harmony with the dialogue, and is unwilling to abandon its old slogans – as hinted by the British paper – it will lose its credibility.

2. In the interests of the dialogue the Communists can no longer afford to pass verdicts summarily. They will rather have to differentiate their argumentation according to the groups they want to talk to.

Second Thesis

The Communist movement is forced to improve its analyses of the capitalist world in terms of thoroughness and, possibly also objectivity.

This allows us to refer to a "phase of analytical Communism". Of course the analysis will make the Communist methods more subtle, but it will also contribute towards a discussion within the Communist camp and, in my view, towards reviving doubts of an eventual success, doubts being a corollary of any analysis.

The valuable contribution by our friends as well as the subsequent discussions were proof that the "dialogue" has been started in all West European countries. In addition, our discussions confirmed that the Communist movement, thanks to its methods as outlined by Professor Lades and thanks to the policies of the Communist states, has scored some successes.

While in the fifties, the Western public felt threatened, but now believe the red danger does exist no longer. It is true that this belief

is mainly orientated at developments within the Soviet Bloc, whereas the activity of our own Communist parties gets but little attention, as our British friends indicated.

Whether this assessment is right or wrong, it leads to the third conclusion of our meeting:

Third Thesis

The dialogue between the non-ruling Communist parties and other groups will be continued.

Its credibility with the Western public will depend on whether the Soviet Union and her satellites keep open the possibilities for a talk on détente.

The intensity of the dialogue attempts will be at a climax when the extension of the Atlantic Alliance is to be decided on.

The third thesis raises the question of "What to do?". I think that we may agree with what Mr. van den Heuvel said in reply. The confrontation, which is not least a competition of spiritual values, should neither consist of a mere negation, nor should it take place merely between our own countries.

This is also a logical consequence of the fact that all efforts at an explanation of the real character of Communism are increasingly being stigmatized as obsolete "cold war" tactics and have, therefore, become difficult.

Mr. van den Heuvel also pointed out that such groups of our society as trade unions, youth, scientists and sportsmen, are interested in closer contacts with the peoples of Central, East and South East Europe.

Thus, in addition to the official policy of "bridge-building", there is a dynamic movement in Western Europe, which, though unpolitical in outlook, is of great political importance, as it is based upon good will. This movement faces the ruling Communist parties and their governments with the alternative: either to disavow their own policies or to start a dialogue with their own peoples. Though the Communists are still trying to contain this dialogue, they will not be able to avoid it in the long run.

Our situation is and probably also will be, characterized by factors which have been explained by Mr. van den Heuvel and which we want to formulate into our fourth and last thesis:

Fourth Thesis

The internal dialogue in the West goes hand in hand with an intensified East-West confrontation which is to induce the ruling Communists continually to analyse their own situation and thus modify their standpoints.

To quote an authority of our American friends, Zbigniew Brzezinski said the following in "Alternative to Partition":

"It remains to be seen how the Communist systems will react to our will to a confrontation. But whatever they will do, whether they will accept the confrontation or not, they will not be able to escape the impact on their own population."

Internal dialogues and the East-West confrontation determine the dialectical situation on which we have to concentrate and which we have to master.

If, in the long run, we master the set of problems involved in the East-West confrontation, we will simultaneously master the dialogue problem.

We are not concerned with power or political hegemony, although of course, the power in being is a warrant of our existence. We are rather concerned with all those values that make life worth living and which manifest themselves in what we call the freedom of the individual and human dignity.

Karl Marx stated that theories and ideas become material power as soon as they have conquered the consciousness of the masses.

Let us see that this dictum proves true in our sense and in accordance with our intentions.

The papers read at this meeting and the subsequent discussions should have been proof of our chances. It will be entirely up to us to grasp these chances.