

THE ARMED FORCES IN THE PSYCHOPOLITICAL EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION

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THE ARMED FORCES IN THE PSYCHOPOLITICAL
EAST WEST CONFRONTATION

INTERDOC CONFERENCE



Noordwijk aan Zee, 29th and 30th March, 1968

International Documentation and Information Centre
(INTERDOC)

Van Stolkweg 10, The Hague
Holland

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An international conference took place at Noordwijk, Netherlands, under the auspices of INTERDOC on the 29th and 30th of March 1968.

The theme of the conference was:

"The Armed Forces in the Psychopolitical
East-West Confrontation"

The conference was attended by representatives from various West European countries.

During the conference papers were presented on the main theme as well as on the relevant situation in the various countries. Each paper was followed by a discussion.

The main papers are presented in this booklet.

INTRODUCTION

by

Rolf Geyer

General

The political situation as a whole throughout the world is characterized by the fact that side by side with the so-called developing countries, which are striving for political and economic, and above all, for ideological and social consolidation, and which for the time being constitute power vacua, there are two power blocs of which the ideological and social orders not only contradict but actually exclude each other.

Historical materialism, which still determines the policies of the communist bloc, admits this as a basic fact of its philosophy.

Yet the political philosophy of the West, which envisages the realization of a permanent pluralistic and democratic order which would guarantee "the four freedoms", as the ultimate aim of all political activity, although with less emphasis than the communist philosophy, also seeks an indivisible social order for the whole world.

In terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the situation has the aspect of a worldwide civil war, or at least the development of a world revolutionary situation. "World politics" therefore increasingly becomes "worldwide inner politics" (Von Weizsäcker) which, in the competition between the two social systems and developments in the third world, aims at bringing about a transformation and unification of social and ideological conditions.

This basic state of affairs is rendered even more complex and complicated through the gradual and even accelerated disintegration of the two power-politically relevant blocs since the latter Fifties. This disintegration weakens relevant psychopolitically supranational factors such as European unification or world revolution: yet it also gives new vigor to national factors (neonationalism in East and West) which were considered to be virtually moribund after 1945.

The importance of psychopolitics

Since any military conflict with the direct involvement of both superpowers entails the risk of escalation to atomic world war and thus to worldwide suicide, war as such can no longer be regarded as within the range of political weapons. This means that the importance of other (e.g. economic or commercial) weapons which statesmen can use to attain their political aims is enhanced. In view of the mutually exclusive Weltanschauung of the two major blocs, psychopolitics occupies a special place among these political instruments. Its aim is to reach, both in time of peace and during armed conflicts, the minds of people both at home and abroad with a view to influencing them in a specific direction.

In this context we use the term "psychopolitics" to indicate all measures which can shape men's minds in this manner.

Psychopolitics therefore includes all comprehensive action and measures such as the transmission of information, propaganda and agitation.

Psychopolitics taken into account the fact that every action contains mind-shaping components, as it:

- promotes the development of ideas regarding the attitude and frame of mind of the acting party,
- and induces in the person directly or indirectly involved (the "target") not only a response but also a mental reaction which in the political field can give rise to psychopolitical attitudes in both individuals and whole groups.

Yet the psychopolitician is aware that each action which is primary aimed at the mind (e.g. agitation, propaganda, cultural exchange) is liable to have indirect political consequences since:

- either a basic psychopolitical attitude of relevant groups is thereby induced,
- or previous ideas about the acting party are corrected, which in turn can hinder the consolidating psychopolitical activity of the other party
- or existing basic psychopolitical attitudes, which are a target for the attacking party and are combated by it, are consolidated.

For the psychopolitician there is therefore an inescapable interdependence between mind-shaping and political practice,

an interdependence which is utilized in a masterly manner by the communist bloc.

In this of course there is nothing new as psychopolitics in one form or other, has always been practised.

The conscious struggle for people's minds in the context of major political conflicts began, as far as the post-medieval era is concerned, during the French revolution. Since World War I it has been increasingly intensified through the aim of world communism to reshape the world in accordance with its own ideas.

In the communist view, as reflected in "Krieg und ideologischer Kampf" by Colonel I.A. Seleznev (Moscow 1964, abridged German version Bern, page 1), there is thus no area between the two social systems in which a fanatical ideological struggle is not being fought. Seleznev adds: "An implacable struggle without compromise is waged at present between the communist and the bourgeois ideology".

The position of the armed forces

The armed forces are involved in this struggle in peace as in war. They are the most potent asset of effective State power, and act as a safeguard to the State against the outside world. This safeguard is the first precondition for the free inner development of the community.

Defence is an integral part of its very existence. The common good of a country's population has no firm ground if the survival of the community cannot be protected against an external threat. This equally applies when countries join forces to protect together what their respective populations consider to be their common interest. The armed forces of such countries pool their military resources into a joint organization for safeguard peace by military means, thus enhancing the efforts of the countries concerned aimed at a political order in accordance with their ideals. It follows that the armed forces are always involved in the great psychopolitical conflict, the extent, and terms and with what arguments are dependent on many factors. These factors are inherent not only within the forces themselves, but are also basic factors in their countries, and include:

- the geographical position of the country,
- the mental attitude of its population,

- the social order and the structure of the population,
- the economic potential,
- the intentions of the opponent.

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

by

Col. Drs. F.C. Spits

I shall concentrate on two aspects of the problem: first, on what, according to Communism, should be the material content of this type of warfare, and secondly on the significance that should be attached to it.

As regards the content of the concept - terminology is significant. The term mostly used in the West, i. e. psychological warfare, does not occur in the Soviet publications. The scanty literature consistently speaks of "ideological struggle and warfare". This difference in terminology is not unreal. Soviet authors, who consider themselves experts on the subject, consider that there is a great difference between what the capitalist West aims at with this type of mental struggle and the objectives of the Communist world. The question is: What are these differences?

Generally speaking, it may be said that the object of mental struggle is man, the man who fights at the front and the man who works in the home country to supply the front with all that is necessary. What is at stake is his morale - the sum of the moral forces he can produce to fight and to die, to labour and to suffer privations. What, we may ask, is the content of this morale.

The content of this morale - and I continue to follow the communist concept - is of an ideological nature. The all-important question that man asks with regard to war, the reply to which determines his attitude towards war, is whether the war is just and legitimate and what is its significance in the light of world history. All considerations focus on this question. Is the war justified morally or is it not? Is it a good war or a bad one? Does it contribute to development and progress? If the answer is positive then man will in the last resort be prepared to make any sacrifice.

This is why information on the causes, objectives and nature of the war is a first requirement. That is the key to open the door leading to the people's heart. Every people rejects war and detests it. But it accepts war if the logic of ideology shows it its

task and duty and furnished a clinching proof of the legitimacy of the war. It is clear that in this respect the Soviet Union assumes an unassailable position. For is not the object of world history world revolution? The Soviet Union is the vehicle of world history: its wars cannot therefore be unjust. Its wars serve world revolution and bring the communist ideal state, and therefore peace, nearer. Consequently, because the Soviet armed forces, are an instrument of peace, they will by definition possess a higher morale.

However, this paramount importance of the ideological aspect certainly does not exclude the psychological element in the factor morale. The psychological facet relates to man's psychic attitude and disposition, his temper, his character, his feelings and his will. For a judgment of the nature of war as a whole these qualities are irrelevant. But they do determine man's attitude in a particular situation in a war, under the influence of peril of life, when he loses his self-command, is seized with fright and struck with panic. To make him keep calm and conquer all negative feelings and moods under such circumstances his will must be steeled. And the measures and means required to achieve this are only remotely related to ideology: a sound discipline, the example of the commanding officer, a continuous contact between officers and the men, information on the battle to be fought, regular supply of munition and provisions. It is clear that this is mainly a matter of controlling the psychological elements of the morale.

Now it would be wrong to deny any connection between the ideological and the psychological aspect of the morale. Experiences and feelings lead to insight, to logical thinking, to general conclusions. Let us take as an example the situation that the soldier is continuously exposed to the action of the weapons which he does not possess himself and to which he has no means to resist. He then wonders why the opponent is superior, why he has better weapons. The answer to this question automatically sets him thinking on the social system of his own country which, apparently, is unable to acquire military and economic superiority.

Impressions and experience obtained through feelings therefore lead to logical thinking, which is not directed to the weapon itself but to the nature of the social order and the political structure. Indeed, this reasoning is not erroneous. To use an example

taken from our own national history: the fact that the Dutch soldier was placed before the enemy with inferior weapons in 1940, gave for some time rise to doubts as to the suitability of our parliamentary monarchy and the position - anchored in history - of the House of Orange. Such a development can be exploited. The psychological effect brought about by the physical power of weapons can in general be increased with the aid of propaganda. "In a war", says Theodor Arnold, "besides their primary function as means of destruction, weapons possess an additional, and important function which partly lies entirely outside the object for which they were originally intended. They have, in their own way, the task of "lending a hand" to consciousness through their intimidating, deterring, or exciting action. Theoretically, one could think of a war in which weapons would not be used at all as means of destruction because their modern psychological secondary function would have made their use superfluous".

The psychological content of the factor morale should therefore not be underestimated, although much more weight should be attached to the ideological component. It is remarkably that civil military science totally ignores the latter fact. It starts from the postulate that man is a biological being and that inter-human relations and common interests are conditioned and determined by biological, and hardly ever or not at all by social and economic factors. That is why in judging and explaining man's motives, it bases itself entirely on his biological needs, his passions and instincts for self-preservation and self-defence. Although it does not altogether neglect the ideological problem - since also the mind is stirred - the emphasis is largely on influencing his psyche.

The question that forces itself upon the communist mind is: why does the bourgeoisie, in approaching the problem of morale, evade this entire complex of problems connected with the process of ideological development and awaking. Is not the answer to this question closely related to the fact that the bourgeoisie is afraid of a confrontation and comparison of ideologies, which is an inevitable condition for the formation of a politically and ideologically conscious mind? Must not it reckon seriously with the possibility that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism will eventually dominate the minds of the masses? And would not it then be better to ignore political consciousness altogether?

This pusillanimity, this uncertainty, this lack of faith is seen by communism as characteristic of the shaky construction of

thoughts which does not explain the link of human actions with social and economic circumstances, which are reflected in ideology, but considers them to be governed by purely biological factors. This is also the origin of the crisis which, for a historical period already, must be regarded as characteristic of the bourgeoisie, its view on history, its philosophy and its policy. The term "psychological warfare", is a symptom of this revolt against the spirit. It explains why imperialism experiences the coming events as irrational and unknowable and why in its helplessness and poverty it has recourse to arguments derived from national psychology, social demagoguery and personal striving for wealth.

The political-ideological warfare of communism, on the contrary, is not directed towards man's feelings and emotions, but towards his thinking, his mind. It tries to develop and shape his consciousness, to change his insight and convictions and the principles which lead to his actions. During World War II the emphasis in Soviet propaganda was not, therefore, on threats, intimidation and insinuation, but on information that contained clear and important ideological arguments that appealed to the intelligence rather than to feelings. It was of a scientific quality, understandable and convincing, and it urged the men to contemplate, to compare and to think.

Yet a propaganda that neglects the psychological factors would be abstract and fruitless. What is important and socially sensible must be transferred to the personal sphere and translated into personal terms. To do this, a knowledge of individual and mass psychology is a prerequisite. Furthermore exertion of influence in the psychological sense operates less in convincing than in bringing about depressive situations which undermine and paralyse the psychic forces. But this method of exerting influence has only a subsidiary function. It adds to the effect of political and ideological propaganda.

On the basis of this one must distinguish between propaganda and agitation. Propaganda is the means employed to influence the ideology of a certain class, agitation is an attack on its psychology. Propaganda is directed to the intelligence and consciousness by means of the printed word and the scientific lecture. Agitation acts on man's feelings, will, and ambitions and to this end makes use of a personal exchange of thoughts, of radio, t.v., film and theatre.

All these means are directed to what may be called the main object of the strategy and tactics of ideological warfare; to aggravate contradictions in the non-communist world. These can be reduced to the same denominator; the class struggle. When projected into the international sphere, this warfare appears in our days in the growing gap between the poor countries and the rich. It also shows up in the contrast between the haves and the have-nots, between the government and the people, the army and the government, and within the army between the officers and the rank and file. It is the aim of ideological propaganda to sharpen these contradictions and hinder the efforts of the leading class to create internal unity. The antagonistic contradictions between the various classes in capitalist countries lend support to this propaganda as the masses as a whole will never identify themselves with the ideology of the ruling class. During World War II this circumstance was exploited as intensively as possible by Soviet propaganda. A pamphlet, of which millions of copies were to be distributed among German soldiers, bore the heading: "The soldiers fall - the dividends of the capitalists rise. What are you fighting for?"

I shall deal now with the question of the significance the communist world attaches to ideological warfare. In this respect communists take a view which they assume to be diametrically opposed to that of the West: Western publications, especially those which have appeared during the past few years, show a tendency to refer to a process of de-ideologisation. Evidently the anti-communist campaign has not been effective with the masses. Therefore another tack is being tried. In capitalist civil propaganda the following themes have been developed for some time past:

1. Capitalism has changed. This change is so radical that social conflicts belong to the past.
2. Communism has changed. The socialisation of the means of production has led to a great lack of initiative. To fill the gap and to raise productivity the Soviet state has developed more and more into what should be called a totalitarian state. Consequently its character, which was revolutionary at the origin, has changed into its opposite. The Soviet Union has taken on the character of a counter-revolutionary state.
3. Under the influence of science and technique both socialism and capitalism have assimilated to much that a hybrid type of

society has been formed. The ideologies remain contradictory but obviously they no longer influence social developments. They have become superfluous. In the Soviet Union this phenomenon finds expression in a slow but gradual decay of the ideology. Probably it will have lost its significance around 1980.

In capitalist countries it is assumed that there will be a transition period of ideological coexistence. To communists the idea is, of course, detestable. In this field coexistence will never be possible. Coexistence is confined to relations between states. International problems can be solved by compromise and concessions, but if compromises are reached they can only relate to matters of an incidental, temporary nature. They will never touch the essence of social and political order, the structure of the state and the ideology on which it is based. Peaceful coexistence excludes any compromise on ideological questions.

Contrary to what is assumed in the West, therefore it is obvious, that ideology, and the struggle that is waged on this level, has considerably grown in importance. This arises particularly from two factors.

1. The strengthening of the Socialist bloc

Before World War II the Soviet Union was isolated as a socialist state. As a result of this war the socialist revolution emerged victorious in a number of European and Asiatic countries so that an international system came into being which now includes as many as 14 countries. Besides this, the decolonialization process has changed international relations. Many millions of people have been "liberated" from colonialism. All this, as well as the ideological unity of the communist parties in the capitalist countries, has seriously impaired imperialistic influence. There is no doubt in the communist mind that the capitalist world prepares for another war. On the other hand, the Socialist camp wages a battle for peace with ideological means. It can do so much better owing to the changed conditions - a change that is of a qualitative nature. The result is also that in the struggle for power the ideological element has been strengthened by its strongly increased influence.

2. The revolutionary changes in the technique of war

The revolution in the military system is also of a qualitative nature. One of its consequences is that in a nuclear war the situation changes so quickly, that it will be almost impossible to influence the ideological convictions and ideas of millions of people. This does not mean, however, that the ideological weapon will not be used. Even the most perfected arms must be operated by men. It is men who will be exposed to the physical and moral effect of the arms. Victory in war depends on the attitude of the forces and the population, and consequently the course and the result of the struggle depends on moral and political factors.

Obviously, part of the effort in the ideological struggle must be transferred to conditions of peace. The primary object will then be to mobilise the masses to prevent war. To this end it should be impressed upon them that capitalism, which is the only source of war left, will have to be destroyed. As long as the means of production have not been socialized there will be classes and there will be a struggle between them that can lead, internationally, to wars. Furthermore, in the ideological struggle, capitalism is placing emphasis on the mental preparation of its peoples to an aggressive war of conquest.

The aim of the ideological effort of the socialist countries will be to avert this baneful influence. The importance of the ideological struggle is, therefore, growing. Besides, there are other factors pointing in that direction. In present circumstances the destruction of the forces of the enemy is no longer the main strategic aim. It is more important to attack the vital sources of supply, to destroy the targets behind the front. For what is vital is the material basis of warfare. It is the millions of workers producing these material means. Consequently the ideological influence exerted on those masses will have a decisive effect on the course of the war.

Finally it should be pointed out that capitalist countries take the view that the development of nuclear weapons must lead to a reduction of the size of the armies. This era does not need big armies. Socialist countries do not share this view. It is true that the potential of the opponent can be destroyed by the nuclear weapons, but the neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, the occupation of points d'appui and strate-

gically important territories is a task for the ground force. To enable them to perform this task, they should rather be increased in size. Also in the atomic era, and despite mechanization and automation, armies of millions must be maintained.

The conclusion must be, if we are to believe Seleznev and other authors, that a fierce struggle is being fought between the communist ideology and that of the bourgeoisie. Everywhere, in all domains, during diplomatic talks, commercial transactions, meetings on subjects of science, art and sport, we can observe the irreconcilability of the parties, the clash between two worlds, the struggle of the ideologies. Ideologically the contradictions will never be bridged.

BRITISH FORCES IN THE EAST/WEST PSYCHOPOLITICAL
CONFRONTATION

by

Wing commander E.S. Williams

Psychopolitics, or its synonymous and included terms Psy-War, Psy-Ops, propaganda, have always been of great concern to British Forces, especially so since the Cold War began. Historically the British appeared very early in the field; propaganda in a recognizable modern form first having been used as a weapon of war in the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil War in the 1640's. World War I in this field is counted a great success - Ludendorf himself having attributed to the final collapse of the German Army in 1918 to propaganda efforts and he questioned its morality; but if it shortened the war then we have no conscience on these grounds. Contemporary evidence of this is found in the London Times for 31st October, 1918: "Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the probable saving of at least a million lives and thousands of millions in money".

Its policy was based on truth - or selected portions of the truth. The risk was taken that our own people could stand the truth without their morale collapsing; there was always this possibility in 1940-1941. In World War II Britain's propaganda services were directed by the Political Warfare Executive. In its final form this was a ministerial committee comprising the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Information which was responsible for policy with its operations under the control of a Director General, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. The BBC was the major medium of wartime propaganda - and a high degree of credibility was built up and maintained not only in our home population, but also with our allies and enemies. That reputation is still maintained in the Soviet Union where international news items are not generally accepted as accurate by the average Russian citizen until they have been confirmed by the BBC. Items transmitted by "Voice of America" and other foreign stations are, needless to say, of interest to Russian listeners, but are not usually given full evidence until repeated on the BBC Overseas Service. It should be emphasized, however, that it is a basic principle of psychological operations, that it can only be

effective in support of conventional military power - never as a substitute for it.

It is now known that in World War II we also had our covert operations. The story of the Deutsche Soldatenzender (Black Boomerang-Sefton Delmer) has been told too often to require repetition here. But this type of black propaganda was essentially a battlefield tactical operation - as limited and precise in its aim as an air strike - and has little relevance to the present East/West confrontation. The position in this can only be to portray the truth in a long term strategic psychopolitical struggle; deception can have no part in our policy unless or until an armed conflict broke out. This is of course a strictly national view. "Black" propaganda plans are difficult to devise and operate and in a European context we lack most of the geographical advantages necessary for success.

It is still British policy to present the truth. This is not open to question but it is a question for decision which truths to tell and how much. Do we, for instance, pursue our psychopolitical operation energetically enough? If, for example, our broadcasting effort was increased, what should we say, and would members of the target area be allowed to hear it? How could we undertake this without running the risk of destroying the tender plant of credibility? If Soviet citizens do listen to the BBC with some eagerness, then their motivation is curiosity - they are intrigued by the outside world and how people live in it. Radio is their only real window - and this knowledge should and does dictate our policy. They do not listen merely because they are disaffected with the regimes, indeed they are quick to switch off if the material broadcast is patently anti-regime and transparently propagandist. We must therefore be careful always to be non-communist in our approach rather than anti-communist. Communist authorities do not hesitate to use their jamming stations if necessary, but they seldom need to do so - the people impose their own censorship. We can and should increase our effort in this direction; our aim should be to convert not to subvert.

In Britain it is accepted that the armed forces are involved very definitely in psychopolitics, but not separately. That is to say, there are no separate aims; the policy of the armed forces must always be completely congruent with national policy. Over the last 15-20 years our armed forces have been engaged directly in psychopolitical operations only in the former colonial terri-

tories where our broad aim has usually been to fight subversion, of communist or other origin, so that in abdicating our colonial authority, we could leave government and power in capable hands. In other words, we have tried to ensure political stability before leaving. We have had mixed success. We have been the agents and executives of Government policy in our confrontation with insurgency, in various corners of the world like Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya. Our activity in these areas has only been successful when pursued in complete harmony and agreement with the civil organs - when one simple national policy has become evident. This policy has usually been two-fold: to persuade terrorists to surrender, and to explain the reasons for the presence of British troops in the territories concerned. In doing this, our propagandists have striven to follow the truth and to make no promises that cannot be carried out. The long drawn out Malayan campaign of 1948-1960 showed us how necessary it is for the military to work closely with the political authority in any confrontation with Communism. This was not peripheral confrontation, but a long, hard lesson in modern psychopolitics which taught the British the important elements of the battle for the hearts and minds of men. More recently, in Borneo, our aims were the same - to win the confidence of the local population - and this our army was able to do by the provision of medical services and other humanity projects at a time when tribal allegiances were determinate and might well have swung towards Indonesia. At the same time, active offensive tactical psychological operations directed at the Indonesian Forces in Borneo were pursued in a variety of ways and probably contributed in some measure to the extraordinary swift collapse of the Sukarno regime in 1965. I speak now of days that are gone, or almost gone, since we are abandoning all pretence of a military role in the wider world and concentrating our forces at home for as great a contribution to the defence of Europe as our national exchequer can afford. Our confrontation with the East - direct military confrontation - will soon be restricted to the New Territories frontier in Hong Kong. The situation there is entirely psychopolitical. We know that the Communist Chinese could take Hong Kong to-morrow morning by overwhelming our small token forces there. They have not yet done so because they are not anxious to lose their one real trade outlet to the outside world nor their one real inlet for foreign currency. The recent border disturbances were merely psychopolitical exercises to

create confusion for the Government of the Colony, to divert an attention from their own strange internal difficulties, and to gather raw material for propaganda showing the Hong Kong Police and Military Forces as "Fascist oppressors of the poor". The British Forces task is to counter these aims, an entirely psychopolitical function, denying the Chinese the opportunity to use the incidents of their own creation for their own propaganda advantage.

It may be of interest to talk for a moment about the personnel and resources we have had at our disposal for these campaigns. They have been impressively small in all cases. As one example, there were never more than a handful of psychological operations staff officers in Borneo at any one time. By comparison with their numbers their achievements were enormous. Apart from their dispiriting effect on their Indonesian opponents which produced many surrenders - they so excelled in coordinating community relations work that it can be said, in the full knowledge that it is true, that the local population in what was British Borneo was very sorry to see the British Forces leave.

Perhaps it should be explained in passing that we had a very lucky start in Borneo. The insurrection in late 1962 collapsed within a very few days after the arrival of a large British task force from Singapore. But it was followed by very heavy rains and unprecedentedly serious floods which left many hundreds of people in remote areas clinging to the tops of trees in the water with little hope of survival. The coincidental presence of a sizeable helicopter force meant that they were all rescued without difficulty either by the R.A.F. or the R.N. This was a fortunate start for a "hearts and minds" programme; the kind of incident which over the course of history has produced the arrogant belief held by some British, that God himself is British.

We have no personnel, officers or other ranks, who are permanently employed in psychopolitical activities. We have a small school where staff officers are familiarized with the subject. It is intended that these officers will be available to conduct psychological operations whenever our contingency plans are put into effect.

Mention is made of these overseas commitments which the British have had, and still have, although in residual form, in order to point out that they were not isolated colonial or imperialist adventures, but together they formed one psychopolitical arena where we were under the critical observation of the

"Third World", the underdeveloped and uncommitted nations. The East/West confrontation has been likened to an internal governmental election where the East and West blocs can be considered as the rival parties expounding their policies in front of the electorate, which is the "Third World". The eventual choice made by this electorate will decide the future political system of the world. It is therefore necessary that our voice be heard and recognized if an eventual communist hegemony is to be avoided.

Where then do the British stand today - or perhaps more to the point - what part will the British Military forces play, psychopolitically, now that they are to be domiciled in Europe? It is certainly the time to reconsider our position in concert with our allies. The answer is not really simple nor indeed clear. In summary, I can only say that we can do nothing more than follow the line of our information policy, which echoes our national foreign policy - and this, however we look at it, is to contain communism, in cooperation with our allies. We would agree wholeheartedly - that is, the military can agree - with two statements in the introductory paper. Firstly, we are in agreement with Col. Selezner that "an implacable struggle without compromise is being waged at present between the communist and bourgeois ideology". This statement could have originated in the West as easily as in the East - it is an expression of fact. As the paper on "War and peace in Communist Thinking" (by C.C. van den Heuvel) implies: "Whatever modification may have occurred in the communist theory of the inevitability of war with capitalism there have been no changes in their point of view that the ideologies of Communism and Capitalism are incompatible". If we were asked "how long must we be prepared to follow this policy of containment?", then the answer would be: until the communist ideological doctrine has also been modified to permit of compromise. Given the continued avoidance of World War III this must inevitably happen within the next half-century under the stimulus of continued technological progress and space exploration, when the present and familiar bases of political power may be radically different. I may appear to be old-fashioned and naive, but it is still clear that this cleavage in ideology reduces to the simple dilemma of "which is subservient - the Individual or the State?" All other differences would appear to admit of some compromise. And even this impasse may eventually erode to the point where the relaxations in the East and the growth of legislated restrictions

in the West have made the definition of political freedom hazier than it is at present. This view is not shared by Soviet sociologists who seem to think that this theory of the "convergence" of capitalism and communism is merely a bourgeois trick to give anti-communism the appearance of an objective scientific analysis of the path of development of the two systems. Secondly, we agree "that defence forces are the greatest asset of effective State power and safeguard the State against the outside world. Defence is an integral part of the State's very existence".

Unfortunately this is where Britain's greatest psychopolitical difficulty comes to light. Our recurrent balance of payments difficulties have led, as we all know, to a drastic curtailment of our defence effort. Globally, and in Europe, we have been forced to reduce to a military level of bare credibility. This is not the place or time to discuss the wisdom or otherwise of our military strategy, but it does mean that after 1971 we will have no continued physical military presence in the Middle East or Far East - our contacts will be commercial and diplomatic only and our psychopolitical approach to the Third World as a whole will be remotely by radio and the printed word or, as I mentioned, by whatever economic and technical aid we are able to afford. You will argue that Germany, France and other European countries have had no more than this for many years now and still have retained a high degree of influence in the Third World. But the facts are changing. Predictably as the British Military presence is withdrawn, the Soviet presence is being extended. I am not saying that our military withdrawal means a complete disconnection with the Third World. We would hope to establish closer relations in such matters as education, training facilities for professions and other forms of aid to the new countries in forming sound bases for their economics and cultures. Our forces, we hope, will still be able to play their part in these schemes, in projects such as the bridge and road building operation recently undertaken by the Royal Engineers in Thailand. The current need for financial stringency is the only problem in such ventures.

A second problem concerns our relations with Africa. The delicate operation of transferring political authority to half a dozen now independent countries was completed in the early 1960's without any real defections to the communist side. We were proud of this achievement, effected as it was at a time when the Congo was in ferment and when Chinese and Russian psychopolitical interference was at its most intense. To some extent the

task was eased by the fact that African politicians were pre-occupied more with racial considerations than with the rival merits of communism and liberal democracy. The present relationship is now very seriously threatened by the state of affairs in Rhodesia where any policy we adopt is almost bound to be wrong and easily exploitable by the communist propagandists.

Probably our greatest difficulty in Britain at the moment is the state of our own public opinion. Defence and military service are not popular concepts at the present moment, especially among our youth, for several reasons, of which the Vietnam war is only one. There is a mood of "militant pacifism" about, which can only be conceded as a significant victory for the psychopolitical effort of the opposition in the "Struggle for Peace Campaign". The soldier and the military career are not the attractive propositions that they still are in the Soviet Union. The Front Organisations have done their work well. It is a remarkable paradox that the freedom cult, of hippie, flower people and drop-outs, is far more susceptible to the appeal of totalitarian and restrictive communism than to that of the permissive liberal governments under whose protection they live and flourish. I do not think Britain is the only sufferer from this disease. Fortunately this is a superficial manifestation; the deep mistrust and scepticism of British society towards communism is as broad and strong as ever. We also have the chronic problem of subversion in our industries - a sphere where the communist propagandist are always hard at work. This is not a subject for discussion in today's context but it is mentioned as yet another of our national psychopolitical vulnerabilities.

The one way to prevent this kind of degeneration developing further is a greater educational and propaganda effort at home, directed at ourselves, to make our population once again fully aware of the strength of the communist attack, to show that the threat is no less dangerous to our way of life than it was in 1949 when NATO was formed, to everybody's relief. Here again the general theme ought to be non-communist rather than anti-communist - an exposition of achievements and advantages of a free society rather than an emphasis on the communist lack of achievement. After all, it would already seem that the communists' own internal propaganda is beginning to boomerang. Their populations have sacrificed so much for so long that unless communism does provide the good life soon, then its subjects must inevitably question the basis of its ideology. It may be that the current ferment in the East European States and indeed

the Soviet Union is but the tip of an iceberg - the first signs of a process of mass introspection. Clumsy propaganda on our part could easily halt this process and put the clock back. We must not close the door on the communists in complete hostility - we in Britain will maintain or improve our current dialogue, our trade, cultural and scientific contacts with them with the long-range hope that the barrier between our two societies will eventually be removed without war and without damage to our principles and values.

Such a programme of education can only be successful if carried out in cooperation and accord with the rest of Europe. This is why a conference of this nature is of such great value, affording as it does a forum for joint discussion of common problems, and a starting point for positive action.

In all aspects of the psychopolitical confrontation Britain will from now on be militarily more involved with Europe, and we must learn how best to serve it while at the same time in the interest of the common cause of the free world preserving the vital essence of the special relationships with the Third World endowed upon us by historical circumstances.

THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE PSYCHOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION

by

Dr. Günther Wagenlehner

The same general principles apply for the Bundeswehr, as for any other army which make it an object of psychopolitical confrontation.

There are moreover certain particularities in the German situation, which may provide successful points of attack for the opponent. These points will be dealt with in this paper.

1. The historical experience

In German history the army has always played a dominant role. This holds particularly for the Nazi period in Germany. After the collapse of National Socialist rule the traditional outlook lapsed. The value of the soldier sank just as deeply as it had been hitherto of significance. The politicians of the first days, also Adenauer and Strauss, used to say that Germany would never have an army again. When later, the Bundeswehr was formed, the two extremes, i. e. the exaltation and the degradation of the soldier, constituted points of psychological attack. On the one hand, this means the reproach from the left, in particular from communists, that the Bundeswehr is traditionally militaristic and reactionary. But on the other hand, from the right, the counter-reproach is made that the Bundeswehr shows a disdain for German tradition and is too little aware of its own value. Between these attacks from the left and the right the Bundeswehr must determine its position and its relationship to the past.

2. The Bundeswehr as part of Atlantic Defense

For the first time in German history the armed forces form an integrated part of a supranationally oriented defense scheme. From historical developments we know that this tradition was a decisive condition to the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr is so considered as a national defense force cannot offer security.

However, this integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO also provides opponents from the left and from the right with psychological points of attack.

In a remarkable concord of ideas (although originating from different motives) the Bundeswehr is blamed by both nationalists and communists for consisting simply of mercenary troops in the service of foreign interest. "Out of NATO" is the slogan used by radicals both from the right and from the left. They equally agree in demanding neutrality of the Federal Republic of Germany. Here again the Bundeswehr has to find, in the psychological defense of its own position, the golden mean between the two extremes. The success of these efforts obviously depends upon the concord of interest between the NATO partners. It can hardly be said that the situation in this respect, especially as regards the future of NATO after 1969, is particularly clear or easy to grasp.

3. In the third place, there is no doubt whatever that the greatest psychological burden on the Bundeswehr derives from the division of Germany. I need only remind you of the fact that the soldiers of the Bundeswehr have as their opponents Germans in the uniform of the National Popular Army. The problem starts with the oath the soldiers are obliged to make, i. e. to defend the rights and the freedom of the German people. But those on the other side of the curtain also belong to Germany, and yet in case of necessary defense, they could be shot at. Now, historically we know that armament began in Germany in the Soviet zone immediately after 1945. Despite the Potsdam endeavours, a regular army was formed there as soon as in 1948, while high officers of the armed forces were trained for this aim in the Soviet Union in 1948/1949. When the Army in the Soviet zone was formed officially in January 1956, it included already 100,000 men, apart from 80,000 policemen in barracks and 700,000 men in paramilitary organizations. At that time, in the Federal Republic 101 officers and non-commissioned officers had obtained their nomination and the first 2000 volunteers were called up. As stated before, historically the facts are clear, but they are of little help to overcome present problems. Obviously, one must start from the principle that the Bundeswehr will

be confronted with the Germans in another uniform exclusively for reasons of defense. But that does not release the individual soldier from the duty to shoot at Germans. Since the Bundeswehr does not, and cannot think lightly as a National Popular Army of education for hatred towards an opponent, the division of Germany remains a problem. The various opponents of the Bundeswehr thus find points of attack for their propaganda.

II. The Bundeswehr as main target of communist propaganda

Just as the Federal Republic of Germany is, simply because of its existence, regarded in Soviet politics as the mischief-maker the Bundeswehr appears in communist propaganda as the incarnation of revanchism and militarism.

In particular, the Eastern zone has for years left nothing undone to attack the Bundeswehr by propaganda. In all so-called Brown book, Grey book, etc. there are special chapters disparaging the Bundeswehr. Two thirds of all propaganda material secretly introduced into the Federal Republic is aimed against the Bundeswehr. Communist radio broadcasts, especially the "soldiers station 935" is aimed directly at the soldiers. The methods are multifarious, the themes essentially the same in all cases.

The communist propaganda mainly concentrates on the following objects:

1. The soldiers should have no confidence in their leaders. The alleged superiority of the National Popular Army and the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries is stressed. Superiors are disparaged; isolated events exaggerated. To influencing Bundeswehr soldiers psychologically a mixture of threats, temptation and sex is used.
2. With the aid of its worldwide relations and the capacities of communist propaganda, efforts are made to shake the confidence of the allies in the Bundeswehr. To this end use is made principally of an alleged conspiracy between radicals of the right and the Bundeswehr. Part of this is the constant slander of the military command of the Bundeswehr. It is not so much persons who are the target, but rather the office. For example, communist propaganda has attacked all General Inspectors since General Heusinger. While, for instance, General Trettner was hardly ever mentioned before his nomination, extensive propaganda

campaign were launched against him afterwards. Psychological defense is not easy in this case. However, many communist falsifications and photographic trickery, etc. have been shown up.

For example, one chapter alone of the Grey book published in 1967 contains 17 falsified quotations and 13 passages out of context which alter the meaning, and many more false statements. But communist propaganda never tires of finding new combinations and contortions. The aggressor here has the advantage. Even where the psychological defense succeeds in proving the falsity in 16 cases, this may be impossible in the 17th case because the archives are in the East zone; the 17th case is sufficient to give an appearance of guilt.

This method of slander also includes the alleged aggressive intentions, plans to attack, etc. Here again, it is of little use to refer to the conditions of the Treaties the Federal Republic has concluded, to the fact that it renounced the use of atomic biological and chemical weapons, and a controlling function in NATO and Western European Union. Intelligent protests do not count against a propaganda of this kind. This does not mean that all communist propaganda should not be carefully examined and refuted. This is done. Nor does it mean that the problems stemming from the burden of the past should be belittled. There are undoubtedly Germans who have disqualified themselves for a post in the Bundeswehr by having participated in war crimes. Only, the statement should be a just one; not just an item in communist propaganda.

If we follow communist propaganda, it is clear that the attacks against the Bundeswehr and its leaders will not cease until a Soviet General would be in command!

III. The present position of the Bundeswehr in the psychological confrontation

It seems to me that in this psychopolitical confrontation the Bundeswehr can only exist if it has a valid mandate, is convinced of its validity and role and can therefore represent it to the outside. Psychological defense should not, therefore, be confined mainly to constant refutation of the opponent's attacks, but also to presenting itself with conviction.

This applies first to the structure of the Bundeswehr itself:

1. The Bundeswehr must regard itself as an integrating part of Western defense, as this is how it can best serve German interests.
2. The Bundeswehr must be well aware of the fact that it is establishing a new German Military tradition, in which the citizen-in-uniform has democratic rights. The good military traditions also belong to it, but only as far as they can serve as an example for the present task of the Bundeswehr. This includes the military resistance against Hitler.
3. The Bundeswehr must include in its "Leadership Training" (Innere Führung) the attainments of modern industrial society and technique. The contradiction between the soldiers' ideal: i. e. to serve, and that of society, i. e. to gain, can only be made to disappear if the Bundeswehr functions not only in accordance with military ideals but also as a great modern undertaking whose objective it is to maintain security.

The present position of the Bundeswehr is largely determined by its relationship towards society and politics:

1. The Bundeswehr is not a state within the state, but as a constituent of the executive; it is subject to political leadership.
2. The Bundeswehr is to all intents and purposes a mirror image of society, neither better nor worse than society. Over 90% of the German population recognizes the Bundeswehr as a necessity to guarantee outside security. This is a sound basis for a positive relationship with the social environment.
3. Threats from radicals of the right or the left jeopardize the Bundeswehr as much as the population as a whole. The position of the Bundeswehr in this respect cannot be misunderstood: every soldier must acknowledge a free democratic order and the constitution.

Things are apt to become more difficult when a radical political party, which is not prohibited, seeks adherents in the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr leaders cannot forbid this activity. But the Inspector General has repeatedly made it clear that a military superior who as a member of a radical party is convinced of opposite of what he has to teach his soldiers must fail as a result of this conflict of conscience.

For the rest, the problem of radical influences, especially from the right, on the Bundeswehr is often misrepresented.

Reliable data show that less than one per cent of the soldiers of all ranks belong to a radical party. The danger of a radicalization of the Bundeswehr as well as of the population as a whole is small, if in the Federal Republic of Germany an intelligent and convincing policy, a policy of peace, is conducted.

Finally, the position of the Bundeswehr in the psychological confrontation with its communist accusers in the East.

The Bundeswehr does not teach hatred and has no "mortal enemy". What it teaches is fulfillment of the defense task. Consequently the enemy is he who attacks the Federal Republic. Obviously, in this connection the presence of a potential threat by the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which constantly boast of their growing preparedness for war, should not be ignored.

For the Bundeswehr to assert itself in the psychological defense against the communist propaganda campaign is a very important task, which requires patience and calm. Moreover, a most important point is also the explanation, at home and abroad, of the Bundeswehr's own objectives and problems. Only in this way can the slander be effectively met in the long run.

Already in 1965, on the occasion of the visit of a Soviet youth delegation in the school for "Leadership Training" (Innere Führung), the Bundeswehr showed that it is open also to Soviet visitors. Typically, after this visit all contacts by communist groups in the Federal Republic with the Bundeswehr were forbidden.

I have stressed several times the point, that it is highly important for the Bundeswehr to count as a member of the Atlantic Defense.

This means that, to fulfil this task, the Bundeswehr has to rely on the confidence of its allies.

It seems to me that the Bundeswehr deserves this trust. To conclude I would like to say: The greater the confidence the allies and its friends place in the Bundeswehr, the better it will be able to stand up to psychopolitical confrontation.

THE RELEVANT SITUATION IN ITALY

by

Ivan Matteo Lombardo

1. The psychopolitical impact of Soviet Military Power

The communist have a final and global aim which they relentlessly pursue, and to attain that purpose they develop overall strategies and adapt suitable tactics for their implementation, adopting every kind of suitable techniques towards that end. With that purpose in mind they coherently coordinate their actions in every single and specific aspect and sector in the realms of politics, economics, diplomacy, technology, mass communication, warfare, and military might. The West is far from attempting to do some coordination of its own, as it seems reluctant to take cognizance of reality. It tries to contain the flood not by erecting a dam, but by setting up in a hap-hazard way, here and there, some scattered mounds of sand.

We should never overlook the fact that while the USSR military might possesses tremendous weight in itself, its psychological impact is even greater. Just as communists are nothing else but the scavengers of revolutions, the Soviet armed forces are the harvesters of action previously carried on in their shadow by "other means". It is worth remembering at this point a statement by Soviet General Svetchin of the Military Academy of Moscow, when elaborating upon Lenin's commentaries on Clausewitz's aphorisms: "The Red Army's task is the one of shaking a tree bearing fruits already rotten".

It belongs to the Soviet concept of the use of the military might to allow that, while it stays looming in the background, attacks of every type could be developed by every possible means, provided none of them would get out of control at the risk of stepping on the threshold of general war. Even the Soviet nuclear weaponry is playing a prominent role in the psychopolitical warfare, because of the use that is being made of it. It does not have to deter the West, which does not think for one second (as it has never thought of, even when it had the monopoly of the atom) of attacking the USSR with it. The

Western world, in contrast, is being constantly reminded of the mushroom cloud, thus being conditioned in a Pavlovian way not to dare to take a stand by counteracting against all the "other means" used against it.

The manner in which communism is waging the protracted conflict practically paralyzes the mind and will of the free world. Its psychopolitical aspects produce a "fall-out" contaminating the minds, and causing mutations in the consciences of the people. The wind spreading this "fall-out" is the one blowing from the mass communication media which have been - more or less in every country of ours - dutifully infiltrated by communists, crypto-communists, "fellow-travellers" and auxiliaries of every kind and denomination. Radio and TV broadcasts are the most powerful means by which "disinformation", slanted information, and occult persuasion are being put to work by the "Red and Pinkish Establishment", in order to fool and condition millions of viewers and listeners with the purpose of achieving psychologically, without risk and with no practical opposition or restraint, results which would be less effective, or even counter-productive, if attempted solely by harsher means. I do not know enough about what is happening with Radio and TV broadcasts in other Western countries, but I do know what is happening in my own country: it is the most noxious network for conveying to the masses half-truths, distorted outlooks, biased commentaries, overt or covert innuendos; for constantly keeping in the limelight the so-called "socialism" of the communist regimes, the negative image communism likes to create about the Western civilization, the various brands of the systemic revolution (Leninism, Maoism, Castroism, Titoism, Guevarism, Lumumbism, etc. etc.).

2. Italy under communist psychopolitical attack

I shall now come to the Italian situation within the framework of the theme of this Conference.

My country does not possess nuclear weapons and therefore entrusts its long-range strategic defense to the nuclear deterrent of the Atlantic Alliance. The Italian armed forces - as a result of a series of objective conditions - have the primary strategic task of defending the territory and the population of the country to which they belong, within the framework of those necessities and those legitimate aspirations which

are recognized by the members of the Alliance. The Italian armed forces provide for two categories of military power: the forces whose employment is foreseen in the framework of NATO; the units assigned to the defense of Italian territory considered as a predominantly national responsibility.

Alongside the existing and potential threat of the communist bloc (against which my country has bound itself in an alliance with other countries sharing the same general ideals and participating in the same realm of interests) Italy is plagued by a serious threat from within, in the form of a large and strong communist party. This one is practically a "foreign base" of the USSR in Italian territory. Some other groups of ideological cranks and political agitators pledge their allegiance to Mao's China, to Castro's Cuba, to the late Guevara's concept of worldwide turmoil and guerrilla warfare. These groups are eventually squabbling with the communist party following the Moscow line, but whenever some mischief has to be made, and/or some agitation to be started or exploited, they coalesce (even if temporarily) and they thus accrue strength to the Muscovites. It thus follows, more or less, that the strategic task of the Italian armed force is above all that of safeguarding the strategic area in which they can directly operate, in order to protect it from a communist onslaught. But this applies, necessarily, to penetration from the outside, i. e. from attempts by conventional and/or unconventional means of the forces of the communist bloc. What is being enacted by the "foreign base" in our territory does not fall into the strategic area entrusted to the armed forces. It is something of a "no man's land" the borders of which are undefinable.

Our constitution and our liberal democratic institutions do not forbid the circulation of subversive ideas and the existence of groups and parties with subversive intentions. The principle of personal freedom does not allow the indictment of individuals and groups because of their political philosophies, or on the basis of intentions attributed to them. This, being a current practice of the communist regimes, has no place in our political mores, therefore the communist party and other subversive movements can carry on, fully and untrammelled, their activities.

Thus the communist party being legal in Italy, we are practically admitting into our country the "foreign base" of the

USSR, as well as agencies of other "isms". The "Trojan horse" has been institutionalized, and we have to admit that we have a veritable stable of "Trojan horses" in our country, not only with ample right of citizenship in our free society, but actually being fed and even patted as though they were prize-winners.

In such countries in which a communist party is not legally recognized, the task of the armed forces is greatly facilitated because their General Staff should be able, in principle, to point out the real and potential enemy abroad as well as the danger within; to provide cadres and ranks with a philosophical content for military training; to explain the nature of threats and the ways by which perils can be recognized. Only thus can the techniques and the methods used by the communists be effectively combatted, both in the course of the psychopolitical war and in the course of an armed struggle. Moreover, it becomes much easier, in principle, to protect the armed forces from communist infiltration at all levels, in a situation in which, as the result of illegal "status" of the communist party, selective discrimination is perfectly legal.

But in a country such as mine, where the communist party is not outlawed; where its representatives sit in Parliament and participate in parliamentary committees (the one dealing with Defense matters inclusive); where Ministries, State Agencies, and vital ganglia of the community are infiltrated by the communist and their allies, the difficulties encountered by the armed forces in fulfilling their principal task of defending the territorial integrity of the State are much greater. And if, in Italy, the armed forces have played a very limited role in their own self-preservation and in the protection of their country from permanent psychopolitical communist operations, this is due, more than to any other cause, to the objective conditions in which they find themselves placed.

Let us now consider the concrete role of the armed forces, and the measures with which they can be faced in the field of defense against daily political aggression and in the event of a crisis.

The primary function should be the one of "deterrence", which is to say that the very existence of armed forces, having a minimum of cohesion and efficiency for being capable of dissuading aggressive ventures along the country's political frontiers, should be ready to prevent, in the same way, pseudo labour struggles, para-political riots, or such subversive

agitations (which are promoted, exploited and fanned by agents of the communist bloc) from being transformed into insurrection and from entering into a revolutionary phase. We all know how the latter builds up step by step: it starts as a spark prior to becoming a wild fire. Violent political agitation, bellicose parades, plotted riots - if unopposed - are followed by terrorism, insurrection, guerrilla warfare, until the whole affair has become so widespread that it is too late to extinguish the blaze.

Where such a deterrent exists, the communists know that if they trespass certain limits they will be met by force and would be crushed. Some uprisings in Genoa in 1961 would probably not have stayed confined to that city and to a few others, if the communists had not feared provoking the intervention of the armed forces, for this would have transformed the political success they won in that episode, into a defeat which would have caused the loss of all their prestige. We should never forget that the majority of the people of a country generally yields reluctantly to communist violence, but accrues to the impact of its action by sheer dead-weight, when acknowledging the failure of the State forces to keep or restore order.

There is no doubt that our military brass are in a predicament. They are loyal to the civilian political power and they are traditionally accustomed at considering that they are committed to the defense of the geographical boundaries of the country. But they do not realize well enough that such territorial frontiers no longer possess the meaning they had hitherto, when they were able to indicate the threshold over which the enemy should not trespass. The notion about boundaries going through the body of the nation, separating the minds and the hearts of part of the citizenry which cherish freedom and true democratic institutions, from the minds and the hearts of another part which is eager to destroy all that, is still somewhat hazy and confused for the minds of our military people. But one should add that such haziness and confusion are not confined to them, as they are rather dominant in the political sphere. The insidiousness of the new forms of aggression; the chance of seeing people of the same community opening the door to, and overtly supporting the enemy; the fact that nowadays the traditional "front lines" are somehow non-existent, just the same as the rear-guard of a

fighting force could suddenly be wholly unprotected - all these are matters which seem to be unrecognized by the politicians.

A fundamental matter should be vigilance. Systematic vigilance must be put into effect in order to be able, both to prevent and to counteract. At this point I feel that certain tasks should be entrusted to the intelligence and secret services of the Ministry of Defense. I am perfectly aware, that some infiltration is possible therein too, but only by those services could it be consistently reduced and effectively coped with. Besides, when the accepted general concept should be to prevent the potential enemy from combining its outside actions against a country with action by possible supporters that he may have within it, it would appear logical to the majority of the people, that the matter should be entrusted to the administration carrying the burden of the defense of the country.

When dealing with psychopolitical operations, which follow the directives of a global strategy, it becomes necessary to be in possession of both general and specific information on the intentions and purposes of the communist bloc. Therefore it is essential to rely upon a central intelligence service.

Upon the understanding that the "frontiers" are passing actually through the political body of the country itself, the Defense Services must identify and keep careful watch on active and potential communist agents, in order to discover their immediate and long-term plans, and also in order to circumscribe - and in turn to infiltrate - any eventual communist organizational apparatus. In principle, such action and vigilance match - though on a more extended scale - similar endeavours which in democratic countries, as for instance the United Kingdom and the United States, have been current and traditional practice for counter-action against enemy espionage and sabotage networks.

I agree that an objection could be raised: that this happened on the eve of a war! I realize, however, that we are not on the eve, but right in the midst of a war declared by the enemy, even if undeclared by us! I furthermore agree that one may argue that spy-ring is one thing, and/or a group of saboteurs, and another one is political subversion even if promoted from abroad. But is there any real difference. As a matter of fact, the type of agents is the same which the KGB and GRU rely upon for sabotage, "desinformation", espionage about our

countries, with the aim at playing havoc therein. In terms of damage is there much difference between what a masterspy or a prospective chief of guerrilla could do?

It is equally important for the armed forces to identify those citizens of secure loyalty who, in the event of a crisis, would represent such elements the armed forces of a country could rely upon. Such citizens should be sought in all circles, but particularly among those who have honourably performed their military service.

The hypothesis of a revolutionary insurrection (with or without overt outside help) that could be crowned with success, must likewise not be forgotten, since it belongs to a facet of the characters of the protracted conflict. To meet this eventuality, and ensuing consequences, a "parallel" General Staff, made up of military personnel and of dedicated civilians, which would function clandestinely during what could be termed the "foreign occupation", must be prepared well in advance. Such body should be in a position to assemble the previously designated cadres and effectives of the zone, bring together citizens whose loyalty is unquestioned, and supply them with weapons and victuals provided for in due time and kept in secret caches: in other words, act as is necessarily adequately befitted for the organization of a resistance movement.

In the course of the permanent psychopolitical offensive with all its underground channels, the Defense Services have acquired an ever increasing importance within the framework of the functions of the General Staff and in consideration of all the hypotheses upon which its operational plans must be based. These tasks could not be entrusted to the Police, but to services of the armed forces, in order that the information collected (and in particular that regarding individuals and organizations connected with the domestic situation) should remain secret and, above all, would not become a political instrument, but would remain safeguarded by the moral and mental armour of the armed force, to be used exclusively for the defense of the State and of the Nation.

Although it has to accommodate itself within the limits imposed by a political situation in which the communist party is legally recognized, the General Staff should nevertheless be able to provide for a type of training having as final purpose the creation and formation of detachments invulnerable to the insinuating action of communist psychopolitical methods and

techniques, and their consequential developments. Guerrilla warfare - which in my opinion is going to become, more and more, the main feature of the protracted conflict - is not a type of military operation pertaining only to the jungles of the under-developed countries. Far from that, its effectiveness in the "asphalt jungles" of the cities (and especially of the big ones) can become the essential character of attempts at subversion in, and the conquest of any country, even of the most industrialized and developed ones. The General Staff, therefore, must adapt its training programmes for preparing psychologically cadres and effectives so as to identify immediately the dangers confronting them, their origin and the techniques which might be applied, the perils of which are often hidden behind false appearances. In the armed forces, elements which seek to undermine morale, to subvert firm beliefs, and to exalt communist convictions individuals have already absorbed from the environment whence they come prior trooping under the colours, should not be under-estimated, lest they could become dangerously infectious.

In Italy, an effort along the lines of the above-mentioned concept has been made by experimenting "special forces training programmes" (with the inclusion of survival tests) whereby a high level of operational efficiency could be attainable with which (as it is well known to communists) it becomes possible to create those conditions in which the convictions of the individuals are so sound that detachments and details under fire will remain loyal and stay firm even when the struggle acquires a revolutionary content. But this has been only an experiment which did not go beyond its initial stage, because it was blocked by hardly edifying political debages, following polemics started and fanned with success by the communists. They have also clamoured against the training of our paratroopers: they hate their "esprit de corps" (generally preserved after the draft period and somehow binding them also in civilian life), and the spirit they develop when serving their time. Some scuffles have taken place between paratroopers and political rabble in the city where their units are located, which is a well known pro-communist section of Italy (Leghorn). I have the impression that some soft-pedaling has been applied to some aspects of the training programmes for the paratroopers and towards the formation of an exclusive "esprit de corps".

Due to the character of the protracted conflict, policies and strategy, especially within the last two decades, have become so intertwined and overlapping that, even while not arriving at Lidell Hart's solution (i. e. unifying the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the Ministry for Defense), new concepts should be thought of, duly evaluated and eventually adopted, in terms of a coherent assessment of the problem. From some fundamental points of view the foreign policy of a country, nowadays, is little more than the diplomatic projection of every member of a military alliance. On this point the communist bloc does teach us something.

Policy-makers entrust to the General Staff the task of planning the defense of the State, and of preparing its defensive structure with the means they are putting at its disposal. The General Staff's task should, therefore, consist in advising the Government on measures to be taken in the field of defense, by indicating the limits of their possibilities, and by pointing out the dangers which, on the one hand, could create the collapse of a government penetrated from within, and which could weaken the alliance to which the Nation has freely subscribed. The validity of a technique applied 20 years ago in Czechoslovakia should not be so easily under-estimated, inasmuch as it has been amply theorized by the communist Jan Kossak: i. e. the conquest of a country by "parliamentary means", with all the gimmicks and trimmings described by the said theoretician. This becomes possible when the State structure has been disrupted bit by bit, and a final challenge by some revolutionary armed groups may terrorize and cow into submission the non-communist political alignment, the armed forces having been neutralized and softened in their spirit of resistance against a "coup" prepared within, by orders from without, with foreign military might looming in the background beyond the frontiers.

In Italy efforts and measures, on the part of the armed forces, to prepare and adapt themselves to the multifarious characters of the struggle, for coping with the psycho-political warfare, have been rather puny. But one has to admit that the armed forces have been inadequately assisted in their efforts, because of the domestic political situation.

Domestic polemics, often slanderous, against the Italian armed forces, aiming at some high brass disliked by the communist party and by other leftist fringes, have stifled

their stamina. Such polemics have certainly not accrued to the improvement of past measures or to the adoption of new ones in order to prepare the men, the methods, the training which are appropriate for the modern dangers which armed forces must face. In this field, as in any other, standstill is regression in relation to the rapid developments of our times.

3. The Mediterranean under communist psychopolitical attack

If today, for Italy, there is a development which is particularly vulnerable to communist psychopolitical activities, this is to be sought in the Mediterranean.

In connection with the Middle East crisis the Soviet military might has penetrated in full attire and strength this inland sea, the importance of which I do not have to point out. A vacuum has been produced by the withdrawal of the French naval strength and by the reduction to the utmost of the British Fleet. NATO naval patrols certainly cannot match the Soviet maritime might. Moreover, Italy has no adequate naval means of her own to stand the challenge; Spain is being disdainfully kept aside from the Atlantic alliance; being only linked by bilateral arrangements with the USA; almost all the North-African shores of the Mediterranean are sort of "off-limits" - politically, strategically and militarily speaking - for the Western world. The vacuum is being temporarily filled by the USA Sixth Fleet. But for how long? In the Mediterranean, after years of dutiful roaming of Soviet so-called "fishing boats" and actual ELINT ships, we can witness the Russian muster a huge, very modern, highly sophisticated fleet: submarines, surface vessels, and soon, "copters carriers". In addition, units of "marines" are being mustered and these, coupled with the development of the Russian merchant fleet, evidence a strategy, not only for dominating the Mediterranean, but also for globally threatening all the lines of maritime communications on the "seven seas".

The Russians are fulfilling a centuries old dream: that of reaching the southern "warm seas". But they will not stop at that. Their new military strategy is ocean-minded: they have come out of their continental shell and are building up the strength that will enable them to challenge the whole non-communist world with hopes of cowing it into submission.

Their submarine fleet is so powerful that one can easily anticipate the role in store for it, as well as the one intended for the surface fast ships they are building at an accelerated path: both are essential for threatening the lines of communication in every ocean, for disrupting throughout the world the outflow of goods and the inflow of raw materials and fuel our industrialized countries need so badly. These same means could become also of paramount importance for contributing to the waging of "revolutionary wars", as well as of "conventional" ones and of conflicts "by proxy".

The merchant fleet may become a nightmare if it would reach as it seems they have planned to do, the mark of 25/30 millions tons d.w. (which cannot be altogether considered a wild dream, since the USSR has been able to more than double the 4.5 millions tons of 1963 to the present 11 millions tons). For the Russians, trade is merely coordinated with politics. In the Soviet strategy the merchant fleet is to be used as a political weapon for trade aims, and as trade means for political ends. It is not only the encirclement of our military alliance we are bound to anticipate, but also the strategic effort of cutting the links of our western countries with the rest of the world, until the USSR would succeed in plucking the whole of Middle East and of Western Europe as a juicy fruit.

In the Mediterranean the tables have been turned and the situation has become - also politically speaking - extremely dangerous for my country. In addition to the new "gunboat (with missiles) diplomacy" the Soviets are making a fuss about their presence in the "mare nostrum" which is likely to become a Russian lake. With an initiative, unheard of until now (except for an episode related to one of Hitler's mouth-pieces), the Soviet military "attaches" have convened a press-conference in Rome, in which they have elaborated at length upon the Russian military might, but adding - rather humorously - that their 5th fleet was roaming in the Mediterranean just for training purposes!

We are in a year of general political elections in Italy, and communist propaganda is being beamed mainly at the Italian youth. While relying upon its leftist portion, the communist are eager to woo the rightist one by tackling a subject towards which the youth may prove extremely sensitive: Italian prestige in the Mediterranean; and, as a corollary, the indication of

the evidence, for Italy's interests in this area, at becoming part of the communist bloc; of how this would restore Italy's position as the major Mediterranean power, making of the peninsula the natural bridge to the developing African world in which she would be apt to act as guide and teacher

This, of course, may fall into receptive ears, and communist propaganda, in the years ahead, may reach the highest pitch for ensuring that the Italians would yield to this "patriotic" ballyhoo. The Kremlin failed 20 years ago when it aimed at the political conquest of Italy, because of the condemnation of the "popular front" by the Italian electorate. But since then, much water has swept under the bridges: lack of leadership sternly dedicated to the Western civilization (De Gasperi's loss and unreplaced role has been a tremendous blow to our country as a whole, not only to his Christian Democratic Party; the Vatican "ecumenism" which, after Pope Pius XII departure, has been either advocating or promoting the "dialogue" with communism; the apparent limitations to a worldwide leadership of the USA; considerable losses of positions (political, cultural, economical, military) endured by the Western World especially in Africa and Asia; the U.K. having given up a global role and falling back to the Islands; the deterioration of the balance of power on the side of the Western World: the circumvention of the nuclear "deterrent" by "revolutionary wars", conventional conflicts, "wars by proxies", psychopolitical struggle, guerilla warfare, etc. etc.

Italy may become an essential pawn in the strategy of the USSR, because this elongated peninsula could really become the turnstile for the access to Europe, via its under-belly, and a bridge towards Africa.

A double effort is being carried on by the Kremlin: the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance, and creation of political unrest in the Mediterranean. As far as this second design is concerned, leftists of every denomination are already at work. After two preparatory meetings (one in Bologna and the other in Belgrade) a conference is shortly going to be convened in Rome gathering all the communist and most of the leftist parties of 11 countries with an outlook on the Mediterranean. The theme of the Conference is the one of making this region a "peace area" (communist acceptance, of course) for which it is imperative that the USA Sixth Fleet should be ousted, and the region be "denuclearized" and "neutralized" You

may well figure how this is going to be done: agitation, unrest, provocations, and eventually some bloody episodes are going to punctuate the build-up. At almost the same time, in Cairo, a conference will convene the trade-unions representatives of the oil workers of the countries of North Africa, of the Near and Middle East. The purpose is evident: to create as much uneasiness and agitation as possible, strengthen the communist grip on those trade-unions, steel them for further meaningful struggles with the aim at allowing the USSR to control the oil wells and most of the pipe-lines, so as finally to dispose of powerful means for strangling the western economies. The psychopolitical action for carrying on schemes of that kind has been in progress for some time although an overwhelming campaign of vilification and indictment against America. Its results are becoming evident for the Sixth Fleet which is finding Mediterranean harbours becoming more and more "difficult" and unfriendly.

All this has been schemed last year at the communist conference of Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) in Czechoslovakia, in which the communist parties of the western and eastern European countries were represented, and have been given full directives for the years up to 1969. Debates (if any) and the resolution carried on, at Karlovy Vary, have dictated to the communist parties, and to their auxiliaries, to do their utmost for mobilizing the masses in all the NATO countries, with the purpose of: dismantling the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO, at its provisional terminating date of 1969; ousting the USA Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean; having the American armed forces withdrawn; isolating, on diplomatic grounds, the Federal Republic of Germany; obtaining recognition for the Pankow regime from every non-communist country

In exchange for that, the Soviets offer to convene a conference for discussing, and possibly reaching, an agreement about a "European Collective Security" system, by which all "foreign military forces and bases" located in Europe would be liquidated. And this practically means: the American armed forces beyond the Atlantic Ocean, and the Russian armed forces beyond the Bug and the Dnieper (but the Muscovite communist parties in the Western countries to stay always "based" were they are); the two military and political blocs to be dismissed; and, tit for tat, the disposal of NATO

and of the Warsaw Pact (which would mean Western Europe practically defenseless, while the USSR, even without the appendage of the Warsaw Pact, would maintain its formidable military might which could be unleashed at will).

If this is looked at in the light of the overlasting efforts the Kremlin is exerting for changing the whole picture of the situation, there is much to be apprehensive about in the future.

In the Mediterranean we are witnessing the USSR wooing Turkey by seduction, with the same aim for which 22 years ago it bore harsh pressure; trying to divide Greece (which had been saved twenty years ago by the Truman Doctrine and by the gallant fight of its loyal army and population against the onslaught of communist guerrillas); "moulding" Egypt, Syria, Algeria into the perfect "proxies" for communist and Russian expansionism; ogling at Malta (where the Kremlin can count upon a rabble-rouser politician); manipulating Cyprus into a simmering Mediterranean Cuba; getting advantage from the Tito's present leanings, for trying to obtain anchorages for the fleet in the Adriatic ports; pressing, cajoling, circumventing Mediterranean countries for acquiring naval bases there.

No wonder the Lybian, Tunisian, and Moroccan rulers appear to be uneasy. They fear to be "jumped" by their Arab "brethren", whenever the USSR would feel convenient and expedient to use the latter ones for crowning its full possession of the Mediterranean and, possibly, with an outlet through Morocco on the Atlantic coast!

And let us not forget China, even if its threat appears to be still remote!

She is still afar but already looming behind a proud token of her presence, right in the Adriatic: the Albanian shores and the highly prized strategical islands there. Moreover, some of her political agents and propaganda hands are already active in organizing an Italian version of the "cultural revolution" in our Universities, at forming groups and movements inspired by the Maoist "gospel" for promoting a super-agitation crowning the one normally carried on by the Muscovite communist endeavours.

"La Cina è vicina" (China is round the corner): this is the slogan some of our youth had been brushing on the walls of many of the Italian cities. They had started soiling those walls two

years ago and the "slogan" appeared, at that time, to be laughable. Then the Chincoms were caught by the turmoil of their "cultural revolution", but some of the nonsense had been exported to our countries in which it found some fertile ground in the nihilistic mentality of a portion of our youth (the one most well off)! I do not know whether the plague is temporary or slated to last at length. But I do know, since we are talking about the Mediterranean that, alas, we are swept between Scylla and Charibdis

In the Mediterranean three main streams of communist subversion are building up the accumulation of the psychopolitical impact: the one flowing from the Kremlin, the one trickling from Peking, the one percolating from Cuba via the structures set up by the Tri-Continental Conference which took place in Havana two years ago!

THE IMPACT OF SCANDINAVIAN MILITARY TRADITION
ON THE SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

by

Nils Ørvik

Most of us accept as basic assumption that the Soviet Union has been and is still trying to increase its influence in Western as well as in Eastern Europe. We may differ in our assessments of its progress, how well it is doing and whether these attempts will succeed. If, however, there is little disagreement as to the Soviet intentions, there is so much more when it comes to identifying the means.

Few question the psychological impact of Soviet military preponderance on the countries in Western Europe. It is not so much the presence of the 7-800 nuclear-tipped missiles that point westward from their launching pads in the Eastern perimeter. It is rather the over-all picture of Soviet military activity, its development of ever bigger and better weapons, which sometimes unconsciously, work on western minds and probably influence peoples attitudes to Soviet policy.

There is much less attention given to the Soviet use of military factors within our own societies. Not the weapons or the troops themselves, but feelings, our general attitudes to the military establishment and military traditions. In our pre-occupation with what goes on within the Soviet Union and its affiliated countries, we are apt to neglect any study of the Soviet-view of ourselves. As seen from Moscow, what pictures do each individual western society present? What is likely to appear as our weak and strong points? If we imagine that we belong to a group of Soviet strategic planners, drawing up a blueprint for psychological warfare, what recommendations would we give as to the possible openings and inroads that each of our national and regional entities present?

For the purpose of this paper I would like to single out just one group of factors from many equally relevant ones and ask how military traditions of a particular area might be turned to good use in a psychological campaign. Such analysis could well be applied to any country in our western community. Here I shall limit my remarks to the four Scandinavian countries,

Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

The Scandinavian countries represent to some extent an untypical element among the states in Western Europe. They are not only geographically apart from the rest, but they have also certain general characteristics which make them different from the countries in Continental Europe as well as from Britain. The Soviet approach is usually closely geared to the special conditions in the regions to which it applies. One might therefore expect traits and accentuations which may not quite correspond to the approaches applied to other areas.

In this brief survey I shall attempt to single out:

1. Some of the reasons why the Soviet Union might be particularly interested in the Scandinavian countries.
2. Some of their differences in military postures.
3. How these are likely to be exploited by the Soviet Union.

1. Why should the Soviet Union take particular interest in Scandinavia.

- a. Strategic reasons

As long as the Soviet Union was predominantly a landpower, there were reasons to believe that its strategic interests in that area were marginal. The intense activity in the years following the Russian revolution was not primarily dictated by strategic interests, but rather by political motivations. The new communist regime was trying to obtain a platform in that area for spreading the gospel and promoting revolution. But strategically until the beginning of the second world war, the basic Soviet attitude towards the Scandinavian countries appeared to be mainly defensive. The war against Finland in 1939-1940 had only limited aims. Its goal was restricted, for the main part, to attaining more depth in the defense of the Leningrad area. The main object was to make sure that Finland could not be used as a springboard for aggressive acts against the Soviet Union.

Even as late as 1948-1949, when two of the Scandinavian countries signed the North Atlantic pact, the defensive aspect was probably still predominant. This last point is, however, debatable. By the end of the war, the strategic importance of Scandinavia had been demonstrated by its vital importance as base area for the German raiders against the supply lines

over the Atlantic Ocean to Murmansk. The German army that operated from Norway and Finland through 1941-1944 was also a constant threat to the vital Soviet areas in the Leningrad region.

Perhaps the most important impact of these events was the new stress on naval warfare. We know today that Soviet's first naval programmes were initiated in the late thirties and were only temporarily checked by the second world war. In the light of a far-reaching, long-term maritime expansion, the three Soviet probes to establish control over the Norwegian islands of Spitsbergen, the Danish island Bornholm and the tip of the North Norwegian peninsulas seem to acquire some greater significance. Common to all three of them was the significance of these areas as important key-points in a large-scale programme for maritime expansion. There has been much guess work done on the Soviet intentions for building this big navy? Was it "to keep up with the Jones?" Or because a big power must also have a big navy? Is it to serve demonstration purposes - or for providing expeditionary forces for use in "wars of national liberation" or finally for expansive use against the West?

We do not know the answers, but we do know the scope of this very ambitious naval and maritime programme from its magnitude and rapid pace of acceleration, we can read the priority that it apparently holds among the desired objects of Soviet foreign policy with the Soviet Union now emerging as a major naval power, the Scandinavian peninsula seem bound to demand more attention among the top planners in the Soviet Union. This political and military focus is likely to put more pressure on the organizations and leaders in the USSR that are responsible for "softening up" of the Scandinavian area and for increasing the degree of direct as well as indirect Soviet influence.

b. The stakes of success

Apart from the strategic advantages, what else might the Soviet Union gain from an increased political control over Scandinavia? A second incentive would seem to be the apparently quite substantial propagandistic advantages. The Scandinavian countries have for centuries had a worldwide reputation for democracy, political stability and unshakably free and incorruptible institutions. If it could be proved that the Scandinavian

countries, preferably without the direct use of physical force were induced to accept and succumb to Soviet influence and on certain points give active support to her foreign policy, it could not fail to have a persuasive effect on other small nations, thereby increasing the international prestige of the Soviet Union.

c. Geography

A third reason would seem to be the sheer impact of geography. Being as close as the Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union actually are, some of them with common borders and very easy means of direct communication, they seem readily accessible for small-scale moves of various kinds which might be much harder to apply to states that are more remote from Russia.

d. Last, but not least, the disparity of the four Scandinavian societies offer possibilities for political approaches and inroads that invite exploitation. That holds for their individual internal tensions and dissensions as well as for the relations between the respective countries within the region.

This brings me to my second major point, the weaknesses that might be exploited - or rather the possibilities that certain factors and conditions in Scandinavia seem to offer for exploitation.

The built-in weaknesses of the Scandinavian security systems

Most people in other parts of the world tend to look at Scandinavia as a fairly homogeneous and integrated area. It is annoying as common to hear people confuse the various capitals and cities. It is of course recognized that Norway and Denmark are members of NATO, while Sweden and Finland practice slightly different brands of neutrality. The integrated term Scandinavian applies often to the positions they take in the United Nations. As their actions on the global level are fairly coherent, the technicalities of their official positions do not spoil the general image of cohesion and unity. A superficial glance may give an impression of Scandinavian identity on major issues in international affairs.

This is, however, not the case. In order to understand the situation their activities should be studied both as declaratory and

as action policies. From their declaration policy, as it appears in the Nordic Council and affiliated organizations, one might visualize a true community, with supernational institutions just around the corner. On the action level, however, one will find that even modest attempts of integrated or even coordinated policies, very often fail because of conflicting perceptions of national interests. The SAS, the Scandinavian Airline System, stands here as a lonely and solitary exception from the rule.

Through more than a century, one of Russia's major aims in the Nordic area has been to prevent all attempts at Scandinavian military integration or the formation of larger units from taking place. This has been the case not only for a truly Nordic regional union, consisting of two or more Scandinavian countries, but also for an organized line-up of any one of them with larger states outside the Nordic area. To forestall clusters of countries coordinating their defense and security policies has perhaps been the most consistent aim of Soviet's Scandinavian policy. Here as elsewhere in Europe, the Soviet Union tries to counteract formation of blocs that are, or might become either outright hostile to the Soviet Union or at any rate less accessible for subversive tactics now applied individually to each separate country.

A study of the Soviet means and methods for softening up Scandinavia would therefore have to be carried out on an individual level, dealing with each separate country with reference to its national characteristics. What may work well in Finland may have little effect in for instance Denmark or Norway. These differences are at least partly products of traditional factors. The Scandinavian countries have a thousand years of troubled coexistence behind them. Many of their present attitudes might be traced back to conflicts and experiences on historical grounds.

Status differences

Tradition and historical background tend to couple the Scandinavian countries in two pairs, Denmark and Sweden are the two "ex-greatpowers", Norway and Finland the "ex-colonies", the new states in the region. It should be kept in mind that while two of the Nordic nations, Denmark and Sweden, for centuries have existed as fully sovereign states, at times even with considerable international influence, Norway has only 63 years of national independence behind her. Finland just celebrated

its 50th anniversary as a sovereign nation. Before that Norway had 500 years, first of Danish, then of Swedish dominance. Finland had an even longer period of Swedish domination and also a century of Russian rule.

In addition to these traditional obstacles, there are differences between the four countries in terms of economic matters, national resources and traditional links with certain larger states in their international environment. Each of them present opportunities for specialized treatment and subtle exploitation. Interregional aversions and frictions make it harder to achieve joint action by all four countries. This blurs the fact that in their relations to the Soviet Union they are virtually in the same boat, faced with the same basic problems of security.

The impact of military tradition

The differences in traditions are particularly important when it comes to the role of the armed forces as implements for national security. Again we find a tendency for the Scandinavian countries to group in pairs. However, in this respect they are coupled differently. In their general attitudes to defense problems Sweden and Finland are much closer to each other than the two "west-Scandinavian" countries. On the other hand, Norway and Denmark present to some extent a similar picture in general defense postures. These parallels are sufficiently pronounced to justify a grouping of the four Scandinavian countries into what might be called the "military" and the "non-military" nations.

Strictly speaking, a classification along these lines is of course not quite fair. Many Swedes and Finns would object as violently to be categorized as military, as many Norwegians and Danes would object to being labelled non-military. However, even risking such objections, in a broader, historical perspective, there seem to be sufficient justifications for using such terms as a means to underline national characteristics which are important to an understanding of the problems we try to raise here.

Sweden. Of the two "military nations" Sweden is perhaps most pronounced as such. For close to two hundred years Sweden not only ranked as a great power in Europe of that day, but also behaved like one. This position was almost exclusively built on military force. In the 17th century the Swedish armies beat Germans, Poles and Russians alike. Names of old battlefields as Narva, Poltava and others are vividly remembered even today.

The armed forces have ever since been in high esteem in the Swedish society. Being an officer or belonging to an old officers family is still a claim to social prestige. Those who have some sort of close relations to the forces, often make a point of linking their military rank to their civilian occupational titles. The positive pro-military attitude does not stop with the mere forms. Until quite recently there has been little difficulty for Swedish governments to get popular support for even quite heavy defense expenditures.

Finland shares most of Sweden's military experiences. If the Finns did not fight most of Sweden's battles, they at any rate regularly fought theirs with the Swedes. All through the period of military greatness, Finnish contingents played an important and honourable role in the Swedish campaigns.

Since then they have added some of their own. The two wars with Russia between 1939 and 1944 ended disasterously for Finland, but in general there is no feeling among the individual Finns of personal defeat and humiliation. They remain very conscious of the fact that they stood their ground to the Russian mass armies. What finally brought them down was quantity, not quality. That last unhappy experience has taught the Finns a greater respect for numerical strength, but they do not concede that military resistance is of little or no use. On the contrary, many Finns explain the extraordinary and unique positions which Finland holds among Soviet's closest neighbours as being mainly due to the strong and determined Finnish resistance during World War II. The military profession is still highly respected and the small, now almost symbolic military establishment is held in high esteem. Officers continue to hold a high social position. Military traditions live on.

Of the two "non-military" nations, Denmark, even when she was a notoriously great colonial power never seemed to put particular emphasis on warlike activities. Nevertheless, the Danish navy was once a formidable force. It solved its main task, protecting trade, shipping and territorial integrity for centuries. The big blow came in 1864, when the Danish armies were crushed by Bismarck and his Prussians. Since then, the Danish attitude to defense has on the whole been a negative one. There has grown an ever hardening conviction that the national military forces will not be able to fill their role as protectors of Danish territory and Danish national interests.

This basic assumption seemed confirmed by the first as well as by the second world war. The military profession appears to have maintained a fairly high social position, perhaps more in an ornamental than in utility sense. The individual Dane is in general not anti-defense minded. On the contrary, voluntary military activities, as for instance serving in the homeguards, are remarkably popular and efficient in Denmark. However, there is a common agreement that defense expenditures should be kept within reasonable, that is, fairly limited proportions.

Norway presents in many respects a similar picture. As far as regular military operations go, that is operating in organized big units, the popular traditions are close to being anti-military. Like the Finns, the Norwegians provided soldiers for the "colonial" ruler-country. But as the Danes, contrary to the Swedes, tended to be on the losing side through most of this period, they saw small results to justify their sacrifices in men and money. Military service also deepened class problems, as the officers were mainly Danes, while the rank and file were Norwegians. As the wars were mostly fought for Danish dynastic interests, the Norwegians naturally had great difficulty in seeing the connections between their military efforts and their national interests.

On the other hand, rural uprisings and peasants' wars contributed to the glorification of small scale wars of the guerilla type which became a counterpart to the regular Danish-led wars. The inherent feeling that "small wars can do good, big wars cannot" was reinforced by their experiences in the resistance movement during World War II. With this distinction, one cannot say that the basic Norwegian attitude is anti-military in a pacifist sense. But there is, for social as well as historical reasons, a deep distrust of what one might call the regular military establishment, with all their staffs, heavy equipment and all the heavy gear that goes with modern armed forces.

This historical background provides parts of the explanation why the two "non-military" nations, Norway and Denmark, joined NATO, while Sweden, the third Scandinavian country, who like them had a free choice, preferred to stay out. Norway and Denmark had no confidence in their own capacity for putting up a military instrument that could fill the requirements for national security. Their economic background was so weak that they did not even venture to try. For the case of Soviet military aggression, which none could ignore as a future possibility, military aid and assist-

ance from the great western nations became the only credible solution to their security problems.

Sweden, however, was at that time - some twenty years ago - one of the strongest military nations in Europe. It had accumulated economic as well as military strength all through the war years, and preferred to rely also for the future on its own national military capabilities and on its clever diplomacy. However, it ought to be kept in mind, that when this decision was made, the Soviet Union had not yet become a nuclear power.

These political and military background factors may to some extent explain why the nordic nations have not been able to get together in a closer association and also why they have chosen such different approaches to national security. As matters stand today, all of them in different ways offer excellent opportunities to a great power that knows their internal and traditional weaknesses and sets out to exploit them in a systematic way. Exploitation of these factors has in fact been a key point in Soviet policy towards the Scandinavian countries for the last couple of decades.

The streak of neutralism

In all these nations there is a basic undertone of built-in scepticism as to the intentions and policies of great powers. Going through their various histories, one can easily see why. There is also a tendency in their foreign policies to distinguish too closely between economic and military matters. They need and they want the economic exchange and the close relations with the greater states. But they remain correspondingly cagy and cautious towards any move that might be interpreted as intervention of meddling with their sovereign rights. In an economic sense they want to be close; in matters of security and military affairs they prefer to keep distance. In practical, concrete terms, this means a leaning both to policies of neutrality and toward integrated international cooperation. They feel that both are necessary and desirable and should be continued. Their eternal problem is how to strike the right balance and secure the maximum advantages of both approaches with minimal losses.

As emotions, popular sentiments and public opinion play a large role for both of these major goals they lay themselves open for interference into their choices by foreign states. The

"base-policy" which Norway and Denmark introduced in 1949 when they entered the North Atlantic alliance is derived from a complex of causes, some very closely related to this dichotomy of conflicting goals of foreign policy. As it were, it provided the Soviet Union with a lever which it has made maximal use of ever since.

The ban on foreign bases could be interpreted in a great variety of ways - from both sides. From the Soviet side it has been used consistently and effectively to restrict the actions of the two Scandinavian members in their relations to their Western allies. From originally being applied just to troops and forces, the Soviet Union has tried to extend the base restrictions to include also certain infrastructure measures, Danish-German naval supply bases, nuclear charges and weapons and their means of delivery. During the last few years its attention has been focusing on the joint allied manoeuvres and other alleged NATO activities in the area.

Denmark has fared better than Norway in this respect. The Soviet pressure has not been as consistent and as intense as in the Norwegian case. There may be several explanations for this. One is probably due to different evaluation of the strategic importance of the Norwegian - compared to the Danish coastline. Another may stem from considerations of political systems and national character. In both cases the military traditions of the two Scandinavian nations play an important part in understanding certain aspects of the Soviet approach.

The Finnish case

Finland's military capabilities and state of preparedness is regulated through the Russo-Finnish peace treaty of 1944 and the Friendship Treaty of 1948. In a military sense the terms have some resemblance to the ones imposed on Germany after the first world war. The forces are restricted in numbers as well as in types and in quantity of weapons. True to their strong military traditions the Finns have consistently made the most of the possibilities that exist within the limits of the agreement. Naturally they have been buying some of their hardware from the Soviet Union and other East European countries. But at the same time they have also bought weapons from Western states, as for instance Great Britain.

With all the possibilities for unilateral interpretations which

the two Finno-Russian treaties entail, there are very narrow limits as to how far the Finns can go in their military measures without tacit or explicit approval from their great neighbour. The restrictions on their armed forces are quite naturally felt as limitations on Finland's sovereignty. And as the Finns consistently have been working for disentangling themselves from the visible and invisible signs of Soviet predominance, they have put great stress on building a reasonable and sizable military establishment.

Here the conditions are much the same as in their foreign policy. The key to both is at any given time to find and to identify the Russian "threshold of tolerance". As is the case with their policy of neutrality, which was made possible in 1955 with the Soviet withdrawal of the Porkkala base, any progress towards greater freedom of action is dependent upon the trust which the Russian government have in the Finns' willingness to follow the basic guidelines of Soviet foreign policy.

The confidence that the Finns enjoy with their great neighbour might therefore be measured by the concessions, as in the foreign field by Finland joining the UN and EFTA and in the defense field by the acquisition of new and better weaponry.

This is all very understandable and certainly not objectionable to any of the other Scandinavian countries. The more Finland succeeds in disentangling herself from Soviet restrictions, the better the prospects for regionally coordinated policies in the North. The Norwegians have, however, had great difficulties in understanding the proposals for arms control that in recent years have been launched by the Finnish president U. Kekkonen.

Political influence through arms control?

While the Finnish government until 1963 refrained from interference in the affairs of their Scandinavian neighbours, they have over the past five years actively been presenting them with proposals that correspond quite closely to Soviet initiatives and the broad guidelines of Soviet policy towards Scandinavia. This concerns in the first place Mr. Kekkonen's proposals for establishing a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia, and secondly, his more reasoned suggestions for a Norwegian-Finnish border agreement. If concluded along the proposed lines this would make it impossible for Norway to continue the joint manoeuvres and other co-allied activities in the border areas, which incidentally

cover most of North Norway.

The confusion as to possible Finnish intentions has recently deepened even further. Since 1967 influential groups in Finland have started openly to argue that Norway and Denmark should discontinue their membership in NATO and rather join Finland and Sweden in some sort of vaguely defined neutrality arrangement. This might be interpreted as tactical moves and empty gestures. The Finns have to reassure the Soviet government that they agree basically with its major goals. Therefore, putting out such proposals and statements may serve as a proof of their allegiance to the general principle. In other words, the Norwegians and Danes should not take these proposals quite seriously.

This might be the correct explanation, and as such - well and good - if it stopped there. But the Finnish proposals and suggestions are quickly and eagerly picked up by the left factions in both countries and put to maximal use in their present anti-American; anti-NATO propaganda. This part of the Finnish foreign policy has therefore caused considerable concern, particularly in Norway. It leaves some very important questions as to ultimate Finnish intentions unanswered.

The Swedish case differs very much from the Finnish as well as from the Norwegian and Danish cases. While the Soviet Union has been and still is actively trying to influence defense postures in the three other Nordic states it clearly follows another line in its corresponding relations to Sweden. Although Sweden presents a much larger military punch and potential than any of the others, there have been few, if any serious Soviet complaints of Sweden's military measures or moves. It looks as if the Soviet Union readily accepts the Swedish policy of neutrality as well as the military machine which the Swedes have built to sustain it. What are the motivations behind this apparent inconsistency? When they make so much fuss about fairly minor moves in Norway and Denmark, why should they not be just as concerned about the strong bastions which Sweden have built against Russia all along the Baltic as well as on the Swedish-Finnish border?

One reason is the obvious one, that there is nothing the Soviet Union can do to stop the Swedes from building them. In terms of Soviet policy towards Scandinavia, there may, however, be other reasons as well, why the Soviet leaders so far from reproaching Sweden for her state of military preparedness, rather should encourage her to go on with it. By accepting the Swedish model of a strongly defended policy of neutrality, it may achieve

two essential objects.

First, its impact on Sweden and Swedish public opinion. It seems bound to deepen and reinforce Swedish isolationist policy. The more the average Swede comes to feel that the Soviet approves and recognizes Sweden's position, the less incentive he would get for changing it. Since 1948-1949 there have been few or no very serious attempts to advocate a stronger pro-Western course in Swedish foreign policy. Public opinion is solidly in favour of continued neutrality. And should there ever emerge such sentiments on a larger scale, they could very effectively be met with references to the satisfactory state of affairs, with both Russians and Americans in basic agreement on the virtues and mutually beneficial effects of Swedish neutrality. Consequently a change could not improve, but possibly impair the apparent satisfactory status quo.

A second Soviet consideration might apply to the reactions of the other Scandinavian countries. All of them have troubles and problems in their relations to the Soviet Union - except Sweden. Danish as well as Norwegian politicians are frequently exposed to sniping and broadsides in Soviet mass media. Almost any change in their military policies receive instant and mostly unfavourable Soviet comments. Over a long period with mounting internal and external difficulties, Danes and Norwegians might start asking: why not do as Sweden does, why not try some kind of stabilization along the lines of neutrality? The Finns are already trying to borrow some of the lustre of Swedish neutrality to patch up their own somewhat tarnish version. But also to the Norwegians and the Danes, the Swedish model must offer certain attractions as a relief from the stresses and strains of keeping the military amplications of alliance-membership. Such nostalgic and envious feelings are likely to be reinforced as the Swedes are now scaling down their national defense expenditures, thus removing a previous counter-argument concerning the high cost of the Swedish military establishment. If such ideas could spread and grow among Norwegian and Danish elites, the lenient Soviet attitude towards Sweden's tough-lines military policy may provide for a handsome pay-off in political terms for Soviet's over-all Scandinavian policy.

There is too little empirical work done on the impact of the traditional factors on Soviet policy towards the Scandinavian countries. It seems, however, that the differences that notoriously exist between the four Scandinavian countries in their military

postures, present accessible inroads which might, when applied systematically and consistantly, become very effective in a long-term psychological campaign.

A SWISS VIEW POINT

by

G. Bruderer

The expression psychological warfare, or psychological defense, is rarely used in Switzerland. The terms mostly heard in this respect are neutral, or spiritual, ("geistige") defense of the country. It constitutes a part of the total defense of the country and belongs to the group of non-military defense elements, together with, for instance, civil defense or economic defense of the country.

The particular political situation of Switzerland, its policy of neutrality, undoubtedly also has a strong influence on the elements of "spiritual" defense.

Even nowadays, as in the past, this Swiss policy of neutrality is misunderstood in various circles. Some blame us for the fact that neutrality is not really a political principle, but rather a tactical manoeuvre aimed at developing our capitalist concerns, including the arms industry, and increasing their wealth even more. Others state that military neutrality actually means nothing but moral lability.

In answer to these reproaches we can say that the principle of non-interference or non-participation in interstate conflicts does not mean indifference to these conflicts, but that our attitude is rooted in the Swiss political traditions and does not mean political or moral neutrality.

Nowadays the psychopolitical situation in Switzerland is more complicated because this world-embracing conflict is not so much of a national power-political, but rather of an ideological nature. This makes it difficult to remain neutral in this conflict of the minds.

This thought needs some further elucidation.

To my personal satisfaction I can state that in Switzerland the idea is growing which I have been emphasizing for years in all kinds of publications, namely, that the world conflict has ideological-political roots and cannot simply be reduced to the national political contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This latter aspect - reducing the conflict to the national power conflict USA-USSR - is a simplification that may be suitable for

use in practical contacts with the man in the street, because he should only be given simple formulas, but it places us before insoluble problems if, for instance, we have to explain why the negro in Ghana, the Italian worker in Turin, or the Belgian radio boss, why all these people should try to undermine and disturb the existing democratic order.

Do they do this in favour of Russia's national pride and greatness? Nobody would seriously believe this. The question can be formulated differently: was Czarist Russia, even in the days of its strongest expansion, ever so dangerous for the world as Soviet Russia is now? Is it only the rockets, the missiles or the nuclear bombs that have increased this danger? No, I would say that it is first and foremost the ideas. I admit that, despite all measures they have taken, ideology does not play the dominant role in the Eastern bloc. But here, with the subversive elements we have to deal with, mainly ideological motives are the most important. Nowadays, the real boundaries that separate men and cause them to become enemies no longer coincide with the national frontiers, but they run at random through countries, people and even families.

This ideological political aspect of the conflict, however, forces the Swiss Government to observe special care. The reproach of one-sidedness of engagement in one direction, could already be explained as a deterioration of neutrality. This results in the fact that in the field of psychological or ideological defense the Government behaves in a particularly reserved way. In Switzerland there are no official services, like e.g. the German Institute for "Leadership Training" (Innere Führung) and there is no political education in the army. I can add that in general the Swiss individual is cautious with respect to any political influence or propaganda.

Owing to the special position of the Swiss army and to its character as a militia, i.e. non-professional army, the communist attacks are conducted not against the army as such, but only against individual elements of military defense, such as the possible introduction of nuclear weapons or of new concepts of mobile defense. On the other hand communist propaganda is aimed at stimulating refusals to serve in the army.

In the psychological defense of the country we can distinguish three levels:

1. The official institutions of the State: Section "Heer und Haus" (Army and Home). Its main object is to safeguard the democratic principles, the traditional concepts of freedom and the

ties between the army and the home. In the official charter of this service it is stated expressly that it is not allowed to influence the army people politically.

2. Unofficial measures taken by the State: these are, for instance, the measures taken by the individual commanders. These go much further in taking psychological measures than the official service "Heer und Haus". By way of example: as far back as in the mid-fifties Commander Ullmann introduced many elements of psychological warfare in the training scheme for his troops.
3. Non-state, non-official services, such as the Swiss Information Service (Schweizerische Aufklärungs Dienst). In its investigations and conclusions this organization can go even much further and act more openly. From the practical activities of this organization I shall give you one example. During the past year I have conducted a study group of this organization which has investigated psychological subversive activities in Switzerland, not only in the army, but in the country as a whole. A part of this work, unfortunately a part only, will be published. I shall just give you some indications of how we have proceeded.

We have tried to distinguish between the various objects and themes of psychological subversive attack. Among the objects were the army, the intellectuals and commercial circles. We have tried to determine the typical methods of psychological subversion adapted to each of these objects.

The Swiss Information Service is one of the institutes engaged on this type of problems. Plans are being made to establish, in the course of 1968, a Swiss organization embracing all activities in the sphere of psychological defense. It is significant that the words psychological defense of the country will not be used in the name of this organization. This is because these words are believed to place too much emphasis on the preservation of certain principles and thus would render it impossible to enter into a discussion with non-conformist and leftist groups. The name will therefore be "Forum Helvetium".

In conclusion I would like to state that in Switzerland there are no psychological problems specific to the army, because the army is faced with the same problems as the population as a whole: the soldier of today is the civilian of yesterday and of to-morrow, and this is a result of the militia-system of the Swiss army.

THE NETHERLANDS FORCES AND THE PSYCHOPOLITICAL STRUGGLE

by

L. van der Put

In these days we are giving consideration in particular to the question whether a defense policy - and the armed forces involved in it - can be a tool in the psychopolitical struggle between the Western world and the Soviet Bloc. The question is even more to the point when we formulate it as follows: Does the presence of a military apparatus (and in this lecture we are referring mainly to the military forces of the Netherlands) provide the Soviet Union with any better opportunities to realize certain objectives?

In attempting to answer to this question, we should, I feel, pay attention to three aspects:

The first point to be considered, obviously, is the basis of Dutch defense policy.

Secondly, it is important to know what motives the Soviet world could have to undermine this basis, and finally, we have to ascertain whether the attitude of the Dutch people towards its defense apparatus has any negative elements that could be easily utilized by the opponent.

The security of the Netherlands and international power relationships

We shall first deal with the basis of Dutch defense policy. The reasons for the Dutch Government to keep up a military force - as part of NATO's international security system - are the following:

The Dutch Government feel it is their task and responsibility to see that the country's prosperity and spiritual and material wellbeing should be developed as much as possible and that every citizen should share in the benefits thereof.

Further, it is obvious that the Dutch Government should contribute according to its ability to the development of prosperity and wellbeing outside its frontiers, especially when the mitigation of distress elsewhere is a humanitarian task. The Netherlands Government proceeds on the principle that for the optimum

performance of these duties it is essential that its own security should also be promoted and guaranteed, as security and stability in the world are necessary for a harmonious social and cultural development of the Netherlands in cooperation with other nations.

However, security and stability today are threatened seriously by political and other disturbance in the world. These stem partly from the struggle for power between States and groups of States and partly from fundamental differences in opinion about political and social world order.

In short, inter-State relations involve the risk of war and there is a struggle in the politico-social field. This is usually referred to as the East-West controversy, reflected in the contrasts between the American and the Russian bloc, and as the North-South controversy, related to the struggle between the rich and the poor countries, between the established order and the rebels, where only a fundamental break-through in political and social relations could lead to a solution.

As regards the situation between States, the Dutch Government in the first instance takes the view that endeavours should be made to reach such international relations and power relationships that crises and conflicts are prevented or, if they should occur, that they do not lead to the use of force and thus to war.

As regards the ideological, i. e. the politico-social, struggle - which, as we all know, is in many respects fought concurrently with the struggle for power between the Great Powers - the Dutch Government tends to favour such forces as will promote freedom and justice. The Government is of opinion that a sound development of man is ensured only if conflicting interests and other contrasts are solved by free negotiations in which parties are prepared to observe justice at any level, also in international relations. We need not discuss this point in further detail: this basis is completely in line with the United Nations Charter.

Yet, the Netherlands armed forces, as a tool of potential force, as an instrument with which the Dutch Government could realize certain political objectives, has no direct task in this politico-ideological struggle. There is no question of the Netherlands wanting to propagate its preference for a just and free world order by making use of its military power. This also implies that the armed forces should not in the first place be regarded as an instrument of power for the direct protection of this concept. The only justification for any actual military action by the Netherlands - in any form whatever - is the right of individual or collective self-defense, a right likewise laid down in the United Nations Charter.

In other words: the Netherlands armed forces should be regarded not as a tool for the Government to carry through any political concept, but as a means of ensuring security and stability.

To facilitate judgement as to whether the opponent is nevertheless trying to involve the Dutch armed forces in the ideological struggle, let us study more closely - against the background of the international power relationships - some elements of this Netherlands defense-task to ensure security.

I have mentioned that the world suffers from serious political differences. As we all know what these are about, let me remark only that they are so serious that parties may get into a position where they might be challenged to settle their differences by force.

This is not an overstatement. Does not history show us many examples of force being used as soon as political and other differences grew sharper as well as many examples of a lack of restraint in political crises and conflicts?

For this failure to control their power we cannot exclusively blame the Governments themselves. After all, the leading groups in the States - Governments, ministers - are urged also by the forces and sentiments at work among the nations. For all sorts of reasons they can be compelled to use the force at their disposal - even if they themselves shrink from doing so. This is as true today as it was in the past.

In our days, however, there is an increasing exercise of restraint among the responsible political groups, at least as regards the power relationships between the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe. Despite sharp contrasts, force will not readily be used because the two Great Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - have arms systems with which to put an end to each other's existence as modern powers and to involve the world in their nuclear ruin. This prospect not only inhibits the will to use nuclear weapons, but also acts as a deterrent to settling conflicts with non-nuclear arms. The fear that the use of conventional force will yet lead to weapons of mass destruction being employed also prevents the parties from actually having recourse to the less terrifying type of arms.

We certainly must not ignore the important politico-strategic revolution that has so been brought about.

The presence of nuclear arms in the Soviet Union and the United States has exerted a profound influence on the nature of the security systems to which the parties from East and West

look for their protection.

A policy of security today can no longer be based on the strategy of defense after an attack, but must be a political strategy for the prevention of war or, at most, a strategy of offering commensurate resistance in the first phases of aggression.

This implies that the two great nuclear powers and their allies try to dissuade one another from using force by making it clear - through the position and extent of their arms systems, which include both nuclear and conventional weapons - that a nuclear attack by one of the parties will not be left unanswered by the other.

As you know, this situation is referred to as the "balance of power". It should be quite clear, however, that this term dates from the pre-atomic era and that it is only a very poor indication indeed of what is actually meant. Thus, the factor "balance", equilibrium, plays only a minor part any more. The fire power based on nuclear weapons and the mobility, based on missiles, have, as it were, surpassed the level at which a lead is still important. Moreover, the "power" concept has got a different meaning. The enormous potential nuclear power now available to the parties does not really represent power but rather a lack of it, inability to use the available military fire power and mobility for military purposes.

By the present balance of power, therefore, is meant a nuclear and conventional strategic system based on arms systems maintained not to launch but to prevent a war. Whether this system suffices to prevent war and to create stability is a question nobody can answer. Nobody can prove that the fact that a major war has been held off so far is due to this strategy of mutual restraint. Nor can the opposite be proved.

It is not my intention to deal with these politico-strategic problems in more detail. Against the background of the theme of our discussions it suffices to say that, by virtue of its NATO membership the Netherlands is involved in the system of nuclear deterrence which in the power relations between the Western and the Soviet world tends to ward off crises and to prevent war. By making a major proportion of its armed forces available to NATO, the Netherlands contributes to enhancing the creditability of this system and benefits from the stability it enforces. Therefore the Netherlands Government regards cooperation between the U.S. and Western Europe under the North Atlantic Charter as an unassailable principle.

The Soviet Union against participation by Western Europe in the nuclear power balance

This brings us to the question what reasons, if any, the Soviet Union could possibly have for undermining the prevailing politico-strategic security system of preventing war, a system from which she also reaps the benefits herself. We must here distinguish between - on the one hand - the power relations as far as they are determined by the strategic nuclear balance of power between America and Russia and, on the other hand, the general military aspect of the East-West relations.

There is no doubt that Moscow knows very well what value to attach to the strategic system that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Maintenance of the nuclear power balance between the two great atomic powers is of vital importance for both and certainly for the Soviet Union herself. Indeed, the Soviet political strategy, stripped of any ideological jargon, is therefore directed - like that of the U.S. - towards prevention of war and the exercise of restraint on the basis of the presence of nuclear power.

However, what is of essential importance to Western security, namely Western Europe's partnership in the Western component of the nuclear power balance, is not essential to the Soviet Union but rather a source of annoyance. The reason is that if Europe were to be dissociated from the American power, the Soviet Union's political freedom of movement with respect to Central and Western Europe would increase considerably. And this political gain would be obtained without any loss of security, because we may assume that the Soviet Union's military force will remain equal to that of an independent force of Europe. In other words: for the Soviet Union there is certainly something to be gained by opposing NATO and the defense policy of NATO countries, including the Netherlands.

Points of attack for undermining the Netherlands defense policy

After this brief explanation of the place of the Netherlands in the international security systems, we will now turn to the question as to whether the defense policy of the Dutch Government is, or could be, object of activities directly aimed at undermining this policy. Another question is whether the attitude of the Dutch people with regard to its defense apparatus contains any negative factors that could be used by an opposing party for successful undermining activities.

First some general remarks on the Dutch. There is quite a lot of dualism in the interest the Dutch people takes in public and political matters. On the other hand, the Dutchman's behaviour is strongly individualistic and particularistic; on the other hand he shows solidarity. Perhaps the fight against the sea and the problems connected with the water economy in this delta area have played a role in this respect. The struggle against the water forces the people to carry out projects jointly and stimulated the public spirit. But otherwise the Dutchman goes his own course, critically disposed towards the structures he has to keep up in cooperation with others.

This is true also for the military defense task.

As a rule the Dutchman shows reserve with respect to the system by which the Government think it must ensure military security. Yet the majority are not pacifists or anti-militarists - it is lack of interest rather than disapproval.

It would carry me too far if I were to discuss the behaviour in the past of the Dutch people towards its armed forces. In fact, this behaviour has varied with political and other conditions. For us it is especially important to know how much support Dutch defense policy is receiving nowadays, and in particular what attacks it has to endure.

First the support. It is worthwhile to mention here an opinion poll recently conducted in connection with a television programme about NATO. Everybody, including the insiders, was surprised to find that 73% of those questioned were of opinion that NATO had in the past twenty years prevented an armed conflict breaking out in Europe. An even more striking result was that 85% felt that the Netherlands should remain a member of NATO.

Even those who tend to be somewhat suspicious of the results of public opinion polls, and those who tend to interpret the figures with a wide safety margin, have to admit that the vast majority seems to accept NATO, and, consciously or not, seem to rely on it for their security.

This picture indeed is in fair agreement with the opinion reflected by the political parties. At the time of the parliamentary elections in 1967 there were only two parties which in their programmes expressly went against NATO. All the big and medium-size parties, in the sections of their programmes dealing with security, pronounced in favour of maintaining the balance of power through NATO as the Western pillar of this balance, even though they did not fail to advocate a lowering of the level in

order to ease the tension and to attain a greater stability in East-West relations.

As it is generally known that the defense task of the Netherlands is almost completely performed within the framework of NATO defense, we may conclude that quite an important majority of the Dutch people shows no tendency to oppose its country's defense apparatus. Consciously or unconsciously it relies on the present security system.

Yet this confidence is clearly under attack nowadays. We can witness an uncoordinated, yet concentrated effort to weaken the foundations of our defense policy and it is difficult to find out whether factors of deliberately organized subversion also play a role here. It is quite certain, however, that an opponent bent on systematically undermining the Netherlands defense could turn to good account the political, ethical and moral agitation that is conducted against the official policy of security by an increasing minority of the Dutch people.

To obtain an impression of the forces that are opposed to the Dutch defense policy, we shall have to classify the opposition under various headings.

First of all we have to mention a strong agitation that is now being conducted in the churches. This movement started in the 1950's when the General Synods of some Protestant churches began to discuss the problems of nuclear armament. Even in those days the General Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church took a very critical standpoint. However, there was no question yet of any systematic opposition. But around 1960 things suddenly began to gather momentum. In 1962 the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church published its so-called "Nuclear Arms Report", which condemned coupling of the Dutch defense policy to the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Two years later the Dutch section of the Roman-Catholic "Pax Christi" peace movement published its report "On the way with Pacem in Terris" in which, on the basis of the Papal encyclical "Pacem in Terris", also a firm stand was taken against the "balance of terror". Since the highest leader of the Catholics in the Netherlands, the Archbishop of Utrecht, is president of the Pax Christi movement, we may take it that Pax Christi speaks in the name of Dutch Catholicism.

The appearance of these reports gave rise to a lively discussion in the Churches, which is still going on, and in which strong doubts are expressed as to the political, ethical and morel right-

ness of the Netherlands defense policy.

By the end of 1966 the Reformed Church and the Roman-Catholic church united their efforts for peace. They joined their peace-promoting activities in what is called in Interchurch Consultation on Peace which was soon joined by a few other churches. This consultation group has gradually developed into a pressure group with the aim to mobilize the member-churches, which together have millions of members, in favour of peace and to arouse a critical disposition towards the present structures of armament in general and towards the Dutch contribution in particular.

This is not the place to pronounce a judgement on the pros and cons of this interchurch attack on the foundations of the Netherlands defense policy. I shall confine myself to pointing out a few facts.

In the first place it may be stated that the Interchurch Consultation on Peace is strongly influenced by groups which - notably in the Dutch Reformed Church - have for years been propagating evangelical pacifism, even before World War II. As a result the Consultation on Peace is inclined to regard the phase of study and contemplation as concluded. They feel that they have been studying matters long enough and that now the time has come to proceed to deliberate agitation on the basis of the 1962 and 1964 reports of the Reformed Synod and of Pax Christi. And although the Peace Consultation Group pretend that they want to refrain from participation in, or interference with international and national political matters, it will be clear that they are inevitably pushed towards a political choice, and - especially as a result of the Vietnam war - this choice is usually detrimental to the American - Western-European cooperation within the NATO security system. This is because they do not see that NATO, in which the American power plays a decisive role, can still exert a stabilising influence on East-West relations. They argue that as long as the Americans are waging a large-scale war in South-East Asia, the NATO cannot be regarded as a neutral security system.

In the second place we may state that the leaders of inter-church peace-actions gravely suspect the Western political strategy of war prevention by the maintenance of nuclear power. Not only do they oppose the existence of security systems that have to be based on weapons of mass destruction, but they also deny that these systems may lead to such a political stability as to allow of effective negotiations on arms control and international peace arrangements on a basis of justice. Obviously, these thoughts are directly opposed to the defense policy of the

Netherlands' Government, which aims at maintenance of the power balance and of political stability.

Finally, I would like to point out that the influence of the Peace Consultation Groups of the Churches should not be underestimated. A critical minority here is appealing purposefully to the broad middle groups who have so far been inclined to rely on the defense policy of the Government and to lend it a - qualified - support. Deliberate attempts to set this majority thinking may adversely effect the public support to the defense apparatus, the more so since simple peace slogans make a deeper impression than subtle, matter-of-fact explanations concerning the principles of Netherlands defense policy.

Another source of opposition against the Dutch defense policy and armed forces is a rapidly increasing discontent as regards the present structure of the social order. This discontent is manifested particularly among the more educated young people - secondary school and university students - but it finds response also in other circles.

Today's young generation, born and bred in a reasonable well-ordered society, without any personal memories of the privation and disruption of the 1930's and 1940's, fiercely opposes social and other evils which they experience to their cost or with which they are confronted otherwise: a still unsolved housing problem, an educational system that is not without faults, a daily flow of information on failing political and social-economic structures and on wars that could be the beginning of complete destruction. Moreover, part of the male youth feel that their career is threatened by their liability to military service.

All these factors contribute to the fact the precisely those young people who feel the urge to manifest themselves are radical and loudly proclaim their sympathy for what in political jargon is called the "New Left". The spokesmen of this group - or rather groups, for they cannot be regarded as an organized movement - are often asked to participate in student forums and other public activities. They loudly and fiercely criticize the established order and refuse to speak in the usual political terms and categories. They reject as irrelevant and selfish the Government's care for security against a menace from other powers. Maintenance of the "balance of power" between States in the classical sense is rejected as an obsolete principle. They only see power relations between, on the one hand, the established order - kept up by oppressors and exploiters - and on the other hand the revolution, which is sought by the oppressed and the

exploited. Neither the Soviet Union as a world power, nor Soviet Communism is attractive to them any more. Mao and Che Guevara are their heroes. In fact, the controversy of our time, in their opinion, is not so much the confrontation of Washington and Moscow, but rather the struggle between the leading groups in Governments that support conservative forces, on the one hand, and the leaders of the revolutionaries, on the other. For the rest, for any threats that are exchanged between powers. They blame the United States. In these circles it is indeed taken almost for granted that the American Government will not be able to control its nuclear power and will one day proceed to nuclear warfare. Sowing panic with the supposed atomic war is an easy means for this group to mobilize public opinion in its favour.

Further I should mention the existence of actions directed against the Government's defense policy by non-church, non-political movements. All sorts of "private" peace movements organized by alarmed citizens, have lately begun to concern themselves with the problem of war and peace. And these, unaware of the real motives of the defense effort, tend to end up with a negative attitude towards the defense policy and the Netherlands' participation in NATO. In fact, more than once such groups will eventually still find themselves in political waters, because at their meetings they have themselves informed by people who oppose the defense policy for political reasons. By attending meetings organized by peace movements and the like the defense ministry has tried during the past year to offer some counterbalance in the form of factual information. But you will realize that the effect of such steps is only limited for two reasons. In the first place because it should be prevented that the information officials should be used, in a way, as rubbing-posts for all sorts of political and social frustrations, and secondly because defense and security problems cannot readily be explained with the aid of simple slogans.

Yet I believe that one of the best means of opposing attacks on the defense policy is to provide the press and the public with an incessant flow of strictly matter-of-fact information on the principles of the defense policy on the lines I have just now been trying to describe briefly. Even so we must face the possibility that agitation directed against the defense policy, if it continues, will eventually have an adverse effect on a sound progress of the Dutch defense effort.

We can certainly say that public opinion has recently become more radical. Day after day open or covert attacks are being

made on the defense policy in the press, the radio or on television. Especially since January last - after the escalation of the war in Vietnam and some other incidents (the crashing of an American bomber in Greenland and the capture of an American reconnaissance ship by North Korea) criticism has flared up and the tone of the discussions has sharpened. Besides arguments against the political strategic principles as such, it is precisely such topical and sensational facts that play a major role.

Some of such facts that appeal to the imagination of the Dutch public have to do with the military participation of the German Federal Republic in NATO and with Bonn's supposed wish to have nuclear weapons at their disposal. To Dutch people who want to make use of it, these German conditions and problems constitute weapons with which to hit the Federal Republic, NATO and Dutch defense policy in one blow.

Thus, in 1967, not merely the "New Left" by many other conducted a vehement campaign against the German general Von Kielmansegg, who, because of his war record, was considered unacceptable as leader of the Headquarters of the NATO forces in Central Europe (AFCENT), which had been transferred to Holland. It is remarkable that these anti-German feelings tend to increase rather than decrease, the more so when we bear in mind that the transfer, some time ago, of some German units to the Dutch training-camp at Budel met with only limited opposition from the side of public opinion, whereas today even the slightest consequence of military cooperation with the Germans meets with criticism.

It seems difficult to say what forces, if any, are at the bottom of all this.

It is certain that the policy of peaceful coexistence propagated by the Soviet Union - a policy increasingly dictated by the nuclear armament situation - tends to undermine the Dutch people's defense-mindedness. It is equally certain that - particularly among the young radicals - contacts are developing with communist and semi-communist groups at home and abroad.

But, quite apart from that, we must not overlook the fact that public opinion is still insufficiently aware of rapid developments in politico-strategic thinking in recent years. It has the greatest difficulty in grasping the function of the nuclear security system as a tool to ensure peace and stability. And this lack of understanding of the principles of security policy

produces blanks, which, if not filled by continuous matter-of-fact information, are utilized by the opponent for his own political ends.

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