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Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY
Minister-President

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's-GRAVENHAGE.

GEHEIM

USSR/Switzerland

COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GENEVA

In conversations in the middle of June in Geneva with a Polish emigré left-wing journalist, a "Trybuna Ludu" (Press organ of the Central Committee of the P.Z.P.R.) correspondent accredited to the Foreign Ministers Conference expressed the following views:

The Polish Government believe that in spite of the present deadlock a total breakdown of the Geneva Conference will be avoided and some kind of an agreement reached, making a Summit Meeting possible. The Russians, in fact, will push for a series of Summit talks interspersed by discussions on a high diplomatic level.

It is considered absolutely certain that KHRUSHCHEV does not desire war and that moreover, owing to continued feuds and undercurrents within the Soviet hierarchy, he is personally interested in having a Summit Conference, as the latter would boost his popularity and further strengthen his position in the Party and the country.

In addition, the Soviet leaders as a whole consider that agreement must be reached at the Geneva Atomic Conference so that other countries - in particular France - can be prevented from joining the Atomic Community. The Russians fully realise that France, with or without nuclear weapons, will never be of any real military importance, but if she is allowed to become a nuclear power they can see no way of preventing China from doing the same. This, in their view, is another reason for having a Summit Meeting.

The change in GROMYKO's attitude is undoubtedly caused by the unmistakable lack of harmony in

the Western camp and particularly by the obstinate and clearly unreasonable attitude taken by West Germany and France. The USSR does not want to miss the opportunity of furthering this split by prolonging the Geneva discussions. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that the limits beyond which KHRUSHCHEV can retreat without risking his own head are fairly narrow.

It can be taken for granted that KHRUSHCHEV will conclude a separate peace treaty with the D.D.R. if no satisfactory settlement of the Berlin problem is reached. It is also certain that whatever decisions are agreed now or later, he will still go on trying to get rid of any remnants of Western domination in Berlin, as a continued free link of a part of an East German city with the West is incompatible with the very idea of the Iron Curtain.

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