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REVIEW: KHRUSHCHEV'S LIEUTENANTS--THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND STATUS

While Khrushchev appears to have attained virtually complete political control in the Soviet Union and is undoubtedly in a position to insist on his point of view, he delegates far greater responsibilities to his subordinates than Stalin ever did, has greater confidence in them, and takes account of their opinions. Khrushchev's lieutenants, therefore, play a major role in the formulation of Soviet policy and the general administration of the Soviet state.

The relative importance of their individual duties, in terms of providing experience and opportunities for building up a personal following, has considerable bearing on their prospects.

Khrushchev is said to have designated Frol Kozlov as his eventual successor, but it remains to be seen if Kozlov will be able to stay in Khrushchev's favor, secure control when Khrushchev dies, and defend his position against other contenders.

Of the 14 members of the presidium, First Deputy Premiers Mikoyan and Kozlov and party secretaries Kirichenko and Suslov form a group immediately below Khrushchev in influence. They apparently divide responsibility

for four major fields--foreign affairs, domestic governmental matters, internal party affairs, and relations with foreign Communist parties. The secret police, downgraded considerably and brought under strict party control since Stalin's death, have not been identified as the special province of any one presidium member.



KHRUSHCHEV

GEHEIM



MIKOYAN



KOZLOV



SUSLOV



KIRICHENKO

Anastas Mikoyan: Anastas Mikoyan, one of the two first deputy premiers, is concerned primarily with foreign relations--especially foreign trade--and is the guiding spirit behind the USSR's global economic penetration drive of recent years.

Mikoyan, who seems to have achieved a position akin to an elder statesman, is the only presidium member enjoying a status almost equal to that of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev recently implied a virtual partnership with Mikoyan when he remarked that Kozlov would take over when "we (Khrushchev and Mikoyan) are gone." Mikoyan, however, does not seem to command any important bloc of followers in the party and apparently has little inclination for supreme power.

Mikoyan is Khrushchev's closest adviser in foreign affairs. He recently jokingly remarked that he was always given the job of dealing with "capitalists" and thought it high time some others on the presidium also "had the opportunity." Mikoyan probably also supervises internal trade, a field with which he has been closely associated for over 30 years.

It has been observed that Mikoyan's opinion is often solicited by Khrushchev. Mikoyan does not hesitate to intervene occasionally to reinforce some point made by Khrushchev and often interrupts the premier during speeches--to the latter's irritation. There appears to exist between them a close and relaxed relationship. They regularly address each other in familiar form, and Khrushchev frequently teases Mikoyan and on several occasions has insisted that he could and perhaps should remove his deputy. Mikoyan is the only one of Khrushchev's close associates--which include Kirichenko and Kozlov--who counters Khrushchev's ribbing, although circumspectly.

Frol Kozlov: Frol Kozlov, the other first deputy premier, appears to concentrate on internal governmental matters. An engineer by training, Kozlov until recently has been confined to party administration. Since his appointment in March 1958 as a first deputy premier, he has been a member of the inner circle, frequently in Khrushchev's company.

Kozlov's speech at the 21st party congress in February was mainly devoted to a comprehensive discussion of industrial automation, modernization of machinery, and labor productivity, suggesting that these are at least some of the areas with which he is concerned.

Western officials have been impressed by Kozlov's intelligence and cultured, urbane manner. He treats Khrushchev with great deference, appears to get along well with Kirichenko and Mikoyan, but is slightly aloof in his bearing.

Kozlov seems to have many of the necessary attributes to qualify him for the top position. His one disadvantage is that he apparently does not have a large personal following in the party machine--the vital source of power in the Soviet Union--and as first deputy premier he is not in the best position to develop a larger following.

With Khrushchev's assistance, however, Kozlov has been extending his influence in the party machine by securing the assignment of a number of his former subordinates in Leningrad to important jobs in the central party apparatus, where they might serve as a

nucleus for "a Kozlov group." If Khrushchev is to be successful in establishing Kozlov as his successor, he will probably have to transfer him ultimately to the party secretariat.

Aleksey Kirichenko: Aleksey Kirichenko is first and foremost a Khrushchev protege. His elevation to the party presidium in 1954 was the first of what was to become a growing list of Khrushchev appointments to such key positions.

Kirichenko has apparently been second in command, under Khrushchev, on the secretariat since his election to that body in December 1957. He assists Khrushchev in the general supervision of the secretariat and its central staff--hence of the entire professional party machine.

A number of reports have claimed that Kirichenko also has specific responsibility for overseeing assignments of party cadres. Evidence to substantiate this is lacking, but the heads of the central committee party departments--which deal with party personnel and organizational matters--are staffed by officials who formerly served with him in the Ukraine.

Western officials are impressed by Kirichenko's ability, energy, and self-confidence. He appears to have an extremely jovial personality coupled with rough "proletarian" manners.

Observers are most impressed by Kirichenko's relationship with Khrushchev, which seems almost that of father and son. Khrushchev often addresses him in the familiar form, and Kirichenko is extremely deferential, generally giving the impression that he is attempting to model himself after his mentor. Despite this close relationship and Kirichenko's key position in the party secretariat, Khrushchev has intimated that he does not consider Kirichenko successor material.

Mikhail Suslov: Mikhail Suslov has been on the party secretariat since 1947, longer than any of the other present members, including Khrushchev. He is considered one of the foremost Soviet ideologists and has long specialized in international Communist party affairs. Nonetheless, his relative position and influence in the Soviet hierarchy continue to remain largely a mystery and the source of endless speculation.

From Stalin's death until Kirichenko's rise in 1957, Suslov was the most influential official in the secretariat next to Khrushchev and acted as the first secretary's righthand man--much as Kirichenko does today. He also had responsibilities in the foreign-policy, internal-propaganda, and cultural fields, as well as in Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties. Suslov now appears to devote himself almost exclusively to foreign Communist parties and does not seem to have any significant influence in internal party affairs.

While there are some indications of past disagreements between Suslov and Khrushchev, notably in regard to Khrushchev's scheme in early 1958 to reorganize the machine-tractor stations, there is no evidence that Suslov ever actually challenged Khrushchev's leadership. Khrushchev appears to have found in Suslov a valuable political and professional asset at times but has apparently never warmed up to him as a person. Suslov nonetheless still ranks as one of the top members of the presidium.

#### SOVIET PARTY PRESIDUM MEMBERS 15 JULY 1959

UNCLASSIFIED	AGE	FULL-TIME JOB	RANKING ON BASIS OF PROBABLE INFLUENCE	NATIONALITY	YEARS
ARISTOV	55	Central Party Secretary Deputy Chairman RSFSR Bureau	Middle Group High Potential	Russian	1955
BELYAYEV	56	First Secretary Kazakhstan	Lowest Group Comeback Possible	Russian	1955
BRIZGALIN	52	Central Party Secretary	Middle Group	Russian	1955
FURTSEVA	49	Central Party Secretary	Middle Group	Russian	1955
IGNATOV	58	RSFSR President	Lowest Group Comeback Possible	Russian	1955
KHRYUSHCHEV	55	Party First Secretary, Premier and Chairman RSFSR Bureau	Top Man	Russian	1955
KIRICHENKO	51	Central Party Secretary	Among Top Five	Russian	1954
KOZLOV	51	First Deputy Premier	Among Top Five	Russian	1954
KUUSINEN	77	Central Party Secretary	Middle Group Near End of Career	Finnish	1954
MIKOYAN	54	First Deputy Premier	Among Top Five	Armenian	1954
MUKHITDINOV	41	Central Party Secretary	Middle Group	Uzbek	1954
SHVERNIK	71	Chairman, Party Control Commission	Lowest Group Near End of Career	Russian	1956
SUSLOV	56	Central Party Secretary	Among Top Five	Russian	1947
VOROSHILOV	78	USSR President	Lowest Group Near End of Career	Russian	1903

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Central Committee Secretaries: The remaining members of the party presidium can be divided between those who are central party secretaries and those who work at other jobs. The functioning members of the secretariat, in addition to Khrushchev, Kirichenko, and Suslov, are Averky Aristov, Leonid Brezhnev, Yekaterina Furtseva, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, and Otto Kuusinen. A ninth, Petr Pospelov, is not a full member of the party presidium, although he is highest ranking of the candidate members. Nikolay Ignatov, elected chairman of the Russian Republic's (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet Presidium last April, has not yet been formally removed from the secretariat, but he presumably no longer performs secretarial work.

The secretariat runs the professional party machine and directs the daily operations of the party--checking on the fulfillment of policy and "distributing" the manpower and resources of the party. Khrushchev, of course, has general responsibility, assisted by Kirichenko, and Suslov handles relations with foreign Communist parties. The other executive duties are divided among the remaining secretaries.

Averky Aristov, because of the potentialities in his present assignment, bears careful watching. A member of the secretariat since 1955 and a full member of the party presidium since June 1957, Aristov is also deputy chairman of the central committee's important bureau for the RSFSR. Created in the central party apparatus in 1956 with Khrushchev as its chairman, the bureau gives the RSFSR a central party organization somewhat comparable to the central committee apparatus in the other republics.

Khrushchev probably has little time for active supervision of the bureau, and the actual day-to-day direction has fallen increasingly to Aristov. Aristov's functions apparently are comparable to those of a republic party boss, for he closely oversees all matters of party concern in the RSFSR.

Aristov now appears to be too close to the working level to exercise a major role in national policy formulation. He is, however, in a strategic position to build up a personal following among professional party officials and other influential party members. RSFSR officials constitute over one third of the present all-union party central committee.

Leonid Brezhnev, a 53-year-old party professional and former associate of Khrushchev during World War II, has been a member of the secretariat since 1956 and appears now to be supervising party work in the heavy industry, construction, and transportation fields. His speech to the 21st party congress was an extensive survey of developments and tasks in heavy industry, and on several recent occasions he has met with heads of satellite party departments of heavy industry. Brezhnev seems also to be responsible for political work in the armed forces and paramilitary organization.

Yekaterina Furtseva, formerly party secretary of Moscow City, and the only woman on the presidium, frequently represents the party leadership at conferences on propaganda agitation, culture, science, and higher education, often accompanied by Pospelov. The exact division of duties between them is not clear. There is some reason to believe that Pospelov is not viewed by Khrushchev as a close supporter, and it may well be that Furtseva was directed into these fields to act as a counterweight to Pospelov. Not an ideologist by training, she may therefore concentrate on administrative and personnel problems, leaving to Pospelov the more subtle interpretations of the party line.

Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, an Uzbek, is the youngest official in the top echelon. In the last two years he has been increasingly active in Near Eastern affairs. He has traveled extensively in that area and has made a number of major policy speeches setting forth the Soviet line on the Near East. Leaders in those countries apparently consider him the official next to Khrushchev to contact on important matters.

Otto Kuusinen, elected to the party presidium and secretariat in June 1957, assists Suslov in the field of foreign Communist party relations. According to one report, Kuusinen is working on an analysis of the current position of colonial and semicolonial nations. Kuusinen is nearly 80 years old and is in failing health, which suggests that his role is principally that of an elder statesman and adviser. He is said to be about the only one on the central committee with a classical education. He was probably elevated to the top ruling body in recognition of his early support for Khrushchev and also to utilize his great prestige as an old and respected official of the international Communist movement.

Other Presidium Members: Kliment Voroshilov, Nikolay Shvernik, Nikolay Belyayev, and Nikolay Ignatov, for varying reasons, are of relatively less political importance than their colleagues. Voroshilov holds the largely honorary post of USSR President. He is 78 years old, in poor health, and somewhat under a cloud for his involvement with the antiparty group in June 1957. Shvernik, chairman of the party control commission--the supreme appeal body for cases of party discipline--is 75 years of age, ailing, and appears to have little political influence.

Belyayev and Ignatov, on the other hand, still have a chance for a comeback. Once one of the top men on the secretariat but now stationed in Alma Ata as party first secretary of the Kazakh Republic, Belyayev is removed from a position where he can exercise day-to-day influence on the national level. Ignatov, prior to his election in April to the heretofore politically unimportant post of RSFSR president, was a party secretary charged with supervision of agricultural matters. The reasons for Ignatov's apparent demotion are unclear, although there is some evidence that he is a victim of some of his presidium colleagues' maneuvers to improve their positions.

Political Intrigue: There is very little evidence of special groupings or factions within the party presidium, and only tenuous indications of jockeying for power. Khrushchev's control is so great that any political intrigue is apt to be confined to maneuvering among his lieutenants for favor and influence, and the development of personal followings in preparation for his death. Despite the fragmentary evidence, the existence of such maneuvering can be assumed because of the nature of the party structure and its tendency to promote factional competition.

Khrushchev's selection of Kozlov as his successor, if such is actually the case, will tend to stimulate rather than discourage competition. Kozlov now is likely to become the target of plotting by other hopefuls and may find it difficult to maintain his standing with Khrushchev. Kirichenko, by virtue of his role in directing the work of the party apparatus, is the most logical rival to Kozlov; Aristov, as administrator of the key RSFSR party bureau, would almost certainly be drawn into any maneuvering among members of the party presidium.