

15 februari 1962

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F H 10261/19

Land: Indonesië/Nederland/Groot-Brittannië.

Onderwerp: West New Guinea.

Referenties: Dit rapport is een meer gedetailleerde weergave van de informatie vervat in het bericht no. 1468/62 d.d. 8 februari 1962.

Datum van waarneming: 12 februari 1962.

Bron: Van bevriende zijde.


Opmerkingen:

Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

INDONESIA/NETHERLANDS/BRITAINPolitical/MilitaryWest New Guinea.

In late January, 1962, a party of Indonesian Army Officers left DJAKARTA for Western Europe, quietly if not secretly. The party consisted of Col. MAGENDA, the Director of Military Intelligence, Major RAGOWO of the Central Intelligence Body (B.P.I.) and an interpreter. They first went to BONN and DÜSSELDORF and then to LONDON, (arriving on 29th January, 1962) and perhaps to other European centres.

2. The purpose of their visit was to sound out the Dutch and discover whether or not they would be likely to agree to hand over sovereign rights in West New Guinea in the very near future. The original initiative had come from unnamed, but prominent Dutch sources. A second objective was to discover how much support either side might expect from Western European countries. The Indonesian party had been led to believe in DJAKARTA that public opinion in The Netherlands had moved a long way towards giving in to the Indonesians and the isolation of LUNS, the Dutch Foreign Minister.

3. The Indonesians were discouraged with the results of their mission. They had held meetings with representatives of the Dutch Catholic Party, the Labour Party and Anti-Revolutionary Party, and as a result had come to the conclusion that public opinion regarding the policy advocated by LUNS was not as favourable for the Indonesians as they had been led to believe. They had concluded that LUNS' admittedly fine record had obscured the picture and if LUNS continued saying "we will not give up New Guinea to the Indonesians", the majority of the Dutch political parties would be prepared to accept this statement.

4. The Indonesians believed in these circumstances that the most they could hope for was protracted bargaining. The Indonesians would not accept this. The political point had now been reached at which Indonesia would either have to get sovereignty by negotiation or by war. The

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feeling was so strong that no Indonesian could look at the question with detached logic. The fact that, to some people, Indonesia might not seem to possess sufficient equipment for invasion was no restraining factor. The despatch of the expedition in which Jos SUDARSO had lost his life was an example of how rashly even senior Indonesian officers were prepared to think and act.

5. The visit of President SUKARNO to Britain in May 1962 would still take place, as the West Irian question would be settled by April 1962.

6. The party left LONDON airport on the afternoon of 30th January for DÜSSELDORF, where they expected to have one final unofficial meeting with the Dutch. After that, they would go on to ROME and then visit Military Attaches in South East Asia. They expected to return to DJAKARTA about the 20th February.