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and the general election.

**GEHEIM**

Referenties:  
Feitelijke datum: Eind april 1961.  
Datum van waarneming: Medio mei 1961.  
Bron: Betrouwbaar.

Opmerkingen:

Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY  
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

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INDONESIA

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Political

SECRET

Indonesian Army Views on the National Front and the General Election

1. A senior Staff Officer of the Ministry of National Defence, speaking privately on 18th April said that the Army were continuing their policy of containing the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.).
2. In January 1961 President SUKARNO appointed RUSLAN ABDULGHANI to head a committee set up to propose names for leadership of some nine hundred posts in the local branches of the National Front. Teams had left DJAKARTA to tour the districts and had collected the names. These teams had been composed on the NASAKOM principle i.e. one "nationalist", one Communist and one member of the Functional Group. There had been little agreement on the proposed lists, each member insisting on forwarding his list of candidates. ABDULGHANI had then prepared one list of nine hundred names and submitted this to the President one week before the latter's departure on his 1961 world tour.
3. The President, in the presence of two Army Officers, had told ABDULGHANI that he was very dissatisfied with the latter's proposals. The lists contained far too many Communists, and the President said that ABDULGHANI should by now be able to put the National interest above the interest of any party. The President made other critical remarks about ABDULGHANI and ordered him to produce a new list within 48 hours. ABDULGHANI left the Palace in a confused emotional state and one of the Army Officers took the opportunity to say that he already had an alternative list in his office. ABDULGHANI inspected the Army's list and agreed to it as it stood. This list was presented to the President who signed it without further comment.

4. Whereas the former list contained an estimated 80% of Communists or pro-Communists in one of the three vital posts of Chairman, Vice Chairman or Secretary, the new and authorised list contained no known Communist in any of these three positions. In this way the Army had insured that the National Front would not in the first instance, be a Communist Front Organisation.

5. On the subject of the elections the Staff Officer said that while these could be expected in some areas in 1962, they would not be held throughout INDONESIA. The areas to be chosen would depend upon the security situation. As a further means of electoral control, only 33% of the seats would be voted upon while 66% would go to Presidential nominees. Of this 66%, political representatives would fill 33% while the Functional Groups would also receive 33%. The Army comprised the great majority in the Functional Groups, and it was estimated that even in Central Java the PKI would not be able to obtain more than 35% of the seats.