

15 september 1961

U 11770/61 - C 46 - P4/PS9.

PH 10163/278

GEHEIM

Land: Joegoslavië e.a.

Onderwerp: Belgrade Non-Aligned Nations Conference,
1-6 September 1961.

Referenties:

Datum van
waarneming: Tweede week september 1961.

Bron: Van bevriende zijde.

Subbronnen: Betrouwbaar.

Opmerkingen:

Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

SECRETBELGRADE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS CONFERENCE1 - 6 September, 1961

Ceylon Prime Minister BANDARANAIKE was determined to avoid attachment to any specific Bloc policy. In any situation where forced to take sides, she intended to align her policy with NEHRU and "similar moderates" and refused an invitation to join the Casablanca bloc because she considered it too far left.

Lebanese Prime Minister SAEB SALAM met NASSER for an hour and a half on 31 August to review the position of the Arab nations at the Conference.

East German newspaperman Ralf BERGMAN said that Soviet Ambassador YEPISHEV asked TITO for an interview on 30 August and told him at that time of the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. BERGMAN's line was that it was better for the Conference to have the announcement now, since it would be an insult for the announcement to come after the Conference had passed resolutions for peace. Other communist newspapermen said the Soviet decision was timed partly to shock the Conference into positive action on disarmament.

(Comment: Instead of fear, the immediate reactions seemed to be annoyance and puzzlement as to why Russia should choose that moment to brandish the stick. Vice Chairman of the Indonesian People's Congress D.N. AIDIT said he was "lost, hurt and confused" by the Russian action. The impression gained was that the Conference was impelled to appeal to all sides to halt nuclear testing).

When NASSER dined with NEHRU and TITO in Belgrade on 31 August, TITO expressed the desire that the Conference avoid giving prominence to the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing in order not to magnify it further. TITO said the Soviets used this method to "kill the Conference".

The Soviet announcement made it necessary for NASSER to revise the draft of the opening speech he had brought with him. After the above-mentioned dinner the entire UAR delegation conferred on the speech. Foreign Minister MAHMUD FAWZI advised NASSER to refer to Soviet nuclear testing, whereas Minister of Presidential Affairs ALI SABRI opposed any condemnation of the Soviet Union and sided with TITO's argument against giving any prominence to the matter. NASSER finally accepted FAWZI's position but said he must also attack the United States in order to remain non-aligned.

SABRI is growing increasingly anti-United States and is well-briefed on Soviet arguments. He speaks openly of being informed on "inside" matters by the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo and has told NASSER that he has seen the entire text of the KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY conversations in Vienna. He is consistently pushing on NASSER Soviet arguments on Germany and Berlin.

UAR Foreign Minister FAWZI thinks the Yugoslavs felt "lost" at the Conference following the Soviet announcement and did not know how to get back to the original format.

NEHRU told NASSER on 31 August he did not want the Conference to come up with concrete decisions

but only to express general wishes. NASSER, TITO, and SUKARNO were displeased with NEHRU's attitude of playing down the Conference. NASSER criticized NEHRU to one UAR representative, saying that NEHRU was not taking a consistent line and pointed out that in the past two weeks The New York Times reflected eight changes in NEHRU's views on Germany.

DORTICOS of the Cuban delegation told NASSER he wants next year's conference to be in Havana. However, NASSER and several other leaders including TITO and NEHRU opposed an annual conference because it would thus become a bloc. NASSER found that DORTICOS was taking the 100 per cent Moscow line.

NEHRU, TITO, NASSER, U NU, SUKARNO and NKRUMAH met jointly but separately from the rest of the Conference the morning of 3 September to discuss U NU's proposal that the Conference send a delegate to Washington and Moscow to attempt to reduce tension in line with U NU's speech suggesting a cooling-off period. It was assumed by U NU before the group met that NEHRU would act as a one-man envoy to both capitals. However, the group decided in principle that a delegation representing the Conference would go to Moscow and Washington.

The Poles at the Conference were extremely elated at the course the meetings were taking and considered the results "great and absolutely un hoped for". They were pleased at repeated references by delegation chiefs to the permanency of the Oder-Neisse frontier. TITO's statement that the frontier is "an already accepted question" was regarded as an unexpected bonus.

Originally there was little enthusiasm about the Conference in Poland, and minimum preparations were made for press coverage. By 3 September, however, four extra reporters had arrived in Belgrade making a total of six.

Polish diplomats in Belgrade predicted to Warsaw that the Conference outcome would be vague and wishy-washy. They believed Soviet tactics and actions, plus the news of the megaton bomb, intimidated the neutrals, although the neutrals might not admit it publicly.

Issues causing difficulty in preparation of the final communique of the Conference were colonialism, Palestine, and Germany with the colonialism issue by far the trickiest problem. NKRUMAH wanted to set the deadline for the elimination of colonialism for 1962 while NEHRU sought to avoid any deadline. A compromise was reached calling for the immediate end of colonialism which in effect met NEHRU's wishes.

Twoede week september 1961.