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Verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. L.J.M. BEEL
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

'S-GRAVENHAGE.

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U 1102/12-59 - C46-P4/P3

REVIEW: CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1958

GEHEIM

Taiwan Strait: The military operation in the Taiwan Strait showed that the Chinese Communists have made progress in combined arms operations and highlighted the power of their artillery against the offshore islands. It also demonstrated, however, a substandard performance of their air force against the Chinese Nationalists, despite the occupation of the coastal airfields by Communist fighters, which greatly inhibited Nationalist overflights.

On the basis of equipment and numbers, the Communists should have made a much better showing, but inferior air tactics, resulting from poor or incomplete pilot training, and a lack of aggressiveness caused them to lose 33 aircraft as against only four Nationalist fighters, including two reconnaissance aircraft. Nationalist pilots indicated that Communist planes did not give the performance which would be expected from MIG-17s when flown by skilled pilots.

Taipei's use of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile may have given the Communists pause in engaging Nationalist fighters.

The Chinese Communist Navy did not directly participate in the crisis except to use motor torpedo boats against Nationalist supply vessels.



The large number of troops brought into the Fukien area during the crisis reflect an improved logistics capability. The Yingtai-Amoy railroad was an important factor in this respect. Some of the motor torpedo boats which operated against the Nationalist supply vessels in the Amoy area were apparently brought to the island on this line.

Withdrawal From North Korea: In a joint communique on 18 February 1958, Chou En-lai and Kim Il-sung announced the Chinese Communists would withdraw from North Korea. Subsequent announcements from Peiping stated that the withdrawal would be completed in three stages, with the final phase to be completed before the end of 1958. Chinese Communist troops in North Korea at that time totaled about 300,000 and included five armies--the 1st, 16th, 21st, 23rd, and 54th.

The first phase of the withdrawal, involving the 16th and 23rd armies, was completed during March and April; the second stage in August with the withdrawal of the 21st and 54th armies; and the third stage on 26 October. Two of the armies--the 16th and 23rd--are believed to be in Manchuria, while the others may have been deployed to South and Southeast China. There are reports that some troops may have been sent to Tibet.

Soviet Military Aid: Soviet military aid to Communist China continued on a fairly large scale during 1958, but indigenous war-production facilities were also expanded--thus decreasing Peiping's dependence on Moscow in its drive to become a first-rate military power. Items of Soviet equipment identified in China during the year included the new ground-control intercept ROCK-CAKE height-finding radar, the LONG TROUGH and TRACK DISH artillery radars, the 100-mm anti-aircraft gun, and the quadruple-mount 14.5 mm heavy anti-aircraft gun.

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES



GROUND FORCES

Strength	514,000	Manpower	133,000
Infantry	181,000	Changhsu	31,000
Artillery	266,000	Total	61,000
Armored	354,000	Sichuan	55,000
Aviation	156,000	Yunnan	63,000
Artillery	155,000	Inner Mongolia	25,000
Weapons	98,000	Unscaled	306,000

SELECTED CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT

Jet fighters day	280
Piston fighters	35
Jet attack fighters	0
Piston attack fighters	0
Jet light bombers	210
Piston light bombers	0
Piston medium bombers	0

Naval Air Force

Jet fighters day	280
Piston fighters	35
Jet attack fighters	0
Piston attack fighters	0
Jet light bombers	210
Piston light bombers	0
Piston medium bombers	0

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Chinese War Production: Chinese Communist facilities now are producing mortars up to 160 mm. caliber, and various artillery pieces. A program of construction of Soviet-designed warships, begun in 1955, apparently continues.

Organizational Changes: Other developments during the year include the reorganization of certain administrative and supply organizations and the implementation of a reserve program which is to be responsible for training the militia.

The "rectification" campaign, which affected virtually all aspects of Chinese Communist life, increased party control over military command and administration at all levels. Other results of the "rectification" program last year were increased emphasis on the study of Communist doctrine and the return of Chinese Communist officers to the ranks for at least one month a year.

Current Capabilities: The continued Soviet support in the form of material and technical aid to the Chinese Communist armed forces and the strides being made by the Chinese Communists to achieve greater independence by the expansion of their own war-production facilities foreshadow an ever-increasing military threat in the Far East. Despite the great strides being made, however, there are several areas where improvements will be necessary before Peiping can rank as a first-rate military power. Thus far the principal element of Peiping's military power is its large ground force, in size second only to Moscow's.

This force relies largely on overwhelming the enemy by numerical superiority, but it is not prepared to wage a nuclear war nor defend against a nuclear attack. Although there have been numerous reports of missile installations, there is no firm evidence that Peiping possesses operational tactical missiles.

The principal weakness in the Chinese Communist Air Force seems to be inadequate pilot training.

The navy, although it has received modern types of Soviet-designed vessels from its own shipyards, will continue to remain principally a coastal defense force for some time to come. The lack of experience in deep-water operations and the limited number of deep-water vessels are factors which will restrict the development of a naval threat for some time to come.

Although there are many vessels which could be used to stage an amphibious assault against the offshore islands, the type of lift capability necessary to mount an invasion of Taiwan itself is inadequate, and this deficiency is not likely to be soon remedied. The Chinese Communists have, however, the capability to undertake operations against the offshore islands at any time and, if not opposed by American forces, could press these operations to a successful conclusion.