

10 november 1961

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FA 10186/17

Land: Indonesië.  
Onderwerp: SUKARNO approval of April deadline for attack on West Irian.

Referenties:

Feitelijke datum: Eind augustus 1961.

Datum van waarneming:

Tweede helft oktober 1961.

Bron:

Van bevriende zijde.

Opmerkingen:

Verzonden aan:

de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY  
Minister-Président

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

10 november 1961

U 13147/61 - C 46 - P4/PS9.



Indonesia

SUKARNO APPROVAL OF APRIL DEADLINE FOR ATTACK ON WEST IRIAN

Just before President SUKARNO left for Belgrade at the end of August he informed General NASUTION that Foreign Minister SUBANDRIO had urged him to set near April as the deadline for an attack on West Irian if a suitable solution has not been found for the problem by that time. SUBANDRIO urged SUKARNO that without such a cut-off point for endeavors at reaching a peaceful settlement of the problem Indonesia's foreign policy would be ineffective and futile. SUKARNO told NASUTION that he fully agreed with SUBANDRIO and he was, therefore, officially ordering NASUTION to see that the armed forces be fully prepared for an attack on West Irian by April 1962.

NASUTION answered SUKARNO that it would be very difficult to make all of the proper preparations by April and that if forced to attack before they are fully prepared the Indonesian losses would be very heavy. NASUTION afterwards discussed this matter with his top assistants including Generals JANI, GATOT SUBROTO, HIDAJAT, and SUHARTO, and it was unanimously agreed that everything possible should be done to avoid an attack on West Irian that soon. It was also decided that if SUKARNO should insist upon an attack, a written order signed by SUKARNO be requested to impress upon him that he is taking full responsibility for ordering a premature attack. Most of the top Army leaders, however, urged that action be taken to forestall an attack order beforehand. Army leaders were quite angry at SUBANDRIO's insistence on this matter and felt that having SUBANDRIO replaced as Foreign Minister would be one solution. There was also talk of forcing an incident between top political leaders and the

Army prior to an attack order as a means of making the political climate such that the order could not be given, but no definite decisions or plans were made on this point.

It was clear that virtually all of the top Army leaders feel that a peaceful solution to the West Irian problem is possible if sufficient time is available for negotiation. The general conclusion of the top leaders was that General NASUTION must convince SUKARNO an attack in April is inadvisable. If SUKARNO persists, however, NASUTION will receive strong support in any move to frustrate such an order as long as the action taken does not make it seem that the Army is afraid to attack West Irian.

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