

GEHEIM

32441R II-13  
1029/AP/69

3 juli 1969

R III-10

Land:

Communistisch China

Onderwerp:

LIAO HO-SHU's Interpretations of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy.

Referenties:

Datum van  
waarneming:

April 1969

Bron:

LIAO HO-SHU, former Chinese Communist Charge  
d'Affaires in The Hague.

Opmerkingen:

Dit bericht is uitsluitend bestemd voor gebruik  
ten Departemente.

Bijlagen:

Mede  
Verzonden aan:

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Zijner Excellentie  
de Minister-President  
Plein 1813, no.4  
's-GRAVENHAGE

GEHEIM

SUBJECT

LIAO Ho-shu's Interpretations of Chinese  
Communist Foreign Policy

SOURCE

LIAO Ho-shu, former Chinese Communist Charge  
d'Affaires in The Hague.

Summary. LIAO Ho-shu did not believe that any written document existed which gave details of Chinese foreign policy towards the world, a particular region or a particular country. When asked to describe Chinese foreign policy principles, LIAO gave the following: support of world revolution, opposition to two Chinas, anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism, and use of trade for political ends. LIAO believed that the most inflexible of these principles is opposition to two Chinas. Regarding China's foreign policy towards The Netherlands, LIAO stated there were two principles: opposition to two Chinas and exploitation of contradictions between The Netherlands and the United States. LIAO admitted, however, that his mission in The Hague had concluded that there were no exploitable contradictions between The Netherlands and the major Western powers and thus had never taken any action. LIAO believed that Chinese foreign policy had been generally unchanging and rejected the contention that the Bandung era was the sign of a different Chinese foreign policy. Nor did he accept the cancellation of the Warsaw talks as a sign of conflict between leftists and rightists over foreign policy issues. Decision-making on foreign policy matters, he believed, rested in the Politburo Standing Committee, thus he felt that speculation about policy disputes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is completely without foundation. End of Summary.

1. LIAO believes that one must read and understand the writings of MAO Tse-tung in order to comprehend the general principles and the tactics of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Although LIAO could not recall any directed reading of MAO's works, he knew that all staff members were very familiar with the writings of MAO and referred frequently to examples from MAO when analyzing given situations. Although he could not recall its

content, LIAO said that in early 1968 a staff member of The Hague mission, who had returned from Peking, showed him a special little red book of MAO's quotations which had been prepared specifically for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

2. LIAO did not believe that any written document existed which gave details of Chinese foreign policy towards the world, a particular region, or a particular country. LIAO himself had never received a briefing concerning Chinese foreign policy towards The Netherlands or other nations in Europe. He assumed that ambassadors and charge d'affaires who were leaving Peking were briefed by the concerned vice-minister about Chinese Communist aims in the ambassador's country or area.

3. When asked to describe Chinese Communist foreign policy principles or objectives, LIAO gave the following (the order is not necessarily significant):

- a. Support of world revolution
- X b. Opposition to two Chinas
- c. Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism
- d. Trade must serve political ends.

4. These four principles would generally govern policies of a state-to-state, party-to-party and people's organization to people's organization nature. Although not articulated in any document, LIAO felt that these four principles plus selected writings of MAO of which the following are examples comprise the guidelines of Chinese foreign policy:

- a. On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism (December 1935)
- b. Strive to Win Over Millions upon Millions of the Masses to the Anti-Japanese National United Front (May 1937)
- c. The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front (November 1938)
- d. Unite all the Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Diehards (February 1940)
- e. Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese United Front (March 1940)
- f. Point Number 10 on Policy (December 1940)
- g. Talk with Anne Louise Strong (1946)
- h. Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One (September 1946)

5. While there was general support for world revolution, there was an obvious tactical difference in approach. European missions did not actually expect to have revolution in Western Europe and thus concentrated their efforts on establishing good relations with people's movements (labor, youth, etc.). In Africa, on the other hand, the conditions were different and the Chinese representatives were interested in establishing close contact with the people's revolutionary movements.

6. In LIAO's view the most inflexible of the guiding principles of Chinese Communist foreign policy was opposition to two Chinas. In Chinese eyes, one of the most important indications of a foreign country's state of relations with China was that nation's views and

actions with regard to two Chinas. If anything, this outlook on China's part was becoming more rigid. For example, Britain had a Consulate on Taiwan. China had accepted this situation, but she would never condone such an arrangement again. LIAO also pointed to the permanent Chinese trade office in Rome. This office was opened as a tactical move to force Italy to break relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government. In the future, LIAO said, no permanent official Chinese Communist mission will be established where there is a Chinese Nationalist mission.

7. While other factors may also account for China's disinterest in joining the United Nations, the realization that membership would mean the acceptance of some form of a two China formula was certainly one of the important considerations. LIAO felt the lack of interest in joining the United Nations was real on the part of China. It was reflected in his office in The Hague by a lack of reporting and analysis of the United Nations and a slackening concern about the activities of the host country with regard to China's membership in the United Nations.

8. The principle of anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism has had flexible application. The Chinese were willing to take advantage of contradictions among imperialist or revisionist states. Thus Pakistan, although a militaristic, non-socialist nation, had contradictions with India, an openly anti-Chinese country, and the United States, the chief imperialist enemy, and had a friendly attitude toward China. Therefore, it served China's immediate interest to have close relations with Pakistan.

9. The principle of trade serving political ends apparently also has been applied with some flexibility. It was used to justify increased trade with West Germany, France or Japan on the grounds that such trade would eventually influence the political outlook of the countries concerned. The same principle could be used to justify a cut in trade with a given country such as The Netherlands in 1966/67 or Japan in the fifties as punishment for alleged anti-Chinese acts.

10. LIAO believed that China had special policies for neighboring states, and that she went out of her way to come to reasonable agreements with them. He pointed to the border agreements with Burma and Pakistan as examples. At the same time, the unwillingness of India and the USSR to come to agreements indicated their hostility toward China. LIAO could not explain the present bad state of Sino-Burmese relations except in terms of Chinese reprisal for anti-Chinese acts or an anti-Chinese policy on the part of the Burmese government. He pointed to the fact that LI Wen-hsin, a colleague in The Hague, who had formerly served in Laos and in the Asian Affairs Department Number One of the MFA, told him that the Chinese missions in Cambodia and North Vietnam had taken steps to control the activities of leftists among the Overseas Chinese in those countries. Acting on Peking's instructions, these two missions told the overseas youths that the Cultural Revolution was not intended for overseas and was suitable only to conditions in China. LIAO gave this as an example both of China's desire to be friendly with neighboring states and of China's returning the treatment she received from other countries.

11. When asked to explain in his own words Chinese policy toward The Netherlands, LIAO replied that there were two points: a) opposition to two Chinas and b) exploitation of contradictions between The Netherlands and the United States and between The Netherlands and other major Western powers. LIAO said that in fact his mission had concluded that there were no exploitable contradictions between The Netherlands and any of the major Western powers and thus the mission had never taken any action. He gave as an example of the kind of action that might have been taken, the purchase of some Dutch products that were being denied entry into the United States. LIAO said that his mission was not charged with locating and exploiting contradictions between The Netherlands and the USSR. He assumed that the Chinese

missions in Eastern Europe would have been looking for contradictions between their host governments and the USSR.

12. When asked to explain Chinese policy toward the United States, LIAO replied that he felt there was only one general aim: to increase the contradictions between the United States and the other nations of the world. Comment: LIAO used the Chinese phrase for loosen the ties between the United States and all the nations of the world.) Of course the Chinese also seek to solve the direct contradiction of "United States occupation of Taiwan". Once that direct contradiction is solved, however, China could have diplomatic relations with the United States despite having identified the United States as China's number one enemy and the leader of the imperialist camp. However, even should diplomatic relations be established, it would still be China's aim to exacerbate contradictions between the United States and other nations of the world.

13. LIAO felt that Chinese foreign policy had been generally unchanging. He rejected the contention that the Bandung era or the period of LIU Shao-ch'i's trip through Asia or CHOU En-lai's trip to Africa had been signs of a different Chinese foreign policy. He felt that they were merely different tactics used to implement the same basic foreign policy aims. In the same way he could not accept the cancellation of the Warsaw Talks as a sign of conflict between "leftists and rightists" over foreign policy issues. To the Chinese, according to LIAO, the mere holding of talks is neither a hard nor a soft policy, it is the use of the talks that is important.

14. While acknowledging that Chinese relations with many countries had apparently worsened in the past few years, LIAO did not feel that Chinese foreign policy had been a failure. He did not think that China was isolated and pointed to its trade relations with most countries and to the recent overtures of Canada and others to establish diplomatic relations. If poor relations exist between China and a given country, LIAO did not blame this on Chinese policy but said it was viewed as a change in attitude of the other country. The concerned Chinese mission, the MFA or the Chinese Government were not to be blamed.

15. LIAO said that decision making most likely rested in the Politburo Standing Committee and not in the MFA. However, even those decisions made in the MFA would be cleared with the MFA party committee. LIAO indicated that little in the way of initiative filtered up from the bottom. Staff members usually responded to directives or requests and did not often prepare unsolicited ideas or suggestions for changes or improvement in Chinese Communist foreign policy.

LIAO felt, therefore, that speculation in the Western press about policy disputes within the MFA was completely without foundation. Policy disputes over Chinese foreign activities, if they occur, would most likely take place in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In LIAO's opinion there have not been any such disputes.