

CONTENTS

**Activities of Communist World Organisations**

**Special Edition**

p. 1 Introduction of activities of Africa  
p. 1 The I. Solidarity Conference (1957-58)

**CHAPTER II: FROM THE I. TO THE II. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE (1958-1960)** 11

p. 12 Relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.  
p. 13 The II. Solidarity Conference (1960)

**CHAPTER III: FROM THE II. TO THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE (1960-1963)** 16

**AFRO - ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO)**

**February 1969**

p. 17 Activities of AAPSO organs  
p. 20 The III. Solidarity Conference (1963)

**CHAPTER IV: FROM THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE TO THE SPLIT** 32

p. 32 The conflict inside AAPSO  
p. 33 General outline of the Sino-Soviet conflict  
p. 34 5. Executive Committee's Meeting (1963)  
p. 35 6. Council Meeting (1964)  
p. 40 The situation after the 5. Council Meeting (1964)  
p. 44 IV. Solidarity Conference (1965)  
p. 49 Towards the Split  
p. 52 The 8. Council Meeting (1967)

**CHAPTER V: FROM THE SPLIT OF 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1968** 57

p. 58 The absolute power of the Permanent Secretariat

**CHAPTER VI: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE (WCP) FORCES ITS WAY INTO AAPSO** 64

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**CHAPTER VII: FEATURES OF AAPSO, FEBRUARY 1969** 72

## CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: EARLY HISTORY AND FOUNDATION	1
p. 2 The WCP as pioneer	
p. 6 Extension of activities to Africa	
p. 7 The I. Solidarity Conference (1957-58)	
CHAPTER II: FROM THE I. TO THE II. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE (1958-1960)	11
p. 12 Relations between the Soviet Union and the UAR	
p. 13 The II. Solidarity Conference (1960)	
CHAPTER III: FROM THE II. TO THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE (1960-1963)	16
p. 16 The establishment of a Solidarity Fund	
p. 17 Activities of the AAPSO organs	
p. 20 The III. Solidarity Conference (1963)	
CHAPTER IV: FROM THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE 32 TO THE RIFT	
p. 32 The conflict inside AAPSO	
p. 33 General outline of the Sino-Soviet conflict	
p. 34 6. Executive Committee Meeting (1963)	
p. 36 6. Council Meeting (1964)	
p. 40 The situation after the 6. Council Meeting (1964)	
p. 44 IV. Solidarity Conference (1965)	
p. 49 Towards the Split	
p. 52 The 8. Council Meeting (1967)	
CHAPTER V: FROM THE SPLIT OF 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1968	57
p. 58 The absolute power of the Permanent Secretariat	
CHAPTER VI: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE (WCP) FORCES ITS WAY INTO AAPSO	64
p. 64 Events organised jointly by AAPSO and the WCP	
CHAPTER VII: FEATURES OF AAPSO, FEBRUARY 1969	72

## SYNOPSIS

AAPSO was founded on 26th December 1957 at the I. Solidarity Conference of Afro-Asian Peoples (Cairo, 26th December 1957 - 1st January 1958) under the domination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-controlled World Council of Peace (WCP). Its purpose was the expansion of the Russian sphere of influence by exploiting Afro-Asian desires to be independent of the European Powers.

The UAR, which after the Suez Crisis (October 1956) had turned to the Soviet Union, was formally entrusted with AAPSO secretarial work: Cairo became the seat of the Permanent Secretariat, the most important organ of AAPSO, headed by the all-powerful General Secretary, the Egyptian Yussef EL SEBAI.

### Conflicts

The initially favourable prospect that the work of AAPSO would prove useful to Moscow soon deteriorated.

The smooth running of the organisation was hindered first of all by differences between Egypt and the Soviet Union (end of 1958-1960), then China and Egypt (since 1960) and finally India and China (since 1959).

AAPSO was tested to breaking-point, however, by the Sino-Soviet conflict which grew constantly from 1960, reaching its peak in 1963 and 1964, and culminating finally in the repudiation of the Chinese faction (in particular at the 8. Council Meeting in Nicosia, 13th-17th December 1967).

### Meetings

Whereas at the I. Solidarity Conference (Cairo, 26th December 1957 - 1st January 1958) the Russians and Chinese still seemed united, at the II Solidarity Conference (Conakry, 11th-15th April 1960) the first signs of the Sino-Soviet struggle appeared - a struggle which was to dominate the III. and IV. Solidarity Conferences (Moshi/Tanganyika, 4th-10th February 1963 and Winneba near Accra, 9th-16th May 1965 respectively).

Of the 8 Council Meetings held, the 6th Council Meeting (Algiers, 22nd-27th March 1964), at which the Sino-Soviet conflict reached its climax, and above all the 8th Council Meeting (Nicosia, 13th-17th February 1967), marking the defeat of the Chinese supporters, are particularly noticeable.

Significant among the 8 Executive Committee meetings are the 3rd (Gaza, 9th-11th December 1961) at which a Cuban delegation appeared for the first time as a token of the (abortive) attempt to extend AAPSO to Latin America, the 6th (Nicosia, 10th-12th September 1963) which served as an arena for the Sino-Soviet contest over the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 5th August 1963 and the 7th (Algiers, 26th March 1964) prohibiting further "ideological" discussions.

With regard to the Permanent Secretariat which meets privately as required, the Chinese Secretary is said to have openly attacked the Soviet representatives for the first time on 3rd January 1967. In addition to the meetings of these organs, pure propaganda events, mostly "conferences", were also organised by the Permanent Secretariat. The following belong in this category:

- 1) "Extraordinary Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples" (Cairo, 1st-3rd July 1967)
- 2) The celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of AAPSO (Cairo, 27th-29th December 1967)
- 3) "Extraordinary Conference on Vietnam", (Cairo, 7th-9th September 1968)
- 4) "International Conference in Support of the Peoples of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies" (Khartoum, 18th-20th January 1969) and
- 5) "II. International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples" (Cairo, 25th-28th January 1969).

The last two events were organised jointly by AAPSO and the WCP.

### Methods

At these events resolutions, appeals and protests etc. are issued within the framework of Solidarity Weeks (e.g. 3rd-10th January "Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America), Days of Struggle (2nd March "Proscription of Nuclear Weapons, 15th March "Laos Day", 1st December "Africa Day" etc.), but also in the absence of such ostensible motives. Common to all these resolutions, appeals and protests is an attitude of hostility towards "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism", meaning in every case Moscow's opponents or those situations from which Moscow cannot hope to profit. (Moscow's domination of 40% of the Asian continent has never been criticised).

In addition to these propaganda activities AAPSO gives financial and military support to, in particular, the pro-Soviet liberation movements against Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. Financial assistance is thought to come mainly from an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund", set up in November 1960, and other aid (including military) from a "Mobilization Committee" founded in January 1969 with headquarters in Cairo.

#### Summary

Briefly defined, AAPSO can be described as an Afro-Asian organisation - whose 75 members (national committees, parties or liberation movements in Africa and Asia) are formally controlled from Cairo;

- whose claim to lead the united front of Afro-Asian peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism was in fact restricted, since the repudiation of the Chinese and after the numerous declarations of independence, to individual African countries and since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 in particular to the Middle East;
- whose nationalist aims are used by Moscow to promote its imperial interests and
- which is controlled by the European USSR with the increasing interference of the WCP and used by the UAR as a facade.

### Chapter I

#### THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANISATIONS (AAPSO)

The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) is a movement which - as far as most of its African and Asian members are concerned - was created for national reasons and pursues national aims. Originally these aims were directed in particular against the Western European colonial Powers but, under the influence of Communist propaganda, especially from Moscow, were very soon extended to include the USA and also to a certain extent the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### EARLY HISTORY AND FOUNDATION

On 12th January 1954 - during preparations for the Colombo Conference in which the heads of governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan took part in April 1954 - the President Sukarno of Indonesia received instructions to send out feelers to see if an Afro-Asian conference was possible. The conference should be held at the beginning of 1955 in Bandung/Indonesia.

In April 1954 the Indian Prime Minister, J. NEHRU had concluded a Tibet agreement with Communist China, in the preamble of which both sides recognised as a basis for their relations the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which were to be invoked so often later on: respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equal rights and mutually advantageous trade. (During a visit to Moscow by NEHRU in 1955 these five principles of peaceful coexistence were also recognised by the Soviet Union as the basis of their policy. At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 29th December 1955 N. S. KHRUSHCHEV declared among other things: "... We have a profound respect for these principles and hold the view: the more countries adopt these principles, the better the prospects for trust between nations. Every nation has

the right to organise its life as it sees fit. The enslavement or plunder of one country by another is a scandalous injustice crying to heaven for vengeance.")

At the preparatory meeting in Djakarta/Indonesia at the end of 1954 there was agreement that the People's Republic of China should take part in the Bandung Conference. Even NEHRU favoured an invitation to the Red Chinese. The majority of the participants, however, did not want any involvement of the Soviet Union despite pressure from the People's Republic of China, which at that time still had the status of an ally dependent on "fraternal aid" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, while of course enjoying more autonomy than the East European satellites.

#### The WCP as a pioneer of an Asian Solidarity Committee (ASC)

As a result of its exclusion from the Bandung Conference <sup>1)</sup> the Soviet Union had to face the danger that it might be isolated from the Third World - which it regarded at the time as a promising field for the expansion of Communism - while its potential rival, the People's Republic of China could pursue its activities among the Afro-Asians as a respected member.

The Soviet Union therefore employed other means in its efforts to undo the Bandung defeat. By virtue of its approaches to the developing countries since 1953 with the help of the World Council of Peace (WCP) the preliminary work was already complete.

The WCP, founded on 21st April 1949, has always been an organisation dominated by Communists of the Moscow line, making propaganda for Soviet foreign policy aims of the moment under the cloak of promoting peace and the relaxation of tension.

1) At the Bandung Conference (Bandung/Indonesia, 19th-24th April 1955) 340 delegates from 23 Asian and six African countries were present. In spite of considerable differences of opinion the final communiqué dealing with economic and cultural cooperation and political aims was accepted unanimously. The Conference rejected colonialism "in all its forms", demanded nuclear disarmament and the destruction of nuclear weapons under international control and expressed its support for the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

In order to keep up the outer pretence of impartiality, the WCP often entrusts the formal organisation of its own meetings to some newly founded and therefore "untainted" organisation or committee, in the hope of attracting as many non-Communist participants as possible.

One such "impartial" camouflage organisation, the "Préparation de la Rencontre pour la Détente Internationale" founded in France, issued invitations to a "World Conference for the Reduction of International Tension" in Stockholm from 19th to 24th June 1954. This ostensibly "impartial" event with more than 250 participants from 30 countries was completely under the control of the WCP, whose most important officials such as KUO MO-YO (People's Republic of China, Ilya EHRENBURG (Soviet Union) and the Chairman Prof. J. BERNAL (Great Britain) were present.

At the World Conference a Bureau and Secretariat were formed with instructions to make preparations for a new, even more comprehensive conference on détente to be held in 1955.

A few months later the real organiser of the Stockholm World Conference of 1954, the WCP, at its council meeting in Stockholm (18th-23rd November 1954), issued an appeal - a fine example of teamwork, this - to the peoples of Asia to extend the peace zone in Asia and ensure peace and collective security on the basis of the five principles, contained in the Tibet Agreement between the People's Republic of China and India (April 1954). A conference on détente of the Asian nations was announced at the council meeting. The proposal came from the Indian delegate and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, Romesh CHANDRA, who today (1969) is General Secretary of the WCP.

The hand of the WCP could not but be detected in the agenda of the Asian Conference for the Reduction of International Tension (New Delhi, 6th-10th April 1955) with its "preparatory committee": proscription of weapons of mass destruction; colonialism and

foreign intervention in Asia; the dangers to Asia ensuing from military pacts and the stationing of foreign troops; admission of China to the UN; peaceful reunification of Korea; racialism.

Taking part in the conference - which Communist propagandists raised to the level of a prelude to the Bandung Conference -- were about 200 delegates from 14 Asian countries.

Among the 200 delegates were 15 citizens of the Soviet Union, 40 Red Chinese, 50 Indians and 39 Japanese. Representatives from Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Syria and Jordan were also present. Particularly prominent were the Red Chinese writer and "peace fighter" Kuo MO-YO, the Soviet writers Nikolai TICHONOV and Mirzo TURSUN-ZADE, the former Foreign Minister of Burma, Dr. E. MAUNG and the former Syrian Prime Minister Maaruf ed-DAWALIBI.

The conference approved the 5 principles of peaceful coexistence, attacked American imperialism and condemned nuclear threats and colonialism.

Within this framework 12 political resolutions were accepted which supported the demands of Red Chinese and Soviet foreign policy.

For example, the conference agreed to MOLOTOV's proposal for a 10 Power Conference on Formosa and the Sino-Soviet demand for a conference on Korea. In addition to other matters (return of Goa to India, New Guinea to Indonesia, Okinawa to Japan, freedom for Malaya) the resolution on "The Struggle of the Arab Peoples for Freedom and Independence" rejected foreign interference in the Arab countries, military pacts and bases in the Middle East etc. The resolution also condemns the "aggressive" policies of ruling circles in Israel.

The conference also sent a short message to the forthcoming Bandung Conference, in which, at the instigation of India and Indonesia, it refrained from identifying too closely with the aims of the Bandung Conference.

The most important decision was beyond doubt the founding of an "Asian Solidarity Committee" (ASC)

ASC was also to form committees in the individual countries. In 1957 there were national committees in India and Japan as well as the People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

(The Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Asian countries was founded in Moscow in May 1956. Its Chairman was Mirza TURSUN-ZADE, Tadjhikian poet, member of the Communist Party, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet and Lenin Prize winner for Literature. According to a TASS report of 15th August 1956 the Committee included writers, scientists, journalists and representatives of church and state from Central Asia and the other Soviet republics).

Together with its national members ASC propagated Asian solidarity and the "Bandung spirit", its main aim being to win support especially among those intellectuals who were still neither Communists nor camp-followers. The national committees also hoped to gain semi-official status.

Neither did the Soviet Union as a state spare any effort to extend its influence to non-Communist Asia or to commend itself as a "peaceful" Power by its continuous endorsement of peaceful coexistence and the "spirit of Bandung".

Soviet activity became evident from visits made by numerous politicians and delegations, e.g. Prime Minister N. BULGANIN and Party Leader N. KHRUSHCHEV to India, Burma and Afghanistan (November/December 1955) and Deputy Prime Minister A. MIKOYAN to Pakistan, India and Burma (March 1956).

ASC did everything to suggest to the outside world that the Communist movement and Bandung were synonymous. Other "discrepancies" were also eliminated: the XX. Party Conference of the CPSU in 1956 decreed that Communism could also come to power in the non-Communist countries by peaceful means. Accordingly Cominform - a successor organisation to the notorious Comintern - was dissolved on 17th April 1956, having been

rendered superfluous by changes in the international situation - e.g. the establishment of a "great peace zone" which "included both Socialist and non-Socialist states in Europe and Asia".

#### The extension of Communist activity to Africa

After the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt on 1st April 1956 after a presence lasting 74 years the Soviet Union began with renewed energy to draw Egypt into its sphere of influence. In June 1956 the Soviet Foreign Minister D. SHEPILOV visited Egypt, (the Lebanon and Syria). After the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt on 26th July 1956 Israel, Great Britain and France intervened on 29th October 1956 and 31st October 1956 respectively, but despite the rapid collapse of Egyptian resistance were compelled to withdraw on 6th November 1956 under pressure from the UN (and in particular the USA)

Egypt was now ripe for the Soviet embrace.  
ASC too decided to act.

It was decided at an Asian Writers' Conference conducted by ASC (New Delhi, December 1956), in which an Egyptian delegation also took part:

- to extend operations to Africa,
- to change the name of ASC to "Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement"
- to consider an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" in Cairo,
- to publish a quarterly, "Asian-African Review" and
- to send a mission to Cairo.

The leader of the delegation to Egypt in February 1957 was the Secretary of the Committee, Dr. A. SINGH, former chief delegate of India in the Korean Armistice Commission. President Nasser, who received the delegation and welcomed the plan to hold an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" in Cairo, was hailed by Dr. SINGH as the "recognised leader of the Arab revival".

The preparatory committee, meeting in Cairo (21st-23rd October 1957), summoned the I. Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference to meet in Cairo from 26th December 1957 - 1st January 1958 and set to work on the agenda.

In the invitations sent out by the Egyptian host delegation it was stressed that the Conference was determined to continue the policies of the Bandung Conference ("New Bandung") and oppose the "imperialist conspiracies" against certain Asian and African states, e.g. as in the recent case of Syria. At the Conference, however, governments would not be represented - as at the Bandung Conference; instead the people would be represented. The majority of the delegates would be members of parliament or representatives of military liberation movements in the individual countries.

The most striking point here is the regulation that "peoples", not governments should be represented. In practice, however, this provides the Communists with the opportunity to announce as "representatives" of a people those persons whom they find amenable and acceptable and who can place them in a position to manipulate the Conference as required. This is only to be expected from the Communist movement, since the Communists regard a handful of Communist functionaries as the "avant-garde", as the "lawful leaders of the people", even when this people is vigorously opposed to Bolshevism.

#### The I. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference 1957/58

At the Conference, which took place in Cairo - as previously mentioned - from 26th December 1957 to 1st January 1958, were 500 delegates from 45 countries.

Among the delegates were many Communists, camp-followers, "observers" from Communist world organisations and individuals who - in the words of a Beirut paper - "represented no-one but themselves". Thus Iraq was represented by dissidents and refugees, Jordan by exiles and Palestine by Arabs who had taken flight. There were even some Cypriots present, although Cyprus belongs neither to Asia nor Africa.

The Soviet delegation dominated the Conference, not only because it represented a powerful state, but because it had been carefully selected and well briefed.

The majority of the 13 members of the Soviet delegation came from Soviet Central Asia. They were characterized in the first

instance by the usual type of "peace delegates". In addition there were the Chairman of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, Mirzo TURSUN-ZADE, the President of the Soviet Peace Committee, M. I. KOTOV, and the writers A.W. SOFRONOV and S. ISRAILOVA.

Also included in the delegation were experts ready to deal with questions which were expected to arise, e.g. the rector of the State University of Turkmenistan, the Caucasian Minister for Social Insurance, the Chairman of the Kirghiz Teachers' Union, a representative of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organisations (K. MURTAZAJEV) and the Chairman of the Bureau of Religious Administration for Moslem Affairs in Central Asia and Kasachstan.

Sh. R. RASHIDOV, the nominal head of state of Uzbekistan, was responsible for political affairs. Assisting RASHIDOV was an associate member of the Academy of Sciences, ZHUKOV, who had also attended the Bandung Conference.

In addition the delegation had an oil expert. The economic expert was A. A. ARSUMANYAN, Director of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations.

The Conference compiled the subjects of the agenda in five committees: organising, political, economic, cultural and social committees. The political committee was further divided into five sub-committees (disarmament and nuclear weapons, imperialism, racial segregation, Palestine and Algeria).

#### Conference resolutions

In the organisational field the most important resolutions were as follows: the formation of an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Council" and a Permanent Secretariat, both to be based in Cairo. The President of the Council was to be Anwar EL SADAT (Egypt) and the General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI (Egypt). The Secretaries included Yang SHU (People's Republic of China) and Sh R. RASHIDOV (Soviet Union).

The four Vice-presidents came from Algeria, India, the Sudan and the Soviet Union (Muchtar AUZEV).

In addition to the General Secretary ten Secretaries belonged to the Secretariat: three from Africa (Ghana, Cameroon and the Sudan), four from Asia (People' Republic of China, India,

Indonesia and Japan), two from the Middle East (Iraq and Syria) and one from the Soviet Union.

The Conference suggested the formation of a united Afro-Asian trade union, cooperative, youth and women's organisation as well as an economic committee.

In addition it was decided to call the II. Conference for 1960 in Conakry, Guinea

In the political sector the resolutions were directed principally against Western countries coinciding with the concepts of imperialism and colonialism.

Demands were made for an Afro-Asian peace zone, March 1st was fixed as the Day of Protest against American nuclear tests and the USA and Great Britain were called upon to accept the Soviet position on a test moratorium. (The Soviet test of 28th December 1957, in other words while the Conference was sitting, was passed over in silence).

Further resolutions demanded the immediate independence of (Western) colonies and the retrocession of various territories, e.g. New Guinea to Indonesia, Goa to India, Okinawa to Japan (but not the Soviet-occupied Kuril Islands to Japan). The "imperialist" war in Algeria was condemned and the establishment of "Algerian liberation committees" in all countries was recommended.

With regard to pacts and economic aid, censure was also limited to the Western countries and the E. E.C. The Bagdad Pact of 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 were criticised as violations of the sovereignty of Arab states.

In addition Israel was denounced as "a strong point of imperialism", a demand was made for the admission of the People' Republic of China to the UN and there was a general condemnation of imperialism and colonialism.

In the cultural and social sectors the Conference demanded the reform of schoolbooks and the inclusion in school curricula of member countries.

Concrete measures were also planned in the economic field:

- the exchange of economic and technical information,
- joint meetings by the Chambers of Commerce and
- the founding of a commercial and capital investment bank.

For the rest, the economic sphere was marked by pledges of large-scale Soviet aid.

### The significance of the Conference

- The Conference extended the activities of the "Solidarity Movement" to Africa;
- whereas in Bandung real discussions took place, Cairo yielded only an all-embracing "unanimity" - as is usual with the Communists;
- the resolutions passed by the Conference put pressure on Egypt to support Soviet policy;
- the Conference was entirely in keeping with the wishes of the Soviet Union (a letter from BULGANIN to NASSER dated 8th January 1958 expresses the Soviet government's "frank satisfaction" with the outcome of the Conference);
- the Soviet delegation did all in its power to extol the Soviet Union as a selfless helper and the means by which all difficulties could be overcome. The leader of the delegation, RASHIDOV declared:

"Tell us what you need and we will be in a position to give you any assistance... We can build you a factory or a transport system, a research centre or a university, a hospital or a cultural institute... We want no profits, no privileges, no participation in the administration, no concessions... We are not asking you to participate in any bloc or to change your government or your domestic or foreign policy. We want to help you as a brother helps his brother, totally and selflessly. We know from our own experience how hard it is to cast off the rags of poverty".

- One important aspect of the I. Solidarity Conference was the fact that representatives of the Soviet Union - a predominantly European empire - were able to take the floor, as of right, in an organisation confined to African and Asian interests. (So far no non-African or non-Asian Power has been granted this right by AAPSO, even though - like the Soviet Union - they could lay claim to the possession of territories in Asia or Africa).
- The Soviet Union achieved still further success with the I. Solidarity Conference: first to dominate AAPSO and then to convince its members that they were bound to the Soviet Union by the same interests.

### Chapter II

#### FROM THE I. TO THE II. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

(1958 - 1960)

The hopes engendered by the I. Solidarity Conference that AAPSO would succeed in effectively propagating its ideas and controlling all Asian and African aspirations were not immediately realised.

Thus, for example, Soviet efforts to associate the two Accra, conferences of independent African states (15th-22nd April and 8th-13th December 1958) with AAPSO were unsuccessful.

The real reason for this failure probably lay in differences in the quality of the participants: at the Accra conferences they were representatives of the independent African states and at the Solidarity Conference private individuals.

This accounts for the failure on 21st April 1958 of attempts by the Soviet expert on Africa, Prof. J. J. POTECHIN to "identify" the I. Accra Conference with the I. Solidarity Conference (just as previous attempts to represent the I. Solidarity Conference in Cairo as a "new Bandung" were unsuccessful). Neither was the All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis (end of January 1960) visibly controlled either by the Soviets or by AAPSO: only a delegation of Soviet observers, led by M. M. MUSACHANOV of the Soviet AAPSO Committee, was present. On 25th January 1960 Pravda described support for "African unity" as an important weapon against colonialism.

But even the new organs formed at the I. Solidarity Conference were not as active as their announcements and aims had led to expect.

According to the available reports of 1958 the Permanent Secretariat did not speak out against American intervention in the Lebanon until 17th July 1958, when it called on member organisations to oppose "imperialist

aggression" with "all the means at their disposal". A further example is provided by the fact that after the I. Council Meeting (Cairo, 11th-13th February 1959) more than two years elapsed before an extraordinary Council Meeting (Cairo, 21st-22nd January 1961) on the Congo question took place.

#### Relations between the Soviet Union and the UAR

The reasons for this relative stagnation are to be found above all in the worsening relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union.

On 1st February 1958 (until 28th September 1961) Egypt and Syria became the United Arab Republic (UAR), and were joined on 8th March 1958 by the Yemen (United Arab States). NASSER, moreover, was still the protégé of the Soviet Union. After NASSER'S eighteen-day stay in the Soviet Union KHRUSHCHEV promised in the final communiqué of 16th May 1958, in addition to an undertaking to visit the UAR, a 15% reduction of Egyptian debts for Soviet deliveries of arms and machines, the delivery of a cotton research station and the gift of an eye clinic. On 22nd December 1958 an agreement was concluded between the UAR and the Soviet Union on the construction of 5 air-fields, etc. in the UAR and on 27th December 1958 the agreement on the financing of the Aswan Dam was signed. On 14th July 1958 after a coup d'état the pro-Western King Feisal of Iraq was assassinated and replaced by the dictator KASSEM, who proved at first to be friendly towards Nasser.

Abdel G. NASSER's position was consolidated by these successes. He felt himself to be on an equal footing even with KHRUSHCHEV and had no desire to be dictated to, especially on matters of domestic policy. After NASSER had criticised the Syrian Communists on 21st December 1958 and Communist and pro-Nasser students clashed in Damascus on 27th December 1958, numerous Communists

were arrested by the UAR government on 1st January 1959 and three publishing houses, distributing for the most part Communist literature in the Arabic language, were closed down.

After KHRUSHCHEV's speech to the XXI. Party Conference (Moscow, 27th January-5th February 1959) NASSER requested KHRUSHCHEV to clarify the Soviet position on Arab nationalism.

On 23rd February 1959 NASSER emphasised the UAR's neutrality, refusing to take orders either from the West or from Moscow.

At a reception for an Iraqi government delegation on 16th March 1959, KHRUSHCHEV warned NASSER: What NASSER was saying about Communism, many reactionaries had said before him. The thankless role of a fighter of Communism would bring NASSER no laurels. But the good relations between the Soviet Union and the UAR would continue as before.

NASSER replied to KHRUSHCHEV's remarks in a speech in Damascus on 20th March 1959: "We will fight the new Communist imperialism with the same weapons as we used earlier to defeat Western imperialism... No power on earth can draw us back into foreign spheres of influence... We do not accept the protection which KHRUSHCHEV affords to the Arab Communists..."

Our reply to KHRUSHCHEV's claims to be defending Communism as a principle is that we regard this not a principle, but as interference in our affairs. KHRUSHCHEV is free to do what he wants in his own country. We have the same freedom in ours."

Although the two statesmen appeared more conciliatory a month later (on 10th November 1959 KHRUSHCHEV said that arms deliveries to the UAR would continue and that the Soviet Union did not have any relations with foreign Communists; 18th-19th January 1960 signing of the agreement to finance the second stage of the Aswan Dam etc, the altercation that had occurred marred NASSER's earlier cordiality and confidence.

#### The II. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference 1960

National tensions also made their mark on the organs of AAPSO, upsetting cooperation between the Soviet and UAR exponents and crippling operational efficiency, all the more so with the emergence of Sino-Egyptian disagreement and the first signs of Sino-Soviet differences which were later to flare up so violently.

The II. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, held from 11th-15th April 1960 in Conakry/Guinea, belongs to this period.

The Conference, which claimed to be a Conference of peoples, was also financed by Guinea, at that time the youngest independent African state. Sekou TOURE, the President of Guinea, after breaking abruptly with France, turned to the Soviet Union and China, promising to offset the remonstrating UAR brigade. The Chinese delegation was the largest and most active.

Soviet propaganda also attempted to "build up" this Conference as a sequel to the Bandung Conference of 1955. But, just as at the I. Solidarity Conference, "peoples", not governments were represented and this, in accordance with the Communist custom, meant that many of the "representative" delegates owed their "credentials" solely to the fact that they were adherents of Communism.

The agenda of the Conference envisaged discussions on the immediate liquidation of colonialism, the economic development of Africa and Asia, cultural and social questions and problems of organisation.

The usual resolutions with the common denominator "struggle against imperialism and colonialism" certainly went some way towards concealing the Sino-Egyptian and Sino-Soviet contradictions as well as the faint stirrings of Chinese opposition to the Soviets, which did however prevent practical decisions - as shown, among other things, in an immense number of "non-committal recommendations" to individual governments. Soviet influence was to be detected in the resolution on economic development, in which governments were urged to nationalise foreign capital and in which the "selfless aid" of the Communist states was contrasted with the "exploitation" of the capitalist countries and the World Bank. (There were, moreover, in the formulation of this resolution clear differences of opinion between the Russians and Chinese: the Chinese wanted to delete a passage which stated that Afro-Asian development could be facilitated 'the sooner the Cold War is ended and international tension reduced'. The Russians adhered firmly to this formulation).

The Soviet delegation, led by Mirzo TURSUN-ZADE also put forward the "dogma" of the "identity of the struggles for peace and liberation" which was subsequently to provide the Chinese with the excuse for attacks on the Soviets.

Also of importance was the call to "extend bi-continental solidarity to Latin America". (Annual report of the General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI).

Despite the many contradictions and the wide conflict of interests the organisational structure of AAPSO was in fact confirmed and agreed upon.

It was at this Conference that the organisation assumed for the first time the designation "Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO)": - the fact that the designation had been used previously anticipated this decision. "Conference" and "Council" were confirmed as the organs made up of representatives of the national committees, their main task being to determine the "general line" to be taken by AAPSO.

The other organs approved were the "executive committee" consisting of representatives from 27 countries and meeting several times a year and the "permanent Secretariat" consisting of representatives from 12 countries. Among the 12 countries are the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the UAR, Algeria, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq and Japan

The Permanent Secretariat should also be provided with a regional office in Conakry and a liaison organ for the purpose of cooperating with the African People's Conference (Accra Conference).

Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) was elected General Secretary. Cairo remained the headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat.

The Chinese were opposed to the choice of Cairo as the headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat and also to the choice of Yussef EL SEBAI as General Secretary. Their protests being in vain, their representative in the Permanent Secretariat refused to work through this organ from 1961-1963.

### Chapter III

#### FROM THE II. TO THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

(1960 - 1963)

During the period between the II. and III. Solidarity Conference (1960-1963) the existence and activity of AAPSO were threatened particularly by the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian conflict and at times its value to the Soviet Union was brought into question.

The series of declarations of independence - especially in Africa - also resulted in AAPSO's original aims losing some of their attraction. And yet, after Soviet-Egyptian differences had been overcome, AAPSO became more agile. There were two predominant reasons for this:

- The Soviets realised the special value of a loyal Afro-Asian organisation, particularly in the light of their differences with the Chinese;
- AAPSO served as a cover for efforts by the Russians to occupy the position relinquished so lightly by the Western Powers.

#### The establishment of a Solidarity Fund

At the executive committee meeting in Beirut (9th-13th November 1960) the machinery of AAPSO was extended to include an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund" and the man appointed to head it, at the I. Fund Meeting (Conakry, 21st-22nd February 1961), was Ismail TOURE (Guinean minister, brother of Sekou TOURE and a convinced Marxist). The vice-presidents included Prof. GOFUROV (Soviet Union), Chu TSE-CHI (People's Republic of China) and Mehdi Ben BARKA<sup>2)</sup>, leader of the National Union of Popular Forces of Morocco. In addition the Fund Committee included persons from Indonesia, Cameroon and the UAR.

The objectives of the Fund were to lend material support to extremist movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, e.g. the nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa

2) Ben BARKA was kidnapped in Paris on 29th October 1965 and - according to a report by the Morocco News Agency - "died" three days later.

and Rhodesia.

Initially the Fund was extremely active. The People's Republic of China gave it generous support and a number of effective relief measures were passed at the meetings, e.g. at the 4. Meeting (beginning of November 1963, Conakry).

#### Activities of the AAPSO organs

The 1. Council Meeting (Cairo, 11th-13th February 1959), at which a special committee was formed under the Permanent Secretariat for the liberation movements in the dependent countries, was followed after almost 2 years by an extraordinary meeting of the Council, devoted to the Congo and Algeria questions (Cairo, 21st-22nd January 1961).

The most important decision made at this meeting was the formation of an "International Aid Committee for the Congo and Algeria" under the Permanent Secretariat in Cairo. Decisions were also taken to support the struggle in the Congo, Algeria, Laos etc.

Following closely on this meeting was the 3. Council Meeting (Bandung/Indonesia, 10th-14th April 1961) in which 200 people from 53 countries are said to have taken part.

The organisers used the fact that this meeting was being held in the same place as the Bandung Conference of 1955 to proclaim AAPSO's faithful adherence to and development of the principles of the Bandung Conference.

The resolutions passed at the Meeting reflected completely the Soviet line. One resolution demanded an immediate end to all forms of colonialism and went further than the UN Resolution of Autumn 1960. Others were directed against "imperialist interference" in the Congo, Algeria and Laos and the dangers of "neo-colonialism" in Africa and Asia. (Since colonialism was in danger of losing its credibility as an "enemy" with the willing surrender of their positions by the West, the Communists introduced the concept of "neo-colonialism", which

its authors chose to interpret as meaning any kind of economic activity on the part of the West in the developing countries).

Whether colonialism or neo-colonialism - the one thing that matters for the Soviet Union is that only Moscow's old and new opponents (e. g. the EEC) in world politics should be regarded as "colonialists" and "neo-colonialists" so that Africans and Asians might feel justified, from an (apparent) identity of interests, in following the Moscow line.

The executive committee held three meetings.

At the 1. meeting of the executive committee (Beirut, 9th-13th November 1960) discussions took place, without agreement being reached, of the Chinese request to move the AAPSO headquarters to Colombo. It was agreed to set up an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund" and the Latin American states were urged to join with AAPSO in a common front against imperialism.

During or before the 3. Council Meeting (Bandung, 10th-14th April 1961) a further meeting also took place. Here too the removal of AAPSO headquarters from Cairo appears to have been the central question. In addition it was decided to form a women's section within the Permanent Secretariat.

At the 3. meeting of the executive committee in Gaza (9th-11th December 1961) a Cuban delegation also took part.

This delegation proposed a conference of Afro-Asian and Latin American "peoples" in Havana to be conducted by the "peace liaison committee for the Asian and Pacific region" - a regional organisation of the WCP Council resident in Peking and founded in October 1952. The group which had organised the WCP event "Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation and Peace" (Mexico City, 5th-8th March 1963) should assist in this. The period from 22nd-26th May 1962 was put forward as a likely date.

At the Gaza Meeting the UN was accused, as a result of its existing structure and composition, of being incapable of fulfilling its obligations and of being a tool of the imperialists.

There were also differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (on the number of vice-presidents, the admission of Albania and Yugoslavia as observers, the location of the next meeting, multi-lateral disarmament, the composition of the aid committee for Algeria and the Congo and relations between the World Council of Peace and AAPSO).

The Permanent Secretariat was in a state of inactivity for almost the whole of 1960. Among the reasons behind this stagnation were Soviet-Egyptian differences, the departure of the Indian and Chinese representatives and Chinese efforts to break Egyptian ascendancy in the Secretariat.

1961 saw the beginning of a much more active period:

Thus, for example, on 5th February 1961 the Secretariat called on all committees to organise a Solidarity Week and pursue a course of collective action for the Congo. In a message from the Permanent Secretariat dated 30th August 1961 to the conference of non-aligned states, due to begin in Belgrade on 1st September 1961, attention was drawn to the following points: the treatment of the German problem, concrete measures to guarantee independence to colonial countries and the danger of military strong-points.

On 27th May 1962 the Secretariat - claiming to express "public opinion" throughout Africa and Asia - protested against the US atom bomb tests near the Christmas Islands.

On the same day all the national committees were informed of the forthcoming "World Congress for Disarmament and Peace" to be held in Moscow by the WCP from 9th-14th July 1962. The Secretariat announced that it would send a delegation to the Congress. The announcement also mentioned the unity in the struggle for national liberation, disarmament and peace - and thus supported the Soviet "line".

### The III. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference 1963

#### Participants and meeting-place

Representatives from 58 member organisations and 40 observer delegations took part in the III. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference which was held in Moshi/Tanganyika from 4th-10th February 1963.

The 400 or so participants (including about 300 Communists and their fellow-travellers) came from 60 countries, of which 32 were African states. Prominent among the Africans were Mario de ANDRADE (Angola), Oginga ODINGA (Kenya), Ben BARKA (Morocco) and Marthe MOUMIE (Cameroon). The ten-man Soviet delegation was led by the chairman of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, Mirzo TURSUN-ZADE. It was made up predominantly of non-Russians, e.g. K. A. GUSEINOV, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan; V. M. ZHIKVADSE, Director of the Institute of Law in the Soviet Academy of Science and a well-known "peace-fighter"; N. ZHANDILYNIN, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, etc.

There was a Cuban delegation from Latin America and Brazil, Chile, British Guiana, Mexico and Puerto Rico sent observers. Observer delegations also came from the European Socialist states, e.g. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany ( a "GDR Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa" had been set up in East Germany on 22nd July 1961 and Communist world organisations such as the World Council of Peace were also represented.

Originally the Conference was to be held at the beginning of September 1962 and then from 7th-15th January 1963 in the capital, Dar es Salaam. Having given its consent, the government then learnt of the Communist background but could not now withdraw its permission. Accordingly its desire was for a quieter meeting-place and this was Moshi, a town

of 14,000 inhabitants at the foot of Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in Africa. There in an elementary school far from the centre the III. Solidarity Conference was at last held.

In this school the delegations, of widely varying quality, assembled. Compared with the strong Chinese and Russian deputations, which included better-known officials, much of the representation was insignificant, to say the least. Nigeria and Ghana were each represented by one man; people from Mali and Guinea and refugees from Cameroon were the only "representatives" of the French-speaking territories of West Africa and in the case of many delegations from Africa and Asia their authority was in itself something of a riddle. The deputation from Malaysia, though genuinely representative, was refused admission, as had happened in 1962 at the VIII. World Youth Festival in Helsinki, because in Communist eyes Malaysia was at that time an "imperialist puppet".

In spite of the absence or lack of representative authority on the part of most of the participants, the gathering in Moshi of the "emissaries of 1700 million people" was for the Communist mass media a reality.

By Communist standards Tanganyika was the "right" country for the III. Solidarity Conference.

Whereas at the beginning of 1963 the political situation in the Arab world and in West Africa seemed to be consolidated, there were signs in East and Southern Africa of an increasing political instability. Here only three states - Somalia, Uganda and Tanganyika (the last of these on 9th December 1961) - had gained their independence. In Kenya the road to independence seemed beset by hard struggles and this was especially true in the case of Southern Rhodesia after the collapse of the Central African Federation. In Angola at the beginning of 1963 two years had already elapsed since

the beginning of the struggle against the Portuguese, in Mozambique anti-Portuguese feelings were beginning to stir and in South Africa Apartheid was convincing many Africans that they would have to fight. Tanganyika had therefore been chosen as the arena by the Permanent Secretariat, because it was now one of the most important centres of the national liberation movement. Tanganyika's President, Julius NYERERE tried to do justice to these African aims.

(The organisers had previously been at pains to hold their conferences in places of crisis. After the Suez Crisis of 1956 Egypt was a susceptible country: thus the I. Solidarity Conference in Cairo in 1957. Guinea played an important role in the wave of independence that swept West Africa: consequently the II. Solidarity Conference in Conakry in 1960).

#### Course of events

Many speakers, most of whom observed the Soviet rules, contributed to the discussions on the agenda which was similar to that of the II. Solidarity Conference in Conakry in 1960. This included the control of imperialism and colonialism; neo-colonialism; the EEC; the broadening of economic and cultural cooperation; social welfare problems; the consolidation of the solidarity movement and - for the first time - cooperation with Latin America.

The casual observer would have described the course of events as smooth, since the majority of the speakers and the resolutions passed favoured opposition to the Western Powers. They confined themselves - thanks to a management as cautious as it was omnipotent - to a fixed scheme and were uniform to the point of boredom:

An address of thanks to the hosts was followed by statements on the work of the national liberation movements and continued solidarity; attacks on imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; descriptions of local problems and expressions of deference to the "true friends" of the Afro-Asians.

#### Differences of opinion

This formal unanimity was overshadowed in particular by the reality of the Sino-Soviet variance which had just become apparent from Chinese attacks against the "revisionists" at the VI. Party Conference of the SED in East Berlin (15th-21st January 1963) and the texts of the Chinese denunciation of Togliatti (31st December 1962 and 4th March 1963).

The Chinese protests and counter-protests were aimed above all against:

- the Moscow thesis accepting the compatibility between the struggle for peace and for national liberation to the correctness and range of application of peaceful coexistence and disarmament;
- the imperialist intervention in the Sino-Indian conflict;
- the "white" observer delegations, e.g. from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and from Communist world organisations such as the World Council of Peace (WCP);
- and finally, the presence of the Soviet delegation, as implied in the contention by the leader of the Chinese delegation - directed at the Soviet representatives - that "whites have no business here".

Outwardly, however, no loud and passionate differences between the Russians and Chinese were voiced publicly in Moshi. This was the more surprising since there had been tensions at previous sessions of the Permanent Secretariat and disputes had broken out at the executive committee meeting in Gaza (9th-11th December 1961), within the Solidarity Fund and at an economic seminar in Colombo (October 1962).

This apparent agreement by the two parties to exercise restraint could not, however, conceal the extent of their differences.

This was shown, for example, by the tireless efforts of both the Chinese and the Soviets to influence small groups of the other delegations outside the main events and win them over to their respective positions. Thus a Western journalist was present when Chinese

tried to prove to a series of delegates that the Russians were not to be trusted, as KHRUSHCHEV had shown in the Cuba Crisis of 1962. Only a "really revolutionary state" like the People's Republic of China deserved this trust. The Russians were "whites" and not a "fraternal Asiatic people". (This must also have been known to the leftwing radical Oginga ODINGA from Kenya. What then was his motive when on 6th February 1963 he stated that there was no such thing as a Sino-Soviet conflict and that this was mere invention on the part of the "Western imperialists" ?)

More resounding - though of less significance for the solidarity movement - were the Sino-Indian clashes.

There had been differences between India and China as early as 1959/60, but these had diminished prior to the II. Solidarity Conference. The Chinese invasion of India on 10th October 1962, though followed by a cease-fire on 21st November 1962, only served to rekindle and increase them.

This conflict, therefore, could no longer be described as an "imperialist invention", nor could it be swept under the carpet.

In the opening session the General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) had requested the delegations to refrain from expressing any views on the Sino-Indian situation which could lead to tensions or even a split. The Indian and Chinese delegations, he announced, had agreed to tackle their differences "in the spirit of Bandung".

But neither the appeal nor the agreement between the delegations had much effect. The Indians accused the Chinese of aggression and the Chinese blamed the Indians for the frontier war. Even in his telegram of greetings to the Conference the Indian Prime Minister NEHRU had accused the Chinese of aggression and the leader of the Indian delegation Chamal LALL declared that the conflict was a threat to Afro-Asian solidarity and world peace. There were lively debates in the political commission and the Indians walked out on 7th February 1963 following their failure to have incorporated in the resolution a recommendation that

China and India should unconditionally accept the proposals of the Colombo states<sup>3)</sup> (which had advocated immediate negotiations between India and the People's Republic of China). As he left, LALL declared: "The Organisation is dead, destroyed and finished. Without India there is no organisation". Three days later the Indians had been coaxed back again and were now satisfied with a compromise formula, which did not contain the word "unconditionally".

During the argument the Indians were supported by the Soviet delegates.

The Soviet Union was, however, under a compliment to the Indians. For example, on 6th February 1962 the leader of the Indian delegation, LALL thanked KHRUSHCHEV and the Soviet Union for coming to the rescue of Cuban independence and world peace during the Cuba Crisis. All Afro-Asian nations - LALL added - would be grateful to the Soviet Union for the great support it had given to the national liberation struggle.

There were other, less serious clashes between

- people from Somalia and Kenya (the latter left the meeting when a speaker from Somalia laid claim to Kenya's northern frontier territories) and
- Aden and Yemen

### Conclusions

The Conference passed a General Declaration and a Political and Economic Resolution.

The General Declaration called on Afro-Asians to

3) At a meeting of their prime ministers in Colombo (28th April - 2nd May 1954) Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan had suggested that there should be cooperation on Asian and international problems in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence" and had called the Bandung Conference (19th-24th April 1955). Since this meeting the above-mentioned states have been known as the "Colombo states".

intensify the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism and to liberate the remaining colonies in Africa. In territories which are not free united "national fronts" should be set up and their activities coordinated.

In the economic field the wealth of all Afro-Asian countries should be used in the fight to eliminate poverty. The Afro-Asians should pursue a policy of economic cooperation.

The national liberation struggle - the Declaration continued - would also serve the interests of peace and disarmament. The Conference wanted, therefore, to see the banning of the production, stockpiling and employment of nuclear weapons with a view to their eventual destruction; the aim should be for peaceful coexistence and multilateral disarmament with controls.

In addition the Afro-Asian peoples should settle their disputes by "peaceful" negotiations and in the spirit of Bandung.

Finally, as no country can be truly free as long as foreign troops are stationed on its territory, a demand was made for the removal of foreign military bases.

The Political Resolution proposed that all Afro-Asian peoples and governments should give every support - military, financial, political, diplomatic and moral - to those liberation movements still fighting for independence; they should oppose imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, "nuclear strategy" and foreign military bases and promote the struggle for Latin America, and particularly Cuba, against the USA.

The Resolution ratified the following "principles": coordination of the struggle against imperialism, intensification of the solidarity movement and control over the implementation of the resolutions passed. In the Economic Resolution the USA and the EEC were accused of pursuing a neo-colonialist policy. The result of an association with the EEC could

only be harmful. The recommended solution was to expand economic relations with the Socialist states. (The atmosphere for this resolution was created with great care. In his report the General Secretary of the Permanent Secretariat, Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) had pointed at the dangerous threat posed by the EEC. Important speakers, e.g. Oginga ODINGA, Kenya had denounced the EEC as "one of the most dangerous manifestations of neo-colonialism". The Conference also decided to set up a Permanent Economic Committee and a Commission to study the advantages of the planning system for the economies of the new states.

In addition to these three main decisions about 30 other texts were approved relating to individual countries or situations, e.g. - Angola, Mozambique, Palestine (opposition to Zionism, right of the Arabs to return to their homeland), Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Zanzibar and other British territories in Africa, Formosa (the right of the Red Chinese to "liberate" it), South Vietnam (end to "aggressive activities" by the USA), the Congo (in its present form the UN was a tool of "American imperialism"), Latin America (support in the struggle against the USA - the governments should have no part in the blockade of Cuba by the USA), Cuba (support against the USA and approval of Castro's 5 Points).

The Conference also accepted the resolution on the "Three-Continent Conference" - following a proposal to this effect by the Council Meeting in Bandung (10th-14th April 1961) and the executive committee meeting in Gaza (9th-11th December 1961). Accordingly the invitation by Fidel Castro to hold the Conference in Havana was accepted and a preparatory committee was formed consisting of 18 members - 6 from each continent. (Africa should send one representative to the preparatory committee from each of the following countries: Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Tanganyika, South Africa and the UAR. Likewise Asia should send one from each of the following: the People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Soviet Union and Vietnam).

### Outcome

- The Conference showed that AAPSO's focal point had shifted from Asia to Africa.

This was due in part to the unstable political situation in Africa, the increased influence of the Soviet Union and an "African" predominance in the organs etc.

- As most of the African states had gained their independence - from the I. Solidarity Conference in 1957 to the III. the number of sovereign states in Africa increased from 8 to 33 - the struggle against colonialism and imperialism gave way in the minds of many participants to a preoccupation with the new problems presented by independence.

There was scarcely any difference in the numerous declarations against the Western Powers, hastily turned out by the Soviet and Chinese delegates and their fellow-travellers by way of Communist propaganda: "It is our sacred duty to help the 50 million human beings suffering under colonial domination to free themselves from this yoke", as the Soviet delegation leader Mirza TURSUN-ZADE put it on 6th February 1963.

- There were three large groups at the Conference: the non-aligned, the supporters of Moscow and those of Peking.

Peking's authority had diminished for a variety of reasons. (China's attack on India; the majority of the participants came from newly independent countries, which had become less radical).

- Moscow dominated the Conference.

This was the result not only of closer relations with the UAR, which exercised great influence through the AAPSO organs. In economic terms Moscow had more to offer than the People's Republic of China. It was also more skilful in adapting to the nationalists with the result that its views take on an appearance, to those not familiar with the methods and aims of

of Communism, often identical to those held by the nationalists. Moscow developed the more powerful propaganda for "Afro-Asian Solidarity" beginning with N. S. KHRUSHCHEV's telegram of greetings of 4th February 1963, in which he described the Soviet Union as a "true friend" of the Afro-Asian peoples, up to the point where a constant stream of "musical" accompaniment is provided by the Soviet mass media.

Clearly Peking's principles were meeting with less approval than previously. Yet neither was KENNEDY's new Africa policy (wide-ranging aid to the new states, defence of the Congo, condemnation of Apartheid, support of the Yemen revolutionary government) having any visible effect on Moscow's position.

- The reason for these unanimous resolutions - in view of China's refusal to participate - was to be found not only in the view taken by many delegates that the decisions did not run contrary to the interests of their countries, but also quite frequently in the un-critical attitude of most of the participants to the officials responsible for drawing up the resolutions.

Many delegates, for example, were interested in the tug-of-war going on behind the scenes, often without understanding its significance. For many their ability to see the more important points of view was so distorted by their own local problems that they accepted the former without attaching much significance to them. - For a great number imperialism, neo-colonialism and many of the resolutions were abstract phrases and as such of little importance: Oscar KAMBONA, head of the Solidarity Conference and later Foreign Minister of Tanganyika, said at a press conference that it remained to be seen if and how individual resolutions could be put into practice. - The representatives of Tanganyika and Uganda voted for the anti-Israeli resolution and applauded anti-Zionist speeches, even though their countries had close cooperation

agreements with Israel.

- At the Conference the World Council of Peace (WCP) was kept at arm's length and admitted only as an observer.

This must have come as an even greater shock to the WCP, since it had been responsible for organising the "Asian Conference for the Reduction of International Tension" (New Delhi, 6th-10th April 1955) as a WCP regional conference, at which the Asian Solidarity Committee (ASC), forerunner of AAPSO, had been founded.

The WCP appeared in the form of a seven-man delegation of distinguished officials, all of whom, in keeping with the occasion, came from the developing countries, with the exception of one Soviet citizen. (The delegation consisted of: WCP Secretaries Olga POBLETE/Chile and N. BAZANOV/Soviet Union and WCP members Alberto T. CASELLA and Alfredo VARELA/ both of the Argentine, Dr. Valerio KONDER/ Brazil, Dr. Jusuf DADOO/South Africa and Romesh CHANDRA/India). Since no-one in the delegation had the right to speak, a "message" was conveyed from the Chairman Prof. BERNAL, in which a number of examples were cited of WCP support for the national liberation movements and the argument put forward that the peace struggle was objectively linked to the struggle for national liberation. Nor were the WCP members allowed to join in the work of the Commission for the "Three-Continent Conference" (although the WCP, according to its own claims, had advocated such a conference since the beginning of 1959).

- In spite of these restrictions and the exclusion of the Moscow auxiliary organisation, the WCP, the Conference was a success for the Soviet Union.

For the Soviet Union was accepted as a "friend". The propaganda ensuing from the Conference was directed against the Western Powers. The non-Communist participants were powerless in this respect. The few expressions of dissent against the "general line",

e.g. President NYERERE's warning to the Afro-Asian peoples on 5th February 1963 of the new Communist colonialism, were simply drowned in the chorus of anti-Western opinion.

The fact that the Conference did not collapse in view of the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet conflict and that the Soviet Union was also involved in the preparation of the "Three - Continent Conference" could only add to Moscow's satisfaction.

## Chapter IV

### FROM THE III. SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE 1963 TO THE RIFT 1967

Starting with the III. Solidarity Conference of 1963, the Sino-Soviet conflict became the most important theme within AAPSO.

#### The conflict inside AAPSO

At the 3. Council Meeting (Bandung, 10th-14th April 1961) and the 3. executive committee meeting (Gaza, 9th-11th December 1961) the evidence of Sino-Soviet differences had been overwhelming. This jockeying for favourable positions from which to control AAPSO came to a head at the II. Solidarity Conference 1960, when the Chinese "fell upon" the Egyptians (an attack which, in reality, was directed at the Russians). However, all these differences of opinion still appeared- especially to the outside observer - to be contained within limits which permitted collisions, without necessarily making allies into opponents.

Already at the III. Solidarity Conference (Moshi, 4th-10th February 1963) the two opponents had taken up positions which were frequently irreconcilable. One tried to supplant the other, even though they were at pains to conceal this from the outside world.

The new dimensions of this conflict and the bitterness with which it was being pursued first came out into the open at the 6. executive committee meeting (Nicosia, 10th-12th September 1963) and the 6th Council Meeting (Algiers, 22nd-26th March 1964). It had to be assumed that since the last event, Chinese and Soviet citizens could no longer work together in one political movement. Following the apparently "calmer" IV. Solidarity Conference of 1965 came the Three-Continent Conference (Havana, 3rd-15th January 1966), during the preparation and conduct of which the Soviet management did all in their power to keep out the Chinese adherents.

Finally at the 8. Council Meeting (Nicosia, Cyprus, 13th-16th February 1967) the Chinese lost the race: they and their adherents immediately withdrew from AAPSO or were excluded from it.

Not only was the Russian leadership consolidated, according as the Chinese faction was ousted. The AAPSO balance was also being tipped more and more in favour of African affairs and in particular, since the Middle-East War of 1967, the troubles of the Arabs.

#### General outline of the Sino-Soviet conflict

For a better understanding of the Sino-Soviet conflict within AAPSO an outline of the two rivals' views on the developing countries would seem useful at this point. At the same time it should be made clear that in the final analysis these differing views make up only one expression of the struggle between the Great Powers for superiority.

Until the mid-1950's the Chinese and Soviet assessment of the value of the national liberation movements, the role of the Communist parties and methods for seizing power seemed to be almost identical.

In 1955 Moscow changed its "line" by accepting the hitherto rejected "national bourgeoisie" in the developing countries, especially when they pursued a neutralist foreign policy.

Consequently the Soviet Union began a foreign aid programme for developing countries, stressing a readiness to cooperate with the nationalists as well as the feasibility of the non-violent road to power. From 1959 the Red Chinese, whose opposing attitude vis-à-vis Moscow had begun to harden, particularly in view of the Soviet claim to the leadership of the Communist world, questioned the Soviet "line" more and more. They maintained that the nationalists were not trustworthy, that they might turn to the West again and that they would obstruct the road to "Socialism" (views shared by the Soviets themselves prior to 1955, so much so that they had treated NEHRU and SUKARNO as "traitors"). Thus the Communists would have to usurp the leading role in the national liberation movements.

Peking also accepted armed struggle as the only means

of seizing power and colonial wars as providing a special answer to Western intervention. In addition Peking began to come forward as the leader of all the liberation movements, propagating a "coloured Communism", an "isolated solidarity" of three continents and pointing at the developing countries as the "storm centres of world revolution" and the "only real anti-imperialist force of the present-day".

After 1959 in these and other questions, e. g. the role of peaceful coexistence, the inevitability of wars and primacy in the Communist world movement, the Chinese and Soviet utterances became contradictory and mutually hostile.

The quarrel became more and more passionate and acute and from 1961-1963, in particular, declaration followed declaration. After a vain attempt at the Moscow talks (5th-20th July 1963) to wipe out the contradictions, the quarrel continued with renewed bitterness.

Since this time the rift between the two rivals has existed to the present day.

However, the Red Chinese position, even in the developing countries, had become less and less favourable for a variety of reasons, principal among which was the internal chaos of the "Cultural Revolution" which broke out in August 1966. This immediately facilitated Moscow's "victory" in the numerous institutions in which both Great Powers were represented.

#### 6. Executive Committee Meeting (Nicosia, 10th-12th September 1963)

Whereas at the III. Solidarity Conference in Moshi the Russians and Chinese still canvassed their views for the most part behind the scenes, in Nicosia their differences first came out into the open and were reported in detail by the mass media of both countries.

In particular the Chinese condemned:

- The Moscow nuclear test ban treaty of 5th August 1963;
- the Moscow version of peaceful coexistence;
- the identification of the liberation movement with

- the peace movement;
- Moscow's domination of AAPSO and
- the consolidation of this organisation by the admission of delegations from the WCP, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany as observers.

The Chinese, however, whose principal allies were the Japanese and Indonesian representatives, could not succeed over Moscow and its supporters. During the night of 12th-13th September 1963 after a ten-hour debate the nuclear test ban treaty was approved in the early hours of the morning.

People from 29 countries took part in the executive committee meeting. Also present as observers were representatives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany as well as the Soviet dominated organisations WCP, IUS, WFDY and WIDF.

After the introductory address by the AAPSO General Secretary, Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR), the following points on the agenda were discussed:

- the strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity;
- concrete measures in support of the liberation movements and
- internal problems (new admissions, financing of the Permanent Secretariat etc.).

All the numerous resolutions had one thing in common, the struggle against the West. They were as follows:

- a "General Declaration" in which the meeting spoke out in favour of the principles of peaceful coexistence, of peace, multilateral and total disarmament, and a conference on disarmament, also the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the disbandment of military strongpoints; in addition, cooperation with all "anti-imperialist and progressive" movements, with the Socialist states and the international "democratic" and workers' movements;

- a general Political Resolution, providing for a stronger AAPSO to give support (also military) to the liberation movements and calling for Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism;
- a resolution approving the Moscow nuclear test ban treaty of 5th August 1963;
- further resolutions on support for Cuba, the guerrillas in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South Vietnam and Cyprus (removal of military bases) and
- decisions of an organisational nature such as the holding of a women's conference in the second half of 1964; refusal to support Afro-Asian actions carried out without AAPSO's consent - or directed against it - (e.g. the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference in Djakarta, which did not allow the participation of Soviet journalists); a general meeting of the Permanent Secretariat and the management of the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund" at the end of 1963 to speed up battle operations in the territories dominated by "imperialists"; the formation of a "Committee for the Support of South Vietnam" within the Permanent Secretariat.

The most important outcome of the executive committee meeting was the failure by the Chinese and their adherents to break the Soviet hegemony.

This defeat led the Chinese to intensify their recruiting campaign not only inside AAPSO itself, but also spurred them to activity in the international field, particularly vis-à-vis the African countries. Thus they were better prepared when they faced the Russians at the next AAPSO event.

The 6. Council Meeting (Algiers, 22nd-26th March 1964), which was opened by the Algerian head of state BEN BELLA, stood therefore even more under the shadow of the Sino-Soviet conflict than had the 6. executive committee meeting (Nicosia, 10th-12th September 1963).

#### The Sino-Soviet conflict

The Chinese delegation - officially numbering 12

people - came to a total of 30 with the technicians and interpreters. Also included in the Chinese faction were the ten-man Japanese and Indonesian delegations and the well-manned delegations from Korea and Vietnam. In addition there were representatives of Afro-Asian lawyers and journalists and a group from Cameroon and South-West Africa. Chinese adherents also existed in other delegations, without, however, being able to dominate them.

Chinese confidence in a favourable outcome was based on the results of CHOU EN LAI's tour of 10 African and 3 Asian states and Albania (13th December 1963 - 29th February 1964) - the longest foreign tour by an important Chinese politician since the seizure of power in 1949 - and also the many agreements concluded by the People's Republic of China with young African states (including Algeria). The Chinese launched an emphatic attack particularly on those Soviet views which they had previously attacked in Nicosia in 1963 in the hope of breaking Soviet hegemony and giving AAPSO a new "revolutionary" direction. On 24th March 1963 the leader of the Chinese delegation Mrs. KUO CHIEN accused the Soviet Union of betrayal in the Congo (Leopoldville) and of moral guilt in the death of PATRICE LUMUMBA. She also rejected the Moscow version of peaceful coexistence, the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 and KHRUSHCHEV's proposals for the peaceful settlement of border and territorial disputes of January 1964.

Uproar ensued on 25th March 1963 during the reply by the Soviet delegation leader, the former 1. Secretary of the Tadzhikian CP, Prof. B.G. GAFUROV (who referred to aid given to Red China in the Korean War). While putting forward anti-Chinese views held by African delegates, GAFUROV was interrupted by a man from Tanganyika, who disputed his right to speak on behalf of participants. Since a simultaneous protest was also made by the Chinese, the meeting was adjourned. Moscow was also attacked at later meetings by the representatives of Peking, making propaganda for the Chinese line. One of the delegates, CHOU TSU-CHI, for example, read out entire chapters reflecting the position taken by Peking against the Soviet Union. Bitter struggles occurred, in particular, at the meetings of the Political Committee (e.g. on 25th March 1963).

Since many Africans were actively opposed to the exploitation of the Council Meeting as an arena for the ideological struggle between Moscow and Peking, as a result of which work was suffering, the executive committee decided at its 7. (closed) meeting on 26th March 1964 to prohibit any further ideological discussions. (The Moscow faction, which had a majority in the executive committee, pushed this resolution through, as it was more advantageous to Moscow to neutralize attacks on its majority).

Here too the Chinese had been unsuccessful. Almost without exception the Council Meeting resolutions reflected Soviet wishes. In the face of Chinese opposition, for example,

pro-Soviet decisions taken by the Permanent Secretariat (economic seminar in Moscow, composition of the preparatory committee for a women's conference) and by the executive committee (acceptance of the Moscow test ban treaty) were upheld, while the Chinese motion condemning KHRUSHCHEV's initiative for a renunciation of force in the settlement of border and territorial disputes was not even put to the vote.

#### Outcome and Decisions of the Meeting

Delegates from 70 countries were present at the Council Meeting, which KHRUSHCHEV, NASSER and CHOU EN LAI had welcomed in telegrams. Of the Permanent Secretariat the General Secretary, the 11 international Secretaries and the technical staff were present in Algiers. A number of the 28 "international" organisations invited was represented by observers. Coinciding with the meeting there was a mass demonstration in front of the government building in Algiers of "Afro-Asian solidarity", at which the Algerian head of state BEN BELLA and the President of Guinea, SEKOU TOURE spoke. Subjects for discussion on the agenda were to include the following: strengthening of the solidarity movement, the fight against imperialism, the consolidation of the young national states, elimination of colonial regimes, support for national wars of liberation and measures to promote détente and peace. Because of the Sino-Soviet conflict it was not possible to deal

with all the questions. Nor could the extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Secretariat (Cairo, 8th April 1964), called to deal with unfinished problems, make any real progress.

The following were accepted at the Council Meeting:

- a General Declaration, in which the assembly identified itself with the principles of Bandung, the decisions of the Cairo, Conakry and Moshi Solidarity Conferences, the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination and Afro-Asian solidarity;
- a Political Resolution, which portrayed Algeria's struggle against France as an example for all oppressed peoples; which called upon all Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples to unite with anti-imperialist forces all over the world in the struggle to attain full independence and economic and social liberation and in the anti-imperialist struggle for peace etc.; and which urged the struggle for disarmament, the prohibition of tests, production, stockpiling and proliferation of nuclear weapons and their destruction;
- separate Resolutions in line with the Soviet position, e.g. on South Vietnam, Cuba, Cyprus and approval of the 2. Conference of Non-Aligned States and the Geneva Conference for Trade and Development;
- a decision to hold the IV. Solidarity Conference in Accra in May 1965, to declare 1st September the day of struggle against military bases and military blocs and to organise a month of solidarity in support of the Communist side in Korea.

#### Results

A survey of the results shows:

- The Soviet Union emerged victorious over the Chinese faction;
- the dispute was so embittered and ruthless that it marked the final rift between the Soviet Union

- and the People's Republic of China;
- numerous Afro-Asian participants had in fact grown tired of the Sino-Soviet struggle.
  - many regarded the confrontations with indifference, but also with increasing impatience, to which the Soviet Union was equally subject when it attempted to act as legal spokesman for African affairs. - At the beginning of 1964 in Cairo the Algerian Chairman of the Council Meeting, Mohammed YAZID, declared that Algeria would withdraw from AAPSO, if the Soviet Union and China continued to harm the solidarity movement with their quarrel. - The Kenyan representative pointed out that he and many others had no interest in a dispute on matters of dogma. "We are not Marxist-Leninists, most of us have never read a line of Das Kapital".
  - The fact, however, that the decisions taken at the meeting accorded completely with Moscow's existing foreign policy, serves as a proof that the Soviet Union had successfully managed to convince the non-Communist nationalists of the bond of common interests.
  - The inclusion of Latin American movements in AAPSO took on a greater urgency (after a demand to this effect in the opening speech by BEN BELLA).
  - As a result of the turbulent dogmatic disputes between the Communist Great Powers, many Afro-Asians came away with the impression that AAPSO was a Communist enterprise. Even the capacity to act of the pro-Soviet and other officials in the Permanent Secretariat was temporarily affected.

#### The situation after the 6. Council Meeting 1964

As a result of the Sino-Soviet clashes the reputation of Communists in general, whatever their alignment, had diminished in the eyes of many Africans and Asians.

For the two Communist Great Powers had not only shown that their principal concern was to dominate AAPSO, but also that they attached much greater

importance to their own problems than to Afro-Asian troubles, to settle which they had previously given assurance after assurance.

This new-found sobriety on the part of the Afro-Asians also led to the alienation of the Soviet Union, which despite its wide-spread domination of the AAPSO organs and even after its victory did not dare, in the face of vocal resistance from the Chinese, openly to exploit AAPSO in the furtherance of its interests.

Thus for the next few years AAPSO followed a policy of deliberate restraint, dealing for the most part with problems which either appealed to members' nationalism or were not unduly exposed to Chinese opposition.

#### Consolidation of Soviet control

The Russians avoided open confrontations, but did not abandon their aim to retain and expand their control of AAPSO. They were assisted in this by:

##### 1. The Soviet AAPSO Committee

- On 8th April 1964 the presidium of the Soviet AAPSO Committee applauded the activities of the Soviet delegation at the 6. Council Meeting in Algiers, while condemning the "disruptive, racialist behaviour" of the Chinese.
- Barely one and a half months after the 6. Council Meeting in Algiers the Soviet AAPSO Committee organised the II. Soviet Solidarity Conference of Afro-Asian Peoples (Baku/Soviet Union, 8th-10th May 1964), at which in the absence of Chinese supporters it made a violent attack on the People's Republic of China.
- The Soviet Committee also strengthened bilateral ties with other committees by inviting foreign delegations and sending delegations of their own.

##### 2. The AAPSO Permanent Secretariat

In the Permanent Secretariat, in practice the most important AAPSO organ, having an Egyptian General Secretary and Secretaries from the People's Republic of China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Cameroon, the Soviet Union, Sudan,

Syria and the UAR (1964), the majority went along with the Soviet Union. Egyptian superiority in the Secretariat was also a contributory factor.

- The Soviet AAPSO Committee went to special pains in the case of the Egyptian General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI, as seen from his frequent visits to the Soviet Union (e. g. July 1964, September 1967).
- The anti-Chinese feelings of the Secretariat could be detected, for example, in its declaration of 10th April 1964 that the Chinese were bent on bringing AAPSO under their control. Thus the Soviet Union could continue its work - since the sessions are not held in public - without having to fear the emergence of details of disputes and arguments.

Already on 20th August 1963 the Permanent Secretariat had decided in favour of the nuclear test ban treaty of 5th August 1963, bitterly opposed by the Chinese, which in accordance with Communist practice also determined the remainder of the organs. An attempt to settle affairs outstanding from the 6. Council Meeting in Algiers at a Permanent Secretariat session on 8th April 1964 was unsuccessful. No agreement could be reached either on preparations for an Afro-Asian Women's Conference, from which the Chinese wished to exclude the Soviets, or on an economic seminar in Moscow. Nor was there any detailed agreement on the rest of the AAPSO programme of activities for 1964 and 1965. A statement on 18th April 1964 by the Permanent Secretariat made it clear that the following events should be held in both years: an economic seminar in Moscow (a pre-announced meeting-place rejected by the Chinese), a women's conference in Algiers (agreement on a preparatory committee for which could not be reached), a meeting of the executive committee in Uganda in September/October 1964, the IV. Solidarity Conference in Accra in May 1965 and a meeting of the executive committee or the Council in Nairobi in the second half of 1965. Further protests and appeals by the Permanent Secretariat: appeal for a collection in support of a

fund for the anti-Portuguese struggle in Portuguese Guinea (26th May 1964); protests against US intervention in Laos (10th June 1964) and against the conviction of terrorists in South Africa (13th June 1964); appeal for a month of solidarity with the Communists in Korea to be held from 25th June-27th July 1964 (10th June 1964); protest against the arrest of 9 Red Chinese in Brazil (August 1964). On 16th May 1964 the Permanent Secretariat announced that preparations for the Three-Continent Conference would continue. On 25th October 1964 there was a statement that the preparatory committee would meet in Cairo in February 1965. But it was not until a meeting in Cairo (1st-2nd September 1965) that the preparatory committee, under the chairmanship of MAHDI BEN BARKA (Morocco), began its work. In accordance with the decision taken by the III. Solidarity Conference 1963, the committee consisted of 6 representatives from Asia, 6 from Africa and 6 from Latin America, its secretary being the AAPSO General Secretary, Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR).

### 3. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees of the European satellites of the Soviet Union

The most prominent of these was the East German committee, canvassing for the Moscow faction with collections, events of every kind, delegations etc.

### 4. The Moscow-controlled World Organisations

Of these the most important was the World Council of Peace (WCP), the linking of which with AAPSO had long been one of Moscow's favourite schemes.

One indication of this was the admission of the Chairman of the Soviet AAPSO Committee, Mirzo TURSUN-ZADE to the WCP Council (WCP Meeting in Warsaw, 28th November-2nd December 1963).

#### IV. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference 1965

The IV. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference was held from 9th-16th May 1965 in Winneba (70km from Accra) in the "KWAME NKRUMAH Ideological Institute". (In this institute future African officials were taught the principles of Marxism-Leninism).

Until his fall on 24th February 1966 and with the support of the Soviet Union the dictator of Ghana, KWAME NKRUMAH, an ambitious man, convinced of his "role as redeemer", pursued the plan for a united government for all Africa.

Also situated in Accra was the "Bureau for African Affairs", which under the guise of promoting Pan-africanism was in reality nothing more than an agitation centre staffed by Communist "advisers" from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, France, Italy and the USA.

NKRUMAH was considered by the Soviet Union to be so reliable that even the IX. World Festival of Youth and Students (the biggest Communist youth festival) was to have been held in Accra (decision of 18th January 1966). The plan miscarried however, as shortly afterwards NKRUMAH was deposed.

#### The Sino-Soviet dispute

Thus the choice of Accra as the arena for the IV. Solidarity Conference served as an indication of the Soviet predominance in the AAPSO organs.

Other efforts too strengthened the Soviet position and pushed the Chinese faction further into the background, with the result that the escalation in the Sino-Soviet conflict, anticipated at the IV. Solidarity Conference, did not materialize. To judge from outward appearances, the observer might even have detected a reduction in tension, as the struggle was not a vociferous one.

The absence of any large-scale Chinese attacks may also be due to the 6. Council Meeting request not to use AAPSO events for the purpose of

settling "disputes of dogma". This prohibition was more of a disadvantage to the People's Republic of China, as it prevented the Red Chinese from launching an attack on positions occupied by the Soviets. The relative restraint exercised by the two opponents may also be due to the fact that the Conference has no importance as an AAPSO organ, its only task being to represent, propagate and formally approve the decisions and plans of the Permanent Secretariat, the executive committee and the Council. As it seldom meets, the Conference therefore has no real power within AAPSO - and this was the principal concern of the opposing parties.

In reality, however, the antagonism between the two rivals had not diminished. In the words of the Peking People's Daily, the struggle between the "two lines" pervaded the entire conference, making the anti-Western resolutions appear as a duty performed of necessity but which failed to cover up the burning immediacy of the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

- A few days before the start of the Conference the Soviets had organised an exhibition of books and photographs in the "Ideological Institute" hall where the Conference was to be held. This exhibition, according to a statement on 9th May 1965 by the New China News Agency/Hsinhua, was directed against the People's Republic of China. After the Ghanaians had removed the exhibition stands at the request of the Chinese, the Russians set up a new one. They also distributed a brochure accusing the Red Chinese of wanting to disassociate the national liberation movement from the Socialist countries and undermine Communist solidarity in addition to regarding war as inevitable and even advantageous.
- These different views were also expressed in the telegrams of greetings from the Soviet Party leader L. BREZHNEV and the (Red) Chinese Prime Minister CHOU EN-LAI. Whereas BREZHNEV saw the role of the Conference to be in the promotion of unity among the "anti-imperialist forces" and

warned against the isolation of the Afro-Asian world from the Socialist camp, CHOU EN-LAI's message was much more belligerent: peaceful coexistence alongside imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism was absolutely impossible and the struggle against imperialism was a vital necessity.

- The Chinese delegation leader, LIAO CHENG-CHI attacked the Soviet thesis on the priority of disarmament, peaceful coexistence and international work-sharing as well as the extortionate character of their development aid.
- While LIAO CHENG-CHI maintained on 11th May 1965 that the IV. Conference - and also the 6. Council Meeting in Algiers - had decided to hold the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking in 1967, the Indians, who had suggested New Delhi, claimed that this was not correct. The Soviet side ignored the Chinese claims and spoke only of the next Solidarity Conference in Havana: "news which must gladden all friends of peace". (By means of this decision ascribed to the IV. Conference the Soviet party hoped to achieve two aims: in the first place the V. Conference in Peking, promised to the Chinese, would lose its topical value and secondly the forum, planned for 1966 in Peking, of the revolutionary forces of Africa, Asia and Latin America would be driven into the background; for the Russians appreciate from their own long experience the many possibilities for manipulating events held in one's own or in a dependent country).
- Differences also arose between the Russians and Chinese over their respective assessments of the authority to represent of persons from Malaysia, Cameroon, Bechuanaland, Ceylon etc.
- The Chinese opposed the admission of East European "observers", as Eastern Europe was neither "Asia nor Africa nor Latin America".
- The Chinese faction also opposed attempts by Moscow to create a favourable climate for Soviet admission to the II. Afro-Asian Conference of

Heads of State ("Second Bandung"). This conference, first called for 29th June 1965 in Algiers, was then put off until 5th November and after the fall of BEN BELLA was postponed indefinitely.

#### Course of events

Approximately 400 representatives from 70 Afro-Asian associations in 60 states and from 30 international organisations were present.

The majority of the participants were Communists and fellow-travellers. Many of the "representatives" of Afro-Asian countries came from Moscow. From Latin America there were Cubans and representatives of national liberation movements in Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay.

The Conference was opened by the President of Ghana, KWAME NKRUMAH in a speech in keeping with the Soviet line and was conducted by his Minister of Information N. A. WELBECK. The general address was given by the AAPSO General Secretary, Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR).

Discussions took place in public plenary sessions and closed commission meetings - there were 4 commissions: political, organisational, economic and cultural and social - on an agenda to include the following subjects:

- liquidation of imperialism and colonialism;
- consolidation of the young states and national liberation movements;
- world peace, prohibition of nuclear weapons, full disarmament, struggle against foreign strongpoints, military pacts and aggressive groupings;
- economic liberation, industrialization and the formation of common markets;
- EEC, the results of the UN Geneva Conference for Trade and Development and
- cultural relations and questions connected with youth, women's organisations, trade unions, press, radio and television.

## Decisions

The Conference passed the following:

- a General Declaration and a Political Resolution. Both contain an analysis of the present political situation and a formulation of solidarity movement objectives.  
(Accounts of the contents of the General Declaration differ: while the Peking People's Daily of 20th May 1965 claims that it contains a passage on the "right of the Afro-Asian peoples to answer imperialist force with revolutionary force", this is not mentioned in the TASS version);
- the resolution entitled "The anti-imperialist struggle on the American continent", supporting Cuba and the revolutionary movements in Venezuela, Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras and other countries and demanding immediate independence for British Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe and other territories;
- further resolutions totalling almost 30 and devoted to "American imperialism" in general and South Vietnam, Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, the Congo (Léopoldville) etc. in particular, thoroughly reflecting Moscow's judgements and conclusions;
- (according to Chinese claims) a decision to hold the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking (January 1967); the Red Chinese AAPSO Committee thereupon decided to hold the V. Conference from 6th-13th June 1967 in Peking. A decision was taken at the 8. Council Meeting (Nicosia, 13th-16th February 1967) to hold the Conference not in Peking but in Algiers. On 6th November 1967 the Permanent Secretariat proposed to the Algerians that the Conference, originally planned for the end of 1967, should be put off until Summer 1968 because of the international situation. At the time of writing (February 1969) both "V." Conferences have yet to be held;
- a decision to set up a special committee with the task of co-ordinating emergency measures for the Congo (Léopoldville).

At an executive committee meeting held on 15th May 1965 - i. e. on the eve of the final session of the Conference - the following decisions were also taken:

- to admit to all AAPSO meetings as observers the representatives of the solidarity committees in the European Communist states and
- to hold a Three-Continent Conference in Havana in 1966.

## Most important results

The more militant theses of the Chinese were unsuccessful; the Soviet Union was able to consolidate further its control of AAPSO. The only visible Chinese success was the decision to hold the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking in 1967 (a decision not even mentioned in the TASS report). An important step was taken to draw Latin America into the Solidarity movement. On 16th May 1965 AAPSO announced that the "first" conference would begin in Havana on 6th January 1966. The fact that, despite the prohibition by the 7. executive committee meeting (Algiers, 26th March 1964), the IV. Conference was also dominated by the Sino-Soviet dispute shows how fundamental it had become for AAPSO. (However, as this was characteristic of every Communist or Communist-dominated organisation at that time, the result was that AAPSO also became branded as a Communist satellite organisation - a far step from the "spirit of Bandung"). As a result of this ever-present conflict, therefore, many illusions were shattered, and in particular illusions held by African nationalists of achieving Afro-Asian "solidarity" through AAPSO.

## Towards the split

Because of the Sino-Soviet conflict AAPSO could no longer effectively pursue its aims: the internal struggles, which had grown continuously since the II. Solidarity Conference in 1960, were affecting not only the activities of the AAPSO organs but also its credibility and reputation in the developing countries.

- The 7. Council Meeting, held during the IV. Solidarity Conference (Winneba, 9th-16th May 1965),

had decided that the next session should be in Tanganyika in 1966. In September 1966 the meeting was called for October 1966, but then postponed indefinitely. It was not until 13th-16th February 1967 in Nicosia that the Council held its 8. Meeting.

- Up to 1966 the Soviet line enjoyed a small numerical superiority in the Permanent Secretariat. Because of the anti-Communist coup in Indonesia (1965) the pro-Chinese Indonesian Secretary moved in 1966 from Cairo to Peking and the Japanese Secretary disassociated himself from the Chinese. Only now was the Soviet faction able to disregard Chinese opposition in the Permanent Secretariat and call the 8. Council Meeting for Nicosia. With its increased majority in the Secretariat and the Moscow-oriented Cypriot AAPSO Committee as host, Russian superiority in Nicosia was assured.

Moscow was also pushing for a decision, since the Chinese faction had begun to attack her directly, even within the Secretariat.

At an AAPSO press conference on 3rd January 1967, marking the "Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" (3rd-10th January 1967), the Chinese AAPSO Secretary LIANG KIANG read out a statement attacking the Soviet Union. The Chinese was not perturbed by the fact that the General Secretary EL SEBAI ordered him to desist or that the Soviet, Indian and Iraqi Secretaries, among others, left the press conference. (This was the first time that the Chinese had openly attacked the Soviet Union within the framework of the Secretariat. Hitherto both opponents had fought "behind the scenes" in this AAPSO organ).

The failure of the attempt by AAPSO to extend its activities to Latin America; the successful "revolt" by the Soviet faction against Chinese predominance among the Afro-Asian writers, in which Moscow supporters broke with the existing organisation and set up one of their own (meeting in Cairo, 19th-20th June 1966); the successful expulsion of the Chinese Secretary LI CHU-PAO from the WCP Secretariat in Vienna (December 1966/January 1967) and

the outbreak of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in August 1966, which weakened the flexibility and reputation of the Chinese - all these things encouraged the Soviet representatives to press for an AAPSO decision.

Before dealing with the decisive 8. Council Meeting in Nicosia, let us first take a brief look at efforts which centred round Latin America.

#### Latin America stays outside AAPSO

The idea of extending AAPSO activity to Latin America is as old as AAPSO itself. Efforts in this direction were intensified at the II. Solidarity Conference in 1960 when the AAPSO General Secretary urged in his annual report the "extension of bi-continental solidarity to Latin America".

Although Latin America was subsequently discussed at all important AAPSO meetings, the first decisive step was only taken at the III. Solidarity Conference in 1963 with the setting-up of a preparatory committee, which did not, however, hold its first working session for a further two and a half years (1st-2nd September 1965 in Cairo) following a decision by the IV. Solidarity Conference of 1965 to hold the I. Three-Continent Conference in Havana in 1966).

As a result of comprehensive Soviet manipulation only a few representatives of the Chinese line managed to gain admission to the I. Three-Continent Conference held in Havana/Cuba from 3rd-15th January 1966. Nevertheless they did succeed (with the support of the Castro adherents) in stipulating that the new Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO) should be created alongside and not, as the Russians wished, in place of AAPSO (which, being an experienced organisation, would have been able to dominate).

The new organisation itself did not come into being at the Conference, but only an Executive Secretariat. But the fact that it exists and is based in Havana with a Cuban, Central Committee member OSMANY CIENFUGEOS, as General Secretary had the

immediate result that AAPSO was cut off from Latin America <sup>4)</sup>.

### The 8. Council Meeting

(Nicosia, 13th-17th February 1967)

In Nicosia in 1963 the world had seen how, even in AAPSO, the Sino-Soviet differences of opinion constituted a fundamental conflict. Nicosia was also the place where this conflict was ended in 1967. The 8. Council Meeting, therefore, is a caesura in the history of AAPSO, the most important event since its foundation in 1957.

### Participants

Under the chairmanship of Dr. VASSOS LYSSARIADES, President of the Cypriot AAPSO Committee and personal physician to the head of state Archbishop MAKARIOS, the Council Meeting began. Among those present were about 300 people from 51 countries, including "observers" from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary; the Communist world organisations, e.g. the World Council of Peace (WCP), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS); the Arab League and the Executive Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO), headquarters Havana. But Moscow's adversary, a Chinese delegation, was absent. Nor were the solidarity committees from Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia Thailand, Ceylon or Guinea represented when the meeting began. When in the course of the session the pro-Chinese delegation of the South-west African National Union (SWANU) was also excluded on 15th February 1967, the following delegations walked out of the meeting: Botswana (People's Party) Lesotho (Congress Party) and Swaziland (Progressive Party). Thus in the last phase the delegations amicably disposed towards Moscow had the meeting to themselves.

4) On 3rd January 1967, for example, the AAPSO General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) had spoken in an appeal of the "close ties" between the peoples of the three continents and the two great organisations - AAPSO and AALAPSO.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict was concentrated during the Council Meeting on the dispute over the choice of location for the V. Solidarity Conference.

While the Chinese party, in accordance with the decisions of the 6. Council Meeting (Algiers, 22nd-26th March 1964) and the IV. Solidarity Conference (Winneba near Accra, 9th-16th May 1965), adhered firmly to Peking, the Soviet line, which included the Indian representatives, wanted Peking replaced by Algiers. (The Japanese who had appeared after the start of the conference, wanted before going to Peking, to clarify whether the AAPSO rift could be avoided).

The discussions ended on 16th February 1967 with a decision to hold the V. Conference in Algiers "owing to circumstances which rendered a Peking conference impossible". All the delegates from 56 countries, including those from North Vietnam and the Vietcong, voted for the transfer.

In the face of this internal AAPSO affair all the political controversies receded into the background, e.g. the inevitability of wars, the Moscow nuclear test ban treaty, the range of application of peaceful coexistence etc.

The Soviet line also imposed its will in other fields.

Among these were the exclusion of the (pro-Chinese) SWANU delegation, the admission of the (pro-Soviet) South-west African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the pro-Soviet sections of the Japanese and Ceylonese AAPSO Committees, the non-admission of the (pro-Chinese) National Zimbabwe Union (ZANU) and the (pro-Chinese) Pan-African Congress of South Africa (PAC) as well as support for a WCP conference for the peoples of South Africa and the Portuguese colonies etc. (see also under Decisions).

### Course of events and Decisions

According to the agenda approximately 300 participants from 56 countries showed their readiness to associate themselves with the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism with special reference to Vietnam, with the activities of the national liberation movements and with the further "consolidation"

of AAPSO, which included such matters as the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking and the II. Three-Continent Conference.

The "observers" from East Germany distributed an 83-page "documentation" on 15th February 1967, entitled "West German complicity in the US intervention in Vietnam" alleging that the Federal Government together with industrial circles and the Federal Armed Forces were giving economic and military support to Saigon.

A large number of resolutions was drawn up by the assembly, meeting in plenary and commission sessions.

The General Declaration condemned, in addition to the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany as an enemy of the Afro-Asians;

Germany was making it possible for the Smith regime in Rhodesia to survive and was sending money, arms and mercenaries to many countries "in the service of imperialism".

The Declaration goes on to demand an end to US air attacks in Vietnam and condemns the racial policy of South Africa, Israel's policy towards the Arabs and "genocide by the Portuguese in Africa".

The Declaration ends with a claim that the "imperialists" are trying to crush the developing countries by the granting of aid with political conditions.

Other resolutions promised the support of the participants to peoples "struggling for their freedom" in Rhodesia, Oman, South Korea, Laos the Portuguese colonies, South Arabia, Yemen etc.

Finally the Council sent congratulations on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution which had "introduced a new phase and promoted the struggle of the people against exploitation and for national independence and progress".

Decisions affecting AAPSO activities referred to the calling of the II. Afro-Asian Women's Conference in Algiers, the V. Solidarity Conference (1967) in Algiers and the II. Three-Continent Conference in Cairo; support for the "International Conference in Support

of the Peoples in the Portuguese Colonies, Zimbabwe, South Africa and South West Africa" proposed by the WCP; a week of solidarity with Vietnam to be held from 13th-19th March 1967 and the financial situation and achievements of the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Funds" etc.

(Up to February 1969 the Women's Conference and the Three-Continent Conference still had not been held. On 6th November 1967, at the suggestion of the Permanent Secretariat, the V. Solidarity Conference was postponed "owing to the international situation". According to an announcement of 23rd January 1968 it should have been held in Summer 1968, but by February 1969 it, too, still had not been held).

The Council admitted 7 new members. Three of these replaced former excluded members (e.g. SWAPO in place of SWANU - alleged to have broken up; the pro-Soviet AAPSO Committee of Ceylon in place of the former united committee which even before the IV. Solidarity Conference of 1965 had split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet branches and the pro-Soviet Japanese AAPSO Committee in place of the former united committee). The admission of the pro-Chinese ZANU (Rhodesia), the Pan-African Congress of South Africa and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) was rejected. (The pro-Soviet African National Congress of South Africa/ANC and the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African People's Union ZAPU are members, however).

The Council also decided in favour of a "Week of Solidarity with Vietnam" (13th-19th March 1967) and support for the "International Conference in Support of the Peoples in the Portuguese Colonies, Zimbabwe, South and South West Africa" proposed by the WCP.

#### Outcome and consequences

1. AAPSO was split as a result of the 8. Council Meeting decision not to hold the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking.

Although the Chinese AAPSO Committee has not

formally left AAPSO, Chinese collaboration after such brusquerie is inconceivable at present.

On 17th March 1967 the Chinese AAPSO Committee announced that the V. Solidarity Conference would still be held in Peking in 1967 and that from now on the Chinese Committee would have nothing more to do with the Soviet-controlled Permanent Secretariat in Cairo.

On 20th March 1967 the Peking-based Indonesian Solidarity Committee announced its withdrawal from the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat.

2. As AAPSO was purged simultaneously of other Chinese adherents, Soviet control over AAPSO since the 8. Council Meeting has been guaranteed beyond dispute.
3. This victory by a European Power, which has pushed its way into AAPSO by virtue of its conquered Asian territories, is bound to have repercussions for AAPSO, in two directions in particular:
  - a) Afro-Asian nationalists who are not dependent on Moscow or are not at the same time Communists of the Moscow line will be further irritated by the now incalculable "white superiority" and - in order to alleviate this reaction - AAPSO will be obliged
  - b) to restrict its sphere of influence to areas where the Soviet Union as a power is in a position to provide military, economic or financial "aid".
4. The Chinese may, after consolidating their internal political position, bring a rival organisation into being.

Up to February 1969, however, the Chinese had not even succeeded in holding the V. Solidarity Conference in Peking, although it had been announced for 1967.

## Chapter V

### FROM THE SPLIT OF 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1968

Since Soviet foreign policy, especially since the II. World War, has always employed conventional methods outside the immediate Soviet sphere of influence, pursuing the aims typical of every expansive Great Power, there was no reason to assume that the undisputed Soviet hegemony would lead to a decisive "bolshevization" of AAPSO.

There were other reasons also why this should not be so: the absence of a power monopoly in the developing countries, the latent presence of the People's Republic of China, the relative independence of, for example, the Arab nationalists, to whom Moscow continued to devote particular attention and not least the unpleasant experiences with Communists beyond the reach of Russian bayonets.

Thus AAPSO continued to pursue its nationalist aims, which were now bound, of course, to coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union. From 1967 the problems of the Middle East, in particular, were seen in the light of the Soviet-Arab interpretation, to be followed only later by Vietnam and the "need to liberate" the Portuguese colonies.

Detailed explanations of the Soviet-Egyptian situation, important for AAPSO on account of the Egyptian prominence in the Permanent Secretariat, are no longer necessary. Since the disputes of 1958-60 the dependence of the UAR on the Soviet Union has never been seriously brought into question. The weaker role of the non-aligned states and the failures of the UAR led to an increasing dependence, on the Egyptian model, of AAPSO on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for her part, made efforts to forge stronger links between her auxiliary organs - the European satellites and the World Council of Peace (WCP) - and AAPSO.

### The absolute power of the Permanent Secretariat

With the central direction of AAPSO activities moving more and more to the Permanent Secretariat the following equation now appears justified: Permanent Secretariat = AAPSO.

As recently as 1966 the Permanent Secretariat was still in a state of near inactivity. Among the Permanent Secretariat's few activities during this period are the following: participation in the I. Three - Continent Conference (Havana, 3rd-15th January 1966) and the opening of a "Solidarity Week for the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America against Imperialism, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism" (3rd January 1967), a yearly event instigated by the I. Three-Continent Conference.

From 1967 the Permanent Secretariat - freed from Chinese pressure - began to work more actively, coming into prominence through its declarations and delegations and as the organizer of functions.

#### 1. Protests and appeals

The Secretariat Declarations were concerned with the following (the date refers in each case to the time of publication):

- the Vietnam War (telegram of 14th March 1967 to the "American Coordinating Committee for Stopping the War in Vietnam"; appeal of 21st July 1967 on the 13th anniversary of the Geneva Agreement of 1954; appeal of 17th August 1967; announcements of 3rd September 1967, 13th February 1968 and 2nd March 1967);
- the Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (proposal to members of 14th June 1967);
- Rhodesia (appeal of 29th August 1967 for support for the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union/ZAPU, directed also against the Federal Republic of Germany; appeal of 21st August 1968 against the conviction of 32 "patriots";
- the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution of 1917 (appeal to take part in the Anniversary Celebrations, issued on 10th September 1967);
- Korea (appeal of 27th June 1968 for a Month of Solidarity from

- 25th June - 27th July 1968);
- South West Africa (appeal of 27th August 1968 for a Day of Solidarity with South West Africa);
- the 100th anniversary of LENIN's birth (beginning of the celebration preparations, 5th November 1968);
- the invasion of Czechoslovakia

The ties between AAPSO and the Soviet Union are shown up particularly clearly by the Permanent Secretariat's silence over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Whereas a large number of Communist Parties and the majority of the world organisations supporting the Moscow faction condemned or at least criticised the invasion, the Permanent Secretariat maintained an official silence. However, the statement by the AAPSO Secretary AMBROSE MAKIWANE, made on 26th August 1968 in Cairo in the presence of the Soviet representative on the Permanent Secretariat, on behalf of the liberation movements of South Africa (ANC), Rhodesia (ZAPU), Angola (MPLA), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) betrays approval of "the measures taken in support of Czechoslovakia" and suggests that the Soviet intervention will "promote" the struggle of the national liberation movement.

#### 2. Delegations

Since 1967 there has also been an increase in the number of visits undertaken e. g.

to East Germany (January 1966, August 1967, November 1968); Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (August/September 1967); North Vietnam and Malaysia (June 1968) and, while returning from Southeast Asia, Paris (July 1968) where memoranda were delivered to the North Vietnamese and American delegations at the Vietnam Talks.

#### 3. Events

There have been no Solidarity Conference and no Council Meeting between the 8. Council Meeting (Nicosia, 13th-17th February 1967) and February 1969.

The 8. executive committee meeting (Cairo, end of January 1969) decided to send AAPSO representatives to support North Vietnam

and the Vietcong at the Paris Vietnam Talks.

The body responsible for all AAPSO events was now the Permanent Secretariat, which took care of the trouble-free running of the events - an essential condition for the restoration of AAPSO's prestige - by simply not inviting hostile persons or members. Thus there were no indications of any disputes at the events, a further proof that the Red Chinese faction had been completely pushed out of the Permanent Secretariat at least.

The series of big functions devoted exclusively to propaganda aims began with the Extraordinary Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (Cairo, 1st-3rd July 1967)

Representatives from about 70 member organisations in more than 45 countries and about 20 observers met at the headquarters of the only legal party in Egypt, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) to make propaganda in support of the Arab countries against "Israeli aggression and imperialism". The Soviet delegation was led by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, RAFIK NIZHANOV.

Preparations for this Conference were surprisingly brief: according to a TASS report of 14th June 1967, the General Secretary had "suggested" to the AAPSO members that they should agree to the holding of a conference in support of the Arab peoples from 20th June-2nd July 1967 in Cairo.

In their telegram of greetings on 1st July 1967 the Soviet representatives L. BREZHNEV, N. PODGORNYY and A. KOSYGIN spoke of the "defence of Arab independence", the "all round political and economic Soviet aid", Soviet efforts to "eliminate the clique of aggression" in the Middle East etc. Thus the line to be taken by the Conference was laid down.

The General Declaration, unanimously accepted, condemned the "aggression by Israel and her imperialist abettors", demanding Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and compensation for Arab losses.

The nature of the Moscow note (adapted to please NASSER) soon becomes clear from the statements in the Declaration that the real cause of the 1967 June

War is to be found in the determination of imperialism to quell the "Arab revolution", preserve its oil and other monopoly interests, exploit Arab riches and protect its military bases - also (to repeat Moscow's well-known propaganda formula for the developing countries) that the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states are the true friends of the Arab nation.

The Conference, at which the Soviet delegation in particular made sure that the USA, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany were exposed as "enemies of peace" in the Middle East, called upon its members to take steps to secure an economic boycott against Israel in their countries and the breaking-off of diplomatic relations.

#### The AAPSO 10th Anniversary Celebrations

December 26th 1957 is regarded as the day when AAPSO was founded (1. Solidarity Conference in Cairo, 26th December 1957-1st January 1958). The 10th anniversary provided the occasion for a meeting in Cairo (27th-29th December 1967) of representatives from 37 countries and delegates from Yugoslavia, Poland and East Germany as well as from the World Council of Peace (WCP), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The Declaration accepted by the assembly confirmed AAPSO's determination to continue the struggle "until both continents are completely free of imperialism and all its traces". The AAPSO Declaration rejects all economic pressure, psychological warfare, counter-revolution and aggression as "tactics of imperialist global strategy" and supports the "just and sacred Vietnamese struggle".

This meeting reflected the further consolidation of the Soviet position, as demonstrated by the reverence accorded to the Soviet delegation led by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, VELI ACHUNDOV, and the permission to make a speech granted to the WCP representative, WCP General Secretary ROMESH CHANDRA (India) - previously the WCP had only been allowed to express its views in writing. In accordance with the Moscow version, CHANDRA described AAPSO's task as "solidarity with all forces for peace" and praised the Soviet

Union as a solid pillar of support. ("Throughout its 50-year history the Soviet Union has supported the popular struggle for freedom and independence").

According to an ADN report of 29th December 1967, the "imperialist" behaviour of the Federal Republic of Germany was also attacked by different delegates - from Ceylon, India, Poland, Cyprus and in particular East Germany.

Extraordinary Conference on Vietnam (Cairo, 7th-9th September 1968)

This Conference, planned after the visit to North Vietnam in June 1968 by the AAPSO General Secretary and for which a preparatory committee had begun work on 4th August 1968, resembled in many respects the one held a year previously, also in Cairo, in support of the Arab peoples.

Even when one considers that in the developing countries Vietnam is a subject which stands above party politics, a glance at the delegates and observers is sufficient to prove that, in addition to the emissaries from their own sphere of influence, the Soviets were quite capable of attracting groups not subject to their authority. 250 delegates came from 72 countries, including the People's Republic of Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) and there were observers from Poland, East Germany, Hungary, the WCP (General Secretary ROMESH CHANDRA), the WFDY and the AATUF.

It could be seen merely from the conference agenda (US aggression in Vietnam, withdrawal of US troops, recognition of the NLF as the sole representative of South Vietnam etc.) that the Conference was attempting to identify itself with the political demands of North Vietnam.

The Conference, which had received messages of greetings from L. BREZHNEV and A. KOSYGIN, but also from HO CHI MINH and ABDEL NASSER, passed an action programme providing for:

- demonstrations and protests on behalf of Vietnam in countries where AAPSO has members;
- a Week of Solidarity with Vietnam from 15th-21st October 1968;
- the expansion of national aid for Vietnam;

- a boycott on American arms transport to South East Asia and
- the despatch of an AAPSO delegation to the Vietnam Talks in Paris to support North Vietnam.

Also passed in addition to the action programme were an appeal, a General Political Declaration and messages to North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese NLF, all propagating Communist aims.

Chapter VI.

THE WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE (WCP) FORCES ITS WAY INTO AAPSO

The WCP - a Communist world organisation of the Moscow line - had played an important part in the founding of AAPSO. Yet original expectations that AAPSO would become a special WCP organisation for Africa and Asia, a constituent of the WCP-directed "world movement of peace-loving forces", were not fulfilled. For the Afro-Asians stood aloof, especially under Chinese influence and also in the knowledge of their self-reliance and independence of the "whites" and consequently of the WCP: Thus before the Soviet victory at the 8. Council Meeting (Nicosia, 13th-17th February 1967) WCP representatives had only been able to attend AAPSO events as "observers": they were not allowed to speak, only to distribute written statements. But the growing Moscow superiority in AAPSO and finally the Soviet success in Nicosia in 1967 resulted in a rapprochement with the WCP (as with all other organisations and states dependent on Moscow): for, to influence AAPSO through these pro-Soviet institutions also, meant a further consolidation of Moscow's position within AAPSO.

Events organised jointly by AAPSO and the WCP

Joint conferences were the first step on the road to cooperation. 1. The first event of this kind was the "International Conference in Support of the peoples of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies (Khartoum, 18th-20th January 1969)

As early as the 8. Council Meeting in Nicosia in 1967 the AAPSO General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) had announced that AAPSO and the WCP intended to hold a joint "International Conference in Support of the Peoples of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies". At the WCP presidium meeting (Prague, February 1967) the Conference was announced for the end of 1967 in Conakry. In April 1967 the WCP stated that the Conference would take place between 15th and 25th October 1967 in Conakry and that the

preparatory committee would meet there on 10th July 1967.

After discussions between the WCP and AAPSO at the end of December 1967 in Cairo (where a WCP delegation had taken part in the 10th anniversary celebrations of the foundation of AAPSO) an announcement was made that the Conference would be held in June 1968 in Tanzania and that a joint preparatory committee had been decided on.

Three months later, after talks between a Soviet AAPSO delegation and the Permanent Secretariat, a joint announcement by AAPSO and the WCP on 17th April 1968 stated that the Conference would begin on 1st June 1968 in Conakry. But this dateline came to nothing either. After the WCP presidium meeting (Nicosia, 6th-8th June 1968) it was announced that the Conference was planned for September 1968 in Khartoum or Conakry.

On 2nd September 1968 EL SEBAI announced the Conference for January 1969 in Khartoum. The agenda was arranged at a preparatory meeting on 12th October 1968 and at a further meeting from 14th-15th November 1968 in Lahti/Finland (the WCP Secretariat has its headquarters in Finland) the exact date was fixed.

At the turn of the year (1968/69) it appeared as though the Conference would not take place in Khartoum, as the Sudanese Foreign Minister SHEIKH ALI ABDEL RAHMAN had demanded the chairmanship on the preparatory committee and in the conducting of the Conference. The organisers, however acceded to this request. Despite the commitment of the Foreign Minister and the presence of the Sudanese President ISMAIL AL AZHARI at the opening and closing rallies, the Sudanese Foreign Minister issued a statement to ambassadors accredited in the Sudan saying that the assembly was a "private meeting", whose decisions did not reflect Sudanese views.

Invitations to the Conference were sent out by a preparatory committee, which, in addition to AAPSO and the WCP, included

6 pro-Soviet liberation movement members of AAPSO, viz:

- the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
- the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC),
- the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO),
- the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC),
- the People's Organisation of South West Africa (SWAPO) and,
- the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU, Rhodesia).

Well over 200 delegates, including 50 delegations from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe, took part in the Conference. In addition to the situation in South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, the agenda provided for discussions on the complex of questions centring round political prisoners and aid for the liberation movements.

During the debates there were attacks on "colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racialism" in general and the USA, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and also Israel and South Africa (the "two imperialist pincers in the North and South of Africa") in particular. (The Sudanese Foreign Minister also followed suit: - After stressing the "close ties" linking the struggle of the Vietnamese and the Arabs, he welcomed the struggle of the peoples of Europe "against the neo-Nazism and expansionism of West German imperialism", which threatened European and world security).

Of the numerous resolutions the most prominent was the General Resolution:

According to the declaration the events in the Portuguese colonies and South Africa should be publicised more forcibly and special attention drawn to the role of NATO; pressure should also be brought to bear for the release of the freedom fighters and a demand made that in future they be treated as prisoners-of-war in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The liberation movements should - the Resolution continues - be supported by the despatch of arms and medicaments, training facilities for military and civilian personnel and by the award of scholarships.

The Conference also decided:

- to set up further WCP and AAPSO committees to achieve the aims of the Conference, with the special task of exposing NATO as a participant in "colonialist enterprises", making propaganda for a boycott of goods from Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa and collecting money for the liberation movements;
- to set up a mobilisation and action committee as a permanent organ to include delegates from AAPSO, the WCP and the 6 liberation movements represented in the preparatory committee. The chairmanship should alternate between the 6 liberation movements and the committee should be Cairo-based and have as its General Secretary the AAPSO General Secretary Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR).

The importance of the Conference lay first and foremost in the fact that the Russians succeeded in showing that the WCP and AAPSO could work together "on an equal footing".

Even though AAPSO set the tone at this conference and the WCP kept in the background (so as to avoid arousing aversions, which not so long previously had compelled it to stand aside), the WCP position was by no means a bad one. For WCP participation can be based on the thesis of "the unity between the peace and liberation struggles", put forward for many years by Moscow's adherents, e.g. at the II. Solidarity Conference (Conakry, 11th-15th April 1960), in an attempt to portray the pro-Soviet WCP as the representative of the "peace struggle".

By the establishment of the mobilisation and action committee in Cairo and the appointment of an Egyptian General Secretary, it is hoped to forge even closer links between the black African liberation movements and AAPSO and the UAR.

Both measures meet with Soviet approval, since AAPSO and the unfortunate UAR are at the moment reliable Soviet tools. In view of the destitution of the African liberation movements, it is hardly likely that black African animosity towards the Arabs (and the Russian "whites") will have any practical repercussions, unless another party (e. g. the Chinese) come forward with offers of support.

The Conference demonstrated Moscow's unlimited control over AAPSO.

Also summoned in addition to the WCP was the "Permanent International Youth Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples and Youth of the Portuguese Colonies", set up in Conakry (24th-27th April 1967) by the Moscow-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). The Committee held a meeting in conjunction with the Conference and published a declaration corresponding with the aims of the Conference. The extent of Soviet efforts to win over the "guerrilla representatives" in Portugal and South Africa could be seen from a meeting at the Soviet cultural centre in Khartoum on 23rd January 1969, attended also by the leader of the PAIGC, Amilcar CABRAL.

There was no Chinese opposition during the Conference.

A joint communiqué, issued in London on the occasion of the Khartoum Conference by 4 African liberation movements faithful to Peking (NCNA/Hsinhua, 22nd January 1969), showed that this was due to a watchful management which had either excluded from AAPSO members of the Chinese line or not invited them. These organisations - the Pan-African Congress (PAC) of South Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, Rhodesia), the National Union for Total Independence for Angola (UNITA) and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) - described the Conference as a "plot by the Soviet revisionists" to control the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies and

South Africa and thus promote cooperation between the USA and the Soviet Union for the purpose of joint world domination. The Conference has - it continues - been boycotted by many African and Asian organisations and the organisers - the WCP and AAPSO - are both mouthpieces of the "Soviet revisionists and their lackeys".

2. The second large AAPSO event, in which the WCP was among the organisers, was the "II. International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples" (Cairo, 25th-28th January 1969).

Whereas the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat had been the only host at the Extraordinary Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (Cairo, 1st-3rd July 1967), the I. International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (New Delhi, 11th-14th November 1967) had been launched jointly by the Indian AAPSO Committee and the All-India Peace Council - consequently by member associations of AAPSO and the WCP - in an attempt to gauge public opinion<sup>5</sup>). The II. International Conference, to cover a much more comprehensive range, was then announced in Cairo.

The notable preliminaries to the Conference (originally to have been held in Cairo in November 1968) were:

- a meeting from 10th-12th September 1968 in Cairo of the preparatory committee under the chairmanship of the General Secretary of the Egyptian Peace Council KHALED MOHIEDDIN in the presence of the AAPSO General Secretary, Yussef EL SEBAI (UAR) and the WCP General Secretary, Romesh CHANDRA (India) to fix the final date for the Conference and
- a propaganda tour by the chairman of the preparatory committee, KHALED MOHIEDDIN (UAR) of Western Europe (Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Great Britain).

5) 130 foreign participants, including the WCP General Secretary ROMESH CHANDRA (India), were present at the New Delhi Conference. The assembly condemned "Israeli aggression" encouraged by the "imperialist" Powers - in particular the USA, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Conference, opened by President NASSER of Egypt, had as its official main aim the implementation of the Middle East Security Council Resolution of 22nd November 1967. It was attended by about 250 people from 74 countries and 15 "international organisations", including the following (some of them heading delegations): the former Prime Minister of Ceylon, S. BANDARANAIKE, the former Indian Minister and friend of NEHRU, KRISHNA MENON, the former Minister and leader of the French delegation at the Algerian peace talks (1962), ROBERT G. A. BURON, the British parliamentarian DINGLE FOOT, the President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique, (FRELIMO), Dr. EDUARDO CHIVAMBO MONDLANE (since assassinated), the Coordinating Chairman of the WCP, ISABELLE BLUME (Belgium), the WCP Presidium member Rev. J. ENDICOTT (Canada) etc.

In accordance with the agenda 4 aspects of "Israeli aggression" were discussed in 4 committees:

1. Effects on liberation objectives and world peace;
2. Violations of the UN Charter;
3. Violation of human rights and
4. Possibilities of mobilizing world opinion through the information media.

The appeal and the declaration described the "Israeli aggression" as "imperialist-expansionist" and demanded the following: a political solution in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November 1967, the opening of the Suez Canal, the withdrawal of Israeli troops - also from Jerusalem -, an end to the cruelties in the occupied territories and full solidarity with the Arabs.

In addition to Israel there was also a condemnation of her "imperialist backers" - naming the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was pointed out that, left to her own resources, Israel would be incapable of any "permanent aggression" and Arab resistance in the occupied territories was declared "legitimate".

Approval was also given of 23 "concrete proposals for the support of the Arab peoples, ranging from solidarity campaigns and advice on propaganda through the mass media to a whole series of emergency measures for the Arab peoples and the Palestine refugees.

In assessing the results of the Conference, the Soviet successes in particular should not be overlooked. For an overwhelming majority accepted Moscow's wishes for a political solution to the Middle East conflict in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November 1967.

In addition the Soviet Union succeeded in presenting itself as the almost undisputed leader of the "anti-imperialist world movement" and as a beneficent state: the Soviet delegation, led by the member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, F. A. TABEJEV, was accepted accordingly.

There was no sign of any Chinese counter-action at the Conference. After the Conference the Chinese presented the Soviet manipulations, vis-à-vis the Conference participants and results, as being such that despite Arab opposition the outcome planned by Moscow was assured (NCNA/Hsinhua, 5th February 1969).

Nor was there any limit on the possibilities for manipulation. For the WCP and AAPSO - more correctly the leading officials in the bilateral secretariats - had unrestricted authority as organisers to make sure that the delegates were "reliable". To counter suspected opposition from radical Arab circles (which was in fact offered) the following forces were mobilised: pro-Soviet delegations and "international organisations" of, for example, the WCP and its national member organisations, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and from the Soviet satellite states - in addition to the Soviet Union there was an East German representative on the Conference "steering-committee". In spite of careful management by the organisers the Conference was not completely harmonious and it was not possible (also reported in Izvestia on 30th January 1969) to reach unanimous agreement on all questions. For there was particular opposition to the Soviet line on a political solution on the basis of the Security Council Resolution of the 22nd November 1967 from the delegates of EL FATAH (Palestine National Liberation Movement)<sup>6)</sup>, Syria, Algeria and Iraq.

6) EL FATAH is said to have established official contact in 1968 with the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO), i. e. with the Cubans, who preach armed revolution.

## Chapter VII

### FEATURES OF AAPSO, FEBRUARY 1969

If, after this study of the history of AAPSO, one is to answer the question "What is AAPSO today?", the following features must be emphasized:

1. An Afro-Asian organisation, having as members 75 national committees, parties or liberation movements from Africa and Asia.
2. Despite this broad membership and its claim, in addition to supporting the national liberation movements, to lead the "united front" of Afro-Asian peoples against imperialism, colonialism and in particular neo-colonialism, its effectiveness has been continuously diminished as a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the fallen prestige of NASSER.

Apart from propaganda for Vietnam, a kind of obligatory exercise for all Communist organisations, AAPSO's field of activity extends over the Middle East - the UAR's most burning problem - and, some way behind, the efforts of the Moscow-line guerrillas in the Portuguese colonies and South and South West Africa - i. e. questions where Soviet aid is vitally necessary.

3. Since the 8. Council Meeting (13th-17th February 1967) the Soviet Union has exercised undisputed control over AAPSO.

Egyptian preponderance in the Permanent Secretariat in no way detracts from this statement, since it must at the present time tip the scales fundamentally in the Soviets' favour. Moscow's control has been further assured and consolidated, in particular, by the inclusion of the World Council of Peace (WCP), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) etc.

4. At present the only active organ determining any line to be taken by AAPSO is the Permanent Secretariat. Thus, with regard to actions, the equation AAPSO=Permanent Secretariat appears quite justified.

The Permanent Secretariat is a relatively small and predictable organ, from which Moscow, in its strengthened position, need fear no surprises. It is a different matter in the case of other organs, the Solidarity Conference, Council and Executive Committee, where the elimination of Chinese influence is a lengthier process. This now appears to have been achieved in the case of the Executive Committee, which held its 8. Meeting at the end of January 1969 without any disputes having so far come to light.

5. AAPSO has not succeeded, as was originally intended, in forming Afro-Asian women's, youth, trade union and economic satellite organisations.

There is only one pro-Soviet Afro-Asian writers' organisation based in Cairo which is subordinate to AAPSO - a breakaway from the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference (meeting in Cairo, 19th-20th June 1966). Its General Secretary is YUSSEF EL SEBAI, General Secretary of AAPSO.

6. AAPSO was created from national motives and its members pursue predominantly nationalist aims.
7. In spite of this theoretical incompatibility with Communist concepts AAPSO is a Moscow satellite organisation, since most of its officials and many of its members, even when they are non-Communists, believe their interests to be identical with those of Moscow and accept the Soviet claim to be a "disinterested ally" and "provider".  
The extent to which AAPSO supports Moscow foreign policy without demur may be deduced from its silence over the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21st August 1968 - an event condemned by other parties and organisations of the Moscow faction.