


3 juni 1959

U 5000/59 - C 46 - P4/PS9.

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Land: Indonesië.  
Onderwerp: Views of Colonel SISWADI on inter-service relationship, March 1959.

Referenties:

Datum van waarneming: Eind april 1959.

Bron: Betrouwbaar.

Subbron: Een politiek waarnemer.

Opmerkingen:

Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY  
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

3 June 1959

INDONESIA

U 5000/59 - 046 - K2/PLg

POLITICAL/MILITARY/AIR.

Views of Colonel SISWADI on Inter-Service  
Relationship. March 1959

**GEHEIM**

1. Colonel SISWADI, Chief of Air Force Intelligence, has recently stated in private conversation that he had personally and bluntly told two American army officers (NOTE: Probably Military Attachés) that the Americans should realize that there was a strong possibility that the arms that they were providing for 20 battalions would be used one day against the officers who were playing politics. He said that the rank and file were dissatisfied, especially the non-commissioned officers, and added that the Americans were presumably aware of the ultimate destination of the arms they supplied to the Chinese after the war, and it was up to them not to make the same mistake in Indonesia.
2. Colonel SISWADI spoke bitterly against Lt. General NASUTION and Major-General Gatot SUBROTO, deputy Chief of Staff. He accused both of ignoring the corruption of their subordinates in order to maintain a semblance of authority.
3. SISWADI said that from information he had received from officers from Central and East Java, the territorial commanders of these areas would not be prepared to follow General NASUTION's policies indefinitely. The only unit on which the Army Chief of Staff could really rely was the SILIWANGI Division.
4. When asked whether the troops would obey if they were ordered to fire on communists SISWADI replied that he did not believe that they would fire on their "brothers" and that many of them would mutiny.

5. Colonel SISWADI again complained of what he called the army's haphazard and day-to-day system of working without overall planning. He explained that AURI has recently tabled a 16-page paper setting out its "strategic Security Conception". The A.L.R.I. had accepted the paper after minor amendments had been made and the Army representatives on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had also accepted it. DJUANDA himself had been favourably impressed with the paper but Army Headquarters had merely informed SISWADI over the telephone that it had been registered. SISWADI replied that the document could be accepted by the joint chiefs of staff but not by the Army Chief of Staff alone. Commenting on this he said that the Army representatives in the Ministry of Defence and Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee were figureheads and that their views did not count. NASUTION and his personal advisers made the real decisions. SISWADI said that he would insist on a debate and would force a quarrel if necessary. He was prepared to say that he could prove with documents that the Americans helped the dissidents: that the Russians, on the other hand, did not interfere; on the contrary they helped Indonesia during the rebellion and would continue to do so.

6. If the three Chiefs of Staff could not agree on his draft plan, the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of Defence would be the arbiter. According to SISWADI, DJUANDA was attempting to do his best to run the country's affairs in an efficient and orderly manner, but he was unable to act against the increasing feudalism of the Army. Both he and Colonel SUPRAJOGI, Minister for Economic Stabilisation, had been unable to do anything to prevent the revenues of the PERKINA being expended by the Army to purchase trucks.